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I.

Jurisdiction and Choice of Law

1. Gemperle vs. Schenker (1967)

G.R. No. L-18164 January 23, 1967

WILLIAM F. GEMPERLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HELEN SCHENKER and PAUL SCHENKER as her husband, defendants-appellees.

Gamboa & Gamboa for plaintiff-appellant


A. R. Narvasa for defendants-appellees.

CONCEPCION, C. J.:

Appeal, taken by plaintiff, William F. Gemperle, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing this case for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of defendant Paul Schenker and for want of cause of action against his wife and co-defendant, Helen
Schenker said Paul Schenker "being in no position to be joined with her as party defendant, because he is beyond the reach of the
magistracy of the Philippine courts."

The record shows that sometime in 1952, Paul Schenker-hereinafter referred to as Schenker — acting through his wife and attorney-
in-fact, Helen Schenker — herein-after referred to as Mrs. Schenker — filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a complaint —
which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2796 thereof — against herein plaintiff William F. Gemperle, for the enforcement of
Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged
pre-emptive rights to the then unissued original capital stock of said corporation and the increase thereof, as well as for an
accounting and damages. Alleging that, in connection with said complaint, Mrs. Schenker had caused to be published some
allegations thereof and other matters, which were impertinent, irrelevant and immaterial to said case No. Q-2796, aside from being
false and derogatory to the reputation, good name and credit of Gemperle, "with the only purpose of attacking" his" honesty,
integrity and reputation" and of bringing him "into public hatred, discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman",
Gemperle commenced the present action against the Schenkers for the recovery of P300,000 as damages, P30,000 as attorney's
fees, and costs, in addition to praying for a judgment ordering Mrs. Schenker "to retract in writing the said defamatory expressions".
In due course, thereafter, the lower court, rendered the decision above referred to. A reconsiderating thereof having been denied,
Gemperle interposed the present appeal.

The first question for determination therein is whether or not the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of Schenker.
Admittedly, he, a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, has not been actually served with summons in the Philippines,
although the summons address to him and Mrs. Schenker had been served personally upon her in the Philippines. It is urged by
plaintiff that jurisdiction over the person of Schenker has been secured through voluntary appearance on his part, he not having
made a special appearance to assail the jurisdiction over his person, and an answer having been filed in this case, stating that "the
defendants, by counsel, answering the plaintiff's complaint, respectfully aver", which is allegedly a general appearance amounting to
a submission to the jurisdiction of the court, confirmed, according to plaintiff, by a P225,000 counterclaim for damages set up in said
answer; but this counterclaim was set up by Mrs. Schenker alone, not including her husband. Moreover, said answer contained
several affirmative defenses, one of which was lack of jurisdiction over the person of Schenker, thus negating the alleged waiver of
this defense. Nevertheless, We hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the
summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the representative and attorney-in-fact of
her husband aforementioned civil case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at her behest, in her aforementioned representative
capacity. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also,
empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the of the one at bar, which is consequence of the
action brought by her on his behalf.

Inasmuch as the alleged absence of a cause of action against Mrs. Schenker is premised upon the alleged lack of jurisdiction over the
person of Schenker, which cannot be sustained, it follows that the conclusion drawn therefore from is, likewise, untenable.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be, is hereby, reversed, and the case remanded to the lower court for proceedings,
with the costs of this instance defendants-appellees. It is so ordered.
2. Pennoyer vs. Neff (1878)

Facts:

 In 1866, Mitchell, attorney from OR, sued Neff, resident of CA, in OR state court to recover unpaid legal fees.
 Mitchell published notice of the commencement of the action in an OR newspaper, pursuant to state statute about giving
notice to out of state defendants. Neff was not personally served.
 When Neff failed to appear, Mitchell obtained a default judgment against him.
 Court attached a tract of land that Neff had purchased in OR. Land was sold to Pennoyer at auction and proceeds awarded
to Mitchell.
 Nine years later, Neff sued Pennoyer in OR federal court to recover the land.

Procedural History:

 Neff won in lower court (on basis of technical problems with 2 affidavits, not on jurisdictional issues)
 Neff won in SCOTUS

Issues:

 Can a state court exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident who has not been personally served while within the
state and whose property within the state was not attached before the onset of litigation?

Holding/Rule:

 A court may enter a judgment against a non-resident only if the party…

o Is personally served with process while within the state, or


o Has property within the state, and that property is attached before litigation begins (as in quasi in rem jurisdiction)

Reasoning:

 "Field theory" of state-court jurisdiction


o Every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory
o No state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property outside its territory
 These principles follow because the states resemble independent nations
 Principles are rooted in the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment. Courts have to give other judgments "full faith and
credit".

o "Full faith and credit" is not valid if the court did not have jurisdiction.

