SCE&G's Emergency Motion For An Injunction Pending Appeal With The U.S. Court of Appeals

Appeal: 18-1899 Doc: 6-1 Filed: 08/08/2018 Pg: 1 of 39 Total Pages:(1 of 383)
NO. 18-1899
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
–––––––––––––
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY,
Movant,
V.
COMER H. RANDALL, in his official capacity as Chairman of the

South Carolina Public Service Commission, et al.,
Respondents,
and
HUGH K. LEATHERMAN, in his official capacity as President Pro
Tempore of the South Carolina Senate; JAY LUCAS, in his official
capacity as Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives,
Intervenors.
–––––––––––––
On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, Columbia Division
No. 3:18-cv-01795-JMC (Hon. J. Michelle Childs).
–––––––––––––
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR AN
INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL
–––––––––––––
Ashley C. Parrish David L. Balser
Counsel of Record Jonathan R. Chally
Justin A. Torres KING & SPALDING LLP
KING & SPALDING LLP 1180 Peachtree St. NE
1700 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Atlanta, GA 30309
Washington, D.C. 20006 (404) 572-2782
(202) 626-2627 dbalser@kslaw.com
aparrish@kslaw.com
Counsel for South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
DATED: August 8, 2018 *additional counsel on inside front cover

I.S. Leevy Johnson

George Craig Johnson
JOHNSON, TOAL & BATTISTE, P.A.
P.O. Box 1431
Columbia, SC 29202
(803) 252-9700
islj@jtbpa.com
Steven J. Pugh
RICHARDSON, PLOWDEN & ROBINSON, P.A.
P.O. Drawer 7788
Columbia, SC 29201
(803) 771-4400
spugh@richardsonplowden.com
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed
persons and entities as described in the fourth sentence of Rule 28.2.1 have
an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in
order that the judges of this court may evaluate possible disqualification or
recusal.
Steven J. Pugh
Benjamin P. Carlton
Richardson Plowden & Robinson, P.A.
I.S. Leevy Johnson
George Craig Johnson
Johnson, Toal & Battiste, P.A.
David L. Balser
Ashley C. Parrish
Jonathan R. Chally
Brandon R. Keel
Julia C. Barrett
Justin A. Torres
Amy R. Upshaw
i
King & Spalding LLP
Halligan Mahoney Williams Smith
Fawley & Reagle, P.A.
John M. Reagle
Thomas K. Barlow
Robinson, Gray, Stepp & Lafitte, LLC
Robert E. Stepp
Robert E. Tyson, Jr.
Vordman Carlisle Traywick, III
Wyche, P.A.
Michael J. Anzelmo
Hon. Jay Lucas
Hon. Hugh K. Leatherman
Matthew T. Richardson
John C. Moylan, III
Eric B. Amstutz
James E. Cox, Jr.
Hon. J. Michelle Childs
ii
Further, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1(a), the undersigned counsel
certifies the following:
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of
SCANA Corporation.
/s/ Ashley C. Parrish

Ashley C. Parrish
KING & SPALDING, LLP
1700 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20007
Telephone: (202) 626-2627
Email: aparrish@kslaw.com
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS .................................................. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................v
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................ 3
A. The Base Load Review Act ................................................................3
B. The PSC Approves The Project And Revised Rates .........................6
C. The Act ...............................................................................................7
STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................ 11
ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................... 11
I. SCE&G Is Likely To Succeed On The Merits. .........................................11
A. The Act’s Targeted, Punitive Taking Of SCE&G’s Property

Makes It A Bill of Attainder. ...........................................................12
B. The Act Takes SCE&G’s Property And Violates Its Due

Process Rights. .................................................................................18
II. The Act Will Cause SCE&G To Suffer Irreparable Harm. .....................24
III. The Balance Of Equities And Public Interest Favor An Injunction

Pending Appeal. ........................................................................................26
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 27
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett,

531 U.S. 356 (2001) ........................................................................................ 24
Bluefield Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va.,
262 U.S. 679 (1923) ........................................................................................ 19
Bratcher v. Clarke,
725 F. App’x 203 (4th Cir. 2018).................................................................... 11
Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington,
538 U.S. 216 (2003) ........................................................................................ 19
Consol. Edison Co. v. Pataki,
292 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2002) ............................................................... 15, 16, 17
Covington & L. Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford,
164 U.S. 578 (1896) ........................................................................................ 19
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,
488 U.S. 299 (1989) ........................................................................................ 19
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cty.,
482 U.S. 304 (1987) ........................................................................................ 21
Fletcher v. Peck,
10 U.S. 87 (1810) ............................................................................................ 12
FPC v. Hope Nat. Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591 (1944) ........................................................................................ 19
Friends of the Earth v. PSC,
387 S.C. 360 (2010) .......................................................................................... 7
Grimsley v. S.C. Law Enf’t Div.,
721 S.E.2d 423 (S.C. 2012) ...................................................................... 12, 14
Hilton v. Braunskill,
481 U.S. 770 (1987) ........................................................................................ 11
v
Horne v. Dept. of Agriculture,

135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) .................................................................................... 19
Knick v. Twp. of Scott,
862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2017) ........................................................................... 22
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh,
543 U.S. 50 (2004) .......................................................................................... 14
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244 (1994) ........................................................................................ 23
Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976) ........................................................................................ 23
McCarthy v. Bronson,
500 U.S. 136 (1991) ........................................................................................ 14
Melendres v. Arpaio,
695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012) .......................................................................... 24
Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425 (1977) ............................................................................ 12, 15, 17
Overstreet v. Lexington Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t,
305 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2002) .......................................................................... 24
Pub. Util. Comm’n of Texas v. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw.,
77 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. App. 1989)..................................................................... 25
S.C. Energy Users Comm. v. PSC,
388 S.C. 486 (2010) .......................................................................................... 7
SCE&G Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
272 S.E.2d 793 (S.C. 1980) ............................................................................ 24
Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
282 U.S. 133 (1930) ........................................................................................ 19
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
520 U.S. 725 (1997) ........................................................................................ 21
vi
Summers v. Adams,
No. 3:08-2265-CMC, 2008 WL 11347422 (D.S.C. Dec. 11, 2008) ................. 26
Update, Inc. v. Samilow,
No. 1:18CV462, 2018 WL 2289851 (E.D. Va. May 17, 2018) ....................... 25
Washlefske v. Winston,
234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000) .................................................................... 13, 18
Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172 (1985) ........................................................................................ 20
Statutes
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-27-2310 ............................................................................ 22

S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-270(A) ........................................................................... 3
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-275(A) ................................................................... 13, 14
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-280(B) ........................................................................... 4
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-280(K) ................................................................. 1, 5, 14
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-285 ................................................................................ 5
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-275 ................................................................................ 4
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-280 ................................................................................ 4
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-210 ................................................................................ 3
S.C. Code Ann. § 55-33-275(C) ........................................................................... 1
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-310 .............................................................................. 22
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-34-10(A) ............................................................................. 9
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-34-10(B) ............................................................................. 9
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-34-20 .................................................................9, 17, 21, 23
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-34-40 ...................................................................... 9, 22, 23
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-34-50 .......................................................................... 22, 23
vii
Rules
Fed. R. App. P. 8 ................................................................................................ 11
Other Authorities
Andrew Brown, State Lawmakers Demand Action over Cancelled South

Carolina Nuclear Reactors, but Can’t Agree on What Comes Next,
The Post and Courier, (Aug. 5, 2017) .............................................................. 8
Libba Holland, Gov. McMaster Speaks About Failed Nuclear Plant During
Lowcountry Visit, WCBD News 2 (Oct. 25, 2017)........................................... 8
viii
INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the South Carolina General Assembly passed the Base
Load Review Act (“BLRA”) to encourage the construction of new clean
energy facilities. To incentivize investment, the BLRA permits utilities
to recover their construction costs in revised consumer electricity rates.
Pursuant to the BLRA, the state Public Service Commission (“PSC”)
entered final and binding orders between 2009 and 2016 authorizing
SCE&G to construct a nuclear power project and to recover its capital
costs in revised rates. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 55-33-275(C), 55-33-275(A)-(H).
In 2016, SCE&G’s contractor went bankrupt and SCE&G
determined that completing the project was no longer feasible. SCE&G
relied on statutory provisions entitling it to recover abandonment costs
and construction costs not already approved in existing rate orders.
These abandonment costs could be disallowed “only to the extent” the
PSC determines that abandonment was imprudent. Id. § 58-33-280(K).
Having exercised its rights under the BLRA, SCE&G is stuck in
the middle of a political firestorm. The General Assembly recently
passed Act 287 and Resolution 285 (together, “the Act”), to punish
SCE&G for perceived wrongdoing. The Act requires SCE&G to refund
1
almost $120 million collected under PSC-approved rates since April
2018, purports to nullify final orders of the PSC approving recovery of
approximately $3.5 billion, and erects a new prudency standard for
evaluating SCE&G’s decision to abandon construction.
The Act is confiscatory in both effect and purpose. As its text
makes clear, and as members of the legislature have admitted, the Act is
designed to take property from SCE&G (and its shareholders) and to
transfer it to ratepayers. The Act has no justification other than
retroactively punishing SCE&G. It deprives SCE&G of its property
while simultaneously eliminating procedural protections. It explicitly
discusses SCE&G’s alleged misdeeds, targets SCE&G, and punishes
SCE&G — a textbook example of improper legislative targeting.
The evidence shows that, if not enjoined, the Act will cause
SCE&G irreparable harm, including enormous unrecoverable economic
losses. The Act will also cause grave and incalculable harms to
SC&EG’s financial integrity. The balance of interests and the public
interest both weigh heavily in favor of an injunction.
The district court denied SCE&G’s request for injunctive relief,
D.E.101, and also denied SCE&G’s request for an injunction pending
2
appeal, D.E.103. SCE&G is therefore seeking emergency relief from this
Court. The Court should enter a preliminary injunction to preserve the
status quo pending appeal and prevent irreparable harm.
SCE&G also requests that the Court set an expedited briefing
schedule for this emergency motion and resolve this motion on an
expedited schedule. Respondents and intervenors oppose this motion.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Base Load Review Act
The South Carolina General Assembly enacted the BLRA to
incentivize investment in clean energy. See BLRA, 2007 South Carolina
Laws Act 16 (S.B. 431), codified at S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-210 et seq.
The BLRA sets forth procedures for determining the prudency of a
project and for allowing utilities to recoup their construction expenses.
Pre-Construction Prudency Review. The BLRA establishes a
process before construction for the PSC to issue a “base load review
order” approving rate recovery for capital costs if the PSC determines
that constructing the plant is prudent. Id. § 58-33-270(A). The BLRA
makes clear that “[a] base load review order shall constitute a final and
binding determination that a plant is used and useful for utility
purposes, and that its capital costs are prudent utility costs and
3
expenses and are properly included in rates so long as the plant is
constructed or being constructed” in accordance with certain schedules
and estimates. Id. § 58-33-275(A) (emphases added).
Revised Rate Orders Entered During Construction. The
BLRA also sets forth a process for the utility to recover its capital costs
as they are incurred during construction. Section 58-33-275 states that
“[s]o long as the plant is constructed or being constructed with the
approved schedules, estimates, and projections …, the utility must be
allowed to recover its capital costs related to the plant through revised
rate filings or general rate proceedings.” In turn, Section 58-33-280
describes the steps for obtaining PSC approval of revised rates on an
annual basis. The BLRA is clear that “[a] utility must be allowed to
recover through revised rates its weighted average cost of capital applied
to all or, at the utility’s option, part of the outstanding balance of
construction work in progress.” Id. § 58-33-280(B). The statute requires
the PSC to enter a revised order “granting, modifying, or denying
revised rates” within four months and, if the PSC grants a rate increase,
requires the utility to “provide notice to its customers.” Id. §§ 58-33-
4
280(F), (H). Every one of the PSC’s revised rate orders is subject to
administrative and judicial review. Id. §§ 58-33-285, -287, -310.
Post-Construction Process. The statute has separate provisions
that allow for recovery of additional costs not covered by PSC orders
approving revised rates during construction. These provisions apply if a
project is abandoned. In that instance, the utility is entitled to recover
its remaining capital costs and the costs of abandonment (i.e., the costs
not approved by any existing rate order), provided the utility is able to
show that “the decision to abandon construction of the plant was
prudent.” Id. § 58-233-280(K).
Crucially, this determination is made “[w]ithout limiting the effect
of Section 58-33-275(A),” which is the statutory provision stating that a
base load order is a “final and binding determination” that a plant’s
“capital costs are prudent utility costs and expenses and are properly
included in rates.” Id. The BLRA makes clear that “recovery of capital
costs and the utility’s cost of capital … may be disallowed only to the
extent that” the utility fails “to anticipate or avoid the allegedly
imprudent costs, or to minimize the magnitude of the costs.” Id.
(emphasis added). It also sets out a standard to determine whether the
5
utility acted imprudently — the PSC must “consider[] the information
available at the time” to determine if “the utility could have acted to
avoid or minimize the costs.” Id.
The BLRA’s text is thus clear that the only costs subject to
“disallow[ence]” when a project is abandoned are costs not previously
approved by the PSC as prudently incurred. The statute contains no
provision that retroactively nullifies earlier final PSC orders.
B. The PSC Approves The Project And Revised Rates
In 2005, SCE&G recognized a need for additional generation
resources for its customers and partnered with Santee Cooper to
construct nuclear reactor units at the V.C. Summer nuclear facility site.
In May 2008, SCE&G filed an application for a base load review order.
The PSC held a three-week, fourteen-session hearing, receiving
testimony from numerous witnesses, experts, and members of the public.
In March 2009, the PSC granted SCE&G’s application. The order found
that the costs and anticipated construction schedule were “reasonable
and prudent.” The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed in almost all
respects. See Friends of the Earth v. PSC, 387 S.C. 360 (2010); S.C.
Energy Users Comm. v. PSC, 388 S.C. 486 (2010).
6
Construction of the project was governed by a contract between
SCE&G, for itself and as agent for Santee Cooper, and a consortium led
by Westinghouse. After work commenced, SCE&G petitioned the PSC
periodically over the next several years, requesting alterations to the
capital-cost and construction schedules. Each time, the PSC granted
SCE&G’s request, concluding the adjustments were “a normal and
expected part of implementing a construction plan of the size and scope
of the present project.” SCE&G also petitioned the PSC for revised rates
every year beginning in 2008. The PSC entered final orders finding the
costs to be prudent and authorizing revised rates.
C. The Act
In March 2017, Westinghouse filed for bankruptcy and informed
SCE&G that it intended to reject its project obligations. A few months
later, Santee Cooper announced that it was suspending construction in
light of Westinghouse’s bankruptcy, leaving SCE&G with no
commercially viable option to move forward. SCE&G abandoned the
project and petitioned the PSC to find that its abandonment decision
was prudent.
7
SCE&G’s announcement was politically unpopular. Both the
South Carolina House and Senate formed special committees that held
contentious hearings. The state Attorney General reported that “his
office plan[ned] to launch an investigation, [and] urg[ed] lawmakers to
stop the utilities from paying off the project’s failure on the backs of
customers.” Andrew Brown, State Lawmakers Demand Action over
Cancelled South Carolina Nuclear Reactors, but Can’t Agree on What
Comes Next, The Post and Courier, (Aug. 5, 2017). The Governor
expressed his desire for legislation to force SCE&G to pay for expenses
in order “to see that rate payers don’t lose their money.” Libba Holland,
Gov. McMaster Speaks About Failed Nuclear Plant During Lowcountry
Visit, WCBD News 2 (Oct. 25, 2017). During floor debate, legislators
made clear their intent to punish SCE&G. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 168-76.
The General Assembly passed Act 287, which became law on June
28, 2018. The Act requires SCE&G to return in excess of $120 million
previously collected through rates authorized under the BLRA, reduces
SCE&G’s rates to eliminate all rate increases granted since 2010, directs
that SCE&G’s past actions be reviewed under a new prudency standard,
and deprives SCE&G of the BRLA’s procedural protections.
8
The Act targets SCE&G by referring to “[t]he investor-owned
utility holding the majority interest in the V.C. Summer Nuclear
Reactor Units 2 and 3 at Jenkinsville, South Carolina.” Act § 3, § 58-34-
10(A); see also id. § 58-34-10(B). The Act mandates that, within five
days of the Act’s effective date, the PSC “provide an experimental rate”
that SCE&G’s customers “shall pay during the pendency of litigation
currently before the commission ... or until replaced by an order of the
commission under Section 58-34-30.” Id. § 58-34-20. Imposing this new
rate, the Act eliminates from current rates the increases authorized by
six final rate orders entered by the PSC after 2010 under the BLRA. Act
§ 3, § 58-34-20. The Act also retroactively redefines the standard of care
that was binding on SCE&G when it constructed and was later forced to
abandon the project. Id. § 1. The Act directs that if there is any conflict
between the statutes, the BLRA is “suspended.” Id. § 3, §§ 58-34-40, -50.
The suspension is not generally applicable; it applies only to SCE&G Id.
§§ 58-34-40, -50.
The Act does not afford SCE&G any notice or opportunity for a
hearing before the new rate takes effect. Id. § 58-34-20. Instead, it
suspends SCE&G’s right to petition for a hearing on the rate change or
9
any rate change going forward “for any pending matters” related to the
project. Id. Moreover, the Act permits the rate to be altered only if the
PSC “determines that an adjustment to the experimental rate is
necessary to satisfy constitutional requirements of utility ratemaking.”
Id. Even if the PSC decides to adjust the rate, it is required to impose
“the lowest possible rate.” Id.
SCE&G filed this Ex parte Young action for declaratory and
injunctive relief the next day. It sought a declaration that the Act is
unconstitutional because it violates the bill-of-attainder clause by
legislatively singling out SCE&G for punishment; effects a taking by
imposing a confiscatory rate and requiring refunds of rates already
lawfully collected; deprives SCE&G of property without due process;
and violates substantive due process by retroactively changing the legal
consequences of SCE&G’s past conduct. SCE&G moved for preliminary
and permanent injunctive relief against the PSC commissioners. The
district court denied the motion. D.E.101, 103. This appeal and motion
followed.
10
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“An order denying preliminary injunction is an immediately
appealable interlocutory order.” Bratcher v. Clarke, 725 F. App’x 203,
204 (4th Cir. 2018). The factors to be considered when a party seeks an
injunction pending appeal are: (1) likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) likelihood of irreparable injury absent a stay; (3) whether a stay will
substantially injure other parties; and (4) the public interest. See Hilton
v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); see also Fed. R. App. P. 8.
ARGUMENT
I. SCE&G Is Likely To Succeed On The Merits.
The district court’s denial of SCE&G’s preliminary injunction
motion rests on two major premises: (1) SCE&G has no property right
under the BLRA, and (2) no takings claim is ripe until the PSC sets a
“final” rate in December. Both premises are wrong. Nothing in the
BLRA permits the PSC to strip SCE&G of rates previously approved by
the PSC, even if a project has been abandoned. Nor does the BLRA
allow for after-the-fact alterations in the process available under the
BLRA for addressing rate orders or prudency determinations. The
deprivation of these rights, including the previously approved rates, was
11
final when the Act imposed a new rate; it makes no difference that the
PSC might adopt another rate at some future date.
A. The Act’s Targeted, Punitive Taking Of SCE&G’s

Property Makes It A Bill of Attainder.
A statute is an unconstitutional bill of attainder if it “determines
guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without
provision of the protections of a judicial trial.” Nixon v. Admin. of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977). Confiscation of property is a classic
example of “punishment.” Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 136 (1810).
The Act Confiscates SCE&G’s Property. The district court
concluded that the bill-of-attainder clause does not apply based on its
view that SCE&G’s decision to abandon construction eliminated its
property interest in revised rates under the BLRA. Op. ¶ 104. The
district court acknowledged that under South Carolina law, a statutory
entitlement to payment creates a property right. Op. ¶ 70 (citing
Grimsley v. S.C. Law Enf’t Div., 721 S.E.2d 423, 427 (S.C. 2012)). But it
concluded that the property right exists only if payment is mandatory.
Id. ¶ 60. According to the district court, because SCE&G’s entitlement
to recover its costs after abandonment depends on a future PSC finding
12
that abandonment was prudent, SCE&G has no “mandatory” property
right.
That conclusion is plainly wrong. A constitutionally protected
property interest is either a “traditional property interest[] [that is] long
recognized” or a right that “stem[s] from an independent source such as
state law.” Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179, 183-84 (4th Cir. 2000).
SCE&G has both. The rates approved under the BLRA are
“mandatory.” Nothing in the statute permits the PSC to strip SCE&G of
its property interest in rates previously approved in final rate orders,
even if the project is later abandoned. Instead, the BLRA makes clear
that “[a] base load review order shall constitute a final and binding
determination that [a plant’s] capital costs are prudent utility costs and
expenses and are properly included in rates so long as the plant is
constructed or being constructed” in accordance with certain schedules
and estimates. Id. § 58-33-275(A) (emphases added).
To be sure, once a utility determines to abandon a project,
construction and abandonment costs that were not previously approved
for recovery through revised rates may also be recaptured through a
later rate revision, if the abandonment is found to be prudent. Id. § 58-
13
233-280(K). But this prudency determination is made “[w]ithout
limiting the effect of Section 58-33-275(A),” i.e., the “final and binding
determination” that a plant’s previously approved “capital costs are
prudent utility costs and expenses and are properly included in rates.”
The BLRA’s provisions, read together, make clear that the district
court was wrong to conclude that SCE&G’s decision to abandon the
project nullified previously approved rates orders. See Koons Buick
Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60 (2004) (statutory language
must be read in its proper context and not viewed in isolation);
McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991) (same). The orders
entered between 2009 and 2016 permitting SCE&G to recover its capital
costs are final determinations, and any later prudency determination
relating to abandonment must be made “[w]ithout limiting the effect” of
those prior orders. Because the revised rates give rise to a mandatory
promise of payment under the BLRA, under South Carolina law they
create a property right. See Grimsley, 721 S.E.2d at 427. SCE&G is
thus entitled to the revised rates previously approved by the PSC.
The Act Targets SCE&G. Relying on Nixon, the district court
concluded that the Act did not target SCE&G, which is a “legitimate
14
class of one.” Op. ¶ 99. That is also incorrect. In Nixon, Congress
established a generally applicable policy that, under the facts that
existed at the time, applied to only one person, President Nixon. Op.
¶ 100 (citing Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472). Here, in contrast, the General
Assembly amended a generally applicable statute — the BLRA — to
single out a particular corporation for punitive measures. Act 287 and
Resolution 285 target SCE&G and SCE&G alone by (1) referencing
“[t]he investor-owned utility holding the majority interest in the V.C.
Summer Nuclear Reactor Units 2 and 3,” S.C. Code Ann. § 58-34-10; (2)
explicitly naming and then rolling back the PSC orders setting SCE&G’s
revised rates, id. § 58-34-20; and (3) referring expressly to SCE&G’s
parent, SCANA in the preamble to Resolution 285.
This case is on all fours with a Second Circuit case holding that a
statute violates the bill-of-attainder clause when it prohibits a utility
from recovering costs solely because it undertook a politically unpopular
action. Consol. Edison Co. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2002). There,
a utility was forced to shut down its nuclear plant temporarily due to a
defective steam generator. Id. at 343. Under existing law, the utility
was able to pass costs associated with the outage on to existing
15
ratepayers, subject to a prudency review by a state commission. Id. at
343−44. Before the commission completed its review, the state assembly
passed a bill ordering the commission to prohibit the utility from
recovering costs associated with the outage. Id. at 344−45. “The basis
for this law [wa]s the legislative finding that ‘[b]y continuing to operate
steam generators known to be defective ... the Consolidated Edison
Company failed to exercise reasonable care on behalf of the health,
safety and economic interests of its customers.’” Id. at 344. This
legislative targeting, the Second Circuit concluded, was an
unconstitutional bill of attainder. Id. at 356.
Here, the General Assembly purports not to have directed the
outcome of the prudency determination that will occur later this year —
a fact the district court relied on in trying to distinguish Consolidated
Edison. Op. ¶¶ 107-08. But that distinction makes no difference. The
Act unambiguously dictated that SCE&G’s rates be reduced
immediately, a directive that requires SCE&G to return more than $120
million in lawfully collected rates. The Act’s punitive purpose — to
confiscate rates paid to SCE&G pursuant to “final and binding” orders
from the PSC — is clear from the Act’s text, see Act § 3, S.C. Code Ann.
16
§ 58-34-20, and from Resolution 285’s preamble, which noted SCE&G’s
“apparent failure to avoid or minimize costs that should have been
avoided” and emphasized that “reliance” on the BLRA “should be
predicated upon a good faith effort to comply with all terms of any
incentives.” These provisions, which indicate that the General Assembly
took action on its view that SCE&G had not complied in good faith, is
functionally identical to the legislature’s negligence finding in
Consolidated Edison.
The Act’s punitive purpose is confirmed by legislators’ statements,
described at ¶¶ 168-76 of the Verified Amended Complaint and never
denied by defendants. The district court brushed aside this evidence —
but courts should consider “whether the legislative record evinces a
confessional intent to punish.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478; see also Consol.
Edison, 292 F.3d at 355. SCE&G has amply demonstrated that the Act
targets it for punishment without the protections of a trial, in violation
of the Bill of Attainder clause. Op. ¶ 110 (citing 2018 S.C. Acts 258 § 3
and acknowledging that the Act “establishes” a new rate “without the
protections of a judicial trial”).
17
B. The Act Takes SCE&G’s Property And Violates Its Due

Process Rights.
The Act takes SCE&G’s property in violation of the Takings Clause
for at least three reasons.
First, the Act deprives SCE&G of its property interest in the
revised rates approved by the PSC in final orders. Perhaps recognizing
that its construction of the BLRA was doubtful, the district court
attempted to buttress its opinion by noting that the BLRA does not
“limit[] the power of the South Carolina General Assembly to regulate
utility rates.” Op. ¶ 83. But that is irrelevant. Whether or not the
General Assembly can prospectively regulate utility rates, it cannot
regulate retroactively to upset settled expectations and take property
without paying just compensation. It also cannot evade those
restrictions by redefining “property” at will. See Washlefske, 234 F.3d at
183 (“a State by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into
public property without compensation”).
Second, the Act takes property from SCE&G by requiring it to
refund more than $120 million it collected after April 2018 pursuant to
lawful PSC orders. S.C. Code Ann. § 58-34-20. The Act thus works a
“classic taking,” where the “government directly appropriates private
18
property for its own use.” Horne v. Dept. of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419,
2425 (2015). Any appropriation of private property is a per se taking
requiring just compensation, even if the property is money. See Brown
v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003).
Third, the Act imposes a confiscatory rate that endangers
SCE&G’s financial integrity. Because the assets of public utilities are
“employed in the public interest” but “owned and operated by private
investors,” the “status of utility property creates its own set of questions
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Duquesne Light Co.
v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989); see also Covington & L. Tpk. Rd.
Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 593 (1896). If a rate fails to “afford
sufficient compensation” to a utility, “the State has taken the use of” the
utility’s property “without paying just compensation.” Duquesne, 488
U.S. at 308; Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 160 (1930).
“[S]ufficient compensation” must include “enough revenue not only for
operating expenses, but also for the capital costs of the business.” FPC
v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944); see also Bluefield
Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679,
692–93 (1923) (“[R]eturn[s] should be reasonably sufficient to assure
19
confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and should be
adequate … to maintain and support its credit”).
The Act’s rate is not sufficient to assure that SCE&G’s return on
equity is commensurate with returns on investments in other similar
enterprises, D.E.55-2 ¶¶ 72, 75, 84, 85; D.E.55-4 ¶¶ 59−60; is not
sufficient to assure confidence in SCE&G’s financial integrity, D.E.55-4
¶¶ 45, 61, 74; and is not adequate for SCE&G to maintain its credit
rating and to attract capital, id. ¶¶ 13, 52, 54. If an injunction is not
entered, SCE&G will likely be foreclosed from accessing certain capital
markets altogether. D.E.55-3 ¶ 10 (explaining that access to sources of
short-term liquidity “would likely disappear”).
Citing Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172, 186-97 (1985), the district court concluded that SCE&G’s
taking claim was not ripe because (1) the rate imposed by the Act may
change once the PSC makes an additional prudency determination
regarding abandonment, and (2) SCE&G failed to bring an inverse
condemnation action under state law. Neither conclusion is warranted.
Williamson County’s finality rule does not apply because SCE&G is
challenging the constitutionality of the Act on its face; its constitutional
20
claims do not depend on any exercise of discretionary authority by the
PSC. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736
n.10 (1997) (facial challenges “are generally ripe the moment the
challenged regulation or ordinance is passed”). The possibility that the
rate might change does not alter the fact that the Act has deprived
SCE&G of its right to previously approved rates under the BLRA. There
is no doubt the Act applies to SCE&G and the immediate effect of the
Act is definite: It requires a new rate go into force and prescribes how
much the rate will be reduced. S.C. Code Ann. § 58-34-20 (eliminating
rate increases authorized in six different orders). The Act also applies
the new rate retroactively, requiring SCE&G to return funds collected
since April. Id.
If the district court’s view were correct, no unconstitutional statute
would ever be enjoined because it is always the case that at some point a
legislature or regulatory agency might act to alter the statute’s
requirements. Even if the deprivation is only temporary, a temporary
taking, like a permanent taking, is subject to the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. Los Angeles Cty., 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
21
Nor was there any effective means of challenging the Act in a state
court inverse condemnation proceeding. The requirement that a litigant
exhaust state court remedies applies only when, unlike here, the suit
seeks money damages, not injunctive or equitable relief. See Knick v.
Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 327 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. granted 138 S. Ct.
1262 (2018) (“claims for injunctive relief presented [are] not … subject to
Williamson County exhaustion.”). In any event. SCE&G, like any
litigant subject to the jurisdiction of the PSC, can only file in state court
upon entry of a final order. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 58-33-310, 58-27-2310.
But the Act explicitly prevents SCE&G from seeking hearing or re-
hearing to challenge the experimental rate on any grounds. The Act
suspends the statutory provisions that permit objections to PSC orders.
Id. § 58-34-50. It also “suspend[s] other statutory provisions” that would
otherwise give SCE&G a right to move to alter the rate. Id. § 58-34-40.
Without an order from the PSC, no court in South Carolina has
jurisdiction to hear SCE&G’s claims.
This procedural straitjacket also demonstrates why the Act
violates SCE&G’s procedural due process rights. Under the
Constitution, “some form of hearing is required” when a person is
22
deprived of a property interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976). Here, as the district court acknowledged, SCE&G was stripped
of its revised rates without any hearing, Op. ¶ 110, and it has no feasible
means of challenging the Act before the PSC.
In addition to the taking of property rights embodied in rates and
various procedural protections, the Act also violates SCE&G’s
substantive due process rights because it “attaches new legal
consequences to events completed before its enactment.” Landgraf v.
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994). Most importantly, it
redefines “prudency,” a critical term under the BLRA establishing what
capital costs can be recovered, and imposes on SCE&G a new
requirement that it and all of its “officers, board, agents, employees,
contractors, subcontractors, consultants” and other “third part[ies]”
behaved prudently. S.C. Code Ann. § 58-34-50. The Act cuts the rates to
which SCE&G is entitled based on its decision to abandon the nuclear
project. Id. § 58-34-20. And it withdraws legal protections mandated by
the BLRA for “matters related to” the project, even though SCE&G
made investments in reliance on the BLRA. Id. §§ 58-34-40, -50.
23
II. The Act Will Cause SCE&G To Suffer Irreparable Harm.
The district court’s denial of injunctive relief has already caused
SCE&G substantial, irreparable harm. Starting on August 7, SCE&G
was forced to begin refunding customers rates collected back to April
2018 on a rolling basis as their monthly billing cycle began. Rooks Decl.
¶ 5. That loss increases every day as new customers begin their monthly
billing cycle. Id. SCE&G will likely not be able to recover the loss, as
the PSC is not authorized to award refunds. SCE&G Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 272 S.E.2d 793, 795 (S.C. 1980) (describing the “two specific
instances” in which the PSC may prescribe refunds). Those funds also
likely cannot be recovered from the state government, since sovereign
immunity prevents a suit against a government for money damages. See
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9
(2001).
The constitutional violations that SCE&G has demonstrated create
a presumption of irreparable harm. See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 695
F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012); Overstreet v. Lexington Fayette Urban
Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover, implementing
the Act will cause unrecoverable economic loss to SCE&G in the form of
24
loss of access to capital markets, reductions in maintenance, and loss of
consumer and investor goodwill. See Pub. Util. Comm’n of Texas v. Gen.
Tel. Co. of the Sw., 77 S.W.2d 827, 829−32 (Tex. App. 1989) (“impaired
ability to borrow funds, an increased cost of capital, a diminished cash
flow, a substantial risk of a downrating of its bonds, reductions in its
workforce and its capital budget, and a decreased ability to maintain its
level and quality of service” constitute irreparable harm); Update, Inc. v.
Samilow, No. 1:18CV462, 2018 WL 2289851, at *9 (E.D. Va. May 17,
2018) (loss of consumer goodwill and reputation are irreparable harm).
Steady payment of dividends is essential to the stability of public
utilities, since dividends “communicate to investors that the company is
stable, growing steadily and rewarding investors for their commitment
to the company,” while missed dividends “signal[] trouble” and cause loss
of access to credit markets and downgrading of corporate debt. D.E.55-4
at ¶ 55. In response to the Act, SCE&G has “slashed its quarterly
dividend by approximately 80% from 61.25 cents per share to 12.37 cents
to preserve its options” as it seeks resolution of this matter. Id. ¶ 57.
This has caused a substantial decline in the stock price of SCE&G’s
corporate parent. Id. ¶¶ 69-74. It has also caused investors to
25
downgrade SCE&G’s bonds to “lowest investment grade” status. Id.
¶ 79; see also D.E.55-1 ¶¶ 41-43. This downgrade has serious
consequences: SCE&G’s negative cash flow and credit downgrade will
make it exceedingly difficult to access funds for continued operations,
including its estimated $520 million in capital costs in 2018. Id. ¶ 80;
see also D.E.55-1 ¶ 65.
III. The Balance Of Equities And Public Interest Favor An

Injunction Pending Appeal.
The balance of equities and the public interest favor an injunction.
Although SCE&G stands to suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is
not granted, defendants will not suffer any harm if a stay issues. If the
Act is upheld as constitutional, and then implemented by the PSC,
customers will not suffer any harm because the money at issue will be
refunded through lower rates.
There is a strong public interest “in avoiding implementation of
unconstitutional legislation.” Summers v. Adams, No. 3:08-2265-CMC,
2008 WL 11347422, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 11, 2008). Moreover, by
increasing regulatory uncertainty, the Act undermines the public
interest by raising “the cost of capital to utilities in the state, curtailing
investment.” D.E.55-1 ¶ 67. The resulting underinvestment leads “to
26
electric service that is less reliable and robust,” and reduces business
investment and job growth. Id. ¶ 68. The Act also undermines the
business climate in the State; investors concerned about regulatory
instability will likely direct their investments to less capricious political
environments. Id. ¶ 69.
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant an injunction pending appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
I.S. Leevy Johnson Ashley C. Parrish
George Craig Johnson Counsel of Record
JOHNSON, TOAL Justin A. Torres
& BATTISTE, P.A. KING & SPALDING LLP
P.O. Box 1431 1700 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Columbia, SC 29202 Washington, D.C. 20006
(803) 252-9700 aparrish@kslaw.com
islj@jtbpa.com (202) 626-2627
Steven J. Pugh David L. Balser

RICHARDSON, PLOWDEN Jonathan R. Chally
& ROBINSON, P.A. KING & SPALDING LLP
P.O. Drawer 7788 1180 Peachtree St. NE
Columbia, SC 29201 Atlanta, GA 30309
(803) 771-4400 (404) 572-2782
spugh@richardsonplowden.com dbalser@kslaw.com
Counsel for South Carolina Electric & Gas Company

Dated: August 8, 2018
27
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This motion complies with the type-volume limitation of Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 27(a)(2)(B) because the motion
contains 5,200 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempt by Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(f).
This motion complies with the typeface requirements of Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(6) because it has been
prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface (14-point Century
Schoolbook) using Microsoft Word.

Ashley C. Parrish
Counsel for South Carolina

Electric & Gas Company
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the
Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system, which will effect service
on all parties, on August 8, 2018.

Ashley C. Parrish
Counsel for South Carolina

Electric & Gas Company
Exhibit A
D.E. 101
3:18-cv-01795-JMC Date Filed 08/06/18 Entry Number 101 Page 1 of 34
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, ) Civil Action No.: 3:18-cv-01795-JMC
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
Cromer H. Randall, in his official capacity )
as Chairman of the South Carolina Public ) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
Service Commission; Swain E. Whitfield, in ) OF LAW, AND ORDER AND
his official capacity as Commissioner of the ) OPINION DENYING SCE&G’S
South Carolina Public Service Commission; ) MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
John E. Howard, in his official capacity as ) INJUNCTION1
Commissioner of the South Carolina Public )
Service Commission; Elliot F. Elam, Jr., in his )
official capacity as Commissioner of the )
South Carolina Public Service Commission; )
G. O’Neal Hamilton, in his official capacity )
as Commissioner of the South Carolina )
Public Service Commission; and Thomas J. )
Ervin, in his official capacity as Commissioner )
of the South Carolina Public Service Commission, )
)
Defendants.2 )
________________________________________ )
Plaintiff South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (“SCE&G”) brings this action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional claims against the following Defendants in their
1
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the court to “state the findings and
conclusions that support” the “granting or refusing [of] an interlocutory injunction.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 52(a)(2). To the extent any findings of fact constitute conclusions of law, they are adopted as
such; to the extent any conclusions of law constitute findings of fact, they are so adopted.
Moreover, as this is a preliminary injunction, any facts identified “are not final determinations of
disputed matters.” EZ Gard Indus., Inc. v. XO Athletic Co., No. 07-CV-4769 (JMR/FLN), 2008
WL 1827490, at *1 n.1 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2008).
2
On July 1, 2018, the terms of former Defendants Robert T. Bockman and Elizabeth Fleming
expired; Thomas J. Ervin began his term as a Commissioner of the South Carolina Public Service
Commission; and, Cromer H. Randall became the Chairman of the South Carolina Public
Service Commission. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Plaintiff substituted the
new Defendants accordingly in its Amended Verified Complaint. (Compare ECF No. 1, with
ECF No. 68.)
official capacities as Commissioners of the South Carolina Public Service Commission (“PSC”):
Swain E. Whitfield, Comer H. Randall, John E. Howard, Elliot F. Elam, Jr., Thomas J. Ervin, and G.
O’Neal Hamilton (collectively, “Defendants”). (ECF No. 68.) Specifically, SCE&G alleges that
its rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution; the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article 1, § 10 of the United States Constitution; and
the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
were violated when the South Carolina General Assembly passed (1) Act of June 28, 2018, 2018
South Carolina Laws Act 287 (H.B. 4375) (“Act 287”3) and (2) Act of July 2, 2018, 2018 South
Carolina Laws Resolution 285 (S. 0954) (“Resolution 285”).4 (ECF No. 68 at 7 ¶ 18 & 47 ¶
239–53 ¶ 284.)
This matter is before the court on SCE&G’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No.
5), which is opposed by Defendants and by South Carolina House of Representatives Speaker
Jay Lucas (“Speaker Lucas”), South Carolina Senate President Pro Tempore Hugh K.
Leatherman, Sr. (“President Leatherman”) (together, “Intervenor Defendants”), and South
Carolina Attorney General Alan Wilson (“Attorney General Wilson”).5 (ECF Nos. 31, 54, 59,
61.) For the reasons set forth in detail below, the court DENIES SCE&G’s Motion for
3
“Act 287” was ratified as “R287,” but is enumerated as Act 258. To be consistent with the
filings in this case, the court will refer to Act of June 28, 2018, 2018 South Carolina Laws Act
287 as “Act 287.”
4
“The PSC is charged with implementing the provisions of” Act 287 and Resolution 285. (ECF
No. 68 at 6–7 ¶ 17.) According to SCE&G, “[e]ach of the defendants, as individual
Commissioners on the PSC, have been, and are expected to be, personally involved in taking
actions to implement [] Act [287 and Resolution 285] and violate SCE&G’s constitutional
rights.” (Id.)
5
On July 18, 2018, the court granted Motions to Intervene filed by Intervenor Defendants. (ECF
Nos. 41, 82.) Additionally, on July 5, 2018, Attorney General Wilson moved to file an Amicus
Brief (ECF No. 10) and the court granted Attorney General Wilson’s Motion on July 12, 2018.
(ECF Nos. 27, 87.)
2
Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 5.)
I. JURISDICTION
1. The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) because
SCE&G is suing Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of its rights under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; the Bill of
Attainder Clause of Article 1, § 10 of the United States Constitution; and the Takings Clause of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 68 at 7 ¶ 18.)
2. Additionally, the court has determined that its exercise of jurisdiction is not
constrained by application of the Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342, Younger abstention, Pullman
abstention, Burford abstention, or sovereign immunity. (See ECF No. 97 at 7–19.)
II. FINDINGS OF FACT RELEVANT TO PENDING MOTION
3. This case arises out of SCE&G’s abandonment of the construction of two nuclear
reactors known as V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 (the “Project”) in Jenkinsville, South Carolina,
and the South Carolina General Assembly’s passage of Act 287 and Resolution 285. (E.g., ECF
No. 68 at 1–2.)
4. The purpose of the Project was to increase SCE&G’s base load capacity and
enable it to meet the electricity demands of its South Carolina customers.6 (See ECF No. 68 at 7
¶ 20, 13 ¶ 54–14 ¶ 61.)
5. SCE&G’s incentive for the Project occurred as a result of the South Carolina
General Assembly’s passage of the Base Load Review Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-210 et seq.
6
“Base load” is defined as “the minimum amount of electric power delivered or required over a
given period of time at a steady rate.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, Glossary,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=B (last visited on Aug. 6, 2018).
3
(20157) (“BLRA”), which became “effective upon signature of the Governor on May 3, 2007.”
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-210.8
6. The PSC is “vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate the rates
and service of every public utility in this State and to fix just and reasonable standards,
classifications, regulations, practices, and measurements of service to be furnished, imposed, or
observed, and followed by every public utility in this State.” S.C. Code Ann. § 58-3-140(A). As
a result, all rates charged by a utility in the state of South Carolina must be approved by the PSC.
See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 58-27-820, -830.
7. On May 30, 2008, SCE&G filed a Combined Application for Certificate of
Environmental Compatibility, Public Convenience and Necessity9 (the “Application”) with the
PSC, pursuant to the BLRA. (ECF No. 68 at 14 ¶ 65.) SCE&G sought approval for construction
of the Project based on a projected cost of $6.3 billion. (Id. ¶ 64.) SCE&G initially projected
that it would complete V.C. Summer Unit 2 by April 1, 2016, and Unit 3 by January 1, 2019.
(ECF No. 68-2 at 17.) In order to avail itself of tax credits and to get the revised rates under the
BLRA, SCE&G needed to complete the Project by 2020. (ECF No. 99 at 58:20–23.) SCE&G
7
All South Carolina Code sections from Title 58 are included in the 2015 codification of Title
58, and the court declines to repeat the year in each citation.
8
“The [stated] purpose of the BLRA ‘is to provide for the recovery of the prudently incurred
costs associated with new base load plants . . . when constructed by investor-owned electrical
utilities, while at the same time protecting customers of investor-owned electrical utilities from
responsibility for imprudent financial obligations or costs.’” S.C. Energy Users Comm. v.
SCE&G, 764 S.E.2d 913, 916 (S.C. 2014) (quoting S.C. Energy Users Comm. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of S.C., 697 S.E.2d 587, 592 (S.C. 2010) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-210)). The
BLRA permitted utilities to apply for a “base load review order,” which would establish that if a
base load plant is constructed or being constructed in accordance with an approved construction
schedule and approved capital costs estimates, then the plant’s financing of capital costs for
construction may be recovered through utility rates. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 58-33-220(4), 58-33-
275.
9
A “combined application” is “a base load review application which is combined with an
application for a certificate under the Utility Facility Siting and Environmental Protection Act.”
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-220(6).
4
later amended the scheduling dates to convey that it would not complete Unit 2 until 2022 and
Unit 3 until 2024. (Id. at 60:8–12.)
8. On March 2, 2009, the PSC approved SCE&G’s Application to construct the
Project finding that its construction “is reasonable and prudent.” (See ECF No. 68-3 at 6 ¶ 11;
see also ECF Nos. 68-1, 68-2.)
9. SCE&G began construction on the Project. (ECF No. 68 at 20 ¶ 96.)
10. On nine occasions between 2008 and 2016, the PSC approved SCE&G’s revised-
rate requests, permitting it to recover for the capital costs of the Project amounting to $445
million annually. (ECF Nos. 68-6 to 68-14.10)
11. As of September 30, 2017, SCE&G has invested approximately $5 billion on the
Project and $316 million in transmission costs related to delivery facilities. (ECF No. 99 at
14:16–23; ECF No. 68 at 26 ¶ 124.)
12. Ratepayers have paid to SCE&G roughly $2 billion in revised rates for financing
the Project. (ECF No. 99 at 61:10–15.)
13. On July 31, 2017, SCE&G “announced that it would cease construction of the
[Project’s] Units and request recovery of its abandoned costs, an outcome expressly
contemplated by the BLRA.” (ECF No. 68 at 31–32 ¶ 158.)
14. On August 1, 2017, SCE&G filed a Petition for Prudency Determination
Regarding Abandonment, Amendments to the Construction Schedule, Capital Cost Schedule and
Other Terms of the BLRA Orders for the V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3 and Related Matters (the
“Petition”) with the PSC to abandon construction of the Project. (ECF No. 68 at 32 ¶ 159.) In
10
PSC Order No. 2009-104(A), PSC Order No. 2009-696, PSC Order No. 2010-625, PSC Order
No. 2011-738, PSC Order No. 2012-761, PSC Order No. 2013-680(A), PSC Order No. 2014-
785, Order No. 2015-712, and PSC Order No. 2016-758.
5
the Petition, SCE&G alleges that it asked the PSC to “enter an order finding that SCE&G’s
decision to abandon the construction of the [V.C. Summer] Units was reasonable and prudent”
and “sought authorization to calculate revised rates reflecting SCE&G’s incurred construction
costs and costs of abandonment, pursuant to the BLRA.” (Id. ¶¶ 160–61.)
15. On August 9, 2017, the South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff (“ORS”)
moved to dismiss SCE&G’s Petition. (Id. ¶ 162.)
16. SCE&G contends that it voluntarily withdrew its Petition on August 15, 2017,
“after legislative leadership demanded more time for legislators to review the project and
threatened to bring the South Carolina General Assembly back into a special session for the
specific purpose of preventing SCE&G from recovering its abandoned costs.” (Id. ¶¶ 164–165.)
17. On January 12, 2018, SCE&G and Dominion Energy, Inc., filed a Joint
Application and Petition (“Joint Petition”), PSC Docket 2017-370-E, with the PSC for review
and approval of the merger between SCE&G and Dominion. (ECF No. 31-1.) In the Joint
Petition, SCE&G requested that the PSC permit SCE&G to recover up to $5 billion from
ratepayers over the next 20 years for the abandoned Project. (Id. at 51–52.)
18. SCE&G alleges that in response to the Project’s abandonment, the South Carolina
General Assembly passed Act 287 and Resolution 285. (ECF No. 68 at 36 ¶ 177.) Act 287
became law on June 28, 2018, and Resolution 285 became law on July 2, 2018. Act 287
instructs the PSC to set utility rates for SCE&G at a level equal to their current rates less the
increases previously granted under the BLRA within five (5) days of the passage of the Act.
2018 S.C. Acts 258 § 3. Act 287 specified that the “experimental rate” would be effective from
the PSC’s implementation until the conclusion of the proceedings currently before the PSC
regarding the Project. Id.
6
19. Additionally, Resolution 285 prohibited the PSC from holding a hearing on the
pending dockets11 prior to November 1, 2018, and instructed the PSC to issue a final decision in
the abandonment proceedings by December 21, 2018. 2018 S.C. Acts 285 § 1.
20. Both the Act and the Resolution repealed any sections of law in conflict with their
operation. 2018 S.C. Acts 258 § 2; 2018 S.C. Acts 285 § 3.
21. Act 287 also repealed the BLRA for any future projects and provided definitions
for prudency, imprudency, and fraud. 2018 S.C. Acts 258 §§ 1, 2.
22. On June 29, 2018, SCE&G filed its Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment
and Temporary, Preliminary, and Permanent Injunctive Relief against Defendants pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of both Act 287 and Resolution 285, asserting the
elimination of the rate increases violates SCE&G’s constitutional rights and “impermissibly
interfere[s] with interstate commerce.” (ECF No. 68 at 2 ¶ 2.) This lawsuit does not challenge
11
The PSC “currently has several pending dockets in which it will need to address complex
issues surrounding the prudency of the costs incurred on the Project, the prudency of
abandonment, whether and to what extent revised rates are recoverable, and the final rate
SCE&G will be permitted to charge its ratepayers.” (ECF No. 52-1 at 20.) The matters are
identified as:
Joint Application and Petition of South Carolina Electric & Gas Company and
Dominion Energy, Incorporated for Review and Approval of a Proposed Business
Combination between SCANA Corporation and Dominion Energy, Incorporated,
as May Be Required, and for a Prudency Determination Regarding the
Abandonment of the V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3 and Associated Consumer
Benefits and Cost Recovery Plans, Docket No. 2017-370-E;
Friends of the Earth and Sierra Club, Complainant/Petitioner v. South Carolina
Electric & Gas Company, Defendant Respondent, Docket No. 2017-207-E; and
Request of the Office of Regulatory Staff for Rate Relief to South Carolina
Electric and Gas Company’s Rates Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-27-920,
Docket No. 2017-305-E.
(ECF No. 31 at 7.) SCE&G is the only utility with pending docket matters before the PSC
concerning the BLRA. The court is informed that the aforementioned matters have been
consolidated. (Id.)
7
or seek review of any PSC order. (Id. at 3 ¶ 4.)
23. On July 2, 2018, SCE&G moved for a preliminary injunction based on its
constitutional claims. (ECF No. 5.) SCE&G seeks relief from the alleged unconstitutional
legislative enactment of Act 287 and Resolution 285. More specifically, SCE&G seeks to enjoin
Defendants from future implementation of Act 287 and Resolution 285. SCE&G does not seek
to enjoin any PSC orders regarding SCE&G’s project construction, capital cost schedules, or rate
increases.12
24. On July 2, 2018, SCE&G sent the PSC a letter informing it that SCE&G had filed
the instant Motion for Preliminary Injunction and requesting that the PSC consent to the
injunction. (ECF No. 94-36.)
25. On July 2, 2018, the PSC issued Order No. 2018-459 (ordered by Defendants
Elam, Ervin, Hamilton, Howard, Randall, and Whitfield) directing SCE&G to calculate a
reduction in its retail electric rates and tariffs by approximately 15% and to submit full tariff
sheet summaries. (ECF No. 94-37.)
26. On July 3, 2018, SCE&G sent the PSC a letter and attached the requested tariff
sheet summaries. (ECF No. 94-40.)
27. On July 3, 2018, the PSC issued Order No. 2018-460 (ordered by Defendants
Elam, Ervin, Hamilton, Howard, Randall, and Whitfield), setting an experimental rate requiring
SCE&G to reduce its electric rates as required by Act 287. (See ECF No. 33-4.) The PSC’s July
3, 2018 Order directs SCE&G to begin implementing the experimental rate in the first billing
cycle in August, which begins on August 7, 2018. (ECF No. 33-4; ECF No. 9 at 2.) The
12
Those orders include: PSC Order 2008-196 (E) approving SCE&G’s combined application
(ECF No. 68-1 to 68-3); PSC Order No. 2009-104(A) approving initial capital cost schedule and
construction schedule (id.); and eleven PSC Orders approving SCE&G’s requests for rate
increases (ECF Nos. 68-6 to 68-14).
8
experimental rate is a monthly reduction of 14.8% for SCE&G’s customers. (ECF No. 99 at
91:5–9.)
28. Act 287’s requirement of an experimental rate, effective from April 1, 2018,
forces SCE&G to (1) “refund” to customers $120 million collected from April to August 2018,
and (2) lose approximately $30 million per month until the PSC’s final decision on the
abandonment proceedings. (Id. at 16:16–22, 17:5–16.)
29. On July 16, 2018, Defendants filed opposition to SCE&G’s Motion for
30. On July 20, 2018, Defendants and Intervenor Defendants filed Motions to
Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF Nos.
48, 50, 52.)
31. On July 23, 2018, Attorney General Wilson filed an Amicus Brief opposing
SCE&G’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.13 (ECF No. 54.)
32. On July 25, 2018, Intervenor Defendants filed opposition to the instant Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. (ECF Nos. 59, 61.)
33. On July 26, 2018, the court granted in part and denied in part the Motions to
Dismiss, dismissed the Complaint, and granted SCE&G leave to file an amended complaint until
July 27, 2018. (ECF No. 67.)
34. On July 27, 2018, SCE&G filed a Verified Amended Complaint, renewing its
request that the court: (1) “Enter a declaratory judgment declaring Act 287 and Resolution 285
are unconstitutional in that they constitute an unlawful taking; violate the substantive and
procedural components of the Due Process Clause, and constitute an unlawful bill of attainder”;
13
After SCE&G filed its Amended Complaint (ECF No. 68), Attorney General Wilson renewed
his Amicus Brief with leave from the Court. (ECF Nos. 85, 87.)
9
and (2) “Enter a temporary, preliminary and permanent injunction directing the Chairman and
Commissioners of the PSC, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and
any other persons who are in active concert or participation with them, to refrain from
implementing Act [287] and Joint Resolution [285].” (ECF No. 68 at 53.)
35. On July 28, 2018, Defendants and Intervenor Defendants filed renewed Motions
to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). (ECF Nos. 76, 77, 78.)
36. On July 30, 2018, SCE&G filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants and
Intervenor Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. (ECF No. 91.)
37. The court heard the parties’ arguments regarding the Preliminary Injunction and
renewed Motions to Dismiss during a hearing on July 30–31, 2018. (ECF Nos. 92, 95.)
38. On August 1, 2018, SCE&G filed a Reply to the Opposition Briefs to its Motion
for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 96.)
39. On August 2, 2018, the court denied the renewed Motions to Dismiss. (ECF No.
97.)
40. As discussed below, upon review of the extensive briefing on the instant Motion
and hearing the parties’ detailed arguments, the court finds that the legal issues in dispute weigh
against granting SCE&G the requested relief. The parties’ positions are discussed in greater
detail below in the context of SCE&G’s specific allegations.
III. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
A. Preliminary Injunctions Generally
41. The court’s authority to issue a preliminary injunction arises from Rule 65, but “it
is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish all four of the
10
following elements: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an
injunction is in the public interest. Id.; The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 346–47 (4th Cir. 2009).
42. The Fourth Circuit no longer recognizes a “flexible interplay among the four
criteria for a preliminary injunction.” Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 347. Each of these requirements
“must be fulfilled as articulated.” De la Fuente v. S.C. Dem. Party, CA No. 3:16-cv-00322-
CMC, 2016 WL 741317, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 25, 2016).
43. “The traditional purpose of a preliminary injunction is to protect the status quo
and to prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of the lawsuit ultimately to preserve the
court’s ability to render a meaningful judgment on the merits.” De La Fuenta, 2016 WL 741317,
at *2.
B. SCE&G’s Request for Relief
44. SCE&G seeks a preliminary injunction that: (a) stays the effect of Act 287 and
Resolution 285; and (b) enjoins Defendants from instituting or implementing any of Act 287 and
Resolution 285’s provisions, “including its mandated retail electric rate reduction and refund
provisions, until further order of the Court.”14 (ECF No. 5 at 1.)
C. The Court’s Review
45. In support of its Motion for Preliminary Injunction, SCE&G relies on its
Memorandum of Law (ECF No. 5-1), Reply Memorandum (ECF No. 96), the PSC’s June 28,
2018 notice of special commission business meeting, and the Declaration of Iris N. Griffin (ECF
14
The parties do not offer argument as to whether SCE&G is seeking a prohibitory or a
mandatory preliminary injunction and, as such, which standard is to be applied. However,
because the preliminary injunction SCE&G seeks is not appropriate under the less stringent
standard, the court need not resolve this dispute.
11
No. 5-3), SCE&G’s Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer.
46. In opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Defendants rely on their
Memorandum of Law (ECF No. 31), a Joint Application and Petition by SCE&G and Dominion
Energy, Inc., for review and approval of their merger (ECF No. 31-1), a September 26, 2017
Petition for rate relief filed by the ORS with the PSC (ECF No. 31-2), and the PSC’s July 5,
2018 hearing officer directive (ECF No. 31-3).
47. In opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, President Leatherman
relies on his Memorandum of Law (ECF No. 59).
48. In opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Speaker Lucas relies on
his Memorandum of Law (ECF No. 61).
49. In opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Attorney General Wilson
relies on his Amicus Brief (ECF No. 54) and his Supplement to the Amicus Brief. (ECF No. 85.)
50. The court heard testimony from various witnesses and oral argument from the
parties’ counsel on July 30 to July 31, 2018. (ECF Nos. 92, 95.)
51. The parties make a plethora of arguments regarding the meritorious value of
SCE&G’s claims. This court finds that SCE&G has not met its burden under the standard the
Supreme Court set out in Winter. Because SCE&G cannot show that all elements required for
injunctive relief are met, the court refuses to grant injunctive relief to SCE&G. The court
addresses below the vitality of SCE&G’s assertions under the requirements set forth in Winter
and reiterated by the Fourth Circuit in Real Truth.
IV. SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Clear Showing of Likely Success on the Merits
52. “[P]laintiffs seeking preliminary injunctions must demonstrate that they are likely
12
to succeed on the merits.” Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Winter, 555
U.S. at 20). “Although this inquiry requires plaintiffs seeking injunctions to make a ‘clear
showing’ that they are likely to succeed at trial, Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 345, plaintiffs need not
show a certainty of success, see 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
& Procedure § 2948.3 (2d ed. 1995); Pashby, 709 F.3d at 321.
i. SCE&G Cannot Establish a Clear Showing of Likely Success as to the Merits of Its
Claim for an Unconstitutional Taking Based on a Redefinition of Property Rights
and/or a Confiscatory Rate.
53. SCE&G asserts that Act 287 and Resolution 285 violate the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment because they confiscate SCE&G’s property by cutting its rates to
“confiscatory levels.” (ECF No. 5-1 at 4; see also ECF No. 68 at 48 ¶¶ 251–52.) More
specifically, SCE&G asserts that Act 287 and Resolution 285 (1) “set[] a confiscatory rate that
prevents SCE&G from earning enough revenue for its capital costs and, in fact, ‘jeapordize[s]’
SCE&G’s ‘financial integrity,’” (2) “prohibit[] SCE&G from recovering a reasonable return on
its investment, takes away SCE&G’s ability to charge rates sufficient to recover amounts spent
in reliance on the BLRA, would allow Dominion Energy to back out of a company-sustaining
merger, and jeopardizes SCE&G’s ability to access capital to fund short-term operations,” (3)
“make[] no attempt to determine the effect of the experimental rate on SCE&G,” and (4)
“mandate[] an arbitrary experimental rate and authorizes the PSC to adjust the rate, only if and
when the PSC in its sole discretion deems it necessary.” (ECF No. 5-1 at 18.)
54. Both the United States Constitution and South Carolina Constitution prohibit the
government from taking property without just compensation. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV;15
S.C. Const. art. I, § 13.16
15
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States declares that “private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “The
13
55. “The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes
taking without just compensation.” Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452
U.S. 264, 297 n.40 (1981)). “[B]ecause the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without just
compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just compensation has been denied.” Id. at
194 n.13. “The nature of the constitutional right therefore requires that a property owner utilize
procedures for obtaining compensation before bringing a § 1983 action.” Id.
56. “A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on the
value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally
being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other
business undertakings which are attended by corresponding, risks and uncertainties; but it has no
constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or
speculative ventures.” Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W.
Va., 262 U.S. 679, 692–93 (1923). “The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure
confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and
economical management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money
necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties.” Id. at 693. “A rate of return may be
reasonable at one time and become too high or too low by changes affecting opportunities for
investment, the money market and business conditions generally.” Id.
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment[] [is] applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (citing Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)).
16
The South Carolina Constitution provides that “private property shall not be taken for private
use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use with just compensation being first made
for the property.” S.C. Const. art. I, § 13.
14
57. A utility is only allowed “just and reasonable” rates that strike a balance between
investors and ratepayers. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 30 U.S. 747, 770 (1968). In this
regard, rates cannot be so low as to be confiscatory to the utility but so high as to burden the
consumer. Mims v. Edgefield City Water, 299 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1983) (citing Bluefield).
58. The United States Constitution expressly “protects utilities from being limited to a
charge for their property serving the public which is so ‘unjust’ as to be confiscatory.”
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307–08 (1989) (citing Covington & Lexington
Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896) (A rate is too low if it is “so unjust as
to destroy the value of [the] property for all the purposes for which it was acquired,” and in so
doing “practically deprive[s] the owner of property without due process of law.”); FPC v. Nat.
Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942) (“By long standing usage in the field of rate
regulation, the ‘lowest reasonable rate’ is one which is not confiscatory in the constitutional
sense.”); FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391–392 (1974) (“All that is protected against, in a
constitutional sense, is that the rates fixed by the Commission be higher than a confiscatory
level.”)). “If the rate does not afford sufficient compensation, the State has taken the use of
utility property without paying just compensation and so violated the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.” Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308.
59. However, “a regulatory taking claim against a state is not ripe until (1) the state
agency imposing the allegedly confiscatory regulation has taken final action against the
plaintiff’s property and (2) the plaintiff has pursued all available remedies under state law.”17
17
The court’s exercise of its power of judicial review rests upon Article III of the Constitution
and depends on the existence of a case or controversy. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395,
401 (1975). Ripeness is a “subset[ ] of Article III’s command that the courts resolve disputes,
rather than emit random advice.” Bryant v. Cheney, 924 F.2d 525, 529 (4th Cir. 1991). The
purpose of the ripeness doctrine “is to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from
15
U.S. W. Commc’ns v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 193 F.3d 1112, 1126 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing
Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 186–97); see also Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533,
544 (4th Cir. 2013) (“For a takings claim against a state or its political subdivisions to be ripe in
federal court, the plaintiff must first have sought compensation “through the procedures the State
has provided for doing so.”) (citing Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194). “Because the Takings
Clause simply requires the payment of just compensation, not necessarily payment before or
simultaneous with the taking, a plaintiff must first seek compensation from the state via the
procedures that the state has established before suing the state in federal court.” Sansotta, 724
F.3d at 544 (citing Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 195).18
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 580 (1985); see also Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 318–19 (4th Cir. 2006). A
case is ripe for judicial decision where the issues are purely legal in nature, relate to an action
which is final, and is not dependent on future uncertainties or contingencies. Miller, 462 F.3d at
319. In determining whether a case is ripe for review, the court must balance “the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision” and “the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 188 (4th Cir. 2007). Ripeness becomes an
issue when a case is anchored in future events that may not occur as anticipated, or at all. Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 200–201
(1983); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689 (1981). “Ripeness is, thus, a
question of timing.” Smith v. United States, C/A No. 6:08-0203-CMC-WMC, 2008 WL 906699,
at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 1, 2008) (citing Stinson v. Sullivan, No. 1:07-cv-01311 LJO SMS HC, 2008
WL 115124, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2008) (citation omitted)). “The burden of proving ripeness
falls on the party bringing suit.” Miller, 462 F.3d at 319.
18
In Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985), the plaintiff complained that the county’s application of its zoning
regulations to plaintiff’s real estate development amounted to a taking without
just compensation. Id. at 182. The Court took care to note that the trial court
“granted a directed verdict to [the county] on the substantive due process and
equal protection claims, and the jury found that respondent had not been denied
procedural due process. Those issues are not before us.” Id., n.4. Thus, the only
due process claim asserted by the plaintiff was a claim of a taking in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 197. The Court
held that the regulatory taking claim was unripe due to plaintiff’s failure to seek a
variance, Id. at 191–94, and because plaintiff had failed to “seek compensation
through the procedures the State has provided for doing so.” Id. at 194. Without
16
60. Upon review, the court observes that neither Act 287 nor Resolution 285 sets the
specific experimental rate that SCE&G alleges constitutes a taking. Act 287 did instruct
Defendants to exercise their authority and “provide an experimental rate that customers . . . shall
pay during the pendency of litigation currently before the commission . . . .” 2018 S.C. Acts 258
§ 3. However, Resolution 285 prevents Defendants from issuing a final rate determination until
at least November 1, 2018, but no later than December 21, 2018. 2018 S.C. Acts 285 § 1.
61. Because of the foregoing, SCE&G is unable to satisfy the first Williamson County
prong since the court has already concluded that Defendants have not taken final action against
SCE&G’s alleged property by implementing a rate that is confiscatory. (ECF No. 67 at 19, 22.)
62. The court further observes that even if it found that SCE&G satisfied the first
Williamson County prong, it is unable to satisfy the second prong showing that it was denied just
compensation because there is not any evidence in the record that SCE&G pursued to completion
an inverse condemnation action in state court.19 See Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 196–97
(“Respondent has not shown that the inverse condemnation procedure is unavailable or
inadequate, and until it has utilized that procedure, its taking claim is premature.”); see also, e.g.,
Carolina Chloride, Inc. v. Richland Cty., 714 S.E.2d 869, 877 (S.C. 2011) (“Inverse
condemnation is a cause of action by a property owner against a governmental entity to recover
judging the merits of the due process taking claim, the Court held that that claim
was also premature due to plaintiff’s failure to seek a variance. Id. at 199–200.
Salt Creek, L.P. v. City of Warr Acres, No. Civ. 01-1500-F, 2002 WL 32026152, at *9 (W.D.
Okla. June 13, 2002).
19
An inverse condemnation “may result from government-imposed limitations on the use of
private property.” Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 620 S.E.2d 76, 79 (S.C. 2005). “Private property”
is property that is “protected from public appropriation–over which the owner has exclusive and
absolute rights.” Private property, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
17
the value of property that has been effectively ‘taken’ by the governmental entity, although not
through the process of eminent domain.”) (citation omitted).
63. Because SCE&G has failed to meet either prong of the test articulated in
Williamson County, which requires final action by the state against the property owner, SCE&G
cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits at this time on its claim asserting the seizing of
its property by cutting rates to “confiscatory levels” in violation of the Takings Clause.20
ii. SCE&G Cannot Establish a Clear Showing of Likely Success as to the Merits of Its
Claim Alleging a Violation of Substantive and Procedural Due Process.
64. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving a person of property
without substantive and procedural due process. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
65. To succeed on a substantive due process claim, SCE&G must show “(1) that [it]
had property or a property interest; (2) that the state deprived [it] of this property or property
interest; and (3) that the state’s action falls so far beyond the outer limits of legitimate
governmental action that no process could cure the deficiency.” Quinn v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs
for Queen Anne’s Cty., Md., 862 F.3d 433, 443 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sylvia Dev. Corp. v.
Calvert Cty., 48 F.3d 810, 827 (4th Cir. 1995)).
66. To succeed on a procedural due process claim, SCE&G must show (1) “[it] ha[s]
a constitutionally cognizable life, liberty, or property interest,” Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 540; (2)
“that the deprivation of that interest was caused by ‘some form of state action,’” Id. (quoting
Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2009)); and
20
Even though “[r]ipeness is a question of subject matter jurisdiction,” the Williamson County
requirement is not “a jurisdictional rule.” Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 545, 548. Moreover, in
Defendants and Intervenor Defendants Motions to Dismiss, they did not raise the issue of
ripeness. Ripeness is not the same as the abstention issues that were raised by Defendants and
Intervenor Defendants. “Because a district court can abstain only when it has subject matter
jurisdiction, a case must be ripe before a district court may abstain.” Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 548
(citing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).
18
(3) “that the procedures employed were constitutionally inadequate,” Patterson, 566 F.3d at
145.
67. SCE&G cannot establish it is likely to prevail on the merits of its due process
challenges because SCE&G has not shown at this time it clearly has a property interest in
revised rates under the BLRA.21
68. The Constitution does not create property interests. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Property interests are “created and their dimensions defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or
understanding that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits.” Id. “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it . . . . He must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Id.; see
also Beckham v. Harris, 756 F.2d 1032, 1036 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The sufficiency of such a
legitimate claim of entitlement must be decided by reference to state law, as evidenced by state
statutes, local ordinances, rules, or mutually explicit understandings that support the claim.”
(citation omitted)).
69. Under South Carolina law, “[t]o determine if the expectation of entitlement is
sufficient ‘will depend largely upon the extent to which the statute contains mandatory language
that restricts the discretion of the [agency] . . . .’” Grimsley v. S.C. Law Enf’t Div., 721 S.E.2d
423, 427 (S.C. 2012) (quoting Jacobson v. Hannifin, 627 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir. 1980)); Doyle
v. City of Medford, 606 F.3d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A regulation granting broad discretion
21
The court’s inquiry is not whether SCE&G “may collect PSC-approved rates following its
abandonment announcement” (ECF No. 91-1 at 30 (emphasis added)), but whether SCE&G is
entitled to collect PSC-approved rates. Under S.C. Code Ann. § 58-27-820, SCE&G may be
required to accept the current PSC-approved rates, but that does not inform whether SCE&G
holds an entitlement in those rates now that it has abandoned the Project.
19
to a decision-maker does not create a property interest.”); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v.
City of Lawrence, Kan., 927 F.2d 1111, 1116 (10th Cir. 1991) (“When analyzing whether a
plaintiff presents a legitimate claim of entitlement, we focus on the degree of discretion given
the decisionmaker . . . .”).
70. SCE&G posits the South Carolina Supreme Court “has held that a law that
guarantees a person a future payment creates a cognizable property interest in that payment.”
(ECF No. 5-1 at 18 (citing Grimsley).)
71. Additionally, SCE&G asserts the BLRA, in two of its subsections, contains
mandatory language “entitl[ing] SCE&G to collect rate payments so as to recover its prudently
incurred capital costs related to the nuclear facility construction and the cost of that capital.”
(ECF No. 5-1 at 20.)
72. SCE&G first points to S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-275(A), which provides, “[A]
base load review order shall constitute a final and binding determination that a plant is used and
useful for utility purposes, and that its capital costs are prudent utility costs and expenses and
are properly included in rates so long as that plant is constructed or being constructed within the
parameters of (1) the approved construction schedule including contingencies; and (2) the
approved capital costs estimates including specific contingencies.” (See also ECF No. 5-1 at
19.)
73. Under S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-275(A), the capital costs to construct a nuclear
plant are prudent and properly included in rates “so long as” (1) the plant is “constructed or
being constructed” and (2) “within the parameters of . . . the approved construction schedule . . .
and . . . the approved capital costs estimates” (emphasis added). See also S.C. Code Ann. § 58-
33-275(C) (“So long as the plant is constructed or being constructed in accordance with the
20
approved schedules, estimates, and projections . . . the utility must be allowed to recover its
capital costs related to the plant through revised rate filings or general rate proceedings.”
(emphasis added)).
74. The phrase “so long as” is “not purely [a] temporal construction[]; more often
than not, [it] express[es] a condition rather than a time limit.” Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s
Dictionary of Legal Usage 82 (3d ed. 2011). See also Moro v. State, 351 P.3d 1, 32 (Or. 2015)
(“[T]he phrase ‘as long as’22 means ‘provided that,’ Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 129
(unabridged ed.[ ]2002), and serves the same function as the phrase ‘if and only if,’ Rodney
Huddleston and Geoffrey K. Pullum, The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language 758
(2002).”).
75. Because, under S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-275(A), the final and binding nature of a
base load review order is conditioned upon whether (1) the plant is “constructed or being
constructed” (2) “within the parameters of . . . the approved construction schedule . . . and . . .
the approved capital costs estimates,” it is not clear that any entitlement exists where a nuclear
plant is not constructed or being constructed.23
76. Accordingly, S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-275(A) constrains the discretion of the PSC
in setting utility rates according to its own base load review orders only so long as a nuclear
22
The phrases “so long as” and “as long as” are defined together by Garner, see Garner, supra ¶
74.
23
SCE&G asserts Act 287 “forces SCE&G to fork over $100 million it previously recovered in
lawful rates.” (ECF No. 5-1 at 26.) The court notes that the PSC’s July 3, 2018 Order does
require SCE&G to refund ratepayers, mandating a “one-time credit for the months of April, May,
June and July should be implemented with the August 2018 billing cycle.” (ECF No. 33-4.)
However, SCE&G does not challenge the PSC’s July 3, 2018 Order. (ECF No. 68 at 3
paragraph 4.) Act 287 instructs the PSC how to calculate the experimental rate and the period to
which that rate should apply, but does not mandate a “refund,” as suggested by SCE&G. (ECF
No. 99 at 16:16–22.) Furthermore, because SCE&G abandoned the Project on July 31, 2017,
SCE&G cannot legitimately claim an entitlement to revised rates collected after abandonment
because it was no longer constructing the Project.
21
plant is constructed or being constructed within the parameters of the approved construction
schedule and the approved capital costs.
77. The court understands there to be three different rate periods at issue. This first
period is the time during which SCE&G was either constructing or otherwise abandoning the
Project and charging ratepayers the revised rates approved by the nine base load review orders
of the PSC. The second rate period is the time during which SCE&G was no longer
constructing the Project but continued to charge the revised rates. The third time period will be
governed by the outcome of the abandonment proceedings currently ongoing before the PSC, as
the PSC must determine when SCE&G was either no longer constructing the Project or
otherwise abandoning the Project and whether SCE&G’s decision to abandon was prudent,
entitling SCE&G to continue to recover the capital costs of the Project. See S.C. Code Ann. §
58-33-280(K).
78. The period during which S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-275(A) may create a property
interest would be the first, as it would coincide with language “so long as the plant is
constructed or being constructed.” S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-275(A). During this period, a
utility’s claim of an entitlement to having its capital costs included in rates may be legitimate, as
the statute uses language generally held to be mandatory like “shall.” See S.C. Code Ann. § 58-
33-275(A) (“[A] base load review order shall constitute a final and binding determination that a
plant is used and useful for utility purposes, and that its capital costs are prudent utility costs
and expenses and are properly included in rates . . . .”). See also Trumball Invs., Ltd. I v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 436 F.3d 443, 447 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating “‘shall’ typically is mandatory
in nature”). However, during the second and third periods, the “so long as the plant is
constructed or being constructed” language ceases to constrain the discretion of the PSC,
22
decreasing the legitimacy of any expectation of entitlement to include the capital costs in rates.
79. Similarly, the language in S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-280(K) constrains the
discretion of the PSC only insofar as “the utility . . . prov[es] by a preponderance of the
evidence that the decision to abandon construction of the plant was prudent.”
80. Accordingly, in the event of abandonment after a base load review order
approving rate recovery has been issued, the capital costs “shall nonetheless be recoverable . . .
provided that” the utility can prove the greater weight of the evidence shows the decision to
abandon the plant was prudent. S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-280(K) (emphasis added).
81. The mandatory language “shall nonetheless be recoverable” does not
significantly restrict the discretion of the PSC because it can deny a utility recovery of its capital
costs if the PSC determines the utility did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the utility’s decision to abandon was prudent. See also S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-225(G) (“If the
utility decides to abandon the project after issuance of a prudency determination . . . the
preconstruction costs related to that project may be deferred . . . and may be included in rates in
the utility’s next general rate proceeding or revised rates proceeding, provided that as to the
decision to abandon the plant, the utility shall bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the decision was prudent.” (emphasis added)).
82. Accordingly, SCE&G has not clearly shown that S.C. Code Ann. §§ 58-33-
275(A) or 58-33-280(K) significantly limit the discretion of the PSC.
83. Furthermore, no section of the BLRA limits the power of the South Carolina
General Assembly to regulate utility rates. See Doyle, 606 F.3d at 672 (“A regulation granting
broad discretion to a decision-maker does not create a property interest.”). See also S.C. Const.
art. IX, § 1 (“The General Assembly shall provide for appropriate regulation of common
23
carriers, publicly owned utilities, and privately owned utilities serving the public as and to the
extent required by the public interest.”).
84. Even though the South Carolina General Assembly has entrusted the PSC with
rate-making power, this grant of power is still subordinate to the General Assembly’s rate-
making authority. See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 313–14 (“It cannot seriously be contended that
the Constitution prevents state legislatures from giving specific instructions to their utility
commissions. We have never doubted that state legislatures are competent bodies to set utility
rates.”); Glendale Water Corp. of Florence v. City of Florence, 265 S.E.2d 41, 42 (S.C. 1980)
(stating the PSC was “creat[ed] by the General Assembly [and] derive[es] all its powers
therefrom”); Piedmont & N. Ry. Co. v. Scott, 24 S.E.2d 353, 361 (S.C. 1943) (“If the conditions
referred to in the [PSC] order are such that they should be remedied[,] this is a matter for the
General Assembly, either by direct legislation to that end, or legislation enlarging the powers of
the [PSC].”).
85. Based on the foregoing, SCE&G’s expectation of entitlement under S.C. Code
Ann. § 58-33-275(A) and S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-280(K) is not legitimate or sufficient because
the statutes do not significantly limit the discretion of the PSC or the South Carolina General
Assembly. See Grimsley, 721 S.E.2d at 427 (“To determine if the expectation of entitlement is
sufficient ‘will depend largely upon the extent to which the statute contains mandatory language
that restricts the discretion of the [agency] . . . .’” (quoting Jacobson, 627 F.2d at 180)); Jacobs,
927 F.2d at 1116 (“When analyzing whether a plaintiff presents a legitimate claim of
entitlement, we focus on the degree of discretion given the decisionmaker and not on the
probability of the decision's favorable outcome.”).
86. To the extent S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-275(A) does create a property interest, that
24
interest exists only “so long as” (1) the plant is “constructed or being constructed” (2) “within
the parameters of . . . the approved construction schedule . . . and . . . the approved capital costs
estimates.” S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-275(A) (emphasis added). See Doyle, 606 F.3d at 673 (“A
factual contingency does not necessarily preclude the creation of a protected property interest. . .
. [A] statute may create a property interest if it mandates a benefit when specific non-
discretionary factual criteria are met.”).
87. The phrase “so long as” in S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-275(A) conditions retention of
any alleged property interest under S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-275(A) on whether (1) the plant is
“constructed or being constructed” (2) “within the parameters of . . . the approved construction
schedule . . . and . . . the approved capital costs estimates.” See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S.
516, 526 (1982) (“We have no doubt that, just as a State may create a property interest that is
entitled to constitutional protection, the State has the power to condition the permanent retention
of that property right on the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present
intention to retain the interest.”).
88. SCE&G’s abandonment of the Project, (ECF No. 5-1 at 7–8), means SCE&G is
no longer performing the conditions necessary to retain any alleged property right under S.C.
Code Ann. § 58-33-275(A), likely extinguishing any entitlement SCE&G could claim under
S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-275(A).
89. To the extent S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-280(K) creates a property interest, the
phrase “provided that” in S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-280(K) conditions any alleged interest upon
SCE&G showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the utility’s decision to abandon
construction of the plant was prudent. S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-280(K).
25
90. SCE&G cannot claim an entitlement under S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-280(K) until
it makes this showing to the PSC. See S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-280(K) (“[T]he costs . . . related
to the plant shall nonetheless be recoverable . . . provided that the utility bear the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision to abandon the plant was
prudent.” (emphasis added)).
91. Moreover the South Carolina General Assembly can likely extinguish property
interests it has created if the conditions on which those interests depend are not met. See United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104 (1985) (“Even with respect to vested property rights, a
legislature generally has the power to impose new regulatory constraints on the way in which
those rights are used, or to condition their continued retention on performance of certain
affirmative duties. As long as the constraint or duty imposed is a reasonable restriction
designed to further legitimate legislative objectives, the legislature acts within its powers in
imposing such new constraints or duties.”) See also Seldovia Native Ass’n, Inc. v. United
States, 35 Fed. Cl. 761, 773 (1996) (stating Congress “has the power to extinguish property
interests it has created if the beneficiaries of the grant do not meet any conditions precedent”).
92. Upon SCE&G’s abandonment of the Project, and thus failure to perform the
necessary statutory conditions defined under S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-275(A), the South
Carolina General Assembly passed Act 287 and Resolution 285, exercising its power to regulate
utility rates and “to impose new regulatory constraints on the way in which [any alleged
property] rights are used, or to condition their continued retention on performance of certain
affirmative duties.” Locke, 471 U.S. at 104.
26
93. Thus, because SCE&G has not shown it has a property interest under the BLRA,
it has failed to establish a clear showing of likely success as to the merits of its claim for
substantive and procedural due process.
iii. SCE&G Cannot Establish a Clear Showing of Likely Success as to the Merits of Its
Claim for a Bill of Attainder.
94. The United States Constitution prohibits states from enacting “bills of attainder.”
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10.
95. A statute is an unconstitutional bill of attainder if it “determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial
trial.” Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977). The Supreme Court later
clarified that the Nixon definition contains three (3) elements: “specification of the affected
persons, punishment, and a lack of a judicial trial.” Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest
Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 847 (1984).
96. A law may not be directed at “an identifiable individual,” Nixon, 433 U.S. at
468;24 however, a law does not automatically violate the prohibition on bills of attainder by
referring to an individual. Id. at 471–72.
97. In Nixon, the law in question addressed policies for the storage of presidential
papers. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472. The law accepted the storage arrangements of the papers of all
former presidents except Nixon, specifically provided for the preservation of Nixon’s materials,
and established a process for reviewing the general standards regarding the storage of
presidential papers. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472. Portions of the law only affected President Nixon
24
Defendants suggest that SCE&G may not assert that Act 287 is a bill of attainder because it is
a corporation. (ECF No. 31 at 15–16 (citing A Helping Hand, LLC v. Balt. Cty., Md., 299 F.
Supp. 2d 501 n.3 (D. Md. 2004)).) However, the court in Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pataki,
292 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2002), held “that corporations must be considered ‘individual[s],’ that may
not be singled out for punishment under the Bill of Attainder Clause in Article I, Section 10.”
Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 349 (citation omitted).
27
and his papers, but he was “a legitimate class of one” because “[t]he Presidential papers of all
[other] former Presidents . . . were already housed in functioning Presidential libraries” and “he
alone has entered into a depository agreement, . . . which by its terms called for the destruction of
certain of the materials.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472. As a result, “Congress ha[d] reason for
concern solely with the preservation of [Nixon’s] materials,” and it was permissible for Congress
to specifically address the storage of his materials. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472.
98. Section 3 of Act 287, the portion addressing the creation and implementation of
the experimental rate, identifies a single utility and changes only that utility’s rates. See 2018
S.C. Acts 258 § 3 (creating S.C. Code Ann. § 58-334-10 (“(A) The investor-owned utility
holding the majority interest in the V. C. Summer Nuclear Reactor Units 2 and 3 at Jenkinsville,
South Carolina, has entered into a merger agreement with an out-of-state investor-owned utility. .
. . (B) . . . This rate shall apply to all customers of the investor-owned utility identified in
subsection (A), which has imposed nine rate increases for the purpose of funding the V. C.
Summer project.”)). By definition, there cannot be more than one “utility holding the majority
interest in the V.C. Summer Nuclear Reactor Units 2 and 3 at Jenkinsville, South Carolina . . . .”
Moreover, Act 287’s references to SCE&G’s potential merger with Dominion Energy, Inc. and
the revised rates granted to SCE&G during the Project’s construction further indicate that the
South Carolina General Assembly intended for Act 287 to affect only SCE&G.
99. However, SCE&G constitutes a legitimate class of one because SCE&G is the
only utility to avail itself of the BLRA and recover capital costs from a base load project, see
South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff, Historical Electric Residential Bills (listing SCE&G
as the only utility to receive a rate increase from the BLRA since its enactment in 2007),
http://www.regulatorystaff.sc.gov/electric/Pages/RateAdjustments.aspx (last visited Aug. 3,
28
2018).
100. Similar to Nixon, Act 287 contains both a general policy decision and a solution
to a unique set of facts existing at the time of the law’s passage. In Nixon, Congress decided to
review the policies affecting the storage of all presidential papers–that is, to establish a general
policy. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472. Act 287 represents a determination by the South Carolina
General Assembly that the public interest requires the repeal of the BLRA. See 2018 S.C. Acts
258 § 2 (preventing any further applications under the BLRA and repealing the BLRA upon the
conclusion of the abandonment proceedings concerning the Project). After establishing a new
policy, the law in Nixon addressed the circumstances surrounding President Nixon’s papers–the
only ones that were not stored in a presidential library. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472. Similarly, Act
287, after making a generalized policy determination about the BLRA, addresses the specifics of
SCE&G’s rates. 2018 S.C. Acts 258 § 3 (“The General Assembly has determined that Section 1,
Article IX of the Constitution requires that the General Assembly exercise its authority to set
certain utility rates for the purpose of protecting the public interest until a determination can be
made by the appropriate regulatory and judicial authorities.”).
101. Thus, while Act 287 does specify an individual affected by the law, that
individual constitutes a legitimate class of one.
102. Moreover, even if Act 287 does impermissibly target SCE&G, SCE&G has not
established a clear showing that the legislation is punitive.
103. When considering whether legislative enactment is punitive, courts consider “(1)
whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2)
whether the statute, ‘viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably
can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes’; and (3) whether the legislative records
29
‘evinces a [legislative] intent to punish.’” Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 852 (quoting Nixon, 433
U.S. at 475–76, 478). These three tests are referred to as the historical, functional, and
motivational tests, respectively. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472–84. Legislation need not satisfy all
three tests to qualify as a bill of attainder. Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 853.
104. Traditionally, bills of attainder occurred when legislative power was used to (1)
sentence “a named individual or identifiable members of a group to death,” (2) imprison, banish,
and punitively confiscate one’s property by the sovereign”; or (3) bar “designated individuals or
groups from participation in specified employments or vocations.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474. “The
only traditional punishment implicated here is punitive confiscation of property.” Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 351 (2d Cir. 2002). However, because the court
finds that SCE&G does not have a property interest at issue at this time, supra p. 18 ¶ 62, it is
unable to demonstrate that Act 287 satisfies the historical connotation of a bill of attainder.
105. The Supreme Court has also applied a functional approach “analyzing whether the
law under challenge, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably
can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475–76 (citing, e.g.,
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 193–194 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128
(1889); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96–97 (1958); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
168–169 (1963)). “Where such legitimate legislative purposes do not appear, it is reasonable to
conclude that punishment of individuals disadvantaged by the enactment was the purpose of the
decisionmakers.” Id.
106. In Act 287, the South Carolina General Assembly states that its purpose is “to set
certain utility rates for the purpose of protecting the public interest until a determination can be
made by the appropriate regulatory and judicial authorities.” 2018 S.C. Acts 258 § 3. However,
30
in Resolution 285, the South Carolina General Assembly recognized that SCE&G “has legal
rights and remedies that must be considered and respected throughout the process of resolving
cost recovery issues for the abandoned Project, yet believes that recognition of SC[][E&G]’s
legal rights and remedies does not require that [] customers continue to pay one hundred percent
of the rates previously authorized by the Commission when the Project was expected, upon
completion to provide valuable services to the customers; . . . .” 2018 S.C. Acts 285.
107. SCE&G relies on Consolidated Edison to stand for the proposition that
“eliminating harm to innocent third parties is a purpose consistent with punishment,” 292 F.3d at
352; however, that case is not similar to the case now before the court. In Consolidated Edison,
the New York State Assembly passed a law which found that Consolidated Edison failed to
exercise reasonable care in its management of a nuclear reactor and prohibited the recovery of
any of the costs which resulted from that action. 292 F.3d at 344 (“[T]he Consolidated Edison
Company failed to exercise reasonable care on behalf of the health, safety and economic interests
of its customers. Therefore it would not be in the public interest for the company to recover
from ratepayers any costs resulting from the February 15, 2000 outage at the Indian Point 2
Nuclear Facility. . . . [T]he New York state public service commission shall prohibit the
Consolidated Edison Company from recovering from its ratepayers any costs . . . .” (citing 2000
N.Y. Laws 190)). The New York State Assembly used the law at issue in Consolidated Edison
to establish that the utility had acted imprudently. Id.
108. In this case, the South Carolina General Assembly made no determination in Act
287 about the prudency of SCE&G’s actions, instead leaving that determination to the PSC. See
2018 S.C. Acts 258 § 1. Furthermore, the New York State Assembly in Consolidated Edison
permanently prevented recovery of the costs associated with the company’s mismanagement.
31
Consol. Edison, 292 F.3d at 344. In contrast, the experimental rate set in Act 287 is only a
temporary bar on the recovery of SCE&G’s costs of the Project. SCE&G could still recover its
costs in the abandonment proceedings determined by the PSC. Accordingly, the court is not
persuaded that the purpose of Act 287 is to punish SCE&G.
109. The “third recognized test of punishment is strictly a motivational one: inquiring
whether the legislative record evinces a[n] [] intent to punish.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478 (citing
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 308–314 (1946); Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169–170). The
record must reflect a clear legislative intent to punish. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617
(1960) (“[O]nly the clearest proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of a statute on
such a ground.”). “Statements by a smattering of legislators ‘do not constitute [the required]
unmistakable evidence of punitive intent.’” Consol. Edison Co., 292 F.3d at 354 (quoting
Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 856 n.15). The court considered the transcript of the South Carolina
Senate’s June 27, 2018 hearing submitted by SCE&G. (ECF No. 94-6.) Upon review, the court
is not persuaded at this time that the transcript provides justification for the conclusion that Act
287 evinces a legislative intent to punish.25
110. As to the third element for a bill of attainder, Act 287 establishes the experimental
rate without the protections of a judicial trial. See 2018 S.C. Acts 258 § 3 (instructing the PSC to
set the experimental rate without conducting a hearing on the matter).
111. Because SCE&G has failed to meet all elements of the test articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Nixon and Selective Service, which requires the infliction of
25
At the preliminary injunction hearing, SCE&G presented statements of a few members of the
South Carolina General Assembly who allegedly wanted to punish the company. However, there
are numerous instances where state senators expressly stated that their goal was not to punish
SCE&G. (See ECF No. 94-6 at 49:8–19, 50:1–3, 51:17–22, 60:1–5.)
32
punishment upon an identifiable individual without a trial, SCE&G cannot show a likelihood of
success on the merits on its claim asserting a bill of attainder.
B. Likelihood of Suffering Irreparable Harm Absent an Injunction, The Balance of Equities,

