Research Foundation of SUNY

Restructuring the Premodern World-System

Author(s): Janet Abu-Lughod
Source: Review (Fernand Braudel Center), Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring, 1990), pp. 273-286
Published by: Research Foundation of SUNY for and on behalf of the Fernand Braudel Center
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 thePremodern
Restructuring
World-System

JanetAbu-Lughod

systemstheoryhas begunto involute,an ironicoutcome

thatmay illustratethe inevitableroutinization of charisma.
Wallerstein's innovations,
field-shaking which reminded us so strongly
to take the global contextinto consideration when evaluatinglocal
changes, and which us
gave powerful conceptsto describeintegrating
systemic are
patterns, now becoming "normal science."Scholars,largely
but not exclusivelyin the atellierat Binghamton,have been adding
moreprecisedetailsto thestoryoftheWest'sriseto hegemony.The
basicpremisesoftheirwork,however,remainrelatively unexamined.
Thereis an ironyto this.The brilliant light thatworld-system the-
ory shoneon developments fromthe sixteenthcenturyonwardhas
createditsownshadowsand even blindspots.It is notthatconsensus
has beenreachedaboutthepost-sixteenth-century system.Controver-
sies stillabound. But theyfocus primarily on the plotat centerstage,
whereWesternculturehas strutted forsome 500 years.Forgottenis
the factthatEuropeanplayersentered- fromtheperipheralwings,
as it were- ontoa preexisting stagewhichsubsequently became ob-
scured, and thattheAtlantic nations are alreadybeing forced to share
the stagewitha considerably largerand morediversecast.
A secondconceptualblindspothas followedfromthis.The term
"world-system," forgettingthe adjective"modern,"has now become
virtually synonymous with theparticularwaytheworldcameto be or-
ganizedafterthesixteenth century.Wallersteinargues,I thinkover-
enthusiastically, that the term world-system (as opposed to world-
REVIEW, XIII, 2, SPRING I99O, 273-86 273

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274 JanetAbu-Lughod

economies,world-empires, long-distance tradingcircuits)shouldbe

to a
appliedexclusively singular instance witha singular(albeitnot
static)formoforganization. And he therefore positsthat,due to the
inherent of
logic capitalism, convergence willbe theultimateoutcome
of all further integration.
Theworld-system, in thissense,had a beginningand, one must
suppose,has a foreordained "evolutionary" It originated
dénouement. with
theestablishment ofa hierarchical arrangement ofdifferentmodes of
production and/orextraction (thecapitalist,thesemifeudal or precap-
italist,and the "slave mode")- whose relationswere based upon un-
equal exchange and whose geographicdistributionwas roughly
congruentwithpositionin the hierarchy (capitalismat the western
Europeancore,feudalism in theeasternEuropeansemiperiphery, and
unfreelaborat the"ThirdWorld"periphery). And presumably it will
"end"whenall partsare capitalist,socialist,or,in an alternative sce-
nariowhichI tendto favor,whenmultiplehierarchies and diversity
supersedethatunicentered system.Does thatmean therewillbe no
moreworld-system? To avoidsucha counterintuitive conclusion, a more
open definition of systemmustbe adopted.
The Oxford English Dictionaryis as goodas anyplaceto start.It defines
"system" as
an organizedorconnectedgroupofobjects;a setor assemblage
ofthingsconnected,associated,orinterdependent, so as toform
a complexunity;a wholecomposedofpartsin orderlyarrange-
mentaccordingto some scheme(OED, s.v."system").
Notethatno particularschemeis specified.A systemmaybe hierarch-
ical or nonhierarchical;
it maybe organizedon a simplelarge-scale
patternof interdependence or it maybe morecomplexlypatterned.
Nor is any particularorganizingprinciplespecified.
Thus, to conflate"world-system"witha particularschemeof or-
ganizationkeeps us from recognizingother possibleschemes.Further-
more,ittakesourattention awayfrommoments ofradicalreorganization,
whentheveryprinciples oforganization areundergoing restructuring.
Sincetheunderstanding ofrestructuring is notperipheral to thebasic
of
problematic world-systems theory, and since Wallerstein can never
be accusedofchasingthechimeraofTalcottParsons'shomeostatic "So-
cial System,"I wantto makea plea forpayingcloserattention tojust

