Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13250 October 29, 1971
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, respondent..
Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and
Special Attorney Jose G. Azurin, (O.S.G.) for petitioner.
Ramirez and Ortigas for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The basic issue posed by petitioner Collector of Internal
Revenue in this appeal from a decision of the Court of
Tax Appeals as to whether or not the requisites of
statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be
necessary for the acquisition of an international
personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to
fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code 1 is now ripe for adjudication.
The Court of Tax Appeals answered the question in the
negative, and thus reversed the action taken by petitioner
Collector, who would hold respondent Antonio Campos
Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella
Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the sum of
P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes
for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the
Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having
been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the
time of her death in 1955. In an earlier resolution
promulgated May 30, 1962, this Court on the assumption
that the need for resolving the principal question would
be obviated, referred the matter back to the Court of Tax
Appeals to determine whether the alleged law of Tangier
did grant the reciprocal tax exemption required by the
aforesaid Section 122. Then came an order from the
Court of Tax Appeals submitting copies of legislation of
Tangier that would manifest that the element of
reciprocity was not lacking. It was not until July 29,
1969 that the case was deemed submitted for decision.
When the petition for review was filed on January 2,
1958, the basic issue raised was impressed with an
element of novelty. Four days thereafter, however, on
January 6, 1958, it was held by this Court that the
aforesaid provision does not require that the "foreign
country" possess an international personality to come
within its terms. 2 Accordingly, we have to affirm.
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, now under
review, sets forth the background facts as follows: "This
is an appeal interposed by petitioner Antonio Campos
Rueda as administrator of the estate of the deceased
Doña Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira,
from the decision of the respondent Collector of Internal
Revenue, assessing against and demanding from the
former the sum P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and
inheritance taxes, including interest and penalties, on the
transfer of intangible personal properties situated in the
Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella
Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. Maria de la Estrella Soriano
Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria Cerdeira for short) is a Spanish
national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen
and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to
her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise
she left, among others, intangible personal properties in
the Philippines." 3 Then came this portion: "On
September 29, 1955, petitioner filed a provisional estate
and inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late
Maria Cerdeira. On the same date, respondent, pending
investigation, issued an assessment for state and
inheritance taxes in the respective amounts of
P111,592.48 and P157,791.48, or a total of P369,383.96
which tax liabilities were paid by petitioner ... . On
November 17, 1955, an amended return was filed ...
wherein intangible personal properties with the value of
P396,308.90 were claimed as exempted from taxes. On
November 23, 1955, respondent, pending investigation,
issued another assessment for estate and inheritance
taxes in the amounts of P202,262.40 and P267,402.84,
respectively, or a total of P469,665.24 ... . In a letter
dated January 11, 1956, respondent denied the request
for exemption on the ground that the law of Tangier is
not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Hence, respondent demanded the
payment of the sums of P239,439.49 representing
deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including ad
valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise
penalties ... . In a letter dated February 8, 1956, and
received by respondent on the following day, petitioner
requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying
the claim for tax exemption of the intangible personal
properties and the imposition of the 25% and 5% ad
valorem penalties ... . However, respondent denied
request, in his letter dated May 5, 1956 ... and received
by petitioner on May 21, 1956. Respondent premised the
denial on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with
Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a
foreign country. Consequently, respondent demanded
the payment of the sums of P73,851.21 and P88,023.74
respectively, or a total of P161,874.95 as deficiency
estate and inheritance taxes including surcharges,
interests and compromise penalties." 4
The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax
Appeals. As there was no dispute between the parties
regarding the values of the properties and the
mathematical correctness of the deficiency assessments,
the principal question as noted dealt with the reciprocity
aspect as well as the insisting by the Collector of Internal
Revenue that Tangier was not a foreign country within
the meaning of Section 122. In ruling against the
contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the
appealed decision states: "In fine, we believe, and so
hold, that the expression "foreign country", used in the
last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign
power which, although not an international person in the
sense of international law, does not impose transfer or
death upon intangible person properties of our citizens
not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar
exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary
that Tangier should have been recognized by our
Government order to entitle the petitioner to the
exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our
Tax. Code." 5
Hence appeal to this court by petitioner. The respective
briefs of the parties duly submitted, but as above
indicated, instead of ruling definitely on the question,
this Court, on May 30, 1962, resolve to inquire further
into the question of reciprocity and sent back the case to
the Court of Tax Appeals for the motion of evidence
thereon. The dispositive portion of such resolution reads
as follows: "While section 122 of the Philippine Tax
Code aforequoted speaks of 'intangible personal
property' in both subdivisions (a) and (b); the alleged
laws of Tangier refer to 'bienes muebles situados en
Tanger', 'bienes muebles radicantes en Tanger',
'movables' and 'movable property'. In order that this
Court may be able to determine whether the alleged laws
of Tangier grant the reciprocal tax exemptions required
by Section 122 of the Tax Code, and without, for the
time being, going into the merits of the issues raised by
the petitioner-appellant, the case is [remanded] to the
Court of Tax Appeals for the reception of evidence or
proof on whether or not the words `bienes muebles',
'movables' and 'movable properties as used in the
Tangier laws, include or embrace 'intangible person
property', as used in the Tax Code." 6 In line with the
above resolution, the Court of Tax Appeals admitted
evidence submitted by the administrator petitioner
Antonio Campos Rueda, consisting of exhibits of laws
of Tangier to the effect that "the transfers by reason of
death of movable properties, corporeal or incorporeal,
including furniture and personal effects as well as of
securities, bonds, shares, ..., were not subject, on that
date and in said zone, to the payment of any death tax,
whatever might have been the nationality of the
deceased or his heirs and legatees." It was further noted
in an order of such Court referring the matter back to us
that such were duly admitted in evidence during the
hearing of the case on September 9, 1963. Respondent
presented no evidence." 7
The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It
reads thus: "That no tax shall be collected under this
Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the
decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a
foreign country which at the time of his death did not
impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in
respect of intangible person property of the Philippines
not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of
the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident
at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from
transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect
of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country." 8 The
only obstacle therefore to a definitive ruling is whether
or not as vigorously insisted upon by petitioner the
acquisition of internal personality is a condition sine qua
non to Tangier being considered a "foreign country".
Deference to the De Lara ruling, as was made clear in
the opening paragraph of this opinion, calls for an
affirmance of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to
be identified with a state, it is required in line with
Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized
sovereign community independent of outside control
bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme
within its territory, acting through a government
functioning under a regime of
law. 9 It is thus a sovereign person with the people
composing it viewed as an organized corporate society
under a government with the legal competence to exact
obedience to its commands. 10 It has been referred to as a
body-politic organized by common consent for mutual
defense and mutual safety and to promote the general
welfare. 11 Correctly has it been described by Esmein as
"the juridical personification of the nation." 12 This is to
view it in the light of its historical development. The
stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a
definite territory, politically organized, exercising by
means of its government its sovereign will over the
individuals within it and maintaining its separate
international personality. Laski could speak of it then as
a territorial society divided into government and
subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy
over all other institutions. 13 McIver similarly would
point to the power entrusted to its government to
maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal
order and to enter into international relations. 14 With the
latter requisite satisfied, international law do not exact
independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did
opine. 15
Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of
international personality, petitioner has not successfully
made out a case. It bears repeating that four days after
the filing of this petition on January 6, 1958 in Collector
of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, 16 it was specifically
held by us: "Considering the State of California as a
foreign country in relation to section 122 of our Tax
Code we believe and hold, as did the Tax Court, that the
Ancilliary Administrator is entitled the exemption from
the inheritance tax on the intangible personal property
found in the Philippines." 17 There can be no doubt that
California as a state in the American Union was in the
alleged requisite of international personality.
Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within
the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. 18
What is undeniable is that even prior to the De Lara
ruling, this Court did commit itself to the doctrine that
even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an
international personality in the sense, did fall under this
exempt category. So it appears in an opinion of the
Court by the then Acting Chief Justicem Bengson who
thereafter assumed that position in a permanent capacity,
in Kiene v. Collector of Internal Revenue. 19 As was
therein noted: 'The Board found from the documents
submitted to it — proof of the laws of Liechtenstein —
that said country does not impose estate, inheritance and
gift taxes on intangible property of Filipino citizens not
residing in that country. Wherefore, the Board declared
that pursuant to the exemption above established, no
estate or inheritance taxes were collectible, Ludwig
Kiene being a resident of Liechtestein when he passed
away." 20 Then came this definitive ruling: "The
Collector — hereafter named the respondent — cites
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of this
Court, holding that intangible personal property in the
Philippines belonging to a non-resident foreigner, who
died outside of this country is subject to the estate tax, in
disregard of the principle 'mobilia sequuntur personam'.
Such property is admittedly taxable here. Without the
proviso above quoted, the shares of stock owned here by
the Ludwig Kiene would be concededly subject to estate
and inheritance taxes. Nevertheless our Congress chose
to make an exemption where conditions are such that
demand reciprocity — as in this case. And the
exemption must be honored." 21
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of
Tax Appeals of October 30, 1957 is affirmed. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18463 October 4, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the
latter.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The important question is here squarely presented of
whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code,
punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall
defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or
other person in authority . . .," is still in force.
About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine
Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain
documents which constituted the records of testimony
given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies,
had disappeared from his office. Shortly thereafter, the
Philippine Senate, having been called into special
session by the Governor-General, the Secretary for the
Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents
and of the steps taken by him to discover the guilty
party. The day following the convening of the Senate,
September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by
Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading as
follows:
Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the
first time, of the scandalous robbery of records which
were kept and preserved in the iron safe of the Senate,
yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication
that the author or authors of the crime will ever be
discovered.
To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go
out of the Sente itself, and the persons in charge of the
investigation of the case would not have to display great
skill in order to succeed in their undertaking, unless they
should encounter the insuperable obstacle of offical
concealment.
In that case, every investigation to be made would be but
a mere comedy and nothing more.
After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially
under the circumstances that have surrounded it, does
not surprise us at all.
The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of
the environment of the place in which it was committed.
How many of the present Senators can say without
remorse in their conscience and with serenity of mind,
that they do not owe their victory to electoral robbery?
How may?
The author or authors of the robbery of the records from
the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but
followed the example of certain Senators who secured
their election through fraud and robbery.
The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9,
1920, adopted a resolution authorizing its committee on
elections and privileges to report as to the action which
should be taken with reference to the article published
inLa Nacion. On September 15, 1920, the Senate
adopted a resolution authorizing the President of the
Senate to indorse to the Attorney-General, for his study
and corresponding action, all the papers referring to the
case of the newspaper La Nacion and its editor, Mr.
Gregorio Perfecto. As a result, an information was filed
in the municipal court of the City of Manila by an
assistant city fiscal, in which the editorial in question
was set out and in which it was alleged that the same
constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.
The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the
municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance
of Manila.
During the course of the trial in the Court of First
Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the defense
moved for the dismissal of the case. On the subject of
whether or not article 256 of the Penal Code, under
which the information was presented, is in force, the trial
judge, the Honorable George R. Harvey, said:
This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated
into the Penal Code of Spain for the protection of the
Ministers of the Crown and other representatives of the
King against free speech and action by Spanish subjects.
A severe punishment was prescribed because it was
doubtless considered a much more serious offense to
insult the King's representative than to insult an ordinary
individual. This provision, with almost all the other
articles of that Code, was extended to the Philippine
Islands when under the dominion of Spain because the
King's subject in the Philippines might defame, abuse or
insult the Ministers of the Crown or other representatives
of His Majesty. We now have no Ministers of the Crown
or other persons in authority in the Philippines
representing the King of Spain, and said provision, with
other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed
into "innocuous desuetude," but the Supreme Corut of
the Philippine Islands has, by a majority decision, held
that said article 256 is the law of the land to-day. . . .
The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule
of stare decisis, is binding upon this court until
otherwise determined by proper authority.
In the decision rendered by the same judge, he
concluded with the following language:
In the United States such publications are usually not
punishable as criminal offense, and little importance is
attached to them, because they are generally the result of
political controversy and are usually regarded as more or
less colored or exaggerated. Attacks of this character
upon a legislative body are not punishable, under the
Libel Law. Although such publications are
reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to the
application of the provision of law under which this case
was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us from the
Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code prescribes
punishment for persons who use insulting language
about Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The
King of Spain doubtless left the need of such protection
to his ministers and others in authority in the Philippines
as well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was
made applicable here. Notwithstanding the change of
sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in a majority decision,
has held that this provision is still in force, and that one
who made an insulting remark about the President of the
United States was punishable under it.
(U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it
would appear to be applicable in this case. Hence, said
article 256 must be enforced, without fear or favor, until
it shall be repealed or superseded by other legislation, or
until the Supreme Court shall otherwise determine.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds
the defendant guilty as charged in the information and
under article 256 of their Penal Code sentences him to
suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the
costs of both instances.
The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and
appellant, reenforced by an extensive brief, and eloquent
oral argument made in his own behalf and by his learned
counsel, all reduce themselves to the pertinent and
decisive question which was announced in the beginning
of this decision.
It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge
considered himself bound to follow the rule announced
in the case of United States vs. Helbig (R. G. No.
14705, 1 not published). In that case, the accused was
charged with having said, "To hell with the President
and his proclamations, or words to that effect," in
violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found
guilty in a judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the Supreme
Court, with the writer of the instant decision dissenting
on two principal grounds: (1) That the accused was
deprived of the constitutional right of cross-examination,
and (2) that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is no
longer in force. Subsequently, on a motion of
reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the
Court of First Instance had committed a prejudicial error
in depriving the accused of his right to cross-examine a
principal witness, set aside the judgment affirming the
judgment appealed from and ordered the return of the
record to the court of origin for the celebration of a new
trial. Whether such a trial was actually had, is not
known, but at least, the record in the Helbig case has
never again been elevated to this court.
There may perchance exist some doubt as to the
authority of the decision in the Helbig case, in view of
the circumstances above described. This much, however,
is certain: The facts of the Helbig case and the case
before us, which we may term the Perfecto case, are
different, for in the first case there was an oral
defamation, while in the second there is a written
defamation. Not only this, but a new point which, under
the facts, could not have been considered in the Helbig
case, is, in the Perfecto case, urged upon the court. And,
finally, as is apparent to all, the appellate court is not
restrained, as was the trial court, by strict adherence to a
former decision. We much prefer to resolve the question
before us unhindered by references to the Helbig
decision.
This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions
all leading to the same result can be had. A majority of
the court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel
Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so
much of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates to
written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the
information and the facts, the defendant is neither guilty
of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the
Libel Law. The view of the Chief Justice is that the
accused should be acquitted for the reason that the facts
alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of
article 156 of the Penal Code. Three members of the
court believe that article 256 was abrogated completely
by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty
over the Philippines and is inconsistent with democratic
principles of government.
Without prejudice to the right of any member of the
court to explain his position, we will discuss the two
main points just mentioned.
1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on
article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. — The Libel
Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the Philippine
Commission shortly after organization of this legislative
body. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation,
expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or
pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions,
tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to
impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the
alleged or natural deffects of one who is alive, and
thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or
ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of
laws now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict
herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."
That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law
took effect, were in conflict therewith, and that the Libel
Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal
Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal
Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults, must
have been particularly affected by the Libel Law.
Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia
Valdez ([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke
of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish
law on the subject of calumnia and injuria." Recently,
specific attention was given to the effect of the Libel
Law on the provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with
calumny and insults, and it was found that those
provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny
and insults in which the elements of writing an publicity
entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law.
(People vs. Castro [1922], p. 842, ante.)
The Libel Law must have had the same result on other
provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance article 256.
