IMMACULADA L. GARCIA, G.R. No.

170735
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
LEGAL AND COLLECTION, SOCIAL Promulgated:
SECURITY SYSTEM,
Respondents. December 17, 2007
x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de Leon, Pacita Fernandez, and
Consuelo Villanueva were directors[3] of Impact Corporation. The corporation was engaged in the
business of manufacturing aluminum tube containers and operated two factories. On 3 July 1985,
the Social Security System (SSS), through its Legal and Collection Division (LCD), filed a case
before the SSC for the collection of unremitted SSS premium contributions withheld by Impact
Corporation from its employees. The case which impleaded Impact Corporation as respondent was
docketed as SSC Case No. 10048. The Social Security Commission ruled in favor of SSS and
declared petitioner liable to pay the unremitted contributions and penalties.

In March 1983, Impact Corporation filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a
Petition for Suspension of Payments,[4] docketed as SEC Case No. 02423, in which it stated that:

[Impact Corporation] has been and still is engaged in the business of manufacturing
aluminum tube containers x x x.

xxxx

In brief, it is an on-going, viable, and profitable enterprise.

On 8 May 1985, the union of Impact Corporation filed a Notice of Strike with the Ministry
of Labor which was followed by a declaration of strike on 28 July 1985. Subsequently, the
Ministry of Labor certified the labor dispute for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in an Order[5] dated 25 August 1985. The Ministry of Labor, in
the same Order, noted the inability of Impact Corporation to pay wages, 13th month pay, and SSS
remittances due to cash liquidity problems. A portion of the order reads:

On the claims of unpaid wages, unpaid 13th month pay and non-remittance of loan
amortization and SSS premiums, we are for directing the company to pay the same
to the workers and to remit loan amortizations and SSS premiums previously
deducted from their wages to the Social Security System. Such claims were never
contested by the company both during the hearing below and in our office. In fact,
such claims were admitted by the company although it alleged cash liquidity as the
main reason for such non-payment.

1
 WHEREFORE, the dispute at Impact Corporation is hereby certified to the
National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration in accordance
with Article 264 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.

xxxx

The company is directed to pay all the entitled workers unpaid wages, unpaid
13th month pay and to remit to the Social Security System loan amortizations and
SSS premiums previously deducted from the wages of the workers.[6]

On 3 July 1985, the Social Security System (SSS), through its Legal and Collection
Division (LCD), filed a case before the SSC for the collection of unremitted SSS premium
contributions withheld by Impact Corporation from its employees. The case which impleaded
Impact Corporation as respondent was docketed as SSC Case No. 10048.[7]

Impact Corporation was compulsorily covered by the SSS as an employer effective 15 July
1963 and was assigned Employer I.D. No. 03-2745100-21.

In answer to the allegations raised in SSC Case No. 10048, Impact Corporation, through
its then Vice President Ricardo de Leon, explained in a letter dated 18 July 1985 that it had been
confronted with strikes in 1984 and layoffs were effected thereafter. It further argued that
the P402,988.93 is erroneous. It explained among other things, that its operations had been
suspended and that it was waiting for the resolution on its Petition for Suspension of Payments by
the SEC under SEC Case No. 2423. Despite due notice, the corporation failed to appear at the
hearings. The SSC ordered the investigating team of the SSS to determine if it can still file its
claim for unpaid premium contributions against the corporation under the Petition for Suspension
of Payments.

In the meantime, the Petition for Suspension of Payments was dismissed which was
pending before the SEC in an Order[8] dated 12 December 1985. Impact Corporation resumed
operations but only for its winding up and dissolution.[9] Due to Impact Corporations liability and
cash flow problems, all of its assets, namely, its machineries, equipment, office furniture and
fixtures, were sold to scrap dealers to answer for its arrears in rentals.

On 1 December 1995, the SSS-LCD filed an amended Petition[10] in SSC Case No. 10048
wherein the directors of Impact Corporation were directly impleaded as respondents, namely:
Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de Leon,[11] Pacita Fernandez, Consuelo Villanueva, and petitioner. The
amounts sought to be collected totaled P453,845.78 and P10,856.85 for the periods August 1980
to December 1984 and August 1981 to July 1984, respectively, and the penalties for late remittance
at the rate of 3% per month from the date the contributions fell due until fully paid pursuant to
Section 22(a) of the Social Security Law,[12] as amended, in the amounts of P49,941.67
and P2,474,662.82.

Summonses were not served upon Eduardo de Leon, Pacita Fernandez, and Consuelo
Villanueva, their whereabouts unknown. They were all later determined to be deceased. On the
other hand, due to failure to file his responsive pleading, Ricardo de Leon was declared in default.

Petitioner filed with the SSC a Motion to Dismiss[13] on grounds of prescription, lack of
cause of action and cessation of business, but the Motion was denied for lack of merit. [14]In her
Answer with Counterclaim[15] dated 20 May 1999, petitioner averred that Impact Corporation had
ceased operations in 1980. In her defense, she insisted that she was a mere director without
managerial functions, and she ceased to be such in 1982. Even as a stockholder and director of
Impact Corporation, petitioner contended that she cannot be made personally liable for the
corporate obligations of Impact Corporation since her liability extended only up to the extent of
her unpaid subscription, of which she had none since her subscription was already fully paid. The
petitioner raised the same arguments in her Position Paper. [16]

On 23 January 1998, Ricardo de Leon died following the death, too, of Pacita Fernandez
died on 7 February 2000. In an Order dated 11 April 2000, the SSC directed the System to check
if Impact Corporation had leviable properties to which the investigating team of respondent SSS
manifested that the Impact Corporation had already been dissolved and its assets disposed of.[17]