Dissent:

 None given.

Notes:

 Courts have to give other judgments "full faith and credit".


 SCOTUS doesn't say anything bad about the notice.
 State has power over people who are there and the land in its boundaries.
 The claim doesn't have to have anything to do with the property in the jurisdiction
 In personam - suit against a person
 In rem - suit against property
 Quasi in rem - suit against someone out of state through property in the state
 Oregon has a real interest in making its courts available to its citizens
 Since the adoption of DP, the validity of judgments like this may be directly questioned and their enforcement in the state
resisted on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over
whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.
 Special appearance means you can enter a jurisdiction in order to dispute jurisdiction issues in a case.
 Theology of Pennoyer
o States have power over their people
o States have power over their property
o All assertions of jurisdictional power must be justified consistent with One and Two
o Problem - Underinclusive, need a way to protect citizens
o How to mitigate
 Create quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to permit assertion of claims against non-residents by grabbing property
 Physical presence - if you can find them, grab them
 Consent can be either express and implied
 Status relationships like marriage

3. International Shoe Co. vs. Washington (1945)

Brief Fact Summary. Defendant was an out of state company that employed salesmen within the state of Washington. Washington
sued Defendant to recover unpaid unemployment taxes and served Defendant in two ways: (1) by mail and (2) by serving one of its
salesmen within the state. Defendant appealed from a verdict for Washington, claiming that Washington had no personal
jurisdiction over Defendant.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. In order for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must have such
minimum contacts with the state so that exercising jurisdiction over the defendant would not offend “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”

Facts. International Shoe Co., Defendant, was a company based in Delaware with an office in St. Louis, Missouri. Defendant
employed salesmen that resided in Washington to sell their product in the state of Washington. Defendant regularly shipped orders
to the salesmen who accepted them, the salesmen would display the products at places in Washington, and the salesmen were
compensated by commission for sale of the products. The salesmen were also reimbursed for the cost of renting the places of
business in Washington. Washington sued Defendant after Defendant failed to make contributions to an unemployment
compensation fund exacted by state statutes. The Washington statute said that the commissioner could issue personal service if
Defendant was found within the state, or by mailing it to Defendant if Defendant was not in the state. The notice of assessment was
served upon Defendant’s salesperson and a copy of the notice was mailed to Defendant. Defendant appeared specially, moving to
set aside the order that service upon the salesperson was proper service. Defendant also argued that it did not “do business” in the
state, that there was no agent upon which service could be made, and that Defendant did not furnish employment within the
meaning of the statute. Defendant also argued that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
imposed a prohibitive burden of interstate commerce. The trial court found for Washington and the Supreme Court of Washington
affirmed, reasoning that the continuous flow of Defendant’s product into Washington was sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction. Defendant appealed.

Issue. Is service of process upon Defendant’s agent sufficient notice when the corporation’s activities result in a large volume of
interstate business so that the corporation receives the protection of the laws of the state and the suit is related to the activities
which make the corporation present?

Held. Yes. Solicitation within a state by the agents of a foreign corporation plus some additional activities render a foreign
corporation amenable to suit within the forum state to enforce an obligation arising out of its activities within the forum state. In
this case, Appellant’s activities within Washington were systematic and continuous within the years in question. These activities
resulted in a large volume of business. Further, Appellant received the benefits and protections of the laws of Washington. As a
result, the suit against Appellant within the state does not involve an unreasonable or undue procedure.

Discussion. In determining whether such minimum contacts exist, a court will look at two factors: sufficient minimum contacts and
notice. International Shoe requires that a defendant have such minimum contacts with the forum state that exercise of jurisdiction
over the defendant would be fair and reasonable. Under this analysis, a court will look to whether both purposeful availment and
foreseeability exist. Under the foreseeability prong of the minimum contacts analysis, it must be foreseeable that the defendant’s
business within the forum makes it amenable to suit within that forum. In addition, under the purposeful availment prong, the
defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum state must arise from non-accidental contact. In addition to the minimum contacts
analysis, due process also requires that a reasonable effort be used to notify the defendant of a pending lawsuit so that it has an
opportunity to appear and be heard.

