Case Digest in Consti Rev. Prepared by Francisco Arzadon Use at Own Risk (2018)

CASE DIGEST IN CONSTI REV.
PREPARED BY: FRANCISCO ARZADON; USE AT OWN RISK [2018]
1. De Leon v Esguerra G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

Short Version: Petitioners question the appointment of respondents as barangay officials and
maintain that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the OIC did not have the authority to
simply appoint their replacements. Date of effectivity of 1987 Constitution retroacts to the date of
the plebiscite, i.e. 2 Feb. 1987. Provisional Constitution deemed to have been superseded by 1987
Constitution on said date of effectivity.
2. Francisco, Jr. vs House of Representatives
Short Version: Separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of
the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people Court cannot make a determination
of what constitutes an impeachable offense; it is a purely political question
3. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947 Ponente: Justice Tuason
Short Version: Resolution of Congress proposing the Parity Amendment was assailed on the ground
that it did not comply with the ¾ rule prescribed by the Constitution. Petition dismissed. Proposal of
amendments to the constitution is a political question. The enrolled copy of the resolution in which
it was certified that the proposal had been approved by the required vote was conclusive upon the
courts. Modified by Gonzales, infra, and Tolentino, infra.
4. Gonzales v. COMELEC APRIL 18, 1969 FERNANDO, J.
Short Version: RBH No. 1 called for an increase in the membership of the HOR; RBH No. 2
called for a Constitutional Convention; and RBH No. 3 called for the amendment of Art. VI, Sec.
16 to allow members of Congress to become delegates to the CONCON without losing their seats.
Petitioners seek to restrain respondents from enforcing the law passed by Congress submitting RBH
Nos. 1 and 2 for ratification during the general elections scheduled on Nov. 1967.
Petition denied.
(1) Proposal of amendments is not a political but a justiciable question subject to judicial review.
(2) Congress may propose amendments and at the same time call for a Constituent Assembly.
(3) Ratification may be done simultaneously with a general election or in a special election called
specifically for that purpose.
(4) There was a proper submission.
5. Tolentino vs. COMELEC
Short version: Petition is for prohibition to restrain respondent COMELEC from holding a
plebiscite for the ratification of a proposed amendment in the Constitution. Petitioner prays that
the resolutions of the Constitutional Convention and the acts of Comelec in obedience to such
resolutions be declared null and void. The Court voted to grant the petition.
Validity of a CONCON Resolution (submitting, for ratification, the proposal to lower the voting
age to 18) was assailed. The question here is whether piecemeal amendments to the Constitution
could be submitted to the people for ratification or rejection.
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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTI REV. PREPARED BY: FRANCISCO ARZADON; USE AT OWN RISK [2018]
Petition granted. All amendments proposed by the same Constitutional Convention shall be submitted
to the people in a single election.
6. Javellana vs Executive Secretary
Short Version: Petitioners seek to enjoin the respondents from implementing any of the provisions
of the “new constitution” not found in the 1935 Constitution, on the theory that it was not validly
ratified in accordance with the provisions of Art.1, Section XV. Although the question of whether
a Constitution was validly ratified is a justiciable question, the question of whether a Constitution has come
into force and effect is a political question beyond the competence of the Court to decide.
7. Planas v. Commission of Elections, et. al.
Short version: Charito Planas filed a petition to the Supreme Court in order to prohibit the
implementation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 73 scheduling a plebiscite to ratify or reject the
proposed Constitutional amendments submitted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, citing
constitutional provisions. Other identical actions were filed including a supplemental urgent motion
for issuance of restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction from implementing PD No. 73
and any other similar proclamations related to such. The Supreme Court justices decided on a vote
of 6 to 3 to dismiss all petitions finding it unnecessary to pass upon the question given the
postponement of the said plebiscite to an indefinite time in the future, until further notice.
8. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-446640 OCTOBER 12, 1976
Short Version: Petitioners question the authority of the President in issuing several PDs proposing
amendments to the New Constitution and calling for a national referendum-plebiscite for the said
amendments. (1) The amending process, both as to proposal and ratification, raises a justiciable
question. (2) In a crisis government, the President shall have the power to assume the constituent
power to propose amendments lodged in the Legislative body.
9. Mitra v. COMELEC G.R. No. L-56503, April 4, 1981
Short Version: Petitioners argue that the 1973 Constitution never validly took effect, Javellana aside,
on the theory that the 1973 Constitution was still and is still at the stage of proposal. They ask the
Court to order a plebiscite for the ratification of the 1973 Constitution. Even without valid
ratification, a new Constitution could come into force and effect by the acquiescence of the people.
Popular acquiescence to a new Constitution gives the document the force and effect of the
Fundamental Law of the Land, regardless of the method of ratification. If it is accepted by the
people (as shown by their participation in several elections and referenda since then), in whom
sovereignty resides according to the Constitution, the courts cannot refuse to yield assent to such a
political decision.
10. Lawyers’ League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano vs. President Corazon
Aquino, et al, defendant
Short Version: Petitioners questioned legitimacy of the Aquino government. The question of
legitimacy of a new government arising from a successful revolution is a political question beyond
the pale of review by the courts.
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11. [De Leon go to #1]

12. Santiago v COMELEC
Short Version: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent COMELEC from acting on the petition by
the PIRMA group asking for an order fixing details on how to collect signatures for a people’s
initiative to amend the Constitution COMELEC permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
provide for the implementation of the system. The system of initiative found in Art. XVII, Sec. 2
is not self-executory. It needs an enabling law before the right of the people could be exercised.
However, an examination of its provisions reveals that RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned.
13. Estrada v Desierto; March 2, 2001; J. Puno
Short Version: Estrada questions legitimacy of Arroyo government and claims, inter alia, that he did
not resign from position and that Arroyo is merely an acting president. (Legal distinction between
EDSA I and EDSA II) The government arising from EDSA I was extra-constitutional, while EDSA
II was a constitutional exercise of the right to free speech, freedom of assembly, and to petition the
government for redress.
14. Lambino vs, COMELEC
Short Version: Petitioners seek review of COMELEC decision denying due course to a people’s
initiative to amend the 1987 Constitution. The constituent power reserved to people under Art.
XVII Sec. 2 is limited to the power to propose amendments to, not revision of, the Constitution.
Moreover, “direct proposal by the people” means that the petition signed by the people should
contain the full text of the proposed amendments to the Constitution.
15. Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System
Short version: Manila Prince Hotel, in a bid against Renong Berhad (a Malaysian firm), to acquire
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation which owns the Manila Hotel, invoked the
Filipino First policy found in Section 10 of Article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines. Since
GSIS refused to accept its bid security to match the bid of the Malaysian group, MPH came to the
Supreme Court on prohibition & mandamus. Supreme Court decided in favor of MPH in pursuant
of the Filipino First Policy found in the Constitution.
16. Oposa v. Factoran
Short Version: This case has a special and novel element. Petitioners minor assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of
the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility”
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
17. Imbong v. Ochoa
Short Version: component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. These
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provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of
the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement
these self-executing provisions
18. Legaspi v. CSC
Short Version: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.
19. Espina v. Zamora
Short Version: National Economy and Patrimony; While Section 19, Article II of the 1987
Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly
of the economic environment.—As the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997),
the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies,
are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action
in the courts.
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1. De Leon v Esguerra G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