2
 In a Resolution dated 28 May 2003, the Social Security Commission ruled in favor of SSS
and declared petitioner liable to pay the unremitted contributions and penalties, stating the
following:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission finds, and so holds, that

respondents Impact Corporation and/or Immaculada L. Garcia, as director and
responsible officer of the said corporation, is liable to pay the SSS the amounts of
P442,988.93, representing the unpaid SS contributions of their employees for the
period August 1980 to December 1984, not inclusive, and P10,856.85, representing
the balance of the unpaid SS contributions in favor of Donato Campos,
Jaime Mascarenas, Bonifacio Franco and Romeo Fullon for the period August
1980 to December 1984, not inclusive, as well as the 3% per month penalty
imposed thereon for late payment in the amounts of P3,194,548.63 and P78,441.33,
respectively, computed as of April 30, 2003. This is without prejudice to the right
of the SSS to collect the penalties accruing after April 30, 2003 and to institute
other appropriate actions against the respondent corporation and/or its responsible
officers.

Should the respondents pay their liability for unpaid SSS contributions within sixty
(60) days from receipt of a copy of this Resolution, the 3% per month penalty for
late payment thereof shall be deemed condoned pursuant to SSC Res. No. 397-S.97,
as amended by SSC Res. Nos. 112-S.98 and 982-S.99, implementing the provision
on condonation of penalty under Section 30 of R.A. No. 8282.

In the event the respondents fail to pay their liabilities within the aforestated period,
let a writ of execution be issued, pursuant to Section 22 (c) [2] of the SS Law, as
amended, for the satisfaction of their liabilities to the SSS.[18]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[19] of the afore-quoted Decision but it was
denied for lack of merit in an Order[20] dated 4 August 2004, thus:

Nowhere in the questioned Resolution dated May 28, 2003 is it stated that the other
directors of the defunct Impact Corporation are absolved from their contribution
and penalty liabilities to the SSS. It is certainly farthest from the intention of the
petitioner SSS or this Commission to pin the entire liability of Impact Corporation
on movant Immaculada L. Garcia, to the exclusion of the directors of the
corporation namely: Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de Leon, Pacita Fernandez
and Conzuelo Villanueva, who were all impleaded as parties-respondents in this
case.

The case record shows that there was failure of service of summonses upon
respondents Eduardo de Leon, Pacita Fernandez and Conzuelo Villanueva, who
are all deceased, for the reason that their whereabouts are unknown. Moreover,
neither the legal heirs nor the estate of the defaulted respondent Ricardo de Leon
were substituted as parties-respondents in this case when he died on January 23,
1998. Needless to state, the Commission did not acquire jurisdiction over the
persons or estates of the other directors of Impact Corporation, hence, it could not
validly render any pronouncement as to their liabilities in this case.

Furthermore, the movant cannot raise in a motion for reconsideration the defense
that she was no longer a director of Impact Corporation in 1982, when she was
allegedly eased out by the managing directors of Impact Corporation as purportedly
shown in the Deed of Sale and Assignment of Shares of Stock dated January 22,
1982. This defense was neither pleaded in her Motion to Dismiss dated January 17,
1996 nor in her Answer with Counterclaim dated May 18, 1999 and is, thus,
deemed waived pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which has suppletory application to the Revised Rules of Procedure of the
Commission.

Finally, this Commission has already ruled in the Order dated April 27, 1999 that
since the original Petition was filed by the SSS on July 3, 1985, and was merely
amended on December 1, 1995 to impleadthe responsible officers of Impact
3
 Corporation, without changing its causes of action, the same was instituted well
within the 20-year prescriptive period provided under Section 22 (b) of the SS Law,
as amended, considering that the contribution delinquency assessment covered the
period August 1980 to December 1984.

In view thereof, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied for lack of
merit.

Petitioner elevated her case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for
Review. Respondent SSS filed its Comment dated 20 January 2005, and petitioner
submitted her Reply thereto on 4 April 2005.

The Court of Appeals, applying Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law, [21] again ruled
against petitioner. It dismissed the petitioners Petition in a Decision dated 2 June 2005,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The assailed Resolution dated 28 May 2003 and the Order dated 4 August 2004 of
the Social Security Commission are AFFIRMED in toto.[22]

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not petitioner, as the only surviving director of Impact Corporation, can be made
solely liable for the corporate obligations of Impact Corporation pertaining to unremitted SSS
premium contributions and penalties therefore.

RULING:

Petitioner in assailing the Court of Appeals Decision, distinguishes the penalties from
the unremitted or unpaid SSS premium contributions. She points out that although the appellate
court is of the opinion that the concerned officers of an employer corporation are liable for
the penalties for non-remittance of premiums, it still affirmed the SSC Resolution holding
petitioner liable for the unpaid SSS premium contributions in addition to the penalties.

Petitioner avers that under the aforesaid provision, the liability does not include liability
for the unremitted SSS premium contributions.

Petitioners argument is ridiculous. The interpretation petitioner would like us to adopt finds
no support in law or in jurisprudence. While the Court of Appeals Decision provided that Section
28(f) refers to the liabilities pertaining to penalty for the non-remittance of SSS employee
contributions, holding that it is distinct from the amount of the supposed SSS remittances,
petitioner mistakenly concluded that Section 28(f) is applicable only to penalties and not to the
liability of the employer for the unremitted premium contributions. Clearly, a simplistic
interpretation of the law is untenable. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.[23] The liability imposed as contemplated under the foregoing Section 28(f) of the
Social Security Law does not preclude the liability for the unremitted amount. Relevant to Section
28(f) is Section 22 of the same law.