4. Mullane vs. Central Hanover Bank Trust and Co. (1950)

Brief Fact Summary. Appellee, a bank located in New York, set up a trust covering 113 participants and sent notice by publication to
all known and unknown beneficiaries regarding Appellee’s application for judicial settlement of the trust, as required under a New
York statute. Upon first distribution of the trust, Appellee would mail notice to known beneficiaries that could benefit from the
interest or principal. Appellant, guardian of the beneficiaries, appealed, arguing that notice by publication alone violated the
beneficiaries’ due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Notice must be “reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
action and give them an opportunity to object.

Facts. Appellee, Central Hanover Bank & Trust, set up common fund pursuant to a New York statute allowing the creation of
common funds for distribution of judicial settlement trusts. There were 113 participating trusts. Appellee petitioned for settlement
of its first account as common trustee. Some of the beneficiaries were not residents of New York. “Notice” was by publication for
four weeks in a local newspaper. Appellee had notified those people by mail that were of full age and sound mind who would be
entitled to share in the principal if the interest they held became distributable. Appellant was appointed as special guardian and
attorney for all persons known or unknown not otherwise appearing who had or might thereafter have any interest in the income of
the common trust fund. Appellee was appointed to represent those interested in the principal. Appellant appeared specially,
objecting that notice by publication, permitted under the applicable statute was inadequate to afford t
he beneficiaries due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and that therefore jurisdiction was lacking.

Issue. Is notice by publication of a judicial settlement to unknown beneficiaries of a common trust reasonable notice under the due
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Is notice by publication to all of the beneficiaries of a common trust whose residences are known reasonable notice under the due
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Held. First issue: Yyes. Second issue: Nno.


Whether or not the action is in personam or in rem, the court can determine the interests of all claimants as long as there is a
procedure allowing for notice and an opportunity to be heard.

There has to be notice and opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. The claimants at issue could potentially
be deprived of property here, as the proposed disposition cuts off their rights to sue for negligent or illegal impairments of their
interests. In addition, the court’s decision appoints someone who, without their knowledge, could use the trust to obtain the fees
and expenses necessary for a sham proceeding.

There need not be personal service because the state has an interest in settling trusts. “Notice has to be reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pending action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.” You do not have to notify all the beneficiaries when the trust concerns many small interests. Sending notice to most of
them will protect their interests sufficiently.

The New York Banking Law, however, that does not require notice to all persons whose whereabouts are known, violates the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because contacting beneficiaries by mail at their last known address is not particularly
burdensome.

Dissent. Justice Burton: Omitted from casebook.


Discussion. The majority’s opinion illustrates that notice by publication will not suffice only because it would be burdensome for the
plaintiff to notify all parties involved. If the plaintiff knows of a way to contact the parties, then the plaintiff must bear that expense.
Mailing notice to an address, if known, will suffice. Notice by publication will suffice only if there is no practical way of knowing the
identity or location of the party.

5. Idonah Perkins vs. Roxas (1941)

G.R. No. 47517 June 27, 1941

IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, petitioner,


vs.
MAMERTO ROXAS, ET AL., respondents.

Alva J. Hill for petitioner.


DeWitt, Perkins & Ponce Enrile for respondent Judge and respondent Perkins.
Ross, Lawrence, Selph & Carrascoso, Jr., for respondent Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.

LAUREL, J.:

On July 5, 1938, the respondent Eugene Arthur Perkins, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of the sum of P71,379.90, consisting of dividends which have been declared and
made payable on 52,874 shares of stock registered in his name, payment of which was being withheld by the company, and for the
recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said shares, to the exclusion of all others. To the complaint, the company filed
its answer, alleging, by way of defense, that the withholding of plaintiff's right to the disposal and control of the shares was due to
certain demands made with respect to said shares by the petitioner herein. Idonah Slade Perkins, and by one George H. Engelhard.
The answer prays that the adverse claimants be made parties to the action and served with notice thereof by publication, and that
thereafter all such parties be required to interplead and settle the rights among themselves.

On September 5, 1938, the trial court ordered the respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, to include in his complaint as parties
defendants petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, and George H. Engelhard. The complaint was accordingly amended and in addition to
the relief prayed for in the original complaint, respondent Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins and George H.
Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and excluded from any claim they assert thereon.
Thereafter, summons by publication were served upon the non-resident defendants, Idonah Slade Perkins and George H. Engelhard,
pursuant to the order of the trial court. On December 9, 1938, Engelhard filed his answer to the amended complaint, and on January
8, 1940, petitioner's objection to the court's jurisdiction over her person having been overruled by the trial court and by this court in
G. R. No. 46831, petitioner filed her answer with a cross-complaint in which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her against
respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, from the Supreme Court of the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole
legal owner and entitled to the possession and control of the shares of stock in question together with all the cash dividends
declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, and prays for various affirmative reliefs against the respondent. To
the answer and cross-complaint thus filed, the respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, filed a reply and an answer in which he sets up
several defenses to the enforcement in this jurisdiction of the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York above
alluded to. Instead of demurring to the reply on either of the two grounds specified in section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, on June 5, 1940, filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that "the court has no jurisdiction of the
subject of the action," because the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York is res judicata.

