LAURA, FLORA and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ vs.

INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS, ESTELITA, ANTONIO,

ROSARIO, and ILUMINADO YANES [G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990]
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the Fourth Civil Cases Division of
the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr.
Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming the decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00
representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental
and reversing the subject decision insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual
damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate court dated May
30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision.
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which were originally
known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square
meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858
(8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros (Exh. A).
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita,
Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and
Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 It is not clear why the
latter is not included as a party in this case.
Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend
to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does not
show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his
children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita,
from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation",
when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato
Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. 2
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. RF 2694
(29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion
of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered in the name of Fortunato D.
Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ). 4 Said transfer certificate of title also contains a
certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the sum of
P7,000.00. 5 Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de
Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a
motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. 7 By virtue of a court order granting said motion, 8 on
March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9 Hence, on April 1,
1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita,
Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago,
Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the
ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from
1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the
share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs
P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. 11
During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot
for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued to Siason, 13 who
thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for assessment purposes. 14
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs, and assisted by
their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and
quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection
with the above-entitled case." 15
On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No.
5022, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to the
plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name of said defendant, and thereafter
to deliver the possession of said lots to the plaintiffs. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 16
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in the aforesaid decision.
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return of service dated
October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B;
that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be
delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution." 17
The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein private respondents (the
Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new
certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo
Alvarez. 18 Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823,
"in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said
properties"; that the decision in the cadastral proceeding 19 could not be enforced against him as he was not a party
thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him not only because he was
not a party-litigant therein but also because it had long become final and executory. 20 Finding said manifestation to
be well-founded, the cadastral court, in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring Siason to
surrender the certificates of title mentioned therein. 21
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5022.
Siason opposed it. 22 In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting that the
Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment therein
could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the case. 23
The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with damages. 24 Named
defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason
(sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with
the sheriffs return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and
if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and
Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason render an
accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13, 1961 until the filing of the complaint; and that the defendants
jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus
attorney's fees of P4, 000.00. 25
In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B, having been
passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had become res judicata and the Yaneses were estopped
from questioning said order. 26 On their part, the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had
been "barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel." 27
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the properties in question
thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable
consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis pendens "before the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No.
5022, equity demanded that they recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed between
Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. 28 The dispositive portion of the decision states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered in the following
manner:
A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the Register of Deeds are (sic) hereby
dismmissed,
 B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez being the legitimate children of
the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum
of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre, Negros
Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages suffered by the plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00
representing moral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's fees, all with legal rate of interest
from date of the filing of this complaint up to final payment.
C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against the defendants, Laura, Flora and
Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is hereby dismissed.
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay the costs
of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 29
The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its decision of August 31, 1983 30 affirmed
the lower court's decision "insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-
appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey
of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00
as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively." 31 The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to
pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs- appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value
of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed
insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral
damages and attorney's fees, respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 32
Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for reconsideration, said appellate court denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been timely and properly invoked
and raised by the petitioners in the lower court.
2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private respondents, if ever there are any,
as alleged in their complaint dated February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial court as
Civil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute of limitation and/or prescription of action
and estoppel.
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. 5022, supra and father of
the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in Civil Case
No. 8474, supra where the private respondents had unqualifiedly and absolutely waived, renounced
and quitclaimed all their alleged rights and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-
B of Murcia Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated November 6, 1962 (Exhibits
"4" Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or indirectly denied by them.
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-
A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or
transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process . 33
The petition is devoid of merit.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is the Supreme Court, to review the
decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute to herein private respondents. Said
decision had long become final and executory and with the possible exception of Dr. Siason, who was not a party to
said case, the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of the case between the parties thereto. It ended when
Alvarez or his heirs failed to appeal the decision against them. 34
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them
in law or estate. 35 As consistently ruled by this Court, every litigation must come to an end. Access to the court is
guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a
competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to return for another try. The prevailing party should
not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be allowed, unscrupulous litigations will
multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice. 36
There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have been finally adjudicated in Civil
Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses have been
illegally deprived of ownership and possession of the lots in question. 37 In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now under
review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed to private
respondents Yaneses, the same having been sold during the pendency of the case by the petitioners' father to Dr.
Siason who did not know about the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was
also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez in favor of Dr. Siason on
November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil Case
No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of
the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in the
ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, for damages. 39 "It is one thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one
devoid of justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious
decided As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable
eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against." 40
The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022 in favor of
private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the instant case on the pretext that the defenses of prescription
and estoppel have not been properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners could have appealed in the former
case but they did not. They have therefore foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot now be heard to complain
in another case in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment which has longing become final and executory.
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo
Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general transmissibility
of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another
or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received
from the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co.,
Inc. 41
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of
our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate
before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is
thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of
the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to
receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties
that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these institutions. From the
 Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from
patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those
rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in
consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's
transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved
herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their
father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the
payment of the debts of the estate. 42
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance. With
this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the deceased which
are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO GEVERO vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION [G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990]
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 20, 1988 decision 1 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals) in AC-GR CV No. 69264, entitled Del Monte Development Corporation vs. Enrique Ababa, et
al., etc. affirming the decision 2 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Misamis Oriental
declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot 476 of the Cagayan Cadastre,
particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing an area of Seven Thousand Eight
Hundred Seventy Eight (7,878) square meters more or less.
As found by the Appellate Court, the facts are as follows:
The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-37365 containing an area of
20,119 square meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot was acquired by purchase from the
late Luis Lancero on September 15, 1964 as per Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of plaintiff and by
virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4320 was issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero,
in turn acquired the same parcel from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by
Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No.
7610 covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha — 1/2 share and
her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2
undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square meters.
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six children aforementioned. The
heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the
estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial
settlement and partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive,
under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D,
among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement
and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis
Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same
prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.
Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar
as the same prejudices the land which it acquired, a portion of Lot 2476. Plaintiff proved that before
purchasing Lot 2476-A it first investigated and checked the title of Luis Lancero and found the same to be
intact in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City. The same with the subdivision plan (Exh.
"B"), the corresponding technical description (Exh. "P") and the Deed of Sale executed by Ricardo Gevero —
all of which were found to be unquestionable. By reason of all these, plaintiff claims to have bought the land
in good faith and for value, occupying the land since the sale and taking over from Lancero's possession until
May 1969, when the defendants Abadas forcibly entered the property. (Rollo, p. 23)
After trial the court a quo on July 18, 1977 rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the plaintiff corporation as the
true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot No. 2476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D
of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing an area of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY
EIGHT (7,878) square meters, more or less. The other portions of Lot No. 2476 are hereby adjudicated as
follows:
Lot No. 2476 – B – to the heirs of Elena Gevero;
Lot No. 2476 – C – to the heirs of Restituto Gevero;
Lot No. 2476 – E – to the defendant spouses Enrique C. Torres and Francisca Aquino;
Lot No. 2476 – F – to the defendant spouses Eduard Rumohr and Emilia Merida Rumohf ;
Lot Nos. 2476-H, 2476-I and 2476 — G — to defendant spouses Enrique Abada and Lilia Alvarez Abada.
No adjudication can be made with respect to Lot No. 2476-A considering that the said lot is the subject of a
civil case between the Heirs of Maria Gevero on one hand and the spouses Daniel Borkingkito and Ursula
Gevero on the other hand, which case is now pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. No
pronouncement as to costs,
SO ORDERED. (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 203; Rollo, pp. 21-22)
From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners herein) appealed to the IAC (now Court of
Appeals) which subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision appealed from.
Petitioners, on March 31, 1986, filed a motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 28) but was denied on April 21, 1986.
Hence, the present petition.
This petition is devoid of merit.
Basically, the issues to be resolved in the instant case are: 1) whether or not the deed of sale executed by
Ricardo Gevero to Luis Lancero is valid; 2) in the affirmative, whether or not the 1/2 share of interest of
Teodorica Babangha in one of the litigated lots, lot no. 2476 under OCT No. 7610 is included in the deed of
sale; and 3) whether or not the private respondents' action is barred by laches.
Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid citing alleged flaws thereto, such as that: 1) the signature
of Ricardo was forged without his knowledge of such fact; 2) Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952
deed of sale when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid the Litigation"; 3) Ricardo's children
remained in the property notwithstanding the sale to Lancero; 4) the designated Lot No. is 2470 instead of the
correct number being Lot No. 2476; 5) the deed of sale included the share of Eustaquio Gevero without his authority;
6) T.C.T. No. 1183 of Lancero segregated the area of 20,119 square meters from the bigger area (OCT No. 7616)
without the consent of the other co-owners; 7) Lancero caused the 1952 Subdivision survey without the consent of
the Geveros' to bring about the segregation of the 20,119 square meters lot from the mother lot 2476 which brought
about the issuance of his title T-1183 and to DELCOR's title T4320, both of which were illegally issued; and 8) the area
sold as per document is 20,649 square meters whereas the segregated area covered by TCT No. T-1183 of Lancero
turned out to be 20,119 square meters (Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 62-78).
As to petitioners' claim that the signature of Ricardo in the 1952 deed of sale in favor of Lancero was forged without
Ricardo's knowledge of such fact (Rollo, p. 71) it will be observed that the deed of sale in question was executed with
all the legal formalities of a public document. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged by both parties before the
notary public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal presumption of the regularity of the notarized
document (Dy v. Sacay, 165 SCRA 473 [1988]); Nuguid v. C.A., G.R. No. 77423, March 13, 1989). In fact it has long
been settled that a public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public is evidence
of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has the presumption of regularity and to contradict all
these, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant (Rebuleda v. I.A.C., 155 SCRA 520-521
[1987]). Forgery cannot be presumed, it must be proven (Siasat v. IAC, No. 67889, October 10, 1985). Likewise,
petitioners allegation of absence of consideration of the deed was not substantiated. Under Art. 1354 of the Civil
Code, consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven.
As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed when he signed the
document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid Litigation" (Rollo, p. 71), it is a basic rule of evidence that the right of
a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of Court). This
particular rule is embodied in the maxim "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under Section 31, Rule 130,
Rules of Court "where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while
holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence against the former." It is however stressed that the admission
of the former owner of a property must have been made while he was the owner thereof in order that such
admission may be binding upon the present owner (City of Manila v. del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 [1905]; Medel v. Avecilla,
15 Phil. 465 [1910]). Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document have no binding effect on
DELCOR, the ownership of the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964.
Petitioners' claim that they remained in the property, notwithstanding the alleged sale by Ricardo to Lancero (Rollo,
p. 71) involves a question of fact already raised and passed upon by both the trial and appellate courts. Said the
Court of Appeals:
Contrary to the allegations of the appellants, the trial court found that Luis Lancero had taken
possession of the land upon proper investigation by plaintiff the latter learned that it was indeed Luis
Lancero who was the owner and possessor of Lot 2476 D. . . . (Decision, C.A., p. 6).
As a finding of fact, it is binding upon this Court (De Gola-Sison v. Manalo, 8 SCRA 595 [1963]; Gaduco vs. C.A., 14
SCRA 282 [1965]; Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola, 19 SCRA 289 [1967]; Tan v. C.A., 20 SCRA 54 [1967]; Ramirez Tel. Co. v. Bank of
America, 33 SCRA 737 [1970]; Lucero v. Loot, 25 SCRA 687 [1968]; Guerrero v. C.A., 142 SCRA 130 [1986]).
Suffice it to say that the other flaws claimed by the petitioners which allegedly invalidated the 1952 deed of sale have
not been raised before the trial court nor before the appellate court. It is settled jurisprudence that an issue which
was neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. (Matienzo v. Servidad, 107
SCRA 276 [1981]; Dela Santa v. C.A., 140 SCRA 44 [1985]; Dihiansan v. C.A., 157 SCRA 434 [1987]; Anchuelo v. IAC, 147
SCRA 434 [1987]; Dulos Realty and Development Corporation v. C.A., 157 SCRA [1988]; Kamos v. IAC, G.R. No. 78282,
July 5, 1989).
Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica (mother of Ricardo) in Lot 2476 under OCT No. 7610 was
not included in the deed of sale as it was intended to limit solely to Ricardos' proportionate share out of the
undivided 1/2 of the area pertaining to the six (6) brothers and sisters listed in the Title and that the Deed did not
include the share of Ricardo, as inheritance from Teodorica, because the Deed did not recite that she was deceased
at the time it was executed (Rollo, pp. 67-68).
The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of
the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if
the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de
Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]).
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were transmitted from the
moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition,
when Ricardo received his share in the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his
share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the
deed of sale.
Petitioners contend that Ricardo's share from Teodorica was excluded in the sale considering that a paragraph of the
aforementioned deed refers merely to the shares of Ricardo and Eustaquio (Rollo, p. 67-68).
It is well settled that laws and contracts shall be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to the different
provisions thereof (Reparations Commission v. Northern Lines, Inc., 34 SCRA 203 [1970]), to ascertain the meaning of
the provisions of a contract, its entirety must be taken into account (Ruiz v. Sheriff of Manila, 34 SCRA 83 [1970]). The
interpretation insisted upon by the petitioners, by citing only one paragraph of the deed of sale, would not only
create contradictions but also, render meaningless and set at naught the entire provisions thereof.
Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by laches considering that the petitioners have remained in the
actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof until at present (Rollo, p. 17).
An instrument notarized by a notary public as in the case at bar is a public instrument (Eacnio v. Baens, 5 Phil. 742).
The execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing (Art. 1498, 1st Par., Civil Code) and is
deemed legal delivery. Hence, its execution was considered a sufficient delivery of the property (Buencamino v.
Viceo, 13 Phil. 97; [1906]; Puato v. Mendoza, 64 Phil. 457 [1937]; Vda. de Sarmiento v. Lesaca, 108 Phil. 900 [1960];
Phil. Suburban Development Corp. v. Auditor Gen., 63 SCRA 397 (1975]).
Besides, the property sold is a registered land. It is the act of registration that transfers the ownership of the land
sold. (GSIS v. C.A., G.R. No. 42278, January 20, 1989). If the property is a registered land, the purchaser in good, faith
has a right to rely on the certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it to look for flaws (Mallorca v. De
Ocampo, No. L-26852, March 25, 1970; Unchuan v. C.A., 161 SCRA 710 [1988]; Nuguid v. CA-G.R. No. 77427, March
13, 1989).
Under the established principles of land registration law, the person dealing with registered land may generally rely
on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to
determine the condition of the property (Tiongco v. de la Merced, L-2446, July 25, 1974; Lopez vs. CA., G.R. No.
49739, January 20, 1989; Davao Grains Inc. vs. IAC, 171 SCRA 612 [1989]). This notwithstanding, DELCOR did more
than that. It did not only rely on the certificate of title. The Court of Appeals found that it had first investigated and
checked the title (T.C.T. No. T-1183) in the name of Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired into the Subdivision Plan, the
corresponding technical description and the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and
found everything in order. It even went to the premises and found Luis Lancero to be in possession of the land to the
exclusion of any other person. DELCOR had therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the land in question.
Consequently, DELCOR's action is not barred by laches. The main issues having been disposed of, discussion of the
other issues appear unnecessary.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
MARIANO LOCSIN, et. al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, et. al. [G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992]
Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 — affirming with modification the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian, et al. v.
Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an action for recovery of real property with damages — is sought. in these proceedings
initiated by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was however reinstated upon a second
motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the respondents were required to comment thereon. The
petition was thereafter given due course and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums. These,
together with the evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court now decides the case.
First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He owned
extensive residential and agricultural properties in the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate
was divided among his three (3) children as follows:
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to his daughter, Magdalena
Locsin;
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador,
Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the
residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his
marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she
had inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented by other properties
acquired by the spouses in the course of their union, 1 which however was not blessed with children.
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens System. Those that Mariano
inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin,
married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir of all
his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes.
Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after both of them
shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin
relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives." 4
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his will was probated
in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his
will, Doña Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceeding was Attorney Lorayes.
In the inventory of her husband's estate 5 which she submitted to the probate court for approval, 6Catalina declared
that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased and form part of his capital at
the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doña Catalina was closest to her nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes,
her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio
Cornelio and Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of all the titles
of her properties; and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-nephew, Attorney
Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal documents and, more often than not, the witnesses to
the transactions were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her
niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in her house.
Don Mariano relied on Doña Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his death, as
if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doña Catalina
began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective
nephews and nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties which she had received from her
husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES
23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481
favor of Mariano Locsin
1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000
Jose R. Locsin
1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian
1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)
favor Aurea Locsin,
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin
4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco
5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian
6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto -
favor of Aurea B. Locsin
7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto -
favor of Aurea B. Locsin
15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto -
Aurea Locsin
16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson
Aurea Locsin M. Acabado
17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin
19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto -
favor of Mariano Locsin
1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Anson
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
Rosario whose maternal
grandfather was Getulio
Locsin
2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
Rosario but the rentals
from bigger portion of
Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
Refinery were assigned to
Maria Jaucian Lorayes
Cornelio
Of her own properties, Doña Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and nieces and others:
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE
2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000
Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)
(6,825 sqm. when
resurveyed)
24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000
in favor of Francisco M.
Maquiniana
26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300
favor of Francisco
Maquiniana
27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000
favor of Ireneo Mamia
28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750
favor of Zenaida Buiza
29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500
favor of Felisa Morjella
30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000
favor of Inocentes Motocinos
31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500
favor of Casimiro Mondevil
32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200
favor of Juan Saballa
25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500
of Rogelio Marticio
Doña Catalina died on July 6, 1977.
Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and ratifying the transfers she had
made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the
relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to them
under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies
which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doña Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already
received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City
(Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime,
alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws on
succession. Those who were closest to Doña Catalina did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against the Locsin
defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew,
the rightful heirs and entitled to the entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de
Locsin, being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and Gregorio, both
surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of Catalina;
(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange and all other instruments
conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those in the
inventory of known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-initio;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to cancel all certificates of title and
other transfers of the real properties, subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and derivatives
therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;
 (4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership and possession of all such
properties to the plaintiffs, together with all muniments of title properly endorsed and delivered, and
all the fruits and incomes received by the defendants from the estate of Catalina, with legal interest
from the filing of this action; and where reconveyance and delivery cannot be effected for reasons
that might have intervened and prevent the same, defendants shall pay for the value of such
properties, fruits and incomes received by them, also with legal interest from the filing, of this case
(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00 each as moral damages; and
(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in the
amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.
Costs against the defendants.9
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its now appealed judgment on
March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's decision.
The petition has merit and should be granted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents, nephews and nieces of Doña
Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten (10)
years before her death. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession." 10 The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment
of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. 11 Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or conveyed
to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs
may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time of her death
devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under
certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not
inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. 12
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doña Catalina, in transferring the properties she had
received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private
respondents' rights to her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that
she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property
during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose
of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were
breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof,
provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself,
and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be
supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall be reduced on petition of any
person affected. (634a)
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doña Catalina was already 90 years old when she died on July 6, 1977. It
insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally
pressured by her husband's nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had
inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture.
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doña Catalina had already begun transferring to her
Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January
26, 1957 to his nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed away, she
also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold
a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 15
On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doña Catalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and
Agapito Lorete.17 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in this case, is estopped from assailing the
genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and
the partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.
Among Doña, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of property which she made in favor
of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doña Catalina was mentally incompetent when she made
those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be made in light of the fact that even as she was transferring
properties to the Locsins, she was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in favor of the Jaucians?
She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death) one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot
2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian Locsin. 19
From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives and other persons, namely:
Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan
Saballa and Rogelio Marticio. 20 None of those transactions was impugned by the private respondents.
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doña Catalina sold some lots not only to Don Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin,
and his nephew, Mariano Locsin
II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was competent to make that conveyance to
Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her other pieces of property to
Aurea and Mariano II?
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, from a "consciousness of its
real origin" which carries the implication that said estate consisted of properties which his wife had inherited from
her parents, flies in the teeth of Doña Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the
private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at the time of the marriage with
the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." She would have
known better than anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal property so it is safe to assume
that none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her under oath, and was approved by the probate court
in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own
nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false inventory that would have
been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to inherit from her eventually.
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don Mariano died, he and his wife
(Doña Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their respective properties should eventually revert to their
respective lineal relatives. As the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doña Catalina, he
would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doña Catalina's nephews and nieces, those
closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her
nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio
Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property which she made in favor of the Locsins,
although it would have been to their advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doña
Catalina acted as a completely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact,
considering their closeness to Doña Catalina it would have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ
"fraud, undue pressure, and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or donate her properties to them. Doña
Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her house. Her nephew-in-
law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her properties. The sales and donations which she signed in
favor of the petitioners were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1)
deed of donation dated November 19,
197423 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4, 1975 24 in favor of Matilde Cordero,
and (3) still another deed dated September 9, 1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed by Hostilio
Cornelio (who is married to Doña Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married to another
niece, Maria Olbes.26 The sales which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on July 15, 1974 27 were witnessed by Hostilio
Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions could not have been anything but free and
voluntary acts on her part.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this action
for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions had
been consummated, and six (6) years after Doña Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject
transactions were recorded in the Registry of Property, 28 whether considered an action based on fraud, or one to
redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions
because the registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them and the whole world. 29
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts and
reconveyance of properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is
DISMISSED, with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein. SO ORDERED.
NATALIA OPULENCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ALADIN SIMUNDAC and MIGUEL OLIVAN
[G.R. No. 125835 July 30, 1998]
Is a contract to sell a real property involved in restate proceedings valid and binding without the approval of the
probate court?
Statement of the Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review before us, assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 in CA-GR CV No. 41994 promulgated on February 6, 1996 and its Resolution 3 dated July 19, 1996. The
challenged Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing the complaint is SET
ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered declaring the CONTRACT TO SELL executed by appellee in
favor of appellants as valid and binding, subject to the result of the administration proceedings of the
testate Estate of Demetrio Carpena.