SEC. 22. Remittance of Contributions. -- (a) The contributions imposed in the

preceding Section shall be remitted to the SSS within the first ten (10) days of each
calendar month following the month for which they are applicable or within such
time as the Commission may prescribe. Every employer required to deduct and to
remit such contributions shall be liable for their payment and if any contribution is
not paid to the SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution a
penalty thereon of three percent (3%) per month from the date the contribution falls
due until paid. If deemed expedient and advisable by the Commission, the
collection and remittance of contributions shall be made quarterly or semi-annually
in advance, the contributions payable by the employees to be advanced by their
respective employers: Provided, That upon separation of an employee, any
4
 contribution so paid in advance but not due shall be credited or refunded to his
employer.

Under Section 22(a), every employer is required to deduct and remit such
contributions penalty refers to the 3% penalty that automatically attaches to the delayed SSS
premium contributions. The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines construction of a
provision of law. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and
scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the
intendment of the law, must be made.[24] Nowhere in the provision or in the Decision can it be
inferred that the persons liable are absolved from paying the unremitted premium contributions.

Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, it is incumbent upon the judge to apply
them regardless of personal belief or predilections - when the law is unambiguous and unequivocal,
application not interpretation thereof is imperative.[25] However, where the language of a statute is
vague and ambiguous, an interpretation thereof is resorted to. An interpretation thereof is necessary
in instances where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an
injustice. A law is deemed ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in either of two or more senses.[26] The fact that a law admits of different
interpretations is the best evidence that it is vague and ambiguous.[27] In the instant case, petitioner
interprets Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law as applicable only to penalties and not to the
liability of the employer for the unremitted premium contributions. Respondents present a more
logical interpretation that is consistent with the provisions as a whole and with the legislative intent
behind the Social Security Law.

This Court cannot be made to accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the
law and its legislators.[28]

Petitioner also challenges the finding of the Court of Appeals that under Section 28(f) of
the Social Security Law, a mere director or officer of an employer corporation, and not necessarily
a managing director or officer, can be held liable for the unpaid SSS premium contributions.

Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law provides the following:

(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association,

partnership, corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors or
partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this Act for the offense.

This Court agrees in petitioners observation that the SSS did not even deny nor rebut the claim
that petitioner was not the managing head of Impact Corporation. However, the Court of Appeals
rightly held that petitioner, as a director of Impact Corporation, is among those officers covered
by Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law.

Petitioner invokes the rule in statutory construction called ejusdem generic; that is, where
general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned. According to petitioner, to be held liable under Section 28(f) of the Social Security
Law, one must be the managing head, managing director, or managing partner. This Court though
finds no need to resort to statutory construction. Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law imposes
penalty on:

(1) the managing head;

(2) directors; or

(3) partners, for offenses committed by a juridical person

The said provision does not qualify that the director or partner should likewise be a managing
director or managing partner.[29] The law is clear and unambiguous.

5
 Petitioner nonetheless raises the defense that under Section 31 of the Corporation Code,
only directors, trustees or officers who participate in unlawful acts or are guilty of gross negligence
and bad faith shall be personally liable, and that being a mere stockholder, she is liable only to the
extent of her subscription.

Section 31 of the Corporation Code, stipulating on the liability of directors, trustees, or

officers, provides:

SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. - Directors or trustees who

willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs
of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their
duty as such directors, or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all
damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or
members and other persons.

Basic is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct
from that of the persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may
be related. A corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from those
acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from the people comprising it. Following this, the
general rule applied is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors,
officers and employees, are its sole liabilities.[30] A director, officer, and employee of a corporation
are generally not held personally liable for obligations incurred by the corporation.

Being a mere fiction of law, however, there are peculiar situations or valid grounds that
can exist to warrant the disregard of its independent being and the lifting of the corporate veil. This
situation might arise when a corporation is used to evade a just and due obligation or to justify a
wrong, to shield or perpetrate fraud, to carry out other similar unjustifiable aims or intentions, or
as a subterfuge to commit injustice and so circumvent the law.[31] Thus, Section 31 of the
Corporation Law provides:

Taking a cue from the above provision, a corporate director, a trustee or an officer, may be
held solidarily liable with the corporation in the following instances:

1. When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases, the officers of

a corporation--
(a) vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation;
(b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the corporate
affairs;
(c) are guilty of conflict of interest to the prejudice of the corporation, its
stockholders or members, and other persons.

2. When a director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered stocks or

who, having knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file with the corporate secretary
his written objection thereto.

3. When a director, trustee or officer has contractually agreed or stipulated to hold

himself personally and solidarily liable with the Corporation.

4. When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law,

personally liable for his corporate action. [32]

The aforesaid provision states:

SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. - Directors or trustees who

willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs
of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their
duty as such directors, or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all
damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or
members and other persons.

6
 The situation of petitioner, as a director of Impact Corporation when said corporation failed
to remit the SSS premium contributions falls exactly under the fourth situation. Section 28(f) of
the Social Security Law imposes a civil liability for any act or omission pertaining to the violation
of the Social Security Law, to wit:

(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association,

partnership, corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors or
partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this Act for the offense.

In fact, criminal actions for violations of the Social Security Law are also provided under
the Revised Penal Code. The Social Security Law provides, in Section 28 thereof, to wit:

(h) Any employer who, after deducting the monthly contributions or loan
amortizations from his employees compensation, fails to remit the said deductions
to the SSS within thirty (30) days from the date they became due shall be presumed
to have misappropriated such contributions or loan amortizations and shall suffer
the penalties provided in Article Three hundred fifteen of the Revised Penal Code.

