G.R. No.
L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and
J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL
OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto
Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two
[2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge
Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor
of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and
that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential
Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal
of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns,
subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using the
articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and
the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to
answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7,
1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing
petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles
as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this
manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was
rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground
that petitioners had come to this Court without having previously
sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge.
Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants
before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in
the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding,
we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and
urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public
interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was
televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to
exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the
revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v.
Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to
suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of
laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search
warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition
impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse
of a period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the
delay in the filing of the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do
[p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact that
the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than
half a year after the petitioners' premises had been
raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no
other choice. If they had waited this long to bring
their case to court, it was because they tried at
first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the
past eleven fill years had taught them that
everything in this country, from release of public
funds to release of detained persons from custody,
has become a matter of executive benevolence or
largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon
suggestion of persons close to the President, like
Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President
Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking
the return at least of the printing equipment and
vehicles. And after such a letter had been sent,
through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence
and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security
Command, they were further encouraged to hope
that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners
finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-124,
Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our
judicial system, We find no ground to punish or chastise them for an
error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by
petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had
abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby
refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos,
Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the seized documents
in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from challenging
the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of
respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal
bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and
cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants
assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to
nullify the search warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct
an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision
as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .6 This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as
petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9,
1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent
judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to
search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and
784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search
Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two
search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed
therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is
based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as
instruments and means of committing the crime of
subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended
and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely,
two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose
and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite
absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants
intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the
places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the
application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the
team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might
have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than
real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b]
was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the
said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge
had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the
premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held
"that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in
the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where
the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had
issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant
intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been
said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official
court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact
that although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr.,
Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal
properties that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be
issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the
offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should
be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed.
It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the
above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is
stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one
other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the
search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it
is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has
control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and
property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties
were seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are
considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v.
Castillo9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that
machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so
when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only
a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land
and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the
case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground
remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge
upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the
P.C. Metrocom.10 The application was accompanied by the Joint
Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of
the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla
which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the
application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned
documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a
probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance
with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a
search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search
warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor
in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the
case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain
a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material
he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not
suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that
petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and
other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which
were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential
Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does
not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such
particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable
cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have
done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is
the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez
and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our
unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles
and things above-described were used and are continuously being
used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the
objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement,
Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge
by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the
issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of
First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or
his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed
before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency
established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general
warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be
seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment,
typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment,
tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the
printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE
FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive
organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE
FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored
yellow with Plate No. NKA
892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored
white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate
No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW,
colored white with Plate No.
PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up
truck with Plate No. NGV 427
with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized
the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the
U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to
"seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or
otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search
warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which
could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to
be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the
articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question
cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable
chapter in English history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor
Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were
given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to
suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan
Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it
is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or
publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no
clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and
printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these
premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship
abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even
militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of
the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing
machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or
artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the government and
its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing rules
and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National
Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be
effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and
regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was
reported that no less than President Marcos himself denied the request
of the military authorities to sequester the property seized from
petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by
government prosecutors for sequestration of the
WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses,
according to Information Minister Gregorio S.
Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents
went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City and
took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all
materials in the premises.
Cendaña said that because of the denial the
newspaper and its equipment remain at the
disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of
the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been
sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister
Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S.
Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing
alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11,
1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned
down the recommendation of our authorities to
close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate
the equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and
20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby
declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a
writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is
hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered
released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 90878 January 29, 1990
PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section
19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the
press.
On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA
AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law,
the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all
comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a
plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled
last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30,
1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27,
1989.
The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the
1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A.
6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No.
2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act
for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V.
Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW"
for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated
in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality
of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or
announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period, on
the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use
his column or radio or television time to campaign for or
against the plebiscite issues.
It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional
because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of
expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.
Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely
reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column
obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and
beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner
believes that said provision of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167
constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom
of the press and further imposes subsequent punishment for those
who may violate it because it contains a penal provision, as follows:
Article XIII, Section 122, Election Offenses and Banned Acts
or Activities. — Except to the extent that the same may not
be applicable plebiscite. the banned acts/activities and
offenses defined in and penalized by the Omnibus Election
Code ('Sections 261, 262, 263 and Article' XXII, B.P. Blg.
881) and the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6646 shall be
aplicable to the plebiscite governed by this Resolution.
Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express
their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite,
it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to disseminate
information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.
On November 28, 1989, We issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondent Commission on Elections from enforcing and
implementing Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167. We also required the
respondent to comment on the petition.
On January 9, 1990, respondent Commission on Elections, through the
Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment.
Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned provision of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is not violative of the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. Rather it is
a valid implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and
regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in
Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines.
It is stated further by respondent that Resolution 2167 does not
absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views and/or from
campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his
views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space
and airtime. This is provided under Sections 90 and 92 of BP 881:
Section 90. Comelec Space. — Commission shall procure
space in at least one newspaper of general circulation in
every province or city: Provided, however, That in the
absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any
other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which
shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates can
announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated,
free of charge equally and impartially within the area in
which the newspaper is circulated.
Section 92. Comelec Time. — The Commission shall
procure radio and television time to be known as "Comelec
Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among
the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and
television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
 broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so
as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during
the period of the campaign.
Respondent Comelec has relied much on Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution and Section 11 of R.A. 6646 as the basis for the
promulgation of the questioned Section 19 of Comelec Resolution
2167.
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The Commission may, during the election period, supervise
or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or information, all grants,
special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation
shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and
the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor,
for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Similarly, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reform
Law of 1987) likewise provides:
Prohibited forms of election Propaganda. — In addition to
the forms of election propaganda prohibited under Section
85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful: ...
(b) for any newspaper, radio, broadcasting or television
station, or other mass media, or any person making use of
the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space
or air time for campaign or other political purposes except to
the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer, or personality who is a candidate
for any elective office shall take a leave of absence from his
work as such during the campaign period. (Emphasis ours)
However, it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what
was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate
the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for
the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time
and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this
provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any
undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio
or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any
elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work
during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It
cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a
candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of
other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.
However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b),
2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has
also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise
by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders
nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has
no statutory basis.
In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where
the constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election
propaganda was assailed, We ruled therein that the prohibition is a
valid exercise of the police power of the state "to prevent the
perversion and prostitution of the electoral apparatus and of the denial
of equal protection of the laws." The evil sought to be prevented in an
election which led to Our ruling in that case does not obtain in a
plebiscite. In a plebiscite, votes are taken in an area on some special
political matter unlike in an election where votes are cast in favor of
specific persons for some office. In other words, the electorate is asked
to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a plebiscite.
Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from
expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the
organic act because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or
Comelec radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the
limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it
is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express
his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such
abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a
restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable
reason.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The
people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently
make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged
discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by
the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by
restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be
exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a
forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of
information to the public concerned because they are limited to either
specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of
Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and
unconstitutional. The restraining order herein issued is hereby made
permanent.
G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY FILM
PRODUCTIONS, petitioners,
vs.
HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 82398 April 29, 1988
HAL MCELROY petitioner,
vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 and JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Hal McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie
production company, Petitioner Ayer Productions pty Ltd. (Ayer
Productions), 1 envisioned, sometime in 1987, the for commercial
viewing and for Philippine and international release, the histolic
peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue). Petitioners discussed this Project with local movie producer
Lope V. Juban who suggested th they consult with the appropriate
government agencies and also with General Fidel V. Ramos and
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played major roles in the events
proposed to be filmed.
The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was
endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board as
wel as the other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos
also signified his approval of the intended film production.
In a letter dated 16 December 1987, petitioner Hal McElroy informed
private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion
picture enclosing a synopsis of it, the full text of which is set out below:
The Four Day Revolution is a six hour mini-series
about People Power—a unique event in modern
history that-made possible the Peaceful revolution
in the Philippines in 1986.
Faced with the task of dramatising these rerkble
events, screenwriter David Williamson and history
Prof Al McCoy have chosen a "docu-drama" style
and created [four] fictitious characters to trace the
revolution from the death of Senator Aquino, to the
Feb revolution and the fleeing of Marcos from the
country.
These character stories have been woven through
the real events to help our huge international
audience understand this ordinary period inFilipino
history.
First, there's Tony O'Neil, an American television
journalist working for major network. Tony reflects
the average American attitude to the Phihppinence
—once a colony, now the home of crucially
important military bases. Although Tony is aware
of the corruption and of Marcos' megalomania, for
him, there appears to be no alternative to Marcos
except the Communists.
Next, Angie Fox a fiery Australian photo-journalist.
A 'new girl in town,' she is quickly caught up in the
events as it becomes dear that the time has come
 for a change. Through Angle and her relationship
with one of the Reform Army Movement Colonels
(a fictitious character), we follow the developing
discontent in the armed forces. Their dislike for
General Ver, their strong loyalty to Defense
Minister Enrile, and ultimately their defection from
Marcos.
The fourth fictitious character is Ben Balano, a
middle-aged editor of a Manila newspaper who
despises the Marcos regime and is a supporter an
promoter of Cory Aquino. Ben has two daughters,
Cehea left wing lawyer who is a secret member of
the New People's Army, and Eva--a -P.R. girl,
politically moderate and very much in love with
Tony. Ultimately, she must choose between her
love and the revolution.
Through the interviews and experiences of these
central characters, we show the complex nature of
Filipino society, and thintertwining series of events
and characters that triggered these remarkable
changes. Through them also, we meet all of the
principal characters and experience directly
dramatic recreation of the revolution. The story
incorporates actual documentary footage filmed
during the period which we hope will capture the
unique atmosphere and forces that combined to
overthrow President Marcos.
David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright
with some 14 hugely successful plays to his
credit(Don's Party,' 'The Club,' Travelling North)
and 11 feature films (The Year of Living
Dangerously,' Gallipoli,' 'Phar Lap').
Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales)
is an American historian with a deep
understanding of the Philippines, who has worked
on the research for this project for some 18
months. Together with Davi Wilhamgon they have
developed a script we believe accurately depicts
the complex issues and events that occurred
during th period .
The six hour series is a McElroy and McElroy co-
production with Home Box Office in American, the
Australian Broadcast Corporation in Australia and
Zenith Productions in the United Kingdom
The proposed motion picture would be essentially a re-enact. ment of
the events that made possible the EDSA revolution; it is designed to be
viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-
drama" style, creating four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real
events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background.
On 21 December 1987, private respondent Enrile replied that "[he]
would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction
and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his
family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for
advertising or commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners
that 'in the production, airing, showing, distribution or exhibition of said
or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or
visual) should not be made to [him] or any member of his family, much
less to any matter purely personal to them.
It appears that petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of
private respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and
petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture.
On 23 February 1988, private respondent filed a Complaint with
application for Temporary Restraining Order and Wilt of Pretion with
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-151
in Branch 134 thereof, seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the
movie "The Four Day Revolution". The complaint alleged that
petitioners' production of the mini-series without private respondent's
consent and over his objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his
right of privacy. On 24 February 1988, the trial court issued ex-parte a
Temporary Restraining Order and set for hearing the application for
preliminary injunction.
On 9 March 1988, Hal McElroy flied a Motion to Dismiss with
Opposition to the Petition for Preliminary Injunction contending that the
mini-series fim would not involve the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile
nor that of his family and that a preliminary injunction would amount to
a prior restraint on their right of free expression. Petitioner Ayer
Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause
of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed.
In an Order 2 dated 16 March 1988, respondent court issued a writ of
Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners, the dispositive portion of
which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued, ordering defendants, and all persons
and entities employed or under contract with them,
including actors, actresses and members of the
production staff and crew as well as all persons
and entities acting on defendants' behalf, to cease
and desist from producing and filming the mini-
series entitled 'The Four Day Revolution" and from
making any reference whatsoever to plaintiff or his
family and from creating any fictitious character in
lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or
bears rent substantial or marked resemblance or
similarity to, or is otherwise Identifiable with,
plaintiff in the production and any similar film or
photoplay, until further orders from this Court,
upon plaintiff's filing of a bond in the amount of P
2,000,000.00, to answer for whatever damages
defendants may suffer by reason of the injunction
if the Court should finally decide that plaintiff was
not entitled thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
On 22 March 1988, petitioner Ayer Productions came to this Court by a
Petition for certiorari dated 21 March 1988 with an urgent prayer for
Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, which petition was
docketed as G.R. No. L-82380.
A day later, or on 23 March 1988, petitiioner Hal McElroy also filed
separate Petition for certiorari with Urgent Prayer for a Restraining
Order or Preliminary Injunction, dated 22 March 1988, docketed as
G.R. No. L-82398.
By a Resolution dated 24 March 1988, the petitions were consolidated
and private respondent was required to file a consolidated Answer.
Further, in the same Resolution, the Court granted a Temporary
Restraining Order partially enjoining the implementation of the
respondent Judge's Order of 16 March 1988 and the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued therein, and allowing the petitioners to
resume producing and filming those portions of the projected mini-
series which do not make any reference to private respondent or his
family or to any fictitious character based on or respondent.
Private respondent seasonably filed his Consolidated Answer on 6
April 1988 invoking in the main a right of privacy.
I
The constitutional and legal issues raised by the present Petitions are
sharply drawn. Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The Four Day
Revolution," they are exercising their freedom of speech and of
expression protected under our Constitution. Private respondent, upon
the other hand, asserts a right of privacy and claims that the production
and filming of the projected mini-series would constitute an unlawful
intrusion into his privacy which he is entitled to enjoy.
Considering first petitioners' claim to freedom of speech and of
expression the Court would once more stress that this freedom
includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit
such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television.
In our day and age, motion pictures are a univesally utilized vehicle of
communication and medium Of expression. Along with the press, radio
and television, motion pictures constitute a principal medium of mass
communication for information, education and entertainment.
In Gonzales v. Katigbak, 3former Chief Justice Fernando, speaking for
the Court, explained:
1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium
for the communication of Ideas and the expression
of the artistic impulse. Their effect on the
perception by our people of issues and public
officials or public figures as well as the pre cultural
traits is considerable. Nor as pointed out
in Burstyn v. Wilson(343 US 495 [19421) is the
Importance of motion pictures as an organ of
public opinion lessened by the fact that they are
designed to entertain as well as to inform' (Ibid,
501). There is no clear dividing line between what
involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If
such a distinction were sustained, there is a
diminution of the basic right to free expression. ...4
This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to
foreign-owned motion picture companies. Furthermore the
circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a
commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a
disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. In
our community as in many other countries, media facilities are owned
either by the government or the private sector but the private sector-
owned media facilities commonly require to be sustained by being
devoted in whole or in pailt to revenue producing activities. Indeed,
commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our
country and hence to exclude commercially owned and operated
media from the exerciseof constitutionally protected om of speech and
of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such
constitutional liberties in our country.
The counter-balancing of private respondent is to a right of privacy. It
was demonstrated sometime ago by the then Dean Irene R. Cortes
that our law, constitutional and statutory, does include a right of
privacy. 5 It is left to case law, however, to mark out the precise scope
and content of this right in differing types of particular situations. The
right of privacy or "the right to be let alone," 6 like the right of free
expression, is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person's
privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a
public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be
published about him constitute of apublic character. 7 Succinctly put,
the right of privacy cannot be invoked resist publication and
dissemination of matters of public interest. 8 The interest sought to be
protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free
from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private
affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of
legitimate public concern. 9
Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 10 on which private respondent relies
heavily, recognized a right to privacy in a context which included a
claim to freedom of speech and of expression. Lagunzad involved a
suit fortion picture producer as licensee and the widow and family of
the late Moises Padilla as licensors. This agreement gave the licensee
the right to produce a motion Picture Portraying the life of Moises
Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the
Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental during the November
1951 elections and for whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson, a
member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and
convicted. 11 In the judgment of the lower court enforcing the licensing
agreement against the licensee who had produced the motion picture
and exhibited it but refused to pay the stipulated royalties, the Court,
through Justice Melencio-Herrera, said:
Neither do we agree with petitioner's subon that
the Licensing Agreement is null and void for lack
of, or for having an illegal cause or consideration,
while it is true that petitioner bad pled the rights to
the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that
did not dispense with the need for prior consent
and authority from the deceased heirs to portray
publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in
that of his mother and the member of his family.
As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, ([1895],147 NY
434,42 NE 31 LRA 286.49 Am St Rep 671), 'a
privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a
deperson to protect his memory, but the privilege
wts for the benefit of the living, to protect their
feelings and to preventa violation of their own
rights in the character and memory of the
deceased.'
Petitioners averment that private respondent did
not have any property right over the life of Moises
Padilla since the latter was a public figure, is
neither well taken. Being a public figure ipso facto
does not automatically destroy in toto a person's
right to privacy. The right to invade a person's
privacy to disseminate public information does not
extend to a fictional or novelized representation of
a person, no matter how public a he or she may
be (Garner v. Triangle Publications, DCNY 97 F.
Supp., SU 549 [1951]). In the case at bar, while it
is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a
true-to-life Story Of Moises Padilla, petitioner
admits that he included a little romance in the film
because without it, it would be a drab story of
torture and brutality. 12
In Lagunzad, the Court had need, as we have in the instant case, to
deal with contraposed claims to freedom of speech and of expression
and to privacy. Lagunzad the licensee in effect claimed, in the name of
freedom of speech and expression, a right to produce a motion picture
biography at least partly "fictionalized" of Moises Padilla without the
consent of and without paying pre-agreed royalties to the widow and
family of Padilla. In rejecting the licensee's claim, the Court said:
Lastly, neither do we find merit in petitioners
contention that the Licensing Agreement infringes
on the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and of the press, in that, as a citizen and as a
newspaperman, he had the right to express his
thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla
without prior restraint.The right freedom of
expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position
in the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine
Blooming Mills Employees Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191
[1963]). It is not, however, without limitations. As
held in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27
SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
xxx xxx xxx
The prevailing doctine is that the clear and present
danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion
for permissible limitation on freedom of speech
and the press, which includes such vehicles of the
mass media as radio, television and the movies, is
the "balancing of interest test" (Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970
ed. p. 79). The principle "requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in given situation
or type of situation" (Separation Opinion of the late
Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission
on Elections, supra, p. 899).
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the
right to privacy asserted by respondent and the
right of freedom of expression invoked by
petitioner. taking into account the interplay of
those interests, we hold that under the particular
circumstances presented, and considering the
obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement
entered into by petitioner, the validity of such
agreement will have to be upheld particularly
because the limits of freedom of expression are
reached when expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern." 13
Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present
danger test" be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court
believes that a different conclusion must here be reached: The
production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture
"The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case,
constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of
privacy."
1. It may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the instant
case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the respondent Judge
upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. The
respondent Judge has restrained petitioners from filming and
producing the entire proposed motion picture. It is important to note
that in Lagunzad, there was no prior restrain of any kind imposed upon
the movie producer who in fact completed and exhibited the film
biography of Moises Padilla. Because of the speech and of expression,
a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates. 14 The invalidity of a
measure of prior restraint doesnot, of course, mean that no
subsequent liability may lawfully be imposed upon a person claiming to
exercise such constitutional freedoms. The respondent Judge should
have stayed his hand, instead of issuing an ex-parte Temporary
Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by the private
respondent and issuing a Preliminary Injunction twenty (20) days later;
for the projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not
exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the
respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely
look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of
any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could
lawfully assert.
2. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-
bloody change of government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue in February 1986, and the trian of events which led up to that
denouement. Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and
concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners' argue, of international interest. The
subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of this
countryand as such, must be regarded as having passed into the
public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and
expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The subject
mater, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and
quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to
the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile. Unlike in Lagunzad,
which concerned the life story of Moises Padilla necessarily including
at least his immediate family, what we have here is not a film
biography, more or less fictionalized, of private respondent Ponce
Enrile. "The Four Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it
focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to
be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the
precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government in
February 1986.
3. The extent of the instrusion upon the life of private respondent Juan
Ponce Enrile that would be entailed by the production and exhibition of
"The Four Day Revolution" would, therefore, be limited in character.
The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of
the proposed film, may be generally described as such intrusion as is
reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account.
Private respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict
in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private
respondent or that of any member of his family.
4. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of
public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place,
private respondent was what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred
to as a "public figure:"
A public figure has been defined as a person who,
by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living,
or by adopting a profession or calling which gives
the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his
affairs, and his character, has become a 'public
personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity.
Obviously to be included in this category are those
who have achieved some degree of reputation by
appearing before the public, as in the case of an
actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or
any other entertainment. The list is, however,
broader than this. It includes public
officers, famous inventors and explorers, war
heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant
prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand
Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short,
anyone who has arrived at a position where public
attention is focused upon him as a person.
Such public figures were held to have lost, to
some extent at least, their tight to privacy. Three
reasons were given, more or less indiscrimately, in
the decisions" that they had sought publicity and
consented to it, and so could not complaint when
they received it; that their personalities and their
affairs has already public, and could no longer be
regarded as their own private business; and that
the press had a privilege, under the Constitution,
to inform the public about those who have become
legitimate matters of public interest. On one or
another of these grounds, and sometimes all, it
was held that there was no liability when they were
given additional publicity, as to matters legitimately
within the scope of the public interest they had
aroused.
The privilege of giving publicity to news, and other
matters of public interest, was held to arise out of
the desire and the right of the public to know what
is going on in the world, and the freedom of the
press and other agencies of information to tell
it. "News" includes all events and items of
information which are out of the ordinary hum-
drum routine, and which have 'that indefinable
quality of information which arouses public
attention.' To a very great extent the press, with its
experience or instinct as to what its readers will
want, has succeeded in making its own
definination of news, as a glance at any morning
newspaper will sufficiently indicate. It includes
homicide and othe crimes, arrests and police
raides, suicides, marriages and divorces,
accidents, a death from the use of narcotics, a
woman with a rare disease, the birth of a child to a
twelve year old girl, the reappearance of one
supposed to have been murdered years ago, and
undoubtedly many other similar matters of
genuine, if more or less deplorable, popular
appeal.
The privilege of enlightening the public was not,
however, limited, to the dissemination of news in
the scene of current events. It extended also to
information or education, or even entertainment
and amusement, by books, articles, pictures, films
and broadcasts concerning interesting phases of
human activity in general, as well as the
reproduction of the public scene in newsreels and
travelogues. In determining where to draw the line,
the courts were invited to exercise a species of
censorship over what the public may be permitted
to read; and they were understandably liberal in
allowing the benefit of the doubt. 15
Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because, inter alia, of
his participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of the
change of government in February 1986. Because his participation
therein was major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful
revolution that fails to make reference to the role played by private
respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a
"public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.
Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private
citizenship. he continues to be a "public figure." After a successful
political campaign during which his participation in the EDSA
Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the press, radio and
television, he sits in a very public place, the Senate of the Philippines.
5. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case
between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and
the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that
the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events. There must, in other words, be no knowing or
reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private
respondent in the EDSA Revolution. 16 There must, further, be no
presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and
certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. 17
The proposed motion picture should not enter into what Mme. Justice
Melencio-Herrera in Lagunzad referred to as "matters of essentially
private concern." 18 To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution"
limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the
EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably
related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into
private respondent's privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and
actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even without a license
from private respondent.
II
In a Manifestation dated 30 March 1988, petitioner Hal McElroy
informed this Court that a Temporary Restraining Order dated 25
March 1988, was issued by Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 88-413, entitled
"Gregorio B. Honasan vs. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd., McElroy Film
Productions, Hal McElroy, Lope Juban and PMP Motion for Pictures
Production" enjoining him and his production company from further
filimg any scene of the projected mini-series film. Petitioner alleged
that Honasan's complaint was a "scissors and paste" pleading, cut out
straight grom the complaint of private respondent Ponce Enrile in Civil
Case No. 88-151. Petitioner Ayer Productions, in a separate
Manifestation dated 4 April 1988, brought to the attention of the Court
the same information given by petitoner Hal McElroy, reiterating that
the complaint of Gregorio B. Honasan was substantially identical to
that filed by private respondent herein and stating that in refusing to
join Honasan in Civil Case No. 88-151, counsel for private respondent,
with whom counsel for Gregorio Honasan are apparently associated,
deliberately engaged in "forum shopping."
Private respondent filed a Counter-Manifestation on 13 April 1988
stating that the "slight similarity" between private respondent's
complaint and that on Honasan in the construction of their legal basis
of the right to privacy as a component of the cause of action is
understandable considering that court pleadings are public records;
that private respondent's cause of action for invasion of privacy is
separate and distinct from that of Honasan's although they arose from
the same tortious act of petitioners' that the rule on permissive joinder
of parties is not mandatory and that, the cited cases on "forum
shopping" were not in point because the parties here and those in Civil public concern shall be
Case No. 88-413 are not identical. recognized. Access to official
For reasons that by now have become clear, it is not necessary for the records, and to documents
Court to deal with the question of whether or not the lawyers of private and papers pertaining to
respondent Ponce Enrile have engaged in "forum shopping." It is, official acts, transactions or
however, important to dispose to the complaint filed by former Colonel decisions, shall be afforded
Honasan who, having refused to subject himself to the legal processes the citizen subject to such
of the Republic and having become once again in fugitive from justice, limitation as may be provided
must be deemed to have forfeited any right the might have had to by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).
protect his privacy through court processes. We trust that within five (5) days from receipt
WHEREFORE, hereof we will receive your favorable response on
a) the Petitions for Certiorari are GRANTED DUE COURSE, and the the matter.