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the challenged Resolution. 5
The Facts
The antecedent facts, as succinctly narrated by Respondent Court of Appeals, are:
In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo [herein private respondents] Aladin
Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that [herein petitioner] Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in their
favor a "CONTRACT TO SELL" Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate, consisting of 23,766 square meters located in
Sta. Rosa, Laguna at P150.00 per square meter; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300,000.00 but
defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the contract. [Private respondents]
therefore prayed that [petitioner] be ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to further pay
damages, attorney's fee and litigation expenses.
In her traverse, [petitioner] admitted the execution of the contract in favor of plaintiffs and receipt of
P300,000.00 as downpayment. However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the
property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner's father), in
respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna; that
at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding;
that the contract to sell was not approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract
[petitioner] had offered to return the downpayment received from [private respondents], but the latter
refused to accept it; that [private respondents] further failed to provide funds for the tenant who demanded
P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy rights on the land; that [petitioner] had chosen to rescind the contract.
At the pre-trial conference the parties stipulated on [sic] the following facts:
1. That on February 3, 1989, [private respondents] and [petitioner] entered into a contract to
sell involving a parcel of land situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, otherwise known as Lot No. 2125
of the Sta. Rosa Estate.
2. That the price or consideration of the said sell [sic] is P150.00 per square meters;
3. That the amount of P300,000.00 had already been received by [petitioner];
4. That the parties have knowledge that the property subject of the contract to sell is subject
of the probate proceedings;
5. That [as] of this time, the probate Court has not yet issued an order either approving or
denying the said sale. (p. 3, appealed Order of September 15, 1992, pp. 109-112, record).
[Private respondents] submitted their evidence in support of the material allegations of the complaint. In
addition to testimonies of witnesses, [private respondents] presented the following documentary
evidences: (1) Contract to Sell (Exh A); (2) machine copy of the last will and testament of Demetrio
 Carpena (defendant's father) to show that the property sold by defendant was one of those devised to her
in said will (Exh B); (3) receipts signed by defendant for the downpayment in the total amount of
P300,000.00 (Exhs C, D & E); and (4) demand letters sent to defendant (Exhs F & G).
It appears that [petitioner], instead of submitting her evidence, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. In essence,
defendant maintained that the contract to sell was null and void for want of approval by the probate
court. She further argued that the contract was subject to a suspensive condition, which was the probate
of the will of defendant's father Demetrio Carpena. An Opposition was filed by [private respondents]. It
appears further that in an Order dated December 15, 1992 the court a quo granted the demurrer to
evidence and dismissed the complaint. It justified its action in dismissing the complaint in the following
manner:
It is noteworthy that when the contract to sell was consummated, no petition was filed in the Court with
notice to the heirs of the time and place of hearing, to show that the sale is necessary and beneficial. A
sale of properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested parties must comply with the requisites
provided by law, (Sec. 7, Rule 89, Rules of Court) which are mandatory, and without them, the authority to
sell, the sale itself, and the order approving it, would be null and void ab initio. (Arcilla vs. David, 77 Phil.
718, Gabriel, et al., vs. Encarnacion, et al., L-6736, May 4, 1954; Bonaga vs. Soler, 2 Phil. 755) Besides, it is
axiomatic that where the estate of a deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate
proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the
probate Court. (Estate of Obave, vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 767).
As held by the Supreme Court, a decedent's representative (administrator) is not estopped from
questioning the validity of his own void deed purporting to convey land. (Bona vs. Soler, 2 Phil, 755). In the
case at bar, the [petitioner,] realizing the illegality of the transaction[,] has interposed the nullity of the
contract as her defense, there being no approval from the probate Court, and, in good faith offers to
return the money she received from the [private respondents]. Certainly, the administratrix is not
estop[ped] from doing so and the action to declare the inexistence of contracts do not prescribe. This is
what precipitated the filing of [petitioner's] demurrer to evidence. 6
The trial court's order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents who alleged:
1. The lower court erred in concluding that the contract to sell is null and void, there being no
approval of the probate court.
2. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] in good faith offers to return the money to
[private respondents].
3. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] is not under estoppel to question the validity
of the contract to sell.
4. The lower court erred in not ruling on the consideration of the contract to sell which is tantamount
to plain unjust enrichment of [petitioner] at the expense of [private respondents]. 7
Public Respondent's Ruling
Declaring the Contract to Sell valid, subject to the outcome of the testate proceedings on Demetrio Carpena's estate,
the appellate court set aside the trial court's dismissal of the complaint and correctly ruled as follows:
It is apparent from the appealed order that the lower court treated the contract to sell executed by appellee
as one made by the administratrix of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena for the benefit of the estate. Hence, its
main reason for voiding the contract in question was the absence of the probate court's approval.
Presumably, what the lower court had in mind was the sale of the estate or part thereof made by the
administrator for the benefit of the estate, as authorized under Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
requires the approval of the probate court upon application therefor with notice to the heirs, devisees and
legatees.
However, as adverted to by appellants in their brief, the contract to sell in question is not covered by Rule 89
of the Revised Rules of Court since it was made by appellee in her capacity as an heir, of a property that was
devised to her under the will sought to be probated. Thus, while the document inadvertently stated that
appellee executed the contract in her capacity as "executrix and administratrix" of the estate, a cursory
reading of the entire text of the contract would unerringly show that what she undertook to sell to
appellants was one of the "other properties given to her by her late father," and more importantly, it was
 not made for the benefit of the estate but for her own needs. To illustrate this point, it is apropos to refer to
the preambular or preliminary portion of the document, which reads:
WHEREAS, the SELLER is the lawful owner of a certain parcel of land, which is more particularly
described as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, the SELLER suffers difficulties in her living and has forced to offer the sale of the above-
described property, "which property was only one among the other properties given to her by her late
father," to anyone who can wait for complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her
father.
WHEREAS, the SELLER in order to meet her need of cash, has offered for sale the said property at ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (150.00) Philippine Currency, per square meter unto the BUYERS, and with this
offer, the latter has accepted to buy and/or purchase the same, less the area for the road and other
easements indicated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2125 duly confirmed after the
survey to be conducted by the BUYER's Licensed Geodetic Engineer, and whatever area [is] left.
(Emphasis added).
To emphasize, it is evident from the foregoing clauses of the contract that appellee sold Lot 2125 not in her
capacity as executrix of the will or administratrix of the estate of her father, but as an heir and more importantly
as owner of said lot which, along with other properties, was devised to her under the will sought to be probated.
That being so, the requisites stipulated in Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court which refer to a sale made by the
administrator for the benefit of the estate do not apply.
xxx xxx xxx
It is noteworthy that in a Manifestation filed with this court by appellants, which is not controverted by appellee,
it is mentioned that the last will and testament of Demetrio Carpena was approved in a final judgment rendered
in Special Proceeding No. B-979 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24 Biñan, Laguna. But of course such approval
does not terminate the proceeding[s] since the settlement of the estate will ensue. Such proceedings will consist,
among others, in the issuance by the court of a notice to creditors (Rule 86), hearing of money claims and
payment of taxes and estate debts (Rule 88) and distribution of the residue to the heirs or persons entitled
thereto (Rule 90). In effect, the final execution of the deed of sale itself upon appellants' payment of the balance
of the purchase price will have to wait for the settlement or termination of the administration proceedings of the
Estate of Demetrio Carpena. Under the foregoing premises, what the trial court should have done with the
complaint was not to dismiss it but to simply put on hold further proceedings until such time that the estate or
its residue will be distributed in accordance with the approved will.
The rule is that when a demurrer to the evidence is granted by the trial court but reversed on appeal, defendant
loses the right to adduce his evidence. In such a case, the appellate court will decide the controversy on the basis
of plaintiff's evidence. In the case at bench, while we find the contract to sell valid and binding between the
parties, we cannot as yet order appellee to perform her obligations under the contract because the result of the
administration proceedings of the testate Estate of Demetrio Carpena has to be awaited. Hence, we shall confine
our adjudication to merely declaring the validity of the questioned Contract to Sell.
Hence, this appeal. 8
The Issue
Petitioner raises only one issue:
Whether or not the Contract to Sell dated 03 February 1989 executed by the [p]etitioner and
[p]rivate [r]espondent[s] without the requisite probate court approval is valid.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Contract to Sell Valid
In a nutshell, petitioner contends that "where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or
intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the
Probate Court." 9 She maintains that the Contract to Sell is void because it was not approved by the probate court, as
required by Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. — The
court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator
to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it
appears necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations:
xxx xxx xxx
Insisting that the above rule should apply to this case, petitioner argues that the stipulations in the Contract to Sell
require her to act in her capacity as an executrix or administratrix. She avers that her obligation to eject tenants
pertains to the administratrix or executrix, the estate being the landlord of the said tenants. 10Likewise demonstrating
that she entered into the contract in her capacity as executor is the stipulation that she must effect the conversion of
subject land from irrigated rice land to residential land and secure the necessary clearances from government offices.
Petitioner alleges that these obligations can be undertaken only by an executor or administrator of an estate, and not
by an heir. 11
The Court is not persuaded. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is
not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix
or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the "lawful owner" and seller of the
subject parcel of land. 12 She also explained the reason for the sale to be "difficulties in her living" conditions and
consequent "need of cash." 13 These representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate
under probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by petitioners has no
application to the instant case.
We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent's
death. 14 Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack
of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell
the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father. 15 Thus, in Jakosalem vs. Rafols, 16 the Court resolved
an identical issue under the old Civil Code and held:
Art. 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to
the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be
accepted." And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs "becomes the
undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to
him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the coowners of the estate while it remains
undivided." . . . And according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his
part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, where some of the
heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, speaking
thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was
limited to the share which may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.
Administration of the Estate Not Prejudiced by the Contract to Sell
Petitioner further contends that "[t]o sanction the sale at this stage would bring about a partial distribution of the
decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate proceedings." 17 This becomes all the more significant
in the light of the trial court's finding, as stated in its Order dated August 20, 1997, that "the legitimate of one of the
heirs has been impaired." 18
Petitioner's contention is not convincing. The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's offer to sell is contingent on
the "complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father." 19Consequently, although the Contract
to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate
proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private
respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate
proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a
premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that "the sale made by an
heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such
administration." 20
 Estoppel
Finally, petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid Contract to Sell with private
respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000 as initial payment of the purchase price. Petitioner may
not renege on her own acts and representations, to the prejudice of the private respondents who have relied on
them. 21 Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party from an unwise or
undesirable contract he or she entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of its
consequences. 22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EMILIO EMNACE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO, et. al.
[G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001]
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern known as
Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an
agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them, consequent to Jacinto
Divinagracia's withdrawal from the partnership. 1 Among the assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six (6)
vehicles, two (2) parcels of land located at Sto. Niño and Talisay, Negros Occidental, and cash deposits in the local
branches of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Prudential Bank.
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanao's untimely demise in 1994, petitioner
failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an
accounting of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the
deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of
P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand for payment thereof. 2
Consequently, Tabanao' s heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment of
shares, division of assets and damages.3 In their complaint, respondents prayed as follows:
1. Defendant be ordered to render the proper accounting of all the assets and liabilities of the partnership at
bar; and
2. After due notice and hearing defendant be ordered to pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs
the following:
A. No less than One Third (1/3) of the assets, properties, dividends, cash, land(s), fishing vessels,
trucks, motor vehicles, and other forms and substance of treasures which belong and/or should
belong, had accrued and/or must accrue to the partnership;
B. No less than Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages;
C. Attorney's fees equivalent to Thirty Percent (30%) of the entire share/amount/award which the
Honorable Court may resolve the plaintiffs as entitled to plus P1,000.00 for every appearance in
court.4
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action or suit, and lack of capacity of the estate of Tabanao to sue. 5 On August 30, 1994, the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss. It held that venue was properly laid because, while realties were involved, the action
was directed against a particular person on the basis of his personal liability; hence, the action is not only a personal
action but also an action in personam. As regards petitioner's argument of lack of jurisdiction over the action because
the prescribed docket fee was not paid considering the huge amount involved in the claim, the trial court noted that
a request for accounting was made in order that the exact value of the partnership may be ascertained and, thus, the
correct docket fee may be paid. Finally, the trial court held that the heirs of Tabanao had aright to sue in their own
names, in view of the provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. 6
The following day, respondents filed an amended complaint, 7 incorporating the additional prayer that petitioner be
ordered to "sell all (the partnership's) assets and thereafter pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs" their
corresponding share in the proceeds thereof. In due time, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to
dismiss,8arguing that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case due to the plaintiffs' failure to pay the
proper docket fees. Further, in a supplement to his motion to dismiss, 9 petitioner also raised prescription as an
additional ground warranting the outright dismissal of the complaint.
On June 15, 1995, the trial court issued an Order, 10 denying the motion to dismiss inasmuch as the grounds raised
therein were basically the same as the earlier motion to dismiss which has been denied. Anent the issue of
prescription, the trial court ruled that prescription begins to run only upon the dissolution of the partnership when
the final accounting is done. Hence, prescription has not set in the absence of a final accounting. Moreover, an action
based on a written contract prescribes in ten years from the time the right of action accrues.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, 11 raising the following issues:
 I. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance of a case despite the failure to pay the required docket fee;
II. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
insisting to try the case which involve (sic) a parcel of land situated outside of its territorial jurisdiction;
III. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the estate of the deceased to appear as party plaintiff, when there is no intestate case and filed by
one who was never appointed by the court as administratrix of the estates; and
IV. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing the case on the ground of prescription.
On August 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, 12 dismissing the petition for certiorari, upon
a finding that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed by the trial
court in issuing the questioned orders denying petitioner's motions to dismiss.
Not satisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review, raising the same issues resolved by the Court of Appeals,
namely:
I. Failure to pay the proper docket fee;
II. Parcel of land subject of the case pending before the trial court is outside the said court's territorial
jurisdiction;
III. Lack of capacity to sue on the part of plaintiff heirs of Vicente Tabanao; and
IV. Prescription of the plaintiff heirs' cause of action.
It can be readily seen that respondents' primary and ultimate objective in instituting the action below was to recover
the decedent's 1/3 share in the partnership' s assets. While they ask for an accounting of the partnership' s assets
and finances, what they are actually asking is for the trial court to compel petitioner to pay and turn over their share,
or the equivalent value thereof, from the proceeds of the sale of the partnership assets. They also assert that until
and unless a proper accounting is done, the exact value of the partnership' s assets, as well as their corresponding
share therein, cannot be ascertained. Consequently, they feel justified in not having paid the commensurate docket
fee as required by the Rules of Court.1âwphi1.nêt
We do not agree. The trial court does not have to employ guesswork in ascertaining the estimated value of the
partnership's assets, for respondents themselves voluntarily pegged the worth thereof at Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000.00). Hence, this case is one which is really not beyond pecuniary estimation, but rather partakes of the
nature of a simple collection case where the value of the subject assets or amount demanded is pecuniarily
determinable.13 While it is true that the exact value of the partnership's total assets cannot be shown with certainty
at the time of filing, respondents can and must ascertain, through informed and practical estimation, the amount
they expect to collect from the partnership, particularly from petitioner, in order to determine the proper amount of
docket and other fees.14 It is thus imperative for respondents to pay the corresponding docket fees in order that the
trial court may acquire jurisdiction over the action. 15
Nevertheless, unlike in the case of Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals,16 where there was clearly an
effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, we see no attempt to cheat the courts
on the part of respondents. In fact, the lower courts have noted their expressed desire to remit to the court "any
payable balance or lien on whatever award which the Honorable Court may grant them in this case should there be
any deficiency in the payment of the docket fees to be computed by the Clerk of Court." 17 There is evident willingness
to pay, and the fact that the docket fee paid so far is inadequate is not an indication that they are trying to avoid
paying the required amount, but may simply be due to an inability to pay at the time of filing. This consideration may
have moved the trial court and the Court of Appeals to declare that the unpaid docket fees shall be considered a lien
on the judgment award.
Petitioner, however, argues that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in condoning the non-payment of the
proper legal fees and in allowing the same to become a lien on the monetary or property judgment that may be
rendered in favor of respondents. There is merit in petitioner's assertion. The third paragraph of Section 16, Rule 141
of the Rules of Court states that:
The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment in favor of the pauper-litigant.
Respondents cannot invoke the above provision in their favor because it specifically applies to pauper-litigants.
Nowhere in the records does it appear that respondents are litigating as paupers, and as such are exempted from the
payment of court fees.18
The rule applicable to the case at bar is Section 5(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which defines the two kinds of
claims as: (1) those which are immediately ascertainable; and (2) those which cannot be immediately ascertained as
to the exact amount. This second class of claims, where the exact amount still has to be finally determined by the
courts based on evidence presented, falls squarely under the third paragraph of said Section 5(a), which provides:
In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or more in accordance with the
appraisal of the court, the difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be. (Underscoring ours)
In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 19 this Court pronounced that the above-quoted provision
"clearly contemplates an Initial payment of the filing fees corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim
subject to adjustment as to what later may be proved." 20 Moreover, we reiterated therein the principle that the
payment of filing fees cannot be made contingent or dependent on the result of the case. Thus, an initial payment of
the docket fees based on an estimated amount must be paid simultaneous with the filing of the complaint.
Otherwise, the court would stand to lose the filing fees should the judgment later turn out to be adverse to any claim
of the respondent heirs.
The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are necessary to defray court expenses in the
handling of cases. Consequently, in order to avoid tremendous losses to the judiciary, and to the government as well,
the payment of docket fees cannot be made dependent on the outcome of the case, except when the claimant is a
pauper-litigant.
Applied to the instant case, respondents have a specific claim - 1/3 of the value of all the partnership assets - but
they did not allege a specific amount. They did, however, estimate the partnership's total assets to be worth Thirty
Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00), in a letter 21 addressed to petitioner. Respondents cannot now say that they are
unable to make an estimate, for the said letter and the admissions therein form part of the records of this case. They
cannot avoid paying the initial docket fees by conveniently omitting the said amount in their amended complaint.
This estimate can be made the basis for the initial docket fees that respondents should pay. Even if it were later
established that the amount proved was less or more than the amount alleged or estimated, Rule 141, Section 5(a) of
the Rules of Court specifically provides that the court may refund the 'excess or exact additional fees should the
initial payment be insufficient. It is clear that it is only the difference between the amount finally awarded and the
fees paid upon filing of this complaint that is subject to adjustment and which may be subjected to alien.
In the oft-quoted case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, 22 this Court held that when the
specific claim "has been left for the determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
lien on the judgment and it shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the additional fee." Clearly, the rules and jurisprudence contemplate the initial
payment of filing and docket fees based on the estimated claims of the plaintiff, and it is only when there is a
deficiency that a lien may be constituted on the judgment award until such additional fee is collected.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint outright despite their failure to pay the
proper docket fees. Nevertheless, as in other procedural rules, it may be liberally construed in certain cases if only to
secure a just and speedy disposition of an action. While the rule is that the payment of the docket fee in the proper
amount should be adhered to, there are certain exceptions which must be strictly construed. 23
In recent rulings, this Court has relaxed the strict adherence to the Manchester doctrine, allowing the plaintiff to pay
the proper docket fees within a reasonable time before the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.24
In the recent case of National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court held that:
The court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the
payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the
time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime.
It does not follow, however, that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint for failure of private
respondent to pay the correct amount of docket fees. Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a
jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a
reasonable time before the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. If the plaintiff
 fails to comply within this requirement, the defendant should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he
would be considered in estoppel. In the latter case, the balance between the appropriate docket fees and the
amount actually paid by the plaintiff will be considered a lien or any award he may obtain in his favor.
(Underscoring ours)
Accordingly, the trial court in the case at bar should determine the proper docket fee based on the estimated amount
that respondents seek to collect from petitioner, and direct them to pay the same within a reasonable time, provided
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet expired, Failure to comply therewith, and upon motion
by petitioner, the immediate dismissal of the complaint shall issue on jurisdictional grounds.
On the matter of improper venue, we find no error on the part of the trial court and the Court of Appeals in holding
that the case below is a personal action which, under the Rules, may be commenced and tried where the defendant
resides or may be found, or where the plaintiffs reside, at the election of the latter. 26
Petitioner, however, insists that venue was improperly laid since the action is a real action involving a parcel of land
that is located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court a quo. This contention is not well-taken. The records
indubitably show that respondents are asking that the assets of the partnership be accounted for, sold and
distributed according to the agreement of the partners. The fact that two of the assets of the partnership are parcels
of land does not materially change the nature of the action. It is an action in personam because it is an action against
a person, namely, petitioner, on the basis of his personal liability. It is not an action in rem where the action is against
the thing itself instead of against the person. 27 Furthermore, there is no showing that the parcels of land involved in
this case are being disputed. In fact, it is only incidental that part of the assets of the partnership under liquidation
happen to be parcels of land.
The time-tested case of Claridades v. Mercader, et al.,28 settled this issue thus:
The fact that plaintiff prays for the sale of the assets of the partnership, including the fishpond in question,
did not change the nature or character of the action, such sale being merely a necessary incident of the
liquidation of the partnership, which should precede and/or is part of its process of dissolution.
The action filed by respondents not only seeks redress against petitioner. It also seeks the enforcement of, and
petitioner's compliance with, the contract that the partners executed to formalize the partnership's dissolution, as
well as to implement the liquidation and partition of the partnership's assets. Clearly, it is a personal action that, in
effect, claims a debt from petitioner and seeks the performance of a personal duty on his part. 29 In fine, respondents'
complaint seeking the liquidation and partition of the assets of the partnership with damages is a personal action
which may be filed in the proper court where any of the parties reside. 30 Besides, venue has nothing to do with
jurisdiction for venue touches more upon the substance or merits of the case. 31 As it is, venue in this case was
properly laid and the trial court correctly ruled so.
On the third issue, petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue since
she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate. Petitioner's objection in this regard is misplaced.
