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Asian Affairs

ISSN: 0306-8374 (Print) 1477-1500 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raaf20

Whither Mr Abe's Japan?

Faizullah Khilji

To cite this article: Faizullah Khilji (2015) Whither Mr Abe's Japan?, Asian Affairs, 46:3, 424-457,
DOI: 10.1080/03068374.2015.1080998

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2015.1080998

Published online: 15 Oct 2015.

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Asian Affairs, 2015
Vol. XLVI, no. III, 424–457, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2015.1080998

WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?


FAIZULLAH KHILJI

Faizullah Khilji has served with the government of Pakistan, and variously as a
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consultant with international agencies, most recently on WTO dispute settlement


panels. He is the coauthor (jointly with Professor Wei Liang) of China and East
Asia’s Post-Crises Community: A Region in Flux. Email: fkhilji@gmail.com

I was struck by General de Gaulle’s criticisms, in his last press conference, of the
Russian and American plans for world hegemony. And also by the phrase: the
Pacific, where the fate of the world will be played out.
A pause, I answer;
Lenin once said that joint action was perfectly conceivable provided the slogans
and flags are kept separate.
– Chou en Lai in conversation with Andre Malraux, Peking, July 19651

Introduction2
Japan’s search for direction preceded the Meiji Reformation (1868–1912)
and has existed since in a nebulous form. Mr Abe’s second coming as
prime minister has raised the question afresh. “I am back and so shall
Japan be”, Mr Abe said whilst visiting Washington, perhaps reassuring
Japan’s foremost ally shortly after assumption of the prime minister’s
office, but raising the question: where is Mr Abe’s Japan headed?3

Japan’s neighbourhood has changed much since the Second World War.
Importantly, China has come to exert an influence on regional and global
affairs that Japan has not experienced perhaps ever in its history. Progres-
sing steadily, increasingly the region’s engine of economic growth, China
now stands poised to be the world’s largest economy,4 having gone past
Japan in 2010. China has also begun to establish multilateral structures,
including some sans the United States, which it sees as guaranteeing
security and economic relations in the region.5

America’s postwar authority in East Asia is in flux, and that must give
cause for some reflection on the part of close allies in the region.
Firstly, the growing China-centric economic linkages have given the
© 2015 The Royal Society for Asian Affairs
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 425

regional economies a vested interest in good relations with China. The


economic ties that bind China and the United States and China and
Japan are, in either case, stronger than the economic ties that bind
Japan and the United States. Secondly, though China continuously
asserts that the Chinese model may not apply elsewhere, other countries
are attracted by the economic success and poverty reduction implicit in
the Chinese model; and the Chinese model is not congruent with the
one that the United States holds forth as universal.6 Thirdly, the gap
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between the Chinese economy and the American one would be likely
to increase with time. These considerations are impacting on the Ameri-
can concept of itself as the primus inter pares Pacific power, as indeed
President Obama and Secretary Lew and others have variously noted.7

The United States evidently wishes to remain the dominant player, a


nation that both sets the agenda and serves as the foremost arbiter of
differences that might arise among the countries, even as America’s
authority is perceived to be irreversibly on the wane.8 The United
States arguably wishes to use the security imperative with its old allies
to assert anew its indispensability in a rapidly evolving region.

It is against the above background of a rising China and a United States


shoring up its geopolitical retreat that a resurgent Mr Abe wishes to bring
Japan out of the long night that descended on the country in August 1945,
and to restore Japan to a normality, and possibly more. This essay is an
attempt to explore Mr Abe’s quest, given the regional context in which
Japan finds itself today. We begin with the differing perspectives on
Japan’s history; a contentious matter that sets Japan apart from its
immediate neighbours and perhaps its allies, and one where Mr Abe
has well-developed views. We consider the postwar developments, con-
tinue the discussion and explore the role of Japan in the context of its
chief ally America’s response to China’s rise. We consider how Mr
Abe may be pursuing his goals, and conclude with some reflections on
the possible directions for Japan.

The contentious ‘history’


Japan’s war
Just where Japan wishes to return ‘back’ to is a question that addresses a
contentious history. Having achieved unity in the 17th century, the ambi-
tion of Tokugawa shoguns was to perfect Japan’s island isolation, to
pursue a stable society and a refined civilization, a ‘land people’ not a
426 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

‘nation of sailors’.9 Faced with the onslaught of European imperial


powers and the United States, Japan chose a direction at the time of the
Meiji Restoration, and the first results were spectacular: the victory
over European Russia, the empire in Asia, and Japan’s Greater Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere. But then that mission to sit with the great imperial
powers of Europe went badly wrong, ending poignantly in a disaster of
gigantic proportions on the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay.

For Japan, ‘modernization’ meant the adoption of the political and econ-
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omic practices of the European imperial powers,10 and being accepted by


the fraternity of these powers. It implied Japan distancing itself from an
Asia then at their mercy. Denied the quest for racial parity with the Eur-
opeans at Versailles, years later the Japanese were to be accepted as ‘hon-
orary whites’ in Apartheid South Africa, having earlier been ‘honorary
Aryans’ in Hitler’s Germany. Japan’s history, from the 19th century
onwards, seems to reveal a reverence for European institutions, accep-
tance of the universality of European institutions, and a drawing away
from Asia. Japan did not perhaps see any reason to offer a different
model of economic and political relations.

In the Japanese psyche, Japan fought the Pacific War for the noblest
reasons, much in the manner that the imperial powers had justified their
colonizing mission.11 The Emperor’s speech, the ‘Jewel Voice Broadcast’,
was not one of a sovereign burdened with guilt; rather it was an explanation
why the Japanese people would have to ‘endure the unendurable’, even
though the Japanese war aims could not have been more selfless and
honorable.12 The Emperor explained that war had been declared
on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan’s self-preser-
vation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to
infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial
aggrandizement.

The Emperor’s apology was to Japan’s allies, expressing “the deepest


sense of regret to Our Allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently
cooperated with the Empire towards the emancipation of East Asia”.

Subsequent efforts by the Emperor, perhaps on reflection, to apologize to


those who had directly suffered Japan’s invasions were firmly frustrated
by Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP).13 And Japan missed an
opportunity for an early normalization of relations in Asia. The Tokyo
War Crimes trials, following Japan’s surrender, added to the ambiguity
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 427

about Japan’s guilt. Judge Radhabinod Pal questioned the legitimacy of


the trials,14 seeing Japan’s behaviour as no worse than that of the imperial
powers sitting in judgment. Doubt naturally strengthened in the Japanese
consciousness about its role in the Pacific war, and it has since continued
to condition Japan’s relations with the nations and territories that it
invaded and occupied during the war.

Mr Abe’s various reflections on ‘history’, and his conduct, offer some


insight with respect to his likely course. Firstly, questioning ‘victor’s
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justice’, he does not see Japan as ‘guilty’:15


The view of that great war was not formed by the Japanese themselves, but rather
by the victorious Allies, and it is by their judgment only that [the Japanese] were
condemned.

Secondly, Mr Abe noted that the Japanese leaders charged with Class-A war
crimes are “not war criminals under the laws of Japan”.16 Mr Abe also visited
the Yasukuni shrine where the Class-A war criminals are enshrined.17 A
smiling Mr Abe was seen, provocatively so for China and Korea, in a
Japan SDF aircraft with 731 markings;18 the number 731 identified the
wartime Japanese army unit that allegedly did biological and other
experiments on prisoners, including vivisections of living ones.19

The Japanese nation never quite endured the sense of guilt in the manner
of the defeated German nation.20 SCAP did not see the need for the
Emperor to apologize for Japan’s acts then, and Mr Abe seems not to
see the need to atone now. In Mr Abe’s understanding Japan’s war was
no worse than that of the Allies: comfort women exist wherever there
are armies; the war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni are not war criminals
under the laws of Japan; the Nanjing massacre is an exaggeration. Unit
731 did its war duty and the Americans exonerated the staff from guilt;
Japan’s understanding of the territorial claims in the region is the author-
itative one. Mr Abe signalled his understanding of the war and Japan’s
territorial claims as definitive by revising the history syllabus taught in
Japan’s schools, thereby undoing what Mr Abe visualized as the “maso-
chistic, biased” elements in the textbooks.21 The integrity of the revised
textbooks has been questioned in Japan.22

Seen from the vantage point of those who were invaded, the Japanese
occupation was of the most brutal and cruel kind.23 China alone suffered
some 14–15 million dead. For Mr Abe though, wiping away any lingering
sense of doubt by enforcing a new authoritative version of history perhaps
428 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

also addresses the need for a guilt-free narrative that is essential for a
nation that wishes to lead other nations. Mr Abe’s reading of Japan’s
history, and hence his point of reference for what he wishes Japan to
be, seems only to emphasize the differences with neighbours, not to
seek a resolution with a view to a closure.24 Nonetheless, seen by
others and not just China or Korea, Mr Abe’s efforts appear to be misdir-
ected. The German Chancellor, Ms Angela Merkel, drawing attention
while in Tokyo to a landmark speech made in 1985 by a former president,
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in which he called on Germans to think hard about their personal respon-


sibility for the crimes of the Third Reich, spoke thus:25
To paraphrase the words of the late President Richard von Weizsäcker, who died a
few weeks ago: the end of the war in Europe, May 8, 1945, was a day of liberation –
liberation from the barbarism of Nazism, the horrors unleashed by Germany in
World War Two and the collapse of civilization in the Shoah [Holocaust].

Territorial claims and disputes


Mr Abe’s history also addresses territorial claims. A reading of the instru-
ments that govern the postwar territorial settlement for Japan26 shows
Japanese sovereignty limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido,
Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as the Allies determine, and that
Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occu-
pied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories
Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pesca-
dores/Penghu, shall be restored to the Republic of China,

and, finally, that “Japan will also be expelled from all other territories
which she has taken by violence and greed”. It is an all-encompassing
description, but school textbooks from 2016 onwards would show
some of these islands, specifically Daioyus/Senkakus and Dokdo, as
Japanese territory, hence entrenching the disputes with China and Korea.

