Judicial Department Consolidated

Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Ermita, et.al. - G.R. Nos.
178552, 178554, 178581, 178890,179157, 179461, October

5, 2010
FACTS:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act
to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,
signed into law on March 6, 2007.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007 petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network,
Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer,
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date,
petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-
]
KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective officer who
are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as
G.R. No. 178554.
The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance
Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid
ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity,
Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap
(KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan,
Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT),
Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective officers, and
joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato
Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col.
Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos,
Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga
Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace
(EMJP), and Promotion of Church Peoples Response (PCPR), which were represented by their respective
officers who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 178890.
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL)
Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179157.
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and organizations
mostly based in the Southern Tagalog Region, and individuals ollowed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the
BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581
ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from
Terrorism, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007 signed into law on March 6, 2007
constitutional?
RULINGS:
https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

Page 1 of 23
Petition failed.
Petitioners lack locus standi

[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show
not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is
lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any
charge under RA 9372.
Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy.
Oposa vs Factoran, GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR.
They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have
a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in
its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to
cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1.Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2.The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is

Page 2 of 23
concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.
It cannot cannot be said to raise a political question.

Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put
in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
"The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
The right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian
firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic
partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00
per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a
manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995,
perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the
MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court

Page 3 of 23
on prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
RULING:
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the
legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a
remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that
the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past,
modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative
body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation.

Tañada v. Angara, G.R. 118295, 2 May 1997
FACTS:
On April 15, 1994, Rizalino Navarro, the Secretary of DTI, signed the Final Act Embodying the Results
in Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. The final act includes the submission of WTO Agreement to
competent authorities and the adoption of ministerial declarations and decisions. President Fidel Ramos signed
the Instrument of Ratification last December 16, 1994.
Senator Tanada, together with other petitioners, seeks to nullify the ratification of the WTO agreement.
They avert that WTO is not in coherence of our "Filipino First Policy". The idea of "free market" posed by WTO
which is illustrated in the access of foreign markets to trading partners, reduction of tariffs on exports,
agricultural and industrial products in particular, and new opportunities for service sectors, is detrimental to our
National Economy.
Furthermore, the petitioners argue that it is a foul to the constitution as Philippines' sovereignty is being
reduced as the legislative cannot pass any legislation contrary to the provisions of WTO and there is an intrusion
on the judiciary to exercise its power promulgating rules on evidence.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19,
Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Page 4 of 23
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative
power by Congress.
4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable
Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final
Act.
RULING:
1. It is a settled rule that it is the dimension of the judiciary to handle cases involving a justiciable question-
whether there is a right legally demandable and enforceable and if there is an existence of grave abuse of
discretion by any branch of the government and its instrumentality. To raise the question whether the
respondents acted in grave abuse of discretion by ratifying WTO is a justiciable question that the Court
has to be the final arbiter.
2. The Constitution clearly speaks in Article II, Declaration of Principles and State Policies, that the
Philippines shall "adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land, and adhere to the policy of peace, justice, equality, freedom and amity with all nations. The
framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to have an isolationist policy when it favored bias to
Filipino labor and products. The Constitution allows exchanges to trading partners on the basis of
equality and reprocity. It only disallows unfair trading and unlimited foreign entry of goods and services.
3. Sovereignty shall be deemed absolute in the domestic setting, however when treaties come into play,
states waive a portion of its sovereignty to acquire benefits granted by the pact or treaty itself. The
Doctrine of Auto-Limitation shall limit the legislative power vis-a-viz the international law and treatises
without violating the Constitution.
4. The burden of proof contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as the duty of the alleged
patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to the
burden of evidence (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake) product
to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process. The foregoing
notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the burden of proof since, regardless of the presumption
provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence of
the alleged identical product, the fact that it is identical to the genuine one produced by the patented
process and the fact of newness of the genuine product or the fact of substantial likelihood that the
identical product was made by the patented process. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement
does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of
adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system. By and large, the arguments adduced in
connection with our disposition of the third issue -- derogation of legislative power - will apply to this
fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any
actually exists
5. Article II of the Agreement, Scope of the WTO, clearly includes the Annexes as integral part of the
agreement. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act
required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the
Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August
25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the
Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in.
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. 113375, 5 May 1994
FACTS:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease"
executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the online lottery system, also known as lotto. Pursuant to Section 1 of
the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and
conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO decided to establish an
online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds.
Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an online lottery system,
the Berjaya Group Berhad, "a multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia,"