The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file
the action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very
moment of Vicente Tabanao' s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his
heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.32
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to
respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which
the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted.33Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente
Tabanao died.34
A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or administratrix, is not
necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their
decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent. 35 From the moment
of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand fulfillment of petitioner's obligations as outlined in their
dissolution agreement were transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the
court's intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
Finally, petitioner contends that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription,
arguing that respondents' action prescribed four (4) years after it accrued in 1986. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals gave scant consideration to petitioner's hollow arguments, and rightly so.
The three (3) final stages of a partnership are: (1) dissolution; (2) winding-up; and (3) termination. 36 The partnership,
although dissolved, continues to exist and its legal personality is retained, at which time it completes the winding up
of its affairs, including the partitioning and distribution of the net partnership assets to the partners. 37 For as long as
the partnership exists, any of the partners may demand an accounting of the partnership's business. Prescription of
the said right starts to run only upon the dissolution of the partnership when the final accounting is done. 38
Contrary to petitioner's protestations that respondents' right to inquire into the business affairs of the partnership
accrued in 1986, prescribing four (4) years thereafter, prescription had not even begun to run in the absence of a final
accounting. Article 1842 of the Civil Code provides:
The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner, or his legal representative as against the
winding up partners or the surviving partners or the person or partnership continuing the business, at the
date of dissolution, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.
Applied in relation to Articles 1807 and 1809, which also deal with the duty to account, the above-cited provision
states that the right to demand an accounting accrues at the date of dissolution in the absence of any agreement to
the contrary. When a final accounting is made, it is only then that prescription begins to run. In the case at bar, no
final accounting has been made, and that is precisely what respondents are seeking in their action before the trial
court, since petitioner has failed or refused to render an accounting of the partnership's business and assets. Hence,
the said action is not barred by prescription.
In fine, the trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's motions to dismiss. Likewise,
the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in upholding the trial court's orders. Precious time has been lost
just to settle this preliminary issue, with petitioner resurrecting the very same arguments from the trial court all the
way up to the Supreme Court. The litigation of the merits and substantial issues of this controversy is now long
overdue and must proceed without further delay.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the case
is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, which is ORDERED to determine the proper docket
fee based on the estimated amount that plaintiffs therein seek to collect, and direct said plaintiffs to pay the same
within a reasonable time, provided the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet expired.
Thereafter, the trial court is ORDERED to conduct the appropriate proceedings in Civil Case No. 416-C.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
JOHNNY RABADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS
[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 3 dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-
35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the
defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392,
together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-
interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that
parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and
admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the
following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva,
Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which
is registered in my name according to the records of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights which I shall set
forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already
received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge
Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy
(75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela
y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in
the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each
year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom I have left and
bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also
the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic,
until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my
command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392
from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have
the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this
my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they
decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and my sister." 4
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia
and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the
conditions of the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of
the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the
testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75
piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar
crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for
compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in case of the sale,
lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to
deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to
the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was
lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the herein
petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable
settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar,
to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later
than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or
Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of
the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop
years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent of
the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the
composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash installment, payable on or before
the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of
crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of
crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of
crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or before December of
crop year 1991-92."5
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of
50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaint and disposing as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is prematurely filed as no cause
of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the
command as mandated exaction from them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title
holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must
fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate
proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her
claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."6
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court; ratiocinating
and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar
annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of
the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's
admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the
codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such
non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of
Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-
open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's
legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per
year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as
heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of
Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."7
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way to this Court via the
present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the
testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with Article 882 of the New
Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the
cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and
the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by
the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not
complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such
testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the substituted heirs are
not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or
reference as to who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843 8 and 8459 of the New Civil Code,
the substitution should be deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated from the
issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of
cause of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of
action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private
respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the
Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of
the decedent10 and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. 11 Thus, the
petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter
by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from
the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not
extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form
part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the
usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his
(decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the
instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or
performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,
private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint
below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable because what
the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near
descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first
instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to
whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be
incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, 12 or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express
charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. 13 The Codicil
sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity,
predecease or renunciation.14 In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants
would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary
substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second
heir.15 In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property
provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of
a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the
property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator
in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution." 16 Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is
not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to
deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir
or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or
the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the
second heir.17 In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the
nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles
882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left by the testator, or the
charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give
security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they may receive,
together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article cannot take effect in
the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity
with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as
an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the
institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the
testator upon the heir. 18 A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of
his rights to the succession.19 On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must
happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does
not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. 20 To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition. 21
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject
property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on
the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private
respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the
said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over
to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently
modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such
institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should
not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator.
In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional. 22
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent has only a right of
usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly
limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of any of its
provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made. 23 Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be
adopted.24
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs of sugar
yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs,
and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved.
The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena
Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance
of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near
descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on
his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should
equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said obligation
imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the
obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his
obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and having
consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the
obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property,
to take effect after his death.25 Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be
disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a
compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993,
in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.

BELINDA TAÑEDO, for herself and in representation of her brothers and sisters, and TEOFILA CORPUZ TAÑEDO,
representing daughter VERNA TAÑEDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. RICARDO & TERESITA TAÑEDO
[G.R. No. 104482. January 22, 1996]
Is a sale of future inheritance valid? In multiple sales of the same real property, who has preference in ownership?
What is the probative value of the lower court's finding of good faith in registration of such sales in the registry of
property? These are the main questions raised in this Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court to set aside and reverse the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV NO. 24987 promulgated on
September 26, 1991 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Third Judicial Region, Tarlac, Tarlac
in Civil Case No. 6328, and its Resolution denying reconsideration thereof, promulgated on May 27, 1992.
By the Court's Resolution on October 25, 1995, this case (along with several others) was transferred from the First to
the Third Division and after due deliberation, the Court assigned it to the undersigned ponente for the writing of this
Decision.
The Facts
On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Tañedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of his eldest brother,
Ricardo Tañedo, and the latter's wife, Teresita Barera, private respondents herein, whereby he conveyed to the latter
in consideration of P1,500.00, "one hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191 of the cadastral survey of
Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac", the said property being
his "future inheritance" from his parents (Exh. 1). Upon the death of his father Matias, Lazaro executed an "Affidavit
of Conformity" dated February 28, 1980 (Exh. 3) to "re-affirm, respect, acknowledge and validate the sale I made in
1962." On January 13, 1981, Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents covering
his "undivided ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191 . . . " (Exh. 4). He acknowledged therein his
receipt of P10,000.00 as consideration therefor. In February 1981, Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same
property to his children, petitioners herein, through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 (Exh. E). On June 7,
1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in their favor in the Registry of Deeds and the
corresponding entry was made in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166451 (Exh. 5).
Petitioners on July 16, 1982 filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale executed by Lazaro in
favor of private respondents covering the property inherited by Lazaro from his father.
Petitioners claimed that their father, Lazaro, executed an "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated December 29, 1980 (Exit. E).
Conveying to his ten children his allotted portion tinder the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Matias,
which deed included the land in litigation (Lot 191).
Petitioners also presented in evidence: (1) a private writing purportedly prepared and signed by Matias dated
December 28, 1978, stating that it was his desire that whatever inheritance Lazaro would receive from him should be
given to his (Lazaro's) children (Exh. A); (2) a typewritten document dated March 10, 1979 signed by Lazaro in the
presence of two witnesses, wherein he confirmed that he would voluntarily abide by the wishes of his father, Matias,
to give to his (Lazaro's) children all the property he would inherit from the latter (Exh. B); and (3) a letter dated
January 1, 1980 of Lazaro to his daughter, Carmela, stating that his share in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate
of his father was intended for his children, petitioners herein (Exh. C).
Private respondents, however presented in evidence a "Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale" dated March 12, 1981
(Exh. 6), wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of petitioners for the reason that it was "simulated or fictitious
without any consideration whatsoever".
Shortly after the case a quo was filed, Lazaro executed a sworn statement (Exh. G) which virtually repudiated the
contents of the Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale (Exh. 6) and the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in favor of private
respondents. However, Lazaro testified that he sold the property to Ricardo, and that it was a lawyer who induced
him to execute a deed of sale in favor of his children after giving him five pesos (P5.00) to buy a "drink" (TSN
September 18, 1985, pp. 204-205).
The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners failed "to adduce a proponderance of
evidence to support (their) claim." On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that
the Deed of Sale dated January 13, 1981 (Exh. 9) was valid and that its registration in good faith vested title in said
respondents.
The Issues
Petitioners raised the following "errors" in the respondent Court, which they also now allege in the instant Petition:
I. The trial court erred in concluding that the Contract of Sale of October 20, 1962 (Exhibit 7, Answer) is
merely voidable or annulable and not void ab initio pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the New Civil
Code involving as it does a "future inheritance".
II. The trial court erred in holding that defendants-appellees acted in good faith in registering the deed of
sale of January 13, 1981 (Exhibit 9) with the Register of Deeds of Tarlac and therefore ownership of the land
in question passed on to defendants-appellees.
III. The trial court erred in ignoring and failing to consider the testimonial and documentary evidence of
plaintiffs-appellants which clearly established by preponderance of evidence that they are indeed the
legitimate and lawful owners of the property in question.
IV. The decision is contrary to law and the facts of the case and the conclusions drawn from the established
facts are illogical and off-tangent.
From the foregoing, the issues may be restated as follows:
1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid?
2. Was the subsequent execution on January 13, 1981 (and registration with the Registry of Property) of a
deed of sale covering the same property to the same buyers valid?
3. May this Court review the findings of the respondent Court (a) holding that the buyers acted in good faith
in registering the said subsequent deed of sale and (b) in "failing to consider petitioners' evidence"? Are the
conclusions of the respondent Court "illogical and off-tangent"?
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, let it be clear that the "errors" which are reviewable by this Court in this petition for review
on certiorariare only those allegedly committed by the respondent Court of Appeals and not directly those of the trial
court, which is not a party here. The "assignment of errors" in the petition quoted above are therefore totally
misplaced, and for that reason, the petition should be dismissed. But in order to give the parties substantial justice
we have decided to delve into the issues as above re-stated. The errors attributed by petitioners to the latter (trial)
court will be discussed only insofar as they are relevant to the appellate court's assailed Decision and Resolution.
The sale made in 1962 involving future inheritance is not really at issue here. In context, the assailed Decision
conceded "it may be legally correct that a contract of sale of anticipated future inheritance is null and void." 3
But to remove all doubts, we hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "(n)o contract
may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law."
Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation between the parties.
Hence, the "affidavit of conformity" dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962 sale, is
also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, "suffers from the same infirmity." Even private respondents in
their memorandum4 concede this.
However, the documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are: (a) the deed of sale of January 13, 1981 in
favor of private respondents covering Lazaro's undivided inheritance of one-twelfth (1/12) share in Lot No. 191,
which was subsequently registered on June 7, 1982; and (b) the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 in favor of
petitioners covering the same property. These two documents were executed after the death of Matias (and his
spouse) and after a deed of extra-judicial settlement of his (Matias') estate was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro
actual title over said property. In other words, these dispositions, though conflicting, were no longer infected with
the infirmities of the 1962 sale.
Petitioners contend that what was sold on January 13, 1981 was only one-half hectare out of Lot No. 191, citing as
authority the trial court's decision. As earlier pointed out, what is on review in these proceedings by this Court is the
Court of Appeals' decision — which correctly identified the subject matter of the January 13, 1981 sale to be the
entire undivided 1/12 share of Lazaro in Lot No. 191 and which is the same property disposed of on December 29,
1980 in favor of petitioners.
Critical in determining which of these two deeds should be given effect is the registration of the sale in favor of
private respondents with the register of deeds on June 7, 1982.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales, as follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to
the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.
The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law, ownership shall belong to the
buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private
respondents was later than the one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of the
undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all.
Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private respondents never took possession
thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other
who has not registered his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property. 5
As to third issue, while petitioners conceded the fact of registration, they nevertheless contended that it was done in
bad faith. On this issue, the respondent Court ruled;
Under the second assignment of error, plaintiffs-appellants contend that defendants-appellees acted in bad
faith when they registered the Deed of Sale in their favor as appellee Ricardo already knew of the execution
of the deed of sale in favor of the plaintiffs; appellants cite the testimony of plaintiff Belinda Tañedo to the
effect that defendant Ricardo Tañedo called her up on January 4 or 5, 1981 to tell her that he was already the
owner of the land in question "but the contract of sale between our father and us were (sic) already
consumated" (pp. 9-10, tsn, January 6, 1984). This testimony is obviously self-serving, and because it was a
telephone conversation, the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 was not shown; Belinda merely told her
uncle that there was already a document showing that plaintiffs are the owners (p. 80). Ricardo Tañedo
controverted this and testified that he learned for the first time of the deed of sale executed by Lazaro in
favor of his children "about a month or sometime in February 1981" (p. 111, tsn, Nov. 28, 1984). . . . 6
The respondent Court, reviewing the trial court's findings, refused to overturn the latter's assessment of the
testimonial evidence, as follows;
We are not prepared to set aside the finding of the lower court upholding Ricardo Tañedo's testimony, as it
involves a matter of credibility of witnesses which the trial judge, who presided at the hearing, was in a
better position to resolve. (Court of Appeals' Decision, p. 6.)
In this connection, we note the tenacious allegations made by petitioners, both in their basic petition and in their
memorandum, as follows:
1. The respondent Court allegedly ignored the claimed fact that respondent Ricardo "by fraud and deceit and
with foreknowledge" that the property in question had already been sold to petitioners, made Lazaro
execute the deed of January 13, 1981;
2. There is allegedly adequate evidence to show that only 1/2 of the purchase price of P10,000.00 was paid
at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, contrary to the written acknowledgment, thus showing bad
faith;
3. There is allegedly sufficient evidence showing that the deed of revocation of the sale in favor of petitioners
"was tainted with fraud or deceit."
4. There is allegedly enough evidence to show that private respondents "took undue advantage over the
weakness and unschooled and pitiful situation of Lazaro Tañedo . . ." and that respondent Ricardo Tañedo
"exercised moral ascendancy over his younger brother he being the eldest brother and who reached fourth
 year college of law and at one time a former Vice-Governor of Tarlac, while his younger brother only attained
first year high school . . . ;
5. The respondent Court erred in not giving credence to petitioners' evidence, especially Lazaro
Tañedo's Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 27, 1982 stating that Ricardo Tañedo deceived the former in
executing the deed of sale in favor of private respondents.
To be sure, there are indeed many conflicting documents and testimonies as well as arguments over their probative
value and significance. Suffice it to say, however, that all the above contentions involve questions of fact, appreciation
of evidence and credibility of witnesses, which are not proper in this review. It is well-settled that the Supreme Court
is not a trier of facts. In petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may
be raised and passed upon. Absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless the lack of any basis
for the conclusions made by the lower courts be amply demonstrated, the Supreme Court will not disturb their
findings. At most, it appears that petitioners have shown that their evidence was not believed by both the trial and
the appellate courts, and that the said courts tended to give more credence to the evidence presented by private
respondents. But this in itself is not a reason for setting aside such findings. We are far from convinced that both
courts gravely abused their respective authorities and judicial prerogatives.
As held in the recent case of Chua Tiong Tay vs. Court of Appeals and Goldrock Construction and Development Corp.7
The Court has consistently held that the factual findings of the trial court, as well as the Court of Appeals, are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Among the exceptional circumstances where a reassessment of
facts found by the lower courts is allowed are when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; when the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; when there is grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; when
the findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee. After a careful study of the case at bench, we find none of the above grounds present to justify the re-
evaluation of the findings of fact made by the courts below.
In the same vein, the ruling in the recent case of South Sea Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals, et al.8 is equally applicable to the present case:
We see no valid reason to discard the factual conclusions of the appellate court. . . . (I)t is not the function of
this Court to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the
parties, particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the
matter coincide. (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
SPS. VIRGILIO & ESPERANZA SANTOS, SPS.VICTORINO & LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO, and TADEO SANTOS
vs. SPS. JOSE and PROSERFINA LUMBAO [G.R. No. 169129. March 28, 2007]
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60450
entitled, Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao v. Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and Esperanza Lati, Spouses
Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos, dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005,
respectively, which granted the appeal filed by herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao
(Spouses Lumbao) and ordered herein petitioners Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F.
Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos to reconvey to respondents Spouses Lumbao the
subject property and to pay the latter attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, thus, reversing the Decision 3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, dated 17 June 1998 which dismissed the Complaint for Reconveyance with
Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao for lack of merit.
Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs
of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20 October 1985. The other petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas
Santos are the daughters-in-law of Rita.
Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged owners of the 107-square meter lot
(subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during her lifetime.
The facts of the present case are as follows:
On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property which
is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died intestate on 19 September
1978. On the first occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mother’s estate through a
document denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. 4 Respondents Spouses Lumbao claimed the
execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their signatures
affixed therein. On the second occasion, an additional seven square meters was added to the land as evidenced by a
document also denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 9 January 1981. 5
After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected
thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present. As the exclusive owners of
the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and
thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate
title in favor of respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned. Respondents Spouses
Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title
to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been
partitioned.
On 2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one
another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, 6 adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other
heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao and
now covered by TCT No. 817297 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.
On 15 June 1992, respondents Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal demand letter 8 to petitioners but
despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still failed and refused to reconvey the subject property to the
respondents Spouses Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages 9 before the
RTC of Pasig City.
Petitioners filed their Answer denying the allegations that the subject property had been sold to the respondents
Spouses Lumbao. They likewise denied that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement had been fraudulently executed
because the same was duly published as required by law. On the contrary, they prayed for the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of cause of action because respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, which repealed Presidential Decree No. 1508 10 requiring first resort to barangay conciliation.
Respondents Spouses Lumbao, with leave of court, amended their Complaint because they discovered that on 16
February 1990, without their knowledge, petitioners executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Julieta S.
Esplana for the sum of ₱30,000.00. The said Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was annotated at the back of TCT No. PT-
81729 on 26 April 1991. Also, in answer to the allegation of the petitioners that they failed to comply with the
mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, respondents Spouses Lumbao said that the Complaint was
filed directly in court in order that prescription or the Statute of Limitations may not set in.
During the trial, respondents Spouses Lumbao presented Proserfina Lumbao and Carolina Morales as their witnesses,
while the petitioners presented only the testimony of petitioner Virgilio.
The trial court rendered a Decision on 17 June 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby denied for lack of merit.
Considering that [petitioners] have incurred expenses in order to protect their interest, [respondents spouses
Lumbao] are hereby directed to pay [petitioners], to wit: 1) the amount of ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses, and 2) costs of the suit.11
Aggrieved, respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 8 June 2005, the appellate court
rendered a Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated June 17,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 62175 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A
new judgment is hereby entered ordering [petitioners] to reconvey 107 square meters of the subject [property]
covered by TCT No. PT-81729 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Metro Manila, and to pay to [respondents
spouses Lumbao] the sum of ₱30,000.00 for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
No pronouncement as to costs.12
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision but it was denied in the
Resolution of the appellate court dated 29 July 2005 for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are the following:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT,
THEREBY CREATING A VARIANCE ON THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF TWO COURTS.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO RECONVEY THE
SUBJECT [PROPERTY] TO THE RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO] AND IN NOT RULING THAT THEY ARE GUILTY OF
LACHES, HENCE THEY CANNOT RECOVER THE LOT ALLEGEDLY SOLD TO THEM.
III. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING HEREIN PETITIONER[S] TO BE IN
GOOD FAITH IN EXECUTING THE "DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT" DATED [2 MAY 1986].
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT LEGALLY
BOUND TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPPOSED BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981] THAT
WERE SUPPOSEDLY EXECUTED BY THE LATE RITA CATOC.
V. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES
LUMBAO’S] ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE WITH DAMAGES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED WITH AN UNENFORCEABLE
DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS THE BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981].
VI. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES
LUMBAO’S] COMPLAINT FOR RECONVEYANCE IS DISMISSABLE (SIC) FOR NON COMPLIANCE OF THE MANDATE OF
[P.D. NO.] 1508, AS AMENDED BY Republic Act No. 7160.
VII. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES
LUMBAO] SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR PETITIONERS’ CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY[‘]S FEES.
Petitioners ask this Court to scrutinize the evidence presented in this case, because they claim that the factual
findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting. They allege that the findings of fact by the trial court
revealed that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo did not witness the execution of the documents known as "Bilihan ng
Lupa"; hence, this finding runs counter to the conclusion made by the appellate court. And even assuming that they
were witnesses to the aforesaid documents, still, respondents Spouses Lumbao were not entitled to the
reconveyance of the subject property because they were guilty of laches for their failure to assert their rights for an
unreasonable length of time. Since respondents Spouses Lumbao had slept on their rights for a period of more than
12 years reckoned from the date of execution of the second "Bilihan ng Lupa," it would be unjust and unfair to the
petitioners if the respondents will be allowed to recover the subject property.
Petitioners allege they are in good faith in executing the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement because even respondents
Spouses Lumbao’s witness, Carolina Morales, testified that neither petitioner Virgilio nor petitioner Tadeo was
present during the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Petitioners affirm
that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was published in a newspaper of general circulation to give notice to all
creditors of the estate subject of partition to contest the same within the period prescribed by law. Since no claimant
appeared to interpose a claim within the period allowed by law, a title to the subject property was then issued in
favor of the petitioners; hence, they are considered as holders in good faith and therefore cannot be barred from
entering into any subsequent transactions involving the subject property.
Petitioners also contend that they are not bound by the documents denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa" because the
same were null and void for the following reasons: 1) for being falsified documents because one of those documents
made it appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were witnesses to its execution and that they appeared personally
before the notary public, when in truth and in fact they did not; 2) the identities of the properties in the "Bilihan ng
Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject property in litigation were not established
by the evidence presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao; 3) the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to
lay their claim over the subject property had already been barred through estoppel by laches; and 4) the respondents
Spouses Lumbao’s claim over the subject property had already prescribed.