(i) Criminal action arising from a violation of the provisions of this Act may be
commenced by the SSS or the employee concerned either under this Act or in
appropriate cases under the Revised Penal Code: x x x.
Respondents would like this Court to apply another exception to the rule that the persons
comprising a corporation are not personally liable for acts done in the performance of their duties.
The Court of Appeals in the appealed Decision stated:

Anent the unpaid SSS contributions of Impact Corporations employees, the officers
of a corporation are liable in behalf of a corporation, which no longer exists or has
ceased operations. Although as a rule, the officers and members of a corporation
are not personally liable for acts done in performance of their duties, this rule admits
of exception, one of which is when the employer corporation is no longer existing
and is unable to satisfy the judgment in favor of the employee, the officers should
be held liable for acting on behalf of the corporation. Following the foregoing
pronouncement, petitioner, as one of the directors of Impact Corporation, together
with the other directors of the defunct corporation, are liable for the unpaid SSS
contributions of their employees.[33]

On the other hand, the SSC, in its Resolution, presented this discussion:

Although as a rule, the officers and members of a corporation are not personally
liable for acts done in the performance of their duties, this rule admits of exceptions,
one of which is when the employer corporation is no longer existing and is unable
to satisfy the judgment in favor of the employee, the officers should be held liable
for acting on behalf of the corporation. x x x.[34]

The rationale cited by respondents in the two preceding paragraphs need not have been
applied because the personal liability for the unremitted SSS premium contributions and the late
penalty thereof attaches to the petitioner as a director of Impact Corporation during the period the
amounts became due and demandable by virtue of a direct provision of law.
Petitioners defense that since Impact Corporation suffered irreversible economic losses,
and by reason of fortuitous events, she should be absolved from liability, is also untenable. The
evidence adduced totally belies this claim. A reference to the copy of the Petition for Suspension
of Payments filed by Impact Corporation on 18 March 1983 before the SEC contained an
admission that:

[I]t has been and still is engaged in business and has been and still is engaged in the
business of manufacturing aluminum tube containers and in brief, it is an on-going,
viable, and profitable enterprise which has sufficient assets and actual and potential
income-generation capabilities.

7
 The foregoing document negates petitioners assertion and supports the contention that
during the period involved Impact Corporation was still engaged in business and was an ongoing,
viable, profitable enterprise. In fact, the latest SSS form RIA submitted by Impact Corporation is
dated 7 May 1984. The assessed SSS premium contributions and penalty are obligations imposed
upon Impact Corporation by law, and should have been remitted to the SSS within the first 10 days
of each calendar month following the month for which they are applicable or within such time as
the SSC prescribes.[35]

This Court also notes the evident failure on the part of SSS to issue a judgment in default
against Ricardo de Leon, who was the vice-president and officer of the corporation, upon his non-
filing of a responsive pleading after summons was served on him. As can be gleaned from Section
11 of the SSS Revised Rules of Procedure, the Commissioner is mandated to render a decision
either granting or denying the petition. Under the aforesaid provision, if respondent fails to answer
within the time prescribed, the Hearing Commissioner may, upon motion of petitioner,
or motu proprio, declare respondent in default and proceed to receive petitioners
evidence ex parte and thereafter recommend to the Commission either the granting or denial of the
petition as the evidence may warrant.[36]

On a final note, this Court sees it proper to quote verbatim respondents prefatory statement
in their Comment:

The Social Security System is a government agency imbued with a salutary purpose
to carry out the policy of the State to establish, develop, promote and perfect a
sound and viable tax exempt social security system suitable to the needs of the
people throughout the Philippines which shall promote social justice and provide
meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazards of
disability, sickness, maternity, old-age, death and other contingencies resulting in
loss of income or financial burden.

The soundness and viability of the funds of the SSS in turn depends on the
contributions of its covered employee and employer members, which it invests in
order to deliver the basic social benefits and privileges to its members. The
entitlement to and amount of benefits and privileges of the covered members are
contribution-based. Both the soundness and viability of the funds of the SSS as well
as the entitlement and amount of benefits and privileges of its members are
adversely affected to a great extent by the non-remittance of the much-needed
contributions.[37]

The sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries. This Court will not turn a
blind eye on the perpetration of injustice. This Court cannot and will not allow itself to be made
an instrument nor be privy to any attempt at the perpetration of injustice.

FOOTNOTES:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with Associate Justices Eliezer R. De Los Santos and Arturo
D. Brion, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-43.
[2]
Id. at 44.
[3]
General Information Sheet of Impact Corporation Corporation, as of 31 December 1974.
[4]
Records, pp. 265-283.
[5]
Id. at 390-393.
[6]
Id. at 392.
[7]
Id. at 1-3.
[8]
Id. at 395-400.
[9]
Id. at 192-196.
[10]
Id. at 223-233.
[11]
Summons were served on Ricardo de Leon; See records, p. 259.
[12]
SEC. 22. Remittance of Contributions. -- (a) The contribution imposed in the preceding Section shall be remitted
to the SSS within the first ten (10) days of each calendar month following the month for which they are applicable or
within such time as the Commission may prescribe. Every employer required to deduct and to remit such contributions
shall be liable for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides
the contribution a penalty thereon of three percent (3%) per month from the date the contribution falls due until paid. If
deemed expedient and advisable by the Commission, the collection and remittance of contributions shall be made
quarterly or semi-annually in advance, the contributions payable by the employees to be advanced by their respective
employers: Provided, That upon separation of an employee, any contribution so paid in advance but not due shall be
credited or refunded to his employer.