Page 5 of 23
became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO." As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad
(through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation
known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which "was intended to be the medium
through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to
PCSO. The bid of PGMC was later on approved which resulted to the petitioners’ objection.
Petitioners’ Contention:
1. That the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an
arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the online lottery system in "collaboration" or
"association" with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which
prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar
activities" in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign
or domestic." Even granting arguendo that a lease of facilities is not within the contemplation of "collaboration"
or "association," an analysis, however, of the Contract of Lease clearly shows that there is a "collaboration,
association, or joint venture between respondents PCSO and PGMC in the holding of the OnLine Lottery
System," and that there are terms and conditions of the Contract "showing that respondent PGMC is the actual
lotto operator and not respondent PCSO."
2. That paragraph 10 of the Contract of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to establish a telecommunications
network that will connect all the municipalities and cities in the territory. However, PGMC cannot do that
because it has no franchise from Congress to construct, install, establish, or operate the network pursuant to
Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended. Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and
cannot, therefore, be granted a franchise for that purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Respondent’s Contention:
1. It is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, (i.e., the building and maintenance of a lottery
system to be used by PCSO in the operation of its lottery franchise); and as such independent contractor, PGMC
is not a co-operator of the lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise, 'in collaboration,
association or joint venture' with PGMC, as such statutory limitation is viewed from the context, intent, and
spirit of Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa 42." It further claims that as an independent
contractor for a piece of work, it is neither engaged in "gambling" nor in "public service" relative to the
telecommunications network, which the petitioners even consider as an "indispensable requirement" of an on-
line lottery system.
2. That the execution and implementation of the contract does not violate the Constitution and the laws; that the
issue on the "morality" of the lottery franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial or legal, which
should be ventilated in another forum; and that the "petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or real
interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought."
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioners have the locus standi (legal standing) to file the petition; and
2. Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in Sec.1 of RA 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.
RULINGS:
1. The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public that the case demands.
The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people.
The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the
Court brushes aside the procedural barrier.
2. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether
domestic or foreign.” The language of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege “to hold
and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO cannot exercise it “in
collaboration, association or joint venture” with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of

Page 6 of 23
the phrase. By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of the
methods mentioned, nor can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise.
Kilosbayan vs. Morato G.R. No. 118910

FACTS:

In the case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona held invalidity of the contract between Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) for
the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract violated the provision in the PCSO Charter
which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries through a collaboration, association, or joint
venture. Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and
accessories on January 25, 1995. The agreements are as follow:
6. Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case be less than an annual rental
computed at P 35,000 per terminal in commercial operation.
7. Rent is computed bi-weekly
8. Term is 8 years
9. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities
10. Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at P 25M
Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA in valid because:
11. It is the same as the old contract of lease.
12. It is still violative of PCSO’s charter.
13. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not been approved by the President and it is not
most advantageous to the government.
PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments
14. ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior contract.
15. ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the exception provided in EO No. 301.
16. Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the Board of Directors of PCSO.
17. Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery equipment.
18. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they
were not parties to the contract.
ISSUES:
19. WON petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal standing to sue.
20. WON the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in operating an online lottery is valid.
RULINGS:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
6. Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.
STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from
the settled ruling on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. Law of the
case (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one
litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as
“the law of this case”. The parties are the same but the cases are not.
Rule on “conclusiveness of judgment” cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and
determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties
involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially
unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceedings involves an instrument or transaction identical
with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second
proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract,
the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner’s standing. Standing is a concept in
constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether
the petitioners are ‘real parties of interest’.
Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either