Finally, petitioners claim that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao
was dismissible because they failed to comply with the mandate of Presidential Decree No. 1508, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7160, particularly Section 412 of Republic Act No. 7160.
Given the foregoing, the issues presented by the petitioners may be restated as follows:
I. Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao is
dismissible for their failure to comply with the mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under
R.A. No. 7160.
II. Whether or not the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa" are valid and enforceable, thus, they can be
the bases of the respondents spouses Lumbao’s action for reconveyance with damages.
III. Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to comply with the "Bilihan ng Lupa" dated 17 August
1979 and 9 January 1981 and consequently, reconvey the subject property to herein respondents spouses
Lumbao.
It is well-settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the court is not a trier of facts and does
not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of
the case considering that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court. 13 But,
the rule is not without exceptions. There are several recognized exceptions 14 in which factual issues may be resolved
by this Court. One of these exceptions is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial
court. This exception is present in the case at bar.
Going to the first issue presented in this case, it is the argument of the petitioners that the Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao should be dismissed for failure to comply with
the barangay conciliation proceedings as mandated by the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic
Act No. 7160. This argument cannot be sustained.
Section 408 of the aforesaid law and Administrative Circular No. 14-93 15 provide that all disputes between parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality are subject to barangay conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a
pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government offices. Non-compliance with the said condition
precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal
on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent
jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants failed to object to
such exercise of jurisdiction.16
While it is true that the present case should first be referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation because the
parties involved herein actually reside in the same city (Pasig City) and the dispute between them involves a real
property, hence, the said dispute should have been brought in the city in which the real property, subject matter of
the controversy, is located, which happens to be the same city where the contending parties reside. In the event that
respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the said condition precedent, their Complaint for Reconveyance
with Damages can be dismissed. In this case, however, respondents Spouses Lumbao’s non-compliance with the
aforesaid condition precedent cannot be considered fatal. Although petitioners alleged in their answer that the
Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao should be dismissed for their
failure to comply with the condition precedent, which in effect, made the complaint prematurely instituted and the
trial court acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case, yet, they did not file a Motion to Dismiss the said complaint.
Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case had they filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, instead of doing so, they invoked the very
same jurisdiction by filing an answer seeking an affirmative relief from it. Worse, petitioners actively participated in
the trial of the case by presenting their own witness and by cross-examining the witnesses presented by the
respondents Spouses Lumbao. It is elementary that the active participation of a party in a case pending against him
before a court is tantamount to recognition of that court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of
the case which will bar said party from later on impugning the court’s jurisdiction. 17 It is also well-settled that the
non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature and may
therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. 18 Hence, herein petitioners can no
longer raise the defense of non-compliance with the barangay conciliation proceedings to seek the dismissal of the
complaint filed by the respondents Spouses Lumbao, because they already waived the said defense when they failed
to file a Motion to Dismiss.
As regards the second issue, petitioners maintain that the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981 are null and void for being falsified documents as it is made to appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were
present in the execution of the said documents and that the identities of the properties in those documents in
relation to the subject property has not been established by the evidence of the respondents Spouses Lumbao.
Petitioners also claim that the enforceability of those documents is barred by prescription of action and laches.
It is the petitioners’ incessant barking that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981 were falsified because it was made to appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the executions
thereof, and their allegation that even respondents Spouses Lumbao’s witness Carolina Morales proved that said
petitioners were not present during the execution of the aforementioned documents. This is specious.
Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court finds that in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979,
the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon. Moreover, in petitioners’ Answer and Amended
Answer to the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission
that indeed they acted as witnesses in the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. 19 However, in
order to avoid their obligations in the said "Bilihan ng Lupa," petitioner Virgilio, in his cross-examination, denied
having knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed that he could not remember the same as well as his
appearance before the notary public due to the length of time that had passed. Noticeably, petitioner Virgilio did not
categorically deny having signed the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and in support thereof, his testimony in
the cross-examination propounded by the counsel of the respondents Spouses Lumbao is quoted hereunder:
ATTY. CHIU: Now, you said, Mr. Witness…Virgilio Santos, that you don’t know about this document which was marked
as Exhibit "A" for the [respondents spouses Lumbao]?
ATTY. BUGARING: The question is misleading, your Honor. Counsel premised the question that he does not have any
knowledge but not that he does not know.
ATTY. CHIU: Being… you are one of the witnesses of this document? [I]s it not?
WITNESS: No, sir.
Q. I am showing to you this document, there is a signature at the left hand margin of this document Virgilio Santos,
will you please go over the same and tell the court whose signature is this?
A. I don’t remember, sir, because of the length of time that had passed.
Q. But that is your signature?
A. I don’t have eyeglasses… My signature is different.
Q. You never appeared before this notary public Apolinario Mangahas?
A. I don’t remember.20
As a general rule, facts alleged in a party’s pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon him,
but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects
to prove, but it is not evidence.21 And in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party’s pleading, the trial
court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented. 22 However, in the case at bar, as the Court of Appeals
mentioned in its Decision, "[herein petitioners] had not adduced any other evidence to override the admission made
in their [A]nswer that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979]
except that they were just misled as to the purpose of the document, x x x." 23 Virgilio’s answers were unsure and
quibbled. Hence, the general rule that the admissions made by a party in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon
him applies in this case.
On the testimony of respondents Spouses Lumbao’s witness Carolina Morales, this Court adopts the findings made
by the appellate court. Thus -
[T]he trial court gave singular focus on her reply to a question during cross-examination if the [petitioners Virgilio and
Tadeo] were not with her and the vendor [Rita] during the transaction. It must be pointed out that earlier in the
direct examination of said witness, she confirmed that [respondents spouses Lumbao] actually bought the lot from
[Rita] ("nagkabilihan"). Said witness positively identified and confirmed the two (2) documents evidencing the sale in
favor of [respondents spouse Lumbao]. Thus, her subsequent statement that the [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo]
were not with them during the transaction does not automatically imply that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] did not
at any time sign as witnesses as to the deed of sale attesting to their mother’s voluntary act of selling a portion of her
share in her deceased mother’s property. The rule is that testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in
its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein. 24
Furthermore, both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were duly notarized
before a notary public. It is well-settled that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public
document25that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution. 26 To overcome this presumption, there must
be presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld. 27 In
addition, one who denies the due execution of a deed where one’s signature appears has the burden of proving that
contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be a
voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the present case petitioners’ denials without clear and convincing evidence to support
their claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the above-mentioned presumption; hence, the
authenticity, due execution and the truth of the facts stated in the aforesaid "Bilihan ng Lupa" are upheld.
The defense of petitioners that the identities of the properties described in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August
1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject property were not established by respondents Spouses Lumbao’s
evidence is likewise not acceptable.
It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," the entire
property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among her and her co-heirs and so the description
of the entire estate is the only description that can be placed in the "Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981" because the exact metes and bounds of the subject property sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao
could not be possibly determined at that time. Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of sale between Rita
and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law and jurisprudence have categorically held that even
while an estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their respective aliquots or undivided
shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. 28 The co-owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate
a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because such right over the thing is represented by an
aliquot or ideal portion without any physical division. In any case, the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer a
concrete portion does not per se render the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of
the selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of the partition upon the termination of the co-
ownership.29
In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been partitioned on 2 May 1986 by virtue of a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold by the mother of the petitioners to respondents Spouses
Lumbao should be deducted from the total lot, inherited by them in representation of their deceased mother, which
in this case measures 467 square meters. The 107-square meter lot already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can
no longer be inherited by the petitioners because the same was no longer part of their inheritance as it was already
sold during the lifetime of their mother.
Likewise, the fact that the property mentioned in the two "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents was described as "a portion
of a parcel of land covered in Tax Declarations No. A-018-01674," while the subject matter of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement was the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3216 of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Rizal in the name of Maria is of no moment because in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17
August 1979 and 9 January 1981, it is clear that there was only one estate left by Maria upon her death. And this fact
was not refuted by the petitioners. Besides, the property described in Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and the
property mentioned in TCT No. 3216 are both located in Barrio Rosario, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, and
almost have the same boundaries. It is, thus, safe to state that the property mentioned in Tax Declaration No. A-018-
01674 and in TCT No. 3216 are one and the same.
The defense of prescription of action and laches is likewise unjustifiable. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one
with a better right. It is, indeed, true that the right to seek reconveyance of registered property is not absolute
because it is subject to extinctive prescription. However, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be
reconveyed, prescription cannot set in. Such an exception is based on the theory that registration proceedings could
not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another. 30
In the case at bar, the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to seek reconveyance does not prescribe because
the latter have been and are still in actual possession and occupation as owners of the property sought to be
reconveyed, which fact has not been refuted nor denied by the petitioners. Furthermore, respondents Spouses
Lumbao cannot be held guilty of laches because from the very start that they bought the 107-square meter lot from
the mother of the petitioners, they have constantly asked for the transfer of the certificate of title into their names
but Rita, during her lifetime, and the petitioners, after the death of Rita, failed to do so on the flimsy excuse that the
lot had not been partitioned yet. Inexplicably, after the partition of the entire estate of Maria, petitioners still
included the 107-square meter lot in their inheritance which they divided among themselves despite their
knowledge of the contracts of sale between their mother and the respondents Spouses Lumbao.
Under the above premises, this Court holds that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981 are valid and enforceable and can be made the basis of the respondents Spouses Lumbao’s action for
reconveyance. The failure of respondents Spouses Lumbao to have the said documents registered does not affect its
validity and enforceability. It must be remembered that registration is not a requirement for validity of the contract
as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. The principal purpose of
registration is merely to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property had
been entered into. Where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he
acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to
him.31 Hence, the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981, being valid and
enforceable, herein petitioners are bound to comply with their provisions. In short, such documents are absolutely
valid between and among the parties thereto.
Finally, the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest applies in the
present case. Article 131132 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights
and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of
acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the
heirs.33 Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-
interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. Being
heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their
mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them. The death of a party
does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights and obligations
thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the
death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract. 34
In the end, despite the death of the petitioners’ mother, they are still bound to comply with the provisions of the
"Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Consequently, they must reconvey to herein
respondents Spouses Lumbao the 107-square meter lot which they bought from Rita, petitioners’ mother. And as
correctly ruled by the appellate court, petitioners must pay respondents Spouses Lumbao attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses for having been compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest. 35 On this matter,
we do not find reasons to reverse the said findings.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Herein petitioners are ordered to
reconvey to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay the latter attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC-SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA
[G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007]
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the National Housing Authority (NHA) against the
Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 31, and private respondent Segunda Almeida.
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land which
are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787. 1 By
virtue of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31,
1975, the DAR was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757. 2 NHA as the successor agency of
LTA is the petitioner in this case.
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private
respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. 3
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-
Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She
also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by
Margarita Herrera. The pertinent portions of which are as follows:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
SA SINO MAN KINAUUKULAN;
Akong si MARGARITA HERRERA, Filipina, may 83 taong gulang, balo, kasalukuyang naninirahan at
tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, sa ilalim ng panunumpa ay malaya at
kusang loob kong isinasaysay at pinagtitibay itong mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ay may tinatangkilik na isang lagay na lupang tirikan (SOLAR), tumatayo sa Nayon ng San Vicente,
San Pedro, Laguna, mayroong PITONG DAAN AT PITUMPU'T ISANG (771) METRONG PARISUKAT ang laki,
humigit kumulang, at makikilala sa tawag na Lote 17, Bloke 55, at pag-aari ng Land Tenure Administration;
2. Na ang nasabing lote ay aking binibile, sa pamamagitan ng paghuhulog sa Land Tenure Administration, at
noong ika 30 ng Julio, 1959, ang Kasunduang sa Pagbibile (AGREEMENT TO SELL No. 3787) ay ginawa at
pinagtibay sa Lungsod ng Maynila, sa harap ng Notario Publico na si G. Jose C. Tolosa, at lumalabas sa
kaniyang Libro Notarial bilang Documento No. 13, Pagina No. 4; Libro No. IV, Serie ng 1959;
3. Na dahilan sa ako'y matanda na at walang ano mang hanap buhay, ako ay nakatira at pinagsisilbihan nang
aking anak na si Francisca Herrera, at ang tinitirikan o solar na nasasabi sa unahan ay binabayaran ng
kaniyang sariling cuarta sa Land Tenure Administration;
4. Na alang-alang sa nasasaysay sa unahan nito, sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay, ang lupang
nasasabi sa unahan ay aking ipinagkakaloob sa nasabi kong anak na FRANCISCA HERRERA, Filipina, nasa
katamtamang gulang, kasal kay Macario Berroya, kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng sulat sa
Nayong ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, o sa kaniyang mga tagapagmana at;
5. Na HINIHILING KO sa sino man kinauukulan, na sakaling ako nga ay bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay ay
KILALANIN, IGALANG at PAGTIBAYIN ang nilalaman sa pangalan ng aking anak na si Francisca Herrera ang
loteng nasasabi sa unahan.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, ako ay nag-didiit ng hinlalaki ng kanan kong kamay sa ibaba nito at sa kaliwang
gilid ng unang dahon, dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila, ngayong ika 7 ng Octubre, 1960. 4
The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The witnesses signed at the left-hand side of both
pages of the document with the said document having 2 pages in total. Margarita Herrera placed her
thumbmark5above her name in the second page and at the left-hand margin of the first page of the document.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the
then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch 1 in Binan, Laguna (now, Regional Trial Court Branch 25). The case for
annulment was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1263. 6
On December 29, 1980, a Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) was rendered
and the deed was declared null and void. 7
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an application
with the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her
mother. Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the application.
In a Resolution8 dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera, holding that:
From the evidence of the parties and the records of the lots in question, we gathered the following facts: the
lots in question are portions of the lot awarded and sold to the late Margarita Herrera on July 28, 1959 by the
defunct Land Tenure Administration; protestant is the daughter of the late Beatriz Herrera Mercado who was
the sister of the protestee; protestee and Beatriz are children of the late Margarita Herrera; Beatriz was the
transferee from Margarita of Lot Nos. 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49, Block 50; one of the lots transferred to Beatriz,
e.g. Lot 47, with an area of 148 square meters is in the name of the protestant; protestant occupied the lots
in question with the permission of the protestee; protestee is a resident of the Tunasan Homesite since birth;
protestee was born on the lots in question; protestee left the place only after marriage but resided in a lot
situated in the same Tunasan Homesite; her (protestee) son Roberto Herrera has been occupying the lots in
question; he has been there even before the death of the late Margarita Herrera; on October 7, 1960,
Margarita Herrera executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" whereby she waived or transferred all her rights
and interest over the lots in question in favor of the protestee; and protestee had paid the lots in question
in full on March 8, 1966 with the defunct Land Tenure Administration.
This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to purchase the lots in question. 9
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President. 10 The NHA Resolution was affirmed by the Office
of the President in a Decision dated January 23, 1987. 11
On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they
submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the NHA. 12 The NHA executed several deeds of sale in
favor of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued in their favor. 13 Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera
directed Segunda Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of the NHA, private respondent
Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a
Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of the disputed properties, and re-
raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because the
other heirs were disregarded. The defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred by
laches and that the decision of the Office of the President was already final and executory. 14 They also contended
that the transfer of purchase of the subject lots is perfectly valid as the same was supported by a consideration and
that Francisca Herrera paid for the property with the use of her own money. 15 Further, they argued that plaintiff's
occupation of the property was by mere tolerance and that they had been paying taxes thereon. 16
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. 17 The Court
of Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed and held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case involving "title and possession to real property within its jurisdiction." 18 The case was then
remanded for further proceedings on the merits.
A pre-trial was set after which trial ensued.
On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the
decision of the Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of
sale executed by NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void. The Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch was
ordered to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title issued. Attorney's fees were also awarded to private respondent.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of
property which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to probate
before it can transfer property.
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for reconsideration which were both
denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed to the Court of Appeals. The brief for the heirs of
Francisca Herrera was denied admission by the appellate court in a Resolution dated June 14, 2002 for being a
"carbon copy" of the brief submitted by the NHA and for being filed seventy-nine (79) days late.
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, viz:
There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the subject lots was awarded to Margarita Herrera in 1959.
There is also no dispute that Margarita executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on October 7, 1960. Defendant
NHA claims that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is, in effect, a waiver or transfer of rights and interest over the
subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. This Court is disposed to believe otherwise. After a perusal of the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Margarita Herrera, it can be ascertained from its wordings taken in their ordinary
and grammatical sense that the document is a simple disposition of her estate to take effect after her death.
Clearly the Court finds that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is a will of Margarita Herrera. Evidently, if the
intention of Margarita Herrera was to merely assign her right over the lots to her daughter Francisca Herrera,
she should have given her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to the defendant NHA or to Francisca Herrera for
submission to the defendant NHA after the full payment of the purchase price of the lots or even prior
thereto but she did not. Hence it is apparent that she intended the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her last will
and not an assignment of rights as what the NHA in its resolution would want to make it appear. The
intention of Margarita Herrera was shared no less by Francisca Herrera who after the former's demise
executed on August 22, 1974 a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is her sole and legal heir. It was
only when said deed was questioned in court by the surviving heirs of Margarita Herrera's other daughter,
Beatriz Mercado, that Francisca Herrera filed an application to purchase the subject lots and presented the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" stating that it is a deed of assignment of rights. 19
The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of Francisca Herrera. It
upheld the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but one that involved
disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. The issue of whether it was a valid will must first be
determined by probate.
Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.
Petitioner NHA raised the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION OF THE NHA AND THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
HAVE ATTAINED FINALITY, AND IF SO, WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RES
JUDICATA BARS THE COURT FROM FURTHER DETERMINING WHO BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAS PREFERENTIAL
RIGHTS FOR AWARD OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS;
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO MAKE THE AWARD ON THE SUBJECT LOTS; AND
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF THE SUBJECT LOTS BY THE NHA IS ARBITRARY.
We rule for the respondents.
Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But
jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "the rule which forbids the reopening of a
matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of
public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
having general judicial powers . . . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with
power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or
a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata."20 To be sure, early jurisprudence were already
mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually
understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof and that the more equitable attitude is
to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.
In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals,21 the Court held that the rule prescribing that
"administrative orders cannot be enforced in the courts in the absence of an express statutory provision for that
purpose" was relaxed in favor of quasi-judicial agencies.
In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true judicial power—that which
is held by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power of adjudication of an administrative agency for
the "formulation of a final order." 22 This function applies to the actions, discretion and similar acts of public
administrative officers or bodies who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature.23 However, administrative agencies are not considered courts, in their strict sense. The doctrine of separation
of powers reposes the three great powers into its three (3) branches—the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary.
Each department is co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department
may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to "determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."24 Courts have an expanded role under the 1987 Constitution in the resolution of societal conflicts
under the grave abuse clause of Article VIII which includes that duty to check whether the other branches of
government committed an act that falls under the category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.25
Next, petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 26 where it is therein
provided that the Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of Appeals) shall exercise the "exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of the Regional Trial Courts and Quasi-
Judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution…" 27 and contends that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction
to rule over awards made by the NHA.
Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28, 2003, already ruled that the issue of the
trial court's authority to hear and decide the instant case has already been settled in the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 26, 1989 (which has become final and executory on August 20, 1989 as per entry of judgment
dated October 10, 1989).28 We find no reason to disturb this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to
controversies. The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of a final and
executory judgment.29 The appellate court's decision becomes the law of the case which must be adhered to by the
parties by reason of policy.30
Next, petitioner NHA contends that its resolution was grounded on meritorious grounds when it considered the
application for the purchase of lots. Petitioner argues that it was the daughter Francisca Herrera who filed her
application on the subject lot; that it considered the respective application and inquired whether she had all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a possible awardee. It is the position of the petitioner that private
respondent possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for lot award and hence the award was
not done arbitrarily.
The petitioner further argues that assuming that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was a will, it could not bind the
NHA.31That, "insofar as [the] NHA is concerned, it is an evidence that the subject lots were indeed transferred by
Margarita Herrera, the original awardee, to Francisca Herrera was then applying to purchase the same before it." 32
We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the
effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her words
"sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay…" Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person should
cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article
774 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others
either by his will or by operation of law.33
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has already passed away.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. 34 The NHA issued its resolution35 on February 5, 1986. The NHA
gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's death
would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have
had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the
same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her
estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs—in accordance with a will or by
operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an existing
Contract to Sell36 with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified
nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties—Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are
transmissible.37 Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or
by operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the decedent should
transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot
make another contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be
an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and obligations. 38
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next
"person"39likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The opposition of other heirs
to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the
Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed
therein null and void40 should have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the
decedent who may claim the property after a testate or intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted
arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to determine. We affirm the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an element of testamentary disposition where (1) it
devolved and transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the death of the instrument maker. 41
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in
Civil Case No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLORIA UMALI y AMADO AND SUZETH UMALI y AMADO
[G.R. No. 84450 February 4, 1991]
In Criminal Case No. 85-473 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City, Gloria Umali and Suzeth Umali were
charged for violation of Section 4, Article 1 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 under an information which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1985, at Recto Street, Poblacion, Municipality of Tiaong, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give marijuana or Indian Hemp, a prohibited drug to one Francisco
Manalo y Arellano, without authority of law.