8
[13]
Dated 17 January 1996.
[14]
Order issued by the SSC on 27 April 1999; records, pp. 320-325
[15]
Records, pp. 336-345.
[16]
Id. at 493-501.
[17]
Order dated 11 April 2000.
[18]
Rollo, pp. 66-67.
[19]
Dated 16 June 2003.
[20]
Adopted/promulgated by the SSC en banc under its Resolution No. 474 on 4 August 2004; Penned by
Commissioner Aurora R. Arnaez; rollo, pp. 68-69.
[21]
SEC. 28. Penal Clause. x x x.
(e) Whoever fails or refuses to comply with the provisions promulgated by the Commission, shall be punished by a
fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), or
imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) day nor more than twelve (12) years, or both, at the discretion
of the court: Provided, That where the violation consists in failure or refusal to register employees or himself, in case
of the covered self-employed or to deduct contributions from employees compensation and remit the same to the SSS,
the penalty shall be a fine of not less Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) and imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) day nor more than twelve (12) years.
(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association, partnership, corporation or any other
institution, its managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this Act for the offense.
[22]
Rollo, pp. 41-42; citations omitted.
[23]
Paras v. COMELEC, 332 Phil. 56, 64 (1996).
[24]
Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 40, 44 (1997).
[25]
De Guzman, Jr. v. Sison, 407 Phil. 351, 368-369 (2001), as cited in Villamor Golf Club v. Pehid, G.R. No. 166152,
4 December 2005, 472 SCRA 36, 47-48.
[26]
Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 400 Phil. 307, 357 (2000).
[27]
Villamor Golf Club v. Pehid, supra note 25; Abello v. Commissioneer of Internal Revenue, 23 February 2005, 452
SCRA 162, 169; Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, G.R. No. L-44717, 28 August 1985, 138
SCRA 273, 281.
[28]
Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., 114 Phil. 225 (1962).
[29]
Decision, page 8.
[30]
Uichico v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 242, 252 (1997), citing Santos v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 325 Phil. 145, 158 (1996).
[31]
Santos v. National Labor Relations Commission, id.
[32]
Philex Gold Philippines, Inc. v. Philex Bulawan Supervisors Union, G.R. No. 149758, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA
111, 124.
[33]
Rollo, p. 39.
[34]
Id. at 66.
[35]
The contributions imposed in the preceding section shall be remitted to the SSS within the first ten (10) days of
each calendar month following the month for which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may
prescribe... (Section 22, R. A. No. 8282 SSS Law).
[36]
Section 11, SSS Rules of Procedure.
[37]
Rollo, pp. 51-52.
[38]
107 Phil. 833 (1960).

9
 ROMARICO J. MENDOZA, G.R. No. 183891
Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

- versus - Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,* and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 3, 2010

FACTS:

For failure to remit the Social Security System (SSS) premium contributions of employees of the
Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc. (SATII) of which he was president, Romarico J. Mendoza
(petitioner) was convicted of violation of Section 22(a) and (d) vis--vis Section 28 of R.A. No.
8282 or the Social Security Act of 1997 by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 4.

he Information against petitioner[2] reads:

xxxx

That sometime during the month of August 1998 to July 1999, in the City
of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then the proprietor of Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc., duly
registered employer with the Social Security System (SSS), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and/or refuse to remit the SSS premium
contributions in favor of its employees amounting to P421, 151.09 to the prejudice
of his employees.

Contrary to and in violation of Sec. 22(a) and (d) in relation to Sec. 28 of

Republic Act No. 8282, as amended (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The monthly premium contributions of SATII employees to SSS which petitioner

admittedly failed to remit covered the period August 1998 to July 1999[3] amounting
to P421,151.09 inclusive of penalties.[4]

After petitioner was advised by the SSS to pay the above-said amount, he proposed to settle
it over a period of 18 months[5] which proposal the SSS approved by Memorandum of September
12, 2000.[6] Despite the grant of petitioners request for several extensions of time to settle the
delinquency in installments,[7] petitioner failed, hence, his indictment.

Petitioner sought to exculpate himself by explaining that during the questioned period,
SATII shut down due to the general decline in the economy.[8]

RULING:

A. RTC

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, as reflected above, convicted petitioner, disposing
as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Romarico J. Mendoza, guilty
as charged beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, he is hereby meted the penalty of 6 years
and 1 day to 8 years.

The accused is further ordered to pay the Social Security System the unpaid premium
contributions of his employees including the penalties in the sum of P421, 151.09.
SO ORDERED. [9] (emphasis supplied)

10
 B. CA

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, by Decision of July March 5, 2007,[10] it
noting that the Social Security Act is a special law, hence, lack of criminal intent or good faith is
not a defense in the commission of the proscribed act.

The appellate court brushed aside petitioners claim that he is merely a conduit of SATII
and, therefore, should not be held personally liable for its liabilities. It held that petitioner, as
President, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of SATII, is the managing head who is liable for
the act or omission penalized under Section 28(f) of the Social Security Act.

ISSUE/ARGUMENT:

Petitioner contended in his motion for reconsideration that Section 28(f) of the Act which
reads:

(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association,

partnership, corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors or
partners shall be liable for the penalties provided in this Act for the offense.

should be interpreted as follows:

If an association, the one liable is the managing head; if a partnership, the
ones liable are the partners; and if a corporation, the ones liable are the
directors. (underscoring supplied)

The appellate court denied petitioners motion, hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari.

