Buaya vs.
Polo The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the
G.R. No. L-75079 ; January 26, 1989
Facts: Solemnidad Buaya is an insurance agent of private complainant of
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation. Private respondent Buaya, was
authorized to transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the
corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the private respondent. Under
the terms of the agency agreement, the petitioner is required to make a
periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit premium
collections to the principal office of private respondent located in the City of
Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted on petitioner's account which
showed a shortage. She was charged with estafa before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the Regional Trial
Court of Manila has no jurisdiction over the offense since the collection was
done in Cebu City and the offense complained of is purely civil in nature. The
RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
Issues:
1) Whether or not RTC Manila has jurisdiction over the case.
2) Whether of not the offense complained is purely civil in nature, hence
warrants the dismissal of the criminal case.
Ruling: The Supreme Court reiterated that the averments in the complaint or
information characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court before
which it must be tried. Thus, in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court
in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment
provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the
complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by
the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the
court may make after the trial.
Further, Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all
criminal - prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of
the essential elements thereof took place.
period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines .
. . ." Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional
Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction.
Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be
prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of the crime
took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to
the offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of business
and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance
premiums she collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private
respondent in Manila.
As to the second issue, the contention that the subject matter is purely civil in
nature, suffice it to state that evidentiary facts on this point have still to be
proved.
Buaya v. Polo
Facts: Solemnidad M. Buaya ("Buaya") was an agent of Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation (CBIC). Audit of her account revealed that she failed
to remit insurance premiums amounting to Php 358,850.72. Consequently, she
was charged with estafa before Branch XIX of the Manila Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The information against her states that, "That during the period 1980 to
June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country
Bankers Insurance Corporation..."
Buaya filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. Her motion for
reconsideration being similarly denied, Buaya filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Petitioner
Buaya argues that the funds she allegedly embezzled were collected in
Cebu City. Hence, the Manila RTC had no jurisdiction to try the case.
Issue: Whether or not the Manila RTC had jurisdiction to try the case.
 Held: Yes. The information filed against Buaya alleges that the crime was
committed "in the City of Manila, Philippines". Moreover, damage to CBIC, an
essential element of estafa, took place in Manila.
Ratio: In the case of People v. Mission (87 Phil. 641), the Supreme Court held
that the jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make
after trial. In relation to this, Rule 110, Section 14 (a) of the Revised Rules of
Court provides that in criminal prosecutions, the action must be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense or any of
the essential elements of the same took place.
Moreover, estafa is a continuing or transitory crime which may be prosecuted
in any place where any of its essential elements took place. Damage or
prejudice to the offended party is an essential element of estafa. In this case,
the damage or prejudice done to the CBIC took place in its principal office,
which is in Manila.
Buaya vs. RTC Judge Polo
Nature: instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside the orders of
denial issued by RTC Manila, Branch XIX on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss and
Motion for Reconsideration The Motion to Dismiss was anchored on the
following grounds
o (a) the court has no jurisdiction over the case and
o (b) the subject matter is purely civil in nature.
Facts:
· Solemnidad M. Buaya was an insurance agent who was authorized to
transact and collect the premiums for CBIC.
· Buaya is required to account and remit premium collections to the
principal office of private respondent located in the City of Manila.
· An audit showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72.
· She was charged with estafa before the RTC-Manila.
· She filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by respondent Judge. The
subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied.
· Buaya:
o Manila RTC has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and
necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu
City.
o Subject matter is purely civil in nature because the fact that CBIC
separately filed a civil case involving the same alleged misappropriated
amount.
· CBIC:
o Denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character,
cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal
until final judgment or order rendered (See. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
o Procedure to be followed is to enter a Plea, go to trial and if the decision
is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment (Newsweek
Inc. v. IAC)
Issue/Held:
1. WON denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in
character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject
of appeal until final judgment or order rendered?
· As a general rule, YES, but there are exceptions because it would be
unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal of a trial if
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the
court of proper venue.
2. WON the Manila RTC has jurisdiction?
Allegations of complaint as basis
·
YES. Jurisdiction of court is based on the COMPLAINT.
· Averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be
prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried (Balite v. People).
· The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations
of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make
after the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).
Essential Elements of a crime
· Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court:
o In all criminal — prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or
any of the essential elements thereof took place.
· Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which
may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of the
crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or
prejudice to the offended party. The failure to remit the insurance premiums
she collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private allege that the crime c h a r g e d o r a n y o f i t s e s s e n t i a l
respondent in Manila. ingredients was committed in Quezon City. The only
reference to Quezon City in the complaint -affidavit is that it is
Dispositive: Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. Remanded to RTC. where respondent resides.