Contrary to law. (Rollo, pp. 7-8)
Upon arraignment, Gloria Umali entered a plea of "not, guilty" as accused Suzeth Umali remained at large. After trial,
the lower court rendered a decision on September 9, 1987, the dispositive portion thereof states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Gloria Umali guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sec. 4, Art. 1 (sic) of RA 6425 as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused being a detention prisoner is
entitled to enjoy the privileges of her preventive imprisonment. The case against Suzeth Umali, her co-
accused in this case is hereby ordered ARCHIVED to be revived until the arrest of said accused is effected. The
warrant of arrest issued against her is hereby ordered reiterated.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)
Hence, this appeal from the lower court's decision with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE BIASED TESTIMONY OF
FRANCISCO MANALO
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE WHICH WERE OBTAINED
IN VIOLATION OF ACCUSED'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ACCUSED NEVER DISPUTED THE CLAIM THAT SHE
WAS THE SOURCE OF MARIJUANA LEAVES FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF FRANCISCO MANALO ON APRIL 5,
1985 AND THAT WHICH WAS USED BY PIERRE PANGAN RESULTING TO THE LATTER'S DRUG DEPENDENCY
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED GLORIA 1, GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF DANGEROUS
DRUGS ACT OF 1972 ON THE BASIS OF MERE CONJECTURES AND NOT ON FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
PROVEN
V
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED DID NOT PASS THE
TEST OF MORAL CERTAINTY. (Rollo, p. 49)
The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by the trial court are as follows:
On April 27, 1985 Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated by Pat. Felino Noguerra for drug dependency and for an
alleged crime of robbery. In the course of the investigation, the policemen discovered that Pierre Pangan was capable
of committing crime against property, only if under the influence of drug (sic). As Pierre Pangan is a minor, the police
investigators sought the presence of his parents. Leopoldo Pangan, father of the minor was invited to the police
headquarters and was informed about the problem of his son. Mr. Pangan asked the police investigators if something
could be done to determine the source of the marijuana which has not only socially affected his son, but other
minors in the community. Previous to the case of Pierre Pangan was the case of Francisco Manalo, who was likewise
investigated by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon Police Department and for which a case for violation of the
Dangerous Drug Act was filed against him, covered by Criminal Case No. 85-516 before Branch 60 of the Regional
Trial Court of Lucena City. Aside from said case, accused Francisco Manalo was likewise facing other charges such as
concealment of deadly weapon and other crimes against property. Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the Tiaong Municipal
Jail, and sought the help of Francisco Manalo and told him the social and pernicious effect of prohibited drugs like
marijuana being peddled to minors of Tiaong, Quezon. Manalo although a detention prisoner was touched by the
appeal made to him by the policeman and agreed to help in the identification of the source of the marijuana. In
return he asked the policeman to help him in some cases pending against him. He did not negotiate his case for
violating the dangerous drug act, as he has entered a plea of guilty to the charged (sic) before the sala of Judge
Eriberto Rosario.
With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation Division gave him four (4) marked
P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known to him. The serial numbers of the money was entered in the police
blotter. The instruction was (sic) for Manalo to bring back the prohibited drug purchased by him to the police
headquarters. Few minutes there after (sic), Manalo returned with two (2) foils of dried marijuana which lie allegedly
bought from the accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators to give a statement on
the manner and circumstances of how he was able to purchase two (2) marijuana foils from accused Gloria Umali.
With the affidavit of Francisco Manalo, supported by the two (2) foils of marijuana. the Chief of the Investigation
Division petitioned the Court for the issuance of a search warrant as a justification for them to search the house of
Gloria Umali located at Rector (sic) Street. Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon. After securing the same, the police operatives,
went to the house of Gloria Umali and served the search warrant on her. Confiscated from the person of Gloria Umali
were the four P5.00 bills with serial numbers BA26943, DT388005, CC582000 and EW69873, respectively as reflected
in the police blotter. Likewise, present in the four (4) P5.00 bills were the letters T which were placed by the police
investigators to further identify the marked four (4) P5.00 bills. The searched (sic) in the house was made in the
presence of Brgy. Capt. Punzalan. The search resulted in the confiscation of a can of milo, containing sixteen (16) foils
of dried marijuana leaves which were placed in a tupperware and kept in the kitchen where rice was being stored.
The return of the search warrant reads as follows:
DATE: 22 April 1985
WHAT: "RAID"
WHERE: Residence of Dr. Emiliano Umali
Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon
WHO: MBRS. OF TIAONG INP
TIME STARTED/ARRIVED AT SAID PLACE:
221410H Apr '85
SERVED TO: MRS. GLORIA UMALI
MR. EMILIANO UMALI
PERSON APPREHENDED/PROPERTY SEIZED/RECOVERED
Mrs. Gloria Umali 16 Aluminum Foils of
Mr. Emiliano Umali Suspected Marijuana leaves
TIME/DATE LEFT SAID PLACE: 221450H Apr '85
WITNESSES (sic) BY:
1. (Sgd) Reynaldo S. Pasumbal
2. (Sgd) Luisabel P. Punzalan
3. (Sgd) Arnulfo C. Veneracion
4. (Sgd) Isidro C. Capino
 Samples of the marijuana leaves confiscated were submitted to the PC Came Laboratory for examination.
Capt. Rosalinda Royales of the PC crime Laboratory took the witness stand, testified and identified the
marijuana submitted to her and in a written report which was marked as Exhibit "G" she gave the following
findings:
Qualitative examination conducted on the specimen mentioned above gave POSITIVE result to the
tests fur marijuana.
In Criminal Case No. 85-516, Francisco Manalo was charged of having in his possession Indian Hemp on April
5, 1985, in violation of Section 8, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425 as amended, otherwise as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. The Court in rendering against him disposed the case as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of illegal possession of "Indian Hemp" penalized under Sec. 8 of Article 6425 (sic); as amended
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer
an imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional to six (6) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor and to pay a fine of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00). Let the period of
detention of the accused be credited to his sentence.
Accused never disputed the claim of Francisco Manalo that the marijuana found in his possession on April 5,
1985 in the municipality of Tiaong, Quezon was sold to him by the accused Gloria Umali. The defense also did
not dispute the claim of the prosecution that in the investigation of Pierre Pangan, the police investigator
came to know that Gloria Umali was the source of the marijuana leaves which he used and smoked resulting
in his present drug dependency. (Rollo, pp. 22-27)
The appellant vehemently denied the findings of the lower court and insisted that said court committed reversible
errors in convicting her. She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and
that his words should not be taken on its face value. Furthermore, he stressed that said witness has several charges
in court and because of his desire to have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood.
However, the plaintiff-appellee through the Solicitor General said that even if Francisco Manalo was then facing
several criminal charges when he testified, such fact did not in any way disqualify him as a witness. "His testimony is
not only reasonable and probable but more so, it was also corroborated in its material respect by the other
prosecution witnesses, especially the police officers." (Rollo, pp. 83-84)
The appellant also claimed that the marked money as well as the marijuana were confiscated for no other purpose
than using them as evidence against the accused in the proceeding for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act and
therefore the search warrant issued is illegal from the very beginning. She stressed that there can be no other
plausible explanation other than that she was a victim of a frame-up.
In relation to this contention, the Solicitor General noted that it is not true that the evidences submitted by the
prosecution were obtained in violation of her constitutional right against illegal search and seizure.
Furthermore, the appellant contended that the essential elements of the crime of which she was charged were never
established by clear and convincing evidence to warrant the findings of the court a quo. She also stressed that the
court's verdict of conviction is merely based on surmises and conjectures.
However, the Solicitor General noted that the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who
had personal knowledge of the happening together with the physical evidence submitted clearly prove the guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of accused-appellant for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Time and again, it is stressed that this Court is enjoined from casually modifying or rejecting the trial court's factual
findings. Such factual findings, particularly the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the testimony of the
witnesses are accorded with great respect on appeal for the trial judge enjoys the advantage of directly and at first
hand observing and examining the testimonial and other proofs as they are presented at the trial and is therefore
better situated to form accurate impressions and conclusions on the basis thereof (See People v. Bravo, G.R. No.
68422, 29 December, 1989,180 SCRA 694,699). The findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight, and should
not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked certain facts of weight and
importance, it being acknowledged that the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a
better position to evaluate their testimonies (People v. Alverez y Soriano, G.R. No. 70831, 29 July 1988, 163 SCRA
745, 249; People v. Dorado, G.R. No. L-23464, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53; People v. Espejo, G.R. No. L-27708,
December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400). Hence, in the absence of any showing that the trial court had overlooked certain
substantial facts, said factual findings are entitled to great weight, and indeed are binding even on this Court.
Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving can make
known their perception to others may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article 821 of the Civil Code
which states that persons 91 convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony" are disqualified
from being witnesses to a will." (Paras, RULES OF COURT ANNOTATED, Vol. IV First Ed., p. 44)
Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify him as a
witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact that said witness is facing several
criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.
The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that he was actuated by
improper motive (People v. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268,29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 718). Hence, in the absence of any
evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full
credence.
Appellant's contention that she was a victim of a "frame-up" is devoid of merit.1âwphi1 "Courts must be vigilant. A
handy defense in such cases is that it is a frame-up and that the police attempted to extort from the accused.
Extreme caution must be exercised in appreciating such defense. It is just as easy to concoct as a frame-up. At all
times the police, the prosecution and the Courts must be always on guard against these hazards in the administration
of criminal justice." (People v. Rojo, G.R. No. 82737, 5 July 1989, 175 SCRA 119)
The appellant's allegation that the search warrant is illegal cannot also be given any merit. "Where marked peso bills
were seized by the police as a result of the search made on the appellant, the admissibility of these marked peso bills
hinges on the legality of the arrest and search on the person of the appellant" (People v. Paco, G.R. No. 76893, 27
February 1989, 170 SCRA 681). Since the search is predicated on a valid search warrant, absent any showing that
such was procured maliciously the things seized are admissible in evidence.
Appellant argues that the lower court's verdict is based on surmises and conjectures, hence the essential elements of
the crime were never established by clear and convincing evidence.
Conviction cannot be predicated on a presumption or speculation. A conviction for a criminal offense must be based
on clear and positive evidence and not on mere presumptions (Gaerlan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57876, 6
November 1989, 179 SCRA 20). The prosecution's evidence consisted of the testimony of witness Manalo and the law
enforcers as well as the physical evidence consisting of the seized marked peso bills, the two (2) foils of marijuana
purchased and the can containing sixteen (16) aluminum foils of dried marijuana.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen. Law
enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v.
Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, 21 February 1989, 170 SCRA 497). Hence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, full
credence should be accorded to the prosecution's evidence. The evidence on record sufficiently established that
Umali gave two (2) foils of marijuana to witness Manalo for which she was given and received four (4) marked five
peso (P5.00) bills, and fully supports conviction for drug pushing in violation of Section 4 Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
Thus, the Court has no option but to declare that the trial court did not err in finding, on the basis of the evidence on
record, that the accused-appellant Gloria Umali violated Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Pursuant to recent jurisprudence and law, the case is covered by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1675, effective February 17, 1980, which raised the penalty for selling prohibited drugs from
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos (People v. Adriano, G.R. No.
65349, October 31, 1984, 133 SCRA 132) Thus, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment but
failed to impose a fine.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the modification that a fine of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) be imposed, as it is hereby imposed, on the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
MANUEL TORRES and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO vs. MARGARITA LOPEZ [G.R. No. L-24569. February 26, 1926]
This case concerns the probate of the alleged will of the late Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez.
Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila Philippine Islands. On February 25, 1924, leaving a considerable estate.
Shortly thereafter Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will asked that the will of Rodriguez be allowed.
Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased on the grounds: (1) That the testator
lacked mental capacity because at the time of senile dementia and was under guardianship; (2) that undue influence
had been exercised by the persons benefited in the document in conjunction with others who acted in their behalf;
and (3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the document was obtained through fraud and deceit. After a
prolonged trial judgment was rendered denying the legalization of the will. In the decision of the trial judge
appeared, among others, these findings:
All this evidence taken together with the circumstances that before and at the time Tomas Rodriguez was
caused to sign the supposed will Exhibit A, and the copies thereof there already existed a final judgment as to
his mental condition wherein he was declared physically and mentally incapacitated to take care of himself
and manage his estate shows in a clear and conclusive manner that at the time of signing the supposed will
of Tomas Rodriguez did not possess such mental capacity as was necessary to be able him to dispose of his
property by the supposed will.
But even supposing as contended by petitioner's counsel that Tomas Rodriguez was at the time of execution
of the will, competent to make a will, the court is of the opinion that the will cannot be probated for it
appears from the declaration of the attesting witness Elias Bonoan that when the legatee Luz Lopez
presented the supposed will, Exhibit A, to Tomas Rodriguez, she told him to sign said Exhibit A because it was
a document relative to the complaint against one Castito, which Exhibit 4, then pending in the justice of the
peace court, and for the further reason that said Tomas Rodriguez was then under guardianship, due to his
being mentally and physically incapacitated and therefore unable to manage his property and take care of
himself. It must also be taken into account that Tomas Rodriguez was an old man 76 years of age, and was
sick in the hospital when his signature to the supposed will was obtained. All of this shows that the signature
of Tomas Rodriguez appearing in the will was obtained through fraudulent and deceitful representations of
those who were interested in it. (Record on Appeal, p. 23)
From the decision and judgment above-mentioned the proponents have appealed. Two errors are specified, viz: (1)
The court below erred in holding that at the time of signing his will, Tomas Rodriguez did not possess the mental
capacity necessary to make the same, and (2) the court below erred in holding that the signatures of Tomas
Rodriguez to the will were obtained through fraudulent and deceitful representations, made by persons interested in
the executions of said will.
The record is voluminous — close to two thousand typewritten pages, with a varied assortment of exhibits. One brief
contains two hundred seventy-four pages, the other four hundred fifteen pages. The usual oral argument has been
had. The court must scale this mountains of evidence more or less relevant and of argument intense and prolific to
discover the fertile valleys of fact and principle.
The topics suggested by the assignments of error — Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence — will be taken up
separately and in order. An attempt will be made under each subject first to make findings of fact quite separate and
apart from those of the judge and second to make findings of law and the law by rendering judgment.
I. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
A. Facts. — For a long time prior to October, 1923, Tomas Rodriguez was in feeble health. His breakdown was
undoubtedly due to organic weakness, to advancing years and to an accident which occurred in 1921 (Exhibit 6).
Ultimately, on August 10 1923, on his initiative, Tomas Rodriguez designated Vicente F. Lopez as the administrator of
his property (Exhibit 7).
On October 22, 1923, Margarita Lopez petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila to name a guardian for Tomas
Rodriguez because of his age and pathological state. This petition was opposed by Attorney Gregorio Araneta acting
on behalf of Tomas Rodriguez for the reason that while Rodriguez was far from strong on account of his years, he was
yet capable of looking after his property with the assistance of his administrator, Vicente F. Lopez. The deposition of
Tomas Rodriguez was taken and a perusal of the same shows that he was able to answer nearly all of the questions
propounded intelligently (Exhibit 5-g). A trial had at which considerable oral testimony for the petitioner was
received. At the conclusion of the hearing, an order was issued by the presiding judge, declaring Tomas Rodriguez
incapacitated to take care of himself and to manage his property and naming Vicente F. Lopez as his guardian.
(Exhibit 37).
Inasmuch as counsel for the appellee make such of one incident which occurred in connection with the guardianship
proceedings, it may as well be mentioned here as later. This episode concerns the effort of deputy sheriff Joaquin
Garcia to make service on Tomas Rodriguez on October 31, 1923. We will let the witness tell in his own words what
happened on the occasions in question:
I found him lying down on his bed. . . . And when it (the cleaning of his head) was finished, I again entered his
room, and told him that I had an order of the court which I wanted to read as I did read to him, but after
reading the order he asked me what the order meant; 'I read it to you so that you may appear before the
court, understand,' then I read it again, but he asked what the order said; in view of that fact I left the order
and departed from the house. (S. R., p. 642.)
To return to our narrative — possibly inspired by the latter portion of the order of Judge Diaz, Tomas Rodriguez was
taken to the Philippine General Hospital on November 27, 1923. There he was to remain sick in bed until his death.
The physician in charge during this period was Dr. Elias Domingo. In the clinical case record of the hospital under the
topic "Diagnosis (in full)," we find the following "Senility; Hernia inguinal; Decubitus" (Exhibit 8).
On the door of the patient's room was placed a placard reading — "No visitors, except father, mother, sisters, and
brothers." (Testimony of head nurse physician, there were permitted to visit the patient only the following named
persons: Santiago Lopez, Manuel Ramirez, Romana Lopez, Luz Lopez de Bueno, Remedio Lopez, Benita Lopez,
Trinidad Vizcarra, Apolonia Lopez, Antonio Haman, and Gregorio Araneta ((Exhibit 9). The list did not include the
names of Margarita Lopez and her husband Antonio Ventura. Indeed the last named persons experienced
considerable difficulty in penetrating in to the room of Rodriguez.
Santiago Lopez states that on one occasion when he was visiting Tomas Rodriguez in the hospital , Rodriguez
expressed to him a desire to make a will and suggested that the matter be taken up with Vicente F. Lopez (S. R., p.
550). This information Santiago Lopez communicated to Vicente F. Lopez, who then interviewed Maximino Mina, a
practicing attorney in the City of Manila, for the purpose of securing him to prepare the will. In accordance with this
request, Judge Mina conferred with Tomas Rodriguez in the hospital in December 16th and December 29th. He
ascertained the wishes of Rodriguez and wrote up a testament in rough draft. The attorney expected to return to the
hospital on December 31st to have the will executed but was unable to do so on account of having to make a trip to
the provinces. Accordingly, the papers were left with Santiago Lopez.
In corroboration of the above statements, we transcribe a portion of Judge Mina's testimony which has not been
challenged in any way:
ARANETA: Q. Will you please tell your motive for holding an interview with Vicente Lopez?
MAXIMINO MINA: A. Then I arrived in the house of Vicente Lopez, after the usual greeting and other
unimportant things, he consulted me or presented the question as to whether or not D. Tomas could make
his will, having announced his desire to do so. I told him that it seemed that we were not called upon to
decide or give an opinion as to whether or not he can make a will; it is a question to be submitted to the
court, but as he had announced his desire, it is our duty to comply with it. Then he requested me to do what
was necessary to comply with his wishes: I told him I was to see him; then we agreed that on the morning
next to the following evening that is on the 16th, I should go to the General Hospital and so I did.
Q. Did you go to the hospital in the evening of the 16th? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you meet D. Tomas? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did D. Tomas tell you his desire to make a will?
OCAMPO: Leading.
ARANETA: I withdraw. What, if anything, did D. Tomas tell you on that occasion when you saw him there? —
A. He told me that.
Q. Please tell us what conversation you had with D. Tomas Rodriguez? — A. The conversation I had with him
that evening — according to my best recollection — I cannot tell the exact words and perhaps the order.
After the usual greetings, Good evening, D. Tomas, ' Good evening,' How are you,' ' How do you do? Very
well, just came here in the name of D. Vicente Lopez why does he not come. He cannot come because he has
many things to do, and besides it is hard for him and makes him tired, so he told me to come.' Mina, your
tenant, attorney.' Are you an attorney? Yes.' Where do you live? I live in Quiapo.' Oh, in Quiapo, a good
district, it is gay a commercial place you must have some business there because that is a commercial place.
Unfortunately, I have none, D. Tomas.' Well, you must be have because the profession alone does not give
enough. Where is your office? I work in the office of Mr. Chicote. That Mr. Chicote must be rich, it seems to
me that he is. The profession gives almost nothing it is better to have properties. I am an attorney but do not
depend upon my profession. I interrupted D. Tomas saying, since you want to make a will, when and to
whom do you want to leave your fortune? Then he said, To whom else? To my cousin Vicente Lopez and his
daughter Luz Lopez. Which properties do you want to give to your cousin and niece? All my properties, Won't
you specify the property to be given to each of them? What for? All my property. Don't you have any other
relatives? Yes, sir I have. Won't you give any to those relatives? What for? was his answer. Well, do you want
to specify said properties, to say what they are? and he again said, What for? they know them, he is my
attorney-in-fact as to all property. I also said, Well and as legacy won't you give property to other persons?
answers, I think, something, they will know it. After being asked, Whom do you think, would you want to be
your executor? After hesitating a little, This Torres, Manuel or Santiago Lopez also. Then I asked him, What is
your religion? He answered, Roman Apostolic Catholic, and then he also asked me, and your? Also Roman
Apostolic Catholic, Where have you studied?' 'In the University of Santo Tomas.' 'It is convenient to preserve
the Catholic religion that our descendants have left us. And you, what did you have anything more to say as
to your testamentary dispositions? No, he answered. Then I remind him, 'You know that Vicente Lopez has
sent me to get these dispositions of yours, and he said, Yes, do it.' I asked him, When do you want it done?
Later on, I will send for you. After this believing to have done my duty, I bade him good-bye.
Q. Did you have any other occasion to see him? — A. Yes.
Q. When? — A. On December 29, 1923, also in the evening.
Q. Why did you go to see him? — A. Because as I had not received any message either from Vicente Lopez or
Tomas Rodriguez, as I had received notices in connection with the few cases I had in the provinces
particularly in Tayabas, which compelled me to be absent from Manila until January 1st at least, for I might
be there for several days, so I went to the General Hospital of my own accord — since I had not received any
messages from them — with a rough draft which I had prepared in accordance with what he had told me in
our conversation. After the greetings, I told him, Here I am D. Tomas; this is the rough draft of your will in
accordance with your former statements to me in order to submit it to you. Do you want to read it?' 'Please
do me the favor of reading it. I read it slowly to him in order that he could understand it . After reading, Is it
all right, that is the way,— few words — you see it takes only a few minutes; now I can execute the will. We
can do it takes only a few minutes.' In view of that statement of his, I called his attention, ' But we don't have
witnesses, D. Tomas.' I looked out through the door to see if I could call some witnesses but it was late then
and it was thought better to do it on the 31st of December. Then we talked about other things, and he again
asked. Where were you born? I told him in Quiapo. Ah, good district, and especially now that the fiesta of
Quiapo is coming near,' and then I interrupted him, Yes, the fiesta of the Holy Child and of Our Lady of Mount
Carmel' because we also talked about the fiesta of San Sebastian. I again reminded him that we could not do
it because the witnesses were not there and he explained, Good Christmas present, isn't it?' I did not tell him
anything and in view of that I did not deem it necessary to stay there any longer.
Q. With whom did you make the arrangement to make the will on the evening of the 31st of December —
you said that it was agreed that the will be executed on the evening of December 31st? — A. With Santiago
Lopez and Don Tomas.