Short Version: Petitioners question the appointment of respondents as barangay officials and maintain
that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the OIC did not have the authority to simply appoint
their replacements. Date of effectivity of 1987 Constitution retroacts to the date of the plebiscite, i.e.
2 Feb. 1987. Provisional Constitution deemed to have been superseded by 1987 Constitution on said
date of effectivity.
Facts:
• In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo De Leon was elected
Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel Salamat, Mario Sta. Ana, Jose Tolentino,
Rogelio de la Rosa and Jose Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act
of 1982.
• Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by
respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent
Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores.
• Respondent OIC Governor also signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986
designating respondents Remigio Tigas, Ricardo Lacanienta Teodoro Medina, Roberto Paz
and Teresita Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and
Municipality.
• Petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda be declared null and void and that respondents
be prohibited from taking over their positions.
o Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982
(BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on
June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have
qualified," or up to June 7, 1988.
o With the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer
has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
• Respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution which provides:
o SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February
25,1986.
o Petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because
their term of six years had not yet expired.
o Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years is
deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision
of the Provisional Constitution.
Issue:
• Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during
the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987
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Held:
• No because the Provisional Constitution has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
Ratio:
• The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore,
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded.
o February 8, 1977 should be considered as the effective date of Memoranda for
replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with the
dictates of justice.
• We find nothing inconsistent between the term of six years for elective Barangay officials and
the 1987 Constitution
o Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and
promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities.
o Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of
political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part and limits the President's
power to "general supervision" over local governments.
• Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term
of office of six years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
o Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
▪ Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years ...
o Pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution:
▪ Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
o The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor are both declared to be of no
legal force and effect.
o Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with
the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this Petition.
2. Francisco, Jr. vs House of Representatives
Short Version: Separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of
the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people Court cannot make a determination of
what constitutes an impeachable offense; it is a purely political question
Petitioners:
1. Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. alleges he has a duty as a member of Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment.
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Francisco says he himself was a victim of capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress.
2. Other petitioners:
• Sedfrey Candelaria, et al, as citizens and taxpayers; Philippine Bar Association: allege
that the issues are of transcendental importance.
• Francisco Chavez, petitions that the second impeachment complaint be declared
unconstitutional.
• Atty. Harry Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession
• Rep. Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul Gonzales, as legislators
• Leonilo R. Alfonso, et. al., claim they have a right to be protected against all forms of
senseless spending of taxpayers’ money
• Integrated Bar of the Philippines, mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility
• Attys. Venicio Flores and Hector Hofileña, claim as professors of law, they have
abiding interest in the subject matter
• Et. al.
Respondents: House of Representatives (rep by Jose De Venecia), Senate (rep by Franklin Drilon),
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix Fuentebella
Date: November 10, 2003
Pontente: J. Conchita Carpio-Morales
Facts:
• On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by

Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF).”
• On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico,
Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee
on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution
which reads: (A)
• The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for
being insufficient in substance.
• Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
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impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third
District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment”
signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives
• Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as
it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution. (B)
• Respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-
respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court
has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which
is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the
performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even
date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex
Abudante Cautela) and Comment, praying that “the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that
the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and
decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be
recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution.” Briefly
stated, the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political
action which cannot assume a judicial character.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings.
2. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.
3. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis
Held:
1. Yes, judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings. Petitioners
plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the
second impeachment complaint. This Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the
judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
(C) Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
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not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
2. Yes, the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action
taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI (B) becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
3. No, the resolution thereof is not a political question – it has not resulted in a political crisis.
The possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to
refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases.
Provisions:
(A) Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(B) Section 3(5), Article XI: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
(C) Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution: 1. The judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Ratio:
HOR’s Contention Supreme Court

Judicial Restraint in the Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon
face of Jurisdiction by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission, to wit: x x x the Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of
such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
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that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the

power of judicial review under the Constitution.
x.x.x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of
its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
Constitutionality of Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
Timing of 2nd Filing President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.
Judicial Restraint in the Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their
face of Risk of Political action may precipitate a crisis. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine
Crises constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut
allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus
with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court’s jurisdiction,
no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem
head on. The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself
with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial
supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
3. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito G.R. No. L-1123, March 5, 1947 Ponente: Justice
Tuason
Short Version: Resolution of Congress proposing the Parity Amendment was assailed on the ground
that it did not comply with the ¾ rule prescribed by the Constitution. Petition dismissed. Proposal of
amendments to the constitution is a political question. The enrolled copy of the resolution in which it was
certified that the proposal had been approved by the required vote was conclusive upon the courts. Modified by
Gonzales, infra, and Tolentino, infra.
Facts:
Page 10 of 52
• Instant petition is for prohibition of a congressional resolution proposing an amendment to

the Constitution. 3 of petitioner senators were proclaimed elected in the April 1946 elections,
but were then suspended on alleged irregularities. The 8 petitioner representatives had not
been allowed to sit. Thus, the mentioned did not take part in the passage of the resolution. If
their votes had been counted, the affirmative votes would have been short of the necessary.
Issue:
• Whether or not the issue is justiciable.
Held:
• No. Enrolled bill doctrine. Political questions are not subject to judicial review, except when
dealing with questions conferred upon the courts by constitutional/statutory proivision.
• This is predicated upon the separation of powers. According to a US case, the efficacy of
ratification by state legislature of proposed amendment to Federal Constitution is a political
question.
• If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification
has to be a political question. 1935 Constitution provides two distinct parts for amendments:
proposal and ratification. Proposal to amend is highly political performed by Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity, and there is less reason for judicial inquiry into a proposal’s
validity rather than ratification. A duly authenticated bill/resolution imports absolute verity
and is binding on the courts.
• The courts cannot mandate the President to use his calling out power when the situation
permits it, or the legislature to pass a certain kind of law. Such duties are beyond judicial review
if the one charged fails to perform them. Motives are beyond the courts.
• The sensible solution is not to patch casual errors by asking the Judiciary to circumvent the
Constitution, but to represent ourselves with competent legislators.
• The Code of Civil Procedure provides proving legislative proceedings 1) journals,
clerk/secretary certified; 2) copy signed by presiding officers and secretaries, conclusive proof.
But this Court chooses to pass over the question. The journals have no signs of irregularity.
4. Gonzales v. COMELEC APRIL 18, 1969 FERNANDO, J.

Short Version: RBH No. 1 called for an increase in the membership of the HOR; RBH No. 2 called
for a Constitutional Convention; and RBH No. 3 called for the amendment of Art. VI, Sec. 16 to allow
members of Congress to become delegates to the CONCON without losing their seats. Petitioners
seek to restrain respondents from enforcing the law passed by Congress submitting RBH Nos. 1 and
2 for ratification during the general elections scheduled on Nov. 1967.
Petition denied.
(1) Proposal of amendments is not a political but a justiciable question subject to judicial review.
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(2) Congress may propose amendments and at the same time call for a Constituent Assembly.
(3) Ratification may be done simultaneously with a general election or in a special election called
specifically for that purpose.
(4) There was a proper submission.
FACTS
• Petitioners challenge the validity of two new sections now included in the Revised Election Code,
under Republic Act No. 4880, which was approved and took effect on June 17, 1967
o prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates
• It shall be unlawful for any political party, political committee, or political
group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at
large earlier than one hundred and fifty days immediately preceding an
election, and for any other elective public office earlier than ninety days
immediately preceding an election.
o limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity.
• It is unlawful for any person whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any
group or association of persons, whether or not a political party or political
committee, to participate in an election campaign or partisan political
activity except during the period of one hundred twenty days immediately
preceding an election involving a public office voted for at large and ninety
days immediately preceding an election for any other elective public office.
• They claim that the said RA 4880 will prejudice their rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly and right to form associations or societies
• Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae
o He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine
▪ The danger: the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials,
being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship,
and undue concentration in politics, with the loss not only of efficiency in
government but of lives as well.
ISSUES/RATIO
1.
A. Treated as a petition for prohibition, even if COMELEC is not sought to be restrained from performing
any specific act
- Due to the exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest,
and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections being barely six months away,
reinforce our stand.
B. Even if petitioners have not shown that they have sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, the petition will prosper
- Taxpayer suit
3. Freedom of Expression
The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is of course a fundamental postulate of our
constitutional system.
- “No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press.”
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- From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation.
o The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom
of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal
values that press for recognition.
- Proper tests for limitation: Cabansag v. Fernandez
- Clear and present danger rule and dangerous tendency rule
o Clear and present danger
▪ The evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished.
▪ The danger to be guarded against is the “substantive evil” sought to be prevented
▪ The term clear seems to point; to a causal connection with the danger of the
substantive evil arising from the utterance questioned.
▪ Present refers to the time element. It used to be identified with imminent and
immediate danger
▪ The danger must not only be probable but very likely inevitable.
o Dangerous tendency
▪ If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable.
▪ It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general
terms.
▪ Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons
to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body seeks to prevent.
4. Freedom of Assembly
The Bill of Rights likewise prohibits the abridgment of the right of the people peaceably to assemble.
- Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public
affairs]
- All these rights (speech, press, peaceably to assemble, petition gov’t for redress of grievances) while
not identical. are inseparable
5. Freedom of Association
The freedom to organize or to be a member of any group or society exists.
**In these three freedoms, since the constitution prohibits their abridgment, they may be subject to limitation
- BUT only upon showing of clear and present danger created in the exercise of said rights
6. Facial challenge
- In effect what we are asked to do is to declare the act void on its face, no evidence having been
introduced as to its actual operation
- In considering whether it is violative of any of the above rights, we cannot ignore of course the
legislative declaration that its enactment was in response to a serious substantive evil affecting the
electoral process, not merely in danger of happening, but actually in existence, and likely to continue
unless curbed or remedied.
o a) Prohibition of too early nomination of candidates
▪ The right of association is affected.
• Political parties have less freedom as to the time during which they may
nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such, however, as to render
meaningless such a basic right.
Page 13 of 52
• Their scope of other legitimate activities is not unduly narrowed.

