1. Isip v.

People (2007) the redemption of the said check, accused refused

and still refuses to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: above-stated amount of P562,000.00, Philippine
Currency.[4]

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the Decision [1] of the The six other Informations are similarly worded except for the
Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21275 date when the offense was committed, the number and amount of the
entitled, People of the Philippines v. Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M. check. The pertinent data in the other informations are as follows:
Isip to the extent that it affirmed with modifications petitioner Manuel
Crim. Case Date of No. of Check Amount of
S. Isips conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136-84 of the Regional
No. Commission Check
Trial Court (RTC), Branch XVII, Cavite City, and its Amended 518644
147-84 17 March 1984 518645 P50,000.00
Decision[2] dated 26 October 2005 denying his Partial Motion for 148-84 30 March 1984 030086[5] P50,000.00
Reconsideration. 149-84 12 March 1984 518674 P150,000.00
155-84 25 March 1984 518646 P95,000.00
156-84 29 March 1984 518669 P90,000.00
157-84 1 April 1984 P25,000.00
The antecedents are the following:

Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal Case No. 136- The spouses Isip were likewise charged before the same court

84 before Branch XVII of the RTC of Cavite City, under the following with five (5) counts of Estafa. The cases were docketed as Criminal

information: Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84. The Estafa

charged in Crim. Case No. 256-84 was allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of
Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the
That on or about March 20, 1984, in the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within
named accused, received from Leonardo A. Jose
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
one (1) seven carat diamond (mens ring), valued
named accused, conspiring, confederating together
at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same
and mutually helping one another, received from
on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of
one Leonardo A. Jose the following pieces of
the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold, on
jewelry, to wit: one (1) set dome shape ring and
or before March 15, 1984, but the herein accused
earrings valued atP120,000.00, with the obligation
once in possession of the above-described articles,
of selling the same on commission basis and deliver
with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of
the proceeds of the sale thereof or return them if
confidence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
not sold, on or before March 21, 1984, but the
and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
herein accused, once in possession of the said
convert the same to his own personal use and
jewelry by means of false pretenses, with intent to
benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands
defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did,
made by Leonardo A. Jose for the return of the
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
jewelry or the delivery of the proceeds of the sale
misappropriate, misapply and convert them to their
thereof, failed to do so, to the damage and
own personal use and benefit and paid the same
prejudice of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the
with Check Nos. 518646 and 518669, dated March
abovestated amount ofP200,000.00, Philippine
29, 1984 and April 1, 1984, respectively, in the
Currency.[3]
amount of P90,000 and P25,000, respectively,
which upon presentation with the bank was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds and
Petitioners wife, Marietta M. Isip, was indicted before the same court notwithstanding repeated demands made by
Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption of the said
for seven counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise check, failed to do so, to his damage and prejudice
in the abovestated amount of P120,000.00,
known as the Bouncing Checks Law.The cases were docketed as
Philippine Currency.[6]
Criminal Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and

157-84. The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No.

Except for the description and value of the pieces of jewelry
146-84 reads:
That on or about March 27, 1984, in the involved, date of receipt and agreed date of return, and the number,
City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within
date and amount of the checks issued in payment thereof, the four
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, knowing fully well that her account other informations are similarly worded. The specifics thereof are as
with the bank is insufficient, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly follows:
issue Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 518672
in the amount ofP562,000.00, in payment for
Crim. Value of Date of Agreed Check Amount
assorted pieces of jewelry, received from Leonardo
Case Jewelry Receipt Date No./Date
A. Jose, which check upon presentation with the
No. of
drawee bank for payment was dishonored for
P150,000 03-07- Return P150,000
insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding
P95,000 84 P95,000
repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for
1
 257- P562,000 03-20- 03-30- 030086/03- P562,000
84 P200,000 84 84 12-84 P50,000
260- 03-20- 03-27- 518647/03- P50,000
84 84 84 25-84
261- 02-03- 03-27- 518672/03-
84 84 84 27-84
378- - 518644/03-
84 17-84
518645/03-
30-84
When arraigned on the charges, petitioner and Marietta Isip
pleaded not guilty. There being only one complainant in all the cases,
joint trial of the cases followed.
The versions of the prosecution and the defense, as taken by
the Court of Appeals in the parties respective briefs, are the following:
i) Prosecution Version.
Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses Manuel and
Marietta Isip were introduced to complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose. The introduction was made by
complainants father, Nemesio, business associate
of the Isips. Nemesio and the Isips were then
engaged in the buy and sell of pledged and
unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling habitus
(pp. 8-16, tsn, June 8, 1993).
Needing a bigger capital to finance the growing
operation, the Isips convinced complainant to be
their capitalist, a proposition to which complainant
acceded to (p. 14, ibid).
Thus, the operation went smoothly that was before
February, 1984 (pp. 14-18, tsn, ibid).
On February 3, 1984, at complainants residence in
Caridad, Cavite City, appellant spouses received
from complainant a 6 carat mens ring valued
at P200,000.00 with the condition that they are
going to sell said jewelry x x x on commission basis
for P200,000.00 and if they are not able to sell the
same, they have to return the ring if sold on or
before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn, October 15, 1993).
On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the ring
or the proceeds thereof. Instead, Marietta Isip
issued two (2) personal checks dated March 17 and
30, 1984, respectively, for P50,000.00 each as
partial payment for the jewelry. The receipt of the
jewelry was acknowledged by Marietta Isip with
Manuel acting as a witness (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid).
This particular mens ring is the subject of Criminal
Case No. 378-84 for Estafa while Check Nos. 518644
and 518645 (Pacific Banking Corp.) dated March 17
and 30, respectively, are the subject of Criminal
Case Nos. 147-84 and 148-84.
In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip couple
went again to complainants residence in
Caridad, Cavite City where complainant delivered
one (1) Choker Pearl with 35 pieces of south sea
pearls with diamond worth P150,000.00. The
condition was that the proceeds be turned over to
complainant on or before March 30, 1984 (pp. 27-
29, tsn, ibid). March 30, 1984 came, but instead of
turning over the proceeds or return the Choker
Pearl, Mrs. Isip issued a check dated March 12, 1984
for P150,000.00 (RCBC check No. 030086) as
payment (p. 34, ibid).
2
This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 254-84 for
Estafa against the spouses and Criminal Case No.
149-84 for violation of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Manuel Isip
went to complainants residence in Cavite City and
got from the latter a mens ring (7 carats)
worth P200,000.00. Mr. Isip signed a receipt with
the condition that he return the ring or deliver the
proceeds, if sold, on or before March 15,
1984. March 15, 1984 came, but Mr. Isip sought an
extension which fell due on April 7, 1984. April 7,
1984 came and went by, but Mr. Isip defaulted (pp.
41-46, tsn, ibid). The above is the subject matter of
Criminal Case No. 136-84 for Estafa against Manuel
Isip.
On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again
to Cavite City and got from complainant one (1)
Dome shaped ring with matching earring with
diamonds valued at P120,000.00. As with their
previous agreement, the item was to be returned
or the proceeds of the sale be delivered on March
21, 1984 (pp. 48-52, tsn, ibid). The following
morning, however, Mrs. Isip issued two (2) personal
checks (Check Nos. 518646 and 518669 dated
March 29, 1984 for P90,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively) in payment for the Dome shaped ring
(p. 53, tsn, ibid).
This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 256084 for
Estafa against the spouses Isip and Criminal Case
Nos. 156-84 and and (sic) 157-84 for Violation of BP
22 against Marietta Isip.
At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple went
back to the residence of complainant and got from
him one (1) collar heart shaped necklace and one
(1) baguette necklace worth P95,000.00 (p. 60, tsn,
ibid). As agreed upon, Marietta Isip signed a receipt
with the condition that the jewelry or the proceeds
thereof be delivered to complainant on March 27,
1984. The Isips defaulted and instead, Mrs. Isip
issued a check (Check No. 518647) dated March 27,
1984 in the amount of P90,000.00 (pp. 3-5,
tsn, October 22, 1993).
The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject of
Criminal Case No. 260-84 for Estafa against the Isip
couple and Criminal Case No. 155-84 for Violation
of BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984, the
Isips went to complainant informing him that
Balikbayan doctors are having a convention in
Vigan, Ilocos Sur saying that, that was the most
opportune time to sell jewelries. Assorted pieces of
jewelry were delivered to Mrs. Isip as reflected in a
receipt duly signed by her (Exhibit O)
acknowledging the value thereof to the tune
ofP562,000.00.
Exhibit O contained the promise that the jewelry or
proceeds thereof will be delivered on March 27,
1984. Inspite of the promise contained in Exhibit O,
Mrs. Isip issued a postdated check (Check No.
51867) dated March 27, 1984 in the amount
of P562,000.00 as payment for the assorted pieces
of jewelry (pp. 8-12, tsn, October 22, 1993).
This is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 261-
84 for Estafa against the couple and Criminal Case
No. 146-84 against Marietta Isip for Violation of BP
22.
All of the checks covered by the above transactions
were deposited on April 6, 1984 (p. 14, tsn, ibid),
but all of them bounced for being drawn against
insufficient funds. Demand letters sent to the
couple proved futile (pp. 15-20, ibid).
ii) Defense Version.
During all the times material to these cases,
complainant Leonardo Jose, who had his residence
at Room 411, 4th Floor, Plaza Towers Condominium
on (sic) 3375 Guerrero Street, Ermita, Manila, but
claims he had his ancestral home at 506 P. Burgos
Street, Caridad, Cavite, was an employee of the
Bureau of Customs, having been so since 1964 (Tr.,
6/8/93, 7). Upon the other hand, appellants
Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and Marietta M.
Isip (Marietta hereafter) are spouses, residents at
3635 M. Arellano Street, Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila
(Tr., 8/29/93, 4) and engaged in various business
undertakings in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio
City, Olongapo City and Bataan (Tr., Idem, 9; Tr.,
10/2/95, 13) appellant Manuel, in the brokerage
and trucking business; while appellant Marietta, in
that of selling jewelry and financing, as well as in PX
goods, real estate and cars, which she started when
she was still single (Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr., 10/2/95,
12). In 1982, at the casino in Olongapo City,
appellant Marietta started obtaining jewelry from
losing or financially-strapped players which she
repledged as security for financing she obtained
from one Nemesio Jose, father of complainant
Leonardo Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem,
14). After about a year, when Nemesio Jose ran
short of capital, he referred appellants to his son,
complainant Leonardo Jose, with address at the
Plaza Towers Condominium aforesaid for needed
financing (Tr., Idem, 13-14; Tr., Idem, 17-
19). Beginning early 1983, at complainants
residence at Plaza Tower Condominium in Manila,
appellant Marietta, accompanied by her husband
who participated only as a witness, started having
transactions with complainant who, on different
dates in February, March and April, 1984, extended
various amounts to her for which appellant
Marietta pledged jewelry which, in turn, were
agreed between her and complainant to be sold on
commission and to turn over the proceeds thereof
or return the jewelry to complainant (Tr., Idem, 16-
18). In the course of the transactions, appellant
Marietta had issued several checks to complainant
as guarantee for the payment of the subject jewelry
which have either been paid or redeemed, had
returned the unsold jewelry to complainant and
had conveyed, by way of payment for other jewelry,
some personal properties, like brass and antics, and
real properties in Balanga, Bataan and Mabalacat,
Pampanga, to complainant who caused the same to
be registered in the names of his son, Christian Jose,
and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A, 3, 4, 5,
6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the result that all the obligations
of appellants to complainant have already been
paid for or offset (Tr., Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24, 34-
36, 37-39; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8). Also, all the checks that
appellant Marietta issued which were initially
dishonored have already been (sic) (Tr., 10/2/95,
25-30; Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In fact, complainant caused
the dismissal of some cases he filed against
appellants. Complainant however failed to return
some of the redeemed and/or paid checks issued to
him by appellant Marietta on the pretext that he
did not bring them (Tr., 3/4/96, 20). Inasmuch as
appellant Marietta incurred some default in
payment and complainant suspected that she
would not be able to redeem the checks or pay for
the pledged jewelry, complainant demanded that
appellants sign certain documents to avoid any
3
misunderstanding, with threat of prosecution
before the Cavite courts if they do not comply (Tr.,
Idem, 19-20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-6). So, in order to
maintain good relations with complainant,
appellant Marietta signed the document
acknowledging obligations to him in one sitting,
which appellant Manuel witnessed (Tr., Idem, 21-
22). Later, appellants learned that, although all the
transactions were entered into in Manila,
complainant filed the cases herein before the
Cavite Regional Trial Court (Tr., Idem, 23-24).[7]
On November 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion thereof reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
finds the accused Dra. Marietta M. Isip guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of a (sic) violation of B.P.
22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-
84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 and she is hereby
sentenced to undergo imprisonment of One (1)
year of prision correctional (sic) in each case; and of
Estafa in the following Crim. Cases: No. 256-84
where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment
of, from Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount
of P120,000.00 for the value of the articles
misappropriated; Crim. Case No. 257-84 where she
is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from
Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of P150,000.00; Crim.
Case No. 260-84 where she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Eight (8) years and One (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen
(17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose
the amount of P95,000.00; Crim. Case No. 261-84
where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment
of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the
amount of P562,000.00; Crim. Case No. 378-84
where she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment
of, from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the
amount of P200,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in Crim.
Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84. However, in Crim. Case No. 136-84, he is
hereby found guilty of Estafa and he is hereby
sentenced to undergo imprisonment of, from
Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in the amount
of P200,000.00 value of the jewelry
misappropriated, and to pay the costs.[8]
In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the transactions involved in
these cases were sufficiently shown to have taken place at complainant
Atty. Leonardo Joses ancestral house in Cavite City when the latter was
on leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs where he was

connected. It said the defense failed to substantially prove its
allegations that the transactions occurred in Manila, particularly in the
Towers Condominium, and that complainant is a resident of
Bigasan, Makati. It added that the testimony of Marietta Isip that the
money with which the complainant initially agreed to finance their
transactions was withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance
in Cavite City further refuted the defenses claim that the transactions
happened in Manila. The trial court likewise found the defenses
contention, that the obligations were already paid and set-off with the
turnover to complainant of personal and real properties, to be
untenable for it is contrary to human nature to demand payment when
the same had already been made and the alleged set-offs were for
other cases which were settled amicably and subsequently dismissed
upon motion of the City Prosecutors Office at the instance of the
complainant.
The trial court was convinced that accused Marietta Isip
misappropriated the pieces of jewelry involved in Criminal Cases No.
256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 and violated Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 when she issued the checks mentioned in Criminal
Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-
84. As to petitioner, the trial court acquitted him in Criminal Cases No.
256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 finding him to have acted
as a mere witness when he signed the receipts involved in said cases,
but found him liable in Criminal Case No. 136-84 for misappropriating a
7-carat diamond mens ring which he secured from the complainant.
Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to the Court of Appeals
assigning the following as errors:
-I-
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE
OF AND DECIDING THE CASES AGAINST
APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE SAME
UPON THE GROUND THAT NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL
INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED THEREIN
WAS COMMITTED WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION.
- II -
THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASES BELOW, ERRD IN NOT HOLDING
THAT NO CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG. 22 WAS INCURRED BY
APPELLANT MARIETTA M. ISIP FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS INASMUCH AS SAID
CHECKS WERE ISSUED AS MERE GUARANTY FOR
OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.
- III -
THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT
LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF ESTAFA HAD BEEN
INCURRED BY APPELLANTS IN THE PREMISES,
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT SUCH INCIPIENT
LIABILITY HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
4
PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS MADE AND/OR
NOVATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
COMPLAINANT AND SAID APPELLANTS.
- IV -
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANTS
MANUEL S. ISIP AND MARIETTA M. ISIP GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF
ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 22 RESPECTFULLY IMPUTED UPON THEM AND
IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM UPON THE GROUND
THAT THEIR GUILT THEREOF, OR OF ANY CRIME FOR
THAT MATTER, HAD NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE
LIABILITY INCURRED BY THEM, IF ANY, IS MERELY
CIVIL.[9]
Before the Court of Appeals could have decided the case, Marietta Isip
died thereby extinguishing her criminal and civil liability, if any.
In a decision promulgated 26 October 2004, the Court of Appeals
disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City (Branch XVII)
1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that the sentence imposed on
accused-appellant Manuel S. Isip shall be two (2)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and that the sum of P200,000.00 he was
ordered to pay to Leonardo A. Jose shall bear
interest at the legal rate from filing of the
information until fully paid;
2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-
84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 is REVERSED and
accused-appellant Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of
the crimes charged; and
3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84,
257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED
and accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and Marietta
M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged, but
ordering them to pay to Leonardo A. Jose, jointly
and severally, the sums
of P120,000.00, P150,000.00, P95,000.00, P562,00
0.00 and P200,000.00 representing the amounts
involved in said cases, plus interest thereon at the
legal rate from filing of the information until fully
paid.[10]
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower courts finding that the
venue was properly laid and that the checks were delivered by the two
accused and/or that the transactions transpired at complainants
ancestral home in Cavite City, and that, consequently, the offenses
charged took place within its territorial jurisdiction. With respect to the
seven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the appellate court
acquitted Marietta Isip of the charges on the ground that since the
checks involved were issued prior to 8 August 1984, the dishonor
thereof did not give rise to a criminal liability pursuant to Ministry
Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice.

As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84,
260-84, 261-84 and 378-84), the Court of Appeals ruled that since the
checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for the pieces of jewelry were
dishonored, there was no payment to speak of. It also found the
defenses claim of redemption/dacion en pago that real and personal
properties were conveyed to complainant who executed affidavits of
desistance and caused the dismissal of some of the cases to be
unmeritorious. However, the appellate court ruled that though
novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the rise
of such liability as long at it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal
information in court.In these five cases, it ruled that there was novation
because complainant accepted the checks issued by Marietta Isip as
payment for the pieces of jewelry involved in said cases.Consequently,
the Court of Appeals acquitted Marietta and petitioner,[11] but held
them liable to complainant for the value of the jewelry involved.
As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for estafa against
petitioner, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling of
conviction. It found petitioners claims that he did not receive the
jewelry worth P200,000.00 mentioned in the information; that the
receipt he issued for said jewelry was among those documents which
were forced upon him to sign under threat of criminal prosecution; and
that he signed the same to preserve his friendship with complainant, to
be not persuasive.
On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself and in
representation of his deceased wife, Marietta Isip, filed a Partial Motion
for Reconsideration insofar as it affirmed his conviction in Criminal Case
No. 136-84 and adjudged him civilly liable, jointly and severally, with
Marietta Isip in Criminal Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84.[12]
On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals, taking into
account the death of Marietta M. Isip prior to the promulgation of its
decision, rendered an Amended Decision with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 26,
2004 is AMENDED in respect to par. 3 of the
dispositive portion thereof which shall now read as
follows:
3. In Crim. Cases Nos.
256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84
and 378-84 is REVERSED,
accused-appellants Manuel S.
Isip and Marietta M. Isip
ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged and the civil aspect of
those cases DISMISSED.[13]
5
Petitioner is now before us appealing his conviction in Criminal Case No.
136-84. He raises the following issues:
First WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE IMPUTED
TO PETITIONER AND FOR WHICH HE WAS
CONVICTED;
Second WHETHER THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY
SHOWS THAT PETITIONER RECEIVED THE SUBJECT
OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT HE RECEIVED IT IN
CAVITE CITY; and
Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL
LIABILITY ARISING FROM SAID OFFENSE, IS (sic)
ANY, WAS EXTINGUISHED BY NOVATION.
On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and it is pure
speculation and conjectural, if not altogether improbable or manifestly
absurd, to suppose that any of the essential elements of the Estafa
charged in Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in Cavite City. First, he
states that the residence of the parties is immaterial and that it is
the situs of the transaction that counts. He argues that it is non
sequitur that simply because complainant had an alleged ancestral
house in Caridad, Cavite, complainant actually lived there and had the
transactions there with him when he and his late wife were actual
residents of Manila.Mere convenience suggests that their transaction
was entered into in Manila. He adds that the source of the fund used to
finance the transactions is likewise inconsequential because it is where
the subject item was delivered and received by petitioner and/or where
it was to be accounted for that determines venue where Estafa, if any,
may be charged and tried. Second, he further argues that it does not
follow that because complainant may have been on leave from the
Bureau of Customs, the transactions were necessarily entered into
during that leave and in Cavite City. He asserts that there is no
competent proof showing that during his leave of absence, he stayed
in Cavite City; and that the transactions involved, including the subject
of Criminal Case 136-84 covering roughly the period from February to
April 1984, coincided with his alleged leave.
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in
civil cases, is jurisdictional.[14] The place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction.[15] It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the
court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over
a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or hold that there is sufficient evidence to show that the particular

information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take transaction took place in Cavite City.

cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the On the second issue, petitioner contends that the Court of

trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court Appeals holding that the ring subject of Crim. Case No. 136-84 was

should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.[16] delivered to and received by petitioner is seriously flawed. He argues

that assuming he signed the receipt evidencing delivery of the ring, not

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, due to the threat of prosecution but merely to preserve his friendship

are convinced that the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite with complainant, the fact remains that there is no showing that the

City. The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction ring was actually delivered to him. Petitioner insists there is no

covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took place in his ancestral home competent evidence that the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84

in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of absence[17] from the was ever actually received by, or delivered to, him.

Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown that venue was properly

laid, it is now petitioners task to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that We find his contentions untenable. The finding of the Court

the transaction involved was entered into inManila. The age-old but of Appeals that petitioner received the ring subject of Criminal Case No.

familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations applies.[18] 136-84 is supported by the evidence on record. The acknowledgment

receipt[21] executed by petitioner is very clear evidence that he received

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient the ring in question. Petitioners claim that he did not receive any ring

and competent evidence that the transaction happened and merely executed said receipt in order to preserve his friendship

in Manila. Petitioner argues that since he and his late wife actually with the complainant deserves scant consideration.

resided in Manila, convenience alone unerringly suggests that the

transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded. The fact Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is, knows the

that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not necessarily mean that significance, import and obligation of what he executed and signed. The

the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not following disputable presumptions weigh heavily against petitioner,

prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can procure namely: (a) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his

goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in the case voluntary act; (b) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (c)

at bar. It is not improbable or impossible for petitioner and his wife to That private transactions have been fair and regular; and (d) That the

have gone, not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the ordinary course of business has been followed [22] Thus, it is presumed

number of times they received pieces of jewelry from that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its

complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by petitioners contents and consequences. We know that petitioner understood fully

late wife in all the transactions with complainant were drawn against well the ramification of the acknowledgment receipt he executed. It

accounts with banks in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the devolves upon him then to overcome these presumptions. We,

conclusion that the transactions were not entered into in Cavite City. however, find that he failed to do so. Aside from his self-serving

allegation that he signed the receipt to preserve his friendship with

It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial complainant, there is no competent evidence that would rebut said

courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and presumptions. It is clear from the evidence that petitioner signed the
binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or acknowledgment receipt when he received the ring from complainant

circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having in Cavite City.

the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and

manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the Petitioners argument that he did not receive the subject

appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence.[19] It is to be ring[23] is further belied by the testimony of his wife when the latter

pointed out that the findings of fact of the trial court have been testified that said ring was borrowed by him on7 March 1984. [24] In all,

affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial courts the delivery of the ring and the transaction regarding the same occurred

findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are in Cavite City.

generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. [20] In the case at bar, Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that, assuming gratia
we find no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the trial court, argumenti that any criminal liability was incurred by petitioner

as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and to apply the exception. We so respecting the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84, the same was

incipient, at best, and was effectively extinguished by novation. The

6
personal and real properties delivered/conveyed to complainant were
more than sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance remained of
the obligations incurred as shown by the fact that complainant
executed Affidavits of Desistance and caused the dismissal of some of
the cases filed. He maintains that the Court of Appeals did not apply the
rule of novation as regards the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84
because it rejected his denial of receipt of said ring and his claim that
he signed the receipt supposedly covering the same under threat of
prosecution and merely to preserve their good relations. He claims the
Court should not have denied the application of the rule of novation on
said case because the rejected initial claim (that he did not receive the
ring and that he signed the receipt to preserve their good relations) was
but an alternative defense and its rejection is not a reason to deny the
application of the novation rule in said case.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that novation[25] cannot
be applied in Criminal Case No. 136-84. The claim of petitioner that the
personal and real properties conveyed to complainant and/or to his
family were more than sufficient to cover or offset whatever balance
remained of the obligations incurred has no basis. If it were true that
the properties delivered to complainant were sufficient, the latter
would have caused the dismissal of all, not some as in this instance, the
cases against petitioner and his late wife.This, complainant did not do
for the simple reason that the properties conveyed to him were not
enough to cover all the obligations incurred by petitioner and his
deceased wife.Complainant testified that the properties he received
were in settlement of cases other than the cases being tried
herein.[26] In particular, he said that petitioner and his spouse settled
eight cases which were subsequently dismissed when they delivered
properties as payment.[27] It follows then that the obligations incurred
by petitioner and his spouse were not yet settled when the criminal
cases herein tried were filed.
His contention, that the Court of Appeals did not apply the
rule of novation in Criminal Case No. 136-84 because it rejected or did
not believe his (alternative) defense of denial, is untenable. The main
reason why the Court of Appeals did not apply novation in said case was
that not all the elements of novation are present. For novation to take
place, four essential requisites have to be met, namely, (1) a previous
valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a new
contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth
of a valid new obligation. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, only the first
element is extant. What distinguishes this case from Criminal Cases No.
256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84, where the Court of Appeals
applied the rule of novation, was that there were checks issued as
payment, though subsequently dishonored, for the pieces of jewelry
involved. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is very clear that neither
7
petitioner nor his wife issued any check as payment for the subject ring
that could have extinguished his old obligation and brought to life a new
obligation.
From the allegations of the information in Criminal Case No.
136-84, it is clear that petitioner was charged with Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa
with abuse of confidence are: (1) the offender receives the money,
goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
deliver, or to return, the same; (2) the offender misappropriates or
converts such money or property or denies receiving such money or
property; (3) the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (4) the offended party demands that the
offender return the money or property.[28] All these are present in this
case. Petitioner received from complainant a seven-carat diamond
(mens ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same
on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or
return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner misappropriated or converted
said ring for his own benefit and even denied receiving the
same. Despite repeated demands from complainant, petitioner failed
to return the ring or the proceeds of the sale thereof causing damage
and prejudice to complainant in the amount of P200,000.00.
As to the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on
petitioner, we find the same to be in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision and amended decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 21275 dated 26 October 2004 dated 26
October 2005, respectively, areAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
2. LBP v. Belista (2009)
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court filed by Land Bank of the Philippines (petitioner),
seeking to annul and set aside the May 26, 2004 Decision[1] and the July
28, 2004 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
81096.
The antecedent facts and proceedings, as narrated by the CA, are as
follows:
It appears that spouses Pablo Ralla and
Carmen Munoz Ralla had donated their eight (8)
parcels of lot located in Ligao, Albay to their daughter,
Rene Ralla Belista, the herein private respondent.
 The court a quo motu propio dismissed the
The eight (8) parcels of lot were placed by case when it issued the herein first assailed Order
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity) dated 12 November 2003 for failure to exhaust
under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian administrative remedies and/or comply with Sections
Reform Program (Presidential Decree No. 27 and 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX, 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
Executive Order No. 228). Consequently, private
Petitioner LBP lodged a Motion for
respondent claimed payment of just compensation
Reconsideration arguing, inter alia, that the DARAB
over said agricultural lands.
2003 Rules of Procedure does not apply to SAC nor its
precursor DARAB Case and that the ground for
It further appears that the DAR's evaluation
dismissal of the case is not among the instances when
of the subject farms was only P227,582.58,
a court may dismiss a case on its motion.
while petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP,
for brevity) assessed the same at P317,259.31.
As the court a quo denied its Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated 28 November
Believing that her lots were grossly
2003, petitioner LBP elevated the case before the
underestimated, private respondent, on 11
Tribunal through the present Petition for Review,
November 2002, filed a Petition for Valuation and
theorizing:
Payment of Just Compensation against petitioning
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SAC A
bank before the DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for
QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING
Region V (RARAD-V) docketed as DCN D-05-02-VC-
THE CASE MOTU PROPIO ON
005.
THE GROUND OF PLAINTIFF'S
FAILURE TO EXHAUST
On 07 July 2003, the RARAD-V issued a
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
Decision, in favor of herein private respondent, the
fallo of which reads: II. WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 5,
6, AND 7, RULE XIX OF THE
Wherefore, just DARAB 2003 RULES OF
compensation for the subject PROCEDURE APPLY TO CASES
areas is hereby preliminarily FILED AND PENDING BEFORE
fixed at TWO MILLION EIGHT THE DARAB OR ITS
HUNDRED NINETY-SIX ADJUDICATORS PRIOR TO ITS
THOUSAND and FOUR EFFECTIVITY AND TO CASES
HUNDRED EIGHT & 91/100 FILED AND PENDING WITH THE
(P2,896,408.91) PESOS. Land SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS.[3]
Bank of
the Philippines, Legaspi City, is
hereby ordered to pay herein
petitioner said amount On May 26, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision
pursuant to existing rules and
guidelines, minus the sum dismissing
already remitted per Order
the petition.
dated January 2, 2003.

SO ORDERED.
The CA ruled that under Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of
As both parties interposed their respective
Procedure, an appeal from the adjudicator's resolution shall be filed
motions for reconsideration, the RARAD-V eventually
issued an Order dated 8 October 2003, the decretal before the DARAB and not before the RTC; that petitioner's filing of the
portion of which reads:
case before the RTC without first seeking the intervention of the DARAB
Wherefore, the is violative of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative
Decision dated July 7, 2003 is
MODIFIED, fixing the valuation remedies. The CA found that petitioner's petition for determination of
claim of petitioner herein with
respect to her due share in the just compensation was filed in the RTC on October 28, 2003 when the
above lots to the tune of Two 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure was already in effect, i.e., on February
Million Five Hundred Forty
Thousand, Two Hundred Eleven 8, 2003, and under its transitory provision, it is provided that the 2003
and 58/100 (P2,540,211.58)
Rules shall govern all cases filed on or after its effectivity; and, since an
Pesos. Land Bank Legaspi City is
hereby ordered to pay herein appeal from the adjudicator's resolution should first be filed with the
petitioner said amount
pursuant to existing rules and DARAB, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), did not err in
guidelines, minus the sum
dismissing petitioner's petition.
already paid per Order
dated January 2, 2003. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a

SO ORDERED. Resolution dated July 28, 2004.

Aggrieved, petitioner Bank, on 28 October

2003, filed an original Petition for Determination of
Just Compensation at the same sala of the RTC,
docketed as Agrarian Case No. 03-06.
Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following arguments:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LAW IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW
CONSIDERING THAT THE LBP DID NOT
VIOLATE THE DOCTRINE OF NON-

8
 EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES WHEN IT FILED THE ORIGINAL Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
PETITION FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST
COMPENSATION BEFORE THE COURTA Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The
QUO WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING THE DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
INTERVENTION OF THE DARAB. determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN matters involving the implementation of agrarian
DECLARING THAT THE APPLICABLE RULE IS reform, except those falling under the exclusive
THE 2003 DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE, jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA)
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE and the Department of Environment and Natural
PETITION (FOR VALUATION AND PAYMENT Resources (DENR) x x x
OF JUST COMPENSATION) WAS FILED
BEFORE THE RARAD ON NOVEMBER 11, Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special
2002.[4] Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination
of just compensation to landowners, and the
Petitioner contends that the petition for valuation and payment of just prosecution of all criminal offenses under this
Act. x x x
compensation was filed with the DARAB- Regional Adjudicator for The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all
Region V (RARAD) on November 11, 2002, long before the effectivity of appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction
within thirty (30) days from submission of the case
the 2003 Rules of Procedure; that under the transitory provision of the for decision.
2003 DARAB Rules, all cases pending with the Board and the
Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to
adjudicators prior to the date of the Rules' effectivity shall be governed
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive
by the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of their filing; that clear from
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
the transitory provision that it is the proceeding of the DARAB which is
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of
governed by the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, thus, it is the date of
the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR's original and
filing of the petition with the DARAB or any of its adjudicators which is
exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just
the reckoning date of the applicability of the 2003 DARAB Rules and not
compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal
the date of filing with the SAC; that under the 1994 DARAB Rules
offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the
prevailing at the time of the filing of the respondent's claim for just
RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just
compensation, the Rules provided that the decision of the adjudicator
compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657 is vested
on land valuation and preliminary determination of just
in the courts.
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board,

but shall be brought

In Republic v. CA,[5] the Court explained:
directly to the RTC; that it was in the observance of the 1994 DARAB
Rules that petitioner brought the adjudicator's decision to the RTC
sitting as SAC.
In his Comment, respondent claims that petitioner's petition with the
RTC is an original action and, since the case was filed at a time when
appeal to the DARAB Central Office was already provided in the 2003
DARAB Rules before resorting to judicial action, the RTC correctly
dismissed the petition, which was correctly affirmed by the CA.
Petitioner filed a Reply reiterating its arguments in the petition.
The issue for resolution is whether it is necessary that in cases involving
claims for just compensation under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 that the
decision of the Adjudicator must first be appealed to the DARAB before
Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are
Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1)
all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners and (2) the prosecution
of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]. The
provisions of 50 must be construed in harmony with
this provision by considering cases involving the
determination of just compensation and criminal
cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from
the plenitude of power conferred on the
DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this
distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency
which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of
eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No.
6657) and over criminal cases. Thus, in EPZA v.
Dulay and Sumulong v. Guerrero - we held that the
valuation of property in eminent domain is
essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested
in administrative agencies, while in Scotys
Department Store v. Micaller, we struck down a law
granting the then Court of Industrial Relations
jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the
Industrial Peace Act.[6]

a party can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC.

In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the original and exclusive
The court rules in the negative. jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as SAC, over all petitions for

9
determination of just compensation to landowners in accordance with
Section 57 of RA No. 6657.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,[7] the Court upheld the RTC's
jurisdiction over Wycoco's petition for determination of
compensation even where no summary administrative proceedings
was held before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over the
determination of land valuation. The Court held:
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, the landowner filed an action for
determination of just compensation without waiting
for the completion of DARABs re-evaluation of the
land. This, notwithstanding, the Court held that the
trial court properly acquired jurisdiction because of
its exclusive and original jurisdiction over
determination of just compensation, thus
It is clear from Sec. 57
that the RTC, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court, has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination
of just compensation to
landowners. This original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC
would be undermined if the
DAR would vest in
administrative officials original
jurisdiction in compensation
cases and make the RTC an
appellate court for the review
of administrative decisions.
Thus, although the new rules
speak of directly appealing the
decision of adjudicators to the
RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian
Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57
that the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine such
cases is in the RTCs. Any effort
to transfer such jurisdiction to
the adjudicators and to convert
the original jurisdiction of the
RTCs into an appellate
jurisdiction would be contrary
to Sec. 57 and, therefore,
would be void. Thus, direct
resort to the SAC [Special
Agrarian Court] by private
respondent is valid.
In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court
properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycocos
complaint for determination of just compensation. It
must be stressed that although no summary
administrative proceeding was held before the
DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal mandate of
initially determining the value of Wycoco's land
pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series of
1990.[8] x x x
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,[9] wherein Land Bank
questioned the alleged failure of private respondents to seek
reconsideration of the DAR's valuation, butinstead filed a petition to fix
just compensation with the RTC, the Court said:
At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA, we held that
there is nothing contradictory between the DARs
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, which includes
just the determination of questions of just
compensation, and the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation. The
first refers to administrative proceedings, while the
second refers to judicial proceedings.
In accordance with settled principles of
administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in
the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the
just compensation for the lands taken under the
agrarian reform program, but such determination is
subject to challenge before the courts. The
resolution of just compensation cases for the taking
of lands under agrarian reform is, after all,
essentially a judicial function.
Thus, the trial court did not err in taking
cognizance of the case as the determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the courts
of justice.[10]
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,[11] where the issue was
whether the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondent's
petition for determination of just compensation despite the pendency
of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB, the Court stated
that:
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of
property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the
power of eminent domain by the State. The
valuation of property or determination of just
compensation in eminent domain proceedings is
essentially a judicial function which is vested with
the courts and not with administrative agencies.
Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance
of respondent's petition for determination of just
compensation.[12]
The RTC dismissed petitioner's petition for determination of just
compensation relying on Sections 5, 6 and 7 of Article XIX of the 2003
DARAB Rules of Procedure, to wit:
Section 5. Appeal. A party who disagrees
with the resolution of the Adjudicator may bring
the matter to the Board by filing with the
Adjudicator concerned a Notice of Appeal
withinfifteen (15) days from receipt of the
resolution. The filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration of said resolution shall interrupt
the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party may file the appeal within the
remaining period, but in no case shall it be less than
five (5) days.
Section 6. When Resolution Deemed Final. Failure
on the part of the aggrieved party to contest the
resolution of the Adjudicator within the aforecited
reglementary period provided shall be deemed a
concurrence by such party with the land valuation,
10
 hence said valuation shall become final and
executory.
Section 7. Filing of Original Action with the Special
Agrarian Court for Final Determination. The party
who disagrees with the decision of the Board may
contest the same by filing an original action with
the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) having jurisdiction
over the subject property within fifteen (15) days
from his receipt of the Board's decision.
Notably, the above-mentioned provisions deviated from
Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure which
provides:
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary
Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation The decision of the Adjudicator on
land valuation and preliminary determination and
payment of just compensation shall not be
appealable to the Board, but shall be brought directly
to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special
Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to
only one motion for reconsideration.
where DARAB acknowledges that the decision of just compensation
cases for the taking of lands under RA 6657 is a power vested in the
courts.[13] Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure provides that the land valuation cases decided by the
adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not
change the clear import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC.
Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving
petitions for the determination of just compensation.[14] In accordance
with the said Section 57, petitioner properly filed the petition before
the RTC and, hence, the RTC erred in dismissing the case. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by law.[15] Only a statute can confer
jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies while rules of
procedure cannot.[16]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 26, 2004 and the
Resolution dated July 28, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 81096, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3, Legaspi City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, is DIRECTED to
hear without delay petitioner's petition for the determination of just
compensation.
SO ORDERED.
3. Mondejar v. Buban (2001)
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a sworn letter complaint dated May 31, 1999, complainant
Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Marino S. Buban, MTCC, Tacloban
City, Branch 1, with gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious
irregularity and grave misconduct relative to Criminal Case No. 98-07-
CR-133 entitled People of the Philippines v. Bernadette Mondejar and
Arlette Mondejar for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. She alleged
11
that respondent judge issued a hold departure order against her on
October 23, 1998 in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97
which provides that hold departure orders shall be issued only in
criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts. She further alleged that respondent judge did not give her an
opportunity to be heard before issuing the questioned order.
When required to comment on the matter, respondent judge
admitted having issued said order because he was not aware of the
Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97. He alleged that he was not furnished
a copy of the circular and managed to secure a copy only after he
instructed his legal researcher to get one from the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City. Accordingly, on April 14, 1997,
he issued an order lifting and setting aside the hold departure order
dated October 23, 1998. As regards the issue of denial of due process,
respondent judge averred that complainant and her counsel were duly
notified of the scheduled hearing but neither appeared on said date.
The Court Administrator after finding that respondent judge
erred in issuing the assailed hold departure order, recommended that
he be severely reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
The recommendation of the Court Administrator is well-taken.
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure
orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level
courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides that
hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Clearly then, criminal
cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall
within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the part of
respondent judge to have issued one in the instant case.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges
to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. The
Court, in exercising administrative supervision of all lower courts, has
not been remised in reminding the members of the bench to exert due
diligence in keeping abreast with the development in law and
jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new circular. It was
circularized in 1997 and violation of which has been accordingly dealt
with in numerous cases before the Court. Herein judge, therefore,
cannot be excused for his infraction. Judges should always be vigilant in
their quest for new developments in the law so they could discharge
their duties and functions with zeal and fervor.
In recent cases,[1] involving similar violations, this Court imposed
the penalty of reprimand on erring judges. Hence, the same penalty
should be imposed on respondent judge.
WHEREFORE, Judge Marino S. Buban is hereby REPRIMANDED
with the warning that a repetition of the same and similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
4. Foz v. People (2009)
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No.
22522, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No.
44527 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of libel. Also assailed is the CA Resolution[2] dated April 8, 2005 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
 The second operation, done by Dr.
In an Information[3] dated October 17, 1994 filed before the Portigo's recommendee, was
RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were devastating to the family and the
patient herself who woke to find
charged with the crime of libel committed as follows: out her anus and vagina closed and
a hole with a catheter punched on
her right side.
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City
of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
This was followed by a bad news
this court, both the accused as columnist and
that she had cancer.
Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a
daily publication with a considerable circulation in
Dr. Portigo recommended another
the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did
operation, this time to bore
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
another hole on the left side of
with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue,
Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he
honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar
made the referral frankly turned it
Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in
down because it would only be a
Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring
waste of money since the disease
and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public
was already on the terminal state.
hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in
the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5,
The company and the family spent
1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO,
some P150,000.00 to pay for the
COMPANY PHYSICIAN, quoted verbatim hereunder,
wrong diagnosis of the company
to wit:
physician.
MEET DR. PORTIGO,
My sympathy for Lita and her
COMPANY PHYSICIAN
family. May the good Lord, Healer
of all healers, be on your side, May
PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to
the Healer of all healers likewise
help to do all their best to promote
touch the conscience of physicians
the health of their patients.
to remind them that their
Especially if they are employed by a
profession is no license for self-
company to serve its employees.
enrichment at the expense of the
poor. But, sad to say, Lita passed
However, the opposite appears to
away, July 2, 1994.
be happening in the Local San
Miguel Corporation office, SMC
Lita is not alone. Society is replete
employees are fuming mad about
with similar experience where
their company physician, Dr.
physicians treat their patients for
Portigo, because the latter is not
profits. Where physicians prefer to
doing well in his sworn obligation in
act like agents of multinational
looking after the health problems
corporations prescribing expensive
of employees, reports reaching
drugs seen if there are equivalent
Aim.. Fire say.
drugs sold at the counter for much
lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have
One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of
hospitals, owned by a so-called
employee Wilfredo Payunan, and
charitable religious institutions and
residing in Burgos,
so-called civic groups, too greedy
Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to
for profits. Instead of promoting
say about Dr. Portigo. Her story
baby-and mother-friendly
began September 19 last year
practices which are cheaper and
when she felt ill and had to go to
more effective, they still prefer the
Dr. Portigo for consultation. The
expensive yet unhealthy practices.
doctor put her under observation,
taking seven months to conclude
The (sic) shun breast feeding and
that she had rectum myoma and
promote infant milk formula
must undergo an operation.
although mother's milk is many
times cheaper and more nutrious
Subsequently, the family sought
(sic) than the brands they peddle.
the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr.
These hospitals separate newly
de los Reyes at Doctor's Hospital.
born from their moms for days,
Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also
conditioning the former to milk
maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got
formula while at the same time
angry, sources said, after knowing
stunting the mother's mammalia
that the family chose a surgeon (Dr.
from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to
Celis) on their own without his nod
death!
as he had one to recommend.
My deepest sympathy to the
Lita was operated by Dr. de los
bereaved family of Mrs. Lita
Reyes last March and was released
Payunan who died July 2, 1994, Her
from the hospital two weeks after.
body lies at the Payunan residence
Later, however, she again
located at 236-G Burgos St.,
complained of difficulty in urinating
Lapaz, Iloilo City.May you rest in
and defecating[. On] June 24, she
peace, Inday Lita.
was readmitted to the hospital.

12
 wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting
in high sense of professional integrity, trust and Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of
responsibility expected of him as a physician, which defamatory imputation was satisfied when petitioner Foz, as
imputation and insinuation as both accused knew
were entirely false and malicious and without columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent doctor and an
foundation in fact and therefore highly libelous,
opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of the
offensive and derogatory to the good name,
character and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar poor. Petitioners pose the question of whether a newspaper opinion
Portigo.
columnist, who sympathizes with a patient and her family and
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the

columnist criticizes the doctor's competence or lack of it, and such

criticism turns out to be lacking in basis if not entirely false. Petitioners

Upon being arraigned[5] on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by
claim that the article was written in good faith in the belief that it would
counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the
serve the public good. They contend that the CA erred in finding the
Information. Trial thereafter ensued.
existence of malice in the publication of the article; that no malice in
On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision[6] finding
law or actual malice was proven by the prosecution; and that the article
petitioners guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision
was printed pursuant to the bounden duty of the press to report
reads:
matters of public interest. Petitioners further contend that the subject

WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and
the jurisprudence aforecited, JUDGMENT is hereby
rendered finding both accused Danny Fajardo and
Vicente Foz, Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT for the crime of Libel defined in Article 353
and punishable under Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed
accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven (11)
Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1)
Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days
of Prision Correccional, as Maximum, and to pay a
fine of P1,000.00 each.[7]
article was an opinion column, which was the columnists exclusive
views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and publisher of Panay
News, did not have to share those views and should not be held
responsible for the crime of libel.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law
are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not
the element of malice required in every indictment for libel was
established by the prosecution, which would require the weighing

anew of the evidence already passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an
that factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are accorded
Order[8] dated February 20, 1998.
finality, unless there appears on records some facts or circumstance of
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.
weight which the court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which
misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, may alter the result
affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
of the case − a situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA
In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in
denied in a Resolution dated April 8, 2005.
their petition do not require the evaluation of evidence submitted in
Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following
court; that malice, as an element of libel, has always been discussed
grounds:
whenever raised as an issue via a petition for review

on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE LIBELOUS WITHIN information charging them with libel did not contain allegations
THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN THIS CASE the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of
AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS libel as charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their
FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER
OF PANAY NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not
ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION
precluded from doing so.
COLUMNISTS.[9]

In Fukuzume v. People,[10] the Court ruled:

13
 It is noted that it was only in his petition
with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the
trial courts jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection
based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction
over the offense charged may be raised or
considered motu proprio by the court at any stage
of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover,
jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal
case cannot be conferred upon the court by the
accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such
jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organized the court, and is given only by law
in the manner and form prescribed by law. While an
exception to this rule was recognized by this Court
beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of
jurisdiction by the court which rendered the
questioned ruling was considered to be barred by
laches, we find that the factual circumstances
involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the
departure from the general rule are not present in
the instant criminal case.[11]
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People[12] that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be
acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense
should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to
try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during
the trial show that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied.)[13]
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written
defamation, to wit:
Article 360. Persons responsible.Any person who
shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar
means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the
editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible
for the defamations contained therein to the same
extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in
cases of written defamations, as provided for in this
chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately
with the court of first instance of theprovince or
city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of
14
the offense: Provided, however, That where one of
the offended parties is a public officer whose office
is in the City of Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action shall be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or
of the city or province where the libelous article is
printed and first published, and in case such public
officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where he held office at the time
of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published and in
case one of the offended parties is a private
individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where he
actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense or where the libelous matter is printed
and first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Agbayani v. Sayo,[14] the rules on venue in Article 360
were restated as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a
private person, the criminal action may be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the
criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province where he actually resided at
the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose
office is in Manila at the time of the commission of
the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding
office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he held office at the time of the commission
of the offense.[15]
Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a
private individual at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous
article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where
the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the province
where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.
The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this
case which for convenience the Court quotes again, to wit:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994
in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as
columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of
Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the
region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the
virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr.
Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner
in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of
injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to
public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and
publish in the regular issue of said daily publication
on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR.
PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN....