Order dated 16 March 1988 of respondent trial court granting a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is hereby SET ASIDE. The limited Temporary
Restraining Order granted by this Court on 24 March 1988 is hereby
MODIFIED by enjoining unqualifiedly the implementation of respondent
Judge's Order of 16 March 1988 and made PERMANENT, and
b) Treating the Manifestations of petitioners dated 30 March 1988 and
4 April 1988 as separate Petitions for Certiorari with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, the Court, in the exercise
of its plenary and supervisory jurisdiction, hereby REQUIRES Judge
Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147,
forthwith to DISMISS Civil Case No. 88-413 and accordingly to SET
ASIDE and DISSOLVE his Temporary Restraining Order dated 25
March 1988 and any Preliminary Injunction that may have been issued
by him.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989
RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL
CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN
GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA,
PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO
FADUL, petitioners,
vs.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his co-petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

CORTES, J.:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be
directed:

(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang

Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who
were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady
Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject
information. (Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing supplied.]
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent
Belmonte the following letter:
June 4, 1986
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte
GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila
Sir:
As a lawyer, member of the media and plain
citizen of our Republic, I am requesting that I be
furnished with the list of names of the opposition
members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were
able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on
guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We
understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one
of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be
furnished with the certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in
connection herewith shall be borne by us.
If we could not secure the above documents could
we have access to them?
We are premising the above request on the
following provision of the Freedom Constitution of
the present regime.
The right of the people to
information on matters of
[Rollo, p. 7.]
To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS
replied:
June 17, 1986
Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte
108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City
Dear Compañero:
Possibly because he must have thought that it
contained serious legal implications, President &
General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred
to me for study and reply your letter to him of June
4, 1986 requesting a list of the opposition
members of Batasang Pambansa who were able
to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on
guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
My opinion in this regard is that a confidential
relationship exists between the GSIS and all those
who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the
GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this
confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for
the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so
ordered by the courts.
 As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the
image of the GSIS as a reputable financial
institution, I regret very much that at this time we
cannot respond positively to your request.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO
Deputy General Counsel
[Rollo, p. 40.]
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the
Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General
Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying
that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves
free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our
desired objective in pursuance of public interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the
instant suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that
137 former members of the defunct interim and regular Batasang
Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were granted
housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.]
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the
Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the
petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their
memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are
reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however,
did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore
asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then
petitioners have no cause of action.
To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal
issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought,
by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued
that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party
can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have
exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law.
The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not
entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have
been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which
is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board,
106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July
30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270,
May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which
requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts
more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as
it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from
the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We
now address ourselves to the issue of whether or not mandamus hes
to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be
done, in pursuance of their right to information.
We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to
be done, both of which involve the issue of whether or not petitioners
are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by
the GSIS.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy
directly involving the constitutional right to information. In Tañada v.
Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24,1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent
case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29,
1987,150 SCRA 530, the Court upheld the people's constitutional right
to be informed of matters of public interest and ordered the
government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the
petitioners.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7
which states:
The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973
Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which provided:
The right of the people to information on 'matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political,
moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free
exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the
democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The
cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of
power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental
agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner
workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims
and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The
postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the
Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of
governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to
such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations
prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the
Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right
to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of information the
disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is not
only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of
access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered
nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. For
an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing
dialogue or process of communication between the government and
the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free
political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue
can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and
thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in
the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information
relating thereto can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to
speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to
information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in
application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press.
Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure * and honesty in the
public service. ** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the
citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking
abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not
absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the people's right to information is
limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of
full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest," and
is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the
information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern," and is not
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee
[Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.]
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public
interest" and "public concern". As observed in Legazpi:
In determining whether or not a particular
information is of public concern there is no rigid
test which can be applied. "Public concern" like
"public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum
of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the
interest of an ordinary citezen. In the final analysis,
it is for the courts to determine on a case by case
basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
[Ibid. at p. 541]
In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered by the
constitutional right to information was the need for adequate notice to
the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and
conduct of citezens. In Legaspi, it was the "legitimate concern of
citezensof ensure that government positions requiring civil service
eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles" [Supra at p.
539.]
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports
that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the
opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS
immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the
intercession of th eformer First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its
employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the
benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character.
More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for
annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and
other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as
well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes
or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is
expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict
compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one
of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (C.A. No.
186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the
actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System" [Second
Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent
himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'"
[Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to
ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of
maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government
employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for
the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that
the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and
that an its transactions were above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the
public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information
sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be
enforced through mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information
sought must not be among those excluded by law.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between
the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality
restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information.
Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the
privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this
petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of
policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only
declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our
system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the
political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as
the repository of all State power.
Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which
is equally protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the
documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed
outside the ambit of the right to information.
There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected.
In the landmark case of Morfe v. Mutuc [130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22
SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando,
stated:
... The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This
is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. UItimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of
his life, is the hallmark of the absolute. state, In
contrast, a system of limited government
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of
this private sector — protection, in other words, of
the dignity and integrity of the individual — has
become increasingly important as modem society
has developed. All the forces of technological age
— industrialization, urbanization, and organization
— operate to narrow the area of privacy and
facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of
private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society." [at pp. 444-
445.]
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the
privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to
information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests
of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the
above-quoted statement of the Court in Morfe is that the right to
privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to
public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right
cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the
case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)],
a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis
of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the
party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent,
invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal
in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W.
285, 46 L.RA. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E.
22, 31 L.R.A. 286 (1895)), and hence may be invoked only by the
person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned
borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their
right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the
time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied
that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness,
public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in
government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to
ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny
[Cf.Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and
82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen v. Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).]
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan
transactions of the GSIS are private in nature and hence, are not
covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions" only.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation
performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the
people's right of access to official records.
It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is
merely incidental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions
are not covered by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and
the right to information which is applicable only to "official"
transactions.
First of all, the "constituent — ministrant" dichotomy characterizing
government function has long been repudiated. In ACCFA v.
Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and
Offices (G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30
SCRA 6441, the Court said that the government, whether carrying out
its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the
same function of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a
proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions
from the coverage and scope of the right to information.
Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission
of 1986, to include government-owned and controlled corporations and
transactions entered into by them within the coverage of the State
policy of fun public disclosure is manifest from the records of the
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Suarez is
recognized.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. May I ask the
Gentleman a few question?
MR. OPLE. Very gladly.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
When we declare a "policy of
full public disclosure of all its
transactions" — referring to
 the transactions of the State
— and when we say the
"State" which I suppose would
include all of the various
agencies, departments,
ministries and
instrumentalities of the
government....
MR. OPLE. Yes, and individual public officers, Mr.
Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. Including government-owned and
controlled corporations.
MR. OPLE. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be
distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever,
does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of
the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and,
therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a
consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to
the consummation of the transaction.
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national
interest.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional Commission
24-25.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though
not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and
considering further that government-owned and controlled
corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental
functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that
transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled
corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the
people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing
loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the
latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination,
to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that
undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may
be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the
records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at
p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to
the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners,
is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought
by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant
thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution
does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue
that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the
thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to
perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to
perform the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia,
G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v.
Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The
request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no
duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent
General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System is
ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records
evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang
Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable
regulations as to the time and manner of inspection, not incompatible
with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.
SO ORDERED.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and
MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO, (in his capacity as chairman
of the PCGG), respondents. GLORIA A. JOPSON, CELNAN
A. JOPSON, SCARLET A. JOPSON, and TERESA A.
JOPSON, petitioners-in-intervention.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J:
Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the
people�s constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern.� Does this right include access to the terms of government
negotiations prior to their consummation or conclusion?� May the
government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), be required to reveal the proposed terms of a compromise agreement
with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth?� More
specifically, are the �General Agreement� and �Supplemental
Agreement,� both dated December 28, 1993 and executed between the
PCGG and the Marcos heirs, valid and binding?
The Case
These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking (1) to
prohibit and �[e]njoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately
entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos� x x x� relating to and concerning the
properties and assets of� Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or
abroad -- including the so-called Marcos gold hoard�; and (2) to �[c]ompel
respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing
or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and
agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs.�[1]
The Facts
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as �taxpayer, citizen and former
government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their
cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the
systematic subjugation of the country�s economy,� alleges that what
impelled him to bring this action were several news reports[2] bannered in a
number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997.� These news items
referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets
deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported
execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the
Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information [3] and the
correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving
the national interest,[4] demands that respondents make public any and all
negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG�s task of recovering the
Marcoses� ill-gotten wealth.� He claims that any compromise on the
alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of �paramount public
interest,� since it has a �debilitating effect on the country�s economy�
that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino
people.� Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions
or deals being contrived and effected by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise
agreement with the Marcos heirs.� They claim, though, that petitioner�s
action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG
to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements.� And even if he has, PCGG
may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms
and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the
subject Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No.
141, entitled Republic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos,and that the Republic
opposed such move on the principal grounds that (1) said Agreements have
not been ratified by or even submitted to the President for approval, pursuant
to Item No. 8 of the General Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed
to comply with their undertakings therein, particularly the collation and
submission of an inventory of their assets.� The Republic also cited an April
11, 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the Sandiganbayan
dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses� attorney-in-fact.
Furthermore, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in his May 4, 1998
Memorandum[5] to then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo,
categorically stated:
�This is to reiterate my previous position embodied in the Palace Press
Release of 6 April 1995 that I have not authorized you to approve the
Compromise Agreements of December 28, 1993 or any agreement at all with
the Marcoses, and would have disapproved them had they been submitted to
me.
�The Full Powers of Attorney of March 1994 and July 4, 1994, did not
authorize you to approve said Agreements, which I reserve for myself as
President of the Republic of the Philippines.�
The assailed principal Agreement[6] reads:
�GENERAL AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Agreement entered into this 28th day of December, 1993, by and
between -
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), a governmental
agency vested with authority defined under Executive Orders
Nos. 1, 2 and 14, with offices at the Philcomcen Building,
Pasig, Metro Manila, represented by its Chairman referred to as
the FIRST PARTY,
--� and� --
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by Imelda
Romualdez Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., all of legal
age, and with address at c/o No. 154 Lopez Rizal St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and Imelda Romualdez Marcos,
Imee Marcos Manotoc, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Jr., and Irene
Marcos Araneta, hereinafter collectively referred to as the
PRIVATE PARTY.
W I T N E S S E T H:
WHEREAS, the PRIVATE PARTY has been impelled by their sense of
nationalism and love of country and of the entire Filipino people, and their
desire to set up a foundation and finance impact projects like installation of
power plants in selected rural areas and initiation of other community projects
for the empowerment of the people;
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss
Federal Tribunal of December 21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in
principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities
are met, but even after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to
procure a final judgment of conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY;
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY is desirous of avoiding a long-drawn out
litigation which, as proven by the past 7 years, is consuming money, time and
effort, and is counter-productive and ties up assets which the FIRST PARTY
could otherwise utilize for its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and
other urgent needs;
WHEREAS, His Excellency, President Fidel V. Ramos, has adopted a policy
of unity and reconciliation in order to bind the nation�s wounds and start the
process of rebuilding this nation as it goes on to the twenty-first century;
WHEREAS, this Agreement settles all claims and counterclaims which the
parties may have against one another, whether past, present, or future,
matured or inchoate.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants set
forth herein, the parties agree as follows:
1.� The parties will collate all assets presumed to be owned by,
or held by other parties for the benefit of, the PRIVATE
PARTY for purposes of determining the totality of the
assets covered by the settlement.� The subject assets shall
be classified by the nature thereof, namely:� (a) real estate;
(b) jewelry; (c) paintings and other works of art; (d)
securities; (e) funds on deposit; (f) precious metals, if any,
and (g) miscellaneous assets or assets which could not
appropriately fall under any of the preceding
classification.� The list shall be based on the full disclosure
of the PRIVATE PARTY to insure its accuracy.
2.� Based on the inventory, the FIRST PARTY shall determine
which shall be ceded to the FIRST PARTY, and which shall
be assigned to/retained by the PRIVATE PARTY.� The
assets of the PRIVATE PARTY shall be net of, and exempt
from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the
Philippines.� However, considering the unavailability of
all pertinent and relevant documents and information as to
balances and ownership, the actual specification of assets to
be retained by the PRIVATE PARTY shall be covered by
supplemental agreements which shall form part of this
Agreement.
3.� Foreign assets which the PRIVATE PARTY shall fully
disclose but which are held by trustees, nominees, agents or
foundations are hereby waived over by the PRIVATE
PARTY in favor of the FIRST PARTY.� For this purpose,
the parties shall cooperate in taking the appropriate action,
judicial and/or extrajudicial, to recover the same for the
FIRST PARTY.
4.� All disclosures of assets made by the PRIVATE PARTY
shall not be used as evidence by the FIRST PARTY in any
criminal, civil, tax or administrative case, but shall be valid
and binding against said PARTY for use by the FIRST
PARTY in withdrawing any account and/or recovering any
asset.� The PRIVATE PARTY withdraws any objection to
the withdrawal by and/or release to the FIRST PARTY by
the Swiss banks and/or Swiss authorities of the $356
million, its accrued interests, and/or any other account; over
which the PRIVATE PARTY waives any right, interest or
participation in favor of the FIRST PARTY.� However,
any withdrawal or release of any account aforementioned by
the FIRST PARTY shall be made in the presence of any
authorized representative of the PRIVATE PARTY.
5.� The trustees, custodians, safekeepers, depositaries, agents,
nominees, administrators, lawyers, or any other party acting
in similar capacity in behalf of the PRIVATE PARTY are
hereby informed through this General Agreement to insure
that it is fully implemented and this shall serve as absolute
authority from both parties for full disclosure to the FIRST
PARTY of said assets and for the FIRST PARTY to
withdraw said account and/or assets and any other assets
which the FIRST PARTY on its own or through the help of
the PRIVATE PARTY/their trustees, etc., may discover.
6.� Any asset which may be discovered in the future as
belonging to the PRIVATE PARTY or is being held by
another for the benefit of the PRIVATE PARTY and which
is not included in the list per No. 1 for whatever reason shall
automatically belong to the FIRST PARTY, and the
PRIVATE PARTY in accordance with No. 4 above, waives
any right thereto.
7.� This Agreement shall be binding on, and inure to the
benefit of, the parties and their respective legal
representatives, successors and assigns and shall supersede
any other prior agreement.
8.� The PARTIES shall submit this and any other
implementing Agreements to the President of the
Philippines for approval.� In the same manner, the
PRIVATE PARTY shall provide the FIRST PARTY
assistance by way of testimony or deposition on any
information it may have that could shed light on the cases
being pursued by the FIRST PARTY against other
parties.� The FIRST PARTY shall desist from instituting
new suits already subject of this Agreement against the
PRIVATE PARTY and cause the dismissal of all other
cases pending in the Sandiganbayan and in other courts.
9.� In case of violation by the PRIVATE PARTY of any of the
conditions herein contained, the PARTIES shall be restored
automatically to the status quo ante the signing of this
Agreement.
For purposes of this Agreement, the PRIVATE PARTY shall be represented
by Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., as their only Attorney-in-Fact.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this instrument this 28th
day of December, 1993, in Makati, Metro Manila.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT
By:
[Sgd.] MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO
Chairman
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, IMELDA R.
MARCOS, MA. IMELDA
MARCOS-MANOTOC,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR.,
& IRENE MARCOS-
ARANETA
By:
[Sgd.]IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-
MARCOS
[Sgd.] MA. IMELDA
MARCOS-MANOTOC
FERDINAND R. MARCOS,
JR.[7]
[Sgd.] IRENE MARCOS-
ARANETA
Assisted by:
[Sgd.] ATTY. SIMEON M.
MESINA, JR.
Counsel & Attorney-in-
Fact�
Petitioner also denounces this supplement to the above Agreement: [8]
�SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT
This Agreement entered into this 28th day of December, 1993, by and
between --
 The Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential On August 19, 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), a governmental Jopson, filed before the Court a Motion for Intervention, attaching thereto
agency vested with authority defined under Executive Orders their Petition in Intervention.� They aver that they are �among the 10,000
Nos. 1, 2 and 14, with offices at the Philcomcen Building, claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos Family and/or the Marcos
Pasig, Metro Manila, represented by its Chairman Magtanggol Estate is recognized by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,
C. Gunigundo, hereinafter referred to as the FIRST PARTY, Human Rights Litigation, Maximo Hilao, et al., Class Plaintiffs No. 92-15526,
-- and -- U.S. Court of Appeals� for the 9th Circuit� US App. Lexis 14796, June 16,
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by Imelda 1994 and the Decision of the Swiss Supreme Court of December 10,
Romualdez Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., all of legal 1997.�� As such, they claim to have personal and direct interest in the
age, and with address at c/o No. 154 Lopez Rizal St., subject matter of the instant case, since a distribution or disposition of the
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and Imelda Romualdez Marcos, Marcos properties may adversely affect their legitimate claims.� In a minute
Imee Marcos Manotoc, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Jr., and Irene Resolution issued on August 24, 1998, the Court granted their motion to
Marcos Araneta, hereinafter collectively referred to as the intervene and required the respondents to comment thereon.� The September
PRIVATE PARTY. 25, 1998 Comment[12] of the solicitor general on said motion merely reiterated
W I T N E S S E T H: his aforecited arguments against the main petition.[13]
The parties in this case entered into a General Agreement dated The Court�s Ruling
Dec. 28, 1993; The petition is imbued with merit.
The PRIVATE PARTY expressly reserve their right to pursue First Procedural Issue:� Petitioner�s Standing
their interest and/or sue over local assets located in the Petitioner, on the one hand, explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he
Philippines against parties other than the FIRST PARTY.
has the legal personality to file the instant petition.� He submits that since ill-
The parties hereby agree that all expenses related to the
gotten wealth �belongs to the Filipino people and [is], in truth and in fact,
recovery and/or withdrawal of all assets including lawyers�
part of the public treasury,� any compromise in relation to it would constitute
fees, agents� fees, nominees� service fees, bank charges,
a diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose
traveling expenses and all other expenses related thereto shall be
interest is for a full, if not substantial, recovery of such assets.�
for the account of the PRIVATE PARTY.
Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE
PARTY shall be entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be wealth of the Marcoses is an issue �of transcendental importance to the
eventually withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits. public.�� He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this instrument this 28th prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government
day of December, 1993, in Makati, Metro Manila. agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are �of paramount public
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON interest;� and if they �immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral
GOOD GOVERNMENT well-being of the people.��
By: Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
[Sgd.] MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO personal interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
Chairman right,[14] such as in this case.� He invokes several decisions[15] of this Court
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of
MARCOS, IMELDA R. the case involved public interest.
MARCOS, MA. IMELDA On the other hand, the solicitor general, on behalf of respondents,
MARCOS-MANOTOC, contends that petitioner has no standing to institute the present action, because
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., no expenditure of public funds is involved and said petitioner has no actual
& IRENE MARCOS- interest in the alleged agreement.� Respondents further insist that the instant
ARANETA petition is premature, since there is no showing that petitioner has requested
By: PCGG to disclose any such negotiations and agreements; or that, if he has, the
[Sgd.] IMELDA ROMUALDEZ- Commission has refused to do so.
MARCOS Indeed, the arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling
[Sgd.] MA. IMELDA decisional rule as regards his legal standing to institute the instant
MARCOS-MANOTOC petition.� Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, real parties in interest are the people themselves.[16]
JR.[9] In Ta�ada v. Tuvera,[17] the Court asserted that when the issue
[Sgd.] IRENE MARCOS- concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the
ARANETA enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in
Assisted by: interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is
[Sgd.] ATTY. SIMEON M. interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal
MESINA, JR. or special interest in the result of the action.[18] In the aforesaid case, the
� Counsel & Attorney- petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters of public
in-Fact� concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Acting on a motion of petitioner, the Court issued a Temporary Constitution,[19] in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and
Restraining Order[10] dated March 23, 1998, enjoining respondents, their enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
agents and/or representatives from �entering into, or perfecting and/or promulgated.� In ruling for the petitioners� legal standing, the Court
executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. declared that the right they sought to be enforced �is a public right
Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth.� recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.�
Issues
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,[20] while reiterating Ta�ada,
The Oral Argument, held on March 16, 1998, focused on the following further declared that �when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of
issues: a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact
�(a)� Procedural: that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general �public� which
(1)� Whether or not the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file possesses the right.�[21]
the instant petition; and Further, in Albano v. Reyes,[22] we said that while expenditure of public
(2)� Whether or not this Court is the proper court before which this action funds may not have been involved under the questioned contract for the
may be filed. development, the management and the operation of the Manila International
(b)� Substantive: Container Terminal, �public interest [was] definitely involved considering
(1)� Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the the important role [of the subject contract]� x x x� in the economic
public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration
(2)� Whether or not there exist any legal restraints against a compromise involved.�� We concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision
agreement between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses� in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the
ill-gotten wealth.�[11] petitioner�s standing.
After their oral presentations, the parties filed their respective Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to
memoranda. information and access to official records, documents and papers -- a right
guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.� Petitioner,
a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen.� Because of the satisfaction
of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner�s
legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a
Filipino citizen,� we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed.
In any event, the question on the standing of Petitioner Chavez is
rendered moot by the intervention of the Jopsons, who are among the
legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth.� The standing of the Jopsons is
not seriously contested by the solicitor general.� Indeed, said petitioners-
intervenors have a legal interest in the subject matter of the instant case, since
a distribution or disposition of the Marcoses� ill-gotten properties may
adversely affect the satisfaction of their claims.
Second Procedural Issue:The Court�s Jurisdiction
Petitioner asserts that because this petition is an original action
for mandamus and one that is not intended to delay any proceeding in the
Sandiganbayan, its having been filed before this Court was proper.� He
invokes Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition
and mandamus.
The solicitor general, on the other hand, argues that the petition has
been erroneously brought before this Court, since there is neither a justiciable
controversy nor a violation of petitioner�s rights by the PCGG.� He alleges
that the assailed agreements are already the very lis mota in Sandiganbayan
Civil Case No. 0141, which has yet to dispose of the issue; thus, this petition
is premature.� Furthermore, respondents themselves have opposed the
Marcos heirs� motion, filed in the graft court, for the approval of the subject
Agreements.� Such opposition belies petitioner�s claim that the
government, through respondents, has concluded a settlement with the
Marcoses as regards their alleged ill-gotten assets.
In Ta�ada and Legaspi, we upheld therein petitioners� resort to
a mandamus proceeding, seeking to enforce a public right as well as to compel
performance of a public duty mandated by no less than the fundamental
law.[23] Further, Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly confers
upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.
Respondents argue that petitioner should have properly sought relief
before the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Civil Case No. 0141, in which the
enforcement of the compromise Agreements is pending resolution.� There
may seem to be some merit in such argument, if petitioner is merely seeking
to enjoin the enforcement of the compromise and/or to compel the PCGG to
disclose to the public the terms contained in said Agreements.� However,
petitioner is here seeking the public disclosure of �all negotiations and
agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and documents related to or relating
to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos
heirs.��
In other words, this petition is not confined to the Agreements that have
already been drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking
towards any settlement on the alleged Marcos loot.� Ineluctably, the core
issue boils down to the precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin
constitutional provisions on �public transactions.�� This broad and
prospective relief sought by the instant petition brings it out of the realm of
Civil Case No. 0141.
First Substantive Issue:
Public Disclosure of Terms of Any Agreement, Perfected or Not
In seeking the public disclosure of negotiations and agreements
pertaining to a compromise settlement with the Marcoses as regards their
alleged ill-gotten wealth, petitioner invokes the following provisions of the
Constitution:
�Sec. 7 [Article III].� The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized.� Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.�
�Sec. 28 [Article II].� Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.�
Respondents� opposite view is that the above constitutional
provisions refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still
being considered.� As regards the assailed Agreements entered into by the
PCGG with the Marcoses, there is yet no right of action that has accrued,
because said Agreements have not been approved by the President, and the
Marcos heirs have failed to fulfill their express undertaking therein.� Thus,
the Agreements have not become effective.� Respondents add that they are
not aware of any ongoing negotiation for another compromise with the
Marcoses regarding their alleged ill-gotten assets.
The �information� and the �transactions� referred to in the subject
provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined scope and
extent.� There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within
which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be
obliged.� However, the following are some of the recognized
restrictions:� (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2)
trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other
confidential information.
Limitations to the Right: (1) National Security Matters
At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding
that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to
state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
matters.[24] But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the
privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other
information,[25] provided that they are examined �in strict confidence� and
given �scrupulous protection.�
Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the
conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable
safeguards for the sake of national interest.[26]
(2)� Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions
The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside
from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial
secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code[27] and other related laws)
as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Act[28]) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.[29]
(3) Criminal Matters
Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those
relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of
criminals,[30] which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest, detention
and prosecution.� Efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously
jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information
regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert
criminal activities.
(4) Other Confidential Information
The Ethical Standards Act[31] further prohibits public officials and
employees from using or divulging �confidential or classified information
officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to
the public.�[32]
Other acknowledged limitations to information access include
diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive
sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of
the Supreme Court.[33]
Scope:� Matters of Public Concern and Transactions Involving Public
Interest
In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.,[34] the Court emphasized that the
information sought must be �matters of public concern,� access to which
may be limited by law.� Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure
extends� only� to� �transactions� involving public interest� and may
also be �subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.�� As to the
meanings of the terms �public interest� and �public concern,� the Court,
in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,[35] elucidated:
�In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern
there is no rigid test which can be applied.� �Public concern� like
�public interest� is a term that eludes exact definition.� Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.� In the final analysis, it is
for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue
is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.�
Considered a public concern in the above-mentioned case was the
�legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring
civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles.�� So
was the need to give the general public adequate notification of various laws
that regulate and affect the actions and conduct of citizens, as held
in Ta�ada.� Likewise did the �public nature of the loanable funds of the
GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers (members of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa)� qualify the information sought in Valmonte as
matters of public interest and concern.� In Aquino-Sarmiento v.