Campanano, Jr vs. Datuin (Ana) October 17, 2007 – J. Carpio-Morales Respondent's complaint-affidavit was thus properly dismissed by the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City for lack of jurisdiction. N o t e : I n a n y e v e n t ,
FACTS: the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not make out
1. Datuin (respondent) was charged by Seishin International Corporation, a c l e a r probable cause of incriminati ng innocent person under
represented by its President, Mr. David Campanano, Jr. with the crime of Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. Case dismissed!
Estafa for violation of BP22.
Additional Info:
2. The RTC of Pasig convicted Datuin of the crime
c h a r g e d a n d t h e d e c i s i o n l a t e r became final and executor. Art. 363. Incriminating Innocent Person. — Any person who, by any act not
constituting perjury, shall directly incriminate or impute to an innocent person
3.Later, he claimed that the complaint of Seishin International Corporation the commission of a crime, shall be punished by arresto menor. (Revised
against him was "false, unfounded and malicious" in light of newly Penal Code)
discovered evidence (cashvoucher which allegedly proves that he paid
for the 2 road rollers P200,000 in cash),respondent filed a complaint for Elements:
Incriminating Against Innocent Persons, punishable under Article 363 of the
Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City 1. That the offender performs an act;
against petitioner and a certain Yasunobu Hirota.The City Prosecutor of
QC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the office has no 2. That by such act he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person
jurisdiction since the original case of Estafa was filed in the RTC of Pasig. the commission of a crime
Datuin elevated the case to the DOJ but it was dismissed as well. However, in
the Court of A p p e a l s , t h e d e c i s i o n w a s r e v e r s e d a n d t h e 3. That such act does not constitute perjury (Campanano, Jr. vs Datuin, G.R.
c a s e w a s r e m a n d e d t o t h e C i t y Prosecutor of QC for further No. 172142, October 17, 2007).
investigation.

ISSUE: Does the City Prosecutor of Quezon City have jurisdiction over
the criminal case filed by Datuin?

HELD: No. For purposes of determining the place where the criminal action is
to be instituted, Section1 5 ( a ) o f R u l e 1 1 0 o f t h e R e v i s e d R u l e s o n
C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e o f 2 0 0 0 p r o v i d e s t h a t "[s]ubject to existing
laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory w h e r e t h e o f f e n s e w a s c o m m i t t e d
Or w h e r e a n y o f i t s essential ingredients occurred." The complaint-
affidavit for incriminating innocent person filed by respondent with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on August 28, 2003 does not
 FIRST DIVISION entitled Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, Complainants-Petitioners, versus
The Secretary of Justice, et al., Respondents.
WILSON CHUA, RENITA CHUA, THE G.R. No. 163797
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are:
CITY PROSECUTOR OF LUCENA CITY,
Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, are the owners of
Petitioners, Present: Padillo Lending Investor engaged in the money lending business in Lucena
City. Their niece, Marissa Padillo-Chua, served as the firms manager. Marissa is
- versus - married to Wilson Chua, brother of Renita Chua, herein petitioners.

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, One of Marissas functions was to evaluate and recommend loan
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, applications for approval by respondents. Once a loan application had
CORONA, been approved, respondents would authorize the release of a check signed
by them or their authorized signatory, a certain Mila Manalo.
RODRIGO PADILLO and MARIETTA AZCUNA, and
PADILLO, Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was conducted. It was
GARCIA, JJ. found that Marissa was engaged in illegal activities. Some of the borrowers
Respondents. whose loan applications she recommended for approval were fictitious and
Promulgated: their signatures on the checks were spurious. Marissas modus operandi was to
alter the name of the payee appearing on the check by adding another
April 24, 2007 name as an alternative payee. This alternative payee would then personally
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------x encash the check with the drawee bank. The cash amounts received were
turned over to Marissa or her husband Wilson for deposit in their personal
DECISION accounts. To facilitate encashment, Marissa would sign the check to signify to
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: the bank that she personally knew the alternative payee. The alternative
payees included employees of Wilson or his friends. The total amount
embezzled reached P7 million.

Respondents filed complaints against petitioners and several others

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Lucena City. In turn, the NBI
the Amended Decision1[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 15, 2003 forwarded their complaints to the Office of the City Prosecutor, same city, for
reversing its Decision2[2] dated January 24, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 62401, preliminary investigation, docketed as I.S. Nos. 98-1487, 98-1621, 98-1629, and
98-1605.

