The Political Ontology

of Doing
Difference . . . and
Sameness
by Mario Blaser

This article is part of the series The Politics of Ontology

In this intervention I would like to contrast different ways in which some

versions of science and technology studies (STS) and some versions of
anthropology have explored ontological politics. Conversations like the
one staged in this panel, composed to some extent by representatives of
both, have been going on for sometime now so it is a bit unfair to make
a strict distinction of “camps.” However, for the purpose of this
discussion let me play with what I perceive as different initial emphases:
on the one hand, the emphasis of STS on enactment; on the other hand,
the emphasis of anthropology on alterity. The STS’s emphasis on
enactments has rendered for us, ontological multiplicity; a call to dwell
on becomings rather than being; and a form of politics that is
fundamentally concerned with how realities are shaped into a given form
or another. The anthropological emphasis on alterity, in turn, has given
us multiple ontologies (that is, ethnographic descriptions of the many-
fold shapes of the otherwise); an injunction not to explain too much or
try to actualize the possibilities immanent to other’s thought but rather
to sustain them as possibilities; and, as a corollary, a politics that initially
hinges upon the hope of making the otherwise visible so that it becomes
viable as a real alternative.

What happens if we cross-check these emphases? From the perspective

of an emphasis on alterity, STS-inflected notions of ontological
multiplicity and becomings (expressed in terms of emergences, fluidity,
material-semiotic assemblages and so on) seem to leave no way out for
the people described: those are not necessarily the terms with which
they would describe themselves! Conversely, from the perspective of an
emphasis on enactments the anthropological penchant for foregrounding
difference seems to put the cart in front of the horse: difference comes
before an account of how it gets enacted.

In the position paper shared by the organizers I notice an attempt to

bring closer these emphases. The authors do pay attention to
enactment, but in a recursive fashion and to make the point of why
ontologically-oriented anthropological analyses are intrinsically political:
basically because they “figurate” the future through their very
enactment, they “do” difference as such. This figuration of a future
abundant in difference is presented to us as a “good”: this is the political
value of doing ontologically-inflected anthropology.

If I am correct in reading the position paper as advocating a certain

good, then in spite of the authors argument to the contrary,
ontologically-oriented analyses do not offer an alternative to imperatives
about what it should be, they are one such imperative. And I am
informed here by intellectual traditions often labeledIndigenous, which,
in translation of course, will alert us that once you have associated
ontology with enactment, it follows that any kind of analysis or account
carries in its belly a certain imperative about what it should be. Hence,
whether you do difference or sameness, and in more or less explicit
ways, you are already enacting a certain imperative.
Now, if we accept that all kinds of accounts are equivalent as
enactments we come right back to the fundamental political question of
STS inspired analyses: what kinds of worlds are being done through
particular accounts and how do we sort out the good from the bad. As
you may have noticed, if we accept that all accounts are enactments we
also end up in a position that is problematic for the ontologically-inclined
anthropologist: in making accounts equivalent as enactments, we are
doing sameness and leaving no way out for our interlocutors, partners
and circumstantial political foes who would not describe their accounts
as enactments. Here is where the injunctions not to describe too much
or actualize other possibilities try to make their mark... But then, how do
we provide an account that makes a case for the “good” being offered
by ontologically-informed anthropology?

It seems to me that the circularity of the problem has to do with an

impossible demand: that ontologically-informed anthropology should
enact an account devoid of any imperative of what it should be. It seems
to me that, no matter how much we may try to elude it, the implicit
imperatives that come along with our accounts unavoidably interrupt,
redirect, clash and otherwise intermingle with other accounts and their
imperatives. Anthropology is ontologically political inasmuch as its
operation presupposes this many-fold consequential intermingling. Then,
in my view, the challenge lies not so much in devising ways to
indefinitely sustain the possible but contributing to actualize some
possibilities and not others. One of these possibilities (but not the only
one) might precisely be a “worlding” (so to speak) where the possible is
indefinitely sustained.
Contributing to actualize some possibilities and not others entails
refusing a wholesale embrace of either difference or sameness. Granted,
in a context where doing sameness is the dominant modality, doing
difference largely becomes an imperative. However I cannot shed from
my mind what an Yshiro teacher and mentor once told me: not all stories
(or accounts) are to be told or enacted just anywhere; every situation
requires its own story. Telling just any story without attending to what
the situation requires is sheer recklessness. Thus, figuring out where,
when and how to do difference and sameness as the circumstances
require is to me the key challenge of doing political ontology.