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RESTRUCTURING THE PREMODERN WORLD-SYSTEM 275

thosemomentsofdiscontinuity, whentheprinciplesof systemic organ-

izationare changing.Thereare at leasttwoofthese:theperiodI have
called "BeforeEuropean Hegemony"(Abu-Lughod,1989), and the
presenttime,whichat least some analystsare referring to as "After
Hegemony"(Keohane, 1984).1
For thepast six yearsI havebeen studying theworld-system that
precededEuropeanhegemony. This paperreportsbriefly on thecon-
clusionsof thatstudy.Froman analysisof the transition betweenit
and the modernworld-system I developsome theoretical guidelines
thatmightstrengthen theabilityofworld-systems theory deal with
to
momentsof restructuring. Finally,I explore,in a verytentativeway,
howthesetheoretical be
might applied
guidelines to increase
our under-
standing of thenew period in world historywe haverecently entered.

THE THIRTEENTH-CENTURY WORLD-SYSTEM:

GROWTH AND DEVOLUTION
The thesisofmybook,Before EuropeanHegemony, is that,bytheend
ofthethirteenth century,a long-standing globally-integrated "world-
system," to which Europe had finallyattached itself, reachingcli-
was
max stage.Eventhough,whencomparedto thecontemporary epoch,
thisthirteenth-century system ofinternationaltrade (and theexpanded
domesticproduction associatedwithit)couldnotbe describedas either
large-scaleortechnologically advanced,itwas substantially morecom-
plexin organization, greaterin volume,and moresophisticated in ex-
ecution than anything theworld had known before. It was in no way
inferiorto thelevelachievedin thesixteenth or eventheseventeenth
century.2
This world-system was organizedaround threeor possiblyfour
"cores."One was theMiddle East, whichoccupieda strategic zone of
international interchange. A secondwas the northernsteppeacross
centralAsia which,afterthe Mongol conquests,had coalescedwith
China. A thirdcore zone was focusedon the Indian Ocean, which
linkedChina to theMiddle East via theStraitofMalacca and India.
And finally, thanksto thetradeand industry stimulated by theCru-
sades that tied
eventually Europe to thisongoingworld-system, the
townsofdevelopingwesternEurope (especiallyin Flanders,France,
and Italy)had begunto forma fourth"core"region.

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276 Abu-Lughod
Janet

What is noteworthy in theworld-system ofthethirteenth century

is thatno singlecultural,economic,or imperialsystem washegemonic.
Indeed,a wide varietyof culturalsystemscoexistedand cooperated,
mostofthemorganizedverydifferently fromtheWest.Christianity,
Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam,Zoroastrianism, and numerousother
smallersects,oftendismissedas "pagan,"all seemto havepermitted,
and indeedfacilitated, livelycommerce,production,exchange,risk-
taking, and the like. Similarly, the economicsystemsthatcoexisted
in thethirteenth-century worldrangedacrossa widespectrum - from
"near"privatecapitalism,albeitwithstatesupport,to"near"statepro-
duction,albeitassistedby privatemerchants.
Thesevariations, furthermore, werenotparticularly congruent with
eithergeographic regionor religiousdomain.The organization oftex-
tileproduction in southIndia was notunlikethatin Flanders,whereas
in China and Egyptlarger-scale coordination was moretypical.The
statebuiltboats fortradein bothVeniceand China, whereaselse-
where(and evenat different timesin Genoa, China, and Egypt)pri-
vate vesselswereoftencomandeeredwhenthe stateneededthem.
Nor weretheunderlying bases foreconomicactivities unvarying.
Participating in the world-system of the centurywere:(a)
thirteenth
largeagrariansocietiessuchas India and China whichcoveredsub-
continents in expanse,and whoseindustrialproductionwas oriented
mainly,but notexclusively, to theprocessingofagricultural rawma-
terials;(b) small portcity-states such as Venice,Aden, and Palembang
or Malacca whosefunctions are bestdescribedas compradoreto an-
ticipatea laterterm;(c) placesas diverseas southIndia, Champagne,
Samarkand,Iraq, and theLevantwhichowedtheirimportance totheir
strategic locations astride pathways between flankingtradingpartners;
and (d) places thatcontainedvalued raw materialsunavailableelse-
where(finequalitywool in England,camphorin Sumatra,frankin-
cense and myrrhon the Arabian Peninsula,spices in the Indian
archipelago, jewelsin Ceylon,ivoryand ostrichfeathers inAfrica,and
evenmilitary slavesin easternEurope). The important fact,however,
was thatmorewas goingon thantradein preciosities. Bulk agricul-
turalproductsand manufactured goodswerealso circulating, and lo-
calizedeconomieswererestructuring withan eyeon theexportmarket.
Despiteso promisinga beginning, thisincipientworld-system be-
gan to unravel after the middle of the fourteenthcenturyand, by the

