DEFINITION OF FOREIGN ELEMENTS

FACTS:

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs.COURT OF


APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A.
Plaintiff Morada is a flight attendant for defendant SAUDIA’s airlines
ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional
based in Jeddah. On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta,
Trial Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Indonesia, Morada became a victim of attempted rape by fellow
crewmembers, Thamer and Allah, who are both Saudi nationals. The
Conflict of Laws; Actions; Where the factual antecedents
two were eventually arrested and deported back to Saudi Arabia while
satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, the problem
Morada was transferred to Manila. On various dates after the incident,
could present a “conflicts” case.—Where the factual antecedents
Morada was summoned to Jeddah by her employer in order to sign
satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agree
documents, purporting to be statements dropping the case against
with petitioner that the problem herein could present a “conflicts”
Thamer and Allah. However, it turned out that a case was in fact filed
case. A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected
against her before the Saudi court, which later found her guilty of (1)
by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a “foreign
adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in
element.” The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social
violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in
and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely
contravention of Islamic tradition.
confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.


Same; Same; The forms in which a foreign element may appear Hence, Morada filed this complaint for damages based on Article 21 of
are many, such as the fact that one party is a resident Philippine the New Civil Code against SAUDIA and its country manager.
national, and that the other is a resident foreign corporation.—The


forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign
ISSUES:

element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a


contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract
Whether or not the case involves a ‘conficts problem’
between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case
State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.
Whether the proper law applicable is Philippine law or the law of the
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner


SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the
RULING:

employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight


stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel
Is there a ‘conflicts’ case?
across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to


Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts”
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.
situation to arise.


A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by
the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a “foreign
element.” The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social
and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely
confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.


The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The
foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to
a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract
between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another
State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.


In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private
respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner
SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the
employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight
stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel
across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts”
situation to arise.


Applicability of Art. 19 and 21, NCC and Jurisdiction of Quezon City
RTC
The Supreme Court held that private respondent aptly predicated her
cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code. Although
Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to
its provisions. Thus, violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable,
with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal forum.


Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, read in the light
of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction, the Supreme Court found that the
RTC of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided under Section
1 of RA 7691. Venue was also held to be proper. Furthermore,
jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff and defendant were
properly acquired.
Choice-of-law Problem


Choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1)
What legal system should control a given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent
should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.


Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under
what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known
as “characterization,” or the “doctrine of qualification.” It is the
“process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of
question specified in a conflicts rule.” The purpose of
“characterization” is to enable the forum to select the proper law.


Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual
situation, event or operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules
is the indication of a “test” or “connecting factor” or “point of
contact.” Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of factual relationship
(such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or
point of contract, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration,
the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.


Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the
possible test for the determination of the applicable law. These “test
factors” or “points of contact” or “connecting factors” could be any of
the following:
1. The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
2. The seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
3. The situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed
to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real
rights are involved;
4. The place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the
place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will
 signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly
important in contracts and torts;
5. The place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g. the
place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a
power of attorney is to be exercised;
6. The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should
govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
7. The place where judicial or administrative proceedings are
instituted or done. The lexfori – the law of the forum – is
particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of
‘procedure’ not going to the substance of the claim involved are
governed by it; and because the lexfori applies whenever the
content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from
application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of
the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
8. The flag of the ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically
all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as
such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts
of affreightment.”
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving
torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of contact” could be the place
or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And
applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the
Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the
alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the
Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a
Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly
believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the
performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her her due and
observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect
her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly
occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is
important here is the place where the over-all harm or the fatality of
the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human
rights of the complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below
(herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify
the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex
loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules on tort liability have
been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just
results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability,
we find here an occasion to apply the “State of the most significant
relationship” rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply
now, given the factual context of this case.


In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most
significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into
account and evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered.
Over-all injury occurred in the Philippines


As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury
occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question
that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with
petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business
of international air carriage. Thus, the “relationship” between the
parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is
not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that
the Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this
dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against
defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly
established.
PHASES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Hasegawa vs. Kitamura GR No. 149177
FACTS:
In March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd, a
Japanese firm, was contracted by the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) to supervise the construction of the Southern
Tagalog Access Road. In April 1999, Nippon entered into an
independent contractor agreement (ICA) with Minoru Kitamura for the
latter to head the said project. The ICA was entered into in Japan and
is effective for a period of 1 year (so until April 2000). In January
2000, DPWH awarded the Bongabon-Baler Road project to Nippon.
Nippon subsequently assigned Kitamura to head the road project. But
in February 2000, Kazuhiro Hasegawa, the general manager of Nippon
informed Kitamura that they are pre-terminating his contract.
Kitamura sought Nippon to reconsider but Nippon refused to
negotiate. Kitamura then filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages against Nippon in the RTC of Lipa.
Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
contract was entered in Japan hence, applying the principle of lex loci
celebracionis, cases arising from the contract should be cognizable
only by Japanese courts. The trial court denied the motion. Eventually,
Nippon filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this time
invoking forum non conveniens; that the RTC is an inconvenient
forum because the parties are Japanese nationals who entered into a
contract in Japan. Kitamura on the other hand invokes the trial court’s
ruling which states that matters connected with the performance of
contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of
performance, so since the obligations in the ICA are executed in the
Philippines, courts here have jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint against Nippon should be dismissed.
RULINGS:
No. The trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of it.
In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint for
specific performance and damages. Such case is incapable of
pecuniary estimation; such cases are within the jurisdiction of the
regional trial court.
Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum
non conveniens. However, such ground is not one of those provided
for by the Rules as a ground for dismissing a civil case.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that Japanese
laws should apply is premature. In conflicts cases, there are three
phases and each next phase commences when one is settled, to wit:
1. Jurisdiction – Where should litigation be initiated? Court must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties, the issues, the
property, the res. Also considers, whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.
2. Choice of Law – Which law will the court apply? Once a local
court takes cognizance, it does not mean that the local laws must
automatically apply. The court must determine which substantive
law when applied to the merits will be fair to both parties.
3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment – Where can the
resulting judgment be enforced?
This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the
RTC’s taking cognizance of the case, Hasegawa immediately filed a
motion to dismiss, which was denied. He filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was also denied. Then he bypassed the proper
procedure by immediately filing a petition for certiorari. The question
of which law should be applied should have been settled in the trial
court had Hasegawa not improperly appealed the interlocutory order
denying his MFR.

RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE [ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 ]
Principle: the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in
judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely:
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Thus, in the instanceswhere the Court held that the local
judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a
foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved: (1) that
the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently
resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its
decision.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut,
United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an
American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired
respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in
several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed
remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 1992, respondent
secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on
behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo
eruption and mudflows.
On 1994, respondent filed before the NLRC, a suit against
BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G.
Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination
and breach of employment contract.The LA ordered BMSI & Rust to
pay Rouzie’s money claims. Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed &
dismissed Rouzie’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an
action for damages before the RTC of La Union. The Complaint
named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as
well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier
labor case.
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed
that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and
RUST, denominated as “Special Sales Representative Agreement,” the
rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of
the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the
complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum
non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory
counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the written contract between respondent
and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the
contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It
also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute –
namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations
and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the
Philippines – that renders our local courts inconvenient forums.
ISSUE(S):
1. W/N the RTC had jurisdiction.
2. W/N the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
forum non conveniens.
RULING:
1. YES.
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where
the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or
can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the
convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise
of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred
by the Constitution and the law & by the material allegations in the
complaint, irrespective of w/n the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or
some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. The case file was an
action for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract.
Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of damages
prayed are w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired jurisdiction
over Rouzi upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon was acquired by its voluntary
appearance in court.
That THE SUBJECT CONTRACT INCLUDED A STIPULATION
THAT THE SAME SHALL BE GOVERNED BYTHE LAWS OF
THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT
THE PHILIPPINE COURTS, OR ANY OTHER FOREIGN
TRIBUNAL FOR THAT MATTER, ARE PRECLUDED FROM
HEARING THE CIVIL ACTION.
REFUSE IMPOSITIONS ON ITS JURISDICTION WHERE IT IS
NOT THE MOST “CONVENIENT” OR
AVAILABLE FORUM AND THE PARTIES ARE NOT
PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING REMEDIES ELSEWHERE.
Raytheon’s averments of the foreign elements are not sufficient to oust
the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of
forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is
more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is w/c the
discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on
this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances require the court’s
desistance.

JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW ARE 2 DISTINCT

CONCEPTS. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question
whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the
merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation
will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant
case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the
trial court.

(b) NO.

UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, A

COURT, IN CONFLICTS-OF-LAWS CASES, MAY
HSBC VS. SHERMAN, 176 SCRA 331 expense. The parties did not stipulate that only the courts of
Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did
FACTS:
the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts of
A complaint was filed by petitioner HSBC against private respondents jurisdiction.
Sherman and Reloj. It appears that Eastern Book Supply Service
CHARACTERIZATION AND POINTS OF CONTRACTS
(Company), a company incorporated in Singapore applied with, and
was granted by the Singapore Branch of petitioner Bank an overdraft -see Saudi Arabian Airlines vs CA
facility, payable monthly. As security, both private respondents, all of
whom are directors of the Company, executed a Joint and Several
Guarantee in favor of petitioner Bank whereby private respondents
agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed by the
Company to petitioner Bank. Likewise included in the said Joint and
Several Guarantee a statement that the Courts of Singapore shall have
jurisdiction over all disputes arising this guarantee. The Company
failed to pay its obligation. Petitioner Bank demanded payment but
private respondents still failed to pay.

Private respondents contended that the court has no jurisdiction over

the subject matter of the complaint and that the court has no
jurisdiction over the persons of the private respondents.

ISSUE:

Is Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the suit?

RULING:

Yes.

One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International

Law: A state does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some
reasonable basis for exercising it whether the proceedings are in rem,
quasi in rem or in personam. The defense of private respondents that
the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on
technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove, at the filing of
the action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage or
CHOICE OF APPLICABLE LAW
AZNAR vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
FACTS:
EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by
Executioner Aznar according to the will, which provides that: Php
3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his
estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI
Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by
Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged
natural child, she having been declared by Us an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.
As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was
never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased appears to
have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when
he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so
that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California
citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was
domiciled in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
1. What law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the
California law?
2. What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property?
HELD:
The partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is
defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as
follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
determination of the meaning of the term “national law” is used
therein.
2. 

The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-
appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose
of his property by will in the form and manner he desires. But HELEN
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California,
which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property
is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is
governed by the law of his domicile.
It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was
a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is
that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the determination of the
validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will, such law
being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a
citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be
applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of
the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile,
which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of
laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If
the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to
be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere,
the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the
State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down
of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters
with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle
of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of
California. But as above explained the laws of California have
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if
there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is
situated” in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16
of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in
the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law
of the deceased should govern. This contention cannot be sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of
laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes
the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil
Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled
in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at
bar. The court of the domicile cannot and should not refer the case
back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back
and forth between the two states, between the country of which the
decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of
the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially
as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime
for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code
of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced
heirs of the parent recognizing them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a
citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions
of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant
HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile,
pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California..
NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union
having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force
only within the state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the
Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to
any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private
law of the State of California.
BELLIS VS. BELLIS
20 SCRA 358
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife
(whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife
(who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.
domiciled therein at the time of his death. So that, even assuming that
Texas has a conflicts rule providing that the domiciliary law should
govern successional rights, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but it would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule, adopting the rule of lex rei
sitae, which calls for the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, where the properties
involved are found in the Philippines.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills,
apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his seven
surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project
of partition claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to
which they were entitled according to the Philippine law. Appellants
argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed
by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine Laws will apply in the determination of
the rights of succession of the illegitimates.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Hence, the court affirmed the ruling of the probate court.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the disposition of the
decedent in his will in which he stated that the Philippine laws will
apply and not his national law was considered illegal and void. This
was in the viewpoint of Article 16 of the New Civil Code which said
that national laws should govern.

The doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent where the decedent

is a national of one country and is domiciled in another. It does not
apply to a case where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and was
Cadalin, et. Al. vs. POEA administrator, et. Al.
G.R. No. L-104776, G.R. Nos. 104911-14, G.R. Nos. 105029-32,
December 5, 1994
FACTS:
Cadalin, et. Al. instituted a class suit with POEA for money
claims for the unexpired portion of their employment contract with
BRII, a foreign corporation, through AIBC, service contractor of the
former. The POEA Administrator rendered decision and in which it
awarded its decision in favor of 324 petitioners only. Dissatisfied of
the resolution, both the petitioners and the private respondents move
for the reconsideration of the resolution made by the POEA
administrator but all the motions were denied by POEA administrator.
Due to the denials of their motions, both parties made their
respective appeals before the NLRC. In its Resolution, NLRC provides
that it agrees with POEA with regard to the use of the Amiri Decree
No. 23, labor law in State of Bahrain, as basis for the renumeration
being more favorable and beneficial to the workers. NLRC, however,
held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to the claimants, who
worked in Bahrain, and set aside awards of the POEA Administrator in
favor of the claimants, who worked elsewhere. With regard to the issue
of Prescription, as raised by the private respondent, NLRC ruled that
the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the complainants
was three years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976. Dissatisfied of the resolutions, the current petition for
review is filed.
ISSUES:
1.What law will govern in the computation of the money claims?
2.What law will govern with regard to the prescription of the claims?
RULINGS:
1.The Amiri Decree No. 23.
The Court ruled that “The parties to a contract may select the law by
which it is to be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is adopted as
a "system" to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions
of their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be
observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth.
In the case at hand, the overseas-employment contracts, which were
prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the
host country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms
and conditions more favorable that those stipulated therein. Since
Bahrain, the host county, offers favorable stipulation, the Amiri Decree
therefore will apply.
Further, the court ruled that any ambiguity in the overseas-
employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII. It
is because the law provides that,” the interpretation of obscure words
or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the
obscurity.” Since, AIBC an BRII are the one who prepares the
employment contract, then contract should be interpreted against them.
2.The Labor Code (3 years)
As correctly pointed out by the NLRC, Money claims-all money
claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the
time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever
barred.
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year
prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines applies only to money claims specifically recoverable
under said Code, does not find support in the plain language of the
provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants in G.R. Nos.
104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims "arising from the
employer's violation of the employee's right," as provided by the Labor
Code supported by the facial reading of the provision.
For Discussion:
The Amiri decree did not apply because, as a general rule, a foreign
procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters,
such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for
appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is
true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in

the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive,
depending on the characterization given such a law.

