PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated
ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO.,
INC
Facts: Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to
stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969,
in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2
P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from
7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and
that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
A meeting was called by the Company and asked the union
panel to confirm or deny the said projected mass demonstration.
Benjamin Pagcu who acted as the spokesperson of the union
panel confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has
already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained
further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management.
According to the respondent company (Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc), workers who belong to the first and regular shifts,
who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, who shall fail to report for work the following
morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such
failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike.
In order to not violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly
Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE', the workers for the
first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from
joining the demonstration and should report for work.
The PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was
received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as
follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION.
The petitioners and their members numbering about 400
proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be
required to participate in the demonstration hence a complaint
was filed against them for "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation
to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act
No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.'
Petitioner’s Contention: They claim that they did not violate the
existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior
notice of the mass demonstration and that it is a valid exercise
of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass
demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not
directed against the respondent firm.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers
of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their
motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the
Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
the CBA?
Ruling: NO. The demonstration against police officers, not
against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of
the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of
the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of
inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal
wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition.
The dismissal or termination of the employment of the
petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day
absence from work. The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any
penalty at all — should have been simply to charge said one-
day absence against their vacation or sick leave.
SC: Directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8)
petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation
from the service until re-instated, minus one day's pay and
whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources
during their separation from the service.
Labor Law; All employees of a firm and not merely those
belonging to a particular shift may join demonstration.—
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from
6 a.m. to 2 p.m. should report for work in order that loss or
damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to
appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration
especially by a labor union, namely, the complete unity of the
Union members as well as their total presence at the
demonstration site in order to generate the maximum
persuasive force that will gain for them not only public sympathy
for the validity of their cause but also immediate action on the
part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction
over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation
is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators
are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of
the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. ... At any
rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their
projected demonstration and the company could have made
arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might
sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day,
especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse
only the day shift employees who will join the demonstration. ...
There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the
part of the firm in rejecting the request... And to regard as a
ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the
Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness
on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Employer who refuses its employees to join
demonstration against police abuse guilty of unfair labor
practice.—Because the refusal on the part of the respondent
firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the
subsequent separation of the eight petitioners from the service
constituted an unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of petition for
redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3
of R.A. No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
Section 3 of R.A. 875 guarantees to the employees the right "to
engage in concerted activities for xxx mutual aid or protection";
while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section Three." xxx The
insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for
the morning and regular shifts should not participate in the mass
demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore state,
"a potent means of inhibiting speech."
PASEI vs. DRILON
Facts: Petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement”. PASEI challenges the temporary suspension of
deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers,"
It assails for "discrimination against males or females;" that it
"does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of
the right to travel.
Respondent: SolGen on behalf of the Labor Secretary and the
administrator of the POEA invokes the police power of the
Philippine State.
Re: Petitioner/EPC/Male&Female
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the
contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes.
The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen
our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants.
The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina
workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by
testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for
urgent Government action.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane
to the purpose behind the measure: to "enhance the protection
for Filipino female overseas workers"
Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor
Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor,"
Issue: Whether D.O. No.1 in the nature of a police power
measure is constitutional.
Ruling: Yes. The concept of police power is it is the authority of
the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” It
may be consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, and (2) in order to foster the common good.
Constitutional Law; Labor Laws: Deployment Ban of
Female Domestic Helper; Concept of Police Power.—The
concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It
has been defmed as the "state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an
imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to
foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore
its all-comprehensive embrace. "Its scope, ever-expanding to
meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient
and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits."
"Protection to Labor" does not signify the promotion of
employment alone.—Protection to labor" does not signify the
promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution
more paramountly is that such an employment be above all,
decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has
to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it
cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these
circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our
toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home. In this case, the
Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot
seriously dispuce, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection,
and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban
on deployment.
EMS MANPOWER vs. NLRC
Facts: Manuel (DH): Private respondent Luisa G. Manuel was
hired as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. Under her
employment contract, secured through the efforts of petitioner
placement agency (EMS), she would receive HK$2,500.00 per
month during the term of her contract. When she was dismissed
and repatriated to the Philippines after she made repeated
demands for her weekly rest day, of which she was denied from
the start of her service, in violation of Clause 6(a) of the
employment contract. She also complained that she was not
allowed to meet or see fellow Filipinos. By the time she left, she
had only received a separation pay of HK$2,500.00 and her
return flight ticket.