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RESTRUCTURING THE PREMODERN WORLD-SYSTEM 277

late fifteenthcentury, onlysmallportionsretainedtheirformer vigor.

Whilehistorians havetraditionally focusedon local eventsto account
fordiscretedeclines,myanalysispointsto a setofcausally-linked or
"systemic" forces setinto motion by the Black Death, which may have
brokenoutas earlyas the1330'sand had definitely spreadthroughout
mostpartsof the systemby mid-fourteenth century.
The first-order effects of thiscatastrophewerehorrendous,with
commercially-linked core cities losinga thirdto a halfof theirpop-
ulationswithina fewyears.The second-order effectsof thismassive
reduction in populationwereofperhapsevengreatersignificance. Re-
coveryin Europe shiftedlocal powernorthward (away fromItalyto
formerly peripheral zones such as England). In the Middle East, the
plague initiateda periodof crisiswhicheven demographicrecovery
failedto alleviate.But it was in thecentralAsian and Chinesearenas
thatthe sourcesof world-system collapsewereto be found.
To comprehend itis
this, necessary tonotethattheroughly 200-year
"medieval"period,duringwhichChina playeda keyrolein complet-
ing the circuitof worldtrade,was an aberrationin Chinesehistory.
Most ofthetime,therewas tension(at best,stand-off, or as Barfield
claims,pay-off) between the nomadic tribesof central Asia and the
settledagriculturalists of China. Most of thetime,China was a land
power. The only deviant periodwas thethirteenth century,whenthe
MongolsunifiedChina withcentralAsia (in theYuan Dynasty),and
whenChinesecommercialshippingdominatedthe Indian Ocean.
The thesisof mybook is thatthe flowering of the world-system
in the thirteenth was
century ultimately due to the completionof a
continuouscircuitoflong-distance sea and land routes,thanksto the
openness of China. Thus, the "rise" of the world-system to its peak
in thesecondhalfofthethirteenth centuryand theopeningdecades
ofthefourteenth was due primarily to developments in theEast, not
in the West.
The causesofthesystem's demisemustalso be soughtin thatare-
na. Apparently, theplaguefirst brokeout in southwest China as early
as the 1330's,chieflyamong the horse-borne Mongol cavalry.Their
mobility, via fastpostroads,graduallydiffused infectedfleasthrough-
out China and central Asia. This selectiveweakening Mongolfor-
of
ces,I suggest,madepossibletheMingRebellionwhich,in 1368,restored
an indigenousgovernment in China. This successful revoltagainstthe

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278 JanetAbu-Lughod

decimatedMongolrulersofChina,however, had thepredictablecon-

sequence of once again splittingcentral
Asia from China. That sin-
gular unificationunder the Yuan Dynastyhad createdan almost
frictionless
mediumthroughwhichoverlandworldtradeflowed.Now
it revertedto its moreusual blockages.
A secondeffect, albeitdelayed,was theeventualwithdrawal ofthe
Ming Dynastyfromthesea routethrough theIndianOcean and Ara-
bian Sea and theclosing(indeed,in somecases,thephysicaldestruc-
tion)oftradingportsin southChina.Whenthisslow,and byno means
even,processwas completedby the 1430's,it signaledthefinalfrag-
mentationofwhat,giventheleveloftechnology, had been a remark-
ably coherent system.
In short,just as the"rise"of thethirteenth-century
world-system
was in essenceattributable to an increasein the connectivity
of the
systemitself,so thedemisewasdue to a breakingofthoseconnections.