▪ Neither is there infringement of their freedom to assemble.
• They can do so, but not for such a purpose.
▪ Court UNANIMOUSLY sustains the validity of this provision
o b) Limitation on the period of election campaign or partisan political activity
▪ If that is all there is to that provision, it suffers from the fatal constitutional infirmity
of vagueness and may be stricken down
• Stricter standards of permissible vagueness may be applied to a statute
having inhibiting effect on speech
▪ But since there are definitions in the law for what acts are included in “election
campaign” and “partisan political activity”, there is no immediate conclusion of
vagueness in the said law (NOTE: there were 6 acts defined to fall under “election
campaign” and “partisan political activity”, a-f)
▪ The majority of the Court would vote that acts contained in c-e are invalid
(no clear and present danger, and overbroad). HOWEVER, we lack one
more vote to call for declaration of unconstitutionality
- In any case, it is the minority opinion that it would be premature for a judgment of nullity of any
provision found in Republic Act No. 4880. The need for adjudication arises only if in the
implementation of the Act there is in fact an unconstitutional application of its provisions.
HELD
a) prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates
- Court is unanimous that it is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
b) limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity.
- Majority voted for unconstitutionality, but since one vote is lacking, said provision is NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
PETITION DISMISSED
5. Tolentino vs. COMELEC

Short version: Petition is for prohibition to restrain respondent COMELEC from holding a plebiscite
for the ratification of a proposed amendment in the Constitution. Petitioner prays that the resolutions
of the Constitutional Convention and the acts of Comelec in obedience to such resolutions be declared
null and void. The Court voted to grant the petition.
Validity of a CONCON Resolution (submitting, for ratification, the proposal to lower the voting age
to 18) was assailed. The question here is whether piecemeal amendments to the Constitution could be
submitted to the people for ratification or rejection.
Petition granted. All amendments proposed by the same Constitutional Convention shall be submitted
to the people in a single election.
Doctrine:
Page 14 of 52
• The Constitutional Convention of 1971 is subject to the condition and limitation that all
amendments to be proposed by the same must be submitted to the people in a single
“election” or plebiscite.
Facts
• The 1971 Constitutional Convention was convened through two resolutions (Resolutions 2
and 4) of Congress in its capacity as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution. The proposed amendment in the present case is the lowering of the voting age
to 18.
o Petitioner submits that the said resolutions contravene the Constitution on two points:
1) only Congress as a legislative body has the power to call and hold a plebiscite so
that it may not be exercised by the Convention, and 2) that the proposed amendments
should all be presented to the people for ratification.
o Respondents posit that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the details
of the plebiscite is within the authority of the Convention, and that the Convention
has the discretion whether to submit the amendments individually or jointly.
o Intervenors contend that the issue is one of a political question over which the Court
cannot rule.
Issues
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the present issue?
2. Is it within the power of the Convention to call and hold a plebiscite for the ratification of proposed
amendments to the Constitution?
3. Does the Constitution allow the submission to the people of piecemeal proposed amendments?
Ratio
1. Yes.
In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, it has been held that the judicial department has the power to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments of government and among
the integral or constituent units thereof.
In considering the present issue justiciable, the Court does not undermine the authority of the
Convention. It is simply because both the Court and the Convention are subject to the Constitution
and the rule of law, and the Constitution provides that it is the duty of the Court to resolve conflicting
claims of authority and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which the
Constitution secures and guarantees to them.
2. Ambiguous.
The Court considers it to be of the utmost importance that the Convention should be untrammeled
and unrestrained in the performance of its constitutionally assigned mission in the manner and form it
may conceive best, and so the Court may step in to clear up doubts as to the boundaries set down by
the Constitution only when and to the specific extent only that it would be necessary to do so to avoid
a constitutional crises or a clearly demonstrable violation of the existing Charter.
The Court refrained from making any pronouncement or expression of views because it is divided in
itself, and that it found itself short of time to study and deliberate the case.
Page 15 of 52
3. No.
The Court holds that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted
to the people in a single “election” or plebiscite.
Article XV, Section 1 provides that “… such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution
when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted
to the people for their ratification.
Any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it, if only because the Constitution
has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument. Once the original constitution is approved, the
part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted
to them, more or less they can assume its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept
or reject it in its entirety. Submitting to them only the proposed amendment deprives the voter of a
fixed frame of reference as to what will be the final draft, so that they cannot decide intelligently
whether to accept or reject it.
6. Javellana vs Executive Secretary

Short Version: Petitioners seek to enjoin the respondents from implementing any of the provisions of
the “new constitution” not found in the 1935 Constitution, on the theory that it was not validly ratified
in accordance with the provisions of Art.1, Section XV. Although the question of whether a Constitution
was validly ratified is a justiciable question, the question of whether a Constitution has come into force and effect is a political
question beyond the competence of the Court to decide.
Facts:
The Plebiscite Case
• On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended
by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.
• Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved
on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said
Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began
to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.
• While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued
Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.
• On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued
Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
• On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the
Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their
agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of
the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect
as law because the calling … of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the
same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters,
Page 16 of 52
and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged
exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed
Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly,
and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.”
• On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects
of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed
Constitution.
• On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was
taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the
plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice.” Said
General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the “order of December 17,
1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and
open debate on the proposed Constitution.”
• Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the
Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for
neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or
announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled
to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential
Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite
and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view
of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation
with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court
deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.
• “In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No.  L-35948 filed an
“urgent motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later
than January 15, 1973.”
• The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring
the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and
“manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or on January
15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a
“supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional
respondents,” praying: “… that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining
respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and
its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary
Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman,
Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and
persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and
reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies
referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period
comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph
1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”
• On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in
said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M.,
Tuesday, January 16, 1973,” and setting the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30
a.m.” While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary
of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President,
Page 17 of 52
he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No.
1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the
Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the
hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the
President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said
Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.
The Ratification Case
• On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite
cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any
of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution.
This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a
class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also
alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new
constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.
• Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without
authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution;
without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution;
and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null
and void.
• Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any
order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable question.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been
ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.
Rulings:
1. It is a justiciable and a non-political question.

1. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether
or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the
requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification
of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the
constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.
2. The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance
with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as
jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution)
shall show.
2. The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6) members of the court.
Page 18 of 52
1. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking
the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the
right of suffrage.
2. The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s
assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally
irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1
of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is
no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be
separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the
Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.
3. Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the
1935 Constitution envisages with the term “votes cast” choices made on ballots –
not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but
natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted
the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official
ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with
the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into
the accuracy of the election returns.
4. The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision
of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held
took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with
the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree
No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable
means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted
said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution
which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as
amended, to insure the “free, orderly, and honest” expression of the people’s will.
For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as
the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution
3. No majority vote has been reached by the Court.
1. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra
hold that “the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”
2. Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no free expression, and there
has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines,
of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law.
Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some
American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification,
a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded
recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine
calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the
difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the
freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.”
3. Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence
to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice
Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of martial law, with the free
expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no
means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have
accepted the Constitution.”
Page 19 of 52
4. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive
Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to
the proposed Constitution.
2. A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition

normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual
acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute congressional
recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled.
This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public
Officers. The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government
does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the
Court prepared to declare that the people’s inaction as regards Proclamation No.
1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or
instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued
subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said
Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the
people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or
acquiescence.
3. As regards the applicability to these cases of the “enrolled bill” rule, it is well to
remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his action
under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning
legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an
act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed
Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive
department of the Government.
4. In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions
therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that
the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the
1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the
people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect;
and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without
prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a
plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of
the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at
the time of such plebiscite.
5. Being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution
being considered in force and effect.
2. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; 4
members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee
cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that
they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not
accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, voted that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result,
there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
Page 20 of 52
7. Planas v. Commission of Elections, et. al.

