1
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JOSE P. DANS, JR., MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION &
COMMUNICATIONS, THE HON. CEFERINO S. CARREON, COMMISSIONER,
NATIONAL TELECOM., COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS: The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the
mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. it alleged that no
hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the
closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action which
closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the respondents to
entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner also
raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents'
general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's
shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs
geared towards public affairs.
Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.
(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom
of Expression.
Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The
absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in
administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast
station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:
(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence
presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
(3) The decision must have something to support itself.
(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support
conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and
not simply accept subordinate’s views
(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various
issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.
The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it
gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.
The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom
of speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or
broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right
to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The
test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the “clear and present danger” rule. If in
the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this danger that will
bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television
may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The
freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy. The people continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs and
broadcast media continues to have the pervasive influence to the people being the most
accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special protection
given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the
Constitution.
Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have
been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that
respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two
warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized
subject to the warrant were real properties.
Issue:

Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court
as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place
sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two
distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in
the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by
nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant,
but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a
temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar,
petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact
bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy
the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere
generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants.
(Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items
to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the
said items.
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
2
181 SCRA 529
Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January
1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated
Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of “Overview”
for the “Baguio Midland Courier” assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on
columnists, commentators or announcers) of the said resolution, which provides “During
the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.”
Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should be
under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods.
Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the
power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other
grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor
Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (“a columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence
from his work during the campaign period”) can be construed to mean that the Comelec
has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the
franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis.
AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR
1988]

Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company,
Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine
and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The
proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB
as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the
intended film production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-
drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing
actual documentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading
playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian
have developed a script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or
exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or
television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation.
petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie
script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint
was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the
movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating
any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears
substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce
motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through
television. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a
commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of
freedom of speech and of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any
audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the
completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present
danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and
concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that
petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public
figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy.
3
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional
freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms
of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events.
CASE DIGEST : VALMONTE vs BELMONTE
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989 RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL,
DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ,
REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and
ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners, vs. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction
invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public
records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received
the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General
Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to
receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary
within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS
records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently
based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The
Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system
of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the
government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The
concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to
privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged
to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and
their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in
government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their
actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I suppose is
generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a
consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which,
though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further

that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by
special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded
the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the
Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern.
Francisco Chavez vs Presidential Commission on Good Government
FACTS: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official
who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated
plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the countrys economy,
alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports[2] bannered in
a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1)
the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded
accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
A provision in the compromise agreement provides:
xxx the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded to the FIRST PARTY, and
which shall be assigned to/retained by the PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE
PARTY shall be net of, and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the
Philippines. Xxx
ISSUE: Whether or not such provision in the compromise agreement exempting the
Marcoses from the taxes due to the government in valid
RULING: The PCGG has a limited life in carrying out its tasks and time is running short. It
is thus imperative that the Court must hold even now, and remind PCGG, that it has indeed
exceeded its bounds in entering into the General and Supplemental Agreements. The
agreements clearly suffer from Constitutional and statutory infirmities,to wit: 1) The
agreements contravene the statute in granting criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs; 2)
PCGG’s commitment to exempt from all forms of taxes the property to be retained the
Marcos’ heirs controverts the Constitution; and 3)the government’s undertaking to cause
the dismissal of all cases filed against the Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan
and other courts encroaches upon judicial powers.
Benjamin Victoriano vs Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
4
Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been an employee of the
Elizalde Rope Factory (ERF) since 1958. He was also a member of the EPWU (Elizalde
Rope Workers’ Union). Under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and
EPWU, a close shop agreement is being enforced which means that employment in the
factory relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the
said factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his
resignation from EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop
agreement by virtue of his being a member of the INC because apparently in the INC, one
is forbidden from being a member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his
resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF
then moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from the EPWU. EPWU
and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop agreement because RA
3350, which provides that close shop agreements shall not cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization, is
unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWU’s and ERF’s legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC
member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop
agreement in the factory where he was employed, his employment could not be validly
terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a union
includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the
rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it
recognizes the workers’ right to join or not to join union. RA 3550 recognizes as well the
primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.
Case Digest. Recent Jurisprudence.Knights of Rizal vs. DMCI et al., G.R. No. No.
213948, April 19, 2017
Remedial Law. Mandamus only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the
office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking
mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.
Remedial Law.Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights and prevent
further injury102 until final adjudication on the merits of the case. In the present case, since
the legal rights of the KOR are not well-defined, clear, and certain, the petition for
mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO lifted.