Petitioner maintains, inter alia, that the managing head or president or general manager of
a corporation is not among those specifically mentioned as liable in the above-quoted Section
28(f). And he calls attention to an alleged congenital infirmity in the Information[11] in that he was
charged as proprietor and not as director of SATII.

Further, petitioner claims that the lower courts erred in penalizing him with six years and
one day to eight years of imprisonment considering the mitigating and alternative circumstances
present, namely: his being merely vicariously liable; his good faith in failing to remit the
contributions; his payment of the premium contributions of SATII out of his personal funds; and
his being economically useful, given his academic credentials, he having graduated from a prime
university in Manila and being a reputable businessman.

SC RULING:

The petition lacks merit.

Remittance of contribution to the SSS under Section 22(a) of the Social Security Act is
mandatory. United Christian Missionary Society v. Social Security Commission[12] explicitly
explains:

No discretion or alternative is granted respondent Commission in the enforcement

of the laws mandate that the employer who fails to comply with his legal
obligation to remit the premiums to the System within the prescribed period
shall pay a penalty of three 3% per month. The prescribed penalty is evidently
of a punitive character, provided by the legislature to assure that employers
do not take lightly the States exercise of the police power in the implementation
of the Republics declared policy to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social
security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the
Philippines and (to) provide protection to employers against the hazards of
disability, sickness, old age and death.[Section 2, Social Security Act; Roman
Catholic Archbishop v. Social Security Commission, 1 SCRA 10, January 20,
11
 1961] In this concept, good faith or bad faith is rendered irrelevant, since the
law makes no distinction between an employer who professes good reasons for
delaying the remittance of premiums and another who deliberately disregards the
legal duty imposed upon him to make such remittance. From the moment the
remittance of premiums due is delayed, the penalty immediately attaches to
the delayed premium payments by force of law. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Failure to comply with the law being malum prohibitum, intent to commit it or good faith
is immaterial.[13]

The provision of the law being clear and unambiguous, petitioners interpretation that a
proprietor, as he was designated in the Information, is not among those specifically mentioned
under Sec. 28(f) as liable, does not lie. For the word connotes management, control and power
over a business entity.[14] There is thus, as Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and
Collection enjoins,[15]

. . . no need to resort to statutory construction [for] Section 28(f) of the Social

Security Law imposes penalty on:

(1) the managing head;

(2) directors; or

(3) partners, for offenses committed by a juridical person. (emphasis supplied)

The term managing head in Section 28(f) is used, in its broadest connotation, not to any specific
organizational or managerial nomenclature. To heed petitioners reasoning would allow
unscrupulous businessmen to conveniently escape liability by the creative adoption of managerial
titles.

While the Court affirms the appellate courts decision, there is a need to modify the penalty imposed
on petitioner. The appellate court affirmed the trial courts imposition of penalty on the basis of
Sec. 28(e) of the Social Security Act which reads:

Sec. 28. Penal Clause. ─ (e) Whoever fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of this
Act or with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission, shall be
punished by a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,0000.00) nor more than
Twenty thousand pesos (P5,000.00) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00), or imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) day nor
more than twelve (12) years or both, at the discretion of the court. x x x

The proper penalty for this specific offense committed by petitioner is, however, provided
in Section 28 (h) of the same Act which reads:

Sec. 28. Penal Clause (h) Any employer who after deducting the monthly
contributions or loan amortizations from his employees compensation, fails to
remit the said deductions to the SSS within thirty (30) days from the date they
became due shall be presumed to have misappropriated such contributions or loan
amortizations and shall suffer the penalties provided in Article Three hundred
fifteen [Art. 315] of the Revised Penal Code. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty in this case should be

x x x prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its

minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
12
 year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayoror reclusion temporal, as the case
may be;
x x x x.

Since the above-quoted Sec. 28 (h) of the Social Security Act (a special law) adopted the
penalty from the Revised Penal Code, the Indeterminate Sentence Law also finds application.[16]

FOOTNOTES:

Designated as Additional Member, per Special Order No. 843 (May 17, 2010), in view of the
vacancy occasioned by the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 87-93.
[2]
Id. at 3.
[3]
Id. at 11.
[4]
Id. at 3.
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
TSN, September 26, 2002, p. 13.
[7]
Id. at 24-26.
[8]
TSN, January 7, 2003, p. 3.
[9]
Rollo, p. 93.
[10]
Penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr. with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja
and Michael P. Elbinias concurring; id. at 49-64.
[11]
Id. at 69.
[12]
G.R. No. L-26712-16, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 982, 987-988.
[13]
Tan v. Ballena, G.R. No. 168111, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 229, 255.
[14]
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY defines a proprietor as [o]ne who has the legal right or
exclusive title to anything. In many instances, it is synonymous with owner.
[15]
G.R. No. 170735, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 456, 458.
[16]
Vide: People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555.
[17]
G.R. Nos. 118950-54, 335 Phil. 242 (1997). In this case, the Court, thru Associate Justice Jose
Vitug, ruled that The fact the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00
should not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead,
the matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition
of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law
accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the
penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be
prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and
two (2) months whole the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should at least be
six (6) years and one (1) day because the amounts involved exceeded P22,000.00, plus an
additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00.

13
 ROMARICO J. MENDOZA, G.R. No. 183891
Petitioner, Present:

BRION, J.,
Chairperson,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD, and
- versus - VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

October 19, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

R E SO L U T I O N
BRION, J.:

We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Romarico J. Mendoza seeking the
reversal of our Decision dated August 3, 2010. The Decision affirmed the petitioners conviction
for his failure to remit the Social Security Service (SSS) contributions of his employees. The
petitioner anchors the present motion on his supposed inclusion within the coverage of Republic
Act (RA) No. 9903 or the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009, whose passage the petitioner
claims to be a supervening event in his case. He further invokes the equal protection clause in
support of his motion.