and the Public Interest Factors
112. Generally, in determining whether to grant a motion for injunctive relief, “[t]he
court must also consider the balance of hardships between the litigants and the impact on the
public at large prior to issuing an injunction.” Uhlig, LLC v. Shirley, C/A No. 6:08-cv-01208-
JMC, 2012 WL 2458062, at *4 (D.S.C. June 27, 2012).
113. However, SCE&G has not made a clear showing that it will likely succeed on the
merits because the law on the questions at the heart of the dispute does not favor its positions.
Therefore, because SCE&G cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits, this court need
not address the other necessary elements for preliminary injunctive relief. La Union Del Pueblo
Entero v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 608 F.3d 217, 225 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Because we have
determined that Plaintiffs cannot show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, we need
not address FEMA’s additional arguments regarding the other necessary elements for
preliminary injunctive relief. The holding on the initial element is sufficient to vacate the
injunction.”); Coleman v. Chase Bank, C/A No. 3:14-cv-101, 2014 WL 2533400, at *3 (E.D. Va.
June 5, 2014) (“Because Plaintiffs cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court
need not address the remaining factors.”).
V. CONCLUSION
114. In sum, SCE&G has not established that it is clearly likely to succeed on the
merits of its claims. For the foregoing reasons and after careful consideration of the entire
record, the court DENIES SCE&G’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 5.)
33
IT IS SO ORDERED.
United States District Judge

August 6, 2018
Columbia, South Carolina
34
Exhibit B
D.E. 103

COLUMBIA DIVISION
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, ) Civil Action No.: 3:18-cv-01795-JMC
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
) ORDER AND OPINION
Cromer H. Randall, in his official capacity ) DENYING SCE&G’S
as Chairman of the South Carolina Public ) EXPEDITED MOTION FOR
Service Commission; Swain E. Whitfield, in ) INJUNCTION PENDING
his official capacity as Commissioner of the ) APPEAL
John E. Howard, in his official capacity as )
Commissioner of the South Carolina Public )
Service Commission; Elliot F. Elam, Jr., in his )
official capacity as Commissioner of the )
G. O’Neal Hamilton, in his official capacity )
as Commissioner of the South Carolina )
Public Service Commission; and Thomas J. )
Ervin, in his official capacity as Commissioner )
of the South Carolina Public Service Commission, )
)
Defendants.1 )
__________________________________________)
This matter is before the court pursuant to Plaintiff South Carolina Electric & Gas
Company’s (“SCE&G”) Expedited Motion for an Injunction Pending Appeal (ECF No. 102).
SCE&G moves under Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for an injunction
pending resolution of its forthcoming appeal of this court’s Order and Opinion Denying
SCE&G’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 101) to the United States Court of
1
On July 1, 2018, the terms of former Defendants Robert T. Bockman and Elizabeth Fleming
expired; Thomas J. Ervin began his term as a Commissioner of the South Carolina Public Service
Commission; and, Cromer H. Randall became the Chairman of the South Carolina Public Service
Commission. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Plaintiff substituted the new
Defendants accordingly in its Amended Verified Complaint. (Compare ECF No. 1, with ECF No.
68.)
1
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
As a result of this court’s Order denying SCE&G’s motion for preliminary injunction
(ECF No. 101), Defendants, Swain E. Whitfield, Comer H. Randall, John E. Howard, Elliot F.
Elam, Jr., Thomas J. Ervin, and G. O’Neal Hamilton (collectively, “Defendants”), in their
official capacities as the Commissioners of the South Carolina Public Service Commission
(“PSC”) will implement (1) Act of June 28, 2018, 2018 South Carolina Laws Act 287 (H.B.
4375) (“Act 287”) and (2) Joint Resolution of July 2, 2018, 2018 South Carolina Laws
Resolution 285 (S. 0954) (“Resolution 285”) (together the “Act”), which SCE&G alleges will
cause it irreparable harm. (ECF No. 102 at 1-2.)
For the reasons below, the court DENIES SCE&G’s Expedited Motion for an Injunction
Pending Appeal (ECF No. 102).
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 29, 2018, SCE&G filed its Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and
Temporary, Preliminary, and Permanent Injunctive Relief against Defendants pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the constitutionality of both Act 287 and Resolution 285. (ECF No. 1
at 2 ¶ 2), which amended the Base Load Review Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 58-33-210 et seq. (2015)
(“BLRA”).
On July 2, 2018, SCE&G moved for a preliminary injunction based on its constitutional
claims. (ECF No. 5.) On July 16, 2018, Defendants filed opposition to SCE&G’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 31.) On July 20, 2018, Defendants and South Carolina House
of Representatives Speaker Jay Lucas and South Carolina Senate President Pro Tempore Hugh K.
Leatherman, Sr. (together “Intervenor Defendants”) filed Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1) and (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF Nos. 48, 50, 52.) On July 23,
2
2018, South Carolina Attorney General Wilson filed an Amicus Brief opposing SCE&G’s Motion
for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 54).2 On July 25, 2018, Intervenor Defendants South
Carolina House of Representatives Speaker Jay Lucas and South Carolina Senate President Pro
Tempore Hugh K. Leatherman, Sr. (together “Intervenor Defendants”) filed opposition to the
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF Nos. 59, 61.)3 On July 27, 2018, SCE&G filed a Verified
Amended Complaint, renewing its request that the court: (1) “Enter a declaratory judgment
declaring Act 287 and Resolution 285 are unconstitutional in that they constitute an unlawful
taking[,] violate the substantive and procedural components of the Due Process Clause, and
constitute an unlawful bill of attainder” and (2) “Enter a temporary, preliminary and permanent
injunction directing the Chairman and Commissioners of the PSC, and their officers, agents,
servants, employees, and attorneys, and any other persons who are in active concert or participation
with them, to refrain from implementing Act [287] and Joint Resolution [285].” (ECF No. 68 at
53.)
The court heard the parties’ arguments regarding the Preliminary Injunction during a
hearing on July 30–31, 2018. (ECF Nos. 92, 95.)
On August 1, 2018, SCE&G filed a Reply to the Opposition Briefs to its Motion for
On August 6, 2018, the court denied SCE&G’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF
No. 5.)
On August 7, 2018, SCE&G filed this Motion (ECF No. 102).
2
On July 5, 2018, Attorney General Wilson moved to file an Amicus Brief (ECF No. 10) and the
court granted Attorney General Wilson’s Motion on July 12, 2018. (ECF Nos. 27, 87.)
3
On July 18, 2018, the court granted Motions to Intervene filed by Intervenor Defendants. (ECF
Nos. 41, 82.)
3
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), a court may “suspend, modify, restore, or
grant” an injunction while an interlocutory appeal regarding the injunction is pending. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 62(c). When considering whether to stay an order pending appeal under Rule 62(c), courts
consider “(1) whether the applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the
merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of
the stay will substantially injure other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public
interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987).4
III. ANALYSIS
SCE&G asserts it is entitled to an injunction pending appeal “for the same reasons stated
in its earlier motion for a preliminary injunction.” (ECF No. 102 at 3.) SCE&G further contends
“the [c]ourt did not address SCE&G’s argument that the retroactive re-definition of ‘prudency’ by
the Act deprived SCE&G of its due process rights.” (ECF No. 102 at 2-3.) SCE&G also “requests
expedited review and consideration of this motion, because such consideration is in the interest of
justice given the substantial showing of irreparable harm that SCE&G has made and the imminent
imposition of rates that SCE&G contends are confiscatory.” (ECF No. 102 at 3.)
The court denied SCE&G’s motion for an injunction because it did not clearly show it was
likely to succeed on the merits of any of its claims. (ECF No. 101 at 33); see also Pashby v. Delia,
709 F.3d 307, 321 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Winter v. Na’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20
(2008)) (“[P]laintiffs seeking preliminary injunctions must demonstrate that they are likely to
succeed on the merits.”). Because SCE&G failed to make this showing, the court declined to
address the other elements for injunctive relief. See La Union Del Pueblo Entero v. Fed.
4
“[M]otions for an injunction pending appeal are governed by the same standard as motions for
stay pending appeal . . . .” McCammon v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 2d 193, 196 (D.D.C. 2008).
4
Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 608 F.3d 217, 225 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Because we have determined that
Plaintiffs cannot show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, we need not address
FEMA’s additional arguments regarding the other necessary elements for preliminary injunctive
relief. The holding on the initial element is sufficient to vacate the injunction.”); Coleman v. Chase
Bank, C/A No. 3:14-cv-101, 2014 WL 2533400, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2014) (“Because Plaintiffs
cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court need not address the remaining
factors.”).
In its Expedited Motion for an Injunction Pending Appeal, SCE&G does not advance any
new arguments as to the merits of its claims. (ECF No. 102.)5 To determine whether SCE&G is
entitled to an injunction pending appeal requires the court “to engage in the same analysis that it
does in reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction.” Overstreet v.
5
As previously stated, SCE&G alleges “the [c]ourt did not address SCE&G’s argument that the
retroactive re-definition of ‘prudency’ by the Act deprived SCE&G of its due process rights.”
(ECF No. 102 at 2-3.) In its preliminary injunction motion, SCE&G argued, “The Act attaches
new legal rights and consequences to events and actions that have already happened, including by
re-defining ‘prudency,’ a critical term under the BLRA establishing what is, and is not, subject to
capital cost recovery.” (ECF No. 5-1 at 27.) However, the BLRA did not define “prudency,” so
the Act cannot “re-defin[]” “prudency.” (ECF No. 102 at 2-3.) Instead, the Act provides the first
definition of the term “prudency” and “imprudency” as related to the BLRA. “Altering statutory
definitions, or adding new definitions of terms previously undefined, is a common way of
amending statutes, and simply does not answer the retroactivity question.” Rivers v. Roadway
Exp., Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 308 (1994). Neither does the Act’s definition of “prudency” in this case
answer the retroactivity question. SCE&G argues, “The definition of ‘prudent’ . . . is explicitly
not related to concepts of ‘negligence, carelessness, or recklessness,’ which leaves entirely unclear
the standard that the PSC should impose under this new definition.” (ECF No. 5-1 at 26 n.10.)
However, the same was true before passage of the Act because the BLRA did not define
“prudency,” also leaving unclear the standard that the PSC should impose when making prudency
determinations. Therefore the Act does not “attach[] new legal consequences to events completed
before its enactment.” Langraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994). Moreover, the PSC
has yet determine whether SCE&G’s decision to abandon the nuclear plant’s construction was
prudent or imprudent; those issues are currently pending before the PSC. Based on the foregoing,
the court finds SCE&G has not made a clear showing it is likely to succeed on the merits of either
of its due process claims based on the Act’s definition of “prudency.”
5
Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Amgen Inc. v.
Azar, C/A No. 17-cv-1006, 2018 WL 1990521, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2018) (“The standards for
evaluating a motion for an injunction pending appeal are ‘substantially the same as those for
issuing a preliminary injunction.’” (quoting Al–Anazi v. Bush, 370 F. Supp. 2d 188, 199 n.11
(D.D.C. 2005))). But because SCE&G advances no new arguments on its claims, the court finds
SCE&G has not clearly shown it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims for the same reasons
stated in the court’s order denying SCE&G’s motion for preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 101.)
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court DENIES SCE&G’s Expedited Motion for an
Injunction Pending Appeal (ECF No. 102).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
United States District Judge

August 7, 2018
Columbia, South Carolina
6
Exhibit C
D.E. 55-1
3:18-cv-01795-JMC Date Filed 07/23/18 Entry Number 55-1 Page 1 of 60
EXHIBIT 1

COLUMBIA DIVISION
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company,

Case No. 3:18-cv-01795-JMC
Plaintiff,
-v-
Swain E. Whitfield, in his official capacity as

Chairman of the South Carolina Public Service
Commission; Comer H. Randall, in his official
capacity as Commissioner of the South Carolina
Public Service Commission; John E. Howard, in
his official capacity as Commissioner of the South
Carolina Public Service Commission; Elliott F.
Elam, Jr., in his official capacity as Commissioner
of the South Carolina Public Service Commission;
Elizabeth B. Fleming, in her official capacity as
Commissioner of the South Carolina Public Service
Commission; Robert T. Bockman, in his official
capacity as Commissioner of the South Carolina
Public Service Commission; G. O’Neal Hamilton,
in his official capacity as Commissioner of the
South Carolina Public Service Commission,
Defendants.
DECLARATION OF GLENN HUBBARD, Ph.D.

Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... 1
A. Qualifications ...................................................................................................................... 1
B. Scope of Assignment .......................................................................................................... 2
C. Declaration Preparation ...................................................................................................... 3
II. SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................ 3
III. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 6

A. Capital Markets ................................................................................................................... 6
1. Cost of Capital and Risk ........................................................................................ 6
2. Credit Ratings ........................................................................................................ 6
B. Rate Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities ................................................................... 10
1. Utilities Need Access to Capital to Ensure That They Can Provide
Reliable Electric Power and Gas Services to Customers at Reasonable
Rates .................................................................................................................... 10
2. Regulated Rates Must be Fair and Reasonable to Compensate Utilities
Adequately and Fairly for the Cost and Risk of Investing in Their
Utility Systems ..................................................................................................... 11
3. In Practice, Effective Utility Rate Regulation Can be Stymied by
Regulatory and Political Hindsight Biases .......................................................... 12
4. A Utility’s Regulatory and Political Environment is an Important
Determinant of its Credit Ratings and Cost of Capital ........................................ 13
C. South Carolina’s Base Load Review Act.......................................................................... 14
D. The Nuclear Plants at Issue ............................................................................................... 16
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LIKELY EFFECTS OF THE ACTS .................................................... 18

A. The Legislature’s Retroactive Rate Change Would Further Increase
Regulatory and Political Uncertainty for SCE&G and Other South Carolina
Public Utilities .................................................................................................................. 18
B. The Consequence of Regulatory Uncertainty is Clear: Reductions and Delays
in Investment Result ......................................................................................................... 21
1. Electric Utilities and Regulatory Hold-Up .......................................................... 22
2. Impact on Investment Following Disallowances in the 1980s ............................ 24
3. International Evidence on the Impact on Investment of Regulatory
and/or Political Uncertainty ................................................................................. 26
4. Investor Protection and the Cost of Capital ......................................................... 26
C. Harm to Stakeholders........................................................................................................ 28
1. SCE&G and its Investors ..................................................................................... 28
2. SCE&G’s Customers ........................................................................................... 30
i
Declaration of Glenn Hubbard, Ph.D.
3. The General Public Interest of the State of South Carolina ................................. 32
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 33
ii
DECLARATION OF GLENN HUBBARD, Ph.D.
I, Glenn Hubbard, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, declare and state, under penalty of perjury, that the
following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. If called to testify, I
could and would testify competently to the following:
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Qualifications
1. My name is Glenn Hubbard. I am the Dean of the Graduate School of Business at Columbia
University, where I hold the Russell L. Carson Professorship in Finance and Economics. In
addition, I am a Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics of the Faculty of Arts
and Sciences. At the National Bureau of Economic Research, I am a Research Associate in
programs on corporate finance, public economics, industrial organization, monetary economics,
and economic fluctuations and growth. I am also a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute in programs on tax policy and financial markets. Since 2006, I have been the Co-chair of
the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, a nonpartisan organization offering analyses and
policy advice on financial regulation. Prior to joining the Columbia faculty as Professor of
Economics and Finance in 1988, I taught in the Department of Economics at Northwestern
University. I also have served as Visiting Professor of Business Administration at Harvard
Business School, John M. Olin Visiting Professor at the University of Chicago, Visiting Professor
and Research Fellow of the Energy and Environmental Policy Center at Harvard University’s John
F. Kennedy School of Government, and John M. Olin Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic
Research. I hold A.M. and Ph.D. degrees in Economics from Harvard University, and B.A. and
B.S. degrees in Economics from the University of Central Florida, summa cum laude.
2. My professional work has centered on analyzing and evaluating issues in corporate finance, public
economics, industrial organization, monetary economics, and energy natural resource economics.
I have authored more than 100 publications, edited a number of books, and authored leading
textbooks on money and financial markets, macroeconomics, and principles of economics. On
topics related to this matter, I have authored articles on investment under uncertainty, the
relationship between investor protections and investment, and the relationship between access to
capital and economic growth, as well as articles on the regulation of energy markets. I also have
served as an economic expert in the determination of the cost of capital and the allowed rate of
return for regulated electric utilities and telecommunication firms.
1
3. I have been an advisor or consultant to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Congressional Budget Office, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Internal Revenue Service,
International Trade Commission, National Science Foundation, U.S. Department of Energy, and
U.S. Department of the Treasury. From 1991 to 1993, I served as Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax
Analysis) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, where I was responsible for economic analysis
of tax policy, the administration’s revenue estimates, and health care policy issues. From 2001 to
2003, I served as Chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers. Over that time
period, I also served as Chair of the Economic Policy Committee for the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development in Paris. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached as Appendix A.
B. Scope of Assignment
4. I have been retained by counsel for South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (“SCE&G”) to assess
the potential impact of South Carolina Laws Acts 285 and 287 (“Acts”) on SCE&G, its customers,
and the general public interest of the state of South Carolina.
5. I understand that the Acts would reduce the rates SCE&G is permitted to collect for the period from
April 1 through December 21, 2018 by imposing an “experimental rate” that excludes rate increases
of approximately $367 million annually ($270 million from April 1 through December 21, 2018)
that were approved by the South Carolina Public Service Commission (the “PSC”) under the state’s
Base Load Review Act (“BLRA”).1 These rate increases reflect financing costs related to the
construction of two nuclear facilities, which were deemed prudent and approved by the PSC under
the BLRA in 2009.2 Such financing costs have been approved by the PSC and collected in rates
by SCE&G since 2009.3
1
“Base Load Review Act,” A16, R28, S431, 117th Session 2007-2008, South Carolina General Assembly, 2007
(“BLRA”), available at https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess117_2007-2008/bills/431.htm (accessed July 19, 2018);
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company v. Swain E. Whitfield et al. No. 3:18-cv-01795-JMC. Memorandum of
Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Consolidation of Preliminary Injunction
Hearing with a Trial on the Merits, July 2, 2018 (“Memorandum”), at 3, 29.
2
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company v. Swain E. Whitfield et al. No. 3:18-cv-01795-JMC. Verified Complaint
for Declaratory Judgment and Temporary, Preliminary, and Permanent Injunctive Relief, June 29, 2018
(“Complaint”), at 36; “Order Approving Revised Rates,” The Public Service Commission of South Carolina, Dkt.
No. 2009-211-E-Order No. 2009-696, September 30, 2009, at 7.
3
Complaint, at 26-27.
2
6. I understand further that the Acts mandate the rate reduction imposed by the temporary
experimental rate without providing SCE&G with the opportunity to present evidence
demonstrating the unreasonableness of the lower rate and the harm that will be caused by its
implementation. Moreover, I understand that the Acts lack any mechanism for SCE&G to recover
funds withheld under the Acts if the PSC were to determine later that the experimental rate is
unreasonable.4
C. Declaration Preparation
7. My billing rate for time spent on this matter is $1,500 per hour. This compensation is not contingent
upon the nature of my findings or on the outcome of this litigation.
8. Employees of Analysis Group, Inc., an economics research and consulting firm, working under my
direction and supervision, have assisted me in this assignment at standard hourly rates charged by
that firm. Consistent with industry practice, I also receive compensation based on the professional
fees earned by Analysis Group in conjunction with their support for this declaration. This
compensation is not contingent upon the nature of my findings or on the outcome of this litigation.
9. The materials that I have relied upon in reaching my conclusions are listed in Appendix B of this
declaration. My work on this matter is ongoing and I may review additional materials or conduct
further analysis. I reserve the right to update, refine, or revise my opinions.
II. SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
10. As a result of my review and analysis, I have reached the following principal conclusions:
 The BLRA was passed in South Carolina in 2007. It was designed to promote the
development of new nuclear power generation in South Carolina. Two major features of
the BLRA were to provide prudency review prior to permitting a project to be undertaken
and, once approved, permit the utility to recover its financing costs during construction. I
understand that SCE&G secured an initial prudency review under the BLRA in 2009 to
construct two nuclear power plants, and based upon that review and the resulting
permission granted, undertook the task of constructing the plants. Utility construction
projects, especially nuclear projects, often take years to complete and require significant
4
3
capital. The rules under which projects are initiated must be predictable and stable to be
reasonable from an economic perspective and provide confidence to investors to finance
the project.
 Implementation of the Acts would defeat this economically important predictability in the
law by retroactively changing the rules. Specifically, implementation of the Acts would
result in the removal of the financing costs from rates for the first time. The
implementation of the Acts thus would amount to retroactively abrogating the assurances
and prudency findings that I understand the state granted to SCE&G and upon which
SCE&G relied in financing the construction of the two nuclear power plants. Given the
retroactive character and significant economic and other consequences of implementing
the Acts, such implementation can be characterized from an economic perspective as a
regulatory or political “shock.”5
 The retroactive change in law and the modification of the regulatory environment that will
result if the Acts are implemented would cause economic harm of various types to SCE&G,
its customers, and the general public interest of the state of South Carolina.
o SCE&G would suffer two types of economic harm. First, SCE&G would suffer a
permanent loss of approximately $270 million in revenue relative to the revenue that
it would continue to collect if the Acts are not implemented.6 Second, SCE&G would
face reduced access to capital and an increase in its cost of capital due to the increased
regulatory and political risk that investors would assign to investments in SCE&G due
to implementation of the Acts. This increased cost of capital would harm SCE&G to
the extent that it is unable to pass the additional cost along to its customers. Any such
harm derived from the regulatory or political shock caused by the Acts could be long-
lived.
5
From an economic perspective, a regulatory or political shock is an abrupt, unexpected, change in regulation or to
the political environment.
6
If the experimental rate is permanently imposed, the annual loss of revenue after 2018 would amount to $367
million. Memorandum, at 3, 29.
4
o SCE&G’s customers also would suffer two types of economic harm, all else equal.
First, their rates would increase to the extent that SCE&G’s higher cost of capital is
passed along to them in rates.7 Second, SCE&G likely would have to reduce its capital
investments, thereby reducing the quality of service to its customers. This behavior
has been documented by economic research regarding utility investment following
political or regulatory shocks such as would occur in this case if the Acts are
implemented.
o The implementation of the Acts also would cause economic harm to the general public
interest of the State of South Carolina. Apart from the direct economic harm to SCE&G
and its customers, economic researchers have found that disallowance of a utility’s
recovery of its investment in nuclear power facilities specifically could result in “spillover”
effects that cause a reduction in similar investments by other utilities in the state. All else
equal, reduced investment in the state’s electric system would result in lower service
reliability and quality, including potentially slower recovery times following major
hurricanes, fewer jobs, and slower economic growth. In addition, the unilateral and
retroactive reversal of an existing law under which there was significant advance prudency
review and participation in decision-making by multiple stakeholders, and under which
investors had committed significant sums of capital to SCE&G, is likely to reduce the
confidence and willingness of utilities and other businesses to invest in South Carolina.
11. In Section III below, I provide background information on the cost of capital, the economics of
utility rate regulation, the potential impact of regulatory and political uncertainty and risk on
regulated utilities and their customers, and the nuclear project at issue in this matter. Section IV
contains my assessment of the economic impact that implementation of the Acts would have on
SCE&G, its customers, and the general public interest of the state of South Carolina. Section V
concludes.
7
An analysis of net harm would compare the present value of the higher future rates to the proposed $270 million
rate reduction in 2018.
5
III. BACKGROUND
A. Capital Markets
1. Cost of Capital and Risk
12. Investors demand compensation for bearing risk. All else equal, greater risk means investors will
require a greater expected future payment per dollar of capital provided. The amount of annual
compensation, expressed as a percentage of the amount of capital invested, is known as the “cost
of capital.”
13. Like most utilities, SCE&G relies on both debt and equity as sources of capital. Equity investors,
as residual claimants, face a variety of risks.8 Imposing additional risk on equity investors will
typically reduce the amount they are willing to pay for the equity security, thereby increasing the
cost of equity.9
14. Debt investors also assess the risk of their investment when setting the price of their capital. Factors
affecting the cost of debt include the expected profitability of the business, the range of possible
outcomes and the company’s ability to service the debt in downside scenarios, the seniority in the
capital structure of a particular debt issuance, the value of collateral or others forms of security,
and other protections such as covenants in the credit agreements. To assess these myriad factors,
market participants often look to credit ratings as a summary measure of risk.
2. Credit Ratings
15. Credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”), Fitch, and Moody’s issue credit ratings
for an issuer that provide an overall measurement of creditworthiness and represent their opinion
8
Financial economists distinguish between systematic and non-systematic risks. Diversified investors can minimize
their exposure to non-systematic (that is, idiosyncratic) risk by spreading their portfolio across many investments.
As a result, in standard finance models such as the capital asset pricing model (“CAPM”), only the systematic
portion of risk (beta) affects the cost of equity.
9
The price paid for a security reflects both the expected cash flows and the discount rate. Strictly speaking, only
systematic risk affects the discount rate. Here, the introduction of the possibility of an ex post regulatory
expropriation is most precisely viewed as a reduction of the expected cash flows. However, the price reduction from
the lower expected cash flows is observationally equivalent to an increase in the discount rate. As a result, I focus
on the cost of capital interpretation for expositional simplicity in this declaration.
6
of an issuer’s capacity and willingness to meet its financial commitments as they come due.10 AAA
is the highest and safest credit rating that S&P or Fitch assigns to an issuer, while Aaa is the highest
and safest rating from Moody’s.11 S&P and Fitch also further refine their letter ratings with plus
and minus “modifiers” to indicate whether a given issuer is at the high end or low end of a given
letter rating. For example, a rating of A+ is higher than a rating of A, which, in turn is higher than
a rating of A-.12 The rating agencies describe such incremental changes in their ratings in terms of
“notches.” An A+ rating is one notch above A and three notches above BBB+.
16. Typically, higher credit ratings correspond to lower expected rates of default and higher expected
rates of repayment. As a result, the interest rates that investors demand on debt securities are related
to those securities’ credit ratings. As I note above, investors require a higher rate of return for
exposure to increased risks. Thus, in order to compensate investors for an increased risk of default
from a lower-rated security or issuer, an issuer with lower-rated debt will have to pay a higher
interest rate than if the debt were more highly rated. Conservative investors who place a premium
on avoiding losses will tend to invest toward the AAA-rated end of the ratings spectrum, while
those willing to take on more risk may choose lower-rated debt that offers higher returns when the
issuer is able to service the debt.
17. Many investors have a preference or mandate to hold only issuances that have “investment grade”
credit ratings, which means BBB- (Baa3 on the Moody’s scale) or higher. Issuers with ratings
below BBB- are considered “non-investment grade” or “speculative,” meaning credit rating
agencies consider these issuers’ ability to meet their financial commitments to be vulnerable to
changing economic conditions. As a result of the more limited investor base for “speculative”
10
See, for example, S&P, “S&P Global Ratings Definition,”
https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-/view/sourceId/504352 (accessed July 20, 2018);
FitchRatings, “Rating Definitions,” https://www.fitchratings.com/site/definitions (accessed July 20, 2018);
Moody’s, “Ratings Definitions,” https://www.moodys.com/Pages/amr002002.aspx (accessed July 20, 2018).
11
The credit ratings S&P and Fitch use for issuers that are not in default are AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC,
and C. S&P Global Ratings (2018), “Guide to Credit Rating Essentials,” at 13; FitchRatings (2010), “Definitions of
Ratings and Other Forms of Opinion,” at 31-35. The corresponding credit ratings from Moody’s are Aaa, Aa, A,
Baa, Ba, B, Caa, Ca, and C. Moody’s Investors Service (2018), “Rating Symbols and Definitions,” at 6.
12
Moody’s uses numerical modifiers of 1, 2, or 3 to correspond to the “+,” neutral, and “-” modifiers.
7
issuers, the investment community tends to view dropping from BBB- to BB+ as a significant event,
and yields rise sharply when moving from BBB- to BB+.13
18. For example, as I show in Figure 1, below, for a five-year corporate bond rated BBB, the yield, as
of July 18, 2018, was 3.9 percent, which was 1.6 percentage points lower than the yield on a
corporate bond rated BB,14 a gap over five times greater15 than the gap between the yields of bonds
rated BBB and those rated A (0.3 percentage points).16 Similarly, for a 30-year corporate bond
rated BBB, the yield, as of July 18, 2018, was 5.1 percent, which was 2.5 percentage points lower
than the yield on a corporate bond rated BB,17 a gap over eight times greater18 than the gap between
the yields of bonds rated BBB and A, respectively (0.3 percentage points).19
13
Berk, Jonathan, and Peter DeMarzo (2017), Corporate Finance, 4th ed., Boston: Pearson Education, at 188-192.
14
-1.6 percentage points = 3.9 percent - 5.5 percent.
15
5.3 = 1.6 percentage points / 0.3 percentage points.
16
0.3 percentage points = 3.9 percent - 3.6 percent.
17
-2.5 percentage points = 5.1 percent - 7.6 percent.
18
8.3 = 2.5 percentage points / 0.3 percentage points.
19
0.3 percentage points = 5.1 percent - 4.8 percent.
8
FIGURE 1
YIELD BY CREDIT RATING
UTILITIES SECTOR
12% 11.5%
10.4%
10% 9.4%
8% 7.6%
7.2%
6% 5.5%
5.1%
4.6% 4.8%
4.4%
3.6%
3.9%
4% 3.2% 3.4%
2%
0%
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC
Investment Grade "Junk" Investment Grade "Junk"
5-Year 30-Year
Notes and Sources:

From S&P Capital IQ.
Annual compounding rate.
Valuation date as of July 18, 2018.
Utilities Sector includes Electric Utilities, Gas Utilities, Multi-Utilities, Water Utilities, and Independent
Power Producers & Energy Traders. See https://www.unm.edu/~maj/Security%20Analysis/GICS.pdf
(accessed July 19, 2018).
Yields for credit rating AAA are derived. Yields for all other ratings are observed. S&P Capital IQ considers
a curve to be observed when there is at least six credits over the whole term structure. S&P Capital IQ
methodology derives curves based on all of the bond price information from the sectors and ratings.
19. As of July 20, 2018, SCE&G was rated at the lowest investment grade rating by Fitch (BBB-) and
Moody’s (Baa3), and the second lowest investment grade rating by S&P (BBB).20 S&P and
Moody’s both have SCE&G on Negative Watch for a downgrade and Fitch has an Evolving
Watch.21
20
FitchRatings, “Fitch Maintains Rating Watch Evolving on SCANA and Subsidiaries,” July 3, 2018; Moody’s
Investors Service, “Rating Action: Moody’s Confirms SCANA, SCE&G and PSNC, Rating Outlook Negative,” July
2, 2018; S&P Global Ratings, “Research Update: SCANA Corp. and Subsidiaries ‘BBB’ Ratings Remain on
CreditWatch Negative on Passage of South Carolina Bill,” July 3, 2018.
21
FitchRatings, “Fitch Maintains Rating Watch Evolving on SCANA and Subsidiaries,” July 3, 2018; Moody’s
Investors Service, “Rating Action: Moody’s Confirms SCANA, SCE&G and PSNC, Rating Outlook Negative,” July
9
B. Rate Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities22
1. Utilities Need Access to Capital to Ensure That They Can Provide Reliable
Electric Power and Gas Services to Customers at Reasonable Rates
20. Electric and gas utilities require substantial amounts of capital to provide reliable electric power
and gas services to their customers at reasonable rates. According to Edison Electric Institute,23
total investments made by U.S. investor-owned electric utilities in 2017 amounted to more than
$113 billion24 and have exceeded $90 billion each year since 2013.25 Operating cash flows are
often insufficient to cover the ongoing investment needed for a utility to maintain its existing
infrastructure and build new facilities needed to serve its market.26 The nature of utility rate
regulation means that the money spent to build or improve infrastructure can only be recovered
slowly over the useful life of the project (often decades), whereas the expenditure to build new
infrastructure occurs upfront.27 If utilities cannot access capital markets, these investments cannot
be made, leading to operational problems that would negatively impact customers.28
21. In early 2017, SCE&G estimated the necessary capital expenditures to be between $400 million
and $500 million per year over the next three years to meet ordinary needs, not including major
new projects.29 To fund these investments, and meet its operating expenses such as payroll and
2, 2018; S&P Global Ratings, “Research Update: SCANA Corp. and Subsidiaries ‘BBB’ Ratings Remain on
CreditWatch Negative on Passage of South Carolina Bill,” July 3, 2018.
22
SCE&G provides electricity generation, transmission and distribution services, as well as selling and transporting
natural gas. SCANA Corporation and South Carolina Electric & Gas Company SEC Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2017, at 5.
23
Edison Electric Institute is “the association that represents all U.S. investor owned electric companies.”
http://www.eei.org/about/Pages/default.aspx (accessed July 19, 2018).
24
Edison Electric Institute (2017), “2017 Financial Review,” at 15.
25
Total investments each year from 2013 to 2016 are $90 billion, $96 billion, $104 billion, and $113 billion,
respectively. Edison Electric Institute (2017), “2017 Financial Review,” at 15.
26
For example, as shown in the aggregate financial statements compiled for the electric utility industry by the
Edison Electric Institute, cash flow provided by operating activities is typically less than net cash used in investing.
Edison Electric Institute (2017), “2017 Financial Review,” at 14; Edison Electric Institute (2016), “2016 Financial
Review,” at 16; Edison Electric Institute (2014), “2014 Financial Review,” at 16.
27
The Regulatory Assistance Project (2011), “Electricity Regulation in the US: A Guide,” at 40, 46; Bonbright,
James (1961), Principles of Public Utility Rates, New York: Columbia University Press, at 76, 178.
28
The Regulatory Assistance Project (2011), “Electricity Regulation in the US: A Guide,” at 27; Bonbright, James
(1961), Principles of Public Utility Rates, New York: Columbia University Press, at 50.
29
SCANA Earnings Presentation, Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2016, February 16, 2017, at 10.
10
taxes when there are shortfalls in its operating cash flow, SCE&G must access the capital markets,
including the commercial paper (short-term corporate debt) market.30
2. Regulated Rates Must be Fair and Reasonable to Compensate Utilities

Adequately and Fairly for the Cost and Risk of Investing in Their Utility Systems
22. From a general economic perspective, the goal of effective utility rate regulation is to set rates in
such a way that the supply- and demand-side incentives created by regulatory activity result in the
provision of the appropriate quantity and quality of service at the lowest possible price.31 To
achieve this result, states have created systems that rely on private suppliers of the utility services
together with economically sensible regulation. Such systems allow the introduction of a profit
motive to control costs, while at the same time providing for appropriate regulatory oversight.
Economically sensible regulation within such systems recognizes that the private suppliers of
public utility services and their investors must have proper incentives to invest and work hard to
provide the desired quality and quantity of service, and must be protected against regulation that
unnecessarily increases costs or retroactively changes the rules for recovering investments.32
23. The primary incentive that private utility firms have to provide good service is the ability to earn
sufficient revenue to recover their operating and capital costs plus a return on invested capital that
is at least equal to the firm’s opportunity cost of capital. The opportunity cost of capital is the
expected return on investments of equivalent business and financial risk.33 Thus, if utility firms are
able to offer investors a rate of return equal to or greater than their opportunity cost of capital, they
30
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company v. Swain E. Whitfield et al. No. 3:18-cv-01795-JMC. Declaration of Iris
N. Griffin, July 2, 2018 (“Griffin Declaration”), at 2-3.
31
Bonbright, James (1961), Principles of Public Utility Rates, New York: Columbia University Press, at 48-62.
32
There is a significant amount of research that has been undertaken on these concepts. See, for example,
Bonbright, James (1961), Principles of Public Utility Rates, New York: Columbia University Press; Bergara, Mario,
Witold Henisz, and Pablo Spiller (1998), “Political Institutions and Electric Utility Investment: A Cross-Nation
Analysis,” California Management Review, 40(2), 18-35; Heller, William, and Mathew McCubbins (1996),
“Politics, Institutions, and Outcomes: Electricity Regulation in Argentina and Chile,” The Journal of Policy Reform,
1(4), 357-387; Knittel, Christopher (2006), “The Adoption of State Electricity Regulation: The Role of Interest
Groups,” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 54(2), 201-222.
33
Berk, Jonathan, and Peter DeMarzo (2017), Corporate Finance, 4th ed., Boston: Pearson Education, at 161.
11
will be able to compete for and attract sufficient capital at reasonable rates to provide the
appropriate quality and quantity of service.34
24. Thus, once projects have been commenced and investments secured under prescribed legal rules
such as the BLRA, then from an economic perspective, it is important that regulators provide
protection to the economic property interests of private suppliers of utility services and their
investors. As I discuss further below, this framework is economically sensible because supply-side
factors as well as demand-side factors determine economic outcomes.
3. In Practice, Effective Utility Rate Regulation Can be Stymied by Regulatory and