Luisa filed a complaint before the POEA for illegal dismissal and
illegal exaction against Yee, EMS and its surety, Paramount
Insurance Corporation.
POEA: Dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. POEA’s basis
is that Luisa was given her separation pay in lieu of notice of her
termination of the employment contract, and Yee actually paid
her repatriation expenses as provided in the POEA Rules and
Regulations. Thus, he concluded that "under the circumstances,
respondent (Yee) has complied with the law and with
complainant's contract of employment and her consequential
repatriation cannot be termed illegal.
NLRC: Reversed and set aside POEA’s decision and ordered
respondent EMS Manpower and Placement Services to pay
complainant the peso equivalent at the time of actual payment.
Issue: Whether Luisa Manuel was illegally dismissed or if her
termination was for a just and valid cause.
Ruling: NO. NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Luisa was
dismissed from her employment without any valid or just
cause, in contravention of her security of tenure, as guaranteed
by the Constitution and the Labor Code, as amended. Under
Article XIII, Section 3 of the Charter, "(t)he State shall afford full
protection to labor, local and overseas," and all workers "shall
be entitled to security of tenure." In basically the same tenor, the
Labor Code provides in Article 279 that "(i)n cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title
(on termination of employment)."
Labor Law; Illegal Dismissals; Evidence; Substantial
Evidence Rule; A single document consisting of a telex,
totally uncorroborated and easily concocted or fabricated
to suit one’s personal interest and purpose, could hardly be
recognized as sufficient, let alone substantial evidence of
an employee’s alleged misconduct.—EMS argues that Yee
was justified in pre-terminating Luisa’s employment due to the
fact that the latter apparently hit her employer’s child, as
evidenced by a photocopy of a telex allegedly transmitted by the
latter herself. This action supposedly constituted “serious
misconduct” under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended,
and “misconduct” under Clause 12(b-ii) of the employment
contract. Even assuming arguendothat Luisa’s act does not fall
within the ambit of said Clause 12(b-ii), her termination would
still be valid in accordance with Clause 12(a). These contentions
are not persuasive. As correctly ruled by the NLRC, the telex
could hardly be recognized as sufficient, let alone substantial
evidence of Luisa’s purported misconduct. It was a single
document, totally uncorroborated and easily concocted or
fabricated to suit one’s personal interest and purpose. The best
supporting evidence would have been a statement from the
child’s teacher who allegedly witnessed the incident, but none
was presented.
Same; Same; Overseas Contract Workers; An employment
contract for an Overseas Contract Worker does not
conform with Philippine laws where it fails to stipulate the
just caused for the termination of the contract or of the
service of the workers as mandated by Section 14(e), Rule
V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code.—Finally, contrary to the claim of EMS that there was no
illegal dismissal in the case at bar because Yee adequately
complied with the employment contract by paying Luisa a one-
month separation pay in lieu of notice and shouldering her
repatriation expenses, suffice it to say that said contract is not in
conformity with our laws inasmuch as it failed to stipulate the
“just causes for the termination of the contract or of the service
of the workers,” as mandated by Section 14(e), Rule V, Book I
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
ECOP vs NWPC
Facts: On October 15, 1990, the Regional Board of the National
Capital Region issued Wage Order No. NCR-01, increasing the
minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the National Capital Region.
ECOP is questioning the validity of the said wage
rationalization or the Wage Order No. NCR-01-A
ECOP assails that the board's grant of an "across-the-board"
wage increase to workers already being paid more than existing
minimum wage rates (up to P125. 00 a day) as an alleged
excess of authority, and alleges that under the Republic Act No.
6727, the boards may only prescribe "minimum wages," not
determine "salary ceilings."
ECOP likewise claims that Republic Act No. 6727 is meant to
promote collective bargaining as the primary mode of settling
wages, and in its opinion, the boards can not preempt collective
bargaining agreements by establishing ceilings. ECOP prays for
the nullification of Wage Order No. NCR 01-Aand for the
"reinstatement" of the old Wage Order (NCR-01.)
SolGen: the Board, in prescribing an across-the-board hike did
not, in reality, "grant additional or other benefits to workers
and employees, such as the extension of wage increases to
employees and workers already receiving more than
minimum wages ..." but rather, fixed minimum wages
according to the "salary-ceiling method."
Republic Act No. 6727/Wage OrderNCR-01-A is intended to
correct "wage distortions" and the salary-ceiling method
(of determining wages) is meant, precisely, to rectify wage
distortions.
SC: Agreed with SolGen. The Commission correctly upheld the
Regional Board of the NCR. The act simply leave the question
of wages to the expertise of experts.