Petitioner's demurrer having been overruled, she now filed in this court a petition entitled "Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus,"
alleging that "the respondent judge is about to and will render judgment in the above-mentioned case disregarding the
constitutional rights of this petitioner; contrary to and annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this
petitioner's favor by the courts of the State of New York, ... which decision is res judicata on all the questions constituting the subject
matter of civil case No. 53317, of the Court of First Instance of Manila; and which New York judgment the Court of First Instance of
Manila is without jurisdiction to annul, amend, reverse, or modify in any respect whatsoever"; and praying that the order of the
respondent judge overruling the demurrer be annulled, and that he and his successors be permanently prohibited from taking any
action on the case, except to dismiss the same.

The only question here to be determined, therefore, is whether or not, in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the
petitioner by the Supreme Court of New York, and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions raised by the
respondent, Eugene Arthur Perkins, in civil case No. 53317 of the Court of First Instace of Manila, the local court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action in the said case. By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action
and of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, and is to be sought for in general
nature of its powers, or in authority specially conferred. In the present case, the amended complaint filed by the respondent,
Eugene Arthur Perkins, in the court below alleged the ownership in himself of the conjugal partnership between him and his wife,
Idonah Slade Perkins; that the petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, and George H. Engelhard assert claims to and interests in the said
stock adverse to Eugene Arthur Perkins; that such claims are invalid, unfounded, and made only for the purpose of vexing, hindering
and delaying Eugene Arthur Perkins in the exercise of the lawful control over and use of said shares and dividends accorded to him
and by law and by previous orders and decrees of this court; and the said amended complaint prays, inter alia, "that defendant
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company be required and ordered to recognize the right of the plaintiff to the control and disposal of
said shares so standing in his name to the exclusion of all others; that the additional defendants, Idonah Slade Perkins and George H.
Engelhard, be each held to have no interest or claim in the subject matter of the controversy between plaintiff and defendant
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, or in or under the judgment to be rendered herein and that by said judgment they, and
each of them be excluded therefrom; and that the plaintiff be awarded the costs of this suit and general relief." The respondent's
action, therefore, calls for the adjudication of title to certain shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, and the
granting of affirmative reliefs, which fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila. (Vide: sec. 146, et
seq., Adm. Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 145; sec. 56, Act No. 136, as amended by Act No. 400.)

Similarly, the Court of First Instance of Manila is empowered to adjudicate the several demands contained in petitioner's cross-
complaint. The cross-complaint sets up a judgment allegedly recovered by Idonah Slade Perkins against Eugene Arthur Perkins in the
Supreme Court of New York and by way of relief prays:

(1) Judgment against the plaintiff Eugene Arthur Perkins in the sum of one hundred eighty-five thousand and four hundred
dollars ($185,400), representing cash dividends paid to him by defendant Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. from February,
1930, up to and including the dividend of March 30, 1937.

(2) That plaintiff Eugene Arthur Perkins be required to deliver to this defendant the certificates representing the 48,000
shares of capital stock of Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. issued as a stock dividend on the 24,000 shares owned by this
defendant as described in the judgment Exhibit 1-A.

(3) That this defendant recover under that judgment Exhibit 1-A interest upon the amount of each cash dividend referred to
in that judgment received by plaintiff Eugene Arthur Perkins from February, 1930, to and including the dividend of March
30, 1937, from the date of payment of each of such dividends at the rate of 7 per cent per annum until paid.

(4) That this defendant recover of plaintiff her costs and disbursements in that New York action amounting to the sum of
one thousand five hundred eighty-four and 20/00 dollars ($1,584.20), and the further sum of two thousand dollars ($2,000)
granted her in that judgment Exhibit 1-A as an extra allowance, together with interest.

(5) For an order directing an execution to be issued in favor of this defendant and against the plaintiff for amounts sufficient
to satisfy the New York judgment Exhibit 1-A in its entirety, and against the plaintiff and the defendant Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co. for such other amounts prayed for herein as this court may find to be due and payable by each of
them; and ordering them to comply with all other orders which this court may issue in favor of the defendant in this case.

(6) For the costs of this action, and

(7) For such other relief as may be appropriate and proper in the premises.