The case of the Daioyu/Senkaku Islands also serves to illustrate the complex-
ity of the territorial claims, including the nuances in the perceptions of a
‘China threat’. These islands (and Okinawa) are a part of the Ryukyu
Islands chain, and Ryukyu for centuries was an independent kingdom
“with a culture arguably more influenced by Chinese than Japanese tra-
dition”.27 Japan, “following the contemporary model of European annexation
of Pacific islands”, occupied parts of the Ryukyu chain in 1879,28 formally
annexing the islands in January 1895. By the ‘unequal’ Treaty of Shimono-
seki (April 1895) China ceded “Formosa together with all islands
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 429

appertaining or belonging to said island of Formosa”; both China and Taiwan


interpret the treaty language as including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

Ending its occupation in 1972, the United States ‘returned’ the Ryukyu
Islands to Japan.29 In clarifying the position to the Senate in the Rever-
sion of Okinawa Treaty, the ownership issue was addressed as follows
by the government:
The United States believes that a return of administrative rights over those islands
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to Japan … can in no way prejudice any underlying claims. … The United States
… considers that any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter for resolution
by the parties concerned.30

China and Japan had sought to avoid controversy that could be an impe-
diment in good diplomatic and economic relations. Resolution of the
status of these islands was thus deferred during the negotiations to nor-
malize Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, and again in 1978.31 But the
Secretary of State, Mrs Hilary Clinton, nuanced the issue in 2010 by
noting that the United States is committed to help Japan defend the Sen-
kakus under the terms of its 1952 treaty (the President of the United
States reiterated this position in 2014).32 The problem gained in com-
plexity when Japan, possibly encouraged by the American pronounce-
ments on the applicability of the treaty with the United States,
purchased the Islands from the private owner in 2012, altering the
status quo.33

The American and Japanese perceptions of ‘China threat’ in the context


of these islands palpably differ;34 the distinction became evident when
China declared its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ),35 with the
skies over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands included in the ADIZ. China
saw itself as emulating the United States, Japan and Korea, and by one
account had acted after taking Japan into its confidence.36 But that
which followed China’s declaration displayed the complexity of interests
at play: the United States, Japan and Korea “challenged” China’s action,
interpreting China’s move as having implications for territorial claims.37
Japanese commercial airlines announced that they would file flight plans
with Chinese authorities when flying through China’s ADIZ, only to
reverse course when so instructed by the Government of Japan. The
United States, however, advised its commercial airlines to follow
China’s instructions, and advised China and Japan to improve communi-
cations to avoid any untoward incident. Contrary to Japan’s expectations,
at a subsequent Abe-Biden event Mr Biden did not ask that China rescind
430 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

the zone.38 Finally, Air Force One, carrying the President of the United
States, filed its flight plan with Chinese authorities whilst traversing
China’s ADIZ.39 Japan once again found itself circumscribed in its
foreign policy, and thus eventually softening its own particular position
came to tacitly acknowledge the existence of a dispute.40

The United States seemed to be saying to Japan that it is for the United
States and not Japan to decide the acceptability of China’s ADIZ, and
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that it is the United States that would be the arbiter of whether the
Japan-US treaty applies to a particular situation. What the United
States could wish China to infer is that an American presence in East
Asia is important to keep Japan’s ambitions in order.

The course taken by ‘postwar’ Japan


Japan’s freedom of action in its security and foreign policies, and
perhaps also to a lesser extent in its economic policy, was circum-
scribed by the path chosen after 1945. Postwar Northeast Asia was
given shape by the then emerging dynamics of the Cold War, and
Japan acquired a new significance.41 No sooner than it had defined
Communism as the new postwar enemy, America changed its priorities
from settling scores with the erstwhile enemy to rebuilding the old
adversary. Cutting short its purge of the bureaucracy and the aca-
demics, the demilitarization of the forces, and the destruction of the
zaibatsu (industrial and financial and business conglomerates), the
United States initiated the move to rebuild the armed forces (SDF),
and assisted with the economic revival of Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan to showcase these economies in its ideological argument
with its Cold War adversaries.42

American occupations were turned into formal alliances, with the right
to station troops in Japan and South Korea. The treaties ensured direct
and tight control of America’s new allies; the relationship was aptly
described using the imagery of hub and spokes, with Japan, Taiwan
and South Korea being the three spokes connected to each other only
via United States – the hub. Japan was denied normalization of relations
with China, the most dramatic such instance being the ‘Yoshida letter’:
on learning that Japan was about to sign a treaty with China, Mr John
Foster Dulles flew to Tokyo in December 1951 to dictate a letter
addressed to himself from Mr Yoshida, aligning Japan with the
United States.43 As a consequence of the alliance and hence the pres-
ence of American troops, Japan’s control over its foreign and security
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 431

policy was affected, and to an extent this also applied to its economic
policy.

Japan’s quest to catch up with the economies of Western Europe and


North America succeeded beyond expectation. Japan’s GDP grew at a
phenomenal rate, outpacing West Germany at a rate close to twice that
of the latter.44 In course of a couple of decades, Japan became the
world’s second largest economy.
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Postwar Japan eventually sought to create its own space in its relationship
with the United States, both late in the Cold War when Japan was exhi-
biting a ‘Japan as number one’ ambition and looking to an East Asia
Economic Caucus, an arrangement excluding the United States, and
again after the Cold War when the Asian financial crisis surfaced and
Japan sought to create a region financially centred on itself. But these
initiatives did not work out. Japan’s ‘flying geese’ approach to develop-
ment was dismissed by the World Bank, rebranded as the East Asian
Miracle, and the success speciously ascribed to the magic of the
market. The ‘Japan as number one’ ambition was rendered futile as
the American-devised Plaza Accord of 1985 limited the possibilities for
the Japanese economy. The concept of a Japan-led East Asian Economic
Caucus evolved into ASEAN+3, but with Japan as one among the three.
Japan’s efforts to set up an Asian Monetary Fund, firmly rebuffed by the
United States,45 led in due course to the Chinag Mai Initiative in which
Japan was a participant, not the ‘leader’. (Indeed, in due course, respond-
ing to Asia’s need for a financial institution to fund infrastructure, China
and not Japan was to set up the AIIB.) And, later, Mr Hatoyama’s propo-
sal for an East Asian Community, Mr Hatoyama considering it prudent to
have ambiguity on inclusion of the United States, did not experience
American bonhomie.46 These efforts by Japan to assert itself in Asia con-
ceivably ran counter to America’s desire to remain the primus inter pares
power. Japan, failing in its endeavours to establish a position of leader-
ship in the region, drifted off into a condition best described as an econ-
omic and political stasis.

Some more modest initiatives did go well. Following growing anti-


Japanese sentiment in Southeast Asia, the Fukuda Doctrine, launched
in August 1977, addressed the need for apposite regional policies.
Japan renounced military power and sought to bring economic pros-
perity and social stability, hence enhancing friendship towards Japan
in the region. The Fukuda Doctrine led to growing Japanese private
investment as well as an increase in ODA flows to ASEAN and East
432 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

Asia.47 But more generally postwar Japan, in the conduct of its foreign
relations and its international economic policy, circumscribed in both
cases by the United States providing security arguably via its troops
stationed in Japan, has not been a normal nation by its own reckoning.

Japan, China’s rise and America’s pivot Asia


American perspectives on Asia-Pacific arguably date back to the ‘open
door’ policies of 19th-century United States.48 And China’s rapid raise
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has led to a recalibration of American policy towards China, the region


and its allies, none more so than Japan. The two main tools constitut-
ing today’s pivot Asia are America’s exceptionally large military and
the promise of access to America’s large market; the pivot, lately rela-
belled ‘rebalancing’, aims to leverage these factors with alliances and a
trade pact. The ratcheting up of the ‘territorial disputes’ and ‘China
threat’ rhetoric helps to drive home the imperative of the military
aspect of the pivot.49 And the proposed TPP (Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship) trade pact, its contents a secret, is said to hold much promise
of potential economic benefits. The United States plans to deploy
the bulk of the American Navy in East Asian waters to safeguard
“freedom for navigation and shipping”,50 and to rotate troop elements
from South Korea and Japan to Australia and the Philippines in a show
of flag.51 The Pentagon has also announced comprehensive battle plans
for East Asia that are rooted in the new AirSea Battle concept.52 Joint
military exercises between Australia, Japan and the United States,
which may also involve other countries in the region, are planned to
be a regular feature.53

The issue of “freedom for navigation and shipping” is predicated upon


maritime “territorial disputes” mentioned earlier. Arguably, China’s mar-
itime zones and claims in the South China Sea are relatively modest.
Because of its particular approach to interstate relations and its condition
over the 18th to 20th centuries, and also because of its earlier rejection of
foreign trade, China did not lay claim to maritime territories in the manner
of European imperial powers:
From early in its history China possessed the … capability to invade … the spar-
sely populated territories of the Pacific … However, it chose not to do so. By the
end of the nineteenth century, the Western powers had turned the Pacific Ocean
into their own ‘backyard’ … . [China’s] altered position was symbolized by the
flood of millions of impoverished Chinese migrants to work in the mainly
Western-owned mines and plantations around the South China Sea and on the
widely scattered Pacific islands.54
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 433

As a result China’s 900,000 km2 of undisputed Exclusive Economic Zone


(EEZ) in the Pacific barely rivals the c. 880,000 km2 EEZ of Pitcairn
Islands, a remote British territory of some 47 km2 and 56 inhabitants,
without an airport or a port, in midst of the Pacific.55

China’s approach to its claims tends to be low-key but not ineffective: for
example China uses passport pages to assert its nine-dash line diplomati-
cally, and the odd non-military craft to assert its claims in the waters. The
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maritime territorial disputes do not substantially negate the growing and


beneficial economic relationships in northeast and southeast Asia that are
working to mutual advantage.56 Nonetheless, the territorial disputes with
Japan keep alive the issue of “freedom for navigation and shipping”.

The economic element of the pivot promises prosperity via the deeper
economic integration that TPP, its content secret, proposes. TPP encom-
passes a number of countries on the shores of the Pacific, but pointedly
excludes China, even though the largest trading partner for each of
these countries may be China.57 Exponents of TPP also see it as an exer-
cise in setting high standards, said to be difficult for China to satisfy but,
oddly enough, not so for Vietnam. Assessed in this perspective,58 the TPP
begins to look like an effort to open the Japanese market, a longstanding
American demand, to the exclusion of the one source of effective compe-
tition, that is China, and to play by America’s rules. From the vantage
point of the United States’ Defense Secretary, “passing the TPP is as
important [to me] as another aircraft carrier”, thereby underlining its stra-
tegic imperative.59

The TPP faces two hurdles: firstly there is the evident diffidence among
some of the participants: both Japan and Malaysia have shown reluctance
to make the required concessions.60 Secondly, the legislative branch of
the American government is unenthusiastic about TPP.61 These hurdles,
though not insurmountable, reinforce each other. A paradoxical aspect is
the late realization by some in Washington that the inclusion of China,
not exclusion, would be beneficial for America’s long-term interests.62
Lacking knowledge of its content, the public in both the United States
and Japan remain skeptical about the benefits of TPP.63

Difficulties in finalizing the TPP may cause greater focus in pursuit of


alternative trading arrangements. Japan is concurrently negotiating the
ASEAN-sponsored Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP), as are Malaysia and Singapore among others.64 Japan is similarly
pursuing a China-Japan-Korea FTA65 as well as an ASEAN+3 FTA.66 In
434 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

addition there is the Japan-sponsored Comprehensive Economic Partner-


ship for East Asia (CEPEA).67 Australia has concluded negotiations for
free trade agreements with China, Japan (to the chagrin of the US) and
Korea respectively.68 As if to cap all these efforts and notwithstanding con-
siderable hesitation, if not resistance, on the part of the United States, China
has launched a proposal for an overarching trade pact that encompasses
East Asia and the Pacific rim, a Free Trade Area of Asia and the Pacific
in the APEC forum, and this one is arguably seen by some analysts as com-
peting with the TPP.69 Japan’s acceptance of TPP would provide a great
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boost to the American effort in tying up the Pacific trade.