Short version: Charito Planas filed a petition to the Supreme Court in order to prohibit the
implementation of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 73 scheduling a plebiscite to ratify or reject the
proposed Constitutional amendments submitted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, citing
constitutional provisions. Other identical actions were filed including a supplemental urgent motion
for issuance of restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction from implementing PD No. 73
and any other similar proclamations related to such. The Supreme Court justices decided on a vote of
6 to 3 to dismiss all petitions finding it unnecessary to pass upon the question given the postponement
of the said plebiscite to an indefinite time in the future, until further notice.
Doctrine:
• Court refrained from reviewing the constitutional validity of Presidential proclamation calling
for a plebiscite to ratify proposed constitutional amendments in relation to the postponement
of the aforementioned plebiscite.
Facts:
• March 16, 1967: Congress passed Resolution No. 2 (Res. 2) calling for a Convention for the
purpose of proposing amendments to the 1935 Constitution.
• June 17, 1969: Congress adopted Resolution No. 4 (Res. 4) amending Res. 2
• August 24, 1970: Republic Act 6132 was approved implementing Res. 2 as amended
• November 10, 1970: Delegates to the Constitutional Convention were elected
• June 1, 1971: Constitutional Convention began performing thus named, the 1971
Constitutional Convention (1971 CC)
• September 21, 1972: While 1971 CC was in session, President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1081 (Proc. No. 1081) placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law
• November 29, 1972: 1971 CC approved the Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines (Proposed Consti)
• November 30, 1972: President issued PD No. 73 “submitting the Proposed Constitution to
the People of the Philippines for ratification or rejection”. A plebiscite for the said ratification
was scheduled on January 15, 1973 and funds were appropriated for such
• December 7, 1972: Charito Planas filed petition GR No. L-35925 to nullify PD No. 73 on
grounds that (1) the power to call for such plebiscite, by Constitution, is held exclusively by
the Congress, and (2) there is no proper submission of the proposed constitution there being
no freedom of discussion under Martial Law and lack of adequate time to inform the people
of the contents of the Proposed Consti (Nov. 30, 1972 – Jan. 15, 1973)
• December 8 – 16, 1972: Similar actions were filed accordingly:
o Pablo C. Sanidad v. COMELEC, et. al. (GR No. L-35929)
o Gerardo Roxas, et. al. v. COMELEC, et. al. (GR No. L-35940)
o Eddie B. Monteclaro v. COMELEC, et. al. (GR No. L-35941)
o Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, et. al. v. The National Treasurer of the Philippines (GR No. L-
35942)
Page 21 of 52
o Vidal Tan, et. al. v. COMELECT, et. al. (GR No. L-35948)
o Jose V. Diokno, et. al. v. COMELEC (GR No. L-35953)
o Jacinto Jimenez v. COMELEC, et. al. (GR No. L-35961)
o Raul M. Gonzales v. COMELEC, et. al. (GR No. L-35965)
o Ernesto Hidalgo v. COMELEC (GR No. L-35979)
▪ Note: GR No. L-35948 (V.Tan) alleged that the 1971 CC exceeded its authority
in approving Sec. 2, 3 (par. 2) and 12 of Proposed Consti.
• December 17, 1972: President issued an order to temporarily suspend the effects of Proc.
No. 1081 (Martial Law) for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Consti.
• January 1, 1973: President issued Presidential Decree (PD) No. 86 organizing Citizen's
Assemblies to be consulted on certain public questions. The voting for such questions is to
take place on January 10 – 15, 1973.
• January 5, 1973: President issued PD No. 86-A which submitted new questions to PD No.
86 with emphasis on questions: (1) Do you approve of the new Constitution?, and (2) Do you
still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
• January 7, 1973: President issued General Order No. 20 (GO No. 20) which postponed the
scheduled plebiscite to an indefinite time in the future, until further notice. This also
suspended the effect of the order issued on December 17, 1972.
• January 12, 1973: Petitioners of case GR No. L-35948 filed an “Urgent Motion for Early
Decision” praying that the case be decided as soon as possible and not later than January 15,
1973. It sees that PD No. 86 and PD No. 86-A as a means to by-pass and short circuit the
powers of the Court to decide on the pending petitions if implemented
• January 15, 1973: Same petitioners filed a “Supplemental Motion for Issuance of Restraining
Order and Inclusion of Additional Respondents” from “collecting, certifying, announcing, and
reporting” the results of the so-called Citizen's Assemblies. They also called for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of PD No. 73 and other
similar proclamations, decrees or orders related to the plebiscite scheduled on January 15,
1973.
• January 17, 1973: While said cases where being heard in court, the Secretary of Justice
delivered to Chief Justice (CJ) Concepcion a copy of Proclamation No. 1102 (Proc No. 1102)
signed by the President that very morning.
• The proclamation certified the ratification of the Proposed Consti by an overwhelming
majority as determined by the votes gathered from the Citizen's Assemblies. It was read in
court by CJ Concepcion for the petitioners to hear.
• After extensive discussion, it was deemed necessary that the Members of the Court write their
own views and the CJ would state the result of the votes cast on the points of issue.
Issues:
MAJOR:
• Is the issuance of PD No. 73 by the President valid given that such power is exclusive of
Congress?
• Did the 1971 Convention exceed their authority in approving several questionable provisions
which were beyond their power to enact?
Page 22 of 52
• Does Martial Law affect the validity of the “proper submission of the Proposed Consti to the
people for ratification” given that there is no freedom of speech, press and assembly?
• Is Proc No. 1102 valid and in conformity with the requirements for ratification stated in the
1935 Constitution?
MINOR:
• Does the 1971 CC have the authority to continue functioning despite Martial Law?
Held:
MAJOR:
• The issue has become moot and academic. Since the plebiscite in question has been postponed,
the court finds it unnecessary to pass upon the question of the validity of PD No. 73. If the plebiscite
is schedules, the parties may file such actions as justified by the given circumstances.
• No. The 1971 CC was legally free to propose any amendment it deems fit unless inconsistent with the
international doctrine of Jus Cogens since it exercised its sovereign powers as delegated to it by the
people. Also, because proposals for amendments cannot be a part of Fundamental Law unless
approved by a majority of votes cast at an election where the proposals were submitted to the people
for ratification. (Sec. 1, Art XV 1935 Constitution)
• The issue is a question of fact and cannot be predetermined. As seen in the temporary suspension
of Proc No. 1081, Martial Law does not necessarily mean that freedom of speech and discussion of
the Proposed Consti. is curtailed. Since the said plebiscite has been postponed, the issue remains to be
a question of fact.
• The Court finds it unnecessary to pass upon such question. The issue on the validity of Proc No.
1102 has not been properly raised and adequately argued on by the parties in Court.
MINOR:
• Yes. In adherence to the ruling of case Duncan v. Kahanamoku, “Legislatures and courts continue to
function” even under Martial Law since they are “indispensable to the operations of the government”.
Such ruling also applies to a constituent body like the 1971 CC.
Ratio:
Petitioner’s contention:
• PD No. 73 has no force and effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite and the
appropriation of funds therefor, are, by Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress.
• There is no proper submission to the people of the said Proposed Consti. Set for January 15,
1973, there being no freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and there being no sufficient
time to inform the people of the contents thereof.
• Thereby, the respondents and agents of the COMELEC, the Treasurer of the Philippines, and
the Auditor General should be prohibited from implementing PD No. 73 in any manner, until
further orders of the Court.
• GR No. L-35948:
Page 23 of 52
• A restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining COMELEC and other included agents
from collecting, certifying, announcing and reporting the so-called Citizen’s Assemblies
referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met. The proceedings
of the so-called Citizen’s Assemblies will place PD Nos. 73 and 86 beyond the reach and
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court.
Supreme Court:
• As regards to the authority of the President to issue PD No. 73, the court finds it unnecessary
to pass upon such question because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been postponed.
In any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper parties
may then file such action as the circumstances may justify.
• On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of
the Proposed Consti to a plebiscite, insofar as the freedom essential therefor is concerned, the
issue involves a question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and Martial Law per se does
not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes
contemplated.
• The question of the validity of Proc. No. 1102 has not been explicitly raised and adequately
argued by the parties in any of these cases and it would not be proper to resolve such a
transcendental question without the most thorough discussion possible under the
circumstances.
8. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-446640 OCTOBER 12, 1976

Short Version: Petitioners question the authority of the President in issuing several PDs proposing
amendments to the New Constitution and calling for a national referendum-plebiscite for the said
amendments. (1) The amending process, both as to proposal and ratification, raises a justiciable
question. (2) In a crisis government, the President shall have the power to assume the constituent
power to propose amendments lodged in the Legislative body.
FACTS:
• On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991
calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the national assembly,
its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the
period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers.
• Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by
declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting
and canvassing of votes in "barangays" applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of
Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which is quoted in the footnote below.
• On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033,
stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October
Page 24 of 52
16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition
to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished
and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
• The questions ask, to wit:
o (1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
o (2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following
amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the
referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2
of Article XVI of the Constitution.
• On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, commenced
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force
and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on
Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on
October 16, 1976.
• Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no
constitutional or legal basis.
ISSUES:
• 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case?