The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper
published an article, naturally in writing, which may
have had the tendency to impeach the honesty, virtue, or
reputation of members of the Philippine Senate, thereby
possibly exposing them to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule, which is exactly libel, as defined by the Libel
Law. Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that
a libel is indictable when defaming a "body of persons
definite and small enough for individual members to be
recognized as such, in or by means of anything capable
of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal Law, art. 267.) But
in the United States, while it may be proper to prosecute
criminally the author of a libel charging a legislator with
corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a
legislature, are within the range of the liberty of the
press, unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3
Wharton's Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and
legal principles in mind, recall that article 256 begins:
Any person who, by . . .writing, shall defame, abuse, or
insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in
authority," etc.
The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on
the subject of libel. The well-known rule of statutory
construction is, that where the later statute clearly covers
the old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly
appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to
give expression in it to the whole law on the subject,
previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary
implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory
Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons, it is evident
that Act No. 277 had the effect so much of this article as
punishes defamation, abuse, or insults by writing.
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason
and Sedition Law, may also have affected article 256,
but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a
pronouncement.
2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian
sevoreignty over the Philippine son article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code. — Appellant's main proposition in
the lower court and again energetically pressed in the
appellate court was that article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code is not now in force because abrogated by the
change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the
Philippines and because inconsistent with democratic
principles of government. This view was indirectly
favored by the trial judge, and, as before stated, is the
opinion of three members of this court.
Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II
of the Spanish Penal Code. Title I of Book II punishes
the crimes of treason, crimes that endanger the peace or
independence of the state, crimes against international
law, and the crime of piracy. Title II of the same book
punishes the crimes of lese majeste, crimes against
the Cortesand its members and against the council of
ministers, crimes against the form of government, and
crimes committed on the occasion of the exercise of
rights guaranteed by the fundamental laws of the state,
including crime against religion and worship. Title III of
the same Book, in which article 256 is found, punishes
the crimes of rebellion, sedition, assaults upon persons in
authority, and their agents, and contempts,
insults, injurias, and threats against persons in authority,
and insults, injurias, and threats against their agents and
other public officers, the last being the title to Chapter V.
The first two articles in Chapter V define and punish the
offense of contempt committed by any one who shall be
word or deed defame, abuse, insult, or threathen a
minister of the crown, or any person in authority. The
with an article condemning challenges to fight duels
intervening, comes article 256, now being weighed in
the balance. It reads as follows: "Any person who, by
word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any
Minister of the Crown or other person in authority,
while engaged in the performance of official duties, or
by reason of such performance, provided that the
offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing be
not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor," — that is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of
any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for
there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United
States of America), or other person in authority in the
Monarchy of Spain.
It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the
Spanish Penal Code having to do with such subjects as
treason, lese majeste, religion and worship, rebellion,
sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are
not longer in force. Our present task, therefore, is a
determination of whether article 256 has met the same
fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the
nature of a municipal law or political law, and is
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States and the characteristics and institutions of the
American Government.
It is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory the previous political relations of
the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here
used to denominate the laws regulating the relations
sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. (American
Insurance Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago,
Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn
[1885], 114 U.S., 542; Roa vs. Collector of Customs
[1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United
States Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the
course of his opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock Island
and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said:
"As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and
regulations in conflict with the political character,
institutions and Constitution of the new government are
at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political
jurisdiction and legislative power — and the latter is
involved in the former — to the United States, the laws
of the country in support of an established religion
or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing
cruel and unusual punishments, and he like, would at
once cease to be of obligatory force without any
declaration to that effect." To quote again from the
United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted
that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise,
impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives;
and much less can it be admitted that they have capacity
to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation
acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it
subject to the Constitution and laws of its own
government, and not according to those of the
government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3
Hos., 210.)
On American occupation of the Philippines, by
instructions of the President to the Military Commander
dated May 28, 1898, and by proclamation of the latter,
the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting
private rights of person and property and providing for
the punishment of crime were nominally continued in
force in so far as they were compatible with the new
order of things. But President McKinley, in his
instructions to General Merritt, was careful to say: "The
first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's
territory is the severance of the former political relation
of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new
political power." From that day to this, the ordinarily it
has been taken for granted that the provisions under
consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the
language of the United States Supreme Court in
Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there
was not and could not be, except as precise questions
were presented, a careful consideration of the codal
provisions and a determination of the extent to which
they accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great
principles of liberty and law' which had been 'made the
basis of our governmental system.' " But when the
question has been squarely raised, the appellate court has
been forced on occasion to hold certain portions of the
Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions and
American constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet
[1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S.vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil.,
273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533;
Weems vs. U.S., supra.)
The nature of the government which has been set up in
the Philippines under American sovereignty was
outlined by President McKinley in that Magna Charta of
Philippine liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of
April 7, 1900. In part, the President said:
In all the forms of government and administrative
provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the
Commission should bear in mind that he government
which they are establishing is designed not for our
satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical
views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the
people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures
adopted should be made to conform to their customs,
their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest
extent consistent with the accomplishment of the
indispensable requisites of just and effective
government. At the same time the Commission should
bear in mind, and the people of the Islands should be
made plainly to understand, that there are certain great
principles of government which have been made the
basis of our governmental system, which we deem
essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of
individual freedom, and of which they have,
unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by
us; that there are also certain practical rules of
government which we have found to be essential to the
preservation of these great principles of liberty and law,
and that these principles and these rules of government
must be established and maintained in their islands for
the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much
they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure
with which they are familiar. It is evident that the most
enligthened thought of the Philippine Islands fully
appreciates the importance of these principles and rules,
and they will inevitably within a short time command
universal assent.
The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr.
Justice Elliott, speaking for our Supreme Court, in the
case of United States vs. Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said:
"The President and Congress framed the government on
the model with which American are familiar, and which
has proven best adapted for the advancement of the
public interests and the protection of individual rights
and privileges."
Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear
the statement made that the happiness, peace, and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands and
their customs, habits, and prejudices, to follow the
language of President McKinley, demand obeisance to
authority, and royal protection for that authority.
According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect
Spanish officials who were the representatives of the
King. With the change of sovereignty, a new
government, and a new theory of government, as set up
in the Philippines. It was in no sense a continuation of
the old, although merely for convenience certain of the
existing institutions and laws were continued. The
demands which the new government made, and makes,
on the individual citizen are likewise different. No
longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in
authority of such exalted position that the citizen must
speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our
Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler
and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other
man. We have no rank or station, except that of
respectability and intelligence as opposed to indecency
and ignorance, and the door to this rank stands open to
every man to freely enter and abide therein, if he is
qualified, and whether he is qualified or not depends
upon the life and character and attainments and conduct
of each person for himself. Every man may lawfully do
what he will, so long as it is notmalum in se or malum
prohibitum or does not infringe upon the qually sacred
rights of others." (State vs.Shepherd [1903], 177 Mo.,
205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)
It is true that in England, from which so many of the
laws and institutions of the United States are derived,
there were once statutes of scandalum magnatum, under
which words which would not be actionable if spoken of
an ordinary subject were made actionable if spoken of a
peer of the realm or of any of the great officers of the
Crown, without proof of any special damage. The Crown
of England, unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that
that of other sovereigns, as for instance, the Emperors
Augustus, Caesar, and Tiberius. These English statutes
have, however, long since, become obsolete, while in the
United States, the offense of scandalum magnatum is not
known. In the early days of the American Republic, a
sedition law was enacted, making it an offense to libel
the Government, the Congress, or the President of the
United States, but the law met with so much popular
disapproval, that it was soon repealed. "In this country
no distinction as to persons is recognized, and in
practice a person holding a high office is regarded as a
target at whom any person may let fly his poisonous
words. High official position, instead of affording
immunity from slanderous and libelous charges, seems
rather to be regarded as making his character free
plunder for any one who desires to create a senation by
attacking it." (Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245;
Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A., 680.)