Militating against America’s ambition to provide ‘leadership’ via the


pivot is its somewhat weakened position in the post-2008 economic situ-
ation, its reliance on inordinate military power as the major policy tool in
a context of rapidly growing economic interdependence, the increasingly
restive allies pursuing policies tuned to national economic advantage, and
the continuing strengthening of the Chinese economy. America’s uncer-
tain economic prospects subtract from the credibility of potential TPP
benefits. America’s military and its diplomatic resources continue to be
preoccupied with the Middle East, whilst its diplomatic resources are
focused on Russia, Ukraine and the creation of a NATO-led mitteleuropa.
Its authority has suffered on account of the rather patchy experience in its
engagements in the two areas. Softening the stance, President Obama has
said that China’s interest lies in observing ‘international norms’ and the
intent of the pivot is not to counter or contain China.70 But China is unli-
kely to concede its claims, and in a bid to maintain its authority the United
States too can be expected to continue to assert itself,71 as best as it can
manage, increasingly via its allies who do not always see such a course in
their best interest, and who may falter and break ranks on occasion.72
Enter Mr Abe’s Japan.

Mr Abe’s goals, pivot Asia and a role for Japan


Mr Abe’s Japan is a natural ally in pivot Asia, and Japan’s present turn to
‘collective self-defence’, a development that the United States had been
seeking, could be seen in that context.73 Mr Abe’s plans include develop-
ing Japan’s military capabilities, and building and developing alliances.
Besides seeking to strengthen the alliance with the United States, Mr
Abe had sought the active involvement of countries in and outside the
region to forestall what he sees as the prospect of Asian waters turning
into ‘Lake Beijing’:74
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 435

Yet, increasingly, the South China Sea seems set to become a ‘Lake Beijing,’ … a
sea deep enough for the People’s Liberation Army’s navy to base their nuclear-
powered attack submarines, capable of launching missiles with nuclear warheads.
Soon, the PLA Navy’s newly-built aircraft carrier will be a common sight – more
than sufficient to scare China’s neighbors.

Mr Abe has emphasized alliances in his strategic vision:


The ongoing disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea mean that
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Japan’s top foreign-policy priority must be to expand the country’s strategic hor-
izons. … I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US state
of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons … .
I would also invite Britain and France to stage a comeback in terms of participating
in strengthening Asia’s security. … The United Kingdom still finds value in the
Five Power Defense Arrangements … I want Japan to join this group, … and par-
ticipate with them in small-sized military drills.
That said, nothing is more important for Japan than to reinvest in its alliance with
the US. In a period of American strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific
region, the US needs Japan as much as Japan needs the US.

Mr Abe signalled his resolve by initiating the lifting of a five-decade-old


ban on arms exports.75

Thus Mr Abe is pursuing possible ‘collective self-defence’ arrangements


with a whole swathe of China’s neighbours and beyond, besides the
United States.76 If Japan’s history is any guide, the country may seek
to eventually establish its own authority in the region. But a Japan that
is strategically independent of the United States in security matters is defi-
nitely not a part of ‘pivot Asia’, and it is an outcome that the United States
may purposefully work to avoid.77

Building alliances may be an uphill task for Mr Abe, as postwar normal-


ization of relations in the region remains a muddled matter for Japan.
Relations with Southeast Asia were normalized in the 1950s as the war
reparation issue was settled.78 A peace treaty with Russia remains a
goal, whilst diplomatic relations have yet to be established with North
Korea. A new freeze, chiefly on account of Mr Abe’s views on
‘history’, characterizes current diplomatic relations with South Korea.79

Postwar Japan’s closest relations in the region have been with India,
attracted partly because of Justice Pal’s dissenting opinion at the Tokyo
War Crimes Trials.80 It is therefore natural that Japan looked to India
to balance an ascendant China.81 India does what it can for Japan: Mr
436 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

Abe was the guest of honour at India’s Republic Day parade, and India
permitted Japan to invest in the disputed territory of Arunchal
Pradesh.82 Nonetheless, Mr Abe’s failed in his one goal: India refrained
from expressing an opinion on the Diaoyu Islands dispute.83 Equally,
India failed to get a nuclear cooperation agreement from Mr Abe.84
Even the arrival of Mr Modi, an Indian Prime Minister perhaps closer
in temperament to Mr Abe and with whom Mr Abe displayed consider-
able bonhomie, could not change matters much.85
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Mr Abe also made an effort to share his regional security perspectives


with ASEAN, becoming the first Japanese prime minister to visit all
ten ASEAN member states. To build support against China’s ADIZ at
the December 2013 Japan-ASEAN summit, Mr Abe dispatched Japan’s
Deputy Foreign Minister to Brunei and Cambodia.86 With a former Viet-
namese official serving as secretary general of ASEAN, a proactive
regional approach to the South China Sea disputes could be expected
from the Secretariat.87 In the event the Japan-ASEAN joint statement
failed to mention China’s ADIZ.88 Pointedly, in a note issued during
the summit, Indonesia asked that Japan’s evolving security role should
be “pursued gradually, in a transparent manner”, and emphasized the
importance of good China-Japan relations for the region.89 The
outcome of the summit, where Mr Abe had announced USD 20 billion
in aid to ASEAN members, fell short of Japan’s expectations.90

ASEAN’s non-security nature and its core principles of non-interference


and decision-making by consensus make a united position in the South
China Sea disputes difficult. Adding to hurdles in Mr Abe’s quest to
develop military alliances is the mutuality of economic interests
between China and the ASEAN economies.91 It may be a struggle for
Japan to balance China’s economic value to ASEAN. Furthermore,
China now appears poised to shape its regional economic relationships
into what Prime Minister Le Keqiang has called an “Asian community
of shared interests, common destiny and shared responsibilities”. The
physical contours of this abstract thinking emerged with the announce-
ment by China of a well-funded Asian Infrastructure Bank, the new
bank eventually attracting as many as 47 founding members from five
continents, including close allies of the United States who had been
asked by the United States to stay away from the institution.92 Japan,
ostensibly fearing American displeasure, did stay away.93 China’s think-
ing was also authoritatively revealed on the eve of the last APEC moot,
where China announced its free trade area for Asia-Pacific initiative, and
the creation of a US$ 40 billion Silk Road Fund to upgrade infrastructure
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 437

links in the Asia-Pacific region.94 At the same time China also actively
seeks “the establishment of a regional security cooperation framework
in Asia”,95 and, more generally, “a global network of partnerships” that
covers the whole spectrum: from security to economics and culture.96
It is not surprising that, excepting the Philippines, China’s neighbours
have been uninterested in Mr Abe’s defence projects.

Looking beyond ASEAN, the task does not get any easier for Mr Abe.
The Dokdo Islands territorial dispute and differences over the ‘comfort
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women’ issue keep Japan and South Korea apart.97 Australia’s position
is gradually shifting to reflect the growing economic linkages with
China. From a situation of volunteering to join America, should it con-
template hostilities vis-à-vis China,98 Australia seems to have moved to
recognize China’s right to a space in the Asia-Pacific region, as evidenced
for example in the recent upgrading of its diplomatic relations to a ‘com-
prehensive strategic partnership’, and it evidently followed its economic
advantage when deciding to join the China-sponsored infrastructure bank
against Washington’s guidance to the contrary.99 And then Australia
stepped back from the likely award of a contract to Japan for the
supply of eight submarines, opening up the purchase to competition
from EU members and the US.100 For now, Australia shows little appetite
for Mr Abe’s diamond of security and democracy.101

Work on signing the peace treaty with Russia was progressing,102 until the
Russian absorption of Crimea.103 The United States denounced that action
and imposed sanctions, and Japan reluctantly followed suit.104 Russian
Foreign Minister Mr Sergey Lavrov subsequently noted that Russia and
China stood together on the issue of how to read Japanese ‘history’.105
Developments since suggest that the commercial and strategic relations
between Russia and China may have shifted into a higher gear.106

With Japan’s immediate neighbours, that is North Korea, Russia and


South Korea, estranged, much work remains for Mr Abe to give effect
to his vision of new alliances.

Japan’s security policy and its domestic peace constituency


The Japanese public’s commitment to maintaining the country’s postwar
‘non-militarized’ status ensured by the constitution, a sentiment shared by
a fair number among Japan’s political class, is a substantial impediment in
the way of the alliances and security goals that Mr Abe contemplates.107
438 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

The existing security policies are seen as having served Japan well, as
having brought peace and prosperity to Japan and its neighbours.108 Any
amendment of the constitution with a view to a shift in Japan’s security
stance should be only be undertaken after gaining the trust of Japan’s
neighbours.109 Differences with China ought to be resolved with
China.110 Security should be achieved with the perceived ‘adversary’,
not against it.
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In any event, an amendment to the Japanese Constitution, requiring a


two-thirds majority in each of the two houses of legislature as well as a
referendum, could prove a drawn-out process with an unpredictable
outcome, and it is a course that Mr Abe has chosen not to pursue.111
The simpler, albeit controversial, option of reinterpreting the Constitution
to permit ‘collective self-defence’ has often been mooted, and Mr Abe
has decided to muddle through with such a course, notwithstanding
public uneasiness as well as some opposition within Mr Abe’s own
ruling coalition.112

A nationalist pitch as well as an economic revival could help Mr Abe to


gather public support. Whilst rewriting ‘history’ engages Japanese
‘nationalism’, albeit with unpredictable results,113 Mr Abe instituted an
ambitious economic programme, popularly named Abenomics, to help
Japan regain sustained economic growth. Mr Abe promised to boost
per capita incomes by 40 per cent in a decade, lower unemployment,
and put an end to the deflation and lassitude that seem to threaten the
country’s economic and social future.114 Well over three years after
assumption of the prime minsiter’s office by Mr Abe, the goals of Abe-
nomics continue to present an elusive quest.