There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila. What is not expressly or
impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to morals,
customs and public order.” This principle is fundamental in a democratic society, to protect
the weak against the strong, the minority against the majority, and the individual citizen
against the government. In essence, this principle, which is the foundation of a civilized
society under the rule of law, prescribes that the freedom to act can be curtailed only
through law.
Facts
DMCI started construction of Torre De Manila Condominium, after it was issued Building
permit by the City Of Manila Office allowing it to build a 49 Storey with Basement & 2
penthouse Level Residential Conduminium.
However the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the
Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit og DMC citing among others,
that “the Torre de Manila Condominium, based on their development plans, upon
completion, will rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the
statue of our hero, and with such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of
the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point.”
Building Official Melvin Q. Balagot then sought the opinion of the City of Manila’s City Legal
Officer on whether he is bound to comply with Resolution No. 121.8 In his letter dated 12
September 2012, City Legal Officer Renato G. Dela Cruz stated that there is “no legal
justification for the temporary suspension of the Building Permit issued in favor of [DMCI-
PDI]” since the construction “lies outside the Luneta Park” and is “simply too far to be a
repulsive distraction or have an objectionable effect on the artistic and historical
significance” of the Rizal Monument.9 He also pointed out that “there is no showing that the
[area of] subject property has been officially declared as an anthropological or
archeological area. Neither has it been categorically designate.
National Historical Commission of the Philippines Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno maintained
that the Torre de Manila project site is outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park and well to
the rear of the Rizal Monument, and thus, cannot possibly obstruct the frontal view of the
National Monument.
On 26 November 2013, following an online petition against the Torre de Manila project that
garnered about 7,800 signatures, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 146,
reiterating its directive in Resolution No. 121 enjoining the City of Manila’s building officials
to temporarily suspend DMCI-PDI’s Building Permit.
Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning Board
Resolution No. 06, Series of 2013, recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI’s application
for variance, which was later on amended.
5
The City Council resolution later states that “the City Council of Manila find[s] no cogent
reason to deny and/or reverse the aforesaid recommendation of the [MZBAA] and hereby
ratifies] and confirm[s] all previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the
City [Council] of Manila for Torre de Manila[.]”
On 12 September 2014, the Knights Of Rizal, a “civic, patriotic, cultural, non- partisan, non-
sectarian and non-profit organization”18 created under Republic Act No. 646,19 filed
a Petition for Injunction seeking a temporary restraining order, and later a permanent
injunction, against the construction of DMCI- PDI’s Torre de Manila condominium project.
The KOR argues that the subject matter of the present suit is one of “transcendental
importance, paramount public interest, of overarching significance to society, or with far-
reaching implication” involving the desecration of the Rizal Monument.
Issues
Whether or not the Court can issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of the City of
Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila Project; and
Whether or not Torre De Manila is a nuisance per se.
Ruling
The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed.
Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila.
The Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law x x x.”61 It is a fundamental principle that no property shall be taken
away from an individual without due process, whether substantive or procedural. The
dispossession of property, or in this case the stoppage of the construction of a building in
one’s own property, would violate substantive due process.
The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues when there is a clear
legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act,
and when the party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such
act.
In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or
rule for that matter, that the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if
the building is within the background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is
no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila “to consider,” in the words of the Dissenting
Opinion, “the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119” in relation to the applications of

DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the ordinance these standards can never be
applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park. While the Rizal Park has been declared a
National Historical Site, the area where Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned
property that is “not part of the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National Heritage
Site in 1995,” and the Torre de Manila area is in fact “well-beyond” the Rizal Park,
according to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno.62 Neither has the area of the
Torre de Manila been designated as a “heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical
landmark or even a national treasure.”63
Also, to declare that the City of Manila failed to consider the standards under Ordinance
No. 8119 would involve making a finding of fact. A finding of fact requires notice, hearing,
and the submission of evidence to ascertain compliance with the law or regulation. In such
a case, it is the Regional Trial Court which has the jurisdiction to hear the case, receive
evidence, make a proper finding of fact, and determine whether the Torre de Manila project
properly complied with the standards set by the ordinance. In Meralco v. Public Service
Commission,64 we held that it is the cardinal right of a party in trials and administrative
proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence
presented considered by the proper court or tribunal.
To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards under Ordinance No. 8119 to the
Torre de Manila project will be an empty exercise since these standards cannot apply
outside of the Rizal Park- and the Torre de Manila is outside the Rizal Park. Mandamus will
lie only if the officials of the City of Manila have a ministerial duty to consider these
standards to buildings outside of the Rizal Park. There can be no such ministerial duty
because these standards are not applicable to buildings outside of the Rizal Park.
The KOR also invokes this Court’s exercise of its extraordinary certiorari power of review
under Section 1, Article VIII65 of the Constitution. However, this Court can only exercise its
extraordinary certiorari power if the City of Manila, in issuing the required permits and
licenses, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Tellingly,
neither the majority nor minority opinion in this case has found that the City of Manila
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the permits and licenses to DMCI-PDI.
Thus, there is no justification at all for this Court to exercise its
extraordinary certiorari power.
Moreover, the exercise of this Court’s extraordinary certiorari power is limited to actual
cases and controversies that necessarily involve a violation of the Constitution or the
determination of the constitutionality or validity of a governmental act or issuance. Specific
violation of a statute that does not raise the issue of constitutionality or validity of the statute
cannot, as a rule, be the subject of the Court’s direct exercise of its
expanded certiorari power. Thus, the KOR’s recourse lies with other judicial remedies or
proceedings allowed under the Rules of Court.
6
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc.,66 we held that in cases where the question of constitutionality of
a governmental action is raised, the judicial power that the courts exercise is likewise
identified as the power of judicial review– the power to review the constitutionality of the
actions of other branches of government. As a rule, as required by the hierarchy of courts
principle, these cases are filed with the lowest court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter. The judicial review that the courts undertake requires:
1) there be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
The lower court’s decision under the constitutional scheme reaches the Supreme Court
through the appeal process, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
In the present case, the KOR elevated this case immediately to this Court in an original
petition for injunction which we later on treated as one for mandamus under Rule 65. There
is, however, no clear legal duty on the City of Manila to consider the provisions of
Ordinance No. 8119 for applications for permits to build outside the protected areas of the
Rizal Park. Even if there were such legal duty, the determination of whether the City of
Manila failed to abide by this legal duty would involve factual matters which have not been
admitted or established in this case. Establishing factual matters is not within the realm of
this Court. Findings of fact are the province of the trial courts.
There is no standard in Ordinance No. 8119 for defining or determining the background
sightline that is supposed to be protected or that is part of the “physical integrity” of the
Rizal Monument. How far should a building like the Torre de Manila be from the Rizal
Monument- one, two, three, four, or five kilometers? Even the Solicitor General, during the
Oral Arguments, conceded that the ordinance does not prescribe how sightline is
determined, neither is there any way to measure by metes and bounds whether a
construction that is not part of the historic monument itself or is outside the protected
area can be said to violate the Rizal Monument’s physical integrity, except only to say
“when you stand in front of the Rizal Monument, there can be no doubt that your view is
marred and impaired.” This kind of a standard has no parameters and can include a
sightline or a construction as far as the human eyes can see when standing in front of the
Rizal Monument. Obviously, this Court cannot apply such a subjective and non-uniform

standard that adversely affects property rights several kilometers away from a historical
sight or facility.
The Dissenting Opinion claims that “the City, by reason of a mistaken or erroneous
construction of its own Ordinance, had failed to consider its duties under [Ordinance No.
8119] when it issued permits in DMCI-PDI’s favor.” However, MZBAA Zoning Board
Resolution Nos. 06 and 06-A67easily dispel this claim. According to the resolutions, the
City of Manila, through the MZBAA, acted on DMCI-PDI’s application for variance under the
powers and standards set forth in Ordinance No. 8119.
Without further proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily in
issuing said resolution, the Court should respect MZBAA’s exercise of discretion. The Court
cannot “substitute its judgment for that of said officials who are in a better position to
consider and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically vested in them by
law.”68 Since the Court has “no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the
administrative departments of the government,” it “should not generally interfere with purely
administrative and discretionary functions.”69 The power of the Court in mandamus
petitions does not extend “to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular
way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either”70
Still, the Dissenting Opinion insists on directing the re-evaluation by the City of Manila,
through the CPDO, of the permits previously issued in favor of the Torre de Manila project
to determine compliance with the standards under Ordinance No. 8119. It also declares
that the circumstances in this case warrant the pro hac vice conversion of the proceedings
in the issuance of the permits into a “contested case” necessitating notice and hearing with
all the parties involved.
Pro hac vice means a specific decision does not constitute a precedent because the
decision is for the specific case only, not to be followed in other cases. A pro hac
vice decision violates statutory law- Article 8 of the Civil Code- which states that “judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.” The decision of the Court in this case cannot be pro hac
vice because by mandate of the law every decision of the Court forms part of the legal
system of the Philippines. If another case comes up with the same facts as the present
case, that case must be decided in the same way as this case to comply with the
constitutional mandate of equal protection of the law. Thus, a pro hac vice decision also
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
It is the policy of the courts not to interfere with the discretionary executive acts of the
executive branch unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. And subject to well-settled exceptions, mandamus does not
lie against the legislative and executive branches or their members acting in the exercise of
their official ministerial functions. This emanates from the respect accorded by the judiciary
to said branches as co-equal entities under the principle of separation of powers.
7
In De Castro v. Salas,71 we held that no rule of law is better established than the one that
provides that mandamus will not issue to control the discretion of an officer or a court when
honestly exercised and when such power and authority is not abused.
In exceptional cases, the Court has granted a prayer for mandamus to compel action in
matters involving judgment and discretion, only “to act, but not to act one way or the
other,”72 and only in cases where there has been a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.73
In this case, there can be no determination by this Court that the City of Manila had been
negligent or remiss in its duty under Ordinance No. 8119 considering that this
determination will involve questions of fact. DMCI- PDI had been issued the proper permits
and had secured all approvals and licenses months before the actual construction began.
Even the KOR could not point to any law that respondent City of Manila had violated and
could only point to declarations of policies by the NHCP and the Venice Charter which do
not constitute clear legal bases for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the preservation and
restoration of ancient monuments, sites, and buildings. It brings together principles in the
field of historical conservation and restoration that have been developed, agreed upon, and
and laid down by experts over the years. Each country, however, remains “responsible for
applying the plan within the framework of its own culture and traditions.”74
The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable as law. The
Philippines is not legally bound to follow its directive, as in fact, these are not directives but
mere guidelines- a set of the best practices and techniques that have been proven over the
years to be the most effective in preserving and restoring historical monuments, sites and
buildings.
The City of Manila concedes that DMCI-PDI’s Zoning Permit was granted without going
through the process under Ordinance No. 8119. However, the same was properly rectified
when, faced with mounting opposition, DMCI-PDI itself sought clarification from the City of
Manila and immediately began complying with the procedure for applying for a variance.
The MZBAA did subsequently recommend the approval of the variance and the City
Council of Manila approved the same, ratifying the licenses and permits already given to
DMCI-PDI. Such ratification was well within the right of the City Council of Manila. The City
Council of Manila could have denied the application had it seen any reason to do so. Again,
the ratification is a function of the City Council of Manila, an exercise of its discretion and
well within the authority granted it by law and the City’s own Ordinance No. 8119.
The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, convenience, and
welfare. There is no indication that the Torre de Manila project brings any harm, danger, or
hazard to the people in the surrounding areas except that the building allegedly poses an
unsightly view on the taking of photos or the visual appreciation of the Rizal Monument by