Morato,[36] the Court also held that official acts of public officers done in
pursuit of their official functions are public in character; hence, the records
pertaining to such official acts and decisions are within the ambit of the
constitutional right of access to public records.
Under Republic Act No. 6713, public officials and employees are
mandated to �provide information on their policies and procedures in clear
and understandable language, [and] ensure openness of information, public
consultations and hearings whenever appropriate� x x x,� except when
�otherwise provided by law or when� required� by� the public
interest.�� In particular, the law mandates free public access, at reasonable
hours, to the annual performance reports of offices and agencies of
government and government-owned or controlled corporations; and the
statements of assets, liabilities and financial disclosures of all public officials
and employees.[37]
In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in
connection with their official functions must be accessible to the public,
consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental affairs.� This
principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity to determine whether
those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the government are honestly,
faithfully and competently performing their functions as public
servants.[38] Undeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free flow of
thought;[39] but thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that the public
would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be
able to criticize as well as participate in the affairs of the government in a
responsible, reasonable and effective manner.� Certainly, it is by ensuring an
unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public
that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people. [40]
The Nature of the Marcoses� Alleged Ill-Gotten Wealth
We now come to the immediate matter under consideration.
Upon the departure from the country of the Marcos family and their
cronies in February 1986, the new government headed by President Corazon
C. Aquino was specifically mandated to �[r]ecover ill-gotten properties
amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and [to] protect
the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets
or accounts.�[41] Thus, President Aquino�s very first executive orders
(which partook of the nature of legislative enactments) dealt with the recovery
of these alleged ill-gotten properties.�
Executive Order No. 1, promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two
(2) days after the Marcoses fled the country, created the PCGG which was
primarily tasked to assist the President in the recovery of vast government
resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives and close associates both here and abroad.�
Under Executive Order No. 2, issued twelve (12) days later, all persons
and entities who had knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets and
properties were warned and, under pain of penalties prescribed by law,
prohibited from concealing, transferring or dissipating them or from otherwise
frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of the government.�
On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving
additional powers to the PCGG which, taking into account the overriding
considerations of national interest and national survival, required it to
achieve expeditiously and effectively its vital task of recovering ill-gotten
wealth.
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority
emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the
Marcoses� alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued
with public interest.[42] We may also add that �ill-gotten wealth,� by its very
nature, assumes a public character.� Based on the aforementioned Executive
Orders, �ill-gotten wealth� refers to assets and properties purportedly
acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper
or illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue
advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influences or
relationships, �resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage
and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.�� Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly
originated from the government itself.� To all intents and purposes,
therefore, they belong to the people.� As such, upon reconveyance they will
be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive
claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts.� Another
declared� overriding� consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-
gotten wealth is that it may be used for national economic recovery.
We believe the foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether
petitioner has a right to respondents� disclosure of any agreement that may
be arrived at concerning the Marcoses� purported ill-gotten wealth.
Access to Information on Negotiating Terms
But does the constitutional provision likewise guarantee access to
information regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final
agreement?� This same clarification was sought and clearly addressed by the
constitutional commissioners during their deliberations, which we quote
hereunder:[43]
�MR. SUAREZ.� And when we say �transactions� which should be
distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the
Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or
does he refer to the contract itself?
�MR. OPLE.� The �transactions� used here, I suppose, is generic and,
therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a
consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
�MR. SUAREZ.� This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to
the consummation of the transaction?
��MR. OPLE.� Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national
interest.�
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we
believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as
other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public
information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up
with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.� Such
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government,
not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications[44] during the stage when common assertions are still in the
process of being formulated or are in the �exploratory� stage.� There is a
need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information
in general, as discussed earlier -- such as on matters involving national
security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified
information.
Second Substantive Issue: Legal Restraints on a Marcos-PCGG
Compromise
Petitioner lastly contends that any compromise agreement between the
government and the Marcoses will be a virtual condonation of all the alleged
wrongs done by them, as well as an unwarranted permission to commit graft
and corruption.
Respondents, for their part, assert that there is no legal restraint on
entering into a compromise with the Marcos heirs, provided the agreement
does not violate any law.
Prohibited Compromises
In general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with
regard to the following matters:� (1) the civil status of persons, (2) the
validity of a marriage or a legal separation, (3) any ground for legal
separation, (4) future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future
legitime.[45] And like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a
compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy
or public order.[46] A compromise is binding and has the force of law between
the parties,[47] unless the consent of a party is vitiated -- such as by mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence -- or when there is forgery, or
if the terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable.� In the latter
instances, the agreement may be invalidated by the courts. [48]
Effect of Compromise on Civil Actions
One of the consequences of a compromise, and usually its primary
object, is to avoid or to end a litigation.[49] In fact, the law urges courts to
persuade the parties in a civil case to agree to a fair settlement. [50] As an
incentive, a court may mitigate damages to be paid by a losing party who
shows a sincere desire to compromise.[51]
In Republic & Campos Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[52] which affirmed the
grant by the PCGG of civil and criminal immunity to Jose Y. Campos and
family, the Court held that in the absence of an express prohibition, the rule on
compromises in civil actions under the Civil Code is applicable to PCGG
cases.� Such principle is pursuant to the objectives of EO No. 14,
particularly the just and expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth, so that it
may be used to hasten economic recovery.� The same principle was upheld
in Benedicto v. Board of Administrators of Television Stations RPN, BBC and
IBC[53] and Republic v. Benedicto,[54] which ruled in favor of the validity of the
PCGG compromise agreement with Roberto S. Benedicto.
Immunity from Criminal Prosecution
However,� any compromise relating to the civil liability arising
from an offense does� not� automatically terminate the criminal
proceeding against or extinguish the criminal liability of the
malefactor.[55] While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by
law, there is no similar general sanction as regards criminal liability.� The
authority must be specifically conferred.� In the present case, the power to
grant criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14,
as amended by EO No. 14-A, which provides:
�SECTION 5.� The Presidential Commission on Good Government is
authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who
provides information or testifies in any investigation conducted by such
Commission to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent,
defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties
in question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to
ascertain or prove the latter�s guilt or his civil liability.� The immunity
thereby granted shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats such
testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by
the Commission.�
 The above provision specifies that the PCGG may exercise such
authority under these conditions:� (1) the person to whom criminal
immunity� is� granted� provides� information or testifies in an
investigation conducted by the Commission; (2) the information or testimony
pertains to the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused
acquired or accumulated ill-gotten property; and (3) such information or
testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove guilt or civil liability of such
individual.� From the wording of the law, it can be easily deduced that
the� person referred to is a witness in the proceeding, not the principal
respondent, defendant or accused.
Thus, in the case of Jose Y. Campos, the grant of both civil and
criminal immunity to him and his family was �[i]n consideration of the full
cooperation of Mr. Jose Y. Campos [with] this Commission, his voluntary
surrender of the properties and assets [--] disclosed and declared by him to
belong to deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos [--] to the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines[;] his full, complete and truthful disclosures[;]
and his commitment to pay a sum of money as determined by the Philippine
Government.�[56] Moreover, the grant of criminal immunity to the Camposes
and the Benedictos was limited to acts and omissions prior to February 25,
1996.� At the time such immunity was granted, no criminal cases have yet
been filed against them before the competent courts.
Validity of the PCGG-Marcos Compromise Agreements
Going now to the subject General and Supplemental Agreements
between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, a cursory perusal thereof reveals
serious legal flaws.� First, the Agreements do not conform to the above
requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A.� We believe that criminal
immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are
the principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now
pending before the Sandiganbayan.� As stated earlier, the provision is
applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a
respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.�
While the General Agreement states that the Marcoses �shall provide
the [government] assistance by way of testimony or deposition on any
information [they] may have that could shed light on the cases being pursued
by the [government] against other parties,�[57] the clause does not fully
comply with the law.� Its inclusion in the Agreement may have been only an
afterthought, conceived in pro forma compliance with Section 5 of
EO� No.� 14,� as� amended.� There is no indication whatsoever that
any of the Marcos heirs has indeed provided vital information against any
respondent or defendant as to the manner in which the latter may have
unlawfully acquired public property.
Second, under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG
commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the
Marcos heirs.� This is a clear violation of the Constitution.� The power to
tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain
extent, in the local legislative bodies.[58] Section 28 (4), Article VI of the
Constitution, specifically provides:� �No law granting any tax exemption
shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress.�� The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax
exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten
wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses from
paying taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of
the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights.� Any special grant of tax
exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class
legislation.� It will also violate the constitutional rule that �taxation shall be
uniform and equitable.�[59]
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the
commissioner of internal revenue to compromise taxes.� Such authority may
be exercised only when (1) there
is reasonable�doubt� as� to� the� validity of� the claim� against the
taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayer�s financial position demonstrates a clear
inability to pay.[60] Definitely, neither requisite is present in the case of the
Marcoses, because under the Agreement they are effectively conceding the
validity of the claims against their properties, part of which they will be
allowed to retain.� Nor can the PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the
power of the commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability.� This power can
be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or excessively
assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs involved do not justify
the collection of the tax due.[61] In this instance, the cancellation of tax liability
is done even before the determination of the amount due.� In any event,
criminal violations of the Tax Code, for which legal actions have been filed in
court or in which fraud is involved, cannot be compromised.[62]
Third, the government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all cases
against the Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other
courts.[63] This is a direct encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in
regard to criminal jurisdiction.� Well-settled is the doctrine that once a case
has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its
dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the
judge.� In a criminal case, the manner in which the prosecution is handled,
including the matter of whom to present as witnesses, may lie within the
sound discretion of the government prosecutor;[64] but the court decides, based
on the evidence proffered, in what manner it will dispose of the
case.� Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a
resolution, even by the justice secretary, to withdraw the information or to
dismiss the complaint.[65] The prosecution�s motion to withdraw or to
dismiss is not the least binding upon the court.� On the contrary, decisional
rules require the trial court to make its own evaluation of the merits of the
case, because granting such motion is equivalent to effecting a disposition of
the case itself.[66]
Thus, the PCGG, as the government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth
cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against
the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole
power and discretion.
Fourth, the government also waives all claims and counterclaims,
�whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate,� against the
Marcoses.[67] Again, this all-encompassing stipulation is contrary to
law.� Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be
waived.[68] The stipulation in the Agreement does not specify the exact scope
of future claims against the Marcoses that the government thereby
relinquishes.� Such vague and broad statement� may� well be interpreted
to include all future illegal acts of any of the Marcos heirs, practically giving
them a license to perpetrate fraud against the government without any liability
at all.� This is a palpable violation of the due process and equal protection
guarantees of the Constitution.� It effectively ensconces the Marcoses
beyond the reach of the law.� It also sets a dangerous precedent for public
accountability.� It is a virtual warrant for public officials to amass public
funds illegally, since there is an open option to compromise their liability
in exchange for only a portion of their ill-gotten wealth.
Fifth, the Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable
period within which the parties shall fulfill their respective prestations.� It
may take a lifetime before the Marcoses submit an inventory of their total
assets.
Sixth, the Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for
determining which assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall
be retained by the Marcoses.� While the Supplemental Agreement provides
that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the $356 million Swiss
deposits (less government recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement
pertains only to the said deposits.� No similar splitting scheme is defined
with respect to the other properties.� Neither is there, anywhere in the
Agreements, a statement of the basis for the 25-75 percent sharing
ratio.�Public officers entering into an arrangement appearing to be
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, in violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[69] invite their indictment for corruption
under the said law.
Finally, the absence of then President Ramos� approval of the
principal Agreement, an express condition therein, renders the compromise
incomplete and unenforceable.� Nevertheless, as detailed above, even if such
approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is crystal clear to the Court that
the General and Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28,
1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are violative
of the Constitution and the laws aforementioned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.� The General and
Supplemental Agreements dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the
Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL� AND VOID for being
contrary to law and the Constitution.� Respondent PCGG, its officers and all
government functionaries and officials who are or may be
directly� or� indirectly� involved� in� the� recovery� of� the� alle
ged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to
disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as
well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in
accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision.� No
pronouncement as to costs.�
SO ORDERED.
Davide Jr. C.J. (Chairman), Melo, and Quisumbing JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., please see separate opinion.
G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974
BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE
FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS'
UNION, defendant-appellant.
Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894.
The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:
Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of
the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the
employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which
had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a
closed shop provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a
condition of employment for all permanent
employees workers covered by this Agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was
renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not
precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to
require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18,
1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an
amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic
Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover
members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its
members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his
resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was taken
thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974.
Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the
latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he
was resigning from the Union as a member. The management of the
Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the
Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the
Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This
prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil
Case No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the
Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee.1 In its answer, the
Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining
agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and
contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e). 2 Upon the facts
agreed upon by the parties during the pre-trial conference, the Court a
quo rendered its decision on August 26, 1965, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
rendered enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope
Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his
present employment and sentencing the
defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay
the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs
of this action.3
From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely
questions of law, assigning the following errors:
I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule
that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional.
II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced
appellant herein to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as
attorney's fees and the cost thereof.
In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350,
the Union contented, firstly, that the Act infringes on the fundamental
right to form lawful associations; that "the very phraseology of said
Republic Act 3350, that membership in a labor organization is banned
to all those belonging to such religious sect prohibiting affiliation with
any labor organization"4 , "prohibits all the members of a given
religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits
affiliations of their members thereto"5 ; and, consequently, deprives
said members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful
associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus
becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935
Constitution. 6
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while
the Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining agreement
containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the employer
from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of
union membership as a condition of employment; and that said Act,
furthermore, impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues
from members who, under the Act, are relieved from the obligation to
continue as such members.7
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350
discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their members
from joining labor unions, in violation of Article Ill, Section 1 (7) of the
1935 Constitution; and while said Act unduly protects certain religious
sects, it leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations.8
Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the
constitutional provision that "no religious test shall be required for the
exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise of his civil right to
join associations for purposes not contrary to law has to be determined
under the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that conversely, if a
worker has to sever his religious connection with a sect that prohibits
membership in a labor organization in order to be able to join a labor
organization, said Act would violate religious freedom.9
Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the
"equal protection of laws" clause of the Constitution, it being a
discriminately legislation, inasmuch as by exempting from the
operation of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni
Cristo", it has granted said members undue advantages over their
fellow workers, for while the Act exempts them from union obligation
and liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the same time to the
enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other emoluments that the
union might secure from the employer. 10
Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the
constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social justice. 11
Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop provision"
in a collective bargaining agreement cannot be considered violative of
religious freedom, as to call for the amendment introduced by Republic
Act No. 3350; 12and that unless Republic Act No. 3350 is declared
unconstitutional, trade unionism in this country would be wiped out as
employers would prefer to hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo in order to do away with labor organizations. 13
Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that Republic Act
No. 3350 does not violate the right to form lawful associations, for the
right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from
a labor organization, if one's conscience does not allow his
membership therein, and the Act has given substance to such right by
prohibiting the compulsion of workers to join labor organizations; 14 that
said Act does not impair the obligation of contracts for said law formed
part of, and was incorporated into, the terms of the closed shop
agreement; 15 that the Act does not violate the establishment of religion
clause or separation of Church and State, for Congress, in enacting
said law, merely accommodated the religious needs of those workers
whose religion prohibits its members from joining labor unions, and
balanced the collective rights of organized labor with the constitutional
right of an individual to freely exercise his chosen religion; that the
constitutional right to the free exercise of one's religion has primacy
and preference over union security measures which are merely
contractual 16; that said Act does not violate the constitutional provision
of equal protection, for the classification of workers under the Act
depending on their religious tenets is based on substantial distinction,
is germane to the purpose of the law, and applies to all the members of
a given class; 17 that said Act, finally, does not violate the social justice
policy of the Constitution, for said Act was enacted precisely to
equalize employment opportunities for all citizens in the midst of the
diversities of their religious beliefs." 18
I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error, it is
necessary to premise that there are some thoroughly established
principles which must be followed in all cases where questions of
constitutionality as obtains in the instant case are involved. All
presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks
a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a
reasonable doubt, that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which
supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate
all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal
interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of
legislation should be adopted. 19
1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No.
3350 prohibits and bans the members of such religious sects that
forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from joining labor
unions appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. 3350;
neither can the same be deduced by necessary implication therefrom.
It is not surprising, therefore, that appellant, having thus misread the
Act, committed the error of contending that said Act is obnoxious to the
constitutional provision on freedom of association.
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of
association. Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as
well as Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide that
the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides
that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form,
join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose
of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection.
What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and
guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding
the different theories propounded by the different schools of
jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can be
safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right
comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or
freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may
act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power,
whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from Joining
an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for
himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he
choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association
he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty
and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said
organization at any time. 20 It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a
union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. 21 Inasmuch
as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have
recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join
associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also
imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join
associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any
association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by
Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal
protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by
operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on
a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only
member of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in
order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace
Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that
although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from
making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue,
therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of
Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious
beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he must
become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right
of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement,
Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to
Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but
such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application
and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging
to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with
any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that
members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join
labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements
with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement,
members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not
members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that
the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on
freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit
the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It
still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not
to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs,
the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor
union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith,
they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to
join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may
the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No.
3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on
freedom of association.
2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for
impairing the obligation of its contract, specifically, the "union security
clause" embodied in its Collective Bargaining Agreement with the
Company, by virtue of which "membership in the union was required as
a condition for employment for all permanent employees workers". This
agreement was already in existence at the time Republic Act No. 3350
was enacted on June 18, 1961, and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to
have been incorporated into the agreement. But by reason of this
amendment, Appellee, as well as others similarly situated, could no
longer be dismissed from his job even if he should cease to be a
member, or disaffiliate from the Union, and the Company could
continue employing him notwithstanding his disaffiliation from the
Union. The Act, therefore, introduced a change into the express terms
of the union security clause; the Company was partly absolved by law
from the contractual obligation it had with the Union of employing only
Union members in permanent positions, It cannot be denied, therefore,
that there was indeed an impairment of said union security clause.
According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into the
express terms of the contract, or its legal construction, or its validity, or
its discharge, or the remedy for its enforcement, impairs the contract.
The extent of the change is not material. It is not a question of degree
or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation
or dispensing with any part of its force. There is an impairment of the
contract if either party is absolved by law from its
performance. 22 Impairment has also been predicated on laws which,
without destroying contracts, derogate from substantial contractual
rights. 23
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the
obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition
is general, affording a broad outline and requiring construction to fill in
the details. The prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment
only. 24 In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to
possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people.
Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or
abrogate contracts already in effect. 25 For not only are existing laws
read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the
parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is
also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. All contracts
made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under
the police power must be understood as made in reference to the
possible exercise of that power. 26 Otherwise, important and valuable
reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering into
contracts for the purpose of doing that which otherwise may be
prohibited. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which
contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. The
contract clause of the Constitution must, therefore, be not only in
harmony with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate instances,
the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the
people. It follows that not all legislations, which have the effect of
impairing a contract, are obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as
to impairment, and a statute passed in the legitimate exercise of police
power, although it incidentally destroys existing contract rights, must
be upheld by the courts. This has special application to contracts
regulating relations between capital and labor which are not merely
contractual, and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public
interest, must yield to the common good. 27
In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against
impairing the obligations of contracts has no application to statutes
relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative
powers of the state involving public welfare. 28 Thus, this Court also
held that the Blue Sunday Law was not an infringement of the
obligation of a contract that required the employer to furnish work on
Sundays to his employees, the law having been enacted to secure the
well-being and happiness of the laboring class, and being, furthermore,
a legitimate exercise of the police power. 29
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs
contract obligations, no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times
and under all circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may
be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must
be determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the
obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the
promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means
adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and
the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the
reserved power of the state construed in harmony with the
constitutional limitation of that power. 30
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No.
3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to
promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those
members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining
labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and
constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only
means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their
dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.
The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said
religious sects against two aggregates of group strength from which
the individual needs protection. The individual employee, at various
times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power —
collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by
management. The union, an institution developed to organize labor
into a collective force and thus protect the individual employee from the
power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of
employee rights, and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when
the Union interacts with management, it produces yet a third aggregate
of group strength from which the individual also needs protection —
the collective bargaining relationship. 31
The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in
the Explanatory Note to House Bill No. 5859, which later became
Republic Act No. 3350, as follows:
It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse
employing a person who, on account of his
religious beliefs and convictions, cannot accept
membership in a labor organization although he
possesses all the qualifications for the job. This is
tantamount to punishing such person for believing
in a doctrine he has a right under the law to
believe in. The law would not allow discrimination
to flourish to the detriment of those whose religion
discards membership in any labor organization.
Likewise, the law would not commend the
deprivation of their right to work and pursue a
modest means of livelihood, without in any manner
violating their religious faith and/or belief. 32
It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to
achieve that purpose — exempting the members of said religious sects
from coverage of union security agreements — is reasonable.
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious
profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the
latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme Court of the
United States has also declared on several occasions that the rights in
the First Amendment, which include freedom of religion, enjoy a
preferred position in the constitutional system. 33 Religious freedom,
although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and
liberty, 34 and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values.
Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only
where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement
of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent
necessary to avoid the danger.
3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional, appellant Union averred that said Act discriminates in
favor of members of said religious sects in violation of Section 1 (7) of
Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution, and which is now Section 8 of Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination and
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the
support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect,
thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or
the practice of any form of worship, 35 but also assures the free
exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost
amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution
are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience,
to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good. 36 Any legislation whose
effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or
to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even
though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. 37 But if
the stage regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general
law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without
imposing such burden. 38
In Aglipay v. Ruiz 39 , this Court had occasion to state that the
government should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives
secular in character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a
religion or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order to
withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion. 40 Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No.
3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no-
establishment" (of religion) clause of the Constitution.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and
temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended
to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the
free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused
work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to
work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by
reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful
employment whereby they can make a living to support themselves
and their families is a valid objective of the state. In fact, the state is
enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor, and
regulate the relations between labor and capital and industry. 41 More
so now in the 1973 Constitution where it is mandated that "the State
shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race
or creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers. 42
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in
favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from
affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees
against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement,
and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and
by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to
unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and
welfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being
of society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed
shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of
any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who
are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining
labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental
and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban
regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. 43 The
free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require
that religious exercise be preferentially aided. 44
We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted
consistently with the spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted
merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a
burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was Congress
itself that imposed that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace
Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems
advisable, could take away the same burden. It is certain that not every
conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but
when general laws conflict with scrupples of conscience, exemptions
ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest"
intervenes. 45 In the instant case, We see no such compelling state
interest to withhold exemption.
Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects members
of certain religious sects, it leaves no right to, and is silent as to the
protection of, labor organizations. The purpose of Republic Act No.
3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The rights of labor unions
are amply provided for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor
Code. As to the lamented silence of the Act regarding the rights and
protection of labor unions, suffice it to say, first, that the validity of a
statute is determined by its provisions, not by its silence 46 ; and,
second, the fact that the law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional. 47
It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel
persons to join and remain members of a union to keep their jobs in
violation of their religious scrupples, would hurt, rather than help, labor
unions, Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest their
resistance spread to other workers, for religious objections have
contagious potentialities more than political and philosophic objections.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the
country, and a fortiori to a labor — union assuming that such unity and
loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a goal that is
constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. 48 A
desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the
constitutional prohibition against requiring a religious test for the
exercise of a civil right or a political right, is not well taken. The Act
does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful
association membership in any particular religion or in any religious
sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that
prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or
qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing
from a labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only
exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of
closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not
required to do a positive act — to exercise the right to join or to resign
from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive
act on his part. A conscientious religious objector need not perform a
positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor union — he
is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a
labor union may have entered into. How then can there be a religious
test required for the exercise of a right when no right need be
exercised?
We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact
Republic Act No. 3350, and that its purpose was legal and in
consonance with the Constitution. It is never an illegal evasion of a
constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result,
which is lawful in itself, by discovering or following a legal way to do
it. 49
5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is a
discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as it grants to the members of
certain religious sects undue advantages over other workers, thus
violating Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution which forbids
the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. 50
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is
not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should
be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on
persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. 51 It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A
law is not invalid because of simple inequality. 52 The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. 53 All that is required of a valid classification is that it
be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member
of the class. 54 This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 55
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of
enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is
recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. 56 It is not necessary
that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of
things or in their relation. 57 Neither is it necessary that the
classification be made with mathematical nicety. 58 Hence legislative
classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow
distinctions, 59 for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the
legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is
addressed to evils as they may appear.
We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned
requirements. The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the
effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who
by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with
a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership
in labor unions. Tile classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There is such real
distinction in the beliefs, feelings and sentiments of employees.
Employees do not believe in the same religious faith and different
religions differ in their dogmas and cannons. Religious beliefs,
manifestations and practices, though they are found in all places, and
in all times, take so many varied forms as to be almost beyond
imagination. There are many views that comprise the broad spectrum
of religious beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners in
which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may
be articulated. Today the country is far more heterogenous in religion
than before, differences in religion do exist, and these differences are
important and should not be ignored.