In our Decision dated August 3, 2010, we AFFIRMED, with modification, the decree of
conviction issued by both the trial and appellate courts for the petitioners violation of Section 22(a)
and (d), in relation to Section 28 of RA No. 8282 or the Social Security Act of 1997. To recall its
highlights, our Decision emphasized that the petitioner readily admitted during trial that he did not
remit the SSS premium contributions of his employees at Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc. from
August 1998 to July 1999, in the amount of P239,756.80; inclusive of penalties, this unremitted
amount totaled to P421,151.09. The petitioners explanation for his failure to remit, which the trial
court disbelieved, was that during this period, Summa Alta Tierra Industries, Inc. shut down as a
result of the general decline in the economy. The petitioner pleaded good faith and lack of criminal
intent as his defenses.

We ruled that the decree of conviction was founded on proof beyond reasonable
doubt, based on the following considerations: first, the remittance of employee contributions to the
SSS is mandatory under RA No. 8282; and second, the failure to comply with a special
law being malum prohibitum, the defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent are immaterial.

The petitioner further argued that since he was designated in the Information as a
proprietor, he was without criminal liability since proprietors are not among the corporate
officers specifically enumerated in Section 28(f) of RA No. 8282 to be criminally liable for the
violation of its provisions. We rejected this argument based on our ruling in Garcia v. Social
Security Commission Legal and Collection.[1] We ruled that to sustain the petitioners argument
would be to allow the unscrupulous to conveniently escape liability merely through the creative
use of managerial titles.

After taking into account the Indeterminate Penalty Law and Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, we MODIFIED the penalty originally imposed by the trial court[2] and, instead,
decreed the penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioner points out that pending his appeal
with the Court of Appeals (CA), he voluntarily paid the SSS the amount of P239,756.80 to settle
14
his delinquency.[3] Note that the petitioner also gave notice of this payment to the CA via a Motion
for Reconsideration and a Motion for New Trial. Although the People did not contest the fact of
voluntary payment, the CA nevertheless denied the said motions.

The present motion for reconsideration rests on the following points:

First. On January 7, 2010, during the pendency of the petitioners case before the Court,
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed RA No. 9903 into law. RA No. 9903 mandates
the effective withdrawal of all pending cases against employers who would remit their delinquent
contributions to the SSS within a specified period, viz., within six months after the laws
effectivity.[4] The petitioner claims that in view of RA No. 9903 and its implementing rules, the
settlement of his delinquent contributions in 2007 entitles him to an acquittal. He invokes the equal
protection clause in support of his plea.

Second. The petitioner alternatively prays that should the Court find his above argument wanting,
he should still be acquitted since the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime
charged.
Third. The petitioner prays that a fine be imposed, not imprisonment, should he be found
guilty.

The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation In Lieu of Comment and claims that the passage
of RA No. 9903 constituted a supervening event in the petitioners case that supports the
petitioners acquittal [a]fter a conscientious review of the case.[5]

THE COURTS RULING

The petitioners arguments supporting his prayer for acquittal fail to convince us. However, we find
basis to allow waiver of the petitioners liability for accrued penalties.

The petitioners liability for the crime is a settled matter

Upfront, we reject the petitioners claim that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the
crime charged. This is a matter that has been resolved in our Decision, and the petitioner did not
raise anything substantial to merit the reversal of our finding of guilt. To reiterate, the petitioners
conviction was based on his admission that he failed to remit his employees contribution to the
SSS.

The petitioner cannot benefit from the terms of RA

No. 9903, which condone only employers who pay
their delinquencies within six months from the laws
effectivity

We note that the petitioner does not ask for the reversal of his conviction based on the
authority of RA No. 9903; he avoids making a straightforward claim because this law plainly does
not apply to him or to others in the same situation. The clear intent of the law is to grant
condonation only to employers with delinquent contributions or pending cases for their
delinquencies and who pay their delinquencies within the six (6)-month period set by the
law. Mere payment of unpaid contributions does not suffice; it is payment within, and only within,
the six (6)-month availment period that triggers the applicability of RA No. 9903.

True, the petitioners case was pending with us when RA No. 9903 was passed.
Unfortunately for him, he paid his delinquent SSS contributions in 2007. By paying outside of the
availment period, the petitioner effectively placed himself outside the benevolent sphere of RA
No. 9903. This is how the law is written: it condones employers and only those employers with
unpaid SSS contributions or with pending cases who pay within the six (6)-month period following
the laws date of effectivity. Dura lex, sed lex.

The petitioners awareness that RA No. 9903 operates as discussed above is apparent in his plea
for equal protection. In his motion, he states that

[he] is entitled under the equal protection clause to the dismissal of the case against him
since he had already paid the subject delinquent contributions due to the SSS which
accepted the payment as borne by the official receipt it issued (please see Annex A).
15
 The equal protection clause requires that similar subjects, [sic] should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The petitioner is no more no less in the same situation as the employer who would
enjoy freedom from criminal prosecution upon payment in full of the delinquent
contributions due and payable to the SSS within six months from the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 9903.[6]

The Court cannot amplify the scope of RA No. 9903 on the ground of equal protection,
and acquit the petitioner and other delinquent employers like him; it would in essence be an
amendment of RA No. 9903, an act of judicial legislation abjured by the trias politica principle.[7]