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius
and fundamental principles of the American character
and system of government. The gulf which separates this
article from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation
of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a
monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the
United States. This article was crowded out by
implication as soon as the United States established its
authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all
proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a
distorted monarchical conception of the nature of
political authority, as opposed to the American
conception of the protection of the interests of the
public, have been obliterated by the present system of
government in the Islands. 1awph!l.net
From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted
that this article punishes contempts against executive
officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover
the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-
judicial officers has no place in a government based
upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in
monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the
people but it is an agent and servant of the people
themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect
and obedience when they are acting within the scope of
their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of
government is calculated to enforce respect and
obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but
never does it place around the individual who happens to
occupy an official position by mandate of the people any
official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for
contemptuous remarks.
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines
with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of
the Crown have no place under the American flag.
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the
court are of the opinion, although for different reasons,
that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant
and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So
ordered.
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ARAULLO, C.J., concurring:
I concur with the dispositive part of the foregoing
decision, that is, with the acquittal of the accused, for the
sole reason that the facts alleged in the information do
not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code; for although that article is in force with respect to
calumny, injuria, or insult, by deed or word, against an
authority in the performance of his duties or by reason
thereof, outside of his presence, it is repealed by the
Libel Law in so far as it refers to calumny, injuria, or
insult committed against an authority by writing or
printing, as was that inserted in the said information.
ROMUALDEZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the result. I believe that the responsibility
of the accused has not been shown either under article
256 of the Penal Code or under the Libel Law.
I am of the opinion that article 256 of the Penal Code is
still in force, except as it refers to "Ministers of the
Crown," whom we do not have in our Government, and
to calumny, injuria, or insult, by writing or printing,
committed against an authority in the performance of his
duties or by reason thereof, which portion was repealed
by the Libel Law.
Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J:
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita
R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B.
Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts
unbecoming a judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report
dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia
Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this
case was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation,
thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R.
Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs,
against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning
the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the
common father of the plaintiff and defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs.
Macariola alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased
Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased
were defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring
of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa
Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the
children of the deceased by his second marriage with
Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were
all the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife,
Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired by the
deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any
partition to be made, those conjugal properties should
first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be
adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of the
latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other
half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes
was to be divided equally among his children by his two
marriages.
On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent
Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
the Court, upon a preponderance of evidence, finds and
so holds, and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the
plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only
children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of
Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate
child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos.
4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of
Lot 1145 as belonging to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras; (4)
Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as
belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene
Ondez in common partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of
Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the deceased
Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant
Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only legal and forced
heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner
of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265,
4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803,
4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot
No. 1154 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive
owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half
(1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining
one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half
(1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to
the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the
division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez,
as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a
hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to
Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining
portion of the estate to be divided among the plaintiffs
Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that
the extent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R.
Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the
equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or
each of the other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983,
New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal
shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista,
14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.]
p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after
this judgment shall have become final to submit to this
court, for approval a project of partition of the hereditary
estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such
manner as the parties may, by agreement, deemed
convenient and equitable to them taking into
consideration the location, kind, quality, nature and
value of the properties involved; (10) Directing the
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R.
Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion
of one-third (1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3)
by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other
claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of
an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of
partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is
marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project
of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but
only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order
dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted
hereunder in full:
The parties, through their respective counsels, presented
to this Court for approval the following project of
partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the
above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court respectfully
submit the following Project of Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall
belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49
square meters along the eastern part of the lot shall be
awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;
3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to
Sinforosa Reyes Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55
square meters along the western part of the lot shall
likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;
5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally
among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No.
3416 after taking the portions awarded under item (2)
and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and
Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that
the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong
exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project
of Partition indicated above which is made in accordance
with the decision of the Honorable Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant
Tacloban City
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff
Tacloban City
While the Court thought it more desirable for all the
parties to have signed this Project of Partition,
nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of the
respective parties to this Court that the Project of
Partition, as above- quoted, had been made after a
conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and the
defendant approving the above Project of Partition, and
that both lawyers had represented to the Court that they
are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project
of Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the above-
quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance with law,
hereby approves the same. The parties, therefore, are
directed to execute such papers, documents or
instrument sufficient in form and substance for the
vesting of the rights, interests and participations which
were adjudicated to the respective parties, as outlined in
the Project of Partition and the delivery of the respective
properties adjudicated to each one in view of said Project
of Partition, and to perform such other acts as are legal
and necessary to effectuate the said Project of Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.
(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge
EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on
November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving
authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of
title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the
project of partition (see Exh. U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project of
partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with an
area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to
the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased
Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of
partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela,
and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and
when the project of partition was approved by the trial
court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided
into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E
inclusive (Exh. V).
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a
stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1
and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of
2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr.
Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer
certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of
the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife
Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around
1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife,
Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion
was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses
Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest in
Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale
the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador
Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan,
Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S.
Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and
Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The
Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall henceforth
refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission only on January 9,
1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9,
1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968
alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent
Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of
the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion
of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties
involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that
he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the
Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a
stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge
of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that
respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted
in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing
with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and
publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when
in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls
of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar;
and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and
utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7,
rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24,
1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on October
16, 1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of
October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice
Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for
investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing,
the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated
May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge
should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the
first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the
second cause of action, respondent should be warned in
case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to
engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of
action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent
Judge be exonerated.
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or
11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein
instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff,
versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment
of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision
in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by
respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the
partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances
with damages. It appears, however, that some defendants
were dropped from the civil case. For one, the case
against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he
was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case
No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March
6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and
on August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion
was dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a
real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil Case
No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired
by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon
was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the
cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina
Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R.
Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and
Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota
and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the
conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and
her counsel.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of
the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was directed
and authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary
(now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National
Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case
No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B.
ASUNCION
(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of
Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C"
and "C- 3"] approving the partition;
(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B.
Asuncion;
(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola
to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,
(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[P400,000.00] for moral damages;
(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[P200,000.001 for exemplary damages;
(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
[P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and
(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00]
for Attorney's Fees.
B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND FOR
THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO
VILLASIN —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants
Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased Gerardo
Villasin;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants
Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the
cost of the suit.
C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE
PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants
Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis,
Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O.
Reyes.
D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT
BONIFACIO RAMO —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio
Ramo the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid
decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon
perfection of the appeal on February 22, 1971.
I
WE find that there is no merit in the contention of
complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first
cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion
violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No.
1184-E which was one of those properties involved in
Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice,
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment
and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession
[emphasis supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to
the sale or assignment of the property which is the
subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein.
WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to
operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take
place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88
SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court
of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased
on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision
in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8,
1963 was already final because none of the parties
therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period;
hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the
litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6,
1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the
amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the
October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to
the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for
there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in
question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who
earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from
three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela
Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that
Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was
adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela
Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita
Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was
subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to
1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31,
1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No.
2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on
March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent
Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation
purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31,
1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their
respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in
which respondent was the president and his wife was the
secretary, took place long after the finality of the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent
two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of
partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or
about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the
Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case
No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and
the two orders approving the same, as well as the
partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances,
the same, however, is of no moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on
March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio
Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which
he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and
his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and
November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no
longer subject of litigation.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of
Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affect
the aforesaid facts — that the questioned sale to
respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was
effected and consummated long after the finality of the
aforesaid decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to
respondent Judge having taken place over one year after
the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as
well as the two orders approving the project of partition,
and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was
no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New
Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on
July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by
Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was
only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical
transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a
consideration for the approval of the project of partition.
In this connection, We agree with the findings of the
Investigating Justice thus:
And so we are now confronted with this all-important
question whether or not the acquisition by respondent of
a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of
the whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent was
the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately
related to the Order of respondent approving the project
of partition, Exh. A.
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or
participation in the transactions between the Reyeses and
the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that
there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr.
Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in
mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of
Respondent's Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no
evidence in the record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon
acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot
1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this
investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere,
and I believe him when he testified that he bought Lot
1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration from
the Reyeses without any intervention of, or previous
understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent
Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition
although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with
approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as
follows:
1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have
required the signature of the parties more particularly
that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition
submitted to him for approval; however, whatever error
was committed by respondent in that respect was done in
good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was
assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record
of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his client
to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p.
24, January 20, 1969). While it is true that such written
authority if there was any, was not presented by
respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to
corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit
being the only one that was presented as respondent's
Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this
investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the
project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her
conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:
1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520
covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in
which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share"
(Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order dated
November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of
partition was duly entered and registered on November
26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale
executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola onOctober 22,
1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth
share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In
this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the
absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the same having
been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her
father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court
of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-
A). The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated
at the back of OCT 19520 on December 3, 1963 (see
Exh. 9-e).
In connection with the abovementioned documents it is
to be noted that in the project of partition dated October
16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October
23, 1963, followed by an amending Order on November
11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated
to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which
complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963,
several days after the preparation of the project of
partition.
Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that
the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue
of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the
project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is absurd
because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-
half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of
Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-
fourth was the share of complainant's mother, Felisa
Espiras; in other words, the decision did not adjudicate
the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein
complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant
became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154
only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A.
Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October
22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she was
wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her
deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also
significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola
admitted during the cross-examination that she went to
Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to
Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which
we can deduce that she could not have been kept
ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to
the project of partition.
Complainant also assails the project of partition because
according to her the properties adjudicated to her were
insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant,
however, did not present any direct and positive
evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the
choice and distribution of the real properties when she
could have easily done so by presenting evidence on the
area, location, kind, the assessed and market value of
said properties. Without such evidence there is nothing
in the record to show that there were inequalities in the
distribution of the properties of complainant's father (pp.
386389, rec.).
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not
violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code
in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which
was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper
for him to have acquired the same. He should be
reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should
be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday
life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed
by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and
indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or
acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had
been in litigation in his court and caused it to be
transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife
were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One
who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the
duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust
of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only
must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must
be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the
uprightness of his administration of justice. In this
particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that the
transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render
his actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if
respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no
longer in litigation in his court and that he was
purchasing it from a third person and not from the
parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless have
refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to
a corporation in which he and his wife were financially
involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition
was related in one way or another to his official
actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent
gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the
lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general
to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and
the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the
complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated
paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
when he associated himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a
stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation
having been organized to engage in business. Said
Article provides that:
Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce,
either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office
or have any direct, administrative, or financial
intervention in commercial or industrial companies
within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in
which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of
the department of public prosecution in active service.
This provision shall not be applicable to mayors,
municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys
nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging
the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions
may not engage in commerce in a determinate territory.
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated
provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce
which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines,
it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it
regulates the relationship between the government and
certain public officers and employees, like justices and
judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public
law which deals with the organization and operation of
the governmental organs of the State and define the
relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory
(People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may
be recalled that political law embraces constitutional
law, law of public corporations, administrative law
including the law on public officers and elections.
Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
partakes more of the nature of an administrative law
because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers
and employees with respect to engaging in business:
hence, political in essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of
Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885,
with some modifications made by the "Commission de
Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was
extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of
August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this
jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States and later on from the United States to the
Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of
Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated
because where there is change of sovereignty, the
political laws of the former sovereign, whether
compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-
enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil.
315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory
by one nation to another, either following a conquest or
otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their
nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former
government immediately cease upon the transfer of
sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not
in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign continue
in force without the express assent or affirmative act of
the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int.
Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of
the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the
constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be
continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by
affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the
war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's
Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed.
142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs.
356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed.
242), Chief Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never
been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each
other undergo any change. Their relations with their
former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are
created between them and the government which has
acquired their territory. The same act which transfers
their country, transfers the allegiance of those who
remain in it; and the law which may be denominated
political, is necessarily changed, although that which
regulates the intercourse and general conduct of
individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly-
created power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897
[1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle
of the public law that on acquisition of territory the
previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that
continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of
the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty
from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic
of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code
of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot
apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First
Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent
Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the
aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that
respondent participated or intervened in his
official capacity in the business or transactions of the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In
the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which
respondent participated has obviously no relation or
connection with his judicial office. The business of said
corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes
or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance. As was held in one case involving the
application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code
which has a similar prohibition on public officers against
directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract
or business in which it is his official duty to intervene,
"(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to
this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he
has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and,
hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or
transactions which have no relation to his office cannot
commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G.
11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino;
Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the
aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its
business operations by reason of respondent's financial
involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in
one way or another in any case filed by or against it in
court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the
different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
in which the corporation was either party plaintiff or
defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled
"Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O.
Bales, et al.," wherein the complainant herein sought to
recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It
must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was
filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on
November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno
when respondent Judge was no longer connected with
the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein
on January 31, 1967.
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same
paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an
existing law expressly prohibiting members of the
Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful
business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as
amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does
not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of
fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may
engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the
practice of law after office hours but with the permission
of the district judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which
prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as
heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon
the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America,
because it is political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491
of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of
a property in litigation before the court within whose
jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to
respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question
to him took place after the finality of his decision in
Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving
the project of partition; hence, the property was no
longer subject of litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of
1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service
from engaging in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of department, the same,
however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph
h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a
prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public
officer from having any interest in any business and not
by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a
violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee
in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business
without a written permission from the Department Head
may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined
by law.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge
violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service
Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A.
No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated
thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not
apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said
Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage
directly in any private business, vocation, or profession
or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural
or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the Head of Department ..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent,
being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic
Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973
Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or
dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the
Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service,
and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct
and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the
Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own
motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now
Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding
investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the
grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the
discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973
Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline
judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the
Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act
of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the
existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable
office regulations, or in the interest of the service,
remove any subordinate officer or employee from the
service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more
than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not
exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation of
Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary
action against civil service officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate
civil service officers or employees subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil
Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head
of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The
Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil
Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the
department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A.
No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the
Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the
government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides,
a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be
considered as a ground for disciplinary action against
judges because to recognize the same as applicable to
them, would be adding another ground for the discipline
of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary
Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal,
namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act
of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has
original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within
one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all
administrative cases against permanent officers and
employees in the competitive service, and, except as
provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon
their removal, separation, and suspension and upon all
matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency
of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards,
guidelines and regulations governing the administration
of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no question
that a judge belong to the non-competitive or
unclassified service of the government as a Presidential
appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid
provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting
Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized
that only permanent officers and employees who belong
to the classified service come under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service"
(Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-
Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging
in private business by joining the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a
ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959,
the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable
because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
expressly declares that:
A judge should abstain from making personal
investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved
in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the
bench, he should not retain such investments previously
made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to
dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that
he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all
relations which would normally tend to arouse the
suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment,
or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the
administration of his judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that
respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on
January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and
sold their respective shares to third parties, and it
appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in
anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court
as there was no case filed in the different branches of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of the
drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the
corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation
on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of
respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation.
Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their
shares in the corporation only 22 days after the
incorporation of the corporation, indicates that
respondent realized that early that their interest in the
corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25.
Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the
commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the
firm after its incorporation and before it became
involved in any court litigation
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action,
complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of
coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial
decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law
and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with
the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that
respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid
causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the
pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the
claim that respondent associated and closely fraternized
with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly
advertised himself as a practising attorney (see Exhs. I,
I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador
Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera,
is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Exh. K. Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no
Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all the time he part.
believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the
bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of
respondent. It has been shown by complainant that Separate Opinions
Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as
an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard AQUINO, J., concurring and dissenting:
with his name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.
and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
respondent and any person for that matter to have I vote with Justice Aquino.
accepted that statement on its face value. "Now with
respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent Separate Opinions
is guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to AQUINO, J., concurring and dissenting:
the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.
Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating I vote with Justice Aquino.
any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly
relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not
influence his official actuations as a judge where said
persons were concerned. There is no tangible convincing
proof that herein respondent gave any undue privileges
in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter
benefitted in his practice of law from his personal
relations with respondent, or that he used his influence,
if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the
Court to favor said Dominador Tan.
Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the
judiciary to refrain as much as possible from maintaining
close friendly relations with practising attorneys and
litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his
social or business relations or friendship constitute an
element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30,
Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have
social relations, that in itself would not constitute a
ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown
that his social relations be clouded his official actuations
with bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. 403-
405, rec.).
In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate
any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which
was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business
by joining a private corporation during his incumbency
as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he
should be reminded to be more discreet in his private
and business activities, because his conduct as a member
of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with
propriety but must always be above suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY
REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS
PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J:
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita
R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B.
Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts
unbecoming a judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report
dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia
Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this
case was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation,
thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R.
Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs,
against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning
the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the
common father of the plaintiff and defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs.
Macariola alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased
Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased
were defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring
of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa
Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the
children of the deceased by his second marriage with
Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were
all the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife,
Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired by the
deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any
partition to be made, those conjugal properties should
first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be
adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of the
latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other
half which is the share of the deceased Francisco Reyes
was to be divided equally among his children by his two
marriages.
On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent
Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
the Court, upon a preponderance of evidence, finds and
so holds, and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the
plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only
children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of
Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate
child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos.
4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of
Lot 1145 as belonging to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras; (4)
Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as
belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene
Ondez in common partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of
Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the deceased
Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant
Bernardita R. Macariola, being the only legal and forced
heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner
of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265,
4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803,
4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot
No. 1154 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive
owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half
(1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining
one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half
(1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to
the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the
division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez,
as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a
hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to
Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining
portion of the estate to be divided among the plaintiffs
Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that
the extent of the total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R.
Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the
equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or
each of the other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983,
New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal
shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista,
14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.]
p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after
this judgment shall have become final to submit to this
court, for approval a project of partition of the hereditary
estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such
manner as the parties may, by agreement, deemed
convenient and equitable to them taking into
consideration the location, kind, quality, nature and
value of the properties involved; (10) Directing the
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R.
Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion
of one-third (1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3)
by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other
claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of
an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of
partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is
marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project
of partition was not signed by the parties themselves but
only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order
dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted
hereunder in full:
The parties, through their respective counsels, presented
to this Court for approval the following project of
partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the
above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court respectfully
submit the following Project of Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall
belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49
square meters along the eastern part of the lot shall be
awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;
3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to
Sinforosa Reyes Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55
square meters along the western part of the lot shall
likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;
5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally
among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No.
3416 after taking the portions awarded under item (2)
and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and
Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that
the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong
exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project
of Partition indicated above which is made in accordance
with the decision of the Honorable Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant
Tacloban City
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff
Tacloban City
While the Court thought it more desirable for all the
parties to have signed this Project of Partition,
nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of the
respective parties to this Court that the Project of
Partition, as above- quoted, had been made after a
conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and the
defendant approving the above Project of Partition, and
that both lawyers had represented to the Court that they
are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project
of Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the above-
quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance with law,
hereby approves the same. The parties, therefore, are
directed to execute such papers, documents or
instrument sufficient in form and substance for the
vesting of the rights, interests and participations which
were adjudicated to the respective parties, as outlined in
the Project of Partition and the delivery of the respective
properties adjudicated to each one in view of said Project
of Partition, and to perform such other acts as are legal
and necessary to effectuate the said Project of Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.
(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge
EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on
November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving
authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of
title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the
project of partition (see Exh. U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project of
partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with an
area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to
the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased
Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of
partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela,
and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and
when the project of partition was approved by the trial
court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided
into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E
inclusive (Exh. V).
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a
stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1
and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of
2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr.
Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer
certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of
the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife
Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around
1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife,
Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion
was declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses
Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest in
Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale
the stockholders of the corporation were Dominador
Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan,
Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S.
Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and
Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The
Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall henceforth
refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission only on January 9,
1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9,
1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968
alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent
Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of
the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion
of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties
involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that
he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the
Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a
stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge
of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that
respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted
in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing
with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and
publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when
in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls
of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar;
and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and
utter disregard for ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7,
rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24,
1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on October
16, 1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of
October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice
Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for
investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing,
the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated
May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge
should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the
first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the
second cause of action, respondent should be warned in
case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to
engage in business. On the third and fourth causes of
action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent
Judge be exonerated.
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or
11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein
instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff,
versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment
of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision
in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by
respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the
partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances
with damages. It appears, however, that some defendants
were dropped from the civil case. For one, the case
against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he
was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case
No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March
6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and
on August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion
was dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a
real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil Case
No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired
by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon
was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the
cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina
Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R.
Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and
Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota
and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the
conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and
her counsel.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of
the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was directed
and authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary
(now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National
Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case
No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B.
ASUNCION
(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of
Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C"
and "C- 3"] approving the partition;
(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B.
Asuncion;
(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola
to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,
(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[P400,000.00] for moral damages;
(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[P200,000.001 for exemplary damages;
(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
[P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and
(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00]
for Attorney's Fees.
B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND FOR
THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO
VILLASIN —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants
Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased Gerardo
Villasin;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants
Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the
cost of the suit.
C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE
PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants
Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis,
Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O.
Reyes.
D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT
BONIFACIO RAMO —
(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio
Ramo the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid
decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon
perfection of the appeal on February 22, 1971.
I subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to
WE find that there is no merit in the contention of
complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first
cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion
violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No.
1184-E which was one of those properties involved in
Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice,
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment
and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession
[emphasis supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to
the sale or assignment of the property which is the
subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein.
WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to
operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take
place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88
SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court
of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased
on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision
in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8,
1963 was already final because none of the parties
therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period;
hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the
litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6,
1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the
amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the
October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to
the June 8, 1963 decision, had long become final for
there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in
question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who
earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from
three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela
Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that
Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was
adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela
Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita
Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was
1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31,
1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No.
2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on
March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent
Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation
purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31,
1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their
respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in
which respondent was the president and his wife was the
secretary, took place long after the finality of the
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent
two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of
partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or
about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the
Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case
No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and
the two orders approving the same, as well as the
partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances,
the same, however, is of no moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on
March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio
Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which
he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and
his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and
November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no
longer subject of litigation.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of
Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affect
the aforesaid facts — that the questioned sale to
respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was
effected and consummated long after the finality of the
aforesaid decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to
respondent Judge having taken place over one year after
the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as
well as the two orders approving the project of partition,
and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was
no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New
Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on
July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by
Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was
only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical
transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a
consideration for the approval of the project of partition.
In this connection, We agree with the findings of the
Investigating Justice thus:
And so we are now confronted with this all-important
question whether or not the acquisition by respondent of
a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of
the whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent was
the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately
related to the Order of respondent approving the project
of partition, Exh. A.
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or
participation in the transactions between the Reyeses and
the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that
there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr.
Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in
mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of
Respondent's Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no
evidence in the record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon
acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot
1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this
investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere,
and I believe him when he testified that he bought Lot
1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration from
the Reyeses without any intervention of, or previous
understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent
Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition
although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with
approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as
follows:
1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have
required the signature of the parties more particularly
that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition
submitted to him for approval; however, whatever error
was committed by respondent in that respect was done in
good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was
assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record
of Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his client
to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p.