• 2. Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to the
Constitution?
• 3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
HELD:
• Issue 1 – Justiciability of the courts

o We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-
justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and
the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the people
ultimately lie in the judgment of the clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not
that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and
procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in
1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the
proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no
power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested
that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the
constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry
must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by
the people.
Page 25 of 52
• Issue 2 – Whether or not the president has the authority to propose amendments to
the Constitution?
o As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the
interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial
convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the
incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to
defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise,
in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies
in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President. Again, harking to
the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National
Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the
President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his
assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has
been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there
is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross
legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his
office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature.
Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and
the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative
upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
• Issue 3 - Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time
frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
o It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the
specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held
not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision."
9. Mitra v. COMELEC G.R. No. L-56503, April 4, 1981

Short Version: Petitioners argue that the 1973 Constitution never validly took effect, Javellana aside,
on the theory that the 1973 Constitution was still and is still at the stage of proposal. They ask the
Court to order a plebiscite for the ratification of the 1973 Constitution. Even without valid ratification,
a new Constitution could come into force and effect by the acquiescence of the people. Popular
acquiescence to a new Constitution gives the document the force and effect of the Fundamental Law
of the Land, regardless of the method of ratification. If it is accepted by the people (as shown by their
participation in several elections and referenda since then), in whom sovereignty resides according to
the Constitution, the courts cannot refuse to yield assent to such a political decision.
Facts:
• Instant suit proceeds on the assumption that the present Constitution is not in effect, praying
for a plebiscite so that people may vote on the ratification of the Constitution. Petitioners
think that if the plebiscite results in the negative, then the 1935 Constitution, which they think
was only suspended by martial law, should be operative.
Page 26 of 52
Issue:
• Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is effective.
Held:
• Yes. SC either checks or legitimates acts of a coordinate department, challenged in an

appropriate legal proceedings. The decision rendered then, whether one of approval or of
rejection, of validity or of unconstitutionality, is controlling. Javellana ruled that no judicial
obstacle exists to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. Petitioners did
not take note of the opinion of CJ Concepcion, voting that the Constitution was ratified by
virtue of the people’s acceptance. The function of judicial review, as observed by Justice Laurel
in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, 8 reflects the adoption of the American
type of constitutional government "where the written constitution is interpreted and given
effect by the judicial department." 9 "Familiarity with the essential background of the type of
government established under our Constitution, in the light of certain well-known principles
and practices that go with the system, should offer the necessary explanation." 11 Even without
valid ratification, a new Constitution could come into force and effect by the acquiescence of
the people. There is this excerpt in a separate opinion in Javellana: “Independently of the lack
of validity of the ratification of the new Constitution, if it be accepted by the people, in whom
sovereignty resides according to the Constitution, then this Court cannot refuse to yield assent
to such a political decision of the utmost gravity, conclusive in its effect.” The government
which is merely an agency to register its commands has no choice but to submit. Its officials
must act accordingly. Once the fact of acceptance by the people of a new fundamental law is
made evident, the judiciary is left with no choice but to accord it recognition. The fact that the
people went to the polls would be indicative of their acquiescence in the present Constitution.
10. Lawyers’ League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano vs.
President Corazon Aquino, et al, defendant
Short Version: Petitioners questioned legitimacy of the Aquino government. The question of
legitimacy of a new government arising from a successful revolution is a political question beyond the
pale of review by the courts.
Facts:
• On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
• On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed through
a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed
Forces of the Philippines.”
• Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
Issues:
Page 27 of 52
• Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.

• Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
Discussions:
• In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to
be redressed by a favourable action.
• The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people
that made the judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held
its legitimacy.
Rulings:
• Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The holding
that petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have a cause
of action.
• The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm
of politics where only the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they
have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control
of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de
jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the
present government.
11. [De Leon go to #1]

12. Santiago v COMELEC
Short Version: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent COMELEC from acting on the petition by the
PIRMA group asking for an order fixing details on how to collect signatures for a people’s initiative
to amend the Constitution COMELEC permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance
of any petition for initiative until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system. The system of initiative found in Art. XVII, Sec. 2 is not self-executory.
It needs an enabling law before the right of the people could be exercised. However, an examination
of its provisions reveals that RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
Facts:
Page 28 of 52
• December 6, 1996 – Atty. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to
Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” wherein Atty. Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order.
o Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country
o Causing necessary publications of the said Order and petition in newspapers of general
and local circulation
o Instructing Municipal Election Registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose
• Provisions sought to be amended:
o Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, section 4 of Article VII, Section 8 of Article X of the
Constitution
• Upon filing of the Delfin Petition UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), COMELEC through its
Chairman issued an order
o Directing Delfin “to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached
Petition for Initiative on 1987 Constitution and the notice of hearing in three (3)
newspapers of general circulation at his own expense not later than December 9, 1996
o Setting the case for hearing on December 12, 1996 at 10:00 am.
• December 12, 1996 – Atty. Delfin, Atty. Quadra, representative of PIRMA , and the
Petitioner-Intervenors appeared at the hearing. On the same day, Sen. Roco filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable
by the COMELEC
• December 18, 1996 – Petitioners Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria
Isabel Ongpin filed special civil action for prohibition with arguments:
o The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can only
be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. But no such law has been passed
yet and Senate Bill No. 1290, An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional Amendments
by People’s Initiative is still pending.
o R.A No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in
other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle
III. This deliberate omission indicates the matter of people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law.
o R.A. No. 6735 will take effect after publication in print media, an indication that the
act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments.
o COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right
of initiative to amend the Constitution. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires
insofar as initiative on amendments is concerned.
o Lifting of term limits constitute a revision, not amendment and people’s initiative is
limited to amendment only.
o Congress has not yet appropriated funds for the people’s initiative.
• December 19, 1996 – Court issued a TRO enjoining COMELEC from proceeding with the
Delfin Petition and Pedrosas from conducting a signature drive.
• January 2, 1997 – Atty. Quadra filed a comment on the petition:
o In contrary to the petitioners’ argument re budget, National Treasury for General
Registration of voters will not amount to 180,000,000.00 pesos.
o All expenses in the signature gathering are all for the account of Delfin and his
volunteers.
Page 29 of 52
o The court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v COMELEC case upheld resolution
No. 2300 pursuant to R.A. 6735. The court said: “The COMELEC can do no less by
seasonably and judiciously promulgating guidelines and rules for both national and
local use, in implementing of these laws.”
o Lifting of term limits is not a revision, but an amendment.
o Atty. Delfin also filed a comment on the petition:
o What he filed on December 6, 1996 is an Initiatory Pleading or Initiatory Petition
o The absence of a subtitle on initiative on the Constitution in RA 6735 does not affect
the validity or sufficiency of the law.
o The claim that COMELEC Resolution 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 20 of RA 6735.
o Lifting of term limits is not a revision, but an amendment for it alters only a few
specific provisions of the Constitution.
• Office of the Solicitor General filed a comment:
o RA 6735 deals with, inter alia, people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.
o A separate subtitle on initiative in RA 6735 is not necessary because of it being national
in scope.
o Lifting of term limits constitutes an amendment, not revision.
o COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid.
• January 14, 1997 – The court confirmed nunc pro tunc the TRO and granted the Motion for
Intervention by Sen. Roco
• January 17, 1997 – DIK and MABINI filed a Motion for Intervention with the following
arguments:
o Delfin proposal is a revision, not an amendment, of the Constitution for it would
involve a change in political philosophy.
o Removal of term limits will negate the philosophy of governance which promotes
effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the
common good.
o Delfin proposal in in contrast with the purpose of an initiative. An initiative may be
availed of by the people if they are dissatisfied with the performance of elected
officials, not if they want to reward elected officials for good performance.
o RA 6735 is deficient and inadequate, and is not an enabling law. And there being no
enabling law, COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin’s petition.
o COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot remedy the deficiency of RA 6735
• January 20, 1997 - Sen. Roco affirms RA No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the
people’s right to initiate constitutional amendments, and it is a consolidation of Senate Bill
No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505. He also submits that COMELEC was empowered under
Section 20 of RA 6735 to promulgate COMELEC Resolution 2300. But, Sen Roco contends
that COMELEC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance the Delfin Petition because it is not
the initiatory pleading contemplated under RA 6735
• January 21, 1997 – IBP filed for a Motion for Intervention
o Congress has failed to pass an enabling law mandated in Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution.
o COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law
on the initiative to amend the Constitution
o Petition for Initiative does not have the required number of signatures
Page 30 of 52
o The petition seeks a revision which can be proposed only by the Congress or a Con-
Con.
• January 23, 1997 – Hearing of the Case
Issues:
1. WON it is proper for the SC to take cognizance on the petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC
2. WON R.A. 6735 intended to include initiative on amendments of the Constitution
3. WON COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid
4. WON COMELEC has jurisdiction over the order asked by the respondents
5. W the lifting of terms limits of elective officials constitutes an amendment or a resolution of
the Constitution
HELD/RATIO:
1. YES. The COMELEC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and
that it becomes imperative for SC to stop the COMELEC from proceeding any further.
2. YES. RA 6735 intends to include initiative on amendments of the Constitution but it is
deficient and inadequate in terms of how to carry it out. Since the legislature has not yet pass
an implementing law, initiative on amendments of the Constitution cannot operate.
3. NO. COMELEC cannot prescribe rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments of the Constitution. It does not have that power under RA 6735.
4. NO. Since the Delfin Petition does not have the required signatures, it cannot be deemed
validly initiated. Is not the initiatory petition under RA 6735 and it should not have been
given cognizance by COMELEC.
5. The Court rendered the discussion on the issue of whether Delfin’s Petition constitutes an
amendment or revision, unnecessary since it is not considered an initiatory petition.
13. Estrada v Desierto; March 2, 2001; J. Puno