The allegations in the Information that Panay News, a daily publication
with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the
region only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in
considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication
was printed and first published in Iloilo City.
In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[16] which involved a libel case filed by a
private individual with the RTC of Manila, a portion of the Information
of which reads:
That on or about March 1995, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas
and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with
others whose true names, real identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and helping
one another, with malicious intent of impeaching
the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of
one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor
General of the Philippines, and with the evident
purpose of injuring and exposing him to public
ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to be
published in Smart File, a magazine of general
circulation in Manila, and in their respective
capacity as Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter,
....[17]
the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest
jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila to hear the libel charge in consonance
with Article 360. The Court made the following disquisition:
x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case
reveals that the word published is utilized in the
precise context of noting that the defendants
cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a magazine
of general circulation in Manila. The Information
states that the libelous articles were published
in Smart File, and not that they were published
in Manila. The place Manila is in turn employed to
situate where Smart File was in general circulation,
and not where the libel was published or first
printed. The fact that Smart File was in general
circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish
that it was published and first printed in Manila, in
the same way that while leading national dailies
such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or
the Philippine Star are in general circulation in
Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers are
published and first printed in Cebu.
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand
sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila courts since
the publication is in general circulation in Manila,
there would be no impediment to the filing of the
libel action in other locations where Smart File is in
general circulation. Using the example of
the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this petition
would allow a resident of Aparri to file a criminal case
for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply
because these newspapers are in general circulation
in Jolo. Such a consequence is precisely what Rep. Act
No. 4363 sought to avoid.[18]
In Agustin v. Pamintuan,[19] which also involved a libel case filed by a
private individual, the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country
Club, with the RTC of Baguio City where the Information therein alleged
that the libelous article was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
15
a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and the entire
Philippines, the Court did not consider the Information sufficient to
show that Baguio City was the venue of the printing and first
publication of the alleged libelous article.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a
private individual may also file the libel case in the RTC of the province
where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the residence
of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that Dr. Edgar Portigo is a
physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, such allegation did not
clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing
in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible
that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place.
Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,[20] where the Information for libel
alleged that the offended party was the Acting General Manager of the
Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the
community, the Court did not find such allegation sufficient to establish
that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court
explained its ruling in this wise:
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation or his actual residence or place
of abode provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency; no particular length of
time of residence is required. However, the
residence must be more than temporary. The term
residence involves the idea of something beyond a
transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one
must abide in a place where he had a house therein.
To create a residence in a particular place, two
fundamental elements are essential: The actual
bodily presence in the place, combined with a freely
exercised intention of remaining there
permanently or for an indefinite time. While it is
possible that as the Acting General Manager of the
Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been
actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations
did not state that he was actually residing therein
when the alleged crimes were committed. It is
entirely possible that the private complainant may
have been actually residing in another place. One
who transacts business in a place and spends
considerable time thereat does not render such
person a resident therein. Where one may have or
own a business does not of itself constitute
residence within the meaning of the statute.
Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of
residence there for purposes of venue.[21]
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal
case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information,
and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.[22] Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue
requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the
RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision
convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want

of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November
24, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
5. People v. Sandiganbayan (2009)
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution[2] of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) datedFebruary 28, 2005 dismissing
Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria
Amante for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to
this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash
advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in
order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December 19, 1995,
or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no
liquidation was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City
Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent
Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within
seventy-two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The
Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996, submitted an investigation
report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-
Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be further
investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed
against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known
as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas,
on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of
an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent
Amante. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the
OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum
finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante.
On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information[3] with the
Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D.
No. 1445, which reads as follows:
16
That on or about December 19, 1995, and
for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo
City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-
ranking public officer, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and
committing the offense in relation to office, having
obtained cash advances from the City Government
of Toledo in the total amount of SEVENTY-ONE
THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00),
Philippine Currency, which she received by reason
of her office, for which she is duty-bound to
liquidate the same within the period required by
law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
fail to liquidate said cash advances of P71,095.00,
Philippine Currency, despite demands to the
damage and prejudice of the government in
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION
TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR
REINVESTIGATION[4] dated November 18, 2004 stating that the
Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September
14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an incomplete proceeding in so far that
respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the
unexpected balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the
investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers were still
in the process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo
City and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said
criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who
was occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall
have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a
position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.
The OSP filed its Opposition[5] dated December 8,
2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim of settlement of the cash
advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be
established during the trial of the case and not in a motion for
reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
the OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over respondent
Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under
those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the
OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did
not make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local
officials/heads.
 The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution[6] dated February 28,
2005, dismissed the case against Amante, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without
prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper
court.
The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by
the movant is hereby considered moot and
academic.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises this lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN
HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE
THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN
RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF
RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES
MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
case in question, petitioner disputes the former's appreciation of this
Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.[7] According
petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or
confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section
4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the
offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds
that the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses
committed in relation to public office.
Respondent Amante, in her Comment[8] dated January 16,
2006, averred that, with the way the law was phrased in Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the several exceptions
to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are
provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section
4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was
correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction only over cases
where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher;
and in cases where the accused is public official below grade 27 but his
position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section
4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended and his offense involves
a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and if the indictment involves
offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the
general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary
grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise
jurisdiction over him must apply. The same respondent proceeded to
cite a decision[9] of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law; it
cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through,
or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties,
neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.
In its Reply[10] dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that
the enumeration of public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D.
No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
should include their commission of other offenses in relation to office
under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case
ofEsteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[11] wherein this Court ruled that an
offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the
offense is intimately connected with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.
The petition is meritorious.
to
The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. As a background, this Court had thoroughly discussed
the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[12] thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No.
1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to
attain the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and employees, based on
the concept that public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at
all times accountable to the people.[13]
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by
P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[14]
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D.
No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No.
7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made
succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x
17
 Code, where one or more of the principal accused are
Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether officials occupying the following positions in the
or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the offense:
the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
(1) Officials of the
executive branch occupying the
This Court rules in the affirmative. positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as
grade 27 and higher, of the
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989
as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16,
(Republic Act No. 6758),
1995, which was again amended onFebruary 5, 1997 by R.A. No. specifically including:

8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the (a)

Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Provincial
governors,
Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a vice-
governors,
criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the members of
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. [15] The the
sangguniang
exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it panlalawiga
n and
expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the
provincial
Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as treasurers,
assessors,
amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the engineers,
and other
Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense
city
involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the department
heads;
Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of
(b)
the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan City mayors,
vice-mayors,
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving: members of
the
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as sangguniang
amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and panlungsod,
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and city
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised treasurers,
assessors,
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the engineers,
and other
government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of city
the offense: department
heads.

(c)
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other Officials of
the
offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in diplomatic
relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no service
occupying
exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court the position
of consul and
to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution higher;
of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies
(d)
in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, Philippine
army and air
2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern.Verily, the pertinent
force
provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the colonels,
naval
following: captains, and
all officers of
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan higher rank;
shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving: (e)
PNP chief
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as superintend
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and ent and PNP
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and officers of
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal higher rank;
18
 (f) jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by,
City and among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
provincial
prosecutors regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
and their
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
assistants,
and officials 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are
and
prosecutors classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of
in the Office
the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
of the
Ombudsman enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated
and Special
Prosecutor; are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and

(g)
Presidents, other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members
directors or
trustees, or of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers ,
managers of and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service
government-
owned or occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air
controlled
force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief
corporations
, state superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial
universities
or prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
educational
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents,
institutions
or directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
foundations;
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
(2) Members of
foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law
Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade 27 and up provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials
under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office
1989; also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

(3) Members of the

judiciary without prejudice to
the provisions of the By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent
Constitution; law, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang

(4) Chairmen and Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in
members of Constitutional
relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Commissions, without prejudice
to the provisions of the Sandiganbayan.
Constitution; and

(5) All other national

and local officials classified as
Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant
to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the following
offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire
However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the
case with the following ratiocination:
x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding
case, stating that the Congress' act of specifically
including the public officials therein mentioned,
obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 (a)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7975, when committed by the officials
enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof, regardless of
their salary grades, to be tried by the
Sandiganbayan. Obviously, the Court was referring
to cases involving violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A.
No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code only because they are the
specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No.
1606 as amended, so that when they are
committed even by public officials below salary
grade '27', provided they belong to the
enumeration, jurisdiction would fall under the
Sandiganbayan. When the offense committed
however, falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No.
1606 as amended, it should be emphasized that the
general qualification that the public official must

19
 belong to grade '27' is a requirement so that the
Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction
over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would fall to the
proper regional or municipal trial court.
In the case at bar, the accused is a
Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with
salary grade '26'. Her office is included in the
enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to
(g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation of
Section 89 of The Auditing Code of
the Philippines which is not a case falling under
Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606
as amended. This being the case, the principle
declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar
because as stated, the charge must involve a
violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code. Therefore, in the instant case, even if the
position of the accused is one of those enumerated
public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since
she is being prosecuted of an offense not
mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general
qualification that accused must be a public official
occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a
requirement before this Court could exercise
jurisdiction over her. And since the accused
occupied a public office with salary grade 26, then
she is not covered by the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the
Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of the Sandiganbayan is the
case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan[16] where this Court ruled that the
officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as
amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. According to petitioner,
the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine
the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense
charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is true
in light of the facts contained in the said case. In the Inding case, the
public official involved was a member of theSangguniang
Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A.
No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the
said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the
provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on
Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in
relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed
by public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
20
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision
shows that those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies
in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad
in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to
the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long
as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with
the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused
was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official
functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had
the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office,
the accused is held to have been indicted for an offense committed in
relation to his office.[17] Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive
Secretary,[18] where the crime involved was murder, this Court held
that:
The phrase other offenses or felonies is
too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the
accuseds official functions. Thus, under said
paragraph b, what determines
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official
position or rank of the offender that is, whether he
is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,[19] where the
public official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information
contained allegations that the accused, petitioner
herein, took advantage of his official functions as
municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he
committed the crime of grave threats as defined in
Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against
complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal
councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and
threatening to kill Legaspi during a public hearing,
after the latter had rendered a privilege speech
critical of petitioners administration. Clearly, based
on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately
connected with the discharge of petitioners official
functions. This was elaborated upon by public
respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein
it held that the accused was performing his official
duty as municipal mayor when he attended said
public hearing and that accuseds violent act was
precipitated by complainants criticism of his
administration as the mayor or chief executive of
the municipality, during the latters privilege
speech. It was his response to private complainants
attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he
would not have been irritated or angered by
whatever private complainant might have said
during said privilege speech. Thus, based on the
allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close
reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante for
violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippinesreveals that the said acceptation and signification,[21] unless it is evident that the legislature

offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[22] The

under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended. intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists

and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is

According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if always presumed.[23]

the intention of the law had been to extend the application of the

exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is

assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third

between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section Division) dated February 28, 2005 isNULLIFIED and SET

2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other ASIDE. Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the

offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading

because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in SO ORDERED.

Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as an 6. Serana v. Sandiganbayan (2008)
element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and
REYES, R.T., J.:
felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and

felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees'

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholar** accused,
office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been
along with her brother, of swindling government funds?
committed in relation to office, this Court held:

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at
(1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and
reach of the term offense committed in relation to ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng
[an accuseds] office by referring to the principle laid
down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and bayan?
to an exception to that principle which was
recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613
(1960)]. The principle set out inMontilla v. Hilario is The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition
that an offense may be considered as committed in
for certiorari assailing the Resolutions[1] of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth
relation to the accuseds office if the offense cannot
exist without the office such that the office [is] a Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her
constituent element of the crime x x x. In People v.
Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice motion for reconsideration.
Concepcion, said that although public office is not
an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract,
the facts in a particular case may show that The Antecedents

x x x the offense therein

charged is intimately Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the
connected with [the accuseds]
respective offices and was University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is
perpetrated while they were in
the performance, though known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President
improper or irregular, of their Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to
official functions. Indeed, [the
accused] had no personal serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending
motive to commit the crime
on December 31, 2000.
and they would not have
committed it had they not held
their aforesaid offices. x x x[20]
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President

Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Diliman.[2] On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and

Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the public officials relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the

involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).[3]

subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public

officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall

enumerated.It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that Annex.[4] President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)

words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The

21
source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the

President. Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as

amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. [5] The which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.[8]It has no jurisdiction over

succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill the crime of estafa.[9] It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by

De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers),

alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X,

filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within

Office of the Ombudsman.[6] the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the

found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received

Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the

Sandiganbayan.[7] The Information reads: coffers of the government.[10]

The undersigned Special Prosecution

Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN over her person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since
D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and
penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who
Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as
held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She added that she was a
follows:
simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive
this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents
officer, being then the Student Regent of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was
while in the performance of her official functions, among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was
committing the offense in relation to her office and
taking advantage of her position, with intent to committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond
gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D.
SERANA, a private individual, did then and there the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v.
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Sandiganbayan.[11]
government by falsely and fraudulently
representing to former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.[12] It disputed petitioners
the University of the Philippines will be renovated
and renamed as President Joseph Ejercito Estrada interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
Student Hall, and for which purpose accused
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount 1606 clearly contains the catch-all phrase in relation to office, thus, the
of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the
President, and the latter relying and believing on the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the
said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave
and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-
91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of
blown trial.[13]
FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which
check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade
Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and
misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations,
and despite repeated demands made upon the was a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she had the general
accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the
said accused failed and refused to do so to the powers of administration and exercised the corporate powers of
damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount. UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public office, petitioners stance

that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public

office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that
allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated. [14]
the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense

charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

Sandiganbayan Disposition
22

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioners motion for lack of merit.[15] It ratiocinated:
leave of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate, any other provisions of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for
cause after an investigation and hearing shall have
been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of
corporation can act only through its board of
the Sandiganbayan over this case.
directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal
stock corporations. The board of directors or
offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the
Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the
corporation.
jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out
by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents
provides that the Sandiganbayan also has
of the University of the Philippines is performing
jurisdiction over other offenses committed by
functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees
public officials and employees in relation to their
of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the
office. From this provision, there is no single doubt
conclusion that being a member of such board,
that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense
accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the
of estafa committed by a public official in relation
category of public officials upon whom this Court is
to his office.
vested with original exclusive jurisdiction,
Accused-movants claim that being merely a
regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a
member in representation of the student body, she
position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher
was never a public officer since she never received
under the Compensation and Position Classification
any compensation nor does she fall under Salary
Act of 1989.
Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express
provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249
Finally, this court finds that accused-movants
which provides:
contention that the same of P15 Million was
received from former President Estrada and not
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan
from the coffers of the government, is a matter a
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
defense that should be properly ventilated during
cases involving:
the trial on the merits of this case.[16]
(A) x x x

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration.[17] The motion was denied with finality in a Resolution
dated February 4, 2004.[18]

xxxx Issue

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of

government-owned or controlled corporations,
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that THE
state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. (Italics supplied) RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that AMOUNTING TO LACKAND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT
the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive
QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE
jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials
enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
salary grades, because the primordial
consideration in the inclusion of these officials is OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.[19]
the nature of their responsibilities and functions.

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely:
provision of law?
(a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition
University of the Philippines reveals that the Board
of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her
exclusively exercises the general powers of
office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President
administration and corporate powers in the
university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to Estrada, not from the government.
the ends specified by law such sums as may be
provided by law for the support of the university; 2)
To prescribe rules for its own government and to
Our Ruling
enact for the government of the university such
general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to
law, as are consistent with the purposes of the
university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation The petition cannot be granted.
of the President of the University, professors,
instructors, lecturers and other employees of the
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
University; to fix their compensation, hours of quash is not correctible by certiorari.
service, and such other duties and conditions as it
may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion

23
 for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition dismiss the case.
for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668),
rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the
Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition
remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial,
for certiorari and dismissed the amended
without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their complaint.

motion to quash.[20]Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this
Court granted the petition for certiorari after the
such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often
motion to quash based on double jeopardy was
dismissed.[21] The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of denied by respondent judge and ordered him to
desist from further action in the criminal case
appeals in a single action.[22] except to dismiss the same.

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[23] the order denying the motion to quash based on
prescription was set aside on certiorari and the
Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus: criminal case was dismissed by this Court.[24]

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave

As a general rule, an order denying a
motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and abuse of discretion.
cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or
order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary
procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
reiterate the issue on appeal from the final R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
judgment. The same rule applies to an order
denying a motion to quash, except that instead of
filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction
from a judgment of acquittal.
of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The
This general rule is subject to certain Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that
exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D.
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the
discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The
reason is that it would be unfair to require the Sandiganbayan.[25]She repeats the reference in the instant petition
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and
expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction for certiorari[26] and in her memorandum of authorities.[27]
over the subject matter or offense, or is not the
court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion
to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave
abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary
remedy of appeal cannot be plain and
adequate. The following are a few examples of the
exceptions to the general rule. We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical

or typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon
the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.[28]
jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the City Court of Manila and directed the
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
respondent court to dismiss the case.
rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon
the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating
jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D.
petition for prohibition and enjoined the
respondent court from further proceeding in the No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos onJune
case.
11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official

conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest
upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall
improper venue, this Court granted the petition for
prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge remain at all times accountable to the people.[29]
from taking cognizance of the case except to
dismiss the same.
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon
the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the
prior judgment, this Court granted the petition
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[30]
24

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March
23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No.
7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to
P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A.
No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while
occupying the position of provincial director and
those holding the rank of senior superintended or
higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution; and
25
(5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant
to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan
trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to
their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether
in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or
of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and
over petitions of similar nature, including quo
warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or
which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as well as the implementing rules that the
Supreme Court has promulgated and may
thereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for
review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases
elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of
the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except
in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
them.
Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and
the corresponding civil action for the recovery of
civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action
being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing
of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing
such civil action separately from the criminal action
 shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where
the civil action had heretofore been filed separately isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without
but judgment therein has not yet been regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed
with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court,
said civil action shall be transferred to the
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the
case may be, for consolidation and joint should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an
determination with the criminal action, otherwise
the separate civil action shall be deemed absurd conclusion.[33] Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est,
abandoned.
ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such

interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute
adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay
approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of
hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.
public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or

corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.[31] Pursuant to Section 10

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be
of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect
filed with the Sandiganbayan.[32]
contemplated by the legislature.[34] The intention of the legislator must

be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases
is to be taken into view.[35] In other words, petitioners interpretation
over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A.
lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted
No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction
as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is
of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We
the statute itself.[36] Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum
quote:
statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa

kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na

Section 4. Prohibition on private
individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
having family or close personal relation with any
public official to capitalize or exploit or take
advantage of such family or close personal relation Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage
from any other person having some business, B. Other offenses or felonies whether
transaction, application, request or contract with simple or complexed with other crimes committed
the government, in which such public official has to by the public officials and employees mentioned in
intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse subsection a of this section in relation to their
or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third office.
civil degree. The word close personal relation shall
include close personal friendship, social and
fraternal connections, and professional Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies
employment all giving rise to intimacy which
assures free access to such public officer. committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no

plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafaas one of the offenses

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly to induce or cause any public official to included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those
commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3
hereof. other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin

requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,

amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for

their penalties. In Perlas, Jr. v. People,[37] the Court had occasion to explain that the

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government
the offense of estafa.
instrumentality. The Court held then:

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends

that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the

Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner

The National Parks Development
Committee was created originally as an Executive
Committee on January 14, 1963, for the

26
 development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and
other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It
was later designated as the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7,
1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda
R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated
Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No.
3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau
of Forest Development, Department of Natural
Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of
Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No.
830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has
remained under the Office of the President (E.O.
No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual
appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular
government agency under the Office of the
President and allotments for its maintenance and
operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC
(Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated
with greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.[38] Pertinent parts of
the Courts ruling in Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to
transfer Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial Court,
for the simple reason that the latter would not have
jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above
intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to
hold a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the
government employees separately charged for the
same crimes, has not altered the nature of the
offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine
of P6,000.00, committed by government
employees in conspiracy with private persons,
including Bondoc. These crimes are within the
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken
cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the
fact that even if the cases could be so transferred,
a joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She
does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student
regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called
upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a
public officer.[39] The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public
officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in
different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and
duty created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him
27
for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public
Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a
public office under our political system is therefore
not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only
because and by virtue of some law expressly or
impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid.,
Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest
or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right
to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices
which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur.
881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,[41] the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of
a public office:
A public office is the right, authority and
duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.[42]
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary
Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is
likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan
also has jurisdiction over other
officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v.
People,[43] We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only
officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.[44]
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees,
or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR
performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
corporation.[45] By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a
public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential
element of public office.[46] At most, it is merely incidental to the public
office.[47]
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public
office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas

the public makes one a public officer.[48] private funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists

the charge has no leg to stand on.

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line

with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the

governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, Office of the President and not its then occupant, President Joseph

philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that petitioner

training.[49] Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00),

declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.[50] Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter

relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation

The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated
to the Information. October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos

(P15,000,000.00).
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public

officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the
offense because it was not committed in relation to her office. source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be

ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.[54]

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act

without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.
Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then

President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing
As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela
body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private
Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a
capacity and not in relation to public office.
quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to

quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the
the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of
information.[51] More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas
the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the
or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a
Rules stating that a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent.
motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.[52] Otherwise, jurisdiction

would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v.
defendant or respondent.[53]
Ramos,[55] where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D.

Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty.
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain
Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that with
terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., while in the
which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and
performance of her official functions,committing the offense in relation
warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.[56]
to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,

conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual,

We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
accurate in his citation. A lawyers conduct before the court should be
government x x x. (Underscoring supplied)
characterized by candor and fairness. [57]The administration of justice

would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor and
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
honesty before the courts.[58]
Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on this

ground.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits. SO ORDERED.