Political Hindsight Biases
25. As noted by one researcher, traditional American utility rate regulation: “involves the ex post facto
determination of a ‘fair return’ on capital already contributed in the absence of any definite public
commitments as to how this return shall be measured.”35 Under such a regime, which by definition
relies to an extent on hindsight, utilities build new infrastructure, such as a new power plant or gas
transmission facilities, before receiving a prudency determination from the regulator.36 During
construction, the utility typically bears both construction and financing costs.37 Upon completion,
the regulator determines how much of the investment is to be considered prudent and adds that
amount to the rate base after the new facility begins operations, thereby permitting the utility to
then earn a return on its investment.38 Given the delay between when investments costs are incurred
and when they are recovered, the rules under which projects are initiated must be predictable and
34
These fundamental financial principles are reflected in two Supreme Court decisions that I understand provide
legal standards in utility rate making proceedings. These are Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591, 603 (1944) and Bluefield Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 692-93
(1923).
35
Bonbright, James (1948), “Utility Rate Control Reconsidered in the Light of the Hope Natural Gas Case,”
American Economic Review, 38(2) Papers and Proceedings of the Sixtieth Annual Meeting of the American
Economic Association, 465-482, at 475.
36
Lyon, Thomas, and John Mayo (2005), “Regulatory Opportunism and Investment Behavior: Evidence from the
U.S. Electric Utility Industry,” RAND Journal of Economics, 36(3), 628-644, at 630; The Regulatory Assistance
Project (2011), “Electricity Regulation in the US: A Guide,” at 40, 63.
37
Teisberg, Elizabeth (1993), “Capital Investment Strategies under Uncertain Regulation,” RAND Journal of
Economics, 24(4), 591-604, at 594-595; The Regulatory Assistance Project (2011), “Electricity Regulation in the
US: A Guide,” at 40.
38
The Regulatory Assistance Project (2011), “Electricity Regulation in the US: A Guide,” at 38, 40, 63.
12
stable to provide sufficient confidence to investors to finance the project at reasonable rates.39 If
regulators can disallow the recovery of certain costs after the fact, the company and its investors
will realize a return that is lower than the return that was originally expected. If the disallowance
is the result of political or regulatory expropriation, negative economic effects will follow,
including reduced investment and provision of a lower quality or quantity of service than is
optimal.40
26. In fact, the “used-and-useful” paradigm, which defines prudency after the fact, can create an
asymmetric allocation of gains and losses that discourages investment:
Defining prudency—as the used-and-useful doctrine does—on the basis of

hindsight, and only for the failures, is to play a regulatory game of heads-the-
consumer-wins, tails-the-investor-loses: In effect it expropriates stockholder
dollars. Governments can do that once; but what do they do for an encore, the next
time companies have to go out and raise capital?41
27. To summarize, in order to “maintain and attract capital,” the expected returns available to investors
must provide adequate compensation for the risks borne relative to other investment options. In
the case of public utilities, they must face the standard financial and business risks faced by all
companies, but they and their investors should not have to bear the risk of the legal framework
being changed retroactively by political action after a project has been commenced.
4. A Utility’s Regulatory and Political Environment is an Important Determinant of

its Credit Ratings and Cost of Capital
28. As I note above, credit ratings provide an assessment of the issuer’s ability to service its debt. The
rating agencies use both quantitative and qualitative inputs to determine their assigned ratings. Of
note, Moody’s places 25 percent weight on the regulatory framework, including “[c]onsistency and
39
See, for example, Bonbright, James (1961), Principles of Public Utility Rates, New York: Columbia University
Press, at 186-187; Heller, William, and Mathew McCubbins (1996), “Politics, Institutions, and Outcomes:
Electricity Regulation in Argentina and Chile,” The Journal of Policy Reform, 1(4), 357-387.
40
See, for example, Lyon, Thomas, and John Mayo (2005), “Regulatory Opportunism and Investment Behavior:
Evidence from the U.S. Electric Utility Industry,” RAND Journal of Economics, 36(3), 628-644, at 628; Heller,
William, and Mathew McCubbins (1996), “Politics, Institutions, and Outcomes: Electricity Regulation in Argentina
and Chile,” The Journal of Policy Reform, 1(4), 357-387.
41
Kahn, Alfred, “Who Should Pay for Power Plant Duds?” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 1985 (emphasis added).
13
[p]redictability,” and 25 percent weight on the “[a]bility to [r]ecover [c]osts and [e]arn [r]eturns.”42
Thus, a negative regulatory and/or political environment will result in a higher risk assessment and
a lower credit rating, all else equal. Lower credit ratings are associated with higher debt yields.
29. Higher levels of regulatory or political risk assigned by investors to the securities of a utility also
will increase investors’ required return on equity.43 Together with higher debt costs, the higher
required return on equity will increase the utility’s total cost of capital.
C. South Carolina’s Base Load Review Act
30. South Carolina passed the BLRA in 2007. The stated purpose of the BLRA was to: “provide for
the recovery of the prudently incurred costs associated with new base load plants…, while at the
same time protecting customers of investor-owned electrical utilities from responsibility for
imprudent financial obligations or costs.”44 By passing the BLRA, South Carolina provided a
mechanism in which regulated utilities were required to obtain a prudency determination before
constructing a base load plant with the assurance that financing costs could be recovered during
construction. By requiring an ex ante prudency review, the BLRA protected the utility, its
customers, and other stakeholders by assuring that only projects judged to be prudent would be
undertaken.
31. Prior to passage of the BLRA, a utility in South Carolina could seek a prudency determination for
a power plant only after its completion, and there was no mechanism for recovery of costs during
construction. In such an environment, utilities found it difficult to attract the capital needed to
cover the significant cost and construction time for a nuclear plant without being able to provide
42
Moody’s Investors Service, “Credit Opinion: South Carolina Electric & Gas Company,” March 9, 2018, at 7.
Moody’s considers four quantitative metrics of SCE&G’s financial strength, which collectively receive 40 percent
weight. These metrics are three-year averages of: 1) operating cash flow before working capital (“CFO pre-WC”) to
Debt, 2) (CFO pre-WC less dividends) to Debt, 3) interest coverage (1 + CFO pre-WC / Interest), 4) Debt to
Capitalization. Moody’s places the remaining 10 percent weight on diversification (market position and diversity of
generation and fuel).
43
As I noted previously, introduction of the possibility of an ex post regulatory expropriation here is most precisely
viewed as a reduction of the expected cash flows, not an increase to a utility’s systematic risk. Strictly speaking,
only systematic risk affects the discount rate. However, the price reduction from the lower expected cash flows is
observationally equivalent to an increase in the discount rate. As a result, I focus on the cost of capital interpretation
for expositional simplicity in this declaration.
44
BLRA, Section 1.A.
14
investors assurance that the PSC would permit a return of and on the investment when construction
was complete. The BLRA was designed to ameliorate this problem.
32. Indeed, economic researchers have found that a regulatory regime that provides for prudency
review in advance of investing, such as that provided for in the BLRA are economically beneficial
because they encourage optimal investment by public utilities.45 This investment should, in turn,
lead to more economically appropriate service quality and prices, all else equal.
33. In this case, I understand that the PSC explicitly reviewed and approved SCE&G’s investments in
the nuclear facilities at issue, and also approved the amount of financing costs related to those
facilities to include in SCE&G’s rates. These prior approvals would be unilaterally and
retroactively reversed by implementation of the Acts, thereby exposing SCE&G to financial risk
not contemplated in the BLRA. One research paper has addressed the pitfalls of this precise
situation. The authors of this scholarly paper pose the following question:
Should the financial risk to which the firm is exposed under a prudence review be
limited when the regulator gives explicit or implicit approval of an investment
before it is undertaken?46
The authors later answer the question as follows, in reference to a prudence review that takes place
in advance of undertaking the project:
Favorable [results of the advance prudence review] should … reduce the

probability that [ex-post] prudence reviews are held and limit both the
expected penalty from and the payment variation under a prudence review.47
The authors go on to state (in the footnote to the quoted sentence) that:
Thus, this finding lends support to claims by industry experts that initial
regulatory approval of a project should limit the subsequent down-side risk
to which the firm is exposed if it undertakes the project. For example, Berlin
(1984, 28) suggests that “where a regulatory commission has blessed a project,
45
Encinosa, William, and David Sappington (1995), “Toward a Benchmark for Optimal Prudency Policy,” Journal
of Regulatory Economics, 7, 111-130.
46
of Regulatory Economics, 7, 111-130, at 112.
47
of Regulatory Economics, 7, 111-130, at 122-123 (emphasis added).
15
or declined to suggest its cancellation following the review of a utility’s

construction program, utilities and their investors should be permitted to rely
on that decision...”48
The authors’ analysis implies that, if there is an advance prudency review, SCE&G’s “expected
penalty,” “payment variation,” and “downside risk” should be limited, in order for the economic
benefits of the regime to be realized. In this case, implementation of the Acts would run counter
to this prescription by imposing an unanticipated penalty on SCE&G. This action would effectively
abrogate the BLRA, thereby reducing or eliminating the value of the law from an economic and
public policy perspective. In addition to the direct harm to SCE&G and its investors, who relied
on the BLRA being followed by the state of South Carolina, there will be economic harm to the
general public interest.
D. The Nuclear Plants at Issue
34. Leading up to 2008, SCE&G identified a need for an additional 600MW of capacity by 2016 and
another 600MW by 2022.49 At the time, natural gas supplies were declining and prices were
volatile. Coal-fired plants faced rising environmental costs. SCE&G reviewed various options to
meet this need and determined that nuclear power was superior to natural gas or coal. SCE&G
further determined that building two new nuclear plants co-located on the site of the existing V.C.
Summer nuclear plant would lead to economies of scale in construction and ongoing operations.50
SCE&G partnered with the South Carolina Public Service Authority (“Santee Cooper”) in this
construction.
35. SCE&G filed an application for a BLRA review order and other related certificates on May 30,
2008.51 This application requested approval for construction and contingency costs of $6.3 billion
(for SCE&G’s 55 percent share).52 The PSC held a three-week hearing on the application in
48
of Regulatory Economics, 7, 111-130, at 123 (emphasis added).
49
Complaint, at 6.
50
51
Complaint, at 14.
52
Complaint, at 14.
16
December 2008, and entered Order No. 2009-104(A) granting the application on March 2, 2009.53
During construction of the plants, the Office of Regulatory Staff (“ORS”) monitored progress and
presented the results of its observations, research, audits, and expert opinions to the PSC at each
proceeding that was held to consider progress with the project.54 To accommodate developments
in the project, SCE&G filed and the PSC approved revisions to the schedule and budget on several
occasions with the most recent three revisions occurring in 2012, 2015, and 2016. These revisions
culminated in an approved cost for the project of $7.7 billion.55
36. In its initial approval of the project, the PSC authorized SCE&G to recover in rates $7.8 million in
financing costs related to $66.0 million of prudently invested capital related to the project.56 The
annual recovery amount was determined by multiplying construction work in progress by the
weighted average cost of capital with appropriate adjustments for taxes. In each of the next eight
years, the PSC approved additional recovery through rates corresponding to the rising financing
costs associated with the level of capital that was invested in the project. By 2016, the level of
prudently invested capital reached $3.8 billion and the corresponding annual financing cost
recovery in rates was $445 million.57 As of July 31, 2017, SCE&G had spent an additional $1.2
billion that was not yet approved by the PSC, bringing its total investment to $5.0 billion.58
37. One noteworthy change to the project during the construction period was revision to the contract
terms with Westinghouse, the lead contractor, that largely converted the agreement to a fixed price
contract.59 I understand that this change was made in response to increasing difficulties with
Westinghouse’s performance, which was causing both increased costs and delays to the completion
dates.60
53
I understand that the South Carolina Supreme Court largely affirmed Order No. 2009-104(A) in 2010.
54
Complaint, at 8.
55
Complaint, at 30.
56
57
58
Griffin Declaration, at 4.
59
Complaint, at 23.
60
Complaint, at 19, 21-23.
17
38. In March 2017, Westinghouse filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and notified SCE&G that it would
seek protection from honoring its obligations under the fixed price contract.61 SCE&G and its
partner Santee Cooper evaluated their options, including completing one or both of the new power
units. SCE&G determined that its 55 percent share of the total cost to complete both units would
be $8.8 billion, or $7.1 billion for a single unit.62 On July 31, 2017, Santee Cooper announced it
was suspending its participation, leaving SCE&G to face the full costs and risks of the project
alone.63
39. Pursuant to the abandonment provision contemplated in §58-33-280(K) of the BLRA, SCE&G
filed a petition with the PSC on August 1, 2017 seeking a prudency ruling of its decision to abandon
the project.64 It withdrew that petition two weeks later in order to provide the relevant parties time
to assess the situation.65
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LIKELY EFFECTS OF THE ACTS
A. The Legislature’s Retroactive Rate Change Would Further Increase Regulatory and
Political Uncertainty for SCE&G and Other South Carolina Public Utilities
40. Historically, the rating agencies viewed the PSC as a constructive regulator, and this provided a
“boost” to SCE&G ratings.66 The rating agencies viewed the BLRA as a favorable factor in their
ratings of SCE&G, as I describe below.67
41. Over the past year, the rating agencies’ view of the regulatory environment in South Carolina has
declined. Fitch described: “severe deterioration in the legislative and regulatory construct in SC in
61
Complaint, at 29.
62
Complaint, at 30.
63
Complaint, at 30.
64
Complaint, at 31.
65
Complaint, at 31.
66
See, for example, Moody’s Investors Service, “Credit Opinion: South Carolina Electric & Gas Company,” March
9, 2018, at 1.
67
See, for example, Moody’s Investors Service, “Rating Action: Moody’s Downgrades SCE&G to Baa3 and
SCANA to Ba1, Ratings Remain under Review,” February 5, 2018, at 1; FitchRatings, “Fitch Downgrades SCANA
to ‘BB+’ / SCE&G to ‘BBB-’; Negative Watch Maintained,” September 29, 2017, at 1.
18
recent days.”68 Moody’s noted that the political and regulatory backlash from SCE&G’s
abandonment decision was: “much greater than our initial expectations.”69 A subsequent Moody’s
report noted that: “what we have historically viewed as one of the most credit supportive political
and regulatory environments in the country, has become one of the most challenged and
uncertain.”70
42. In a January 3, 2018 report, Moody’s wrote that “it will take some time to prove the environment
has permanently returned to a more normal state of long-term credit supportiveness” and that there
would be “heightened regulatory risk inherent in the South Carolina political environment until a
relationship track record of predictable support can be established.”71 On the same day, Fitch stated
that it “remains concerned about the general constructiveness of the regulatory regime in South
Carolina over the medium term, even after a satisfactory recovery mechanism for the stranded
nuclear investment is achieved.”72
43. The rating agencies responded negatively to passage of the Acts.
 Fitch (July 3, 2018):
If allowed to stand, Fitch considers the magnitude of the cut to be detrimental to

SCE&G’s and SCG’s credit metrics, even after consideration of SCG’s 80%
reduction of the common dividend.73
Despite the Legislature’s characterization of the new rate as “temporary,” Fitch is

concerned that the expected December order could be of the same magnitude. If
so, Fitch expects SCG’s Total Adjusted Debt/EBITDAR to average around 6.0x
over the next three years and SCE&G’s to average around 5.7x, both above Fitch’s
previously stated downgrade thresholds of 5.5x and 5.0x, respectively. SCG has
filed a federal court challenge to the legislation and requested an injunction to stay.
Absent prompt favorable legal intervention, Fitch is likely to downgrade the
68
FitchRatings, “Fitch Downgrades SCANA to ‘BB+’ / SCE&G to ‘BBB-’; Negative Watch Maintained,”
September 29, 2017, at 1.
Moody’s Investors Service, “Rating Action: Moody’s Places SCANA and SCE&G on Review for Downgrade,”
69
November 1, 2017, at 1.
70
Moody’s Investors Service, “Credit Opinion: South Carolina Electric & Gas Company,” March 9, 2018, at 4.
71
Moody’s Investors Service, “Rating Action: Moody’s Changes Dominion Energy’s Rating Outlook to Negative
from Stable; Continues Review for Downgrade of SCE&G and SCANA,” January 3, 2018, at 1-2.
72
FitchRatings, “Fitch Revises Rating Watch on SCANA and Subsidiaries to Evolving,” January 3, 2018, at 1.
73
FitchRatings, “Fitch Maintains Rating Watch Evolving on SCANA and Subsidiaries,” July 3, 2018, at 1.
19
ratings of SCG, SCE&G, and PSNC by one notch. If the PSC issues an order in
December 2018 with a permanent cut of a similar magnitude, additional
downgrades may be warranted. Fitch also notes important changes to South
Carolina utility regulation contained in HB4375 that, in Fitch’s view, are likely to
result in the continuation of SCG’s adversarial regulatory relationship.74
A decision by DEI to terminate the merger could also lead to multi-notch

downgrades for SCG and its subsidiaries.75
The ratings reflect the sharp deterioration in the legislative and regulatory
environment in South Carolina since abandonment of the new nuclear project in
July 2016. In addition to HB 4375’s legislatively mandated 14.8% rate cut,
changes to definitions and statutory components of the state’s utility regulation are
likely to result in diminished regulatory support, in Fitch’s opinion. Among such
items are an expansive definition of prudence, removal of the mandate that the
Office or Regulatory Staff (ORS) must consider preservation of a utility’s financial
integrity, and granting the ORS subpoena powers.76
 S&P (July 3, 2018):
We are maintaining the CreditWatch to reflect the potential for a downgrade if the
Court does not issue an injunction prohibiting the SCPSC from implementing the
new law. The rate reduction would significantly weaken the company’s financial
measures, despite its recent announced plan to reduce its dividend by about 80%.77
We believe the enactment of House Bill 4375, which will temporarily reduce
customer rates by approximately 15% or about $31 million per month, will weaken
the company’s financial measures, despite its recent decision to reduce its dividend
by about 80%. Absent the Court issuing an injunction, prohibiting the SCPSC
from implementing the new law, we could lower ratings to reflect our expectation
of materially weaker financial measures. Specifically, we expect that the
company’s adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt would deteriorate to
about the 13%-14% range from SCANA’s current 17%-18% range.78
 Moody’s (July 2, 2018):
74
75
76
FitchRatings, “Fitch Maintains Rating Watch Evolving on SCANA and Subsidiaries,” July 3, 2018, at 1-2.
S&P Global Ratings, “Research Update: SCANA Corp. and Subsidiaries ‘BBB’ Ratings Remain on CreditWatch
77
Negative on Passage of South Carolina Bill,” July 3, 2018, at 1.

78
Negative on Passage of South Carolina Bill,” July 3, 2018, at 1-2.
20
The ratings confirmations consider the manageable impact of the legislated

revenue reduction on SCE&G’s and SCANA’s credit quality and metrics,
especially in light of the dividend cut, while also recognizing that ultimate
authority for establishing permanent rates remains with the SCPSC.79
Moody’s believes the new legislation may further pressure the SCPSC to set rates
that are unusually low or significantly delay or deny recovery; however we think
it is unlikely they would establish rates that are lower than the temporary rates set
by the new legislation.80
If SCE&G’s rates are adjusted in accordance with the legislation, Moody’s

anticipates cash flow credit metrics at SCE&G and SCANA will decline to levels
that are commensurate with their current ratings. For example we expect the two
companies will exhibit ratios of cash flow from operations excluding changes in
working capital (CFO pre-WC) to debt in the low teens.81
Downward pressure on the ratings could again increase if SCE&G is ordered to

refund amounts previously collected under the BLRA, particularly without the
benefit of a larger, better capitalized partner; or if rates established by the SCPSC
later this year do not provide an opportunity for SCE&G to maintain a ratio of CFO
pre-WC to debt that is at least in the low-teens on a sustained basis. Furthermore,
if the company’s liquidity becomes constrained, such as being unable to draw on
its credit lines or to issue additional debt, there could also be downward movement
in the ratings.82
B. The Consequence of Regulatory Uncertainty is Clear: Reductions and Delays in

Investment Result
44. All else equal, if regulated utilities in South Carolina face increased risk of retroactive regulation
changes that prevent them from recovering previously approved capital expenditures, then utilities
may eliminate or defer necessary maintenance and improvements to the electric power system,
potentially leading to a less reliable electric power system and a lower quality of service for
customers. Regulatory uncertainty may have a direct impact on utilities’ capital expenditures –
i.e., utilities propose fewer (or no) maintenance and improvement projects because of concern that
they will be unable to recover the costs – or an indirect impact – i.e., utilities are unable to obtain
Moody’s Investors Service, “Rating Action: Moody’s Confirms SCANA, SCE&G and PSNC, Rating Outlook
79
Negative,” July 2, 2018, at 1.

80

81

82
21
adequate financing at an affordable rate to be able to implement proposed maintenance and

improvement projects because investors are concerned they will not be repaid.
45. Academic research provides evidence that increased uncertainty can cause reductions and delays
in investment.83 Uncertainty can also cause investors to change the type of investments made. For
example, uncertainty over future demand, fuel costs, or regulatory changes can cause utilities to
invest in smaller, and potentially less cost-effective generation plants, over large generation plants
that benefit from economies of scale, because smaller plants require a smaller upfront investment
that is more likely to be recovered.84
1. Electric Utilities and Regulatory Hold-Up
46. As regulated monopolies, electric utilities are vulnerable to regulatory risk for three primary
reasons: (i) investments are large and irreversible, (ii) generation, transmission, and distribution
technologies are characterized by economies of scale and scope, and (iii) outputs are consumed by
nearly every member of the population.85 As explained by Bergara, et al. (1998):
These features have traditionally raised the need for governmental regulation of
utilities… [but] the fact that infrastructure services tend to be massively consumed
implies that politicians and interest groups will care about the level of
infrastructure pricing. Thus, massive consumption, economies of scale, and sunk
investments provide governments (either national or local) with the incentive to
behave opportunistically vis-à-vis the investing company.86
47. The incentive for regulators and politicians to behave opportunistically can then result in
inefficiently low levels of investment by the utility and reductions in economic growth, given the
dependence of other industries on reliable access to electric power at reasonable rates. Heller and
83
See, for example, Dixit, Avinash, and Robert Pindyck (1994), Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, at 135-145, 372-373; Hubbard, Glenn (1994), “Investment Under Uncertainty: Keeping One’s
Options Open,” Journal of Economic Literature, 32(4), 1816-1831.
84
Dixit, Avinash, and Robert Pindyck (1994), Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
at 51-54; Teisberg, Elizabeth (1993), “Capital Investment Strategies under Uncertain Regulation,” RAND Journal of
Economics, 24(4), 591-604, at 591, 600.
85
Bergara, Mario, Witold Henisz, and Pablo Spiller (1998), “Political Institutions and Electric Utility Investment: A
Cross-Nation Analysis,” California Management Review, 40(2), 18-35, at 19-20.
86
22
McCubbins (1996), for example, review the theory behind regulatory expropriation of utilities’
capital for political gain and its impacts:
Utilities, as attractive and potent tools for redistribution, are particularly vulnerable
to political winds. Political interference in production and pricing of utility
services tends to be inefficient, as economic criteria often are low on the list of
considerations for political decisions. Politically motivated redistributive efforts
often drive away sources of long-term capital investment and hence seriously
impede economic development… Risk, whether market or political, is an
important determinant of private investment decisions. The greater the risk, all
else constant, the lower the level of private investment (World Bank 1995; Levy
and Spiller 1996). Governments can, however, increase the level of private
investment by reducing the political risks associated with capital-intensive
industries. These political risks are well known and are referred to as the “hold
up” problem: governments can force utilities to shoulder burdensome taxes, to use
input factors ineffectively, or to charge unprofitable rates for their service.
Moreover, due to the capital intensivity [sic] of utility production, exit is often
difficult, and thus governments can pursue strategies that depreciate the asset value
of the investment, essentially expropriating the capital through regulation
(Williamson 1983).87
48. Knittel (2006) reviews the shift from municipal- to state-level regulatory regimes in the United
States at the beginning of the 20th century and finds that:
The increase in the geographical breadth of electricity firms and the ability for ex
post opportunism by corrupt municipal regulators likely led electricity firms to
curb large sunk cost investments, resulting in inefficient levels of generation. If
state regulators were less corrupt, or potentially less corrupt, then state regulators
and interested parties would have seen state regulation as a means of relieving the
contracting inefficiencies, thereby spurring investment in generation capacity.88
Based on his empirical analysis, he finds that “[g]reater capacity shortage in a state is correlated
with the adoption of state regulation,” suggesting that “when capacity shortages were present,
industrial consumers lobbied for state regulation.”89 Similarly, he finds that “[a]fter controlling for
regional costs differences and cost differences due to hydroelectric output, states with low prices
87
Heller, William, and Mathew McCubbins (1996), “Politics, Institutions, and Outcomes: Electricity Regulation in
Argentina and Chile,” The Journal of Policy Reform, 1(4), 357-387, at 358.
88
Knittel, Christopher (2006), “The Adoption of State Electricity Regulation: The Role of Interest Groups,” The
Journal of Industrial Economics, 54(2), 201-222, at 207.
89
23
are more likely to adopt state regulation,” suggesting that under municipal-level regulation prices
may have been set “too low to support adequate generation and distribution investment levels.”90
In other words, at the beginning of the 20th century, empirical evidence suggests that state-level
regulation was adopted in states where it was viewed as being less risky for utilities than municipal
regulation.
2. Impact on Investment Following Disallowances in the 1980s
49. During the 1980s in a number of cases, regulators disallowed certain capital expenditures using
hindsight reviews mainly related to new nuclear generation plants.91 Thereafter, several articles
examined the impact of these hindsight reviews by regulators on investment by electric utilities.
These examinations determined that hindsight reviews may result in disallowances for a number of
reasons, including because a plant is not deemed to be “used-and-useful” (e.g., because of
unexpectedly low growth in demand for electricity) or because of excessive costs (e.g., because of
unexpectedly high costs of construction).92
50. Prior to the 1980s, utilities had come to “expect that any costs that were ‘prudently incurred’ would
be passed through to ratepayers. In the 1980s, however, many nuclear power plants turned out to
have costs far beyond initial projections. A number of state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs)
responded—with ‘20-20 hindsight’—by refusing to let utilities charge these higher costs to
consumers.”93 In response, “a number of industry members and observers alleged that the implicit
‘regulatory contract’ between regulators and regulated firms was violated, with regulators
opportunistically reneging on their end of the deal after fundamental demand and supply conditions
had shifted.”94
90
91
U.S. Electric Utility Industry,” RAND Journal of Economics, 36(3), 628-644, at 628.
92
See, for example, Lyon, Thomas (1995), “Regulatory Hindsight Review and Innovation by Electric Utilities,”
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 7, 233-254, at 238.
93
Lyon, Thomas (1995), “Regulatory Hindsight Review and Innovation by Electric Utilities,” Journal of Regulatory
Economics, 7, 233-254, at 237.
94
24
51. Indeed, based on data from 132 “investor-owned electric utilities (IOUs) for which continuous
investment data were reported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Electric Power Division (EPD)
in its Financial Statistics of Selected Electric Utilities,” Lyon and Mayo (2005) find that
“investment peaked in the early 1980s and fell between 1985 and 1991” following the major
disallowances by state commissions.95
52. Other articles find evidence that the types of investment shifted following the disallowances. Lyon
(1995), for example, provides evidence that firms invested less in new technology in the 1990s
relative to the 1970s96 and demonstrates that the: “threat of hindsight review may indeed cause
underinvestment or a total refusal to invest in new capacity; in addition, it may cause a utility to
switch from an innovative technology to a more costly conventional one.”97 Similarly, Teisberg
(1993) examines the trend towards smaller, shorter lead-time plants in the 1970s and 1980s and
demonstrates that “rational firms invest in smaller, shorter-lead-time plants, or delay investment
when faced with uncertain and asymmetric profit and loss restrictions,” such as those created by
hindsight review.98
53. Lyon and Mayo (2005) demonstrate that utilities that experienced disallowances reduced their
investment expenditures in the years following the disallowances.99 They also argue that if utilities
believe disallowances occurred because of regulatory opportunism, then other utilities in the same
state would reduce their investment after observing disallowances at another utility.100 While the
authors do not find evidence of regulatory opportunism across all utilities in their sample, they do
95
U.S. Electric Utility Industry,” RAND Journal of Economics, 36(3), 628-644, at 631-633.
96
Economics, 7, 233-254, at 236.
97
Economics, 7, 233-254, at 234.
98
Economics, 24(4), 591-604, at 591. See also, Guthrie, Graeme (2006) “Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on
Risk and Investment,” Journal of Economic Literature, 44(4), 925-972.
99
100
25
find evidence of a spillover effect among nuclear plant operators.101 This study highlights that if
the Acts passed by the legislature are implemented and considered to be opportunistic by other
utilities, large-scale investment by electric utilities in the state, and consequently the reliability of
the electric power system, may suffer.
3. International Evidence on the Impact on Investment of Regulatory and/or

Political Uncertainty
54. Similar to the research analyzing the effects of regulatory uncertainty in the United States following
the disallowances in the 1980s, there are many articles studying whether cross-country differences
in regulatory and/or political regimes impact investment in regulated utilities. For example, Cubbin
and Stern (2006) summarize the existing theory as: “[d]eveloping economies with high-quality
regulatory agencies (as measured by regulatory governance) should attract more sustained
investment into their utility service industries and at a lower cost of capital. The regulated utilities
should also have higher efficiency and growth rates.”102 They demonstrate empirically that
“[c]ontrolling for privatization and competition and allowing for country-specific fixed effects,
both regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance are positively and significantly
associated with higher per capita generation capacity.”103 Similarly, Bergara, et al. (1998) find that
political credibility and an independent judiciary increase per capita electricity generation
capacity.104
4. Investor Protection and the Cost of Capital
55. Studies on international capital markets provide additional perspective on how regulatory
uncertainty affects access to capital. A series of papers by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (LLSV) examine how investor protections afforded by different legal environments
101
102
Cubbin, John, and Jon Stern (2006), “The Impact of Regulatory Governance and Privatization on Electricity
Industry Generation Capacity in Developing Economies,” The World Bank Economic Review, 20(1), 115-141, at
116.
103
Industry Generation Capacity in Developing Economies,” The World Bank Economic Review, 20(1), 115-141, at
115.
Bergara, Mario, Witold Henisz, and Pablo Spiller (1998), “Political Institutions and Electric Utility Investment:
104
A Cross-Nation Analysis,” California Management Review, 40(2), 18-35, at 24-26.
26
affect the size of capital markets and asset valuations in those markets. These authors find that
countries that better protect investors from expropriation have larger capital markets and higher
asset valuations than countries with weaker investor protections.105 This research notes the
importance of the consistent application of the rule of law:
Where laws are protective of outside investors and well enforced, investors are
willing to finance firms, and financial markets are both broader and more valuable.
In contrast, where laws are unprotective of investors, the development of financial
markets is stunted. … By limiting expropriation, the law raises the price that
securities fetch in the marketplace.106
56. The consequence of the LLSV evidence for the electric utility market in South Carolina is that
enforcement of the Acts would reduce investors’ willingness to provide capital to electric utility
companies in the state. This change in behavior would lead to less capital being available and at a
higher price.
57. In summary, academic research demonstrates that an increase in regulatory uncertainty, particularly
if the regulatory change is seen as politically opportunistic, is likely to lead to decreased and
delayed investments and cause the investments that are made to be less cost-effective and
innovative.107 This evidence includes theoretical models as well as empirical studies of the
development of state-level regulations in the United States, the response to prudency disallowances
in the 1980s, and cross-country analyses.
58. Implementation of the Acts would create regulatory and political uncertainty and amount to
retroactively abrogating the assurances and prudency findings that I understand the state granted to
SCE&G and upon which SCE&G and its investors relied in financing and constructing two nuclear
105
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (1997), “Legal Determinants
of External Finance,” Journal of Finance, 52(3), 1131–1150, at 1131; La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (2002), “Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation,” Journal of Finance,
57(3), 1147–1170, at 1147. See also, Himmelberg, Charles, Glenn Hubbard, and Inessa Love (2000), “Investor
Protection, Ownership, and Investment,” working paper.
106
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (2002), “Investor Protection
and Corporate Valuation,” Journal of Finance, 57(3), 1147–1170, at 1147.
107
As I discuss above, expropriation risk can be ameliorated to some extent by a credible regulatory regime, such as
the BLRA, that allows for advance prudency determinations. However, in this case, implementation of the Acts
would render the BLRA largely ineffective by showing that the advance prudency reviews and approvals were not
certain to be honored.
27
power plants. Given the retroactive character and significant economic and other consequences of
implementing the Acts, academic research suggests that utilities in South Carolina likely will
eliminate or defer necessary maintenance and improvements to the electric power system,
potentially leading to a less reliable electric power system and a lower quality of service for
customers. For example, following the disallowances that occurred in the 1980s, utilities reduced
investment and chose smaller, less innovative investments that could be constructed more
quickly.108 Similarly, countries with weaker investor protections have smaller capital markets,
lower asset valuations, and less electricity generation per capita than countries with stronger
investor protections.109
C. Harm to Stakeholders
1. SCE&G and its Investors
59. Most directly, the Acts would deprive SCE&G of $270 million in revenues that are due under the
BLRA. As I discuss above, these disputed revenues resulted from a robust ex ante review process
in which the PSC approved $3.3 billion of expenditures SCE&G made on the project over the better
part of a decade.110 During this period, ORS monitored progress on the project and audited
SCE&G’s expenditures, and resulting in nine approvals by the PSC.111
60. In determining to pursue the project, SCE&G relied upon the revised rates provided for under the
BLRA. In addition, SCE&G disclosed BLRA-related payments to investors in its 10-Ks. For
example, its 2016 10-K states:
Under the BLRA, the SCPSC has approved, among other things, a milestone
schedule and a capital costs estimates schedule for the New Units. This approval
Lyon, Thomas (1995), “Regulatory Hindsight Review and Innovation by Electric Utilities,” Journal of
108
Regulatory Economics, 7, 233-254, at 236; Teisberg, Elizabeth (1993), “Capital Investment Strategies under
Uncertain Regulation,” RAND Journal of Economics, 24(4), 591-604, at 591.
109
57(3), 1147–1170, at 1147; Cubbin, John, and Jon Stern (2006), “The Impact of Regulatory Governance and
Privatization on Electricity Industry Generation Capacity in Developing Economies,” The World Bank Economic
Review, 20(1), 115-141, at 115; Bergara, Mario, Witold Henisz, and Pablo Spiller (1998), “Political Institutions and
Electric Utility Investment: A Cross-Nation Analysis,” California Management Review, 40(2), 18-35, at 24-26.
South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff, “SCE&G Cumulative Rate Increases Approved Under the Base Load
110
Review Act,” November 21, 2016.

South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff, “SCE&G Cumulative Rate Increases Approved Under the Base Load
111
Review Act,” November 21, 2016.

28
constitutes a final and binding determination that the New Units are used and
useful for utility purposes, and that the capital costs associated with the New
Units are prudent utility costs and expenses and are properly included in
rates, so long as the New Units are constructed or are being constructed within the
parameters of the approved milestone schedule, including specified contingencies,
and the approved capital costs estimates schedule. Subject to the same conditions,
the BLRA provides that SCE&G may apply to the SCPSC annually for an order to
recover through revised rates SCE&G’s weighted average cost of capital applied
to all or part of the outstanding balance of construction work in progress
concerning the New Units. Estimated operating costs, including the depreciation
of the utility plant costs, are then to be recovered through rates beginning when the
construction of each New Unit is completed and placed into service. The BLRA
also provides that, in the event of abandonment prior to plant completion,
construction work in progress costs incurred, including AFC, and a return on those
costs may be recoverable through rates, so long as SCE&G demonstrates by a
preponderance of the evidence that its decision to abandon the New Unit(s) was
prudent.112
SCE&G has disclosed the binding prudency filing to investors since February 2009.113 During this
period, SCE&G issued $2.9 billion in debt.114
61. As I note above, the credit rating agencies viewed BLRA revenues as important to SCE&G’s
financial condition, and the regulatory and political environment is an important factor in
determining SCE&G’s credit ratings. The downward revision to the rating agencies’ assessments
of the regulatory and political environment in South Carolina points to lower credit ratings even if
its quantitative credit metrics remain stable. In addition, a loss of the BLRA revenues would reduce
SCE&G’s quantitative credit metrics and place additional pressure on its credit ratings. For
example, Moody’s notes the importance of keeping CFO pre-WC to Debt at least in the low
112
See, for example, SCANA Corporation and South Carolina Electric & Gas Company SEC Form 10-K for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2016, at 87 (emphasis added).
113
See, for example, SCANA Corporation and South Carolina Electric & Gas Company SEC Form 10-K for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2008, at 52; SCANA Corporation and South Carolina Electric & Gas Company SEC
Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2009, at 25; SCANA Corporation and South Carolina Electric &
Gas Company SEC Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010, at 16; SCANA Corporation and South
Carolina Electric & Gas Company SEC Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2011, at 13; SCANA
Corporation and South Carolina Electric & Gas Company SEC Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31,
2012, at 61; SCANA Corporation and South Carolina Electric & Gas Company SEC Form 10-K for the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2014, at 39; SCANA Corporation and South Carolina Electric & Gas Company SEC Form 10-
K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2015, at 78; SCANA Corporation and South Carolina Electric & Gas
Company SEC Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, at 109
114
Exhibit 1.
29
teens.115 Dropping below this level places SCE&G at risk for further downgrades in its credit
ratings, which would in turn lead to a higher cost of its debt. Indeed, given that SCE&G’s credit
ratings are at the low-end of the investment grade portion of the scale, any downgrade would likely
put them below investment grade, resulting in a particularly large increase in SCE&G’s cost of
debt.
62. The academic evidence discussed above also points to a higher cost of equity due to the Acts. For
example, LLSV provide evidence that investor expropriation reduces the availability of capital and
raises its price.116 Thus, a retroactive change to the BLRA’s economic assurances upon which
SCE&G and its investors relied when deciding to pursue the project and provide capital to finance
it introduces regulatory and political uncertainty that would increase the cost of capital. This
increased cost would cause direct economic harm to SCE&G and its investors to the extent that
SCE&G is unable to pass the increased cost on to its customers.
63. I also understand that the Acts preclude SCE&G from later recapturing the disputed $270 million,117
making the harm to SCE&G and its investors permanent and irreparable.
2. SCE&G’s Customers
64. Despite the apparent intent of protecting SCE&G’s customers, the Acts may harm them in at least
two ways. First, the direct channel of harm is that customers would face higher rates, to the extent
the PSC passes along SCE&G’s higher cost of capital in future rates.118
65. Second, to the extent that the PSC does not fully adjust rates to reflect a higher cost of capital,
customers face indirect harm in the form of reduced investment by SCE&G. As I discuss above,
SCE&G estimates that the necessary capital expenditures to maintain its generation, transmission,
Moody’s Investors Service, “Rating Action: Moody’s Downgrades SCE&G to Baa3 and SCANA to Ba1, Ratings
115
Remain Under Review,” February 5, 2018, at 1.

116
57(3), 1147–1170, at 1147.
117
The annual loss of revenue after 2018 would amount to $367 million. Memorandum, at 3, 29; Griffin
Declaration, at 11.
118
Net harm would compare the present value of the higher future rates to the proposed $270 million rate reduction
in 2018.
30
and distribution assets and provide safe and reliable service to its customers to be between $400
million and $500 million per year for the next three years.119 Funding these critical investments
requires ongoing access to capital. If the rates the PSC allows SCE&G to charge its customers are
insufficient to provide investors the market-based cost of capital, it would be unable to “maintain
and attract capital” as necessary to serve its customers.120
66. This prediction that the implementation of the Acts would reduce investment has support in the
academic literature as I discuss above. For example, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show that
uncertainty reduces investment,121 and Teisberg (1993) provides evidence that regulatory
uncertainty in the 1980s can explain the shift to smaller, shorter-lead-time, power plants.122 Heller
and McCubbins (1996) note that it is possible to: “increase the level of private investment by
reducing the political risks associated with capital-intensive industries.”123 Knittel (2006) finds that
states with capacity shortages and low prices were more likely to shift from municipal- to state-
level regulation of electric utilities suggesting utilities expected a reduction in regulatory
expropriation under state-level regulation.124 Lyon and Mayo (2005) provide evidence that utilities
reduce their investment after their regulator disallows part of their construction costs. 125
International evidence provides further support that weak investor protections are associated with
119
SCANA Earnings Presentation, Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2016, February 16, 2017, at 10.
120
Griffin Declaration, at 7, 9.
121
at 135-145, 372-373.
122
Economics, 24(4), 591-604.

123
Argentina and Chile,” The Journal of Policy Reform, 1(4), 357-387, at 358.
124
125
U.S. Electric Utility Industry,” RAND Journal of Economics, 36(3), 628-644, at 638, 640.
31
reduced access to capital in general (LLSV),126 and that electricity generation capacity, specifically,
is lower when regulatory protection is lower (Cubbin and Stern (2006), Bergara, et al. (1998)).127
3. The General Public Interest of the State of South Carolina
67. The general public interest of the state of South Carolina would be harmed by the implementation
of the Acts as well. First, abrogating the BLRA would cause economic harm by weakening the
BLRA itself, an economically sensible law, which would lead to underinvestment across the state.
The BLRA was designed to mitigate the uncertainty imposed on investors when the prudency
review occurs after the plant is complete (Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Teisberg (1993), Encinosa and
Sappington (1995)).128 Additionally, if market participants view implementation of the Acts as
regulatory or political opportunism, it would raise the cost of capital to utilities in the state,
curtailing investment. Lyon and Mayo (2005) provide evidence of a “spillover effect” in that
disallowances of construction costs incurred by nuclear plant operators in the 1980s reduced
investment by other nuclear plant operators in the same state.129
68. As I note for the customers of SCE&G, underinvestment in the electric power system would lead
to electric service that is less reliable and robust. Further, this decline in the quality of electric
service, as well as the reduction in expenditures on construction and maintenance in the state, would
reduce employment and economic growth.
69. In addition, unilaterally and retroactively reversing an existing law under which there was
significant advance prudency review and participation in decision-making by multiple
stakeholders, and under which investors had committed significant sums of capital to SCE&G, also
126
57(3), 1147–1170, at 1147.
127
Industry Generation Capacity in Developing Economies,” The World Bank Economic Review, 20(1), 115-141;
128
at 135-145, 372-373; Teisberg, Elizabeth (1993), “Capital Investment Strategies under Uncertain Regulation,”
RAND Journal of Economics 24(4), 591-604; Encinosa, William, and David Sappington (1995), “Toward a
Benchmark for Optimal Prudency Policy,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 7, 111-130.
129
32
would be likely to reduce the confidence and willingness of utilities and other businesses to invest
in South Carolina.
V. CONCLUSION
70. The retroactive change in law and the modification of the regulatory environment that will result if
the Acts are implemented would cause economic harm of various types to SCE&G, its customers,
and the general public interest of the state of South Carolina.
71. Academic research provides evidence that increased regulatory uncertainty can cause reductions
and delays in investment and change the type of investments made. For example, following the
disallowances that occurred in the 1980s, utilities reduced investment and chose smaller, less
innovative investments that could be constructed more quickly. Similarly, countries with weaker
investor protections have smaller capital markets, lower asset valuations, and less electricity
generation per capita than countries with stronger investor protections.
72. If the Acts are implemented, SCE&G would lose millions of dollars of revenue, face reduced access
to capital, and incur an increased cost of capital, all of which are likely to cause SCE&G to reduce
investment. SCE&G’s customers in turn, likely would face increased rates to the extent that
SCE&G’s higher cost of capital is passed along to them in rates, and a lower quality of service, if
SCE&G must reduce investment due to a lack of affordable capital. Furthermore, as documented
in the literature, abrogating all or part of the BLRA and disallowing SCE&G’s previously approved
capital expenditures would cause economic harm to the residents of South Carolina by encouraging
lower levels of utility investment in the state. All else equal, reduced investment in the state’s
electric system would result in lower service reliability and quality, including potentially slower
recovery times following major hurricanes, fewer jobs, and slower economic growth. In addition,
by unilaterally and retroactively reversing an existing law under which there was significant
advance prudency review and participation in decision-making by multiple stakeholders, and under
which investors had committed significant sums of capital to SCE&G, implementation of the Acts
also is likely to reduce the confidence and willingness of utilities and other businesses to invest in
South Carolina.
33
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on: July 23, 2018
Glenn Hubbard, Ph.D.
34
EXHIBIT 1
DEBT ISSUED BY SCE&G
Year Debt Issued by SCE&G

2009 $325,000,000
2010 -
2011 $380,000,000
2012 $500,000,000
2013 $400,000,000
2014 $300,000,000
2015 $500,000,000
2016 $500,000,000
2017 -
Total $2,905,000,000
Notes and Sources:

Includes debt issued by SCE&G only.
SCANA Corporation SEC Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2009.
Appendix A
ROBERT GLENN HUBBARD
Curriculum Vitae
PERSONAL DATA
Born: In Orlando, Florida.
Marital Status: Married, two children.
FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION
Public Economics, Corporate Finance and Financial Institutions, Macroeconomics, Industrial Organization, Natural
Resource Economics, Public Policy.
EDUCATION
Ph.D., Economics, Harvard University, May 1983.
Dissertation: Three Essays on Government Debt and Asset Markets, supervised by Benjamin M. Friedman, Jerry A. Hausman,
and Martin S. Feldstein.
A.M., Economics, Harvard University, May 1981.
B.A., B.S., Economics, University of Central Florida, June 1979, summa cum laude.
HONORS AND AWARDS

Distinguished Eagle Scout Award, National Boy Scouts of America, November 2017.
Visionary Award, Council for Economic Education, 2016.
Silver Beaver Award, Boy Scouts of America, 2014.
Medal of Honor, Foreign Policy Association, 2014.
Homer Jones Lecture, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2013.
Fiftieth Anniversary Award of Scholarship, University of Central Florida, 2013.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt Distinguished Service Award, Greater New York Council, Boy Scouts of America, 2012.
Bloomberg Markets, 50 Most Influential Members of the Global Financial Community, 2012.
National Association of Corporate Directors, Directorship 100: People to Watch, 2011.
Joint American Economic Association/American Finance Association Distinguished Speaker, 2008.
Cairncross Lecture, University of Oxford, 2007.
Fellow of the National Association of Business Economists, 2005.
William F. Butler Memorial Award, New York Association of Business Economists Award, 2005.
Exceptional Service Award, The White House, 2002.
Michelle Akers Award for Distinguished Service, University of Central Florida, 2001.
Alumni Hall of Fame, University of Central Florida, 2000.
Best Paper Award for Corporate Finance, Western Finance Association, 1998.
Exceptional Service Award, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1992.
Distinguished Alumnus Award, University of Central Florida, 1991.
John M. Olin Fellowship, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1987-1988.
Teaching Commendations, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University.
Northwestern University Associated Student Government Teaching Awards, announced in 1985, 1986, and 1987.
Graduate Distinctions: National Science Foundation Fellowship, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Fellowship.
Undergraduate Distinctions: National Merit Scholarship, National Society of Professional Engineers Award, Florida
Society of Professional Engineers Award, National Council of Teachers of English Award, Omicron Delta Kappa,
Financial Management Association Honor Society.
Robert Glenn Hubbard 2 July 2018
POSITIONS HELD
2004-present Dean, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University
1994-present Russell L. Carson Professor of Economics and Finance, Graduate School of Business, Columbia
University
1997-present Professor of Economics, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University
2017-present Co-Chair, Aspen Institute Future of Work Initiative National Advisory Council
2017-present Member, Aspen Institute Economic Strategy Group
2007-2017 Panel of Economic Advisors, Federal Reserve Bank of New York (also 1993-2001)
2003-2012 Featured commentator, Nightly Business Report
2003-2010 Featured commentator, Marketplace
2003-present Visiting Scholar American Enterprise Institute (also 1995-2001)
1999-2004 Co-Director, Columbia Business School Entrepreneurship Program
2004-2005 Viewpoint Columnist, Business Week
2004-2006 Member, Panel of Economic Advisors, Congressional Budget Office
2001-2003 Chairman, President’s Council of Economic Advisers
2001-2003 Chairman, Economic Policy Committee, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
2001-2003 Member, White House National Economic Council and National Security Council
2001-2003 Member, President’s Council on Science and Technology
1997-1998 Visiting Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School
1995-2001 Visiting Scholar and Director of Tax Policy Program, American Enterprise Institute
1994-1997 Senior Vice Dean, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University
1994 MCI Fellow, American Council for Capital Formation
1994 John M. Olin Visiting Professor, Center for the Study of Economy and the State, University of
Chicago
1991-1993 Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Analysis), U.S. Department of the Treasury
1988-present Professor of Economics and Finance, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University
1987-1988 John M. Olin Fellow in residence at the National Bureau of Economic Research
1983-1988 Assistant Professor of Economics, Northwestern University, with half-time research appointment in
the Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research
1985 Visiting Scholar, Center for Business and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University
1981-1983 Teaching Fellow (Department of Economics) and Resident Tutor in Economics (Dunster House),
Harvard University
DIRECTORSHIPS
2007-present Met Life (Lead independent director)
2006-2008 Capmark Financial Corporation; Information Services Group
2004-present ADP, Inc.; BlackRock Closed-End Funds
2004-2014 KKR Financial Corporation (Lead independent director)
2004-2008 Duke Realty Corporation
2004-2006 Dex Media/R.H. Donnelley
2003-2005 ITU Ventures
2000-2001 Angel Society, LLC; Information Technology University, LLC
CONSULTING OR ADVISORY RELATIONSHIPS

2016-present 55 Capital
2014-present Fiscal Note
2007-present Consulting or Speaking Engagements at Some Point: U.S. Department of Justice, Internal Revenue
Service, Abbott, Access Midstream, Airgas, AlixPartners, Alternative Investment Group, Amazon,
American Century, America’s Health Insurance Plans, AMVAC, ApexBrasil, Association for Corporate
Growth, Atlantic Point, Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Barclays Services Corporation,
BBVA Compass, BGC, BNP Paribas, Brevan Howard, Calamos, Capital Research, Carlyle Group,
Citigroup, Commonfund, Compagnie Financiere Tradition, ComScore, Credit Suisse, Dell, Deutsche
Bank, Donald Fewer, FactSet, Fidelity, Franklin Resources, Freddie Mac, Gartner, Goldman Sachs,
Good, Government of Greece, Great-West, Sue Ann Hamm, The Hartford, Intel, Investcorp, Jarden, JP
Morgan Chase, Key Bank, Kosmos, Macquarie, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, Mylan, NAI, NAREIT,
National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation, New York Bankers Association, NMS Group,
Nationwide, Ocwen, Oracle, Patriarch, Pension Real Estate Association, Pershing Square, PNC,
Principal Management Corporation, Prium, Promontory, Rabobank, Real Estate Roundtable, Related
Properties, Reynolds American, Rio Tinto, Royal Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Scotland,
Rural/Metro, SCG&E, SIG, Solera, SunTrust, Telia Sonera, Trust Company of the West, Tullett
Prebon, Visa, Walter Energy, Wells Fargo, William Walters, Wilmington Trust
2005-2009 Arcapita
2005-2010 Nomura Holdings America
2008 Laurus Funds
2005-2008 Chart Venture Partners
2003-2009 Ripplewood Holdings
POSTS IN NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

2006-present Co-Chair, Committee on Capital Markets Regulation
2004-present Member, Advisory Board, National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse
2003-present Member, Manhattan District Council Board, Boy Scouts of America
2017-present Trustee, Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York
2012-2015 Trustee, Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York
2010-2011 Co-Chair, The Study Group on Corporate Boards
2008-2011 Elder, Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church
2008-2010 Chairman, Economic Club of New York
2006-2008 Member, Board of Directors, Resources for the Future
2003-2008 Trustee, Tax Foundation
2004-2010 Trustee, Economic Club of New York
2004-2007 Trustee, Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
1987-present Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research (Monetary Economics, Corporate
Finance, Public Economics, Economic Fluctuations, Industrial Organization)
2007-present Life Member, Council on Foreign Relations
2017-present Member, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
2003 Member, Committee of Visitors, National Science Foundation
2000 Panelist, Graduate Fellowship Selection Committee, National Science Foundation
1999-2001 Director, Project on Nonprofit Organizations, National Bureau of Economic Research
1997-2001 Member, COSSA-Liaison Committee, American Economic Association
1993-2001 Board of Advisors, Institutional Investor Project, School of Law, Columbia University
1995-1999 Member, Board of Academic Consultants, American Law Institute
1997 Member, Grants Panel for Integrative Graduate Education and Research Training Program,
National Science Foundation
1994-1996 Member, Economics Grants Panel, National Science Foundation
1993-1996 Member, Federal Taxation and Finance Committee, National Tax Association
1990-1995 Co-organized research program on International Aspects of Taxation at the National Bureau of
Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts
1995 Member, Program Committee, American Economic Association Meeting
1983-1987 Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research
1983-1986 Adjunct Faculty Research Fellow, Energy and Environmental Policy Center, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
1986, 1988, 1994 Member of the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity
1985, 1987 Special guest of the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity
1990-1991 Organized research program on Environmental Economics and Public Policy at the National
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts
1988-1990 Co-organized research program on Dynamic Models of Firms and Industries at the National Bureau
of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts
1985-1989 Organized research program and workshops on contracting in financial markets at the Summer
Institute, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts
1988 Organized Economic Fluctuations program on Industrial Economics and Macroeconomics, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Stanford, California
1986-1988 Organized research program and workshop on links between macroeconomics and industrial
organization at the Summer Institute, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
1991 Member, Program Committee, Econometric Society Winter Meetings
1982-1983 Member, Energy Modeling Forum VII Study Group, Stanford University, Stanford, California
1981-present Consultant on research projects with private corporations and government and international
agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration, U.S. Department
of Energy, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Treasury, and U.S. International Trade
Commission; National Science Foundation; The World Bank; Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System; Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Congressional Budget Office
Member: American Economic Association, American Finance Association, Association for Public Policy and
Management, Econometric Society, International Association of Energy Economists, National Tax
Association, the Royal Economic Society, and the Institute for Management Science
Referee: American Economic Review; Canadian Journal of Economics; Columbia Journal of World Business;
Econometrica; Economic Journal; Energy Economics; Energy Journal; International Finance;
International Tax and Public Finance; Journal of Business; Journal of Business and Economic
Statistics; Journal of Economic History; Journal of Economic Literature; Journal of Finance; Journal
of Financial Economics; Journal of Financial Intermediation; Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, Journal of Financial Services Research; Journal of Industrial Economics; Journal of
International Money and Finance; Journal of Law and Economics; Journal of Macroeconomics;
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking; Journal of Monetary Economics; Journal of Political
Economy; Journal of Public Economics; Journal of Regulatory Economics; Journal of Small
Business Finance; Management Science; National Tax Journal; Quarterly Journal of Economics;
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance; RAND Journal of Economics; Review of Economic
Dynamics; Review of Economic Studies; Review of Economics and Statistics; Review of Financial
Economics; Scandinavian Journal of Economics; Southern Economic Journal; National Science
Foundation; C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics (New York University); Addison-Wesley
Publishing Company; Ballinger Press; Cambridge University Press; Harvard Business School
Press; MIT Press; W.W. Norton; Oxford University Press
Associate Editor: Journal of Applied Corporate Finance
Former Associate Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review; International Finance;
Editor: International Tax and Public Finance; Journal of Industrial Economics; Journal of Macroeconomics;
Journal of Small Business Finance; National Tax Journal
PUBLICATIONS AND PAPERS

