ARTICLE 10.

Local Government
Section 2
1. LGUs have certain powers given by the Constitution which may not be curtailed by the national government, but that outside of
these, local governments may not pass ordinances contrary to statute.
2. The SC denied the municipalities around Laguna Lake the power to authorize the construction or dismantling of fish pens etc,
the municipalities were claiming authority on their general powers granted under the Local Govt. Code. LLDA claimed power
based on law. The SC ruled the specific powers of LLDA prevail over the general power of local governments.
3. LGUs don’t have the power to grant franchises to operate a CATV system.
4. The law provides that the budget officer will be appointed by the Department head upon recommendation of the head of the
local government. None however of those recommended by the local government head meets the requirements of law. The
department head can’t just choose any other person, he must return the recommendations and ask for new ones. Phrase “upon
recommendation of the governor” is CONSISTENT with the mandate of Section 2 of local autonomy.
5. When the law is capable of two interpretations, the interpretation favoring local autonomy is FAVORED.
6. COA may not reduce the allowance given to judges by local governments. The Local Government Code allows LGUs to give
allowance to judges and decide how much to give. Reducing what has been decided by the local government interferes with
their local autonomy and thus is prohibited.
7. Under the LGC the Secretary of Justice is granted power to act on cases involving the approval of local tax ordinances and
revenue measures. Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice declared ordinance 7794 as void for failure to follow the
procedure under the law (no notice of public hearing which is required, and it was not translated to Filipino). City of manila filed
a petition saying the law is unconstitutional because it gives the SOJ power of control, which is lodged by the constitution to the
president alone and violates the local autonomy of manila. The SC said that the SOJ in setting aside the law did not make a
new one or replace the judgment of those who made law, it is only supervisory power granted to the SOJ to make sure that
laws are followed
8. Passing an ordinance to entice employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to avail of incentives being offered
therein by wat of “early retirement package” is valid under LGC providing powers expressly and impliedly provided. Such is
consistent with local autonomy and such is a way of reorganization by reasons of economy or redundancy of functions.
Section 4
1. COA committed GAD in disallowing the release of premiums paid for the hospitalization and insurance benefits granted by the
Province of Negros to its officials and employees since that is a form of control not granted to the President or executive
officers. The president’s approval as indicated in AO 103 is only to GOCCs, departments and bureaus NOT the LGUs.
2. LGUs are only subject to GENERAL supervision of the president and NOT CONTROL.
3. Does the President through the DILG or Congress by law have the right to suspend someone despite local autonomy? Yes. The
power of general supervision of the President includes the power to investigate and remove. Also the Constitution (Sec. 3, Art.
10) provides that the LGC may provide for removal showing that it can be subjected to law. Autonomy does not transform local
governments into a kingdom unto themselves. The President has the power of general supervision over them (although not the
power of control).
4. The secretary of the DILG may not annul the election of officers of barangay officials as such would be tantamount to control.
Section 5
1. The power of LG to raise revenue cannot be limited by administrative order since it can only be limited by Congress.
2.
Section 6