Q. Was the will executed on the 31st of December? — A. What happened is this: In view of that agreement, I
fixed up the draft which I had, dating it the 31st of December, putting everything in order; we agreed that
Santiago would meet me on 31st day between five and six in the evening or a little before, but it happened
that before the arrival of that date Santiago Lopez came and told me that I need not trouble about going to
the General Hospital; because it could not be carried out for the reason that certain requisites were lacking.
In view of this and bearing always in mind that on the following day I had to go to the provinces, I told
Santiago Lopez that I would leave the papers with him because I might go to the provinces.
 Q. What may be the meaning of those words good Christmas present? — A. They are given a Christmas
present when Christmas comes or on the occasion of Christmas.
Q. I show you this document which is marked Exhibit A, tell me if that is the will or copy of the will which you
delivered to Santiago Lopez on December 21, 31, 1923? — A. With the exception of the words '3 de enero de
1924' It seems to be literally identical. (S. R. pp. 244-249.)
As the witness stated, the will which was prepared by him is identical with that signed by the testator and the
attesting witnesses with the single exception of the change of the date from December 31, 1923, to January 3, 1924.
Two copies besides the original of the will were made. The will is brief and simple in terminology.
For purposes of record, we copy the will as here translated into English:
ONLY PAGE
In the City of Manila, Philippines Islands, this January 3, 1924, I, Tomas Rodriguez, of age and resident of the
City of Manila, Philippine Islands, do freely and voluntarily make this my will and testament in the Spanish
language which I know, with the following clauses:
First I declare that I am a Roman Apostolic Catholic, and order that my body be buried in accordance with my
religion, standing and circumstances.
Second. I name my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as my only universal heirs of
all my property.
Third. I appoint D. Manuel Torres and D. Santiago Lopez as my prosecutors.
In witness whereof I sign this typewritten will, consisting of one single page, in the presence of the witness
who sign below.
(Sgd.) TOMAS RODRIGUEZ
(Left marginal signatures:)
TOMAS RODRIGUEZ
ELIAS BONOAN
V. L. LEGARDA
A. DE ASIS
We hereby certify that on the date and in the place above indicated, Don Tomas Rodriguez executed this will,
consisting of one single typewritten page, having signed at the bottom of the will in the presence of us who
saw as witnesses the execution of this will, we signed at the bottom thereof in the presence of the testator
and of each other.
(Sgd.) V. L. LEGARDA
ELIAS BONOAN
A. DE ASIS
(Exhibit A.)
On the afternoon of January 3, 1924 there gathered in the quarters of Tomas Rodriguez in the Philippine General
Hospital, Santiago Lopez and Dr. A. De Asis, attesting witness; and Dr. Elias Fernando Calderon, Dr. Elias Domingo and
Dr. Florentino Herrera, physicians, there for purposes of observation. (Testimony of Elias Bonoan, S. R., p. 8 of Vl.
Legarda, S. R. p. 34. ) Possibly also Mrs. Luz Lopez de Bueno and Mrs. Nena Lopez were present; at least they were
hovering in the background.
As to what actually happened, we have in the record two absolutely contradictory accounts. One emanates from the
attesting witness, Doctor Bonoan. The other is the united testimony of all remaining persons who were there.
Doctor Elias Bonoan was the first witness called at the trial. He testified on direct examination as to formal matters,
such as the identification of the signatures to the will .On cross-examination, he rather started the proponents of the
will by stating that Luz Lopez de Bueno told Tomas Rodriguez to sign the document it concerned a complaint against
Castito and that nobody read the will to the testator. Doctor Bonoan's testimony along this line is as follows:
QUESTIONS.
MARCAIDA : Q. Why were you a witness to the will of Tomas Rodriguez?
Araneta: I object to the question as being immaterial.
Court: Objection overruled.
Dr. Bonoan: A. Because I was called up by Mrs. Luz by telephone telling me to be in the hospital at 3 o'clock
sharp in the afternoon of the 3d of January.
Q. Who is that Luz whom you have mentioned? — A. Luz Lopez, daughter of Vicente Lopez.
Q. What day, January 3, 1924? A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did Luz Lopez talk to you in connection with your going to the hospital? — A. On the morning of the
3d she called me up by telephone.
Q. On the morning? — A. On the morning.
Q. Before January 3, 1924, when the will of Tomas Rodriguez was signed, did Luz Lopez talk to you? A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many days approximately before was it? — A. I cannot tell the day, it was approximately one week
before, — on that occasion when I was called up by her about the deceased Vicente Lopez.
Q. What did she tell you when you went to the house of Vicente Lopez one week approximately before
signing the will? - A. That Tomas Rodriguez would make a will.
Q. Don't you know where the will of Tomas Rodriguez was made? - A. In the General Hospital.
Q. Was that document written in the hospital? — A. I have not seen it.
Q. When you went to the General Hospital on January 3, 1924, who were the persons you met in the room
where the patients was ? — A. I met one of the nieces of the deceased Tomas Rodriguez, Mrs. Nena Lopez
and Dna. Luz Lopez.
Q. Were those the only persons? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. What time approximately did you go to the General Hospital on January 3d? — A. A quarter to 3.
Q. After you, who came? — A. Antonio de Asis, Doctor Herrera, later on Doctor Calderon arrived with Doctor
Elias Domingo and lastly Santiago Lopez came and then Mr. Legarda.
Q. When you entered the room of the patient, D. Tomas Rodriguez, in the General Hospital in what position
did you find him?— A. He was lying down.
Q. Did you greet D. Tomas Rodriguez? A. I did.
Q. Did D. Tomas Rodriguez answer you? — A. Dna. Nena immediately answered in advance and introduced
me to him saying that I was the brother of his godson.
Q. Did other persons whom you have mentioned, viz, Messrs. Calderon, Herrera, Domingo, De Asis and
Legarda greet Tomas Rodriguez?
ARANETA: I object to the question as being improper cross-examination. It has not been the subject of the
direct examination.
COURT: Objection overruled.
ARANETA: Exception.
A. No, sir, they joined us.
Q. What was D. Tomas told when he signed the will.? — A. To sign it.
Q. Who told D. Tomas to sign the will? — A. Luz Lopez.
Q. What did Luz Lopez tell Tomas Rodriguez in order that he should sign the will? — A. She told him to sign
the document; the deceased Tomas Rodriguez before signing the document asked what that was which he
was to sign.
Q. What did anybody answer to that question of D. Tomas? — A. Luz Lopez told him to sign it because it
concerned a complaint against Castito. D. Tomas said, 'What is this?" And Luz Lopez answered, 'You sign this
document, uncle Tomas, because this is about the complaint against Castito.
Q. Then Tomas Rodriguez signed the will? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who had the will? Who was holding it? — A. Mr. Vicente Legarda had it his own hands.
 Q. Was the will signed by Tomas Rodriguez lying down, on his feet or seated? — A. Lying down.
Q. Was the will read by Tomas Rodriguez or any person present at the time of signing the will, did they read it
to him? — A. Nobody read the will to him.
Q. Did not D. Tomas read the will? — A. I have not seen it.
Q. Were you present? — A. Yes, sir. ( S. R. p. 8)
As it would be quite impracticable to transcribe the testimony of all the others who attended the making of the will,
we will let Vicente L. Legarda, who appears to have assumed the leading role, tell what transpired. He testified in
part:
ARANETA : Q. Who exhibited to you those documents, Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2?
LEGARDA: A. Santiago Lopez.
Q. Did he show you the same document? — A. First that is to say the first document he presented to me was
a rough draft, a tentative will, and it was dated December 31st, and I called his attention to the fact that the
date was not December 31, 1923, and that it was necessary to change the date to January 3, 1924, and it was
done.
Q. And it was then, was it not when Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 were written? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you any know where it was written? — A. In the General Hospital.
Q. Did any time elapse from your making the suggestion that the document which you delivered to Santiago
Lopez be written until those three Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 were presented to you? — A. About nine or ten
minutes approximately.
Q. The time to make it clean? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where were you during that time? — A. In the room of D. Tomas Rodriguez.
Q. Were you talking with him during that time. — A. Yes, sir.
Q. About what things were you talking with him? — A. He was asking me about my health, that of my family
how my family was my girl, whether we were living in Pasay, he asked me about the steamer Ildefonso, he
said that it was a pity that it had been lost because he knew that my father-in-law was the owner of the
steamer Ildefonso.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When those documents, Exhibit A, A-1, and A-2, that is the original and two copies of the will signed by D.
Tomas Rodriguez were written clean, will you please tell what happened? — A. When Santiago Lopez gave
them to me clean, I approached D. Tomas Rodriguez and told him: Don Tomas, here is this will which is ready
for your signature.
Q. What did D. Tomas do when you said that his will you were showing to him was ready? — A. The first thing
he asked was: the witnesses? Then I called the witnesses — Gentlemen, please come forward, and they
came forward, and I handed the documents to D. Tomas. D. Tomas got up and then took his eyeglasses, put
them on and as he saw that the electric lamp at the center was not sufficiently clear, he said: 'There is no
more light;' then somebody came forward bringing an electric lamp.
Q. What did D. Tomas do when that electric lamp was put in place? — A. The eyeglasses were adjusted again
and then he began to read, and as he could not read much for a long time, for he unexpectedly felt tired and
took off the eyeglasses, and as I saw that the poor man was tired, I suggested that it be read to him and he
stopped reading and I read the will to him.
Q. What happened after you had read it to him? — A. He said to me, 'Well, it is all right. It is my wish and my
will. Don't you have any pen?' I asked a pen of those who were there and handed it to D. Tomas.
Q. Is it true that Tomas Rodriguez asked at that time 'What is that which I am going to sign?' and Luz Lopez
told him: 'It is in connection with the complaint against Castito?' — A. It is not true, no, sir.
Q. During the signing of the will, did you hear Luz Lopez say anything to Tomas Rodriguez? — A. No, Sir, she
said nothing.
Q. According to you, Tomas Rodriguez signed of his own accord? — A. Yes, sir.
 Q. Did nobody tell him to sign? — A. Nobody.
Q. What happened after the signing of the will by Tomas Rodriguez? — A. I called the witnesses and we
signed in the presence of each other and of Tomas Rodriguez.
Q. After the signing of the will, did you have any conversation with Tomas Rodriguez? — A. Doctor Calderon
asked D. Tomas Rodriguez some questions.
Q. Do you remember the questions and the conversation held between Doctor Calderon and D. Tomas after
the signing of the will? — A. I remember that afterwards Doctor Calderon talked to him about business. He
asked him how the business of making loans at 18 per cent. It seems that Tomas Rodriguez answered: That
loan at 18 per cent is illegal, it is usury. (S. R., p. 38.)
In addition to the statements under oath made by Mr. Legarda, an architect and engineer in the Bureau of Public
Works and professor of engineering and architecture in the University of Santo Tomas, suffice it to say that Luz Lopez
de Bueno denied categorically the statements attributed to her by Doctor Bonoan (S. R., p. 568). In this stand, she is
corroborated by Doctor Calderon, Domingo, and Herrera, the attending physicians. On this point, Doctor Calderon
the Director of the Philippine General Hospital and Dean of the College of Medicine in the University of the
Philippines, testified:
Mr. ARANETA: Q. What have you seen or heard with regard to the execution of the will?
Dr. CALDERON: A. Mr. Legarda handled the will to D. Tomas Rodriguez. D. Tomas asked for his eyeglass,
wanted to read and it was extremely hard for him to do so. Mr. Legarda offered to read the will, it was read
to him and he heard that in that will Vicente Lopez and Luz Lopez were appointed heirs; we also saw him sign
that will, and he signed not only the original but also the other copies of the will and we also saw how the
witnesses signed the will; we heard that D. Tomas asked for light at that moment; he heard that D. Tomas
asked for light at that moment; he was at that time in a perfect mental state. And we remained there after
the will was executed. I asked him, 'How do you feel, how are you? Well I am well, ' he answered. ' How is the
business? There is a crisis at there is one good business, namely, that of making loans at the rate of 18 per
cent, 'and he answered, 'That is usury.; When a man answers in that way, ' That is usury it shows that he is all
right.
Q. Were you present when Mr. Legarda handed the will to him? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did any person there tell Don Tomas that was a complaint to be filed against one Castito? — A. No, sir, I
have not heard anything of the kind.
Q. It was said here that when the will was handed to him, D. Tomas Rodriguez asked what that was which he
was to sign and that Luz Lopez answered, 'That is but a complaint in connection with Castito.' Is that true? —
A. I have not heard anything of the kind.
Q. Had anybody told that to the deceased, would you have heard it? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was Luz Lopez there? — A. I don't remember having seen her; I am not sure; D. Santiago Lopez and the
three witnesses were there; I don't remember that Luz Lopez was there.
Q. Had anybody told that to the deceased, would you have heard it? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you remember whether he was given a pen or he himself asked for it? — A. I don't know; it is a detail
which I don't remember well; so that whether or not he was given a pen or he himself asked for it, I do not
remember.
Q. But did he sign without hesitation ? — A. With no hesitation.
Q. Did he sign without anybody having indicated to him where he was to sign? — A. Yes, without anybody
having indicated it to him.
Q. Do you know whether D. Tomas Rodriguez asked for more light before signing? — A. He asked for more
lights, as I have said before.
Q. Do you remember that detail? — A. Yes, sir. They first lighted the lamps, but as the light was not sufficient,
he asked for more light.
Q. Do you remember very well that he asked for light? — A. Yes, sir. (S. R. p.993).
A clear preponderance of the evidence exists in favor of the testimony of Vicente Legarda, corroborated as it is by
other witnesses of the highest standing in the community. The only explanation we can offer relative to the
testimony of Doctor Bonoan is that possibly he may have arrived earlier than the others with the exception of Luz
Lopez de Bueno, and that Luz Lopez de Bueno may have made some sort of an effort to influence Tomas Rodriguez.
There is however no possible explanation of the statement of Doctor Bonoan to the effect that no one read the will
to Rodriguez when at least five other persons recollect that Vicente Legarda read it to him and recall the details
connected with the reading.
There is one curious occurrence which transpired shortly after the making of the will which should here be
mentioned. It is that on January 7, 1923 (1924), Luz Lopez de Bueno signed a document in favor of Doctor Bonoan in
the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000). This paper reads as follow:
Be it know by these present:
That I, Luz Lopez de Bueno in consideration of the services which at my instance were and will when
necessary be rendered by Dr. Elias Bonoan in connection with the execution of the will of my uncle,
Don Tomas Rodriguez and the due probate thereof, do hereby agree to pay said doctor, by way of
remuneratory donation, the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000), Philippine currency, as soon as
said services shall have been fully rendered and I shall be in possession of the inheritance which in
said will is given to me.
In witness whereof, I sign this document which was freely and spontaneously executed by me in
Manila, this January 7, 1923.
(Sgd.) LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO
(Exhibit 1)
There is a sharp conflict of testimony, as is natural between Doctor Bonoan and Luz Lopez de Bueno relative to the
execution of the above document. We shall not attempt to settle these differences as in the final analysis it will not
affect the decision one way or the other. The most reasonable supposition is that Luz Lopez de Bueno imprudently
endeavored to bring over Doctor Bonoan to her side of the race by signing and giving to him Exhibit 1. But the event
cannot easily be explained away.
Tomas Rodriguez passed away in the Philippine General Hospital, as we said on February 25, 1924. Not even prior to
his demise the two actions in the Lopez family had prepared themselves for a fight over the estate. The Luz Lopez
faction had secured the services of Doctor Domingo, the physician in charge of the Department of Insane of San
Lazaro Hospital an Assistant Professor of Nervous and Mental Diseases in the University of the Philippines, as
attending physician; as associated with him for purposes of investigation Dr. Fernando Calderon the Director of the
Philippine General Hospital and Dr. Florentino Herrera, a physician in active practice in the City of Manila; and had
arranged to have two members of the medical fraternity, Doctors De Asis and Bonoan as attesting witnesses. The
Margarita Lopez faction had taken equal precautions by calling a witnesses in the guardship proceedings Dr. Sixto de
los Angeles Professor and Chief of the Department of Legal Medicine in the University of the Philippines, and Dr.
Samuel Tietze, with long experience in mental diseases; thereafter by continuing Doctors de Los Angeles and Tietze
to examine Tomas Rodriguez and by associating with them Dr. William Burke, a well-known physician of the City of
Manila. Skilled lawyers were available to aid and abet the medical experts. Out of such situations, do will contests
arise.
An examination of the certificates made by the two sets of physicians and of their testimony shows that on most
facts they concur. Their deductions from these facts disclose a substantial divergence of opinion. It is a hopeless task
to try to reconcile the views of these distinguished gentlemen who honestly arrived at definite but contradictory
conclusions. The best that we can do under the circumstances is to set forth the findings of the Calderon committed
on the hand and of the De Los Angeles committee on the other.
Doctors Calderon, Domingo and Herrera examined Tomas Rodriguez individually and jointly before the date when the
will was executed. All of them, as we have noticed were, present at the signing of the will to note the reactions of the
testator. On the same day that the will was accomplished, the three doctors signed the following certificate:
The undersigned, Drs. of Medicine, with offices in the City of Manila, and engaged in the practice of their
profession do hereby certify:
That they have jointly examined Mr. Tomas Rodriguez, confined in the General Hospital, floor No. 3, room No.
361 on three different occasion and on different days and have found that said patient is suffering from
anemia, hernia inguinal, chronic dyspepsia and senility.
As to his mental state the result of the different tests to which this patient was submitted is that his
intellectual faculties are sound, except that his memory is weak, which is almost a loss for recent facts, or
events which have recently occurred, due to his physical condition and old age.
They also certify that they were present at the time he signed his will on January 3, 1924, at 1:25 p.m. and
have found his mental state in the same condition as was found by the undersigned in their former
examination and that in executing said will the testator and full knowledge of the contents thereof.
In testimony whereof, we sign in Manila this January 3, 1924.
(Sgd.) FLORENTINO HERRERA
Tuberias 1264
Quiapo
(Sgd.) Dr. FERNANDO CALDERON
General Hospital
Manila
(Sgd.) Dr. ELIAS DOMINGO
613 Remedios
Malate
(Exhibit E in relation with Exhibits C and D.)
Doctor Calderon while on the witness-stand expressed a definite opinion as to the mentality of Tomas
Rodriguez What follows is possibly the most significant of the doctor's statements:
Dr. CALDERON testifying after interruption:
A. I was naturally interested in finding out the true mental state of Tomas Rodriguez and that was the chief
reason why I accepted and gave my cooperation to Messrs. Elias Domingo and Florentino Herrera because
had I found that Tomas Rodriguez and Florentino Herrera because had I found that Tomas Rodriguez was
really insane, I should have ordered his transfer to the San Lazaro Hospital or to other places, and would not
have left him in the General Hospital. Pursuant to my desire, I saw Tomas Rodriguez in his room alone twice
to have interviews with his, he begging a person whom I knew since several years ago; at the end of the
interviews I became convinced that there was nothing wrong with him; I had not seen anything indicating
that he was insane and for this reason I accepted the request of my companions and joined them; we have
been on five different occasions examining Tomas Rodriguez jointly from the physical standpoint but chiefly
from the standpoint of his mental state; I have been there with Messrs. Herrera and Elias Domingo,
examining Tomas Rodriguez and submitting to a mental test on the 28, 29, 10 and 31 of December and the
22nd of January, 1924 — five consecutive days in which he have been together besides my particular visits.
Q. Will you place state the result of the observation you made alone before those made by the three of you
jointly? — A. I asked Tomas Rodriguez some questions when I went alone there, I asked him were he was
living formerly and he well remembered that in Intramuros, Calle Real; I asked him whether he remembered
one Calderon who was living in the upper floor of the house and then he told me yes; than I asked him about
his tenant by the name of Antonio Jimenez and he told me yes, — now I remember that he had two
daughters, Matilde and Paz. Then I told him that I had been living in the house of the gentlemen, Antonio
Jimenez already dead — in the upper story of the house belonged to Tomas Rodriguez; I told him that
Antonio Jimenez was his tenant of the upper story, that is that he was living on the ground floor and Antonio
Jimenez upstairs and he remembered all of this I also began to talk of my brother, Felipe Calderon, who he
said of course that he knew; he remembered him because he was his companion and was a successful
attorney. This was when I had an interview with him. Then in order to observe better and to be sure of my
judgment or opinion about the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez, I saw him again and we began to speak of
something which I don't remember now. In fine, we talked of things of interest and as I had finally accepted
the request of Drs. Elias Domino and Florentino Herrera to join then the first and second time that Herrera,
Domingo and myself went there, no stenographic notes were taken of what happened there.
Q. So that before joining Doctors Herrera and Domingo you had already paid two visits to the patient? — A.
Yes, sir.
Q. From the result f the conversation you had with Tomas Rodriguez on those two visits what is your opinion
as to his mental capacity? — A. That he was sick; that he was weak, but I have found absolutely no
 incoherence in his ideas; he answered my questions well and as I was observing him there were times when
he did not remember things of the present — because this must be admitted — but on the other hand he
had a wonderful memory of past events; in talking with him, you would not notice in the conversation any
alteration in his mind nor that man had lost the reasoning power or logic.
Q. Did you notice any loss of memory, or that his memory was weakening about things of the past? — A.
About things of the past, I mean that you talk to him now about specific matters, and after about five or ten
minutes he no longer remembers what had been talked of.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Do you remember the conversation you had with him for the first time when the three of you paid a visit
to the patient? — A. I don't remember the details, but I do remember the questions I put to him. I asked D.
Tomas Rodriguez: You are an old man aged, sick: Yes, I am thinking to make a will. But why don't you decide?
There is no hurry there is time to make a will, 'he said. Then in case you decide to make a will, to whom are
you going to leave your property? Don't you have any relatives? I have a relative, Vicente Lopez, my first
cousin, and Margarita Lopez my first cousin they are brothers.' In that case, to whom, do you want to leave
your property? Why, I don't have much, very little, but I am decided to leave it to my cousin, Vicente Lopez
and his daughter Luz Lopez. Why would you not give anything to Margarita Lopez? No because her husband
is very bad, 'to use his exact language is very bad.'