locals and tourists. In fact, the Court must take the approval of the MZBAA, and its
subsequent ratification by the City Council of Manila, as the duly authorized exercise of
discretion by the city officials. Great care must be taken that the Court does not unduly
tread upon the local government’s performance of its duties. It is not for this Court to dictate
upon the other branches of the government how their discretion must be exercised so long
as these branches do not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Likewise, any violation of Ordinance No. 8119 must be determined in the proper case and
before the proper forum. It is not within the power of this Court in this case to make such
determination. Without such determination, this Court cannot simply declare that the City of
Manila had failed to consider its duties under Ordinance No. 8119 when it issued the
permits in DMCI-PDI’s favor without making a finding of fact how the City of Manila failed
“to consider” its duties with respect to areas outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park. In the
first place, this Court has no jurisdiction to make findings of fact in an original action like this
before this Court. Moreover, the City of Manila could not legally apply standards to sites
outside the area covered by the ordinance that prescribed the standards. With this, taken in
light of the lack of finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City of
Manila, there is no basis to issue the writ of mandamus against the City of Manila.
Torre de Manila is Not a Nuisance Per Se.
In its petition, the KOR claims that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per’ se that deserves
to be summarily abated even without judicial proceedings.87 However, during the Oral
Arguments, counsel for the KOR argued that the KOR now believes that the Torre de
Manila is a nuisance per accidens and not a nuisance per se.88
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health
or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards
decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway
or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.
The Court recognizes two kinds of nuisances. The first, nuisance per se, is one “recognized
as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to
public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined
law of necessity.”89 The second, nuisance per accidens, is that which “depends upon
certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot
be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a
thing in law constitutes a nuisance.”90
8
It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. The Torre de
Manila project cannot be considered as a “direct menace to public health or safety.” Not
only is a condominium project commonplace in the City of Manila, DMCI-PDI has,
according to the proper government agencies, complied with health and safety standards
set by law. DMCI-PDI has been granted the following permits and clearances prior to
starting the project: (1) Height Clearance Permit from the Civil Aviation Authority of the
Philippines;91 (2) Development Permit from the HLURB;92 (3) Zoning Certification from the
HLURB;93 (4) Certificate of Environmental Compliance Commitment from the Environment
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources;94 (5)
Barangay Clearance;95 (6) Zoning Permit;96 (7) Building Permit;97 (8) and Electrical and
Mechanical Permit.98
Later, DMCI-PDI also obtained the right to build under a variance recommended by the
MZBAA and granted by the City Council of Manila. Thus, there can be no doubt that the
Torre de Manila project is not a nuisance per se.
On the other hand, the KOR now claims that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per
accidens.
By definition, a nuisance per accidens is determined based on its surrounding conditions
and circumstances. These conditions and circumstances must be well established, not
merely alleged. The Court cannot simply accept these conditions and circumstances as
established facts as the KOR would have us do in this case.99 The KOR itself concedes
that the question of whether the Torre de Manila is a nuisance per accidens is a question of
fact.100
The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an authority to find facts, to estimate their
force, and to apply rules of law to the case thus made.101 This Court is no such authority.
It is not a trier of facts. It cannot simply take the allegations in the petition and accept these
as facts, more so in this case where these allegations are contested by the respondents.
The task to receive and evaluate evidence is lodged with the trial courts. The question,
then, of whether the Torre de Manila project is a nuisance per accidens must be settled
after due proceedings brought before the proper Regional Trial Court. The KOR cannot
circumvent the process in the guise of protecting national culture and heritage.
The TRO must be lifted.
Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights and prevent further injury102 until
final adjudication on the merits of the case. In the present case, since the legal rights of the
KOR are not well-defined, clear, and certain, the petition for mandamus must be dismissed
and the TRO lifted.