Even from the phychological point of view, the classification is based
on real and important differences. Religious beliefs are not mere
beliefs, mere ideas existing only in the mind, for they carry with them
practical consequences and are the motives of certain rules. of human
conduct and the justification of certain acts. 60 Religious sentiment
makes a man view things and events in their relation to his God. It
gives to human life its distinctive character, its tone, its happiness or
unhappiness its enjoyment or irksomeness. Usually, a strong and
passionate desire is involved in a religious belief. To certain persons,
no single factor of their experience is more important to them than their
religion, or their not having any religion. Because of differences in
religious belief and sentiments, a very poor person may consider
himself better than the rich, and the man who even lacks the
necessities of life may be more cheerful than the one who has all
possible luxuries. Due to their religious beliefs people, like the martyrs,
became resigned to the inevitable and accepted cheerfully even the
most painful and excruciating pains. Because of differences in religious
beliefs, the world has witnessed turmoil, civil strife, persecution, hatred,
bloodshed and war, generated to a large extent by members of sects
who were intolerant of other religious beliefs. The classification,
introduced by Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, rests on substantial
distinctions.
The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its
purpose. The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who
cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from being
deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their work
because of union shop security agreements.
Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to
conditions existing at the time of its enactment. The law does not
provide that it is to be effective for a certain period of time only. It is
intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions to which the
law is applicable exist. As long as there are closed shop agreements
between an employer and a labor union, and there are employees who
are prohibited by their religion from affiliating with labor unions, their
exemption from the coverage of said agreements continues.
Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects;
this is evident from its provision. The fact that the law grants a privilege
to members of said religious sects cannot by itself render the Act
unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act only restores to
them their freedom of association which closed shop agreements have
taken away, and puts them in the same plane as the other workers
who are not prohibited by their religion from joining labor unions. The
circumstance, that the other employees, because they are differently
situated, are not granted the same privilege, does not render the law
unconstitutional, for every classification allowed by the Constitution by
its nature involves inequality.
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual
inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces
inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.
A classification otherwise reasonable does not offend the constitution
simply because in practice it results in some inequality. 61 Anent this
matter, it has been said that whenever it is apparent from the scope of
the law that its object is for the benefit of the public and the means by
which the benefit is to be obtained are of public character, the law will
be upheld even though incidental advantage may occur to individuals
beyond those enjoyed by the general public. 62
6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates
the constitutional provision on social justice is also baseless. Social
justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. 63 Republic
Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare
of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions;
the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of
livelihood. In determining whether any particular measure is for public
advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly benefited
— it is sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited thereby.
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all component
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the
community. 64 Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the
members of a religious sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also
component elements of society, for it insures security in their
employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union having a
closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also advances the
proper economic and social equilibrium between labor unions and
employees who cannot join labor unions, for it exempts the latter from
the compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed shop
agreements and equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is
concerned, those whose religion prohibits membership in labor unions
with those whose religion does not prohibit said membership. Social
justice does not imply social equality, because social inequality will
always exist as long as social relations depend on personal or
subjective proclivities. Social justice does not require legal equality
because legal equality, being a relative term, is necessarily premised
on differentiations based on personal or natural conditions. 65 Social
justice guarantees equality of opportunity 66 , and this is precisely what
Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish — it gives laborers,
irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for — in other words,
the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this matter, it has
been held that a statute which is not necessary is not, for that reason,
unconstitutional; that in determining the constitutional validity of
legislation, the courts are unconcerned with issues as to the necessity
for the enactment of the legislation in question. 67 Courts do inquire into
the wisdom of laws. 68 Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by the
people, are presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the
needs of the people, and it may change the laws accordingly. 69 The
fear is entertained by appellant that unless the Act is declared
unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing members of religious
sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, and thus be
a fatal blow to unionism. We do not agree. The threat to unionism will
depend on the number of employees who are members of the religious
sects that control the demands of the labor market. But there is really
no occasion now to go further and anticipate problems We cannot
judge with the material now before Us. At any rate, the validity of a
statute is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficacy to
accomplish the end desired, not from its effects on a particular
case. 70 The essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere
incidental result arising from its exertion, is the criterion by which the
validity of a statute is to be measured. 71
II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of which
the Union argued that the decision of the trial court ordering the Union
to pay P500 for attorney's fees directly contravenes Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 875, for the instant action involves an industrial
dispute wherein the Union was a party, and said Union merely acted in
the exercise of its rights under the union shop provision of its existing
collective bargaining contract with the Company; that said order also
contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil Code; that, furthermore, Appellee
was never actually dismissed by the defendant Company and did not
therefore suffer any damage at all . 72
In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the
instant case there was really no industrial dispute involved in the
attempt to compel Appellee to maintain its membership in the union
under pain of dismissal, and that the Union, by its act, inflicted
intentional harm on Appellee; that since Appellee was compelled to
institute an action to protect his right to work, appellant could legally be
ordered to pay attorney's fees under Articles 1704 and 2208 of the Civil
Code. 73
The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is
relied upon by appellant provides that:
No suit, action or other proceedings shall be
maintainable in any court against a labor
organization or any officer or member thereof for
any act done by or on behalf of such
organization in furtherance of an industrial
dispute to which it is a party, on the ground only
that such act induces some other person to break
a contract of employment or that it is in restraint of
trade or interferes with the trade, business or
employment of some other person or with the right
of some other person to dispose of his capital or
labor. (Emphasis supplied)
That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be disputed
for appellant sought the discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed
shop agreement and under Section 2 (j) of Republic Act No. 875 a
question involving tenure of employment is included in the term "labor
dispute". 74 The discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute
itself. It being the labor dispute itself, that very same act of the Union in
asking the employer to dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act done ... in
furtherance of an industrial dispute". The mere fact that appellant is a
labor union does not necessarily mean that all its acts are in
furtherance of an industrial dispute. 75 Appellant Union, therefore,
cannot invoke in its favor Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875. This
case is not intertwined with any unfair labor practice case existing at
the time when Appellee filed his complaint before the lower court.
Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union,
serve as its shield. The article provides that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation may be awarded "when the defendant's act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff ... to incur expenses to protect his
interest"; and "in any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered". In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant
Union's act in demanding Appellee's dismissal caused Appellee to
incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his job. Costs
according to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be
allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision,
dated August 26, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its
Civil Case No. 58894, appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant Union. It is so ordered.
Makalintal, C.J, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 213948
KNIGHTS OF RIZAL, Petitioner.
vs.
DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC., CITY OF
MANILA, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CULTURE AND THE
ARTS, NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
Bury me in the ground, place a stone and a cross over it.
My name, the date of my birth, and of my death. Nothing more.
If you later wish to surround my grave with a fence, you may do so.
No anniversaries. I prefer Paang Bundok.
- Jose Rizal
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Injunction, with Applications for
Temporary Restraining Order, Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and
Others 1 filed by the Knights of Rizal (KOR) seeking, among others, for
an order to stop the construction of respondent DMCI Homes, Inc. 's
condominium development project known as the Torre de Manila. In its
Resolution dated 25 November 2014, the Court resolved to treat the
petition as one for mandamus. 2
The Facts
On 1 September 2011, DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-
PDI) 3 acquired a 7,716.60-square meter lot in the City of Manila,
located near Taft Avenue, Ermita, beside the former Manila Jai-Alai
Building and Adamson University.4The lot was earmarked for the
construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila condominium project.
On 2 April 2012, DMCI-PDI secured its Barangay Clearance to start
the construction of its project. It then obtained a Zoning Permit from the
City of Manila's City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) on 19
June 2012.5
Then, on 5 July 2012, the City of Manila's Office of the Building Official
granted DMCI-PDI a Building Permit, allowing it to build a "Forty Nine
(49) Storey w/ Basement & 2 penthouse Level Res'l./Condominium" on
the property. 6
On 24 July 2012, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121
enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the
Building Permit of DMCI-PDI, citing among others, that "the Torre de
Manila Condominium, based on their development plans, upon
completion, will rise up high above the back of the national monument,
to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights,
would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal
Roxas Boulevard vantage point[.]"7
Building Official Melvin Q. Balagot then sought the opinion of the City
of Manila's City Legal Officer on whether he is bound to comply with
Resolution No. 121.8 In his letter dated 12 September 2012, City Legal
Officer Renato G. Dela Cruz stated that there is "no legal justification
for the temporary suspension of the Building Permit issued in favor of
[DMCI-PDI]" since the construction "lies outside the Luneta Park" and
is "simply too far to I be a repulsive distraction or have an objectionable
effect on the artistic and historical significance" of the Rizal
Monument. 9 He also pointed out that "there is no showing that the
[area of subject property has been officially declared as an
anthropological or archeological area. Neither has it ' been
categorically designated by the National Historical Institute as a
heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a
national treasure."
Subsequently, both the City of Manila and DMCI-PDI sought the
opinion or the National Historical Commission of the Philippines
(NHCP) on the matter. In the letter10 dated 6 November 2012 from
NHCP I Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. Diokno addressed to DMCI-
PDI and the letter 11 dated 7 November 2012 from NHCP Executive
Director III Ludovico D. Bado)f addressed to then Manila Mayor Alfredo
S. Lim, the NHCP maintained that the Torre de Manila project site is
outside the boundaries of the Rizal f.ark and well to the rear of the
Rizal Monument, and thus, cannot possibly obstruct the frontal view of
the National Monument.
On 26 November 2013, following an online petition against the Torre
de Manila project that garnered about 7,800 signatures, the City
Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 146, reiterating its directive in
Resolution No. 121 1 enjoining the City of Manila's building officials to
temporarily suspend ~MCI-PDI's Building Permit. 12
In a letter to Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada dated 18 December 2013,
DMCI-PIDI President Alfredo R. Austria sought clarification on the
controversy surrounding its Zoning Permit. He stated that since the
CPDO granted its Zoning Permit, DMCI-PDI continued with the
application for the Building Permit, which was granted, and did not
deem it necessary to go through the process of appealing to the local
zoning board. He then expressed DMCI-PDI's willingness to comply
with the process if the City of Manila deemed it necessary. 13
On 23 December 2013, the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and
Appeals (MZBAA) issued Zoning Board Resolution No. 06, Series of
2013, 14 recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI's application for
variance. ;The MZBAA noted that the Torre de Manila project "exceeds
the prescribed maximum Percentage of Land Occupancy (PLO) and
exceeds the prescribeµ Floor Area Ratio (FAR) as stipulated in Article
V, Section 17 of City Ordinance No. 8119[.]" However, the MZBAA still
recommended the approval of the variance subject to the five
conditions set under the same resolution.
After some clarification sought by DMCI-PDI, the MZBAA issued
Zoning Board Resolution No. 06-A, Series of 2013, 15 on 8 January
2014, amending condition (c) in the earlier resolution. 16
On 16 January 2014, the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No.
5, Series of 2014, 17 adopting Zoning Board Resolution Nos. 06 and
06- A. The City Council resolution states that "the City Council of
Manila find[ s] no cogent reason to deny and/or reverse the aforesaid
recommendation of the [MZBAA] and hereby ratif[ies] and confirm[s] all
previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the City
[Council] of Manila for Torre de Manila[.]"
Arguments of the KOR
On 12 September 2014, the KOR, a "civic, patriotic, cultural,
nonpartisan, non-sectarian and non-profit organization" 18 created
under Republic Act No. 646, 19 filed a Petition for Injunction seeking a
temporary restraining I order, and later a permanent injunction, against
the construction of DMCIPDI's Torre de Manila condominium project.
The KOR argues that the subject matter of the present suit is one of
"transcendental importance, paramount public interest, of overarching
significance to society, or with far-reaching implication" involving the
desecration of the Rizal Monument.
The KOR asserts that the completed Torre de Manila structure will
"[stick] out like a sore thumb, [dwarf] all surrounding buildings within a
radius of two kilometer/s" and "forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal
Monument in Luneta Park: Torre de Manila building would loom at the
back I and overshadow the entire monument, whether up close or
viewed from a distance. ''20
Further, the KOR argues that the Rizal Monument, as a National
Treasure, is entitled to "full protection of the law"21and the national
government must abate the act or activity that endangers the nation's
cultural heritage "even against the wishes of the local government
hosting it." 22
Next, the KOR contends that the project is a nuisance per
se23 because "[t]he despoliation of the sight view of the Rizal
Monument is a situation that annoy's or offends the senses' of every
Filipino who honors the memory of the National Hero Jose Rizal. It is a
present, continuing, worsening and aggravating status or condition.
Hence, the PROJECT is a nuisance per se. It deserves I to be abated
summarily, even without need of judicial proceeding. "24
The KOR also claims that the Torre de Manila project violates the
NHCP's Guidelines on Monuments Honoring National Heroes,
Illustrious Filipinos and Other Personages, which state that historic
monuments should assert a visual "dominance" over its
surroundings,25 as well as the country's commitment under
the International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of
Monuments and Sites, otherwise known as the Venice Charter. 26
Lastly, the KOR claims that the DMCI-PDI's construction was
commenced and continues in bad faith, and is in violation of the City of
Manila's zoning ordinance. 27
Arguments of DMCI-PDI
In its Comment, DMCI-PDI argues that the KOR's petition should be
dismissed on the following grounds:
I.
THXS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THIS
ACTION.
II.
KOR HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT OR INTEREST TO FILE OR
PR0SECUTE THIS ACTION.
III.
TORRE DE MANILA IS NOT A NUISANCE PER SE.
IV.
DMCI-PDI ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN CONSTRUCTING TORRE DE
MANILA; AND
V.
KOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORPER
AND/OR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 28
First, DMCI-PDI asserts that the Court has no original jurisdiction over
actions for injunction.29 Even assuming that the Court has concurrent
jurisdiction, DMCI-PDI maintains that the petition should still have been
filed with the Regional Trial Court under the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts and because the petition involves questions of fact. 30
DMCI-PDI also contends that the KOR's petition is in actuality an
opposition' or appeal from the exemption granted by the City of
Manila's MZBAA, a matter which is also not within the jurisdiction of the
Court. 31 DMCI-PDI claims that the proper forum should be the
MZBAA, and should the KOR fail there, it should appeal the same to
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). 32
DMCI-PDI further argues that since the Rizal Monument has been
declared a National Treasure, the power to issue a cease and desist
order is lodged with the "appropriate cultural agency" under Section 25
of Republic Act No. li0066 or the National Cultural Heritage Act of
2009. 33 Moreover, DMCI-PDI asserts that the KOR availed of the
wrong remedy since an action for injunction is not the proper remedy
for abatement of a nuisance. 34
Second, DMCI-PDI maintains that the KOR has no standing to institute
this proceeding because it is not a real party in interest in this case.
The purposes of the KOR as a public corporation do not include the
preservation of the Rizal Monument as a cultural or historical heritage
site.35 The KOR has also not shown that it suffered an actual or
threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal conduct of the City of
Manila. If there is any injury to the KOR at all, the same was caused by
the private conduct of a private entity and not the City of Manila. 36
Third, DMCI-PDI argues that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per
se. DMCI-PDI reiterates that it obtained all the necessary permits,
licenses, clearances, and certificates for its construction. 37 It also
refutes the KOR's claim that the Torre de Manila would dwarf all other
structures around it; considering that there are other tall buildings even
closer to the Rizal Monument itself, namely, the Eton Baypark Tower at
the corner of Roxas Boulevard and T.M. Kalaw Street (29 storeys; 235
meters from the Rizal Monument) and Sunview Palace at the corner of
M.H. Del Pilar and T.M. Kalaw Streets (42 storeys; 250 meters from
the Rizal Monument). 38
Fourth, DMCI-PDI next argues that it did not act in bad faith when it
started construction of its Torre de Manila project. Bad faith cannot be
attributed to it since it was within the "lawful exercise of [its]
rights." 39 The KOR failed to present any proof that DMCI-PDI did not
follow the proper procedure and zoning restrictions of the City of
Manila. Aside from obtaining all the necessary permits from the
appropriate government agencies,40 DMCI-PDI also sought clarification
on its right to build on its site from the Office of the City Legal Officer of
Manila, the Manila CPDO, and the NHCP.41 Moreover, even if the KOR
proffered such proof, the Court would be 1 in no position to declare
DMCI-PDI's acts as illegal since the Court is not a trier of facts. 42
Finally, DMCI-PDI opposes the KOR's application for a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction. DMCI-PDI
asserts that the KOR has failed to establish "a clear and unmistakable
right to enjoin I the construction of Torre de Manila, much less request
its demolitior."43 DMCI-PDI further argues that it "has complied with all
the legal requirements for the construction of Torre de Manila x x x
[and] has violated o right of KOR that must be protected. Further, KOR
stands to suffer o damage because of its lack of direct pecuniary
interest in this petiti1 on. To grant the KOR's application for injunctive
relief would constitute an unjust taking of property without due process
of law. "44
Arguments of the City of Manila
In its Comment, the City of Manila argues that the writ of mandamus
cannot issue "considering that no property or substantive rights
whatsoever in favor of [the KOR] is being affected or x x x entitled to
judicial protection[.]"45
The City of Manila also asserts that the "issuance and revocation of a
Building Permit undoubtedly fall under the category of a discretionary
act or duty performed by the proper officer in light of his meticulous
appraisal and evaluation of the pertinent supporting documents of the
application in accordance with the rules laid out under the National
Building Code [and] Presidential Decree No. 1096,"46 while the remedy
of mandamus is available only to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty. 47
Further, the City of Manila maintains that the construction of the Torre
de Manila did not violate any existing law, since the "edifice [is] well
behind (some 789 meters away) the line of sight of the Rizal
Monument."48 It adds that the City of Manila's "prevailing Land Use and
Zoning Ordinance [Ordinance No. 8119] x xx allows an adjustment in
Floor Area Ratios thru the [MZBAA] subject to further final approval of
the City Council."49 The City Council adopted the MZBAA's favorable:
recommendation in its Resolution No. 5, ratifying all the licenses and
permits issued to DMCI-PDI for its Torre de Manila project.
In its Position Paper dated 15 July 2015, the City of Manila admitted
that the Zoning Permit issued to DMCI-PDI was "in breach of certain
provisions of City Ordinance No. 8119."50 It maintained, however, 1
that the deficiency is "procedural in nature and pertains mostly td the
failure of [DMCI-PDI] to comply with the stipulations that allow an
excess in the [FAR] provisions." 51 Further, the City of Manila argued
that the MZBAA, when it recommended the allowance of the project's
variance, imposed certain conditions upon the Torre de Manila project
in order to mitigate the possible adverse effects of an excess FAR. 52
The Issue
The issues raised by the parties can be summed up into one main
point: Can the Court issue a writ of mandamus against the officials of
the City of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de
Manila project?
The Court's Ruling
The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must be dismissed.
There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de
Manila.
In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission,53 the Court
held that "what is not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may
be done, except when the act is contrary to morals, customs and I
public order." This principle is fundamental in a democratic society, to
protect the weak against the strong, the minority against the majority,
and the individual citizen against the government. In essence, this
principle, which is the foundation of a civilized society under the rule of
law, prescribes that the freedom to act can be curtailed only through
law. Without this principle, the rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of
citizens can be arbitrarily and whimsically trampled upon by the shifting
passions of those who can spout the loudest, or those who can gather
the biggest crowd or the most number of Internet trolls. In other
instances,54 the Court has allowed or upheld actions that were not
expressly prohibited by statutes when it determined that these acts
were not contrary to morals, customs, and public order, or that
upholding the same would lead to a more equitable solution to the
controversy. However, it is the law itself - Articles 130655 and
1409(1)56 of the Civil Code - which prescribes that acts not contrary to
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are allowed if also
not contrary to law.
In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila
project is "contrary to morals, customs, and public order" or that it
brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. On the contrary, the
City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the
standards set under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to
construct its Torre de Manila project.
There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is no law
prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila due to its effect on
the background "view, vista, sightline, or setting" of the Rizal
Monument.
Specifically, Section 47 reads:
SEC. 47. Historical Preservation and Conservation Standards. -
Historic site and facilities shall be conserved and preserved. These
shall, to the extent possible, be made accessible for the educational
and cultural enrichment of the general public.
The following shall guide the development of historic sites and
facilities:
1. Sites with historic buildings or places shall be developed to conserve
and enhance their heritage values.
2. Historic sites and facilities shall be adaptively re-used.
3. Any person who proposes to add, to alter, or partially demolish a
designated heritage property will require the approval of the City
Planning and Development Office (CPDO) and shall be required to
prepare a heritage impact statement that will demonstrate to the
satisfaction of CPDO that the proposal will not adversely impact the
heritage significance of the property and shall submit plans for review
by the CPDO in coordination with the National Historical Institute (NHI).
4. Any proposed alteration and/or re-use of designated heritage
properties shall be evaluated based on criteria established by the
heritage significance of the particular property or site.
5. Where an owner of a heritage property applies for approval to
demolish a designated heritage property or properties, the owner shall
be required to provide evidence to satisfaction that demonstrates that
rehabilitation and re-use of the property is not viable.
6. Any designated heritage property which is to be demolished or
significantly altered shall be thoroughly documented for archival
purposes with! a history, photographic records, and measured
drawings, in accordance with accepted heritage recording guidelines,
prior to demolition or alteration.
7. Residential and commercial infill in heritage areas will be sensitive to
the existing scale and pattern of those areas, which maintains the
existing landscape and streetscape qualities of those areas, and which
does not result in the loss of any heritage resources.
8. Development plans shall ensure that parking facilities (surface lots
residential garages, stand-alone parking garages and parking
components as parts of larger developments) are compatibly
integrated into heritage areas, and/or are compatible with adjacent
heritage resources.
9. Local utility companies (hydro, gas, telephone, cable) shall be
required to place metering equipment, transformer boxes, power lines,
conduit, equipment boxes, piping, wireless telecommunication towers
and other utility equipment and devices in locations which do not
detract from the visual character of heritage resources, and which do
not have a negative impact on its architectural integrity.
10. Design review approval shall be secured from the CPDO for any
alteration of the heritage property to ensure that design guidelines and
standards are met and shall promote preservation and conservation of
the heritage property. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that the standards laid down in Section 47 of Ordinance No.
8119 only serve as guides, as it expressly states that "the following
shall guide the :development of historic sites and facilities."
A guide simply sets a direction 'or gives an instruction to be followed
by prope1iy owners and developers in order to conserve and enhance
a property's heritage values.
On the other hand, Section 48 states:
SEC. 48. Site Performance Standards. - The City considers it in the
public interest that all projects are designed and developed in a safe,
efficient and aesthetically pleasing manner. Site development shall
consider the environmental character and limitations of the site and its
adjacent properties. All project elements shall be in complete harmony
according to good design principles and the subsequent development
must be visually pleasing as well as efficiently functioning especially in
relation to the adjacent properties and bordering streets.
The design, construction, operation and maintenance of every facility
shall be in harmony with the existing and intended character of its
neighborhood. It shall not change the essential character of the said
area but will be a substantial improvement to the value of the
properties in the neighborhood in particular and the community in
general.
Furthermore, designs should consider the following:
1. Sites, buildings and facilities shall be designed and developed with1
regard to safety, efficiency and high standards of design. The natural
environmental character of the site and its adjacent properties shall be
considered in the site development of each building and facility.
2. The height and bulk of buildings and structures shall be so designed
that it does not impair the entry of light and ventilation, cause the loss I
of privacy and/or create nuisances, hazards or inconveniences to
adjacent developments.
3. Abutments to adjacent properties shall not be allowed without the
neighbor's prior written consent which shall be required by the City
Planning and Development Office (CPDO) prior to the granting of a
Zoning Permit (Locational Clearance).
4. The capacity of parking areas/lots shall be per the minimum
requirements of the National Building Code. These shall be located,
developed and landscaped in order to enhance the aesthetic quality of
the facility. In no case, shall parking areas/lots encroach into street
rights-of-way and shall follow the Traffic Code as set by the City.
5. Developments that attract a significant volume of public modes of
transportation, such as tricycles, jeepneys, buses, etc., shall provide
on-site parking for the same. These shall also provide vehicular
loading and unloading bays so as street traffic flow will not be
impeded.
6. Buffers, silencers, mufflers, enclosures and other noise-absorbing I
materials shall be provided to all noise and vibration-producing
machinery. Noise levels shall be maintained according to levels
specified in DENR DA9 No. 30 - Abatement of Noise and Other Forms
of Nuisance as Defined by Law.
7. Glare and heat from any operation or activity shall not be radiated,
seen or felt from any point beyond the limits of the property.
8. No large commercial signage and/or pylon, which will be
detrimental to the skyline, shall be allowed.
9. Design guidelines, deeds of restriction, property management plans
and other regulatory tools that will ensure high quality developments
shall be required from developers of commercial subdivisions and
condominiums. These shall be submitted to the City Planning and
Development Office (CPDO) for review and approval. (Emphasis
supplied)
Se9tion 4 7 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates
the "development of historic sites and facilities."Section 48
regulates "large commercial signage and/or pylon." There is
nothing in Sections 47 and 48 of Ordinance No. 8119 that disallows the
construction of a building outside the boundaries of a historic site
or facility, where such building may affect the1 background of a
historic site. In this case, the Torre de Manila stands 870 meters
outside and to the rear of the Rizal Monument and "cannot possibly
obstruct the front view of the [Rizal] Monument." 57 Likewise, ;the Torre
de Manila is not in an area that has been declared as an
"anthropological or archeological area" or in an area designated as a
heritage zone, cultural property, historical landmark, or a national
treasure by the NHCP. 58
Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the subject
of arts and culture, provides that "[t]he State shall conserve, promote
and popularize the nation's historical and cultural heritage and
resources x x x." Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress
passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation of our
cultural heritage.
One such law is Republic Act No. 10066,59 or the National Cultural
Heritage Act of 2009, which empowers the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts and other cultural agencies to issue a cease and
desist order "when the physical integrity of the national cultural
treasures or important cultural properties [is] found to be in danger of
destruction or significant alteration from its original state."60 This
law declares that the State should protect the "physical integrity" of the
heritage property or building if there is "danger of destruction or
significant alteration from its original state." Physical integrity refers
to the structure itself - how strong and sound the structure is. The
same law does not mention that another project, building, or property,
not itself a heritage property or building, may be the subject of a cease
and desist order when it adversely affects the background view, vista,
or sightline of a heritage property or building. Thus, Republic Act No.