The economic policies constituting Abenomics are metaphorically called


‘the three arrows’, to be shot in unison for maximum impact. The first
arrow promises an end to Japan’s endemic deflation via quantitative
easing (QE), applied with sheer enormity in practice.115 A large fiscal
stimulus package, aimed at boosting domestic economic activity, consti-
tutes the second arrow. A spectrum of reforms meant to enhance the econ-
omy’s capacity for growth forms the third arrow; reforms include
measures to provide flexibility to employers in dealing with the labour
force, measures to improve the fiscal balance via imposition of higher
taxes, and targeted deregulation in special zones.116 The proposed TPP
membership is also generally seen as a part of the third arrow. Though
the third arrow is the one most desired by the business community, it is
also the one proving problematic to launch.
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 439

Reforms seen as important by the business community, including labour


law and medical insurance reform, have yet to be announced, whilst those
unveiled are marked by a lack of detail. The delay in announcement of
labour market measures was explained thus: “When it comes to redun-
dancies, Japanese people are very sensitive”, and that “[to] gain
people’s understanding will require more careful explanation than for
other reforms”. With ill-defined reform thus dependent on an unpredict-
able political calculus, the prospective investor faces uncertainty.117
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The government’s seriousness in implementing electorally difficult


measures is being questioned.118 Mr Abe has been accused of pressuring
the Government Pension Fund to boost stock prices and create a stock
market bubble.119 The TPP negotiations seem to present difficulties in
reaching agreement over import tariffs, reportedly in the agriculture and
automobile sectors.120 The second instalment of the proposed increase
in the sales tax, which had cross-party support in the legislature, to help
address the ever-increasing public debt and hence the arguably question-
able state of public finances, has been postponed.121 The first instalment
is widely seen as having caused the economy to slip into a recession,
thus bearing out the retailers’ fears of a sharp fall in business.122 The
public understandably is not keen on the second instalment, and for this
reason the opposition does not object to the postponement either.123

Quantitative easing and a fiscal stimulus, the first two arrows, have
yielded mixed results thus far. The consequent depreciation of the yen
initially provided an impetus to exports, whilst boosting the price level
chiefly on account of imported goods, especially energy;124 this was
not how deflation was to be moderated though, putting a question mark
over the effectiveness of the policy in the face of a decline in energy
prices. The subsequent drop in energy prices choked any inflationary
tendencies and raised the spectre of deflation afresh. Contrary to expec-
tations, the trade deficit increased to an unprecedented high,125 and
remains in the red. Wages have stagnated.126 Efforts to raise wages, criti-
cal for ending Japan’s deflationary cycle and stimulating growth, have
met with resistance on the part of employers, and the Bank of Japan
has voiced concern that any consumption growth would not be sustain-
able in the absence of a sustained increase in wages.127 Though unem-
ployment has registered a modest decline,128 the outlook for the
economy, and for Abenomics, remains uncertain.129

Critics see Abenomics as misconceived, and observe that ever since the
Tokyo stock market crash of 1990 the economy has grown faster when
440 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

prices fell! Furthermore, savings decrease during periods of deflation and


increase during the inflationary phase, and therefore the expected results
from Abenomics are unlikely to materialize.130 The last time the tax was
increased, in 1997, core inflation dropped below zero, foreshadowing the
eventual slide into deflation.131 Some see any growth that obtains as
unsustainable and producing few benefits for the general public.132 Argu-
ably, with somewhat mixed results from Mr Abe’s various arrows,
Japan’s corporate sector is reluctant to invest in new plant and to hire,
and is hoarding cash instead.133
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Whither Japan?
We return to the singular question: where is Mr Abe’s Japan headed?
Perhaps Mr Abe senses a possible opportunity for Japan in a fast-changing
geopolitical scenario. He sees a United States in relative economic decline
and its authority diminished. Its hegemony in Asia-Pacific stands visibly
diluted by a China on the rise. Its pivot Asia is being applied in a faltering
manner.134 China has developed space for itself in the region,135 though its
long history appears not to reveal a ‘leadership’ ambition. But an enduring
desire among the Japanese leadership to ‘lead’ Asia is discernible. Perhaps
it is possible that once Japan has enhanced its military, it can dispense with
the need for American forces. And once the American forces leave, Japan
can be itself. Japan has been the leading Asian nation within living
memory: can it repeat that feat?

Mr Abe may conceivably be making an effort at ‘great power’ status for


Japan:136 respected not only for its aesthetics, its technology and its
business acumen, but also for its geopolitical authority – a Japan that
leads a regional order defined by a diamond of security and democracy,
a latter-day version of the empires of old. The path that Mr Abe seems to
chart towards this goal lies via enhancing Japan’s military capabilities and
via military alliances that seek freedom of the seas but also avowedly seek
to set limits to China. He explicitly targets China as the bête noire, threa-
tening the very peace that the word Pacific embodies.

Though lacking a modernization model of its own, Mr Abe’s Japan sees


itself as a modern nation, its modernism derived directly from Europe. It
sees itself as a democracy with an ‘advanced’ economy, in a distinctly
different category from China or indeed the rest of Asia. Thus identifying
Japan with the West, Mr Abe seeks the latter’s support in furthering
Japan’s goals, first and foremost the support of the United States. Mr
Abe, it would appear, proposes to achieve his goals through leveraging
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 441

his agenda with America’s pivot Asia, and through alliances with what he
perceives as other like-minded countries in the region and beyond. To
build domestic public support for such a programme, Mr Abe aims to
strengthen the economy, and also by appealing to Japanese nationalism
through rewriting history. A robust economy would be a necessary con-
dition to whittling down China’s importance as the region’s engine of
economic growth.
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But Mr Abe’s Japan does not choose its direction in a void. Japan pursues
its goals in a given geographical neighbourhood, cognizant perhaps of the
shadow that its imperial past casts in the region. Ever since the Meiji res-
toration, one might say that Japan has been ill at ease in its neighbour-
hood, in Asia but not of Asia, and looking to the European imperial
powers for inspiration. Much as Japan wishes not to be burdened with
guilt for the Pacific war, Japan’s neighbours would not accept that
history and neither would a fair number of Japanese. Mr Abe though
may expect selective support from the United States: faced with the
USSR, the United States did subscribe to a history that parallels in
great part Mr Abe’s version; so why would it not do so when devising
pivot Asia to address a rising China?137

Mr Abe is not the first postwar prime minister to make an effort for a
space in the Asia-Pacific that is independent of the United States, but
he is the most ambitious of them. As noted earlier, Japan’s ‘flying
geese’ approach to economic policy, Japan’s effort to set up an Asian
Monetary Fund, Japan’s moves to reach closure with China and
Russia, and Mr Hatoyama’s talk of an East Asian Community were all
summarily snuffed out by Washington. Thus rearmament and ‘collective
defence’ within the US-Japan treaty are desirable, but riotous revision of
history may not qualify, if for no other reason than the fact that such revi-
sion unsettles South Korea, another important American ally. The United
Sates would also not wish Japan to indulge in provocation of China to the
point of causing a credible threat of a war.138

But Mr Abe would also be aware that a militarily strong and independent
Japan is not compatible with the United States’ own policies. Japan as an
independent great power is not consonant with America’s ‘calling’ as the
primus inter pares nation in the Asia-Pacific, a source of much needed
‘leadership’. Mr Abe may understandably be cautious in his pursuit of
geopolitical authority. If he were to seek that explicitly, there is every
likelihood of America asserting itself to achieve a different outcome.
Hence one might speculate that Mr Abe prudently uses treaty cover to
442 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

begin militarization, and subsequently works to extend Japan’s military


reach through alliances in the region based on Japan’s ‘collective self-
defence’ approach, arguably as a part of pivot Asia.

Two developments could then encourage Mr Abe in adopting a course


independent of the United States: firstly, if the American economy is
unable to make a sustained and robust recovery, and America faces diffi-
culty in supporting its existing economic and military standing in Asia-
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Pacific; and secondly, if the Japanese economy can deliver a second


miracle under Mr Abe, and consequently Mr Abe has greater scope to
develop the full range of military capabilities. Thus far, the third year
into his second tenure as Prime Minister, the robust economic recovery
seems to elude him. If in either situation Mr Abe were to ask the Amer-
ican troops stationed in Japan to leave, he may well have domestic public
opinion with him. The two developments would probably be concurrent.
But at present such possibilities seem a long shot.

Mr Abe’s ambitions most likely transcend ‘independence’ from United


States domination, and may include scaling new heights: an independent
Japan replacing China as the leading great power in the region and
beyond. When looking to the future, China on the other hand sees two
Pacific powers, rather than just the United States as a single overarching
one, and thus looks to craft policies that may help ‘balance’ the interests
of a distant and distracted United States with those of a rising China, with
Mr Abe’s Japan perhaps scratching at the door.

Today’s reality though is that Japan is hamstrung firstly by an ageing


population, declining in numbers, and, secondly, by several years of slug-
gish economic performance and declining prices. The Philippines apart,
enthusiasm for Mr Abe’s goals is lacking in the region. Leading East
Asia does not seem a realistic proposition when Mr Abe’s policies
have managed to estrange Japan from all the four immediate neighbours,
that is China, North Korea, Russia and South Korea. For the moment Mr
Abe perhaps finds himself in a muddle: Abenomics appears not to be
delivering just yet, and the territorial assertiveness vis-à-vis China has
been somewhat compromised by the four-point joint statement with
China that preceded the recent meeting with an arguably terse Mr Xi
Jinping.139 The United States appears to aim at balancing China’s
growing influence, not facilitating a new Japanese overarching authority.
These and other difficulties led him to seek refuge in a snap election for
his continuity.140
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 443

Reality thus argues for some modesty in ambition. In contrast to Mr Abe,


the Japanese commission on ‘Japan’s Goals in the 21st Century’141 did
offer an important recommendation on seeking closer social and cultural
ties with the East Asians, more nearly a relationship among equals rather
than one of a great power providing leadership. Such a goal would
necessarily involve a different set of policies especially vis-à-vis the
Koreans and Chinese, including a different immigration policy and there-
fore a different concept of who is a Japanese person.142 It would be the
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nearest to a Japanese economic-political model of its own, something it


has not previously offered in its history. The proposal of an East Asian
Community coexisting in harmony by one-time Prime Minister
Hatoyama would seem to address this.143 But the reality of today’s
East Asia also offers a combustible mix, and, if Mr Abe’s past and
present are any guide, then that past is one of a person with unfulfilled
ambitions and a predilection for action, and his present seems to show
a much hurried person, perhaps one who sees himself as running out of
time. A line from an unhappy poet comes to mind:144
My soul sets sail towards terrible shipwrecks.

NOTES

1. Andre Malraux, Antimemoirs. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1968, p. 365.


2. I am grateful to Keiko Arai, Khalil Hamdani, Wei Liang, Mia Mikic, Iftikhar
Murshed, S.M. Nassem, Maika Oshikawa, and Eric Rahim for their most helpful
comments on earlier draft versions. The author alone is responsible for the opinions
expressed and errors that remain.
3. Speaking at the CSIS in Washington on 23 February 2013, Mr Abe said:

Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, Michael Green and others published a paper about
Japan in which they asked if Japan would end up becoming a Tier-two nation. Sec-
retary Armitage, here is my answer to you. Japan is not, and will never be, a Tier-
two country. … And I reiterate this by saying, I am back, and so shall Japan be.