RELEVANCE FOR WORLD-SYSTEMS THEORY

Whatcan a studyoftheriseand fallofthethirteenth-century world-
system tellus about causal analysis?
First,it confirms world-systems theory,in thatevenin thisearlier
phase, more than internal
causal variables are needed to accountfor
change;variablesat the systemlevelmustbe sought.However,just
as therehad been no singleoverriding factorthat,likesomedeus ex
machina,accountedfora suddenorganization ofthethirteenth-century
world-system, but rather gradual and de-
synergistically-interrelated
velopments thatwerein largepartrelatedtothelinkagesbeingforged,
so in thedownswing therewas a similarly complexand systemic proc-
ess wherebyconstituent partsdeclinedas they"delinked."
Secondly,however, itcautionsus againstreifying as an ex-
"cycles"
planation.Duringthemorethan300 years,overwhichthethirteenth-
century world-system formed and devolved,eachoftheindividualsub-
regionsexperienced cyclicalvariations-butthesewerenotnecessarily
congruent with thetemporalpatternsin otherareas. All thatcan be
said is thatwhentherewas a periodofcongruenceamongtheupward
cyclesofrelatedregions,synergism wasdefinitelypresentandonecould
of
speak a vectorofcommonascent.Such upturnsweredue, in part
at least,to thelinkageseach regionmanagedto forgewithotherparts

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RESTRUCTURING THE PREMODERN WORLD-SYSTEM 279

of the world-system; and feedbackfromthatsystem,in turn,inten-

sifiedlocaldevelopment. The samewastruein reverse. Whenseparate
regionsexperiencedsetbacks,eitherfromunique or commonunder-
lyingcauses,theoveralldirection ofthevectorofchangewasdeflected.
And just because theregionshad becomeso interlinked, declinesin
one inevitably contributed to declinesoccurring elsewhere, especially
in contiguouspartswhichformed"tradingpartners."
Thirdly,our findings suggestthatworld-systems maynotonlybe
organizedin varyingways,but thata weakenedworld-system may
even
undergorestructuring, though the old system continues in ves-
tigialform.If theparticular"modern"world-system, whoseearlyor-
ganization Wallerstein has so carefully traced, was built on theremains
ofa préexistent system, albeitrestructured, itis conceivablethata sub-
sequent one is possible.Indeed, the processcontinues,as can be ob-
served in the present"rise" of Japan and the Pacific NIC's, a
phenomenon thatis drastically alteringtheshapeofthecontemporary
world-system.
World-systems do not"fail";they"restructure." If we assumethat
restructuring, ratherthansubstitution, is whathappenswhenworld-
systems succeed one another, albeitafter intervening periodsofincho-
ateness(disorganization?), thenfailurecannotreferto thepartsthem-
selves but only to the decliningefficacy and functioning of the ways
by which they were formerly connected.When we say that the
thirteenth-century world-system failed,we meanthatthesystemitself
devolved.Its devolution was bothcausedbyand a signofthe"decline"
in its constitutent parts,withmultiplefeedbackloops.
Thus,despitethepopularity ofthatcliché,"riseand fall,"which has
beenindiscriminately to
applied nations,3 empires,4 civilizations,5and
now,world-systems, the metaphoris unfortunate.
In the courseof history, some nations,or at least groupswithin
them,gainrelativepowervis-à-visothersand occasionallysucceedin
settingthetermsoftheirinteractions withsubordinates, whetherby
means of directrule (empires),indirectsupervision(whatwe today
termneocolonialism), or throughunequal influenceon the internal
policiesofothers(hegemony).When thishappens,we call it a "rise."
Conversely, thelossofan advantageous positionis called"decline," even
whentheremaybe no real deterioration in absolutelevelof life.6
The riseand fallof empires judgedbydifferent
is criteria.Empires