Page 7 of 23
principally or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the
detriment which would positively result to them from the contract. Petitioners do not have such present
substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of public contracts may be made before COA or before
the Ombudsman.
7. Equipment Lease Agreement is valid.
It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO now bears all losses because the operation of the system is
completely in its hands. Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Court is not
inclined to review. Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by law as a maximum. (4.3% of gross receipt
is discussed in the dissenting opinion of Feliciano, J.)
In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement. Petitioners state that this would allow
PGMC to control and operate the on-line lottery system the Court held that the claim is speculative. In any case,
in the construction of statutes, the resumption is that in making contracts, the government has acted in good
faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason for denying power.
It was held in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona that PCSO does not have the power to enter into any contract which
would involve it in any form of “collaboration, association, or joint venture” for the holding of sweepstakes
activities. This only mentions that PCSO is prohibited from investing in any activities that would compete in
their own activities. It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement which does not compete with their own
activities. The Court held that is also based on speculation. Evidence is needed to show that the transfer of
technology would involve the PCSO and its personnel in prohibited association with the PGMC. EO. 301
applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment and not on the contracts of lease.
Public bidding for leases are only for privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government
owned buildings or spaces for private use.
Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. The motion for reconsideration of petitioners is
DENIED with finality
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. 160261, 10 November 2003
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the
House Committee.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To
date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the
said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003
of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the
second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.

Page 8 of 23
RULING:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral
to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In
fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to
the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1,
Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered
that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
SANLAKAS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
Armed with high-powered ammunition and explosives, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted
men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in
Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers
demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief
of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion.
PROCLAMATION NO. 427-DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION – WHEREAS, under Section

18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call out such Armed Forces to
suppress the rebellion.
GENERAL ORDER NO. 4-DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS REBELLION-NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress and quell the rebellion. I hereby direct the
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Chief of the Philippine National Police and the
officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and quell the
rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.

Page 9 of 23
Petitioners Contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not authorize the declaration of
a state of rebellion.[6] They contend that the declaration is a constitutional anomaly that confuses,
confounds and misleads because verzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or
general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens. Petitioners also submit that
the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII,
commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of
martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT proclamation 427 and General Order no. 4 was within the power of the President vested
upon her the by the Constitution.
RULING:
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the
President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII provides: Sec. 18. The
President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by
the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from
declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-
in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.
The court cited The [1935] Philippine [C]onstitution which establishes the three departments of the
government in this manner: The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines. The judicial powers shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as may be provided by law. These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by
actual division but also confer plenary legislative, executive, and judicial powers. For as the Supreme
Court of the Philippines pointed out in Ocampo v. Cabangis, a grant of legislative power means a grant
of all the legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power
which may be exercised under the government. If this is true of the legislative power which is exercised
by two chambers with a combined membership [at that time] of more than 120 and of the judicial power
which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally if not more appropriately apply to the executive
power which is vested in one official the president. He personifies the executive branch. There is a unity
in the executive branch absent from the two other branches of government. The president is not the chief
of many executives. He is the executive. His direction of the executive branch can be more immediate
and direct than the United States president because he is given by express provision of the constitution
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
Unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary
for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to
what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of

Page 10 of 23
the Constitution.
The President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief
executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief Powers. Indeed, as the
Solicitor General accurately points out, statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in
Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, which states: SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of
a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have
the force of an executive order. [Emphasis supplied.
It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power
was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of
the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without
factual basis.[65]
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and,
therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that
military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the theater of war or that military authorities have taken
over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights.
There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is
no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency
powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution: Sec. 23. (1) .(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised
powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a
state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President
by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by
Section 23 (2), Article VI.
DISMISSED
DAVID vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President... whenever it becomes
necessary,... may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress… rebellion...,” and in my capacity as their

Page 11 of 23
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare
a State of National Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause
behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New
People’s Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a
clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA.
Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched
without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of any
official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building – were several materials for publication.
The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the
warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or
suppress lawless violence.
ISSUES:
1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?
RULING:
The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.
1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.
Searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following
circumstances of valid warrant-less arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner David’s
warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the
arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective
“Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the
rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such
fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 was
NOT valid.