In this case, period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the
claims in question would contravene the public policy on the
protection to labor, hence cannot be used as basis for prescription.
BANK OF AMERICA NT & ASIA VS. AMERICAN REALTY
CORP.
PRINCIPLE: “In a conflict between a Philippine law and a foreign
law, Philippine law prevails.”
FACTS:
The Bank of America granted a loan to a corporation secured by a real
estate mortgage by the respondent. Upon the loan maturity, the
corporation debtor failed to pay and the petitioner bank filed four (4)
collection cases in the foreign courts (England and Hong Kong)
against the corporation debtors. At the same time it also filed an
extrajudicial foreclosure in the office of the Provincial Sheriff of
Bulacan, Philippines on the real estate mortgage and said was sold in a
public auction.
The respondent files action for damages against petitioner due to the
act of foreclosing the real estate mortgage extrajudicially despite the
pending civil suits before the foreign courts to collect the principal
loan. Petitioner contends that the respondent is not made a party on the
collection case before the foreign courts for being a third party
mortgagor and such actions were filed in foreign courts and thus
decisions rendered on such courts are not enforceable in the
Philippines unless a separate action is filed in the Philippines to
enforce such judgment and that under the English law which is the law
governing in the principal agreement, the mortgagee does not lose its
security interest by filing a civil action for sum of money. The court
rendered judgment in favor of defendants declaring that the filing of
civil suit on collection of a sum of money in foreign courts constitutes
a waiver on the security of the mortgages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the
principal debtors before foreign courts constitutes a waiver of the
remedy of foreclosure.
RULING:
The court held that Section 4 Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure provides that “if two or more suits are instituted on the basis
of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
others.”
A mortgagor creditor may pursue two remedies either to
institute against the mortgage debtor a personal action for collection of
money or foreclosure of a mortgage but cannot avail of both remedies.
In Phil. jurisdiction these remedies are alternative and not cumulative.
Thus, choosing one remedy is a bar to avail of the other remedy.
Plaintiff cannot split up a single cause of action by filing both
remedies as expressly prohibited by the rules on civil procedure.
On the contention of the petitioner that the English law should
apply to the principal agreements that states that the mortgagee does
not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of
money, the court held that a foreign law must be properly pleaded and
proved as fact. If not pleaded, the court will presume that the foreign
law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. This is the
DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION.
Granting however that the English law is applicable in the
Philippine court, such law is contrary to sound and established public
policy of the forum which proscribes the splitting of a single cause of
action, thus still cannot be applied by the court in the case.
It is proper that Philippine law should be upheld since it is the
country upon which the case is filed. Therefore the filing of a
collection case by the petitioner in foreign courts is a waiver for the
remedy of foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner, vs. SHARON DEL
MUNDO DACASIN, Respondent. G.R. No. 168785 February 5,
2010
The Facts
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and
respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were
married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie,
born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and
obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County,
Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner.3 In its
ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and
respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and
retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in
Manila a contract (Agreement 4 ) for the joint custody of Stephanie.
The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate
disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain
from the Illinois court an order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to
Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement.
Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent
exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among
others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of
jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained
respondent’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance
over the suit considering the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to
enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of
Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner
following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction;5 and (3)
the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of
the Civil Code6 prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.7
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument
that the divorce decree obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the
divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied
reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case of respondent, the
divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his
nationality.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the
validity of the Agreement to justify its enforcement by the trial court:
(1) the Agreement novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the
terms of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint;8 or (2) the
Agreement is independent of the divorce decree obtained by
respondent.
The Issue
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint
custody of the parties’ child.
The Ruling of the Court
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but
not to enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual and
equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit
and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s
custody.

Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction to Enforce
Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time
petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on
Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation.9 An action for specific
performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on
joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions.10 Thus,
jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was
grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the
Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This
conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was
"jurisdiction x xx for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the
various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution."11 Petitioner’s
suit seeks the enforcement not of the "various provisions" of the
divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child
custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-
called "retained jurisdiction."
Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce
the Agreement which is contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the
terms of agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
12 Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed
"inexistent and void from the beginning."13 For lack of relevant
stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine
substantive law serve as default parameters to test the validity of the
Agreement’s joint child custody stipulations.14
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January
2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years
old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and
respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United States
because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child
custody for spouses separated in fact or in law15 (under the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: "no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother x x
x."16 (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody17 to the
mother is mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy consideration,19
subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here.20 )
Clearly then, the Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint
custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child
under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to
law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to
allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the
spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for
joint parental authority when spouses live together.21 However, upon
separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law
if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary
is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1)
children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put,
for a child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons),
the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take
care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother.
Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the
Family Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years
anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is
unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or
afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a
child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude
the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the
second paragraph of Article 213.22
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213
of the Family Code applies only to judicial custodial agreements based
on its text that "No child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise." To limit this provision’s enforceability to court sanctioned
agreements while placing private agreements beyond its reach is to
sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children under
seven years old of separated parents. This effectively empowers
separated parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to
subvert a legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole
custody of her children under seven years of age "to avoid a tragedy
where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her."This ignores
the legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a
mother who is deprived of her child of tender age."
It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring one
separated parent (mother) over the other (father) encourages paternal
neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the
parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between the
separated parents.25However, these are objections which question the
law’s wisdom not its validity or uniform enforceability. The forum to
air and remedy these grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At
any rate, the rule’s seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by
ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as
granting the father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements
are not inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the
second paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the mother
final authority on the care and custody of the minor under seven years
of age, in case of disagreements.
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second
paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only until the
child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until the child’s
emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to
the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see
fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and respondent are
not barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of
Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole
custody over Stephanie. Respondent’s act effectively brought the
parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent
sole custody of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged
invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the
divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse26 - to support the Agreement’s
enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v.
Romillo27 settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a
Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.28 There, we
dismissed the alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting of alleged
post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the
foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this
jurisdiction in this wise:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding
on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
 It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by within coverage of the default standard on child custody proceedings –
the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered the best interest of the child.30 As the question of custody is already
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens before the trial court and the child’s parents, by executing the
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to
this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the take advantage of the court’s jurisdiction, submit evidence on the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce custodial arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest, and let the trial
dissolves the marriage. court render judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled
doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to
x xxx
serve the child’s best interest.31
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
and 23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over
60. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s
this ruling.
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera29 to dismiss
criminal complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who
obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse
because he no longer qualified as "offended spouse" entitled to file the
complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear
by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against
the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the
alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.