In a Resolution dated March 18, 1999, Lucena City Prosecutor Romeo

A. Datu (now retired), disposed of the complaints as follows:
 WHEREFORE, after preliminary investigation, finding
sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of a prima facie case of
Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Documents, let an
Information be filed against Marissa Padillo-Chua, Wilson Chua,
Renita Chua, and several John Does, the same to be filed with
the Regional Trial Court.
The case against the other respondents, namely, Perla
Correa, Giovani Guia, Emmanuel Garcia, Zenaida Nantes,
Cherrylyn Mendoza, Rosalie Mazo, Fernando Loreto, Cesar
Salamat, Antonio Bana, Isidro Manalo, Jr., Ramon Villanueva,
Alexander Asiado, Peter Tan, Jun Tan, Flaviano Evaso, Edgar
Sebastian, Crisencio Asi, Roberto Ong and Gregorio Flancia is
provisionally dismissed.
Forthwith, the City Prosecutor filed an Information for estafa against
Marissa, Wilson, and Renita with the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City,
docketed therein as Criminal Cse No. 99-182. It was raffled of to Branch 59.
Believing that a more serious offense should have been charged
against petitioners, respondents interposed an appeal to the Secretary of
Justice who issued a Resolution dated January 3, 2000, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution is modified. The
City Prosecution Office of Lucena City is hereby directed to file
the Information of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents defined and penalized
under Article 315 par. 1(b) in relation to Articles 171 and 172 (58
counts) against respondent Marissa Padillo-Chua and to cause
the withdrawal of the Information of estafa through falsification
of commercial documents against respondents Wilson Chua
and Renita Chua. Report to us the action taken within ten (10)
days from receipt hereof.
The Secretary of Justice found that the participation of Wilson Chua in
the commission of the crime was not clearly established by the evidence.
There was no showing that he abused the trust and confidence of
respondents when two (2) of the questioned checks were deposited in his
bank account. As to Renita Chua, the Secretary of Justice found no proof of
conspiracy between her and Marissa.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied with
finality by the Secretary of Justice on November 6, 2000.
Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62401. They alleged that in issuing the
Resolution dated January 3, 2000 directing the Prosecutors Office of Lucena
City to file the corresponding Information only against Marissa, the Secretary
of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion. They prayed that the Court
of Appeals order the Lucena City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information in
Criminal Case No. 99-182 and instead, file several Informations against
petitioners.
On January 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
dismissing the petition, holding that there was no conspiracy among the
petitioners.
Respondents seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration. Revisiting
its Decision, the Court of Appeals, on May 15, 2003, promulgated its
Amended Decision granting respondents motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, the Court orders the DOJ, City
Prosecutor, Lucena City to include Wilson Chua and Renita
Chua as accused in the said case.
SO ORDERED.
In reversing itself, the Court of Appeals found that it overlooked certain
facts and circumstances which, if considered, would establish probable
cause against Wilson and Renita. The Court of Appeals identified these facts
to be: (1) Marissas consistent practice of depositing checks with altered
names of payees to the respective accounts of Wilson Chua and Renita
Chua; (2) considering that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife, it can
be inferred that one knows the transactions of the other; and (3) Wilson had
full knowledge of the unlawful activities of Marissa. This is supported by the
affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara dated November 26, 1998.
Wilson Chua and Renita Chua filed their motion for reconsideration of
the Amended Decision, but the Court of Appeals denied the same on May
28, 2004.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners contend that the Court of
Appeals erred in compelling the Secretary of Justice to include in the
Information Wilson and Renita.
Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, partly provides that All criminal actions either commenced by a
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of a public prosecutor. The rationale for this rule is that since a criminal
offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it necessarily follows that
a representative of the State shall direct and control the prosecution
thereof.3[3] In Suarez v. Platon,4[4] this Court described the prosecuting
officer as:
[T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in
a peculiar and very definite sense a servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer.
Having been vested by law with the control of the prosecution of
criminal cases, the public prosecutor, in the exercise of his functions, has the
power and discretion to: (a) determine whether a prima facie case exists;5[5]
(b) decide which of the conflicting testimonies should be believed free from
the interference or control of the offended party;6[6] and (c) subject only to
the right against self-incrimination, determine which witnesses to present in
court.7[7] Given his discretionary powers, a public prosecutor cannot be
compelled to file an Information where he is not convinced that the
evidence before him would warrant the filing of an action in court. For while
he is bound by his oath of office to prosecute persons who, according to
complainants evidence, are shown to be guilty of a crime, he is likewise duty-
bound to protect innocent persons from groundless, false, or malicious
prosecution.8[8]
We must stress, however, that the public prosecutors exercise of his
discretionary powers is not absolute.
First, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is subject to appeal
to the Secretary of Justice who, under the Administrative Code of 1987, as
amended, exercises control and supervision over the investigating
prosecutor. Thus, the Secretary of Justice may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify
the ruling of said prosecutor. In special cases, the public prosecutors decision
may even be reversed or modified by the Office of the President.9[9]
 Second, the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, on the ground that he committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.10[10]
Here, we note that the Court of Appeals, on motion for
reconsideration by respondents, ruled that the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving that only Marissa should be
charged.
We agree.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.11[11] We have carefully
examined the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated January 3, 2000
wherein he ruled that there was no probable cause to hold Wilson Chua and
Renita Chua for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. As
found by the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice either overlooked or
patently ignored the following circumstances: (1) Marissas practice of
depositing checks, with altered names of payees, in the respective accounts
of Wilson and Renita Chua; (2) the fact that Wilson and Marissa are husband
and wife makes it difficult to believe that one has no idea of the transactions
entered into by the other; and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara dated
November 26, 1998 confirming that Wilson had knowledge of Marissas illegal
activities.
Indeed, as we ruled in Sanchez v. Demetriou,12[12] not even the
Supreme Court can order the prosecution of a person against whom the
prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie
case. The only possible exception to this rule is where there is an unmistakable
showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, as in this
case.
Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in directing the City Prosecutor
of Lucena City to include Wilson and Renita Chua in the Information for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Amended Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62401. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES JULY 14, 2008NACHURA, J.SUBJECT AREA:
Estoppel by laches
NATURE:
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. The RTC found hi m gui l ty. I n hi s ap p eal b efor e the C A,
the p eti ti oner , f or the fi r s t ti me, q ues ti oned RTCs jurisdiction on the
case. The C A i n affi r mi ng the dec i s i on of the RTC, r ul ed that the
pri nci pl e of es top p el b y l ac hes has already precluded the petitioner
from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC—the trial went on for 4 y e a r s
with the petitioner actively participating therein and
w i t h o u t h i m e v e r r a i s i n g t h e jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner,
for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter may b e r ai sed at any ti me even for the fi r s t ti me on
appeal . As undue del ay i s fur ther ab s ent herein, the principle of
laches will not be applicable. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON peti ti oner ’s fai l ur e to rai se the i ssue of juri sdi c ti on the alleged conspirators should be held individually responsible for their own
duri ng the tri al of t hi s c as e, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine respective acts. Accordingly, appellant’s criminal liability in this case must be
laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue judged on the basis of his own acts as established by the quantum of proof
was immediately raised in petitioner’s appeal to the CA required in criminal cases.