In other words, Idonah Slade Perkins in her cross-complaint brought suit against Eugene Arthur Perkins and the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York and asked the court below
to render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of action recognized by section
309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, to adjudicate, settled and determine.

The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment "annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment
rendered and entered in this petitioner's favor by the courts of the State of New York, ... which decision is res judicata on all the
questions constituting the subject matter of civil case No. 53317," and argues on the assumption that the respondent judge is
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the proceedings will give
validity and efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is a question that goes to the merits of
the controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each other, and not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The
test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it
is right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment case be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which
the petitioner here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court — and the rightful exercise — of its jurisdiction.

The petition is, therefore, hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

6. In re: Union Carbide (1986)

Facts

On the night of 23 December 1984, a gas leak occurred at the pesticide plant of Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in Bhopal, India
resulting in the deaths of more than 2,000 people and injuries to more than 200,000 others. . Thereafter, the India passed a law
giving the Indian government the exclusive right to represent the victims of the disaster. As thus, the Indian government filed a
complaint before a New York district court. The Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum
non conveniens and lack of personality. The district court granted the motion on three conditions, namely, that UCC: (1) consent to
the jurisdiction of Indian courts and waive defenses based on the Statute of Limitations; (2) agree to the satisfy the judgement of the
Indian court, provided it complied with the requirements of due process; and (3) be subject to discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure of the US. Consequently, the Indian government filed sued the UCIL and the UCC before the a district court in India.
The UCC appealed the conditions.

Arguments for the Defendant

While Indian courts may provide an adequate alternative forum, they adhere to standards of due process much lower than that
followed in the US. Hence, US courts must supervise the proceedings before Indian courts.

Issue

Whether or not the dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens is proper.

Held

Yes. The Indian courts are adequate alternative fora.

Ratio Decidendi

Almost all of the estimated 200,000 plaintiffs are citizens and residents of India who have revoked their representation by an
American counsel in favor of the Indian government, which now prefers Indian courts. Further, the UCC has already consented to
the assumption of jurisdiction by the Indian courts. All the witnesses and evidence are likewise in India.

As to the conditions, the first is valid in order to secure the viability of the Indian courts as alternate fora. The second is problematic
as it gives the impression that foreign judgments the UCC's consent is necessary in order for the judgement of the Indian courts to
be enforceable in New York. The laws of New York, in fact, recognizes that a judgment rendered by a foreign court may be enforced
in that State except if such judgment was rendered in violation of due process or without jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. The request of UCC of supervision by US courts of Indian courts is untenable. The power of US courts cannot extend
beyond their territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, once US courts dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens, they lose any
further jurisdiction over the case, except in case of an action for enforcement later on. Denial of due process may, however,
constitute a defense against the enforcement of the Indian judgment. The third condition is likewise invalid. Basic justice dictates
that both parties must be given equal access to evidence in each other's possession. Hence, both parties maybe subjected to the
modes of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on equal terms subject to approval by Indian courts.

7. Heine vs. New York Insurance Co. (1940)


Facts
The New York Life Insurance Company and the Guardian Insurance Company ("the insurance companies") were corporations created
in New York, USA. As conditions to be allowed to conduct business in Germany, they were made to agree to be supervised by
German authorities, to invest the proceeds of policies in German securities, and to establish a local agency to whom summons may
be served. The insurance companies were later sued before courts in both the US and Germany for the recovery on some 240 life
insurance policies issued in Germany to German nationals, payable in German currency.

Arguments for the Plaintiff

As the US courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, they have no choice but to try the case.

Issue
Whether or not the US courts may dismiss the case on the ground of forum non conveniens.

Held
Yes. Under the circumstances, the case may be more suitably tried before German courts.

Ratio Decidendi

The courts in both jurisdictions are competent to try the case and summons may be served upon the insurance companies in both
jurisdictions. Requiring the insurance companies to defend their interests in the US would subject them to great and unnecessary
inconvenience and expenses, including the possibility of having to bring documentary evidence all the way from their office in
Germany. Moreover, trying the case in the US additionally burden the courts in that jurisdiction, to the detriment of other litigants.
The assumption of jurisdiction over a case the cause of action of which arose from another jurisdiction and wherein both parties are
non-residents is discretionary upon the court.

8. Wing On Company vs. Syyap (1967)

9. Bank of America vs. CA (2003)

10. Fleumer vs. Hix (1930)

11. Philippine Trust Co. vs. Bohanan (1960)

II. Choice of Law

1. Gray vs Gray (1934)

2. Alabama Great Southern Railroad vs. Carroll (1982)

3. Auten vs. Auten (1954)

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