Issue: Whether Wage Order No. NCR-01-A providing for new
wage rates, as well as authorizing various Regional Tripartite
Wages and Productivity Boards to prescribe minimum wage
rates for all workers in the various regions, and for a National
Wages and Productivity Commission to review, among other
functions, wage levels determined by the boards is valid.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the National Wages
and Productivity Commission and Regional Tripartite Wages
and Productivity Board-NCR.
Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and denied the
petition of ECOP.
The Supreme Court held that Republic Act No. 6727 was
intended to rationalize wages, first, by providing for full-time
boards to police wages round-the-clock, and second, by giving
the boards enough powers to achieve this objective.
The Court's opinion is that if Republic No. 6727 intended the
boards alone to set floor wages, the Act would have no need for
a board but an accountant to keep track of the latest consumer
price index, or better, would have Congress done it as the need
arises, as the legislature, prior to the Act, has done so for years.
Labor Law; Wages; The National Wages and Productivity
Commission noted that the determination of wages has
generally involved true methods, the “floor-wage” method
and the “salary-ceiling” method.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act No. 6727 was intended to
rationalize wages. first, by providing for full-time boards to
police wages round-the-clock and second by giving the
boards enough powers to achieve this objective.—As the
Commission noted, the increasing trend is toward the second
mode, the salary-cap method, which has reduced disputes
arising from wage distortions (brought about, apparently, by the
floor-wage method), Of course, disputes are appropriate
subjects of collective bargaining and grievance procedures, but
as the Commission observed and as we are ourselves agreed,
bargaining has helped very little in correcting wage distortions.
Same; Same; Same; Court not convinced that the Regional
Board of the National Capital Region in decreeing an
across-the-board hike performed an unlawful act of
legislation.—The Court is not convinced that the Regional
Board of the National Capital Region, in decreeing an across-
the-board hike, performed an unlawful act of legislation. It is true
that wage-fixing, like rate-fixing, constitutes an act Congress; it
is also true, however, that Congress may delegate the power to
fix rates provided that, as in all delegations cases, Congress
leaves sufficient standards. As this Court has indicated, it is
impressed that the above-quoted standards are sufficient, and
in the light of the floorwage method’s failure, the Court believes
that the Commission cor-rectly upheld the Regional Board of the
National Capital Region.
Same; Same; Same; The Act as meant to nationalize wages
that is, by having permanent boards to decide wages rather
than leaving wage determination to Congress year after
year and law after law.—lt is the Court’s thinking, reached after
the Court’s own study of the Act. The Court is not of course
saying that the Act is an effort of Congress to pass the buck, or
worse, to abdicate its duty, but simply, to leave the question of
wages to the expertise of experts.
Same; Same; Definition of.—The Labor Code defines “wage”
as follows: “Wage” paid to any employee shall mean the
remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of
being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other
method of calculating the same; which is payable by an
employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract
of employment for work done or to be done, or for services
rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair and reasonable
value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, of board,
lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer
to the employee “Fair and reasonable value” shall not include
any profit to the employer or to any person affiliated with the
employer,,
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS
vs QUISUMBING
Facts: Private respondent International School, Inc. (the
School, for short) is a domestic educational institution
established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents.
The School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of
its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2)
local-hires. In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain
benefits not accorded local-hires including housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel
allowance and a salary rate 25% more than local hires based
on “significant economic disadvantages”
The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed
by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of
higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic
disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the
"dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his
home country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of
deviating from a promising career path.
ISSUE: Whether or not the there is distinction between foreign
and local hires.
RULING: NO. The employer in this case has failed to discharge
this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform
25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both
groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform under similar working conditions.
The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably
institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism
of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility,
under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
If an employer accords employees the same position and rank,
the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. If
the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for
that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others
receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.
Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed
by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates
of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification.
There is no reasonable distinction between the services
rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
Labor Law; Constitutional Law; That public policy abhors
inequality and discrimination is beyond contention.—That
public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond
contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against
these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and
Human Rights exhorts Congress to “give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities.” The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires
every person, “in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.”
Same; Same; International law, which springs from general
principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination.—
International law, which springs from general principles of law,
likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law
include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in
Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination
in Respect of Employment and Occupation—all embody the
general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of
fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution,
has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
Same; Same; State directed to promote “equality of
employment opportunities for all.”—The Constitution also
directs the State to promote “equality of employment
opportunities for all.” Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the
State shall “ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
race or creed.” It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter
of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation
to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes
its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment.