1. The unprogrammed funds for LGUs stating that it shall be released only WHEN the original revenue targets can be realized is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Article 6 providing for automatic release of funds.
2. Issuance of memorandum circulars providing that 20% of internal revenue allotments is CONSTITUTIONAL because it merely
reiterates what is provided in LGC. The issuance did not provide for sanctions and DID NOT particularly establish a new set of
facts or omissions.
3. Local autonomy granted to LGUs does not completely sever ties from national government. Such issuance is an exercise of
supervision to find if LGUs faithfully execute laws such as the 2-% directive in LGC.
Section 8
1. The three-term limit of local elective officials under the Constitution (except for barangay officials1) applies when:
a. The local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times.
b. He has fully served three consecutive terms.
2. L was serving his term but it was challenged and he had to abandon office. The SC held he could run for the next election
because he did not serve three full terms.
3. T lost when he ran for a third term. On recall however it was found that he really won so he served the rest of the former
winner’s term. HE can still run in the next election because he had not served three full terms.
4. H served for three full terms. In the first year after the end of his third term, he ran in a recall election. He is still qualified to run
for another term because due to the recall election there was an interruption thus breaking the successiveness.
5. During the third term of the mayor of a municipality the municipality was converted to a city. Could he run as Mayor of the city
in the next election? No since there has been no change in territory nor in constituency.
6. After serving a full three-year term, A was declared to have been invalidly elected. The term should still be elected for purposes
of the tree term limit, it is of no consequence that he was declared not elected since he already served.
7. Preventive suspension of a local elective official does not interrupt his term for purposes of computing the three-term limit.
8. When the fourth consecutive term is contested and COMELEC decided one month before the expiration of the term, such term
will not be counted a FULLY served. Thus the 2007 election is NOT the fifth term but rather the first term.
9. When during the third term (2004) the Punong Barangay abandoned his office to run as councilor, such term is considered a
voluntary renunciation so he still fully served that term according to the constitution. Thus when in 2007 he run again for
Punong barangay he is DISQUALIFIED.
10. NOTE: LGC §43(b) provides that barangay officials are covered by the three-term limit, while §43(c) states that the term of office
of barangay officials shall be 5 years.
11. Preventive suspension shall NOT be considered an interruption for it merely bars the public official from discharging the
functions of the office. Thus 3 term limit still applies.
12. Reapportionment of district resulting for the member of Sanggunian for the first, second and third terms to serve the 2nd district
and for the fourth term to serve the 3rd district composed of the 8 out of 10 towns previously from the 2 nd district, such change
of district does NOT alter the fact that the district which elected Naval is the same one which brought him to office in the
previous terms.
13. The clear wording of section 8 article X expresses the intent to set a limitation on the period within which all elective local
officials can occupy their offices. We have already established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are thus
bound by the 3-term limit. Such holdover provision would run contrary to the 3-term limit. Elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan’s term are not provided for in the consti so allowed to holdover these positions.
Section 10

1. The term “areas affected” include those that are left behind due to the fact that boundaries would be altered etc. Thus need the
votes of those left behind. The fact that the plebiscite was already held doesn’t make it moot and academic since as long as the
province has been created and is existing the constitutionality of its formation may be questioned.
2. Several municipalities sought to be converted into component cities, not all however were acted upon by Congress and thus
there were pending bills left to the next Congress. While these bills were pending however, the Congress passed a new law
which increased the income requirement solely from locally generated sources from 20m to 100m to be qualified to become a
component city. The issue is the application of this law to the pending bills. The SC held that the LGUs were exempt from the
coverage of the new income requirement.
3. Congress during the time of the enactment of the law to increase income was aware of the pending bills and in the deliberations
it was discussed that it would be unfair to allow the law to retroactively apply to the pending bills, the congress however did not
put the language into the law since the deliberations and interpretation would form part of the bill and therefore their intent to
exclude the pending bills was made manifest.
4. Even if we are to disregard the deliberations the SC said that the municipalities had already proven themselves as viable and
capable to become component cities of their respective provinces, they were centers of trade and commerce, points of
convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral and other natural resources and flourishing tourism spots.
5. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt
respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
6. The Supreme Court said that the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province,
enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative
powers, Congress gave validity to that exemption in the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355
creating the Island Province of Dinagat. Therefore, the creation of Dinagat Province is valid.
7. Conversion of Cabanatuan to HUC allows the entire province of Nueva Ecija to participate in the plebiscite because they will be
directly affected in the aspect of economic and political rights since Cabanatuan will be free from the OVERSIGHT powers of the
province.
Section 11
1. MMDA cannot order Bel Air Village to open Jupiter Street to the public because it is not an LGU with police power.
2. MMDA may confiscate and suspend or revoke a driver’s license when a traffic law or regulation has been violated as part of its
mandate to manage transportation and traffic as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs.
Section 12
1. A resident of a component city whose charters prohibit voting in a provincial elective official may not run for a provincial
elective office.
Section 16
1. When DILG did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM but when ARMM Vice-governor took control, such is valid.
2. Governor has no power to declare a state of emergency and exercise the conduct of general search and seizures. He has no
authority to convene the Civilian Emergency Force. Only president is clothed with calling-out powers.