24, January 20, 1969). While it is true that such written
authority if there was any, was not presented by
respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to
corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit
being the only one that was presented as respondent's
Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this
investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the
project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her
conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:
1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520
covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in
which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share"
(Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order dated
November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of
partition was duly entered and registered on November
26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale
executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola onOctober 22,
1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth
share of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In
this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the
absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the same having
been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her
father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court
of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-
A). The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated
at the back of OCT 19520 on December 3, 1963 (see
Exh. 9-e).
In connection with the abovementioned documents it is
to be noted that in the project of partition dated October
16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October
23, 1963, followed by an amending Order on November
11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated
to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which
complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963,
several days after the preparation of the project of
partition.
Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that
the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue
of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the
project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is absurd
because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-
half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of
Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-
fourth was the share of complainant's mother, Felisa
Espiras; in other words, the decision did not adjudicate
the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein
complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant
became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154
only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A.
Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October
22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she was
wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her
deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also
significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola
admitted during the cross-examination that she went to
Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to
Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which
we can deduce that she could not have been kept
ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to
the project of partition.
Complainant also assails the project of partition because
according to her the properties adjudicated to her were
insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant,
however, did not present any direct and positive
evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the
choice and distribution of the real properties when she
could have easily done so by presenting evidence on the
area, location, kind, the assessed and market value of
said properties. Without such evidence there is nothing
in the record to show that there were inequalities in the
distribution of the properties of complainant's father (pp.
386389, rec.).
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not
violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code
in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which
was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper
for him to have acquired the same. He should be
reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should
be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday
life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed
by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and
indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or
acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had
been in litigation in his court and caused it to be
transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife
were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One
who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the
duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust
of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only
must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must
be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the
uprightness of his administration of justice. In this
particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that the
transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render
his actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if
respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no
longer in litigation in his court and that he was
purchasing it from a third person and not from the
parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless have
refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to
a corporation in which he and his wife were financially
involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition
was related in one way or another to his official
actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent
gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the
lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general
to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and
the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the
complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated
paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
when he associated himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a
stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation
having been organized to engage in business. Said
Article provides that:
Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce,
either in person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office
or have any direct, administrative, or financial
intervention in commercial or industrial companies
within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in
which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of
the department of public prosecution in active service.
This provision shall not be applicable to mayors,
municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys
nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging
the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions
may not engage in commerce in a determinate territory.
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated
provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce
which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines,
it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it
regulates the relationship between the government and
certain public officers and employees, like justices and
judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public
law which deals with the organization and operation of
the governmental organs of the State and define the
relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory
(People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may
be recalled that political law embraces constitutional
law, law of public corporations, administrative law
including the law on public officers and elections.
Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
partakes more of the nature of an administrative law
because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers
and employees with respect to engaging in business:
hence, political in essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of
Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885,
with some modifications made by the "Commission de
Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was
extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of
August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this
jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States and later on from the United States to the
Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of
Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated
because where there is change of sovereignty, the
political laws of the former sovereign, whether
compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-
enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil.
315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory
by one nation to another, either following a conquest or
otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their
nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former
government immediately cease upon the transfer of
sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not
in conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign continue
in force without the express assent or affirmative act of
the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int.
Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of
the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the
constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be
continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by
affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the
war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's
Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed.
142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs.
356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed.
242), Chief Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never
been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each
other undergo any change. Their relations with their
former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are
created between them and the government which has
acquired their territory. The same act which transfers
their country, transfers the allegiance of those who
remain in it; and the law which may be denominated
political, is necessarily changed, although that which
regulates the intercourse and general conduct of
individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly-
created power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897
[1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle
of the public law that on acquisition of territory the
previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that
continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of
the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty
from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic
of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code
of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot
apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First
Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent
Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the
aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that
respondent participated or intervened in his
official capacity in the business or transactions of the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In
the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which
respondent participated has obviously no relation or
connection with his judicial office. The business of said
corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes
or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance. As was held in one case involving the
application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code
which has a similar prohibition on public officers against
directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract
or business in which it is his official duty to intervene,
"(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to
this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he
has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and,
hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or
transactions which have no relation to his office cannot
commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G.
11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino;
Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the
aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its
business operations by reason of respondent's financial
involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in
one way or another in any case filed by or against it in
court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the
different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
in which the corporation was either party plaintiff or
defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled
"Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O.
Bales, et al.," wherein the complainant herein sought to
recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It
must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was
filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on
November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno
when respondent Judge was no longer connected with
the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein
on January 31, 1967.
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same
paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an
existing law expressly prohibiting members of the
Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful
business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as
amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does
not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of
fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may
engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the
practice of law after office hours but with the permission
of the district judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which
prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as
heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon
the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America,
because it is political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491
of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of
a property in litigation before the court within whose
jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to
respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question
to him took place after the finality of his decision in
Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving
the project of partition; hence, the property was no
longer subject of litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of
1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service
from engaging in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of department, the same,
however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph
h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a
prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public
officer from having any interest in any business and not
by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a
violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee
in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business
without a written permission from the Department Head
may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined
by law.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge
violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service
Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A.
No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated
thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not
apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said
Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage
directly in any private business, vocation, or profession
or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural
or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the Head of Department ..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent,
being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic
Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973
Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or
dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the
Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service,
and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct
and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the
Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own
motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now
Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding
investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the
grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the
discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973
Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline
judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the
Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act
of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the
existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable
office regulations, or in the interest of the service,
remove any subordinate officer or employee from the
service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more
than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not
exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation of
Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary
action against civil service officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate
civil service officers or employees subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil
Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head
of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The
Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil
Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the
department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A.
No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the
Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the
government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides,
a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be
considered as a ground for disciplinary action against
judges because to recognize the same as applicable to
them, would be adding another ground for the discipline
of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary
Act recognizes only two grounds for their removal,
namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act
of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has
original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within
one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all
administrative cases against permanent officers and
employees in the competitive service, and, except as
provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon
their removal, separation, and suspension and upon all
matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency
of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards,
guidelines and regulations governing the administration
of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no question
that a judge belong to the non-competitive or
unclassified service of the government as a Presidential
appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid
provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting
Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized
that only permanent officers and employees who belong
to the classified service come under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service"
(Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-
Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging
in private business by joining the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a
ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959,
the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable
because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
expressly declares that:
A judge should abstain from making personal
investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved
in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the
bench, he should not retain such investments previously
made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to
dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that
he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all
relations which would normally tend to arouse the
suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment,
or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the
administration of his judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that
respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on
January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and
sold their respective shares to third parties, and it
appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in
anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court
as there was no case filed in the different branches of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of the
drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the
corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation
on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of
respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation.
Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their
shares in the corporation only 22 days after the
incorporation of the corporation, indicates that
respondent realized that early that their interest in the
corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25.
Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the
commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the
firm after its incorporation and before it became
involved in any court litigation
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action,
complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of
coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial
decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law
and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with
the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that
respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid
causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the
pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the
claim that respondent associated and closely fraternized
with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly
advertised himself as a practising attorney (see Exhs. I,
I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador
Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and
is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in
Exh. K.
The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa
Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all the time he
believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the
bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of
respondent. It has been shown by complainant that
Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as
an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard
with his name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I
and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for
respondent and any person for that matter to have
accepted that statement on its face value. "Now with
respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent
is guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to
the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of
Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact
even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating
any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly
relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not
influence his official actuations as a judge where said
persons were concerned. There is no tangible convincing
proof that herein respondent gave any undue privileges
in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter
benefitted in his practice of law from his personal
relations with respondent, or that he used his influence,
if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the
Court to favor said Dominador Tan.
Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the
judiciary to refrain as much as possible from maintaining
close friendly relations with practising attorneys and
litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his
social or business relations or friendship constitute an
element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30,
Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have
social relations, that in itself would not constitute a
ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown
that his social relations be clouded his official actuations
with bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. 403-
405, rec.).