See: Shinzo Abe, ‘Japan is Back’, talk given at CSIS, Washington DC, 22 February
2013; http://csis.org/files/attachments/130222_speech_abe.pdf.
4. See Chris Giles, ‘China Poised to Pass US as World’s Leading Economic Power
this Year’. Financial Times, April 30 2014. Also see Simon Rabinovitch, ‘China
Forecast to Overtake US by 2016’. Financial Times, March 22, 2013 (citing an
OECD report) at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0a3f5794-92b3-11e2-9593-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2cLUiOVsx.
5. Such structures include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Con-
ference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) for a
444 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

security dialogue; and Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralized (CMIM), bilateral


currency swaps and a bank to fund infrastructure to consolidate regional economic
interdependence. At the November 2014 Beijing APEC summit, China launched
an Asia-Pacific trade initiative. It has also taken steps with the other BRICS to
set up a global development bank. Importantly China is also in the process of
launching its own renminbi-based international payments system (see Michelle
Chen and Koh Gui Qing, Exclusive: China’s international payments system
ready, could launch by end-2015 – sources, Reuters, 9 March 2015).
6. The best-known work on the universality of America’s creed of liberal democracy
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and market economy remains Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last
Man. London: Penguin, 2012.
7. See Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, 20 January 2015, at:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-
union-address-january-20-2015; Shawn Donnan and Jeff Dyer, ‘US warns of loss
of influence over China bank’. Financial Times, March 17, 2015; Hugh White,
‘The new security order’, 24 June 2013, at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/
06/24/the-new-security-order; and Robert A. Manning and James J. Przystup,
‘What is China’s endgame?’, 20 August 2013, at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/
2013/08/20/what-is-chinas-endgame/.
8. Speaking in at SAIS in Washington on 22 October 2013, Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
acknowledged that the US has lost much of the leverage it had a score of years ago,
adding Washington was not likely to ever recover its position as the dominating
global force, “at least not in the lifetime of anyone in this hall”. See: http://www.
sais-jhu.edu/news-and-events/news/sais-hosted-national-security-forum-october-22-
washington-dc.
9. See Raymond Aron, Peace and War. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966,
pp. 190–191.
10. See for example discussion in Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword,
Patterns of Japanese Culture. New York: Mariner, 2005, pp. 77–78.
11. Eri Hotta argues that Japan’s system of collective leadership structures made it
possible for every leader to escape individual responsibility, thus facilitating the
decision to go to war. The Emperor, instead of taking a clear decision, read out
a poem of his grandfather’s, the great Meiji:

In all four seas all are brothers and sisters,


Then why, oh why, these rough winds and waves?

See Eri Hotta, Japan 1941. New York: Knopf, 2013, p. 176.

12. For the text of Emperor Hirohito’s speech of 15 August 1945 see: Hirohito’s ‘Jewel
Voice Broadcast’. Air Force Magazine Vol. 95. Issue 8 (2012): http://www.
airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/August%202012/0812keeper.
aspx. An account of how the war was credibly presented as a modern technological
and noble endeavour to the Japanese people is in the chapter titled ‘Japan’s
Beautiful Modern War’, in John D. Dower (Ed.), Ways of Forgetting, Ways of
Remembering. New York: The New Press, 2012, pp. 65–104. The Emperor
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 445

explained that he had “ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint
Declaration of the Powers” so as to “save the millions of Our subjects”. (Japan con-
cluded the war by accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, which in turn
reaffirmed the earlier Cairo Declaration.)
13. See Matthew D. Plant, ‘MacArthur Aide: U.S. Must Learn from Errors’. The Salt
Lake Tribune, December 7, 2006. Also see ‘Honesty, not Apology’. The Econom-
ist, August 21, 1993.
14. See Yuki Tanaka, Tim McCormack and Gerry Simpson, eds., Beyond Victor’s
Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2011),
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and also see Nakajima Takeshi, ‘The Tokyo Tribunal, Justice Pal and the Revisionist
Distortion of History’. The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol. 9. Issue 44, No. 3 (2011).
15. Mr Abe speaking to the House of Representatives Budget Committee. See Peter
Lee, ‘India Places its bet on Japan: Roiling the waters of Asia-Pacific’. The
Asia-Pacific Journal Vol. 11. Issue 24, No. 3 (2013).
16. Ibid.
17. See Jonathan Soble, Jamil Anderlini and Song Jung-a, ‘Japanese PM Provokes
Anger with Yasukuni Visit’. Financial Times, December 26, 2013, and David
Pilling, ‘Washington Regrets the Shinzo Abe it Wished for’. Financial Times,
February 9, 2014.
18. See: South China Morning Post, ‘Abe Training Jet Photo Sparks Outrage in South
Korean Media’, May 16, 2013.
19. See the extensive discussion in Hal Gold, Unit 731: Testimony. Boston, MA: Tuttle
Publishing, 2003.
20. See Jennifer Lind, ‘The perils of apology’, Foreign Affairs, May–June 2009, and
Ayako Doi, ‘It’s never too late to say sorry’, Foreign Affairs, September-October
2009.
21. See Asahi Shimbun, Editorial: ‘Dark facts in Japan’s history all the more important
to keep in schoolbooks’, January 22, 2015, ‘Insight: Revising Textbooks Pillar of
Abe’s Education Reform’. Asahi Shimbun, March 2, 2014. Also see ‘Japanese
Schoolchildren to Learn Disputed Islands Belong to Tokyo’, South China
Morning Post, January 29, 2014.
22. See Asahi Shimbun, Editorial, ‘Revised textbooks fall short in objective views on
territorial disputes’, April 5, 2014: the contrary view is that by signing the
San Francisco Treaty, Japan accepted the verdict of victor’s history; see Yoshihide
Soeya, ‘Postwar Diplomatic Framework Brought Peace, Affluence to Japan and
Asia’. Asahi Shimbun, March 18, 2014.
23. See for example discussion in Rana Mitter, China’s War with Japan 1937–45.
London: Allen Lane, 2013.
24. The United States too expressed reservations regarding the revision of the history
syllabus. See David Pilling, ‘Washington Regrets the Shinzo Abe it Wished for’.
Financial Times, February 9, 2014.
25. See Robin Harding, Jamil Anderlini and Stephen Wagstyl, ‘Merkel Intervenes in
Japanese Second World War Debate’. Financial Times, March 9, 2015, and
Pang Zhongpeng, ‘World Watching Abe’s Moves on Japan’s Past’. China
Daily, March 20, 2015.
446 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

26. See Clause 8 of Potsdam Declaration, and the Cairo Declaration.See http://
www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html, and http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~
worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19431127.D1E.html.
27. Peter Nolan, ‘Imperial Archipelagos’, New Left Review, March-April 2013, p. 87.
28. L M Cullen, A history of Japan 1582–1941. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003, pp. 226–227.
29. Including Okinawa and Diaoyu Islands.
30. See http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/198821.pdf
31. The status of these islands came up during the negotiations to normalize Sino-Japa-
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nese relations in 1972, and Premier Zhou En-lai, in a meeting with Prime Minister
Kakuei Tanaka, reportedly said, “We should reach agreement on the major issues
while leaving minor differences unsettled”. In negotiations over the 1978 Japan-
China peace and friendship treaty, Deng Xiaoping, the vice premier, remarked,
“The next generation should work on those issues that our generation does not
have the wisdom to resolve”. See, Ukeru Magosaki, ‘Continuing to table
Senkaku Issue is to Japan’s Advantage’. Asahi Shimbun, July 11, 2012.
32. See Mure Dickie and Geoff Dyer, ‘Dispute scuppers China-Japan Summit’. Finan-
cial Times, October 29 2010; also see, Joint Press Conference with President
Obama and Prime Minister Abe at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2014/04/24/joint-press-conference-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-
japan.
33. See ‘Noda Government to buy Senkaku Islands for 2 Billion Yen’. Asahi Shimbun,
September 5, 2012.
34. See ‘Insight: Japan, U.S. Differ on China in Talks on ‘Grey Zone’ Military
Threats’. Asahi Shimbun, March 10, 2014.
35. Minnie Chan and Julian Ryall, ‘Fear of Conflict with Japan as China Sets up air
Defence Zone’. South China Morning Post, November 23, 2013.
36. The United States set up its ADIZ in 1950, and it also did likewise for Korea,
during the Korean War, and for Japan, in the course of the occupation. Japan
expanded its ADIZ in 1972 and again in 2010. By one Japanese account China
is reported to have taken Japan into confidence about its proposed ADIZ,
months ahead of its official announcement:

The Mainichi Shinbun obtained secret documents … , which reveal that senior PLA
officers had told their Japanese counterparts in May 2010 that they had established
the ADIZ … , and that they were moving toward making it public … , they invited
dialogue with the Japan Self-Defense Forces on how the two countries’ overlapping
ADIZs might be managed … … , the Japanese government was … well aware “in
early 2013” that “final preparations” for the announcement of the Chinese ADIZ
were under way. … What emerges … is not the sudden, aggressive, unilateral
action by the Chinese government … , but rather a careful, long-term process that
culminated in the November 2013 public declaration.It is also worth noting that
in June 2010 – one month after the Japanese were informed by China of their inten-
tion to establish a large, overlapping ADIZ in the East China Sea – the Japanese gov-
ernment announced (unilaterally) an expansion of its own ADIZ in the East China
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 447

Sea by 22 kilometers in order to include Yonaguni Island.

See Michael Penn, ‘The “China Threat” narrative stumbles’, SNA (Shingetsu News
Agency), at: http://shingetsunewsagency.com/tokyo/?p=456.

37. Korea followed up with an extension of its existing ADIZ, to overlap partially with
China’s ADIZ, covering the airspace above a submerged Leodo/Socotra rock
claimed by Korea as well as China. Korea’s newly extended ADIZ also now over-
lapped with Japan’s ADIZ.
38. See Peter Lee, ‘Has Abe overreached on China’s ADIA’. Asia Times, December 3,
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2012. Also see Kristine Kwok, ‘US and China silent silent on air defence zone
after Biden tells Xi of deep concerns’. South China Morning Post, December 4,
2013.
39. See M K Bhadrakumar, ‘Obama Resets the “Pivot” to Asia’. Asia Times Online,
May 9, 2014.
40. Japan, in a four-point agreement with China (a part of its efforts to arrange a bilat-
eral Xi-Abe meeting), included an acknowledgement for the first time of the
‘different positions’ of the two parties with respect to the disputed islands. The rel-
evant part of the text in the agreement reads as follows:

The two sides have acknowledged that different positions exist between them
regarding the tensions which have emerged in recent years over the Diaoyu
Islands and some waters in the East China Sea, and agreed to prevent the situation
from aggravating through dialogue and consultation and establish crisis manage-
ment mechanisms to avoid contingencies.

See Xinhua, ‘China, Japan Reach Four-Point Agreement on Ties’, November 7,


2014, and Tetsuo Shibata, ‘Abe Administration Suffered ’Diplomatic Defeat’ by
China with Agreement Statement’. Asahi Shimbun, November 26, 2014.
41. The conflict in the Pacific during the Second World War may also be seen as a con-
tinuation of a longer struggle for the American domination of East Asia and the
Pacific. See discussion in, variously, Perry Anderson, ‘Imperium’. New Left
Review, September–October 2013, p. 7; Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy
in World Politics. New Brunswick: Transaction Publications, 2008, pp. 414–417;
Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power. New York: Pantheon Books, 1974,
pp. 165–169; and Andrew J. Bacevich, ‘Naming Our Nameless War?’. Tom Dis-
patch, May 28, 2013.
42. See Victor D Cha, ‘Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia’, Inter-
national Security, Winter 2010, pp. 158–196.
43. Victor D. Cha writes (ibid., in particular p. 186):

The United States also sought to control Japan’s relationship with China, fearing that
a recovering Japan would see China as its natural economic partner … Dulles flew to
Tokyo in December 1951 to obtain a commitment that Japan would not conclude a
bilateral treaty with communist China. The resulting ‘Yoshida letter’ was an extra-
ordinary powerful example of the exertion of the US control over an ally, the scale of
448 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

which did not become fully known until it was later revealed that Dulles actually
dictated the letter.