HELD: No. RATIO: Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as HEIRS OF JANE HONRALES vs. JONATHAN HONRALES. G.R. No. 182651.August
a general rule, the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the 25, 2010.
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only FACTS: Respondent Jonathan Honorales was charged of parricide when she
in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.Laches shot her wife, Jane Honorales. Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay then issued
should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, a recommendation of withdrawing the parricide and instead respondent be
that i s,l ac k of j uri sdi c ti on mus t hav e been rai sed so belatedl y as charged only of reckless imprudence resulting to parricide.
to warrant the p r es ump ti on that th e party entitled to assert it had
abandoned or declined to assert it. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack While the motion to withdraw the information was still pending, a new
of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the information for reckless imprudence was filed with the MTC against
proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an respondent. The heirs meanwhile filed for a petition for review with the Office
exceptional case because of the presence of laches. In the case at bar, the of the President for the downgrading of the offense. While the motion to
factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present. Petitioner withdraw was still pending, respondent pleaded guilty and was found guilty
Atty.Regal ado, after the r ec ei p t of the Court of Appeal s with the MTC for reckless imprudence. He also filed a motion to dismiss his
resol uti on fi ndi ng her gui l ty of c onte mpt,promptl y fi l ed a Moti on parricide case with the RTC citing that his arraignment and judgment as
for Rec onsi der ati on as s ai li ng the said c ourt’s juri sdic tion based grounds for dismissal.
on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the
appellate court’s directive to show cause why she should not be cited for Heirs then filed a certiorari with the CA as the RC judge granted respondent's
contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be motion to withdraw arguing that an appeal was still pending. CA denied the
considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to certiorari and cited that double jeopardy would attach.
take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to
disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that Petitioner argues that MTC did not acquire jurisdiction and it remained in the
impelled her to comply. RTC. Also, double jeopardy does not apply as the heirs were not notified of
the proceedings in the MTC. No conviction was also held in the RTC.
PEOPLE V. ROBERT FIGUEROA G.R. NO. 134056
ISSUE: Whether respondent's double jeopardy is violated.
Accused was convicted of violating Sec 14-A of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
972 – Unauthorized manufacture of regulated drugs. He contends that since RULING: The SC held that respondent's double jeopardy was not violated. The
his alleged co-conspirator was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence to SC said that he RTC acted with grave abuse when they granted the motion
prove that she conspired with him, he should likewise be acquitted. to withdraw without making an independent assessment of the merits of the
case and the evidence on record. Also, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the
HELD: Once a conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and case as there was still a case pending in the RTC.
each of the conspirators is liable for the crimes committed by the other
conspirators. It follows then that if the prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, With regards with the double jeopardy, there was absence of judgment
rendered by a competent court which is an essential element of double
jeopardy.
Heirs of Jane Honrales v. Honrales; GR No. 182651 (2010)
FACTS: Jane Honrales was fatally shot by her husband, respondent Jonathan
Honrales. An information was filed against respondent before the RTC of
Manila. The RTC issued an Order granting leave to conduct the
reinvestigation and authorizing 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Biglang-Awa to
reinvestigate the case. The heirs of the victim moved before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila for the inhibition from conducting the
reinvestigation and praying that the case be remanded to the court for trial.
Prosecutor Rebagay recommended the withdrawal of the information for
parricide and the filing of an information for reckless imprudence resulting in
parricide in its stead. She subsequently filed with the RTC a motion to
withdraw the information for parricide. While the Motion to Withdraw
Information was still pending, an Information for Reckless Imprudence
resulting in Parricide was filed against respondent before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Determined to have respondent prosecuted for
parricide, petitioner heirs filed a petition for review with the DOJ questioning
the downgrading of the offense, but it was dismissed. Petitioner Heirs
appealed the dismissal of their petitions to the Office of the President, which
the latter still dismissed. Judge Barrios issued an Order granting the withdrawal
of the Information for parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest issued
against respondent. Petitioner Heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
assailing the orders issued by the RTC through Judge Barrios. The CA dismissed
the petition for certiorari.
Though it found that Judge Barrios failed to make an independent
assessment of the merits of the case and thus abdicated his judicial power
and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of Justice, it ruled that the
remand of the case to the RTC would serve no useful purpose since it may
result in the reopening of the parricide case which would violate
respondent’s constitutional right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whetherornottheremandoftheparricidecaseto thetrialcourtwil violaterespondent’s
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
RULING: No, it will not violate respondent’sright againstdoublejeopardy.UnderSection 7 of
Rule117
of the Rules of Court, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are
present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the
same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted
or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information
for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide while the criminal case for
parricide was still pending before the RTC. In Dioquino v. Cruz, Jr., we held
that once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the Information is filed,
it is there retained. Therefore, as the offense of reckless imprudence resulting
in parricide was included in the charge for intentional parricide pending
before the RTC, the MeTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the criminal case
filed before it, the RTC having retained jurisdiction over the offense to the
exclusion of all other courts. The requisite that the judgment be rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent.
People of the Philippines and Heirs of Jane Honrales vs. Jonathan Honrales
G.R. No. 182657 August 25, 2010
Facts: Jane Honrales (Jane) was fatally shot be her husband Jonathan
Honrales (Jonathan) which caused his immediate death. An information for
parricide was filed against Jonathan in RTC. Then prosecutor moved for the
withdrawal of the Information for parricide. During the pendency of the
Motion to Withdraw the Information, an Information for reckless imprudence
resulting to parricide was filed against Jonathan in the MeTC. Thereafter
Jonathan was arraigned in the MeTC and plead guilty to the offense (reckless
imprudence resulting to parricide) and moved for the dismissal of the the
crime of parricide in the RTC which was thereafter granted by the court.
Issue: Whether or not Jonathan would be put on double jeopardy in case the
parricide case would be reopened.
Ruling: No. The court ruled that for double jeopardy to exist the following
requisites should be present:
1. a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;
2. the first jeopardy has been validly terminated;
3. a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first;
A first jeopardy attaches only:
1. after a valid indictment;
2. before a competent court;
3. after arraignment;
4. when a valid plea has been entered;
5. when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case is
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
The MeTC took cognizance of the Information for reckless imprudence
resulting in parricide while the criminal case for parricide was still pending
before the RTC. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the
Information is filed, it is there retained. Therefore, the MeTC has no jurisdiction
over the case filed before it since the RTC retained its jurisdiction over the
offense to the exclusion of other courts. The judgment rendered by the MeTC
is null and void for not acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
Lavides vs. CA
FACTS: Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under
R.A. No. 7610 (an act providing for stronger deterrence and special
protection against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination, providing
penalties for its violation, and other purposes). His arrest was made without a
warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. It appears
that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported
to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by
petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioner’s room at the
Metropolitan Hotel in
Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police