7. Esquivel v. Ombudsman (2002)

RESOLUTION

28
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus[1] with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order seeks to annul and set aside: (1) the Ombudsman
resolution[2] dated June 15, 1998 finding prima facie case against herein
petitioners, and (2) the order[3] denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Further, in their supplemental petition,[4] petitioners
assail the Sandiganbayan for taking cognizance of cases without or
beyond its jurisdiction. They impleaded that court and the People of the
Philippines as additional parties in this case.
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan are
both residents of Barangay Dampulan, Jaen, Nueva Ecija, but assigned
with the Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division (RIID), Police
Regional Office 3, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. In their
respective complaint-affidavits,[5] filed before the Philippine National
Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), Third
Regional Office, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, Eduardo and
Catacutan charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero
Esquivel,[6] municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony
Eboy Esquivel, barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged
illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder,
and grave threats. Also included in the charges were SPO1 Reynaldo
Espiritu, SPO2 Nestor Villa Almayda, and LTO Officer Aurelio Diaz. PO2
Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan likewise accused P/S Insp. Bienvenido C.
Padua and SPO3 Inocencio P. Bautista of the Jaen Municipal Police
Force of dereliction of duty.
The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed that
at about 12:30 p.m. of March 14, 1998, PO2 Eduardo was about to eat
lunch at his parents house at Sta. Monica Village, Dampulan, Jaen,
Nueva Ecija, when petitioners arrived. SPO1 Espiritu, SPO2 Almayda,
LTO Officer Diaz, and several unidentified persons accompanied them.
Without further ado, petitioners disarmed PO2 Eduardo of his Cal. 45
service pistol, which was covered by a Memorandum Receipt and
COMELEC Gun Ban Exemption. They then forced him to board
petitioners vehicle and brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall.
PO2 Eduardo also stated that while they were on their way to the
town hall, Mayor Esquivel mauled him with the use of a firearm and
threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel pointed a gun at PO2 Eduardo
and said, Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita, aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit
mo ako kinakalaban! (You son of a bitch! I will kill you, I will create an
accident for you. Why are you against me?) Upon reaching the
municipal hall, Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel shoved
PO2 Eduardo inside an adjacent hut. Mayor Esquivel then ordered SPO1
Espiritu to kill him, saying Patayin mo na iyan at gawan ng senaryo at
report. (Kill him, then create a scenario and make a report.)
At this point, according to SPO1 Catacutan, he arrived to verify
what happened to his teammate, PO2 Eduardo, but Mayor Esquivel
likewise threatened him. Mayor Esquivel then ordered P/S Insp.
Bienvenido Padua of the Jaen Police Station to file charges against PO2
Eduardo. Then, the mayor once again struck PO2 Eduardo in the nape
with a handgun, while Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel was holding the
latter. PO2 Eduardo then fell and lost consciousness. When he regained
his consciousness, he was told that he would be released. Prior to his
release, however, he was forced to sign a statement in the police
blotter that he was in good physical condition.
PO2 Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most
likely maltreated and threatened because of jueteng and tupada. He
said the mayor believed he was among the law enforcers who raided
a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the mayor
disliked the fact that he arrested members of crime syndicates with
connections to the mayor.[7]
In support of his sworn statement, PO2 Eduardo presented a
medical certificate showing the injuries he suffered and other
documentary evidence.[8]
After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office
forwarded the pertinent records to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.[9]
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a
preliminary investigation and required petitioners and their
29
companions to file their respective counter-affidavits. In their joint
counter-affidavit,[10] petitioners and their companions denied the
charges against them. Instead, they alleged that PO2 Eduardo is a
fugitive from justice with an outstanding warrant of arrest for
malversation. They further alleged that the gun confiscated from PO2
Eduardo was the subject of an illegal possession of firearm complaint.
On June 15, 1998, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued the
impugned resolution[11] recommending that both Mayor Esquivel
and Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel be indicted for the
crime of less serious physical injuries, and Mayor Esquivel alone for
grave threats. The charges against the other respondents below were
dismissed, either provisionally or with finality.
On August 14, 1998, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved
the aforesaid resolution.
Thereafter, separate informations docketed as Criminal Case No.
24777[12] for less serious physical injuries against Mayor Esquivel and
Mark Anthony Eboy Esquivel, and Criminal Case No. 24778[13] for grave
threats against petitioner mayor, were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
On August 26, 1998, petitioners moved for reconsideration of the
August 14, 1998 resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. As
directed by the Sandiganbayan, they likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation[14] with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP). That motion was, however, denied by the OSP in the
assailed order[15] dated December 7, 1998. On December 11, 1998, the
Ombudsman approved the OSPs order of denial.
On February 8, 1999, petitioners were arraigned in both cases,
and they pleaded not guilty to the charges.
With their failure to extend the suspension of proceedings
previously granted by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners elevated the matter to this Court alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents in rendering
the resolution and the order.
On June 9, 1999, we denied for lack of merit petitioners
motion[16] reiterating their plea for the issuance of a TRO directing
public respondents to refrain from prosecuting Criminal Cases Nos.
24777 and 24778.[17]
Petitioners now submit the following issues for our resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN
GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING
THE ADMISSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT THAT HE
WAS IN GOOD PHYSICAL CONDITION WHEN HE WAS
RELEASED FROM THE POLICE HEADQUARTERS OF JAEN,
NUEVA ECIJA;
2. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN
GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN FINDING
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR GRAVE THREATS WHEN
PETITIONERS WERE LEGALLY EFFECTING THE ARREST
OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY VIRTUE OF THE
WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA UNDER CRIM. CASE
NO. 4925 FOR MALVERSATION OF GOVERNMENT
PROPERTY; and
3. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSES FILED AGAINST
PETITIONERS.
Petitioners formulation of the issues may be reduced to the
following:
(1) Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in directing
the filing of the informations against petitioners?
(2) Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777 and 24778?
Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse
of discretion when he failed to consider the exculpatory evidence in
their favor, namely, the admission of PO2 Eduardo that he was in good
physical condition when he left the police station in Jaen, Nueva
Ecija.[18] With such admission, PO2 Eduardo is now estopped from
claiming that he was injured since it is conclusive evidence against him
and need not be proven in any other proceeding.[19]
Public respondents, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman
through the OSP, counter that petitioners raise a factual issue which is
not a proper subject of a certiorari action. They further postulate that
this is the very same defense advanced by petitioners in the charges
against them and being evidentiary in nature, its resolution can only be
threshed out in a full-blown trial.[20]
We find the present petition without merit.
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there
exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file
the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.[21] Settled
is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers
without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. [22] Said
exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate[23] and the
courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as
well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will
grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much
the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they
decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.[24] Thus, in Rodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,[25] we held
that:
This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non-
interference in the determination of the Ombudsman regarding the
existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the
exercise of such discretion.
In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
disputed resolution and order.
There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman,
much less grave abuse in disregarding PO2 Eduardos admission that he
was in good physical condition when he was released from the police
headquarters.[26] Such admission was never brought up during the
preliminary investigation. The records show that no such averment was
made in petitioners counter-affidavit[27] nor was there any document
purporting to be the exculpatory statement attached therein as an
annex or exhibit. Petitioners only raised this issue in their motion for
reconsideration.[28] In his opposition to said motion, PO2 Eduardo did
admit signing a document to the effect that he was in good physical
condition when he left the police station. However, the admission
merely applied to the execution of said document and not to the
truthfulness of its contents. Consequently, the admission that
petitioners brand as incontrovertible is but a matter of evidence best
addressed to the public respondents appreciation. It is evidentiary in
nature and its probative value can be best passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits.
Given these circumstances, certiorari is not the proper
remedy. As previously held, but now bears stressing:
. . . [t]his Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to
examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to
the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned
decision, resolution or order.[29]
Petitioners would have this Court review the Sandiganbayans
exercise of jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78. Petitioners
theorize that the latter has no jurisdiction over their persons as they
hold positions excluded in Republic Act No. 7975.[30] As the positions of
municipal mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned therein,
they claim they are not covered by said law under the principle
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[31]
Petitioners claim lacks merit. In Rodrigo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan,[32] Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,[33] and Layus vs.
30
Sandiganbayan,[34] we already held that municipal mayors fall under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor
can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not
a municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. R.A.
7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,[35] provides that it is only in cases
where none of the accused (underscoring supplied) are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher [36] that exclusive
original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.[37] Note that under
the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of
27.[38] Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused in Criminal
Case No. 24777 of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under salary
grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion
in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case, as well as over Criminal
Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the writ of certiorari
cannot issue in petitioners favor.
For the same reason, petitioners prayer for a writ of prohibition
must also be denied.
First, note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself,
commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to which it
has no legal claim.[39] As earlier discussed, the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78 is clearly founded on
law.
Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be
resorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies provided by law are
adequate and available.[40] Prohibition is granted only where no other
remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress. That the petitioners
have another and complete remedy at law, through an appeal or
otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for denying the issuance
of the writ.[41] In this case, petitioners were not devoid of a remedy in
the ordinary course of law. They could have filed a motion to quash the
informations at the first instance but they did not. They have only
themselves to blame for this procedural lapse as they have not shown
any adequate excuse for their failure to do so. Petitioners did make a
belated oral motion for time to file a motion to quash the informations,
during their much delayed arraignment,[42] but its denial is not a proper
subject for certiorari or prohibition as said denial is merely an
interlocutory order. [43]
Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior
court unless the attention of the court whose proceedings are sought
to be stayed has been called to the alleged lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[44] The foundation of this rule is the respect and
consideration due to the lower court and the expediency of preventing
unnecessary litigation;[45] it cannot be presumed that the lower court
would not properly rule on a jurisdictional objection if it were properly
presented to it.[46] The records show that petitioners only raised the
issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan before this
Court.
Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of
a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary
duty.[47] The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment.[48] Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to
control or review the exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is
his discretion and judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
Court. When a decision has been reached in a matter involving
discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of to review or
correct it, however erroneous it may be. [49] Moreover, as earlier
discussed, petitioners had another remedy available in the ordinary
course of law. Where such remedy is available in the ordinary course of
law, mandamus will not lie.[50]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo,
Sr., JJ., concur.
8. DOJ v. Liwag (2005)
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) under it, seeking to challenge the Order dated June 22, 2001 and
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated June 25, 2001 issued by the
late Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila in Civil Case No. 01-100934.
The facts are as follows:
Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group, Mary Ong filed a
complaint-affidavit on January 8, 2001 before the Ombudsman against
PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino,
other high-ranking officials of the PNP, and several private individuals.
Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different
offenses imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The cases were
docketed as OMB Case Nos. 4-01-00-76, 4-01-00-77, 4-01-00-80, 4-01-
00-81, 4-01-00-82, and 4-01-00-84. The Ombudsman found the
complaint-affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance and
thus required the respondents therein to file their counter-affidavits on
the charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents submitted their
counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against them be
dismissed.
Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses
executed sworn statements before the NBI, alleging the same facts and
circumstances revealed by Mary Ong in her complaint-affidavit before
the Ombudsman.[1] NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter dated
May 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez,
recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials,
and private individuals for the following alleged crimes:
a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao,
Zeng Kang Pang, James Wong and Wong Kam Chong;
b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and
c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.[2]
In the said letter, Director Wycoco likewise manifested that this
recommendation was made after taking the sworn statements of Mary
Ong and other witnesses such as Chong Kam Fai, Zeng Kang Pang, and
Quenna Yuet Yuet. The sworn statements of these witnesses were
attached to the letter.[3]
On May 7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a
subpoena to Lacson, Aquino and the other persons named in the
witnesses sworn statements. Lacson and Aquino received the subpoena
on May 8, 2001. The subpoena directed them to submit their counter-
affidavits and controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary
investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI on May 18, 2001 at the
DOJ Multi-Purpose Hall. However, Lacson and Aquino, through their
counsel, manifested in a letter dated May 18, 2001, that the DOJ panel
of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed therewith by Mary
Ong since there are complaints pending before the Ombudsman
alleging a similar set of facts against the same respondents.
Furthermore, they claimed that according to the Courts ruling in Uy v.
Sandiganbayan,[4] the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases
involving public officials, including police and military officials such as
private respondents.[5]
The DOJ construed the aforesaid letter as a motion to dismiss and,
on May 28, 2001, denied the dismissal of the cases before it through an
Order that stated the following as basis of the denial:
It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss
which is not allowed under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[;]
It appearing further that respondents rank and/or civil service
classification has no bearing in the determination of jurisdiction as the
crimes charged herein do not involve violation of the Anti-Graft and
31
Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully Acquired Property [or] Bribery, nor
are they related to respondents discharge of their official duties;
It appearing finally that paragraph 2 of the Joint Circular of the Office
of the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice No. 95-001 dated
October 5, 1995, provides that offenses committed not in relation to
office and cognizable by the regular courts shall be investigated and
prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City Prosecutor which shall
rule thereon with finality;[6]
On the very same day that the DOJ issued the aforesaid Order,
the Solicitor General received a copy of a petition for prohibition filed
by Lacson and Aquino before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
In the said petition for prohibition, Lacson and Aquino maintained that
the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation on
the complaints submitted by Mary Ong and the other witnesses. They
argued that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was
violating the Ombudsmans mandate of having the primary and
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. Again, they relied on Uy v. Sandiganbayan to bolster
their claim.
On June 22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued the Order herein assailed
prohibiting the Department of Justice from conducting the preliminary
investigation against Lacson and Aquino. A Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was likewise issued by the trial court. The dispositive portion
of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Prohibition is
hereby GRANTED, and accordingly a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
hereby ISSUED, enjoining the respondents and their subordinates,
agents[,] and other persons acting in their behalf, individually and
collectively, from conducting a preliminary investigation in IS No.
2001-402, insofar as petitioners here are concerned, and directing the
petitioners to file their counter-affidavits in said case until such time
that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have disclaimed jurisdiction
over the offenses subject matter of the investigations before it, or
until such Office shall have categorized the said offenses as being
committed by the petitioners not in relation to their respective offices.
Let the corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction, therefore, issue
without bond, as there is no showing whatsoever in the pleadings of
the parties that the respondents will suffer any injury by reason of the
issuance of the writ prayed for, in accordance with Section 4(b), Rule
58 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED. [7]
Hence, this petition was filed before this Court by the DOJ,
through then Secretary Hernando Perez, the NBI, through Director
Reynaldo Wycoco, and the panel of prosecutors designated by the DOJ
to conduct the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 2001-402. In their
petition, they raise the following issues:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISREGARDING THE CRYSTAL CLEAR AUTHORITY OF PETITIONERS DOJ
AND THE PANEL OF STATE PROSECUTORS TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 08,
SERIES OF 1990 OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND SECTION 4
OF RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS TAKEN OVER
THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ; AND IN IGNORING THE
FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO AVAIL OF AN
ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY BEFORE THE FILING OF A
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
CONSIDERING THE NBI COMPLAINT FILED WITH THE DOJ AND THE
COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT FILED BY MARY ONG BEFORE THE OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN AS INVOLVING ABSOLUTELY THE SAME OFFENSES,
RESPONDENTS AND ALLEGED VICTIMS.
IV
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
GRANTING RELIEF TO RESPONDENT MICHAEL RAY B. AQUINO DESPITE
THE GLARING FACT THAT HE IS CHARGED WITH SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT OFFENSES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND
THE DOJ.
V
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
PREJUDGING THE MAIN CASE FOR PROHIBITION BY GRANTING THE
SAME DESPITE THE FACT THAT HEARINGS IN THE CASE WERE ONLY
HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE MERIT OF THE PRAYER
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.[8]
A perusal of the issues raised reveals that the present petition
puts forth one central question to be resolved: whether or not the DOJ
has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the
pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same
accused, facts, and circumstances. The addition of other names in the
second proceedings does not alter the nature thereof as being
principally directed against the respondents herein in connection with
substantially the same set of facts alleged.
First, however, a threshold question has to be resolved.
Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the
trial court to reconsider the assailed Order. They maintain that it was
imperative for them to do so for the sake of the speedy administration
of justice and that this is all the more compelling, in this case,
considering that this involves the high-ranking officers of the PNP and
the crimes being charged have already attracted nationwide attention.
Indeed, this Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At
stake here may not only be the safety of witnesses who risked life and
limb to give their statements to the authorities, but also the rights of
the respondents, who may need to clear their names and reputations
of the accusations against them. Procedural laws are adopted not as
ends in themselves but as means conducive to the realization of justice.
The rules of procedure are not to be applied when such application
would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and
existence.[9]
Now, to the merits.
The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is
based on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter
I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ, which states:
Section 1. Declaration of policy. It is the declared policy of the State to
provide the government with a principal law agency which shall be
both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal
justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders
and administration of the correctional system; . . .
Section 3. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the
Department shall have the following powers and functions:
...
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and
administer the probation and correction system;
...
Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective
April 11, 1978, provides:
32
Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision
and Control of the Secretary of Justice. There is hereby created and
established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision and
control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution
Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of
Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscals
Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving
violations of penal laws.
Respondents Lacson and Aquino claim that the Ombudsman has
primary jurisdiction over the cases filed against them, to the exclusion
of any other investigatory agency of Government pursuant to law and
existing jurisprudence. They rely on the doctrine in Uy v.
Sandiganbayan aforementioned, and contend that the Ombudsman, in
the exercise of the said primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
cases involving public officials, including police and military officials.
They likewise claim that it should be deemed that the Ombudsman has
already taken over the investigation of these cases, considering that
there are already pending complaints filed therewith involving the
same accused, facts and circumstances.
Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act
of 1989, provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases; .[10]
The question is whether or not the Ombudsman has in effect
taken over the investigation of the case or cases in question to the
exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. In granting
the petition for prohibition, RTC Judge Liwag gave the following
rationale:
Since the Ombudsman has taken hold of the situation of the parties in
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the matter, it is the feeling
of this Court that the respondents cannot insist on conducting a
preliminary investigation on the same matter under the pretext of a
shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis, the resolution
on the matter by the Ombudsman is final. In the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman itself, the other
investigative agencies of the Government have no power and right to
add an input into the Ombudsmans investigation. Only in matters
where the other investigative agencies are expressly allowed by the
Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may such agencies
conduct the investigation, subject to the final decision of the
Ombudsman. That is the situation. It is not otherwise. To allow the
respondents to meddle with the investigation of similar cases being
investigated by the Ombudsman would put them to a higher plane
than the source of their powers with respect to such cases. This is, of
course, anathema to orderly judicial procedures. This is contrary to
ordinary common sense. It would certainly be presumpt[u]ous, if not
ridiculous, for the Department of Justice to be making
recommendation as to its preliminary investigation to the
Ombudsman in matters being handled by such Office itself. Such
recommendation would be pre-emptive of the actions of the said
Office. Such a situation must thus be disallowed.
The public respondents capitalized on the fact that the Ombudsman
may take over, at any stage, from any investigative agency of the
Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials,
including police and military officials such as the petitioners. It is the
feeling of this Court that the respondents cannot find comfort in that
provision of the law. That situation presupposes the conduct by other
Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving public
officials in cases not theretofore being taken cognizance of by the
Ombudsman. If the Ombudsman, as in the case, has already taken
hold of the situation of the parties, it cannot take over, at any stage of
the proceedings, the investigation being conducted by another
agency. It has the case before it. Rudimentary common sense and
becoming respect for power and authority would thus require the
respondents to desist from interfering with the case already handled
by the Ombudsman. Indeed, as conceded by the respondents, they
are deputized prosecutors by the Ombudsman. If that is so, and that is
the truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers negates
absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and
authority. The hierarchy of powers must be remembered. The
principle of agency must be recalled.[11]
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the
Office of the Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any
malfeasance, misfeasance or non-feasance of public officers or
employees.[12] To discharge its duty effectively, the Constitution
endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with special features which
puts it a notch above other grievance-handling, investigate bodies.
First and foremost, it extended independence to the Ombudsman and
insulated it from the intrusions of partisan politics. Thus, the
Constitution provided for stringent qualification requirements for the
selection of the Ombudsman and his deputies, i.e., they should be
natural-born citizens, of recognized probity and independence and
must not have been candidates for any elective office in the
immediately preceding election.[13] The Ombudsman and his deputies
were given the rank and salary equal to that of the Chairman and
Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, with a
prohibition for any decrease in their salary during their term of
office.[14] They were given a fixed term of seven years, without
reappointment.[15] Upon their cessation from office, they are
prohibited from running for any elective office in the immediately
succeeding election.[16]Finally, unlike other investigative bodies, the
Constitution granted the Office of the Ombudsman fiscal
autonomy.[17] Clearly, all these measures are intended to enhance the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman was likewise envisioned by the
Constitution to serve as the principal and primary complaints and
action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic
maze of procedures. For this purpose, it was granted more than the
usual powers given to prosecutors. It was vested with the power to
investigate complaints against a public office or officer on its own
initiative, even without a formal complaint lodged before it.[18] It can
inquire into acts of government agencies and public servants based on
reports in the media and those which come to his attention through
sources other than a complaint. The method of filing a complaint with
the Ombudsman is direct, informal, speedy and inexpensive. All that
may be required from a complainant is sufficient information detailing
the illegal or improper acts complained of. The ordinary citizen, who
has become increasingly dependent on public agencies, is put to
minimal expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the
Office of the Ombudsman. Vis--vis other prosecutors, the exercise by
the Ombudsman of its power to investigate public officials is
given preference over other bodies.
As aforementioned, Congress itself acknowledged the significant
role played by the Office of Ombudsman when it enacted Republic Act
No. 6770. Section 15 (1) of said law gives the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases. This
power to take over a case at any time is not given to other investigative
bodies. All this means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan is not co-equal with other
investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman can delegate
the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power.
Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation of cases involving violations of the
Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction cannot diminish
the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to
investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers and
employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation.
In contrast, the DOJ is an extension of the executive department,
33
bereft of the constitutional independence granted to the
Ombudsman.
Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal
jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter,[19] the settled rule is
that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.[20] Thus,
assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and
the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is
not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case
before both bodies or be viewed as a contest between these bodies as
to which will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is
the Ombudsman before whom the complaint was initially filed. Hence,
it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary investigation to the
exclusion of the DOJ.
None of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a
factual situation similar to that of the present case. In Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),[21] the Court
upheld the special authority of the PCGG to conduct the preliminary
investigation of ill-gotten wealth cases pursuant to Executive Order No.
1, issued by then President Aquino, creating the PCGG. While the Court
emphasized in Cojuangco that the power of the Ombudsman to
conduct a preliminary investigation over said cases is not exclusive but
a shared authority, the complaints for the alleged misuse of coconut
levy funds were filed directly with the PCGG. No complaint was filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman.Moreover, a close scrutiny of said
case will disclose that the Court recognized the primary, albeit shared,
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate all ill-gotten wealth
cases.[22]In fact, it ordered the PCGG to desist from proceeding with the
preliminary investigation as it doubted the impartiality of the PCGG to
conduct the investigation after it had previously caused the issuance of
sequestration orders against petitioners assets.
In Sanchez v. Demetriou,[23] the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission filed a complaint with the DOJ against petitioner Mayor
Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. After
the DOJ panel prosecutors conducted the preliminary investigation, a
warrant of arrest was issued and the corresponding Informations were
filed in court by the DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner claimed that it is only
the Ombudsman who has the power to conduct investigation of cases
involving public officers like him. The Court reiterated its previous ruling
that the authority to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of public
officers is not an exclusive authority of the Ombudsman but a shared
authority. However, it will be noted that the complaint for preliminary
investigation in that case was filed solely with the DOJ.
In Aguinaldo v. Domagas,[24] a letter-complaint charging
petitioners with sedition was filed with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ panel of
prosecutors, the corresponding Information was filed in court. The
pertinent issue raised by petitioners was whether the prosecutors can
file the said Information without previous authority from the
Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the affirmative and reiterated its ruling
regarding the shared authority of the DOJ to investigate the case. Again,
it should be noted thatthe complaint in that case was addressed solely
to the provincial prosecutor.
The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v.
Felix[25] and Honasan v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the
DOJ[26] where the letter-complaint against petitioners public officers
were brought alone to the DOJ prosecutors for investigation.
In sum, in none of the aforecited cases was the complaint filed
ahead with the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous exercise of power
between two coordinate bodies and no risk of conflicting findings or
orders. In stark contrast with the present case, Mary Ong filed a
complaint against respondents initially with the Office of the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation which was immediately
acted on by said Office. For reasons not readily apparent on the records,
she thereafter refiled substantially the same complaint with the NBI
and the DOJ.
Not only this.
The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the
conduct of preliminary investigation over the cases filed against the
respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice.
Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial, it is not a casual affair
either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A.
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF
trial.[27] When one is hailed before an investigative body on specific
into cash.
charges, the very act of filing said complaint for preliminary
investigation immediately exposes the respondent and his family to A preliminary investigation was conducted and, thereafter, the
anxiety, humiliation and expense. To allow the same complaint to be
filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a
promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue
Resolution[2] dated May 29, 2000recommending the filing against
difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend
his position before every agency or body where the same complaint herein petitioners of fourteen (14) counts each of Malversation of
was filed.This would leave hapless litigants at a loss as to where to
appear and plead their cause or defense. Public Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said

There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the Resolution was approved by the Ombudsman; hence, twenty-eight
distinct possibility that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the (28) Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26087 to 26114
same time would come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the
guilt of the respondents. were filed against herein petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.

Finally, the second investigation would entail an unnecessary Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed
expenditure of public funds, and the use of valuable and limited
resources of Government, in a duplication of proceedings already their respective Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation,
started with the Ombudsman. which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third
From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-
any grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the respondent Judge. evaluate the cases against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

No costs. Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its

SO ORDERED. Resolution[3] dated September 18, 2000. It recommended the

Davide Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or insufficiency of
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
evidence.
Callejo, Sr., Tinga, Chico-Nazario andGarcia, JJ., concur.

9. Lazatin v. Desierto (2009)

The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs
DECISION (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. In a

Memorandum[4] dated October 24, 2000, the OLA recommended

PERALTA, J.:
that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to

proceed with the trial of the cases against petitioners. On October

This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, praying that the Ombudsman's disapproval of
the Office of the Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution[1] dated
September 18, 2000, recommending dismissal of the criminal cases
filed against herein petitioners, be reversed and set aside.
27, 2000, the Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum,
thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution dated September 18,
2000 and ordering the aggressive prosecution of the subject
cases. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for
continuation of criminal proceedings.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.

Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit docketed as Petitioners allege that:

OMB-0-98-1500, charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of

Public Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the I.

THE OMBUDSMAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and OF DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION.
(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.
II.
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION WAS BASED
ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS,
then Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND
CONJECTURES.[5]
Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year 1996, i.e., he was
Amplifying their arguments, petitioners asseverate that the
both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his
Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution
CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the
dismissing the cases against petitioners because, under Section 13,
disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant,

34
 Sec.13. The Office of the
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only Ombudsman shall have
with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing of the following powers,
functions, and duties:
proper cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the
xxxx
power to prosecute. They point out that under the Constitution, the

power to prosecute belongs to the OSP (formerly the Tanodbayan), Promulgate its rules and
procedure and exercise
which was intended by the framers to be a separate and distinct such other functions or
duties as may be
entity from the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioners conclude
provided by law.
that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a separate and
Expounding on this power of Congress to
distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power and prescribe other powers, functions, and
authority over the OSP. Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. duties to the Ombudsman, we quote
Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during
6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an interpellation by Commissioner Rodrigo:
xxxx
organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, should be

struck down for being unconstitutional. MR. RODRIGO:

Precisely, I am coming
to that. The last of the
enumerated functions
Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved from any
of the Ombudsman is:
liability because the checks were issued to petitioner Lazatin to exercise such powers
or perform such
allegedly as reimbursement for the advances he made from his functions or duties as
may be provided by
personal funds for expenses incurred to ensure the immediate
law. So, the legislature
implementation of projects that are badly needed by the Pinatubo may vest him with
powers taken away
victims. from the Tanodbayan,
may it not?

MR. COLAYCO:
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious. Yes.

MR. MONSOD:
Yes.
Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is

stale. It has long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 xxxx

granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and

placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional MR. RODRIGO:
Madam
infirmity. The issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 President. Section 5
reads: The Tanodbayan
violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as shall continue to
1995 in Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.[6] function and exercise its
powers as provided by
law.
Therein, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the

Ombudsman is in accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, MR. COLAYCO:

That is correct, because
Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise it is under P.D. No.
1630.
such other functions or duties as may be provided by
law. Elucidating on this matter, the Court stated: MR. RODRIGO:
So, if it is provided by
x x x While the intention to withhold law, it can be taken
prosecutorial powers from the away by law, I suppose.
Ombudsman was indeed present, the
Commission [referring to the
Constitutional Commission of 1986] did not MR. COLAYCO:
hesitate to recommend that the Legislature That is correct.
could, through statute, prescribe such
other powers, functions, and duties to the MR. RODRIGO:
Ombudsman. x x x As finally approved by And precisely, Section
the Commission after several 12(6) says that among
amendments, this is now embodied in the functions that can
paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI be performed by the
(Accountability of Public Officers) of the Ombudsman are such
Constitution, which provides: functions or duties as
may be provided by
law. The sponsors
35
 admitted that the So, this is a
legislature later on reversible disability,
might remove some unlike that of a eunuch;
powers from the it is not an irreversible
Tanodbayan and disability.[7]
transfer these to the
Ombudsman. The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed

the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld

MR. COLAYCO: by the Court in Acop. It was explained, thus:

Madam President, that x x x the petitioners conclude that the
is correct. inclusion of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor as among the offices under the
xxxx Office of the Ombudsman in Section 3 of
R.A. No. 6770 (An Act Providing for the
MR. RODRIGO: Functional and Structural Organization of
Madam President, what the Office of the Ombudsman and for Other
I am worried about is, if Purposes) is unconstitutional and void.
we create a
constitutional body The contention is not impressed with
which has neither merit. x x x
punitive nor
prosecutory powers but xxxx
only persuasive powers, x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly
we might be raising the provides that the then existing Tanodbayan,
hopes of our people too to be henceforth known as the Office of the
much and then Special Prosecutor, shall continue to
disappoint them. function and exercise its powers as now or
hereafter may be provided by law, except
MR. MONSOD: those conferred on the Office of the
I agree with the Ombudsman created under this
Commissioner. Constitution. The underscored phrase
evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's
MR. RODRIGO: powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent
Anyway, since we state amendatory legislation. It follows then that
that the powers of the Congress may remove any of the
Ombudsman can later Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers
on be implemented by under P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other
the legislature, why not powers, except those powers conferred by
leave this to the the Constitution on the Office of the
legislature? Ombudsman.

xxxx
MR. MONSOD: (reacting
to statements of
Commissioner Blas
Ople):
xxxx
With respect
to the argument that
he is a toothless animal,
we would like to say
that we are promoting
the concept in its form
at the present, but we
are also saying that he
can exercise such
powers and functions
as may be provided by
law in accordance with
the direction of the
thinking of
Commissioner
Rodrigo. We do not
think that at this time
we should prescribe
this, but we leave it up
to Congress at some
future time if it feels
that it may need to
designate what powers
the Ombudsman need
in order that he be
more effective. This is
not foreclosed.
36
Pursuing the present line of reasoning,
when one considers that by express
mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article
XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may
exercise such other powers or perform
functions or duties as may be provided by
law, it is indubitable then that Congress has
the power to place the Office of the Special
Prosecutor under the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress
may remove some of the powers granted to
the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and
transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant
the Office of the Special Prosecutor such
other powers and functions and duties as
Congress may deem fit and wise. This
Congress did through the passage of R.A.
No. 6770.[8]
The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag
v. Guerrero.[9] More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Valera,[10] the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling
in Acop and Camanag, declared that the OSP is merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act
under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the
Ombudsman and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to
preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and
Deputy Ombudsman.[11] The Court's ruling in Acop that the
authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770
 not what is
was authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation settled. Stare
for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,[12] where it was held decisis simply means
that for the sake of
that the power to prosecute carries with it the power to authorize certainty, a conclusion
reached in one case
the filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to
should be applied to
the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, those that follow if the
facts are substantially
Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional the same, even though
the parties may be
powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of
different. It proceeds
the Ombudsman. from the first principle
of justice that, absent
Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the any powerful
constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should be countervailing
considerations, like
revisited and the principle of stare decisis set aside. Again, this cases ought to be
decided alike.Thus,
contention deserves scant consideration. where the same
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to questions relating to
the same event have
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is been put forward by
the parties similarly
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines which
situated as in a
provides, thus: previous case litigated
and decided by a
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying competent court, the
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution rule of stare decisis is a
shall form a part of the legal system of bar to any attempt to
the Philippines. relitigate the same
issue.[16]

It was further explained in Fermin v. People[13] as follows:

The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins
adherence to judicial precedents. It requires Court has ruled that [a]bandonment thereof must be based only on
courts in a country to follow the rule
strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of
established in a decision of the Supreme
Court thereof. That decision becomes a predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably
judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The affected and the public's confidence in the stability of the solemn
doctrine of stare decisis is based on the
pronouncements diminished.[17] Verily, only upon showing that
principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits
settled and closed to further argument.[14]
derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the

courts be justified in setting aside the same.