Short Version: Estrada questions legitimacy of Arroyo government and claims, inter alia, that he did
not resign from position and that Arroyo is merely an acting president. (Legal distinction between
EDSA I and EDSA II) The government arising from EDSA I was extra-constitutional, while EDSA
II was a constitutional exercise of the right to free speech, freedom of assembly, and to petition the
government for redress.
DOCTRINE: Succession; Constructive Resignation
• “ART. VII, SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the
contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
• Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
• Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume
the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the
Page 31 of 52
Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the
Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its
rules and without need of call.
• If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session
within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office."
FACTS:
• (1) the expose of Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson on October 4, 2000; (2) the “I accuse”
speech of then Senator Teofisto Guingona in the Senate; (3) the joint investigation of the
speech of Senator Guingona by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice;
(4) the investigation of the Singson expose by the House Committee on Public Order and
Security; (5) the move to impeach the petitioner in the House of Representatives; (6) the
Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin demanding petitioner’s resignation; (7) a
similar demand by the Catholic Bishops conference; (8) the similar demands for petitioner’s
resignation by former Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos; (9) the resignation
of respondent Arroyo as Secretary of the DSWD and her call for petitioner to resign; (10) the
resignation of the members of petitioner’s Council of Senior Economic Advisers and of
Secretary Mar Roxas III from the Department of Trade and Industry; (11) the defection of
then Senate President Franklin Drilon and then Speaker of the House of Representatives
Manuel Villar and forty seven (47) representatives from petitioner’s Lapiang Masang Pilipino;
(12) the transmission of the Articles of Impeachment by Speaker Villar to the Senate; (13) the
unseating of Senator Drilon as Senate President and of Representative Villar as Speaker of the
House; (14) the impeachment trial of the petitioner; (15) the testimonies of Clarissa Ocampo
and former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu in the impeachment trial; (16) the 11-10 vote
of the senator-judges denying the prosecutor’s motion to open the 2nd envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held a P3.3 billion deposit in a secret
bank account under the name of “Jose Velarde”; (17) the prosecutors’ walkout and resignation;
(18) the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings to give a chance to the
House of Representatives to resolve the issue of resignation of their prosecutors; (19) the rally
in the EDSA Shrine and its intensification in various parts of the country; (20) the withdrawal
of support of then Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and the then Chief of
Staff, General Angelo Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services; (21) the same
withdrawal of support made by the then Director General of the PNP, General Panfilo
Lacson, and the major service commanders; (22) the stream of resignations by Cabinet
secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs; (23) petitioner’s agreement
to hold a snap election and opening of the controversial second envelope.
ISSUES/ RATIO:
• WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy. (YES)
Page 32 of 52
o Respondents: The cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court to decide. Respondents cite Lawyers League for a Better
Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. and related
cases.
o Held: The doctrines of the cited cases cannot apply. Those doctrines pertained to
EDSA I, which was an exercise of people power done in “in defiance of the provisions
of the 1973 Constitution, as amended”, was EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL. By
reason of its extra constitutional nature, the legitimacy of the new government born
in its wake raises political questions, which makes EDSA I not susceptible of
judicial review.
o On the other hand, EDSA II, which was an exercise of people power of freedom of
speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances,
only affected the office of the President. This makes it an INTRA-
CONSTITUTIONAL act. The resignation of the sitting President that it caused and
the succession of the Vice President as President raise LEGAL QUESTIONS, which
makes EDSA II susceptible of judicial review.
• Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, WON petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President. (NO)
• Was there a valid resignation, WITH RESPECT TO FACT? (YES)
o For there to be a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written.
It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be
given legal effect.
o Held: The resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his
leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement,
o (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic
albeit with the reservation about its legality;
(2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake
of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he
was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume
the presidency as soon as the disability disappears;
(3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President;
(4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in
the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after
occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and
(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.
o The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency
is now in the past tense.
• B) Was there a valid resignation, WITH RESPECT TO LAW? (YES)
o After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues
that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019,
Page 33 of 52
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly
prohibits his resignation, viz:
o “Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a
prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.”
o The intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or
retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the
investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to
prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery
under the Revised Penal Code.
o He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
• WON conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal
prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President,
whether he is immune from criminal prosecution. (NO)
o CENTERPIECE of Petitioner’s stance: He transmitted a written declaration to the
Senate President and Speaker of the House which says that he is unable to perform
the functions of his office, and that his Vice President, Gloria, will be the Acting
President in his stead.
o He is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
Respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the
petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency on the grounds that
“Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the
President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in
section 11 of Article VII.”
• HELD: In spite of the messages he transmitted to the Senate President and the House of
Representatives, both Houses of the Congress issued resolutions saying that both houses of
Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability.
• The question of whether or not Congress erred in rejecting petitioner’s claim of inability is
POLITICAL IN NATURE. The court cannot take cognizance of such question without
violating principle of the separation of powers.
• These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner’s claim that a non-sitting
president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency:
• One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.
• It declared as a state policy that “(t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."[119] It ordained
that “(p)ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.”
• It set the rule that “(t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred
by prescription, laches or estoppel.”
• It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.
• It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which
is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.”
Page 34 of 52
• The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.
14. Lambino vs, COMELEC

Short Version: Petitioners seek review of COMELEC decision denying due course to a people’s
initiative to amend the 1987 Constitution. The constituent power reserved to people under Art. XVII
Sec. 2 is limited to the power to propose amendments to, not revision of, the Constitution. Moreover,
“direct proposal by the people” means that the petition signed by the people should contain the full
text of the proposed amendments to the Constitution.
FACTS
• The Lambino group alleged that they were able to gather 6.3 million (therefore meeting the
stipulated requirements for an initiative under RA 6735 Sec 5 (b) and (c) ) signatures to support
their petition to change Sections 1-7, Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution. These changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
• The COMELEC denied the petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution. The Commission also cited the Court’s declaration that RA 6735 was inadequate
to implement such amendments to the Constitution according to the ruling in
• Santiago v Commission on Elections.
• Hence, the Lambino group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the
COMELEC’s ruling. The petitioners contend that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to their petition. They argued that Santiago is not a binding precedent,
and that it only binds the parties to that case.
• Various groups and individuals sought intervention, supporting or opposing the Lambino
• Group’s petition. Those who supported it agreed that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion by relying only on the ruling of the Santiago case. Those who opposed believe
that Santiago is a binding precedent and further challenged (1) the Lambino Group’s legal
standing, (2) the validity of supporting signatures, (3) compliance with the minimum
requirement, (4) the nature of the proposed changes, and (5) the compliance with the
requirement in RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
Issue(s)
• 1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Sec 2, Art XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative
• 2. Whether the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on
proposals on amend the Constitution, and
• 3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group’s petition.
Held/Holding/Ruling
There is no merit to the petition because the Lambino Group failed to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people’s initiative.
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Rationale
• The Initiative petition does not comply with Sec 2, Art XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People: An amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
• Capezzuto v State Ballot Commission. ”A signature requirement would be meaningless if the person
supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing.”
• The Lambino Group failed to show the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes.
o Lambino assured the people that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the
2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 elections. However, the
proposed Section 5(2) does not specify the time period for this. The signatories had to rely on the verbal
representations of Atty. Lambino because the the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the
proposed changes. The lef the people to believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in
2007 of elections for the regular parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
o The proposed Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-
Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system, which puts people in a dilemma because they
can answer only either yes or no to the entire petition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively
contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
o The proposed Section 4(3) states that not one of the present Senators will remain as member of
Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by June
30, 2010. The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against Senators.
• The Initiative violates Sec 2, Art XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through
initiatives: A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment, and not to its
revision.
• The framers of the Constitution intended and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention
may propose revisions to the Constitution. A people’s initiative can only propose amendments,
according to Article XVII Sec 2. A popular clamor, even one backed by alleged 6.3 million
signatures, cannot justify a deviation prescribed in the Constitution for which they are still
bound.
• Amendment: merely adds or deletes with the intent to improve upon and not change the basic
principle in the Constitution.
• Revision: implies a change that alters a basic principle in the Constitution
• Quantitative test:
o Affects the Constitution, through deletion or alteration, of numerous of existing
provisions.
o It affects Article VI and Article VII, a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.
• Qualitative test:
o Inquires into the degree of revision or change
o A change from Bicameral-Presidential to Unicameral to Parliamentary substantially
changes the basic structure of government which effectively reduces 3 co-equal
branches to 2
• Under both quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment.
(Answers to issues 2 and 3)
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• It is not necessary to revisit the Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. Change
in the Santiago ruling will not affect the outcome of the present petition. Moreover, the Court must avoid
revisiting a ruling involving constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.
• No grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. It merely followed the Court’s ruling in
Santiago and only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of the Court.
15. Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System
Short version: Manila Prince Hotel, in a bid against Renong Berhad (a Malaysian firm), to acquire 51%
of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation which owns the Manila Hotel, invoked the Filipino
First policy found in Section 10 of Article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines. Since GSIS
refused to accept its bid security to match the bid of the Malaysian group, MPH came to the Supreme
Court on prohibition & mandamus. Supreme Court decided in favor of MPH in pursuant of the
Filipino First Policy found in the Constitution.
Doctrine:
• Supremacy of the Constitution (Section 10 of Article XII of the Constitution)