10066 cannot apply to the Torre de Manila condominium project.
Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila.
The Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or 1property without due process of law x x x." 61 It is a
fundamental principle that no property shall be taken away from an
individual without due process, whether substantive or procedural. The
dispossession of property, or in this case the stoppage of the
construction of a building in one's own property would violate
substantive due process.
The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus only issues
when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer
sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the party seeking
mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.
In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in
any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the construction of a
building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the
background sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no
legal duty on the part of the City of Manila "to consider," in the words
of the Dissenting Opinion, "the standards set under Ordinance No.
8119" in relation to the applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de
Manila since under the ordinance these standards can never be
applied outside the boundaries of Rizal Park. While the Rizal Park
has been declared a National Historical Site, the area where Torre de
Manila is being built is a privately-owned property that is "not pap: of
the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National Heritage Site in
1095," and the Torre de Manila area is in fact "well-beyond" the Rizal
Park, according to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I.
Diokno. 62 Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been designated
as a "heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a
national treasure."63
Also, to declare that the City of Manila failed to consider the standards
under Ordinance No. 8119 would involve making a finding of fact. A
finding lot fact requires notice, hearing, and the submission of evidence
to ascertain compliance with the law or regulation. In such a case, it is
the Regional Trial Court which has the jurisdiction to hear the case,
receive evidence, make a proper finding of fact, and determine
whether the Torre de Manila project properly complied with the
standards set by the ordinance. In Meralco v. Public Service
Commission, 64 we held that it is the cardinal right of a party in trials
and administrative proceedings to be heard, which includes the right of
the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof and to have such evidence presented
considered by the proper court or tribunal.
To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards under
Ordinance No. 8119 to the Torre de Manila project will be an empty
exercise since these standards cannot apply outside of the Rizal Park -
and the Torre de Manila is outside the Rizal Park. Mandamus will lie
only if the officials
The KOR also invokes this Court's exercise of its
extraordinary certiorari power of review under Section 1, Article VIII65 of
the Constitution. However, this Court can only exercise its
extraordinary certiorari power if the City of Manila, in issuing the
required permits and licenses, gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Tellingly, neither the
majority nor minority opinion in this case has found that the City of
Manila committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the permits and
licenses to DMCI-PDI. Thus, there is no justification at all for this Court
to exercise its extraordinary certiorari power.
Moreover, the exercise of this Court's extraordinary certiorari power is
limited to actual cases and controversies that necessarily involve a
violation of the Constitution or the determination of the constitutionality
or validity of a governmental act or issuance. Specific violation of a
statute that does not raise the issue of constitutionality or validity of the
statute cannot, as a rule, be the subject of the Court's direct exercise of
its expanded certiorari power. Thus, the KOR's recourse lies with other
judicial remedies or proceedings allowed under the Rules of Court.
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC
Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., 66we held that in cases
where the question of constitutionality of a governmental action is
raised, the judicial power that the courts exercise is likewise identified
as the power of judicial review - the power to review the
constitutionality of the actions of other branches of government. As a
rule, as required by the hierarchy of courts principle, these cases are
filed with the lowest court with jurisdiction over the 1subject matter.
The judicial review that the courts undertake requires:
1) there be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power;
2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;
3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and
4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lismota of the case.
The lower court's decision under the constitutional scheme reaches the
Supreme Court through the appeal process, through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the KOR elevated this case immediately to this
Court in an original petition for injunction which we later on treated as
one for mandamus under Rule 65. There is, however, no clear legal
duty on the City of Manila to consider the provisions of Ordinance No.
8119 for applications for permits to build outside the protected areas
of the Rizal Park. Even if there were such legal duty, the determination
of whether the City of .Manila failed to abide by this legal duty would
involve factual matters which have not been admitted or established in
this case. Establishing factual matters is not within the realm of this
Court. Findings of fact are the province of the trial courts.
There is no standard in Ordinance No. 8119 for defining or determining
the background sightline that is supposed to be protected or that is part
of the "physical integrity" of the Rizal Monument. How far should a
building like the Torre de Manila be from the Rizal Monument - one,
two, three, four, or five kilometers? Even the Solicitor General, during
the Oral Arguments, conceded that the ordinance does not prescribe
how sightline is determined, neither is there any way to measure by
metes and bounds whether al construction that is not part of the
historic monument itself or is outside the protected area can be
said to violate the Rizal Monument's physicalintegrity, except only to
say "when you stand in front of the Rizal Monument, there can be no
doubt that your view is marred and impaired." This kind of a standard
has no parameters and can include a sightline or a construction as far
as the human eyes can see when standing in front of the Rizal
Monument. Obviously, this Court cannot apply such a subjective and
non-uniform standard that adversely affects property rights several
kilometers away from a historical sight or facility.
The Dissenting Opinion claims that "the City, by reason of a mistaken
or erroneous construction of its own Ordinance, had failed to consider
its duties under [Ordinance No. 8119] when it issued permits in DMCI-
PDI's favor." However, MZBAA Zoning Board Resolution Nos. 06 and
06-A67 easily dispel this claim. According to the resolutions, the City of
Manila, through the MZBAA, acted on DMCI-PDI's application for
variance under the powers and standards set forth in Ordinance No.
8119.
Without further proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, capriciously,
or arbitrarily in issuing said resolution, the Court should respect
MZBAA's exercise of discretion. The Court cannot "substitute its I
judgment :for that of said officials who are in a better position to
consider and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically
vested in them by law." 68 Since the Court has "no supervisory power
over the proceedings I and actions of the administrative departments of
the government," it "should not generally interfere with purely
administrative and discretionary functions.; 69 The power of the Court in
mandamus petitions does not extend "to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either."70
Still, the Dissenting Opinion insists on directing the re-evaluation by the
City of Manila, through the CPDO, of the permits previously issued in
favor of the Torre de Manila project to determine compliance with the
standards ]under Ordinance No. 8119. It also declares that the
circumstances in this case warrant the prohacvice conversion of the
proceedings in the issuance of the permits into a "contested case"
necessitating notice and hearing with all the parties involved.
Prohac vice means a specific decision does not constitute a precedent
because the decision is for the specific case only, not to be followed in
other cases. A prohac vice decision violates statutory law - Article 8 of
the Civil Code - which states that "judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines." The decision of the Court in this case
cannot be prohac vice because by mandate bf the
law everydecision of the Court forms part of the legal system of the
Philippines. If another case comes up with the same facts as the
present case, that case must be decided in the same way as this case
to comply with the constitutional mandate of equal protection of the
law. Thus, a prohac vice decision also violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
It is the policy of the courts not to interfere with the discretionary
executive acts of the executive branch unless there is a clear showing
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Mandamus does not lie against the legislative and executive branches
or their members acting in the exercise of their official discretionary
functions. This emanates from the respect accorded by the judiciary to
said branches as co-equal entities under the principle of separation of
powers.
In De Castro v. Salas,71 we held that no rule of law is better established
than the one that provides that mandamus will not issue to control the
discretion of an officer or a court when honestly exercised and when
such power and authority is not abused.
In exceptional cases, the Court has granted a prayer for mandamus to
compel action in matters involving judgment and discretion, only "to
act, but not to act lone way or the other," 72 and only in cases where
there has been a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion,
manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.73
In this case, there can be no determination by this Court that the City
of Manila had been negligent or remiss in its duty under Ordinance No.
8119 considering that this determination will involve questions of fact.
DMCI- PDI had been issued the proper permits and had secured all
approvals and licenses months before the actual construction began.
Even the KOR could not point to any law that respondent City of
Manila had violated and could only point to declarations of policies by
the NHCP and the Venice Charter which do not constitute clear legal
bases for the issuance of a writ of mandam1s.
The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the
preservation and restoration of ancient monuments, sites, and
buildings. It brings I together principles in the field of historical
conservation and restoration that have been developed, agreed upon,
and and laid down by experts over the years. Each country, however,
remains "responsible for applying the plan within the framework of its
own culture and traditions."74
The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become
enforceable as law. The Philippines is not legally bound to follow its
directive, as in fact, these are not directives but mere guidelines - a set
of the best practices and techniques that have been proven over the
years to be the most effective in preserving and restoring historical
monuments, sites and buildings.
The City of Manila concedes that DMCI-PDI's Zoning Permit was
granted without going through the process under Ordinance No. 8119.
However, the same was properly rectified when, faced with mounting
opposition, DMCI-PDI itself sought clarification from the City of Manila
and immediately began complying with the procedure for applying for a
variance. The MZBAA did subsequently recommend the approval of
the variance and the City Council of Manila approved the same,
ratifying the licenses and permits already given to DMCI-PDI. Such
ratification was well within the right of the City Council of Manila. The
City Council of Manila could have denied the application had it seen
any reason to do so. Again, the ratification is a function of the City
Council of Manila, an exercise of its discretion1 and well within the
authority granted it by law and the City's own Ordinance No. 8119.
The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health,
convenience, and welfare. There is no indication that the Torre de
Manila project brings any harm, danger, or hazard to the people in the
surrounding areas except that the building allegedly poses an unsightly
view on the taking of photos or the visual appreciation of the Rizal
Monument by locals and tourists. In fact, the Court must take the
approval of the MZBAA, and its subsequent ratification by the City
Council of Manila, as the duly authorized exercise of discretion by the
city officials. Great care must be taken that the Court does not unduly
tread upon the local government's performance of its duties. It is not for
this Court to dictate upon the other branches bf the government how
their discretion must be exercised so long as these branches do not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Likewise, any violation of Ordinance No. 8119 must be determined in
the proper case and before the proper forum. It is not within the power
of this Court in this case to make such determination. Without such
determination, this Court cannot simply declare that the City of Manila
had failed to consider its duties under Ordinance No. 8119 when it
issued the permits in DMCI-PDI's favor without making a finding of fact
how the City of Manila failed "to consider" its duties with respect to
areas outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park. In the first place, this
Court has no jurisdiction to make findings of fact in an original action
like this before this Court. Moreover the City of Manila could not legally
apply standards to sites outside the area covered by the ordinance that
prescribed the standards. With this, I taken in light of the lack of finding
that there was grave abuse of discretion I on the part of the City of
Manila, there is no basis to issue the writ of mandamus against the
City of Manila.
During the Oral Arguments, it was established that the granting of a
variance neither uncommon nor irregular. On the contrary, current
practice has made granting of a variance the rule rather than the
exception:
JUSTICE CARPIO: Let's go to Ordinance 8119. For residential
condominium that stand alone, in other words not part of a commercial
complex or an industrial complex ...
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: The [Floor Area Ratio (FAR)] is uniform for the
entire City of Manila, the FAR 4, correct? ATTY. FLAMINIANO: I
believe so, Your Honor, it's FAR 4.
JUSTICE CARPIO: So it's FAR 4 for all residential condominium
complex or industrial projects.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: There might be, the FAR might be different when
it comes to condominiums in commercial areas, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: Yes, I'm talking of stand-alone ...
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
JUITICE CARPIO: ... residential condominiums...
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Uniform at FAR 4, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: And the percentage of land occupancy is always
60 percent.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: 60 percent correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: Okay ... how many square meters is this Torre de
Manila?
xxx
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: The land area, Your Honor, it's almost 5,000 ...
5,556.
JUSTICE CARPIO: So, it's almost half a hectare.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: And at FAR 4, it can only build up to 18 storeys, I
mean at FAR 4, is that correct?
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: If the 60 percent of the lot...
JUSTICE CARPIO: Yes, but that is a rule.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: That is a rule, that's the rule, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: 60 percent of...
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Of the land area.
JUSTICE CARPIO: ... buildable, the rest not buildable.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: Okay, so if you look around here in the City of
Manila anywhere you go, you look at stand alone residential
condominium buildings...
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: There's a lot of them, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: It's always not FAR 4, it's more than FAR 4.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: And the buildable area is to the edge of the
property ...it's not 60 percent, correct?
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: So, if you look at all the ... residential buildings
in the last ten years, they [have] all variances. They did not follow
the original FAR 4 or the 60 percent (of land occupancy). Every
residential building that stand alone was a variance. ATTY.
FLAMINIANO: That's correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: So the rule really in the City of Manila is
variance, and the exception which is never followed is FAR 4.
ATTY. FLAMINIANO: FAR 4, it appears to be that way, Your
Honor.
xxxx
JUSTICE CARPIO: Every developer will have to get a variance
because it doesn't make sense to follow FAR 4 because the land
is so expensive and if you can build only two storeys on a 1,000-
square meter lot, you will surely lose money, correct? ATTY.
FLAMINIANO: Exactly, Your Honor. 75 (Emphasis supplied)
This, the MZBAA's grant of the variance cannot be used as a
basis to grant the mandamus petition absent any clear finding
that said act amo'1nted to "grave abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice, or palpable excess of authority."
The KOR is Estopped from Questioning the
Torre de Manila Construction.
The KOR is now estopped from questioning the construction of the
Torre de Manila project. The KOR itself came up with the idea to build
a structure right behind the Rizal Monument that would dwarf the Rizal
Monument.
In the mid-1950s, the Jose Rizal National Centennial Commission
(JRNCC) l formulated a plan to build an Educational Center within the
Rizal Park. In July 1955, the KOR proposed the inclusion of a national
theater on the site of the Educational Center. The JRNCC adopted the
proposal. The following[ year, a law - Republic Act No. 142776 -
authorized the establishment of the Jose Rizal National Cultural Shrine
consisting of a national theater, a national museum, and a national
library on a single site. 77
To be built on the open space right behind the 12.7 meter high Rizal
Monument were: the KOR's proposed nationaltheater, standing 29.25
meters high and 286 meters in distance from the Rizal Monument;
the nationallibrary, standing 25 .6 meters high and 180 meters in
distance from the Rizal ;Monument, with its rear along San Luis Street
(now T.M. Kalaw Street); and facing it, the nationalmuseum, at 19.5
meters high and 190 meters in I distance from the Rizal Monument,
with its back along P. Burgos Street. 78
However, several sectors voiced their objections to the construction for
various reasons. Among them, the need to preserve the open space of
the park, the high cost of construction, the desecration of the park's
hallowed grounds, and the fact that the proposed cultural center
including the 129.25 meter high national theater proposed by the
KOR would dwarf the 12.7 meter high Rizal Monument. 79 The
JRNCC revised the plan and only the National Library - which still
stands today - was built. 80
According to the NHCP, the KOR even proposed to build a Rizal
Center on the park as recently as 2013.81 The proposal was
disapproved by the NHCR and the Department of Tourism.
Surely, as noble as the KOR's intentions were, its proposed center
would have dwarfed the Rizal Monument with its size and proximity.
In contrast, the Torre de Manila is located well outside the Rizal Park,
and to the rear of the Rizal Monument - approximately 870 meters from
the Rizal Monument and 3 0 meters from the edge of Rizal Park. 82
It is a basic principle that "one who seeks equity and justice must come
to court with clean hands. "83 In Jenosa v. Delariarte, 84 the Court
reiterated ,that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands. This "signifies that a
litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful as to the controversy in issue. " 85Thus, the KOR, having
earlier proposed a national theater a mere 286meters in distance from
the back of the Rizal Monument that would have dwarfed the Rizal
Monument, comes to this I Court with unclean hands. It is now
precluded from "seeking any equitable refuge" 86 from the Court. The
KOR's petition should be dismissed on this ground alone.
Torre de Manila is Not a Nuisance Per Se.
In its petition, the KOR claims that the Torre de Manila is a
nuisance perse that deserves to be summarily abated even without
judicial proceedings. 87 However, during the Oral Arguments, counsel
for the KOR argued that the KOR now believes that the Torre de
Manila is a nuisance per accidens and not a nuisance perse. 88
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or
offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the
use of property.
Thy Court recognizes two kinds of nuisances. The first,
nuisance perse, is on "recognized as a nuisance under any and all
circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health
or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the
undefined law of necessity." 89 The second, nuisance peraccidens, is
that which "depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and
its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due
hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing
in law constitutes a nuisance. "90
It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per
se. The Torre de Manila project cannot be considered as a "direct
menace to I public health or safety." Not only is a condominium project
commonplace in the City of Manila, DMCI-PDI has, according to the
proper government agencies, complied with health and safety
standards set by law. DMCI-PDI has been granted the following
permits and clearances prior to starting the project: (1) Height
Clearance Permit from the Civil Aviation Authority of the
Philippines;91 (2) Development Permit from the HLURB;92 (3) Zoning
Certification from the HLURB;93 (4) Certificate of Environmental
Compliance Commitment from the Environment Management Bureau
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources;94 (5)
Barangay Clearance95 (6) Zoning Permit;96 (7) Building Permit;97 (8)
and Electrical and Mechanical Permit.98
Later, DMCI-PDI also obtained the right to build under a variance
recommended by the MZBAA and granted by the City Council of
Manila. Thus, there can be no doubt that the Torre de Manila project is
not a nuisance perse.
On the other hand, the KOR now claims that the Torre de Manila is a
nuisance peraccidens.
By definition, a nuisance peraccidens is determined based on its
surrounding conditions and circumstances. These conditions and
circumstances must be well established, not merely alleged. The Court
cannot simply accept these conditions and circumstances as
established facts as the KOR would have us do in this case. 99 The
KOR itself concedes that the question of whether the Torre de Manila
is a nuisance peraccidens is a question of fact. 100
The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an authority to find
facts, to estimate their force, and to apply rules of law to the case thus
made. 101 1lhis Court is no such authority. It is not a trier of facts. It
cannot simply take the allegations in the petition and accept these as
facts, more so in this case where these allegations are contested by
the respondents.
The task to receive and evaluate evidence is lodged with the trial
courts. The question, then, of whether the Torre de Manila project is a
nuisance peraccidens must be settled after due proceedings brought
before the proper Regional Trial Court. The KOR cannot circumvent
the process in the guise be protecting national culture and heritage.
The TRO must be lifted.
Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights and prevent
102
further injury until final adjudication on the merits of the case. In the
present case, since the legal rights of the KOR are not well-defined,
clear, and certain, the petition for mandamus must be dismissed and
the TRO lifted.
The general rule is that courts will not disturb the findings of I
administrative agencies when they are supported by substantial
evidence. In this case, DMCI-PDI already acquired vested rights in the
various permits, licenses, or even variances it had applied for in order
to build a 49-storey building which is, and had been, allowed by the
City of Manila's zoning ordinance.
As we have time and again held, courts generally hesitate to review
discretionary decisions or actions of administrative agencies in the
absence of proof that such decisions or actions were arrived at with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In JRS Business Corp. v. Montesa, 103 we held that mandamus is the
proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part
of a tribunal in the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty, or there was an unlawful exclusion of a party from
the use and enjoyment be a right to which he is clearly entitled. Only
specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear
and certain. If the legal rights of th6 petitioner are not well-defined,
definite, clear, and certain, 104 the petition must be dismissed. Stated
otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers
powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a
power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. 105
In sum, bearing in mind the Court does not intervene in discretionary
acts of the executive department in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion, 106 and considering that mandamus may only be issued to
enforce a clear and certain legal right, 107 the present special civil
action for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO issued earlier
must be lifted.
A FINAL WORD
It had been Rizal’s wish to die facing the rising sun. In his Mi Ultimo
Adios, the poem he left for his family the night before he was executed,
Rizal wrote:
Yo muero cuando veo que el cielo se colora
Y al fin anuncia el dia tras lobrego capuz 108
[Ako’y mamamatay, ngayong namamalas
na sa Silanganan ay namamanaag
yaong maligayang araw na sisikat
sa likod ng luksang nagtabing na ulap.] 109
[I die just when I see the dawn break,
Through the gloom of night, to herald the day] 110
Yet at the point of his execution, he was made to stand facing West
towards Manila Bay, with his back to the firing squad, like the traitor the
colonial government wished to portray him. He asked to face his
executioners, facing the East where the sun would be rising since it
was early morning, but the Spanish captain did not allow it. As he was
shot and a single bullet struck his frail body, Rizal forced himself, with
his last remaining strength, to turn around to face the East and thus he
fell on his back with] his face to the sky and the rising sun. Then, the
Spanish captain approached Rizal and finished him off with one pistol
shot to his head.
Before his death, Rizal wrote a letter to his family. He asked for a
simple tomb, marked with a cross and a stone with only his name and
the date of his birth and death; no anniversary celebrations; and
interment at Paang Bundok(now, the Manila North Cemetery). Rizal
never wanted his grave to be a burden to future generations.
The letter never made it to his family and his wishes were not carried
out. The letter was discovered many years later, in 1953. By then, his
remains had been entombed at the Rizal Monument, countless
anniversaries had been . celebrated, with memorials and monuments
built throughout the world.
Rizal's wish was unmistakable: to be buried without pomp or
pageantry; to the point of reaching oblivion or obscurity in the
future. 111 For Rizal's life was never about fame or vainglory, but for the
country he loved dearly and for which he gave up his life.
The Rizal Monument is expressly against Rizal' s own wishes. That
Rizal's statue now stands facing West towards Manila Bay, with Rizal's
back to the East, adds salt to the wound. If we continue the present
orientation of Rizal's statue, with Rizal facing West, we would be like
the Spanish captain who refused Rizal's request to die facing the rising
sun in the East. On the other hand, if Rizal' s statue is made to face
East, as Rizal had desired when he was about to be shot, the
background - the blue sky above Manila Bay - would forever be clear
of obstruction, and we would be faithful to Rizal's dying wish.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 16
June 2015 is LIFTED effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18336 May 31, 1963
MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC., WILLIAM A. YOTOKO and FELIPE
BENABAYE, petitioners,
vs.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MAGDALENA ESTATE,
INC., respondent.
Roxas and Sarmiento for petitioners.
Rufino B. Risma and Pedro S. de Guzman for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the resolution en banc of the
Court of Industrial Relations dated February 14, 1961, in CIR Case No.
1616-ULP.
On June 6, 1958, Acting CIR Prosecutor Pedro M. Ligaya filed with the
CIR, on behalf of respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa
Magdalena Estate, Inc. (NAFLU), a complaint for unfair labor practice
(docketed as Case No. 1616-ULP) against petitioners Magdalena
Estate, Inc., William A. Yotoko, and Felipe Benabaye, under Section
4(a), subsections 1, 4, 5 and 6, of Republic Act No. 875. In substance,
said complaint alleged that petitioners locked out the 66 members of
respondent Union on November 25, 1957, resulting in the filing in the
CIR of Case No. 1517-ULP; that thereafter because the workers were
readmitted on December 9, 1957, the said Case No. 1517-ULP was
dismissed at the instance of the Union; that shortly before December
25, 1957 the officers and agents of petitioner Corporation required the
members of the Union to sign application form (Annex E of complaint),
otherwise they would not receive Christmas bonus; that sometime on
February 28, 1958 and thereafter, petitioner Corporation, by its officers
and agents, again required and had been requiring the members of
respondent Union to sign another application form (Annex F of
complaint) under threat of dismissal, but they refused; that, as a
consequence, on April 13, 1958, petitioner Corporation dismissed from
employment the following officers and/or members of respondent
Union, to wit: Buenaventura de la Cruz, Ramon Veloso, Potenciano
Lerios, Serapio Gasigan, Nicolas Benigno, Manuel Orbien, Rosendo
Manuel, Domingo Limbauam, Andres Mayuga, Amando Losana,
Nicasio Palogan, Roberto Lopez, Geronimo Gilliaco, Isidro Gatan,
Antonio Tandaya, Candido Quilang, Eugenio Narabe, and Cenon
Galvez, without just cause, because of their union affiliations and
activities, due to their refusal to sign the application form (Annex F),
and for having filed charges against the petitioners, as well as for being
about to give testimonies in connection therewith; and that on March 6,
1958, another member of respondent Union (Nelson Helican) was
unjustly dismissed from work for union membership.
Answering amended complaint, petitioners specifically denied all the
material allegations therein contained, but admitted that the laborers
specified in Paragraph 13 of said complaint were in fact laid off on April
13, 1958, and the services of Nelson Helican were, likewise,
terminated on March 6, 1958. As special defenses, petitioners
contended that the controversy was submitted by respondent Union for
conciliation to the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor
(Regional Office 111), and while conferences were being, the Union
ceased attending them and its members resumed working after the
overhauling and inventory of the equipment of petitioner Corporation,
leaving the impression that the Union desisted from pursuing its
demands; that Republic Act No. 875 does not require that the
responsive reply of the employer to the proposals or demands of its
employees be in writing, consequently, the verbal replies of petitioners
on October 24, and 29, 1957 and on November 19 and 26, 1957,
constitute substantial compliance with the provisions of law on the
matter; that respondent Union is not yet qualify to be the exclusive
representative of all the employees and laborers in petitioner
Corporation, for purposes of collective bargaining, because it has not
been designated or selected by the majority of the employees there
having been no certification election; and that the members of
respondent Union are employed in petitioner Corporation, as per
agreement, on a day-to-day basis, and depending upon the needs and
exigencies of the Roads Department of petitioner Corporation and that
the latter reserved the right to determine who and how many laborers
will be hired to work in said department from day to day.