In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v.
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason
Remington Steel Corporation,[15] the Court expounded on the
to convince the Court that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be
importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating that:
applied to this case. They have not successfully demonstrated how or

why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy
grounded on the necessity for securing certainty been validly conferred by law with the power of control and supervision
and stability of judicial decisions, thus: over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the

latter.
Time and again, the
court has held that it is
a very desirable and
necessary judicial
practice that when a The second issue advanced by petitioners is that the Ombudsman's
court has laid down a disapproval of the OSP Resolution recommending dismissal of the cases
principle of law as
applicable to a certain is based on misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises and
state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle conjectures. The question is really whether the Ombudsman correctly
and apply it to all future ruled that there was enough evidence to support a finding of probable
cases in which the facts
are substantially the cause.That issue, however, pertains to a mere error of
same. Stare decisis et
judgment. It must be stressed that certiorari is a remedy meant to
non quieta
movere. Stand by the correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. This has been
decisions and disturb
37
emphasized in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals,[18] to wit:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review
of facts and evidence is not the province of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra
ordinem - beyond the ambit of
appeal. Incertiorari proceedings, judicial review
does not go as far as to examine and assess the
evidence of the parties and to weigh the
probative value thereof. It does not include an
inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of
evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation
of evidence is merely an error of judgment that
cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in
the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of
was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by
the extraordinary writ
of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, or its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions
of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine
conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact
of the court a quo.[19]
Evidently, the issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a
finding of probable cause would necessitate an examination and re-
evaluation of the evidence upon which the Ombudsman based its
disapproval of the OSP Resolution. Hence, the Petition
for Certiorari should not be given due course.
Likewise noteworthy is the holding of the Court in Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
Desierto,[20] imparting the value of the Ombudsman's
independence, stating thus:
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act
of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to
investigate and prosecute any act or omission
of a public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling
of the Court not to interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are
supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned
as the champion of the people and preserver of
the integrity of public service, he has wide
latitude in exercising his powers and is free
from intervention from the three branches of
government. This is to ensure that his Office is
insulated from any outside pressure and
improper influence.[21]
Indeed, for the Court to overturn the Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause, it is imperative for petitioners to clearly prove that
said public official acted with grave abuse of
discretion. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Desierto,[22] the Court elaborated on what constitutes such abuse,
to wit:
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman's exercise of power must have
been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner
which must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of
law. x x x[23]
In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman
acted in a manner described above. Clearly, the Ombudsman was
acting in accordance with R.A. No. 6770 and properly exercised its
power of control and supervision over the OSP when it disapproved
the Resolution dated September 18, 2000.
It should also be noted that the petition does not question any
order or action of the Sandiganbayan Third Division; hence, it
should not have been included as a respondent in this petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
10. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact v. Desierto
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
v.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking
to annul and set aside the Order[1] of the Ombudsman dated July 6,
1998 dismissing three complaints filed by petitioner docketed as OMB-
0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and OMB-0-96-2645, and its
Order[2] of August 31, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 13, which created herein petitioner
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
(Committee).
38
 repay all their loans. Accordingly, the Committee found the loan

accounts of the above-mentioned three corporations as behest loans.

On March 6, 1996 and June 28, 1996, Orlando S. Salvador

(Salvador), in his capacity as PCGG consultant, executed three separate

Sworn Statements stating that among the loan accounts referred by the
The Committee submitted its report to President Ramos who
Assets Privatization Trust to the Committee for investigation, report and
instructed then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, sitting as the
recommendation are those of the following corporations: P.R. Garcia
Committee's ex-officio Chairman, to file the necessary charges against
and Sons Development and Investment Corporation (PRGS), Golden
the DBP Chairman and members of the Board of Directors, the former
River Mining Corporation (Golden River), and Filipinas Carbon and
PNB President and former NIDC General Manager, together with the
Mining Corporation (Filcarbon).
respective stockholders/officers of the three corporations.

With respect to the loan account of PRGS, Salvador alleged

Subsequently, the Sworn Statements of Salvador were used
that the said corporation obtained from the Development Bank of the
by the Committee as its bases in filing separate complaints with the
Philippines (DBP) an initial loan guarantee of P26,726,774.72 and a
Office of the Ombudsman against herein private respondents for
straight industrial loan amounting to P29,226,774.72 on October 26,
alleged violation of the provisions of Sections 3 (e) [3] and (g)[4] of
1967 for the purpose of redeeming mortgaged properties,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
rehabilitating buildings and equipment and defraying its operational
Corrupt Practices Act.
expenses.

The complaint against respondents Lorenzo N. Salcedo and

Anent the loan account of Golden River, Salvador claimed that
Josephine S. Garcia, stockholders of PRGS;
the corporation obtained loan accommodations from DBP beginning
and Wenceslao Pascual, Gaudencio Viduya, Julia
from 1975 until 1982 and that as of October 31, 1986, it had a total
D. Macuja,Placido L. Mapa, Jr., Jose Teves,
obligation of P43,193,000.00; that out of its five loan accounts, only the
Alejandro Melchor, Recio Garcia, Rafael Sison, Cesar Zalamea, Don M.
first two loans of Golden River obtained in 1975 and 1977 were
Perry and Rolando Soza, then officers and members of the Board of
sufficiently collateralized, leaving three other loans without any
Directors of DBP, is docketed as OMB-0-96-2643.
sufficient collateral, to wit: refinancing loan obtained in 1980 for the

amount of P14,724,430.00; refinancing loan obtained on March 13,

1982 for the amount of P5,551,000.00; and refinancing loan obtained The complaint against Ricardo Silverio, Sr., Ricardo Silverio,

on December 1, 1982 for the amount of P7,118,656.52. Jr., and Ricardo S. Tangco, stockholders of Golden River;

and Placido Mapa, Jose de Ocampo, Recio Garcia, Jose Tengco, Jr.,

Rafael Sison, Jose de Ocampo, Jose R. Tengco, Alice L. Reyes,

As to the loan account of Filcarbon, Salvador averred that the
Cesar Zalamea, Don Perry and Rolando M. Soza, then officers and
said corporation applied with the National Investment Development
members of the Board of Directors of DBP, is docketed as OMB-0-96-
Corporation (NIDC) a loan guarantee of P27.4 Million on January 17,
2644.
1977; that the loan application was favorably recommended by the
The complaint against Panfilo O. Domingo, then PNB
President of the Philippine National Bank (PNB); that the application
President; Conrado S. Reyes, then NIDC General Manager;
was subsequently approved by PNB's Board of Directors on August 17,
and Conrado Calalang, Antonio M. Gonzales, Norberto
1977.
L. Villarama, Sene B. dela Costa, Antonio O. Mendoza, Jr. and Ignacio

C. Bertumen, officers and stockholders of Filcarbon, is docketed as

Salvador alleged that, based on the evidence submitted to OMB-0-96-2645.

the Committee, these three corporations did not have sufficient

collaterals for the loans they obtained, except with respect to the loans
Subsequently, the three aforementioned cases were
obtained by Golden River in 1975 and 1977. Salvador also alleged that
consolidated by the Office of the Ombudsman.
the above-mentioned corporations did not have adequate capital to

ensure not only the viability of their operations but also their ability to

39
 In his assailed Order of July 6, 1998, the Ombudsman, upon State to recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is not barred by

the recommendation of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation prescription.

Bureau, dismissed the complaints against herein respondents. The

Ombudsman ruled that, except with respect to the two loan

In his Comment, the Ombudsman, citing the proceedings of
transactions entered into by Golden River in 1982, all the offenses
the 1986 Constitutional Commission as authority, contends that the
alleged by the Committee as having been committed by herein
provisions of Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution, which provides
respondents had already prescribed under the provisions of Section 11
for the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover ill-gotten
of R.A. No. 3019. As to the two 1982 transactions of Golden River, the
wealth, applies only to civil actions and not to criminal cases. The
Ombudsman found that, contrary to the claims of herein petitioner, the
Ombudsman further avers that prior to its amendment, Section 11 of
loan accounts obtained by the said corporation have sufficient
R.A. No. 3019 provided that the period for the prescription or
collaterals.
extinguishment of a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

was ten years. Subsequently, the said provision was amended in 1982

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the increasing the prescriptive period to fifteen years. Applying the

Ombudsman denied it in its Order dated August 31, 1998. Constitution and the law to the present case, the Ombudsman argues

that, except with respect to the two loan transactions entered into by

Golden River in 1982, all the other alleged criminal acts of herein private
Hence, herein petition.
respondents in connection with the loan transactions they entered into

in the years 1967 until 1980 had already prescribed in 1995. Hence,

private respondents can no longer be prosecuted with respect to

Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman erred in
these transactions.
dismissing, motu proprio, the three complaints without first requiring

respondents to submit their counter-affidavits and petitioner to file its

reply thereto. Such dismissal, petitioner avers, is premature. Petitioner

The Ombudsman also avers that under Section 2, Rule II of
further argues that even granting that the Ombudsman feels that
Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
petitioner's evidence is insufficient, the Ombudsman should have first
Ombudsman), the Ombudsman is authorized to dismiss, motu proprio,
required petitioner to clarify said evidence or to adduce additional
a complaint even without requiring the respondents to file their
evidence, in accordance with due process.
counter-affidavits and even without conducting a preliminary

investigation.

Petitioner also asserts that the Ombudsman erred in

dismissing petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that

As to the loan accounts of Golden River obtained on March
it was filed out of time as evidence shows that the said motion was
13, 1982 and December 1, 1982, the Ombusman contends that based
timely filed.
on pieces of evidence presented by the complainant, the said loans had

more than sufficient collateral.

Petitioner contends that the consolidation of the three

complaints and the subsequent issuance of a single Order dismissing
The Ombudsman asserts that his findings of fact and his
them is erroneous. Petitioner argues that the three complaints cannot
application of pertinent laws as well as rules of evidence deserve great
be lumped together and a single order issued for their resolution as
weight and respect and even accorded full faith and credit in the
these complaints involve different sets of facts and are based on
absence of any showing of any error or grave abuse of discretion.
different loan transactions.

Respondents Panfilo O. Domingo, Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Alicia Ll.

Petitioner further avers that the pieces of evidence submitted
Reyes, Cesar Zalamea, Placido L. Mapa, Jr., Conrado T. Calalang,
as part of the complaints were not considered by the Ombudsman
Norberto Villarama and Ricardo C.Silverio filed their respective
when it issued the assailed Orders; that the findings of the Committee
Comments. While the present petition is pending in this Court,
that the subject loans are behest loans prevail; and, that the right of the
respondents Conrado Reyes and Jose Teves died.[5] In a

40
 Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin
Resolution[6] issued by this Court dated February 22, 2006, to run from the day of the
respondents Wenceslao Pascual, Senen dela Costa, commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same not be
Lorenzo Salcedo and Antonio Mendoza were dropped as respondents known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the
for an earlier resolution of the case after all efforts of petitioner to
institution of judicial
ascertain their correct and present addresses proved to be in vain. proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
With respect to the other respondents who failed to file their The prescription shall be
interrupted when proceedings
respective comments, the Court dispenses with the comments in order
are instituted against the guilty
that the present petition may be resolved. person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
The Court shall first deal with the issue of prescription as this The above provisions are clear and need no
interpretation. In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee vs.
was the main basis of the Ombudsman in dismissing petitioner's
Hon. Desierto*, we held:
complaints. x x x it was well-nigh impossible
for the State, the aggrieved
party, to have known the
violations of R.A. No. 3019 at
Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides: the time the questioned
transactions were made
The right of the State to recover properties
because, as alleged, the public
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees,
officials concerned connived or
from them or from their nominees or transferees,
conspired with the
shall not be barred by prescription,laches,
beneficiaries of the loans. Thus,
or estoppel.
we agree with the COMMITTEE
that the prescriptive period for
the offenses with which
respondents in OMB-0-96-0968
In Presidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto[7], the were charged should be
computed from
Court held that the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover the discovery of the
ill-gotten wealth applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten commission thereof and not
from the day of such
wealth, and not to criminal cases. In other words, the prosecution of commission.
offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten The assertion by the
Ombudsman that the phrase if
wealth contemplated in the above-mentioned provision of the the same not be known in
Constitution may be barred by prescription.[8] Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does
not mean lack of knowledge but
that the crime is not reasonably
knowable is unacceptable, as it
provides an interpretation that
Under Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended defeats or negates the intent of
by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195, which took effect on March 16, the law, which is written in a
clear and unambiguous
1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said Act language and thus provides no
room for interpretation but
was increased from ten to fifteen years.
only application.
We reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad
Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans
As to whether or not the subject complaints filed against vs. Desierto** thus:
In cases involving violations of
herein respondents had already prescribed, the Court's disquisition on
R.A. No. 3019 committed prior
an identical issue in Salvador v. Desierto[9]is instructive, to wit: to the February
1986 Edsa Revolution that
ousted President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, we ruled that the
The applicable laws on prescription of government as the aggrieved
criminal offenses defined and penalized under the party could not have known of
Revised Penal Code are found in Articles 90 and 91 the violations at the time the
of the same Code. For those penalized by special questioned transactions were
laws, Act No. 3326, as amended, applies. Here, since made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R.
R.A. 3019, the law alleged to have been violated, is No. 140232, January 19, 2001,
a special law, the applicable law in the computation 349 SCRA 767; Domingo
of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. vs.Sandiganbayan, supra, Note
3326, as amended, which provides: 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact
Finding Committee on Behest
Loans vs. Desierto, supra, Note
16). Moreover, no person
41
 would have dared to question
the legality of those that the presumption of regularity of the Ombudsman's performance of
transactions. Thus, the his official duties must yield to the evidence presented by petitioner. As
counting of the prescriptive
period commenced from the such, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the
date of discovery of the offense
Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 should be considered as timely filed.
in 1992 after an exhaustive
investigation by the
Presidential Ad Hoc Committee
on Behest Loans.
Nonetheless, a perusal of the assailed Order dated August 31,
As to when the period of
prescription was interrupted, 1998 of the Ombudsman shows that there are grounds other than late
the second paragraph of
Section 2, Act No. 3326, as filing upon which the Ombudsman denied petitioner's Motion for
amended, provides Reconsideration, to wit:
that prescription is interrupted
when proceedings are xxxx
instituted against the guilty
person.[10]
All the foregoing notwithstanding, and
bearing in mind the peculiar circumstances of this
case, particularly the fact that the subject loans are
now alleged as ill-gotten wealth and behest loans,
The complaints filed against respondents did not specify the
the same remains to be bare allegations with no new
exact dates when the alleged offenses were discovered. However, it is evidence tendered to thwart the Order in question.

not disputed that it was the Committee that discovered the same. As

such, the discovery could not have been made earlier than October 13, The complaints herein are plain and
simple. There is no allegation even that the
1992, the date when the Committee was created. It is clear, therefore, questioned loans were granted at the behest of
respondent officials in these cases x x x.
that the alleged criminal offenses against herein respondents had not
x x x x[12]
yet prescribed when the complaints were filed in 1996. Thus, the

Ombudsman seriously erred in dismissing the three complaints filed by

petitioner on the ground of prescription.

It, thus, appears that the Ombudsman's basis for dismissing the

complaints was not merely the prescription of the complaints, but also

the lack of any allegation therein that the questioned loans are behest
As to petitioner's claim that it is error on the part of the
loans.
Ombudsman to deny petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on the

ground that the same was filed out of time:

However, while there was no specific or particular mention that the

questioned loan accounts were behest loans, the complaints contain

The Ombudsman is presumed to have regularly performed its
allegations consistent with the criteria laid down by Memorandum
official duty in the determination of whether or not the said Motion was
Order No. 61 issued by President Ramos on November 9, 1992.
really filed beyond the reglementaryperiod as provided under the

pertinent rules of the Office of the Ombudsman. However, this

presumption is disputable. In the present case, petitioner contends that

The said Memorandum provides for the following as a frame of
the subject Motion was sent by registered mail on July 29, 1998, which
reference in determining whether a loan, which is under scrutiny, is
was the last day allowed for filing of the same. As proof of such mailing,
behest:
petitioner presented a Certification[11]issued by the Central Post Office

in Manila stating therein that Registered Letter No. 74220 was sent by

the PCGG on July 29, 1998, addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman (a) It is under-collateralized;

in Manila, and that said letter was duly delivered to and received on
(b) The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
August 5, 1998 by an authorized representative of the Office of the
(c) Direct or indirect endorsement by high government
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman failed to controvert petitioner's
officials, like the presence of marginal notes;
submission in any of the pleadings filed in the present petition. A simple

referral to the date that appears on the front page of the Motion for (d) Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower

Reconsideration, indicating the date when the Office of the corporation are identified as cronies;

Ombudsman received the Motion, would have easily disputed the

(e) Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose
allegation of petitioners. In the absence thereof, the Court finds
intended;
42
 (f) Use of corporate layering;
(g) Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being
sought; and
(h) Extraordinary speed with which the loan release was
made.[13] (Emphasis supplied).
In Presidential Commission on Good Government
Hon. Desierto,[14] the Ombudsman adopted the position that to qualify
as a behest loan, two or more of the criteria enumerated in
Memorandum Order No. 61 must be present.
It is therefore erroneous for the Ombudsman to conclude in the present
case that the complaints against PRGS and Filcarbon were bereft of any
allegations that their questioned loans are behest, considering that said
complaints explicitly alleged the presence of two of the criteria: that the
subject loans are under-collateralized and that the borrower
corporations are undercapitalized.
Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman, provides:
SEC. 2. Evaluation. - Upon evaluating the complaint,
the investigating officer shall recommend whether it
may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government
office or agency which has jurisdiction over
the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or
official for fact-finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication;
or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
While under this Rule, the Ombudsman may dismiss a complaint
outright for want of palpable merit, but a sense of justice and fairness
demands that the Ombudsman must set forth in a Resolution the
reasons for such dismissal.
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be
informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and
legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.[15] This Court has
held that the constitutional and statutory mandate that no decision
shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based applies
as well to dispositions by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.[16] In
fact, Section 18 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, makes the Rules of Court applicable, in
a suppletory manner, to its own rules of procedure. One of the
requirements provided under Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court is
that a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case should
state the facts and the law on which it is based.
v.
A careful reading of the questioned Orders of the Ombudsman shows
that there is no express finding that the complaints filed by petitioner
were manifestly without merit. There is no explanation or discussion,
whatsoever, as to how it reached its conclusion that the disputed loans
are not behest insofar as PRGS and Filcarbon are concerned.
Thus, for a proper disposition of the complaints against PRGS
and Filcarbon, the Court finds it necessary to refer them back to the
Ombudsman for proper evaluation based on their merits.
As to Golden River, the Ombudsman did not err in dismissing the
complaint against it with respect to its loan transactions obtained
on March 13, 1982 and December 1, 1982. The Court finds no cogent
reason to deviate from the findings of the Ombudsman, to wit:
Discussing these two loans, we find that in
1980, Golden River Corporation was granted a
refinance in the amount of P14,724,430 pesos. Such
grant in 1982 for P5,551,000.00 is less than 50% of
the said P14,724,430 pesos, hence, this cannot be
said to be granted with insufficient collateral, taking
the same as reference point alone without the
previous collaterals and assets which were
admittedly sufficient as admitted by complainant in
paragraph b, p. 2 of the Sworn Statement of Orlando
L. Salvador (p. 10, Records, OMB-0-96-2644)
xxx
Likewise, the loans for P7,118,656.52 on
December 1, 1982 is not more than 50% of the
additional assets alone which is the money
equivalent of the two refinanced loans of
P14,724,430.00 and P5,551,000.00 the total of
which is P20,275,430.00 pesos. Considering that the
refinancing ratio has a maximum of 70% of the total
assets/collaterals, even the last two loans which
were within the prescriptive period are not without
sufficient collaterals.
In other words, collaterals were sufficient
in accordance with Sec. 78, R.A. 337, as amended
(General Banking Act) x x x[17]
This Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has
discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He may
43
dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in

form and substance or, should he find it otherwise, to continue with the
Petitioner contended that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the
inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the
complaints without requiring respondents to file their counter-
complaint is in due and proper form and substance. Quite relevant is
affidavits and petitioner its reply, or to further require petitioner to
the Court's ruling in Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman[18] and
clarify its evidence or adduce additional evidence.
reiterated in the case of The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- Finding

Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon. Desierto,[19] to wit:

It is quite clear under Section 2(a), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of

The prosecution of offenses committed by public the Office of the Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a complaint outright
officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman.
To insulate the Office from outside pressure and for want of palpable merit. At that point, the Ombudsman does not
improper influence, the Constitution as well as R.A.
have to conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a
6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free complaint.[25] Should the investigating officer find the complaint devoid
from legislative, executive or judicial intervention.
This court consistently refrains from interfering of merit, then he may recommend its outright dismissal.[26] The
with the exercise of its powers, and respects the Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a preliminary
initiative and independence inherent in the
Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the investigation is proper.[27] It is only when the Ombudsman opts not to
champion of the people and the preserver of the
integrity of the public service.[20] dismiss the complaint outright for lack of palpable merit would the

Ombudsman be expected to require the respondents to file their

counter-affidavit and petitioner, its reply.

As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsmans

exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers, as provided in the

Constitution, without good and compelling reasons to indicate Lastly, the Court finds nothing erroneous in the Ombudsman's act

otherwise.[21] The basis for this rule was provided in the case of consolidating the three complaints and of issuing a single order for

of Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman[22] where the Court held as follows: their dismissal considering that, with the exception of the complaint

regarding the two 1982 loan accounts of Golden River which was

separately discussed by the Ombudsman on their merits, the dismissal

The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by of all the other complaints was based on a common ground, which is
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but
prescription.
upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of
the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed However, in the remand of the complaints against respondents, orderly
before it, in much the same way that the courts
administration of justice behooves the Ombudsman not to consolidate
would be extremely swamped if they would be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the the three complaints, as the respective respondents therein would
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time
they decide to file an information in court or dismiss inevitably raise different defenses which would require separate
a complaint by a private complainant.[23] presentation of evidence by the parties involved.

While the Court has previously held that it may interfere with the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Except with
discretion of the Ombudsman in case of clear abuse of discretion,[24] the
respect to the complaints relative to the loan accounts of Golden River
Ombudsman is not guilty of abuse of discretion in dismissing the
obtained on March 13, 1982, and December 1, 1982, the assailed
complaint against Golden River insofar as the two 1982 loan
Orders of the Ombudsman dated July 6, 1998 and August 31, 1998 in
transactions are concerned.
OMB-0-96-2643, OMB-0-96-2644 and OMB-0-96-2645 are SET ASIDE.

However, the complaint against Golden River had not been completely
The Office of the Ombudsman is directed to conduct with dispatch an
disposed of by the Ombudsman as it failed to discuss the refinancing
evaluation on the respective merits of the complaints against herein
loan obtained by the said corporation in 1980 for the amount
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule II of its Rules
of P14,724,430.00. Hence, the complaint against Golden River should
of Procedure.
also be referred back to the Ombudsman for proper evaluation of its

merits with respect to the aforementioned loan.