The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding Justify Remand

Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the logical

end to its lack of cause of action, we remand the case for the trial court
to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody. Stephanie is now nearly
15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the
Zapanta versus Local Civil Registrar of Davao
237 SCRA 25
Facts:
The petition alleges that petitioner Gliceria S. Zapanta is the
widow of the late "Florencio B. Zapanta;" that said deceased was born
in Sta. Rita, Pampanga, on 24 October 1899, as evidenced by his
certificate of baptism. That on 5 August 1965, the late Florencio B.
Zapanta was admitted and confined at the San Pedro Hospital, Davao
City, and met his untimely demise on 11 August 1965 (p. 6, Record on
Appeal); that after the traditional church ceremonies at the Sta. Ana
Church, Davao City, the remains of the deceased was entombed at the
municipal cemetery of Davao City on 12 August 1965; that when
petitioner requested the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City for a
certified true copy of the death certificate of her late husband, she
discovered, to her dismay and surprise, that the name indicated in said
death certificate was "Flaviano Castro Zapanta," albeit the date of
death and all other circumstances and information reflected therein
clearly and conclusively revealed that the person referred to therein
was no other than her late husband, Florencio B. Zapanta
Hence, petitioner prays that, after due notice and hearing, an
order be issued directing the Local Civil Registrar of Davao City to
correct the death certificate of her deceased husband by changing his
name from "Flaviano Castro Zapanta" to "Florencio B. Zapanta."
After due publication of the notice of hearing, the Assistant
City Fiscal of Davao City filed a motion to dismiss the petition,
advancing inter-alia that petitioner seeks to correct not only a clerical
error, but indeed a substantial one.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition on the ground
that the correction of the name "Flaviano Castro Zapanta" to
"Florencio B. Zapanta," was not merely clerical but substantial in
nature and that it thereby did not have the power to grant the relief
prayed for.
Issue:
WON the RTC erred in dismissing the petition to correct the
death certificate of the deceased.
Ruling:
Yes, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition to correct the
death certificate of the deceased.
The general perception was that the judicial proceeding under
Art. 412 of the Civil Code, implemented by Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, could only justify the correction of innocuous or clerical errors
apparent on the face of the record and capable of being corrected by
mere reference to it, such as misspellings and obvious mistakes.
However, in later cases, the Court has held that it adheres to the
principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
Moreover, the Court defined the Adversary Proceeding wherein
one having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex
parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it. Hence, provided the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel has been given opportunity to demolish the opposite
party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered, the suit or proceeding is “appropriate.”
In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent in the
lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and
publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place
thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or
appropriate action.
Thus, the questioned Order of the then Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Davao is hereby SET ASIDE and
Special Proceeding is ordered reinstated.
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM,vs.ERNST JOHAN
BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM,
G.R. No. 193707. December 10, 2014.
Conflict of Laws; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Foreign Laws;
International Law; In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law.—In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is
not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is
incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of
the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to
support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a
divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 592
(2000), has already enunciated that: True, foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.
Same; Doctrine of Processual Presumption; Foreign Laws; If the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts
will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic
or internal law.—In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national
law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to
support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it
is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the
noncompliance therewith.
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo
Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue
of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.
Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly
support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her
son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Norma
filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the
latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged
in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien.
ISSUE:
Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law?
RULING:
Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child,
as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not,
however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign
law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign
law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national
of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of B. AGREEMENT OF THEPARTIES
provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of
See Cadalin vs. POEA 238 SCRA 721
the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to
support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst See HSBC vs. Sherman 176 SCRA 331
to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
C. SUBSTANCE VS. PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLE
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign
laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not D. CENTER OF GRAVITY DOCTRINE
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
E. RENVOI DOCTRINE
must be alleged and proved.
-see Aznar vs. Garcia
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents F. LEX FORI
of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
G. APPLICABILITY OF PH LAWS AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the
foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a
parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-
compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be
denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
H. PROOF AND AUTHENTICATION OF FOREIGN LAW
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. V. COURT OF APPEALS
AND PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES, INC.
G.R. NO. 119602 OCTOBER 6, 2000
FACTS:
The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President
Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz,
Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and
when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Vasquez, an official pilot
of Venezuela, was designated by the harbor authorities in Puerto Ordaz
to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. However,
the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River, this
obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels. As a result of the
blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner
Wildvalley was unable to sail out. Subsequently, Wildvalley filed a
suit with the RTC of Manila against President Lines Inc. and Pioneer
Insurance Company for damages in the form of unearned profits and
interest thereon.
The petitioner averred that the Court of Appeals seriously erred
in disregarding Venezuelan law despite the fact that the same has been
substantially proved in the trial court without objection from private
respondent, and who objection was interposed belatedly on appeal.
ISSUE:
Is the Venezuelan law applicable to the case at bar?
RULING:
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice
of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. A
distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an
unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted
hereunder. Where the foreign law sought to be proved is “unwritten”,
the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and
published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country
concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as amended,
provides: The record of public document referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office.”
We take note that these written laws were not proven in the
manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132, of the Rules of Court.
For a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory: (1) it must be attested by the officer having
legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) it must be
accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign
service officer, and with the seal of his office.
It is not enough that the GacetaOficial, or a book published by
the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as
evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by
Section 24, of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that
Captain Monzon, who attested the document, is the officer who had
legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office accompanying
the copy o the public document. No such certificate could be found in
the records of the case.
is outlined in the termination letter Gran received. The labor arbiter
dismissed the labor case but on appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the arbiter. The Court of
Appeals likewise affirmed the NLRC.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Saudi labor laws should be applied.

EDI-Staff builders International, Inc. vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, RULING:
537 SCRA 409, October 26, 2007
No. The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court. EDI did
not present proof as to the existence and the specific provisions of such
FACTS: foreign law. Hence, processual presumption applies and Philippine
labor laws shall be used. In international law, the party who wants to
In 1993, EDI-Staffbuilders, Inc. (EDI), upon request of Omar
have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB), a company in Saudi Arabia, sent to
proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact
OAB resumes from which OAB can choose a computer specialist.
to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot
Eleazar Gran was selected. It was agreed that his monthly salary shall
take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only
be $850.00. But five months into his service in Saudi Arabia, Gran
domestic or forum law. Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove
received a termination letter and right there and then was removed
the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law
from his post. The termination letter states that he was incompetent
doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption
because he does not know the ACAD system which is required in his
comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
line of work; that he failed to enrich his knowledge during his 5 month
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same
stay to prove his competence; that he is disobedient because he failed
as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues
to submit the required daily reports to OAB. Gran then signed a
presented before us.
quitclaim whereby he declared that he is releasing OAB from any
liability in exchange of 2,948.00 Riyal.