Issues having been joined, the case was heard and, thereafter, the
CIR (on September 5, 1960) rendered a decision (thru Judge Arsenio
Martinez) declaring petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice and
directing them to cease and desist from further committing unfair labor
practice acts, and to reinstate respondent Union members Candido
Quilang, Buenaventura de la Cruz, Eugenio Narabe, and Nelson
Helican to their former positions in the Roads Department of
petitioners, with full back wages from April 13, 1958 (for Quilang, Cruz,
and Narabe) and from March 6, 1958 (for Helican) up to their actual
reinstatement, with all the rights, privileges, and benefits, including
seniority appertaining thereto. The CIR also suggested that in case of
an opening or when the exigencies of petitioners' business requires
additional laborers, the other 15 complainants-members of respondent
Union who did not testify and prove their case be given the chance to
work again with petitioner Corporation.
From this portion of the decision omitting the 15 complainants-
members of the Union in the order of reinstatement, respondent Union
filed a motion for reconsideration and, on March 27, 1961, the CIR en
banc issued a resolution1declaring that "there being substantial
evidence of unfair labor practice committed against the fifteen
employees, the affirmative action taken for said four (Quilang, Cruz,
Narabe and Helican) should be applied to the fifteen, namely,
reinstatement with back wages from April 13, 1958, until reinstated."
Dissatisfied with said resolution, petitioners filed with us the present
petition for review.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners claim that the present case is not a class suit under Section
12, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court; hence, the relief granted to the 4
dismissed employees who appeared and testified may not be extended
to the 15 others who did not appear and testify at the hearing of the
case. Petitioners might be correct if this were an ordinary proceeding
under the Rules of Court. But this is not and, as a rule, the CIR, in the
hearing, investigation, and determination of any question or
controversy and in exercising its duties and power under
Commonwealth Act No. 103, "is not bound by any technical rules of
evidence, but may inform its mind as it may deem just and equitable".
Substantially, though not strictly, the complaint in the Instant case
complies with the requirements of a class suit under the Rules of
Court. Note that, as the CIR correctly found, the complaint was filed in
the name of the respondent Union, and all the dismissed laborers,
except Nelson Helican, are regular employees of the company and
members of the Union. Said the CIR:
1. The complaint was filed in the name of the Kapisanan ng
mga Manggagawa sa Magdalena Estate (NAFLU):
2. All the dismissed laborers involved in this case are
members of the complainant union. Their membership was
known to the respondents, through Exhibits "1-A" and "12"
which, according to the company's counsel, Mr. Sarmiento,
came to their possession in the latter part of 1957;
3. All the dismissed laborers, except Nelson Helican, are all
regular employees of the company. The fifteen who did not
testify are also regular employees, is could be seen from
respondents' Exhibits "31", "31-A" to "31-IIII", where their
periods of employment with the respondent are made to
appear under the columns "Experience", "Employer",
"Position Held", and "Salary".
The causes of action and common to all the complainants, viz: the
requirement to sign application forms which would place them under
temporary basis, removable at pleasure of the company; their refusal
to sign said applications; and their dismissal because of said refusal.
The subject matter of the complaint (namely, reinstatement with full
back-wages to their former positions) is a matter of general or common
interest to all 19 dismissed employees.
Petitioners next contend that the CIR erred in finding that there is
substantial evidence of unfair labor practice committed by petitioners
against the 15 employees who did not appear and testify at the hearing
of the case. The following factual findings of the CIR disclose,
however, substantial evidence of unfair labor practice committed by
petitioners against said employee-members respondent Union:
All these employees worked continuously for a long time.
They were never required to sign any contract of
employment. It was only on December 16, 1957, January 2
and February 1958 that they were required to sign
application forms. By signing these contracts, they would be
placed at the mercy the company, because after the expiry
date of said contracts, the respondents could dismiss them.
After two years of employment, and after the company came
to know of the existence of the union on November 10, 1957,
the fifteen who did not testify were required to sign contract
forms, the same contract required of the four who testified.
The contract makes the employees temporary after the have
worked for two years.
As could be seen from respondents' Exhibits "33", "33-A" to
"33-GGGG", the fifteen who did not testify did not sign the
contract.
Respondents' Exhibits "20", "20-A" to "20-K", show that on
April 12, 1958, the fifteen who did not testify were given
notices of separation and letters of dismissal like the four
who testified.
3. It is claimed that the dismissal was due to the trenchment
policy. This policy was implemented only in the Road
Department in the early part of 1958, because that was the
only department wherein a labor union existed. The fifteen
dismissed laborers were working in that department.
4. Respondents claim that all these dismissed laborers are
inefficient and lazy. If this is true, why did the company send
them separation notices when they could have discharged
the without notices?
Lastly, it must be noted in said letters of dismissal the
company said: "We thank you for your invaluable services
and do not hesitate to approach us if you need references in
the future." This expression of gratitude does not tally with
the imputation of inefficiency, drunkenness, laziness, etc.
The case of Dimayuga, et al. v. CIR, et al. (L-10213, May 27, 1957)
cited by petitioners is not in point. Unlike the instant case which was
filed in the Union's name for its dismissed members,
the Dimayuga case was filed in petitioner's individual names as
individual complainants. Secondly, the instant case is an unfair labor
practice case, whereas the Dimayuga case is not. In the Dimayuga
case, the CIR warned petitioners that unless they appear individually
and testify to justify their respective claims, the same may be denied,
whereas in the case at bar, there was no such warning and neither the
court nor the petitioners asked that the 15 others give testimony.
Lastly, in the instant case, the 4 dismissed employees testified not only
on their behalves, but also on behalf of the other 15 who did not testify.
Petitioners also contend that the CIR erred in not considering their
claim of a retrenchment policy, by reason of which, the 19 employees
in question had to be dismissed. The claim is untenable, in the light of
the factual finding of the CIR, to wit:
3. It is claimed that the dismissal was due to the
retrenchment policy. This policy was implemented only in the
Road Department in the early part of 1958, because that
was the only department wherein a labor union existed. The
fifteen dismissed laborers were working in that department.
Lastly, petitioners argue that the lower court erred in not considering
the evidence on the cause of the dismissal of the 15 employees. There
was actually no necessity for so doing on the part of the CIR, it having
found substantial evidence of unfair labor practice against the other 15
dismissed employees from the testimony of the 4 employees who
appeared and testified during the hearing of the case. To do so would
have been a useless formality. Suffice to say that, as the complaint
alleged, all 19 were found to have been dismissed by petition "their
union affiliation and activities, for their sign the application form Annex
"F", above referred to, and for having filed charges against the
respondents (herein petitioners)."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the resolution of the court a
quo appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners. It
is so ordered.
G.R. No. 103560 July 6, 1995
GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICE, INC.
(INPORT), petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fifth Division)
ADELO EBUNA, EMMANUEL VALMORIDA, RODOLFO PEREZ,
ROGER ZAGADO, MARCOS GANZAN, AND REY VALLE,
(WILFREDO DAHAN, ROGELIO VILLAFUERTE, WILFREDO
AMPER, RICARDO ABA, YOLITO AMBUS, FIDEL CALIO, VICENTE
CAHATOL, SOTECO CUENCA, NICOLAS DALAGUAN, BALBINO
FAJARDO, ROLANDO JAMILA, RICARDO LAURETO, RUDY
LAURETO, QUIRICO LEJANIO, OSCAR LAPINIG, FELIPE
LAURETE, JESUSTUDY OMISOL, ZOSIMO OMISOL, PEDRO
SUAREZ, SATURNINO SISIBAN and MANUEL
YANEZ), respondents.
G.R. No. 103599 July 6, 1995
ADELO EBUNA, WILFREDO DAHAN, RICARDO LAURETO, REY
VALLE, VICENTE CAHATOL, MARCOS GANZAN, RODOLFO
PEREZ, ROEL SAA, ROGELIO VILLAFUERTE, MANUEL YANEZ,
WILFREDO AMPER, QUIRECO LEJANO, EMMANUEL VALMORIA,
ROLANDO JAMILLA, NICOLAS DALAGUAN, BALBINO FAJARDO,
PEDRO SUAREZ, ELPIDIO ESTROGA, RUBEN PAJO, JESUSTODY
OMISOL, RICARDO ABA, FIDEL CALIO, SATURNINO SESYBAN,
RUDY LAURETO, OSCAR LAPINIG, FELIPE LAURENTE, ROGER
ZAGADO, SOTECO CUENCA, FIDEL ESLIT, ZOSIMO OMISOL,
ANGEL BERNIDO, and MICHAEL YAGOTYOT, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIFTH DIVISION,
and GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICES, INC. (INPORT),
respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Should separation pay and backwages be awarded by public
respondent NLRC to participants of an illegal strike? This is the core
issue to be decided in these two petitions.
Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. (INPORT) filed a petition
for certiorari against the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
assailing the latter's decision in "Gold City Integrated Port Services,
Inc. v. Adelo Ebuna, et al." (NLRC RAB X Case No. 5-0405-85) with
twenty-seven private respondents (G.R. No. 103599).1 This petition
has been consolidated with G.R. No. 103599 where the petitioners are
the private respondents in instant case and the private respondent is
INPORT. For the sake of clarity, INPORT shall be denominated in the
case at bench as the petitioner and the employees as private
respondents.
Instant case arose from the following facts:
Early in the morning of April 30, 1985, petitioner's employees stopped
working and gathered in a mass action to express their grievances
regarding wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. Said
employees were all members of the Macajalar Labor Union —
Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW) with whom petitioner had an
existing collective bargaining agreement.
Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at the port
of Cagayan de Oro. The strike paralyzed operations at said port.
On the same morning, the strikers filed individual notices of strike
("Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-Welga") with the then Ministry
of Labor and Employment.
With the failure of conciliation conferences between petitioner and the
strikers, INPORT filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for Illegal
Strike with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction.
On May 7, 1985, the National Labor Relations Commission issued a
temporary restraining order. Thereafter, majority of the strikers
returned to work, leaving herein private respondents who continued
their protest.2
Counsel for private respondents filed a manifestation that petitioner
required prior screening conducted by the MLU-FFW before the
remaining strikers could be accepted back to work.
Meanwhile, counsel for the Macajalar Labor Union (MLU-FFW) filed a
"Motion to Drop Most of the Party Respondents From the Above
Entitled Case." The 278 employees on whose behalf the motion was
filed, claimed that they were duped or tricked into signing the individual
notices of strike. After discovering this deception and verifying that the
strike was staged by a minority of the union officers and members and
without the approval of, or consultation with, majority of the union
members, they immediately withdrew their notice of strike and returned
to work.
The petitioner INPORT, not having interposed any objection, the Labor
Arbiter, in his decision dated July 23, 1985, granted their prayer to be
excluded as respondents in the complaint for illegal strike. Moreover,
petitioner's complaint was directed against the 31 respondents who did
not return to work and continued with the strike.
For not having complied with the formal requirements in Article 264 of
the Labor Code,3 the strike staged by petitioner's workers on April 30,
1985 was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal.4 The workers who
participated in the illegal strike did not, however, lose their
employment, since there was no evidence that they participated in
illegal acts. After noting that petitioner accepted the other striking
employees back to work, the Labor Arbiter held that the private
respondents should similarly be allowed to return to work without
having to undergo the required screening to be undertaken by their
union (MLU-FFW).
As regards the six private respondents who were union officers, the
Labor Arbiter ruled that they could not have possibly been "duped or
tricked" into signing the strike notice for they were active participants in
the conciliation meetings and were thus fully aware of what was going
on. Hence, said union officers should be accepted back to work after
seeking reconsideration from herein petitioner.5
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby ordered that the
strike undertaken by the officers and majority union
members of Macajalar Labor Union-FFW is ILLEGAL
contrary to Article 264 of the Labor Code, as amended. Our
conclusion on the employment status of the illegal strikers is
subject to our discussion above.6
Both petitioner and private respondents filed motions for
reconsideration, which public respondent NLRC treated as appeals. 7
On January 14, 1991, the NLRC affirmed with modification8 the
Arbiter's decision. It held that the concerted action by the workers was
more of a "protest action" than a strike. Private respondents, including
the six union officers, should also be allowed to work unconditionally to
avoid discrimination. However, in view of the strained relations
between the parties, separation pay was awarded in lieu of
reinstatement. The decretal portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is Affirmed with
modification in accordance with the foregoing resolution.
Complainant INPORT is hereby ordered, in lieu of
reinstatement, to pay respondents the equivalent of twelve
(12) months salaries each as separation pay. Complainant is
further ordered to pay respondents two (2) years backwages
based on their last salaries, without qualification or
deduction. The appeal of complainant INPORT
is Dismissed for lack of merit.9
Upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration, public respondent
modified the above resolution on December 12, 1991. 10
The Commission ruled that since private respondents were not actually
terminated from service, there was no basis for reinstatement.
However, it awarded six months' salary as separation pay or financial
assistance in the nature of "equitable relief." The award for backwages
was also deleted for lack of factual and legal basis. In lieu of
backwages, compensation equivalent to P1,000.00 was given.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the resolution of January 14, 1991
is Modified reducing the award for separation pay to six (6)
months each in favor of respondents, inclusive of lawful
benefits as well as those granted under the CBA, if any,
based on the latest salary of respondents, as and by way of
financial assistance while the award for backwages
is Deleted and Set Aside. In lieu thereof, respondents are
granted compensation for their sudden loss of employment
in the sum of P1,000.00 each. The motion of respondents to
implead PPA as third-party respondent is Noted. Except for
this modification the rest of the decision sought to be
reconsidered shall stand. 11
In the instant petitions for certiorari, petitioner alleges that public
respondent Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in
awarding private respondents separation pay and backwages despite
the declaration that the strike was illegal.
On the other hand, private respondents, in their petition, assail the
reduction of separation pay and deletion of backwages by the NLRC
as constituting grave abuse of discretion.
They also allege that the Resolution of January 14, 1991 could not be
reconsidered after the unreasonable length of time of eleven months.
Before proceeding with the principal issues raised by the parties, it is
necessary to clarify public respondent's statements concerning the
strike staged by INPORT's employees.
In its resolution dated January 14, 1991, the NLRC held that the facts
prevailing in the case at bench require a relaxation of the rule that the
formal requisites for a declaration of a strike are mandatory.
Furthermore, what the employees engaged in was more of a
spontaneous protest action than a strike. 12
Nevertheless, the Commission affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision
which declared the strike illegal.
A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, 13 is defined
as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of
employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. 14 A labor
dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or
conditions of employment or the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the
terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and
employees. 15
Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held
the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for their wages and other
benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of
work by concerted action resulted from a labor dispute.
The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the legality of said
strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was illegal for failure to
comply with the requirements of Article 264 (now Article 263)
paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code. 16
The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not conform to
the notice required by the law to be filed since they were represented
by a union (MLU-FFW) which even had an existing collective
bargaining agreement with INPORT.
Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot,
cooling-off period and reporting requirements.
As we stated in the case of National Federation of Sugar Workers v.
Ovejera, 17 the language of the law leaves no room for doubt that the
cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote
report were intended to be mandatory. 18
Article 265 of the Labor Code reads, inter alia:
(i)t SHALL be unlawful for any labor organization . . . to
declare a strike . . . without first having filed the notice
required in the preceding Article or without the necessary
strike vote first having been obtained and reported to the
Ministry. (Emphasis ours)
In explaining the above provision, we said:
In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period,
the avowed intent of the law is to provide an
opportunity for mediation and conciliation. It thus
directs the MOLE to exert all efforts at mediation
and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement'
during the cooling-off period. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban
after the filing of a strike-vote report, as prescribed
in Art. 264 of the Labor Code, are reasonable
restrictions and their imposition is essential to
attain the legitimate policy objectives embodied in
the law. We hold that they constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the state. 19
From the foregoing, it is patent that the strike on April 30,
1985 was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements
of the law.
The effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 265
(now Article 264) of the Labor Code, make a distinction
between workers and union officers who participate therein.
A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike
and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost their employment status. 20 An ordinary
striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in
an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed
illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand,
may be terminated from work when he knowingly
participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when
he commits an illegal act during a strike.
In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority of the
striking workers, including union officers, back to work.
Private respondents were left to continue with the strike after
they refused to submit to the "screening" required by the
company. 21
The question to be resolved now is what these remaining
strikers, considering the circumstances of the case, are
entitled to receive under the law, if any.
Are they entitled, as they claim, to reinstatement or
separation pay and backwages?
In his decision, the Labor Arbiter ordered INPORT to
reinstate/accept the remaining workers as well as to accept
the remaining union officers after the latter sought
reconsideration from INPORT. 22
The NLRC on January 14, 1991, modified the above
decision by ordering INPORT to pay private respondents the
equivalent of twelve months in salary as separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement and two years' backwages. 23
On reconsideration, public respondent modified its original
award and reduced the separation pay to six months,
deleted the award for backwages and instead awarded
P1,000.00 as compensation for their sudden loss of
employment. 24
Under the law, an employee is entitled to reinstatement and
to his full backwages when he is unjustly dismissed. 25
Reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from
which one had been removed or separated. Reinstatement
and backwages are separate and distinct reliefs given to an
illegally dismissed employee. 26
Separation pay is awarded when reinstatement is not
possible, due, for instance, to strained relations between
employer and employee.
It is also given as a form of financial assistance when a
worker is dismissed in cases such as the installation of labor
saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses,
closing or cessation of operation of the establishment, or in
case the employee was found to have been suffering from a
disease such that his continued employment is prohibited by
law. 27
Separation pay is a statutory right defined as the amount
that an employee receives at the time of his severance from
the service and is designed to provide the employee with the
wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another
employment. 28 It is oriented towards the immediate future,
the transitional period the dismissed employee must undergo
before locating a replacement job. 29
Hence, an employee dismissed for causes other than those
cited above is not entitled to separation pay. 30Well-settled is
it that separation pay shall be allowed only in those
instances where the employee is validly dismissed
for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting
on his moral character. 31
Backwages, on the other hand, is a form of relief that
restores the income that was lost by reason of unlawful
dismissal. 32
It is clear from the foregoing summary of legal provisions
and jurisprudence that there must generally be unjust or
illegal dismissal from work, before reinstatement and
backwages may be granted. And in cases where
reinstatement is not possible or when dismissal is due to
valid causes, separation pay may be granted.
Private respondents contend that they were terminated for
failure to submit to the controversial "screening"
requirement.
Public respondent Commission took the opposite view and
held:
As the evidence on record will show, respondents
were not actually terminated from the service.
They were merely made to submit to a screening
committee as a prerequisite for readmission to
work. While this condition was found not wholly
justified, the fact remains that respondents who
are resistant to such procedure are partly
responsible for the delay in their readmission back
to work. Thus, We find justifiable basis in further
modifying our resolution of January 14, 1991 in
accordance with the equities of the case.
We shall therefore recall the award for backwages
for lack of factual and legal basis. The award for
separation pay shall likewise (be) reasonably
 reduced. Normally, severance benefit is granted
as an alternative remedy to reinstatement. And
since there is no dismissal to speak of, there is no
basis for awarding reinstatement as a legal
remedy. In lieu thereof, We shall grant herein
respondents separation pay as and by way of
financial assistance in the nature of an "equitable
relief". 33
We find that private respondents were indeed dismissed
when INPORT refused to accept them back to work after the
former refused to submit to the "screening" process.
Applying the law (Article 264 of the Labor Code) which
makes a distinction, we differentiate between the union
members and the union officers among private respondents
in granting the reliefs prayed for.
Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, a worker merely
participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from
his employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts
during a strike that he may be declared to have lost his
employment status. Since there appears no proof that these
union members committed illegal acts during the strike, they
cannot be dismissed. The striking union members among
private respondents are thus entitled to reinstatement, there
being no just cause for their dismissal.
However, considering that a decade has already lapsed from
the time the disputed strike occurred, we find that to award
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement would be more
practical and appropriate.
No backwages will be awarded to private respondent-union
members as a penalty for their participation in the illegal
strike. Their continued participation in said strike, even after
most of their co-workers had returned to work, can hardly be
rewarded by such an award.
The fate of private respondent-union officers is different.
Their insistence on unconditional reinstatement or
separation pay and backwages is unwarranted and
unjustified. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike, the
law mandates that a union officer may be terminated from
employment. 34
Notwithstanding the fact that INPORT previously accepted
other union officers and that the screening required by it was
uncalled for, still it cannot be gainsaid that it possessed the
right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from
service. The law, in using the word may, grants the employer
the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an
illegal strike as having lost his employment. 35
Moreover, an illegal strike which, more often than not, brings
about unnecessary economic disruption and chaos in the
workplace should not be countenanced by a relaxation of the
sanctions prescribed by law.
The union officers are, therefore, not entitled to any relief.
However, the above disquisition is now considered moot and
academic and cannot be effected in view of a manifestation
filed by INPORT dated May 15, 1987. 36 In said
Manifestation, it attached a Certification by the President of
the Macajalar Labor Union (MLU-FFW) to the effect that the
private respondents/remaining strikers have ceased to be
members of said union. The MLU-FFW had an existing
collective bargaining agreement with INPORT containing a
union security clause. Article 1, Section 2(b) of the CBA
provides:
The corporation shall discharge, dismiss or
terminate any employee who may be a member of
the Union but loses his good standing with the
Union and or corporation, upon proper notice of
such fact made by the latter; provided, however, . .
. after they shall have received the regular
appointment as a condition for his continued
employment with the corporation. . . . 37
Since private respondents (union members) are no longer
members of the MLU, they cannot be reinstated. In lieu of
reinstatement, which was a proper remedy before May 1987
when they were dismissed from the union, we award them
separation pay. We find that to award one month salary for
every year of service until 1985, after April of which year
they no longer formed part of INPORT's productive work
force partly through their own fault, is a fair settlement.
Finally, there is no merit in INPORT's statement that a
Resolution of the NLRC cannot be modified upon
reconsideration after the lapse of an unreasonable period of
time. Under the present circumstances, a period of eleven
months is not an unreasonable length of time. The
Resolution of the public respondent dated January 14, 1991
did not acquire finality in view of the timely filing of a motion
for reconsideration. Hence, the Commission's modified
Resolution issued on December 12, 1991 is valid and in
accordance with law.
In sum, reinstatement and backwages or, if no longer
feasible, separation pay, can only be granted if sufficient
bases exist under the law, particularly after a showing of
illegal dismissal. However, while the union members may
thus be entitled under the law to be reinstated or to receive
separation pay, their expulsion from the union in accordance
with the collective bargaining agreement renders the same
impossible.
The NLRC's award of separation pay as "equitable relief"
and P1,000.00 as compensation should be deleted, these
being incompatible with our findings detailed above.
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing premises, the petition in
G.R. No. 103560 ("Gold City Integrated Port Service Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al.") is GRANTED.
One month salary for each year of service until 1985 is
awarded to private respondents who were not union officers
as separation pay. The petition in G.R. No. 103599 ("Adelo
Ebuna, et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et
al.") is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION,
NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO,
ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO
VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for
petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio
Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and
members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers
in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular
second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5
P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of
their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge
Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following
stipulation of facts of the parties — parties —
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company
learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of
the Pasig Police Department to be participated by
the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well
as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to
4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning
of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on
March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the
Company's canteen, and those present were: for
the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de
Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section
heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano,
(2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4)
 Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6)
Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to
confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969.
PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as
spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the
planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or
dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO
that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the
union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the Company. For which reason, the
Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong
to the first and regular shifts, who without previous
leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4,
1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is
a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore,
would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969,
another meeting was convoked Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union
panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino,
Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3,
1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the
PBMEO representatives that while all workers may
join the Malacañang demonstration, the workers
for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969
should be excused from joining the demonstration
and should report for work; and thus utilize the
workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to
violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly
Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All
those who will not follow this warning of the
Company shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the
Company's warning that the officers shall be
primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it
was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch
as the Malacañang demonstration will be held the
following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of
PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which
was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the
contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING
REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES
JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.'
(Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400
proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent
Company that the first shift workers should not be required to
participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and
third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2
P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass
demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge
against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift,
charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections
13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of
the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-
20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur
L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.).
Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969,
by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor
Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they
did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent
Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969;
that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their
constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike because it was not directed against the
respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by
the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September
15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad
faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas,
Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible
for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a
consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the
respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the
aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29,
1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a
motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on
the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked
for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to
Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex
"G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p.
63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received
on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be
September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of
the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days
from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to
file their motion for reconsideration; and that because their motion for
reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly
dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo,1 which held among others, that a
motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses
(Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written
arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for
reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en
banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners for
being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period
prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein
petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which
was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of
the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15,
16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five (5)
days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the
decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be
perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court
a petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground
that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due
to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the
president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their counsel,
attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes
"K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the
order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3,
1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-
89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which
underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity
and worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the
cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of
man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent
in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty,
equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments,
and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles."3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the
Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections."4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not
the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour
was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the
authority it was entitled to exercise."5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to
petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign
people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the
ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as
Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk,
but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen.6 And as Justice
Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all;
and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are
protected.7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not
only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of
his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru
these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive
public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can
appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress
and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on
erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized.8 Because these
freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious
in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only
"with narrow specificity."9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the
passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against
the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and
of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such
priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored
by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the
means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law is
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to
validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other
hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a
more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate
danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando
in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion
in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo
in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and
Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms
of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against
public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the
men and women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr.
Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice
Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief
Judge Learned Hand, viz. — whether the gravity of the evil, discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is
necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the
mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by
their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work,"
herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated
the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles
governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained.
The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before
Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not
against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said
demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom
expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for
redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental
agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for
their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police
excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private
respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro
the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein
private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the
cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more
efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as
profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for
its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at
the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police
or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its
failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position
of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all
the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further
indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their
right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local
officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent
firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons
afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of
their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from
6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or
damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of
the firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic
situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as
they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As
above intimated, the condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their
families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated.