Edited Volumes
Transition Costs of Fundamental Tax Reform (with K.A. Hassett), Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2001.
Inequality and Tax Policy (with K.A. Hassett), Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2001.
Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations (with M. Feldstein and J.R. Hines), Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1995.
Taxing Multinational Corporations (with M. Feldstein and J. R. Hines), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Studies in International Taxation (with A. Giovannini and J. B. Slemrod), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
Financial Markets and Financial Crises, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
Books
Balance (with T. Kane), Simon and Schuster, 2013.
Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise (with J.F. Cogan and D.P. Kessler), Hoover Institution Press and AEI Press, 1st ed., 2005;
2nd ed., 2011.
Seeds of Destruction (with P. Navarro), FT Publishing, 2010.
The Mutual Fund Industry: Competition and Investor Welfare (with M.F. Koehn, S.I. Ornstein, M. Van Audenrode, and J.
Royer), New York: Columbia Business School Publishing, 2010.
The Aid Trap: Hard Truths About Ending Poverty (with W. Duggan), Columbia Business School Publishing, 2009.
Textbooks
Principles of Economics (with A.P. O’Brien), Pearson Prentice Hall, 1st ed., 2006; 2nd ed., 2008; 3rd ed., 2010; 4th ed.,
2013; 5th ed., 2015; 6th ed., 2017; 7th ed., 2019.
Money, Banking, and the Financial System (with A.P. O’Brien), Pearson Prentice Hall, 1st ed., 2012; 2nd ed., 2013.
Macroeconomics (with A.P. O’Brien and M. Rafferty), Pearson Prentice Hall, 1 st ed., 2012; 2nd ed., 2014; 3rd ed., 2018.
Money, the Financial System, and the Economy, Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1st ed., 1994; 2nd ed.,
1997; 3rd ed., 2000; 4th ed., 2002; 5th ed., 2004; 6th ed., 2007.
Publications
Articles
“Establishing Credible Rules for Fed Emergency Lending” (with C. Calomiris, D. Holtz-Eakin, A.H. Meltzer, and H.S.
Scott), Journal of Financial Economic Policy 8 (2017): 260-267.
“The Response of Deferred Executive Compensation to Changes in Tax Rates” (with A. Gorry, K.A. Hassett, and A.
Mathur), Journal of Public Economics 151 (2017): 28-40.
“Country Characteristics and the Incidence of Capital Income Taxation on Wages: An Empirical Assessment” (with C.
Azemar), Canadian Journal of Economics 48 (2015): 1762-1802.
“Taxing Capital’s Gains: Capital’s Ideas and Tax Policy in the Twenty-First Century“, National Tax Journal, 68 (2015):
409-424.
Reforming the Tax Preference for Employer Health Insurance” (with J. Bankman, J.F. Cogan, and D.P. Kessler), Tax
Policy and the Economy, volume 26, Cambridge, University of Chicago Press, 2012.
“The Effect of Tax Preferences on Health Spending” (with J.F. Cogan and D.P. Kessler), National Tax Journal, 64 (2011):
795-816.
“The Effect of Medicare Coverage for the Disabled on the Market for Private Insurance” (with J.F. Cogan and D.P.
Kessler), Journal of Health Economics 29 (2010): 418-428.
“The Effect of Massachusetts’ Health Reform on Employer-Sponsored Insurance Premiums” (with J.F. Cogan and D.P.
Kessler), Forum for Health Economics and Policy, 2010.
“The Mortgage Market Meltdown and House Prices” (with C. Mayer), The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 9:
Issue 3 (Symposium), Article 8 (2009).
“Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy” (with J. Coates), Journal of Corporation
Law, 33 (Fall 2007).
“Evaluating Effects of Tax Preferences on Health Care Spending and Federal Revenues” (with J.F. Cogan and D.P.
Kessler), in J.M. Poterba, ed., Tax Policy and the Economy, volume 21, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007.
“To Bundle or Not to Bundle: Firms’ Choices Under Pure Building” (with A. Saha and J. Lee), International Journal of the
Economics of Business 14 (2007): 59-83.
“The Economic Effects of Federal Participation in Terrorism Risk” (with B. Deal and P. Hess), Risk Management and
Insurance Review 8 (2005): 177-209.
"The Effects of Progressive Income Taxation on Job Turnover" (with W.M. Gentry), Journal of Public Economics 88
(September 2004): 2301-2322.
“Business, Knowledge, and Global Growth”, Capitalism and Society, 1 (2006).
“Precautionary Savings and the Governance of Nonprofit Organizations” (with R. Fisman), Journal of Public Economics,
2005.
“Government Debt and Interest Rates” (with E. Engen), in M. Gertler and K. Rogoff, NBER Macroeconomics Annual
2004, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.
“Entrepreneurship and Household Saving” (with W.M. Gentry), Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy, 4 (2004).
“Taxing Multinationals” (with M. Devereux), International Taxation and Public Finance 10(2003):469-487.
“The Effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the Location of Assets in Financial Services Firms” (with R. Altshuler),
Journal of Public Economics 87 (January 2003):109-127.
“The Role of Nonprofit Endowments” (with R. Fisman), in E. Glaeser, ed., The Governance of Not-For-Profit
Organizations, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
“Are There Bank Effects in Borrowers’ Costs of Funds?: Evidence from a Matched Sample of Borrowers and Banks” (with
K.N. Kuttner and D.N. Palia), Journal of Business 75 (October 2002): 559-581.
"The Share Price Effects of Dividend Taxes and Tax Imputation Credits" (with T.S. Harris and D. Kemsley), Journal of
Public Economics 79 (March 2001): 569-596.
"Tax Policy and Entrepreneurial Entry" (with W.M. Gentry), American Economic Review 90 (May 2000).: 283-287.
“Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance” (with
C.P. Himmelberg and D. Palia), Journal of Financial Economics 53 (1999): 353-384.
“A Reexamination of the Conglomerate Merger Wave in the 1960s” (with D. Palia), Journal of Finance 54 (June 1999):
1131-1152.
“Inflation and the User Cost of Capital: Does Inflation Still Matter?” (with D. Cohen and K.A. Hassett), in M. Feldstein, ed.,
The Costs and Benefits of Achieving Price Stability, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
“Are Investment Incentives Blunted by Changes in Prices of Capital Goods?: International Evidence” (with K.A. Hassett),
International Finance 1 (October 1998): 103-125.
“Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment,” Journal of Economic Literature 36 (March 1998): 193-225.
“Fundamental Tax Reform and Corporate Financial Policy” (with W.M. Gentry), in J.M. Poterba, ed., Tax Policy and the
Economy, volume 12, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998.
“Distributional Implications of Introducing a Broad-Based Consumption Tax” (with W.M. Gentry), in J.M. Poterba, ed., Tax
Policy and the Economy, volume 11, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.
“How Different Are Income and Consumption Taxes?,” American Economic Review 87 (May 1997): 138-142.
“Tax Policy and Investment,” (with K.A. Hassett), in A.J. Auerbach, ed., Fiscal Policy: Lessons from Economic Research,
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.
"Assessing the Effectiveness of Saving Incentives" (with J. Skinner), Journal of Economic Perspectives 10 (Fall 1996):
73-90.
"The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition Among
Small and Large Banks" (with N. Economides and D. Palia), Journal of Law and Economics 39 (October 1996): 667-704.
"Tax Reforms and Investment: A Cross-Country Comparison" (with J.G. Cummins and K.A. Hassett), Journal of Public
Economics 62 (1996): 237-273.
"Benefits of Control, Managerial Ownership, and the Stock Returns of Acquiring Firms" (with D. Palia), RAND Journal of
Economics 26 (Winter 1995): 782-792.
"Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry" (with D. Palia), Journal of Financial
Economics 39 (1995): 105-130.
"Tax Policy, Internal Finance, and Investment: Evidence from the Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936-1937" (with C.
Calomiris), Journal of Business 68 (October 1995): 443-482.
"A Reconsideration of Investment Behavior Using Tax Reforms as Natural Experiments" (with J.G. Cummins and K.A.
Hassett), Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1994:2): 1-59.
"Precautionary Saving and Social Insurance" (with J. Skinner and S. Zeldes), Journal of Political Economy 105 (April
1995): 360-399.
"Expanding the Life-Cycle Model: Precautionary Saving and Public Policy" (with J. Skinner and S. Zeldes), American
Economic Review 84 (May 1994): 174-179.
"The Tax Sensitivity of Foreign Direct Investment: Evidence from Firm-Level Panel Data" (with J. Cummins), in M.
Feldstein, J.R. Hines, and R.G. Hubbard, eds., Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1995.
"International Adjustment Under the Classical Gold Standard: Evidence for the U.S. and Britain, 1879- 1914" (with C.
Calomiris), in T. Bauoumi, B. Eichengreen, and M. Taylor, eds., Modern Perspectives on the Gold Standard, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995.
"Internal Finance and Firm-Level Investment" (with A. Kashyap and T. Whited), Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 27
(August 1995): 683-701.
"Do Tax Reforms Affect Investment?" (with J.G. Cummins and K.A. Hassett), in J.M. Poterba, ed., Tax Policy and the
Economy, vol. 9, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.
"The Importance of Precautionary Motives for Explaining Individual and Aggregate Saving" (with J. Skinner and S.
Zeldes), Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 40 (June 1994): 59-126.
"Corporate Financial Policy, Taxation, and Macroeconomic Risk" (with M. Gertler), RAND Journal
of Economics 24 (Summer 1993): 286-303.
"Internal Net Worth and the Investment Process: An Application to U.S. Agriculture" (with A. Kashyap), Journal of
Political Economy 100 (June 1992): 506-534.
"Long-Term Contracting and Multiple-Price Systems" (with R. Weiner), Journal of Business 65 (April 1992): 177-198.
"Efficient Contracting and Market Power: Evidence from the U.S. Natural Gas Industry" (with R. Weiner), Journal of Law
and Economics 34 (April 1991): 25-67.
"Interest Rate Differentials, Credit Constraints, and Investment Fluctuations" (with M. Gertler and A. Kashyap), in R.G.
Hubbard, ed., Financial Markets and Financial Crises, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
"Taxation, Corporate Capital Structure, and Financial Distress" (with M. Gertler), in L.H. Summers, ed., Tax Policy and
the Economy, volume 4, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990.
"Firm Heterogeneity, Internal Finance, and Credit Rationing" (with C. Calomiris), Economic Journal 100 (March 1990):
90-104.
"Coming Home to America: Dividend Repatriations in U.S. Multinationals" (with J. Hines), in A. Razin and J.B. Slemrod,
eds., Taxation in the Global Economy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
"Price Flexibility, Credit Availability, and Economic Fluctuations: Evidence from the U.S., 1894-1909" (with C. Calomiris),
Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (August 1989): 429-452.
"Financial Factors in Business Fluctuations" (with M. Gertler), in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Financial Market
Volatility--Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses, 1989.
"Contracting and Price Adjustment in Commodity Markets: Evidence from Copper and Oil" (with R. Weiner), Review of
Economics and Statistics 71 (February 1989): 80-89.
"Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment" (with S. Fazzari and B.C. Petersen), Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 1988:1: 141-195; Reprinted in Z.J. Acs, ed., Small Firms and Economic Growth, Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward
Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1995.
"Investment, Financing Decisions, and Tax Policy" (with S. Fazzari and B.C. Petersen), American Economic Review 78
(May 1988): 200-205.
"Market Structure and Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Manufacturing" (with I. Domowitz and B.C. Petersen), Review of
Economics and Statistics 70 (February 1988): 55-66.
"Capital Market Imperfections and Tax Policy Analysis in the Life-Cycle Model" (with K. Judd), Annales d' Economie et de
Statistique 9 (January-March 1988): 111-139.
"Social Security and Individual Welfare: Precautionary Saving, Borrowing Constraints, and the Payroll Tax" (with K.
Judd), American Economic Review 77 (September 1987): 630-646.
"Oligopoly Supergames: Some Empirical Evidence on Prices and Margins" (with I. Domowitz and B.C. Petersen), Journal
of Industrial Economics 36 (June 1987): 379-398.
"Uncertain Lifetimes, Pensions, and Individual Saving," in Zvi Bodie, John B. Shoven, and David A. Wise (eds.), Issues in
Pension Economics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 175-205.
"The Farm Debt Crisis and Public Policy" (with C. Calomiris and J. Stock), Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
1986:2: 441-479.
"Liquidity Constraints, Fiscal Policy, and Consumption" (with K. Judd), Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1986:1:
1-50.
"The Intertemporal Stability of the Concentration-Margins Relationship" (with I. Domowitz and B.C. Petersen), Journal of
Industrial Economics 35 (September 1986): 13-34.
"Pension Wealth and Individual Saving: Some New Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 18 (May 1986):
167-178.
"Supply Shocks and Price Adjustment in the World Oil Market," Quarterly Journal of Economics 101 (February 1986): 85-
102.
"Regulation and Long-Term Contracts in U.S. Natural Gas Markets" (with R. Weiner), Journal of Industrial Economics 35
(September 1986): 51-71.
"Business Cycles and the Relationship Between Concentration and Price-Cost Margins" (with I. Domowitz and B.C.
Petersen), RAND Journal of Economics 17 (Spring 1986): 1-17.
"Inventory Optimization in the U.S. Petroleum Industry: Empirical Analysis and Implications for Energy Emergency
Policy" (with R. Weiner), Management Science 32 (July 1986): 773-790.
"Social Security, Liquidity Constraints, and Pre-Retirement Consumption," Southern Economic Journal 51 (October
1985): 471-484.
"Personal Taxation, Pension Wealth, and Portfolio Composition," Review of Economics and Statistics 67 (February
1985): 53-60.
"Industry Margins and the Business Cycle: Some New Microeconomic Evidence" (with I. Domowitz and B.C. Petersen),
Economics Letters 19 (1985): 73-77.
"Oil Supply Shocks and International Policy Coordination" (with R. Weiner), European Economic Review 30 (February
1986): 91-106.
"Do IRAs and Keoghs Increase Saving?," National Tax Journal 37 (March 1984): 43-54.
The Financial Impacts of Social Security: A Study of Effects on Household Wealth Accumulation and Allocation, in
Monograph Series in Finance and Economics, New York University, 1983.
Writings on Public Policy
“Supporting Work, Inclusion, and Mass Prosperity,” in M. Strain ed., The U.S. Labor Market: Questions and Challenges
for Public Policy. Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2016.
“Financial Regulatory Reform: A Progress Report,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (May/June 2013): 181-197
“Consequences of Government Deficits and Debt,” International Journal of Central Banking (January 2012).
“Putting Economic Ideas Back into Innovation Policy,” in J. Lerner and S. Stern, eds., The Rate and Direction of Inventive
Activity Revisited. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.
“Back to the Future: The Marshall Plan” (with W. Duggan), in C. Schramm, ed.
Entrepreneurship and Expeditionary Economics, Kansas City: Kauffman Foundation (2011): 8-19.
“The Morning After: A Road Map for Financial Regulatory Reform,” in R. B. Porter, R. R. Glauber, and J.J. Healey, eds.,
New Directions in Financial Services Regulation, Cambridge: MIT Press (2011): 77-98.
“The Best Business Education Ever,” BizEd 6:5 (2007).
“An Action Plan for US Capital Markets,” International Finance 10:1 (2007): 91-99.
“Nondestructive Creation,” strategy+business 27 (Summer 2007): 30-35.
“The Productivity Riddle,” strategy+business 45 (Winter 2006): 28-33.
“Overview of the Japanese Deficit Question,” (with T. Ito), in “Tackling Japan’s Fiscal Challenges: Strategies to Cope with
High Public Debt and Population Aging, Palgrave, Macmillan (October 31, 2006).
“The U.S. Current Account Deficit and Public Policy,” Journal of Policy Modeling 28 (2006): 665-671.
“Making Markets Work,” (with J.F. Cogan and D.P. Kessler), Health Affairs 24 (November/December 2005): 1447-1457.
How Capital Markets Enhance Economic Performance and Facilitate Job Creation (with W.C. Dudley), New York:
Goldman Sachs Markets Institute, 2004.
“Would a Consumption Tax Favor the Rich?,” In A.J. Auerbach and K.A. Hassett, eds., Toward Fundamental Tax
Reform. Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2005.
“The Economist as Public Intellectual,” Journal of Economic Education 35 (Fall 2004): 391-394.
“Success Taxes, Entrepreneurship, and Innovation,” (with W.M. Gentry), in Innovation and the Economy, volume 5,
forthcoming.
“Tax Policy and International Competitiveness,” Taxes-The Tax Magazine (March 2004): 233-241.
"Capital-Market Imperfections, Investment, and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism," in Heinz Hermann, ed.,
Investing for the Future. Frankfurt: Deutsche Bundesbank, 2001.
“The Growth of Institutional Stock Ownership: A Promise Unfulfilled,” (with F.R. Edwards), Journal of Applied Corporate
Finance 13 (Fall 2000): 92-104.
"Telecommunications, the Internet, and the Cost of Capital," in Ingo Vogelsang and Benjamin Compaine, eds., The
Internet Upheaval, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000.
"Federal Deposit Insurance: Economic Efficiency or Politics?" (with N. Economides and D. Palia), Regulation 22 (1999):
15-17.
Institutional Investors and Corporate Behavior (with G. R. Downes, Jr. and E. Houminer), Washington, D.C., American
Enterprise Institute, 1999.
The Magic Mountain: Is There a Budget Surplus? (with K.A. Hassett), Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,
1999.
Medical School Financing and Research: Problems and Policy Options, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,
1999.
“The Golden Goose: Understanding (and Taxing) the Saving of Entrepreneurs,” in Gary D. Libecap, ed., Advances in the
Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Growth, volume 10, Greenwich: JAI Press, 1998.
“U.S. Tax Policy and Multinational Corporations: Incentives, Problems, and Directions for Reform,” in Dale W. Jorgenson
and James M. Poterba, eds., Borderline Case: International Tax Policy, Corporate Research and Development, and
Investment, Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, 1998.
"Distributional Tables and Tax Policy," in David F. Bradford, ed., Distributional Analysis of Tax Policy, Washington, D.C.:
AEI Press, 1995.
"Is There a 'Credit Channel' for Monetary Policy?," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 77 (May/June 1995): 63-
77.
"U.S. Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment: Incentives, Problems, and Reform," Tax Policy and Economic Growth,
Washington, DC: American Council for Capital Formation, 1995.
"The Use of 'Distribution Tables' in the Tax Policy Process," National Tax Journal 46 (December 1993): 527-537.
"Securities Transactions Taxes: Tax Design, Revenue, and Policy Considerations," Tax Notes (November 22, 1993):
985-1000.
"Corporate Tax Integration: A View from the Treasury Department," Journal of Economic Perspectives (Winter 1993):
115-132; reprinted in P. Roberti, ed., Financial Markets and Capital Income Taxation in a Global Economy, Amsterdam:
North-Holland, 1998.
"The President's 1992 Health Care White Paper: An Economic Perspective," National Tax Journal 45 (September 1992):
347-356.
"Household Income Changes Over Time: Some Basic Questions and Facts," Tax Notes (August 24, 1992).
"Household Income Mobility During the 1980s: A Statistical Assessment Based on Tax Return Data" (with J. Nunns and
W. Randolph), Tax Notes (June 1, 1992).
"Debt Renegotiation," Institutional Investor 24 (June 1990).
"Petroleum Regulation and Public Policy" (with R. Weiner), in Leonard Weiss and Michael Klass (eds.), Regulatory
Reform: What Actually Happened, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1986.
"Natural Gas: The Regulatory Transition" (with R. Braeutigam), in Leonard Weiss and Michael Klass (eds.), Regulatory
Reform: What Actually Happened, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1986.
"Natural Gas Contracting in Practice: Evidence from the United States" (with R. Weiner), in Michael Hoel and Bruce
Wolman (eds.), Natural Gas Markets and Contracts, Contributions to Economic Analysis Series, North-Holland, 1986.
"Contracting and Regulation Under Uncertainty: The Natural Gas Market" (with R. Weiner), in John P. Weyant and
Dorothy B. Sheffield (eds.), The Energy Industries in Transition: 1985-2000, Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.
"Oil and OECD Economies: Measuring Stockpile Coordination Benefits" (with J. Marquez and R. Weiner), in Mark Baier
(ed.), Energy and Economy: Global Interdependencies, Bonn: Gesellschaft für Energiewissenschaft und Energiepolitik,
1985.
"Managing the Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Energy Policy in a Market Setting" (with R. Weiner), Annual Review of
Energy 10 (1985): 339-359.
"Modeling Oil Price Fluctuations and International Stockpile Coordination" (with R. Weiner), Journal of Policy Modeling 7
(Summer 1985): 339-359.
"Crude Oil Trading and Price Stability" (with R. Weiner), in William F. Thompson and David J. De Angelo (eds.), World
Energy Markets: Stability or Cyclical Change, Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.
"Energy Price Shocks, Inflation, and Economic Activity: Simulation Results of the Hubbard-Fry Model", in Bert Hickman
and Hillard Huntington (eds.), Macroeconomic Impact of Oil Supply Shocks: Report of the Energy Modeling Forum VII
Project, 1985.
"Drawing Down the Strategic Petroleum Reserve: The case for Selling Futures Contracts" (with S. Devarajan), in Alvin
Alm and Robert Weiner (eds.), Oil Shock: Policy Response and Implementation, Cambridge: Ballinger Press, 1983.
"Government Stockpiles in a Multi-Country World: Coordination versus Competition" (with R. Weiner), in Alvin Alm and
Robert Weiner (eds.), Oil Shock: Policy Response and Implementation, Cambridge: Ballinger Press, 1983.
"The 'Sub-Trigger' Crisis: An Economic Analysis of Flexible Stock Policies" (with R. Weiner), Energy Economics 5 (July
1983): 178-189.
"Temporary Tax Reductions as Responses to Oil Shocks," in Alvin Alm and Robert Weiner (eds.), Oil Shock: Policy
Response and Implementation, Cambridge: Ballinger Press, 1983.
"Policy Analysis with Your Hands Tied: The Case of Disruption Tariff Under Oil Price Controls," in Fred S. Roberts (ed.),
Energy Modeling IV: Planning for Energy Disruptions, Institute of Gas Technology, 1982.
Comments, Notes, and Reviews
“Comment” on D. Elmendorf, “’Dynamic Scoring’: Why and How to Include Macroeconomic Effects in Budget Estimates
for Legislative Proposals,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Fall 2015): 134-138.
“Comment” on A.J. Auerbach, “The Choice Between Income and Consumption Tax: A Primer,” in A.J. Auerbach and D.
Shaviro, eds., Key Issues in Public Finance: Essays In Honor of David Bradford, forthcoming.
“Pay Without Performance: A Market Equilibrium Critique,” Journal of Corporation Law 30 (Summer 2005): 717-720.
“Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment: Response to Kaplan and Zingales,” Quarterly Journal of Economics
115 (May 2000): 695-705.
“Comment” on Charles Handlock, Joel Houston, and Michael Ryngaert, “The Role of Managerial Incentives in Bank
Acquisitions,” Journal of Banking and Finance 23 (1999): 250-254.
“Comment” on D.H. Moss, “Courting Disaster?: The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy Since 1903,” in K.A. Froot,
ed., The Financing of Catastrophic Risk, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
“Market for Corporate Control” (with D. Palia), in P. Newman, ed., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the
Law, London: Macmillan, 1998.
"Comment" on Joseph Peek and Eric Rosengren, “Do Monetary Policy and Regulatory Policy Affect Bank Loans?” in Is
Bank Lending Important for the Transmission of Monetary Policy? Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference Series
(Proceedings) 39 (1995): 47-79.
"Introduction," in M. Feldstein, J.R. Hines, and R.G. Hubbard, eds., Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
"Introduction," in M. Feldstein, J.R. Hines, and R.G. Hubbard, eds., Taxing Multinational Corporations, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1995.
"Investment Under Uncertainty: Keeping One's Options Open," Journal of Economic Literature 32 (December 1994):
1794-1807.
"Introduction," in A. Giovannini, R.G. Hubbard, and J. Slemrod, eds., Studies in International Taxation, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1993.
"Comment" on G. Peter Wilson, "The Role of Taxes in Location and Source Decisions," in A. Giovannini, R.G. Hubbard,
and J.B. Slemrod, eds., Studies in International Taxation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
"Market Structure and Cyclical Fluctuations in U.S. Manufacturing: Reply" (with I. Domowitz and B.C. Petersen), Review
of Economics and Statistics, 1993.
"Introduction," in R.G. Hubbard, ed., Financial Markets and Financial Crises, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
"Introduction," in R.G. Hubbard, ed., Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, Chicago: University of
"Comment" on Alberto Giovannini and James R. Hines, Jr., "Capital Flight and Tax Competition: Are There Viable
Solutions to Both Problems?," in A. Giovannini and C. Mayer, eds., European Financial Integration, London: Centre for
Economic Policy Research, 1990.
"Comment" on Roger H. Gordon and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, "Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on Corporate
Financial Policy and Organizational Form," in J.B. Slemrod, ed., Do Taxes Matter?: Economic Impacts of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990.
"Comment" on James M. Poterba, "Tax Policy and Corporate Saving," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1987:2.
"Comment" on Robert E. Hall, "Market Structure and Macro Fluctuations," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
1986:2.
"Comment" on Alan S. Blinder and Angus Deaton, "The Time-Series Consumption Function Revisited," Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1985:2.
"Comment" on Benjamin S. Friedman and Mark Warshawsky, "The Cost of Annuities: Implications for Saving Behavior
and Bequests," in Zvi Bodie, John Shoven, and David Wise (eds.), Pensions in the U.S. Economy, Chicago: University of
"Energy Security: Book Reviews," Energy Journal 4 (April 1983).
"When the Oil Spigot is Suddenly Turned Off: Some Further Thoughts" (with R. Weiner), Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management 2 (Winter 1983).
Submitted Papers and Working Papers
“The Elasticity of Taxable Income in the Presence of Intertemporal Income Shifting” (with A. Gorry and A. Mathur),
Working Paper, Columbia University, November 2017.
“Country Characteristics and the Incidence of Capital Income Taxation on Wages: An Empirical Assessment” (with C.
Azémar), Working Paper, Columbia University, 2013.
“Analysis of Discrimination in Prime and Subprime Mortgage Markets” (with Darius Palia and Wei Yu), Working Paper,
Columbia University, 2011.
“The Elasticity of Deferred Income With Respect to Marginal Income Tax Rates” (with K.A. Hassett and A. Mathur),
Working Paper, Columbia University, 2011.
“Tax Policy and Wage Growth” (with W. M. Gentry), Working Paper, Columbia University, 2001.
"Investor Protection, Ownership, and Investment" (with C.P. Himmelberg and I. Love), Working Paper, Columbia
University, 2000.
"Incentive Pay and the Market for CEOs: An Analysis of Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity" (with C.P. Himmelberg),
Working Paper, Columbia University, 2001.
“Noncontractible Quality and Organizational Form in the U.S. Hospital Industry,” (with K.A. Hassett), Working Paper,
Columbia University, 1999.
“Entrepreneurship and Household Saving,” (with W. M. Gentry), Working Paper, Columbia University, 2001.
“Corporate Payouts and the Tax Price of Corporate Retentions: Evidence from the Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936-37"
(with P. Reiss), Working Paper No. 3111, National Bureau of Economic Research, September 1989.
"Market Structure, Durable Goods, and Cyclical Fluctuations in Markups" (with I. Domowitz and B. Petersen), Working
Paper, Northwestern University, 1987.
"Finite Lifetimes, Borrowing Constraints, and Short-Run Fiscal Policy" (with K. Judd), Working Paper No. 2158, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1987.
GRANTS RECEIVED
“Corporate Board Study Group,” Rockefeller Foundation, 2009.
“Institutional Investors, Boards of Directors, and Corporate Governance,” Korn/Ferry, 1997.
"An Economic Analysis of Saving Incentives," Securities Industry Association, 1994, with Jonathan Skinner.
"Securities Transactions Taxes: Tax Design, Revenue, and Policy Considerations," Catalyst Institute, 1993.
"Precautionary Saving in the U.S. Economy," Bradley Foundation, 1989-1990, with Jonathan Skinner and Stephen
Zeldes.
"Taxation, Corporate Leverage, and Financial Distress," Garn Institute for Finance, 1989-1990.
"Precautionary Saving in a Dynamic Model of Consumption and Labor Supply," National Science Foundation (Economics
Group SES-8707997), 1987-1989, with Jonathan Skinner and Stephen Zeldes.
"Industrial Behavior and the Business Cycle: A Panel Data Study of U.S. Manufacturing," National Science Foundation
(Economics Group SES-8420152), 1985-1987, with Ian Domowitz and Bruce Petersen.
"Efficient Contracting and Market Power: Evidence from the U.S. Natural Gas Market," Transportation Center,
Northwestern University, Summer 1985.
"Constructing a Panel Data Base for Studies of U.S. Manufacturing," University Research Grants Committee,
Northwestern University, 1985-1986.
"Economic Analysis of Multiple-Price Systems: Theory and Application, "National Science Foundation (Regulatory
Analysis and Policy Group, SES-8408805), 1984-1985.
"Contracting and Price Adjustment in Product Markets," University Research Grants Committee, Northwestern University,
1983-1984.
PAPERS PRESENTED
University Seminars
Bard College, University of Bergamo, Butler Community College, University of California (Berkeley), University of
California (Los Angeles), University of California (San Diego), Carleton, University of Chicago, Columbia, University of
Dubuque, Emory, University of Florida, University of Central Florida, Florida Atlantic University, George Washington,
Georgetown, Georgia Southern University, Harvard, Hendrix College, University of Illinois, Indiana University, Johns
Hopkins, Laval, Lehigh, University College (London), University of Kentucky, London School of Economics, MIT,
University of Maryland, University of Miami, Miami University, University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, New York
University, Northwestern, Oxford, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton, Rice, University of Rochester, Stanford,
Syracuse, University of Miami, University of Texas, Texas Tech University, Tufts, University of Virginia, University of
Wisconsin (Madison), University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee), Virginia Tech, and Yale.
Conference Papers Presented
American Council for Capital Formation, Washington, DC, June 1994.
American Economic Association, Philadelphia, 2018; Chicago, 2017; San Francisco, 2016; Boston, 2015; Philadelphia,
2014; San Diego, 2013; Chicago, 2012; New Orleans, 2008; Chicago, 2007; Boston, 2006; Philadelphia, 2005; San
Diego, January 2004; Atlanta, January 2002; New Orleans, January 2001; Boston, January 2000; New York, January
1999; New Orleans, January 1997; San Francisco, January 1996; Washington, D.C., January 1995; Boston, January
1994; Anaheim, January 1993; Washington, D.C., December 1990; Atlanta, December 1989; New York, December 1988;
Chicago, December 1987; New Orleans, December 1985; Dallas, December 1984.
American Enterprise Institute, Conference on Corporate Taxation, 2016; Conference on Private Equity, 2007;
Conference on Corporate Taxation, 2006; Conference on Multinational Corporations, 2004, 2003; Conference on
Multinational Corporations, February 1999; Conference on Income Inequality, January 1999; Conference on Transition
Costs of Fundamental Tax Reform, November 1998; Conference Series on Social Insurance Reform, 1997-1998;
Conference Series on Fundamental Tax Reform, 1995-1998; Conference on Distributional Analysis of Tax Policies,
Washington, D.C., December 1993.
American Finance Association, New Orleans, January 2008; San Diego, January 2004; Boston, January 2000; New
York, January 1999; New Orleans, January 1997.
Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Dallas, December 1984; San Francisco, December 1983.
Association of Public Policy Analysis and Management, New Orleans, October 1984; Philadelphia, October 1983.
Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform, Washington, DC, June 1994.
Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, September 2015, September 1994, April 1988, September 1987, September
1986, April 1986, September 1985.
Centre for Economic Policy Research Conference on Capital Taxation and European Integration, London, September
1989.
Conference on International Perspectives on the Macroeconomic and Microeconomic Implications of Financing

Constraints, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Bergamo, Italy, October 1994.
Congressional Research Service Conference for New Members of Congress, Williamsburg, January 1999.
Congressional Research Service Conference for Members of the Ways and Means Committee, Baltimore, October 2001.
Deutsche Bundesbank Conference on Investing for the Future, Frankfurt, Germany, May 2000.
Eastern Economic Association, Boston, March 1988; Boston, February 1983.
Econometric Society, New Orleans, January 1997; San Francisco, January 1996; Washington, D.C., January 1995; New
Orleans, January 1992; Washington, December 1990; Atlanta, December 1989; New York, December 1988; Chicago,
December 1987; New Orleans, December 1986; New York, December 1985; Boston, August 1985; Madrid, September
1984; San Francisco, December 1983; Pisa, August 1983.
Energy Modeling Forum, Stanford University, August 1983; February 1983; August 1982.
European Commission, Conference on Taxation of Financial Instruments, Milan, June 1998.
European Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo, September 2002; March 2002.
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Annual Economic Conference, North Falmouth, Massachusetts, June 1995.
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium on "Financial Market Volatility – Causes, Consequences, and Policy
Responses," Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 1988; Comment of Rogoff, August 2004.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Conference on Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry, New York, March
1998.
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Conference on Economic Policy, Philadelphia, November 2007; November 2001.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Conference on Economic Policy, St. Louis, October 1994.
Harvard Law School U. S.-Japan Symposium, Tokyo, December 2003; Washington, D. C., September 2002; Tokyo,
December 2001.
Hoover Institution, Conference on Fundamental Tax Reform, December 1995.
The Institute of Gas Technology, Washington, DC, May 1982.
The Institute of Management Science/Operations Research Society of America, Orlando, November 1983; Chicago, April
1983.
International Association of Energy Economists, Boston, November 1986; Philadelphia, December 1985; Bonn, June
1985; San Francisco, November 1984; Washington, DC, June 1983; Denver, November 1982; Cambridge (England),
June 1982; Houston, November 1981.
International Conference on the Life Cycle Model, Paris, June 1986.
International Institute of Public Finance, Innsbruck, August 1984.
International Seminar on Public Economics, Amsterdam, April 1997.
National Academy of Sciences, February 1997.

National Association of Business Economists, Washington, March 2015; Orlando, September 2003; Washington,
September 2002; New York, September 2001; Boston, September 1996; Dallas, September 1992; New Orleans, October
1987.
National Bureau of Economic Research - IMEMO Conference on the American Economy, Moscow, August 1989.
National Bureau of Economic Research Summer Institute, August 2014; August 2012; August 2009; August 2006;
August 2005; July-August 2003; July-August 2000; July-August 1999; July-August 1998; August 1997; July 1995; July
1994; July 1993; August 1992; July-August 1991; July-August 1990; July-August 1989; July-August 1988; July-August
1987; July-August 1986; July 1985; July 1984; July 1983.
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment,
Cambridge, May 1989.
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Chinese Economic Reform, Shanghai, China, July 2000.
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Financial Crises, Key Biscayne, March 1990.
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Government Expenditure Programs, Cambridge, November
1986.
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Indian Economic Reform, Rajasthan, India, December 1999.
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Innovation Policy, Washington, DC, April 2004, April 2003.
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on International Taxation, Washington, DC, April 1994; Cambridge,
January 1994; New York, September 1991; Nassau, Bahamas, February 1989.
National Bureau of Economic Research, Macroeconomic Annual Conference, Cambridge, MA, April 2004.
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Macroeconomics and Industrial Organization, Cambridge, July
1988; Cambridge, July 1987; Cambridge, July 1986; Chicago, November 1985.
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Nonprofit Organizations, Cheeca Lodge, January 2002;
Cambridge, October 2001.
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Pensions, Baltimore, March 1985; San Diego, April 1984.
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Productivity, March 1988; March 1987.
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Public Economics, Cambridge, April 1999, April 1994, April 1993,
November 1991, April 1991, March 1988, November 1987, March 1987.
National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Tax Policy and the Economy, Washington, DC, October 2001,
November 1998, November 1996, November 1994, November 1991, November 1989.
National Bureau of Economic Research Trans-Atlantic Public Economics Seminar, London, May 2002; Gerzensee, May
2000; Turin, May 1994.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Policy Committee Meeting, Paris, November 2002,
April 2002, November 2001, April 2001.
National Tax Association/Tax Institute of America, Washington, DC, June 2000; Atlanta, October 1999; Arlington, May
1992; Seattle, October 1983.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Ministerial Meeting, Paris, May 2002, May 2001.
Princeton Center for Economic Policy Conference, October 2000, October 1995.
Sveriges Riksbank/Stockholm School of Economics Conference on Asset Markets and Monetary Policy, Stockholm,
Sweden, June 2000.
U.S. House of Representatives, Budget Committee, June 2001.
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, DC, June 2006; June 2005; June 1999;
April 1997, June 1996, July 1992.
U.S. Joint Economic Committee, Washington, DC, February 2003, October 2002, October 2001, May 2001.
U. S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Washington, DC, October 2001, May 2001.
U.S. Senate Committee on Budget, February 2003, September 2001.
U. S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Technology, July 2002.
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Washington, DC, February 2003, February 2002, February 1997, January 1995,
January 1992, December 1981.
TESTIMONY AS AN EXPERT WITNESS 2014 – 2018
American Vanguard Corporation v. United States of America, Civil Action No.: 16-694 C, in the United States Court of
Federal Claims. Provided deposition testimony 2018.
Joan Obeslo, et al. v. Great-West Capital Management, LLC, et al., Civil Action No. 16-cv-230-CMA-MJW consolidated
with No. 16-cv-1215 and No. 16-cv-3162, in the United States District Court, District of Colorado. Provided deposition
testimony 2018.
In re: Appraisal of Jarden Corporation, Case No. 12456-VCS, In the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.
Provided deposition testimony and trial testimony 2018.
Kortright Capital Partners LP, et al. v. Investcorp Investment Advisors Limited, Case No. 16cv7619, United States District
Court, Southern District of New York. Provided deposition testimony 2018.
Syncora Guarantee Inc. v. Alinda Capital Partners LLC, American Roads LLC, Macquarie Securities (USA) Inc., and
John S. Laxmi, Index No. 651258/2012, In the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Provided deposition testimony
2018.
Great Hill Equity Partners IV, LLP, et al. v. SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLP, et al, Civil Action No. 7906, In the Court of
Chancery for the State of Delaware. Provided trial testimony 2017.
Saul Chill and Sylvia Chill, for the use and benefit of the Calamos Growth Fund v. Calamos Advisors LLC and Calamos
Financial Services LLC, Case No. 15 Civ: 1014 (ER), United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
Provided deposition testimony 2017.
Broadway Gate Master Fund, Ltd., Pennant Master Fund LP, and Pennant Windward Master Fund, LP v. Ocwen
Financial Corporation, et al., Civil Case 9:16-cv-80056, United States District Court, Southern District of Florida.
Provided deposition testimony 2017.
In re: Allergan, Inc. Proxy Violation Securities Litigation, Case No. 8:14-cv-2004-DOC (KES), United States District
Court, Central District of California, Southern District - Santa Ana. Provided deposition testimony 2017.
In the Matter of: Certain Integrated Circuits with Voltage Regulators and Products Containing Same, Investigation No.
337-TA-1024, United States International Trade Commission, Washington, D.C. Provided deposition testimony 2017.
In re: Appraisal of Solera Holdings, Inc., Case No. 12080-CB, In the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.
Provided deposition testimony and trial testimony 2017.
In re: Good Technology Corporation Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 11580-VCL, In the Court of Chancery of the State
of Delaware. Provided deposition testimony 2017.
Mylan Inc. & Subsidiaries, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Docket No. 16145-14, 27086-14, United States
Tax Court, Washington, D.C. Provided deposition testimony 2017.
Abbott Laboratories v. Alere, Inc., C.A. No. 12963-VCG, In the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware. Provided
deposition testimony 2017.
In re: LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 2262, 11 Civ. 2613, United States District Court
Southern District of New York. Provided deposition testimony 2017.
In the Matter of: Determination of Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords III), Docket
No. 16-CRB-0003-PR (2018-2022), Before the Copyright Royalty Board Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Provided
deposition testimony and trial testimony 2017.
In re: Ocwen Financial Corporation Securities Litigation, Case No. 14-81057 CIV-WPD, United Stated District Court,
Southern District of Florida. Provided deposition testimony 2017.
Motors Liquidation Company Avoidance Action Trust v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., Case No. 09-00504, United
States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York. Provided deposition testimony and trial testimony 2017.
Great Hill Equity Partners IV, LLP, et al. v. SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLP, et al, Civil Action No. 7906, In the Court of
Chancery for the State of Delaware. Provided deposition testimony 2016.
Jennifer L. Kasilag, et al. v. Hartford Investment Financial Services, LLC, Civil No. 1:2011cv01083, In the United States
District Court, District of New Jersey, Camden Vicinage. Provided trial testimony 2016.
In re: Ocwen Financial Corporation Securities Litigation, Case No. 14-81057 CIV-WPD, United Stated District Court,
Southern District of Florida. Provided deposition testimony 2016.
In the Matter of Lynn Tilton; Patriarch Partners, LLC, et al. Administrative Proceeding No. 3-16462, United States of
America before the Securities and Exchange Commission. Provided testimony 2016.
Carlyle Capital Corporation Limited, Alan John Roberts, Neil Mather, Christopher Morris, Adrian John, Denis Rabet,
solely in their capacity as Joint Liquidators of Carlyle Capital Corporation Limited (In Liquidation) v. William Elias
Conway, Jr., James H. Hance, Jr., et al, Court File No. 1510, In the Royal Court of Guernsey, Ordinary Court. Provided
testimony 2016.
Illinois Tool Works, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, United States Tax Court, Docket No.
10418-14. Provided trial testimony 2016.
General Electric Company v. United States of America, Case No. 3:14-cv-190-JAM, United States District Court, District
of Connecticut. Provided deposition testimony in 2016.
Symbol Technologies, Inc., Securities Litigation, Consolidated C.A. No. 05-cv-3923-DRH, United States District Court,
Eastern District of New York. Provided deposition testimony in 2015.
Jennifer L. Kasilag, et al. v. Hartford Investment Financial Services, LLC, Civil No. 1:2011cv01083, In the United States
District Court, District of New Jersey, Camden Vicinage. Provided deposition testimony 2015.
American Chemicals & Equipment, Inc. 401(K) Retirement Plan v. Principal Management Corporation and Principal
Global Investors, LLC., 4:14-cv-00044-JAJ-HCA, United States District Court, Southern District of Iowa. Provided
deposition testimony in 2015.
Appraisal of Dell Inc., Consol. C.A. No. 9322-VCL, In the Court of the Chancery of the State of Delaware. Provided
deposition testimony and trial testimony in 2015.
Jacqueline Coffin and Sandra Lowry v. Atlantic Power Corporation, et al., Court File No. CV-13-480939-00CP, Ontario
Superior Court of Justice. Provided deposition testimony in 2015.
Peter J. Rush, et al. v. Walter Energy, Inc., et al., Master File No. 2:12-cv-00281-VEH, United States District Court
Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division. Provided deposition testimony in 2014.
Tullett Prebon PLC, Tullett Prebon Financial Services LLC f/k/a Tullett Liberty Securities LLC and Tullett Prebon
Americas Corp. v. BGC Partners, Inc., case No. L-003796-11, Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County. Provided
trial testimony in 2014.
Basis Pac-Rim Opportunity Fund & Basis Yield Alpha Fund v. TCW Asset Management Company, Index No.
654033/2012, Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York. Provided deposition testimony in 2014.
Postova Bank, A.S. and Istrokapital SE v. The Hellenic Republic, case no. ARB/13/8, International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes. Provided arbitration testimony in 2014.
Sue Ann Hamm v. Harold G. Hamm, case no. FD-2012-2048, District Court of Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma.
Provided deposition testimony and trial testimony in 2014.
GE Dandong, et al. v. Pinnacle Performance Limited, et al, court file no. 10-civ-8086, United States District Court
Southern District of New York. Provided deposition testimony in 2014.
Appendix B
Documents Relied Upon
Case Documents:
Declaration of Iris N. Griffin, Case No. 3:18-cv-01795-JMC, July 2, 2018.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Consolidation of
Preliminary Injunction Hearing with a Trial on the Merits, Case No. 3:18-cv-01795-JMC, July 2, 2018.
Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Temporary, Preliminary, and Permanent Injunctive Relief, Civil
Action No. 3:18-cv-01795-JMC, June 29, 2018, with Exhibits.
Legal Filings:
“Base Load Review Act,” A16, R28, S431, 117th Session 2007-2008, South Carolina General Assembly, 2007,
https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess117_2007-2008/bills/431.htm (accessed July 19, 2018).
“Order Approving Revised Rates,” The Public Service Commission of South Carolina, Dkt. No. 2009-211-E-Order
No. 2009-696, September 30, 2009.
Bluefield Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
The Public Service Commission of South Carolina, “In Re: Combined Application of South Carolina Electric & Gas
Company for a Certificate of Environmental Compatibility and Public Convenience and Necessity and for a Base
Load Review Order for the Construction and Operation of a Nuclear Facility in Jenkinsville, South Carolina,”
Dkt. No. 2008-193-E — Order No. 2009-104(A).
Journal Articles, News Articles, and Books:

Cross-Nation Analysis,” California Management Review, 40(2).
Berk, Jonathan, and Peter DeMarzo (2017), Corporate Finance, 4th Edition, Boston: Pearson Education.
Bonbright, James (1948), “Utility Rate Control Reconsidered in the Light of the Hope Natural Gas Case,” American
Economic Review, 38(2) Papers and Proceedings of the Sixtieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Association.
Bonbright, James (1961), Principles of Public Utility Rates, New York: Columbia University Press.
Industry Generation Capacity in Developing Economies,” The World Bank Economic Review, 20(1).
Dixit, Avinash, and Robert Pindyck (1994), Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Encinosa, William, and David Sappington (1995), “Toward a Benchmark for Optimal Prudency Policy,” Journal of
Regulatory Economics, 7.
Guthrie, Graeme (2006) “Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 44(4).
Argentina and Chile,” The Journal of Policy Reform, 1(4).
Himmelberg, Charles, Glenn Hubbard, and Inessa Love (2000), “Investor Protection, Ownership, and Investment,”
working paper.
Hubbard, Glenn (1994), “Investment Under Uncertainty: Keeping One’s Options Open,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 32(4).
Kahn, Alfred (1985), “Who Should Pay for Power Plant Duds?” Wall Street Journal.
Journal of Industrial Economics, 54(2).
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (1997), “Legal Determinants of
External Finance,” Journal of Finance, 52(3).
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (2002), “Investor Protection and
Corporate Valuation,” Journal of Finance, 57(3).
Economics, 7.
Lyon, Thomas, and John Mayo (2005), “Regulatory Opportunism and Investment Behavior: Evidence from the U.S.
Electric Utility Industry,” RAND Journal of Economics, 36(3).
Page 1 of 3
Appendix B
Journal Articles, News Articles, and Books (cont.):

Economics, 24(4).
Credit Ratings Reports:

FitchRatings, “Fitch Downgrades SCANA to ‘BB+’ / SCE&G to ‘BBB-’; Negative Watch Maintained,” September
29, 2017.
FitchRatings, “Fitch Maintains Rating Watch Evolving on SCANA and Subsidiaries,” July 3, 2018.
FitchRatings, “Fitch Revises Rating Watch on SCANA and Subsidiaries to Evolving,” January 3, 2018.
Moody’s Investors Service, “Credit Opinion: South Carolina Electric & Gas Company,” March 9, 2018.
Moody’s Investors Service, “Rating Action: Moody’s Changes Dominion Energy’s Rating Outlook to Negative
from Stable; Continues Review for Downgrade of SCE&G and SCANA,” January 3, 2018.
Negative,” July 2, 2018.
Moody’s Investors Service, “Rating Action: Moody’s Downgrades SCE&G to Baa3 and SCANA to Ba1, Ratings
Remain under Review,” February 5, 2018.
Moody’s Investors Service, “Rating Action: Moody’s Places SCANA and SCE&G on Review for Downgrade,”
November 1, 2017.
Negative on Passage of South Carolina Bill,” July 3, 2018.
SCANA Annual Reports:

SCANA Corporation and South Carolina Electric & Gas Company SEC Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended
December 31, 2017.
December 31, 2016.
December 31, 2015.
December 31, 2014.
December 31, 2013.
December 31, 2012.
December 31, 2011.
December 31, 2010.
December 31, 2009.
December 31, 2008.
Websites:
Edison Electric Institute, “About EEI,” http://www.eei.org/about/Pages/default.aspx (accessed July 19, 2018).
FitchRatings, “Rating Definitions,” https://www.fitchratings.com/site/definitions (accessed July 20, 2018).
Moody’s, “Ratings Definitions,” https://www.moodys.com/Pages/amr002002.aspx (accessed July 20, 2018).
S&P, “Global Industry Classification Standard (CIGS®),”
https://www.unm.edu/~maj/Security%20Analysis/GICS.pdf (accessed July 19, 2018).
S&P, “S&P Global Ratings Definition,” https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/article/-
/view/sourceId/504352 (accessed July 20, 2018).
Page 2 of 3
Appendix B
Other:
Edison Electric Institute (2014), “2014 Financial Review.”
FitchRatings (2010), “Definitions of Ratings and Other Forms of Opinion.”
Moody’s Investors Service (2018), “Rating Symbols and Definitions.”
S&P Capital IQ.
S&P Global Ratings (2018), “Guide to Credit Rating Essentials.”
SCANA Earnings Presentation, Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2016, February 16, 2017.
South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff (2016), “SCE&G Cumulative Rate Increases Approved Under the Base
Load Review Act.”
The Regulatory Assistance Project (2011), “Electricity Regulation in the US: A Guide.”
Page 3 of 3
Exhibit D
D.E. 55-2
EXHIBIT 2

COLUMBIA DIVISION
Plaintiff, Case No. 3:18-CV-01795-JMC
v.
Swain E. Whitfield, in his official capacity

as Chairman of the South Carolina Public
Service Commission, et al.,
Defendants.
DECLARATION OF ROBERT B. HEVERT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. QUALIFICATIONS ............................................................................................................5
II. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF OPINIONS ......................................................5
III. THE RETURN ON EQUITY IN COST OF SERVICE REGULATION ...........................8
IV. ESTIMATING THE INVESTOR-REQUIRED RETURN ON EQUITY ........................10

A. Background ............................................................................................................10
B. Importance of Considering Multiple Cost of Common Equity Models ................11
C. Proxy Company Selection......................................................................................12
D. Cost of Equity Estimation Methods .......................................................................14
(1) Capital Asset Pricing Model ........................................................................ 14
(2) Empirical CAPM (“ECAPM”) .................................................................... 18
(3) Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium Approach .................................................. 19
(4) Constant Growth Discounted Cash Flow (“DCF”) Model .......................... 22
(5) Multi-Stage DCF Model .............................................................................. 25
(6) Authorized Returns for Electric Utilities ..................................................... 28
E. Capital Market and Other Considerations..............................................................30

(1) Capital Market Environment ....................................................................... 30
(2) Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”) ................................................................ 34
V. PRO FORMA RETURN ON EQUITY UNDER THE ACT .............................................36

A. Pro Forma Return on Equity ..................................................................................36
B. The Pro Forma ROE Relative to the Cost of Debt.................................................36
C. The Act’s Effect on the Cost of Equity ..................................................................37
VI. CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................41
SCOTTMADDEN, INC. PAGE 2 OF 41

APPENDICES
A. Resume of Robert B. Hevert

B. Testimony and Expert Report Listing of Robert B. Hevert
C. List of Documents Relied Upon

EXHIBITS
Exhibit RBH-1 Expected Market Risk Premium

Exhibit RBH-2 Beta Coefficients
Exhibit RBH-3 Capital Asset Pricing Model, Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model
Exhibit RBH-4 Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium Model
Exhibit RBH-5 Constant Growth Discounted Cash Flow Model
Exhibit RBH-6 Multi-Stage Discounted Cash Flow Model
Exhibit RBH-7 Authorized ROEs by RRA State Commission Ranking
Exhibit RBH-8 Moody's Utility A and BAA Bond Yields
Exhibit RBH-9 Value Line Financial Strength Ratings and Beta Coefficients

I, Robert B. Hevert, declare and state, under penalty of perjury, that the following is true and
correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. If called to testify, I could and
would testify competently to the following:
I. QUALIFICATIONS
1. I am a Partner of ScottMadden, Inc. (“ScottMadden”). ScottMadden, with offices in

Raleigh, North Carolina; Atlanta, Georgia; and Westborough, Massachusetts, is a consulting
firm with 35 years of experience in the energy and utilities industry. Among ScottMadden’s
principal practice areas is Rates, Regulation, and Planning, for which I am the Practice Area
Lead.
2. I have approximately 30 years of experience in the utility industry, having served as an

executive in energy consulting firms and as a financial executive of a New York Stock
Exchange-traded utility company. I have appeared as an expert witness and provided
testimony on a variety of economic, financial, and regulatory issues related to the energy and
utility industry on over 250 occasions. The majority of those appearances have concerned
the Return on Equity for regulated utilities. Attached to this report are Appendix A, a copy
of my curriculum vitae; Appendix B, a list of my appearances as an expert witness; and
Appendix C, a list of documents relied upon in preparing this report. I am being
compensated for my work on this assignment at a rate of $460 per hour. My compensation is
not contingent upon the outcome of this proceeding. I reserve the right to update and
supplement this declaration as may be necessary.
II. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
3. ScottMadden has been retained by King & Spalding, attorneys for South Carolina Electric &
Gas (“SCE&G”, or the “Company”) to provide expert testimony in connection with Case No.
3:18-CV-01795-JMC in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
Columbia Division. I have been asked to provide my expert opinion regarding the equity
return investors in electric utilities generally require, and to compare that required rate of

return to the pro forma return on the Company’s equity that would result if 2018 South
Carolina Laws Act 287 (H.B. 4375) (the “Act”) is not enjoined by this Court.1
4. Based on my analyses, which are supported by the data presented in Exhibits RBH-1 through
RBH-9, the Return on Equity (also referred to in this declaration as the “ROE”, or the “Cost
of Equity”) required by investors in vertically integrated electric utilities2 such as SCE&G
currently is in the range of 10.25 percent to 11.00 percent. Accordingly, and as supported by
the quantitative and qualitative analyses discussed throughout this declaration, my opinion is
that 10.75 percent is a reasonable estimate of the investor-required return for vertically
integrated electric utilities similar to SCE&G. The pro forma effect of the rate imposed by
the Act, however, would result in a return on the Company’s equity of only 5.16 percent.3
Not only does the pro forma return fall far below the indicated market-required Return on
Equity, it falls below returns authorized by regulatory commissions around the U.S. for
vertically integrated electric utilities such as SCE&G, below the Company’s existing Cost of
Debt, and only marginally above the current Cost of Debt for investment grade utility
companies. Based on my analyses, experience, and research, such a low Return on Equity
does not provide reasonable compensation to equity investors and has never been authorized
in the United States for an electric utility comparable to SCE&G. If the Act were not
enjoined, it therefore would substantially diminish SCE&G’s ability to compete for and
attract long term capital.
5. I further conclude that if the rates under the Act were to be implemented, the risks to the
Company’s equity investors would increase, and the return required by them also would
increase. My analyses indicate that the Company’s investor-required Return on Equity could
increase by approximately 220 to 625 basis points,4 to a range of approximately 12.95
1
“Pro Forma” refers to the Company’s analysis of the Act’s effect on SCE&G’s December 2017 Return on
Equity (see Pro Forma Financials for SCE&G Assuming Implementation of the Act).
2 Vertically integrated electric utilities provide electric generation, transmission, and distribution services.
3 Source: Pro Forma Financials for SCE&G Assuming Implementation of the Act.
4 One basis point is one-one hundredth of a percentage point. 100 basis points therefore equals one
percentage point.

percent to 17.00 percent. That is, the Act not only would provide a pro forma Return on
Equity far below the reasonable return required by investors in vertically integrated electric
utilities, it could increase the ROE required by investors in the Company, due to increased
risks.
6. In arriving at my conclusions, I undertook the following analyses, each of which is described

more fully in this declaration:
1) I reviewed the regulatory construct of “Cost of Service” regulation, and how the Return
on Equity is applied in that construct (Section III);
2) I applied several widely-accepted methods of calculating the investor-required Return on
Equity for electric utilities, and calculated the range of results produced by each of those
methods (Section IV);
3) I reviewed the Returns on Equity recently authorized by regulatory commissions across
the United States for vertically integrated electric utilities (Section IV);
4) I considered the implications of the evolving capital market environment, and the Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act, relative to the assumptions underlying the financial models used to
estimate the Cost of Equity, and for equity returns required by investors in electric
utilities (Section IV);
5) Based on the range of model results and my assessment of capital market conditions and
other factors, I concluded that the Cost of Equity for vertically integrated electric utilities
falls in the range of 10.25 percent to 11.00 percent (Section IV);
6) I reviewed the pro forma effect of the Act on the Company’s earned Return on Equity,
and found it to be 5.16 percent (Section V);
7) I considered the pro forma 5.16 percent Return on Equity relative to the Cost of Debt and
found that difference to be either negative (the embedded Cost of Debt is greater than the
pro forma Return on Equity), or negligible (the marginal Cost of Debt is only somewhat
below the pro forma Return on Equity; Section V); and
8) I estimated the additional return likely required by equity investors if the Act were to be
implemented (Section V).

7. On balance, those analyses, together with my experience in utility finance, indicate that the
5.16 percent pro forma return on the Company’s common equity that would result from the
rates imposed by the Act is far below the reasonable Return on Equity required for an equity
investment in vertically integrated electric utilities such as SCE&G.
III. THE RETURN ON EQUITY IN COST OF SERVICE REGULATION
8. In the United States, utilities such as SCE&G operate within a regulatory construct referred
to as “Cost of Service” regulation. Under this construct, utilities typically are granted an
exclusive service territory in exchange for the obligation to provide service to customers
within that territory, and to be subject to rate regulation, including a regulated rate of return.
In large measure, Cost of Service regulation arises from the “essential” nature of utility
services, whose unit costs decrease with increasing levels of output. Although they may
serve different market sectors (e.g., electricity, natural gas, water, waste water) utilities
typically are capital-intensive enterprises, whose investments are long-lived, essentially
irreversible, and represent high “sunk” costs.5
9. Within this broad regulatory construct, utilities are given the opportunity to recover costs
associated with constructing, operating, and maintaining the utility system, including the
return of and on invested capital, through commission-approved rates (i.e., the “Cost of
Service”). Utilities go through a regulatory review process with their state public service
commissions, through which the commissions approve the rates utilities are authorized to
charge customers. These rates not only allow the utilities to recover costs they incur in
providing service, but also provide the utilities the opportunity to earn a reasonable Return on
Equity.
10. A key element of Cost of Service regulation is the “Revenue Requirement”, which represents
the sum of the operating and capital costs required to provide service. The Revenue
Requirement generally is defined as:
5 Bonbright et. al., Principles of Public Utility Rates, 1988, at 8 - 9, 23 – 24.

Equation 1
where:
RR = Revenue requirement;
RB = Rate base;
ROR = Rate of Return;
OE = Operating expenses;
D = Annual depreciation expense; and
T = Taxes.
11. Within the Revenue Requirement, the rate base generally includes investments in utility plant
(adjusted by other items such as working capital requirements), less accumulated
depreciation, and non-investor supplied capital (including, Accumulated Deferred Income
Taxes). As Equation [1] indicates, the balance of those items, (that is, the rate base) is the
amount on which investors are given the opportunity to earn a fair return. In summary, the
Revenue Requirement reflects the operating and capital costs incurred in providing utility
service and, therefore, the total revenue the utility may recover through its approved rates.
12. As Equation [1] also demonstrates, the Revenue Requirement includes the utility’s Rate of
Return, which represents the weighted average cost of the debt and equity capital supplied by
investors to support investments in the rate base, and which is calculated as follows:
Equation 2
where:
WD, = Percentage of debt in the capital structure;
CD = Cost of debt;
WE = Percentage of common equity in the capital structure;
CE= Cost of Common Equity (also referred to as the “Return on Equity”);
WP = Percentage of Preferred Equity in the capital structure;6 and
CP = Cost of preferred equity.
13. The principles underlying the fair Rate of Return for ratemaking purposes, as applied in
utility rate proceedings and as established in two U.S. Supreme Court cases, recognize that
6 As a practical matter, utilities typically have a negligible amount of Preferred Stock outstanding.

the authorized Return on Equity must be: (1) comparable to the returns investors expect to
earn on other investments of similar risk; (2) sufficient to assure confidence in the company’s
financial integrity; and (3) adequate to maintain and support the company’s credit and to
attract capital.7 In short, authorized rates should provide the opportunity to earn a reasonable
Return on Equity such that the subject utility remains competitive in the capital markets and
is able to attract equity capital, enabling it to avoid relying too heavily on debt.
IV. ESTIMATING THE INVESTOR-REQUIRED RETURN ON EQUITY
A. Background
14. In general terms, the investor-required Return on Equity, or the Cost of Equity, is the return
investors require to make an equity investment in a firm. That is, investors will provide
funds to a firm if the return they expect is equal to, or greater than, the return they require.
From the firm’s perspective, that required return, whether it is provided to debt or equity
investors, has a cost.8 As noted above, individually we speak of the “Cost of Debt” and the
“Cost of Equity”; together, they are referred to as the “Cost of Capital,” or the overall “Rate
of Return”.
15. The Cost of Capital (including the costs of both debt and equity) is based on the economic
principle of “opportunity costs.” Investing in any asset, whether debt or equity securities,
implies a forgone opportunity to invest in alternative assets. For an investment to be
sensible, its expected return therefore must be at least equal to the return expected on
alternative, comparable-risk investment opportunities.
16. Although both debt and equity have required costs, they differ in certain fundamental
respects. Most notably, the Cost of Debt is contractually defined - debt holders are promised
7 See, Bluefield Water Works v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679 (1923) and Federal Power
Commission et al. v. Hope Natural Gas Co. City of Cleveland, 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
8 For example, bond investors’ trades lead to market prices that, when considered relative to the bond’s
maturity, credit rating, coupon rate, and other terms leads to the yield investors require on it. Because that
yield is that which investors require, it also is the yield the issuing firm must pay to issue debt.

a series of specified interest payments and have a contractual right to receive the bond’s par
value upon maturity. Equity investors have no such assurances - they hold a security that
never matures, receive no repayment of principal from the issuing firm, and receive dividend
payments whose timing and amounts are at the issuing firm’s discretion. Moreover, equity
investors have a claim on cash flows only after debt holders and other creditors are paid.
Because equity investors bear the “residual risk” of ownership in perpetuity, they take greater
risks and require higher returns than do debt holders.
17. Whereas the Cost of Debt can be directly observed as the interest rate or yield on debt
securities, the Cost of Equity must be estimated based on financial models applied to capital
market data. Each of those models is subject to its own set of assumptions, which may
become more, or less, applicable as market conditions change. Because the Cost of Equity is
an opportunity cost, those models typically are applied to a group of “comparable” or
“proxy” companies. The choice of models (including their inputs), the selection of proxy
companies, and the interpretation of model results all require the application of reasoned
judgment. That judgment should consider data and information not necessarily included in
the models themselves. In the end, the estimated Cost of Equity should reflect the return
investors require considering the subject company’s risks, and the returns available on
comparable investments.
B. Importance of Considering Multiple Cost of Common Equity Models
18. The use of multiple methods in estimating the Cost of Equity is well-supported in academic
literature. As Dr. Roger Morin notes:
Each methodology requires the exercise of considerable judgment
on the reasonableness of the assumptions underlying the
methodology and on the reasonableness of the proxies used to
validate the theory. The inability of the [Discounted Cash Flow]
model to account for changes in relative market valuation,
discussed below, is a vivid example of the potential shortcomings
of the [Discounted Cash Flow] model when applied to a given
company. Similarly, the inability of the [Capital Asset Pricing
Model] to account for variables that affect security returns other
than beta tarnishes its use.

No one individual method provides the necessary level of precision

for determining a fair return, but each method provides useful
evidence to facilitate the exercise of an informed judgment.
Reliance on any single method or preset formula is inappropriate
when dealing with investor expectations because of possible
measurement difficulties and vagaries in individual companies’
market data. 9
19. As Dr. Morin points out, although many empirical models have been developed to estimate
the Cost of Equity, all are subject to limiting assumptions or other constraints. Professor
Eugene Brigham, a widely-respected scholar and finance academician, recommends using
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”), the Discounted Cash Flow (“DCF”) model, and
the Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium model, and choosing among them on the basis of
confidence in the data for the particular case.10 Dr. Morin likewise recommends using
multiple models to arrive at the best estimate for the investor-required Return on Equity.11
20. My analyses therefore include these three well-established methods: (1) the Capital Asset
Pricing Model, including the “Empirical” form of that model; (2) the Bond Yield Plus Risk
Premium Method; and (3) the Discounted Cash Flow model, in both the Constant Growth
and Multi-Stage forms. In my experience, these are the methods most commonly used to set
the authorized Return on Equity in utility rate proceedings.
C. Proxy Company Selection
21. Because the Cost of Equity is market-based and SCE&G is not a publicly traded entity (and
therefore has no market price), we cannot directly estimate its Cost of Equity. It therefore is
necessary to develop a group of publicly-traded, comparable companies that may be used as
its “proxy”. As a general proposition, the proxy group should reflect risks fundamentally
comparable to the subject company and include enough companies to have confidence in the
financial models’ analytical results. Based on those two objectives, I began with the universe
9 Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance (Public Utility Reports, Inc., 2006), at 428 [clarification added].
10 Ibid., at 430-431, citing Eugene Brigham, Louis Gapenski, Financial Management: Theory and Practice,
7th Ed., 1994, at 341.
11 Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance (Public Utility Reports, Inc., 2006), at 430-431.

of companies Value Line12 classifies as Electric Utilities, and applied the following screening
criteria, primarily in an effort to develop a reasonably-sized proxy group that is most
comparable to SCE&G:
1) I excluded one company because it does not consistently pay quarterly cash
dividends;
2) I excluded companies that are not covered by at least two utility industry equity
analysts;
3) I excluded companies that are not vertically integrated;
4) I excluded companies whose regulated operating income over the three most recently
reported fiscal years composed less than 60.00 percent of the respective totals for that
company;
5) I excluded companies whose regulated electric operating income over the three most
recently reported fiscal years represented less than 60.00 percent of total regulated
operating income; and
6) I eliminated companies that are known currently to be party to a merger or other
significant transaction.
Those criteria rendered the following 22-company proxy group:
12 Value Line is an independent investment research and financial publishing firm that provides investment
research, analysis and commentary on over 6,000 stocks.

Table 1: Proxy Group Screening Results
Company Ticker
ALLETE, Inc. ALE
Alliant Energy Corporation LNT
Ameren Corporation AEE
American Electric Power Company, Inc. AEP
Avangrid, Inc. AGR
Black Hills Corporation BKH
CMS Energy Corporation CMS
DTE Energy Company DTE
Duke Energy Corporation DUK
El Paso Electric EE
Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. HE
IDACORP, Inc. IDA
NextEra Energy, Inc. NEE
NorthWestern Corporation NWE
OGE Energy Corp. OGE
Otter Tail Corporation OTTR
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation PNW
PNM Resources, Inc. PNM
Portland General Electric Company POR
Southern Company SO
WEC Energy Group, Inc. WEC
Xcel Energy Inc. XEL
D. Cost of Equity Estimation Methods
(1) Capital Asset Pricing Model
22. The CAPM estimates the Cost of Equity for a given security as a function of a risk-free rate
of return plus a risk premium to compensate equity investors for market risk associated with
that security. As shown in Equation [3], the CAPM is defined by four components, each of
which theoretically is a forward-looking estimate:
Equation 3
Where:

k = the investor-required ROE;

rf = the risk-free rate of return;
β = Beta coefficient of an individual security; and
rm = the required return on the market as a whole.
23. In Equation [3], the term (rm – rf) represents the Market Risk Premium.13
24. According to the theory underlying the CAPM, because a portion of risk can be diversified
away by adding securities to investment portfolios, the market will not compensate investors
for bearing that “diversifiable” risk. Under the CAPM, therefore, investors should be
concerned only with “non-diversifiable” risk, i.e., risks that are “systematic” and affect the
economy as a whole. Non-diversifiable risk is measured by the Beta coefficient, which is
defined as:
β x ρ , Equation [4]
where σj is the standard deviation of returns for company “j,” σm is the standard deviation of
returns for the broad market (as measured, for example, by the S&P 500 Index), and ρj,m is
the correlation of returns in between company j and the broad market. The Beta coefficient
therefore represents the extent to which the subject security’s returns are related to changes in
the overall market. As Equation [4] indicates, Beta coefficients measure both relative
volatility (i.e., the standard deviation) of returns, and the correlation in returns between the
subject company and the overall market.
25. Equation [3] describes the Security Market Line (“SML”), or the CAPM risk-return
relationship, presented in Chart 1 below. The intercept is the risk-free rate (rf), which has a
Beta coefficient of zero, and the slope is the expected Market Risk Premium (rm – rf),
adjusted by the Beta coefficient. By definition, rm, the return on the market, has a Beta
coefficient of 1.00.
13 The Market Risk Premium is defined as the incremental return of the market portfolio over the risk-free
rate.

Chart 1: Illustrative Security Market Line
26. Intuitively, and as Chart 1 suggests, a company with a Beta coefficient of 1.00 is as risky as
the overall market; companies with Beta coefficients less than 1.00 are less risky, and those
whose Beta coefficients are greater than 1.00 have greater risk than the overall market.
a) Risk-Free Rate
27. The Risk-Free rate of return is measured by yields on U.S. Treasury securities, which
generally are considered to have little risk of default. The principal analytical issue
surrounding the selection of the risk-free rate is the maturity of the U.S. Treasury security to
be used for that purpose. As noted by Morningstar, that maturity should approximate the
horizon of the underlying investment:
The traditional thinking regarding the time horizon of the chosen
Treasury security is that it should match the horizon of whatever is
being valued. When valuing a business that is being treated as a
going concern, the appropriate Treasury yield should be that of a
long-term Treasury bond. Note that the horizon is a function of the
investment, not the investor. If an investor plans to hold stock in a
company for only five years, the yield on a five-year Treasury note
would not be appropriate since the company will continue to exist
beyond those five years.14
14 Morningstar, Inc., 2013 Ibbotson Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation Valuation Yearbook, at 44.

28. As noted earlier, equity securities represent expected residual cash flows in perpetuity. It is
the perpetual nature of equity that describes the investment horizon noted by Morningstar,
and that informs the appropriate maturity of the risk-free security in the CAPM. Simply, the
30-year Treasury bond is the longest-maturity security available to match the perpetual
nature of utility equity investments. I therefore used two different measures of the risk-free
rate: (1) the 30-day average yield on 30-year Treasury bonds as of June 15, 2018 (3.11
percent); and (2) the projected 30-year Treasury yield (3.48 percent).
b) Market Risk Premium
29. As noted in Equation [3], the Market Risk Premium reflects the return on the overall market,
less the risk-free rate. To estimate the expected market return, I calculated the market
capitalization weighted average ROE based on the Constant Growth DCF model. To do so, I
relied on data from Bloomberg and Value Line, respectively. For the Bloomberg-derived
growth estimates, I calculated the expected dividend yield (using the one-half growth rate
assumption described below) and combined that amount with the projected earnings growth
rate to arrive at the market capitalization weighted average DCF result. I performed that
calculation for each of the S&P 500 companies for which Bloomberg provided consensus
growth rates. I then subtracted the current 30-year Treasury yield from that amount to arrive
at the market DCF-derived ex-ante market risk premium estimate. In the case of Value Line,
I performed the same calculation, again using all companies for which five-year earnings
growth rates were available. The results of those calculations are provided in Exhibit RBH-
1.
c) Beta Coefficient
30. As shown in Exhibit RBH-2, I relied on Beta coefficients reported by Bloomberg and Value
Line. Although both services adjust their calculated (or “raw”) Beta coefficients to reflect
the tendency to regress to the market mean of 1.00, Value Line calculates the Beta coefficient
over a five-year period, whereas Bloomberg’s calculation is based on two years of data.
31. As shown in Table 2 (below) the CAPM analyses provide an ROE range of 10.13 percent to
12.28 percent (see also Exhibit RBH-3).

Table 2: Summary of CAPM Results15

Bloomberg Value Line
Derived Derived
Market Risk Market Risk
Premium ROE Premium ROE
Average Bloomberg Beta Coefficient
Current 30-Year Treasury (3.11%) 10.13% 10.34%
Near Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (3.48%) 10.50% 10.71%
Average Value Line Beta Coefficient
(2) Empirical CAPM (“ECAPM”)
32. The ECAPM reflects the finding that the actual Security Market Line (see Chart 1, above) is
not as steeply sloped as predicted by the CAPM.16 As a consequence, the CAPM likely
under-estimates the Cost of Equity for relatively low-Beta coefficient firms, such as
regulated utilities like SCE&G, and over-estimates the return for relatively high-Beta firms.
To that point, Fama and French state that “[t]he returns on the low beta portfolios are too
high, and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low.”17 Similarly, Dr. Roger Morin
observes that “[w]ith few exceptions, the empirical studies agree that … low-beta securities
earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict, and high-beta securities earn
less than predicted.”18
33. Dr. Morin explains that the ECAPM “makes use” of those findings, and estimates the Cost of
Equity based on the following equation:19
Equation 5
15 See Exhibit RBH-3.

16 Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance (Public Utility Reports, Inc., 2006), at 175-176.
17 Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence, Journal
of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 2004, at 33.
18 Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance (Public Utility Reports, Inc., 2006), at 175.
19 Ibid, at 189.

where α, or “alpha”, is an adjustment to the risk/return line, and “MRP” is the Market Risk
Premium (defined above). Summarizing empirical evidence regarding the range of
estimates for alpha, Dr. Morin explains that the evidence “reduces to the following more
pragmatic form.”20
.25 .75 Equation 6
34. Equations [5] and [6] tend to produce similar results when “alpha” is in the range of 1.00
percent to 2.00 percent.21 The ECAPM results, which produce an ROE range of 11.53
percent to 13.33 percent, are provided in Table 3, below.
Table 3: Summary of ECAPM Results22

Bloomberg Value Line
Derived Derived
Market Risk Market Risk
Premium ROE Premium ROE
Average Bloomberg Beta Coefficient
Average Value Line Beta Coefficient
(3) Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium Approach
35. The Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium approach is based on the financial principle that because
equity investors bear the residual risk associated with ownership, they require a premium
over the return they would have earned as a bondholder. This approach therefore estimates
the Cost of Equity as the sum of the (1) Equity Risk Premium23 and (2) yield on a given class
of bonds. As noted in the earlier discussion of the CAPM, because the Equity Risk Premium
20 Ibid, at 190.
21 Ibid.
23 That is, the incremental return required by equity investors over the return required by bond investors.

is not directly observable, it typically is estimated using a variety of approaches, some of

which incorporate ex-ante, or forward-looking estimates of the Cost of Equity, and others
that consider historical, or ex-post, estimates. The Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium method
discussed below relies on observable authorized returns for electric utilities to calculate the
Equity Risk Premium.
36. In applying this approach, I first defined the Equity Risk Premium as the difference between
the authorized ROE and the then-prevailing 30-year Treasury yield. I then gathered data for
the 1,556 electric utility rate proceedings decided between January 1980 and June 15, 2018.
In addition to the authorized ROE, I also calculated the average period between the filing of
the case and the date of the final order (the “lag period”). To reflect the prevailing level of
interest rates during the pendency of the proceedings, I calculated the average 30-year
Treasury yield over the average lag period (approximately 200 days).
37. Because the data covers several economic cycles,24 the analysis also may be used to assess
the stability of the Equity Risk Premium. Prior research, for example, has shown that the
Equity Risk Premium is inversely related to the level of interest rates.25 That is, as interest
rates fall, the Equity Risk Premium increases. That finding is particularly relevant given the
low level of current Treasury yields relative to other measures of equity risk discussed later
in this declaration.
38. To estimate the Equity Risk Premium, I applied a regression analysis in which the observed
Equity Risk Premium is the dependent variable, and the average 30-year Treasury yield is the
independent variable. Relative to the long-term historical average, the analytical period
includes interest rates and authorized ROEs that are quite high during one period (i.e., the
24 See National Bureau of Economic Research, U.S. Business Cycle Expansion and Contractions.
25 See, e.g., Robert S. Harris and Felicia C. Marston, Estimating Shareholder Risk Premia Using Analysts’
Growth Forecasts, Financial Management, Summer 1992, at 63-70; Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome,
and Steve R. Vinson, The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility’s Cost of Equity, Financial
Management, Spring 1985, at 33-45; and Farris M. Maddox, Donna T. Pippert, and Rodney N. Sullivan, An
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Risk Premiums for the Electric Utility Industry, Financial Management,
Autumn 1995, at 89-95.