Facts:
• GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program (Proclamation No. 50), decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of issued & outstanding shares of Manila Hotel Corporation
• In a close bidding held on September 18, 1995, only two bidders participated: Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation (petitioner), a Filipino corporation which offered to buy 51% of the MHC
(15,300,000 shares) at P41.58 per share AND Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm which offered
to buy the same number of shares at P44.00 per share
• Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder, the petitioner wrote a letter
to respondent on September 28, 1995 matching the bid price
• On October 10, 1995 petitioner sent a manager’s check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-
three Million Pesos as bid security to match the bid of the Malaysian group. Respondent
refused to accept the said check.
• On October 17, 1995, petitioner came to the Supreme Court on prohibition and mandamus
• On October 18, 1996, Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting the sale to the Malaysian firm
• MPH invoked Article XII, Section 10 of the Constitution: “In the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos”.
Issues:
• 1. Whether the Constitutional provision stated is self-executing
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• 2. Whether Manila Hotel falls under the term national patrimony

• 3. Whether Manila Prince Hotel falls under the category of “qualified Filipino”
• 4. Whether GSIS, being a government corporation, is under the constitutional provision
Held:
• Yes.
• GSIS’ Contention Supreme Court’s Contention
• Article XII, Section 10, second paragraph of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislations.
• Granting that said provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term
national patrimony which only refers to lands of public domain, waters, minerals, coal, etc.
• Granting that Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the shares and is not
considered as a qualified Filipino.
• Constitutional provision is addressed to the State and not to GSIS which has a separate and
distinct personality • Constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature & extent
of the rights and the liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself. (General rule: all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing; exception: when expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary)
• National patrimony also refers to cultural heritage of Filipinos. Manila Hotel is a landmark of
cultural value to the Filipinos.
• Anyone who controls 51% of the equity will have actual control of the hotel. Qualified
Filipinos include corporations at least 60% Filipino-owned.
• The sale of MHC could only be carried out through GSIS. This makes the sale a “state action”
(ii. when the government is so significantly involved with private actor as to make the govt
responsible for its actions)
16. Oposa v. Factoran

Short Version: This case has a special and novel element. Petitioners minor assert that they represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility” insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Facts:
• Lower court:
o petitioners were the minors represented by their parents and Philippine Ecological Network,
Inc.;
o Respondent: Factoran Jr.—then secretary of DENR; then substituted by the new secretary
Alcala.
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o Complaint was instituted as taxpayers’ class suit alleging "are all citizens of the Republic
of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests."
▪ This was filed for themselves also for others “so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all before the court”
▪ Minors asseverate that they “represent their generation as well as the generations yet
unborn.”
o Prayer:
▪ Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country
▪ Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
o Petitioners argue that the distortion and disturbance of the balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as :
(a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the
"aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams,
(b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water,
incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality
of Bacoor, Cavite,
(c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with
the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
— approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes,
(d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna,
(e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures,
(f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic
life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity,
(g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country,
(h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers,
(i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent
mechanism of forests,
(j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation
of electric power, and
(k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to
perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming,
otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
o Ultimately claiming that the court should consider the data submitted as a matter of judicial
notice.
o Petitioner’s cause of action includes:
▪ 25 years ago, 16M hectares of rainforests consisting the 53% of the country’s
landmass, now only 1.2M hectares remain with 850,000 hectares of virgin rainforests
remains with 3.0M hectares of immature uneconomic secondary growth forests.
▪ Public records reveal defendant’s predecessor have granted timber license agreements
(TLA) to cut 3.89M hectares and at the present rate, of about 200,000 hectares per
annum, the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of the decade
▪ The serious injury and irreplaceable damage of this continued trend of deforestation
to the current minor generation and to generations yet unborn are evident, and even
felt as of now of the current generation.
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▪ The continued TLAs will work great damage and irreplaceable injury to plaintiffs-
especially to plaintiffs minor and successors- who may never see, use, benefit from
and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
▪ Petitioners allege their cause of action, among others, is their “clear and constitutional
right to a balances and healthful ecology, entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as the parens patriae.” (parent of the country)
• Defendant Factoran filed Motion to Dismiss based on two grounds:
o plaintiffs have no cause of action against him (i.e. petitioners fail to allege a specific legal
right violated)
o The issue raised by plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative
or executive branches of the Government.
• In petitioners’ Opposition to the Motion, they maintain that:
o complaint shows clear and unmistakable cause of action;
o the motion is dilatory; -- meant to delay (delaying tactics)
o the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant’s abuse of discretion
• Respondent Judge granted motion to dismiss, sustaining defendant’s claim that there was no cause of
action and that it raises a political question. Further, that granting petitioners’ prayer would result
in the impairment of contracts. (Respondents submit that cancellation of TLAs cannot be done by
the State without due process of law.)
• Thus plaintiffs lead to filing this special civil action for certiorari
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS:
o Complaint clearly states a cause of action containing allegation concerning their right to a sound
environment:
o Art 19, 20, 21 of the Civil Code, Sec 4 of EO 192 creating DENR, Sec 3 PD 1151 (Phil.
Environmental Policy), Sec 16 Art II Consti, the concept of generational genocide in Crim
Law and the concept of man’s inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation
embodied in natural law.
o Grave abuse of discretion in granting TLAs to cover more areas of logging than what is available—
Judicial question
o Non impairment clause not invoked since TLA are not contracts. And even if it was, it may still be
revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS:
o Pet failed to allege specific legal right violated claiming that allegations concerning an “environmental
right” as vague which would supposedly entitle petitioners “protection by the state in its capacity as
parens patriae—reiterating the question of allowing logging in the Philippines is a political question
more suitable for the Congress to handle.
o Cancellation of TLA cannot be done without due process of law.
ISSUE/Held: ** petition granted. The order of the respondent Judge dimissing the civil case is set aside (though only
ordering that the case be remanded to the lower courts)—though petitioners did not pursue the issue in the lower
courts
Page 40 of 52
The court ruled that the case is indeed a class suit, covering a subject of common and general interest not just to several, but
to all citizens of the Philippines.—hence all requisites of filing a suit under Sec 12 Rule 3 of the Revised ROC are present in the
civil case and instant petition
I. WON petitioners have locus standi
o This case has a special and novel element. Petitioners minor assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of “intergenerational
responsibility” insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
o The minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
II. WON there is cause of action
o The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right—the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology incorporated in our fundamental law (ART II SEC 16 consti)
▪ Though not located in the bill of rights, It does not follow that it is less important
than any other civil or political right.
▪ This right is in a different category altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation- which is a right that need not be written in the
constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
▪ That it was not written in the bill of rights but part of the state policies for the
framers intended it go give highlight to its continuing importance and imposing
upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve and protect the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology and to health.
o A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
o Citing constitutional commission debate citing Mr. Villacorta and Mr. Azcuna where it was
stressed that the right to a healthful environment necessarily carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance.
o The court cited EO 192 sec 4 mandating DENR "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources,
including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as
the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to
ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos."
▪ Citing also sec 3 Declaration of policy, also re-stated in title XIV book IV admin
code of 197 Section 1 declaration of policy
• Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State
to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and
other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the
quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments
of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as
well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
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system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their

utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
• Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit
of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas
and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a
sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different
segments of the present as well as future generations.
• (2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that
takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
▪ Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers
and functions of the DENR.
▪ Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue
of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of
1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
o Cause of action is defined as:
▪ An act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other,
its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
▪ Filing a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a
cause of action, the question submitted to the court involves “sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint itself.” No other matter should be considered, the
truth is deemed hypothetically admitted.
***this part onwards not so important***
III. WON complaint raises a political question
o This is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or
review. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of 1987 Constitution)
IV. WON court erred in applying the non-impairment clause
o Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
o The respondent did not even invoke the non-impairment clause in his motion to dismiss.
o Even so, Sec. 20 of the Forestry Reform Code must be read into every timber license: “when
the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted.”
o All licenses may be revoked by executive action. It is not a contract, property or property
right protected by the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege.
17. Imbong v. Ochoa