Q. Did you talk with him on that occasion about his estate? — A. Yes, sir, he told me that he had three
estates, — one on Calle Magallanes, another on Calle Cabildo and the third on Calle Juan Luna and besides
he had money in the Monte de Piedad and Hogar Filipino.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. From the question made by you and the answers given by Mr. Tomas Rodriguez on that occasion, what is
your opinion as to his mental capacity? — A. The following: That the memory of Tomas Rodriguez somewhat
failed as to things of the present, but is all right with regard to matters or facts of the past; that his ideas
were incoherent; that the thought with logic, argued even with power and generally in some of the
interviews I have arrived at the conclusion that Tomas Rodriguez had an initiative of his own, did not need
that anybody should make him any suggestion because he answered in such a way that if you permit me now
to show you my stenographic notes, they will prove to you conclusively that he had an initiative of his own
and had no need of anybody making him any question. (S. R. p. 72.)
Doctor Elias Domingo, who was the attending physician for Tomas Rodriguez throughout all the time that Rodriguez
in the hospital had examined him, was likewise certain that Rodriguez possessed sufficient mentality to make a will.
Among other things, Doctor Domingo testified:
ARANETA: Q. Have you known D. Tomas Rodriguez?
Dr. DOMINGO: A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you attend D. Tomas Rodriguez as physician? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did you begin to attend him as physician? — A. On November 28, until his death.
Q. On November 28 or October 28, 1923, do you remember? — A. I had been attending him as physician
from November 28th although it true that I had opportunities to see and examine him during the months of
October and November.
Q. What was the object of your visits or attendance during the months of October and November? — A. It
was for the purpose of observing his mental state.
Q. Did you really examine his mental condition or capacity during the months of October and November? —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many times did you visit him? — A. I don't remember exactly but I visited him about five or six times.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Please tell us the result of your examination during those months of October and November? — A. I
examined him physically and mentally; I am not going to tell here the physically result but the result of the
mental examination, and that is: General Conduct: In most of the times that I have seen him I found him lying
on his bed, smoking a cigarette and asked for a bottle of lemonade from time to time; I also observed that he
 was very careful when throwing the ash of the cigarette, seeing to it that it did not fall on the blankets; he
also was careful not to throw the stub of the cigarette in any place to avoid fire; I made more observations as
to his general conduct and I found that sometimes Don Tomas could move within the place although with
certain difficulty. On two occasions I found him seated, once seated at the table, seated in the chair, and
other on a rocking chair. I also examined his manner of talking and to all questions that I put to him he
answered with a coherence and in a relevant manner, although sometimes he showed eagerness and certain
delay. I based these points of my declaration on the questions which are usually asked when making a mental
examination for instance I asked him, What is your name, 'and he correctly answered Tomas Rodriguez; I
asked him if he was married and he answered 'No;' I asked him his profession and he answered that formerly
he was an attorney but that at the time I was making the examination he was not practising the profession; I
asked him with what he supported himself and he said that he lived upon his income, he said verbatim, 'I live
on my income.' I also asked him what the amount of him income was and he answered that it was about
P900; I asked him what the source of this income was and he said that it came from his property.
Q. Did you ask him about his property? — A. No, at that time.
Q. Proceed. — A. I also observed his emotional status and effectivity. I found it rather superficial, and he
oftentimes got angry due to his physical disease; I asked him if he had any relatives and he answered
correctly saying that he had. He mentioned Vicente Lopez, Margarita Lopez, and Luz Lopez. As to his memory.
His memory of the past. He very easily remembered past events and when he described them he did it with
such pleasure the he used to smile afterwards — if it was a fact upon which one must smile, His memory of
recent facts was very much lessened. I say this because on various occasions and not having known me when
he had a better memory, after I had seen him thrice he remembered my name and he recognized me. Insight
and judgment. I arrived at the conclusion that he had fair knowledge of himself because he knew that he was
sick and could not be moving with ease, but he believed that he could perform with sufficient ease mental
acts; his judgment was also all right because I asked him this question: 'Supposing that you could find a bill of
P5 in the vestibule of a hotel, what would you do with it ?' He told me that he would take the bill and give it
to the manager in order that the latter may look for the owner if possible. His reasoning. I found that he
showed a moderated retardation in the flow of his thought, especially with regard to recent events, but was
quite all right as to past events, His capacity, He believed that he was capable of thinking properly although
what did not permit him to do so was his physical decrepit condition. The conclusion is that his memory is
lost for recent events tho not totally and diminution of his intellectual vigor. This is in few words the result of
my examination.
Tomas Rodriguez was likewise examined thoroughly by Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke. Doctor De los
Angeles had been a witness in the gurardianship proceedings and had seen the patient of November 6 and 7, 1923.
Doctor Tietze had also been a witness in the guardianship case and had visited the patient on November 9 and 12,
1923, and on January 15, 1924. Doctors Tietze and Burke together examined Rodriguez on January 17, 20, and 24,
1924. The three physicians conducted a joint examination result, on March 15, 1924, they prepared and signed the
following:
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
In the Matter of Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez, male, 76 years of age, single and residing or being confined in the
Philippine General Hospital.
We, the undersigned Doctors, Sixto de los Angeles, W. B. Burke, and Samuel Tietze, do hereby certify as
follows:
1. That we are physicians, duly registered under the Medical Act, and are in the actual practice of the medical
profession in the Philippines.
2. That on January 27th and 28th, and February 10th, 1924, at the Philippine General Hospital, we three have
with care the diligence jointly and personally examined the person of said Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez; and
previous to these dated, we have separately and partly jointly observed and examined said patient on various
occasions; Dr. Sixto de los Angeles, at the patient's home, 246 Magallanes St., Manila, on November 6th and
7th , 1923; Dr. Samuel Tietze, at the patient's home on November 9th and 12th, 1923, and at the Philippine
General Hospital no January 17th, 20th, and 24, 1924; and as a result of the medical examinations and the
history of the case we found and hereby certify to the following conclusions:
(a) That he was of unsound mind suffering from senile dementia, or of mental impairment exceeding to a
pathological extent the unusual conditions and changes found to occur in the involutional period of life.
(b) That he was under the influence of the above condition continuously, at least from November, 1923, till
the date of our joint reexamination, January 27th and 28th, and February 10th, 1924; and that he would
naturally have continued without improvement, as these cases of insanity are due to organic pathological
changes of the brain. This form of mental disease is progressive in its pathological tendency, going on to
progressive atropy and degeneration of the brain, the mental symptoms, of course, running parallel with
such pathological basis.
(c) That on account of such disease and conditions his mind and memory were so greatly impaired as to
make him unable to know or to appreciate sufficiently the nature, effect, and consequences of the business
he was engaged in; to understand and comprehend the extent and condition of his properties; to collect and
to hold in his mind the particulars and details of his business transactions and his relations to the persons
who were or might have been the objects of his bounty; and to free himself from the influences of
importunities, threats and ingenuities, so that with a relatively less resistance, he might had been induced to
do what others would not have done.
3. We have diagnosed this case as senile demential of the simple type, approaching the deteriorated stage
upon the following detailed mental examination:
(a) Disorder of memory. — There was almost an absolute loss of memory of recent events, to the extent that
things and occurrences seen or observed only a few minutes previously were completely forgotten. Faces
and names of person introduced to him were not remembered after a short moment even without leaving
his bedside . He showed no comprehension of the elemental routine required in the management of his
properties, i.e.: who were the lessees of his houses, what rents they were paying, who was the administrator
of his properties, in what banks he deposited his money or the amount of money deposited in such banks.
Regarding his personal relation, he forgot that Mr. Antonio Ventura is the husband of his nearest woman
cousin; the Mrs. Margarita Lopez was married, saying that the latter was single or spinster, in spite of the fact
that formerly, during the past twenty-five years, he was aware of their marriage life, He did not know the
names of the sons and daughters of Mr. Vicente Lopez, one of his nearest relatives, even failing to name Mrs.
Luz Lopez de Bueno, a daughter of said Vicente Lopez, and who now appears to be the only living beneficiary
of his will. He also stated that Mr. Vicente Lopez frequently visited him in the hospital, though the latter died
on January 7th, 1924. He did not recognized and remember the name and face of Doctor Domingo, his own
physician. However, the memory for remote events was generally good, which is a characteristic symptom
of senile dementia.
(b) Disorientation of time, place and persons. — He could not name the date when asked (day or month);
could not name the hospital wherein he was confined; and failed to recognize the fact that Doctor Domingo
was his physician.
(c) Disorders of perception. — He was almost completely indifferent to what was going on about him. He also
failed to recognize the true value of objects shown him, that is he failed to recognized the 'Saturday Evening
Post' nor would he deny that it was a will when presented as such. He also failed to show normal intellectual
perception. Making no effort to correlate facts or to understand matters discussed in their proper light.
(d) Emotional deterioration. — The patient was not known during his time of physical incapacity to express in
any way or lament the fact that he was unable to enjoy the happiness that was due him with his wealth. As a
matter of fact, he showed complete indifference. He showed loss of emotional control by furious outbreaks
over trifling matter and actually behaved like a child; for example, if his food did not arrive immediately of
when his cigar was not lit soon, he would becomes abusive in his language and show marked emotional
outburst. If the servants did not immediately answer his call, he would break down and cry as a child.
(e) Symptoms of decreased intellectual capacity. — There was a laxity of the internal connection of ideas. The
patient has shown no insight regarding his own condition. He did not appreciate the attitude of the parties
concerned in his case; he would on several occasion become suspicious and fail to comprehend the purpose
of our examination. He was inconsistent in his ideas and failed to grasp the meaning of his own statements.
When questioned whether he would make a will, he stated to Doctor Tietze that he intended to bequeath his
money to San Juan de Dios Hospital and Hospicio de San Jose. When He was informed, however, that he had
made a will on January 31, 1924, he denied the latter statement, and failed to explain the former. Although
for a long time confined to bed and seriously ill for a long period, he expressed himself as sound physically
and mentally, and in the false belief that he was fully able to administer his business personally.
His impairment of the intellectual field was further shown by his inability, despite his knowledge of world
affairs, to appreciate the relative value of the statement made by Doctor Tietze as follows: 'We have here a
cheque of P2,000 from the King of Africa payable to you so that you may deposit it in the bank. Do you want
to accept the cheque?' His answer was as follows: 'Now I cannot give my answer. It may be a surprise.' Such
answer given by a man after long experience in business life, who had handled real estate property, well
versed in the transaction of cheques, certainly shows a breaking down of the above field. No proper question
were asked why the cheque was given by the King, who the King was, why he was selected by the King of
Africa, or if there is a King of Africa at present. He further shows doubt in his mental capability by the
following questions and answers:
"MARCAIDA: P. ¿Tiene usted actualmente algún asunto en los tribunales de justicia de Manila? -- R.
No recuerdo en este momento.
"P. De tener usted algún asunto propio en los tribunales de justicia de Manila, ¿a qué abogado
confiaría usted la defensa del mismo?--R. Al Sr. Marcaida, como conocido antiguo.
"P. ¿Ha hablado usted y conferenciado alguna vez o varias veces en estos días, o sea desde el 25 de
octubre de 1923 hasta hoy, con algún abogado para que le defendiera algún asunto ante el Juzgado
de Primera Instancia de Manila?--R. Con ninguno, porque en caso de nombrar, nombraría al Sr.
Marcaida. (P. 5, deposition, Nov. 19, 1923.)
"ARANETA: P. ¿No recuerda usted que usted me ha encomendado como abogado para que me
oponga a que le declaren a usted loco o incapacitado?--R. Sí, señor, quien ha solicitado? (P. 9,
deposition, Nov. 19, 1923.)
"Dr. DOMINGO: P. ¿Don Tomás, me conoce usted? ¿Se acuerda usted que soy el Doctor Domingo?--R.
Sí. (P. 7, sten. N., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P. ¿Quién soy, Don Tomás, usted me conoce?--R. No sé. (P. 6, sten. N., Feb. 10, 1924.)
"Dr. ÁNGELES: P. ¿Me conoce usted, D. Tomás?--R. Le conozco de vista. (P. 6, sten. N., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P. Nos vamos a despedir ya, Don Tomás, de usted. Yo soy el Doctor Ángeles, ¿me conoce usted?--R.
De nombre.
"P. Este es el Doctor Burke, ¿le conoce usted?--R. De nombre.
"P. Este es el Doctor Domingo, ¿le conoce usted?--R. De vista.
"P. Este es el Doctor Burke, ¿recuerda usted su nombre?--R. No. (P. 10, sten. N., Jan. 28, 1924.)
"P.¿Usted conoce a este Doctor? (Señalando al Doctor Burke).--R. De vista; su nombre ya lo he
olvidado, ya no me acuerdo.
"P.¿Usted nos ve a los tres? (Doctores Ángeles, Burke y Tietze).--R. Ya lo creo.
"Dr. BURKE: P. ¿Qué profesión tenemos? (Señalando a los Sres. Ángeles, Burke y Tietze).--R. YO creo
que son doctores.
"P. ¿Y lso dos? (Señalando a los Doctores Ángeles y Tietze).--R. No. sé.
"P. ¿Y este señor? (Señalando al Doctor Ángeles).--R. No me acuerdo en este momento. (P. 4. And 5,
sten. N., Feb. 10, 1924.)
(f) Other facts bearing upon the history of the case obtained by investigation of Doctor Angeles:
I. Family History. — His parents were noted to be of nervous temper and irritable.
II. Personal history. — He was a lawyer, but did not pursue his practice, devoting the greater part of his life to
collecting antiquities, He was generally regarded by his neighbors as miserly and erratic in the ordinary habits
of life. He lead a very unhygienic life, making no attempt to clean the filth of dirt that was around him. He
was neglectful in personal habits. On April, 1921, he suffered an injury to his forehead, from which he
became temporarily unconscious, and was confined in the Philippine General Hospital for treatment. He
frequently complained of attacks of dizziness and headache, following this injury; suffered form a large
hernia; and about two years ago, he was fined for failure in filing his income tax, from which incident, we
have reason to believe, the onset of his mental condition took place. This incident itself can most probably be
considered as a failure of memory. His condition became progressively worse up to his death.
 4. The undersigned have stated all the above facts contained in this certificate to the best of our knowledge
and belief.
Manila, P.I., March 15, 1924.
(Sgd.) SIXTO DE LOS ANGELES
W.B. BURKE, M.D.
SAMUEL TIETZE
(Exhibit 33 in relation with Exhibits 28 and 29.)
Another angle to the condition of the patient on or about January 3, 1924, is disclosed by the treatment record kept
daily by the nurses, in which appear the nurse's remarks. (Exhibits 8-A, 8-B, and 8-C.) In this connection, the
testimony of the nurses is that Rodriguez was in the habit for no reason at all of calling "Maria, where are my 50
centavos, where is my key." In explanation of the observation made by the nurses, the nurse Apolonio Floreza
testified.
Direct questions of Attorney OCAMPO:
Q. Among your observations on the 1st of January, 1924, you say 'with pains all over the body, and uttered
some incoherent words of the same topics whenever is awakened.' How could you observe that he had pains
all over the body?
APOLONIO FLOREZA, nurse: A. I observed that by the fact that whenever I touched the body of the patient he
complained of some pain.
Q. On what part of the body did you touch him? — A. On all the parts of his body.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. How did you touch him, strongly or not? — A. Slightly.
Q. When you touched him slightly, what did he do? — A. He said that it was aching.
Q. What words did he say when, according to your note, he uttered incoherent words whenever he awakes?
— A. As for instance, 'Maria,' repeating it 'Where are my 50 centavos, where is my key?'
Q. Did you hear him talk of Maria? — A. Only the word Maria.
Q. How long approximately was he talking uttering the name of 'Maria, Where are my 50 centavos,' and
where is my key? — A. For two or three minutes.
Q. Can you tell the court whether on those occasions when he said the name of Maria he said other words
and was talking with somebody? — A. He was talking to himself.
Q. This remark on Exhibit 8-B when was it written by you? A. January 2, 1924.
Q. In the observation correspondingly to January 2, 1924 you say, 'With pains over the body,' and later on
talked too much whenever patient is awakened.' How did you happen to know the pain which you have
noted here? A. The pains all over the body, I have observed them when giving him baths.
Q. Besides saying that it ached when you touched the body, do you know whether he did any extraordinary
thing? A. You mean to say acts?
Q. Acts or words? A. Yes, sir, like those words which I have already said which he used to say — Maria, the
key, 50 centavos.
Q. You say that he called Maria. What did he say about Maria on that date January 2, 1924? — A. He used to
say Maria where is Maria?
Q. On that date January 2, 1924, did you answer him when he said Maria? — A. No sir.
Q. In this observation of yours appearing on page 8-C you say among other things with pain all over the body
and shouted whenever he is given injection.' Did you really observe this in the patient? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did he shout?
ARANETA: Objection as being immaterial.
COURT: Overruled.
 ARANETA: Exception.
A. In a loud voice.
Q. Besides shouting do you remember whether he said anything? — A . He repeated the same words I have
said before — Maria the 50 centavos the key.
Q. When did this observation occur which appear on page 8-C? — A. On January 3, 1924. (S. R. p. 5595.)
On certain facts pertaining to the condition of Tomas Rodriguez there is no dispute. On January 3, 1924, Rodriguez
had reached the advanced age of 76 years. He was suffering from anemia, hernia inguinal, chronic dypsia, and
senility. Physically he was a wreck.
As to the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, Doctors Calderon, Domingo and Herrera admit that he
was senile. They, together with Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke, further declare that his memory however
for remote events was generally good. He was given to irrational exclamations symptomatic of a deceased mind.
While, however, Doctors Calderon Domingo, and Herrera certify that the intellectual faculties of the patient are
"sound, except that his memory is weak," and that in executing the will the testator had full understanding of the act
he was performing and full knowledge of the contents thereof, Doctors De Los Angeles, Tietze and Burke certify that
Tomas Rodriguez was of unsound mind and that they diagnosed his case as senile dementia of the simple type
approaching the deteriorated stage. Without attempting at this stage to pass in judgment on the antagonistic
conclusions of the medical witnesses, or on other disputed point, insofar as the facts are concerned, a resolution of
the case comes down to this: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess sufficient mentality to make a will, or
had he passed so far along in senile dementia as to require the court to find him of unsound? We leave the facts in
this situation to pass on to a discussion of the legal phases of the case.
B. Law. — The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes as a requisite to the allowance of a will that the testator be of
"sound mind" (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 614). A "sound mind" is a "disposing mind." One of the grounds for
disallowing a will is "If the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapable of the execution." (Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 634 [2].) Predicated on these statutory provisions, this court has adopted the following definition of
testamentary capacity: "'Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which
the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally
be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.'" (Bugnao vs. Ubag [1909], 14 Phil., 163, followed in Bagtas
vs. Paguio [1912], 46 Phil., 701.) The mental capacity of the testator is determined as of the date of the execution of
his will (Civil Code, art. 666).
Various tests of testamentary capacity have been announced by the courts only later to be rejected as incomplete. Of
the specific tests of capacity, neither old age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the
appointment of a guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly to show testamentary incapacity. Each
case rests on its own facts and must be decided by its own facts.
There is one particular test relative to the capacity to make a will which is of some practical utility. This rule concerns
the nature and rationality of the will. Is the will simple or complicated? Is it natural or unnatural? The mere exclusion
of heirs will not, however, in itself indicate that the will was the offspring of an unsound mind.
On the issue of testamentary capacity, the evidence should be permitted to take a wide range in order that all facts
may be brought out which will assist in determining the question. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a will
concerning the testator's mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. The
evidence of those present at the execution of the will and of the attending physician is also to be relied upon.
(Alexander on Willis, vol. I, pp. 433, 484; Wharton & Stille's Medical Jurisprudence, vol. I pp. 100 et seq.)
The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly
established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document.
(Hernaez vs. Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689; Bagtas vs. Paguio, supra.)
Counsel for the appellee make capital of the testator being under guardianship at the time he made his will. Citing
section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure and certain authorities, they insist that the effect of the judgment is
conclusive with respect to the condition of the person. To this statement we cannot write down our conformity. The
provisions of the cited section were taken from California, and there the Supreme court has never held what is now
urged upon us by the appellee. The rule announced that in some states, by force of statute, the finding of insanity is
conclusive as to the existence of insanity during the continuance of adjudication, is found to rest on local statutes, of
which no counterpart is found in the Philippines. (32 C.J., 647; Gridley vs. Boggs [1882], 62 Cal., 190; In the matter of
the Estate of Johnson [1881], 57 Cal., 529.) Even where the question of insanity is out in issue in the guardianship
proceedings, the most that can be said for the finding is that it raises a presumption of incapacity to make a will but
does not invaluable the testament if competency can be shown. The burden of providing sanity in such case is cast
upon the proponents.
It is here claimed that the unsoundness of mind of the testator was the result of senile dementia. This is the form of
mental decay of the aged upon which will are most often contested. A Newton, Paschal, a Cooley suffering under the
variable weather of the mind, the flying vapors of incipient lunacy," would have proved historic subjects for expert
dispute. Had Shakespeare's King Lear made a will, without any question it would have invited litigation and doubt.
Senile dementia usually called childishness has various forms and stages. To constitute complete senile
dementiathere must be such failure of the mind as to deprive the testator of intelligent action,. In the first stages of
the diseases, a person may possess reason and have will power. (27 L. R. A., N. S. [1910], p. 89; Wharton & Stille's
Medical Jurisprudence, vol. I. pp. 791 et seq.; Schouler on Wills, vol. I, pp. 145 et seq.)