44
SO ORDERED.
11. Castro v. Deloria (2009)
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court filed by Sharon Castro (petitioner) to assail the July 22, 2003
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed CA-G.R. SP No.
69350; and the March 26, 2004 CA Resolution[2] which denied the
motion for reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Guimaras, with Malversation
of Public Funds, under an Information which reads, as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and
for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of
Buenavista, Province of Guimaras, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court,
abovenamed accused, a public officer, being the
Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras and as such, was in
the custody and possession of public funds in the
amount of P556,681.53, Philippine Currency,
representing the value of her collections and other
accountabilities, for which she is accountable by
reason of the duties of her office, in such capacity
and committing the offense in relation to office,
taking advantage of her public position, with
deliberate intent, and with intent to gain, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle and
convert to her own personal use and benefit said
amount of P556,681.53, and despite notice and
demands made upon her account for said public
funds, she has failed to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16, 2001.
On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds
of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to
conduct the preliminary investigation and file
Information. Petitioner argued that the Information failed to allege her
salary grade -- a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of
the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,[4] petitioner further argued that as
she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against
her was cognizable by the RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted
only by the public prosecutor, and not by the Ombudsman whose
prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable
the Sandiganbayan.[5]
The RTC denied the Motion to Quash
Order[6] dated September 7, 2001. It held that the jurisdiction of the
RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but
on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense
charged.[7] Moreover, it sustained the prosecutorial authority of the
Ombudsman in the case, pointing outthat in Uy, upon motion for
clarification filed by the Ombudsman, the Court set aside its August 9,
1999 Decision and issued a March 20, 2001 Resolution expressly
recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the
Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the RTC.
The RTC further held that the Motion to Quash was contrary
to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was filed after petitioner pleaded not guilty
under the Information.[8]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[9] which the
RTC denied in its December 18, 2001 Order.[10]
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[11] with the CA, but the
latter dismissed the petition in the Decision under review.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[12] was also denied.
Hence, the present petition, confining the issues to the
following:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May
31, 2000, when the Information for
Malvesation of Public Funds was instituted
against the Petitioner, had the authority to file
the same in light of this Supreme Courts ruling
in the First Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case, which
declared that the prosecutorial powers of the
Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan.
2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution
issued by the Supreme Court dated February
22, 2001 in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can
be made applicable to the Petitioner-Accused,
without violating the constitutional provision
on ex-post facto laws and denial of the
accused to due process.[13]
Petitioner contends that from the time of the promulgation
on August 9, 1999 of the Decision of the Court in Uy up to the time of
issuance on March 20, 2001 of the Resolution of the Court in the same
case, the prevailing jurisprudence was that the Ombudsman had no
prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable by the RTC. As the
investigation and prosecution against petitioner was conducted by the
Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999 Decision
the in Uy was applicable, notwithstanding that the said decision was set
aside in the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in said case. Hence,
the Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at that
time the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers
over the case.
The petition lacks merit.
by
The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v.
Enoc,[14] wherein accused Ruben Enoc, et al. invoked the August 9,
in an
1999 Decision of the Court in Uy[15] in a motion to dismiss the 11 counts
of malversation that were filed against them by the Ombudsman before
the RTC. The RTC granted the motion but upon petition filed by the
Ombudsman, the Court reversed the RTC and held:
In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation
invoking the very same resolution promulgated
45
on March 20, 2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan employees. Indeed, it must be
reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory stressed that the powers
power of the Ombudsman extended only to cases granted by the legislature to
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. the Ombudsman are very broad
Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the and encompass all kinds of
said ruling and held that the Ombudsman has malfeasance, misfeasance and
powers to prosecute not only graft cases within non-feasance committed by
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also public officers and employees
those cognizable by the regular courts. It held: during their tenure of office.

The power to Moreover, the

investigate and to prosecute jurisdiction of the Office of the
granted by law to the Ombudsman should not be
Ombudsman is plenary and equated with the limited
unqualified. It pertains to any authority of the Special
act or omission of any public Prosecutor under Section 11 of
officer or employee when such RA 6770. The Office of the
act or omission appears to be Special Prosecutor is merely a
illegal, unjust, improper or component of the Office of the
inefficient. The law does not Ombudsman and may only act
make a distinction between under the supervision and
cases cognizable by the control and upon authority of
Sandiganbayan and those the Ombudsman. Its power to
cognizable by regular courts. It conduct preliminary
has been held that the clause investigation and to prosecute
any illegal act or omission of is limited to criminal cases
any public official is broad within the jurisdiction of the
enough to embrace any crime Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the
committed by a public officer or lawmakers did not intend to
employee. confine the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the
The reference made Ombudsman to these types of
by RA 6770 to cases cognizable cases. The Ombudsman is
by the Sandiganbayan, mandated by law to act on all
particularly in Section 15(1) complaints against officers and
giving the Ombudsman primary employees of the government
jurisdiction over cases and to enforce their
cognizable by the administrative, civil and
Sandiganbayan, and Section criminal liability in every case
11(4) granting the Special where the evidence
Prosecutor the power to warrants. To carry out this
conduct preliminary duty, the law allows him to
investigation and prosecute utilize the personnel of his
criminal cases within the office and/or designate any
jurisdiction of the fiscal, state prosecutor or
Sandiganbayan, should not be lawyer in the government
construed as confining the service to act as special
scope of the investigatory and investigator or prosecutor to
prosecutory power of the assist in the investigation and
Ombudsman to such cases. prosecution of certain
cases. Those designated or
Section 15 of RA 6770 deputized to assist him work
gives the Ombudsman primary under his supervision and
jurisdiction over cases control. The law likewise allows
cognizable by the him to direct the Special
Sandiganbayan. The law prosecutor to prosecute cases
defines such primary outside the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction as authorizing the jurisdiction in accordance with
Ombudsman to take over, at Section 11(4c) of RA 6770.
any stage, from any
investigatory agency of the We, therefore, hold that the
government, the investigation Ombudsman has authority to investigate and
of such cases. The grant of this prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97)
authority does not necessarily against respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 of
imply the exclusion from its Digos, Davao Del Sur even as this authority is not
jurisdiction of cases involving exclusive and is shared by him with the regular
public officers and employees prosecutors.
cognizable by other courts. The
exercise by the Ombudsman of WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7,
his primary jurisdiction over 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, branch 19 of
cases cognizable by the Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case
Sandiganbayan is not Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby REINSTATED
incompatible with the and the Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to try and
discharge of his duty to decide the same. (Emphasis supplied)
investigate and prosecute
other offenses committed by
public officers and
46
 Similarly relevant is the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon.
Breva,[16] in which, citing the August 9, 1999 Decision in Uy, the RTC
dismissed a criminal complaint that was filed before it by the
Ombudsman. The Court reversed the RTC, for, given the
Courts Uy ruling under its March 20, 2001 Resolution, the trial courts
assailed Orders x x x are, in hindsight, without legal support and must,
therefore, be set aside.
It is settled, therefore, that the March 20, 2001 Resolution
in Uy, that the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases
cognizable by the RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or
pending at the time when its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative
ruling on the issue.
Petitioner would argue, however, that the March 20, 2001
Resolution in Uy cannot have retroactive effect, for otherwise it would
amount to an ex-post facto law, which is constitutionally proscribed.[17]
Petitioner is grasping at straws.
A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act,
constitutes part of that law as of the date of its original passage. Such
interpretation does not create a new law but construes a pre-existing
one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous legislative intent
of that law.[18] Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court
in Uyinterpreting the Ombudsman Act is deemed part of the law as of
the date of its effectivity on December 7, 1989.
Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or
abandons a doctrinal interpretation of such law, the Court, recognizing
that acts may have been performed under the impression of the
constitutionality of the law or the validity of its interpretation, has
consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the
mere subsequent declaration of the nullity of the law or its
interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a prospective
application.[19] But where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned,
a judicial interpretation of the law should be deemed incorporated at
the moment of its legislation.[20]
In the present case, the March 20, 2001 Resolution
in Uy made no declaration of unconstitutionality of any law nor did it
vacate a doctrine long held by the Court and relied upon by the
public. Rather, it set aside an erroneous pubescent interpretation of the
Ombudsman Act as expressed in the August 9, 1999 Decision in the
same case. Its effect has therefore been held by the Court to reach back
to validate investigatory and prosecutorial processes conducted by the
Ombudsman, such as the filing of the Information against petitioner.
With the foregoing disquisition, the second issue is rendered moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
47
12. Antonino v. Desierto (2008)
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure filed by petitioner, former Congresswoman Luwalhati
R. Antonino (petitioner) of the First Congressional District of South
Cotabato which includes General Santos City (city), assailing that
portion of the Resolution[2] dated January 20, 1999 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) dismissing the case against private
respondents, former city Mayor Rosalita T. Nuez (Mayor
Nuez), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Regional Executive Director for Region XI Augustus L. Momongan
(Momongan), Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Abednego O. Adre
(Judge Adre), former City Legal Officer Pedro G. Nalangan III (Nalangan),
Register of Deeds Asteria E. Cruzabra (Cruzabra), Land Management
Officer III of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) of South Cotabato Julio C. Diaz (Diaz) and Regional Technical
Director of the DENR for Region XI Agapito Borinaga (Borinaga)
(respondents).
The facts, as narrated by the Ombudsman, are as follows:
Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by
then President Diosdado Macapagal on October 3,
1963 (Record, pp. 23-24). The pertinent provision
of which states that:
do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and
reserve for recreational and health resort site
purposes, under the administration of the
municipality of General Santos, subject to private
rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of land of the
public domain situated in the said municipality and
more particularly described as follows:
Mr-1160-D Municipal Reservation
The Municipal Government
of General Santos Magsaysay Park
A parcel of land (as shown on plan Mr-1160-D)
situated in the barrio of
Dadiangas, Municipality of General
Santos, province of Cotabato. x x x containing an
area of 52,678 square meters.
On January 22, 1968, Republic Act No. 5412
(Record, pp. 25-26), known as the Charter of the
City of General Santos was enacted creating the City
of General Santos where it is provided that The
National Government hereby cedes to the City of
General Santos the ownership and possession to all
lands of the public domain within the city. Later,
said Act was amended by Republic Act No. 6386 on
August 16, 1971 (Record, pp. 27-28) wherein it read
that The disposition of all lands of the public
domain within the city shall be in accordance with
the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered
One hundred forty-one, as amended: Provided,
That all incomes and receipts derived from such
disposition shall accrue exclusively to the city as
provided in this Act.
On the other hand, the property subject of
Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was thereafter
subdivided into three lots, namely: Lot Y-1 with an
area of 18,695 square meters, Lot X containing
15,020 square meters and Lot Y-2 with 18,963
square meters, or a total of 52,678 square meters
which is still equivalent to the original area.
However, on February 25, 1983, former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2273
amending Proclamation No. 168 (Record, pp. 29-
31), which provides that:
do hereby exclude from the
operation of Proclamation No.
168 dated October 3,
1963, which established the
recreational and health resort
reservation situated in the
Municipality of General Santos,
now General Santos City, Island
of Mindanao, certain portions
of the land embraced therein
and declare the same open to
disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land
Act, which parcels of land are
more particularly described as
follows:
Lot Y-1, MR-1160-D
(Magsaysay Park)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-1,
MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park)
situated in
the Municipality of General
Santos,
now General Santos City, Islan
d of Mindanao. x x x containing
an area of EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
NINETY-FIVE (18,695) SQUARE
METERS. x x x
Lot Y-2, MR-1160-D
(Magsaysay Park)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot Y-2,
MR-1160-D, Magsaysay Park)
situated in
the Municipality of General
Santos,
now General Santos City, Islan
d of Mindanao. x x x containing
an area of EIGHTEEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY-THREE (18,963) SQUARE
METERS. x x x
Thus, leaving only Lot X as that covered by
Presidential Proclamation No. 168 and is therefore
reserved for recreational and health resort site
purposes.
As a result of such exclusion, the Heirs of Cabalo
Kusop applied for Free Patent with the District Land
Office and consequently Certificates of Title were
issued sometime in 1983. In 1984, two cases were
filed by the local government
of General Santos City against the said Heirs of
Kusop for Declaration of Nullity of Titles and, on the
48
other hand, the Heirs of Kusop filed a case against
the said local government for Injunction and
Damages. The said three cases were consolidated
before the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, Branch 22, presided by respondent
Judge Abednego Adre.
On May 23, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
General Santos City passed Resolution No. 87,
Series of 1991, entitled Resolution Approving the
Compromise Agreement to be entered into by and
between the City Government of General Santos
represented by the City Mayor and the Heirs of
Cabalo Kusop, re: Magsaysay Park (Record, pp.
1506-1507). Significant provisions of the said
Compromise Agreement (Record, pp. 33-39) state
that:
1. The subject matter of this
agreement are Lots Y-1, MR-
1160-D and Y-2, MR-1160-D
with combined area of THIRTY-
SEVEN THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT
(37,658) SQUARE METERS, and
from this the HEIRS AND
BENEFICIARIES shall receive a
total net area of TWENTY
THOUSAND (20,000) SQUARE
METERS and to the CITY shall
pertain the remainder of
SEVENTEEN THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT
(17,658) SQUARE METERS
which if added to Lot X, MR-
1160-D, previously donated to
the CITY as stated in par. 7 of
the WHEREAS clause, with an
area of FIFTEEN THOUSAND
AND TWENTY (15,020) SQUARE
METERS (located in between
Lots Y-1 and Y-2), the CITY shall
retain a total area of THIRTY
TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SEVENTY-EIGHT (32,678)
SQUARE METERS.
Said Compromise Agreement was signed by
respondent City Mayor Rosalita Nuez, assisted by
respondent Pepito Nalangan III, and the heirs and
beneficiaries of Cabalo Kusop.
As a consequence of the said Compromise
Agreement, respondent Judge Abednego Adre
issued an Order (Record, pp. 40-52), covering the
three pending cases, on May 6, 1992, the
dispositive portion of which states:
ACCORDINGLY, finding the
foregoing Compromise
Agreement in conformity with
Article 6 in correlation with
Article 1306 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, the same is
hereby APPROVED and
ADOPTED as judgment in these
cases. The parties are enjoined
to faithfully comply therewith.
A Writ of Execution was accordingly issued
on November 28, 1995.
However, on July 22, 1997, acting upon the Motion
for Exclusion of an Extraneous Subject from the
Coverage of the Judgment thereof and the Motion
for Issuance of Clarificatory Order submitted by the
Heirs of Cabalo Kusop and jointly by CENR Officer
and Regional Technical Director of DENR,
respectively, respondent Judge issued another
Order [assailed RTC Order] (Record, pp. 53-59) in
the above-cited three cases, stating that:
ACCORDINGLY, based on all the foregoing facts, law
and jurisprudence, the motion for exclusion of Lot
X, MR-1160-D comprising an area of 15,020
SQUARE METERS is GRANTED. The movants heirs
of Kusop are, however, enjoined to donate to the
City of General Santos in keeping with the intent
and spirit of the compromise agreement.
Compromise Judgment dated May 6, 1992 per said
courts order dated July 22, 1997.
Thereupon, public respondents Cesar Jonillo and
City Assessor Leonardo Dinopol, together with
recommendation for approval from respondent
Rivera, submitted an appraisal of lots X-1 to X-16
stating therein the appraisal amount of P100.00
per square meter and existing improvements of
residential light house per lot with an appraised
value ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00(refer
to application papers, Record, pp. 421-500).

On July 23, 1997, the following private respondents Subsequently, on August 4, 1997, respondent Cesar
applied for Miscellaneous Sales Patent over Jonillo prepared a letter-report addressed to the
portions of Lot X, to be divided as follows (refer to Regional Executive Director of DENR for each of the
affidavits, Record, pp. 60-75): sixteen (16) applicants recommending for the
private sale of the subject lots to the above-named
Applicants Area applied applicants-respondents, without public auction
(refer to sample letter-report of recommendation
1. Mad Guaybar - 999 sq. m.; in favor of Rico Altizo, Record, p. 77). Respondent
CENR Officer, Renato Rivera, also issued
2. Oliver Guaybar - 999 sq. m.; recommendation letters for each of the sixteen
applicants addressed to the PENR Officer for the
3. Jonathan Guaybar - 999 sq. m.; approval of the appraisal of the subject lots and of
the private sale (please refer to sample
4. Alex Guaybar - 999 sq. m.; recommendation letter in favor of Rico Altiz[o],
Record, p. 78).
5. Jack Guiwan - 999 sq. m.;
A notice of sale was issued by respondent Julio Diaz
6. Nicolas Ynot - 999 sq. m.; also on the same date stating therein that
on September 5, 1997 the subject lot/s will be sold
7. Carlito Flaviano III - 999 sq. m.; (Record, p. 79).

8. Jolito Poralan - 999 sq. m.; On September 18, 1997, the following Certificates
of Titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of
9. Miguela Cabi-ao - 999 sq. m.; General Santos City, respondent Asteria Cruzabra,
which titles were also signed by respondent
10. Jose Rommel Saludar - 999 sq. m.; Augustus Momongan, as DENR Regional Executive
Director, to wit:
11. Joel Teves - 999 sq. m.;
Name of Owner OCT No. Lot Record
12. Rico Altizo - 999 sq. m.; No. Page No.

13. Johnny Medillo - 999 sq. m.; 1. Mad Guaybar P-6393-A X-1 80-82;

14. Martin Saycon - 999 sq. m.; 2. Oliver Guaybar P-6392 X-2 83-85;

15. Arsenio delos Reyes, - 510 sq. m.; and, 3. Jonathan Guaybar P-6389-A X-3 86-88;
Jr.
4. Alex Guaybar P-6393 X-4 89-91;
16. Jose Bomez - 524 sq. m.
5. Jack Guiwan P-6399 X-5 92-94;
The following day, July 24, 1997, public respondent
Cesar Jonillo, as Deputy Land Management 6. Nicolas Ynot P-6388-A X-6 95-97;
Inspector, recommended for the approval of the
survey authority requested by the above-named 7. Carlito Flaviano III P-6389 X-7 98-
private respondents for Lot X (Record, p. 418). 100;

Within the same day, the Survey Authority was 8. Jolito Poralan P-6391 X-8 101-
issued to private respondents by public respondent 103;
CENR Officer Renato Rivera (Record, p. 419). As a
result of which, Lot X was subdivided into 16 lots 9. Miguela Cabi-ao P-6392-A X-9 104-
(refer to subdivision plan, Record, p. 32). 106;

On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita 10. Jose Rommel P-6388 X-10 107-
T. Nuez, assisted by respondent City Legal Officer Saludar 109;
Pedro Nalangan III issued 1st Indorsements (refer to
application documents, Record, pp. 421-500) 11. Joel Teves P-6396 X-11 110-
addressed to CENRO, DENR for portions of Lot X 112;
applied by private respondents and stated therein
that this office interposes no objection to whatever 12. Rico Altizo P-6395 X-12 113-
legal proceedings your office may pursue on 115;
application covering portions thereof after the
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 13. Johnny Medillo P-6390 X-13 116-
excluded Lot X, MR-1160-D from the coverage of the 117;

49
 14. Martin Saycon P-6394-A X-14 118-
120; have regularly performed their official functions. Accordingly, the

charges against the respondents were dismissed. Thus, the case was
15. Arsenio delos P-6395-A X-15 121-
Reyes 123; disposed in this wise:

16. Jose Bomez P-6394 X-16 124-

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office
127.
finds and so holds that the following crimes were
committed and that respondents, whose names
Sometime on September 24 and 25, 1997, except
appear below, are probably guilty thereof:
for lots X-6, X-7, X-15 and X-16, the above-named
registered owners sold their lots, through their
1. CESAR JONILLO sixteen (16) counts of
attorney-in-fact, respondent Atty. Nilo Flaviano, to
Falsification of public document to the sixteen (16)
the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits
recommendation reports submitted;
System (AFP-RSBS) in the amount of Two Million
Nine Hundred Ninety-Seven Thousand Pesos
2. RENATO RIVERA sixteen (16) counts of
(P2,997,000.00) per 999 sq. m. lot (Record, pp. 127-
Falsification of public document relative to the
150). Then, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-
sixteen (16) reports submitted, all dated August 4,
81051 to 81062 were issued in the name of the
1997;
vendee on September 25, 1997 (Record, pp. 151-
173).
3. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN
GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, CARLITO
On the other hand, the registered owners of lot
FLAVIANO III, NICOLAS YNOT, JOLITO PORALAN,
numbers X-6 and X-7 executed a Deed of Exchange
MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL SALUDAR, JOEL
with AFP-RSBS, represented by respondent Jose
TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY MED[I]LLO, MARTIN
Ramiscal, Jr., consenting to the exchange of lots X-
SAYCON, ARSENIO DE LOS REYES, and JOSE BOMEZ
6 and X-7 with lots Y-1-A-1 and Y-1-A-2,
in conspiracy with public respondents CESAR
respectively, the latter two lots being owned by
JONILLO and RENATO RIVERA one (1) count each for
AFP-RSBS (Record, pp. 175-178). While lots X-15
private respondents and sixteen (16) counts each
and X-16 were exchanged with one office unit or
for public respondents for violation of Section 3(e)
condo unit to be given or ceded to respondent Nilo
of RA 3019;
Flaviano (Record, pp. 179-182).[3]
4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO
FLAVIANO as conspirators for twelve (12) counts of
Based on the foregoing, petitioner filed a verified complaint- falsification of public documents relative to the
twelve (12) unilateral Deeds of Sale;
affidavit[4] before the Ombudsman against the respondents together

with Cesar Jonillo (Jonillo), Renato Rivera (Rivera), Mad Guaybar, Oliver 5. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN
GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO
Guaybar, Jonathan Guaybar, Alex Guaybar, Jack Guiwan, Carlito PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL
SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY
Flaviano III, Nicolas Ynot, Jolito Poralan, Miguela Cabi-ao, Jose Rommel MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON one (1) count each as
Saludar, Joel Teves, Rico Altizo, Johnny Medillo, Martin Saycon, Arsenio conspirator in the falsification of public document
relative to the corresponding unilateral Deed of
de los Reyes, and Jose Bomez (Mad Guaybar and his companions), Gen. Sale executed by their agent in their behalf;
Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Gen. Ramiscal), Wilfredo Pabalan (Pabalan), and Atty.
6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN and
Nilo Flaviano (Atty. Flaviano) (indicted) for violation of Paragraphs (e), NILO FLAVIANO twelve (12) counts of violation of
section 3(e) of RA 3019 for short-changing the
(g) and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,[5] as amended, and government inn the correct amount of taxes due
for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-RSBS; and
for malversation of public funds or property through falsification of

public documents. 7. MAD GUAYBAR, OLIVER GUAYBAR, JONATHAN

GUAYBAR, ALEX GUAYBAR, JACK GUIWAN, JOLITO
PORALAN, MIGUELA CABI-AO, JOSE ROMMEL
The Ombudsman's Ruling SALUDAR, [J]OEL TEVES, RICO ALTIZO, JOHNNY
MEDILLO, MARTIN SAYSON one (1) count each of
violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 as conspirator
in short-changing the government in the payment
In the assailed Resolution dated January 20, 1999, the Ombudsman of taxes for the sale of Lot-X to AFP-RSBS.
held that Mayor Nuez and Nalangan, among others, entered into the
Let the herein attached Informations against
Compromise Agreement on behalf of the city and pursuant to the aforementioned respondents be filed with the
proper courts.
authority granted to them by the Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of

Resolution No. 87; hence, it is not the sole responsibility of Mayor Nuez Charges against respondents ROSALITA NUEZ,
AUGUSTUS MOMONGAN, ABEDNEGO ADRE,
and Nalangan but of the entire Sangguniang Panlungsod. Moreover, ASTERIA CRUZABRA, PEDRO NALANGAN III, JULIO
DIAZ and AGAPITO BORINAGA are hereby
the Ombudsman opined that the validity of the Compromise
DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of
Agreement had been settled when the Office of the Solicitor General criminal cases against private respondents, for
offenses committed not in conspiracy with the
(OSG) and the RTC found it to be in order. The Ombudsman also ruled herein public respondents, by the proper parties-
in-interest.
that the Order of Judge Adre was made in accordance with the facts of

the case, while Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra were found to SO RESOLVED.[6]