Page 12 of 23
The search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be
issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8
mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it
be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which
case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by
the CIDG operatives.
ALAN PAGUIA v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
FACTS:
Petitioner, standing as a citizen and taxpayer filed a petition for the writ of certiorari to invalidate
PGMA's nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Davide, Jr. as Permanent Representative to the UN.
Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that time of his nomination, 70, disqualifies him from holding
his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all
officers and employees of the DFA at 65. Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all
DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against
the rest of the DFA officials and employees. Respondents raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they
question petitioners standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s standing to bring the suit is barred by his indefinite suspension from the practice
of law
RULING:
Yes. Petitioners suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Certainly, preparing
a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules
of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.
PEOPLE vs. VERA
FACTS:

Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants in a criminal case where he was convicted. Cu Unjieng
appealed up to the Supreme Court but was denied. On 27 November 1936 he filed fan application for probation
under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition that he
is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe
good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila denied the petition on18 June 1937.
Thereafter, the seventh branch of CFI of Manila, set the petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. The Fiscal of the
City of Manila and the private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April 1937 that Act 4221, assuming that
it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1,
subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its
applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial
boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective
provinces

Page 13 of 23
ISSUE:
Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper
party in present case.
RULING:
The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a
proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case. If Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the
People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set
aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound
inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the
state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
LUIS GENERAL v. URRO
FACTS:
When Roces, a former NAPOLCOM Commissioner, died in September 2007, PGMA appointed the petitioner on
July 21, 2008 as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place of Roces. On the same date, PGMA appointed
Eduardo U. Escueta (Escueta) as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice
Chairman.
Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro(Urro) in place of the petitioner, Constancia P.de Guzman in place of
Celia Leones, and Escuetaas permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners. In a letter dated March 19, 2010, DILG
Head Executive Assistant/Chief-of-Staff Pascual V. Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate congratulatory letters to the
respondents, for being appointed as NAPOLCOM Commissioners. The petitioner then filed the present quo
warranto petition questioning the validity of the respondents appointments mainly on the ground that it violates
the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. On July 30, 2010, Pres. Benigno S. Aquino III,
issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the
Previous Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments."
The petitioner argues that the appointment issued to him was really a "regular" appointment, and as such, he
cannot be removed from office except for cause. Since the appointment paper of respondent Urro, while bearing
a date prior to the effectivity of the constitutional ban on appointments, was officially released (perthe
congratulatory letter dated March 19, 2010 issued to Urro) when the appointment ban was already in effect, then
the petitioners appointment, though temporary in nature, should remain effective as no new and valid
appointment was effectively made. The petitioner assails the validity of the appointments of respondents De
Guzman and Escueta on the same grounds.
Both parties dwelt lengthily on the issue of constitutionality of the respondents appointments in light of E.O. No.
2.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of judicial review.
RULING:
The petition lacks merit. POLITICAL LAW: Judicial power; kinds of appointments.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the
existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3)recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis

Page 14 of 23
mota of the case. Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action. In the present case, the
constitutionality of the respondents appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the submitted pleadings,
what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this
present petition: a quo warranto against respondent Urro.
The Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing private individual must
show a clear right to the contested office. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an
expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an
acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority.
Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary (acting)
appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting
appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved. Here, nothing in the enumeration of functions of
the members of the NAPOLCOM that would be subverted or defeated by the President's appointment of an
acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a permanent appointee. Viewed as
an institution, a survey of pertinent laws and executive issuances will show that the NAPOLCOM has always
remained as an office under or within the Executive Department.Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the
petitioners acting appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners
or of the NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.
Estoppel also clearly militates against the petitioner. From the time he was appointed until apprised of the
appointment of Urro, the petitioner discharged the functions of his office without expressing any misgivings on
his appointment. He cannot later on be heard to say that the appointment was really a permanent one so that he
could not be removed except for cause.
DENIED
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that
same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the
SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant
reprieve.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the
execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered… that by
granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.
RULING:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their
decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused
after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of
our government.
Kilosbayan v. Ermita
FACTS:
Respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, announced an appointment in
favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by
the retirement of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported

Page 15 of 23
that the appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacañang in view of the question relating to the
citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
• that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen
• respondent Ong's birth certificate speaks for itself and it states his nationality as "Chinese" at birth
• that birth certificate prevails over respondent Ong's new Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of
Immigration dated October 16, 1996, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino and over the opinion of then
Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona that he is a natural-born Filipino.
Respondent Ong’s version of his ancestral claim:
8. Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who was allegedly a Filipino citizen who
married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen and had a son, Juan Santos;
9. that in 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship;
10. that at that time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also became a Filipino citizen;
11. that respondent Ong's mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok
Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927;
12. that, therefore, respondent's mother was a Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a
Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen;
13. that when respondent Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a
result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the naturalization.
ISSUE:
Is respondent Ong a natural born citizen so as to qualify his appointment in the judiciary
RULING:
• Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No person shall be appointed Member of
the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
• SEC. 9 of Article VIII. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be appointed by
the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
• No. Respondent Ong is a naturalized Citizen and not a natural born Filipino citizen.
• In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted
to the Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because
his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was
a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen.
• His birth certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a
Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
• It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The
alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot
amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along
with his father.
• Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under
the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this
Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution.
Arturo de Castro vs. JBC
FACTS:

This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential

Page 16 of 23
election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed
a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced
immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010
upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice.
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and
published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its
meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the
following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not
later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief
Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of
nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the
prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of
appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties
is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as
Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to
here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the
President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
ISSUE:
Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
RULING:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court
to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4, Article VIII, states: Section 4. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Had the framers intended to extend
the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they
could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4,
Article VIII.
That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Had the framers
intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4, Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the

Page 17 of 23
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that
every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment.
It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if
they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar
prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4.
Gonzales vs. Narvasa G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation
of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants.
The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and recommend proposed
amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of implementing them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case
RULING:
In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer.
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in
danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or
are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues
raised.
In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus,
payer’s action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In
the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The
PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR
were authorized by the President, not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds
intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant
to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if
he possesses a taxpayer’s interest in this particular issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish

Page 18 of 23
petitioner with the information requested.
Maceda vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, 22 April 1993

FACTS:
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks
the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991
denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November
22, 1951 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and
other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon
A. Abiera of the Public Attorney’s Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated
February 6, 1989, by certifying “that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or
determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998,” when
in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal
cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified
his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the
months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by the Supreme Court an extension of ninety
(90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
ISSUE:
14. Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SC’s
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts
RULING:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and
under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for
his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of
this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take
the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said
judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

Javellana v. DILG
FACTS:
Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. On October 5,
1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1)

Page 19 of 23
violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in
relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No.
6713, otherwise known as the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,” and
(2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.
Divinagracia’s complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or
Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of
law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government,
as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of
the same department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang,
filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for “Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement
with Damages” putting him in public ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and
civil cases in the city, without prior authority of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 80-38.

On August 13, 1990, a formal hearing of the complaint was held in Iloilo City in which the complainant,
Engineer Divinagracia, and the respondent, Councilor Javellana, presented their respective evidence.
Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to continue his practice of
law for the reasons stated in his letter-request.

On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting forth
guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective officials.

In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana’s motion to dismiss was denied by the public respondents. His
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on June 20, 1991.
Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed
into law, Section 90 of which provides:
Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing
their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which
he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the
interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
ISSUE:

Page 20 of 23

Whether or not DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the
Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.
RULING:
No. Petitioner’s contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the
statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court’s power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice
of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of
conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the
private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS

NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
FACTS:
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent this
Court which requested the honourable court o grant his designation as a member of the Ilocos norte Provincisl
Committee created pursuant ot EO 956, as amended by EO 326. He requeted the honourable court to authorize
him to accept the appointment and to as assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position
considering his membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a
violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B) that both of the
Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of his present position as Executive Judge of
Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; and to consider his
membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Rodolfo Manzano’s appointment is unconstitutional?
RULING:
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are
created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees. It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees
on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs.
Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided the postion also
incurs the designated to report quarterly to the Office of the Secretary of Justice. Under the Constitution, the
members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which
discharges an administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny
his request.
As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees
on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for
which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial
duties. The aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
People v. Lizada
FACTS:
21. Freddie Lizada is charged with 4 counts of qualified rape of his stepdaughter, and meting on him the
death penalty for each count
22. That sometime in August, November 5, October 22 and September 15 all in the year 1998, in the City of