received reports of petitioner’s activities.
When petitioner opened the door, the police saw him with Lorelie, who was
wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him.
Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the
arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for
violation of Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed against petitioner.
petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on
an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of
the
Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under
the Law on Which He is Charged.
nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the
same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children
No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate
applications for bail in the nine cases.
TRIAL COURT: 2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the above-entitled case.
He is hereby granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for
each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following
conditions:
a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of
appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and must
always be present at the hearings of these cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail
bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants
for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall
proceed to trial in absentia;
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997
stands; and
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the
arraignment to enable this Court to immediately acquire
 jurisdiction over the accused;
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him. Pending
resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment
scheduled on May 23, 1997. He filed a motion in which he prayed that the
amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the
same be done prior to his arraignment.
the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner’s motions to reduce bail
bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly,
petitioner was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges
against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the
total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the May 16, 1997
order and the "hold-departure" order of April 10, 1997. The pre-trial
conference was set on June 7, 1997.
The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to
pass upon the validity of condition (d) on the ground that the issue had
become moot and academic. Petitioner takes issue with the Court of
Appeals with respect to its treatment of condition (d) of the May 16, 1997
order of the trial court which makes petitioner’s arraignment a prerequisite to
the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void and
that his arraignment was also invalid because it was held pursuant to such
invalid condition.
ISSUE: WON the condition is void and the arraignment invalid.
HELD: CONDITION IS VOID.
bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and
the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the
accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of
petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his
presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule
114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is
that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so
required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the
presence of the accused at the arraignment is required
to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to
place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to
quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash
can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing
of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be
released on bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or
information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
The condition imposed in the trial court’s order of May 16, 1997 that the
accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be
present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule
114. For another condition of bail under Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure
of the accused to appear at the trial without justification despite due
notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express waiver of his
right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial
shall proceed in absentia." Jjsc
Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the
accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the
proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence
or of guilt, (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes,
and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in
which case the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At
such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be
waived.
IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT THE ARRAIGNMENT OF PETITIONER ON MAY 23,
1997 WAS ALSO INVALID. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the
arraignment did not emanate from the invalid condition that "approval of
the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without
such a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In
sum, although the condition for the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his
arraignment and the subsequent proceedings against him are valid.
Miranda et al. v. Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006
Crim Pro - Jurisdiction
Facts: On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon,
Isabela which were later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the
witness protection program.
Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including
SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to
the RTC of Manila. The RTC convicted the accused and sentenced them two
counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be
arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC
acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and
identified the petitioners as the ones responsible for the death of the victims,
so, Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting
Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners
and SPO2 Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In
the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the
petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the urgent motion on the ground
that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion
cannot be properly heard by the court.
Issues: Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused.
Held. No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
Jurisdiction of the Court. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody
of law over the body of the accused.
Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the
law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the
Court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other relief sought by the dependant where by mere
application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the defence of lack of jurisdiction
over the person accused.
Miranda vs. TuliaoG.R. # 158763, March 31, 2006
Facts: On Mar. 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela
which were later identified as the bodiesof Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao,
son of the private respondent Virgilio Tulio who is now under the
witnessprotection program.2 informations for murder were filed against the 5
police officer including SPO2 Maderal in RTC of Santiago City. The venue was
later transferred to Manila. RTC Manila convicted all the accused and
sentencedthem 2 counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who
was yet to be arraigned at that time, being atlarge. Upon automatic review,
the SC acquitted the four accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.In
Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and
identified the herein petitionerMiranda and 4 others responsible for the death
of the victims. Respondent Tuliao then filed a criminal complaintfor murder
against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumalian issued warrant of
arrest against the petitionersand SPO2 Maderal.Petitioners filed an urgent
motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall
orquash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge
Tumalian noted the absence of petitionersand issued a Joint order denying
the said urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard
by the court. The petitioners appealed theresolution of the Public prosecutor
to the DOJ.The new Presiding Judge named Judge Anghad took over the
case and issued a Joint Order reversing theJoint Order of Judge Tumalian. He
also ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest. Respondent Tulia filed
apetition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for TRO
seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad fromfurther proceeding of the case and
seeking to nullify the Joint Orders of the said Judge. The SC issued a
resolutiongranting the prayer. Notwithstanding the said resolution, Judge
Anghad issued a Joint Order dismissing theinformation against the
petition.Respondent Tuliao filed a motion to cite Judge Anghad in contempt.
The SC referred the said motion tothe CA. The CA rendered the assailed
decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the
criminalcases in the RTC of Santiago City as well as the issuance of warrant of
arrest. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does
not submit his person to the jurisdictionof the court
Held: Petition is dismissed and cost against the petitioners.It has been held
that an accused cannot seek judicial relief is he does not submit his person to
the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the accused can be acquired