44. See Angus Maddison, Contours of the World Economy, Essays in Macro-Econ-
omic History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, especially Tables 3.23,
A4, A6 and A8.
45. Andrew Sheng, From Asian to Global Financial Crisis: An Asian Regulator’s
View of Unfettered Finance in the 1990s and 2000s. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2009, p. 34.
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46. Mr James Baker, US Secretary of State at the time, told Japanese businessmen and
officials that an East Asian Economic Caucus was not acceptable. See Dr Mahathir
Mohammad, A Doctor in the House. Petaling Jaya: MPH, 2011, pp. 612–614.
47. See William W. Haddad, ‘Japan, the Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN’. Contempor-
ary Southeast Asia Vol. 2. Issue 1 (1980): 10–29. Also see Makoto Iokibe, Ed., The
Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan. London: Routledge, 2007, especially
pp. 222–223.
48. See discussion in Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power. New York:
Pantheon Books, 1974, pp. 165–169; and in Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s
Strategy in World Politics. New Brunswick: Transaction Publications,
2008 (reprint of the 1942 edition), pp. 139–141.
49. See Mr Chuck Hagel’s speech as reported by Helene Cooper and Jane Perlez, ‘US
sway in Asia is Imperiled as China Challenges Alliances’. New York Times, May
30, 2014; the statement by Commander of the US Pacific Fleet Admiral Harry
Harris, as reported in Ben Bland, ‘US Pacific Fleet Commander wars Asia it
Risks Crimea Like Crisis’. Financial Times, March 16, 2014.
50. See for example discussion in David Nakamura, ‘Obama aims to reinvigorate Asia
strategy’. Washington Post, April 17, 2014, which notes, inter alia:

The Pentagon announced in 2012 that it intended to have 60 per cent of its naval and
Air Force assets in the Asia-Pacific region by 2020.

51. The overall troop numbers in Asia-Pacific are not set to increase. Analysts point to
a decline in the number of American troops in Asia, ever since the numbers peaked
in the course of the Vietnam War. See discussion in John Feffer, ‘The US Pivot:
Rebalancing as Retreat’. Asia Times, January 30, 2014.
52. See discussion in Yoichi Kato and Nanae Kurashige, ‘New Superpower Relations:
U.S., China in “New Model” of Military Rivalry’. Asahi Shimbun, April 11, 2014,
and in Geoff Dyer, ‘US v China: Is this the new Cold War?’. Financial Times,
February 20, 2014. Also see ‘Counter A2/AD in Japan-US Defense Cooperation:
Toward Allied Air-Sea Battle’, Project 2049 Institute, March 2012.
53. See, for example, Yoichi Kato, ‘Interview, Amy Seabright, US Carries No Uncer-
tainty about Response to Rise of China’. Asahi Shimbun, October 2, 2014. Also see
‘US, Japan, Australia Risk Antagonising China with Agreement on Military
Cooperation’. South China Morning Post, November 16, 2014.
54. Peter Nolan, ‘Imperial Archipelagos’. New Left Review, March–April 2013, p. 94.
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 449

55. Ibid, pp. 77–95. For Pitcairn Island’s EEZ see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Pitcairn_Islands.
56. See South China Morning Post, ‘Japan Foreign Minister Meets China Envoy to
Mend Frosty Ties’, December 20, 2013, and the The Daily Yomiuri / The Japan
News, ‘Japan, China Agree to Improve Dialogue’, December 21, 2013.
57. As of December 2014 TPP economies comprised Australia, Brunei, Chile, Canada,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and
Vietnam.
58. See for example discussion in Reuters, ‘Weighty Issues Remain for Japan,
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Australia in trade Pact Talks’, April 6, 2014.


59. Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘TPP as Important as Another Aircraft Carrier: US
Defense Secretary’. The Diplomat, April 8, 2015.
60. Shawn Donnan notes:

In an interview with the Financial Times last week, Sander Levin, the most senior
Democrat on the powerful House ways and means committee, which covers trade,
also said … “The goal remains the same and that is putting together a [TPP] bill
that would have substantial bipartisan support … . If there isn’t substantial bipartisan
support it really jeopardises the passage of trade legislation. … “Getting trade legis-
lation passed [by Congress] is always difficult. So the focus has to be on the sub-
stance of it”, Mr Levin said. “That’s just a fact … . If you go by the clock
instead of by the substance I think you can really undermine the likelihood of
passing effective trade legislation.”

See Shawn Donnan, ‘Obama Presses for Pacific Rim Trade Deal’. Financial Times,
November 10, 2014. Also see, Edward Luce, ‘Bell Tolls for Obama Ahead of 2016’.
Financial Times, November 5, 2014; Shawn Donnan, ‘Barack Obama’s Fast Track
Hopes on Trade Remain Stuck in the Slow Lane’. Financial Times, April 30, 2014;
and Jeremy Grant, ‘Obama Wins Malaysia’s Backing for “Asia Pivot”. Financial
Times, April 27, 2014.

61. See for example Asahi Shimbun, ‘No End in Sight Yet for Trans-Pacific Trade
Pact’, February 25, 2014.
62. See discussion in Dan Steinbock, ‘Should China Join the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
China-US Focus’, February 27, 2014, at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-
economy/should-china-join-the-trans-pacific-partnership-talks/. Also see M.K.
Bhadrakumar, ‘China Takes a Leap Forward to TPP’, April 10, 2014, at: http://
blogs.rediff.com/mkbhadrakumar/2014/04/10/china-takes-a-leap-forward-to-tpp/.
63. Editorial, ‘Japanese, Americans Skeptical about TPP Benefits’. Asahi Shimbun,
September 17, 2014.
64. See: http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-framework-for-regional-comprehensive-
economic-partnership.
65. See: http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/chinarh.shtml.
66. See: http://aric.adb.org/fta/east-asia-free-trade-area-(asean3).
67. See: http://aric.adb.org/fta/comprehensive-economic-partnership-for-east-asia-(cepea-
asean6). This arrangement embraces the 16 members of the East Asian Summit.
450 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

68. See Korea-Australia FTA signed in Seoul, Media release, Minister for Trade and
Investment, Hon. Andrew Robb, 8 April 2014, at: http://trademinister.gov.au/
releases/Pages/2014/ar_mr_140408.aspx; Jane Wardell and Tim Kelly, ‘Japan,
Australia Sign Economic Partnership Pact’, Reuters, July 8, 2014; and Jamie
Smyth, ‘China and Australia Agree Trade Deal’. Financial Times, November
17, 2014. Also see Jamie Smyth, ‘Diplomacy Weighs on Tony Abbott’s Asia
Trade Mission’. Financial Times, April 7, 2014, and Shawn Donnan, Jamie
Smyth and Ben McLannahan, ‘Japan-Australia Trade Deal is Dismissed by the
US’, Financial Times, 7 April 2014.
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69. See ‘Apec Summit Backs Beijing Roadmap to Vast Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area’.
The Guardian, November 11, 2014, and ‘APEC Ministers Adopt Roadmap for
New Free Trade Zone’. Mainichi Japan, November 8, 2014. Also see Andrew
Hammond, ‘China’s Proposed Free-Trade Pact Puts Pressure on US to Conclude
TPP’. South China Morning Post, November 14, 2014, and Nicola Casirini,
‘Western Competition for Asian Markets is Heating Up’. The National Interest,
November 20, 2014.
70. See M.K. Bhadrakumar, ‘Obama Resets the “Pivot” to Asia’. Asia Times Online,
May 9, 2014. Also see: ‘Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping in
Joint Press Conference’. November 12, 2014, at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/11/12/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-joint-
press-conference.
71. ‘Hagel drew a direct line between Russia’s takeover of Ukraine’s Crimea region
and the continuing territorial disputes between China, Japan and others over
remote islands in the East China Sea.’ See ‘Chuck Hagel Says US will Send
Two Ballistic Missile Destroyers to Japan’. The Guardian, April 6, 2014.
72. See for example discussion in Hugh White, ‘US Resistance to China Infrastructure
Bank is Futile’. New York Times, October 22, 2014, for an Australian perspective.
73. For example, ‘Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Stressed Thursday that the Coun-
try’s Continued Self-Imposed Ban on Exercising its Right to Collective Self-Defense
will Adversely Affect the Japan-US Alliance’. See Peter Lee, ‘US Blind to Barbs in
Japan Defense Plan’. Asia Times, February 13, 2014. ‘Collective self-defence’ has
been pursued by the United States ever since the onset of the Korean War, with
Japan’s response hitherto being one of reluctance more often than not. See discussion
in Makoto Iokibe, ed., The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan. London: Routledge,
2009. Mr Abe’s grandfather, Mr Nobusuke Kishi, a ‘strongman’, was also engaged in
treaty revision when prime minister. Also see Kuniichi Tanida, Fumiaki Sonoyama
and Koji Sonoda, ‘Analysis: Desire to Assist U.S. Military Not Based on Real-
World Scenarios’. Asahi Shimbun, April 6, 2014.
74. See Shinzo Abe, Asia’s democratic security diamond, 27 December 2012, at:
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-
india-by-shinzo-abe.
75. Asahi Shimbun editorial, ‘New Arms Export Rules Undermine Japan’s Pacifism’,
April 1, 2014.
76. See ‘Land of the Rising Gun: Japan, Pacifist No More’. The American Interest,
March 30, 2015: Mina Polliman, ‘Japan’s Argument for Collective Self-
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 451

Defence’. The Diplomat, March 30, 2015; and Peter Lee, ‘US Blind to Barbs in
Japan Defense Plan’. Asia Times, February 13, 2014.
77. See for example discussion in David Pilling, ‘Washington Regrets the Shinzo Abe
it Wished for’. Financial Times, February 9, 2014.
78. Normalization with China had to await America’s recognition in the 1970s.
79. See for example discussion in Asahi Shimbun, ‘Park: Summit with Abe Hinges on
Attitude Toward “Comfort Women” Issue’, December 2, 2014, and Demetri
Sevastopulo and Simon Mundy, ‘Park Under Pressure to Talk to Abe’. Financial
Times, November 12, 2014.
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80. Justice Pal’s dissenting opinion, several hundred pages long, was translated into
Japanese, and it endeared India to Japan. The Emperor of Japan conferred the
First Class of the Order of the Sacred Treasure on Justice Pal. Speaking to the
Japanese Diet in December 2006, Prime Minister Singh said:

The principled judgment of Justice Radhabinod Pal after the War is remembered
even today in Japan. Ladies and Gentlemen, these events reflect the depth of our
friendship and the fact that we have stood by each other at critical moments in
our history.