The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized
in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds
fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as
he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on
bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances — over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic
reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon — at once the shield
and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-
consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if
freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so
that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness
for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against
the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and
hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause
for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement,
is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral
as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of
the employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations,
in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular
working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial
Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to
stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours,
constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and
deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should
not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969
could not have been legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction
would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even
if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent
Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not
rooted in any industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they suggested
to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.
should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be
averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective
demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity
of the Union members as well as their total presence at the
demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the
validity of their cause but also immediately action on the part of the
corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues
they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of
freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third,
then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the
demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more
persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the
absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial
indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position
and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union
notified the company two days in advance of their projected
demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to
counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the
absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the
Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join
the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union
reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the
morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-
43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on
the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from
work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration.
And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held
against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross
vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it
is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on
the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition
for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right
"to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged
by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their
mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of
which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees
to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against
such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the
respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift
should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of
dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting
speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves
at least equal protection as the concerted action of employees in giving
publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality,
nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and
promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic
Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the
protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic
Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted
activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned
order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company,
"while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution,"
nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and
"warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the
first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the
following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such
failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat
of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass
demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against
the local police, were more important to them because they had the
courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of
dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's
wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more
especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego
their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about
the desired relief from police abuses. But management was adamant
in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free
speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary
to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses
inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the
evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the
corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and
to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the
Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to
disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the
operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss
actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only
mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not
present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to
comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were
exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day
of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the
customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or
that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to
absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the
company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds
of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such
savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or
damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its
workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the
employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for
proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent
from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which
guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article
XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor
...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State
is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these
constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise
these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless
constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of
Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to
eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting
the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the
purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral,
social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at
bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very
governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy
and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison d'etre —
as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right
divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is
null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction
secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained
through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the
judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of
an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced
confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-
incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present evidence in his
defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of
law, 26 even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-
two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm
trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both
failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the
inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been
subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human
rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of
jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a
nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on
all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and
corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified
by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations
exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a law
enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of
these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the
freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of
one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one
demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised
when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified,
abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise
these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on
procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be
reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer
and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ
the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the
required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources
with which to pay for competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for
reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5) days from
notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall
be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for
reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of
procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations
pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or
seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated
September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they
could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2)
days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more
directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a
mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period
for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over
constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in the light of the
aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the
Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the
Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of
constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any
statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to
natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations
procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of
Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or
reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead
constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by
the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is
unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the
Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved
workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the
necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the
filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51;
Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in
the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one
day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates
the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated
September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to
be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts
adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten
(10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16
and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp.
57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein
petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after
the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting arguments
counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein
petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated
October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for
being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period
(Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to
reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf such
motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by
the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject
of29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these
cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses
presently available must be specifically raised in the complaint or
answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such
pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be
raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the
determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of
the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which
no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is
thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court
gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural
rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must
likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners
even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against
them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered
no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny
application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on
such human rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent
power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice
Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-
c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove
with all situations without concerning itself about
procedural niceties that do not square with the
need to do justice, in any case, without further loss
of time, provided that the right of the parties to a
full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus,
this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and
vice-versa. In other words, when all the material
facts are spread in the records before Us, and all
the parties have been duly heard, it matters little
that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or
of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the
appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation
of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and
within the power of this Court to strike down in an
appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot
be beyond the admit of its authority, in appropriate
cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any error
of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be
exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If
there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain,
on whether or not the errors this Court has found
in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of
being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court
would still be on firm legal grounds should it
choose to reverse said decision here and
now even if such errors can be considered as
mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the
exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the
unnecessary return of this case to the lower court
for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary
course of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial
Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an unreasoning
adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein
laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to survive,
must be according supremacy over the property rights of their
employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case,
especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has
be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience
to the Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a Court
of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned
and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees
outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in
the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules
relied upon by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore
such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human
rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar
facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of
Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at is also
authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R.
charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-
stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case
of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by
the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not
"newly discovered," as such term is understood in
the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We
hold that such criterion is not binding upon the
Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of
Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or
procedure and shall have such other powers as
generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided,
however, That in the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy and
in exercising any duties and power under this Act,
the Court shall act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard
to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but
may inform its mind in such manner as it may
deem just and equitable.' By this provision the
industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of
the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts.
Said court is not even restricted to the specific
relief demanded by the parties but may issue such
orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient
for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling
any doubts that may give rise to future disputes.
(Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17,
1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor,
71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that
this provision is ample enough to have enabled
the respondent court to consider whether or not its
previous ruling that petitioners constitute a
minority was founded on fact, without regard to the
technical meaning of newly discovered evidence.
... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v.
Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with
"pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor
workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer
seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the
fundamental law, simply because their counsel — erroneously
believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23,
1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for
reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day
late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when
they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the attainment of which
such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this
score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma
vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland
in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The
Villamor decision was cited with approval in
Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600
[1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil.
156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2
SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910,
"technicality. when it deserts its proper-office as an
aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and
chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from
courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has
remained committed. The late Justice Recto in
Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a
similar mind. For him the interpretation of
procedural rule should never "sacrifice the ends
justice." While "procedural laws are no other than
technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they
were adopted not as ends themselves for the
compliance with which courts have organized and
function, but as means conducive to the realization
the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid.,
p.,128). We have remained steadfastly opposed,
in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a
sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar of
sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the
sacred principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court
of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As
succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they "should
give way to the realities of the situation." (Urbayan
v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016,
1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated
in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing
McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3
SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an
earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of
procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure
substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule
were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the employment
of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day
absence from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the
severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the
other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who
participated in the demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter
of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union
members who are not officers, were not dismissed and only the Union
itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as
respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by
the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp.
20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400
or so employee participated in the demonstration, for which reason
only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in
the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were
so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for
work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued
in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should
have been simply to charge said one-day absence against their
vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the
petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union
leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as
that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal
blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive
hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not
from those who consciously seek to destroy our
system of Government, but from men of goodwill
— good men who allow their proper concerns to
blind them to the fact that what they propose to
accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often
commendable. What we must remember,
however, is thatpreservation of liberties does not
depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has
the same effect whether the suppress or be a
reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against
misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the
infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in
our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the
demands of the moment makes easier another,
larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights
is a never ending one.
 ... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all
of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless
the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our
own liberties, even if we feel secure because we
belong to a group that is important and respected,
we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code
of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all
honor and good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention,
but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its
laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the
local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income
or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms
and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This
is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to
by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its
employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs.
C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for
having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank
president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality,
nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in
the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro,
We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this
admission of the respondents. Assuming that the
latter acted in their individual capacities when they
wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless
protected for they were engaged in concerted
activity, in the exercise of their right of self
organization that includes concerted activity for
mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some
members of this Court. For, as has been aptly
stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by
a small group of employees, if in furtherance of
their interests as such, is a concerted activity
protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6
A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have
allowed the respondents to air their grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to
discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in
giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be
sure, the right of self-organization of employees is
not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB
324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer
to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v.
Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29,
1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does
not touch the normal exercise of the right of the
employer to select his employees or to discharge
them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that
right by interfering with the countervailing right of
self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB
313 U.S. 177 [1941])...
xxx xxx xxx
In the final sum and substance, this Court is in
unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an
interference with the employees' right of self-
organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a
refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair
labor practice within the meaning and intendment
of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act.
(Emphasis supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify
labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the
complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no
less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly
and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more
imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not
against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with
full back pay from the date of their separation from the service until re
instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have
realized from other sources during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company,
Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J, took no part.
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-
Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0.
FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP
Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte,Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court) filed pursuant to Rule 191 of the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data,2 seeking a review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in
Special Proc. No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The questioned Decision
denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R.
Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos
Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent
(P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and
respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was the
Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management
Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an
Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private
Armies in the Country."7 The body, which was later on referred to as
the Zeñarosa Commission,8 was formed to investigate the existence of
private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating
them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them
permanently in the future.9 Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the
Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the
President a confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.:
The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the
President" (the Report).10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte
(PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations
against her and her aides,11 and classified her as someone who keeps
a PAG.12 Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–
Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the
Zeñarosa Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s
enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she
pointed out the following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion
regarding the status of PAGs in the Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one
dedicated Special Task Group (STG) for each private armed
group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities."16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation
generated by the PNP and captioned as "Status of PAGs
Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which classifies
PAGs in the country according to region, indicates their
identity, and lists the prominent personalities with whom
these groups are associated.17 The first entry in the table
names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to
herein petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from
the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press
conference held in Malacañang on March 24, 2010 at which
time, the Commission was also asked to comment on the
PNP report that out of one hundred seventeen (117) partisan
armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had been
dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members apprehended and
more than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
 Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics
were based on PNP data but that the more significant fact
from his report is that the PNP has been vigilant in
monitoring the activities of these armed groups and this
vigilance is largely due to the existence of the Commission
which has continued communicating with the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel in the field to
constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs.
Commissioner Basbaño stressed that the Commission’s
efforts have preempted the formation of the PAGs because
now everyone is aware that there is a body monitoring the
PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner
Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified that
the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to
threaten and sow fear during the election has been
considerably weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of
the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is
truly reflective of the situation in the field, the PNP complied with the
Commission’s recommendation that they revise their validation system
to include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the most recent
briefing provided by the PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred
seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups, the PNP reported that
seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news
program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the
politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her
association with a PAG also appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was
publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the
unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and
forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission.23 As a result, she claimed that
her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities
maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well
as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to
harassment and police surveillance operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for
the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she
prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports
from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information
forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done
to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding
unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from
making baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to
RTC Br. 13, which issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after
finding the Petition meritorious on its face.27 Thus, the trial court (a)
instructed respondents to submit all information and reports forwarded
to and used by the Zeñarosa Commission as basis to include her in the
list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed respondents, and any
person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to
the Zeñarosa Commission, or to any other government entity,
information that they may have gathered against her without the
approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written return
of the writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the
summary hearing of the case on 23 July 2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted
within the bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation and
surveillance of Gamboa.29 The information stored in their database
supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was
implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for murder and frustrated murder
docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a Complaint
for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in
authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder,
docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for
failing to comply with the following requisites under the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was
violated or threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life,
liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the actions and recourses she took to
secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the files,
registers or databases, the government office, and the person in
charge, in possession or in control of the data or information. 31 They
also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited
to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not
the proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation
of Gamboa.32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010,
dismissed the Petition.33 The trial court categorically ruled that the
inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as
published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy, to
wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of
persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa’s right to privacy indubitably has
been violated. The violation understandably affects her life, liberty and
security enormously. The untold misery that comes with the tag of
having a PAG could even be insurmountable. As she essentially
alleged in her petition, she fears for her security that at any time of the
day the unlimited powers of respondents may likely be exercised to
further malign and destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to
life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise
undisputed that there was certainly intrusion into Gamboa’s activities. It
cannot be denied that information was gathered as basis therefor. After
all, under Administrative Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa Commission
was tasked to investigate the existence of private armies in the
country, with all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
xxx xxx xxx
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa
alleged as she accused respondents, who are public officials, of having
gathered and provided information that made the Zeñarosa
Commission to include her in the list. Obviously, it was this gathering
and forwarding of information supposedly by respondents that
petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the
Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial
evidence that the subject information originated from respondents, and
that they forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without
the benefit of prior verification.35 The trial court also ruled that even
before respondents assumed their official positions, information on her
may have already been acquired.36 Finally, it held that the Zeñarosa
Commission, as the body tasked to gather information on PAGs and
authorized to disclose information on her, should have been impleaded
as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24
September 2010,38 raising the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa
Commission be impleaded as either a necessary or
indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to
present sufficient proof to link respondents as the informant
to [sic] the Zeñarosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the
Zeñarosa Commission to [sic] the PNP as alleged by
Gamboa is an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents
are distinct to PNP as an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a)
Gamboa failed to present substantial evidence to show that her right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b) the trial court
correctly dismissed the Petition on the ground that she had failed to
present sufficient proof showing that respondents were the source of
the report naming her as one who maintains a PAG.40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order,
fulfilling the mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should be done
in accordance with due process, such that the gathering and
forwarding of unverified information on her must be considered
unlawful.41 She also reiterates that she was able to present sufficient
evidence showing that the subject information originated from
respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the
writ of habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the
concept of the right to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data
as an extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right to
informational privacy; and finally, contextualize the right to privacy vis-
à-vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been
recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v.
Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty
as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised
by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn
statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right
to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas:
"Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from
unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is
to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the
beginning of all freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone
is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise
compel respect for his personality as a unique individual whose claim
to privacy and interference demands respect. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas,
speaking for five members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees
create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third
Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any
house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another
facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to
create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." After
referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, Justice
Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy
which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."
xxx xxx xxx
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of
Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government
has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one
of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government.
Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his
life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state
can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other
words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces
of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and
organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support
this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic
and a totalitarian society."44 (Emphases supplied)
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory
bases of the right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of
privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of
Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety
or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions
of the Bill of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided
by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws.
The Civil Code provides that "every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of
meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any
violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes
the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised
Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling.
Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-
Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the
Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it
is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by
some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x
x.46 (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must
be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard
Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,47 this Court
underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent
has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right.
While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution,
guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative
investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be
allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v.
Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access information
on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy
of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the
right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling
state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid
down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individual’s
right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a
valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies
involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the
public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this
purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the
assailed legislative investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing
state objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these
cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy
may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest
deemed legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.49 It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted,
there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand,
and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law
and jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas
data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted,
finds its origins from the European tradition of data protection,51 this
Court can be guided by cases on the protection of personal data
decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular
note is Leander v. Sweden,52 in which the ECHR balanced the right of
citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs with the right
of the state to protect its national security. In this case, Torsten
Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as a temporary
replacement museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was
adjacent to a restricted military security zone.53 He was refused
employment when the requisite personnel control resulted in an
unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the secret police
register, which was kept in accordance with the Personnel Control
Ordinance and to which he was prevented access. 54 He claimed,
among others, that this procedure of security control violated Article 8
of the European Convention of Human Rights55 on the right to privacy,
as nothing in his personal or political background would warrant his
classification in the register as a security risk. 56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of
information relating to the private life of Leander, coupled with the
refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an
interference in his right to respect for private life. 57 However, the ECHR
held that the interference was justified on the following grounds: (a) the
personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was the
protection of national security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control
Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the scope and
the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and
release of information by the authorities.59 The following statements of
the ECHR must be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference
corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that
it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter
alia, the Gillow judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no.
109, p. 22, § 55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national
authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation, the scope of
which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate
aim pursued but also on the particular nature of the
interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of the
respondent State in protecting its national security must be
balanced against the seriousness of the interference with the
applicant’s right to respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of
protecting national security, for the Contracting States to have laws
granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect
and store in registers not accessible to the public information on
persons and, secondly, to use this information when assessing the
suitability of candidates for employment in posts of importance for
national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr.
Leander’s legitimate interests through the consequences it had on his
possibilities of access to certain sensitive posts within the public
service. On the other hand, the right of access to public service is not
as such enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek
judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, §§ 34-35), and,
apart from those consequences, the interference did not constitute an
obstacle to his leading a private life of his own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of
appreciation available to the respondent State in assessing the
pressing social need in the present case, and in particular in choosing
the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national
security, was a wide one.
xxx xxx xxx
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was
not communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the
conclusion that the interference was not "necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security", as it is the very absence of
such communication which, at least partly, ensures the efficacy of the
personnel control procedure (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-
mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, § 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the
issue of the Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and
the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of
communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of
the Ordinance, should be effectively applied in so far as it did not
jeopardise the purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that
the safeguards contained in the Swedish personnel control system
meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having
regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it, the
respondent State was entitled to consider that in the present case the
interests of national security prevailed over the individual interests of
the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr.
Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to have been
disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific
component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate
state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy,
may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged
intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest
involved.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the
interest of the state to dismantle private armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies
and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted
authority.60 It also provides for the establishment of one police force
that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and
administered by a national police commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the
issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to
investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275
clothed it with the powers of an investigative body, including the power
to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence
relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce
documents, books, and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the
Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of
Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the
commission in the performance of its functions.63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law
to (a) enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives
and properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary
steps to ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes.64
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the
foregoing powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission
and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected
of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their
activities.65 One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the
data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from
the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the
forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was
not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in
life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence
regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of
investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the
Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police
force in the fulfillment of the former’s mandate, and thus had the power
to request assistance from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that
the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without
prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the
opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or
threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial
component of intelligence-gathering and
investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the
PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on
individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored
the situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in place to make
sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and
accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court
declines to make any further determination as to the propriety of
sharing information during specific stages of intelligence gathering. To
do otherwise would supplant the discretion of investigative bodies in
the accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an undue
encroachment on their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection
established in existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless
deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that
information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence
gathered must be released exclusively to the authorities empowered to
receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the right to
privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s person
or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."67
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but
emphasized its confidential nature.1âwphi1 That it was leaked to third
parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it
must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents
were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are
other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her
reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of
habeas data unnecessary and improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through
substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals
maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard,
respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted
against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity,
which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of
dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life
of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP
of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed
Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa
the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA
SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed
FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and
NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by
her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA.
CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by
their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V.
PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents
FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor,
represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and
MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by
their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY
ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed
KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE
KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all
surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents
BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA
MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents
ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and
MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their
parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE,
NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and
represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA,
PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all
surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE
MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA,
DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors,
represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS
BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch
66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a
balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of
whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was
filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs
therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented
and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic,
non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter
alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel
C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of
the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who
are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are
"so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is
prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements
in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant
rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna
may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and
chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in
order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land
area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent
(54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known
as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt
water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and
the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with
the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000)
cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island
of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's
unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a
critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h)
increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the
siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for
domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k)
the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases
which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as
the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences
of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film
evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing
allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had
some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land
mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there
remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's
land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere
850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests
are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million
hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's,
predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut
the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding
areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about
200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft
of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous
consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to
the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations
yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already
being felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable
injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and
their successors — who may never see, use,
benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural
resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resource property he holds in trust for the benefit
of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as
the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final
demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990
is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to
cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant
to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights
of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be
left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare,
barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna
and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had
been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the
public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental
quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and
well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to
cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory
to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full
and efficient use of natural resources (sic)."
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section
2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural
heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16,
Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the
highest law of humankind — the natural law —
and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation
and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in law other than the instant action to
arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed
a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely:
(1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July
1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the
complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for
would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again,
the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but
have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states
a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their
right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the
1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal
Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and
self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on
the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192,
to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged
grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements
(TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves
a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's
non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not
apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise
submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State
when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to
allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see
nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political
question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit
that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law.
Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time —
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can
neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found,
after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural
matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.
The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue
with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case
is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of
the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it,
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them
before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter
being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners
minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world
in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible
to the present as well as future generations. 10Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We
shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners
and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the
Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with
the defendant. For although we believe that
plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it
(sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking
to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1,
Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that
the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions
and vague conclusions based on unverified data.
In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the
matter before it, being impressed with political
color and involving a matter of public policy, may
not be taken cognizance of by this Court without
doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it
cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to
do otherwise would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs
failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved
or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A
reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of
the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter
of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution
for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they
are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because
of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would
not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna
who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the
State to provide sanctions
against all forms of pollution
 — air, water and noise
pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The
right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily
carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the same
and, therefore, sanctions may
be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental
balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions
of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon
C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of
which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and
proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public
domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources
as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of
the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment,
and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and the use of
the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as
well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of
the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof
which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State
shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people,
the full exploration and development as well as the
judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality
of the environment and the objective of making the
exploration, development and utilization of such
natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a
true value system that takes into account social
and environmental cost implications relative to the
utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,
specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes
particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and
higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be
in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and
have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former
"declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop,
maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill
the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-
being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the
said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty —
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O.
No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative
duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause
of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they
claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of
the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the
ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of
the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be
considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is
beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted.
The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged
facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this
Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost
care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to
manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively
nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law
itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable
parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a
political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive
or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.
What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-
vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or
the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions
from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political
Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this
Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the
traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law.
The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts
of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the
judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the
power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and
to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of
"grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic
phrase that can expand or contract according to
the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court,
noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional
objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was
political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is
the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The
court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it
cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements. For to
do otherwise would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not
shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing
undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license
holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public
interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the
Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so
requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or
a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court
held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J.
168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither
is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong
Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs.
Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State
to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein.
They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October
27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause,
which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of
contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are
contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is
because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only
been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the
purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general
welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of
government, is not meant to be absolute. The
same is understood to be subject to reasonable
legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of
public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other
words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property
and the making of contracts are normally matters
of private and not of public concern. The general
rule is that both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise
his freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of
the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of
31
the state.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-
impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover,
with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of
right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of
18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside.
The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO
ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR
ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 163, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE BUSINESS RESOURCES, INC.
represented by, MR. TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO;
MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA and/or MAYOR
RICARDO D. PAPA, JR., respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD VENTURES INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and R. J. ORION DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR
WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA FISHING & TRADING CORP.;
ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT
CORPORATION and TRIM CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF
BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS
CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or
MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH VENTURES, INC., represented by its
PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA
and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA MAR TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN
LAGOON FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.;
MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B.
PACIS, respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
It is difficult for a man, scavenging on the garbage dump created by
affluence and profligate consumption and extravagance of the rich or
fishing in the murky waters of the Pasig River and the Laguna Lake or
making a clearing in the forest so that he can produce food for his
family, to understand why protecting birds, fish, and trees is more
important than protecting him and keeping his family alive.
How do we strike a balance between environmental protection, on the
one hand, and the individual personal interests of people, on the
other?
Towards environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety,
and sustainable development, Republic Act No. 4850 created the
"Laguna Lake Development Authority." This Government Agency is
supposed to carry out and effectuate the aforesaid declared policy, so
as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act
clearly named, within the context of the national and regional plans and
policies for social and economic development.
Presidential Decree No. 813 of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
amended certain sections of Republic Act No. 4850 because of the
concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs
and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and
prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply,
irrigation, fisheries, and the like. Concern on the part of the
Government and the general public over: — the environment impact of
development on the water quality and ecology of the lake and its
related river systems; the inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River,
industrial, domestic and agricultural wastes from developed areas
around the lake; the increasing urbanization which induced the
deterioration of the lake, since water quality studies have shown that
the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the
same; and the floods in Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore
towns which will influence the hydraulic system of Laguna de Bay,
since any scheme of controlling the floods will necessarily involve the
lake and its river systems, — likewise gave impetus to the creation of
the Authority.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4850 was amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared
to be the national policy to promote, and
accelerate the development and balanced growth
of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces, cities and towns hereinafter referred to
as the region, within the context of the national
and regional plans and policies for social and
economic development and to carry out the
development of the Laguna Lake region with due
regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the
quality of human life and ecological systems, and
the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution.1
Special powers of the Authority, pertinent to the issues in this case,
include:
Sec. 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby further
amended by adding thereto seven new
paragraphs to be known as paragraphs (j), (k), (l),
(m), (n), (o), and (p) which shall read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(j) The provisions of existing
laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, to engage in
fish production and other
aqua-culture projects in
Laguna de Bay and other
bodies of water within its
jurisdiction and in pursuance
thereof to conduct studies and
make experiments, whenever
necessary, with the
collaboration and assistance
of the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources, with the
end in view of improving
present techniques and
practices. Provided, that until
modified, altered or amended
by the procedure provided in
the following sub-paragraph,
the present laws, rules and
permits or authorizations
remain in force;
(k) For the purpose of
effectively regulating and
monitoring activities in Laguna
de Bay, the Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue new permit for the use
of the lake waters for any
projects or activities in or
affecting the said lake
including navigation,
construction, and operation of
fishpens, fish enclosures, fish
corrals and the like, and to
impose necessary safeguards
for lake quality control and
management and to collect
necessary fees for said
activities and
projects: Provided, That the
fees collected for fisheries
may be shared between the
Authority and other
government agencies and
political sub-divisions in such
proportion as may be
determined by the President
of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the
Authority's Board: Provided,
further, That the Authority's
Board may determine new
areas of fishery development
or activities which it may place
under the supervision of the
Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources taking into
account the overall
development plans and
programs for Laguna de Bay
and related bodies of
water: Provided, finally, That
the Authority shall subject to
the approval of the President
of the Philippines promulgate
such rules and regulations
which shall govern fisheries
development activities in
Laguna de Bay which shall
take into consideration among
others the following: socio-
economic amelioration of
bonafide resident fishermen
whether individually or
collectively in the form of
cooperatives, lakeshore town
development, a master plan
for fishpen construction and
operation, communal fishing
ground for lake shore town
residents, and preference to
lake shore town residents in
hiring laborer for fishery
projects;
(l) To require the cities and
municipalities embraced
within the region to pass
appropriate zoning ordinances
and other regulatory
measures necessary to carry
out the objectives of the
Authority and enforce the
same with the assistance of
the Authority;
(m) The provisions of existing
laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, to exercise
water rights over public
waters within the Laguna de
Bay region whenever
necessary to carry out the
Authority's projects;
(n) To act in coordination with
existing governmental
agencies in establishing water
quality standards for
industrial, agricultural and
municipal waste discharges
into the lake and to cooperate
with said existing agencies of
the government of the
Philippines in enforcing such
standards, or to separately
pursue enforcement and
penalty actions as provided
for in Section 4 (d) and
Section 39-A of this
Act: Provided, That in case of
conflict on the appropriate
water quality standard to be
enforced such conflict shall be
resolved thru the NEDA
Board.2
To more effectively perform the role of the Authority under Republic
Act No. 4850, as though Presidential Decree No. 813 were not thought
to be completely effective, the Chief Executive, feeling that the land
and waters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources
requiring judicious management to their optimal utilization to insure
renewability and to preserve the ecological balance, the competing
options for the use of such resources and conflicting jurisdictions over
such uses having created undue constraints on the institutional
capabilities of the Authority in the light of the limited powers vested in it
by its charter, Executive Order No. 927 further defined and enlarged
the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated
the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de
Bay Region".
Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of
Executive Order No. 927 which include in particular the sharing of fees:
Sec 2. Water Rights Over Laguna de Bay and
Other Bodies of Water within the Lake Region: To
effectively regulate and monitor activities in the
Laguna de Bay region, the Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of
all surface water for any projects or activities in or
affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
For the purpose of this Executive Order, the term
"Laguna de Bay Region" shall refer to the
Provinces of Rizal and Laguna; the Cities of San
Pablo, Pasay, Caloocan, Quezon, Manila and
Tagaytay; the towns of Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and
Malvar in Batangas Province; the towns of Silang
and Carmona in Cavite Province; the town of
Lucban in Quezon Province; and the towns of
Marikina, Pasig, Taguig, Muntinlupa, and Pateros
in Metro Manila.
Sec 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby
empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake
water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes
including but not limited to fisheries, recreation,
municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation,
irrigation, and waste disposal purpose; Provided,
that the rates of the fees to be collected, and
the sharing with other government agencies and
political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject
to the approval of the President of the
Philippines upon recommendation of the
Authority's Board, except fishpen fee, which will be
shared in the following manner; 20 percent of the
fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5
percent shall go to the Project Development Fund
which shall be administered by a Council and the
remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of
LLDA. However, after the implementation within
the three-year period of the Laguna Lake Fishery
Zoning and Management Plan, the sharing will be
modified as follows: 35 percent of the fishpen fee
goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5
percent goes to the Project Development Fund
 and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by
LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA
shall form part of its corporate funds and shall not
be remitted to the National Treasury as an
exception to the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1234. (Emphasis supplied)
It is important to note that Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 813
defined the term "Laguna Lake" in this manner:
Sec 41. Definition of Terms.
(11) Laguna Lake or Lake. Whenever Laguna
Lake or lake is used in this Act, the same shall
refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered
by the lake water when it is at the average annual
maximum lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as
referred to a datum 10.00 meters below mean
lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at and
below such elevation are public lands which form
part of the bed of said lake.
Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of
1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the
provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave
municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing
privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides:
Sec. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges.
(a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority
to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters
and impose rental fees or charges therefor in
accordance with the provisions of this Section.
(b) The Sangguniang Bayan may:
(1) Grant fishing privileges to
erect fish corrals, oyster,
mussel or other aquatic beds
or bangus fry areas, within a
definite zone of the municipal
waters, as determined by it; . .
..
(2) Grant privilege to gather,
take or catch bangus fry,
prawn fry or kawag-kawag or
fry of other species and fish
from the municipal waters by
nets, traps or other fishing
gears to marginal fishermen
free from any rental fee,
charges or any other
imposition whatsoever.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 447. Power, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(XI) Subject to the provisions
of Book II of this Code, grant
exclusive privileges of
constructing fish corrals or
fishpens, or the taking or
catching of bangus fry, prawn
fry or kawag-kawag or fry of
any species or fish within the
municipal waters.
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue
fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took
advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the
consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as
of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water
surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares
in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to
construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the
policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna
Lake carrying capacity.
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of
separate independent policies in the operation of fishpens and
fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake
and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated
the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current
environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to
the general public that:
In compliance with the instructions of His
Excellency PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS given
on June 23, 1993 at Pila, Laguna pursuant to
Republic Act 4850 as amended by Presidential
Decree 813 and Executive Order 927 series of
1983 and in line with the policies and programs of
the Presidential Task Force on Illegal Fishpens
and Illegal Fishing, the general public is hereby
notified that:
1. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which
were not registered or to which no application for
registration and/or permit has been filed with
Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March
31, 1993 are hereby declared outrightly as illegal.
2. All fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to
demolition which shall be undertaken by the
Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and
Illegal Fishing.
3. Owners of fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-
culture structures declared as illegal shall, without
prejudice to demolition of their structures be
criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-
A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813
for violation of the same laws. Violations of these
laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not
exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five
Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the
court.
All operators of fishpens, fishcages and other
aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in
accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have
one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to
show cause before the LLDA why their said
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures should not be demolished/dismantled.
One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the concerned
owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-
culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective
structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition
shall be effected.
Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases
against the Authority before various regional trial courts, to wit: (a) Civil
Case No. 759-B, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal, filed by Fleet Development,
Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; (b) Civil Case No. 64049, for Injunction,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig, filed by IRMA Fishing and
Trading Corp., ARTM Fishing Corp., BDR Corp., MIRT Corp. and
TRIM Corp.; (c) Civil Case No. 566, for Declaratory Relief and
Injunction, Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig, filed by Manila
Marine Life Business Resources, Inc. and Tobias Reynaldo M. Tianco;
(d) Civil Case No. 556-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by AGP Fishing
Ventures, Inc.; (e) Civil Case No. 522-M, for Prohibition, Injunction and
Damages, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, filed by
Blue Lagoon and Alcris Chicken Growers, Inc.; (f) Civil Case No. 554-,
for Certiorari and Prohibition, Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Morong,
Rizal, filed by Greenfields Ventures Industrial Corp. and R.J. Orion
Development Corp.; and (g) Civil Case No. 64124, for Injunction,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Pasig, filed by SEA-MAR Trading Co.,
Inc. and Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corp. and Minamar Fishing
Corporation.
The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on
jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were invariably denied.
Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory
injunction were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566
enjoining the Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar
structures in question.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R.
Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the Authority with this court. Impleaded
as parties-respondents are concerned regional trial courts and
respective private parties, and the municipalities and/or respective
Mayors of Binangonan, Taguig and Jala-jala, who issued permits for
the construction and operation of fishpens in Laguna de Bay. The
Authority sought the following reliefs, viz.:
 (A) Nullification of the temporary restraining
order/writs of preliminary injunction issued in Civil
Cases Nos. 64125, 759 and 566;
(B) Permanent prohibition against the regional trial
courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases
involving the Authority which is a co-equal body;
(C) Judicial pronouncement that R.A. 7610 (Local
Government Code of 1991) did not repeal, alter or
modify the provisions of R.A. 4850, as amended,
empowering the Authority to issue permits for
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures in Laguna de Bay and that, the
Authority the government agency vested with
exclusive authority to issue said permits.
By this Court's resolution of May 2, 1994, the Authority's consolidated
petitions were referred to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision, dated June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of Appeals holding
that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of
government whose decision or order are appealable only to the Court
of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial
functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the
LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are
concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991;
(D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved
to and is now vested with their respective local government units
concerned.
Not satisfied with the Court of Appeals decision, the Authority has
returned to this Court charging the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
PROBABLY COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE LAGUNA LAKE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS NOT A QUASI-
JUDICIAL AGENCY.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT R.A. 4850 AS AMENDED BY P.D.
813 AND E.O. 927 SERIES OF 1983 HAS BEEN
REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7160. THE SAID
RULING IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED
PRINCIPLES AND JURISPRUDENCE OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE POWER TO ISSUE FISHPEN
PERMITS IN LAGUNA DE BAY HAS BEEN
DEVOLVED TO CONCERNED (LAKESHORE)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
We take a simplistic view of the controversy. Actually, the main and
only issue posed is: Which agency of the Government — the Laguna
Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region — should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna
Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned?
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813,
and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically
provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water
for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including
navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures,
fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the
Local Government Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the
exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The
Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals,
oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a
definite zone of the municipal waters.
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not
necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake
Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority
over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express
provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the
Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of
the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments.
The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No.
7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic
in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which
is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It
is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided
for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent
statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the
intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general
law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special
law."3
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute,
the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as
an exception to the general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied
repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given
to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed,
amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.4
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should
prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority,
which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and
sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative
intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.
We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake
Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body
of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km² lake
surface water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other
smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km² basin or watershed
transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater
portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon
provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that
needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be
serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an
exhaustible natural resource — a very limited one — which requires
judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability
and preserve its ecological integrity and balance."
"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a
national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced
growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to
the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part
of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need
when they passed this LLDA law — the special law designed to govern
the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources."
"Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts
of management policies where lakeshore local government units
exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water.
The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of
water therefrom or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain
area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900 km² of lake
water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water
resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve,
protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay."5
The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was
clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that
Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local
governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book
II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On
The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government
Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the
purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna
de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality
control and management.6 It does partake of the nature of police power
which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most
demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation.
Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid
exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government
Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages
and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3
of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees
collected.
In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial
agency or not, it is our holding that, considering the provisions of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850 and Section 4 of Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake
Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 304, 306,
which we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution
cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where
the special law provides for another forum. It must
be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a
specialized administrative agency, is specifically
mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws to carry out and make effective
the declared national policy of promoting and
accelerating the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and
the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon
and Caloocan with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life
and ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and
pollution. Under such a broad grant of power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter,
obviously has the responsibility to protect the
inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the
deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from
the discharge of wastes from the surrounding
areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared
policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to
pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans,
programs, and projects proposed by local
government offices/agencies within the region,
public corporations, and private persons or
enterprises where such plans, programs and/or
projects are related to those of the LLDA for the
development of the region.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . While it is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as
are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a
settled rule that an administrative agency has also
such powers as are necessarily implied in the
exercise of its express powers. In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter,
as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with
respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake
region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease
and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise,
it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper
agency.
there is no question that the Authority has express powers
as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution
cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and
on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de
Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to
the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may
only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be
sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal
questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided
for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended.
Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion
of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such
powers as are by its charter vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will
render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the
Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power
would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if
not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local
Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are
hereby granted, insofar as they relate to the authority of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority to grant fishing privileges within the
Laguna Lake Region.
The restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued by Judge Arturo
Marave, RTC, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal; Judge Herculano Tech, RTC,
Branch 70, Binangonan, Rizal; and Judge Aurelio Trampe, RTC,
Branch 163, Pasig, Metro Manila, are hereby declared null and void
and ordered set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
The Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby
prohibited from issuing permits to construct and operate fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures within the Laguna Lake
Region, their previous issuances being declared null and void. Thus,
the fishing permits issued by Mayors Isidro B. Pacis, Municipality of
Binangonan; Ricardo D. Papa, Municipality of Taguig; and Walfredo M.
de la Vega, Municipality of Jala-jala, specifically, are likewise declared
null and void and ordered cancelled.
The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put up by
operators by virtue of permits issued by Municipal Mayors within the
Laguna Lake Region, specifically, permits issued to Fleet
Development, Inc. and Carlito Arroyo; Manila Marine Life Business
Resources, Inc., represented by, Mr. Tobias Reynald M. Tiangco;
Greenfield Ventures Industrial Development Corporation and R.J.
Orion Development Corporation; IRMA Fishing And Trading
Corporation, ARTM Fishing Corporation, BDR Corporation, Mirt
Corporation and Trim Corporation; Blue Lagoon Fishing Corporation
and ALCRIS Chicken Growers, Inc.; AGP Fish Ventures, Inc.,
represented by its President Alfonso Puyat; SEA MAR Trading Co.,
Inc., Eastern Lagoon Fishing Corporation, and MINAMAR Fishing
Corporation, are hereby declared illegal structures subject to
demolition by the Laguna Lake Development Authority.
SO ORDERED.
METROPOLITAN MANILA G.R. Nos. 171947-48
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Present:
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1] PUNO, C.J.,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, QUISUMBING,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC CARPIO,
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND CORONA,
MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE CARPIO MORALES,
COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE AZCUNA,
NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME TINGA,
GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF CHICO-NAZARIO,
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL VELASCO, JR.,
GOVERNMENT, NACHURA,
Petitioners, REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
- versus - BRION, JJ.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF
MANILA BAY, represented and
joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN,
MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH
DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA
LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA,
FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE
SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG,
HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS,
FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and Promulgated:
JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA,
Respondents. December 18, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate
change, has of late gained the attention of the international community. Media
have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction
of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper
disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental
destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer
simply heals by itself.[2] But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate
crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and
procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by
the nature of their respective offices or by direct statutory command, are
tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers,
shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and
their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the
high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm.
Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental
pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and
commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud
historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the
past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and
slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of
people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies,
among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of
the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99
of the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of
the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law,
specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment
Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and
ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the
defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to
public health and in the depletion and contamination of
the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL
defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable
and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and
to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for
swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.[3]
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the
continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of
the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a
balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act
No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship;
and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners
be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted
concrete plan of action for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht
Club followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the
Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management
Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different
beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform
content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when
what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for
bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the SB level, is
one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.[4]
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS
efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second
Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented,
as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being
conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis
Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or
washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision [5] in favor of
respondents. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed
defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily,
to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its
waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming,
skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To
attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR
as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months
from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective
duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and
concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and
restoration of the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and
maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in
strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their
capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts
under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage
facilities for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning
up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste
facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous
substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the
discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of
other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that
contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain
an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or
adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as
other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use
or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life
in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous
fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate
budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and
rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures
and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters
to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid
wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the
construction and engineering arm of the government,
DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing
debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other
non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the
operations of septic and sludge companies and require
them to have proper facilities for the treatment and
disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic
tanks.
 Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts
of the people through education the importance of
preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP
Maritime Group, to protect at all costs
the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed
before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were
eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA),
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime
Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with
this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution
of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with
the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the
pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the
cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for
cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of
the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision[6] of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners
appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial
courts decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual
basic functions under existing laws.[7]
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of
their Rule 45 petition on the following ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON
BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED
THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DECLARING
THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES
CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO
REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND
DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL
COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS
I include formulation and implementation of policies,
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152
RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC
POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER
CLEANING IN GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION
OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL
ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE
COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of
PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up
Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the
cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be
compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the ManilaBay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on
oral arguments.
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus
under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial
duty.[8] A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor judgment.[9] It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under
conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.[10] Mandamus is
available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but
not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and
maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily
involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the
agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate,
has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located
by undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the
exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory
command is clear and that petitioners duty to comply with and act according
to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion.
According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without
discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up,
or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token,
respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not
to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is
the MMDAs ministerial duty to attend to such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform
their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such
duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of
the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done
is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so
in Social Justice Society v. Atienza[11] in which the Court directed the City
of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027
directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their
business in the so-called Pandacan Terminals within six months from the
effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant
case, the MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill
and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage
disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The
MMDAs duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope
of the MMDAs waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which
standards, programs and projects for proper and
sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include
the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill
and related facilities and the implementation of other
alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and
recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the
minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which
provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall
maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are
Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003,[12] enjoining the MMDA and local government
units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001,
from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five
years after such effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.
The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be
noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003,
but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal
system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated,
discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries
to act officially according to their judgment or conscience. [13] A discretionary
duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or
not to perform.[14] Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or
not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for
want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and
pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are
enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions
relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to
perform these duties. Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,[15] is the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use
of the countrys environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine
Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR
as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and
implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality
management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Acts Sec. 19(k),
exercises jurisdiction over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its
location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent
information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and
technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution.
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water
Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework,
and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is
nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of
RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.The [DENR] shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the implementation
and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise
provided herein. As such, it shall have the following
functions, powers and responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report
within twenty-four (24) months from the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the
Department shall thereafter review or revise and
publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management
Framework within twelve (12) months following
the completion of the status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality
Management Area Action Plan within 12 months
following the completion of the framework for
each designated water management area. Such
action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality
management area governing board every five (5)
years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in
the process of completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality
Management Framework.[16] Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to
submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan. [17] Again, like
the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it
under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested
that the DENR, with the assistance of and in partnership with various
government agencies and non-government organizations, has completed, as of
December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated
budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay
Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the
Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some
of its phases should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track
what are assigned them under existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234, [18] is vested with
jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all waterworks and sewerage
systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and
several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary
sewerages as may be necessary for the proper sanitation
and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the
System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and
control over local water districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and
regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate
local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct,
operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and
disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275,
the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing
sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and
safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of
the country.[19] In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to
provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code
of 1987 (EO 292),[20] is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and
enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper
utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with
local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of
establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that
fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized
and managed on a sustainable basis.[21] Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is
charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of
water quality standards in marine waters.[22] More specifically, its Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources(BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall
primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for
the development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic
resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national
government, is tasked under EO 292[23] to provide integrated planning, design,
and construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource
development systems in accordance with national development objectives and
approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to
perform metro-wide services relating to flood control and sewerage
management which include the formulation and implementation of policies,
standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and
sewerage system.
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the
DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily
responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country,
DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood control
services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and
drainage services shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and
encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages) in
violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the
Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,[24] or the Marine
Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing
laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial
waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in
accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution
Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective
implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law,
apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or
out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating
craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any
method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial
and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or
procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either
from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or
vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf,
manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any
refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other
than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any
navigable water from which the same shall float or be
washed into such navigable water; and
 c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the
bank of any navigable water or on the bank of any
tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall
be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either
by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or
otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded
or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such
water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law on December 13, 1990,
the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to perform all police functions over the
Philippine territorial waters and rivers. Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police
functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires
the capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has
not yet attained the capability to assume and perform the police functions of
PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall
coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations
governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of
the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group
were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and
regulations.[25]
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated to
establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port
system in support of trade and national development.[26] Moreover, Sec. 6-c of
EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within the
ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry
out its powers and functions and attain its purposes and
objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the
functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law
enforcement bodies within the area. Such police
authority shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement
within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as
movement within the port of watercraft.[27]
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a
signatory to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,[28] the Philippines, through the PPA,
must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and
terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine
ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to
prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-
generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and
apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within
Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have
jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain
adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as
other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would
necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction. [29]
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are
frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as
roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps
and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable
materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as
enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an
environmental compliance certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA
7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed when persons or entities occupy
danger areas such asesteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks
and playgrounds. The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the
DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279
and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro
Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan,
Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or
eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to
implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and
other encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws
in coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD
1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the
establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply
or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275,
the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned
agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection,
treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation of a
centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly
urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage management system shall
be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 72[30] of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of
the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.1[31] of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules,
the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper
disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict enforcement
of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge
collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their
environmental sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine
Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on
environmental education in its school curricula at all levels.[32] Under Sec. 118
of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher
Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a
nationwide educational campaign to promote the development, management,
conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to
strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all
levels, with an emphasis on waste management principles.[33]
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec.
2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and
sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively
achieve the countrys development objectives.[34]
One of the countrys development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the
Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall
pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the
protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and
marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among
others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and
abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to
promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic
instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources;
to formulate a holistic national program of water quality management that
recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated from
concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public
health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management
program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain
the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the countrys development
objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in
themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and
mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the
issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the
Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water pollution in general, not
just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the
quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its
state will adversely affect its best usage, the
government agencies concerned shall take such
measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of
 such water to meet the prescribed water quality
standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the
responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and
clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense.
In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies
concerned shall undertake containment, removal and
clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or
entities responsible for such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on
the subject, Cleanup Operations, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20)
of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however,
to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC.
16. Cleanup Operations.Notwithstanding the provisions
of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes
pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the
applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible
to contain, remove and clean up any pollution incident
at his own expense to the extent that the same water
bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and
beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency
cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails
to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in
coordination with other government agencies
concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and
cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said
operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to
have caused such pollution under proper administrative
determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost
incurred shall be made to the Water Quality
Management Fund or to such other funds where said
disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more
apparent than real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case,
merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup
operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the
Environment Code concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in
specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that
the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g)
and (h), which defines the terms cleanup operations and accidental spills, as
follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in
removing the pollutants discharged or spilled in water
to restore it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or
other hazardous substances in water that
result from accidents such as collisions and
groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152
merely direct the government agencies concerned to undertake containment,
removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of
the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec.
20 is limited only to water pollution incidents, which are situations that
presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the
corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the
point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires cleanup
operations to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means
that there must have been a specific incident of either intentional or accidental
spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec.
62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and
cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners posture,
respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec.
20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed
covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of
businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly
accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far
from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope
of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution
incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.
To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental
issues, coupled with their narrow reading of their respective mandated roles,
has contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming,
respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup
coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase
cleanup operations embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such
limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases cleanup operations and
accidental spills do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where
said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in
any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to
act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water
quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best
usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies,
when appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the
prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the
quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as
couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which
the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left
behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake
the cleanup work for the polluters account. Petitioners assertion, that they
have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a
water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the
containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier
discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into
play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there
are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly
invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the
pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific
pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse
over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The
appellate court wrote: PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of
environmental protection and management. This is better served by making
Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific
pollution incidents.[35]
Granting arguendo that petitioners position thus described vis--vis
the implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the
fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it
is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general
pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with
reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152
mentions water pollution incidents which may be caused by polluters in the
waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water
bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other
hand, specifically adverts to any person who causes pollution in or pollutes
water bodies, which may refer to an individual or an establishment that
pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the
contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water
pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless
polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution
incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government
agencies concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to
apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be
amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has
been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to
contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of
setting, it behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup
operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers
for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the
initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of
the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It
is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland
bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching
the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic
exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again
deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and
other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the
petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on
continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and
duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its
water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as
continuing mandamus,[36] the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances,
issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be
set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine
of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean
up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.[37]
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other
unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-
Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Paraaque-
Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers,
the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan)
River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers
and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge their
waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers
and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the
pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized
structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or
unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then
practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for
naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.[38]
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures
is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code,[39] which prohibits the building of
structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other
waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the
shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire
length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban
areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty
(40) meters in forest areas, along their margins,
are subject to the easement of public use in the
interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing
and salvage.No person shall be allowed to stay in
this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation,
navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial
establishments standing along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other
major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated as
unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly
contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and
the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-
complying industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the
necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their
industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into
the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such
period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer
their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for
petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian
Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro
Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there
reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is
shocking. Some highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled
dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and
Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of
lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic
liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the
earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are
used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms
the presence of a large amount of human waste in the
dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably
generated by households that lack alternatives to
sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation
is an understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and
other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of
pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs
into the Marikina and Pasig Riversystems
and Manila Bay.[40]
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should
now more than ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the
blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37,
reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open
Dumps for Solid Waste.No open dumps shall be
established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of
solid waste by any person, including LGUs which
[constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be
allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided,
further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5)
years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis
added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace
period of five (5) years which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and
gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the
prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of
RA 9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in roads,
canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open
burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not
have proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila
sewerage system that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are
violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies,
groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and
unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste
and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by
human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment including
dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or
residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and
other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances,
from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure.
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court
wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive
departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective
official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a
need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some
of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices
and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground,
and as a historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late
in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the
plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead,
daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with
the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their
minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through
petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of
the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over.
Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle
down to work before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we
must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot
shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning
up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners hiding
behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution
incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a
discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically
transform and improve waste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of
the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall
protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue
of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. [41] Even
assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding
petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing
them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep
the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.
Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision
of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September
13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but
with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening
events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to
clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and
restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea
waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR
Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit
for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use
of the countrys environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275,
designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its
enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement
its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest
possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with
concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful
implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated
completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of
1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991,[42] the DILG, in
exercising the Presidents power of general supervision and its duty to
promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec.
43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in
Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to
inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the
banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such
as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-
Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers,
the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan)
River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers
and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the
lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment
facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances,
and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to
require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or
septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage
water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros,
and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other
sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,[43] the MWSS is directed to provide,
install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment
facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest
possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,[44] the LWUA, through the local water
districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install,
operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and
safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible
time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,[45] the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered
to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to
assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga,
and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic
resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime
Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each
other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws
and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513[46] and the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to
immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of
solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into
the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the
violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs
and projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila,
in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group,
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other
agencies, shall dismantle and remove allstructures, constructions, and other
encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other
applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH,
as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control
services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan,
Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government
agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River,
the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting
waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a
sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year
from finality of this Decision.On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and
in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary
landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension
and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective
penal provisions of RA 9003,[47] Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act),
and other existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275,
within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed
septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and
disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall
give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within
which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its
environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,[48] Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of
RA 9003,[49] the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste
management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school
curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and,
through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward
achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila
Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General
Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses
relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the
Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development objective to attain
economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and
revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA,
DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS,
LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of continuing mandamus, shall,
from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive
report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.