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280 JanetAbu-Lughod

risewhentheirgeographicspan of controlexpands,and, conversely,

declinewhenthoseboundariescontract.Even morecomplexis the
idea of the rise and fallof wholecivilizations, in whichthecultural
content, as wellas its is as
expanse, judged alternately "high"or "deca-
dent."
World-systems do not rise and fallin the same waythatnations
or empiresor civilizations do. Rather,theyrisewhenintegration in-
creasesand theydeclinewhenconnections along olderpathways decay.
However,it wouldbe sophomoricto suggestthatthe worldreturns
to thestatusquo antewhenthevigorofa givendynamicofintegra-
tiondissipates.Rather,theold partsliveon and becomethematerials
out ofwhichrestructuring develops.In thissense,the"modernworld-
system"was both a continuation of the earlierone and at the same
timea "new"world-system.
What,then,markstheboundariesbetweenworld-systems? When
do we use theterm"restructuring"? I thinkwe reservetheterm"re-
structuring" forperiodswhenplayerswho wereformerly peripheral
to
begin occupy more powerful positions in the system, whenge-
and
ographiczonesformerly marginalto intenseinteractions becomefoci
and evencontrolcentersofsuchinterchanges. (If theplayersand zones
remainconstant,one does not talkof restructuring, no matterhow
muchactivities inthesystem fluctuate, long they notdisappear.)
as as do
And, I contend,thatis exactlywhathas been happeningin the
worldin thetwentieth century. Can our understanding oftheearlier
restructuring, whichled to thehegemonyof theWest,help us study
thisnew development and predictits outcome?

THE NEW WORLD-SYSTEM

Analystsagreeon someofthemajorcharacteristics oftheworld-

systemthatis nowevolving,althoughtheydiffer on datingtheorigin
of thetransformation, in accountingforit causes,and in predicting
its likelyoutcome.Amongthe commonlyrecognizedtrendsare:

(a) the globalizationof at least the upper circuitof finance,

production-planning, and tradewithinthecapitalistcoun-
tries;

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RESTRUCTURING THE PREMODERN WORLD-SYSTEM 281

(b) the"lossof empire"by the Atlanticstatesand the rise of

severalAsian powersthatforcenturiesweremarginalto,
or insulatedfrom,thatuppercircuit;and
(c) a renewedvitality,therefore,in the PacificOcean arena
which,sincethe Second WorldWar,has assumedan im-
portanceat leastequal to,ifnotgreaterthan,theAtlantic,
on whichthe formerworld-system was focused.

Some scholars,contemplating thesegrandglobalshifts, use theterm

to
"restructuring" the
capture paradoxical meaning ofthis typeofchange,
namely-a continuity withthepast(theold"world-system" hascertainly
notended),but also a significant shiftin itsmajorplayersand there-
lationsamongthem.
This presentsa challengeto howwe Westernsocialscientists con-
ceptualizechange.Untilnow,in someways,we havehad it too easy.
If,indeed,a modernEuro-centered world-system beganto takeshape
in the sixteenthcentury, and continuedto evolveoverthenextcen-
turiesas theWest strengthened and enlargeditscorepositionand ex-
tendedits directand indirectcontrolovermoreand moredistantly
locatedsemi-and realperipheries, thenourchiefproblematic as scho-
larsofsocialchangehas beento studythecontinuities ofthesystem -
namely,its"progress" and "diffusion."
Eventhoughthedead-center ofthecoremigrated(fromHolland-
to
Spain England and then to the eastern seaboardoftheUnitedStates,
withsomeintermediaries and buds), nevertheless it remainedwithin
a common cultural zone that excluded African, Latin Americanand
Asianpowers.Andeventhoughtheeconomicand politicalinstitutions
ofthecoreunderwent significanttransformations, theyremainedwithin
a traditionthatwas culturallyWestern.Indeed, mostof the "great"
socialscienceliteraturegeneratedsincetheeighteenth century has es-
sentiallytrackedthedevelopment of thiscore and its evolvinginsti-
tutions.
The conceptsand tools designedto analyze continuouschange
withinthesamebasicstructure, however, are provinglessrobustwhen
appliedto thechangesthatnow seemto be takingplace. It now ap-
pearsthatthelargercontext is undergoing reorganization.I thinkmuch
of our theoreticalfoundering in early"modernization" or "develop-