Cited in Peter Lee, ‘India places its bet on Japan: Roiling the waters of Asia-Pacific’.
The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 11. Issue 24, No. 3 (2013). Prime Minister Abe met
Justice Pal’s son in Kolkata in 2007, who presented Mr Abe with photographs of
Justice Pal with Mr Abe’s grandfather, ex-Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi. (Mr
Kishi was detained after the war as a suspected Class A criminal though never
indicted – in a complete reversal of policy, the CIA supported Mr Kishi to consoli-
date his party’s rule in postwar Japan, as this was the conservative force in Japanese
politics. See John D. Dower, Ways of Forgetting Ways of Remembering, Japan in
the Modern World. New York: The New Press, 2012, especially pp. 185–187.

81. See discussion in Taizo Miyagi, ‘Post-War Asia and Japan—Moving beyond the
Cold War: An Historical Perspective’, Asia-Pacific Review Vol. 18. Issue 1
(2011): 25–44.
82. A territory also claimed by China.
83. See discussion in Sourab Gupta, ‘The Japan-India strategic equation is not
working’. East Asia Forum, February 3, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/02/
03/the-japan-india-strategic-equation-is-not-working/. India did purchase some
Japanese military hardware.Also see: Nithin Gokhale, ‘Tokyo’s Courting of
New Delhi Brings Stronger Defense Ties’, Global Times, February 18, 2014, at:
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/843271.shtml#.UyMOuCjPbww.
84. See discussion in M.K. Bhadrakumar, ‘Delhi Fails to Win Japan’s “Nuclear
Trust”’. 27 January 2014, at: http://blogs.rediff.com/mkbhadrakumar/2014/01/
27/delhi-fails-to-win-japans-nuclear-trust/. Also see: Pramit Pal Chaudhuri,
‘Nuclear is Still a Four Letter Word in Japanese’. Hindustan Times, January 26,
2014, and K. Shankar Bajpai, ‘Japan, India and the Balance of Power’, The
Hindu, January 27, 2014.
452 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

85. See Clint Richards, ‘Modi Abe Summit High on Rhetoric, Lagging on Agree-
ments’. The Diplomat, September 2, 2014, and Victor Mallet and Jonathan
Soble, ‘India’s Narindra Modi Chides China as He Embraces Japan’. Financial
Times, September 2, 2014.
86. See Asahi Shimbun, ‘Abe Needs to Acknowledge World’s Concern about Japan-
China Tension’, Editorial, January 29, 2014.
87. See Richard Javad Heydarian, Japan’s ‘Democratic Security Diamond’. East
Asia Forum, February 15, at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/15/japans-
democratic-security-diamond/.
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88. It noted instead “the importance of maintaining peace, stability and prosperity in
the region and promoting maritime security and safety, freedom of navigation,
unimpeded commerce, exercise of self-restraint and resolution of disputes by
peaceful means.” See Asahi Shimbun, ‘Abe Needs to Acknowledge World’s
Concern about Japan-China Tension’, Editorial, January 29, 2014. Also see
Dylan Loh Ming Hui, ‘Japan’s Courtship of ASEAN Doomed to End in
Tears?’. East Asia Forum, February 21, 2014, at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/
2014/02/21/japans-courtship-of-asean-doomed-to-end-in-tears/.
89. See Dylan Loh Ming Hui, ibid.
90. See, ‘Japan Unable to get ASEAN Members on Same Page at Special Summit’.
Asahi Shimbun, December 15, 2013. Mr Abe having failed to get a joint commu-
niqué, decided to go it alone, noting in a press briefing that “raising tensions in this
region is to nobody’s advantage”, and that “Asean’s role as a centre of economic
growth depends on freedom of the seas and the air”. See South China Morning
Post, ‘Asean Urges Japan to be Active Peacemaker’, December 15, 2013.
Mr Abe’s emissary is said to have asked Singapore’s Prime Minister to advise Sin-
gapore’s commercial aircraft not to observe China’s ADIZ, but Singapore’s Prime
Minister responded with a question of his own, asking whether the United States
too had been similarly advised by Japan, thus silencing his Japanese interlocutor.
See: Asahi Shimbun, ‘Japan Unable to Get ASEAN Members on Same Page at
Special Summit’, December 15, 2013.
91. See discussion in Wei Liang and Faizullah Khilji, China and East Asia’s Post-
Crises Community: A Region in Flux. Lexington: Lanham, 2012.
92. Tom Mitchell, ‘China-led AIIB Attracts Rush of Applicants’. Financial Times,
April 1, 2015. Lucy Hornby, ‘Taiwan Applies to Join China-led AIIB’.
New York Times, March 31, 2015.
93. Fear of angering Washington forced Tokyo to stay out of China-backed AIIB,
Asahi Shimbun, Editorial, 1 April 2015.
94. See Minnie Chan, ‘China to Create US$40 Billion Silk Road Fund to Upgrade
Asia links’. South China Morning Post, November 9, 2014. Also see Peter Drysdale,
‘The Economic Rules of Geopolitics’. East Asian Forum, November 3, 2014.
95. See ‘Chinese Economy Sees Stable, Good Start: Premier’. Xinhua/China Daily,
April 10, and ‘Chinese Premier Highlights Asian Integration at Boao’. Xinhua,
April 10, 2014.
96. See Keira Lu Huang, ‘President Xi Jinping Puts “Network of Partners” on Foreign
Policy Agenda’. South China Morning Post, December 1, 2014.
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 453

97. President Obama got the two heads of governments together, but that is as far as
joint action went. See Richard McGregor and Simon Munday, ‘US Draws
Together South Korea and Japan’. Financial Times, March 25, 2014. And at the
November 2014 Apec moot in Beijing, unlike Mr Xi Jinping and Mr Abe, the
Japanese and Korean heads did not have a meeting; see discussion in Demetri
Sevastopulo and Simon Mundy, ‘Park Under Pressure to Talk to Abe’. Financial
Times, November 12, 2014.
98. See for example in Ewan MacAskill, Wikileaks: ‘Hillary Clinton’s Question: How can
We Stand up to Beijing’. Observer, December 4, 2010; the author reports as follows:
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According to the note of Clinton’s lunch with Rudd in Washington: “The secretary
affirmed the US desire for a successful China, with a rising standard of living and
improving democracy at a pace Chinese leaders could tolerate . … The secretary
also noted the challenges posed by China’s economic rise, asking: ‘How do you
deal toughly with your banker?’”

Rudd responded by calling himself “a brutal realist on China”, arguing for a policy
of “integrating China effectively into the international community and allowing it to
demonstrate greater responsibility, all while also preparing to deploy force if every-
thing goes wrong”. He described Chinese leaders as “subrational and deeply
emotional” on Taiwan.

99. See discussion in Xinhua, ‘Spotlight: Sino-Oz Comprehensive Strategic Partner-


ship Forged, FTA Talks Concluded’, November 18, 2014, and Jamie Smyth,
‘Australia to Join China-led Bank Despite US Opposition’. Financial Times,
March 28, 2015.
100. Jamie Smyth, ‘Australia Rows Back on A$ 20 bn Sub Deal’. Financial Times,
February 20, 2015.
101. See discussion in Hugh White, The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power.
OUP, 2013; and in Hugh White, ‘Why Obama should Abandon the Pivot’. East
Asia Forum. May 4, 2014, at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/05/04/why-
obama-should-abandon-the-pivot/. The ANZUS alliance was focused on a possible
Japan threat. Also see Yao Chun, ‘Sino-US Future on View in Oz Visit’. Global
Times, November 14, 2014.
102. The Russian foreign minister publicly announced “that talks be conducted in an atmos-
phere where making provocative comments is avoided”, and that “In the past, there
were negative scenes that made the very continuity of talks questionable”, hoping
that he “won’t see such scenes resurface”. See Kiyoshi Takenaka, ‘Japan, Russia
Agree Next Step Toward Peace Treaty’. Reuters, November 1, 2013, at: http://
www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-russia-japan-idUSBRE9A00OJ20131101
Also see ‘Vladimir Putin and Shinzo Abe Hail Cordial Japan-Russia Relations’. South
China Morning Post, February 10, 2014, at: http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/
1424843/vladimir-putin-and-shinzo-abe-hail-cordial-japan-russia-relations. It is
worth recalling that when Japan agreed to settle its Kuril Islands dispute with the erst-
while Soviet Union in the 1956 bilateral peace talks, the United States threatened to
assert its sovereignty over Okinawa and Japan backed off. See Kimie Hara, ‘50
454 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

Years from San Francisco: Re-Examining the Peace Treaty and Japan’s Territorial
Problems’. Pacific Affairs Vol. 74. Issue 3 (2001): 361–382, and Gregory Clark,
‘Tokyo’s Claim to the Kurils Is Shaky’. The New York Times, July 18, 1992.
103. See Hiroyuki Akita and Tsuyoshi Nagasawa, ‘Tense US-Russia Relations Complicate
Abe’s Diplomacy’. Nikkei Asian Review, March 13, 2014, at: http://asia.nikkei.com/
magazine/20140313-The-Xi-show/Politics-Economy/Abe-diplomacy-embroiled-in-
tense-USRussia-relations.
104. See ‘Obama, Abe agree Russia Moves in Ukraine Threaten World Peace’. Asahi
Shimbun, March 7, 2014, ‘Abe Noncommittal on Sanctions Against Russia Over
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Ukraine’. Asahi Shimbun, March 8, 2014, and ‘Japan Imposes Sanctions Against
Russia Over Crimea Independence’. Asahi Shimbun, March 18, 2014.
105. “The solidarity of our countries is of significant importance against the background
of constant attempts to falsify the history, negate the deeds of soldiers-liberators,
and whitewash German fascism and Japanese militarism”, said Mr Lavrov. See
‘Lavrov Outlines the Way Forward for Relations’. China Daily, April 14, 2014,
at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014-04/14/content_17433463_3.htm.
106. See Jack Farchy, Kathrin Hille and Mr Tom Mitchell, ‘Putin Courts China as West
Turns Away’. Financial Times, May 19, 2014, ‘Japan’s Embrace of Russia Under
Threat with Ukraine Crisis’. Asahi Shimbun, March 5, 2014. Also see ‘Russia’s
Gazprom-Neft to Sell Oil for Rubles, Yuan, RIA Novosti, August 27, 2014.
107. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.
108. See for example, Yoshihide Soeya, ‘Postwar Diplomatic Framework Brought
Peace, Affluence to Japan and Asia’. Asahi Shimbun, March 18, 2014.
109. See for example, Shinji Miyadi, ‘Point of View: Revise Article 9 Only after
Gaining Trust in Asia’. Asahi Shimbun, March 26, 2014.
110. See editorial: ‘Japan and China Need Fresh Dialogue Over Reparations Issue’.
Asahi Shimbun, March 20, 2014.
111. The lowering of the voting age from 20 to 18 years is being sought in draft legis-
lation. See ‘Bill Submitted to Lower Japan’s Voting Age to 18 from 20 Years’.
Japan Daily Press, April 9, 2014. Also see Peter Drysdale, ‘Japan’s Constitutional
Dilemma’. East Asia Forum, March 10, 2014, at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/
2014/03/10/japans-constitutional-dilemma/.
112. In a series of editorials, opinion pieces and reports, the Asahi Shimbun highlighted
the disenchantment and opposition among the public, intelligentsia and the legisla-
ture to the reinterpretation of Article 9 to permit collective self-defence. See for
example, Asahi Shimbun, Editorial, ‘New Defence Guidelines could Move
Beyond Limits set by the Constitution’, October 16, 2014; ‘Major Security Shift:
Survey Finds Majority of Public Opposed to Exercise of the Right to Collective
Self-Defence’, July 6, 2014; ‘Major Security Shift: Pacifism Key to Improving
Japan’s Relations with China, Scholar Says’, July 10, 2014; ‘Major Security
Shift: Abe’s Proactive Pacifism an Exercise in “Military Power in Diplomacy”’,
July 14, 2014; ‘Major Security Shift: Abe Offers 1st Explanation in Diet, but
Many not Buying it’, July 15, 2014; ‘Editorial: Diet Deliberations Highlight
Abe’s Inept Thinking’, July 16, 2014; and, ‘Scholars say Cabinet Decision Opens,
not Ends, Debate on Collective Self-Defense’, July 17, 2014. Also see ‘Editorial:
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 455