The general rule is that courts will not disturb the findings of administrative agencies when
they are supported by substantial evidence. In this case, DMCI-PDI already acquired
vested rights in the various permits, licenses, or even variances it had applied for in order
to build a 49-storey building which is, and had been, allowed by the City of Manila’s zoning
ordinance.
As we have time and again held, courts generally hesitate to review discretionary decisions
or actions of administrative agencies in the absence of proof that such decisions or actions
were arrived at with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In JRS Business Corp. v. Montesa,103 we held that mandamus is the proper remedy if it
could be shown that there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, or there was an unlawful exclusion of a party
from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is clearly entitled. Only specific legal
rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights of the
petitioner are not well-defined, definite, clear, and certain,104 the petition must be
dismissed. Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers
powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed
and to perform a duty already imposed.105
In sum, bearing in mind the Court does not intervene in discretionary acts of the executive
department in the absence of grave abuse of discretion,106 and considering that
mandamus may only be issued to enforce a clear and certain legal right,107 the present
special civil action for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO issued earlier must be
lifted.
There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila.
In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission,53 the Court held that “what is
not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary
to morals, customs and public order.” This principle is fundamental in a democratic society,
to protect the weak against the strong, the minority against the majority, and the individual
citizen against the government. In essence, this principle, which is the foundation of a
civilized society under the rule of law, prescribes that the freedom to act can be curtailed
only through law. Without this principle, the rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of citizens
can be arbitrarily and whimsically trampled upon by the shifting passions of those who can
shout the loudest, or those who can gather the biggest crowd or the most number of
Internet trolls. In other instances,54the Court has allowed or upheld actions that were not
expressly prohibited by statutes when it determined that these acts were not contrary to
morals, customs, and public order, or that upholding the same would lead to a more
equitable solution to the controversy. However, it is the law itself- Articles 130655 and
9
1409(1 )56 of the Civil Code- which prescribes that acts not contrary to morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy are allowed if also not contrary to law.
In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is “contrary to
morals, customs, and public order” or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the
community. On the contrary, the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied
with the standards set under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre
de Manila project.
There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law prohibiting the
construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on the background “view, vista,
sightline, or setting” of the Rizal Monument.
Zoning, as well as land use, in the City of Manila is governed by Ordinance No. 8119. The
ordinance provides for standards and guidelines to regulate development projects of
historic sites and facilities within the City of Manila.
Specifically, Section 47 reads:
SEC. 47. Historical Preservation and Conservation Standards.- Historic sites and facilities
shall be conserved and preserved. These shall, to the extent possible, be made accessible
for the educational and cultural enrichment of the general public.
The following shall guide the development of historic sites and facilities:
Sites with historic buildings or places shall be developed to conserve and enhance their
heritage values.
Historic sites and facilities shall be adaptively re-used.
Any person who proposes to add, to alter, or partially demolish a designated heritage
property will require the approval of the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) and
shall be required to prepare a heritage impact statement that will demonstrate to the
satisfaction of CPDO that the proposal will not adversely impact the heritage significance of
the property and shall submit plans for review by the CPDO in coordination with the
National Historical Institute (NHI).
Any proposed alteration and/or re-use of designated heritage properties shall be evaluated
based on criteria established by the heritage significance of the particular property or site.
Where an owner of a heritage property applies for approval to demolish a designated
heritage property or properties, the owner shall be required to provide evidence to
satisfaction that demonstrates that rehabilitation and re-use of the property is not viable.