In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate
any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which
was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business
by joining a private corporation during his incumbency
as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he
should be reminded to be more discreet in his private
and business activities, because his conduct as a member
of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with
propriety but must always be above suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY
REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS
PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972
PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG
HOK, ROSITA LEE HONG HOK and LEONCIO
LEE HONG HOK, petitioners,
vs.
ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.
Luis General, Jr. for respondent Aniano David.
Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:p
Petitioners 1 in this appeal by certiorari would have us
reverse a decision of respondent Court of Appeals
affirming a lower court judgment dismissing their
complaint to have the Torrens Title 2 of respondent
Aniano David declared null and void. What makes the
task for petitioners quite difficult is that their factual
support for their pretension to ownership of such
disputed lot through accretion was rejected by
respondent Court of Appeals. Without such
underpinning, they must perforce rely on a legal theory,
which, to put it mildly, is distinguished by unorthodoxy
and is therefore far from persuasive. A grant by the
government through the appropriate public
officials 3 exercising the competence duly vested in them
by law is not to be set at naught on the premise,
unexpressed but implied, that land not otherwise passing
into private ownership may not be disposed of by the
state. Such an assumption is at war with settled
principles of constitutional law. It cannot receive our
assent. We affirm.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following
that of the lower court makes clear that there is no legal
justification for nullifying the right of respondent
Aniano David to the disputed lot arising from the grant
made in his favor by respondent officials. As noted in
the decision under review, he "acquired lawful title
thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application
in accordance with which an order of award and for
issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of
Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing
an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot
2863 of the Naga Cadastre. On the basis of the order of
award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on August 26,
1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant
to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano David
on October 21, 1959. According to the Stipulation of
Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano
David and during all the proceedings in connection with
said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales
patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants did not put
up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal
to them because after the registration and issuance of the
certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a
public land patent, the land covered thereby
automatically comes under the operation of Republic
Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein....
Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning
the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud
should be raised within one year from the date of the
issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title
based thereon becomes indefeasible.... In this case the
land in question is not a private property as the Director
of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources have always sustained the public character
thereof for having been formed by reclamation.... The
only remedy therefore, available to the appellants is an
action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud. In this
case we do not see any fraud committed by defendant-
appellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase of
the land involved through his Miscellaneous Sales
Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered in the records
of the Bureau of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No.
V-9033, because everything was done in the open. The
notices regarding the auction sale of the land were
published, the actual sale and award thereof to Aniano
David were not clandestine but open and public official
acts of an officer of the Government. The application
was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's application,
and the said deceased occupied the land since 1938." 4
On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to
elicit a different conclusion is likely to be attended with
frustration. The first error assigned predicated an
accretion having taken place, notwithstanding its
rejection by respondent Court of Appeals, would seek to
disregard what was accepted by respondent Court as to
how the disputed lot came into being, namely by
reclamation. It does not therefore call for any further
consideration. Neither of the other two errors imputed to
respondent Court, as to its holding that authoritative
doctrines preclude a party other than the government to
dispute the validity of a grant and the recognition of the
indefeasible character of a public land patent after one
year, is possessed of merit. Consequently, as set forth at
the outset, there is no justification for reversal.
1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose
by petitioner aimed at this legal proposition set forth in
the exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra
of the Court of Appeals, now a member of this Court:
"There is, furthermore, a fatal defect of parties to this
action. Only the Government, represented by the
Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void
certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent (Lucas
vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157; Director of Lands vs. Heirs
of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1959). This
was not done by said officers but by private parties like
the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title
issued for the land involved are void since they are not
the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared
as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre
after claiming it as their private property. The cases cited
by appellants are not in point as they refer to private
registered lands or public lands over which vested rights
have been acquired but notwithstanding such fact the
Land Department subsequently granted patents to public
land applicants." 5 Petitioner ought to have known better.
The above excerpt is invulnerable to attack. It is a
restatement of a principle that dates back to Maninang v.
Consolacion, 6a 1908 decision. As was there
categorically stated: "The fact that the grant was made
by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was
in conformity with the law or not is a question which the
government may raise, but until it is raised by the
government and set aside, the defendant can not question
it. The legality of the grant is a question between the
grantee and the government." 7 The above citation was
repeated ipsissimis verbis in Salazar v. Court of
Appeals. 8 Bereft as petitioners were of the right of
ownership in accordance with the findings of the Court
of Appeals, they cannot, in the language of Reyes v.
Rodriguez, 9 "question the [title] legally issued." 10 The
second assignment of error is thus disposed of.
2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not
of outright rejection, of the well-known distinction in
public law between the government authority possessed
by the state which is appropriately embraced in the
concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or
acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the
matter further. The former comes under the heading
of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this
term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the
state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may
provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other
natural resources, including their disposition, except as
limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the
confusion that existed during the medieval era between
such two concepts, but did note the existence of res
publicae as a corollary to dominium." 11 As far as the
Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by
Justice Holmes in Cariño v. Insular Government, 12 a
case of Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier
decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all
lands were held from the Crown...." 13 That was a
manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, 14 which
was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership
however being vested in the state as such rather than the
head thereof. What was stated by Holmes served to
confirm a much more extensive discussion of the matter
in the leading case of Valenton v. Murciano, 15 decided
in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited was incorporated
in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 16 in these
words: "We having acquired full sovereignty over the
Indies and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by
us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and
patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held
without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us
according as they belong to us, in order that after
reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys
audiences, and governors may seem necessary for public
squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places
which are peopled, taking into consideration not only
their present condition, but also their future and their
probable increase, and after distributing to the natives
what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage,
confirming them in what they now have and giving them
more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain
free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may
wish." 17
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular
Government" 18 that "as to the unappropriated public
lands constituting the public domain the sole power of
legislation is vested in Congress, ..." 19 They continue to
possess that character until severed therefrom by state
grant. 20 Where, as in this case, it was found by the Court
of Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of
reclamation, its being correctly categorized as public
land is undeniable. 21 What was held in Heirs of Datu
Pendatun v. Director of Lands 22 finds application. Thus:
"There being no evidence whatever that the property in
question was ever acquired by the applicants or their
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title or by any
other means for the acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be public domain." 23 For it is
well-settled "that no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from the government." 24 It is indispensable then that
there be a showing of a title from the state or any other
mode of acquisition recognized by law. 25 The most
recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: 26 "The applicant, having
failed to establish his right or title over the northern
portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present
controversy, and there being no showing that the same
has been acquired by any private person from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property
is and remains part of the public domain." 27 To repeat,
the second assignment of error is devoid of merit.
3. The last error assigned would take issue with this
portion of the opinion of Justice Esguerra: "According to
the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales
application of Aniano David and during all the
proceedings in connection with said application, up to
the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or
adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after
the registration and issuance of the certificate and
duplicate certificate of title based on a public land
patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes
under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all
the safeguards provided therein ... Under Section 38 of
Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the
certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within
one year from the date of the issuance of the patent.
Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes
indefeasible ..." 28 Petitioners cannot reconcile
themselves to the view that respondent David's title is
impressed with the quality of indefeasibility. In thus
manifesting such an attitude, they railed to accord
deference to controlling precedents. As far back as 1919,
in Aquino v. Director of
Lands, 29 Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court,
stated: "The proceedings under the Land Registration
Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the
Public Land Law are the same in that both are against
the whole world, both take the nature of judicial
proceedings, and for both the decree of registration
issued is conclusive and final." 30 Such a view has been
followed since then. 31 The latest case in point
is Cabacug v. Lao. 32 There is this revealing excerpt
appearing in that decision: "It is said, and with reason,
that a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is
more favorably situated than that of an owner of
registered property. Not only does a free patent have a
force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the
person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the
right to repurchase within a period of five years." 33 It is
quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally
indefensible.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolution of March
14, 1969 are affirmed. With costs against petitioners-
appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Teehankee Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra,
JJ., concur.