1. Maglasang v.
Cabatingan transfers mortis causa may also be made for the
Facts –
 On February 17, 1992, Conchita
Cabatingan executed in favor of her
brother, petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a
"Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter
Vivos for House and Lot" (½) portion of
Conchitas house and lot at Liloan, Cebu
 (4) other deeds of donation were
subsequently executed by Conchita on
January 14, 1995, as follows:
1. Pet Estela C. Maglasang, two (2)
parcels of land (Cogon, Cebu 307
sqm and portion of land in Masbate
50,232 sqm);
2. Pet Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion
land in Masbate (80,000 sqm);
3. Pet Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of
Masbate property (80,000 sqm)
 Same provision in Deed of donation that
- effective upon the death of the
DONOR; if DONEE should die before the
DONOR, donation shall be deemed
automatically rescinded
 On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan
died
 Upon learning of the existence the
donations, resps filed with RTC action for
Annulment
 Respondents allege, that petitioners,
through machinations; taking advantage
of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile
condition, caused the execution of the
deeds of donation, and, that the
documents are void for failing to comply
with the provisions of CC regarding
formalities of wills and testaments,
considering that these are donations
mortis causa.
 RTC judgment in favor of respondents;
 - 3,492 sqm; now in possession of
Issue –
WON the donations made by the late Conchita
Cabatingan are donations inter vivos or mortis
causa
Held –
In a donation mortis causa, the right of
disposition is not transferred to the donee while
the donor is still alive.
Whether a donation is one of mortis causa,
characteristics must be taken into account:
1. Conveys no title or ownership to the
transferee before the death of the transferor or
transferor should retain the ownership (full or
naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. Before his death, transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will;
3. Transfer should be void if the transferor
(donor) should survive the transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations
as mortis causa; the phrase "to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits
of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan
did not intend to transfer the ownership of the
properties to petitioners during her lifetime.
That the donations were made "in consideration
of the love and affection of the donor" does not
qualify the donations as inter vivos because
same reason.
As the donation is in the nature of a mortis
causa disposition, the formalities of a will should
have been complied with under Article 728 CC,
otherwise, the donation is void.
One of the decisive characteristics of a donation
mortis causa is that the transfer should be
considered void if the donor should survive the
done.
Art 805 and 806 (see codal)
The deeds although acknowledged before a
notary public of onor and donee, were not
executed in the manner provided by Art 805 and
806 CC. Thus, the trial court did not commit
any reversible error in declaring the subject
deeds of donation null and void.
2. Villanueva v. Sps Branoco
Facts –
 Pet represented by his heirs, sued resps
spouses Branoco (respondents), in the
RTC to recover a 3,492 square-meter
parcel of land
 Petitioner claimed ownership over the
Property through purchase in July 1971
from Casimiro Vere who, bought from
Alvegia Rodrigo in August 1970.
Petitioner declared the Property in his
name for tax purposes soon after
acquiring it.
 Resps similarly claimed ownership over
the Property through purchase in July
1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez to whom
Rodrigo donated the Property in May
1965.
Provisions of Donation as follows:
EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21,
1962 in the concept of an owner, but
the Deed of Donation or that
ownership be vested on her upon
my(donor’s) demise
- if the Donee predeceases me(donor),
land will not be reverted to the
Donor, but will be inherited by the
heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ
 Respondents entered the Property in
1983 and paid taxes afterwards
 trial court ruled for petitioner; CA
reversed(Deed as donation inter vivos)
 In this petition, petitioner seeks the
reinstatement of the trial court’s ruling.
Pets claim ownership over the Property
through acquisitive prescription, having
allegedly occupied it for more than 10
years.
Issue –
Whether the contract between the parties’
predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and
Rodriguez, was a donation or a devise.
Held –
SC affirm the CA.
Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez
Under a Perfected Donation:
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed
naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated
that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the
[Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but
will be inherited by the heirs of x x x
Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the
passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate, waiving
Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of
title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned
of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition. As
only donations inter vivos need acceptance by
the recipient.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was
only the beneficial title to the Property, evident
from Rodriguez’s undertaking to "give one [half]
x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve
during her lifetime." Thus, the Deed’s stipulation
that "the ownership shall be vested on
[Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into
account the non-reversion clause, could only
refer to Rodrigo’s beneficial title.
Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations
are interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the
donor’s intent.
The principle that "the designation of the
donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the
deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to take
effect at the death of the donor’ are not
controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be
construed together with the rest of the
instrument, in order to give effect to the real
intent of the transferor.
Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred
naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in
1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the
donation nor dispose of the said property in
favor of another." Thus, Rodrigo’s post-donation
sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As
Vere’s successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired
no better right than him. On the other hand,
respondents bought the Property from
Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter’s title which
they may invoke against all adverse claimants,
including petitioner.
Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property:
The ten year ordinary prescriptive period to
acquire title through possession of real property
in the concept of an owner requires
uninterrupted possession coupled with just title
and good faith.
There is just title when the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through
one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but
the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.
Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that
the person from whom the possessor received
the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership.
Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just
title having successively acquired the Property
through sale, neither was a good faith
possessor. Rodrigo disclosed in the Deed,
Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the
Property "in the concept of an owner" since 21
May 1962.
When Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo in
1970, Rodriguez was in possession of the
Property, a fact that prevented Vere from being
a buyer in good faith.
3. Insular Life v. Ebrado
Facts –
 Buenaventura was issued a life insurance
with a rider for accidental death; named
Carponia (common law wife as
beneficiary)
 He died in an accident; both Carponia
and legal wife filed a claim
 RTC held that carponia is disqualified;

Issue –
WON a common-law wife named as beneficiary
in the life insurance policy of a legally married
man claim the proceeds in case of his death.
Held –
The general rules of civil law should be applied
to resolve this void in the Insurance Law.
Article 2012 of the same Code, "any person who
is forbidden from receiving any donation under
Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life
insurance policy by the person who cannot
make a donation to him.
Article 739 CC provides:
The following donations shall be void:
1. Those made between persons who were
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
donation;
2. Those made between persons found guilty of
the same criminal offense, in consideration
thereof;
3. Those made to a public officer or his wife,
descendants or ascendants by reason of his
office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for
declaration of nullity may be brought by the
spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of
the donee may be proved by preponderance of
evidence in the same action.
In essence, a life insurance policy is no different
from a civil donation insofar as the beneficiary is
concerned. Both are founded upon the same
consideration: liberality. A beneficiary is like a
donee, because from the premiums of the policy
which the insured pays out of liberality, the
beneficiary will receive the proceeds or profits of
said insurance. Article 739 CC should equally
operate in life insurance contracts.
The mandate of Article 2012 cannot be laid
aside: any person who cannot receive a
donation cannot be named as beneficiary in the
life insurance policy of the person who cannot
make the donation. The disabilities attached to
marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.
A conviction for adultery or concubinage is not
exacted before the disabilities mentioned in
Article 739 may effectuate.
Judgment affirmed; the proceeds of the policy
are hereby held payable to the estate of the
deceased insured.
4. Dolar v. Brgy Lublub
Facts –
 Petitioner and Serafin Jaranilla were co-
owners of land; 4.6 ha, identified as Lot
No. 1 in Brgy. Lublub
 Both donated Lot No. 1 to respt
Barangay Lublub with conditions.
5. Quilala v. Alcantara
Facts –
 Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of
Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of
Violeta Quilala of land; 94 sqm
 The deed of donation was registered
with RoD, TCT No. 143015 was issued in
the name of Violeta Quilala.
 Catalina and Violeta Quilala died
 Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is
the surviving son of Violeta Quilala
 Resps, claiming to be Catalina's only
surviving relatives within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity, executed a
deed of extrajudicial settlement of
estate, dividing and adjudicating unto
themselves the above-described
property
 1984, resps instituted an action for the
declaration of nullity of the donation
inter vivos
 RTC declared the donation as null and
void; CA affirmed with modification; MR
– denied; hence this petition for review

Issue –
WON donation executed by Catalina in favour of
Violeta is valid.

Held –
Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation
of an immovable must be made in a public
instrument in order to be valid, specifying
therein the property donated and the value of
the charges which the donee must satisfy. As a
mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in
an effective transfer of title over the property
from the donor to the donee, and is perfected
from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee, provided the donee is
not disqualified or prohibited by law from
accepting the donation. Once the donation is
accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable,
and the donee becomes the absolute owner of
the property. The acceptance, to be valid, must
be made during the lifetime of both the donor
and the donee. It may be made in the same
deed or in a separate public document, and the
donor must know the acceptance by the donee.

Below the terms and stipulations of the

donation, the donor, donee and their witnesses
affixed their signature. However, the
Acknowledgment appearing on the second page
mentioned only the donor, Catalina Quilala.

RTC ruled that Violeta's failure to acknowledge

her acceptance before the notary public, the
same was set forth merely on a private
instrument, i.e., the first page of the
instrument. We disagree.

(Section 112, paragraph 2 of Presidential Decree

No. 1529)
The specification of the location of the signature
is merely directory. The fact that one of the
parties signs on the wrong side of the page does
not invalidate the document. is authenticated by
the parties.

The fact that the donee was not mentioned by

the notary public in the acknowledgment is of
no moment. Donation is valid.