Any designated heritage property which is to be demolished or significantly altered shall be
thoroughly documented for archival purposes with a history, photographic records, and
measured drawings, in accordance with accepted heritage recording guidelines, prior to
demolition or alteration.
Residential and commercial infill in heritage areas will be sensitive to the existing scale and
pattern of those areas, which maintains the existing landscape and streetscape qualities of
those areas, and which does not result in the loss of any heritage resources.
Development plans shall ensure that parking facilities (surface lots, residential garages,
stand-alone parking garages and parking components as parts of larger developments) are
compatibly integrated into heritage areas, and/or are compatible with adjacent heritage
resources.
Local utility companies (hydro, gas, telephone, cable) shall be required to place metering
equipment, transformer boxes, power lines, conduit, equipment boxes, piping, wireless
telecommunication towers and other utility equipment and devices in locations which do not
detract from the visual character of heritage resources, and which do not have a negative
impact on its architectural integrity.
Design review approval shall be secured from the CPDO for any alteration of the heritage
property to ensure that design guidelines and standards are met and shall promote
preservation and conservation of the heritage property. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that the standards laid down in Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 only serve as
guides, as it expressly states that “the following shall guide the development of historic
sites and facilities.” A guide simply sets a direction or gives an instruction to be followed by
property owners and developers in order to conserve and enhance a property’s heritage
values.
On the other hand, Section 48 states:
SEC. 48. Site Performance Standards.- The City considers it in the public interest that all
projects are designed and developed in a safe, efficient and aesthetically pleasing manner.
Site development shall consider the environmental character and limitations of the site and
its adjacent properties. All project elements shall be in complete harmony according to
good design principles and the subsequent development must be visually pleasing as well
as efficiently functioning especially in relation to the adjacent properties and bordering
streets.
The design, construction, operation and maintenance of every facility shall be in harmony
with the existing and intended character of its neighborhood. It shall not change the
essential character of the said area but will be a substantial improvement to the value of the
properties in the neighborhood in particular and the community in general.
10
Furthermore, designs should consider the following:
Sites, buildings and facilities shall be designed and developed with regard to safety,
efficiency and high standards of design. The natural environmental character of the site and
its adjacent properties shall be considered in the site development of each building and
facility.
The height and bulk of buildings and structures shall be so designed that it does not impair
the entry of light and ventilation, cause the loss of privacy and/or create nuisances, hazards
or inconveniences to adjacent developments.
Abutments to adjacent properties shall not be allowed without the neighbor’s prior written
consent which shall be required by the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) prior
to the granting of a Zoning Permit (Locational Clearance).
The capacity of parking areas/ lots shall be per the minimum requirements of the National
Building Code. These shall be located, developed and landscaped in order to enhance the
aesthetic quality of the facility. In no case, shall parking areas/ lots encroach into street
rights-of- way and shall follow the Traffic Code as set by the City.
Developments that attract a significant volume of public modes of transportation, such as
tricycles, jeepneys, buses, etc., shall provide on-site parking for the same. These shall also
provide vehicular loading and unloading bays so as street traffic flow will not be impeded.
Buffers, silencers, mufflers, enclosures and other noise-absorbing materials shall be
provided to all noise and vibration-producing machinery. Noise levels shall be maintained
according to levels specified in DENR DAO No. 30- Abatement of Noise and Other Forms
of Nuisance as Defined by Law.
Glare and heat from any operation or activity shall not be radiated, seen or felt from any
point beyond the limits of the property.
No large commercial signage and/or pylon, which will be detrimental to the skyline, shall be
allowed.
Design guidelines, deeds of restriction, property management plans and other regulatory
tools that will ensure high quality developments shall be required from developers of
commercial subdivisions and condominiums. These shall be submitted to the City Planning
and Development Office (CPDO) for review and approval. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates the “development of historic sites
and facilities.” Section 48 regulates “large commercial signage and/or pylon.” There is
nothing in Sections 47 and 48 of Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the construction of
a building outside the boundaries of a historic site or facility, where such building may affect