50

On February 4, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was, however, denied by the Ombudsman in his
Order[7] dated April 26, 2000. The Ombudsman held that since the
criminal Informations were already filed against the aforementioned
indicted and the cases were already pending before the Sandiganbayan
and the regular courts ofGeneral Santos City, the Ombudsman had lost
jurisdiction over the said case.
The Sole Issue
Hence, this Petition, on the sole ground that:
THE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS
PROSECUTORY FUNCTIONS, BY DISMISSING THE
CHARGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS DESPITE
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF DIRECT
PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE
CONSPIRACY TO CHEAT AND DEFRAUD THE CITY
GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY
THROUGH THE ILLEGAL DISPOSITION OF LOT X OF
THE MAGSAYSAY PARK IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND
ITS CHARTER.[8]
Petitioner avers that the Ombudsman ignored substantial evidence
pointing to the existence of a conspiracy among all the respondents and
those indicted, which led to the illegal and fraudulent disposition of Lot
X of the Magsaysay Park. To prove her claim of a grand conspiracy,
petitioner outlines the individual participation, cooperation and
involvement of each respondent, as follows:
1. The assailed RTC Order issued by Judge Adre on July 22,
1997 was part of the grand scheme and was made the basis
for the filing of the miscellaneous sales applications of Mad
Guaybar and his companions. The same Order was likewise
used by Mayor Nuez and Nalangan as the reason for
interposing no objection to the said applications. The assailed
RTC Order was issued by Judge Adre almost five (5) years after
his Judgment based on the Compromise Agreement had long
become final; thus, it was issued with grave abuse of
discretion and in gross ignorance of the law. Judge Adre,
therefore, violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
2. Mayor Nuez and Nalangan knew or ought to have known,
by reason of their respective offices and as administrators of
the properties of the city, that Lot X of theMagsaysay Park is
owned by the city and reserved as health and recreation site.
Yet, Nalangan's Comment, filed before Judge Adre issued the
assailed RTC Order, stated that per verification, there was no
51
existing donation from the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop to the city.
Likewise, in their 1st Indorsement dated August 2, 1997,
instead of opposing the applications of Mad Guaybar and his
companions, Mayor Nuez and Nalangan endorsed the same
and interposed no objection thereto. Said Indorsement was
part of the grand conspiracy and was utilized as a front for the
resale of the said property to AFP-RSBS, to the injury of the
city. Petitioner submits that Mayor Nuez and Nalangan also
violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
3. After Mayor Nuez and Nalangan issued their
1st Indorsement on August 2, 1997 and after Jonillo
submitted his falsified report on August 4, 1997, Diaz, on the
same date, scheduled the sale of Lot X to Mad Guaybar and
his companions on September 5, 1997. Thus, Diaz issued
notices of sale of the subdivided lots of Lot X on September 5,
1997 without public auction and at the disadvantageous price
recommended by Rivera. Therefore, Diaz, as a co-conspirator,
should be similarly charged with Jonillo and Rivera for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for falsification
of public documents.
4. Borinaga, conspiring with Rivera, filed on June 9, 1997 the
Motion for Issuance of a Clarificatory Order before Judge
Adre, which led to the issuance by the latter of the assailed
RTC Order. Borinaga and Rivera likewise represented to the
RTC that upon verification, they did not find in the records
any deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop.
Borinaga should be held liable as an active participant in a
grand scheme to defraud the city.
5. Momongan, by the nature of his office, knew that Lot X is
not disposable and alienable and is, therefore, not a proper
subject of a sales patent application. Despite such knowledge
and based on the falsified reports of Jonillo and Rivera,
Momongan allowed Lot X to be subdivided and sold to Mad
Guaybar and his companions by approving their
miscellaneous sales application and issuing the Original
Certificates of Title (OCTs) covering the subdivided lots of Lot
X. In sum, Momongan adopted as his own the false reports,
and granted unwarranted benefit and advantage to Mad
Guaybar and his companions, to the injury of the city.
6. While the function of Cruzabra in the registration of
documents and titles may be considered as ministerial, the
circumstances under which the titles were issued in the
names of Mad Guaybar and his companions and eventually,
 in the name of AFP-RSBS, indicate that Cruzabra was aware
and was part of the grand conspiracy to defraud the city. Each
of the sixteen (16) OCTs was transcribed and signed by
Cruzabra on September 22, 1997. On the same date, Atty.
Flaviano claimed and received the owners' copies of the
OCTs; Mad Guaybar and his companions executed a Joint
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing Atty. Flaviano to
be their attorney-in-fact, for the purpose of selling their
respective lots; and Cruzabra registered and annotated said
SPA in their respective titles. On September 25, 1997, Atty.
Flaviano registered with Cruzabra twelve (12) Deeds of
Absolute Sale in favor of AFP-RSBS, after paying the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) on the same day the capital gains tax
and documentary stamp tax due thereon. On the same day,
Cruzabra canceled the OCTs and issued, in lieu thereof,
twelve (12) Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) in favor of
AFP-RSBS. The remaining four (4) lots were transferred and
registered in the name of AFP-RSBS on October 10, 1997 by
virtue of deeds of exchange executed by the registered
owners in favor of the former. Petitioner submits that
Cruzabra could not have been unaware of the restrictions;
instead, she allowed the transfer and registration of the said
lots to AFP-RSBS so swiftly, that it could only be interpreted
as part of the scheme to defraud the city.[9]
In sum, petitioner ascribes to the Ombudsman grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory functions,
by completely ignoring and disregarding the pieces of substantial
evidence which clearly establish the existence of a common design
among the respondents and those indicted in the fraudulent sale and
disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park.
On the other hand, respondents separately raise their respective
defenses against petitioner's claims, as follows:
1. The Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), contends that, in effect, petitioner is asking
this Court to review the pieces of evidence gathered by the
Ombudsman during the preliminary investigation. This is not
proper. In Espinosa v. Office of the
Ombudsman[10] and Young v. Office of the
Ombudsman,[11] this Court accorded highest respect for the
factual findings of the Ombudsman, absent a clear case of
grave abuse of discretion. The OSP claims that the
Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion
because the respondents, based on their counter-affidavits,
52
have valid and legal justifications, sufficient for the
Ombudsman to exculpate them from the charges.[12]
2. Cruzabra avers that there is no showing that conspiracy
exists between her and other respondents charged before
the Ombudsman. Petitioner's allegations with respect to
Cruzabra refer to recorded transactions which are legal acts.
Such allegations did not discuss how the alleged conspiracy
was committed; they are merely conjectures and bare
allegations. Inasmuch as conspiracy cannot be presumed, and
there is no convincing evidence to support such allegations,
the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
Lastly, Cruzabra claims that the canceled OCTs do not contain
any restriction to transfer the respective lots to AFP-RSBS. As
such, Cruzabra submits that it would be most unfair if she
would be made a part of the alleged conspiracy simply
because she exercised her ministerial functions as Register of
Deeds.[13]
3. Momongan alleges, among others, that as Regional
Executive Director of the DENR, he is duly authorized to sign
patents and reconstituted patents. Since the standard
procedure and processes were complied with, Momongan
simply relied on his subordinates and on their good faith. He
argues that he acted in accordance with law, department
guidelines, rules and regulations, and that to require him to
scrutinize every phase of a report of a subordinate is a very
tall order.[14]
4. Judge Adre manifests that in the Joint Resolution[15] of the
Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigation (Blue Ribbon) and National Defense and
Security, dated December 23, 1998, not one of the
respondents was recommended for prosecution in
connection with the irregularity involving
the Magsaysay Park. Judge Adre claims that he acted
properly, and even sought the opinion of the OSG before the
Compromise Agreement was approved. However, Judge Adre
narrated that due to the vagaries of politics, the judgment lay
dormant, as no motion for execution was filed by then Mayor
Adelbert Antonino, husband of petitioner, after Mayor Nuez
lost in the elections. Subsequently, the writ was not issued as
the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop did not execute any deed of
donation in favor of the city. He declared that the RTC did not
lose jurisdiction over the case when the Motions for
Clarification and Exclusion were filed; thus, the issuance of
 the assailed RTC Order excluding Lot X andenjoining the Heirs Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)[22] provides:

of Cabalo Kusop from donating the same to the city in keeping

SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All
with the intent and spirit of the compromise agreement, was provisionary orders of the Office of the
proper.[16] Ombudsman are immediately effective and
executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive

5. Borinaga posits that the Ombudsman's factual findings need
not be disturbed, as they are not attended by grave abuse of
discretion. He maintains that he acted in accordance with
law; that as the Regional Technical Director is not required to
go to the premises of the land subject of miscellaneous
or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must
be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written
notice and shall be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which
materially affects the order, directive or decision;

applications, and he may rely on the data submitted by the
CENRO and reviewed by the PENRO.[17] Moreover, Borinaga
argues that the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner
assailing the Ombudsman's Resolution was filed out of
time.[18] The Certification[19] dated October 1, 2003, issued by
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been
committed prejudicial to the interest of the
movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be
resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided,
That only one motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.

Severo A. Sotto, Records Officer IV of the Office of the

Other than the statement of material dates wherein petitioner claimed
Ombudsman, shows that petitioner was personally served
that she received through counsel the assailed Resolution of the
with a copy of the assailed Resolution on February 24, 1999
Ombudsman on January 21, 2000, she failed to establish that her
by Jose Ruel Bermejo, Process Server, and she filed her
Motion for Reconsideration was indeed filed on time, and thus, failed
Motion for Reconsideration only on February 4, 2000.
to refute the assertion of the respondents based on the

aforementioned Certification that petitioner was personally served a

6. Diaz opines that there is no substantial evidence to prove
copy of the assailed Resolution on February 24, 1999. There are a
that he participated in a grand scheme to unlawfully dispose
number of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in the interest
of the lots covered by Lot X. He vouches that when he issued
of justice. However, in this case, petitioner did not proffer any
the notice of sale, he did so on the basis of the requisite
explanation at all for the late filing of the motion for reconsideration.
documents submitted to his office.[20]
After the respondents made such allegation, petitioner did not bother
7. Mayor Nuez and Nalangan contend that Mayor Nuez did not
to respond and meet the issue head-on. We find no justification why
violate the Charter of the City, because when she entered into
the Ombudsman entertained the motion for reconsideration, when, at
the Compromise Agreement with the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop,
the time of the filing of the motion for reconsideration the assailed
she was authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod under
Resolution was already final.
Resolution No. 87, series of 1991, after almost one (1) year of

committee and public hearings. The same was also referred

Even only on the basis of this fatal procedural infirmity, the instant
to the OSG, which recommended its approval. When the
Petition ought to be dismissed. And on the substantive issue raised, the
Heirs of Cabalo Kusop filed a Motion for Exclusion of Lot X,
petition is likewise bereft of merit.
Nalangan had no recourse but to tell the truth that, indeed,
he found no deed of donation made in favor of the city. While
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and
they admit to have issued Indorsements, they made it clear
pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to
that the DENR shall undertake only what is legally
investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or
feasible. Mayor Nuez and Nalangan asseverate that they had
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
no intention of giving up the claim of the city over Lot X, as
improper or inefficient.[23] Well-settled is the rule that this Court will
they even filed a case against Mad Guaybar and his
not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his
companions.[21]
investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling

reasons that indicate otherwise. The rule is based not only upon respect
Our Ruling
for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the

Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as

The instant Petition lacks merit.
well. A contrary rule would encourage innumerable petitions seeking

53

dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman,
which would grievously hamper the functions of the office and the
courts, in much the same way that courts would be swamped by a
deluge of cases if they have to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of public prosecutors each time they decide to file an information
or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.[24]
Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the
finding of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as what the petitioner did in
this case, consistent with our ruling in Collantes v. Marcelo,[25] where
we laid down the following exceptions to the rule:
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection
to the constitutional rights of the accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of
justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub
judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied.
Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to
evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by,
or in contemplation of law.[26]
The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is
found wanting in this case. Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate
from the general rule. We concur with the disquisition of GIO I Rubillar-
Arao in dismissing the charges against respondents, as approved by
Ombudsman Desierto, thus:
Hence, without ruling on the validity of the titles,
this Office is constrained to limit its evaluation of
54
the issue on the participation of each respondent in
the titling of Lot X, whether the same would
constitute a violation of RA 3019 and/or other
illegal acts.
1. Respondent Abednego Adre His participation
extends only to his issuance of an Order excluding
Lot-X from the coverage of the Compromise
Agreement.
A review of the terms and conditions of the subject
Compromise Agreement confirms the Order of the
respondent that indeed Lot X was excluded. The
Order of respondent judge was made in accordance
with the facts of the case. It is even noteworthy
that respondent judge assisted in preserving the
claim of the government
of General Santos City over Lot X by enjoining the
donation of said property by the private
respondents.
2. Respondents Nuez and Nalangan Said
respondents participation in the titling of Lot-X was
when they issued or caused the issuance of
Indorsements stating therein that this office (Office
of the Mayor) interposes no objection to whatever
legal proceedings your (CENRO) office may pursue
on the application covering portions thereof (Lot-X).
The contents of the Indorsements, as quoted
above, cannot be construed as a waiver on the part
of General Santos City on its claim over Lot-X. On
the contrary, it has given DENR the authority to
take the necessary legal proceedings relative to the
titling of the property. Moreover, it should be
taken into account that DENR has the
responsibility, authority and the power to grant
alienable and disposable lands to deserving
claimants.
Based on these circumstances, there is no evidence
to prove that respondents Nuez and Nalangan gave
unwarranted benefit to the claimants by issuing
said Indorsements. In fact, they protected the
interest of the government over Lot-X by
immediately filing a case for nullification of titles
upon knowing of the issuances thereof.
xxxx
[5.] Public respondents Julio C. Diaz, Agapito
Borinaga, Augustus L. Momongan, Asteria E.
Cruzabra Based on the evidences on record, these
respondents were in the regular performance of
their official functions. Their participation in the
titling of Lot-X was due to the fact that the
documents for titling were submitted to their
respective offices as a matter of course, and there
is nothing that they can do but to follow the
established procedure upon finding that all the
documents for titling were submitted.[27]
Indeed, while the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the
existence of probable cause is not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner
must prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant
the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court. In this respect,
petitioner fails.[28]
Moreover, the elements of the offense, essential for the conviction of
an accused under Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, are as follows:

(1) The accused is a public officer or a private
person charged in conspiracy with the former;
(2) The said public officer commits the prohibited
acts during the performance of his or her official
duties, or in relation to his or her public functions;
(3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party,
whether the government or a private party;
(4) Such undue injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
such parties; and
(5) That the public officer has acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
neglect.[29]
Thus, in order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019,
the act of the accused that caused undue injury must have been done
with evident bad faith or with gross inexcusable negligence. Bad
faith per se is not enough for one to be held liable under the law; bad
faith must be evident. Bad faith does not simply connote bad moral
judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the
nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or some motive of self-interest, or ill will for ulterior
purposes. On the other hand, gross negligence is characterized by the
want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a willful or
intentional manner displaying a conscious indifference to
consequences as far as other persons may be affected.[30]
As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, there is no
showing of evident bad faith and/or gross negligence in the respective
acts of the respondents. It must be stressed that it is good faith, not bad
faith, which is presumed, as the chapter on Human Relations of the Civil
Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe good faith, which
springs from the fountain of good conscience.[31]
Finally, petitioner speaks of conspiracy among the respondents and
those indicted. However, as found by the Ombudsman, such conspiracy
alleged in the complaint was not supported by ample evidence. At best,
the evidence adduced was not clear as to respondents' participation in
the acts in question. Actori incumbit onus probandi- the burden of proof
rests with the plaintiff or the prosecution. The inherent weakness of
complainant's case is not a ground for the Ombudsman to conduct
preliminary investigation.[32] For it is fundamental that conspiracy
cannot be presumed. Conspiracy must be proved by direct evidence or
by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before, during and after the
commission of the crime charged indicative of a common
design.[33] This, the petitioner sadly failed to establish.
55
All told, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the criminal complaint against respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
13. Sesbreo v. Aglugub (2005)
TINGA, J.:
Peter L. Sesbreo filed a Verified Complaint[1] dated March 2, 2004
against respondent judge, Hon. Gloria B. Aglugub, charging the latter
with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Neglect of Duty and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service relative to Criminal Case
No. 39806 entitled People v. Enrique Marcelino, et al.
It appears that complainant filed three (3) separate complaints
against Enrique Marcelino (Marcelino), Susan Nuez (Nuez), Edna
Tabazon (Tabazon) and Fely Carunungan (Carunungan), all from the
Traffic Management Unit of San Pedro, Laguna, for Falsification, Grave
Threats and Usurpation of Authority. The three (3) cases were assigned
to respondent judges branch and subsequently consolidated for
disposition.
After conducting a preliminary examination, respondent issued
a Consolidated Resolution[2] dated May 6, 2003, dismissing the cases for
Falsification and Grave Threats for lack of probable cause, and setting
for arraignment the case for Usurpation of Authority. Except for
Marcelino who failed to appear during the arraignment, all of the
accused were arraigned. Respondent judge issued a warrant for
Marcelinos arrest.
Subsequently, complainant filed a Private Complainants Urgent
Manifestation[3] dated February 6, 2004 alleging that the accused were
also charged with violation of Republic Act No. 10[4] (R.A. 10) and
praying that warrants of arrest be likewise issued against all of the
accused.
Acting upon this manifestation, respondent judge issued
an Order[5] dated February 12, 2004 stating that a charge for violation
of R.A. 10 was indeed alleged in the complaint for Usurpation of
Authority but was not resolved due to oversight. However, since the
statute only applies to members of seditious organizations engaged in
subversive activities pursuant toPeople v. Lidres,[6] and considering that
the complaint failed to allege this element, respondent judge found no
probable cause and dismissed the charge for violation of R.A. 10.
Further, citing Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Rules), respondent judge denied complainants prayer for
the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused and ordered the
records forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutors Office (PPO) for
review.
Thereafter, complainants counsel, Atty. Raul Sesbreo (Atty.
Sesbreo), filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest Against Non-Appearing
Accused. Respondent judge, however, did not act on these motions
allegedly because the court had already lost jurisdiction over the case
by then.
The PPO affirmed respondents order and remanded the case to
the court for further proceedings on the charge of Usurpation of
Authority.
During the hearing of the case on February 14, 2004, Tabazon,
Carunungan and Nuez did not appear. Atty. Sesbreo, however, did not
move for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Neither did
he object to the cancellation of the scheduled hearing.
The foregoing circumstances brought about the filing of the
instant administrative complaint.
Complainant contends that respondent judge violated Sec. 6(b),
Rule 112 of the Rules when she refused to issue warrants of arrest
against the accused. Complainant also faults respondent judge for
allegedly motu proprio reconsidering her Consolidated
Resolution dated May 6, 2003 and failing to order its transmittal to the
Office of the Ombudsman within ten (10) days.
In her Comment With Motion To Dismiss The Administrative
Complaint[7] dated March 26, 2004, respondent judge counters that the
issuance of a warrant of arrest is discretionary upon the judge. Since
she found no indication that the accused would abscond, she found it
unnecessary to issue the warrant. Moreover, under Republic Act No.
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the PPO has
been designated as the Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor. The PPO
can take action on similar cases for review and appropriate action. Thus,
she acted in accordance with law when she forwarded the records of
the case to the PPO for review and not to the Office of the Ombudsman
as complainant insists.
Respondent judge further accuses complainant and Atty. Sesbreo
of falsification, and the latter of violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly, the affidavit which
was attached to the instant verified complaint was not notarized by
Atty. Raul Corro as indicated therein. Further, Atty. Sesbreo was
allegedly convicted of Homicide and may have been suspended from
the practice of law.
Complainant reiterates his allegations in his Complainants Reply
To Respondents Comment Dated March 26, 2004[8] dated May 11, 2004.
He further contends that there is no provision in the Ombudsman Act
of 1989 specifically deputizing the PPO to be the Deputized
Ombudsman Prosecutor as respondent judge contends. He adds that
respondent judge failed to comply with Administrative Order No. 8
since she has yet to forward her resolution to the Deputy Ombudsman.
Moreover, complainant points out that the affidavit attached to
his complaint was notarized by Atty. Corro as certified by a member of
the latters staff. Complainant also disproves respondent judges
allegation that Atty. Sesbreo is in the habit of filing administrative
complaints against judges, explaining that the latter merely acted as
counsel for litigants who filed administrative complaints against certain
judges.
In another Verified Complaint[9] filed on March 18, 2004,
complainant further charges respondent with violating Sec. 9(b), Rule
112 of the Rules.
Respondent Judge filed a Comment With Motion To Dismiss
Administrative Complaint[10] dated May 7, 2004 clarifying that contrary
to complainants allegation, she did not conduct a preliminary
investigation in the case for Usurpation of Authority. What was
submitted for preliminary investigation was the charge for violation of
R.A. 10. It was her resolution dismissing the charge for violation of R.A.
10 which was transmitted to the PPO for appropriate action. However,
since the charges for violation of R.A. 10 and Usurpation of Authority
were contained in a single complaint, respondent judge deemed it
proper to forward the entire records to the PPO.
Complainant filed a Complainants Reply To Respondents
Comment Dated May 7, 2004[11] dated May 20, 2004 substantially
reiterating his allegations.
The Verified Complaint filed on March 18, 2004 was treated as a
supplemental complaint per the notation in the Memorandum[12] dated
June 25, 2004.
In sum, complainant asserts that respondent judge erred in
conducting a preliminary investigation for the charge of Usurpation of
Authority; in not issuing warrants of arrest for failure of the accused to
appear during trial; in issuing her Order dated February 12, 2004
dismissing the complaint for violation of R.A. 10; and in transmitting the
records of the case to the PPO instead of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that the
instant complaint be dismissed for lack of merit but that respondent
judge should be reminded to be more circumspect in the performance
of her duties.[13] It made the following findings:
A careful consideration of the records as well as the pertinent rules
reveals that there is nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure which
requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest for the non-appearance of
the accused during the trial. Hence, its issuance rests on the sound
56
discretion of the presiding judge. More so in this case, the private
prosecutor did not move for the issuance of such warrant.
As regards the next issue, Rep. Act No. 10 penalizes a person who,
with or without pretense of official position, shall perform any act
pertaining to the Government, or to any person in authority or public
officer, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall be punished with
imprisonment of not less than two (2) years nor more than ten (10)
years. Violation thereof is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court but
subject to preliminary investigation.
Respondent judge admitted that she overlooked the charge when she
conducted the preliminary examination of the complaints.
Nonetheless, after reviewing the case, respondent Judge found no
probable cause and ordered the dismissal of the case. Therefore,
when respondent Judge motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the
case for lack of probable cause, she was acting in accordance with the
procedure on preliminary investigation laid down in Sec. 3, Rule 112 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Respondent Judge also directed that the records of the case be
forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutors Office on review. Sec. 5 of
Rule 112 provides that the resolution of the Investigating Judge is
subject to review by the provincial or city prosecutor, or the
Ombudsman or his deputy, as the case may be.
It is respondent Judges contention that the resolution shall be
reviewed by the Provincial Prosecutor. She explained that pursuant to
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor has jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the charge of Violation of R.A. No. 10.
However, Sec. 31 of Rep. Act No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989
provides that prosecutors can (be) deputized by the Ombudsman to
act as special investigator or prosecutor only on certain cases. Such
provision is not applicable to the issue at hand. Therefore, respondent
Judge erred when she forwarded the case for review to the Provincial
Prosecutors Office. Nonetheless, complainant failed to show that
respondent Judge was motivated by bad faith when she issued the
assailed order. At most, she is guilty of judicial error for which she
could not be held administratively accountable absent any proof of
fraud or other evil motive.[14]
A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a
complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed
by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without
regard to the fine.[15] Thus, a preliminary investigation is not required
nor was one conducted for the charge of violation of Art. 177 of the
Revised Penal Code which is punishable by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or from six (6) months and one (1) day
to four (4) years and two (2) months.[16]
This being so, Sec. 9, Rule 112 of the Rules is applicable. Said
section provides:
Sec. 9. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation nor covered by
the Rule on Summary Procedure.
(b) If filed with the Municipal Trial Court.If the complaint or
information is filed with the Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court for an offense covered by this section, the procedure in
section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed. If within ten (10) days after
the filing of the complaint or information, the judge finds no probable
cause after personally evaluating the evidence, or after personally
examining in writing and under oath the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, he shall
dismiss the same. He may, however, require the submission of
additional evidence, within ten (10) days from notice, to determine
further the existence of probable cause. If the judge still finds no
probable cause despite the additional evidence, he shall, within ten
(10) days from its submission or expiration of said period, dismiss the
case. When he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest,
or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and
hold him for trial. However, if the judge is satisfied that there is no
necessity for placing the accused under custody, he may issue
summons instead of a warrant of arrest.
 Under the foregoing section, if a complaint or information is filed
directly with the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure laid down in Sec.
3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules shall be observed. If the judge finds no
sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the
complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of arrest,
or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested, and
hold the latter for trial. However, the judge is given the discretion to
merely issue summons instead of a warrant of arrest if he does not find
it necessary to place the accused under custody.
It is thus not obligatory but merely discretionary upon the
investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused even
after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in
the form of searching questions for the determination of whether
probable cause exists. Whether it is necessary to place the accused in
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice is left to the judges
sound judgment.[17]
Moreover, the judge is not required to transmit the records of the
case to the prosecutor for review.
In this case, respondent judge, following the foregoing procedure,
found probable cause to hold the accused for trial for the charge of
Usurpation of Authority and forthwith set their arraignment and the
pre-trial. There is nothing irregular in the course of action taken by
respondent judge.
Neither is there merit in complainants contention that
respondent judge should have issued a warrant of arrest against the
accused for their failure to appear during the initial presentation of
evidence for the prosecution for the charge of Usurpation of Authority.
The issuance of a warrant of arrest for non-appearance of the accused
during trial is discretionary upon the judge. Indeed, there is nothing in
the Rules which requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest for non-
appearance of the accused during trial.
Respondent judge concedes, however, that due to oversight, she
failed to rule on the charge of violation of R.A. 10 in her Consolidated
Resolution dated May 6, 2003. Nonetheless, she asserts in
her Comment With Motion To Dismiss Administrative
Complaint[18] dated May 7, 2004 that she conducted a preliminary
investigation for the charge of violation of R.A. 10 and dismissed the
charge after taking into consideration the affidavits and evidence
presented. Complainant does not dispute the fact that indeed a
preliminary investigation was conducted for this charge.[19] Thus, when
respondent judge dismissed the complaint for violation of R.A. 10, she
merely did so to correct an oversight.
Furthermore, as the Order dated February 12, 2004 confirms, it
was the dismissal of the charge for violation of R.A. 10 that was elevated
to the PPO for review. It was imprudent, however, for respondent judge
to transmit the entire records of the case to the PPO knowing that the
charge for Usurpation of Authority was included in the records of the
case. Respondent judge should have ensured that at least one complete
set of the records remained in her sala so that the prosecution for
Usurpation of Authority would not be held up. Injudicious though her
actuation was, we do not agree with complainant that respondent
judge was motivated by an evil intent to delay the case.
This brings us to the issue of whether respondent should have
transmitted her Order dated February 12, 2004 dismissing the charge
of violation of R.A. 10 to the Office of the Ombudsman instead of the
PPO. Complainant asserts that since the charge of violation of R.A. 10 is
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Ombudsman has the
primary jurisdiction to review the resolution of dismissal.
This issue is answered by Administrative Order No.
8[20] entitled Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, which provides that all prosecutors are now deputized
Ombudsman prosecutors. Moreover, [R]esolutions in Ombudsman
cases[21] against public officers and employees prepared by a deputized
assistant prosecutor shall be submitted to the Provincial or City
Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward the same to the
Deputy Ombudsman of the area with his recommendation for the
approval or disapproval thereof. The Deputy Ombudsman shall take
appropriate final action thereon, including the approval of its filing in
the proper regular court or the dismissal of the complaint, if the crime
charged is punishable by prision correccional or lower, or fine of not
more than P6,000.00 or both. Resolutions involving offenses falling
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by the
57
Deputy Ombudsman with his recommendation thereon to the Office of
the Ombudsman.
Thus, respondent judge did not err and was, in fact, merely acting
in accordance with law when she forwarded the case for violation of
R.A. 10 to the PPO. The fact that the PPO remanded the case to the
court for further proceedings instead of forwarding the same to the
Deputy Ombudsman as required by Administrative Order No. 8 is quite
another matter. In any event, respondent judge should have taken the
necessary steps to remedy the lapse in order to preclude delay in the
disposition of the case.
In sum, for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed
order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official
duties must not only be found to be erroneous but, most importantly,
it must be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty or
some other like motive. Respondent judges actuations are hardly
indicative of bad faith or any motive to delay the case which
characterizes the offense of gross ignorance of the law.[22]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant complaint is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. Respondent Judge Gloria B. Aglugub is ADMONISHED
to be more circumspect in the performance of her duties in the future.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.
14. Punzalan v. Dela Pea (2004)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court is the June 6, 2002 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals and
its May 23, 2003 Resolution which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong City. At around 11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997, Dencio
dela Pea, a house boarder of the Platas, was in front of a store near
their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan,
Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex Toto Ofrin, and several others
arrived. Ricky Eugenio shouted at Dela Pea, Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili
and sumbrero mo?[2] Dela Pea replied, Kalbo nga ako, ay
pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako.[3] Irked by the response, Jose Gregorio
slapped Dela Pea while Rainier punched him in the mouth. The group
then ganged up on him. In the course of the melee, somebody
shouted, Yariin na yan![4] Thereafter, Alex Toto Ofrin kicked Dela Pea
and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed because he was able
to run. The group chased him.
While Dela Pea was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas
family driver, who was carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara
and pointed it to the group chasing him in order to scare them. Michael
Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the gun away
from Dela Pea. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan
on the thigh. Shocked, Dela Pea, Cagara and Plata ran towards the
latters house and locked themselves in. The group ran after them and
when they got to the Platas house, shouted, Lumabas kayo dyan,
putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo![5] Dela Pea, Cagara, and Plata
left the house through the back door and proceeded to the police
station to seek assistance.
As a result of the incident, Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal
complaint against Michael Plata for Attempted Homicide[6] and against
Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm. In turn, Plata, Cagara
and Dela Pea filed several counter-charges[7] for grave oral defamation,
grave threats, robbery, malicious mischief and slight physical injuries
against the Punzalans, including one for Attempted Murder filed by
Dela Pea against Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen others (I.S.
No. 97-11528); and one for Grave Threats filed by Dela Pea against Alex
Toto Ofrin (I.S. No. 97-11520-21).
In their counter-affidavit,[8] the Punzalans argued that the
charges against them were fabricated in order to dissuade them from
testifying in the Attempted Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm
cases instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara, respectively.
 Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral
Defamation, docketed as I.S. No. 97-11522, against Rosalinda Punzalan,
mother of Rainier, alleging that on October 16, 1997 at the Office of the
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, Rosalinda approached him, and within
hearing distance of other people, told him, Hoy Robert, magkanong
ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok
pa kita ng trabaho.[9] In her defense, Rosalinda denied having uttered
the alleged defamatory statements.
On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City dismissed the complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against
Rosalinda Punzalan,[10] holding that Cagara failed to show that the
alleged defamatory statements would cast dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon him. He also found that the statements were uttered
by Rosalinda in a state of distress and, hence, were not
actionable.[11] The charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier, Randall
and 14 others was also dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor because
complainant Dela Peas claim that he accidentally shot Rainier forms
part of the defense of Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case
previously filed by Rainier against the latter.[12]
Dela Pea and Cagara separately appealed to the Department of
Justice. On March 23, 2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero
issued a Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the
Assistant City Prosecutor by ordering, among others (1) that the charge
of Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan be downgraded
to Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted Murder
against Rainier, Randall and 14 others be downgraded to Attempted
Homicide; and (3) that the charge of Grave Threats against Alex Toto
Ofrin be downgraded to Other Light Threats. The dispositive portion of
the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the resolution is hereby MODIFIED. The City Prosecutor
of Mandaluyong City is directed to file information for three (3) counts
of slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan; information for
two (2) counts [of] other light threats against Alexander Toto Ofrin;
information for attempted homicide against Alexander Toto Ofrin,
Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito dela Cruz,
Emmanuel Nobida, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio,
Alejandro Diez, Vicente Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark
Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar and Raymond Poliquit; information
for malicious mischief and theft against Rainier Punzalan, Mark Catap,
Alejandro Diez, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Alexander Toto Ofrin, Herson
Mendoza, Emmanuel Nobida, Edwin Vivar, Avelino Bobby Serrano, and
John Does; and to report action taken within 10 days from receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan, together
with their co-respondents, filed separate motions for reconsideration.
On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23, 2000
Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Informations against the
movants. He ruled, among others, that the Oral Defamation case should
be dismissed because the alleged defamatory statements were uttered
without malice as Rosalinda was then in a state of shock and anger.
Anent the Attempted Homicide case filed by Dela Pea against Rainier,
the Secretary held that the allegations in support thereof should first
be threshed out in the trial of the Attempted Homicide case filed by
Rainier against Michael Plata. He added that Dela Pea failed to prove
that Rainier, Randall and his companions intended to kill him. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the appealed resolution is
REVERSED. The resolution dated March 23, 2000 is set aside and the
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City is directed to withdraw the
separate informations for slight oral defamation, other light threats,
attempted homicide, malicious mischief and theft against all
respondents and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
Resolution, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated October 11,
2000.[15]
On January 11, 2001, respondents filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals praying that the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong be directed to file one count of Slight Oral Defamation
against Rosalinda; one count of Attempted Homicide against Rainier,
58
Randall and 14 others; and two counts of Other Light Threats against
Alex Toto Ofrin.[16]
On June 6, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted and the
questioned Resolutions of public respondent dated 06 June 2000 and
11 October 2000 are set aside insofar as it directed the withdrawal of
informations for slight oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan and
attempted homicide against the respondents Alexander Toto Ofrin,
Rainier Punzalan, Jose Gregorio Lanuzo, Avelino Serrano, Lito de la Cruz,
Emmanuel Nobido, Randall Punzalan, Mark Catap, Ricky Eugenio,
Alejandro Diez, Vicente Joven Manda, Herson Mendoza, Mark
Labrador, Alex Pascua, Edwin Vivar, and Raymond Poliquit.
The resolution dated 06 June 2000 and 11 October 2000 is hereby
affirmed insofar as it directed the withdrawal of information for two (2)
counts of other light threats against Alexander Toto Ofrin.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.[18] Hence, the
instant petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN SETTING ASIDE THE RESOLUTIONS OF
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DATED JUNE 6, 2000 AND
OCTOBER 11, 2000.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT, MORE LIKELY
THAN NOT, SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION HAD BEEN COMMITTED AND
WAS COMMITTED BY HEREIN PETITIONER ROSALINDA PUNZALAN.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF RESPONDENTS AND THEIR WITNESSES,
WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN WEIGHT, ARE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE INTENT
TO KILL SUCH THAT PETITIONERS RANDALLL AND RAINIER PUNZALAN
MUST BE PROSECUTED FOR ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE.[19]
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not there is
sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause against
petitioner Rosalinda Punzalan for Slight Oral Defamation and against
petitioners Randall and Rainier Punzalan for Attempted Homicide.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The pertinent law in relation to this case is Section 1 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Where the error is in
the judges findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of
law and fact, appeal is the remedy.[20]
Lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction are distinguished
thus: the respondent acts without jurisdiction if he does not have the
legal power to determine the case; where the respondent, being
clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority
as determined by law, he is performing a function in excess of his
jurisdiction.[21] In the case of Meat Packing Corp. v.
Sandiganbayan,[22] it was held that grave abuse of discretion implies a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not sufficient that
a tribunal, in the exercise of its power, abused its discretion; such abuse
must be grave.[23]
We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion in his Resolutions dated June 6, 2000 and
October 11, 2000. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the
Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and
supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors.
Supervision and control includes the authority to act directly whenever
a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to
direct the performance of duty; and to approve, revise or modify acts
and decision of subordinate officials or units.[24]
In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not
commit grave abuse of discretion contrary to the finding of the Court of
Appeals. It is well-settled in the recent case ofSamson, et al. v.
Guingona[27] that the Court will not interfere in the conduct of
preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise
of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will
establish probable cause for the filing of information against an
offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review unless shown
to have been made with grave abuse.[28]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated June 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated May 23, 2003
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, directing the
withdrawal of the informations for slight oral defamation and
attempted homicide against the petitioners, is REINSTATED.