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282 JanetAbu-Lughod

mentofunderdeveloped nations"studiesmaynothavebeen entirely

maliciousor ill-intentioned. Its naivetewas due to the factthatwe
assumedthatthebasicstructure wouldnotchange:thatgradually, one
afteranotheroftheso-calledThirdWorldnationswouldbe absorbed
intoourworld.It did notoccurto us thattheymightchange thestruc-
tureand,in consequence,ourplacein it.(It is soberingto rereadearly
discussions onJapanwhich,intheimmediate postwarperiod,wasclas-
sifiedamongthe underdeveloped or "backward"areas.)
In thisnewnon-normal science,we do notknowhowto proceed.
a
Recently,spate ofbooks has appeared,allwrestling withthisdilemma
or includingsomberpredictions of the declinein exclusiveWestern
power; one ofthese was even entitledBeyond American Hegemony,a direct
namingoftheanxiety.The widespreadpublicityforPaul Kennedy's
surprisingly popularbookfocusedon chaptereight,whichtriedto re-
assuretheWestthatit need notlose its primeplace. This literature
symptomizes a deep anxietyaboutthefuture.We havebeen so busy
in Westernsocial sciencesstudyingthe persistence and evolutionof
the"modern" world-system that we are unprepared to understand what
we sensemaybe its break-upor at least its radicaltransformation.
I wantto tryto applyto the presentsome of the insightsI have
gainedfromstudying thethirteenth century and itsrestructuring.Chart
1 laysout in tentativefashiona numberof dimensionsalong which
I thinkthethreesuccessive"World-Systems" can be compared.It is
impossible, in thispreliminary essay, explainall theentries,much
to
less to defendmyreasonsfordescribingthemas I do.
On thebasis ofthistentative comparison,mypreliminary theory
about thecurrentrestructuring places its origin,not in the 1950-70
periodfavoredbyotherinvestigators, but in theseconddecade ofthe
twentieth century-withtheFirstWorldWarand itsdirectimpacton
the dissolutionof theOttomanEmpireand on the RussianRevolu-
tion.Whiletheformer added,in theshort-run, to theimperialreach
ofEurope,thelattersplittheecumeneofeastEuropeand centralAsia
fromwesternEurope and interrupted a priorprocessof integration.
The "world"agricultural depressionofthe 1920's,followed by the
"GreatDepression" at thecore,further interruptedestablishedpatterns
and depressedthe volumeof exchange,permitting modestindustri-
alizationin the periphery.
Butitwastheincredibly destructive character oftheSecondWorld

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RESTRUCTURING THE PREMODERN WORLD-SYSTEM 283

Chart 1: ComparisonbetweenThree Formsof WorldSystem

SYSTEM I SYSTEM II SYSTEM III

DIMENSION
TIME:
Range 12th-15thc. 16th-20thc. 21stc-
Peak of System end 13th end 19th ?
Periodof Restructure
to next 15thc. 20thc. ?

DIMENSION
TECHNOLOGY:
Level low moderate high
Diffusion low moderate high
Eradicationof space
by time low moderate high

DIMENSION
SYSTEM ORGANIZATION:
Core Players multiple few multiple
Dominance low high lower
EconomicOrganization varied one form alternative
coexistent hegemonic forms?
Unit of Analysis cities nations firms

DIMENSION
SPATIAL PATTERN:
Natureof Space highly time-cost fungible
constraining distorted
Travel ship rail/steam plane
Degree of Intraregional high low increasing
Diversity
Degree of Interregional low high declining
Diversity
Divisionof Labor)
(International

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284 JanetAbu-Lughod

DIMENSION
SYSTEM INTEGRATION:
Degree of Entailment modestbut highbut highand
increasing uneven increasingly
even
ResponseTime decades year instantaneous
(Sample Event) (Black Death) (Depression) (StockMarket
Crash)

DIMENSION
RESTRUCTURE BETWEEN: TransitionI to II TransitionII to II
ProximateSystemicCauses disease,depression, depression,war,
war ?
New Players European Asian
New Regions Atlantic Pacific
New Rules conquest co-existence?
New Goods manufactured information

Warthatultimately Europeand precipitated

splitcontinental theChi-
nese Revolution.The effects werecomparableto thosethatoccurred
in the fourteenth centurywhencentralAsia and continental China
ceased to serveas arenasforfrictionlessexchange.The "legal"decol-
-
onizationof imperialdomains regardlessof theirsubsequentrein-
corporationthroughother means- signaled the end of the past
principlesof systemicorganization.
These vacuumsand discontinuities permittedtherestructuring of
the systemand openedtheway fornew playersplayingby different
rules,in thesamewaythatthevacuumsand discontinuities thatcame
in thewakeoftheBlack Death in thefourteenth centuryopenedthe
way forEuropeanplayersplayingby theirown rules.I see parallels
betweenthe responsesof the Indian Ocean powersto the arrivalof
the Portuguesein the early sixteenthcenturyand contemporary
American-European responsesto theJapanese. The bewilderment
amongformerly powerful theirsenseofaggrievement
players, and anger,
and theirunwillingness to recognizethenew principlesbywhichthe
comingworld-system would be organized,are quite similar.

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RESTRUCTURING THE PREMODERN WORLD-SYSTEM 285

WORLD-SYSTEMS THEORY: A NEW AGENDA

I realizeI am not here callingfora new researchagenda. Each

one ofthese"events" is wellstudied,and indeed,itwouldbe impossible
forany individualto "master"the multipleand complexliteratures
about them.But just as I foundeach of the separateregionsof the
thirteenthcentury wellstudiedbyspecialists, butfoundno theorythat
connectedthem,so I see littlesystematic macroanalysis ofhowthese
events,when combined, have operated torestructurethepresentworld-
system.Instead,we have generalallegationsof twokinds.One, that
developsout of theinsightsof Lenin, is now beingpursuedby Wal-
It positsconvergence
lerstein. toa singlesystem finance
ofinternational
capitalism thatwillorder all partsof theglobein an hierarchical
(albeit
no longerspatially-ordered) system.The secondsuggeststhecreation
ofa multi-centered, multi-formed, butincreasingly integrated,
global
systemin whichseveraldiversebut culturally- and geographically-
"blocks"
distinct coexist.I see someelements ofthisappearing,forwhich
thethirteenth century offers a precedent.I do notknowwhichofthese
scenariosis mostprobable,butno otherresearchquestionseemsmore
important forus to study.

NOTES

1. Robert Keohane's After andDiscordin theWbrld

Cooperation
Hegemony: Political
Economy
(1984)
is thebestknown.The titleformybookwas selectedbeforeI saw thissource,so theparal-
lelismis quite accidental.
2. Lest one thinkthatthiswas an entirelynewphenomenon, we mightrecallthatthis
thirteenth-century systemhad its in
precursor classical around
times, the beginningof the
Christianera, whenit encompassedalmostthe same geographicspace, but was organized
in a radicallydifferentmanner.
3. See, forexample,Mancur Olson, TheRiseandDecline ofNations(1982).
4. Including,mostrecently,RobertGilpin(1987);David Calleo (1987);RobertKeohane
(1984); and Paul Kennedy(1987).
5. Of which,amongmany,are Spengler'sTheDecline oftheWest
(originallypublished1926)
and Toynbee'sA Study ofHistory
(1947-1957).
6. The entiredebategeneratedbytheeighthchapterofPaul Kennedy'srecentworkseems
to revolvearoundthisdistinction.

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286 JanetAbu-Lughod

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