Short Version: component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. These provisions
Page 42 of 52
are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these
self-executing provisions
FACTS:
• Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court,
beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the
profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the
controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.
• The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
• After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has
synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:
• PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule
• SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1. Right to Life
2. Right to Health
3. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4. The Family
5. Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6. Due Process
7. Equal Protection
8. Involuntary Servitude
9. Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10. Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM
RULING:
1. Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it
behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
1. The petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once
a controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is
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raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the
Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. In the scholarly estimation of
former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, “judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three
great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority
and control between them.” To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in
that balancing operation. Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the
Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of
constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial
review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
2. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or
controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that
the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. When an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but
also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
3. The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge,
also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in
the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom
of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized. In
this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld
the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope
to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
4. The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set
aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the
social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and
just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
Considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily
at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
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5. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court
may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
6. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. It is well-settled that the
“one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of
the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the
title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks
to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to
cripple or impede legislation.” In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions
of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth.
2. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins
at implantation. According to him, “fertilization and conception are two distinct and
successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous.”
Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that medical authorities confirm that the
implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only
after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected. This theory of
implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It
does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized
ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object – it is a living human being complete with
DNA and 46 chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would
constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution. It is
the Court’s position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a
fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life.
2. A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.
These provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary,
the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no
need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions. In Manila Prince
Hotel v. GSIS, it was stated:
1. x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
–… in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing. . . .
2. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
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discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions

would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute.
3. It is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one’s participation in the support of modem reproductive health
measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters
dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law,
custom and rule of a church … are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which
are outside the province of the civil courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court
extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court
makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has
authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to
determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot
enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State
is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon
by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because
it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God
the things that are God’s. The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking
information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform
an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas)
has written, “at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability
of the human conscience.
1. The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers,
whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates
of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief
and conviction, it would be violative of “the principle of non-coercion”
enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
2. The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service
providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such
institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under
Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down
for being violative of the freedom of religion.
3. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24,
considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and
services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the
religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected. The
Page 46 of 52
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer

a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure
on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a
constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
4. The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in
the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution
of their parental authority.
5. Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on
age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content,
manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and
whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the
Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
6. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the
words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with
their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule
that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is,
every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s reproductive
health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct
necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given
priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus: Section 11. The State
shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost.
There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.
The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. It should be noted that Section
7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from
fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their
number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated
above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the “promotion and/or
stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health.”
8. The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the
assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service.
Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they
Page 47 of 52
choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service

providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to
provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly,
therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono
service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite
to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress
in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest. Consistent with what
the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious
objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and
convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or
otherwise.
9. The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the
power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and
methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and
highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods
fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as
“health products.” Being the country’s premiere and sole agency that ensures
the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped
with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the
principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public
health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes
“service” and “methods.” From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that
Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven
medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted
delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, as follows:
1. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings,
the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time,
to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10. A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment
of health care facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the training of
barangay health workers, it will be the national government that will provide for the
funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the
local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
18.Legaspi v. CSC
Short Version: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
Page 48 of 52
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.
Facts:
• The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern in
a special civil action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil
service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of
Cebu City. The standing of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being
devoid of legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of government employees
for failure of petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the information sought.
Issue:
• Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case at bar.
[WON provision is self-executing]
Held:
• The court held that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus
is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that
he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen
and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee
of adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law
as in regulation in the manner of examining the public records by the government agency in
custody thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern
is not absolute. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting
national security.
• The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of
public interest. All appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit
and fitness while a public office is a public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable
to the people even as to their eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court also
noted that the information on the result of the CSC eligibility examination is released to the
public therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not unusual or unreasonable. The
public, through any citizen, has the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person occupying
government positions.
• These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which
the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations
167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of
information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people
upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature.
(Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and
limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the
declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation
may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become
Page 49 of 52
operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right
may be properly invoked in a Mandamus proceeding such as this one.
19. Espina v. Zamora

Short Version: National Economy and Patrimony; While Section 19, Article II of the 1987
Constitution requires the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the
economic environment.—As the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997), the
provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are
not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in
the courts.
Doctrine:
• The constitutional mandate of an economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Facts:
• On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also
• known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which
• absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762
• now allows them to do so under four categories:
• Members of the House of Representatives filed the present petition, assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:
o First, the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution
which enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control of Filipinos
to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote industrialization and full
employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition and trade
policies.
Page 50 of 52
o Second, the implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade,
which taken together with alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in
the loss of effective Filipino control of the economy.
o Third, foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and
sarisari store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment.
o Fourth, the World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the
passage of R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for the release of certain loans.
o Fifth, there is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or
combinations in restraint of trade.
• Respondents countered that:
o First, petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition.
o Second, the petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.
o Third, petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A.
8762. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing
provisions that are judicially demandable.
o Fourth, the Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign
investments.
Issue:
• 1. Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the
• constitutionality of R.A. 8762; and
• 2. Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.
Held:
• 1. No. There is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization
Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators.
BUT the issue is of transcendental importance.
• 2. No.
Ratio :
• Petitioners invoke Art. II, Sec. 9, 19 and 20, and Art. XII, Sec. 10, 12 and 13.
• As the Court explained in Tañada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987
Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing.
Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
• Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly
of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests
from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all
areas of development.
• The 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services.
The key, as in all economies in the world, is to strike a balance between protecting local
businesses and allowing the entry of foreign investments and services.
• Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to
Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the
national interest requires.
Page 51 of 52
o Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it depending on
the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain
industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.
o In this case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to
foreign investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens. The
NEDA has not opposed such policy.
• The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise
of the police power of the State.
• The Retail Trade Liberalization Act lessens the restraint on the foreigners’ right to property or
to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial
of the Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have the
right to engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in question has permitted the
entry of foreign investors.
• The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that business. Thus –
o First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-
enumerated;
o Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in countries
which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage in retail trade
business; and
o Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain retailing
activities outside their accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores or
carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari
stores and such other similar retailing activities.
Page 52 of 52

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CASE DIGEST IN CONSTI REV.

PREPARED BY: FRANCISCO ARZADON; USE AT OWN RISK [2018]

1. De Leon v Esguerra G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

11. [De Leon go to #1]

1. De Leon v Esguerra G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987

2. Francisco, Jr. vs House of Representatives

• On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by

HOR’s Contention Supreme Court

that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the

• Instant petition is for prohibition of a congressional resolution proposing an amendment to

• Whether or not the issue is justiciable.

4. Gonzales v. COMELEC APRIL 18, 1969 FERNANDO, J.

• Their scope of other legitimate activities is not unduly narrowed.

5. Tolentino vs. COMELEC

6. Javellana vs Executive Secretary

1. It is a justiciable and a non-political question.

2. A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition

7. Planas v. Commission of Elections, et. al.

8. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-446640 OCTOBER 12, 1976

• 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case?

• Issue 1 – Justiciability of the courts

9. Mitra v. COMELEC G.R. No. L-56503, April 4, 1981

• Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is effective.

• Yes. SC either checks or legitimates acts of a coordinate department, challenged in an

• Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.

11. [De Leon go to #1]

13. Estrada v Desierto; March 2, 2001; J. Puno

• WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy. (YES)

• The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.

14. Lambino vs, COMELEC

15. Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System

• Supremacy of the Constitution (Section 10 of Article XII of the Constitution)

• 1. Whether the Constitutional provision stated is self-executing

• 2. Whether Manila Hotel falls under the term national patrimony

16. Oposa v. Factoran

system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their

17. Imbong v. Ochoa

discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions

punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer

choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service

19. Espina v. Zamora

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