either through compulsory process, such aswarrant of arrest or through his
voluntary appearance, such as when he surrender to the police or to the
court. It isonly when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his
person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court. Since,
petitioner were not arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty, they cannot
seek judicialrelief.
Mondiguing vs Abad G.R. No. L-41313 06 November 1975
Facts: Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are two of the ten defendants
accused of double murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder. As a
result of that incident, Governor Gualberto Lumauig of Ifugao was wounded
and his executive assistant and his driver were killed. Mondiguing and
Dunuan filed a petition to transfer the venue of the case to Baguio City or
Quezon City. They claimed that they could not expect a fair and impartial
trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because Judge Francisco Men Abad of the Court of
First Instance of that province is a protege’ of Governor Lumauig and his
brother, former Congressman Romulo Lumauig, and because their witnesses
would be afraid to testify for fear of harassment and reprisals. The petitioners
further claimed that, as may be inferred from previous incidents recounted in
the petition, their lives and the lives of their witnesses and lawyers would be in
grave danger in Ifugao. In Paredes vs. Abad, L-36927-28, April 15, 1974, 56
SCRA 522, 534, disqualified Judge Abad from trying the electoral protests filed
by Crescencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan against Gualberto Lumauig and
John Langbayan. In that case it was alleged that Judge Abad was a political
leader of Governor Lumauig and was recommended to his present position
by the Lumauig brothers. .
Issue: Whether or not the plea for a change of venue for trial is justified
Decision: Petition accepted; hostile sentiment against the accused at the
place of trial is a justification for transfer of venue
Mondiguing vs Abad (1975)
22 Oct 2017
FACTS: Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are accused of double
murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder in Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Ifugao Province. The case was filed in connection with an
ambuscade, that, as a result of that incident, Governor Gualberto Lumauig
of Ifugao was wounded and his exec. assistant and his driver were killed. Up
to this time the accused in that case have not been arraigned. .
Mondiguing and Dunuan filed a petition to transfer the venue of the case to
Baguio City or Quezon City. They claimed that they could not expect a fair
and impartial trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because the Judge of the CFI of that
province is a protege’ of the then Governor and his brother, former
Congressman, and because their witnesses would be afraid to testify for fear
of harassment and reprisals. The petitioners further claimed that their lives and
the lives of their witnesses and lawyers would be in grave danger because of
the tensions and antagonisms spawned by the case and the political rivalry
between the Lumauig and Mondiguing factions. (The accused, George
Bayucca was killed on October 28, 1970 and Alipio Mondiguing resigned as
mayor of Banaue and took refuge in Baguio City). .
Respondent presiding Judge Abad disputed the correctness or truth of the
grounds on the change of venue and prayed that the petition be dismissed.
He said that, if there would be bias on his part, he would be biased in favor of
the People of the Philippines since the charged was not “committed
personally against” the Governor. However, this statement is not correct since
the governor is one of the victims mentioned in the information.
The fact also, is that, previously, the Court has disqualified Judge Abad from
trying the electoral protests filed against the governor since allegedly the
judge was a political leader of the Governor and was recommended to his
present position by the latter.
ISSUE: Whether Mondiguing’s plea for a change of venue is justified.
RULING: The petition is meritorious.
A change of the place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for
whimsical or flimsy reasons. “The interests of the public require that, to secure
the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to
prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be,
where he committed his crime.
The Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering “a change of venue or
place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice” (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the
Constitution). It “possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the
trial and disposition of a case pending in a CFI be transferred to another CFI
within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand,
and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court
that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and
impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice”.
A change of venue was ordered by this Court in a case where it was shown
that the accused might be liquidated by his enemies in the place where the
trial was originally scheduled to be held.
In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a miscarriage of justice
and considering that his life would be in danger if he were to be tried in
Lagawe, Ifugao, he should be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in the City of
Baguio. Petition is granted.
Pacoy v. Cajigal September 28, 2007
FACTS: · SSGT. Jose Pacoy seeks to annul the order of Presiding Judge
Afable Cajigal of RTC 68 of Camiling Tarlac. · On July 4, 2002, an information
for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner for shooting and killing his
commanding officer, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with an armalite rifle. Upon
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. · However, on the same day
and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order,
likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct
and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public
respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. · The
prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word Homicide and
instead wrote the word Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph
of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that
of the original Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of
the victims name from Escuita to Escueta. · Petitioner was to be re-
arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the
ground that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that
his Homicide case had been terminated without his express consent, resulting
in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the
amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a
plea of not guilty. · Respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. The MR
was likewise denied. Thus, petitioner went straight to SC and filed a petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in amending the Information after
petitioner had already entered in plea to the charge of information for
homicide â NO
HELD: · In the present case, the change of the offense charged from
Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial
amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee. · While the
amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows
that the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the
opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of
word Homicide and its replacement by the word Murder. There was no
change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended
Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the
original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the
act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and
preamble from Homicide to Murder as purely formal. · Section 14, Rule 110
also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the
accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not
prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an
accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is
whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood,
would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any
evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint
or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the
amended Information are identical with those of the original Information for
Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the
case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense
of petitioner. Amendment Substitution · May involve either formal or
substantial changes · Necessarily involves a substantial change from the
original charge · Amendment before plea has been entered can be
effected without leave of court · substitution of information must be with
leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed · Where the
amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; · In substitution of
information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused
has to plead anew to the new information · An amended information refers
to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge,
hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been
taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original
information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy
· Substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a
different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the
original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy
Pacoy vs. Hon. Cajigal (GR 157472)
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in
cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the
amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether
the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint
or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made;
and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to
the complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory
portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original
Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution’s
theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights
or defense of petitioner.
xxxxx
Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the
offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused
cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the
information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of
the charge and a substitution of a new information charging the proper
offense. Section 14 does not apply to a secondinformation, which involves
the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements
or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
a part of those constituting the latter.
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent
judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the
dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the same original
information that was amended by merely crossing out the word Homicide
and writing the word Murder, instead, which showed that there was no
dismissal of the homicide case.
Palana v. People, GR No. 149995, September 28, 2007
Facts:: On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of BP 22. Private
complainant Alex B.Carlos testified that sometime in eptem!er 19"#, petitioner and his wife
!orrowed mone$ from him in the amount of P%9&,&&&.&&. 'o secure the pa$ment of the
loan, petitioner issued a postdated chec( for the same amount in favor of the complainant.
)owever, when the chec( was presented for pa$ment, it was dishonored !$ the !an( for
insufficienc$ of funds. u!se*uent demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to ma(e good
the said dishonored chec(.Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him !$ private
complainant was an investment !$ the latter who was his !usiness partner. )e argued that the
su!+ect chec( was not issued in eptem!er 19"# to guarantee the pa$ment of a loan since
his chec(ing account was opened onl$ on ecem!er 1, 19"#. )e claimed that private
complainant ca+oled him to issue a chec( in his favor allegedl$ to !e shown to a textile
supplier who would provide the partnership with the necessar$ raw materials. Petitioner
alleged that when the chec( was issued sometime in -e!ruar$ 19"", complainant (new that
the same was not funded.
ss!es:
1/0hether or not petitioner was guilt$ of violation of BP 22. 2/0hether or not
the egional 'rial Court has +urisdiction over the case.
R!l"n#: On the first issue, after a careful review of the records, the upreme Court sustains
petitioner s conviction for violation of BP 22. 3ach element of the offense was dul$ proven !$ the
prosecution. Petitioner admitted that at the time he issued the su!+ect chec(, he (new that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee !an( for pa$ment of such chec(.
Conse*uentl$, when the chec( was presented for pa$ment, it was dishonored !$ the drawee !an(
for insufficienc$ of funds. 'hereafter, he received demand letters to pa$ the amount of the chec(
from private complainant !ut he did not compl$ with it. 'he issue as to whether the amount of the
su!+ect chec( represents the amount of the mone$ loaned !$ private complainantto
petitioner or as an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual *uestion involving the
credi!ilit$ of witnesses. On the second issue, petitioner s argument that it is the 4'C and
not the 'C which has +urisdiction over the case pursuant to .A. #591 is without
merit. 6t is horn!oo( doctrine that +urisdiction to tr$ a criminal action is
determined !$ the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and not
during the arraignment of the accused. 'he 6nformation charging petitioner with violation of
BP 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law determinative of
+urisdiction is BP 129 which provides 73xclusive original +urisdiction over all offenses punisha!le
with imprisonment of not exceeding four $ears and two months, or a fine of not more than
four thousand pesos, or !oth such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposa!le
accessor$ or other penalties, including the civil lia!ilit$ arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of (ind, nature, value or amount thereof8 Provided, however, that in
offenses involving damage to propert$ through criminal negligence the$ shall have exclusive
original +urisdiction where the imposa!le fine does not exceed twent$ thousand
pesos. :iolation of BP 22 is punisha!le with imprisonment of not less than ;& da$s !ut not
morethan one $ear or !$ a fine of not less than !ut not more than dou!le the amount of the
chec( which fine shall in no case exceed P2&&,&&&.&&, or !oth fine and imprisonment at
the discretion of the court. 6n the present case, the fine imposa!le is P2&&,&&&.&& hence,
the egional 'rial Court properl$ ac*uired +urisdiction over the case. 'he 4etropolitan 'rial Court
could not ac*uire +urisdiction over the criminal action !ecause its +urisdiction is onl$ for
offenses punisha!le with a fine of not more than P<,&&&.&&. 6ndeed, .A. =o. #591 contains
retroactive provisions. )owever, these onl$ appl$ to civil cases that have not $et reached the
pre>trial stage. =either from an express proviso nor !$ implication can it !e construed that .A.
=o. #591 has retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided !$ the egional
'rial Courts prior to its effectivit$.
Palanavs.People(G.r.No.149995,September28,2007)
FACTS: On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22
in an Informationwhich reads as follows: That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality
of Makati, Metro Manila,Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,
ISIDROPABLITOM.PALANA did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly make
or draw and issue to Alex B. Carlos toapply on account or for the value the check in the
amount of P590,000.00.Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September
1987, petitioner and hiswi fe b or r owed m oney fr om hi m i n the a mount of
P590,000.00 . To s e c ur e the p ayment of the l oan , petitioner issued a
postdated check for the same amount in favor of the complainant. However,
when thecheck was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of
funds. Subsequentdemand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make good the said dishonored
check.
Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was an investment
by thelatter who was his business partner. He argued that the subject check
was not issued in September 1987to guarantee the payment of a loan since
his checking account was opened only on December 1, 1987.He claimed
that private complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his favor allegedly
to be shown to atextile supplier who would provide the partnership with the
necessary raw materials. Petitioner allegedthat when the check was issued
sometime in February 1988, complainant knew that the same was
notfunded.After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on
September 23, 1997 a Decisionfinding petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner
appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appealswhich affirmed the trial
court’s decision in toto. Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
ISSUE/S:WON petitioner was guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. WON the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING: On the first issue, after a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioner’s
convictionfor violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized
under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows:(1) the accused makes, draws, or issues
any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the accused knows
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is
subsequently dishonored by thedrawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason hadnot the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.Each element of the offense was duly
proven by the prosecution. Petitioner admitted that at thetime he issued the
subject check, he knew that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with thedrawee bank for payment of such check. Consequently, when the
check was presented for payment, itwas dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he received demand letters to pay the amount of the
check from private complainant but he did not comply with it. The issue as
tow h e t h e r t h e a m o u n t o f t h e s u b j e c t c h e c k r e p r e s e n t s t h e
a m o u n t o f t h e m o n e y l o a n e d b y p r i v a t e complainant to petitioner or
as an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual question involving thecredibility of
witnesses. Where the issue is one of credibility, the appellate court will not
generallydisturb the findings of the lower court considering that it is in a better position to
settle that issue since ith a d t h e a d v a n t a g e o f h e a r i n g t h e w i t n e s s e s
and observing their conduct during the trial,
w h i c h circumstances carry great weight in assessing their credibility. In the
present case, we see no reason toreverse the finding of the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the amount of the subjectcheck was a
loan and not an investment.On the second issue, petitioner’s argument that it is
the Metropolitan Trial Court and notthe Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is withoutmerit. It is hornbook
doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law inforce at the
time of the institution of the action and not during the arraignment of the
accused.The Information charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August
19, 1991.