In the case of People v. Peralta,[25] we reiterated the rule that the No pronouncement as to costs.
right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion
the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of SO ORDERED.
which depends on a variety of factors which are best appreciated by Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna,
prosecutors. Likewise, in the case of Hegerty v. Court of Appeals,[26] we JJ., concur.
declared that:

A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion 15. People v. Duca (2009)
to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification has been
shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
presented by the petitioner.
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
We need only to stress that the determination of probable cause during
a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside and annul the
executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating
prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action where he is Decision[1] dated November 23, 2005 rendered by the Court of Appeals
not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312.
the averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not to
prosecute when after investigation or reinvestigation they are
convinced that the evidence adduced was not sufficient to establish a
prima facie case. Thus, the determination of the persons to be The CA decision reversed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
prosecuted rests primarily with the prosecutor who is vested with (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 2003-0194-
discretion in the discharge of this function.
D[3] which affirmed an earlier decision[4] of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is
within the purview of the functions of the prosecutor and, ultimately, Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, convicting respondent
that of the Secretary of Justice.
Arturo Duca of the crime of falsification under Article 171 of the Revised
The reasons of the Secretary of Justice in directing the City
Penal Code.
Prosecutor to withdraw the informations for slight oral defamation
against Rosalinda Punzalan and for attempted homicide against the
other respondents other than Rosalinda Punzalan is determinative of
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion. The facts as found by the CA are quoted as follows:

First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show

that the defamatory remarks were uttered within the Office of the City It appears that Arturo Duca, together
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The Court of Appeals in its Decision with his mother, Cecilia Duca, were charged of the
dated June 6, 2002 stated the settled rule that the assessment of the crime of Falsification of Official Document defined
credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court in view of its and penalized under Article 172, in relation
opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses on to Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
the stand. The City Prosecutor, the proper officer at the time of the Code in an Information which reads:
occurrence of the incident, is the best person to observe the demeanor
and conduct of the parties and their witnesses and determine probable That on or about
cause whether the alleged defamatory utterances were made within December 10, 2001 in the
the hearing distance of third parties. The investigating prosecutor Municipality of San Fabian,
found that no sufficient evidence existed. The Secretary of Justice in his Province of Pangasinan,
Resolution affirmed the decision of the City Prosecutor. Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
As to the charge of attempted homicide against the herein Court, the said accused
petitioners other than Rosalinda Punzalan, the Secretary of Justice confederating together and
resolved to dismiss the complaint because it was in the nature of a mutually abiding each other,
countercharge. The Department of Justice in a Resolution dated June with intent to cause damage,
18, 1998 had already directed that Dencio Dela Pea be likewise did then and there, willfully,
investigated for the charge of attempted homicide in connection with unlawfully and feloniously
the shooting incident that occurred on August 13, 1997 making him a cause the preparation of a
party to the case filed by Rainier Punzalan. This resulted in the Declaration of Real Property
resolution of the Secretary of Justice that the complaint of herein over a bungalow type
respondent Dencio Dela Pea should be threshed out in the proceedings residential house covered by
relevant to the shooting incident that resulted in the serious injury of Property Index No. 013-32-027-
herein petitioner Rainier Punzalan. 01-116131 of the Municipal
Assessors Office of San Fabian,
Pangasinan by making it appear
59
 that the signature appearing on Both accused denied that they falsified the
the sworn statement of owner signature of Aldrin Duca. Cecilia testified that she
is that of Aldrin F. Duca when had no participation in the execution as she was
the truth of the matter is not in Manila at that time.
because the latter was abroad
at that time having arrived in On the other hand, Arturo testified that the
the Philippines only on signature atop the name Aldrin Duca was
December 12, 2001, and it was his. However, he intersposed the defense that he
accused Arturo F. Duca who was duly authorized by the latter to procure the
affixed his own signature said tax declaration.
thereon to the damage and
prejudice of the undersigned On April 3, 2003, the MCTC of San Fabian-San
private complainant Pedro Jacinto rendered a decision, dispositive portion of
Calanayan. which reads as follows:

Upon being arraigned, both the accused pleaded WHEREFORE, the

not guilty. Then trial on the merits ensued. Court finds the accused Arturo
F. Duca guilty beyond
The evidence for the prosecution shows that reasonable doubt of the crime
sometime in 1999, Pedro Calanayan (hereinafter of falsification defined and
Calanayan), private complainant herein, filed an penalized under Article 171 of
action for ejectment and damages against Cecilia F. the Revised Penal Code and
Duca, Ruel F. Duca, Arsenio F. Duca and Vangie F. hereby imposes upon said
Duca before the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court accused a prison term of two
(MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, years, four months and one day
docketed as Civil Case No. 960 (SF-99). The case was to six (6) years of Prision
decided in favor of Calanayan. There being no Correccional and a fine of
appeal interposed by the aforesaid defendants, the P2,000.00.Accused Cecilia is
said decision became final and executory. On acquitted for lack of evidence.
November 22, 1999, a writ of execution was issued
by the MCTC to enforce the decision. On February The accused Arturo F.
29, 2000, the money judgment was likewise Duca is hereby ordered to pay
satisfied with the public auction of the lot owned by to the complaining witness
Cecilia Duca covered by TCT No. 233647. On March actual damages in the amount
1, 2000, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of of P60,000.00 moral damages
Jocelyn Barque, the highest bidder in the auction of P150,000.00 plus exemplary
sale. damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 plus cost.
On October 19, 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for
the Declaration of Nullity of Execution and SO ORDERED.
Damages with prayer for Writ of Injunction and
Temporary Restraining order against Sheriff IV Dissatisfied with the decision, Arturo Duca
Vinez Hortaleza and Police Officers Roberto Vical, appealed. On March 24, 2004, the RTC of Dagupan
Alejandre Arevalo, Emilio Austria, Victor Quitales, City, Branch 44, rendered a decision, disposing the
Crisostomo Bonavente and Calanayan. The case case as follows:
was docketed as Civil Case No. 2000-0304-D.
WHEREFORE, the
When the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca decision dated April 3, 2003 of
testified to the effect that the house erected on the the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial
lot subject of the ejectment case is owned by her Court, San Fabian-San Jacinto,
son Aldrin Duca. In support of such claim she Pangasinan convicting accused
presented Property Index No. 013-32-027-01- Arturo F. Duca of the crime of
116131 (Exhibit B). At the back of the said exhibit is Falsification defined and
a sworn statement showing that the current and penalized under Article 171 of
fair market value of the property, which is a the Revised Penal Code and
bungalow, is P70,000.00 with the signature affixed imposing upon said accused an
on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca and imprisonment of two years,
subscribed and sworn to before Engr. Reynante four months and one day to six
Baltazar, the Municipal Assessor of San Fabian, (6) years of Prision Correccional
Pangasinan, on December 10, 2001. The signature and a fine of P2,000.00, and
on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca is ordering him to pay to the
that of Arturo Duca. According to the prosecution, complaining witness actual
Arturo made it appear that the signature is that of damages in the amount of
his brother Aldrin who was out of the country at P60,000.00, moral damages in
that time. Aldrin arrived in the Philippines only on the amount of P150,000.00
December 12, 2001, as evidenced by a certification plus exemplary damages in the
from the Bureau of Immigration, Manila. Arturo amount of P100,000.00 plus
even made it appear that his Community Tax cost, is AFFIRMED.
Certificate (CTC) No. 03841661 issued on December
10, 2001 is that of his brother Aldrin. That because x x x.
of the misrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were
able to mislead the RTC such that they were able to SO ORDERED.[5]
get a TRO against Sheriff Hortaleza and the
policemen ordering them to stop from evicting the
plaintiffs from the property in question.
Aggrieved with the ruling of the RTC, Duca elevated the case to the

CA via a petition for review. On November 23, 2005, the CA

60
promulgated its assailed decision acquitting Duca of the crime charged its discretion when it acted on respondents appeal without affording

and reversing the RTC decision. The CA held: the prosecution the opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the

decision of the CA acquitting respondent should be considered void for

However, the prosecution failed to establish the
fact that Arturo was not duly authorized by Aldrin being violative of due process.
in procuring the tax declaration. On the contrary,
the defense was able to establish that Arturo Duca
was duly authorized by his brother Aldrin to secure In his Comment,[8] respondent argues that there was no denial of due
a tax declaration on the house erected on the land
process because the prosecution was properly represented by the
registered under their mothers name.
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and a private prosecutor who
xxx xxx xxx
handled the presentation of evidence under the control and
From the foregoing testimony, it can be deduced
supervision of the Provincial Prosecutor. Since the control and
that Arturo could not have falsified the Tax
Declaration of Real Property under Property Index supervision conferred on the private prosecutor by the Provincial
No. 013-32-027-01-116B1 (Exhibit B) by making it
appear that Aldrin Duca, his brother, participated in Prosecutor had not been withdrawn, the Solicitor General could not
the accomplishment of the said document since he claim that the prosecution was not afforded a chance to be heard in the
was actually acting for and in behalf of the latter. It
must be noted that as early as June 2001, Arturo CA. According to the respondent, he should not be prejudiced by the
has already been authorized by Aldrin; albeit
verbally, to register the house in the latters name Provincial Prosecutors failure to inform the Solicitor General of the
as he cannot do it personally as he was abroad. This pendency of the appeal.
authority of Arturo was confirmed by the latters
execution of an Affidavit dated January 19, 2002
confirming the procurement of the said tax
The petition is impressed with merit.
declaration (Exhibit 6) as well as a Special Power of
attorney executed on June 17, 2002 (Exhibit 7).
Thus, what appeared to be defective from the
beginning had already been cured so much so that The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before
the said document became valid and binding as an
the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the
official act of Arturo.
Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of
If Arturo did not state in the Tax Declaration in what
capacity he was signing, this deficiency was cured the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides, viz.:
by Aldrins subsequent execution of Exhibits 6 and
7. SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office
of the Solicitor General shall represent the
The RTCs conclusion that the special power of Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
attorney executed by Aldrin was a mere
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
afterthought designed to extricate Arturo from any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
criminal liability has no basis since from the very requiring the services of lawyers. x x x It shall have
start, it has been duly established by the defense the following specific powers and functions:
that Aldrin had verbally instructed Arturo to cause
the execution of Exhibit B for the purpose of (1) Represent the Government in the
registering his house constructed on his mothers lot Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
for taxation purposes.[6]
criminal proceedings; represent the Government
and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
Hence, the instant petition anchored on this sole actions and special proceedings in which the
ground: Government or any officer thereof in his official
capacity is a party. (emphasis supplied)
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND HAD ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED
Jurisprudence has been consistent on this point. In the recent
PRIVATE RESPONDENT ARTURO F. DUCAS APPEAL
WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE OF case of Cario v. De Castro,[9] it was held:
THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL THEOPPORTUNITY TO BE
HEARD THEREON.[7] In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of
Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the authority to
represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor
General. Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among
Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when the specific powers and functions of the OSG was
to represent the government in the Supreme Court
the CA resolved the respondents appeal without notifying the People and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings. This provision has been carried over
of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the pendency of the
to the Revised Administrative Code particularly in
same and without requiring the Solicitor General to file his Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without
doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
comment. Petitioner contends that once the case is elevated to the CA People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.[10]
or this Court, it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring

or defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely abused

61

Likewise, in City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina,[11] the Court made the
following pronouncement:
Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court all criminal actions commenced by complaint
or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal. The fiscal
represents the People of the Philippines in the
prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at
the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts,
municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial
courts. However, when such criminal actions are
brought to the Court of Appeals or this Court, it is
the Solicitor General who must represent the
People of the Philippines not the fiscal.[12]
And in Labaro v. Panay,[13] the Court held:
The OSG is the law office of the
Government authorized by law to represent the
Government or the People of the Philippines before
us and before the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings, or before any court, tribunal, body, or
commission in any matter, action, or proceeding
which, in the opinion of the Solicitor General,
affects the welfare of the people as the ends of
justice may require.[14]
Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is
regarded as the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines and
as such, should have been given the opportunity to be heard on behalf
of the People. The records show that the CA failed to require the
Solicitor General to file his Comment on Ducas petition. A copy of the
CA Resolution[15] dated May 26, 2004 which required the filing of
Comment was served upon Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr. (counsel for Duca),
Atty. Villamor Tolete (counsel for private complainant Calanayan) and
RTC Judge Crispin Laron. Nowhere was it shown that the Solicitor
General had ever been furnished a copy of the said Resolution. The
failure of the CA to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment
deprived the prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case.
Pertinently, Saldana v. Court of Appeals, et al.[16] ruled as follows:
When the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its
right to due process is thereby violated (Uy vs.
Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 [May 29,
1974];Serino vs. Zoa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433 [Aug.
31, 1971]; People vs. Gomez, L-22345, 20 SCRA 293
[May 29, 1967]; People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17
SCRA 1119 [Aug. 31, 1966]).
The cardinal precept is that where there is a
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of
the States right to due process raises a serious
jurisdiction issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, L-300026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30,
1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded
at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right
of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in
disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
(Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370, [May 25, 1973] 51
SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA
62
416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision
rendered notwithstanding such violation may be
regarded as a lawless thing, which can be treated as
an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it
exhibits its head (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).[17]
The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases,
that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its evidence in
support of the charge. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this
Court is that a decision rendered without due process is void ab
initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for
lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity
to be heard.[18]
The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without
giving the Solicitor General the chance to file his comment on the
petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to refute the
material allegations of the said petition filed before the CA. The said
decision is, therefore, a nullity. In Dimatulac v. Villon,[19] we held:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must
balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone. The interests of society and the
offended parties which have been wronged must
be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of
conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and
an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice;
for, to the society offended and the party wronged,
it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be
rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on
one hand, and the State and offended party, on the
other.[20]
Further, the CA should have been guided by the following provisions of
Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party
desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review
with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time
to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket
and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of
P500.00 for costs, andfurnishing the Regional Trial
Court and the adverse party with a copy of the
petition. The petition shall be filed and served
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision
sought to be reviewed or of the denial of
petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration
filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper
motion and the payment of the full amount of the
docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for
costs before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within
which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to extend fifteen
(15) days.
Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with
requirements. The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other
 lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of
the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. (emphasis supplied)
The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the filing of the
instant petition for certiorari without a motion for reconsideration is
justified.

Respondent appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The

petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The assailed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312 is hereby SET

respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of ASIDE and the case isREMANDED to the CA for further
Court to serve copies of his petition for review upon the adverse party,
proceedings. The CA is ordered to decide the case with dispatch.
in this case, the People of the Philippines through the OSG. Respondent

failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG and instead served a
SO ORDERED.
copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City.[21] The service

of a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through the

Prosecutor would be inefficacious for the reason that the Solicitor

General is the sole representative of the People of the Philippines in

appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court. The respondents failure

to have a copy of his petition served on the People of the Philippines,

through the OSG, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition

as provided in Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA has

no other recourse but to dismiss the petition. However, the CA, instead

of dismissing respondents petition, proceeded to resolve the petition

and even acquitted respondent without the Solicitor Generals

comment. We, thus, find that the CA committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its

assailed decision.

On a procedural matter, the Court notes that petitioner filed the instant

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without filing a motion for

reconsideration with the CA. It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies

only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy

in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a

general rule, must be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against

whom the writ of certiorari is sought. Ordinarily, certiorari as a special

civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed

before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its

assigned errors.[22] This rule, however, is not without

exceptions. In National Housing v. Court of Appeals,[23] we held:

However, in Progressive Development Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, we held that while generally a
motion for reconsideration must first be filed
before resorting to certiorari in order to give the
lower court an opportunity to rectify its errors, this
rule admits of exceptions and is not intended to be
applied without considering the circumstances of
the case. The filing of a motion for reconsideration
is not a condition sine qua non when the issue
raised is purely one of law, or where the error is
patent or the disputed order is void, or the
questions raised on certiorari are the same as those
already squarely presented to and passed upon by
the lower court.[24] (emphasis supplied)

63