Same; Same; Discrimination, particularly in terms of
wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code.—Discrimination,
particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor
Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes the
payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as
against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248
declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.
Same; Same; If an employer accords employees the same
position and rank, the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work.—The School contends that petitioner has
not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that
of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If
an employer accords employees the same position and rank,
the presumption is that these employees perform equal work.
This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the
employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that
employee to explain why he receives less or why the others
receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The
employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the
employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
Same; Same; The State has the right and duty to regulate
the relations between labor and capital.—The Constitution
enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare,” “to afford labor full protection.” The State,
therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital. These relations are not merely
contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor
contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield
to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations
that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike
down these stipulations.
RENO FOODS vs NLM
Facts: Petitioner Reno Foods, Inc. (Reno Foods) is a
manufacturer of canned meat products, respondent Nenita
Capor (Capor) was an employee of Reno Foods.
It is a standard operating procedure of petitioner-company to
subject all its employees to reasonable search of their
belongings upon leaving the company premises, the guard
found six Reno canned goods inside Capor’s bag. RENO filed a
case of qualified theft against Capor. While NLM-Katipunan filed
in behalf of Capor, filed a case of illegal dismissal and money
claims against RENO before the NLRC, praying that Capor be
awarded backwages and moral and exemplary damages. The
Labor Arbiter found Capor guilty of grave misconduct which
was just cause for termination. Further, that Capor is not entitled
to reinstatement, backwages, moral and exemplary damages.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the ruling by awarding
separation pay to Capor as financial assistance. Petitioner
appealed before the CA, which affirmed the ruling of NLRC.
Issue: WON NLRC committed GADALEJ in granting the
financial assistance to an employee who was validly dismissed
for theft of company property.
Ruling: YES. Separation pay is only warranted when the cause
for termination is not attributable to the employee’s fault, , such
as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as
well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no
longer feasible. It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed
for just cause, such as serious misconduct.
The Court awards financial assistance to employees who were
terminated for just causes, on grounds of equity and social
justice. We recognized the harsh realities faced by employees
that forced them, despite their good intentions, to violate
company policies, for which the employer can rightfully
terminate their employment. BUT the award of financial
assistance shall not be given to validly terminated employees,
whose offenses are iniquitous or reflective of some depravity in
their moral character.
On Capor’s allegation that her length of service and previously
clean employment record should be considered in awarding her
separation pay, the Court ruled that it cannot simply erase the
gravity of the betrayal exhibited by a malfeasant employee.
Length of service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be
stacked against the employer. After all, an employer-employee
relationship is symbiotic where both parties benefit from mutual
loyalty and dedicated service. If an employer had treated his
employee well, has accorded him fairness and adequate
compensation as determined by law, it is only fair to expect a
long-time employee to return such fairness with at least some
respect and honesty. Betrayal by a long-time employee is more
insulting and odious for a fair employer.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; A criminal
conviction is not necessary to find just cause for
employment termination.— Otherwise stated, an employee’s
acquittal in a criminal case, especially one that is grounded on
the existence of reasonable doubt, will not preclude a
determination in a labor case that he is guilty of acts inimical to
the employer’s interests.
Same; Same; Separation Pay; Separation pay is not allowed
when an employee is dismissed for just cause such as
serious misconduct.—The law is clear. Separation pay is only
warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to
the employee’s fault, such as those provided in Articles 283 and
284 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in
which reinstatement is no longer feasible. It is not allowed when
an employee is dismissed for just cause, such as serious
misconduct.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence has classified theft of
company property as a serious misconduct and denied the
award of separation pay to the erring employee.—
Jurisprudence has classified theft of company property as a
serious misconduct and denied the award of separation pay to
the erring employee. We see no reason why the same should
not be similarly applied in the case of Capor. She attempted to
steal the property of her long-time employer. For committing
such misconduct, she is definitely not entitled to an award of
separation pay.
Same; Same; Length of service and a previously clean
employment record cannot simply erase the gravity of
the betrayal exhibited by a malfeasant employee.—. Length
of service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be stacked
against the employer. After all, an employer-employee
relationship is symbiotic where both parties benefit from mutual
loyalty and dedicated service. If an employer had treated his
employee well, has accorded him fairness and adequate
compensation as determined by law, it is only fair to expect a
long-time employee to return such fairness with at least some
respect and honesty. Thus, it may be said that betrayal by a
long-time employee is more insulting and odious for a fair
employer.