People vs. CA – not available (only fulltext)

PEOPLE, petitioner, vs. GUTIERREZ, ET. AL., respondents.
FACTS:
1. In the morning of May 22, 1970, a group of armed persons set fire to
various inhabited houses in barrio Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur.
2. On the afternoon of the same day, several residential houses were
likewise burned in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and
province, which resulted to the destruction of various houses and
resulted in the death of an old woman.
3. Two informations were filed in the Court of First Instance (one for arson
with homicide and the other for arson), charging the 17 private
respondents, together with 82 other unidentified persons,
“confederating, conspiring, constabulating and helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or caused to be
burned several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied.”
4. Two of the accused furnished bail and voluntarily appeared before
respondent Judge, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
5. The Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221,
authorizing the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second
Judicial District to hold a special in Ilocos Sur.
6. Three days after, the Secretary of Justice further issued Administrative
Order No. 226, authorizing respondent Judge to transfer the criminal
cases to the Circuit Criminal Court.
7. The prosecution moved the respondent Judge for a transfer of said
cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the above-mentioned
administrative Orders and calling attention to the circumstance that
they were issued at the instance of the witnesses for reason of security
and personal safety.
8. The accused opposed such transfer and the respondent Judge
declined the transfer sought on the ground that said Administrative
Order only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court
where the interest of justice required it for more expeditious disposal of
the cases; and in the cases involved the accused had already
pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to
subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court
under Sec. 4 of RA No. 5179 the same should have been done right at
the very inception of these cases.
RA 5179 created the Criminal Circuit Courts for the purpose of alleviating the
burden of the CFI, and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases
pending or to be filed therein, but nowhere indicates an intent to permit the
transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts.
9. In view of the lower court’s denial of the motion to transfer the cases to
the Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to the SC for writs of
certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying to
set aside the order of denial of transfer and to compel the CFI to
remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Secondary
Judicial District.
10. Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of
the fact that the Administrative Order merely authorized the court
below, but did not require or command it.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court committed abuse of discretion in denying to
transfer cases to the Circuit Criminal Court.
RULING: YES. Respondent Judge, in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as
permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and
violated neither the law nor the EOs mentioned. HOWEVER, in refusing to
consider Department AO No. 226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory,
respondent Judge failed to act upon the contention of the prosecuting
officers that the cases should be transferred to the Criminal Circuit Court of
the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending,
in view of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court where they felt their
lives would be endangered.
This refusal by the witnesses to testify due to security and safety manifest the
imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos
Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of
truth and justice and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side
of the case.

The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the SC, and such inferior
courts as may be established by law, and such judicial power connotes
certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an
effective administration of justice. The courts “can by appropriate means do
all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make
the judiciary an effective institution of government”.

One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring

the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring
site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of
preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands.

Thus, the SC held:

1. That RA No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts did not, and does
not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and
individual cases;
2. That the SC, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by the
Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent
power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case
pending in a CFI be transferred to another CFI within the same district
whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are
serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that
originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and
impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.
3. That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for
the transfer of the hearing of th.e said criminal cases of the CFI of
Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in
the interest of truth and justice

[By: ABAD, R.; BALAN, N.; CASUCIAN, J.; DELA CRUZ, L.; DISTOR, K.;
LIANKO, K.; REYES, O./ 1S 09-10]