1980s) and quite low during another (i.e., the post-Lehman bankruptcy period). To account
for that variability, I used the semi-log regression, in which the Equity Risk Premium is
expressed as a function of the natural log of the 30-year Treasury yield:
RP α β LN T Equation [7]
39. As shown on Chart 2 (below), the semi-log form is useful when measuring an absolute
change in the dependent variable (in this case, the Risk Premium) relative to a proportional
change in the independent variable (the 30-year Treasury yield).
Chart 2: Equity Risk Premium vs. Treasury Yields
10.00%
y = ‐0.0271ln(x) ‐ 0.0253
R² = 0.7367
8.00%
6.00%
4.00%
Equity Risk Premium
2.00%
0.00%
0.00% 2.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00% 12.00% 14.00% 16.00%
‐2.00%
‐4.00%
‐6.00%
Treasury Yield
40. As Chart 2 illustrates, and consistent with the research noted above, the Equity Risk Premium
increases as interest rates fall. Consequently, simply relying on the long-term average Equity
Risk Premium would significantly understate the Cost of Equity and produce results well
below any reasonable estimate. Based on the regression coefficients in Chart 2, the implied
ROE is between 9.96 percent and 10.28 percent (see Table 4 below and Exhibit RBH-4).
Table 4: Summary of Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium Results
Estimated
Return on
Equity
Current 30-Year Treasury (3.11%) 9.96%
Near-Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (3.48%) 10.03%
Long-Term Projected 30-Year Treasury (4.30%) 10.28%

(4) Constant Growth Discounted Cash Flow Model
41. The DCF approach is based on the theory that a stock’s current price represents the present
value of all expected future cash flows. One challenge in applying the DCF approach is that
because expectations regarding growth (i.e., the timing and size of future cash flows) are not
directly observable, they must be estimated from market-based information. The DCF model
also assumes investors’ decisions are driven solely by net present value analyses (see
Equations [8] and [9], below). Consequently, the Constant Growth DCF model will not
produce reliable estimates of the market-required ROE if the market price of a stock diverges
from investors’ estimate of its intrinsic value (i.e., the calculated present value). Deviations
between market prices and intrinsic value can and do occur when, for example, investors take
short-term trading positions to hedge event risk (e.g., a “flight to safety”), to speculate (e.g.,
momentum trades), or as a temporary position to increase current income (i.e., a “reach for
yield”).26
42. In its simplest form, the DCF model expresses the Cost of Equity as the sum of the expected
dividend yield and long-term growth rate, and is expressed as follows:
⋯ Equation [8]
where P represents the current stock price, D1 … D represent expected future dividends, and
k is the discount rate, or required ROE. Equation [8] is a standard present value calculation
that can be simplified and rearranged into the familiar form:
1
Equation 9
43. Equation [9] often is referred to as the “Constant Growth DCF” model, in which the first
term is the expected dividend yield and the second term is the expected long-term annual
growth rate.
26 Some investors may select relatively high dividend yield companies as a “reach for yield” in response to
the shortage of investment alternatives that provide adequate yield, rather than investing in stocks based on
their long-term return potential.

44. The Constant Growth DCF model requires the following assumptions: (1) a constant average
annual growth rate for earnings and dividends; (2) a stable dividend payout ratio; (3) a
constant price-to-earnings multiple; and (4) a discount rate greater than the expected growth
rate. Under those assumptions, dividends, earnings, book value, and the stock price all grow
at the same, constant rate. The model further assumes the current Cost of Equity (that is, its
result) will remain unchanged in perpetuity.
45. The dividend yield is based on the proxy companies’ current annualized dividend, and
average closing stock prices over the 30-, 90-, and 180-trading day periods as of June 15,
2018. Because utility companies tend to increase their quarterly dividends at different times
throughout the year, it is reasonable to assume that dividend increases will be evenly
distributed over calendar quarters. Given that assumption, it is appropriate to calculate the
expected dividend yield by applying one-half of the long-term growth rate to the current
dividend yield.27 That adjustment ensures that the expected dividend yield is, on average,
representative of the coming twelve-month period, and does not overstate the dividends to be
paid during that time.
46. In its Constant Growth form, the DCF model (i.e., as presented in Equation [9] above)
assumes a single, constant growth estimate in perpetuity. To reduce the long-term growth
rate to a single measure, we must assume a fixed dividend payout ratio, and the same
constant growth rate for earnings per share (“EPS”), dividends per share, and book value per
share. Because dividends are sustained by earnings growth, the model should incorporate
measures of long-term earnings growth.
47. I applied the DCF model to the proxy group of integrated electric utility companies using the
following inputs for the price and dividend terms:
1) The average daily closing prices for the 30-trading days, 90-trading days, and 180-
trading days ended June 15, 2018, for the term P0; and

2) The annualized dividend per share as of June 15, 2018, for the term D0.
48. I then calculated the Constant Growth DCF results using each of the following sources of
EPS growth rates:
1) The Zacks28 consensus long-term earnings growth estimates;
2) The First Call consensus long-term earnings growth estimates; and
3) The Value Line long-term earnings growth estimates.
49. I calculated the proxy group mean and median high DCF results using the maximum EPS
growth rate as reported by Value Line, Zacks, and First Call for each proxy group company
in combination with the dividend yield for each of the proxy group companies. The proxy
group mean and median high results then reflect the average maximum DCF result for the
proxy group as a whole. I used a similar approach to calculate the proxy group mean and
median low results using instead the minimum growth rate as reported by Value Line, Zacks,
and First Call for each proxy group company. The Constant Growth DCF results are
summarized in Table 5, below (see also Exhibit RBH-5).
Table 5: Constant Growth DCF Results
Mean Low ROE Mean ROE Mean High ROE

30-Day Average 8.45% 9.24% 10.12%
90-Day Average 8.49% 9.29% 10.16%
180-Day Average 8.37% 9.16% 10.03%
50. As noted earlier, the Constant Growth DCF model is subject to several assumptions that
likely are not consistent with current market conditions. As a consequence, the model’s
mean, and mean low results are well below a reasonable estimate of the market-required
ROE. For example, of the 1,395 vertically integrated electric utility rate cases provided by
Regulatory Research Associates that disclosed the awarded ROE since 1980, only one
28 Zacks and First Call both provide “consensus” growth rate projection, which include projections from
multiple analysts covering a given stock. Value Line’s projections are attributed to a single analyst.

authorized ROE has been as low as 9.00 percent.29 On that basis alone, the Constant Growth
DCF mean and mean low results are not reliable measures of electric utilities’ Cost of Equity.
On balance, it is my view that the Constant Growth DCF method should be given less weight
than other methods in estimating the investor-required Return on Equity.
(5) Multi-Stage DCF Model
51. The Multi-Stage DCF model, which is an extension of the Constant Growth form, enables the
analyst to specify growth rates over three distinct stages (i.e., three distinct time periods). As
with the Constant Growth form of the DCF model, the Multi-Stage form defines the Cost of
Equity as the discount rate that sets the current price equal to the discounted value of
expected future cash flows. Unlike the Constant Growth form, the Multi-Stage DCF model
must be solved in an iterative fashion.
52. In the model’s first two stages, “cash flows” are defined as projected dividends. In the third
stage, cash flows equal both dividends and the expected price at which the stock will be sold
at the end of the period (i.e., the “terminal price”). I calculated the terminal price based on
the Gordon model, which defines the price as the expected dividend divided by the difference
between the Cost of Equity (i.e., the discount rate) and the long-term expected growth rate.
The terminal price therefore is defined by the present value of the remaining “cash flows” in
perpetuity. In each stage, the dividend is the product of the projected earnings per share and
the expected dividend payout ratio. A summary description of the model is provided in
Table 6 (below).
29 Source: Regulatory Research Associates.

Table 6: Multi-Stage DCF Model Structure

Stage 0 1 2 3
Cash Flow Initial Stock Expected Expected Expected
Component Price Dividend Dividend Dividend +
Terminal Value
Inputs Stock Price Expected EPS Expected EPS Expected EPS

Earnings Per Expected DPS Expected DPS Expected DPS
Share (“EPS”) Terminal Value
Dividends Per
Share (“DPS”)
53. Because the model provides the ability to specify near-, intermediate-, and long-term growth
rates, it avoids the sometimes-limiting assumption that the subject company will grow at the
same, constant rate in perpetuity. In addition, by calculating the dividend as the product of
earnings and the payout ratio, the model enables analysts to reflect assumptions regarding the
timing and extent of changes in the payout ratio to reflect, for example, increases or
decreases in expected capital spending, or transition from current payout levels to long-term
expected levels. My assumptions regarding the various model inputs are described in Table
7 (below).

Table 7: Multi-Stage DCF Model Assumptions
Stage
Initial First Transition Terminal
Stock Price 30-, 90-, and 180-
day average stock
price as of June
15, 2018.
Earnings 2017 actual EPS EPS growth as Transition to Long-term GDP
Growth escalated by average of (1) Long-term GDP growth
Period 1 growth Value Line; (2) growth
rate Zacks; (3) First
Call growth rates
Payout Ratio Value Line Transition to Long-term
company-specific long-term industry average
industry payout payout ratio
ratio
Terminal Expected
Value dividend in final
year divided by
solved Cost of
Equity less long-
term growth rate
54. The long-term growth rate of 5.45 percent is based on the real GDP growth rate of 3.21
percent from 1929 through 2017, and an inflation rate of 2.16 percent. The GDP growth rate
is calculated as the compound growth rate in the chain-weighted GDP for the period from
1929 through 2017.30 The rate of inflation of 2.16 percent is an average of two components:
(1) the compound annual forward rate starting in ten years (i.e., 2028, which is the beginning
of the terminal period) based on the 30-day average spread between yields on long-term
nominal Treasury Securities and long-term Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, known as
the “TIPS spread” of 2.13 percent;31 and (2) the projected Blue Chip Financial Forecast of
CPI for 2025 – 2029 of 2.20 percent.32
30 See, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Current-Dollar and Real Gross Domestic Product, May 30, 2018
update.
31 See, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Table H.15 Selected Interest Rates.”
32 Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 37, No. 6, June 1, 2018, at 14.

55. As noted in Table 7, for the first two periods I relied on the first year and long-term projected
payout ratios reported by Value Line for each of the proxy companies.33 I assumed that by
the end of the second period (i.e., the end of year ten), the payout ratio will converge to the
long-term industry average of 65.57 percent.34 Table 8a presents the results of the Multi-
Stage DCF analyses (see also Exhibit RBH-6). As with the Constant Growth form, this form
of the Multi-Stage DCF model generally produces estimates below those recently authorized
by regulatory commissions.
Table 8a: Multi-Stage Discounted Cash Flow Model Results (Gordon Model Method)
Low ROE Mean ROE High ROE
30-Day Average 9.05% 9.23% 9.45%
90-Day Average 9.09% 9.28% 9.50%
180-Day Average 8.96% 9.14% 9.36%
56. I performed a second set of Multi-Stage DCF analyses, in which the terminal value was
calculated by multiplying the terminal year Earnings Per Share by the current Price/Earnings
ratio. Those results are provided in Table 8b, below (see also Exhibit RBH-6).
Table 8b: Multi-Stage Discounted Cash Flow Model Results (Terminal P/E Method)
Low ROE Mean ROE High ROE

30-Day Average 9.40% 9.89% 10.42%
90-Day Average 9.53% 10.02% 10.55%
180-Day Average 9.19% 9.67% 10.21%
(6) Authorized Returns for Electric Utilities
57. As discussed earlier, the Cost of Equity is an opportunity cost, reflecting the return forgone
on investments of comparable risk. Although no two companies are identical, the returns
33 As reported in the Value Line Investment Survey as “All Div’ds to Net Prof.” Please note that Value Line
is a source frequently relied upon in rate proceedings, and is the only source that consistently provides
intermediate-term payout ratio projections.
34 Source: Bloomberg Professional.

authorized by utility commissions provide an observable measure of the returns available on

investments in vertically integrated electric utilities. Because authorized returns are publicly
available,35 it is reasonable to assume they are reflected, at least to some degree, in investors’
return expectations and requirements. Furthermore, in my experience, regulatory
commissions generally weigh the types of market and methodological factors considered in
this declaration in determining authorized ROEs. It therefore is reasonable to consider
authorized returns as relevant benchmarks in estimating investor-required returns.
58. Given the capital-intensive nature of utility operations, the ongoing need to access external
capital, and the weight rating agencies place on the regulatory environment,36 it also is
important to consider the extent to which the jurisdictions that recently have authorized
ROEs for electric utilities are viewed as having constructive regulatory environments.
Regulatory Research Associates (“RRA”), which is a widely-referenced source of rate case
data, provides an assessment of the extent to which regulatory jurisdictions are constructive
from investors’ perspectives, or not. As RRA explains, less constructive environments are
associated with higher levels of risk:
RRA maintains three principal rating categories for regulatory
climates: Above Average, Average, and Below Average. Within
the principal rating categories, the numbers 1, 2, and 3 indicate
relative position. The designation 1 indicates a stronger rating; 2, a
mid-range rating; and, 3, a weaker rating. The evaluations are
assigned from an investor perspective and indicate the relative
regulatory risk associated with the ownership of securities issued
by the jurisdiction’s utilities. The evaluation reflects our
assessment of the probable level and quality of the earnings to be
realized by the state’s utilities as a result of regulatory, legislative,
and court actions.37
35 See, for example, American Electric Power Company, Inc., SEC Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year ended
December 31, 2017, at 4; Duke Energy Corporation, SEC Form 10-K-A, for the Fiscal Year ended
December 31, 2017, at 152,157; NextEra Energy, Inc., SEC Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year ended
December 31, 2017, at 10; WEC Energy Group, SEC Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year ended December 31,
2017, at 139.
36 Moody’s Investors Service, Rating Methodology: Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities, December 23,
2013, at 6.
37 Source: Regulatory Research Associates, accessed July 18, 2018.

59. Until recently, RRA ranked South Carolina as “Average/1,” which falls in the top one-third
of the 53 regulatory commissions ranked by it. In early October 2017, RRA reduced South
Carolina’s ranking to “Average/2” due to the “heightened risk surrounding the recovery of
the nuclear costs.”38 As Table 9 (below) indicates, authorized ROEs for vertically integrated
electric utilities in jurisdictions rated greater than Average/2 range from 9.50 percent to 10.55
percent, with mean and median returns of 10.00 percent.
Table 9: Average Authorized ROE by RRA Ranking39
Authorized ROE (%)
Vertically Integrated Electric Utilities
Greater than Less than
RRA Ranking Average/2 Average/2 Average/2
Average 10.00% 9.58% 9.66%
Median 10.00% 9.56% 9.50%
Maximum 10.55% 10.10% 11.95%
Minimum 9.50% 9.10% 9.30%
E. Capital Market and Other Considerations
60. As discussed earlier, financial models used to estimate the Cost of Equity are meant to
reflect, and therefore are influenced by, current and expected capital market conditions. It
therefore is important to assess the reasonableness of model results in the context of those
conditions. To the extent certain ROE estimates are incompatible with market data and
developments, or are inconsistent with basic financial principles, their results should be
discounted relative to those produced by other methods.
(1) Capital Market Environment
61. Beginning in 2008, the Federal Reserve proceeded on a steady path of initiatives intended to
lower long-term Treasury yields.40 The Federal Reserve policy actions “were designed to put
downward pressure on longer-term interest rates by having the Federal Reserve take onto its
balance sheet some of the duration and prepayment risks that would otherwise have been
38 Ibid.
39 2014 through June 2018. Source: Regulatory Research Associates. See Exhibit RBH-7.
40 See Federal Reserve Press Release, June 19, 2013.

borne by private investors.”41 Under that policy, “Securities held outright” on the Federal
Reserve’s balance sheet increased from approximately $489 billion at the beginning of
October 2008 to $4.12 trillion by mid-June 2018.42 To put that increase in context, the
securities held by the Federal Reserve represented approximately 3.29 percent of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) at the end of September 2008, and had risen to approximately 20.63
percent of GDP in June 2018.43 As such, the Federal Reserve policy actions represented a
significant source of liquidity, and had a substantial effect on capital markets.
62. Although the Federal Reserve’s market intervention policies have kept interest rates
historically low, since July 8, 2016 (when the 30-year Treasury yield hit an all-time low of
2.11 percent), interest rates have risen. As the Federal Reserve increased the Federal Funds
target rate by 25 basis points five times from December 2016 (0.50 percent - 0.75 percent) to
June 2018 (1.75 percent - 2.00 percent), short-term and long-term interest rates increased, as
well (see Chart 3 below).44
41 See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Domestic Open Market Operations During 2012, April 2013, at
29.
42 Source: Federal Reserve Board Schedule H.4.1. “Securities held outright” include U.S. Treasury securities,
Federal agency debt securities, and mortgage-backed securities.
43 Source: Ibid; Bureau of Economic Analysis.
44 Sources: Federal Reserve Board Schedule H.15, Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 37, No. 6, June 1,
2018, at 2. Three-year, seven-year and 20-year projected Treasury yields interpolated.

Chart 3: Treasury Yield Curve: 7/8/2016, 6/15/2018 and Projected Q3 201945
63. The increase in the ten- and 30-year yields from July 2016 to June 2018 is highly related to
increasing inflation. Leading up to and following the November 2016 Presidential election,
expected inflation, as measured by the breakeven forward inflation rate and zero-coupon
inflation index swaps, also increased. Although those measures of expected inflation fell
somewhat between February and June 2017, they have increased since then such that they are
similar to, although somewhat above, the Federal Reserve’s 2.00 percent inflation target (see
Chart 4, below).
45 Sources: Federal Reserve Board Schedule H.15; Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 37, No. 6, June 1,
2018, at 2. Three-year, seven-year and 20-year projected Treasury yields interpolated.

Chart 4: Five-Year Forward Inflation46

2.50
2.30
2.10
1.90
Inflation Rate
1.70
1.50
1.30
1.10
0.90
0.70
0.50
Jan‐16 Apr‐16 Jul‐16 Oct‐16 Jan‐17 Apr‐17 Jul‐17 Oct‐17 Jan‐18 Apr‐18
Breakeven Rate Zero Coupon Inflation Indexed Swap Rate
64. On September 20, 2017, the Federal Reserve announced it would “initiate the balance sheet
normalization program described in the June 2017 Addendum to the Committee’s Policy
Normalization Principles and Plans.”47 Those “Principles and Plans” call for reducing the
reinvestment of principal payments received from its holdings of Treasury securities by up to
$30 billion per month, and mortgage-backed securities by up to $20 billion per month.48 At
the same time, the Federal Reserve will continue considering increases to the Federal Funds
target rate; as noted below, current market data indicate an approximately 94.30 percent
likelihood of an additional rate increase by January 2019 (see Table 10, below).
46 Source: Bloomberg Professional Services.

47 See Federal Reserve Press Release, (Sept. 20, 2017).
48 See Federal Reserve Addendum to the Policy Normalization Principles and Plans, as adopted effective June
13, 2017.

Table 10: Probability of Federal Funds Rate Increases49
Target Rate Federal Reserve Meeting Date

(bps)
8/1/18 9/26/18 11/8/18 12/19/18 1/30/19
175-200 98.0% 15.7% 15.3% 6.3% 5.7%
200-225 2.0% 82.6% 80.9% 42.5% 38.6%
225-250 0.0% 1.7% 3.8% 48.9% 48.2%
250-275 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 7.2%
275-300 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3%
65. On balance, considering the assumptions underlying the various models used to estimate the
Cost of Equity, and the evolving market environment, it is my judgment that less weight
should be given to DCF-based estimates. Taking into account the prospects for increasing
inflation and interest rates, risk premium-based methods currently provide more reliable
estimates; I consider their results to be more meaningful measures of the Cost of Equity for
electric utilities such as SCE&G.
(2) Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”)
66. On December 22, 2017, the President of the United States signed into law the TCJA, which
(in part) reduced the federal income tax rate from 35.00 percent to 21.00 percent, and
removed the bonus depreciation available to utilities.50 Because utilities’ revenues are based
on the Revenue Requirement model discussed earlier (see, Equation [1]), the lower tax rate
reduces revenue to be collected. The lower tax rate also reduces deferred income taxes,
creating a liability, as it reflects taxes previously collected under the higher tax rate that now
must be refunded to customers. In addition, the loss of bonus depreciation removes a source
of cash flow that had been available to utilities as a source of funds for capital investments,
or to finance day-to-day operations. In short, whereas the TCJA represents a positive source
of cash flow for non-regulated sectors, it is expected to have a negative overall effect on
49 Source: http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-rates/countdown-to-fomc.html, accessed June 15, 2018.

50 Moody’s Investors Service, Sector Comment, “Tax reform is credit negative for sector, but impact varies
by company”, January 24, 2018, at 2.

utilities’ cash flows and credit quality. To that point, on June 18, 2018 Moody’s Investors
Service changed its outlook on the U.S. utility sector to “negative” from “stable”.51
67. As Chart 5 (below) demonstrates, from November 1, 2017 through June 15, 2018, the S&P
500 gained about 7.77 percent in value whereas the Proxy Group lost about 8.55 percent,
underperforming the overall market by more than 16.00 percent.
Chart 5: Relative Performance Since November 201752
15.00%
12.50%
10.00%
7.77%
7.50%
5.00%
2.50%
0.00%
11/1/2017
11/8/2017
11/15/2017
11/22/2017
11/29/2017
12/6/2017
12/13/2017
12/20/2017
12/27/2017
1/3/2018
1/10/2018
1/17/2018
1/24/2018
1/31/2018
2/7/2018
2/14/2018
2/21/2018
2/28/2018
3/7/2018
3/14/2018
3/21/2018
3/28/2018
4/4/2018
4/11/2018
4/18/2018
4/25/2018
5/2/2018
5/9/2018
5/16/2018
5/23/2018
5/30/2018
6/6/2018
6/13/2018
‐2.50%
‐5.00%
‐7.50%
‐10.00%
‐12.50% ‐8.55%
‐15.00%
ENO Proxy Group S&P 500
68. In summary, utility stocks have lost value since the TCJA was enacted, utilities cannot take
advantage of the TCJA in the ways other sectors can, and investors see the prospect of
increasing interest rates. Those factors weigh against utility stock valuations. As with the
evolving capital market environment, in my judgment the TCJA is further reason to conclude
the Cost of Equity for electric utilities falls toward the upper end of a reasonable range of
results.
51 Moody’s Investors’ Service, Announcement, Moody’s changes the US regulated utility sector outlook to
negative from stable, June 18, 2018, at 1.
52 Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence. Proxy Group calculated as an index.

V. PRO FORMA RETURN ON EQUITY UNDER THE ACT
A. Pro Forma Return on Equity
69. I have been provided the Company’s calculation of its pro forma Return on Equity assuming
the Act is not enjoined and understand it to be 5.16 percent. I further understand the pro
forma overall Rate of Return to be 5.49 percent, including a Cost of Debt of 5.86 percent.53 I
have relied on those calculations in developing my overall conclusion that the pro forma
Return on Equity is far below the return reasonably required by equity investors in vertically
integrated electric utilities.
B. The Pro Forma ROE Relative to the Cost of Debt
70. As discussed in Section III, because debt investors are exposed to fewer risks than are equity
investors, the return they require (the Cost of Debt) is lower than the return required by
equity investors (the Cost of Equity). The pro forma Return on Equity, assuming the Act is
not enjoined, falls 70 basis points below the Company’s existing Cost of Debt. For the
reasons discussed in Sections III and IV, the proposition that equity investors would accept a
return lower than that available to debt investors is highly implausible.
71. I recognize that the Cost of Debt included in the pro forma Rate of Return is “embedded”.
That is, it reflects interest rates prevailing at the time the debt was issued in the past - it is not
necessarily a direct measure of the current, or “marginal” Cost of Debt. Because the Cost of
Equity reflects the return required in the current markets, it also is reasonable to compare the
pro forma ROE to the current, or marginal Cost of Debt for electric utilities. To do so, I
calculated the average yield on the Moody’s Utility A and Moody’s Utility Baa bond indices
for the 30 days ended June 15, 2018.54 As Table 11 (below) indicates, the overall average
yield during that period was 4.50 percent, only 66 basis points below the 5.16 percent pro
forma Return on Equity (the Baa yield was only 45 basis points below).
53 Source: Pro Forma Financials for SCE&G Assuming Implementation of the Act.
54 At the parent company level, the median credit rating of the proxy group is BBB+ / Baa1 (S&P and
Moody’s ratings, respectively); at the operating company level, the median credit rating is A- / A3.

Table 11: Moody’s Utility Bond Index Yields55

Moody’s Moody’s
Utility A Utility Baa Average
Index Index
30-days
ending 4.28% 4.71% 4.50%
6/15/18
72. Thus, regardless of whether it is considered relative to the Company’s 5.86 percent
embedded Cost of Debt, or the 4.50 percent marginal Cost of Debt, the analysis demonstrates
that the 5.16 percent pro forma Return on Equity that would result for SCE&G if the Act is
not enjoined falls far below the returns required by equity investors.
C. The Act’s Effect on the Cost of Equity
73. The analyses discussed above are based on the proxy companies – they do not reflect the
additional risk, and therefore the additional return potentially required by investors if rates
under the Act were to be implemented. Although we cannot precisely quantify how investors
would react to a decision that effectively limits the Company’s pro forma ROE to 5.16
percent, based on my experience and research, I do know that such a low return has never
been authorized in the United States for an electric utility comparable to SCE&G.
74. SCE&G’s current credit ratings from Moody’s and Fitch are at the threshold “notch” for
investment grade (Baa3, and BBB-, respectively), and one notch above the threshold from
Standard & Poor’s (BBB).56 Comments by rating agencies have made clear that adverse
legislative or regulatory developments could lower ratings for SCE&G and SCANA by as
much as two credit notches, to below investment grade.57 Were that to occur, the risks to
equity investors would increase, and the return they would require likewise would increase.
75. To understand the nature of the increase resulting from downgrades to below investment
grade, I reviewed the incremental return required on below investment grade utility debt
55 Source: Bloomberg Professional. See Exhibit RBH-8.

56 3:18-cf-01795-JMC Entry Number 5-3 Page 6 of 11.
57 Ibid.

relative to investment grade utility debt. Based on data from Bloomberg Professional, since
June 2017 the difference in yields for utility bonds rated within the BBB ratings categories,
and those rated below investment grade (in the BB ratings category) has been about 220 basis
points. Simply applying this measure, the corresponding Cost of Equity would be
approximately 12.95 percent (10.75 percent plus 2.20 percent), 779 basis points above the
5.16 percent pro forma ROE under the Act.
76. Although below investment grade debt reflects risks greater than its investment grade
counterparts, it still has protections not available to equity investors, and a priority claim on
cash flows relative to equity investors. Consequently, in my opinion the increase in the Cost
of Equity would be greater than the increase in the Cost of Debt.
77. An alternate means of assessing the implications of the financial risk associated with the Act
is by reference to Beta coefficients, which are measures of the subject company’s risk
relative to the overall market. Under that construct, as relative (undiversifiable) risk
increases, so does the return required for taking on that risk. Therefore, differences in Beta
coefficients may be seen as broad measures of incremental risk.
78. To make that assessment, it is important to identify a group of companies that likely have
risks comparable to those that would be faced by investors in SCE&G if the Act were to be
implemented. The difference between the average Beta coefficient for that group, and the
average Beta coefficient provided in Exhibit RBH-2 would represent a measure of the
incremental systematic risk associated with the Act. Multiplying that difference by the
expected Market Risk Premium would provide a measure of the required incremental equity
return.
79. Because no two companies are identical, it is unlikely a single comparison of the Company’s
financial risk and profile would be fully comparable to the pro forma effect of the Act. I
therefore developed a comparison group of companies that (1) are classified by Value Line as
operating in the Electric Utility, Power, or Diversified Natural Gas industries, and (2) have
Financial Strength Ratings (also by Value Line) of “B” or lower.

80. Value Line’s “Financial Strength Rating” considers several factors including “[b]alance sheet
leverage, business risk, the level and direction of profits, cash flow, earned returns, cash,
corporate size, and stock price”,58 all of which are important considerations to equity
investors. By selecting companies operating in the electric utility and energy industries, with
Financial Strength Ratings similar to SCANA’s, we are able to develop a group whose Beta
coefficients reasonably reflect the potential financial distress associated with the Act and,
therefore, the incremental return required by equity investors.
81. I selected companies with Financial Strength ratings of “B” or lower because Value Line
recently (May 18, 2018) reduced SCANA’s rating from “B+” to “B.” PG&E Corporation is
the only other electric utility with a Financial Strength Rating that low; its Financial Strength
Rating was dropped from “B++” to “B” in January 2018. Because Value Line’s Beta
coefficients are calculated over five years, the effect of their recently decreased ratings would
not be reflected to any meaningful degree in either SCANA’s or PG&E Corporation’s Beta
coefficient. Consequently, I looked to the “Power” and “Diversified Natural Gas” sectors for
companies with Financial Strength Ratings of “B” or lower.
82. As shown in Table 12 below (see also, Exhibit RBH-9), the average Beta coefficient for all
companies (within the sectors noted above) with Financial Strength Ratings of “B” or lower
is 1.16; the average for companies with “B” ratings is 1.22. In both cases, the average was
below the median and the skew was negative, indicating a relatively large number of
observations toward the lower end of the respective ranges.
58 Value Line Educational Articles, Financial Strength, January 27, 2012.

Table 12: Average Beta Coefficients59

Average 1.16
Median 1.25
OVERALL Std. Dev. 0.77
Skew -0.11
# Companies 82
Average 1.22
FINANCIAL Median 1.38
STRENGTH Std. Dev. 0.62
RATING = B Skew -0.89
# Companies 20
83. I considered 1.15 (that is, approximately equal to the 1.16 average coefficient for the Overall
Group) to be a reasonable measure of the Value Line Beta coefficient associated with the
Act. As shown in Exhibit RBH-2, the average Value Line Beta coefficient for the proxy
group is 0.677; the difference between 1.15 and 0.677 (i.e., 0.473) would reflect the
incremental systematic risk. Assuming an expected Market Risk Premium of 12.80 percent
(see, Exhibit RBH-1), the incremental Cost of Equity would be about 605 basis points (6.05
percent = 0.473 x 12.80 percent). Applying the ECAPM, the increased Beta coefficient
indicates a Cost of Equity somewhat more than 17.00 percent.60
84. Based on the analyses discussed above, it is my view that the incremental returns required by
equity investors in SCE&G, assuming the Act is implemented, likely would be in the range
of 220 to 625 basis points, indicating a required Return on Equity in the range of
approximately 12.95 percent to 17.00 percent.61 In other words, based on the analyses and
data discussed above, the Act likely would significantly increase the cost SCE&G would
have to pay to attract equity capital.
59 Source: Value Line. See Exhibit RBH-9.

60 Based on Equation [6]: 3.11% + (.25 x 12.80%) + (.75 x 1.15 x 12.80%) = 17.35%.
61 Based on my point estimate of 10.75 percent: 10.75% + 6.25% = 17.00%.

VI. CONCLUSIONS
85. For the reasons discussed above, it is my professional opinion that the pro forma Return on
Equity that would result if the Act is not enjoined would be far below the investor-required
Return on Equity for a vertically integrated electric utility such as SCE&G. By any accepted
method of calculating the investor-required return, or by reference to authorized returns in
numerous rate proceedings for companies such as SCE&G, the result is the same: the pro
forma equity return resulting from the Act is well below the return required by equity
investors for vertically integrated electric utilities. Thus, if the Act is not enjoined, it would
substantially affect the Company’s ability to compete for and attract long-term capital.
Moreover, the Act could have the added consequence of substantially increasing the required
Return on Equity for an investment in SCE&G due to increasing the Company’s risk profile.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on July 23,
2018.
Robert B. Hevert

3:18-cv-01795-JMC Date Filed 07/23/18 Entry Number 55-2 Page 43 Appendix
of 170
Appeal: 18-1899 Doc: 6-5 Filed: 08/08/2018 Pg: 44 of 171 Total Pages:(186Aof 383)
Resume of:
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Summary
Bob Hevert is a financial and economic consultant with more than 30 years of broad experience in the energy and
utility industries. He has an extensive background in the areas of corporate finance, mergers and acquisitions,
project finance, asset and business unit valuation, rate and regulatory matters, energy market assessment, and
corporate strategic planning. He has provided expert testimony on a wide range of financial, strategic, and
economic matters on more than 250 occasions at the state, provincial, and federal levels.
Prior to joining ScottMadden, Bob served as managing partner at Sussex Economic Advisors, LLC. Throughout
the course of his career, he has worked with numerous leading energy companies and financial institutions
throughout North America. He has provided expert testimony and support of litigation in various regulatory
proceedings on a variety of energy and economic issues. Bob earned a B.S. in business and economics from the
University of Delaware and an M.B.A. with a concentration in finance from the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst. Bob also holds the Chartered Financial Analyst designation.
Areas of Specialization
 Regulation and rates
 Utilities
 Fossil/hydro generation
 Markets and RTOs
 Nuclear generation
 Mergers and acquisitions
 Regulatory strategy and rate case support
 Capital project planning
 Strategic and business planning
Recent Expert Testimony Submission/Appearance
 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission – Return on Equity
 New Jersey Board of Public Utilities – Merger Approval
 New Mexico Public Regulation Commission – Cost of Capital and Financial Integrity
 United States District Court – PURPA and FERC Regulations
 Alberta Utilities Commission – Return on Equity and Capital Structure
Recent Assignments
 Provided expert testimony on the cost of capital for ratemaking purposes before numerous state utility
regulatory agencies, the Alberta Utilities Commission, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
 For an independent electric transmission provider in Texas, prepared an expert report on the economic
damages with respect to failure to meet guaranteed completion dates. The report was filed as part of an
arbitration proceeding and included a review of the ratemaking implications of economic damages
 Advised the board of directors of a publicly traded electric and natural gas combination utility on dividend
policy issues, earnings payout trends and related capital market considerations
 Assisted a publicly traded utility with a strategic buy-side evaluation of a gas utility with more than $1 billion in
assets. The assignment included operational performance benchmarking, calculation of merger synergies,
risk analysis, and review of the regulatory implications of the transaction
 Provided testimony before the Arkansas Public Service Commission in support of the acquisition of
SourceGas LLC by Black Hills Corporation. The testimony addressed certain balance sheet capitalization and
credit rating issues
 For the State of Maine Public Utility Commission, prepared a report that summarized the Northeast and
Atlantic Canada natural gas power markets and analyzed the potential benefits and costs associated with
natural gas pipeline expansions. The independent report was filed at the Maine Public Utility Commission
Appeal: 18-1899 Doc: 6-5 Filed: 08/08/2018 Pg: 45 of 171 Appendix
Total B of 383)
Pages:(187
Testimony & Expert Report Listing of:
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Page 1 of 14
SPONSOR DATE CASE/APPLICANT DOCKET NO. SUBJECT
Regulatory Commission of Alaska
Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC 06/18 Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC Docket No. U-18-043 Return on Equity
ENSTAR Natural Gas Company 06/16 ENSTAR Natural Gas Company Matter No. TA 285-4 Return on Equity
ENSTAR Natural Gas Company 08/14 ENSTAR Natural Gas Company Matter No. TA 262-4 Return on Equity
Alberta Utilities Commission
AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR Distribution & 10/17 AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR Distribution & 2018 General Cost of Capital, Rate of Return
Transmission, Inc., and FortisAlberta Inc. Transmission, Inc., and FortisAlberta Inc. Proceeding ID. 22570
EPCOR Energy Alberta G.P. Inc. 01/17 EPCOR Energy Alberta G.P. Inc. Proceeding 22357 Energy Price Setting Plan
AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR Distribution & 02/16 AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR Distribution & 2016 General Cost of Capital, Rate of Return
Transmission, Inc. Transmission, Inc. Proceeding ID. 20622
Arizona Corporation Commission
Southwest Gas Corporation 05/16 Southwest Gas Corporation Docket No. G-01551A-16-0107 Return on Equity
Southwest Gas Corporation 11/10 Southwest Gas Corporation Docket No. G-01551A-10-0458 Return on Equity
Arkansas Public Service Commission
Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company 09/16 Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company Docket No. 16-052-U Return on Equity
SourceGas Arkansas, Inc. 12/15 SourceGas Arkansas, Inc. Docket No. 15-078-U Response to Direct Testimony
by Arkansas Attorney General
related to Compliance Issues
CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. d/b/a 11/15 CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. d/b/a Docket No. 15-098-U Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Arkansas Gas CenterPoint Energy Arkansas Gas
SourceGas Arkansas, Inc. 04/15 SourceGas Arkansas, Inc. Docket No. 15-011-U Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. d/b/a 01/07 CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. d/b/a Docket No. 06-161-U Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Arkansas Gas CenterPoint Energy Arkansas Gas
California Public Utilities Commission
Southwest Gas Corporation 12/12 Southwest Gas Corporation Docket No. A-12-12-024 Return on Equity
Colorado Public Utilities Commission
Atmos Energy Corporation 06/17 Atmos Energy Corporation Docket No. 17AL-0429G Return on Equity
Xcel Energy, Inc. 03/15 Public Service Company of Colorado Docket No. 15AL-0135G Return on Equity (gas)
Xcel Energy, Inc. 06/14 Public Service Company of Colorado Docket No. 14AL-0660E Return on Equity (electric)
Xcel Energy, Inc. 12/12 Public Service Company of Colorado Docket No. 12AL-1268G Return on Equity (gas)
Total B of 383)
Pages:(188
Testimony & Expert Report Listing of
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Page 2 of 14
Xcel Energy, Inc. 11/11 Public Service Company of Colorado Docket No. 11AL-947E Return on Equity (electric)
Xcel Energy, Inc. 12/10 Public Service Company of Colorado Docket No. 10AL-963G Return on Equity (electric)
Atmos Energy Corporation 07/09 Atmos Energy Colorado-Kansas Division Docket No. 09AL-507G Return on Equity (gas)
Xcel Energy, Inc. 12/06 Public Service Company of Colorado Docket No. 06S-656G Return on Equity (gas)
Xcel Energy, Inc. 04/06 Public Service Company of Colorado Docket No. 06S-234EG Return on Equity (electric)
Xcel Energy, Inc. 08/05 Public Service Company of Colorado Docket No. 05S-369ST Return on Equity (steam)
Xcel Energy, Inc. 05/05 Public Service Company of Colorado Docket No. 05S-246G Return on Equity (gas)
Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority
Connecticut Light and Power Company 11/17 Connecticut Light and Power Company Docket No. 17-10-46 Return on Equity
Connecticut Light and Power Company 06/14 Connecticut Light and Power Company Docket No. 14-05-06 Return on Equity
Southern Connecticut Gas Company 09/08 Southern Connecticut Gas Company Docket No. 08-08-17 Return on Equity
Southern Connecticut Gas Company 12/07 Southern Connecticut Gas Company Docket No. 05-03-17PH02 Return on Equity
Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation 12/07 Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation Docket No. 06-03-04PH02 Return on Equity
Delaware Public Service Commission
Delmarva Power & Light Company 08/17 Delmarva Power & Light Company Docket No. 17-0977 (Electric) Return on Equity
Delmarva Power & Light Company 08/17 Delmarva Power & Light Company Docket No. 17-0978 (Gas) Return on Equity
Delmarva Power & Light Company 05/16 Delmarva Power & Light Company Case No. 16-649 (Electric) Return on Equity
Delmarva Power & Light Company 05/16 Delmarva Power & Light Company Case No. 16-650 (Gas) Return on Equity
Delmarva Power & Light Company 03/13 Delmarva Power & Light Company Case No. 13-115 Return on Equity
District of Columbia Public Service Commission
Potomac Electric Power Company 12/17 Potomac Electric Power Company Formal Case No. 1150 Return on Equity
Washington Gas Light Company 02/16 Washington Gas Light Company Formal Case No. 1137 Return on Equity
Potomac Electric Power Company 03/13 Potomac Electric Power Company Formal Case No. 1103-2013-E Return on Equity
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Sabine Pipeline, LLC 09/15 Sabine Pipeline, LLC Docket No. RP15-1322-000 Return on Equity
Total B of 383)
Pages:(189
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Page 3 of 14
NextEra Energy Transmission West, LLC 07/15 NextEra Energy Transmission West, LLC Docket No. ER15-2239-000 Return on Equity
Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC 05/15 Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, LLC Docket No. RP15-1026-000 Return on Equity
Public Service Company of New Mexico 12/12 Public Service Company of New Mexico Docket No. ER13-685-000 Return on Equity
Public Service Company of New Mexico 10/10 Public Service Company of New Mexico Docket No. ER11-1915-000 Return on Equity
Portland Natural Gas Transmission System 05/10 Portland Natural Gas Transmission System Docket No. RP10-729-000 Return on Equity
Florida Gas Transmission Company, LLC 10/09 Florida Gas Transmission Company, LLC Docket No. RP10-21-000 Return on Equity
Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline, LLC 07/09 Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline, LLC Docket No. RP09-809-000 Return on Equity
Spectra Energy 02/08 Saltville Gas Storage Docket No. RP08-257-000 Return on Equity
Panhandle Energy Pipelines 08/07 Panhandle Energy Pipelines Docket No. PL07-2-000 Response to draft policy
statement regarding inclusion
of MLPs in proxy groups for
determination of gas pipeline
ROEs
Southwest Gas Storage Company 08/07 Southwest Gas Storage Company Docket No. RP07-541-000 Return on Equity
Southwest Gas Storage Company 06/07 Southwest Gas Storage Company Docket No. RP07-34-000 Return on Equity
Sea Robin Pipeline LLC 06/07 Sea Robin Pipeline LLC Docket No. RP07-513-000 Return on Equity
Transwestern Pipeline Company 09/06 Transwestern Pipeline Company Docket No. RP06-614-000 Return on Equity
GPU International and Aquila 11/00 GPU International Docket No. EC01-24-000 Market Power Study
Florida Public Service Commission
Florida Power & Light Company 03/16 Florida Power & Light Company Docket No. 160021-EI Return on Equity
Tampa Electric Company 04/13 Tampa Electric Company Docket No. 130040-EI Return on Equity
Georgia Public Service Commission
Atlanta Gas Light Company 05/10 Atlanta Gas Light Company Docket No. 31647-U Return on Equity
Hawaii Public Utilities Commission
Maui Electric Company, Limited 10/17 Maui Electric Company, Limited Docket No. 2017-0150 Return on Equity
Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc. 12/16 Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc. Docket No. 2016-0328 Return on Equity
Hawai‘i Electric Light Company, Inc. 09/16 Hawai‘i Electric Light Company, Inc. Docket No. 2015-0170 Return on Equity
Maui Electric Company, Limited 12/14 Maui Electric Company, Limited Docket No. 2014-0318 Return on Equity
RP15-1322-000
Total B of 383)
Pages:(190
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Page 4 of 14
Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc. 06/14 Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc. Docket No. 2013-0373 Return on Equity
Hawai’i Electric Light Company, Inc. 08/12 Hawai’i Electric Light Company, Inc. Docket No. 2012-0099 Return on Equity
Illinois Commerce Commission
Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren 01/18 Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois Docket No. 18-0463 Return on Equity
Illinois
Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren 01/15 Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois Docket No. 15-0142 Return on Equity
Illinois
Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural Gas) 04/14 Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural Gas) Corp. Docket No. 14-0371 Return on Equity
Corp. d/b/a Liberty Utilities d/b/a Liberty Utilities
Ameren Illinois Company 01/13 Ameren Illinois Company Docket No. 13-0192 Return on Equity
d/b/a Ameren Illinois d/b/a Ameren Illinois
Ameren Illinois Company 02/11 Ameren Illinois Company Docket No. 11-0279 Return on Equity (electric)
Ameren Illinois Company 02/11 Ameren Illinois Company Docket No. 11-0282 Return on Equity (gas)
Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission
Indiana Michigan Power Company 7/17 Indiana Michigan Power Company Cause No. 44967 Return on Equity
Duke Energy Indiana, Inc. 12/15 Duke Energy Indiana, Inc. Cause No. 44720 Return on Equity
Duke Energy Indiana, Inc. 12/14 Duke Energy Indiana, Inc. Cause No. 44526 Return on Equity
Northern Indiana Public Service Company 05/09 Northern Indiana Public Service Company Cause No. 43894 Assessment of Valuation
Approaches
Kansas Corporation Commission
Kansas City Power & Light Company 05/18 Kansas City Power & Light Company Docket No. 18-KCPE-480-RTS Return on Equity
Westar Energy 02/18 Westar Energy Docket No. 18-WSEE-328-RTS Return on Equity
Great Plains Energy, Inc. and 01/17 Great Plains Energy, Inc. and Docket No. 16-KCPE-593-ACQ Response to Direct Testimony
Kansas City Power & Light Company Kansas City Power & Light Company by Commission Staff related to
the ratemaking capital structure
processes
Kansas City Power & Light Company 01/15 Kansas City Power & Light Company Docket No. 15-KCPE-116-RTS Return on Equity
Maine Public Utilities Commission
Northern Utilities, Inc. 05/17 Northern Utilities, Inc. Docket No. 2017-00065 Return on Equity
Total B of 383)
Pages:(191
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Page 5 of 14
Central Maine Power Company 06/11 Central Maine Power Company Docket No. 2010-327 Response to Bench Analysis
provided by Commission Staff
relating to the Company’s credit
and collections processes
Maryland Public Service Commission
Washington Gas Light Company 05/18 Washington Gas Light Company Case No. 9481 Return on Equity
Potomac Electric Power Company 01/18 Potomac Electric Power Company Case No. 9472 Return on Equity
Delmarva Power & Light Company 07/17 Delmarva Power & Light Company Case No. 9455 Return on Equity
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities
Boston Gas Company, Colonial Gas 11/17 Boston Gas Company, Colonial Gas DPU 17-170 Return on Equity
Company each d/b/a National Grid Company each d/b/a National Grid
NSTAR Electric Company Western and 01/17 NSTAR Electric Company Western DPU 17-05 Return on Equity
Massachusetts Electric Company each d/b/a Massachusetts Electric Company each d/b/a
Eversource Energy Eversource Energy
National Grid 11/15 Massachusetts Electric Company and DPU 15-155 Return on Equity
Nantucket Electric Company d/b/a National
Grid
Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company 06/15 Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company DPU 15-80 Return on Equity
d/b/a Unitil d/b/a Unitil
NSTAR Gas Company 12/14 NSTAR Gas Company DPU 14-150 Return on Equity
Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company 07/13 Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company DPU 13-90 Return on Equity
d/b/a Unitil d/b/a Unitil
Total B of 383)
Pages:(192
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Page 6 of 14
Bay State Gas Company d/b/a Columbia 04/12 Bay State Gas Company d/b/a Columbia Gas DPU 12-25 Capital Cost Recovery
Gas of Massachusetts of Massachusetts
National Grid 08/09 Massachusetts Electric Company d/b/a DPU 09-39 Revenue Decoupling and
National Grid Return on Equity
National Grid 08/09 Massachusetts Electric Company and DPU 09-38 Return on Equity – Solar
Nantucket Electric Company d/b/a National Generation
Grid
Bay State Gas Company 04/09 Bay State Gas Company DPU 09-30 Return on Equity
NSTAR Electric 09/04 NSTAR Electric DTE 04-85 Divestiture of Power Purchase
Agreement
Agreement
Agreement
Agreement
Agreement
Unitil Corporation 01/04 Fitchburg Gas and Electric DTE 03-52 Integrated Resource Plan; Gas
Demand Forecast
Bay State Gas Company 01/93 Bay State Gas Company DPU 93-14 Divestiture of Shelf Registration
Bay State Gas Company 01/91 Bay State Gas Company DPU 91-25 Divestiture of Shelf Registration
Michigan Public Service Commission
Indiana Michigan Power Company 05/17 Indiana Michigan Power Company Case No. U-18370 Return on Equity
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission
CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. d/b/a 08/17 CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. d/b/a Docket No. G-008/GR-17-285 Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Minnesota Gas CenterPoint Energy Minnesota Gas
ALLETE, Inc., d/b/a Minnesota Power Inc. 11/16 ALLETE, Inc., d/b/a Minnesota Power Inc. Docket No. E015/GR-16-664 Return on Equity
Otter Tail Power Corporation 02/16 Otter Tail Power Company Docket No. E017/GR-15-1033 Return on Equity
Minnesota Energy Resources Corporation 09/15 Minnesota Energy Resources Corporation Docket No. G-011/GR-15-736 Return on Equity
Total B of 383)
Pages:(193
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Page 7 of 14
Xcel Energy, Inc. 11/13 Northern States Power Company Docket No. E002/GR-13-868 Return on Equity
Xcel Energy, Inc. 11/12 Northern States Power Company Docket No. E002/GR-12-961 Return on Equity
Otter Tail Power Corporation 04/10 Otter Tail Power Company Docket No. E-017/GR-10-239 Return on Equity
Minnesota Power a division of ALLETE, Inc. 11/09 Minnesota Power Docket No. E-015/GR-09-1151 Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. d/b/a 11/08 CenterPoint Energy Minnesota Gas Docket No. G-008/GR-08-1075 Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Minnesota Gas
Otter Tail Power Corporation 10/07 Otter Tail Power Company Docket No. E-017/GR-07-1178 Return on Equity
Xcel Energy, Inc. 11/05 Northern States Power Company -Minnesota Docket No. E-002/GR-05-1428 Return on Equity (electric)
Xcel Energy, Inc. 09/04 Northern States Power Company - Minnesota Docket No. G-002/GR-04-1511 Return on Equity (gas)
Mississippi Public Service Commission
CenterPoint Energy Resources, Corp. d/b/a 07/09 CenterPoint Energy Mississippi Gas Docket No. 09-UN-334 Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Entex and CenterPoint
Energy Mississippi Gas
Missouri Public Service Commission
KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations 01/18 KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Case No. ER-2018-0146 Return on Equity
Company Company
Kansas City Power & Light Company 01/18 Kansas City Power & Light Company Case No. ER-2018-0145 Return on Equity
Laclede Gas Company and Missouri Gas 11/17 Laclede Gas Company and Missouri Gas Case No. GR-2017-0215 Goodwill Adjustment on Capital
Energy Energy Case No. GR-2017-0216 Structure
Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural Gas) 09/17 Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural Gas) Corp. Case No. GR-2018-0013 New Ratemaking Mechanisms
Corp. d/b/a/ Liberty Utilities d/b/a/ Liberty Utilities
Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren 07/16 Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Case No. ER-2016-0179 Return on Equity (electric)
Missouri Missouri
Kansas City Power & Light Company 07/16 Kansas City Power & Light Company Case No. ER-2016-0285 Return on Equity (electric)
Total B of 383)
Pages:(194
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Page 8 of 14
Missouri Missouri
Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren 06/14 Union Electric Company d/b/a Ameren Case No. EC-2014-0223 Return on Equity (electric)
Missouri Missouri
Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural Gas) 02/14 Liberty Utilities (Midstates Natural Gas) Corp. Case No. GR-2014-0152 Return on Equity
Corp. d/b/a Liberty Utilities d/b/a Liberty Utilities
Laclede Gas Company 12/12 Laclede Gas Company Case No. GR-2013-0171 Return on Equity
Missouri Missouri
Union Electric Company d/b/a AmerenUE 09/10 Union Electric Company d/b/a AmerenUE Case No. ER-2011-0028 Return on Equity (electric)
Union Electric Company d/b/a AmerenUE 06/10 Union Electric Company d/b/a AmerenUE Case No. GR-2010-0363 Return on Equity (gas)
Montana Public Service Commission
Northwestern Corporation 09/12 Northwestern Corporation d/b/a Northwestern Docket No. D2012.9.94 Return on Equity (gas)
Energy
Nevada Public Utilities Commission
Southwest Gas Corporation 05/18 Southwest Gas Corporation Docket No. 18-05031 Return on Equity (gas)
Southwest Gas Corporation 04/12 Southwest Gas Corporation Docket No. 12-04005 Return on Equity (gas)
Nevada Power Company 06/11 Nevada Power Company Docket No. 11-06006 Return on Equity (electric)
New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission
Northern Utilities, Inc. 06/17 Northern Utilities, Inc. Docket No. DG 17-070 Return on Equity
Liberty Utilities d/b/a EnergyNorth Natural 04/17 Liberty Utilities d/b/a EnergyNorth Natural Gas Docket No. DG 17-048 Return on Equity
Gas
Unitil Energy Systems, Inc. 04/16 Unitil Energy Systems, Inc. Docket No. DE 16-384 Return on Equity
Liberty Utilities d/b/a Granite State Electric 04/16 Liberty Utilities d/b/a Granite State Electric Docket No. DE 16-383 Return on Equity
Company Company
Liberty Utilities d/b/a EnergyNorth Natural 08/14 Liberty Utilities d/b/a EnergyNorth Natural Gas Docket No. DG 14-180 Return on Equity
Gas
Liberty Utilities d/b/a Granite State Electric 03/13 Liberty Utilities d/b/a Granite State Electric Docket No. DE 13-063 Return on Equity
Company Company
EnergyNorth Natural Gas d/b/a National Grid 02/10 EnergyNorth Natural Gas d/b/a National Grid Docket No. DG 10-017 Return on Equity
NH NH
Total B of 383)
Pages:(195
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Page 9 of 14
Unitil Energy Systems, Inc., EnergyNorth 08/08 Unitil Energy Systems, Inc., EnergyNorth Docket No. DG 07-072 Carrying Charge Rate on Cash
Natural Gas, Inc. d/b/a National Grid NH, Natural Gas, Inc. d/b/a National Grid NH, Working Capital
Granite State Electric Company d/b/a Granite State Electric Company d/b/a National
National Grid, and Northern Utilities, Inc. – Grid, and Northern Utilities, Inc. – New
New Hampshire Division Hampshire Division
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities
Atlantic City Electric Company 06/18 Atlantic City Electric Company Docket No. ER18060638 Return on Equity
Pivotal Utility Holdings, Inc. 08/16 Elizabethtown Gas Docket No. GR16090826 Return on Equity
The Southern Company; AGL Resources 04/16 The Southern Company; AGL Resources Inc.; BPU Docket No. GM15101196 Merger Approval
Inc.; AMS Corp. and Pivotal Holdings, Inc. AMS Corp. and Pivotal Holdings, Inc. d/b/a
d/b/a Elizabethtown Gas Elizabethtown Gas
Pepco Holdings, Inc. 03/14 Atlantic City Electric Company Docket No. ER14030245 Return on Equity
Orange and Rockland Utilities 11/13 Rockland Electric Company Docket No. ER13111135 Return on Equity
Pepco Holdings, Inc. 09/06 Atlantic City Electric Company Docket No. EM06090638 Divestiture and Valuation of
Electric Generating Assets
Pepco Holdings, Inc. 12/05 Atlantic City Electric Company Docket No. EM05121058 Market Value of Electric
Generation Assets; Auction
Conectiv 06/03 Atlantic City Electric Company Docket No. EO03020091 Market Value of Electric
Generation Assets; Auction
Process
New Mexico Public Regulation Commission
Public Service Company of New Mexico 12/16 Public Service Company of New Mexico Case No. 16-00276-UT Return on Equity (electric)
Public Service Company of New Mexico 12/14 Public Service Company of New Mexico Case No. 13-00390-UT Cost of Capital and Financial
Integrity
Southwestern Public Service Company 02/11 Southwestern Public Service Company Case No. 10-00395-UT Return on Equity (electric)
Total B of 383)
Pages:(196
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Page 10 of 14
Xcel Energy, Inc. 07/07 Southwestern Public Service Company Case No. 07-00319-UT Return on Equity (electric)
New York State Public Service Commission
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, 01/15 Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Case No. 15-E-0050 Return on Equity (electric)
Inc. Inc.
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. 11/14 Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. Case Nos. 14-E-0493 and 14-G- Return on Equity (electric and
0494 gas)
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, 01/13 Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Case No. 13-E-0030 Return on Equity (electric)
Inc. Inc.
Niagara Mohawk Corporation d/b/a National 04/12 Niagara Mohawk Corporation d/b/a National Case No. 12-E-0201 Return on Equity
Grid for Electric Service Grid for Electric Service (electric)
Niagara Mohawk Corporation d/b/a National 04/12 Niagara Mohawk Corporation d/b/a National Case No. 12-G-0202 Return on Equity
Grid for Gas Service Grid for Gas Service (gas)
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. 07/11 Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. Case No. 11-E-0408 Return on Equity (electric)
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. 07/10 Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. Case No. 10-E-0362 Return on Equity (electric)
Consolidated Edison Company of New 11/09 Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Case No. 09-G-0795 Return on Equity (gas)
York, Inc. Inc.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, 11/09 Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Case No. 09-S-0794 Return on Equity (steam)
Inc. Inc.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 07/01 Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Case No. 01-E-1046 Power Purchase and Sale
Agreement; Standard Offer
Service Agreement
North Carolina Utilities Commission
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 08/17 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146 Return on Equity
Duke Energy Progress, LLC 06/17 Duke Energy Progress, LLC Docket No. E-2, Sub 1142 Return on Equity
Public Service Company of North Carolina, 03/16 Public Service Company of North Carolina, Docket No. G-5, Sub 565 Return on Equity
Inc. Inc.
Dominion North Carolina Power 03/16 Dominion North Carolina Power Docket No. E-22, Sub 532 Return on Equity
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 02/13 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Docket No. E-7, Sub 1026 Return on Equity
Carolina Power & Light Company d/b/a 10/12 Carolina Power & Light Company d/b/a Docket No. E-2, Sub 1023 Return on Equity
Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc.
Total B of 383)
Pages:(197
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Page 11 of 14
Virginia Electric and Power Company d/b/a 03/12 Virginia Electric and Power Company d/b/a Docket No. E-22, Sub 479 Return on Equity (electric)
Dominion North Carolina Power Dominion North Carolina Power
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 07/11 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Docket No. E-7, Sub 989 Return on Equity (electric)
North Dakota Public Service Commission
Otter Tail Power Company 11/17 Otter Tail Power Company Docket No. 17-398 Return on Equity (electric)
Otter Tail Power Company 11/08 Otter Tail Power Company Docket No. 08-862 Return on Equity (electric)
Oklahoma Corporation Commission
CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp., d/b/a 03/16 CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp., d/b/a Cause No. PUD201600094 Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Oklahoma Gas CenterPoint Energy Oklahoma Gas
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company 12/15 Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company Cause No. PUD201500273 Return on Equity
Public Service Company of Oklahoma 07/15 Public Service Company of Oklahoma Cause No. PUD201500208 Return on Equity
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company 07/11 Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company Cause No. PUD201100087 Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp., d/b/a 03/09 CenterPoint Energy Oklahoma Cause No. PUD200900055 Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Oklahoma Gas Gas
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
Pike County Light & Power Company 01/14 Pike County Light & Power Company Docket No. R-2013-2397237 Return on Equity (electric &
gas)
Veolia Energy Philadelphia, Inc. 12/13 Veolia Energy Philadelphia, Inc. Docket No. R-2013-2386293 Return on Equity (steam)
Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission
The Narragansett Electric Company d/b/a 11/17 The Narragansett Electric Company d/b/a Docket No. 4770 Return on Equity (electric &
National Grid National Grid gas)
The Narragansett Electric Company d/b/a 04/12 The Narragansett Electric Company d/b/a Docket No. 4323 Return on Equity (electric &
National Grid National Grid gas)
National Grid RI – Gas 08/08 National Grid RI – Gas Docket No. 3943 Revenue Decoupling and
Return on Equity
South Carolina Public Service Commission
South Carolina Electric & Gas 12/17 South Carolina Electric & Gas Docket No. 2017-305-E Return on Equity
Duke Energy Progress, LLC 07/16 Duke Energy Progress, LLC Docket No. 2016-227-E Return on Equity
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 03/13 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Docket No. 2013-59-E Return on Equity
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 08/11 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Docket No. 2011-271-E Return on Equity
Total B of 383)
Pages:(198
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Page 12 of 14
South Dakota Public Utilities Commission
Otter Tail Power Company 04/18 Otter Tail Power Company Docket No. EL18-021 Return on Equity (electric)
Northern States Power Company 06/09 South Dakota Division of Northern States Docket No. EL09-009 Return on Equity (electric)
Power
Texas Public Utility Commission
Texas-New Mexico Power Company 05/18 Texas-New Mexico Power Company Docket No. 48401 Return on Equity
Entergy Texas, Inc. 05/18 Entergy Texas, Inc. Docket No. 48371 Return on Equity
Southwestern Public Service Company 08/17 Southwestern Public Service Company Docket No. 47527 Return on Equity
Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC 03/17 Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC Docket No. 46957 Return on Equity
El Paso Electric Company 02/17 El Paso Electric Company Docket No. 46831 Return on Equity
Southwestern Electric Power Company 12/16 Southwestern Electric Power Company Docket No. 46449 Return on Equity (electric)
Sharyland Utilities, L.P. 04/16 Sharyland Utilities, L.P. Docket No. 45414 Return on Equity
Southwestern Public Service Company 02/16 Southwestern Public Service Company Docket No. 44524 Return on Equity (electric)
Wind Energy Transmission Texas, LLC 05/15 Wind Energy Transmission Texas, LLC Docket No. 44746 Return on Equity
Cross Texas Transmission 12/14 Cross Texas Transmission Docket No. 43950 Return on Equity
Southwestern Public Service Company 12/14 Southwestern Public Service Company Docket No. 43695 Return on Equity (electric)
Sharyland Utilities, L.P. 05/13 Sharyland Utilities, L.P. Docket No. 41474 Return on Equity
Wind Energy Texas Transmission, LLC 08/12 Wind Energy Texas Transmission, LLC Docket No. 40606 Return on Equity
Southwestern Electric Power Company 07/12 Southwestern Electric Power Company Docket No. 40443 Return on Equity
Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC 01/11 Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC Docket No. 38929 Return on Equity
Texas-New Mexico Power Company 08/10 Texas-New Mexico Power Company Docket No. 38480 Return on Equity (electric)
CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric LLC 06/10 CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric LLC Docket No. 38339 Return on Equity
Xcel Energy, Inc. 05/10 Southwestern Public Service Company Docket No. 38147 Return on Equity (electric)
Texas-New Mexico Power Company 08/08 Texas-New Mexico Power Company Docket No. 36025 Return on Equity (electric)
Xcel Energy, Inc. 05/06 Southwestern Public Service Company Docket No. 32766 Return on Equity (electric)
Texas Railroad Commission
Total B of 383)
Pages:(199
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Page 13 of 14
CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. D/B/A 11/17 CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. D/B/A GUD 10669 Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Entex And CenterPoint CenterPoint Energy Entex And CenterPoint
Energy Texas Gas Energy Texas Gas
Atmos Pipeline - Texas 01/17 Atmos Pipeline - Texas GUD 10580 Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. D/B/A 12/16 CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. D/B/A GUD 10567 Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Entex And CenterPoint CenterPoint Energy Entex And CenterPoint
CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. d/b/a 03/15 CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp. d/b/a GUD 10432 Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Entex and CenterPoint CenterPoint Energy Entex and CenterPoint
Atmos Energy Corporation – West Texas 06/12 Atmos Energy Corporation – West Texas GUD 10174 Return on Equity
Division Division
Atmos Energy Corporation – Mid-Texas 06/12 Atmos Energy Corporation – Mid-Texas GUD 10170 Return on Equity
Division Division
Atmos Pipeline – Texas 09/10 Atmos Pipeline - Texas GUD 10000 Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Texas Gas CenterPoint Energy Texas Gas
Utah Public Service Commission
Questar Gas Company 12/07 Questar Gas Company Docket No. 07-057-13 Return on Equity
Vermont Public Service Board
Central Vermont Public Service Corporation; 02/12 Central Vermont Public Service Corporation; Docket No. 7770 Merger Policy
Green Mountain Power Green Mountain Power
Central Vermont Public Service Corporation 12/10 Central Vermont Public Service Corporation Docket No. 7627 Return on Equity (electric)
Green Mountain Power 04/06 Green Mountain Power Docket Nos. 7175 and 7176 Return on Equity (electric)
Total B of 383)
Pages:(200
Robert B. Hevert
Partner
Page 14 of 14
Vermont Gas Systems, Inc. 12/05 Vermont Gas Systems Docket Nos. 7109 and 7160 Return on Equity (gas)
Virginia State Corporation Commission
Virginia Electric and Power Company 03/17 Virginia Electric and Power Company Case No. PUR-2017-00038 Return on Equity
Virginia Natural Gas, Inc. 03/17 Virginia Natural Gas, Inc. Case No. PUE-2016-00143 Return on Equity
Virginia Electric and Power Company 10/16 Virginia Electric and Power Company Case No. PUE-2016-00112; PUE- Return on Equity
2016-00113; PUE-2016-00136
Washington Gas Light Company 06/16 Washington Gas Light Company Case No. PUE-2016-00001 Return on Equity
Virginia Electric and Power Company 06/16 Virginia Electric and Power Company Case Nos. PUE-2016-00063; Return on Equity
PUE-2016-00062; PUE-2016-
00061; PUE-2016-00060; PUE-
2016-00059
Virginia Electric and Power Company 12/15 Virginia Electric and Power Company Case Nos. PUE-2015-0058; PUE- Return on Equity
2015-0059; PUE-2015-0060; PUE-
2015-0061; PUE-2015-0075; PUE-
2015-0089; PUE-2015-0102; PUE-
2015-0104
Virginia Electric and Power Company 03/15 Virginia Electric and Power Company Case No. PUE-2015-00027 Return on Equity
Virginia Electric and Power Company 03/13 Virginia Electric and Power Company Case No. PUE-2013-00020 Return on Equity
Virginia Natural Gas, Inc. 02/11 Virginia Natural Gas, Inc. Case No. PUE-2010-00142 Capital Structure
Columbia Gas of Virginia, Inc. 06/06 Columbia Gas of Virginia, Inc. Case No. PUE-2005-00098 Merger Synergies
Dominion Resources 10/01 Virginia Electric and Power Company Case No. PUE000584 Corporate Structure and
Electric Generation Strategy
Expert Reports
United States District Court, Western District of Texas, Austin Division
Southwestern Public Service Company 02/12 Southwestern Public Service Company C.A. No. A-09-CA-917-SS PURPA and FERC regulations
American Arbitration Association
Confidential Client 11/14 Confidential Client Confidential Economic harm related to
failure to perform
Appendix C: Documents Relied Upon 1
Source
American Electric Power Company, Inc., SEC Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year ended December 31, 2017
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 37, No. 6, June 1, 2018
Bluefield Water Works v. Public Service Commission, 22 U.S. 679 (1923).
Bonbright et. al., Principles of Public Utility Rates, 1988
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Current-Dollar and Real Gross Domestic Product, May 30, 2018 (Data
included in Hevert Workpapers.xlsx.)
CME Group Fedwatch Tool, accessed June 15, 2018
Duke Energy Corporation, SEC Form 10-K-A, for the Fiscal Year ended December 31, 2017
Eugene Brigham, Louis Gapenski, Financial Management: Theory and Practice, 7th Ed., 1994
Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a
Utility’s Cost of Equity, Financial Management, Spring 1985
Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 2004
Exhibit RBH-1 through Exhibit RBH-9
Farris M. Maddox, Donna T. Pippert, and Rodney N. Sullivan, An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Risk
Premiums for the Electric Utility Industry, Financial Management, Autumn 1995
Federal Power Commission et. al. v. Hope Natural Gas Co. City of Cleveland, 320 U.S. 591, January 3,
1944
Federal Reserve Addendum to the Policy Normalization Principles and Plans, as adopted effective June
13, 2017
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Domestic Open Market Operations During 2012, April 2013
Federal Reserve Board Schedule H.4.1 (Data included in Hevert Workpapers.xlsx.)
Federal Reserve Board Schedule H.15 (Data included in Hevert Workpapers.xlsx.)
Federal Reserve Press Release, June 19, 2013
Federal Reserve Press Release, Sept. 20, 2017
Moody’s Investors’ Service, Announcement, Moody’s changes the US regulated utility sector outlook to
negative from stable, June 18, 2018
Moody’s Investors’ Service, Sector Comment, Tax reform is credit negative for sector, but impact
varies by company, January 24, 2018
Moody’s Investors Service, Rating Methodology: Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities, December 23,
2013
Morningstar, Inc., 2013 Ibbotson Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation Valuation Yearbook
National Bureau of Economic Research, U.S. Business Cycle Expansion and Contractions
NextEra Energy, Inc., SEC Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year ended December 31, 2017
Pro Forma Financials for SCE&G Assuming Implementation of the Act
Regulatory Research Associates, Public Service Commission of South Carolina, accessed July 18, 2018.
Robert S. Harris and Felicia C. Marston, Estimating Shareholder Risk Premia Using Analysts’ Growth
Forecasts, Financial Management, Summer 1992
Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance (Public Utility Reports, Inc., 2006)
SCE&G v. SCPSC Complaint Exhibit 1
1 I have reviewed the June 12, 2018 Report by Baker Tilly to the South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff,
its associated June 26, 2018 Interpretation Letter, and the March 22, 2018 “Preliminary Analysis of an Interim
Reduction in SCE&G Rates” by Bates White Economic Consulting, and found those reports do not address
the issue for which I have been asked to provide my expert opinion, i.e., the investor-required Return on
Equity. Consequently, the Baker Tilly and Bates White reports are irrelevant to the analyses in this report.
1
Source
SCE&G v. SCPSC Complaint Exhibit 13, ORS SC PR January 15, 2016
SCE&G Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s
SCE&G Motion for Prelim Injunction
SCE&G v. SCPSC Verification of Griffin
SCE&G Declaration of Griffin
SCE&G Motion for Preliminary Injunction – PSC Meeting
SCE&G Letter RE: PSC Decision
SCE&G Letter RE: PSC Decision Exhibit A
Value Line Educational Articles, Financial Strength, January 27. 2012
WEC Energy Group, SEC Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year ended December 31, 2017
Data supporting Exhibit Nos.__(RBH-1) through (RBH-9) and Charts 1 – 5:

Hevert Workpapers.xlsx
Proxy Group Value Line Reports.pdf
Proxy Group Zacks Consensus Growth Rates.pdf
Proxy Group Yahoo Consensus Growth Rates.pdf
2
Exhibit RBH-1
Page 1 of 14
Ex-Ante Market Risk Premium

Market DCF Method Based - Bloomberg
[1] [2] [3]

S&P 500 Current 30-Year
Est. Required Treasury (30-day Implied Market
Market Return average) Risk Premium
15.73% 3.11% 12.62%
[4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]

Market Estimated Dividend Long-Term Weighted
Company Ticker Capitalization Weight in Index Yield Growth Est. DCF Result DCF Result
AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES INC A $ 21,158.43 0.08% 0.91% -0.45% 0.46% 0.0004%

AMERICAN AIRLINES GROUP INC AAL $ 20,022.89 0.08% 0.99% 17.10% 18.18% 0.0146%
ADVANCE AUTO PARTS INC AAP $ 10,154.13 0.04% 0.18% 16.64% 16.84% 0.0069%
APPLE INC AAPL $ 928,174.66 3.73% 1.45% 11.21% 12.74% 0.4746%
ABBVIE INC ABBV $ 158,005.59 0.63% 3.86% 13.63% 17.75% 0.1126%
AMERISOURCEBERGEN CORP ABC $ 20,848.42 0.08% 1.59% 9.92% 11.59% 0.0097%
ABIOMED INC ABMD $ 19,729.48 0.08% 0.00% 37.00% 37.00% 0.0293%
ABBOTT LABORATORIES ABT $ 110,293.04 0.44% 1.78% 12.67% 14.56% 0.0645%
ACCENTURE PLC-CL A ACN $ 105,289.11 0.42% 1.63% 11.10% 12.82% 0.0542%
ADOBE SYSTEMS INC ADBE $ 124,013.88 0.50% 0.00% 18.66% 18.66% 0.0929%
ANALOG DEVICES INC ADI $ 37,646.08 0.15% 1.86% 9.60% 11.55% 0.0175%
ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND CO ADM $ 25,739.25 N/A 2.83% N/A N/A N/A
AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING ADP $ 61,483.70 0.25% 1.77% 13.50% 15.39% 0.0380%
ALLIANCE DATA SYSTEMS CORP ADS $ 12,871.02 0.05% 0.95% 12.40% 13.41% 0.0069%
AUTODESK INC ADSK $ 30,239.83 0.12% 0.00% 34.00% 34.00% 0.0413%
AMEREN CORPORATION AEE $ 13,820.92 0.06% 3.28% 8.97% 12.40% 0.0069%
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER AEP $ 32,038.65 0.13% 3.86% 5.64% 9.61% 0.0124%
AES CORP AES $ 8,644.49 0.03% 4.00% 8.23% 12.39% 0.0043%
AETNA INC AET $ 61,985.45 0.25% 1.06% 11.08% 12.19% 0.0303%
AFLAC INC AFL $ 35,418.14 0.14% 2.28% 6.52% 8.87% 0.0126%
ALLERGAN PLC AGN $ 58,719.04 0.24% 1.70% 9.24% 11.01% 0.0260%
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP AIG $ 49,561.10 0.20% 2.37% 11.00% 13.50% 0.0269%
APARTMENT INVT & MGMT CO -A AIV $ 6,492.27 0.03% 3.69% 6.02% 9.82% 0.0026%
ASSURANT INC AIZ $ 6,024.46 N/A 2.38% N/A N/A N/A
ARTHUR J GALLAGHER & CO AJG $ 11,995.39 0.05% 2.47% 10.32% 12.91% 0.0062%
AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES INC AKAM $ 13,986.57 0.06% 0.00% 11.71% 11.71% 0.0066%
ALBEMARLE CORP ALB $ 10,337.53 0.04% 1.43% 12.90% 14.43% 0.0060%
ALIGN TECHNOLOGY INC ALGN $ 29,067.07 0.12% 0.00% 31.45% 31.45% 0.0367%
ALASKA AIR GROUP INC ALK $ 7,769.93 0.03% 2.03% 15.52% 17.71% 0.0055%
ALLSTATE CORP ALL $ 32,973.17 0.13% 1.88% 9.00% 10.96% 0.0145%
ALLEGION PLC ALLE $ 7,793.32 0.03% 0.93% 12.06% 13.04% 0.0041%
ALEXION PHARMACEUTICALS INC ALXN $ 27,038.28 0.11% 0.00% 18.87% 18.87% 0.0205%
APPLIED MATERIALS INC AMAT $ 49,706.84 0.20% 1.21% 14.46% 15.76% 0.0314%
ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES AMD $ 15,839.08 0.06% 0.00% 23.60% 23.60% 0.0150%
AMETEK INC AME $ 17,389.27 0.07% 0.75% 10.58% 11.36% 0.0079%
AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP AMG $ 8,462.84 0.03% 0.73% 12.85% 13.63% 0.0046%
AMGEN INC AMGN $ 122,422.23 0.49% 2.83% 5.11% 8.01% 0.0394%
AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC AMP $ 21,305.80 N/A 2.40% N/A N/A N/A
AMERICAN TOWER CORP AMT $ 61,196.40 0.25% 2.25% 15.02% 17.44% 0.0428%
AMAZON.COM INC AMZN $ 832,634.81 3.34% 0.00% 41.51% 41.51% 1.3876%
ANDEAVOR ANDV $ 20,552.66 0.08% 1.80% 7.95% 9.82% 0.0081%
ANSYS INC ANSS $ 14,936.52 0.06% 0.00% 13.17% 13.17% 0.0079%
ANTHEM INC ANTM $ 62,564.65 0.25% 1.24% 10.09% 11.39% 0.0286%
AON PLC AON $ 34,116.83 0.14% 1.11% 11.42% 12.60% 0.0173%
SMITH (A.O.) CORP AOS $ 10,761.42 0.04% 1.15% 11.50% 12.71% 0.0055%
APACHE CORP APA $ 15,901.44 0.06% 2.40% -17.09% -14.89% -0.0095%
ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP APC $ 35,278.39 0.14% 1.07% 19.23% 20.40% 0.0289%
AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS INC APD $ 35,987.21 0.14% 2.59% 11.42% 14.15% 0.0204%
AMPHENOL CORP-CL A APH $ 27,527.12 0.11% 0.93% 10.86% 11.84% 0.0131%
APTIV PLC APTV $ 27,199.73 0.11% 0.86% 10.59% 11.50% 0.0126%
ALEXANDRIA REAL ESTATE EQUIT ARE $ 13,165.30 0.05% 2.86% 6.78% 9.73% 0.0051%
ARCONIC INC ARNC $ 8,464.05 0.03% 1.39% 15.95% 17.45% 0.0059%
ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC ATVI $ 58,924.87 0.24% 0.44% 15.55% 16.02% 0.0379%
AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES INC AVB $ 23,318.59 0.09% 3.47% 6.41% 9.98% 0.0093%
BROADCOM INC AVGO $ 116,653.12 0.47% 2.59% 13.01% 15.77% 0.0739%
AVERY DENNISON CORP AVY $ 9,325.99 0.04% 1.74% 9.83% 11.66% 0.0044%
AMERICAN WATER WORKS CO INC AWK $ 14,430.78 0.06% 2.22% 8.00% 10.31% 0.0060%
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO AXP $ 84,762.88 0.34% 1.48% 17.30% 18.90% 0.0643%
ACUITY BRANDS INC AYI $ 5,010.54 0.02% 0.43% 10.00% 10.45% 0.0021%
AUTOZONE INC AZO $ 18,330.00 0.07% 0.00% 13.58% 13.58% 0.0100%
BOEING CO/THE BA $ 208,494.08 0.84% 1.95% 15.33% 17.43% 0.1459%
BANK OF AMERICA CORP BAC $ 296,880.30 1.19% 2.06% 13.40% 15.59% 0.1858%
BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC BAX $ 40,453.85 0.16% 0.96% 13.06% 14.09% 0.0229%
BB&T CORP BBT $ 40,796.62 0.16% 3.02% 14.32% 17.56% 0.0288%
BEST BUY CO INC BBY $ 20,901.31 0.08% 2.41% 11.22% 13.76% 0.0115%
BECTON DICKINSON AND CO BDX $ 62,033.58 0.25% 1.32% 13.91% 15.33% 0.0382%
FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC BEN $ 18,345.47 0.07% 10.06% 10.00% 20.56% 0.0151%
BROWN-FORMAN CORP-CLASS B BF/B $ 25,338.31 0.10% 1.26% 13.62% 14.97% 0.0152%
BRIGHTHOUSE FINANCIAL INC BHF $ 5,395.78 0.02% 0.00% 8.00% 8.00% 0.0017%
Exhibit RBH-1
Page 2 of 14
BAKER HUGHES A GE CO BHGE $ 36,246.24 0.15% 2.01% 66.45% 69.13% 0.1006%
BIOGEN INC BIIB $ 64,363.75 0.26% 0.00% 5.41% 5.41% 0.0140%
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP BK $ 57,537.79 0.23% 1.85% 8.10% 10.02% 0.0231%
BOOKING HOLDINGS INC BKNG $ 103,164.28 0.41% 0.00% 14.12% 14.12% 0.0585%
BLACKROCK INC BLK $ 84,519.21 0.34% 2.22% 11.38% 13.72% 0.0466%
BALL CORP BLL $ 12,799.67 0.05% 1.02% 5.50% 6.55% 0.0034%
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO BMY $ 89,572.71 0.36% 2.93% 9.23% 12.29% 0.0442%
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC-CL B BRK/B $ 473,175.06 1.90% 0.00% 6.70% 6.70% 0.1273%
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP BSX $ 45,478.55 0.18% 0.00% 21.34% 21.34% 0.0390%
BORGWARNER INC BWA $ 10,133.21 0.04% 1.39% 4.83% 6.25% 0.0025%
BOSTON PROPERTIES INC BXP $ 18,536.02 0.07% 2.70% 5.91% 8.69% 0.0065%
CITIGROUP INC C $ 169,162.59 0.68% 2.21% 13.86% 16.22% 0.1102%
CA INC CA $ 15,527.32 0.06% 2.76% 3.08% 5.87% 0.0037%
CONAGRA BRANDS INC CAG $ 15,150.51 0.06% 2.19% 10.35% 12.65% 0.0077%
CARDINAL HEALTH INC CAH $ 17,010.01 0.07% 3.38% 9.96% 13.51% 0.0092%
CATERPILLAR INC CAT $ 89,704.42 0.36% 2.13% 25.67% 28.07% 0.1011%
CHUBB LTD CB $ 60,964.18 0.24% 2.23% 10.00% 12.35% 0.0302%
CBOE GLOBAL MARKETS INC CBOE $ 11,566.25 0.05% 1.12% 18.64% 19.86% 0.0092%
CBRE GROUP INC - A CBRE $ 16,524.94 0.07% 0.00% 10.75% 10.75% 0.0071%
CBS CORP-CLASS B NON VOTING CBS $ 21,294.67 0.09% 1.38% 15.32% 16.80% 0.0144%
CROWN CASTLE INTL CORP CCI $ 41,934.45 0.17% 4.23% 12.77% 17.27% 0.0291%
CARNIVAL CORP CCL $ 46,254.07 0.19% 2.93% 14.40% 17.54% 0.0326%
CADENCE DESIGN SYS INC CDNS $ 12,691.41 0.05% 0.00% 12.00% 12.00% 0.0061%
CELGENE CORP CELG $ 56,594.50 0.23% 0.00% 19.05% 19.05% 0.0433%
CERNER CORP CERN $ 20,529.35 0.08% 0.00% 11.94% 11.94% 0.0098%
CF INDUSTRIES HOLDINGS INC CF $ 10,403.17 0.04% 2.69% 11.75% 14.60% 0.0061%
CITIZENS FINANCIAL GROUP CFG $ 20,213.10 0.08% 2.36% 20.98% 23.58% 0.0191%
CHURCH & DWIGHT CO INC CHD $ 12,298.73 0.05% 1.74% 10.24% 12.07% 0.0060%
C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE INC CHRW $ 12,544.01 0.05% 2.08% 9.58% 11.76% 0.0059%
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS INC-A CHTR $ 78,244.80 0.31% 0.00% 29.32% 29.32% 0.0921%
CIGNA CORP CI $ 42,584.10 0.17% 0.02% 11.84% 11.87% 0.0203%
CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORP CINF $ 11,324.43 N/A 3.07% N/A N/A N/A
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO CL $ 56,465.32 0.23% 2.57% 8.43% 11.10% 0.0252%
CLOROX COMPANY CLX $ 16,687.10 0.07% 2.68% 8.53% 11.32% 0.0076%
COMERICA INC CMA $ 16,259.73 0.07% 1.55% 26.85% 28.60% 0.0187%
COMCAST CORP-CLASS A CMCSA $ 155,903.56 0.63% 2.22% 15.40% 17.79% 0.1114%
CME GROUP INC CME $ 57,838.26 0.23% 3.79% 15.00% 19.07% 0.0443%
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL INC CMG $ 12,840.81 0.05% 0.00% 18.94% 18.94% 0.0098%
CUMMINS INC CMI $ 23,583.95 0.09% 3.09% 9.06% 12.29% 0.0116%
CMS ENERGY CORP CMS $ 12,453.76 0.05% 3.24% 6.29% 9.62% 0.0048%
CENTENE CORP CNC $ 25,394.98 0.10% 0.00% 15.49% 15.49% 0.0158%
CENTERPOINT ENERGY INC CNP $ 11,170.84 0.04% 4.32% 5.54% 9.98% 0.0045%
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP COF $ 47,310.58 0.19% 1.73% 16.36% 18.23% 0.0346%
CABOT OIL & GAS CORP COG $ 10,609.96 0.04% 1.01% 39.25% 40.46% 0.0172%
ROCKWELL COLLINS INC COL $ 22,599.77 0.09% 1.08% 11.60% 12.75% 0.0116%
COOPER COS INC/THE COO $ 11,639.15 0.05% 0.03% 10.73% 10.76% 0.0050%
CONOCOPHILLIPS COP $ 76,475.53 0.31% 1.75% 6.00% 7.80% 0.0240%
COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP COST $ 90,918.43 0.36% 1.03% 10.89% 11.98% 0.0437%
COTY INC-CL A COTY $ 10,882.79 0.04% 3.45% 15.63% 19.35% 0.0085%
CAMPBELL SOUP CO CPB $ 11,153.95 0.04% 3.87% 3.40% 7.34% 0.0033%
SALESFORCE.COM INC CRM $ 102,820.51 0.41% 0.00% 26.30% 26.30% 0.1086%
CISCO SYSTEMS INC CSCO $ 208,102.55 0.84% 2.82% 6.24% 9.14% 0.0764%
CSX CORP CSX $ 58,342.31 0.23% 1.32% 15.16% 16.58% 0.0388%
CINTAS CORP CTAS $ 20,331.40 0.08% 0.85% 11.60% 12.50% 0.0102%
CENTURYLINK INC CTL $ 19,440.81 0.08% 11.99% -15.40% -4.34% -0.0034%
COGNIZANT TECH SOLUTIONS-A CTSH $ 47,282.04 0.19% 0.93% 15.03% 16.03% 0.0304%
CITRIX SYSTEMS INC CTXS $ 14,493.08 0.06% 0.00% 11.00% 11.00% 0.0064%
CVS HEALTH CORP CVS $ 71,256.74 0.29% 3.01% 11.23% 14.41% 0.0412%
CHEVRON CORP CVX $ 237,035.48 0.95% 3.61% 54.01% 58.59% 0.5575%
CONCHO RESOURCES INC CXO $ 18,743.97 0.08% 0.00% 32.85% 32.85% 0.0247%
DOMINION ENERGY INC D $ 43,287.17 0.17% 5.04% 5.55% 10.72% 0.0186%
DELTA AIR LINES INC DAL $ 38,707.50 0.16% 2.40% 16.18% 18.77% 0.0292%
DEERE & CO DE $ 48,237.33 0.19% 1.68% 7.67% 9.41% 0.0182%
DISCOVER FINANCIAL SERVICES DFS $ 26,023.23 0.10% 1.98% 8.89% 10.96% 0.0114%
DOLLAR GENERAL CORP DG $ 26,041.37 0.10% 1.19% 15.95% 17.23% 0.0180%
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC DGX $ 15,117.81 0.06% 1.72% 9.95% 11.76% 0.0071%
DR HORTON INC DHI $ 16,168.46 0.06% 1.13% 20.52% 21.77% 0.0141%
DANAHER CORP DHR $ 71,470.98 0.29% 0.58% 8.15% 8.76% 0.0251%
WALT DISNEY CO/THE DIS $ 161,832.80 0.65% 1.55% 5.00% 6.59% 0.0428%
DISCOVERY INC - A DISCA $ 18,493.49 N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
DISH NETWORK CORP-A DISH $ 16,176.03 0.06% 0.00% -11.61% -11.61% -0.0075%
DIGITAL REALTY TRUST INC DLR $ 22,806.44 0.09% 3.80% 7.28% 11.21% 0.0103%
DOLLAR TREE INC DLTR $ 20,929.01 0.08% 0.00% 13.37% 13.37% 0.0112%
DOVER CORP DOV $ 11,882.35 0.05% 2.51% 12.63% 15.30% 0.0073%
DR PEPPER SNAPPLE GROUP INC DPS $ 21,898.33 0.09% 2.02% 11.00% 13.14% 0.0115%
DUKE REALTY CORP DRE $ 10,153.94 0.04% 2.84% -4.09% -1.31% -0.0005%
DARDEN RESTAURANTS INC DRI $ 11,648.59 0.05% 2.69% 10.72% 13.56% 0.0063%
DTE ENERGY COMPANY DTE $ 17,614.76 0.07% 3.69% 5.30% 9.09% 0.0064%
DUKE ENERGY CORP DUK $ 52,084.30 0.21% 4.92% 4.45% 9.47% 0.0198%
DAVITA INC DVA $ 12,820.52 0.05% 0.00% 20.25% 20.25% 0.0104%
DEVON ENERGY CORP DVN $ 21,066.85 0.08% 0.74% 10.58% 11.35% 0.0096%
DOWDUPONT INC DWDP $ 157,233.30 0.63% 2.28% 8.23% 10.61% 0.0670%
Exhibit RBH-1
Page 3 of 14
DXC TECHNOLOGY CO DXC $ 23,882.69 0.10% 0.91% 6.15% 7.09% 0.0068%
ELECTRONIC ARTS INC EA $ 44,891.32 0.18% 0.00% 13.50% 13.50% 0.0243%
EBAY INC EBAY $ 38,655.81 0.16% 0.00% 10.04% 10.04% 0.0156%
ECOLAB INC ECL $ 42,288.45 0.17% 1.10% 13.30% 14.47% 0.0246%
CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC ED $ 22,910.16 0.09% 3.89% 3.00% 6.95% 0.0064%
EQUIFAX INC EFX $ 14,916.47 0.06% 1.26% 8.00% 9.31% 0.0056%
EDISON INTERNATIONAL EIX $ 19,692.03 0.08% 4.02% 5.26% 9.39% 0.0074%
ESTEE LAUDER COMPANIES-CL A EL $ 58,003.16 0.23% 0.93% 19.60% 20.62% 0.0480%
EASTMAN CHEMICAL CO EMN $ 15,549.28 0.06% 2.09% 7.65% 9.82% 0.0061%
EMERSON ELECTRIC CO EMR $ 45,542.91 0.18% 2.69% 11.79% 14.64% 0.0268%
EOG RESOURCES INC EOG $ 66,094.38 0.27% 0.60% 8.00% 8.62% 0.0229%
EQUINIX INC EQIX $ 31,684.58 0.13% 2.29% 18.75% 21.26% 0.0270%
EQUITY RESIDENTIAL EQR $ 23,374.21 0.09% 3.40% 5.31% 8.80% 0.0083%
EQT CORP EQT $ 14,724.18 0.06% 0.22% 17.50% 17.74% 0.0105%
EVERSOURCE ENERGY ES $ 17,311.47 0.07% 3.70% 6.27% 10.09% 0.0070%
EXPRESS SCRIPTS HOLDING CO ESRX $ 45,905.17 0.18% 0.00% 6.73% 6.73% 0.0124%
ESSEX PROPERTY TRUST INC ESS $ 15,487.18 0.06% 3.15% 6.48% 9.74% 0.0061%
E*TRADE FINANCIAL CORP ETFC $ 16,972.04 0.07% 0.00% 28.18% 28.18% 0.0192%
EATON CORP PLC ETN $ 34,656.03 0.14% 3.30% 9.04% 12.49% 0.0174%
ENTERGY CORP ETR $ 15,335.55 0.06% 4.62% 0.91% 5.56% 0.0034%
ENVISION HEALTHCARE CORP EVHC $ 5,416.45 0.02% 0.00% 14.96% 14.96% 0.0033%
EVERGY INC EVRG $ 14,319.24 0.06% 3.07% 9.40% 12.61% 0.0072%
EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES CORP EW $ 32,145.92 0.13% 0.00% 15.33% 15.33% 0.0198%
EXELON CORP EXC $ 40,037.31 0.16% 3.33% 5.31% 8.73% 0.0140%
EXPEDITORS INTL WASH INC EXPD $ 13,431.15 0.05% 1.17% 10.83% 12.06% 0.0065%
EXPEDIA GROUP INC EXPE $ 18,636.34 0.07% 0.98% 16.76% 17.82% 0.0133%
EXTRA SPACE STORAGE INC EXR $ 12,196.03 0.05% 3.39% 6.04% 9.54% 0.0047%
FORD MOTOR CO F $ 47,341.25 0.19% 5.05% -7.42% -2.56% -0.0049%
FASTENAL CO FAST $ 15,156.15 0.06% 2.81% 17.50% 20.55% 0.0125%
FACEBOOK INC-A FB $ 567,125.83 2.28% 0.00% 21.49% 21.49% 0.4892%
FORTUNE BRANDS HOME & SECURI FBHS $ 8,298.63 0.03% 1.41% 12.68% 14.18% 0.0047%
FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC FCX $ 24,470.13 0.10% 1.16% -1.41% -0.26% -0.0003%
FEDEX CORP FDX $ 70,694.46 0.28% 0.76% 14.60% 15.41% 0.0437%
FIRSTENERGY CORP FE $ 16,548.75 0.07% 4.15% -0.12% 4.03% 0.0027%
F5 NETWORKS INC FFIV $ 11,153.41 0.04% 0.00% 10.31% 10.31% 0.0046%
FIDELITY NATIONAL INFO SERV FIS $ 35,564.19 0.14% 1.20% 4.40% 5.62% 0.0080%
FISERV INC FISV $ 31,317.82 0.13% 0.00% 11.00% 11.00% 0.0138%
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP FITB $ 21,024.15 0.08% 2.42% 6.00% 8.49% 0.0072%
FOOT LOCKER INC FL $ 6,648.62 0.03% 2.43% 6.58% 9.09% 0.0024%
FLIR SYSTEMS INC FLIR $ 7,527.58 N/A 1.15% N/A N/A N/A
FLUOR CORP FLR $ 6,843.78 0.03% 1.77% 27.68% 29.69% 0.0082%
FLOWSERVE CORP FLS $ 5,339.32 0.02% 1.89% 19.47% 21.54% 0.0046%
FMC CORP FMC $ 12,088.80 0.05% 0.89% 14.17% 15.12% 0.0073%
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FOX-A FOXA $ 82,655.19 0.33% 0.83% 10.60% 11.48% 0.0381%
FEDERAL REALTY INVS TRUST FRT $ 8,761.68 0.04% 3.40% 4.20% 7.67% 0.0027%
TECHNIPFMC PLC FTI $ 14,331.85 0.06% 1.69% 8.47% 10.23% 0.0059%
FORTIVE CORP FTV $ 28,257.82 0.11% 0.36% 13.04% 13.42% 0.0152%
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP GD $ 58,159.15 0.23% 1.87% 11.45% 13.42% 0.0313%
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO GE $ 115,515.00 0.46% 3.73% 4.03% 7.84% 0.0363%
GGP INC GGP $ 19,800.38 0.08% 4.52% 1.10% 5.64% 0.0045%
GILEAD SCIENCES INC GILD $ 91,317.32 0.37% 3.22% -5.21% -2.07% -0.0076%
GENERAL MILLS INC GIS $ 26,934.99 0.11% 4.33% 7.33% 11.82% 0.0128%
CORNING INC GLW $ 24,154.85 0.10% 2.48% 4.96% 7.50% 0.0073%
GENERAL MOTORS CO GM $ 61,888.59 0.25% 3.47% 11.05% 14.71% 0.0365%
ALPHABET INC-CL A GOOGL $ 802,558.86 3.22% 0.00% 18.96% 18.96% 0.6107%
GENUINE PARTS CO GPC $ 13,950.36 0.06% 3.01% -2.49% 0.48% 0.0003%
GLOBAL PAYMENTS INC GPN $ 18,746.52 0.08% 0.03% 22.03% 22.07% 0.0166%
GAP INC/THE GPS $ 12,255.66 0.05% 3.07% 9.25% 12.46% 0.0061%
GARMIN LTD GRMN $ 11,545.09 0.05% 3.43% 5.90% 9.43% 0.0044%
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC GS $ 90,986.74 0.37% 1.38% 16.05% 17.54% 0.0641%
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO GT $ 6,012.51 N/A 2.15% N/A N/A N/A
WW GRAINGER INC GWW $ 17,904.22 0.07% 1.71% 14.70% 16.53% 0.0119%
HALLIBURTON CO HAL $ 40,820.50 0.16% 1.57% 67.55% 69.65% 0.1141%
HASBRO INC HAS $ 11,684.93 0.05% 2.75% 8.17% 11.03% 0.0052%
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INC HBAN $ 16,890.53 0.07% 3.05% 13.77% 17.03% 0.0115%
HANESBRANDS INC HBI $ 7,315.52 0.03% 2.96% 5.87% 8.91% 0.0026%
HCA HEALTHCARE INC HCA $ 37,203.86 0.15% 1.31% 12.58% 13.97% 0.0209%
HCP INC HCP $ 11,284.48 0.05% 6.19% -0.37% 5.81% 0.0026%
HOME DEPOT INC HD $ 231,331.64 0.93% 2.03% 13.25% 15.41% 0.1431%
HESS CORP HES $ 18,018.78 0.07% 1.72% -7.90% -6.25% -0.0045%
HARTFORD FINANCIAL SVCS GRP HIG $ 19,253.56 0.08% 1.93% 9.50% 11.53% 0.0089%
HUNTINGTON INGALLS INDUSTRIE HII $ 9,813.25 0.04% 1.29% 27.50% 28.97% 0.0114%
HILTON WORLDWIDE HOLDINGS IN HLT $ 25,186.95 0.10% 0.72% 11.23% 12.00% 0.0121%
HARLEY-DAVIDSON INC HOG $ 7,646.10 0.03% 3.23% 8.95% 12.32% 0.0038%
HOLOGIC INC HOLX $ 11,037.83 0.04% 0.00% 9.51% 9.51% 0.0042%
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC HON $ 112,211.27 0.45% 2.03% 10.68% 12.82% 0.0578%
HELMERICH & PAYNE HP $ 6,882.41 0.03% 4.43% 122.99% 130.15% 0.0360%
HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE HPE $ 24,147.68 0.10% 2.37% -4.05% -1.73% -0.0017%
HP INC HPQ $ 37,991.99 0.15% 2.37% 7.75% 10.21% 0.0156%
H&R BLOCK INC HRB $ 4,950.98 0.02% 4.27% 11.00% 15.50% 0.0031%
HORMEL FOODS CORP HRL $ 19,331.67 0.08% 2.05% 8.05% 10.19% 0.0079%
HARRIS CORP HRS $ 17,717.92 N/A 1.53% N/A N/A N/A
Exhibit RBH-1
Page 4 of 14
HENRY SCHEIN INC HSIC $ 11,288.49 0.05% 0.00% 8.34% 8.34% 0.0038%
HOST HOTELS & RESORTS INC HST $ 15,783.06 0.06% 3.90% 3.98% 7.95% 0.0050%
HERSHEY CO/THE HSY $ 19,671.09 0.08% 2.91% 8.10% 11.13% 0.0088%
HUMANA INC HUM $ 42,261.54 0.17% 0.65% 13.13% 13.83% 0.0235%
INTL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP IBM $ 133,463.41 0.54% 4.26% 1.97% 6.26% 0.0336%
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE IN ICE $ 43,071.40 0.17% 1.29% 10.43% 11.79% 0.0204%
IDEXX LABORATORIES INC IDXX $ 19,796.13 0.08% 0.00% 16.91% 16.91% 0.0134%
INTL FLAVORS & FRAGRANCES IFF $ 9,962.21 0.04% 2.21% 6.20% 8.48% 0.0034%
ILLUMINA INC ILMN $ 42,446.25 0.17% 0.00% 16.22% 16.22% 0.0276%
INCYTE CORP INCY $ 15,677.24 0.06% 0.00% 58.81% 58.81% 0.0370%
IHS MARKIT LTD INFO $ 20,315.11 0.08% 0.00% 12.33% 12.33% 0.0101%
INTEL CORP INTC $ 256,812.60 1.03% 2.05% 8.98% 11.12% 0.1146%
INTUIT INC INTU $ 53,616.69 0.22% 0.74% 16.29% 17.09% 0.0368%
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO IP $ 22,953.09 0.09% 3.51% 8.67% 12.33% 0.0114%
INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COS INC IPG $ 9,086.70 0.04% 3.59% 4.96% 8.63% 0.0031%
IPG PHOTONICS CORP IPGP $ 12,939.30 0.05% 0.00% 12.00% 12.00% 0.0062%
IQVIA HOLDINGS INC IQV $ 20,895.00 0.08% 0.00% 15.73% 15.73% 0.0132%
INGERSOLL-RAND PLC IR $ 22,847.51 0.09% 2.00% 10.92% 13.02% 0.0119%
IRON MOUNTAIN INC IRM $ 9,509.83 0.04% 6.83% 9.00% 16.14% 0.0062%
INTUITIVE SURGICAL INC ISRG $ 55,570.11 0.22% 0.00% 11.75% 11.75% 0.0262%
GARTNER INC IT $ 12,585.67 0.05% 0.00% 15.00% 15.00% 0.0076%
ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS ITW $ 50,357.06 0.20% 2.36% 10.16% 12.64% 0.0255%
INVESCO LTD IVZ $ 11,300.08 0.05% 4.35% 8.97% 13.52% 0.0061%
HUNT (JB) TRANSPRT SVCS INC JBHT $ 14,294.57 0.06% 0.72% 12.72% 13.48% 0.0077%
JOHNSON CONTROLS INTERNATION JCI $ 32,454.20 0.13% 3.03% 10.47% 13.66% 0.0178%
JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP INC JEC $ 9,152.67 0.04% 0.92% 19.36% 20.36% 0.0075%
JEFFERIES FINANCIAL GROUP IN JEF $ 7,655.70 0.03% 1.80% 18.00% 19.96% 0.0061%
JOHNSON & JOHNSON JNJ $ 328,858.41 1.32% 2.96% 7.39% 10.46% 0.1381%
JUNIPER NETWORKS INC JNPR $ 9,528.37 0.04% 2.43% 8.68% 11.21% 0.0043%
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO JPM $ 367,375.43 1.47% 2.28% 9.80% 12.19% 0.1798%
NORDSTROM INC JWN $ 8,451.44 0.03% 2.98% 8.55% 11.66% 0.0040%
KELLOGG CO K $ 23,259.65 0.09% 3.31% 8.07% 11.51% 0.0107%
KEYCORP KEY $ 21,647.32 0.09% 2.54% 16.47% 19.22% 0.0167%
KRAFT HEINZ CO/THE KHC $ 75,113.20 0.30% 4.13% 6.90% 11.17% 0.0337%
KIMCO REALTY CORP KIM $ 7,006.56 0.03% 6.86% 2.94% 9.90% 0.0028%
KLA-TENCOR CORP KLAC $ 17,558.47 0.07% 2.22% 11.16% 13.50% 0.0095%
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP KMB $ 36,134.60 0.15% 3.87% 14.07% 18.21% 0.0264%
KINDER MORGAN INC KMI $ 36,995.82 0.15% 4.71% 88.15% 94.94% 0.1410%
CARMAX INC KMX $ 12,890.48 0.05% 0.00% 12.90% 12.90% 0.0067%
COCA-COLA CO/THE KO $ 187,742.19 0.75% 3.47% 8.39% 12.01% 0.0905%
MICHAEL KORS HOLDINGS LTD KORS $ 10,120.71 0.04% 0.00% 7.83% 7.83% 0.0032%
KROGER CO KR $ 20,807.26 0.08% 2.06% 5.57% 7.69% 0.0064%
KOHLS CORP KSS $ 12,365.13 0.05% 3.38% 6.73% 10.23% 0.0051%
KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN KSU $ 11,296.32 0.05% 1.34% 8.70% 10.10% 0.0046%
LOEWS CORP L $ 15,930.99 N/A 0.50% N/A N/A N/A
L BRANDS INC LB $ 10,087.46 0.04% 6.60% 9.95% 16.88% 0.0068%
LEGGETT & PLATT INC LEG $ 5,817.86 0.02% 3.32% 10.00% 13.48% 0.0031%
LENNAR CORP-A LEN $ 16,805.13 0.07% 0.30% 20.99% 21.32% 0.0144%
LABORATORY CRP OF AMER HLDGS LH $ 19,376.64 0.08% 0.00% 9.15% 9.15% 0.0071%
LKQ CORP LKQ $ 10,359.82 0.04% 0.00% 13.15% 13.15% 0.0055%
L3 TECHNOLOGIES INC LLL $ 15,498.10 0.06% 1.66% 11.07% 12.82% 0.0080%
ELI LILLY & CO LLY $ 94,758.42 0.38% 2.62% 10.57% 13.33% 0.0507%
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP LMT $ 88,554.11 0.36% 2.65% 22.09% 25.04% 0.0890%
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP LNC $ 14,694.92 0.06% 1.99% 8.00% 10.07% 0.0059%
ALLIANT ENERGY CORP LNT $ 9,250.01 0.04% 3.35% 5.92% 9.37% 0.0035%
LOWE'S COS INC LOW $ 80,946.15 0.32% 1.84% 15.34% 17.32% 0.0563%
LAM RESEARCH CORP LRCX $ 29,267.31 0.12% 1.37% 11.95% 13.40% 0.0157%
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO LUV $ 30,254.13 0.12% 1.11% 11.62% 12.80% 0.0155%
LYONDELLBASELL INDU-CL A LYB $ 45,213.43 0.18% 3.48% 7.73% 11.34% 0.0206%
MACY'S INC M $ 11,724.81 0.05% 4.20% -0.07% 4.14% 0.0019%
MASTERCARD INC - A MA $ 208,303.54 0.84% 0.50% 21.41% 21.97% 0.1837%
MID-AMERICA APARTMENT COMM MAA $ 10,980.87 0.04% 3.85% 7.00% 10.99% 0.0048%
MACERICH CO/THE MAC $ 7,884.30 0.03% 5.35% 4.95% 10.43% 0.0033%
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL -CL A MAR $ 49,056.33 0.20% 1.10% 17.58% 18.78% 0.0370%
MASCO CORP MAS $ 11,873.17 0.05% 1.12% 15.84% 17.04% 0.0081%
MATTEL INC MAT $ 6,082.21 0.02% 0.00% 9.73% 9.73% 0.0024%
MCDONALD'S CORP MCD $ 130,700.63 0.52% 2.47% 8.77% 11.35% 0.0595%
MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY INC MCHP $ 23,969.04 0.10% 1.43% 11.79% 13.30% 0.0128%
MCKESSON CORP MCK $ 30,266.38 0.12% 0.87% 6.35% 7.24% 0.0088%
MOODY'S CORP MCO $ 33,927.92 0.14% 1.01% 8.00% 9.05% 0.0123%
MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL INC-A MDLZ $ 60,212.28 0.24% 2.28% 10.73% 13.14% 0.0318%
MEDTRONIC PLC MDT $ 117,519.05 0.47% 2.22% 7.07% 9.37% 0.0442%
METLIFE INC MET $ 47,075.54 0.19% 3.62% 11.42% 15.25% 0.0288%
MGM RESORTS INTERNATIONAL MGM $ 17,388.43 0.07% 1.54% 8.64% 10.24% 0.0072%
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES INC MHK $ 15,890.27 0.06% 0.00% 8.58% 8.58% 0.0055%
MCCORMICK & CO-NON VTG SHRS MKC $ 13,953.61 0.06% 1.97% 8.30% 10.35% 0.0058%
MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS MLM $ 14,402.09 0.06% 0.78% 13.36% 14.19% 0.0082%
MARSH & MCLENNAN COS MMC $ 41,853.99 0.17% 1.92% 12.77% 14.81% 0.0249%
3M CO MMM $ 121,689.11 0.49% 2.65% 8.70% 11.47% 0.0560%
MONSTER BEVERAGE CORP MNST $ 31,752.14 0.13% 0.00% 16.30% 16.30% 0.0208%
ALTRIA GROUP INC MO $ 109,376.15 0.44% 5.10% 4.87% 10.09% 0.0443%
MOSAIC CO/THE MOS $ 11,169.37 0.04% 0.35% 7.00% 7.36% 0.0033%
Exhibit RBH-1
Page 5 of 14
MARATHON PETROLEUM CORP MPC $ 33,975.80 0.14% 2.51% 6.87% 9.46% 0.0129%
MERCK & CO. INC. MRK $ 166,879.55 0.67% 3.12% 7.14% 10.37% 0.0695%
MARATHON OIL CORP MRO $ 17,055.35 0.07% 1.01% 5.00% 6.03% 0.0041%
MORGAN STANLEY MS $ 90,566.52 0.36% 2.17% 14.35% 16.67% 0.0606%
MSCI INC MSCI $ 15,526.24 0.06% 0.97% 10.00% 11.02% 0.0069%
MICROSOFT CORP MSFT $ 769,318.57 3.09% 1.68% 11.41% 13.19% 0.4072%
MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS INC MSI $ 18,567.73 0.07% 1.83% 4.07% 5.94% 0.0044%
M & T BANK CORP MTB $ 25,378.47 0.10% 1.92% 13.84% 15.90% 0.0162%
METTLER-TOLEDO INTERNATIONAL MTD $ 14,956.40 0.06% 0.00% 11.95% 11.95% 0.0072%
MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC MU $ 67,533.09 0.27% 0.00% 7.50% 7.50% 0.0203%
MYLAN NV MYL $ 20,103.33 0.08% 0.00% 6.37% 6.37% 0.0051%
NOBLE ENERGY INC NBL $ 16,393.47 0.07% 1.22% 12.50% 13.80% 0.0091%
NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDIN NCLH $ 12,346.69 0.05% 0.24% 19.90% 20.16% 0.0100%
NASDAQ INC NDAQ $ 15,848.39 0.06% 1.82% 10.79% 12.70% 0.0081%
NEXTERA ENERGY INC NEE $ 75,212.98 0.30% 2.79% 8.57% 11.47% 0.0346%
NEWMONT MINING CORP NEM $ 20,485.88 0.08% 1.46% -3.00% -1.56% -0.0013%
NETFLIX INC NFLX $ 170,390.79 0.68% 0.00% 47.27% 47.27% 0.3233%
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION CO NFX $ 5,568.37 0.02% 0.00% 13.72% 13.72% 0.0031%
NISOURCE INC NI $ 8,800.53 0.04% 3.19% 5.86% 9.14% 0.0032%
NIKE INC -CL B NKE $ 122,235.83 0.49% 1.02% 12.18% 13.26% 0.0651%
NEKTAR THERAPEUTICS NKTR $ 9,917.35 N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
NIELSEN HOLDINGS PLC NLSN $ 11,181.92 0.04% 4.47% 12.00% 16.74% 0.0075%
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP NOC $ 56,068.00 0.23% 1.45% 14.77% 16.33% 0.0367%
NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO INC NOV $ 15,846.30 0.06% 0.48% 77.95% 78.62% 0.0500%
NRG ENERGY INC NRG $ 10,510.90 0.04% 0.36% 19.82% 20.22% 0.0085%
NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORP NSC $ 43,697.93 0.18% 1.86% 14.38% 16.37% 0.0287%
NETAPP INC NTAP $ 20,817.59 0.08% 1.97% 10.17% 12.24% 0.0102%
NORTHERN TRUST CORP NTRS $ 24,049.29 0.10% 1.72% 13.84% 15.69% 0.0151%
NUCOR CORP NUE $ 21,264.76 0.09% 2.27% 6.45% 8.80% 0.0075%
NVIDIA CORP NVDA $ 161,012.82 0.65% 0.23% 10.40% 10.64% 0.0688%
NEWELL BRANDS INC NWL $ 12,652.49 0.05% 3.53% 5.30% 8.93% 0.0045%
NEWS CORP - CLASS A NWSA $ 9,368.61 0.04% 1.44% 12.95% 14.48% 0.0054%
REALTY INCOME CORP O $ 15,063.99 0.06% 4.94% 4.39% 9.43% 0.0057%
ONEOK INC OKE $ 27,862.74 0.11% 4.76% 25.16% 30.51% 0.0341%
OMNICOM GROUP OMC $ 17,142.18 0.07% 3.23% 5.67% 8.99% 0.0062%
ORACLE CORP ORCL $ 188,929.45 0.76% 1.63% 8.50% 10.20% 0.0773%
O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE INC ORLY $ 23,175.29 0.09% 0.00% 14.72% 14.72% 0.0137%
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP OXY $ 63,811.63 0.26% 3.71% 11.55% 15.48% 0.0396%
PAYCHEX INC PAYX $ 25,071.95 0.10% 2.85% 8.50% 11.47% 0.0115%
PEOPLE'S UNITED FINANCIAL PBCT $ 6,515.75 0.03% 3.71% 2.00% 5.74% 0.0015%
PACCAR INC PCAR $ 22,515.96 0.09% 3.78% 6.80% 10.71% 0.0097%
P G & E CORP PCG $ 20,760.39 0.08% 4.51% 5.25% 9.88% 0.0082%
PUBLIC SERVICE ENTERPRISE GP PEG $ 26,539.07 0.11% 3.43% 6.62% 10.15% 0.0108%
PEPSICO INC PEP $ 152,574.71 0.61% 3.37% 6.92% 10.40% 0.0637%
PFIZER INC PFE $ 212,690.40 0.85% 3.74% 7.37% 11.25% 0.0960%
PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GROUP PFG $ 16,152.18 0.06% 3.72% 9.39% 13.28% 0.0086%
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO/THE PG $ 194,579.71 0.78% 3.64% 7.30% 11.07% 0.0865%
PROGRESSIVE CORP PGR $ 36,324.70 0.15% 2.10% 8.00% 10.18% 0.0148%
PARKER HANNIFIN CORP PH $ 22,725.43 0.09% 1.60% 9.59% 11.27% 0.0103%
PULTEGROUP INC PHM $ 8,671.39 0.03% 1.21% 21.25% 22.58% 0.0079%
PACKAGING CORP OF AMERICA PKG $ 11,230.09 0.05% 2.28% 8.00% 10.38% 0.0047%
PERKINELMER INC PKI $ 8,611.78 0.03% 0.36% 15.34% 15.73% 0.0054%
PROLOGIS INC PLD $ 34,033.29 0.14% 2.98% 6.47% 9.54% 0.0130%
PHILIP MORRIS INTERNATIONAL PM $ 127,280.31 0.51% 5.37% 10.87% 16.52% 0.0844%
PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP PNC $ 67,593.74 0.27% 2.37% 11.11% 13.62% 0.0369%
PENTAIR PLC PNR $ 7,824.03 0.03% 1.91% 10.55% 12.56% 0.0039%
PINNACLE WEST CAPITAL PNW $ 8,519.23 0.03% 3.70% 4.49% 8.27% 0.0028%
PPG INDUSTRIES INC PPG $ 26,273.63 0.11% 1.74% 8.73% 10.55% 0.0111%
PPL CORP PPL $ 18,930.42 0.08% 6.05% 5.40% 11.62% 0.0088%
PERRIGO CO PLC PRGO $ 10,399.89 0.04% 0.93% 6.52% 7.48% 0.0031%
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC PRU $ 41,395.20 0.17% 3.65% 8.50% 12.31% 0.0205%
PUBLIC STORAGE PSA $ 37,288.57 0.15% 3.79% 5.46% 9.35% 0.0140%
PHILLIPS 66 PSX $ 53,245.16 0.21% 2.62% 10.00% 12.75% 0.0273%
PVH CORP PVH $ 12,442.41 0.05% 0.09% 10.56% 10.66% 0.0053%
QUANTA SERVICES INC PWR $ 5,343.39 N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
PRAXAIR INC PX $ 46,053.83 0.18% 2.07% 13.97% 16.18% 0.0299%
PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES CO PXD $ 31,392.74 0.13% 0.14% 15.00% 15.15% 0.0191%
PAYPAL HOLDINGS INC PYPL $ 101,295.97 0.41% 0.00% 18.63% 18.63% 0.0758%
QUALCOMM INC QCOM $ 88,749.77 0.36% 3.97% 5.67% 9.76% 0.0348%
QORVO INC QRVO $ 10,766.88 0.04% 0.00% 12.39% 12.39% 0.0054%
ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD RCL $ 24,247.12 0.10% 2.13% 15.52% 17.82% 0.0173%
EVEREST RE GROUP LTD RE $ 9,286.18 0.04% 2.32% 10.00% 12.43% 0.0046%
REGENCY CENTERS CORP REG $ 10,125.40 0.04% 3.74% 8.48% 12.39% 0.0050%
REGENERON PHARMACEUTICALS REGN $ 34,008.63 0.14% 0.00% 14.66% 14.66% 0.0200%
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP RF $ 20,879.34 0.08% 2.33% 16.09% 18.61% 0.0156%
ROBERT HALF INTL INC RHI $ 8,641.97 0.03% 1.54% 16.20% 17.87% 0.0062%
RED HAT INC RHT $ 31,090.99 0.12% 0.00% 17.36% 17.36% 0.0217%
RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL INC RJF $ 14,240.49 0.06% 1.06% 17.00% 18.15% 0.0104%
RALPH LAUREN CORP RL $ 11,394.00 0.05% 1.69% 5.45% 7.18% 0.0033%
RESMED INC RMD $ 15,101.72 0.06% 1.31% 16.10% 17.51% 0.0106%
ROCKWELL AUTOMATION INC ROK $ 22,310.61 0.09% 1.91% 11.49% 13.51% 0.0121%
ROPER TECHNOLOGIES INC ROP $ 29,297.54 0.12% 0.57% 13.27% 13.87% 0.0163%
Exhibit RBH-1
Page 6 of 14
ROSS STORES INC ROST $ 32,058.66 0.13% 1.02% 13.12% 14.21% 0.0183%
RANGE RESOURCES CORP RRC $ 3,982.81 0.02% 0.50% 22.54% 23.09% 0.0037%
REPUBLIC SERVICES INC RSG $ 22,912.42 0.09% 1.99% 12.32% 14.43% 0.0133%
RAYTHEON COMPANY RTN $ 57,889.49 0.23% 1.70% 14.97% 16.80% 0.0390%
SBA COMMUNICATIONS CORP SBAC $ 17,988.59 0.07% 0.00% 27.15% 27.15% 0.0196%
STARBUCKS CORP SBUX $ 78,811.80 0.32% 2.15% 14.43% 16.73% 0.0529%
SCANA CORP SCG $ 5,332.23 0.02% 4.53% -2.10% 2.39% 0.0005%
SCHWAB (CHARLES) CORP SCHW $ 75,675.79 0.30% 0.71% 23.37% 24.16% 0.0734%
SEALED AIR CORP SEE $ 7,252.15 0.03% 1.45% 11.28% 12.81% 0.0037%
SHERWIN-WILLIAMS CO/THE SHW $ 37,615.66 0.15% 0.85% 12.25% 13.16% 0.0199%
SVB FINANCIAL GROUP SIVB $ 16,730.22 0.07% 0.00% 10.75% 10.75% 0.0072%
JM SMUCKER CO/THE SJM $ 12,010.84 0.05% 3.16% 5.70% 8.95% 0.0043%
SCHLUMBERGER LTD SLB $ 92,568.45 0.37% 2.99% 39.63% 43.21% 0.1606%
SL GREEN REALTY CORP SLG $ 8,927.99 0.04% 3.29% 3.62% 6.97% 0.0025%
SNAP-ON INC SNA $ 9,121.45 0.04% 2.14% 9.70% 11.95% 0.0044%
SYNOPSYS INC SNPS $ 13,495.92 N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
SOUTHERN CO/THE SO $ 44,987.50 0.18% 5.37% 4.38% 9.87% 0.0178%
SIMON PROPERTY GROUP INC SPG $ 50,939.11 0.20% 4.79% 6.21% 11.16% 0.0228%
S&P GLOBAL INC SPGI $ 52,441.28 0.21% 0.94% 11.70% 12.69% 0.0267%
STERICYCLE INC SRCL $ 5,484.60 0.02% 0.08% 8.87% 8.95% 0.0020%
SEMPRA ENERGY SRE $ 29,533.48 0.12% 3.20% 16.96% 20.43% 0.0242%
SUNTRUST BANKS INC STI $ 31,984.72 0.13% 2.54% 13.31% 16.02% 0.0206%
STATE STREET CORP STT $ 35,934.23 0.14% 1.85% 17.73% 19.74% 0.0285%
SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY STX $ 16,773.04 0.07% 4.32% 3.15% 7.54% 0.0051%
CONSTELLATION BRANDS INC-A STZ $ 44,399.73 0.18% 1.27% 11.41% 12.75% 0.0227%
STANLEY BLACK & DECKER INC SWK $ 21,904.26 0.09% 1.79% 11.50% 13.40% 0.0118%
SKYWORKS SOLUTIONS INC SWKS $ 18,699.07 0.08% 1.26% 11.41% 12.74% 0.0096%
SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL SYF $ 26,582.53 0.11% 1.93% 10.60% 12.63% 0.0135%
STRYKER CORP SYK $ 62,925.45 0.25% 1.07% 8.89% 10.01% 0.0253%
SYMANTEC CORP SYMC $ 13,213.91 0.05% 1.41% 8.52% 9.99% 0.0053%
SYSCO CORP SYY $ 34,848.91 0.14% 2.07% 11.85% 14.04% 0.0196%
AT&T INC T $ 242,856.90 0.97% 6.06% 5.00% 11.21% 0.1093%
MOLSON COORS BREWING CO -B TAP $ 14,668.88 0.06% 2.46% 5.32% 7.84% 0.0046%
TRANSDIGM GROUP INC TDG $ 17,821.62 0.07% 0.00% 11.80% 11.80% 0.0084%
TE CONNECTIVITY LTD TEL $ 34,663.76 0.14% 1.66% 8.99% 10.72% 0.0149%
TARGET CORP TGT $ 41,184.67 0.17% 3.42% 5.17% 8.68% 0.0143%
TIFFANY & CO TIF $ 16,930.36 0.07% 1.53% 12.34% 13.97% 0.0095%
TJX COMPANIES INC TJX $ 59,500.54 0.24% 1.67% 12.53% 14.29% 0.0341%
TORCHMARK CORP TMK $ 9,593.30 0.04% 0.76% 10.45% 11.24% 0.0043%
THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC TMO $ 86,821.37 0.35% 0.30% 11.50% 11.82% 0.0412%
TAPESTRY INC TPR $ 13,357.62 0.05% 2.94% 11.31% 14.42% 0.0077%
TRIPADVISOR INC TRIP $ 8,043.61 0.03% 0.00% 14.41% 14.41% 0.0047%
T ROWE PRICE GROUP INC TROW $ 30,192.12 0.12% 2.14% 12.57% 14.84% 0.0180%
TRAVELERS COS INC/THE TRV $ 34,963.70 0.14% 2.37% 16.58% 19.15% 0.0269%
TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY TSCO $ 9,080.54 0.04% 1.62% 13.29% 15.02% 0.0055%
TYSON FOODS INC-CL A TSN $ 28,688.86 0.12% 1.63% 8.50% 10.20% 0.0118%
TOTAL SYSTEM SERVICES INC TSS $ 15,760.37 0.06% 0.60% 14.57% 15.21% 0.0096%
TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWRE TTWO $ 13,898.27 0.06% 0.00% 10.00% 10.00% 0.0056%
TWITTER INC TWTR $ 34,472.13 0.14% 0.00% 30.68% 30.68% 0.0424%
TIME WARNER INC TWX $ 77,269.69 0.31% 1.64% 5.10% 6.78% 0.0210%
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC TXN $ 113,446.82 0.46% 2.19% 10.46% 12.76% 0.0581%
TEXTRON INC TXT $ 17,259.54 0.07% 0.12% 13.51% 13.64% 0.0095%
UNDER ARMOUR INC-CLASS A UAA $ 9,801.25 0.04% 0.00% 25.39% 25.39% 0.0100%
UNITED CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS UAL $ 20,487.15 0.08% 0.00% 20.48% 20.48% 0.0168%
UDR INC UDR $ 9,890.51 0.04% 3.49% 5.36% 8.95% 0.0036%
UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES-B UHS $ 10,902.08 0.04% 0.23% 9.44% 9.67% 0.0042%
ULTA BEAUTY INC ULTA $ 14,917.41 0.06% 0.00% 18.50% 18.50% 0.0111%
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC UNH $ 245,991.98 0.99% 1.23% 13.05% 14.36% 0.1418%
UNUM GROUP UNM $ 8,657.56 0.03% 2.47% 7.00% 9.56% 0.0033%
UNION PACIFIC CORP UNP $ 113,241.55 0.45% 1.98% 14.20% 16.32% 0.0742%
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE-CL B UPS $ 100,619.33 0.40% 3.07% 8.73% 11.93% 0.0482%
UNITED RENTALS INC URI $ 13,446.52 0.05% 0.00% 17.76% 17.76% 0.0096%
US BANCORP USB $ 84,389.59 0.34% 2.56% 8.03% 10.69% 0.0362%
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP UTX $ 101,535.55 0.41% 2.24% 10.59% 12.95% 0.0528%
VISA INC-CLASS A SHARES V $ 276,132.85 1.11% 0.61% 17.35% 18.01% 0.1997%
VARIAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC VAR $ 11,179.13 0.04% 0.00% 16.00% 16.00% 0.0072%
VF CORP VFC $ 33,473.45 0.13% 2.24% 8.06% 10.38% 0.0140%
VIACOM INC-CLASS B VIAB $ 12,058.09 0.05% 2.74% 4.17% 6.96% 0.0034%
VALERO ENERGY CORP VLO $ 49,645.28 0.20% 2.78% 26.80% 29.95% 0.0597%
VULCAN MATERIALS CO VMC $ 17,460.37 0.07% 0.82% 21.09% 22.00% 0.0154%
VORNADO REALTY TRUST VNO $ 13,695.98 0.05% 3.48% 7.45% 11.06% 0.0061%
VERISK ANALYTICS INC VRSK $ 18,161.99 0.07% 0.00% 12.84% 12.84% 0.0094%
VERISIGN INC VRSN $ 17,511.36 0.07% 0.00% 10.40% 10.40% 0.0073%
VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS INC VRTX $ 39,503.78 0.16% 0.00% 62.50% 62.50% 0.0991%
VENTAS INC VTR $ 19,322.82 0.08% 5.84% 1.83% 7.73% 0.0060%
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC VZ $ 198,578.95 0.80% 4.97% 2.31% 7.34% 0.0585%
WATERS CORP WAT $ 15,766.49 0.06% 0.00% 10.11% 10.11% 0.0064%
WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE INC WBA $ 65,251.59 0.26% 2.46% 10.73% 13.32% 0.0349%
WESTERN DIGITAL CORP WDC $ 24,118.91 0.10% 2.51% 14.08% 16.77% 0.0162%
WEC ENERGY GROUP INC WEC $ 19,121.65 0.08% 3.64% 3.00% 6.69% 0.0051%
WELLTOWER INC WELL $ 21,388.94 0.09% 6.06% 5.82% 12.05% 0.0103%
WELLS FARGO & CO WFC $ 267,910.60 1.08% 2.98% 10.66% 13.79% 0.1484%
Exhibit RBH-1
Page 7 of 14
WHIRLPOOL CORP WHR $ 10,763.61 0.04% 3.01% 9.98% 13.14% 0.0057%
WILLIS TOWERS WATSON PLC WLTW $ 20,419.37 0.08% 1.53% 10.00% 11.61% 0.0095%
WASTE MANAGEMENT INC WM $ 36,462.48 0.15% 2.19% 11.71% 14.03% 0.0205%
WILLIAMS COS INC WMB $ 22,074.33 0.09% 5.11% -12.20% -7.40% -0.0066%
WALMART INC WMT $ 246,985.68 0.99% 2.51% 6.21% 8.79% 0.0872%
WESTROCK CO WRK $ 15,338.39 0.06% 2.88% 8.00% 10.99% 0.0068%
WESTERN UNION CO WU $ 9,532.45 0.04% 3.64% 4.26% 7.97% 0.0031%
WEYERHAEUSER CO WY $ 27,971.67 0.11% 3.51% 9.25% 12.92% 0.0145%
WYNN RESORTS LTD WYNN $ 18,819.22 0.08% 1.69% 18.70% 20.55% 0.0155%
CIMAREX ENERGY CO XEC $ 8,117.28 0.03% 0.58% 74.20% 74.99% 0.0244%
XCEL ENERGY INC XEL $ 22,048.77 0.09% 3.51% 5.88% 9.50% 0.0084%
XL GROUP LTD XL $ 14,510.57 N/A 1.64% N/A N/A N/A
XILINX INC XLNX $ 17,794.03 0.07% 2.06% 10.20% 12.36% 0.0088%
EXXON MOBIL CORP XOM $ 341,501.09 1.37% 3.99% 13.05% 17.29% 0.2371%
DENTSPLY SIRONA INC XRAY $ 10,221.09 0.04% 0.80% 8.95% 9.78% 0.0040%
XEROX CORP XRX $ 6,980.76 N/A 3.61% N/A N/A N/A
XYLEM INC XYL $ 12,837.39 N/A 1.18% N/A N/A N/A
YUM! BRANDS INC YUM $ 26,704.20 0.11% 1.74% 12.40% 14.25% 0.0153%
ZIMMER BIOMET HOLDINGS INC ZBH $ 23,046.90 0.09% 0.87% 5.54% 6.43% 0.0060%
ZIONS BANCORPORATION ZION $ 10,896.52 0.04% 1.77% 10.23% 12.09% 0.0053%
ZOETIS INC ZTS $ 43,160.80 0.17% 0.56% 14.89% 15.49% 0.0268%
Total Market Capitalization: 24,910,989.71 15.73%
Notes:
[1] Equals sum of Col. [9]
[2] Source: Bloomberg Professional
[3] Equals [1] − [2]
[5] Equals weight in S&P 500 based on market capitalization
[8] Equals ([6] x (1 + (0.5 x [7]))) + [7]
[9] Equals Col. [5] x Col. [8]
Exhibit RBH-1
Page 8 of 14
Ex-Ante Market Risk Premium

Market DCF Method Based - Value Line
[1] [2] [3]

S&P 500 Current 30-Year
Est. Required Treasury (30-day Implied Market
Market Return average) Risk Premium
16.10% 3.11% 12.99%
[4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]

Market Estimated Long-Term Weighted
Company Ticker Capitalization Weight in Index Dividend Yield Growth Est. DCF Result DCF Result
AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES INC A $ 21,004.06 0.09% 0.92% 12.00% 12.98% 0.0122%