When Gran returned, he filed a labor case for illegal dismissal

against EDI and OAB. EDI in its defense averred that the dismissal is
valid because when Gran and OAB signed the employment contract,
both parties agreed that Saudi labor laws shall govern all matters
relating to the termination of Gran’s employment; that under Saudi
labor laws, Gran’s termination due to incompetence and
insubordination is valid; that Gran’s insubordination and incompetence
NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN decisions in a long line of cases that a foreign law, being a matter of
SERVICES, INC., vs. evidence, must be alleged and proved, the law of Singapore ought not
National Seamen Board,et. Al. to be recognized in this case.
G.R. No. L-54204 September 30, 1982
But it is our considered opinion that the jurisprudence on this matter
was never meant to apply to cases before administrative or quasi-
Principle: Administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound
judicial bodies such as the National Seamen Board. For well-settled
strictly by technical rules.
also is the rule that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not
Topic: Proof and Authentication of Foreign Law bound strictly by technical rules. It has always been the policy of this
Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of valid
FACTS:
claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of
Napoleon Abordo is an employee of Norse Management CO. employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered
(petitioner) as Second Engineer. He died from apoplectic stroke while shall be considered. We see no reason to deviate from this well
in the course of employment. He embarks in a vessel of Singaporean considered policy. Certainly not on technical grounds as movants
Registry. Due to his death, Napolean’s wife claimed for compensation herein would like us to.
benefits before National Seamen’s Board (respondent) alleging that the
Since National Seamen Board is a quasi-judicial body, then it may not
benefits that she will be receiving shall be based on the law where the
be bound strictly by the technical rules. Hence, its decision it using
vessel is registered. On the other hand, petitioners contend that the law
Singaporean Law is valid.
of Singapore should not be applied because the respondent don’t have
a jurisdiction over Singapore’s Insurance Law, that their responsibility
is not alleged in the complaint and that no proof of the existence of the
Workmen’s Insurance Law of Singapore. Respondent resolve the case
and used the Law of Singapore as basis of the benefits. Petitioner
appealed the resolution before the Ministry of Labor but it did not
receive any favorable consideration. Hence, the current petition.

ISSUE:

What law shall govern? Philippine law or Singaporean Law?

RULING:

Singaporean Law.

The court ruled that it is true that the law of Singapore was not alleged
and proved in the course of the hearing. And following Supreme Court
TOPIC: CITIZENSHIP AND MODES OF ACQUISITION HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the
CASE: BENGZON VS. HRET
said election.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in
Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
view of the constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
citizen.”
RULING:
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born
in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted YES.
in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a consequence,
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63
he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act
enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost
reacquired by a former citizen:
or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.” Whatever doubt
1. by naturalization,
that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased
by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his 2. by repatriation, and
service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
3. by direct act of Congress.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
**
repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces
of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections.
He won over petitioner Bengzon who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad

Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified
to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. citizenship due to:
 1. desertion of the armed forces; recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II;

3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other

time,

4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and

5. political economic necessity.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.

This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by

rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of
the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry
in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The
said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the

Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to
Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares VS. Comelec
FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was
found abandoned as a newborn in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar on 3rd day of September year 1968. Parental
care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his
relatives, Emiliano Militar and Emiliano's wife. The relatives then
reported and registered the child as a founding with the Civil Registrar
of Iloilo. The child was then named Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar. Grace was adopted by celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces).The petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar"in her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live
Birth. The trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's
name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to
"Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe" on 13th day of May year 1974.
Although there were annotations placed in the child’s foundling
certificate but it was only in 2005 that Susan Roces found out that their
lawyer failed to secure a new Certificate of Live Birth with a Poe’s
new name as well as the name of the adoptive parents. Roces then
submitted an affidavit and in 2006, a Certificate of Live Birth in the
name of Mary Grace Poe was released by the Civil Registry of Iloilo.
At the age of 18, Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan.
Initially, the petitioner was enrolled and pursued a degree in
Development Studies at the University of the Philippines but she chose
to pursue her studies abroad and left for the United States of America
(U.S.) in 1988. Poe graduated in 1991 from Boston College in
Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts
degree in Political Studies. In 1988, she was issued a Philippine
passport.
On 27 July 1991, Poe married Teodoro Llamanzares and flew to the
US right after the wedding. The petitioner gave birth to her eldest child
Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16th day of April year 1992 in the US. In
2001, Poe became a naturalized American Citizen and she obtained a
US Passport that same year. In April 2004, Poe came back to the
Philippines in order to support her father’s candidacy. It was at this
time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter. Her two daughters
Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born
in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. Poe
returned to the US in July 2004 with her two daughters. Poe returned
in December 2004 after knowing her father’s deteriorating condition.
The latter died and Poe stayed until February 2005 to take care of the
funeral arrangements. Poe wanted to be with her grieving mother that
is why she and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in
the Philippines sometime first quarter of 2005. They prepared for
resettlement including notification of their children’s schools,
coordination with property movers and inquiry with Philippine
authorities as to how they can bring their pet dog.
According to Poe, as early as 2004, she already quit her job in
the US. Poe came home on May 24, 2005 and immediately secured a
TIN while her husband stayed in the US. They stayed with her mother
until she and husband was able to purchase a condominium in San
Juan sometime February 2006. On February 14, 2006, Poe went back
to the US to set up the other family belongings. She commuted back in
March 2006. In early 2006, Poe and husband acquired a property in
Corinthian Hills in Quezon City where they built their family home.
On July 7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 9225. On July 10, 2006,
she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together
with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children.
The Bureau of Immigration acted in favor of the petition on July 18,
2006. She and her children were then considered dual citizens. Poe
then registered as voter in August 2006 and secured a Philippine ISSUES:
passport thereafter.
Issue 1: Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
On October 6, 2010, she was appointed as Chairperson of the
Issue 2: Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.
MTRCB. Before assuming her post, she executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the US before a notary public in Pasig Issue 3: Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for
City on October 20, 2010. The following day, she submitted the committing material misrepresentations in her COC.
Affidavit to the Bureau of Immigration and took her oath as a
RULINGS:
chairperson of MTRCB. Poe from them on, she stopped using her
American passport. 1. Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino.
For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only
On July 12, 2011, Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of
natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency. First, there is a very
Renunciation of Nationality of the US before the Vice Consul of the
high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Grace Poe's
US Embassy in Manila.On December 9, 2011, the US Vice Consul
physical features are typical of Filipinos. As a matter of fact that she
issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the US effective October
was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of
21, 2010. On October 2, 2012, Poe filed with COMELEC her
the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be
Certificate of Candidacy for Senator saying that she was resident of
more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino
the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6 months before May 13,
is also a circumstantial mevidence of her parents’ nationality. That
2013. She was then proclaimed a Senator on May 16, 2013. On
high probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
October 15, 2015, Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To
2016 elections. She declared that she is a natural born and her
assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually
residence in the Philippine up to the day before election would be 10
impossible, as the norm.
years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the Supreme Court pronounced and
There were some petitions filed against Poe because there are
said that foundlings are as a natural-born citizens. This is based on the
some issues about her that made her have this case in running for
finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention
president. Petitions were filed against Poe alleging that (1) she
manifests that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the
committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she stated that
enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to
she is a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years 11 months up to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
the day before May 9, 2016 Elections, (2) she is not natural born
exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the
considering that Poe is a foundling and (3) Grace Poe’s candidacy
enumeration with respect to foundlings, the Supreme Court felt the
should be denied, rejected,or cancelled for committing material
need to examine or test the intent of the framers.
misrepresentations in her Certificate of Candidacy.
 Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-
born citizenship is supported by treaties and the general principles of
international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some
of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume
foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is
found.

2. Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi

coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile. Grace
Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not
on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was approved
by the BI. COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree that an alien’s
stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent
resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit.
Such cases are different from the circumstances in this case, in which
Grace Poe presented an overwhelming and somehow an accurate
evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her
domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on
May 24, 2005, it was for good.

3. No. The COMELEC cannot cancel, deny or reject her Cerftificate of

Candidacy on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for
ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide
upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is
suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution
that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on
ground of false representations regarding her qualifications. In this
case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe was pronounced
qualified as a candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any
false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and
residency.
DJUMANTAN VS. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995
Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso
facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her
failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her
extended stay here as an alien.
Facts
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a
contract worker. He embraced and was converted to Islam. On May
17, 1974, he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He
returned to the Philippines in January 1979.
On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez,
(Marina and Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the “guests” of Banez. The
latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of
petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitality extended to him
during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty
and Support,” for his “guests.”
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as
temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her
husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage” with
the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two.
This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed
from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident under Section
13(a) of the same law.
On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of
registration.
Issue:
WON the petitioner’s admission into the country and the change of her
status from temporary visitor to permanent resident are legal
Ruling:
No, there was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting
petitioner’s entry into the country and the change of her immigration
status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such
privileges were obtained through misrepresentation. Never was the
marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration
authorities in her applications for temporary visitor’s visa and for
permanent residency.
The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary
visitor is a matter that could influence the exercise of discretion on the
part of the immigration authorities. The immigration authorities would
be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to have
entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is married to
another woman.
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose
presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and
unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the
country. This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part
of the nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure
permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the
part of the government to permit them to stay.
The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to
continue to reside in the country, is protected only so far as Congress
may choose to protect it. There is no law guaranteeing aliens married
to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given
permanent residency, in the Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her
from the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission
and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino
husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not
excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the
expiration of her extended stay here as an alien.

Therefore, the Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated

September 27, 1990 revoking the issuance of the permanent resident
visa to petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are
REVERSED.
LOSS AND REACQUISITION OF FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.*
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS
MANZANO and theCOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual citizenship is different from
dual allegiance.—Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states.For instance, such a situation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without
any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of
both states.
Same; Same; Instances where it is possible for certain classes of
citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship.—Considering
the citizenshipclause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born
in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country; (3)
Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the
former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are
deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on
the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition.
Same; Same; The phrase “dual citizenship” in Republic Act No.
7160, §40(d) and in Republic Act No. 7854, §20 must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance.”—In including §5 in Article IV on
citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not
with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160,
§40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to
“dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance,
who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they
elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:



Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the
May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the highest number votes while
Mercado bagged the second place. However, Manzano’s proclamation
was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification on the
ground that he is an American citizen.



In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner
with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen
because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother.
He was born in the United States (San Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14,
1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws (jus soli).
But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not
lose his Filipino citizenship.



The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and
cancelled Manzano’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is a
dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual citizens
are disqualified from running for any position.



The COMELEC en banc reversed the division’s ruling. In its
resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a Filipino
citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as an alien with
the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using an American
passport, this did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as
he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of
allegiance to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC found that when
respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a
Philippine voter and voted as such, which effectively renounced his
US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no
longer had US citizenship.
 that country;


Hence, this petition for certiorari.


ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen
2. Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold
elective office


RULING:
 person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR
DISQUALIFICATION
Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without
any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of
both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries
which follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers
if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the
former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they
are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines
may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but
the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions
on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual’s volition.



LGC prohibits “Dual Allegiance” not “Dual Citizenship”
The phrase “dual citizenship” in the LGC must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a

 dual citizen.
By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear Allegiance
to the Other Country 


 On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt
the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual of his election of Philippine citizenship.

has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no 

moment. His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his


undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
PETITIONER’S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-


Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner
The COMELEC en banc’s ruling was that Manzano’s act of registering
on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his American
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
Nationality Act wherein it is provided that “a person who is a national
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty
citizenship.
over foreign territory.” But this provision was declared
unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless, our SC held
that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present
post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect
renounced his American citizenship.



To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does
CASE: Valles vs. COMELEC 337 SCRA 543
PRINCIPLE: Principle of Jus Sanguinis
FACTS:
 Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a
Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen,
she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later
married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998
elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her
disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.
ISSUE:
 born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
RULING:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship
of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the
basis of place of birth.
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of
the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has
established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship, xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers
citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows
the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim
Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935

Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the
Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by
which the United States governed the country. These were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who

were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including
their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents
father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
YU VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 83882. January 24, 1989
RATIO: Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that
is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication.
FACTS:
Petitioner- a Portuguese National acquired a Philippine
citizenship by naturalization on Feb. 10, 1978.
Despite naturalization, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for
and was issued a renewed Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N.
1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo.
Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on
20 July 1986.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Mr. Willie Yu’s acts constitute a renunciation
of his Philippine Citizenship?
RULING:
YES, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation
that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after
having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport
and represented himself as such in official documents even after he
had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner though a naturalized Filipino signed commercial

documents stating his citizenship as Portuguese without the
authentication of an appropriate Philippine Consul