Page 21 of 23
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of one ANALIA ORILLOSA
y AGOO, by then and there embracing her, kissing and touching her private parts, thereafter removing
her skirt and panty, placing himself on top of her and trying to insert his penis into her vagina and
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the said ANALIA ORILLOSA y AGOO, against her will
and consent.
23. On May 29, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment against accused-appellant finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, defined and penalized in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code, and meted on him the death penalty for each count. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
From all the evidence submitted by the prosecution, the Court concludes that the accused
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged against him in these four (4) cases,
convicts him thereof, and sentences him to DEATH PENALTY in each and every case as
provided for in the seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. SO
ORDERED.
24. Hence, accused-appellant assailed the decision of the court a quo and averred in his brief that: the trial
court gravely erred in not making a finding f fact in its decision and such failure is a reversible error
25. Accused-appellant contends that the decision of the trial court is null and void as it failed to comply with
the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. He avers that the court a quo made no findings of facts in its
decision. The trial court even failed to state in said decision the factual and legal basis for the imposition
of the supreme penalty of death on him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not making a finding of facts in its decision
HELD:
The contention of accused-appellant is well-taken. Article VIII, paragraph 14 of the 1987 Constitution
provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based. This requirement is reiterated and implemented by Rule 120, Section 2 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment.The judgment must be written in the official language,
personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and
distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the
judgment is based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if
there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any,
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.
The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person reading the decision on how it was reached
by the court after consideration of the evidence of the parties and the relevant facts, of the opinion it has formed
on the issues, and of the applicable laws. The parties must be assured from a reading of the decision of the trial
court that they were accorded their rights to be heard by an impartial and responsible judge.
More substantial reasons for the requirement are:
• The losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate
what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal.
• The decision ,if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its merits and persuade it to
accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the litigation with a useless appeal.
• The decisions with a full exposition of the facts and the law on which they are based, especially those coming
from the Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve as useful references and
even as precedents in the resolution of future controversies.
The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts which had been proved and its conclusions culled
therefrom, as well as its resolution on the issues and the factual and legal basis for its resolution. Trial courts
should not merely reproduce the respective testimonies of witnesses of both parties and come out with its
decretal conclusion.
In this case, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the Constitution and the Rules on

Page 22 of 23
Criminal Procedure. It merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and of accused-
appellant on direct and cross examinations and merely made referral to the documentary evidence of the parties
then concluded that, on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellant is guilty of four (4)
counts of rape and sentenced him to death, on each count.
The trial court even failed to specifically state the facts proven by the prosecution based on their evidence, the
issues raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual and legal issues, as well as the legal and factual bases
for convicting accused-appellant of each of the crimes charged. The trial court rendered judgment against
accused-appellant with the curt declaration in the decretal portion of its decision that it did so based on the
evidence of the prosecution. The trial court swallowed hook, line and sinker the evidence of the prosecution. It
failed to explain in its decision why it believed and gave probative weight to the evidence of the prosecution.
Reading the decision of the trial court, one is apt to conclude that the trial court ignored the evidence of accused-
appellant. The trial court did not even bother specifying the factual and legal bases for its imposition of the
supreme penalty of death on accused-appellant for each count of rape. The trial court merely cited seventh
paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The decision of the trial court is a good example of
what a decision, envisaged in the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, should not be.

Page 23 of 23

Judicial Department Consolidated

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Judicial Department Consolidated

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Ermita, et.al. - G.R. Nos.

178552, 178554, 178581, 178890,179157, 179461, October

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

Petitioners lack locus standi

Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy.

Oposa vs Factoran, GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

​1.Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

It cannot cannot be said to raise a political question.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. 113375, 5 May 1994

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

Kilosbayan vs. Morato G.R. No. 118910

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. 160261, 10 November 2003

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

SANLAKAS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PROCLAMATION NO. 427-DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION – WHEREAS, under Section

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

DAVID vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

ALAN PAGUIA v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

PEOPLE vs. VERA

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

LUIS GENERAL v. URRO

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

Arturo de Castro vs. JBC

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

Gonzales vs. Narvasa G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

Maceda vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, 22 April 1993

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

https://z-p3-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/JUDICIAL%20Departme…vmJIasesc2lr_K5yzYVlHo3RFQ5R-WefoyKWENqjvl4GTwSjqQE 24/06/2018, 10]05 PM

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi

1.Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;