It is a rather remarkable coincidence that of all the leading cases which have gone forth from this court, relating to
the testator having a sound and disposing mind, and which have been brought to our notice by counsel, every one of
them has allowed the will, even when it was necessary to reverse the judgment of the trial court. A study of these
cases discloses a consistent tendency to protect the wishes of the deceased whenever it be legally possible. These
decisions also show great tenderness on the part of the court towards the last will and testament of the aged. (See
Hernaez vs. Hernaez [1903], 1 Phil., 689, per Arellano, C. J., In the matter of the will o f Butalid [1908] 10 Phil., 27 per
Arellano, C. J.; Bugnao vs. Ubag [1909] 14. Phil., 163, per Carson, J.; Macapinlac vs. Alimurong [1910], 16 Phil., 41, per
Arellano, C.J.; Bagtas vs. Paguio [1912], 22 Phil., 227, per Trent, J.; Galvez vs. Galvez [1913], 26 Phil., 243, per Torres,
J.; Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin [1923], 44 Phil., 573, per Ostrand, J.; and Jocson vs. Jocson [1922], 46 Phil., 701,
per Villamor, J.) Because of their peculiar applicability, we propose to make particular mention of four of the earlier
cases of this court.
In the case of Hernaez vs. Hernaez supra the subject of the action was the will executed by Dona Juana Espinosa. The
annulment of the will was sought first upon the ground of the incapacity of the testatrix. She was over 80 years of
age, so ill that three days extreme unction, and two days afterwards she died. Prior thereto she walked in a stooping
attitude and gave contradictory orders," as a result of her senile debility." The chief Justice reached the conclusion
that neither from the facts elicited by the interrogatories nor the documents presented "can the conclusion be
reached that the testatrix was deprived of her mental faculties." The will was held valid and efficacious.
In the case of In the matter of the will of Butalid, supra, the will was contested for the reason that Dominga Butalid at
the date of the execution of the document was not in the date of the execution of the document was not in the free
use of her intellectual powers, she being over 90 years of age, lying in bed seriously ill, senseless and unable to utter
a single word so that she did not know what she was doing when she executed the will while the document was
claimed to have been executed under the influence and by the direction of one of the heirs designated in the will. Yet
after an examination of the evidence in the will. Yet after an examination of the evidence in the will. The Chief Justice
rendered judgment reversing the judgment appealed from and declaring the will presented for legalization to be
valid and sufficient.
In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag, supra the court gave credence to the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who
swore positively that at the time of the execution of the will the testator was of sound mind and memory. Based on
these and other facts, Mr. Justice Carson, speaking for court, laid down the following legal principles:
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full
testamentary known as insanity or idiocy there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and
while on one hand it had been held that mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body, or
from age, will to render a person incapable of making a will a weak or feeble minded person may make a
valid will provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about and
how or to whom he is disposing of his property' (Lodge vs. Lodge, 2 Houst. [Del.] 418); that, "To constitute a
sound be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise (Sloan vs. Maxwell, # N. J. Eq., 563);
that it has not been understood that a testator must possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind
and memory) in the highest degree. . . .Few indeed would be the wills confirmed it this is correct. Pain,
sickness, debility of body from age or infirmity, would according to its violence or duration in a greater or less
degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the derangement must be such as deprives him of
the rational faculties common to man' (Den. vs. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L., 680); and that Sound mind does not
mean a perfectly balanced mind. The question of soundness is one of degree' (Boughton vs. Knight. L. R., 3 P.
 & D., 64; 42 L. P. P., 25); on the other hand, it has been held that testamentary incapacity does not
necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of an unsound mind. Weakness of intellect,
whether it arises from extreme old age, from disease, or great bodily infirmities of suffering, or from all these
combined, may render the testator in capable of making a valid will, providing such weakness really
disqualifies for from knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is engaged
in (Manatt vs. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293, 302).
In the case of Nagtas vs. Paquio, supra, the record shows that the testator for some fourteen or fifteen years prior to
the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body, that a few years prior to his death his
hearing became impaired and that he had lost the power of speech. However, he retained the use of his hand and
could write fairly well. Through the medium of signs, he was able to indicate his wishes to his family. The will was
attacked n the ground that the testator lacked mental capacity at the time of its execution. The will was nevertheless
admitted to probate, Mr. Justice Trent, speaking for the court, announcement the following pertinent legal doctrines:
* * * There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held
that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of
making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his
pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard few
indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both
medical and legal are universal in the statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree and
that there are many graduations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of
diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity and idiocy.
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right which a person
may exercise and this right should be nullified unless mental incapacity is established in a positive and
conclusive manner. In discussing the question of testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume 28, page 70, of
the American and English Encyclopedia of Law that —
'Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression perfect soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary
capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental weakness, disorders or peculiarities and still be
capable in law of executing a valid will.' (See the numerous cases there cited in support of this statement.)
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswel on Insanity, section 365 and quoted with
approval in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill. 466) as follows:
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly unbroken
unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise or that the testator should be in the full possession of his
reasoning faculties.
In note, 1 Jarnan on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
The question is not so much, what was the degree of memory possessed by the testator as had, he a
disposing memory? Was he able to remember the property he was about to bequeth the manner of
distributing it and the object of his bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently sound to
enable him to know and understand the business in which he was engaged at the time when he executed his
will.' (See authorities there cited)
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon the trial of the case: The testator
died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early years he was an intelligent and well informed man. About
seven years prior to his death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that time his mind and memory were
much enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in consequence of the shrinking of his brain he was
affected with senile cataract causing total blindness. He became filthy and obscene in his habits, although
formerly he was observant of the proprieties of life. The court, in commenting upon the case, said:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the capacity to make a will, if
sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be
total or extend to his immediate family to property. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the will and his physical and mental
weakness and defective memory were in striking contrast with their strength in the meridian of his life. He
was blind; not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was forgetful of recent events, especially
 of names and repeated questions in conversation; and sometimes, when aroused from sleep or slumber,
would seem bewildered. It is not singular that some of those who had known him when he was remarkable
for vigor and intelligence are of the opinion that his reason was so far gone that he was incapable of making
a will, although they never heard him utter an irrational expression.
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same contract as was pictured
by the court in the case just quoted. . . .
The particular difference between all of the Philippine case which are cited and the case at bar are that in none of the
Philippine cases was there any declaration of incomplicated and in none of them were the facts quite as complicated
as they are here. A case in point where the will was contested, because the testator was not of sound and disposing
mind and memory and because at the time of the making of the will he was acting under the undue influence of his
brothers and where he had a guardian when he executed his will, is Ames' Will ([1902] 40 Ore., 495). Mr. Justice
Moore, delivering the opinion of the court, in part said:
It is contended by contestant's counsel that on the day said pretended will purports to have been executed,
Lowell was declared incompetent by a court which had jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter and that
the decree therein appointing a guardian of his person and estate raises the distable presumption that he did
not possess sufficient testamentary capacity at the time to overcome which required evidence so strong as to
leave no reasonable doubt as to his capacity to make a valid will, and the testimony introduced by the
proponent being insufficient for that purpose the court erred in admitting it to probate.
The appointment of a guardian of a person alleged to be non compos mentis, by a court having jurisdiction
must necessarily create a presumption of the mental infirmity of the ward; but such decree does not
conclusively show that the testamentary capacity of the person under guardianship is entirely destroyed and
the presumption thus created may be overcome by evidence proving that such person at the time he
executed a will was in fact of sound and disposing mind and memory: Stone vs. Damon, 12 Mass., 487; Breed
vs. Pratt, 18 Pick, 115: In re Slinger's Will, 72 Wis., 22 (37 N. W. 236).
The testimony shows that the testator retained a vivid recollection of the contents of the books he had read
and studied when he was young but that he could not readily recall to his mind the ordinary incidents of his
later life. The depth and intensity of mental impression always depend upon and are measured by the degree
of attention given to the perception of truth, which demands reflection; and hence the inability of a person
to recollect events and hence the inability is evidence of mental decay, because it manifest a want of power
on concentration of the mind. The aged live in the past and the impression retained in their minds are those
that were made in their younger days, because at that period of their lives they were able to exercise will
power by giving attention. While the inability of a person of advanced years to remember recent events
distinctly undoubtedly indicates a decay of the human faculties, it does not conclusively establish senile
dementia, which is something more than a mere loss of mental power, resulting from old age and is not only
a feeble condition of the mind but a derangement thereof. . . . The rule is settled in this state that if a testator
at the time he executes his will understand the business in which he is engaged and has a knowledge of his
property and how he wishes to dispose of it among those entitled to his bounty, he possess sufficient
testamentary capacity, notwithstanding his old age, sickness debility of body, or extreme distress.
xxx xxx xxx
It is contented by contestant's counsel that if Lowell at the time he executed the pretended will, was not
wholly lacking in testamentary capacity, he was, in consequence of age ill health, debility of body and
infirmity of will power, Andrew and Joseph having knowledge thereof took advantage of his physical and
mental condition and unduly influenced him to device and bequeth his property in the manner indicated,
attempting thereby to deprive the contestant of all interest therein except such as was given her by
statute. . . . Assuming that he was easily persuaded and that his brothers and the persons employed by them
to care for him took advantage of his enfeebled condition and prejudiced his mind against the contestant did
such undue influence render the will therefore executed void? . . . When a will has been properly executed, it
is the duty of the courts to uphold it, if the testator possessed a sound and disposing mind and memory and
was free from restraint and not acting under undue influence notwithstanding sympathy for persons legally
entitled to the testator's bounty and a sense of innate justice might suggest a different testamentary
disposition.
Believing, as we do, that the findings of the circuit court are supported by the weight of the testimony its
decree is affirmed.
Insofar as the law on testamentary capacity to make a will is concerned and carrying alone one step further the
question suggested at the end of the presentation of the facts on the same subject a resolution of the case comes
down to this: Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess sufficient mentality to make a will which would meet
the legal test regarding testamentary capacity and have the proponents of the will carried successfully the burden of
proof and shown him to be of sound mind on that date?
II. UNDUE INFLUENCE
A. Facts. — The will was attacked on the further ground of undue influence exercised by the persons benefited in the
will in collaboration with others. The trial judge found this allegation to have been established and made it one of the
bases of his decision. it is now for us to say if the facts justify this finding.
Tomas Rodriguez voluntary named Vicente F. Lopez as his administrator. The latter subsequently became his
guardian. There is every indication that of all his relatives Tomas Rodriguez reposed the most confidence in Vicente F.
Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno. Again, it was Vicente F. Lopez, who, on the suggestion of Rodriguez
secured Maximino Mina to prepare the will, and it was Luz Lopez de Bueno who appears to have gathered the
witnesses and physicians for the execution of the will. This faction of the Lopez family was also a favor through the
orders of Doctor Domingo as to who could be admitted to see the patient.
The trial judge entertained the opinion that there existed "a preconceived plan on the part of the persons who
surrounded Tomas Rodriguez" to secure his signature to the testament. The trial judge may be correct in this
supposition. It is hard to believe, however, that men of the standing of Judge Mina, Doctors Calderon, Domingo,
Herrera, and De Asis and Mr. Legarda would so demean themselves and so fully their characters and reputation as to
participate in a scheme having for its purpose to delude and to betray an old man in his age, rather named was acting
according to the best of his ability to assist in a legitimate act in a legitimate manner. Moreover, considering the
attitude of Tomas Rodriguez toward Margarita Lopez and her husband and his apparent enmity toward them, it
seems fairly evident that even if the will had been made in previous years when Rodriguez was more nearly in his
prime, he would have prepared somewhat a similar document.
B. LAW. — One of the grounds for disallowing a will is that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the art of the beneficiary or some other person for his benefit (Code of Civil Procedure, sec., 634[4]).
Undue influence, as here mentioned in connection with the law of wills and as further mentioned in the Civil Code
(art. 1265), may be defined as that which compelled the testator to do that which is against the will from fear the
desire of peace or from other feeling which is unable to resist.
The theory of undue influence is totally rejected as not proved.
III. JUDGMENT
To restate the combined issued of fact and law in this case pertaining to testamentary capacity: Did Tomas Rodriguez
on January 3, 1924, possess sufficient mentality to make a will which would meet the legal test regarding
testamentary capacity and have the proponents of the will carried successfully the burden of proof and shown him to
be of sound mind on that date?
Two of the subscribing witnesses to the will, one a physician clearly to the regular manner in which the will was
executed and to the testator's mental condition. The other subscribing witness, also, a physician on the contrary
testified to a fact which, if substantiated, would require the court to disallow the will. The attending physician and
three other eminent members of the medical fraternity, who were present at the execution of the will, expressed
opinions entirely favorable to the capacity of the testator. As against this we have the professional speculations of
three other equally eminent members of the medical profession when the will was executed. The advantage on
those facts is all with those who offer the will for probate.
The will was short. It could easily be understood by a person in physical distress. It was reasonable, that is, it was
reasonable if we take into account the evident prejustice of the testator against the husband of Margarita Lopez.
With special reference of the definition of testamentary capacity, we may say this: On January 3, 1924, Tomas
Rodriguez, in our opinion comprehended the nature of the transaction in which he was engaged. He had two
conferences with his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew what the will was to contain. The will was read to him by Mr.
Legarda. He signed the will and its two copies in the proper places at the bottom and on the left margin. At that time
the testator recollected the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have
claims upon him While for some months prior to the making of the will he had not manage his property he seem to
have retained a distinct recollection of what it consisted and of his income. Occasionally his memory failed him with
reference to the names of his relatives. Ordinarily, he knew who they were, he seemed to entertain a prediliction
towards Vicente F. Lopez as would be natural since Lopez was nearest in which the instrument distributed the
property naming the objects of his bounty. His conversations with Judge Mina disclosed as insistence on giving all of
his property to the two persons whom he specified.
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may have been physically decrepit, may
have been weak in intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory, may have had a guardian and may have a been
extremely eccentric, but he still possessed the spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed
intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms "testamentary
capacity." That in effect is the definite opinion which we reach after an exhaustive and exhausting study of a tedious
record, after weighing the evidence for the oppositors, and after giving to the case the serious consideration which it
deserves.
The judgment of the trial court will be set aside and the will of Tomas Rodriguez will be admitted to probate without
special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

Separate Opinions
STREET AND OSTRAND, JJ., dissenting:
We are of the opinion that the judgment which is the subject of appeal in this case is in all respects correct and
should be affirmed. The testator was clearly suffering from senile dementia and lacked the "disposing mind and
memory" the possession of which is a condition precedent to the exercise of testamentary power.
DANILO, LEONORA, DIVINA, PROSPERO, and CONNIE ALUAD vs. ZENAIDO ALUAD
[G.R. No. 176943 October 17, 2008]
Petitioners’ mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses
Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin).
Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz.
After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself. 1
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter
Vivos"2(Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners’ mother Maria 3 covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from
her husband Crispin. The Deed of Donation provided:
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter
being adopted and hav[ing] been brought up by the former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY
WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above-described, to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
rescinded and [of] no further force and effect; Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or
anyone of them who should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of
landherein donated.4 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in Matilde’s name.
On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property. 5
Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament, 6 devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682,
and 680 to Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to respondent.
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year. 7
On August 21, 1995, Maria’s heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a
Complaint,8 for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against
respondent, alleging:
That in 1978, plaintiff[s] possessed the two (2) parcels of land above-described until January 1991 when defendant
entered and possessed the two (2) parcels of land claiming as the adopted son of Crispin Aluad who refused to give
back possession until Matilde Aluad died in [1994] and then retained the possession thereof up to and until the
present time, thus, depriving the plaintiffs of the enjoyment of said parcels of land x x x;
That after the death of Matilde R. Aluad, the plaintiffs succeeded by inheritance by right of representation from their
deceased mother, Maria Aluad who is the sole and only daughter of Matilde Aluad[.] 9
To the complaint respondent alleged in his Answer. 10
That Lot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was adjudicated to him in the Last Will and Testament of Matilde
Aluad x x x while Lot 676 was purchased by him from Matilde Aluad. These two lots are in his possession as true
owners thereof.11 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners later filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Already Filed to Conform to Evidence 12 to which it
annexed an Amended Complaint 13 which cited the donation of the six lots via Deed of Donation in favor of their
mother Maria. Branch 15 of the RTC granted the motion and admitted the Amended Complaint. 14
Respondent filed an Amended Answer 15 contending, inter alia, that the Deed of Donation is forged and falsified and
petitioners’ change of theory showed that "said document was not existing at the time they filed their complaint and
was concocted by them after realizing that their false claim that their mother was the only daughter of Matild[e]
Aluad cannot in anyway be established by them";16 and that if ever said document does exist, the same was already
revoked by Matilde "when [she] exercised all acts of dominion over said properties until she sold Lot 676 to
defendant and until her death with respect to the other lots without any opposition from Maria Aluad." 17
The trial court, by Decision18 of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot
Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. Thus it
disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the subject Lots Nos. 674 and 676, Pilar Cadastre;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver the possession of the subject lots to the plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs:
a. Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees;
b. Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), representing the income from subject Lot 676, a year from 1991 up to the
time said lot is delivered to the plaintiffs, together with the interest thereof at the legal rate until fully paid;
c. Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), representing the income from the subject Lot No. 674, a year from 1991 up to
the time said lot is delivered to the plaintiffs, plus legal interest thereof at the legal rate until fully paid; and
d. The costs of the suit.
Defendant’s counterclaim is ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.19
On petitioners’ motion, the trial court directed the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. 20 Possession of the
subject lots appears to have in fact been taken by petitioners.
By Decision21 of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, it holding that the Deed of
Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the
formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no
attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code, reading:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will shall, also
sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last on the left margin and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that that testator
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction,
in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator, and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot No. 676, it did not so declare with respect
to Lot No. 674, as Matilde’s last will and testament had not yet been probated. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition worthy of merit, the same is hereby GRANTED and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 15, dated 20 September 1996, in Civil Case No. V-6686 for declaration of
ownership, recovery of ownership and possession, and damages is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
A new one is entered in its stead declaring defendant-appellant as the lawful owner of Lot [No.] 676 of the Pilar
Cadastre. Accordingly, plaintiffs-appellees are directed to return the possession of the said lot to the defendant-
appellant.
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay P40,000.00 to defendant-appellant as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.22 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Their Motion for Reconsideration 23 having been denied,24 petitioners filed the present Petition for
Review,25contending that the Court of Appeals erred
I
X X X WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW (RTC, Branch 15, Roxas City) HOLDING THAT THE
DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS’ MOTHER IS IN FACT A DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
II
X X X WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT IS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO. 676 AS LOT BUYER ON THE BASIS OF
A DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE DONOR WHO HAD NO MORE RIGHT TO SELL THE SAME.
III
X X X WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE PETITIONERS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO. 674 AFTER HAVING RULED
WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENT CANNOT BE DECLARED OWNER THEREOF.
IV
X X X WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS IN VIOLATION OF
PARAGRAPH (a) SECTION 2, RULE 39, OF THE RULES OF COURT (AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RETURN
POSSESSION OF LOT 676 TO RESPONDENT) AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COST[S] OF
SUIT.26
As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners’ mother one of mortis causa, it having the
following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what amounts to the
same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.27 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no
other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners’
mother during her (Matilde’s) lifetime.28
The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who
should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein
donated"29 means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the
right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership. 30 The
phrase in the Deed of Donation "or anyone of them who should survive" is of course out of sync. For the Deed of
Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have
referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves concede that such phrase does not refer to the donee, thus:
x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the disputed paragraph should only refer to Matilde
Aluad, the donor, because she was the only surviving spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14 November
1981, as her husband – Crispin Aluad [–] had long been dead as early as 1975. 31
The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned:
x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period when the donor provides in the aforequoted
provisions, "but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
rescinded and [of] no further force and effect". When the donor provides that should the "DONEE" xxx die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" the logical
construction thereof is that after the execution of the subject donation, the same became effective immediately and
shall be "deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" upon the arrival of a resolutory term or period, i.e.,
the death of the donee which shall occur before that of the donor. Understandably, the arrival of this resolutory term
or period cannot rescind and render of no further force and effect a donation which has never become effective,
because, certainly what donation is there to be rescinded and rendered of no further force and effect upon the
arrival of said resolutory term or period if there was no donation which was already effective at the time when the
donee died?32 (Underscoring supplied)
A similar ratio in a case had been brushed aside by this Court, however, thus:
x x x [P]etitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners [donee] die ahead of [donor]
Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation as inter vivos.
Petitioners’ arguments are bereft of merit.33
xxxx
x x x The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case [donees] the petitioners
predecease [the donor] Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics of a
donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is
exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect
during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated to the donee or independently of, and not by
reason of her death, she would not have expressed such proviso in the subject deeds. 34 (Underscoring supplied)
As the Court of Appeals observed, "x x x [t]hat the donation is mortis causa is fortified by Matilde’s acts of possession
as she continued to pay the taxes for the said properties which remained under her name; appropriated the produce;
and applied for free patents for which OCTs were issued under her name." 35
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed 36 but they were not, as it
was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. 37
Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause 38 the execution of which clause is a
requirement separate from the subscription of the will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the
pages of the will. So the Court has emphasized:
x x x Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will
from the requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]. The respective intents
behind these two classes of signature[s] are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every
page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the
other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements
contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of
the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the
left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these
witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a
wholly different avowal.
x x x It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used
upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The only
proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation
clause.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the notary public, 40 which is not in accordance with
the requirement of Article 806 of the Civil Code that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses.
More. The requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper
part of each page was not also followed.41
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a
will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were
observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria. 42 Matilde thus validly
disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her
(Matilde’s) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by
Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.
Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No. 674 in favor of their mother is
indeed mortis causa, hence, Matilde could devise it to respondent, the lot should nevertheless have been awarded to
them because they had acquired it by acquisitive prescription, they having been in continuous, uninterrupted,
adverse, open, and public possession of it in good faith and in the concept of an owner since 1978. 43
Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the lower courts, however, they having laid their
claim on the basis of inheritance from their mother. As a general rule, points of law, theories, and issues not brought
to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 44 For a contrary rule would be unfair to
the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it
could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court. 45
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.