Section 17
1. Since synchronization of elections is NOT just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it. The regional
autonomy granted to ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having to act in accordance with a national policy
mandated by no less than the Constitution.

Section 18-19
1. An ordinary statute cannot amend the organic act that provides for an autonomous region, which under the Constitution can
only be created and changed through a plebiscite called for the purpose.
2. It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual
constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual
constituent unit.
3. When approved by majority it IMMEDIATELY takes effect so an oversight committee to look after the transition is NOT
unconstitutional.
4. A single province CANNOT constitute the CAR.
5. CAR – Apayao, Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga, Mountain Province, Baguio (HUC)
6. Since the CAR is inexistent when the tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Admin made under EO 220 rendered a decision for a
land dispute, such is NOT valid because such court is NON-EXISTENT.
7. ARMM regional assembly has no power to create a province because such would create a legislative district thus against the
SOLE power of congress to create such.
8. Only amendments and revisions to the Organic Act itself need plebiscite but synchronization of elections is NOT one of them.

Province of North Cotabato v. GRP:

The main body of the MOA_AD has four parts:
1. Concepts and principles: The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) which has the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.
a. Bangsamoro people: natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao. And its adjacent islands including Palawan and
Sulu archipelago and their descendants including their spouses.
b. Bangsamoro people therefore not only includes Moros as traditionally understood but ALL INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
OF MINDANAO AND ITS ADJACENT ISLANDS.
2. Territory: The BJE is defined as the geographic area of ARMM and other provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays (Brgys.
In Zamboanga, Palawan, sulu, etc.)
3. Resources: BJE is free to enter into economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option
to establish trade mission in those countries.
a. External defense is to remain with the national government.
b. The national government is to take steps to ensure that the BJE is able to participate in international meetings and
events like the ASEAN and the UN.
c. Governance: The relationship between the RP government and BJE is associative (shared authority and
responsibility). It provides that “provisions requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall take effect
upon signing of the comprehensive compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendment.”
Substantive Issues:
1. The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.
a. International Law Concept of Association: when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable lings.
One state the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other – the principal—while maintaining its
international status as a state (middle ground between integration and independence). It is usually used as a
transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence.
b. The Associative concept in the MOA-AD has many provisions, which are consistent with this international concept
of association.
 i. Capacity to enter trade relations with foreign countries
ii. Participation in meetings and events of ASEAN and UN.
c. The concept of association is NOT recognized under our Constitution.
i. The concept implies powers that go beyond anything granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. Implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution however does
not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State.
2. The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution.
a. BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria laid down in the Montevideo Convention (permanent
population, defined territory, government, capacity to enter into relations with other states) – thus contrary to the
Constitution.
b. Furthermore, the fact that the components of the ARMM already had a plebiscite for the ARMM doesn’t mean
there is no more need for a plebiscite because BJE is a completely different entity that would require another
plebiscite.
3. The MOA-AD would not comply with Article 10, Section 20 of the Constitution:
a. To accept the BJE and MOA-AD would require an amendment to this Article to expand the list in the provision.
b. Under sub-paragraph 9 of Section 20 of Article 10 allows increasing the powers of the region by passage of law.
However the mere passage of law pursuant to this would not suffice since any law that might vest in the BJE
powers found in the MO-AD should also comply with other provisions of the Constitution. Thus, if a law would be
passed for instance to give treaty-making power to the BJEC it would go against our Constitutional system that
provides that the President is the sole organ and authority for external relations.
c. Not only is it inconsistent with the Constitution but also statutory law such as the Organic Act of ARMM and the
IPRA.
i. Under the organic act the term Bangsamoro contrasts with the definition therein where under the act a
distinction between Bangsamoro people and tribes people is made while in the MOA-AD they are
lumped together.
ii. IPRA lays down prevailing procedure of delineating and recognizing ancestral domain, the MOA-AD’s
manner is a clear departure from that procedure. (In IPRA it is more detailed procedure, in MOA-AD it just
states that the land mass, maritime, terrestrial, fluvial, etc embracing the mindano-sulu-palawan
geographic region).