Petitioner was detained by the CID for obtaining a Foreign

passport while (at the same time) holding a Filipino citizenship as well

Respondents argue that the petitioner was in full knowledge

and legal capacity when he applied for A Philippine citizenship
through naturalization he consequently recognizes, identifies and
agrees to the oath taken which states to renounce ‘absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state
or sovereignty” and pledged to “maintain true faith and allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines,". Hence, petitioner then knows the
limitations or restrictions once solemnizing said oath and it succeeding
consequences should they be violated.
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONER V. GO 25 SCRA 890
FACTS:
The Department of Foreign Affairs informed the Commissioner of
Immigration that, on the basis of the findings made by the NBI, the signature
of the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on certain documents, amongst
them cable authorization authorizing the documentation of Beato Go Callano
and others, were not authentic. Thereupon, the Department declared several
documents among them the cable authorization to be null, void and no effect
and the certificates of registration and identity issued to Beato Go Callano
and his brothers were cancelled.
The Board of Immigration Commissioners ordered that they be
returned to the to the port where they came or to the country of which they
were nationals, upon the ground that they had been able to enter this country
and gain admission as Filipino citizens by the fraudulenty secured
authorization.
The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals and found out that
respondents were the illegitimate children of Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen
and Emilia Callano a Filipino citizen. Go Chiao Lin and Emilia together
with the respondents went on vacation to Amoy, China, but Go died there.
Emilia has to return to the Philippines as the maid of Consul Eutiquio Sta.
Romana because she was penniless, leaving her children behind.
Subsequently the latter were able to go to Hongkong, where they sought and
obtained employment. They applied with the Philippine Consul General in
Hongkong for entry into the Philippines as Filipino citizens and they were
allowed to register in the Consulate as Filipino citizens and to travel directly
to the Philippines.
However, the Board of Immigration Commissioners and the
Commissioner of Immigration maintain that they were Filipino citizens when
they left the Philippines in 1946, they lost that citizenship because they were
recognized by their common-law father, they became citizens of the Republic
of China in accordance with the Chinese Nationality Law.
ISSUE:
Did the respondents lose their Philippine citizenship upon the performance of
certain acts or the happening of certain events in China?
RULING:
In deciding the question no foreign law can be applied. The
respondents are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth, and their status must be
governed by Philippine law wherever they may be, in conformity with
Article 15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code which provides as follows:
“Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, conditions and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.” Under Article IV, Section 2, of the Philippine
Constitution, “Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner
provided by law,” which implies that the question of whether a Filipino has
lost his Philippine citizenship shall be determined by no other than the
Philippine Law.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic
Act No. 106, provides that a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship;
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a
foreign country, rendering service to, or accepting a commission in in the
armed forces of a foreign country; cancellation of the certificate of
naturalization; declaration by competent authority that he is a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in time of war; in the case of a woman by marriage
to a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband’s country, she
acquired his nationality. Recognition of the petitioners by their alien father is
not among the ground for losing Philippine citizenship under Philippine law,
and it cannot be said that the petitioners lost their former status by reason of
such recognition.
ELEGIBILITY OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person independently
of his residence or intention.
MAYOR JOSE UGDORACION, JR. v COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EPHRAIM M.TUNGOL April 18, 2008 We are guided by three basic rules: (1) a man must have a
residence or domicile somewhere;(2) domicile, once established,
FACTS: remains until a new one is validly acquired; and (3) a man can have
Jose Ugdoracion and Ephraim Tungol were rival mayoralty but one residence or domicile at any given time. The general rule is
candidates in Albuquerque, Bohol in the May 2007 elections. Tungol that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lost only when there is
filed a petition to cancel Ugdoracion’s Certificate of Candidacy an actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
contending that the latter’s declaration of eligibility for Mayor abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts
constituted material misrepresentation; that he is actually a “green which correspond with such purpose.
card” holder or a permanent resident of the US.It appears that
In the instant case, however, Ugdoracion’s acquisition of a
Ugdoracion became a permanent US resident on September 26, 2001
lawful permanent resident status in the US amounted to an
and was issued an Alien Number by the USINS. Ugdoracion, on the
abandonment and renunciation of his status as a resident of the
other hand, presented the following documents as proof of his
Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of origin, which
substantial compliance with the residency requirement: (1) a residence
was Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new domicile of choice, which is
certificate; (2) an application for a new voter’s registration; and (3)
the USA.
a photocopy of Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status.
COMELEC cancelled Ugdoracion’s COC and removed his name from
the certified list of candidates for Mayor. His motion for recon was
denied. Hence, the petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to the
COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether Ugdoracion lost his domicile of origin

RULING:

YES. Residence, in contemplation of election laws, is

synonymous to domicile. Domicile is the place where one actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return (animus
revertendi) and remain (animus manendi).

Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is

acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is
acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3)domicile
CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND REACQUISITION ACT
RULINGS:
NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner, vs.
RO GEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, YES.
respondents.
G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008 The court ruled that Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225
compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens
TOPIC: Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of
FACTS: Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an
became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He filed authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General elections.
(PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19
June 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioner’s request, and on the In the case at bar, since the petitioner wants to run as a
same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the candidate in Philippine elections, he should have executed a personal
Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27 September and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship in addition to
2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. the oath of allegiance that he executed before the PCG. The filing of
06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. his certificate of candidacy (COC) is not similar to personal and sworn
renunciation as required by law although the provisions in the COC is
Petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of almost similar to the provisions of Sworn of Renuciation.
Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. Private
respondent filed a petition for disqualification before COMELEC
alleging therein that petitioner failed to renounce his US Citizenship.
Petitioner answered that he already made an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and the oath contained in the certificate of
Candidacy is already a renouncement of his Foreign Citizenship.
COMELEC ruled to disqualify the petitioner for its failure to make the
required renunciation of foreign citizenship. This rulings was affirmed
by COMELEC en Banc.

ISSUE:
Is the COMELEC correct in disqualifying the petitioner?
SOBEJANA-CONDON VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been
born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984,
she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a
certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra,
Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as
the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The
application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the
Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La
Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought
elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the
position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and
was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office
on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma
P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private respondents) all
registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo
warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The
petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding
her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she
failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since
September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She
claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A.
No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear
abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon
disqualified and ineligible to hold office of vice mayor of Caba La
union and nullified her proclamation as the winning candidate.
After that the decision was appealed to the COMELEC but the
appeal was dismissed in the second division and affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an
Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual
citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her
certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the
"personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office
does not apply to her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for elective
office due to failure to renounce her Australian Citizenship in
accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
HELD:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of
Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.
 Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores

one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and
obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions
imposed in Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall

meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought

elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship
in Canberra, Australia.
Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the
exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer
oath.

The Supreme Court said that, the renunciation of her Australian

citizenship was invalid due to it was not oath before any public officer
authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon void.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is

hereby DISMISSED.
Maquiling vs. COMELEC, April 16, 2013
Facts:
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3
However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a
citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship.
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225
before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA
and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship, which states:
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, On 28 April
2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching
thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23
April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
American."10To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship,
Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel
record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been
using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the
Philippines.
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an
Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and
memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof. After Arnado
failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default
and to present evidence exparte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010
elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. It was only after his proclamation that
Arnado filed his verified answer,
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION:
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation
of a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation, the
COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification.
The First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino
citizen.18The Court ruled that Arnado’s act of consistently using his
US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009
effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second
highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case
and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended
Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First
Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under
Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this
case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes,
should be proclaimed as the winner.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of
declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a US passport, There are three questions posed by the
parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the
subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
Issues:
1. whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
2. whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
3. whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government
Code is applicable to this case.
RULINGS:
1. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper
when there has not yet been any proclamation of the winner.
2. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s
nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used
his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport,
Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American,
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign
citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of
renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already
carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not
only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also
to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and
privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to
vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a
local elective.
3. The rule on Succession under LGC is not applicable. Maquiling is
not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from
among the qualified candidates.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v.
Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a
second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election
contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once
again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a
secondplacer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to
any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots.
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter
dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision that a
candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that
produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is
that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a
disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who
obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction
being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly
elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no
one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at
the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only
question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected
and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that
Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. An
ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a
wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have
been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material
time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not
have been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may
have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a
legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the
outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains
unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a
candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The
number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to
qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for
public office.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as
in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If
a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe
his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty
and fidelity to any other state.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign
voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule
of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to
trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is
electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the
end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to
set in.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the
winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from
among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54
and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any
legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not
considered at all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are
disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more
so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute
the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in
favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
must also be respected.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v.
COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm of
notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in
favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a
mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified
candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is
not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate.
The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the
candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s
disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who
placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.
The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among
the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed

and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also
the proclamation.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s

candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission
of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the
individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been
elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his

citizenship. With Arnado being barred from even becoming a
candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except
that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to
the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the
elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the
winner.

Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the

elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at
all in the May 2010 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should

not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the
rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

RENATO M. DAVID, petitioner, vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 199113. March 18, 2015
Citizenship; Dual Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003; Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise
known as the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,”
was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(PGMA)on August 29, 2003.—R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the
“Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,” was signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003.
Sections 2 and 3 of said law read: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is
hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. SEC.
3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.—Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic: “I ___________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.” Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who,
after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid
oath.
Same; Same; Same; In the case of those who became foreign
citizens after Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 took effect, they shall retain
Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship
provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.—In fine,
for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be
deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost
pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is
one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its
title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the
provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries and allowing dual citizenship, and also provides for the
procedure for reacquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the
case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect,
they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new
law.
CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:
In 1974, petitioner Renato M. David migrated to Canada where
he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement,
David and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot
where they constructed a residential house. However, they came to
know that the portion where they built their house is a public land and
part of the salvage zone. In April 2007, David filed a Miscellaneous
Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land wherein he indicated
that he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay
opposed the application and she also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents (Art. 172, RPC). Meanwhile, David
re-acquired his Filipino citizenship in October 2007.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor recommended the
filing of the information in court. David filed a petition for review
before the Department of Justice (DOJ) but the same was denied.
Meanwhile, CENRO rejected David’s MLA, ruling that the latter’s
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the
defect in his MLA. Thereafter, an information for Falsification of
Public Document was filed before the Municipal Trial Court and a
warrant of arrest was issued against the David. The latter then filed an
Urgent Motion for ReDetermination of Probable Cause, which was
denied. David’s petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
May David be indicted for falsification for representing himself
as a Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-
acquition of Philippin citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No.
9225?
RULING:
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria
MacapagalArroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy
of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed
to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following
oath of allegiance to the Republic: xxx
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath (Emphasis
supplied).
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who
have become citizens of another country shall be deemed “not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase
“under the conditions of this Act.” Section 3 lays down such
conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in
the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those
natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization
in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath
ofallegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino
citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology
used is different, “reacquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the
second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity
of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of
Philippine Citizenship”, the authors of the law intentionally employed
the terms “re-acquire” and “retain” to describe the legal effect of
taking the oath of allegiance to theRepublic of the Philippines. This is
also evident from the title of the lawusing both re-acquisition and
retention.
Considering that David was naturalized as a Canadian citizen
prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of
natural born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the
new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no
Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance. retroactive effect insofaras his dual citizenship status is concerned. The
MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of
public document under Article172, paragraph 1.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at
the time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings in
Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already
lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizensafter R.A. 9225 came into force.
In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos
who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the
new law’s effectivity.

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in

relation to Article 171 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private
individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage
of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents.
The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article
172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private individual or a
public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and (3) that the falsification
was committed in a public, official or commercial document.

David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public

document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under
CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by
which anatural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the
Rommel Apolinario Jalosjos v. The Commission on Elections
G.R No. 191970, April 24, 2012
RATIO: The question of residence is a question of intention.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every
person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once
established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c)
a person can have but one domicile at a time.
Facts:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on
October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in 1981 and there acquired
Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided
to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother, Romeo in Brgy
Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return,
he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. On
September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing
a sworn renunciation of the same.
From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential
property in the same village. He applied for registration as a voter in
the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Dan Erasmo, Sr., the Barangay
Captain of Veterans Village opposed the same. Acting on the
application, the Election registration Board approved it and included
Jalosjos’ name in the Commission on Elections voters list.
On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Governor of Zambonag Sibugay Province for the May
10, 2010 elections. Erasmo promptly filed a petition to deny due
course of to cancel Jalosjos COC on the ground that the latter made
material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with
(1) the requirements of R.A 9225 and (2) the one-year residency
requirement of the Local Government Code.
After hearing, the Second Division of the Comelec ruled that,
while Jalosjos had regained Philippine citizenship by complying with
the requirements of R.A 9225, he failed to prove the residency
requirement for gubernatorial candidate. He failed to present ample
proof of a Bona Fide intention to establish domicile in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. On motion for reconsideration, the Comelec en
banc affirmed the Second division decision.
Acting on Jalosjos prayer for the issuance of temporary
restraining order, the Court resolved on May 7, 2010 to issue a status
quo ante order, enjoining the Comelec from enforcing its February 11,
2010 decision pending further orders. Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the
election and was proclaimed winner of the 2010 gubernatorial race.
Issue:
WON the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed
to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his
domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay
Rulings:
The requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile,
meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular
place but must also have personal in such place coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.
Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every
person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once
established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c)
a person can have but one domicile at a time.
The COMELEC appears hasty in concluding that Jalosjos
failed to prove that he successfully changed his domicile to Zambonga
Sibugay. When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live
with his brother in Zamboanga, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with
intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship and renounced his allegiance to that country. In
addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. It is sufficient that he
should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a
friend or relative. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things:
actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his
domicile. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in holding otherwise.
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002
TOPIC: Venue of Estate Proceedings
FACTS:
Petitioner and Private Respondent are the only sons of late Ignacio
Tayag and Andrea Jao who died intestate. Herein, respondent filed a
petition for issuance of letter of administration before RTC of Quezon
City, place where the decedent resides at the time of death. Petitioner
moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper
venue. He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon
City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The
decedent’s actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his
late mother used to run and operate a bakery.
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which
he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)
In the case at hand, since the decedent resides at Quezon City at the
time of his death, then Quezon City is the proper venue to have the
estate proceedings.

The RTC dismissed the petition of the petitioner which was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the current petition.

ISSUE:

Which venue has the jurisdiction to the estate proceedings? Quezon or

Pampanga?

RULINGS:

Quezon.

The law provides that, if the decedent is an inhabitant of the

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
San Luis vs. San Luis,
514 SCRA 294, February 06, 2007
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United
States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June
20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children
of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.
Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed
that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she
was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
The trial court dismissed the petition on the basis that venue was
improperly laid since at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly
elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the
petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati
City. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the venue was properly laid.
RULING:
Yes, the venue was proper. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which
he resides at the time of his death."
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence"
of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. While petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also
maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate.