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The petitioner sold logs to a company that agreed to pay the sales taxes, but failed to do so. The tax authority then required the petitioner to pay the unpaid taxes. The petitioner filed two requests for reconsideration that were denied and then filed an appeal, but it was 33 days after receiving the initial demand for payment, exceeding the 30-day limit. The petitioner argued the 30-day period should count from when the second reconsideration request was denied, not the initial payment demand date. The court held that this argument was untenable and would allow taxpayers to delay tax assessments indefinitely, which would be detrimental to the government.
The petitioner sold logs to a company that agreed to pay the sales taxes, but failed to do so. The tax authority then required the petitioner to pay the unpaid taxes. The petitioner filed two requests for reconsideration that were denied and then filed an appeal, but it was 33 days after receiving the initial demand for payment, exceeding the 30-day limit. The petitioner argued the 30-day period should count from when the second reconsideration request was denied, not the initial payment demand date. The court held that this argument was untenable and would allow taxpayers to delay tax assessments indefinitely, which would be detrimental to the government.
The petitioner sold logs to a company that agreed to pay the sales taxes, but failed to do so. The tax authority then required the petitioner to pay the unpaid taxes. The petitioner filed two requests for reconsideration that were denied and then filed an appeal, but it was 33 days after receiving the initial demand for payment, exceeding the 30-day limit. The petitioner argued the 30-day period should count from when the second reconsideration request was denied, not the initial payment demand date. The court held that this argument was untenable and would allow taxpayers to delay tax assessments indefinitely, which would be detrimental to the government.
NORTH CAMARINES LUMBER CO., INC. v. CIR GR No. L-12353, September 30, 1960 109 PHIL 511 FACTS: The petitioner sold more than 2M boardfeet of logs to General Lumber Co. with the agreement that the latter would pay the sales taxes. The CIR, upon consultation officially advised the parties that the bureau interposes no objection so long as the tax due shall be covered by a surety. General Lumber complied, but later failed, with the surety, to pay the tax liabilities, and so the respondent collector required the petitioner to pay thru a letter dated August 30, 1955. Twice did the petitioner filed a request for reconsideration before finally submitting the denied request for appeal before the Court of Tax Appeals. The CTA dismissed the appeal as it was clearly filed out of time. The petitioner had consumed thirty-three days from the receipt of the demand, before filing the appeal. Petitioner argued that in computing the 30-day period in perfecting the appeal the letter of the respondent Collector dated January 30, 1956, denying the second request for reconsideration, should be considered as the final decision contemplated in Section 7, and not the letter of demand dated August 30, 1955. ISSUE: Is the contention of the petitioner tenable? HELD: No. This contention is untenable. We cannot countenance that theory that would make the commencement of the statutory 30-day period solely dependent on the will of the taxpayer and place the latter in a position to put off indefinitely and at his convenience the finality of a tax assessment. Such an absurd procedure would be detrimental to the interest of the Government, for "taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need."