Abe’s Unacceptable Rush Toward Collective Self-Defense’. Asahi Shimbun, March


4, 2014, ‘Justice Minister Cautions Abe Over Collective Self-Defense Plan’. Asahi
Shimbun, March 5, 2014, and ‘Insight: Abe to Reshuffle Cabinet to Strengthen Base
for Security Changes’. Asahi Shimbun, March 1, 2014. Also see ‘Hitoshi Tanaka,
Japan’s Debate on Constitutional Reinterpretation: Paving the Way for Collective
Self-Defense’. East Asia Forum, March 9, 2014; at: http://www.eastasiaforum.
org/2014/03/09/japans-debate-on-constitutional-reinterpretation-paving-the-
way-for-collective-self-defence/.
113. A Financial Times report noted the following:
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A year ago, more were in favour of collective self-defence than against. But a
poll this month … , showed the situation has reversed, with 41 per cent now
opposed and 34 per cent in favour.”

See Jonathan Soble, ‘Shinzo Abe Seeks to Shift Japan’s Stance on Military Expan-
sion’, Financial Times, May 13, 2014.
114. See, for example, discussion in Jonathan Soble, ‘Abe’s “Third Arrow” Reforms
Leave Investors Hungry for Detail’, 6 June 2013, and Jonathan Soble, ‘Japan:
Abe’s Next Shot’, 18 July 2013; and also see David Pilling, ‘This will be a
Crunch Year for the Japanese Economy’. Financial Times, January 15, 2014
115. David Pilling, ibid.; Gavyn Davies, ‘Bank of Japan Opens the Floodgates’. Finan-
cial Times, November 2, 2014.
116. For an anecdotal discussion of tokku or targeted deregulation in special zones, see
Jonathan Soble, ‘Abe’s Arrows: Japan Goes Back to the Future for Economic
Zones’. Financial Times, December 11, 2013.
117. Editorial, ‘Abe’s Missing Arrow, Japan Needs Structural Reforms for “Abe-
nomics” to Succeed’. Financial Times, October 7, 2013, and Jonathan Soble and
David Pilling, ‘Shinzo Abe Warns of Delay in Key Labour Reforms in Japan’,
October 6, 2013.
118. See, for example, discussion in Jonathan Soble and David Pilling, ‘Shinzo Abe
Warns of Delay in Key Labour Reforms in Japan’, 6 October 2013, and Jonathan
Soble, ‘Abe’s “Third Arrow” Reforms Leave Investors Hungry for Detail’, 6 June
2013. A businessmen appointed by Mr Abe to advise on legislation to boost
growth, noted “stupid, irrational conflicts running through the deregulation
debates”. See Jennifer Thompson, ‘Abenomics Brings Dilemmas for Business’.
Financial Times, December 2, 2013. Also see Jonathan Soble and Ben McLanna-
han, ‘Rakuten Chief Attacks Shinzo Abe Over Reform U-Turn’. Financial Times,
November 6, 2013.
119. Ben McLannahan, ‘Japan Pension Fund Warns of Unfair Abe Pressure’, 16 Feb-
ruary 2014.
120. See Jonathan Soble, ‘US-Japan Trade Impasse Points to No April TPP Deal for
Obama’. Financial Times, April 10, 2014; Anna Fifield, ‘Japan’s Abe Says
Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Talks with U.S. are Near “Final Stage”’. Washing-
ton Post, November 7, 2014; and ‘Editorial, No Rush in TPP Talks’. Japan Times,
November 16, 2014.
456 WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN?

121. Szu Ping Chan, ‘“Godfather” of Abenomics: Tax Hike Must be Delayed’. Daily
Telegraph, November 14, 2014.
122. Results of a Tankan survey reported in Jonathan Soble, ‘Japanese Retailers Fear
Sharp Business Fall as Sales Tax Rises’. Financial Times, April 1, 2014, and
Ben McLannahan, ‘Japan’s Retailers Play Games with Tax Rise Prices’. Financial
Times, March 23, 2014.
123. See for example discussion in Aurelia George Mulgan, ‘Japan’s Unnecessary Elec-
tion’. East Asia Forum, November 25, 2014.
124. See David Pilling, ‘Wages and Taxes will Decide the Fate of Japanese Economy’.
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Financial Times, March 26, and Ben McLannahan, ‘Japanese Debt: Still Climb-
ing’. Financial Times, March 24, 2014. Also see Ben McLannahan, ‘Japan’s
CPI Suggests Lingering Deflation Pressure’. Financial Times, March 28, 2014;
and David Pilling, ‘Three Arrows and Five Rings: Abe’s Inflationary Quest’.
Financial Times, September 11, 2013.
125. Jonathan Soble, ‘J-Curve’ Recovery Eludes Shinzo Abe as Trade Deficit Bal-
loons’. Financial Times, February 20, 2014.
126. See Ben McLannahan, ‘Japan’s Workers Still Await Wage Boost’. Financial
Times, July 31, 2014.
127. Jonathan Soble and Ben McLannahan, ‘Rakuten Chief Attacks Shinzo Abe Over
Reform U-Turn’. Financial Times, November 6, 2013.
128. David Pilling, ‘This will be a Crunch Year for the Japanese Economy’. Financial
Times, January 15, 2014.
129. See for example discussion in Robin Harding, ‘World Watches Japan and Waits for
Outcome of Abenomics Experiment’. Financial Times, March 29, 2015, Andrew
Smithers, ‘Japan’s Chances of Achieving Inflation’, 5 December 2014, and
Stephen Harner, ‘Abenomics’ Most Likely Achievement: Stagflation?’. Forbes
Asia, March 20, 2014.
130. Andrew Smithers, ‘Japan: Inflation is not a Sensible Policy’. Financial Times,
February 27, 2014. Also see Andrew Smithers, ‘Abenomics’, 7 April 2013, at:
http://www.smithers.co.uk/news_article.php?id=124.
131. Given that most people have no more money to spend, many businesses, Akio
Fujita (director of the Association of Small & Medium-sized Business Entrepre-
neurs) believes, will feel compelled to keep their tax-inclusive prices steady to
avoid losing customers. “Getting the first arrow right is the most important
thing, because the others on their own won’t get us out of deflation”, says Toshihiro
Nagahama, economist at Dai-Ichi Life Research. Bond market investors are also
sceptical that the inflation arrow is on target: prices of Japanese government
bonds suggest otherwise. See Jonathan Soble and Ben McLannahan, ‘Abe’s
Arrows: Japan Counts the Cost of Inflation’. Financial Times, December 10,
2013. Also, concerns about the impact of an increase in Japan’s national sales
tax on consumer spending are seen as affecting orders for new machinery,
which seem to have dropped sharply, denting optimism, and, unless consumer
expenditure firms up, investing in new capacity would be counterproductive.
See Jonathan Soble, ‘Drop in Japan Core Machinery Orders Dents Optimism’.
Financial Times, February 12, 2014.
WHITHER MR ABE’S JAPAN? 457

132. Kiyoshi Okonogi, ‘People Will Soon Feel the Failure of Abenomics’. Asahi
Shimbun, February 18, 2014.
133. Kevin Krolicki and Tetsushi Kajimoto, ‘Japan’s Wary Manufacturers Resist Abe’s
Urge to Splurge’. Reuters, April 4, 2015, and Andrew Smithers, ‘What is Corpor-
ate Japan Doing with its Cash Pile’. Financial Times, March 4, 2015.
134. See David Nakamura, ‘Obama Aims to Reinvigorate Asia Strategy’. Washington
Post, April 17, 2014.
135. China has helped set up two security-oriented organizations in the region that
exclude the United States as a member: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
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(SCO) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in


Asia (CICA).
136. Mr Hagel, The United States Secretary for Defense, has referred to Japan as a
“great power”. His Chinese counterpart referred to the United States too as a
great power. In responding to Mr Hagel’s talk in Beijing, the vice-chairman of
China’s Central Military Commission, Chinese General Fan Changlong, said:
“China hopes the U.S. can be a responsible great power and do more to promote
regional stability and the friendship between the two countries and militaries.”See:
Zhang Pengfei, ‘China Dissatisfied with Hagel’s Remarks’. Xinhua, April 9, 2014,
at: http://english.cntv.cn/2014/04/09/ARTI1397006112111220.shtml.
137. See Alex Lee, ‘Realpolitik Trumps a Shinzo Abe Apology before US Congress’.
South China Morning Post, March 23, 2015.
138. See for example discussion in Robert A. Manning and James J. Przystup, ‘Points of
View: Obama-Abe Summit should Overcome Dangerous “Mirror-Image Trust
Gap”’. Asahi Shimbun, April 14, 2014.
139. See for example discussion in Tetsuo Shibata, ‘Abe Administration Suffered “Dip-
lomatic Defeat” by China with Agreement Statement’. Asahi Shimbun, November
26, 2014.
140. See for example discussion in Aurelia George Mulgan, ‘Japan’s Unnecessary Elec-
tion’. East Asia Forum, November 25, 2014.
141. Reporting in January 2000.
142. See discussion in Christopher Goto Jones, Japan, A Very Short Introduction.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
143. Mr Hatoyama, recognizing the emergence of a multipolar world, argues for a
regional community, based on the concept of yu-ai, the equivalent of fraternity
and mutual trust. Mr Hatoyama is emphatic that it is “the East Asian region,
which is showing increasing vitality in its economic growth and even closer
mutual ties” that “must be recognised as Japan’s basic sphere of being’, and ‘we
must not forget our identity as a nation located in Asia”. See ‘Hatoyama Outlines
East Asia Bloc’. Japan Times, November 16, 2009, and Yukio Hatoyama, ‘My
Political Philosophy’, in the monthly Voice, September issue, August 10, 2009.
144. A translation of the following line from Paul Verlaine’s work: Mon ame pour
d’affreux naufrages appareille.

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