the background of a historic site. In this case, the Torre de Manila stands 870 meters
outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument and “cannot possibly obstruct the front view
of the [Rizal] Monument.”57Likewise, the Torre de Manila is not in an area that has been
declared as an “anthropological or archeological area” or in an area designated as a
heritage zone, cultural property, historical landmark, or a national treasure by the NHCP.58
Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the subject of arts and culture,
provides that “[t]he State shall conserve, promote and popularize the nation’s historical and
cultural heritage and resources x x x.” Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress
passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation of our cultural heritage.
One such law is Republic Act No. 10066,59 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009,
which empowers the National Commission for Culture and the Arts and other cultural
agencies to issue a cease and desist order “when the physical integrity of the national
cultural treasures or important cultural properties [is] found to be in danger of destruction or
significant alteration from its original state.”60 This law declares that the State should
protect the “physical integrity” of the heritage property or building if there is “danger of
destruction or significant alteration from its original state.” Physical integrity refers to the
structure itself- how strong and sound the structure is. The same law does not mention that
another project, building, or property, not itself a heritage property or building, may be the
subject of a cease and desist order when it adversely affects the background view, vista, or
sightline of a heritage property or building. Thus, Republic Act No. 10066 cannot apply to
the Torre de Manila condominium project.
A FINAL WORD
It had been Rizal’s wish to die facing the rising sun. In his Mi Ultimo Adios, the poem he left
for his family the night before he was executed, Rizal wrote:
Yo muero cuando veo que el cielo se colora Y al fin anuncia el dia tras lobrego capuz108
[Ako y mamamatay, ngayong namamalas na sa Silanganan ay namamanaag yaong
maligayang araw na sisikat sa likod ng luksang nagtabing na ulap.]109
[I die just when I see the dawn break, Through the gloom of night, to herald the day]110
Yet at the point of his execution, he was made to stand facing West towards Manila Bay,
with his back to the firing squad, like the traitor the colonial government wished to portray
him. He asked to face his executioners, facing the East where the sun would be rising since
it was early morning, but the Spanish captain did not allow it. As he was shot and a single
bullet struck his frail body, Rizal forced himself, with his last remaining strength, to turn
around to face the East and thus he fell on his back with his face to the sky and the rising
11
sun. Then, the Spanish captain approached Rizal and finished him off with one pistol shot
to his head.
Before his death, Rizal wrote a letter to his family. He asked for a simple tomb, marked with
a cross and a stone with only his name and the date of his birth and death; no anniversary
celebrations; and interment at Paang Bundok (now, the Manila North Cemetery). Rizal
never wanted his grave to be a burden to future generations.
The letter never made it to his family and his wishes were not carried out. The letter was
discovered many years later, in 1953. By then, his remains had been entombed at the Rizal
Monument, countless anniversaries had been celebrated, with memorials and monuments
built throughout the world.
Rizal’s wish was unmistakable: to be buried without pomp or pageantry, to the point of
reaching oblivion or obscurity in the future.111 For Rizal’s life was never about fame or
vainglory, but for the country he loved dearly and for which he gave up his life.
The Rizal Monument is expressly against Rizal’s own wishes. That Rizal’s statue now
stands facing West towards Manila Bay, with Rizal’s back to the East, adds salt to the
wound. If we continue the present orientation of Rizal’s statue, with Rizal facing West, we
would be like the Spanish captain who refused Rizal’s request to die facing the rising sun in
the East. On the other hand, if Rizal’s statue is made to face East, as Rizal had desired
when he was about to be shot, the background- the blue sky above Manila Bay- would
forever be clear of obstruction, and we would be faithful to Rizal’s dying wish.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court on 16 June 2015 is LIFTED effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc (INPORT) vs. NLRC
Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc (INPORT) vs. NLRC
GR No. 103560
July 6, 1995
Facts: Petitioner’s employees stopped working and gathered in a mass action to express
their grievances regarding wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. Said employees
were all members of the Macajalar Labor Union — Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW)
with whom petitioner had an existing collective bargaining agreement.

Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at the port of Cagayan de Oro.
The strike paralyzed operations at said port.
The strikers filed individual notices of strike (“Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-
Welga”) with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment.
With the failure of conciliation conferences between petitioner and the strikers, INPORT
filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining
order/preliminary injunction.
The National Labor Relations Commission issued a temporary restraining order.
Thereafter, majority of the strikers returned to work, leaving herein private respondents who
continued their protest.
For not having complied with the formal requirements in Article 264 of the Labor
Code, 3 the strike staged by petitioner’s workers on April 30, 1985 was found by the Labor
Arbiter to be illegal. 4 The workers who participated in the illegal strike did not, however,
lose their employment, since there was no evidence that they participated in illegal acts.
After noting that petitioner accepted the other striking employees back to work, the Labor
Arbiter held that the private respondents should similarly be allowed to return to work
without having to undergo the required screening to be undertaken by their union (MLU-
FFW).
As regards the six private respondents who were union officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that
they could not have possibly been “duped or tricked” into signing the strike notice for they
were active participants in the conciliation meetings and were thus fully aware of what was
going on. Hence, said union officers should be accepted back to work after seeking
reconsideration from herein petitioner. 5
The NLRC affirmed with modification 8 the Arbiter’s decision. It held that the concerted
action by the workers was more of a “protest action” than a strike. Private respondents,
including the six union officers, should also be allowed to work unconditionally to avoid
discrimination. However, in view of the strained relations between the parties, separation
pay was awarded in lieu of reinstatement.
Upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, public respondent modified the above
resolution.
The Commission ruled that since private respondents were not actually terminated from
service, there was no basis for reinstatement. However, it awarded six months’ salary as
separation pay or financial assistance in the nature of “equitable relief.” The award for
backwages was also deleted for lack of factual and legal basis. In lieu of backwages,
compensation equivalent to P1,000.00 was given.
12
Issue: Whether separation pay and backwages be awarded by public respondent NLRC to
participants of an illegal strike?
Held: Reinstatement and backwages or, if no longer feasible, separation pay, can only be
granted if sufficient bases exist under the law, particularly after a showing of illegal
dismissal. However, while the union members may thus be entitled under the law to be
reinstated or to receive separation pay, their expulsion from the union in accordance with
the collective bargaining agreement renders the same impossible.
Ratio: A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, 13 is defined as any
temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute. 14 A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions
of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employers and employees. 15
Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on
April 30, 1985 to press for their wages and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly
a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted action resulted from a labor dispute.
The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the legality of said strike. The Arbiter
correctly ruled that the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of Article
264 (now Article 263) paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code. 16
The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not conform to the notice required by
the law to be filed since they were represented by a union (MLU-FFW) which even had an
existing collective bargaining agreement with INPORT.
Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-off period
and reporting requirements.
A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost their employment status. 20 An ordinary striking worker cannot be
terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed
illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work
when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits
an illegal act during a strike.
In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority of the striking workers, including union
officers, back to work. Private respondents were left to continue with the strike after they
refused to submit to the “screening” required by the company.

Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may
not be terminated from his employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a
strike that he may be declared to have lost his employment status. Since there appears no
proof that these union members committed illegal acts during the strike, they cannot be
dismissed. The striking union members among private respondents are thus entitled to
reinstatement, there being no just cause for their dismissal.
However, considering that a decade has already lapsed from the time the disputed strike
occurred, we find that to award separation pay in lieu of reinstatement would be more
practical and appropriate.
No backwages will be awarded to private respondent-union members as a penalty for their
participation in the illegal strike. Their continued participation in said strike, even after most
of their co-workers had returned to work, can hardly be rewarded by such an award.
The fate of private respondent-union officers is different. Their insistence on unconditional
reinstatement or separation pay and backwages is unwarranted and unjustified. For
knowingly participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a union officer may be
terminated from employment. 34
Notwithstanding the fact that INPORT previously accepted other union officers and that the
screening required by it was uncalled for, still it cannot be gainsaid that it possessed the
right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. The law, in using the
word may, grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an
illegal strike as having lost his employment. 35
Moreover, an illegal strike which, more often than not, brings about unnecessary economic
disruption and chaos in the workplace should not be countenanced by a relaxation of the
sanctions prescribed by law.
The union officers are, therefore, not entitled to any relief.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, from the foregoing premises, the petition in G.R. No. 103560
(“Gold City Integrated Port Service Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.”) is
GRANTED. One month salary for each year of service until 1985 is awarded to private
respondents who were not union officers as separation pay. The petition in G.R. No.
103599 (“Adelo Ebuna, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.”) is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
PBM Employees vs PBM
Facts:
13
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co.,
Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of
the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The
Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution
but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting
to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400
proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the
first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the
workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M.
to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of
the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for
bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble
violated.
Held:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein
private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well
as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees
with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their
right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom,
theemployees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very
survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled
enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer

loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to
2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The
employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as
they believed they were by thepeace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was
a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their
families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the
human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property
rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against policeofficers, not against
the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstratingemployees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective
bargainingagreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral
as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If
demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue
raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons
can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their
members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will
enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution.
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012
31JUL
FACTS
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte)
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her
as someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of
data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the
Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of
individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her
reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE
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Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right
to privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty
or security.
RULING
NO.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in
which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be
granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
right to life, liberty or security on the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her
supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard,
respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in
relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the
presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the
collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful
mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The
first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila),
of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent)
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs
alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued
deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License

Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the
court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did
not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the
Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment
and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary
government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration,
utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy
15
declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers
and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said
right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain
that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion,
violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the
wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid
for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-
impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by
the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral
and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of
the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC
decision is SET ASIDE.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory Construction
GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No.
4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all
surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the
Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave
municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their
municipal waters.
ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the
Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter
is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation
which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special
law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
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In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the
purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local
Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for
revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Ba
MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law)
FACTS:
The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had
fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants
(public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up
Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water
Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited
only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay.
APPLICABLE LAWS:
PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––
Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will
adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall take such
measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet
the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be
the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean - up water pollution
incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government
agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and
expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities
responsible for such pollution.
HELD:
(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned
ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations
when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to
 17

act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality
“has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.”
Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only.
The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is
well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution
incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While
the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making
process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to
be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what
other judicial discipline describes as “continuing mandamus ,” the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its
decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in

the rules of procedure for environmental cases.