RA No. 9903 creates two classifications of employers delinquent in remitting the SSS
contributions of their employees: (1) those delinquent employers who pay within the six (6)-month
period (the former group), and (2) those delinquent employers who pay outside of this availment
period (the latter group). The creation of these two classes is obvious and unavoidable when
Section 2 and the last proviso of Section 4[8] of the law are read together. The same provisions
show the laws intent to limit the benefit of condonation to the former group only; had RA No.
9903 likewise intended to benefit the latter group, which includes the petitioner, it would have
expressly declared so. Laws granting condonation constitute an act of benevolence on the
governments part, similar to tax amnesty laws; their terms are strictly construed against the
applicants. Since the law itself excludes the class of employers to which the petitioner belongs, no
ground exists to justify his acquittal. An implementing rule or regulation must conform to and be
consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute; it cannot amend the law either by abridging
or expanding its scope.[9]

For the same reason, we cannot grant the petitioners prayer to impose a fine in lieu of
imprisonment; neither RA No. 8282 nor RA No. 9903 authorizes the Court to exercise this option.

On the matter of equal protection, we stated in Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, et

[10]
al. that the guarantee simply means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in
like circumstances. In People v. Cayat,[11] we further summarized the jurisprudence on equal
protection in this wise:

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal

protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class.
The difference in the dates of payment of delinquent contributions provides a substantial
distinction between the two classes of employers. In limiting the benefits of RA No. 9903 to
delinquent employers who pay within the six (6)-month period, the legislature refused to allow a
sweeping, non-discriminatory condonation to all delinquent employers, lest the policy behind RA
No. 8282 be undermined.

The petitioner is entitled to a waiver of his accrued

penalties

Despite our discussion above, the petitioners move to have our Decision reconsidered is
not entirely futile. The one benefit the petitioner can obtain from RA No. 9903 is the waiver of his
accrued penalties, which remain unpaid in the amount of P181,394.29. This waiver is derived from
the last proviso of Section 4 of RA No. 9903:

Provided, further, That for reason of equity, employers who settled arrears in
contributions before the effectivity of this Act shall likewise have their accrued
penalties waived.

This proviso is applicable to the petitioner who settled his contributions long before the passage
of the law. Applied to the petitioner, therefore, RA No. 9903 only works to allow a waiverof his
accrued penalties, but not the reversal of his conviction.

16
Referral to the Chief Executive for possible exercise of
executive clemency

We realize that with the affirmation of the petitioners conviction for violation of RA No. 8282, he
stands to suffer imprisonment for four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, notwithstanding the payment
of his delinquent contribution.

Under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code,[12] the courts are bound to apply the law as it is and
impose the proper penalty, no matter how harsh it might be. The same provision, however, gives
the Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but are beyond
its power when it considers the penalty imposed as excessive. Although the petitioner was
convicted under a special penal law, the Court is not precluded from giving the Revised Penal
Code suppletory application in light of Article 10[13] of the same Code and our ruling in People v.
Simon.[14]
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS petitioner Romarico J. Mendozas
motion for reconsideration. The Court AFFIRMS the petitioners conviction for violation of
Section 22(a) and (d), in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8282, and the petitioner is thus
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In light of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9903, the petitioners liability for accrued penalties is
considered WAIVED. Considering the circumstances of the case, the Court transmits the case to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, and RECOMMENDS the grant of
executive clemency to the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES:
[1]
G.R. No. 170735, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 456.
[2]
The penalty originally imposed was six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of imprisonment.
[3]
SSS Special Bank Receipt No. 918224 is attached to the present motion as Annex A; rollo, p. 278.
[4]
Section 2. Condonation of Penalty. - Any employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all contributions due and
payable to the Social Security System (SSS), including those with pending cases either before the Social Security
Commission, courts or Office of the Prosecutor involving collection of contributions and/or penalties, may within six
(6) months from the effectivity of this Act: (a) remit said contributions; or (b) submit a proposal to pay the same in
installments, subject to the implementing rules and regulations which the Social Security Commission may prescribe:
Provided, That the delinquent employer submits the corresponding collection lists together with the remittance or
proposal to pay installments: Provided, further, That upon approval and payment in full or in installments of
contributions due and payable to the SSS, all such pending cases filed against the employer shall be withdrawn without
prejudice to the refiling of the case in the event the employer fails to remit in full the required delinquent contributions
or defaults in the payment of any installment under the approved proposal.
[5]
Rollo, p. 355.
[6]
Citing Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 70, id. at 563-
564.
[7]
Refers to the principle of separation of powers among the three branches of the government.
[8]
Section 4. Effectivity of Condonation. - The penalty provided under Section 22(a) of Republic Act No. 8282 shall
be condoned by virtue of this Act when and until all the delinquent contributions are remitted by the employer to the
SSS: Provided, That, in case the employer fails to remit in full the required delinquent contributions, or defaults in the
payment of any installment under the approved proposal, within the availment period provided in this Act, the penalties
are deemed reimposed from the time the contributions first become due, to accrue until the delinquent account is paid
in full: Provided, further, That for reason of equity, employers who settled arrears in contributions before the
effectivity of this Act shall likewise have their accrued penalties waived. [italics ours]
[9]
Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 110, 121-122.
[10]
90 Phil. 83, 90 (1951).
[11]
68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939).
[12]
Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the
law, and in cases of excessive penalties. Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the
subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as
may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions
of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense.
[13]
Article 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
[14]
G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555, 574, which states: The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal
Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical
impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.
Since neither RA No. 8282 nor RA No. 9903 prohibits the application of the Revised Penal Code, the provisions of
the Code may be applied suppletorily.

17