AMERICAN AIRLINES GROUP INC AAL $ 20,490.38 0.09% 0.91% 3.50% 4.43% 0.0041%
ADVANCE AUTO PARTS INC AAP $ 9,627.73 0.04% 0.19% 13.00% 13.20% 0.0057%
APPLE INC AAPL $ 956,327.30 4.29% 1.53% 13.00% 14.63% 0.6277%
ABBVIE INC ABBV $ 157,598.00 0.71% 3.87% 15.00% 19.16% 0.1355%
AMERISOURCEBERGEN CORP ABC $ 19,029.83 0.09% 1.76% 7.00% 8.82% 0.0075%
ABIOMED INC ABMD $ 17,957.61 0.08% 0.00% 23.00% 23.00% 0.0185%
ABBOTT LABORATORIES ABT $ 110,766.40 0.50% 1.77% 9.50% 11.35% 0.0564%
ACCENTURE PLC-CL A ACN $ 102,385.70 0.46% 1.81% 9.50% 11.40% 0.0523%
ADOBE SYSTEMS INC ADBE $ 121,992.70 0.55% 0.00% 25.50% 25.50% 0.1396%
ANALOG DEVICES INC ADI $ 37,816.66 0.17% 1.88% 13.00% 15.00% 0.0255%
ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND CO ADM $ 24,981.71 0.11% 3.00% 6.00% 9.09% 0.0102%
AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING ADP $ 59,443.98 0.27% 2.10% 11.00% 13.22% 0.0352%
ALLIANCE DATA SYSTEMS CORP ADS $ 12,241.63 0.05% 1.03% 13.00% 14.10% 0.0077%
AUTODESK INC ADSK $ 29,282.77 N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
AMEREN CORPORATION AEE $ 13,860.84 0.06% 3.30% 7.50% 10.92% 0.0068%
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER AEP $ 31,594.64 0.14% 4.01% 4.50% 8.60% 0.0122%
AES CORP AES $ 8,412.55 N/A 4.09% N/A N/A N/A
AETNA INC AET $ 58,792.95 0.26% 1.11% 10.00% 11.17% 0.0295%
AFLAC INC AFL $ 35,436.58 0.16% 2.32% 6.50% 8.90% 0.0141%
ALLERGAN PLC AGN $ 55,348.53 0.25% 1.76% 5.00% 6.80% 0.0169%
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP AIG $ 48,358.13 0.22% 2.38% 52.00% 55.00% 0.1193%
APARTMENT INVT & MGMT CO -A AIV $ - 0.00% 3.67% 4.50% 8.25% 0.0000%
ASSURANT INC AIZ $ 5,125.58 0.02% 2.30% 5.50% 7.86% 0.0018%
ARTHUR J GALLAGHER & CO AJG $ 12,244.41 0.05% 2.44% 17.00% 19.65% 0.0108%
AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES INC AKAM $ 13,350.50 0.06% 0.00% 17.00% 17.00% 0.0102%
ALBEMARLE CORP ALB $ 10,546.19 0.05% 1.41% 10.00% 11.48% 0.0054%
ALIGN TECHNOLOGY INC ALGN $ 27,194.46 0.12% 0.00% 27.50% 27.50% 0.0336%
ALASKA AIR GROUP INC ALK $ 7,668.67 0.03% 2.06% 4.50% 6.61% 0.0023%
ALLSTATE CORP ALL $ 32,806.40 0.15% 1.97% 12.00% 14.09% 0.0207%
ALLEGION PLC ALLE $ 7,616.18 0.03% 1.05% 9.50% 10.60% 0.0036%
ALEXION PHARMACEUTICALS INC ALXN $ 26,390.72 0.12% 0.00% 18.00% 18.00% 0.0213%
APPLIED MATERIALS INC AMAT $ 51,662.46 0.23% 1.56% 21.00% 22.72% 0.0527%
ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES AMD $ 14,428.41 N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
AMETEK INC AME $ 17,549.06 0.08% 0.74% 10.50% 11.28% 0.0089%
AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP AMG $ 8,968.73 0.04% 0.85% 6.50% 7.38% 0.0030%
AMGEN INC AMGN $ 122,151.10 0.55% 2.91% 8.00% 11.03% 0.0604%
AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC AMP $ 20,602.71 0.09% 2.53% 16.00% 18.73% 0.0173%
AMERICAN TOWER CORP AMT $ 61,019.73 0.27% 2.37% 11.50% 14.01% 0.0383%
AMAZON.COM INC AMZN $ 819,310.50 3.68% 0.00% 48.00% 48.00% 1.7644%
ANDEAVOR ANDV $ 21,880.87 0.10% 1.63% 5.50% 7.17% 0.0070%
ANSYS INC ANSS $ 14,341.80 0.06% 0.00% 10.50% 10.50% 0.0068%
ANTHEM INC ANTM $ 58,670.57 0.26% 1.31% 15.50% 16.91% 0.0445%
AON PLC AON $ 34,828.21 0.16% 1.13% 9.50% 10.68% 0.0167%
SMITH (A.O.) CORP AOS $ 10,910.30 0.05% 1.13% 13.00% 14.20% 0.0070%
APACHE CORP APA $ 15,954.64 N/A 2.40% N/A N/A N/A
ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP APC $ 36,104.43 N/A 1.40% N/A N/A N/A
AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS INC APD $ 36,763.22 0.16% 2.62% 8.00% 10.72% 0.0177%
AMPHENOL CORP-CL A APH $ 27,433.70 0.12% 1.01% 9.00% 10.06% 0.0124%
APTIV PLC APTV $ 26,650.84 0.12% 0.87% 11.00% 11.92% 0.0142%
ALEXANDRIA REAL ESTATE EQUIT ARE N/A N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
ARCONIC INC ARNC $ 8,666.84 N/A 1.34% N/A N/A N/A
ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC ATVI $ 56,266.19 0.25% 0.46% 13.50% 13.99% 0.0353%
AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES INC AVB $ - 0.00% 3.58% 7.00% 10.71% 0.0000%
BROADCOM INC AVGO $ 108,514.60 0.49% 2.65% 38.00% 41.15% 0.2004%
AVERY DENNISON CORP AVY $ 9,356.00 0.04% 1.99% 12.50% 14.61% 0.0061%
AMERICAN WATER WORKS CO INC AWK $ 14,113.23 0.06% 2.32% 8.50% 10.92% 0.0069%
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO AXP $ 87,272.80 0.39% 1.47% 8.50% 10.03% 0.0393%
ACUITY BRANDS INC AYI $ 4,951.98 0.02% 0.43% 13.00% 13.46% 0.0030%
AUTOZONE INC AZO $ 18,116.74 0.08% 0.00% 12.50% 12.50% 0.0102%
BOEING CO/THE BA $ 215,303.30 0.97% 2.01% 18.00% 20.19% 0.1950%
BANK OF AMERICA CORP BAC $ 306,193.10 1.37% 1.80% 13.00% 14.92% 0.2049%
BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC BAX $ 39,888.93 0.18% 1.02% 13.50% 14.59% 0.0261%
BB&T CORP BBT $ 42,434.10 0.19% 2.87% 9.00% 12.00% 0.0228%
BEST BUY CO INC BBY $ 21,211.36 0.10% 2.51% 10.50% 13.14% 0.0125%
BECTON DICKINSON AND CO BDX $ 61,400.35 0.28% 1.32% 10.00% 11.39% 0.0314%
FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC BEN $ 18,569.34 0.08% 2.86% 7.50% 10.47% 0.0087%
BROWN-FORMAN CORP-CLASS B BF/B $ 24,640.75 0.11% 1.37% 14.00% 15.47% 0.0171%
Exhibit RBH-1
Page 9 of 14
BRIGHTHOUSE FINANCIAL INC BHF N/A N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
BAKER HUGHES A GE CO BHGE $ 14,639.18 N/A 2.08% N/A N/A N/A
BIOGEN INC BIIB $ 64,435.51 0.29% 0.00% 7.50% 7.50% 0.0217%
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP BK $ 58,265.47 0.26% 1.67% 9.00% 10.75% 0.0281%
BOOKING HOLDINGS INC BKNG $ 102,863.80 0.46% 0.00% 14.00% 14.00% 0.0646%
BLACKROCK INC BLK $ 88,031.54 0.39% 2.10% 12.00% 14.23% 0.0562%
BALL CORP BLL $ 13,033.43 0.06% 1.07% 21.00% 22.18% 0.0130%
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO BMY $ 86,009.39 0.39% 3.04% 15.00% 18.27% 0.0705%
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC-CL B BRK/B $ - N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP BSX $ 42,809.67 0.19% 0.00% 16.00% 16.00% 0.0307%
BORGWARNER INC BWA $ 10,547.12 0.05% 1.36% 9.00% 10.42% 0.0049%
BOSTON PROPERTIES INC BXP $ - 0.00% 2.62% 3.50% 6.17% 0.0000%
CITIGROUP INC C $ 174,542.90 0.78% 1.94% 11.00% 13.05% 0.1022%
CA INC CA $ 14,975.08 0.07% 2.86% 7.00% 9.96% 0.0067%
CONAGRA BRANDS INC CAG $ 14,631.04 0.07% 2.34% 6.50% 8.92% 0.0059%
CARDINAL HEALTH INC CAH $ 16,467.45 0.07% 3.61% 11.00% 14.81% 0.0109%
CATERPILLAR INC CAT $ 93,446.58 0.42% 2.00% 17.50% 19.68% 0.0825%
CHUBB LTD CB $ 61,596.84 0.28% 2.21% 9.50% 11.81% 0.0327%
CBOE GLOBAL MARKETS INC CBOE $ 11,582.83 0.05% 1.05% 15.50% 16.63% 0.0086%
CBRE GROUP INC - A CBRE $ 16,246.22 0.07% 0.00% 11.50% 11.50% 0.0084%
CBS CORP-CLASS B NON VOTING CBS $ 19,434.81 0.09% 1.41% 10.50% 11.98% 0.0104%
CROWN CASTLE INTL CORP CCI $ 42,529.20 0.19% 4.39% 12.00% 16.65% 0.0318%
CARNIVAL CORP CCL $ 45,487.85 0.20% 3.26% 12.50% 15.96% 0.0326%
CADENCE DESIGN SYS INC CDNS $ 12,426.42 0.06% 0.00% 10.50% 10.50% 0.0059%
CELGENE CORP CELG $ 57,682.15 0.26% 0.00% 19.50% 19.50% 0.0505%
CERNER CORP CERN $ 19,987.21 0.09% 0.00% 9.00% 9.00% 0.0081%
CF INDUSTRIES HOLDINGS INC CF $ 10,008.77 0.04% 3.03% 47.00% 50.74% 0.0228%
CITIZENS FINANCIAL GROUP CFG $ 20,433.26 0.09% 2.15% 15.50% 17.82% 0.0163%
CHURCH & DWIGHT CO INC CHD $ 11,588.78 0.05% 1.84% 9.00% 10.92% 0.0057%
C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE INC CHRW $ 12,261.67 0.06% 2.09% 10.50% 12.70% 0.0070%
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS INC-A CHTR $ 66,059.84 0.30% 0.00% 19.50% 19.50% 0.0578%
CIGNA CORP CI $ 43,085.19 0.19% 0.02% 12.50% 12.52% 0.0242%
CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORP CINF $ 11,613.36 0.05% 3.00% 7.00% 10.11% 0.0053%
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO CL $ 54,746.87 0.25% 2.68% 11.00% 13.83% 0.0340%
CLOROX COMPANY CLX $ 16,127.86 0.07% 3.08% 8.00% 11.20% 0.0081%
COMERICA INC CMA $ 16,681.69 0.07% 1.41% 16.50% 18.03% 0.0135%
COMCAST CORP-CLASS A CMCSA $ 147,747.70 0.66% 2.38% 12.50% 15.03% 0.0996%
CME GROUP INC CME $ 58,295.08 0.26% 1.63% 4.50% 6.17% 0.0161%
CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL INC CMG $ 12,473.84 0.06% 0.00% 18.00% 18.00% 0.0101%
CUMMINS INC CMI $ 23,704.24 0.11% 3.00% 8.50% 11.63% 0.0124%
CMS ENERGY CORP CMS $ 12,254.85 0.05% 3.41% 7.00% 10.53% 0.0058%
CENTENE CORP CNC $ 21,070.43 0.09% 0.00% 11.50% 11.50% 0.0109%
CENTERPOINT ENERGY INC CNP $ 10,963.68 0.05% 4.45% 8.50% 13.14% 0.0065%
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP COF $ 47,013.65 0.21% 1.65% 5.50% 7.20% 0.0152%
CABOT OIL & GAS CORP COG $ 10,591.41 N/A 1.03% N/A N/A N/A
ROCKWELL COLLINS INC COL $ 22,833.65 0.10% 0.95% 12.50% 13.51% 0.0138%
COOPER COS INC/THE COO $ 11,098.50 0.05% 0.03% 16.50% 16.53% 0.0082%
CONOCOPHILLIPS COP $ 81,296.18 N/A 1.64% N/A N/A N/A
COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP COST $ 88,847.61 0.40% 1.13% 9.00% 10.18% 0.0406%
COTY INC-CL A COTY $ 10,064.21 0.05% 3.73% 7.00% 10.86% 0.0049%
CAMPBELL SOUP CO CPB $ 10,080.49 0.05% 4.18% 4.50% 8.77% 0.0040%
SALESFORCE.COM INC CRM $ 96,000.90 N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
CISCO SYSTEMS INC CSCO $ 206,639.10 0.93% 3.02% 7.50% 10.63% 0.0986%
CSX CORP CSX $ 57,554.53 0.26% 1.34% 17.50% 18.96% 0.0489%
CINTAS CORP CTAS $ 19,927.98 0.09% 0.95% 14.50% 15.52% 0.0139%
CENTURYLINK INC CTL $ 19,005.49 0.09% 12.26% 2.50% 14.91% 0.0127%
COGNIZANT TECH SOLUTIONS-A CTSH $ 44,957.92 0.20% 1.04% 11.50% 12.60% 0.0254%
CITRIX SYSTEMS INC CTXS $ 14,845.84 0.07% 0.00% 6.50% 6.50% 0.0043%
CVS HEALTH CORP CVS $ 66,060.32 0.30% 3.08% 9.00% 12.22% 0.0362%
CHEVRON CORP CVX $ 242,615.10 1.09% 3.53% 31.00% 35.08% 0.3818%
CONCHO RESOURCES INC CXO $ 19,429.91 0.09% 0.00% 33.00% 33.00% 0.0288%
DOMINION ENERGY INC D $ 40,740.67 0.18% 5.63% 6.50% 12.31% 0.0225%
DELTA AIR LINES INC DAL $ 37,554.47 0.17% 2.69% 10.50% 13.33% 0.0225%
DEERE & CO DE $ 51,447.81 0.23% 1.74% 15.50% 17.37% 0.0401%
DISCOVER FINANCIAL SERVICES DFS $ 26,545.96 0.12% 1.85% 8.00% 9.92% 0.0118%
DOLLAR GENERAL CORP DG $ 25,102.29 0.11% 1.24% 12.50% 13.82% 0.0156%
QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC DGX $ 14,633.60 0.07% 1.86% 9.50% 11.45% 0.0075%
DR HORTON INC DHI $ 16,017.28 0.07% 1.18% 12.00% 13.25% 0.0095%
DANAHER CORP DHR $ 71,596.25 0.32% 0.62% 10.50% 11.15% 0.0358%
WALT DISNEY CO/THE DIS $ 153,705.00 0.69% 1.64% 9.00% 10.71% 0.0739%
DISCOVERY INC - A DISCA $ 11,889.20 0.05% 0.00% 15.00% 15.00% 0.0080%
DISH NETWORK CORP-A DISH $ 14,937.57 0.07% 0.00% 1.00% 1.00% 0.0007%
DIGITAL REALTY TRUST INC DLR $ - 0.00% 3.82% 6.50% 10.44% 0.0000%
DOLLAR TREE INC DLTR $ 19,490.09 0.09% 0.00% 19.50% 19.50% 0.0171%
DOVER CORP DOV $ 12,208.73 0.05% 2.38% 10.50% 13.00% 0.0071%
DR PEPPER SNAPPLE GROUP INC DPS $ 21,664.13 0.10% 2.00% 7.00% 9.07% 0.0088%
DUKE REALTY CORP DRE $ - 0.00% 2.88% 1.00% 3.89% 0.0000%
DARDEN RESTAURANTS INC DRI $ 11,314.41 0.05% 2.78% 13.00% 15.96% 0.0081%
DTE ENERGY COMPANY DTE $ 17,611.11 0.08% 3.83% 7.00% 10.96% 0.0087%
DUKE ENERGY CORP DUK $ 51,509.48 0.23% 5.01% 5.50% 10.65% 0.0246%
DAVITA INC DVA $ 12,303.24 0.06% 0.00% 11.00% 11.00% 0.0061%
Exhibit RBH-1
Page 10 of 14
DEVON ENERGY CORP DVN $ 22,048.92 0.10% 0.76% 29.00% 29.87% 0.0295%
DOWDUPONT INC DWDP $ 161,093.00 N/A 2.31% N/A N/A N/A
DXC TECHNOLOGY CO DXC $ 24,100.67 0.11% 0.90% 17.00% 17.98% 0.0194%
ELECTRONIC ARTS INC EA $ 42,031.37 0.19% 0.00% 12.00% 12.00% 0.0226%
EBAY INC EBAY $ 40,733.15 0.18% 0.00% 12.50% 12.50% 0.0228%
ECOLAB INC ECL $ 42,083.49 0.19% 1.12% 9.00% 10.17% 0.0192%
CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC ED $ 22,637.69 0.10% 4.00% 3.00% 7.06% 0.0072%
EQUIFAX INC EFX $ 15,216.75 0.07% 1.23% 8.00% 9.28% 0.0063%
EDISON INTERNATIONAL EIX $ 19,457.43 0.09% 4.15% 4.50% 8.74% 0.0076%
ESTEE LAUDER COMPANIES-CL A EL $ 55,649.78 0.25% 1.08% 13.50% 14.65% 0.0366%
EASTMAN CHEMICAL CO EMN $ 15,447.37 0.07% 2.07% 8.50% 10.66% 0.0074%
EMERSON ELECTRIC CO EMR $ 46,335.72 0.21% 2.66% 11.50% 14.31% 0.0298%
EOG RESOURCES INC EOG $ 68,259.41 N/A 0.64% N/A N/A N/A
EQUINIX INC EQIX $ 31,578.20 0.14% 2.30% 26.00% 28.60% 0.0405%
EQUITY RESIDENTIAL EQR $ - 0.00% 3.37% -13.00% -9.85% 0.0000%
EQT CORP EQT $ 14,084.75 0.06% 0.23% 40.50% 40.78% 0.0258%
EVERSOURCE ENERGY ES $ 17,895.86 0.08% 3.83% 5.00% 8.93% 0.0072%
EXPRESS SCRIPTS HOLDING CO ESRX $ 43,896.85 0.20% 0.00% 14.50% 14.50% 0.0286%
ESSEX PROPERTY TRUST INC ESS $ - 0.00% 3.11% 5.00% 8.19% 0.0000%
E*TRADE FINANCIAL CORP ETFC $ 17,200.89 0.08% 0.00% 17.00% 17.00% 0.0131%
EATON CORP PLC ETN $ 35,132.68 0.16% 3.29% 9.00% 12.44% 0.0196%
ENTERGY CORP ETR $ 13,854.63 0.06% 4.72% 2.00% 6.77% 0.0042%
ENVISION HEALTHCARE CORP EVHC $ 5,203.88 N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
EVERGY INC EVRG N/A N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES CORP EW $ 29,779.50 0.13% 0.00% 15.00% 15.00% 0.0200%
EXELON CORP EXC $ 38,654.82 0.17% 3.61% 8.00% 11.75% 0.0204%
EXPEDITORS INTL WASH INC EXPD $ 13,263.09 0.06% 1.18% 9.00% 10.23% 0.0061%
EXPEDIA GROUP INC EXPE $ 18,148.36 0.08% 1.00% 21.00% 22.11% 0.0180%
EXTRA SPACE STORAGE INC EXR $ - 0.00% 3.52% 9.00% 12.68% 0.0000%
FORD MOTOR CO F $ 47,939.00 0.22% 4.99% 2.50% 7.55% 0.0162%
FASTENAL CO FAST $ 15,230.15 0.07% 2.80% 7.50% 10.41% 0.0071%
FACEBOOK INC-A FB $ 546,098.30 2.45% 0.00% 28.50% 28.50% 0.6983%
FORTUNE BRANDS HOME & SECURI FBHS $ 8,411.00 0.04% 1.39% 14.00% 15.49% 0.0058%
FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC FCX $ 25,980.57 N/A 1.12% N/A N/A N/A
FEDEX CORP FDX $ 68,741.06 0.31% 0.86% 11.00% 11.91% 0.0367%
FIRSTENERGY CORP FE $ 15,900.14 0.07% 4.32% 3.00% 7.38% 0.0053%
F5 NETWORKS INC FFIV $ 10,812.47 0.05% 0.00% 10.50% 10.50% 0.0051%
FIDELITY NATIONAL INFO SERV FIS $ 34,805.10 0.16% 1.21% 16.00% 17.31% 0.0270%
FISERV INC FISV $ 30,853.77 0.14% 0.00% 10.00% 10.00% 0.0138%
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP FITB $ 21,657.87 0.10% 2.28% 6.50% 8.85% 0.0086%
FOOT LOCKER INC FL $ 6,760.10 0.03% 2.39% 7.50% 9.98% 0.0030%
FLIR SYSTEMS INC FLIR $ 7,565.45 0.03% 1.18% 11.50% 12.75% 0.0043%
FLUOR CORP FLR $ 6,983.50 0.03% 1.69% 4.00% 5.72% 0.0018%
FLOWSERVE CORP FLS $ 5,496.20 0.02% 1.81% 2.00% 3.83% 0.0009%
FMC CORP FMC $ 11,943.50 0.05% 0.83% 19.00% 19.91% 0.0107%
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FOX-A FOXA $ 73,453.05 0.33% 0.91% 13.00% 13.97% 0.0460%
FEDERAL REALTY INVS TRUST FRT $ - 0.00% 3.34% 4.00% 7.41% 0.0000%
TECHNIPFMC PLC FTI N/A N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
FORTIVE CORP FTV $ 27,176.03 N/A 0.36% N/A N/A N/A
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP GD $ 60,253.14 0.27% 1.83% 9.00% 10.91% 0.0295%
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO GE $ 119,684.00 0.54% 3.48% 9.50% 13.15% 0.0706%
GGP INC GGP $ - 0.00% 4.66% -0.50% 4.15% 0.0000%
GILEAD SCIENCES INC GILD $ 93,469.99 0.42% 3.17% -1.00% 2.15% 0.0090%
GENERAL MILLS INC GIS $ 24,069.62 0.11% 4.64% 4.00% 8.73% 0.0094%
CORNING INC GLW $ 23,969.92 0.11% 2.50% 13.00% 15.66% 0.0168%
GENERAL MOTORS CO GM $ 62,020.35 0.28% 3.55% 3.50% 7.11% 0.0198%
ALPHABET INC-CL A GOOGL N/A N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
GENUINE PARTS CO GPC $ 13,855.00 0.06% 3.05% 9.00% 12.19% 0.0076%
GLOBAL PAYMENTS INC GPN $ 18,660.57 0.08% 0.03% 11.00% 11.03% 0.0092%
GAP INC/THE GPS $ 12,205.98 0.05% 3.08% 6.50% 9.68% 0.0053%
GARMIN LTD GRMN $ 11,580.84 0.05% 3.45% 7.00% 10.57% 0.0055%
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC GS $ 88,175.47 0.40% 1.37% 9.00% 10.43% 0.0413%
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO GT $ 6,069.60 0.03% 2.57% 12.50% 15.23% 0.0041%
WW GRAINGER INC GWW $ 17,497.47 0.08% 1.74% 8.50% 10.31% 0.0081%
HALLIBURTON CO HAL $ 42,813.75 N/A 1.47% N/A N/A N/A
HASBRO INC HAS $ 11,100.18 0.05% 2.84% 9.50% 12.47% 0.0062%
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INC HBAN $ 17,143.95 0.08% 2.96% 11.00% 14.12% 0.0109%
HANESBRANDS INC HBI $ 7,138.81 0.03% 3.43% 6.00% 9.53% 0.0031%
HCA HEALTHCARE INC HCA $ 36,966.06 0.17% 1.33% 12.50% 13.91% 0.0231%
HCP INC HCP $ - 0.00% 6.14% 8.00% 14.39% 0.0000%
HOME DEPOT INC HD $ 226,380.20 1.02% 2.10% 12.00% 14.23% 0.1445%
HESS CORP HES $ 19,201.07 N/A 1.60% N/A N/A N/A
HARTFORD FINANCIAL SVCS GRP HIG $ 18,826.62 0.08% 1.90% 13.00% 15.02% 0.0127%
HUNTINGTON INGALLS INDUSTRIE HII $ 9,925.73 0.04% 1.29% 12.50% 13.87% 0.0062%
HILTON WORLDWIDE HOLDINGS IN HLT $ 26,673.89 0.12% 0.71% 8.50% 9.24% 0.0111%
HARLEY-DAVIDSON INC HOG $ 7,081.90 0.03% 3.48% 9.00% 12.64% 0.0040%
HOLOGIC INC HOLX $ 10,443.15 0.05% 0.00% 22.00% 22.00% 0.0103%
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC HON $ 113,600.60 0.51% 1.96% 9.50% 11.55% 0.0589%
HELMERICH & PAYNE HP $ 7,252.30 0.03% 4.26% 56.50% 61.96% 0.0202%
HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE HPE $ 24,309.84 0.11% 2.83% -0.50% 2.32% 0.0025%
HP INC HPQ $ 37,939.05 0.17% 2.46% 5.50% 8.03% 0.0137%
Exhibit RBH-1
Page 11 of 14
H&R BLOCK INC HRB $ 6,051.90 0.03% 3.39% 10.50% 14.07% 0.0038%
HORMEL FOODS CORP HRL $ 19,063.67 0.09% 2.11% 9.50% 11.71% 0.0100%
HARRIS CORP HRS $ 18,136.24 0.08% 1.55% 11.50% 13.14% 0.0107%
HENRY SCHEIN INC HSIC $ 10,965.04 0.05% 0.00% 9.00% 9.00% 0.0044%
HOST HOTELS & RESORTS INC HST $ - 0.00% 3.62% -1.00% 2.60% 0.0000%
HERSHEY CO/THE HSY $ 19,066.96 0.09% 2.88% 7.50% 10.49% 0.0090%
HUMANA INC HUM $ 40,811.62 0.18% 0.68% 13.00% 13.72% 0.0251%
INTL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP IBM $ 133,435.80 0.60% 4.33% 1.00% 5.35% 0.0320%
INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE IN ICE $ 43,859.69 0.20% 1.27% 11.50% 12.84% 0.0253%
IDEXX LABORATORIES INC IDXX $ 18,968.83 0.09% 0.00% 17.00% 17.00% 0.0145%
INTL FLAVORS & FRAGRANCES IFF $ 9,961.28 0.04% 2.31% 8.50% 10.91% 0.0049%
ILLUMINA INC ILMN $ 41,264.37 0.19% 0.00% 16.00% 16.00% 0.0296%
INCYTE CORP INCY $ 14,624.51 N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
IHS MARKIT LTD INFO $ 20,453.77 0.09% 0.00% 18.50% 18.50% 0.0170%
INTEL CORP INTC $ 260,400.80 1.17% 2.15% 13.00% 15.29% 0.1786%
INTUIT INC INTU $ 52,920.96 0.24% 0.76% 14.50% 15.32% 0.0364%
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO IP $ 24,269.87 0.11% 3.24% 15.50% 18.99% 0.0207%
INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF COS INC IPG $ 8,863.11 0.04% 3.65% 9.50% 13.32% 0.0053%
IPG PHOTONICS CORP IPGP $ 13,354.06 0.06% 0.00% 13.50% 13.50% 0.0081%
IQVIA HOLDINGS INC IQV $ 21,428.41 0.10% 0.00% 14.50% 14.50% 0.0139%
INGERSOLL-RAND PLC IR $ 22,468.80 0.10% 1.99% 9.00% 11.08% 0.0112%
IRON MOUNTAIN INC IRM $ 9,950.12 0.04% 6.78% 12.50% 19.70% 0.0088%
INTUITIVE SURGICAL INC ISRG $ 54,989.02 0.25% 0.00% 17.50% 17.50% 0.0432%
GARTNER INC IT $ 12,529.66 0.06% 0.00% 13.50% 13.50% 0.0076%
ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS ITW $ 50,216.94 0.23% 2.11% 11.50% 13.73% 0.0309%
INVESCO LTD IVZ $ 11,402.78 0.05% 4.32% 7.50% 11.98% 0.0061%
HUNT (JB) TRANSPRT SVCS INC JBHT $ 13,968.26 0.06% 0.76% 13.00% 13.81% 0.0087%
JOHNSON CONTROLS INTERNATION JCI $ 32,361.57 0.15% 2.98% 3.00% 6.02% 0.0087%
JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP INC JEC $ 9,360.28 0.04% 0.91% 11.00% 11.96% 0.0050%
JEFFERIES FINANCIAL GROUP IN JEF $ 8,215.97 0.04% 1.74% 24.00% 25.95% 0.0096%
JOHNSON & JOHNSON JNJ $ 330,794.40 1.48% 2.92% 9.00% 12.05% 0.1789%
JUNIPER NETWORKS INC JNPR $ 9,573.07 0.04% 2.63% 4.50% 7.19% 0.0031%
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO JPM $ 377,249.30 1.69% 2.13% 9.50% 11.73% 0.1985%
NORDSTROM INC JWN $ 8,757.48 0.04% 2.84% 5.50% 8.42% 0.0033%
KELLOGG CO K $ 21,604.22 0.10% 3.57% 7.00% 10.69% 0.0104%
KEYCORP KEY $ 21,756.70 0.10% 2.35% 12.50% 15.00% 0.0146%
KRAFT HEINZ CO/THE KHC $ 70,472.73 0.32% 4.47% 9.50% 14.18% 0.0448%
KIMCO REALTY CORP KIM $ - 0.00% 7.00% -0.50% 6.48% 0.0000%
KLA-TENCOR CORP KLAC $ 18,070.24 0.08% 2.59% 15.50% 18.29% 0.0148%
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP KMB $ 35,568.68 0.16% 3.93% 9.50% 13.62% 0.0217%
KINDER MORGAN INC KMI $ 37,599.66 0.17% 4.69% 57.00% 63.03% 0.1063%
CARMAX INC KMX $ 13,263.22 0.06% 0.00% 11.50% 11.50% 0.0068%
COCA-COLA CO/THE KO $ 185,011.00 0.83% 3.59% 6.50% 10.21% 0.0847%
MICHAEL KORS HOLDINGS LTD KORS $ 9,651.95 0.04% 0.00% 5.00% 5.00% 0.0022%
KROGER CO KR $ 21,732.60 0.10% 2.40% 5.00% 7.46% 0.0073%
KOHLS CORP KSS $ 13,073.76 0.06% 3.14% 7.50% 10.76% 0.0063%
KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN KSU $ 11,067.57 0.05% 1.34% 12.50% 13.92% 0.0069%
LOEWS CORP L $ 16,161.71 0.07% 0.50% 16.50% 17.04% 0.0124%
L BRANDS INC LB $ 10,438.90 0.05% 6.53% 0.50% 7.05% 0.0033%
LEGGETT & PLATT INC LEG $ 5,648.55 0.03% 3.53% 9.00% 12.69% 0.0032%
LENNAR CORP-A LEN $ 17,078.87 0.08% 0.32% 12.00% 12.34% 0.0095%
LABORATORY CRP OF AMER HLDGS LH $ 18,782.31 0.08% 0.00% 9.50% 9.50% 0.0080%
LKQ CORP LKQ $ 10,084.68 0.05% 0.00% 11.00% 11.00% 0.0050%
L3 TECHNOLOGIES INC LLL $ 15,858.68 0.07% 1.58% 11.00% 12.67% 0.0090%
ELI LILLY & CO LLY $ 93,216.73 0.42% 2.62% 11.50% 14.27% 0.0597%
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP LMT $ 91,926.06 0.41% 2.61% 13.00% 15.78% 0.0651%
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP LNC $ 14,995.92 0.07% 1.98% 7.50% 9.55% 0.0064%
ALLIANT ENERGY CORP LNT $ 9,071.78 0.04% 3.42% 6.50% 10.03% 0.0041%
LOWE'S COS INC LOW $ 81,599.95 0.37% 1.93% 13.50% 15.56% 0.0570%
LAM RESEARCH CORP LRCX $ 30,987.00 0.14% 2.33% 19.50% 22.06% 0.0307%
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO LUV $ 29,361.22 0.13% 1.26% 11.50% 12.83% 0.0169%
LYONDELLBASELL INDU-CL A LYB $ 46,643.36 0.21% 3.37% 7.50% 11.00% 0.0230%
MACY'S INC M $ 12,319.18 0.06% 3.76% 5.00% 8.85% 0.0049%
MASTERCARD INC - A MA $ 209,117.90 0.94% 0.50% 15.00% 15.54% 0.1458%
MID-AMERICA APARTMENT COMM MAA $ - 0.00% 3.87% -2.50% 1.32% 0.0000%
MACERICH CO/THE MAC $ - 0.00% 5.32% 8.00% 13.53% 0.0000%
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL -CL A MAR $ 49,473.31 0.22% 1.18% 12.50% 13.75% 0.0305%
MASCO CORP MAS $ 11,861.08 0.05% 1.09% 16.00% 17.18% 0.0091%
MATTEL INC MAT $ 5,662.24 0.03% 0.00% 26.50% 26.50% 0.0067%
MCDONALD'S CORP MCD $ 133,075.70 0.60% 2.42% 10.00% 12.54% 0.0749%
MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY INC MCHP $ 23,954.34 0.11% 1.43% 13.50% 15.03% 0.0161%
MCKESSON CORP MCK $ 30,049.15 0.13% 0.93% 9.50% 10.47% 0.0141%
MOODY'S CORP MCO $ 34,115.88 0.15% 0.99% 13.00% 14.05% 0.0215%
MONDELEZ INTERNATIONAL INC-A MDLZ $ 58,513.51 0.26% 2.47% 9.50% 12.09% 0.0317%
MEDTRONIC PLC MDT $ 117,406.30 0.53% 2.22% 7.50% 9.80% 0.0516%
METLIFE INC MET $ 48,225.66 0.22% 3.57% 6.00% 9.68% 0.0209%
MGM RESORTS INTERNATIONAL MGM $ 17,454.71 0.08% 1.53% 25.00% 26.72% 0.0209%
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES INC MHK $ 15,500.63 0.07% 0.00% 10.00% 10.00% 0.0070%
MCCORMICK & CO-NON VTG SHRS MKC $ 13,263.42 0.06% 2.08% 9.50% 11.68% 0.0069%
MARTIN MARIETTA MATERIALS MLM $ 14,450.40 0.06% 0.77% 12.00% 12.82% 0.0083%
MARSH & MCLENNAN COS MMC $ 41,811.04 0.19% 2.02% 9.00% 11.11% 0.0208%
Exhibit RBH-1
Page 12 of 14
3M CO MMM $ 121,748.40 0.55% 2.65% 9.50% 12.28% 0.0671%
MONSTER BEVERAGE CORP MNST $ 29,722.42 0.13% 0.00% 14.50% 14.50% 0.0193%
ALTRIA GROUP INC MO $ 107,361.00 0.48% 4.94% 10.50% 15.70% 0.0756%
MOSAIC CO/THE MOS $ 11,292.69 0.05% 0.34% 10.00% 10.36% 0.0052%
MARATHON PETROLEUM CORP MPC $ 36,963.05 0.17% 2.53% 13.00% 15.69% 0.0260%
MERCK & CO. INC. MRK $ 166,906.90 0.75% 3.10% 5.50% 8.69% 0.0650%
MARATHON OIL CORP MRO $ 17,998.30 N/A 0.95% N/A N/A N/A
MORGAN STANLEY MS $ 92,492.92 0.41% 1.92% 11.00% 13.03% 0.0541%
MSCI INC MSCI $ 14,846.67 0.07% 1.09% 22.00% 23.21% 0.0155%
MICROSOFT CORP MSFT $ 775,767.30 3.48% 1.67% 12.00% 13.77% 0.4793%
MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS INC MSI $ 18,190.86 0.08% 1.99% 12.00% 14.11% 0.0115%
M & T BANK CORP MTB $ 26,081.78 0.12% 1.80% 12.00% 13.91% 0.0163%
METTLER-TOLEDO INTERNATIONAL MTD $ 14,997.61 0.07% 0.00% 11.00% 11.00% 0.0074%
MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC MU $ 69,051.54 0.31% 0.00% 24.00% 24.00% 0.0744%
MYLAN NV MYL $ 21,135.37 0.09% 0.00% 8.50% 8.50% 0.0081%
NOBLE ENERGY INC NBL $ 17,041.65 N/A 1.26% N/A N/A N/A
NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDIN NCLH $ 11,671.87 0.05% 0.00% 16.50% 16.50% 0.0086%
NASDAQ INC NDAQ $ 15,898.36 0.07% 1.85% 9.00% 10.93% 0.0078%
NEXTERA ENERGY INC NEE $ 73,654.98 0.33% 2.93% 8.50% 11.55% 0.0382%
NEWMONT MINING CORP NEM $ 20,581.89 0.09% 1.45% 8.50% 10.01% 0.0092%
NETFLIX INC NFLX $ 157,085.00 0.70% 0.00% 47.00% 47.00% 0.3312%
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION CO NFX $ 5,766.09 0.03% 0.00% 21.00% 21.00% 0.0054%
NISOURCE INC NI $ 7,953.81 0.04% 3.31% 18.00% 21.61% 0.0077%
NIKE INC -CL B NKE $ 121,036.40 0.54% 1.07% 14.00% 15.14% 0.0822%
NEKTAR THERAPEUTICS NKTR $ 8,601.22 N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
NIELSEN HOLDINGS PLC NLSN $ 11,025.16 0.05% 4.52% 7.50% 12.19% 0.0060%
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP NOC $ 58,953.32 0.26% 1.42% 8.50% 9.98% 0.0264%
NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO INC NOV $ 16,295.06 0.07% 0.47% 41.50% 42.07% 0.0308%
NRG ENERGY INC NRG $ 10,548.68 N/A 0.36% N/A N/A N/A
NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORP NSC $ 43,002.89 0.19% 1.89% 13.50% 15.52% 0.0299%
NETAPP INC NTAP $ 19,832.00 0.09% 1.08% 14.00% 15.16% 0.0135%
NORTHERN TRUST CORP NTRS $ 24,096.54 0.11% 1.57% 11.00% 12.66% 0.0137%
NUCOR CORP NUE $ 21,124.82 0.09% 2.29% 19.50% 22.01% 0.0209%
NVIDIA CORP NVDA $ 159,580.30 0.72% 0.23% 24.00% 24.26% 0.1737%
NEWELL BRANDS INC NWL $ 11,885.08 0.05% 3.76% 9.00% 12.93% 0.0069%
NEWS CORP - CLASS A NWSA $ 9,128.03 N/A 1.28% N/A N/A N/A
REALTY INCOME CORP O $ - 0.00% 5.01% 4.00% 9.11% 0.0000%
ONEOK INC OKE $ 28,179.12 0.13% 4.74% 20.50% 25.73% 0.0325%
OMNICOM GROUP OMC $ 16,705.81 0.07% 3.27% 7.00% 10.38% 0.0078%
ORACLE CORP ORCL $ 195,154.20 0.88% 1.59% 8.00% 9.65% 0.0845%
O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE INC ORLY $ 23,262.10 0.10% 0.00% 11.50% 11.50% 0.0120%
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP OXY $ 66,223.79 N/A 3.63% N/A N/A N/A
PAYCHEX INC PAYX $ 24,299.46 0.11% 3.31% 10.50% 13.98% 0.0152%
PEOPLE'S UNITED FINANCIAL PBCT $ 6,640.73 0.03% 3.66% 10.50% 14.35% 0.0043%
PACCAR INC PCAR $ 22,859.96 0.10% 3.52% 6.50% 10.13% 0.0104%
P G & E CORP PCG $ 21,501.89 0.10% 0.00% 7.50% 7.50% 0.0072%
PUBLIC SERVICE ENTERPRISE GP PEG $ 25,613.28 0.11% 3.58% 4.00% 7.65% 0.0088%
PEPSICO INC PEP $ 143,546.00 0.64% 3.67% 7.50% 11.31% 0.0728%
PFIZER INC PFE $ 213,450.80 0.96% 3.73% 13.00% 16.97% 0.1625%
PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GROUP PFG $ 16,295.33 0.07% 3.67% 5.00% 8.76% 0.0064%
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO/THE PG $ 190,506.00 0.85% 3.79% 9.00% 12.96% 0.1108%
PROGRESSIVE CORP PGR $ 36,464.06 0.16% 1.79% 15.50% 17.43% 0.0285%
PARKER HANNIFIN CORP PH $ 23,331.65 0.10% 1.73% 14.00% 15.85% 0.0166%
PULTEGROUP INC PHM $ 8,962.28 0.04% 1.18% 15.50% 16.77% 0.0067%
PACKAGING CORP OF AMERICA PKG $ 11,599.84 0.05% 2.57% 10.00% 12.70% 0.0066%
PERKINELMER INC PKI $ 8,638.32 0.04% 0.36% 12.50% 12.88% 0.0050%
PROLOGIS INC PLD $ - 0.00% 2.94% 1.00% 3.95% 0.0000%
PHILIP MORRIS INTERNATIONAL PM $ 120,300.10 0.54% 5.53% 8.50% 14.27% 0.0770%
PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP PNC $ 69,564.70 0.31% 2.03% 9.50% 11.63% 0.0363%
PENTAIR PLC PNR $ 7,998.83 0.04% 1.56% 12.00% 13.65% 0.0049%
PINNACLE WEST CAPITAL PNW $ 8,336.77 0.04% 3.84% 5.00% 8.94% 0.0033%
PPG INDUSTRIES INC PPG $ 25,893.53 0.12% 1.75% 7.50% 9.32% 0.0108%
PPL CORP PPL $ 17,859.98 0.08% 6.48% 2.00% 8.54% 0.0068%
PERRIGO CO PLC PRGO $ 10,227.44 0.05% 1.08% 3.50% 4.60% 0.0021%
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC PRU $ 41,992.74 0.19% 3.61% 6.00% 9.72% 0.0183%
PUBLIC STORAGE PSA $ - 0.00% 3.90% 7.00% 11.04% 0.0000%
PHILLIPS 66 PSX $ 54,707.90 0.25% 2.78% 8.00% 10.89% 0.0267%
PVH CORP PVH $ 12,742.86 0.06% 0.09% 11.00% 11.09% 0.0063%
QUANTA SERVICES INC PWR $ 5,556.14 0.02% 0.00% 17.50% 17.50% 0.0044%
PRAXAIR INC PX $ 45,912.94 0.21% 2.17% 10.00% 12.28% 0.0253%
PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES CO PXD $ 33,303.28 0.15% 0.16% 72.00% 72.22% 0.1079%
PAYPAL HOLDINGS INC PYPL $ 98,508.41 0.44% 0.00% 16.50% 16.50% 0.0729%
QUALCOMM INC QCOM $ 89,868.48 0.40% 4.09% 4.50% 8.68% 0.0350%
QORVO INC QRVO $ 10,249.37 0.05% 0.00% 21.00% 21.00% 0.0097%
ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD RCL $ 22,104.61 0.10% 2.30% 11.00% 13.43% 0.0133%
EVEREST RE GROUP LTD RE $ 9,428.45 0.04% 2.30% 5.50% 7.86% 0.0033%
REGENCY CENTERS CORP REG $ - 0.00% 3.75% 12.50% 16.48% 0.0000%
REGENERON PHARMACEUTICALS REGN $ 33,295.76 0.15% 0.00% 14.50% 14.50% 0.0217%
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP RF $ 21,453.14 0.10% 2.10% 13.00% 15.24% 0.0147%
ROBERT HALF INTL INC RHI $ 8,408.46 0.04% 1.68% 6.50% 8.23% 0.0031%
RED HAT INC RHT $ 29,936.52 0.13% 0.00% 20.50% 20.50% 0.0275%
Exhibit RBH-1
Page 13 of 14
RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL INC RJF $ 14,494.07 0.07% 1.21% 14.00% 15.29% 0.0099%
RALPH LAUREN CORP RL $ 11,208.02 0.05% 1.81% 3.00% 4.84% 0.0024%
RESMED INC RMD $ 15,115.90 0.07% 1.36% 11.00% 12.43% 0.0084%
ROCKWELL AUTOMATION INC ROK $ 22,434.87 0.10% 2.06% 8.50% 10.65% 0.0107%
ROPER TECHNOLOGIES INC ROP $ 29,329.42 0.13% 0.58% 10.00% 10.61% 0.0140%
ROSS STORES INC ROST $ 32,301.69 0.14% 1.06% 11.50% 12.62% 0.0183%
RANGE RESOURCES CORP RRC $ 4,049.86 0.02% 0.49% 38.00% 38.58% 0.0070%
REPUBLIC SERVICES INC RSG $ 22,384.23 0.10% 2.14% 13.50% 15.78% 0.0159%
RAYTHEON COMPANY RTN $ 61,033.42 0.27% 1.63% 11.00% 12.72% 0.0348%
SBA COMMUNICATIONS CORP SBAC $ 18,351.33 0.08% 0.00% 45.50% 45.50% 0.0375%
STARBUCKS CORP SBUX $ 78,990.34 0.35% 2.36% 15.00% 17.54% 0.0621%
SCANA CORP SCG $ 5,135.13 N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
SCHWAB (CHARLES) CORP SCHW $ 77,306.76 0.35% 0.70% 15.50% 16.25% 0.0564%
SEALED AIR CORP SEE $ 7,004.48 0.03% 1.48% 19.00% 20.62% 0.0065%
SHERWIN-WILLIAMS CO/THE SHW $ 36,958.16 0.17% 0.87% 12.00% 12.92% 0.0214%
SVB FINANCIAL GROUP SIVB $ 17,062.05 0.08% 0.00% 17.00% 17.00% 0.0130%
JM SMUCKER CO/THE SJM $ 11,450.88 0.05% 3.16% 7.50% 10.78% 0.0055%
SCHLUMBERGER LTD SLB $ 96,405.27 0.43% 2.87% 28.00% 31.27% 0.1353%
SL GREEN REALTY CORP SLG $ - 0.00% 3.37% 0.50% 3.88% 0.0000%
SNAP-ON INC SNA $ 8,850.89 0.04% 2.10% 8.50% 10.69% 0.0042%
SYNOPSYS INC SNPS $ 13,424.37 0.06% 0.00% 10.50% 10.50% 0.0063%
SOUTHERN CO/THE SO $ 43,681.97 0.20% 5.60% 3.00% 8.68% 0.0170%
SIMON PROPERTY GROUP INC SPG $ - 0.00% 4.89% 4.00% 8.99% 0.0000%
S&P GLOBAL INC SPGI $ 51,204.31 0.23% 1.02% 14.50% 15.59% 0.0358%
STERICYCLE INC SRCL $ 5,492.95 0.02% 0.00% 8.00% 8.00% 0.0020%
SEMPRA ENERGY SRE $ 26,600.64 0.12% 3.62% 8.50% 12.27% 0.0146%
SUNTRUST BANKS INC STI $ 33,034.57 0.15% 2.35% 9.50% 11.96% 0.0177%
STATE STREET CORP STT $ 36,851.30 0.17% 1.79% 10.00% 11.88% 0.0196%
SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY STX $ 15,852.45 0.07% 4.56% 5.00% 9.67% 0.0069%
CONSTELLATION BRANDS INC-A STZ $ 43,522.18 0.20% 1.43% 12.50% 14.02% 0.0274%
STANLEY BLACK & DECKER INC SWK $ 22,344.09 0.10% 1.74% 10.00% 11.83% 0.0119%
SKYWORKS SOLUTIONS INC SWKS $ 18,663.43 0.08% 1.25% 14.50% 15.84% 0.0133%
SYNCHRONY FINANCIAL SYF $ 27,027.92 0.12% 1.69% 10.50% 12.28% 0.0149%
STRYKER CORP SYK $ 66,576.61 0.30% 1.06% 14.50% 15.64% 0.0467%
SYMANTEC CORP SYMC $ 13,234.78 0.06% 1.41% 7.50% 8.96% 0.0053%
SYSCO CORP SYY $ 34,244.91 0.15% 2.19% 14.50% 16.85% 0.0259%
AT&T INC T $ 207,848.30 0.93% 5.98% 5.50% 11.64% 0.1086%
MOLSON COORS BREWING CO -B TAP $ 13,513.40 0.06% 2.95% 11.50% 14.62% 0.0089%
TRANSDIGM GROUP INC TDG $ 17,805.78 0.08% 0.00% 11.00% 11.00% 0.0088%
TE CONNECTIVITY LTD TEL $ 34,189.54 0.15% 1.81% 10.50% 12.41% 0.0190%
TARGET CORP TGT $ 41,754.05 0.19% 3.17% 6.50% 9.77% 0.0183%
TIFFANY & CO TIF $ 16,393.16 0.07% 1.67% 12.00% 13.77% 0.0101%
TJX COMPANIES INC TJX $ 59,081.68 0.27% 1.65% 12.50% 14.25% 0.0378%
TORCHMARK CORP TMK $ 9,749.99 0.04% 0.75% 10.00% 10.79% 0.0047%
THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC TMO $ 87,086.84 0.39% 0.31% 9.50% 9.82% 0.0384%
TAPESTRY INC TPR $ 13,189.88 0.06% 2.95% 13.50% 16.65% 0.0099%
TRIPADVISOR INC TRIP $ 7,736.40 0.03% 0.00% 7.00% 7.00% 0.0024%
T ROWE PRICE GROUP INC TROW $ 30,463.77 0.14% 2.26% 11.50% 13.89% 0.0190%
TRAVELERS COS INC/THE TRV $ 35,063.85 0.16% 2.37% 5.50% 7.94% 0.0125%
TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY TSCO $ 9,448.47 0.04% 1.62% 10.50% 12.21% 0.0052%
TYSON FOODS INC-CL A TSN $ 25,653.28 0.12% 1.79% 10.50% 12.38% 0.0143%
TOTAL SYSTEM SERVICES INC TSS $ 15,844.13 0.07% 0.60% 10.50% 11.13% 0.0079%
TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWRE TTWO $ 12,966.74 N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
TWITTER INC TWTR $ 29,855.87 N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
TIME WARNER INC TWX $ 74,579.34 0.33% 1.69% 9.00% 10.77% 0.0360%
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC TXN $ 115,096.60 0.52% 2.12% 9.50% 11.72% 0.0605%
TEXTRON INC TXT $ 17,577.01 0.08% 0.12% 15.00% 15.13% 0.0119%
UNDER ARMOUR INC-CLASS A UAA $ 10,466.05 0.05% 0.00% 3.00% 3.00% 0.0014%
UNITED CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS UAL $ 19,430.17 0.09% 0.00% 2.50% 2.50% 0.0022%
UDR INC UDR $ - 0.00% 3.47% -2.00% 1.44% 0.0000%
UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES-B UHS $ 11,002.19 0.05% 0.34% 11.00% 11.36% 0.0056%
ULTA BEAUTY INC ULTA $ 15,506.66 0.07% 0.00% 21.00% 21.00% 0.0146%
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC UNH $ 239,518.80 1.07% 1.21% 14.50% 15.80% 0.1698%
UNUM GROUP UNM $ 8,680.88 0.04% 2.65% 12.00% 14.81% 0.0058%
UNION PACIFIC CORP UNP $ 109,851.90 0.49% 2.05% 13.00% 15.18% 0.0748%
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE-CL B UPS $ 100,155.80 0.45% 3.13% 8.50% 11.76% 0.0529%
UNITED RENTALS INC URI $ 13,949.18 0.06% 0.00% 14.00% 14.00% 0.0088%
US BANCORP USB $ 85,466.53 0.38% 2.47% 8.50% 11.07% 0.0425%
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP UTX $ 101,953.00 0.46% 2.20% 9.00% 11.30% 0.0517%
VISA INC-CLASS A SHARES V $ 273,970.50 1.23% 0.67% 15.00% 15.72% 0.1932%
VARIAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS INC VAR $ 11,166.31 0.05% 0.00% 10.00% 10.00% 0.0050%
VF CORP VFC $ 32,925.14 0.15% 2.25% 7.50% 9.83% 0.0145%
VIACOM INC-CLASS B VIAB $ 11,176.17 0.05% 2.88% 2.00% 4.91% 0.0025%
VALERO ENERGY CORP VLO $ 52,353.45 0.23% 2.68% 10.00% 12.81% 0.0301%
VULCAN MATERIALS CO VMC $ 17,270.46 0.08% 0.86% 18.00% 18.94% 0.0147%
VORNADO REALTY TRUST VNO $ 13,600.89 0.06% 3.52% -5.50% -2.08% -0.0013%
VERISK ANALYTICS INC VRSK $ 18,014.06 0.08% 0.00% 9.50% 9.50% 0.0077%
VERISIGN INC VRSN $ 13,245.06 0.06% 0.00% 12.00% 12.00% 0.0071%
VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS INC VRTX $ 36,911.63 N/A 0.00% N/A N/A N/A
VENTAS INC VTR $ - 0.00% 5.85% 5.50% 11.51% 0.0000%
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC VZ $ 202,504.30 0.91% 4.82% 4.50% 9.43% 0.0857%
Exhibit RBH-1
Page 14 of 14
WATERS CORP WAT $ 15,897.97 0.07% 0.00% 10.50% 10.50% 0.0075%
WALGREENS BOOTS ALLIANCE INC WBA $ 63,069.96 0.28% 2.52% 11.00% 13.66% 0.0386%
WESTERN DIGITAL CORP WDC $ 24,697.40 0.11% 2.42% 10.50% 13.05% 0.0145%
WEC ENERGY GROUP INC WEC $ 18,736.71 0.08% 3.84% 7.00% 10.97% 0.0092%
WELLTOWER INC WELL $ - 0.00% 6.10% 7.00% 13.31% 0.0000%
WELLS FARGO & CO WFC $ 271,134.00 1.22% 2.89% 5.00% 7.96% 0.0969%
WHIRLPOOL CORP WHR $ 10,534.27 0.05% 3.10% 7.50% 10.72% 0.0051%
WILLIS TOWERS WATSON PLC WLTW $ 20,642.49 N/A 1.54% N/A N/A N/A
WASTE MANAGEMENT INC WM $ 35,975.16 0.16% 2.23% 9.50% 11.84% 0.0191%
WILLIAMS COS INC WMB $ 21,841.07 0.10% 5.15% 22.50% 28.23% 0.0277%
WALMART INC WMT $ 250,687.40 1.12% 2.45% 5.50% 8.02% 0.0902%
WESTROCK CO WRK $ 15,527.58 0.07% 2.84% 9.00% 11.97% 0.0083%
WESTERN UNION CO WU $ 9,571.27 0.04% 3.66% 7.00% 10.79% 0.0046%
WEYERHAEUSER CO WY $ 28,845.41 0.13% 3.36% 21.50% 25.22% 0.0326%
WYNN RESORTS LTD WYNN $ 18,189.35 0.08% 1.70% 27.00% 28.93% 0.0236%
CIMAREX ENERGY CO XEC $ 8,169.07 0.04% 0.75% 38.50% 39.39% 0.0144%
XCEL ENERGY INC XEL $ 21,730.04 0.10% 3.61% 5.50% 9.21% 0.0090%
XL GROUP LTD XL $ 14,414.71 0.06% 1.56% 42.00% 43.89% 0.0284%
XILINX INC XLNX $ 18,012.87 0.08% 2.04% 7.50% 9.62% 0.0078%
EXXON MOBIL CORP XOM $ 351,162.60 1.58% 3.98% 18.00% 22.34% 0.3519%
DENTSPLY SIRONA INC XRAY $ 9,803.21 0.04% 0.81% 8.50% 9.34% 0.0041%
XEROX CORP XRX $ 6,998.58 0.03% 3.64% 4.50% 8.22% 0.0026%
XYLEM INC XYL $ 13,159.80 0.06% 1.15% 15.50% 16.74% 0.0099%
YUM! BRANDS INC YUM $ 27,530.13 0.12% 1.82% 9.50% 11.41% 0.0141%
ZIMMER BIOMET HOLDINGS INC ZBH $ 23,109.11 0.10% 0.88% 5.00% 5.90% 0.0061%
ZIONS BANCORPORATION ZION $ 11,223.97 0.05% 1.69% 15.00% 16.82% 0.0085%
ZOETIS INC ZTS $ 41,521.46 0.19% 0.58% 14.00% 14.62% 0.0272%
Total Market Capitalization: 22,289,621.15 16.10%
Notes:
[1] Equals sum of Col. [9]
[2] Source: Value Line
[3] Equals [1] − [2]
[5] Equals weight in S&P 500 based on market capitalization
[8] Equals ([6] x (1 + (0.5 x [7]))) + [7]
[9] Equals Col. [5] x Col. [8]
Exhibit RBH-2
Page 1 of 1
Bloomberg and Value Line Beta Coefficients
[1] [2]
Company Ticker Bloomberg Value Line
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 0.582 0.750

Alliant Energy Corporation LNT 0.517 0.700
Ameren Corporation AEE 0.469 0.650
American Electric Power Company, Inc. AEP 0.565 0.650
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 0.596 0.400
Black Hills Corporation BKH 0.639 0.900
CMS Energy Corporation CMS 0.529 0.650
DTE Energy Company DTE 0.540 0.650
Duke Energy Corporation DUK 0.539 0.600
El Paso Electric EE 0.598 0.750
Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. HE 0.527 0.650
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 0.590 0.700
NextEra Energy, Inc. NEE 0.524 0.650
NorthWestern Corporation NWE 0.513 0.650
OGE Energy Corp. OGE 0.672 0.950
Otter Tail Corporation OTTR 0.730 0.850
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation PNW 0.557 0.650
PNM Resources, Inc. PNM 0.617 0.700
Portland General Electric Company POR 0.501 0.650
Southern Company SO 0.405 0.550
WEC Energy Group, Inc. WEC 0.527 0.600
Xcel Energy Inc. XEL 0.503 0.600
Mean 0.556 0.677
Notes:
Exhibit RBH-3
Page 1 of 1
Capital Asset Pricing Model and Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model Results
Bloomberg, and Value Line Derived Market Risk Premium
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

CAPM ECAPM
Average Bloomberg Value Line
Risk-Free Beta Market DCF Market DCF Bloomberg Value Line Bloomberg Value Line
Rate Coefficient Derived Derived MRP MRP MRP MRP
PROXY GROUP AVERAGE BLOOMBERG BETA COEFFICIENT

Current 30-Year Treasury [9] 3.11% 0.556 12.62% 12.99% 10.13% 10.34% 11.53% 11.78%
Near-Term Projected 30-Year Treasury [10] 3.48% 0.556 12.62% 12.99% 10.50% 10.71% 11.90% 12.15%
Mean 10.32% 10.52% 11.72% 11.96%
CAPM ECAPM
Average Bloomberg Value Line
Risk-Free Beta Market DCF Market DCF Bloomberg Value Line Bloomberg Value Line
Rate Coefficient Derived Derived MRP MRP MRP MRP
PROXY GROUP AVERAGE VALUE LINE AVERAGE BETA COEFFICIENT

Current 30-Year Treasury [9] 3.11% 0.677 12.62% 12.99% 11.66% 11.91% 12.68% 12.95%
Near-Term Projected 30-Year Treasury [10] 3.48% 0.677 12.62% 12.99% 12.03% 12.28% 13.05% 13.33%
Mean 11.85% 12.09% 12.86% 13.14%
Notes:
[1] See Notes [9] and [10]
[2] Source: RBH-3
[3] Source: RBH-2
[4] Source: RBH-2
[5] Equals Col. [1] + (Col. [2] x Col. [3])
[6] Equals Col. [1] + (Col. [2] x Col. [4])
[7] Equals Col. [1] + 0.75 x (Col. [2] x Col. [3]) + 0.25 x Col. [3]
[8] Equals Col. [1] + 0.75 x (Col. [2] x Col. [4]) + 0.25 x Col. [4]
[10] Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 37, No. 6, June 1, 2018, at 2.
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 1 of 32
Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

30-Year
Treasury Risk Return on
Constant Slope Yield Premium Equity
-2.53% -2.71%
Current 30-Year Treasury 3.11% 6.85% 9.96%
Near-Term Projected 30-Year Treasury 3.48% 6.55% 10.03%
Long-Term Projected 30-Year Treasury 4.30% 5.98% 10.28%
10.00%
y = -0.0271ln(x) - 0.0253
R² = 0.7367
8.00%
6.00%
4.00%
Equity Risk Premium
2.00%
0.00%
0.00% 2.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00% 12.00% 14.00% 16.00%
-2.00%
-4.00%
-6.00%
Treasury Yield
Notes:
[1] Constant of regression equation
[2] Slope of regression equation
[3] Source: Current = Bloomberg Professional,
[3] Near Term Projected = Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 37, No. 6, June 1, 2018, at 2.
[3] Long Term Projected = Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Vol. 37, No. 6, June 1, 2018, at 14.
[4] Equals [1] + ln([3]) x [2]
[5] Equals [3] + [4]
[6] Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence
[7] Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence
[8] Source: Bloomberg Professional, equals 200-trading day average (i.e. lag period)
[9] Equals [7] - [8]
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 2 of 32
Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium

[6] [7] [8] [9]
Date of 30-Year
Electric Rate Return on Treasury Risk
Case Equity Yield Premium
1/1/1980 14.50% 9.36% 5.14%
1/7/1980 14.39% 9.38% 5.01%
1/9/1980 15.00% 9.40% 5.60%
1/14/1980 15.17% 9.42% 5.75%
1/17/1980 13.93% 9.44% 4.49%
1/23/1980 15.50% 9.47% 6.03%
1/30/1980 13.86% 9.52% 4.34%
1/31/1980 12.61% 9.53% 3.08%
2/6/1980 13.71% 9.58% 4.13%
2/13/1980 12.80% 9.63% 3.17%
2/14/1980 13.00% 9.65% 3.35%
2/19/1980 13.50% 9.68% 3.82%
2/27/1980 13.75% 9.78% 3.97%
2/29/1980 13.75% 9.81% 3.94%
2/29/1980 14.00% 9.81% 4.19%
2/29/1980 14.77% 9.81% 4.96%
3/7/1980 12.70% 9.89% 2.81%
3/14/1980 13.50% 9.97% 3.53%
3/26/1980 14.16% 10.10% 4.06%
3/27/1980 14.24% 10.12% 4.12%
3/28/1980 14.50% 10.13% 4.37%
4/11/1980 12.75% 10.27% 2.48%
4/14/1980 13.85% 10.29% 3.56%
4/16/1980 15.50% 10.31% 5.19%
4/22/1980 13.25% 10.35% 2.90%
4/22/1980 13.90% 10.35% 3.55%
4/24/1980 16.80% 10.38% 6.43%
4/29/1980 15.50% 10.41% 5.09%
5/6/1980 13.70% 10.45% 3.25%
5/7/1980 15.00% 10.45% 4.55%
5/8/1980 13.75% 10.46% 3.29%
5/9/1980 14.35% 10.47% 3.88%
5/13/1980 13.60% 10.48% 3.12%
5/15/1980 13.25% 10.49% 2.76%
5/19/1980 13.75% 10.51% 3.24%
5/27/1980 13.62% 10.54% 3.08%
5/27/1980 14.60% 10.54% 4.06%
5/29/1980 16.00% 10.56% 5.44%
5/30/1980 13.80% 10.56% 3.24%
6/2/1980 15.63% 10.57% 5.06%
6/9/1980 15.90% 10.60% 5.30%
6/10/1980 13.78% 10.60% 3.18%
6/12/1980 14.25% 10.61% 3.64%
6/19/1980 13.40% 10.62% 2.78%
6/30/1980 13.00% 10.65% 2.35%
6/30/1980 13.40% 10.65% 2.75%
7/9/1980 14.75% 10.67% 4.08%
7/10/1980 15.00% 10.68% 4.32%
7/15/1980 15.80% 10.70% 5.10%
7/18/1980 13.80% 10.71% 3.09%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 3 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
7/22/1980 14.10% 10.72% 3.38%
7/24/1980 15.00% 10.73% 4.27%
7/25/1980 13.48% 10.73% 2.75%
7/31/1980 14.58% 10.75% 3.83%
8/8/1980 13.50% 10.78% 2.72%
8/8/1980 14.00% 10.78% 3.22%
8/8/1980 15.45% 10.78% 4.67%
8/11/1980 14.85% 10.78% 4.07%
8/14/1980 14.00% 10.79% 3.21%
8/14/1980 16.25% 10.79% 5.46%
8/25/1980 13.75% 10.82% 2.93%
8/27/1980 13.80% 10.83% 2.97%
8/29/1980 12.50% 10.84% 1.66%
9/15/1980 13.50% 10.88% 2.62%
9/15/1980 13.93% 10.88% 3.05%
9/15/1980 15.80% 10.88% 4.92%
9/24/1980 12.50% 10.93% 1.57%
9/24/1980 15.00% 10.93% 4.07%
9/26/1980 13.75% 10.94% 2.81%
9/30/1980 14.10% 10.96% 3.14%
9/30/1980 14.20% 10.96% 3.24%
10/1/1980 13.90% 10.97% 2.93%
10/3/1980 15.50% 10.98% 4.52%
10/7/1980 12.50% 10.99% 1.51%
10/9/1980 13.25% 11.00% 2.25%
10/9/1980 14.50% 11.00% 3.50%
10/9/1980 14.50% 11.00% 3.50%
10/16/1980 16.10% 11.02% 5.08%
10/17/1980 14.50% 11.03% 3.47%
10/31/1980 13.75% 11.11% 2.64%
10/31/1980 14.25% 11.11% 3.14%
11/4/1980 15.00% 11.12% 3.88%
11/5/1980 13.75% 11.12% 2.63%
11/5/1980 14.00% 11.12% 2.88%
11/8/1980 13.75% 11.14% 2.61%
11/10/1980 14.85% 11.15% 3.70%
11/17/1980 14.00% 11.18% 2.82%
11/18/1980 14.00% 11.19% 2.81%
11/19/1980 13.00% 11.19% 1.81%
11/24/1980 14.00% 11.21% 2.79%
11/26/1980 14.00% 11.21% 2.79%
12/8/1980 14.15% 11.22% 2.93%
12/8/1980 15.10% 11.22% 3.88%
12/9/1980 15.35% 11.22% 4.13%
12/12/1980 15.45% 11.23% 4.22%
12/17/1980 13.25% 11.23% 2.02%
12/18/1980 15.80% 11.23% 4.57%
12/19/1980 14.50% 11.23% 3.27%
12/19/1980 14.64% 11.23% 3.41%
12/22/1980 13.45% 11.23% 2.22%
12/22/1980 15.00% 11.23% 3.77%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 4 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
12/30/1980 14.50% 11.22% 3.28%
12/30/1980 14.95% 11.22% 3.73%
12/31/1980 13.39% 11.22% 2.17%
1/2/1981 15.25% 11.22% 4.03%
1/7/1981 14.30% 11.21% 3.09%
1/19/1981 15.25% 11.20% 4.05%
1/23/1981 13.10% 11.20% 1.90%
1/23/1981 14.40% 11.20% 3.20%
1/26/1981 15.25% 11.20% 4.05%
1/27/1981 15.00% 11.21% 3.79%
1/31/1981 13.47% 11.22% 2.25%
2/3/1981 15.25% 11.23% 4.02%
2/5/1981 15.75% 11.25% 4.50%
2/11/1981 15.60% 11.28% 4.32%
2/20/1981 15.25% 11.33% 3.92%
3/11/1981 15.40% 11.49% 3.91%
3/12/1981 14.51% 11.50% 3.01%
3/12/1981 16.00% 11.50% 4.50%
3/13/1981 13.02% 11.52% 1.50%
3/18/1981 16.19% 11.55% 4.64%
3/19/1981 13.75% 11.56% 2.19%
3/23/1981 14.30% 11.58% 2.72%
3/25/1981 15.30% 11.60% 3.70%
4/1/1981 14.53% 11.68% 2.85%
4/3/1981 19.10% 11.71% 7.39%
4/9/1981 15.00% 11.78% 3.22%
4/9/1981 15.30% 11.78% 3.52%
4/9/1981 16.50% 11.78% 4.72%
4/9/1981 17.00% 11.78% 5.22%
4/10/1981 13.75% 11.80% 1.95%
4/13/1981 13.57% 11.82% 1.75%
4/15/1981 15.30% 11.85% 3.45%
4/16/1981 13.50% 11.87% 1.63%
4/17/1981 14.10% 11.87% 2.23%
4/21/1981 14.00% 11.90% 2.10%
4/21/1981 16.80% 11.90% 4.90%
4/24/1981 16.00% 11.95% 4.05%
4/27/1981 12.50% 11.97% 0.53%
4/27/1981 13.61% 11.97% 1.64%
4/29/1981 13.65% 12.00% 1.65%
4/30/1981 13.50% 12.02% 1.48%
5/4/1981 16.22% 12.05% 4.17%
5/5/1981 14.40% 12.07% 2.33%
5/7/1981 16.25% 12.11% 4.14%
5/7/1981 16.27% 12.11% 4.16%
5/8/1981 13.00% 12.13% 0.87%
5/8/1981 16.00% 12.13% 3.87%
5/12/1981 13.50% 12.16% 1.34%
5/15/1981 15.75% 12.22% 3.53%
5/18/1981 14.88% 12.23% 2.65%
5/20/1981 16.00% 12.26% 3.74%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 5 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
5/21/1981 14.00% 12.27% 1.73%
5/26/1981 14.90% 12.30% 2.60%
5/27/1981 15.00% 12.31% 2.69%
5/29/1981 15.50% 12.34% 3.16%
6/1/1981 16.50% 12.35% 4.15%
6/3/1981 14.67% 12.37% 2.30%
6/5/1981 13.00% 12.39% 0.61%
6/10/1981 16.75% 12.42% 4.33%
6/17/1981 14.40% 12.46% 1.94%
6/18/1981 16.33% 12.47% 3.86%
6/25/1981 14.75% 12.51% 2.24%
6/26/1981 16.00% 12.52% 3.48%
6/30/1981 15.25% 12.54% 2.71%
7/1/1981 15.50% 12.56% 2.94%
7/1/1981 17.50% 12.56% 4.94%
7/10/1981 16.00% 12.62% 3.38%
7/14/1981 16.90% 12.64% 4.26%
7/15/1981 16.00% 12.65% 3.35%
7/17/1981 15.00% 12.67% 2.33%
7/20/1981 15.00% 12.68% 2.32%
7/21/1981 14.00% 12.69% 1.31%
7/28/1981 13.48% 12.74% 0.74%
7/31/1981 13.50% 12.78% 0.72%
7/31/1981 15.00% 12.78% 2.22%
7/31/1981 16.00% 12.78% 3.22%
8/5/1981 15.71% 12.83% 2.88%
8/10/1981 14.50% 12.87% 1.63%
8/11/1981 15.00% 12.88% 2.12%
8/20/1981 13.50% 12.95% 0.55%
8/20/1981 16.50% 12.95% 3.55%
8/24/1981 15.00% 12.97% 2.03%
8/28/1981 15.00% 13.01% 1.99%
9/3/1981 14.50% 13.05% 1.45%
9/10/1981 14.50% 13.11% 1.39%
9/11/1981 16.00% 13.12% 2.88%
9/16/1981 16.00% 13.15% 2.85%
9/17/1981 16.50% 13.16% 3.34%
9/23/1981 15.85% 13.20% 2.65%
9/28/1981 15.50% 13.23% 2.27%
10/9/1981 15.75% 13.33% 2.42%
10/15/1981 16.25% 13.37% 2.88%
10/16/1981 15.50% 13.38% 2.12%
10/16/1981 16.50% 13.38% 3.12%
10/19/1981 14.25% 13.39% 0.86%
10/20/1981 15.25% 13.41% 1.84%
10/20/1981 17.00% 13.41% 3.59%
10/23/1981 16.00% 13.45% 2.55%
10/27/1981 10.00% 13.48% -3.48%
10/29/1981 14.75% 13.51% 1.24%
10/29/1981 16.50% 13.51% 2.99%
11/3/1981 15.17% 13.53% 1.64%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 6 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
11/5/1981 16.60% 13.55% 3.05%
11/6/1981 15.17% 13.56% 1.61%
11/24/1981 15.50% 13.61% 1.89%
11/25/1981 15.25% 13.61% 1.64%
11/25/1981 15.35% 13.61% 1.74%
11/25/1981 16.10% 13.61% 2.49%
11/25/1981 16.10% 13.61% 2.49%
12/1/1981 15.70% 13.61% 2.09%
12/1/1981 16.00% 13.61% 2.39%
12/1/1981 16.49% 13.61% 2.88%
12/1/1981 16.50% 13.61% 2.89%
12/4/1981 16.00% 13.61% 2.39%
12/11/1981 16.25% 13.63% 2.62%
12/14/1981 14.00% 13.63% 0.37%
12/15/1981 15.81% 13.63% 2.18%
12/15/1981 16.00% 13.63% 2.37%
12/16/1981 15.25% 13.63% 1.62%
12/17/1981 16.50% 13.63% 2.87%
12/18/1981 15.45% 13.63% 1.82%
12/30/1981 14.25% 13.67% 0.58%
12/30/1981 16.00% 13.67% 2.33%
12/30/1981 16.25% 13.67% 2.58%
12/31/1981 16.15% 13.67% 2.48%
1/4/1982 15.50% 13.67% 1.83%
1/11/1982 14.50% 13.72% 0.78%
1/11/1982 17.00% 13.72% 3.28%
1/13/1982 14.75% 13.74% 1.01%
1/14/1982 15.75% 13.75% 2.00%
1/15/1982 15.00% 13.76% 1.24%
1/15/1982 16.50% 13.76% 2.74%
1/22/1982 16.25% 13.79% 2.46%
1/27/1982 16.84% 13.81% 3.03%
1/28/1982 13.00% 13.81% -0.81%
1/29/1982 15.50% 13.82% 1.68%
2/1/1982 15.85% 13.82% 2.03%
2/3/1982 16.44% 13.84% 2.60%
2/8/1982 15.50% 13.86% 1.64%
2/11/1982 16.00% 13.88% 2.12%
2/11/1982 16.20% 13.88% 2.32%
2/17/1982 15.00% 13.89% 1.11%
2/19/1982 15.17% 13.89% 1.28%
2/26/1982 15.25% 13.89% 1.36%
3/1/1982 15.03% 13.89% 1.14%
3/1/1982 16.00% 13.89% 2.11%
3/3/1982 15.00% 13.88% 1.12%
3/8/1982 17.10% 13.88% 3.22%
3/12/1982 16.25% 13.88% 2.37%
3/17/1982 17.30% 13.88% 3.42%
3/22/1982 15.10% 13.89% 1.21%
3/27/1982 15.40% 13.89% 1.51%
3/30/1982 15.50% 13.90% 1.60%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 7 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
3/31/1982 17.00% 13.91% 3.09%
4/1/1982 14.70% 13.91% 0.79%
4/1/1982 16.50% 13.91% 2.59%
4/2/1982 15.50% 13.91% 1.59%
4/5/1982 15.50% 13.92% 1.58%
4/8/1982 16.40% 13.93% 2.47%
4/13/1982 14.50% 13.94% 0.56%
4/23/1982 15.75% 13.94% 1.81%
4/27/1982 15.00% 13.94% 1.06%
4/28/1982 15.75% 13.94% 1.81%
4/30/1982 14.70% 13.94% 0.76%
4/30/1982 15.50% 13.94% 1.56%
5/3/1982 16.60% 13.94% 2.66%
5/4/1982 16.00% 13.94% 2.06%
5/14/1982 15.50% 13.92% 1.58%
5/18/1982 15.42% 13.92% 1.50%
5/19/1982 14.69% 13.92% 0.77%
5/20/1982 15.00% 13.91% 1.09%
5/20/1982 15.10% 13.91% 1.19%
5/20/1982 15.50% 13.91% 1.59%
5/20/1982 16.30% 13.91% 2.39%
5/21/1982 17.75% 13.91% 3.84%
5/27/1982 15.00% 13.89% 1.11%
5/28/1982 15.50% 13.89% 1.61%
5/28/1982 17.00% 13.89% 3.11%
6/1/1982 13.75% 13.89% -0.14%
6/1/1982 16.60% 13.89% 2.71%
6/9/1982 17.86% 13.88% 3.98%
6/14/1982 15.75% 13.88% 1.87%
6/15/1982 14.85% 13.88% 0.97%
6/18/1982 15.50% 13.87% 1.63%
6/21/1982 14.90% 13.87% 1.03%
6/23/1982 16.00% 13.86% 2.14%
6/23/1982 16.17% 13.86% 2.31%
6/24/1982 14.85% 13.86% 0.99%
6/25/1982 14.70% 13.86% 0.84%
7/1/1982 16.00% 13.84% 2.16%
7/2/1982 15.62% 13.84% 1.78%
7/2/1982 17.00% 13.84% 3.16%
7/13/1982 14.00% 13.82% 0.18%
7/13/1982 16.80% 13.82% 2.98%
7/14/1982 15.76% 13.82% 1.94%
7/14/1982 16.02% 13.82% 2.20%
7/19/1982 16.50% 13.80% 2.70%
7/22/1982 14.50% 13.77% 0.73%
7/22/1982 17.00% 13.77% 3.23%
7/27/1982 16.75% 13.75% 3.00%
7/29/1982 16.50% 13.74% 2.76%
8/11/1982 17.50% 13.68% 3.82%
8/18/1982 17.07% 13.63% 3.44%
8/20/1982 15.73% 13.60% 2.13%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 8 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
8/25/1982 16.00% 13.57% 2.43%
8/26/1982 15.50% 13.56% 1.94%
8/30/1982 15.00% 13.55% 1.45%
9/3/1982 16.20% 13.53% 2.67%
9/8/1982 15.00% 13.52% 1.48%
9/15/1982 13.08% 13.50% -0.42%
9/15/1982 16.25% 13.50% 2.75%
9/16/1982 16.00% 13.50% 2.50%
9/17/1982 15.25% 13.50% 1.75%
9/23/1982 17.17% 13.47% 3.70%
9/24/1982 14.50% 13.46% 1.04%
9/27/1982 15.25% 13.46% 1.79%
10/1/1982 15.50% 13.42% 2.08%
10/15/1982 15.90% 13.32% 2.58%
10/22/1982 15.75% 13.24% 2.51%
10/22/1982 17.15% 13.24% 3.91%
10/29/1982 15.54% 13.16% 2.38%
11/1/1982 15.50% 13.15% 2.35%
11/3/1982 17.20% 13.13% 4.07%
11/4/1982 16.25% 13.11% 3.14%
11/5/1982 16.20% 13.09% 3.11%
11/9/1982 16.00% 13.05% 2.95%
11/23/1982 15.50% 12.89% 2.61%
11/23/1982 15.85% 12.89% 2.96%
11/30/1982 16.50% 12.81% 3.69%
12/1/1982 17.04% 12.79% 4.25%
12/6/1982 15.00% 12.73% 2.27%
12/6/1982 16.35% 12.73% 3.62%
12/10/1982 15.50% 12.66% 2.84%
12/13/1982 16.00% 12.65% 3.35%
12/14/1982 15.30% 12.63% 2.67%
12/14/1982 16.40% 12.63% 3.77%
12/20/1982 16.00% 12.57% 3.43%
12/21/1982 14.75% 12.56% 2.19%
12/21/1982 15.85% 12.56% 3.29%
12/22/1982 16.25% 12.54% 3.71%
12/22/1982 16.58% 12.54% 4.04%
12/22/1982 16.75% 12.54% 4.21%
12/29/1982 14.90% 12.48% 2.42%
12/29/1982 16.25% 12.48% 3.77%
12/30/1982 16.00% 12.47% 3.53%
12/30/1982 16.35% 12.47% 3.88%
12/30/1982 16.77% 12.47% 4.30%
1/5/1983 17.33% 12.40% 4.93%
1/11/1983 15.90% 12.34% 3.56%
1/12/1983 14.63% 12.33% 2.30%
1/12/1983 15.50% 12.33% 3.17%
1/20/1983 17.75% 12.24% 5.51%
1/21/1983 15.00% 12.22% 2.78%
1/24/1983 14.50% 12.21% 2.29%
1/24/1983 15.50% 12.21% 3.29%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 9 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
1/25/1983 15.85% 12.19% 3.66%
1/27/1983 16.14% 12.17% 3.97%
2/1/1983 18.50% 12.13% 6.37%
2/4/1983 14.00% 12.10% 1.90%
2/10/1983 15.00% 12.06% 2.94%
2/21/1983 15.50% 11.98% 3.52%
2/22/1983 15.50% 11.97% 3.53%
2/23/1983 15.10% 11.96% 3.14%
2/23/1983 16.00% 11.96% 4.04%
3/2/1983 15.25% 11.89% 3.36%
3/9/1983 15.20% 11.82% 3.38%
3/15/1983 13.00% 11.77% 1.23%
3/18/1983 15.25% 11.73% 3.52%
3/23/1983 15.40% 11.69% 3.71%
3/24/1983 15.00% 11.67% 3.33%
3/29/1983 15.50% 11.63% 3.87%
3/30/1983 16.71% 11.61% 5.10%
3/31/1983 15.00% 11.59% 3.41%
4/4/1983 15.20% 11.58% 3.62%
4/8/1983 15.50% 11.51% 3.99%
4/11/1983 14.81% 11.49% 3.32%
4/19/1983 14.50% 11.38% 3.12%
4/20/1983 16.00% 11.36% 4.64%
4/29/1983 16.00% 11.24% 4.76%
5/1/1983 14.50% 11.24% 3.26%
5/9/1983 15.50% 11.15% 4.35%
5/11/1983 16.46% 11.12% 5.34%
5/12/1983 14.14% 11.11% 3.03%
5/18/1983 15.00% 11.05% 3.95%
5/23/1983 14.90% 11.01% 3.89%
5/23/1983 15.50% 11.01% 4.49%
5/25/1983 15.50% 10.98% 4.52%
5/27/1983 15.00% 10.96% 4.04%
5/31/1983 14.00% 10.95% 3.05%
5/31/1983 15.50% 10.95% 4.55%
6/2/1983 14.50% 10.93% 3.57%
6/17/1983 15.03% 10.84% 4.19%
7/1/1983 14.80% 10.78% 4.02%
7/1/1983 14.90% 10.78% 4.12%
7/8/1983 16.25% 10.76% 5.49%
7/13/1983 13.20% 10.75% 2.45%
7/19/1983 15.00% 10.74% 4.26%
7/19/1983 15.10% 10.74% 4.36%
7/25/1983 16.25% 10.73% 5.52%
7/28/1983 15.90% 10.74% 5.16%
8/3/1983 16.34% 10.75% 5.59%
8/3/1983 16.50% 10.75% 5.75%
8/19/1983 15.00% 10.80% 4.20%
8/22/1983 15.50% 10.80% 4.70%
8/22/1983 16.40% 10.80% 5.60%
8/31/1983 14.75% 10.84% 3.91%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 10 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
9/7/1983 15.00% 10.86% 4.14%
9/14/1983 15.78% 10.89% 4.89%
9/16/1983 15.00% 10.90% 4.10%
9/19/1983 14.50% 10.91% 3.59%
9/20/1983 16.50% 10.91% 5.59%
9/28/1983 14.50% 10.94% 3.56%
9/29/1983 15.50% 10.95% 4.55%
9/30/1983 15.25% 10.95% 4.30%
9/30/1983 16.15% 10.95% 5.20%
10/4/1983 14.80% 10.96% 3.84%
10/7/1983 16.00% 10.97% 5.03%
10/13/1983 15.52% 10.99% 4.53%
10/17/1983 15.50% 11.00% 4.50%
10/18/1983 14.50% 11.00% 3.50%
10/19/1983 16.25% 11.01% 5.24%
10/19/1983 16.50% 11.01% 5.49%
10/26/1983 15.00% 11.04% 3.96%
10/27/1983 15.20% 11.04% 4.16%
11/1/1983 16.00% 11.06% 4.94%
11/9/1983 14.90% 11.09% 3.81%
11/10/1983 14.35% 11.10% 3.25%
11/23/1983 16.00% 11.13% 4.87%
11/23/1983 16.15% 11.13% 5.02%
11/30/1983 15.00% 11.14% 3.86%
12/5/1983 15.25% 11.15% 4.10%
12/6/1983 15.07% 11.15% 3.92%
12/8/1983 15.90% 11.16% 4.74%
12/9/1983 14.75% 11.17% 3.58%
12/12/1983 14.50% 11.17% 3.33%
12/15/1983 15.56% 11.19% 4.37%
12/19/1983 14.80% 11.21% 3.59%
12/20/1983 14.69% 11.22% 3.47%
12/20/1983 16.00% 11.22% 4.78%
12/20/1983 16.25% 11.22% 5.03%
12/22/1983 14.75% 11.23% 3.52%
12/22/1983 15.75% 11.23% 4.52%
1/3/1984 14.75% 11.27% 3.48%
1/10/1984 15.90% 11.30% 4.60%
1/12/1984 15.60% 11.31% 4.29%
1/18/1984 13.75% 11.33% 2.42%
1/19/1984 15.90% 11.33% 4.57%
1/30/1984 16.10% 11.37% 4.73%
1/31/1984 15.25% 11.37% 3.88%
2/1/1984 14.80% 11.38% 3.42%
2/6/1984 13.75% 11.40% 2.35%
2/6/1984 14.75% 11.40% 3.35%
2/9/1984 15.25% 11.42% 3.83%
2/15/1984 15.70% 11.44% 4.26%
2/20/1984 15.00% 11.46% 3.54%
2/20/1984 15.00% 11.46% 3.54%
2/22/1984 14.75% 11.47% 3.28%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 11 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
2/28/1984 14.50% 11.51% 2.99%
3/2/1984 14.25% 11.54% 2.71%
3/20/1984 16.00% 11.64% 4.36%
3/23/1984 15.50% 11.67% 3.83%
3/26/1984 14.71% 11.68% 3.03%
4/2/1984 15.50% 11.71% 3.79%
4/6/1984 14.74% 11.75% 2.99%
4/11/1984 15.72% 11.78% 3.94%
4/17/1984 15.00% 11.81% 3.19%
4/18/1984 16.20% 11.82% 4.38%
4/25/1984 14.64% 11.85% 2.79%
4/30/1984 14.40% 11.87% 2.53%
5/16/1984 14.69% 11.98% 2.71%
5/16/1984 15.00% 11.98% 3.02%
5/22/1984 14.40% 12.02% 2.38%
5/29/1984 15.10% 12.06% 3.04%
6/13/1984 15.25% 12.15% 3.10%
6/15/1984 15.60% 12.17% 3.43%
6/22/1984 16.25% 12.21% 4.04%
6/29/1984 15.25% 12.26% 2.99%
7/2/1984 13.35% 12.27% 1.08%
7/10/1984 16.00% 12.31% 3.69%
7/12/1984 16.50% 12.32% 4.18%
7/13/1984 16.25% 12.33% 3.92%
7/17/1984 14.14% 12.35% 1.79%
7/18/1984 15.30% 12.36% 2.94%
7/18/1984 15.50% 12.36% 3.14%
7/19/1984 14.30% 12.37% 1.93%
7/24/1984 16.79% 12.39% 4.40%
7/31/1984 16.00% 12.43% 3.57%
8/3/1984 14.25% 12.44% 1.81%
8/17/1984 14.30% 12.49% 1.81%
8/20/1984 15.00% 12.49% 2.51%
8/27/1984 16.30% 12.51% 3.79%
8/31/1984 15.55% 12.52% 3.03%
9/6/1984 16.00% 12.53% 3.47%
9/10/1984 14.75% 12.54% 2.21%
9/13/1984 15.00% 12.55% 2.45%
9/17/1984 17.38% 12.56% 4.82%
9/26/1984 14.50% 12.57% 1.93%
9/28/1984 15.00% 12.57% 2.43%
9/28/1984 16.25% 12.57% 3.68%
10/9/1984 14.75% 12.58% 2.17%
10/12/1984 15.60% 12.59% 3.01%
10/22/1984 15.00% 12.59% 2.41%
10/26/1984 16.40% 12.58% 3.82%
10/31/1984 16.25% 12.58% 3.67%
11/7/1984 15.60% 12.58% 3.02%
11/9/1984 16.00% 12.58% 3.42%
11/14/1984 15.75% 12.58% 3.17%
11/20/1984 15.25% 12.58% 2.67%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 12 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
11/20/1984 15.92% 12.58% 3.34%
11/23/1984 15.00% 12.58% 2.42%
11/28/1984 16.15% 12.57% 3.58%
12/3/1984 15.80% 12.56% 3.24%
12/4/1984 16.50% 12.56% 3.94%
12/18/1984 16.40% 12.53% 3.87%
12/19/1984 14.75% 12.53% 2.22%
12/19/1984 15.00% 12.53% 2.47%
12/20/1984 16.00% 12.53% 3.47%
12/28/1984 16.00% 12.50% 3.50%
1/3/1985 14.75% 12.49% 2.26%
1/10/1985 15.75% 12.47% 3.28%
1/11/1985 16.30% 12.46% 3.84%
1/23/1985 15.80% 12.43% 3.37%
1/24/1985 15.82% 12.43% 3.39%
1/25/1985 16.75% 12.42% 4.33%
1/30/1985 14.90% 12.40% 2.50%
1/31/1985 14.75% 12.39% 2.36%
2/8/1985 14.47% 12.35% 2.12%
3/1/1985 13.84% 12.31% 1.53%
3/8/1985 16.85% 12.28% 4.57%
3/14/1985 15.50% 12.25% 3.25%
3/15/1985 15.62% 12.25% 3.37%
3/29/1985 15.62% 12.17% 3.45%
4/3/1985 14.60% 12.14% 2.46%
4/9/1985 15.50% 12.11% 3.39%
4/16/1985 15.70% 12.06% 3.64%
4/22/1985 14.00% 12.02% 1.98%
4/26/1985 15.50% 11.98% 3.52%
4/29/1985 15.00% 11.97% 3.03%
5/2/1985 14.68% 11.94% 2.74%
5/8/1985 15.62% 11.89% 3.73%
5/10/1985 16.50% 11.87% 4.63%
5/29/1985 14.61% 11.73% 2.88%
5/31/1985 16.00% 11.71% 4.29%
6/14/1985 15.50% 11.61% 3.89%
7/9/1985 15.00% 11.45% 3.55%
7/16/1985 14.50% 11.39% 3.11%
7/26/1985 14.50% 11.33% 3.17%
8/2/1985 14.80% 11.29% 3.51%
8/7/1985 15.00% 11.27% 3.73%
8/28/1985 14.25% 11.15% 3.10%
8/28/1985 15.50% 11.15% 4.35%
8/29/1985 14.50% 11.15% 3.35%
9/9/1985 14.60% 11.11% 3.49%
9/9/1985 14.90% 11.11% 3.79%
9/17/1985 14.90% 11.08% 3.82%
9/23/1985 15.00% 11.06% 3.94%
9/27/1985 15.50% 11.05% 4.45%
9/27/1985 15.80% 11.05% 4.75%
10/2/1985 14.00% 11.03% 2.97%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 13 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
10/2/1985 14.75% 11.03% 3.72%
10/3/1985 15.25% 11.03% 4.22%
10/24/1985 15.40% 10.96% 4.44%
10/24/1985 15.82% 10.96% 4.86%
10/24/1985 15.85% 10.96% 4.89%
10/28/1985 16.00% 10.95% 5.05%
10/29/1985 16.65% 10.94% 5.71%
10/31/1985 15.06% 10.93% 4.13%
11/4/1985 14.50% 10.92% 3.58%
11/7/1985 15.50% 10.90% 4.60%
11/8/1985 14.30% 10.89% 3.41%
12/12/1985 14.75% 10.73% 4.02%
12/18/1985 15.00% 10.69% 4.31%
12/20/1985 14.50% 10.67% 3.83%
12/20/1985 14.50% 10.67% 3.83%
12/20/1985 15.00% 10.67% 4.33%
1/24/1986 15.40% 10.41% 4.99%
1/31/1986 15.00% 10.35% 4.65%
2/5/1986 15.00% 10.32% 4.68%
2/5/1986 15.75% 10.32% 5.43%
2/10/1986 13.30% 10.29% 3.01%
2/11/1986 12.50% 10.28% 2.22%
2/14/1986 14.40% 10.24% 4.16%
2/18/1986 16.00% 10.23% 5.77%
2/24/1986 14.50% 10.18% 4.32%
2/26/1986 14.00% 10.15% 3.85%
3/5/1986 14.90% 10.08% 4.82%
3/11/1986 14.50% 10.02% 4.48%
3/12/1986 13.50% 10.00% 3.50%
3/27/1986 14.10% 9.86% 4.24%
3/31/1986 13.50% 9.84% 3.66%
4/1/1986 14.00% 9.83% 4.17%
4/2/1986 15.50% 9.81% 5.69%
4/4/1986 15.00% 9.78% 5.22%
4/14/1986 13.40% 9.69% 3.71%
4/23/1986 15.00% 9.57% 5.43%
5/16/1986 14.50% 9.32% 5.18%
5/16/1986 14.50% 9.32% 5.18%
5/29/1986 13.90% 9.19% 4.71%
5/30/1986 15.10% 9.18% 5.92%
6/2/1986 12.81% 9.17% 3.64%
6/11/1986 14.00% 9.07% 4.93%
6/24/1986 16.63% 8.94% 7.69%
6/26/1986 12.00% 8.91% 3.09%
6/26/1986 14.75% 8.91% 5.84%
6/30/1986 13.00% 8.87% 4.13%
7/10/1986 14.34% 8.75% 5.59%
7/11/1986 12.75% 8.73% 4.02%
7/14/1986 12.60% 8.71% 3.89%
7/17/1986 12.40% 8.66% 3.74%
7/25/1986 14.25% 8.57% 5.68%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 14 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
8/6/1986 13.50% 8.44% 5.06%
8/14/1986 13.50% 8.35% 5.15%
9/16/1986 12.75% 8.06% 4.69%
9/19/1986 13.25% 8.03% 5.22%
10/1/1986 14.00% 7.95% 6.05%
10/3/1986 13.40% 7.93% 5.47%
10/31/1986 13.50% 7.77% 5.73%
11/5/1986 13.00% 7.75% 5.25%
12/3/1986 12.90% 7.58% 5.32%
12/4/1986 14.44% 7.58% 6.86%
12/16/1986 13.60% 7.52% 6.08%
12/22/1986 13.80% 7.51% 6.29%
12/30/1986 13.00% 7.49% 5.51%
1/2/1987 13.00% 7.49% 5.51%
1/12/1987 12.40% 7.47% 4.93%
1/27/1987 12.71% 7.46% 5.25%
3/2/1987 12.47% 7.47% 5.00%
3/3/1987 13.60% 7.47% 6.13%
3/4/1987 12.38% 7.47% 4.91%
3/10/1987 13.50% 7.47% 6.03%
3/13/1987 13.00% 7.47% 5.53%
3/31/1987 13.00% 7.46% 5.54%
4/6/1987 13.00% 7.47% 5.53%
4/14/1987 12.50% 7.49% 5.01%
4/16/1987 14.50% 7.50% 7.00%
4/27/1987 12.00% 7.54% 4.46%
5/5/1987 12.85% 7.58% 5.27%
5/12/1987 12.65% 7.62% 5.03%
5/28/1987 13.50% 7.70% 5.80%
6/15/1987 13.20% 7.78% 5.42%
6/29/1987 15.00% 7.83% 7.17%
6/30/1987 12.50% 7.84% 4.66%
7/8/1987 12.00% 7.86% 4.14%
7/10/1987 12.90% 7.86% 5.04%
7/15/1987 13.50% 7.88% 5.62%
7/16/1987 13.50% 7.88% 5.62%
7/16/1987 15.00% 7.88% 7.12%
7/27/1987 13.00% 7.92% 5.08%
7/27/1987 13.40% 7.92% 5.48%
7/27/1987 13.50% 7.92% 5.58%
7/31/1987 12.98% 7.95% 5.03%
8/26/1987 12.63% 8.06% 4.57%
8/26/1987 12.75% 8.06% 4.69%
8/27/1987 13.25% 8.06% 5.19%
9/9/1987 13.00% 8.14% 4.86%
9/30/1987 12.75% 8.31% 4.44%
9/30/1987 13.00% 8.31% 4.69%
10/2/1987 11.50% 8.33% 3.17%
10/15/1987 13.00% 8.43% 4.57%
11/2/1987 13.00% 8.55% 4.45%
11/19/1987 13.00% 8.64% 4.36%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 15 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
11/30/1987 12.00% 8.68% 3.32%
12/3/1987 14.20% 8.70% 5.50%
12/15/1987 13.25% 8.77% 4.48%
12/16/1987 13.50% 8.78% 4.72%
12/16/1987 13.72% 8.78% 4.94%
12/17/1987 11.75% 8.79% 2.96%
12/18/1987 13.50% 8.80% 4.70%
12/21/1987 12.01% 8.81% 3.20%
12/22/1987 12.00% 8.81% 3.19%
12/22/1987 12.00% 8.81% 3.19%
12/22/1987 12.75% 8.81% 3.94%
12/22/1987 13.00% 8.81% 4.19%
1/20/1988 13.80% 8.94% 4.86%
1/26/1988 13.90% 8.95% 4.95%
1/29/1988 13.20% 8.96% 4.24%
2/4/1988 12.60% 8.96% 3.64%
3/1/1988 11.56% 8.94% 2.62%
3/23/1988 12.87% 8.92% 3.95%
3/24/1988 11.24% 8.92% 2.32%
3/30/1988 12.72% 8.92% 3.80%
4/1/1988 12.50% 8.92% 3.58%
4/7/1988 13.25% 8.93% 4.32%
4/25/1988 10.96% 8.96% 2.00%
5/3/1988 12.91% 8.97% 3.94%
5/11/1988 13.50% 8.99% 4.51%
5/16/1988 13.00% 8.99% 4.01%
6/30/1988 12.75% 9.00% 3.75%
7/1/1988 12.75% 8.99% 3.76%
7/20/1988 13.40% 8.96% 4.44%
8/5/1988 12.75% 8.92% 3.83%
8/23/1988 11.70% 8.93% 2.77%
8/29/1988 12.75% 8.94% 3.81%
8/30/1988 13.50% 8.94% 4.56%
9/8/1988 12.60% 8.95% 3.65%
10/13/1988 13.10% 8.93% 4.17%
12/19/1988 13.00% 9.02% 3.98%
12/20/1988 12.25% 9.02% 3.23%
12/20/1988 13.00% 9.02% 3.98%
12/21/1988 12.90% 9.02% 3.88%
12/27/1988 13.00% 9.03% 3.97%
12/28/1988 13.10% 9.03% 4.07%
12/30/1988 13.40% 9.04% 4.36%
1/27/1989 13.00% 9.05% 3.95%
1/31/1989 13.00% 9.05% 3.95%
2/17/1989 13.00% 9.05% 3.95%
2/20/1989 12.40% 9.05% 3.35%
3/1/1989 12.76% 9.05% 3.71%
3/8/1989 13.00% 9.05% 3.95%
3/30/1989 14.00% 9.05% 4.95%
4/5/1989 14.20% 9.05% 5.15%
4/18/1989 13.00% 9.05% 3.95%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 16 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
5/5/1989 12.40% 9.05% 3.35%
6/2/1989 13.20% 9.00% 4.20%
6/8/1989 13.50% 8.98% 4.52%
6/27/1989 13.25% 8.91% 4.34%
6/30/1989 13.00% 8.90% 4.10%
8/14/1989 12.50% 8.77% 3.73%
9/28/1989 12.25% 8.63% 3.62%
10/24/1989 12.50% 8.54% 3.96%
11/9/1989 13.00% 8.49% 4.51%
12/15/1989 13.00% 8.34% 4.66%
12/20/1989 12.90% 8.32% 4.58%
12/21/1989 12.90% 8.31% 4.59%
12/27/1989 12.50% 8.29% 4.21%
12/27/1989 13.00% 8.29% 4.71%
1/10/1990 12.80% 8.24% 4.56%
1/11/1990 12.90% 8.24% 4.66%
1/17/1990 12.80% 8.22% 4.58%
1/26/1990 12.00% 8.20% 3.80%
2/9/1990 12.10% 8.17% 3.93%
2/24/1990 12.86% 8.15% 4.71%
3/30/1990 12.90% 8.16% 4.74%
4/4/1990 15.76% 8.17% 7.59%
4/12/1990 12.52% 8.18% 4.34%
4/19/1990 12.75% 8.20% 4.55%
5/21/1990 12.10% 8.28% 3.82%
5/29/1990 12.40% 8.30% 4.10%
5/31/1990 12.00% 8.30% 3.70%
6/4/1990 12.90% 8.30% 4.60%
6/6/1990 12.25% 8.31% 3.94%
6/15/1990 13.20% 8.32% 4.88%
6/20/1990 12.92% 8.32% 4.60%
6/27/1990 12.90% 8.33% 4.57%
6/29/1990 12.50% 8.33% 4.17%
7/6/1990 12.10% 8.34% 3.76%
7/6/1990 12.35% 8.34% 4.01%
8/10/1990 12.55% 8.41% 4.14%
8/16/1990 13.21% 8.43% 4.78%
8/22/1990 13.10% 8.45% 4.65%
8/24/1990 13.00% 8.46% 4.54%
9/26/1990 11.45% 8.59% 2.86%
10/2/1990 13.00% 8.61% 4.39%
10/5/1990 12.84% 8.62% 4.22%
10/19/1990 13.00% 8.67% 4.33%
10/25/1990 12.30% 8.68% 3.62%
11/21/1990 12.70% 8.69% 4.01%
12/13/1990 12.30% 8.67% 3.63%
12/17/1990 12.87% 8.67% 4.20%
12/18/1990 13.10% 8.67% 4.43%
12/19/1990 12.00% 8.66% 3.34%
12/20/1990 12.75% 8.66% 4.09%
12/21/1990 12.50% 8.66% 3.84%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 17 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
12/27/1990 12.79% 8.66% 4.13%
1/2/1991 13.10% 8.65% 4.45%
1/4/1991 12.50% 8.65% 3.85%
1/15/1991 12.75% 8.64% 4.11%
1/25/1991 11.70% 8.63% 3.07%
2/4/1991 12.50% 8.60% 3.90%
2/7/1991 12.50% 8.59% 3.91%
2/12/1991 13.00% 8.58% 4.43%
2/14/1991 12.72% 8.57% 4.15%
2/22/1991 12.80% 8.55% 4.25%
3/6/1991 13.10% 8.53% 4.57%
3/8/1991 12.30% 8.52% 3.78%
3/8/1991 13.00% 8.52% 4.48%
4/22/1991 13.00% 8.49% 4.51%
5/7/1991 13.50% 8.47% 5.03%
5/13/1991 13.25% 8.47% 4.78%
5/30/1991 12.75% 8.44% 4.31%
6/12/1991 12.00% 8.41% 3.59%
6/25/1991 11.70% 8.39% 3.31%
6/28/1991 12.50% 8.38% 4.12%
7/1/1991 12.00% 8.38% 3.62%
7/3/1991 12.50% 8.37% 4.13%
7/19/1991 12.10% 8.34% 3.76%
8/1/1991 12.90% 8.32% 4.58%
8/16/1991 13.20% 8.29% 4.91%
9/27/1991 12.50% 8.23% 4.27%
9/30/1991 12.25% 8.23% 4.02%
10/17/1991 13.00% 8.20% 4.80%
10/23/1991 12.50% 8.20% 4.30%
10/23/1991 12.55% 8.20% 4.35%
10/31/1991 11.80% 8.19% 3.61%
11/1/1991 12.00% 8.19% 3.81%
11/5/1991 12.25% 8.19% 4.06%
11/12/1991 12.50% 8.18% 4.32%
11/12/1991 13.25% 8.18% 5.07%
11/25/1991 12.40% 8.18% 4.22%
11/26/1991 11.60% 8.18% 3.42%
11/26/1991 12.50% 8.18% 4.32%
11/27/1991 12.10% 8.18% 3.92%
12/18/1991 12.25% 8.15% 4.10%
12/19/1991 12.60% 8.15% 4.45%
12/19/1991 12.80% 8.15% 4.65%
12/20/1991 12.65% 8.14% 4.51%
1/9/1992 12.80% 8.09% 4.71%
1/16/1992 12.75% 8.07% 4.68%
1/21/1992 12.00% 8.06% 3.94%
1/22/1992 13.00% 8.06% 4.94%
1/27/1992 12.65% 8.05% 4.60%
1/31/1992 12.00% 8.04% 3.96%
2/11/1992 12.40% 8.03% 4.37%
2/25/1992 12.50% 8.01% 4.49%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 18 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
3/16/1992 11.43% 7.98% 3.45%
3/18/1992 12.28% 7.98% 4.30%
4/2/1992 12.10% 7.95% 4.15%
4/9/1992 11.45% 7.94% 3.51%
4/10/1992 11.50% 7.93% 3.57%
4/14/1992 11.50% 7.93% 3.57%
5/5/1992 11.50% 7.89% 3.61%
5/12/1992 11.87% 7.88% 3.99%
5/12/1992 12.46% 7.88% 4.58%
6/1/1992 12.30% 7.87% 4.43%
6/12/1992 10.90% 7.86% 3.04%
6/26/1992 12.35% 7.85% 4.50%
6/29/1992 11.00% 7.85% 3.15%
6/30/1992 13.00% 7.85% 5.15%
7/13/1992 11.90% 7.84% 4.06%
7/13/1992 13.50% 7.84% 5.66%
7/22/1992 11.20% 7.83% 3.37%
8/3/1992 12.00% 7.81% 4.19%
8/6/1992 12.50% 7.80% 4.70%
9/22/1992 12.00% 7.71% 4.29%
9/28/1992 11.40% 7.71% 3.69%
9/30/1992 11.75% 7.70% 4.05%
10/2/1992 13.00% 7.70% 5.30%
10/12/1992 12.20% 7.70% 4.50%
10/16/1992 13.16% 7.70% 5.46%
10/30/1992 11.75% 7.71% 4.04%
11/3/1992 12.00% 7.71% 4.29%
12/3/1992 11.85% 7.68% 4.17%
12/15/1992 11.00% 7.66% 3.34%
12/16/1992 11.90% 7.66% 4.24%
12/16/1992 12.40% 7.66% 4.74%
12/17/1992 12.00% 7.66% 4.34%
12/22/1992 12.30% 7.65% 4.65%
12/22/1992 12.40% 7.65% 4.75%
12/29/1992 12.25% 7.63% 4.62%
12/30/1992 12.00% 7.63% 4.37%
12/31/1992 11.90% 7.63% 4.27%
1/12/1993 12.00% 7.61% 4.39%
1/21/1993 11.25% 7.59% 3.66%
2/2/1993 11.40% 7.56% 3.84%
2/15/1993 12.30% 7.52% 4.78%
2/24/1993 11.90% 7.49% 4.41%
2/26/1993 11.80% 7.48% 4.32%
2/26/1993 12.20% 7.48% 4.72%
4/23/1993 11.75% 7.29% 4.46%
5/11/1993 11.75% 7.25% 4.50%
5/14/1993 11.50% 7.24% 4.26%
5/25/1993 11.50% 7.23% 4.27%
5/28/1993 11.00% 7.22% 3.78%
6/3/1993 12.00% 7.21% 4.79%
6/16/1993 11.50% 7.19% 4.31%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 19 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
6/18/1993 12.10% 7.18% 4.92%
6/25/1993 11.67% 7.17% 4.50%
7/21/1993 11.38% 7.10% 4.28%
7/23/1993 10.46% 7.09% 3.37%
8/24/1993 11.50% 6.96% 4.54%
9/21/1993 10.50% 6.81% 3.69%
9/29/1993 11.47% 6.77% 4.70%
9/30/1993 11.60% 6.76% 4.84%
11/2/1993 10.80% 6.60% 4.20%
11/12/1993 12.00% 6.57% 5.43%
11/26/1993 11.00% 6.52% 4.48%
12/14/1993 10.55% 6.48% 4.07%
12/16/1993 10.60% 6.48% 4.12%
12/21/1993 11.30% 6.47% 4.83%
1/4/1994 10.07% 6.44% 3.63%
1/13/1994 11.00% 6.42% 4.58%
1/21/1994 11.00% 6.40% 4.60%
1/28/1994 11.35% 6.39% 4.96%
2/3/1994 11.40% 6.38% 5.02%
2/17/1994 10.60% 6.36% 4.24%
2/25/1994 11.25% 6.35% 4.90%
2/25/1994 12.00% 6.35% 5.65%
3/1/1994 11.00% 6.35% 4.65%
3/4/1994 11.00% 6.35% 4.65%
4/25/1994 11.00% 6.41% 4.59%
5/10/1994 11.75% 6.45% 5.30%
5/13/1994 10.50% 6.46% 4.04%
6/3/1994 11.00% 6.54% 4.46%
6/27/1994 11.40% 6.65% 4.75%
8/5/1994 12.75% 6.88% 5.87%
10/31/1994 10.00% 7.33% 2.67%
11/9/1994 10.85% 7.39% 3.46%
11/9/1994 10.85% 7.39% 3.46%
11/18/1994 11.20% 7.45% 3.75%
11/22/1994 11.60% 7.47% 4.13%
11/28/1994 11.06% 7.49% 3.57%
12/8/1994 11.50% 7.54% 3.96%
12/8/1994 11.70% 7.54% 4.16%
12/14/1994 10.95% 7.56% 3.39%
12/15/1994 11.50% 7.57% 3.93%
12/19/1994 11.50% 7.58% 3.92%
12/28/1994 12.15% 7.61% 4.54%
1/9/1995 12.28% 7.64% 4.64%
1/31/1995 11.00% 7.69% 3.31%
2/10/1995 12.60% 7.70% 4.90%
2/17/1995 11.90% 7.70% 4.20%
3/9/1995 11.50% 7.71% 3.79%
3/20/1995 12.00% 7.72% 4.28%
3/23/1995 12.81% 7.72% 5.09%
3/29/1995 11.60% 7.72% 3.88%
4/6/1995 11.10% 7.71% 3.39%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 20 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
4/7/1995 11.00% 7.71% 3.29%
4/19/1995 11.00% 7.70% 3.30%
5/12/1995 11.63% 7.68% 3.95%
5/25/1995 11.20% 7.65% 3.55%
6/9/1995 11.25% 7.60% 3.65%
6/21/1995 12.25% 7.56% 4.69%
6/30/1995 11.10% 7.52% 3.58%
9/11/1995 11.30% 7.20% 4.10%
9/27/1995 11.30% 7.12% 4.18%
9/27/1995 11.50% 7.12% 4.38%
9/27/1995 11.75% 7.12% 4.63%
9/29/1995 11.00% 7.11% 3.89%
11/9/1995 11.38% 6.90% 4.48%
11/9/1995 12.36% 6.90% 5.46%
11/17/1995 11.00% 6.86% 4.14%
12/4/1995 11.35% 6.78% 4.57%
12/11/1995 11.40% 6.74% 4.66%
12/20/1995 11.60% 6.70% 4.90%
12/27/1995 12.00% 6.66% 5.34%
2/5/1996 12.25% 6.48% 5.77%
3/29/1996 10.67% 6.42% 4.25%
4/8/1996 11.00% 6.42% 4.58%
4/11/1996 12.59% 6.43% 6.16%
4/11/1996 12.59% 6.43% 6.16%
4/24/1996 11.25% 6.43% 4.82%
4/30/1996 11.00% 6.43% 4.57%
5/13/1996 11.00% 6.44% 4.56%
5/23/1996 11.25% 6.43% 4.82%
6/25/1996 11.25% 6.48% 4.77%
6/27/1996 11.20% 6.48% 4.72%
8/12/1996 10.40% 6.57% 3.83%
9/27/1996 11.00% 6.71% 4.29%
10/16/1996 12.25% 6.76% 5.49%
11/5/1996 11.00% 6.81% 4.19%
11/26/1996 11.30% 6.83% 4.47%
12/18/1996 11.75% 6.83% 4.92%
12/31/1996 11.50% 6.83% 4.67%
1/3/1997 10.70% 6.83% 3.87%
2/13/1997 11.80% 6.82% 4.98%
2/20/1997 11.80% 6.82% 4.98%
3/31/1997 10.02% 6.80% 3.22%
4/2/1997 11.65% 6.80% 4.85%
4/28/1997 11.50% 6.81% 4.69%
4/29/1997 11.70% 6.81% 4.89%
7/17/1997 12.00% 6.77% 5.23%
12/12/1997 11.00% 6.60% 4.40%
12/23/1997 11.12% 6.57% 4.55%
2/2/1998 12.75% 6.39% 6.36%
3/2/1998 11.25% 6.29% 4.96%
3/6/1998 10.75% 6.27% 4.48%
3/20/1998 10.50% 6.22% 4.28%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 21 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
4/30/1998 12.20% 6.12% 6.08%
7/10/1998 11.40% 5.94% 5.46%
9/15/1998 11.90% 5.78% 6.12%
11/30/1998 12.60% 5.58% 7.02%
12/10/1998 12.20% 5.54% 6.66%
12/17/1998 12.10% 5.52% 6.58%
2/5/1999 10.30% 5.38% 4.92%
3/4/1999 10.50% 5.34% 5.16%
4/6/1999 10.94% 5.32% 5.62%
7/29/1999 10.75% 5.52% 5.23%
9/23/1999 10.75% 5.70% 5.05%
11/17/1999 11.10% 5.90% 5.20%
1/7/2000 11.50% 6.05% 5.45%
1/7/2000 11.50% 6.05% 5.45%
2/17/2000 10.60% 6.17% 4.43%
3/28/2000 11.25% 6.20% 5.05%
5/24/2000 11.00% 6.18% 4.82%
7/18/2000 12.20% 6.16% 6.04%
9/29/2000 11.16% 6.03% 5.13%
11/28/2000 12.90% 5.89% 7.01%
11/30/2000 12.10% 5.88% 6.22%
1/23/2001 11.25% 5.79% 5.46%
2/8/2001 11.50% 5.77% 5.73%
5/8/2001 10.75% 5.62% 5.13%
6/26/2001 11.00% 5.62% 5.38%
7/25/2001 11.02% 5.60% 5.42%
7/25/2001 11.02% 5.60% 5.42%
7/31/2001 11.00% 5.59% 5.41%
8/31/2001 10.50% 5.56% 4.94%
9/7/2001 10.75% 5.55% 5.20%
9/10/2001 11.00% 5.55% 5.45%
9/20/2001 10.00% 5.55% 4.45%
10/24/2001 10.30% 5.54% 4.76%
11/28/2001 10.60% 5.49% 5.11%
12/3/2001 12.88% 5.49% 7.39%
12/20/2001 12.50% 5.50% 7.00%
1/22/2002 10.00% 5.50% 4.50%
3/27/2002 10.10% 5.45% 4.65%
4/22/2002 11.80% 5.45% 6.35%
5/28/2002 10.17% 5.46% 4.71%
6/10/2002 12.00% 5.47% 6.53%
6/18/2002 11.16% 5.48% 5.68%
6/20/2002 11.00% 5.48% 5.52%
6/20/2002 12.30% 5.48% 6.82%
7/15/2002 11.00% 5.48% 5.52%
9/12/2002 12.30% 5.45% 6.85%
9/26/2002 10.45% 5.41% 5.04%
12/4/2002 11.55% 5.29% 6.26%
12/13/2002 11.75% 5.27% 6.48%
12/20/2002 11.40% 5.25% 6.15%
1/8/2003 11.10% 5.19% 5.91%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 22 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
1/31/2003 12.45% 5.13% 7.32%
2/28/2003 12.30% 5.05% 7.25%
3/6/2003 10.75% 5.03% 5.72%
3/7/2003 9.96% 5.02% 4.94%
3/20/2003 12.00% 4.98% 7.02%
4/3/2003 12.00% 4.96% 7.04%
4/15/2003 11.15% 4.94% 6.21%
6/25/2003 10.75% 4.79% 5.96%
6/26/2003 10.75% 4.79% 5.96%
7/9/2003 9.75% 4.79% 4.96%
7/16/2003 9.75% 4.79% 4.96%
7/25/2003 9.50% 4.80% 4.70%
8/26/2003 10.50% 4.83% 5.67%
12/17/2003 9.85% 4.94% 4.91%
12/17/2003 10.70% 4.94% 5.76%
12/18/2003 11.50% 4.94% 6.56%
12/19/2003 12.00% 4.94% 7.06%
12/19/2003 12.00% 4.94% 7.06%
12/23/2003 10.50% 4.94% 5.56%
1/13/2004 12.00% 4.95% 7.05%
3/2/2004 10.75% 4.99% 5.76%
3/26/2004 10.25% 5.02% 5.23%
4/5/2004 11.25% 5.03% 6.22%
5/18/2004 10.50% 5.07% 5.43%
5/25/2004 10.25% 5.08% 5.17%
5/27/2004 10.25% 5.08% 5.17%
6/2/2004 11.22% 5.08% 6.14%
6/30/2004 10.50% 5.10% 5.40%
6/30/2004 10.50% 5.10% 5.40%
7/16/2004 11.60% 5.11% 6.49%
8/25/2004 10.25% 5.10% 5.15%
9/9/2004 10.40% 5.10% 5.30%
11/9/2004 10.50% 5.07% 5.43%
11/23/2004 11.00% 5.06% 5.94%
12/14/2004 10.97% 5.07% 5.90%
12/21/2004 11.25% 5.07% 6.18%
12/21/2004 11.50% 5.07% 6.43%
12/22/2004 10.70% 5.07% 5.63%
12/22/2004 11.50% 5.07% 6.43%
12/29/2004 9.85% 5.07% 4.78%
1/6/2005 10.70% 5.08% 5.62%
2/18/2005 10.30% 4.98% 5.32%
2/25/2005 10.50% 4.96% 5.54%
3/10/2005 11.00% 4.93% 6.07%
3/24/2005 10.30% 4.90% 5.40%
4/4/2005 10.00% 4.88% 5.12%
4/7/2005 10.25% 4.87% 5.38%
5/18/2005 10.25% 4.78% 5.47%
5/25/2005 10.75% 4.76% 5.99%
5/26/2005 9.75% 4.76% 4.99%
6/1/2005 9.75% 4.75% 5.00%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 23 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
7/19/2005 11.50% 4.64% 6.86%
8/5/2005 11.75% 4.62% 7.13%
8/15/2005 10.13% 4.61% 5.52%
9/28/2005 10.00% 4.54% 5.46%
10/4/2005 10.75% 4.54% 6.21%
12/12/2005 11.00% 4.55% 6.45%
12/13/2005 10.75% 4.55% 6.20%
12/21/2005 10.29% 4.54% 5.75%
12/21/2005 10.40% 4.54% 5.86%
12/22/2005 11.00% 4.54% 6.46%
12/22/2005 11.15% 4.54% 6.61%
12/28/2005 10.00% 4.54% 5.46%
12/28/2005 10.00% 4.54% 5.46%
1/5/2006 11.00% 4.53% 6.47%
1/27/2006 9.75% 4.52% 5.23%
3/3/2006 10.39% 4.53% 5.86%
4/17/2006 10.20% 4.61% 5.59%
4/26/2006 10.60% 4.64% 5.96%
5/17/2006 11.60% 4.69% 6.91%
6/6/2006 10.00% 4.74% 5.26%
6/27/2006 10.75% 4.80% 5.95%
7/6/2006 10.20% 4.83% 5.37%
7/24/2006 9.60% 4.86% 4.74%
7/26/2006 10.50% 4.86% 5.64%
7/28/2006 10.05% 4.86% 5.19%
8/23/2006 9.55% 4.89% 4.66%
9/1/2006 10.54% 4.90% 5.64%
9/14/2006 10.00% 4.91% 5.09%
10/6/2006 9.67% 4.92% 4.75%
11/21/2006 10.08% 4.95% 5.13%
11/21/2006 10.08% 4.95% 5.13%
11/21/2006 10.12% 4.95% 5.17%
12/1/2006 10.25% 4.95% 5.30%
12/1/2006 10.50% 4.95% 5.55%
12/7/2006 10.75% 4.95% 5.80%
12/21/2006 10.90% 4.95% 5.95%
12/21/2006 11.25% 4.95% 6.30%
12/22/2006 10.25% 4.95% 5.30%
1/5/2007 10.00% 4.95% 5.05%
1/11/2007 10.10% 4.95% 5.15%
1/11/2007 10.10% 4.95% 5.15%
1/11/2007 10.90% 4.95% 5.95%
1/12/2007 10.10% 4.95% 5.15%
1/13/2007 10.40% 4.95% 5.45%
1/19/2007 10.80% 4.94% 5.86%
3/21/2007 11.35% 4.87% 6.48%
3/22/2007 9.75% 4.86% 4.89%
5/15/2007 10.00% 4.81% 5.19%
5/17/2007 10.25% 4.81% 5.44%
5/17/2007 10.25% 4.81% 5.44%
5/22/2007 10.20% 4.80% 5.40%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 24 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
5/22/2007 10.50% 4.80% 5.70%
5/23/2007 10.70% 4.80% 5.90%
5/25/2007 9.67% 4.80% 4.87%
6/15/2007 9.90% 4.82% 5.08%
6/21/2007 10.20% 4.83% 5.37%
6/22/2007 10.50% 4.83% 5.67%
6/28/2007 10.75% 4.84% 5.91%
7/12/2007 9.67% 4.86% 4.81%
7/19/2007 10.00% 4.87% 5.13%
7/19/2007 10.00% 4.87% 5.13%
8/15/2007 10.40% 4.88% 5.52%
10/9/2007 10.00% 4.91% 5.09%
10/17/2007 9.10% 4.91% 4.19%
10/31/2007 9.96% 4.90% 5.06%
11/29/2007 10.90% 4.87% 6.03%
12/6/2007 10.75% 4.86% 5.89%
12/13/2007 9.96% 4.86% 5.10%
12/14/2007 10.70% 4.86% 5.84%
12/14/2007 10.80% 4.86% 5.94%
12/19/2007 10.20% 4.86% 5.34%
12/20/2007 10.20% 4.85% 5.35%
12/20/2007 11.00% 4.85% 6.15%
12/28/2007 10.25% 4.85% 5.40%
12/31/2007 11.25% 4.85% 6.40%
1/8/2008 10.75% 4.83% 5.92%
1/17/2008 10.75% 4.81% 5.94%
1/28/2008 9.40% 4.80% 4.60%
1/30/2008 10.00% 4.79% 5.21%
1/31/2008 10.71% 4.79% 5.92%
2/29/2008 10.25% 4.75% 5.50%
3/12/2008 10.25% 4.73% 5.52%
3/25/2008 9.10% 4.68% 4.42%
4/22/2008 10.25% 4.60% 5.65%
4/24/2008 10.10% 4.60% 5.50%
5/1/2008 10.70% 4.59% 6.11%
5/19/2008 11.00% 4.56% 6.44%
5/27/2008 10.00% 4.55% 5.45%
6/10/2008 10.70% 4.54% 6.16%
6/27/2008 10.50% 4.54% 5.96%
6/27/2008 11.04% 4.54% 6.50%
7/10/2008 10.43% 4.52% 5.91%
7/16/2008 9.40% 4.52% 4.88%
7/30/2008 10.80% 4.51% 6.29%
7/31/2008 10.70% 4.51% 6.19%
8/11/2008 10.25% 4.51% 5.74%
8/26/2008 10.18% 4.50% 5.68%
9/10/2008 10.30% 4.50% 5.80%
9/24/2008 10.65% 4.48% 6.17%
9/24/2008 10.65% 4.48% 6.17%
9/24/2008 10.65% 4.48% 6.17%
9/30/2008 10.20% 4.48% 5.72%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 25 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
10/8/2008 10.15% 4.46% 5.69%
11/13/2008 10.55% 4.45% 6.10%
11/17/2008 10.20% 4.44% 5.76%
12/1/2008 10.25% 4.40% 5.85%
12/23/2008 11.00% 4.27% 6.73%
12/29/2008 10.00% 4.24% 5.76%
12/29/2008 10.20% 4.24% 5.96%
12/31/2008 10.75% 4.22% 6.53%
1/14/2009 10.50% 4.15% 6.35%
1/21/2009 10.50% 4.12% 6.38%
1/21/2009 10.50% 4.12% 6.38%
1/21/2009 10.50% 4.12% 6.38%
1/27/2009 10.76% 4.09% 6.67%
1/30/2009 10.50% 4.08% 6.42%
2/4/2009 8.75% 4.06% 4.69%
3/4/2009 10.50% 3.96% 6.54%
3/12/2009 11.50% 3.93% 7.57%
4/2/2009 11.10% 3.85% 7.25%
4/21/2009 10.61% 3.80% 6.81%
4/24/2009 10.00% 3.79% 6.21%
4/30/2009 11.25% 3.78% 7.47%
5/4/2009 10.74% 3.77% 6.97%
5/20/2009 10.25% 3.74% 6.51%
5/28/2009 10.50% 3.74% 6.76%
6/22/2009 10.00% 3.76% 6.24%
6/24/2009 10.80% 3.77% 7.03%
7/8/2009 10.63% 3.77% 6.86%
7/17/2009 10.50% 3.78% 6.72%
8/31/2009 10.25% 3.82% 6.43%
10/14/2009 10.70% 4.01% 6.69%
10/23/2009 10.88% 4.06% 6.82%
11/2/2009 10.70% 4.09% 6.61%
11/3/2009 10.70% 4.10% 6.60%
11/24/2009 10.25% 4.15% 6.10%
11/25/2009 10.75% 4.16% 6.59%
11/30/2009 10.35% 4.17% 6.18%
12/3/2009 10.50% 4.18% 6.32%
12/7/2009 10.70% 4.18% 6.52%
12/16/2009 10.90% 4.21% 6.69%
12/16/2009 11.00% 4.21% 6.79%
12/18/2009 10.40% 4.22% 6.18%
12/18/2009 10.40% 4.22% 6.18%
12/22/2009 10.20% 4.23% 5.97%
12/22/2009 10.40% 4.23% 6.17%
12/22/2009 10.40% 4.23% 6.17%
12/30/2009 10.00% 4.26% 5.74%
1/4/2010 10.80% 4.28% 6.52%
1/11/2010 11.00% 4.30% 6.70%
1/26/2010 10.13% 4.35% 5.78%
1/27/2010 10.40% 4.35% 6.05%
1/27/2010 10.40% 4.35% 6.05%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 26 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
1/27/2010 10.70% 4.35% 6.35%
2/9/2010 9.80% 4.38% 5.42%
2/18/2010 10.60% 4.40% 6.20%
2/24/2010 10.18% 4.41% 5.77%
3/2/2010 9.63% 4.41% 5.22%
3/4/2010 10.50% 4.41% 6.09%
3/5/2010 10.50% 4.41% 6.09%
3/11/2010 11.90% 4.42% 7.48%
3/17/2010 10.00% 4.41% 5.59%
3/25/2010 10.15% 4.42% 5.73%
4/2/2010 10.10% 4.43% 5.67%
4/27/2010 10.00% 4.46% 5.54%
4/29/2010 9.90% 4.46% 5.44%
4/29/2010 10.06% 4.46% 5.60%
4/29/2010 10.26% 4.46% 5.80%
5/12/2010 10.30% 4.45% 5.85%
5/12/2010 10.30% 4.45% 5.85%
5/28/2010 10.10% 4.44% 5.66%
5/28/2010 10.20% 4.44% 5.76%
6/7/2010 10.30% 4.44% 5.86%
6/16/2010 10.00% 4.44% 5.56%
6/28/2010 9.67% 4.43% 5.24%
6/28/2010 10.50% 4.43% 6.07%
6/30/2010 9.40% 4.43% 4.97%
7/1/2010 10.25% 4.43% 5.82%
7/15/2010 10.53% 4.43% 6.10%
7/15/2010 10.70% 4.43% 6.27%
7/30/2010 10.70% 4.41% 6.29%
8/4/2010 10.50% 4.41% 6.09%
8/6/2010 9.83% 4.41% 5.42%
8/25/2010 9.90% 4.37% 5.53%
9/3/2010 10.60% 4.35% 6.25%
9/14/2010 10.70% 4.33% 6.37%
9/16/2010 10.00% 4.33% 5.67%
9/16/2010 10.00% 4.33% 5.67%
9/30/2010 9.75% 4.29% 5.46%
10/14/2010 10.35% 4.24% 6.11%
10/28/2010 10.70% 4.21% 6.49%
11/2/2010 10.38% 4.20% 6.18%
11/4/2010 10.70% 4.20% 6.50%
11/19/2010 10.20% 4.18% 6.02%
11/22/2010 10.00% 4.18% 5.82%
12/1/2010 10.13% 4.16% 5.97%
12/6/2010 9.86% 4.15% 5.71%
12/9/2010 10.25% 4.15% 6.10%
12/13/2010 10.70% 4.15% 6.55%
12/14/2010 10.13% 4.15% 5.98%
12/15/2010 10.44% 4.15% 6.29%
12/17/2010 10.00% 4.15% 5.85%
12/20/2010 10.60% 4.15% 6.45%
12/21/2010 10.30% 4.14% 6.16%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 27 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
12/27/2010 9.90% 4.14% 5.76%
12/29/2010 11.15% 4.14% 7.01%
1/5/2011 10.15% 4.13% 6.02%
1/12/2011 10.30% 4.12% 6.18%
1/13/2011 10.30% 4.12% 6.18%
1/18/2011 10.00% 4.12% 5.88%
1/20/2011 9.30% 4.12% 5.18%
1/20/2011 10.13% 4.12% 6.01%
1/31/2011 9.60% 4.12% 5.48%
2/3/2011 10.00% 4.12% 5.88%
2/25/2011 10.00% 4.14% 5.86%
3/25/2011 9.80% 4.18% 5.62%
3/30/2011 10.00% 4.18% 5.82%
4/12/2011 10.00% 4.21% 5.79%
4/25/2011 10.74% 4.23% 6.51%
4/26/2011 9.67% 4.23% 5.44%
4/27/2011 10.40% 4.24% 6.16%
5/4/2011 10.00% 4.24% 5.76%
5/4/2011 10.00% 4.24% 5.76%
5/24/2011 10.50% 4.27% 6.23%
6/8/2011 10.75% 4.30% 6.45%
6/16/2011 9.20% 4.32% 4.88%
6/17/2011 9.95% 4.32% 5.63%
7/13/2011 10.20% 4.36% 5.84%
8/1/2011 9.20% 4.39% 4.81%
8/8/2011 10.00% 4.38% 5.62%
8/11/2011 10.00% 4.38% 5.62%
8/12/2011 10.35% 4.37% 5.98%
8/19/2011 10.25% 4.36% 5.89%
9/2/2011 12.88% 4.32% 8.56%
9/22/2011 10.00% 4.24% 5.76%
10/12/2011 10.30% 4.14% 6.16%
10/20/2011 10.50% 4.10% 6.40%
11/30/2011 10.90% 3.87% 7.03%
11/30/2011 10.90% 3.87% 7.03%
12/14/2011 10.00% 3.80% 6.20%
12/14/2011 10.30% 3.80% 6.50%
12/20/2011 10.20% 3.76% 6.44%
12/21/2011 10.20% 3.76% 6.44%
12/22/2011 9.90% 3.75% 6.15%
12/22/2011 10.40% 3.75% 6.65%
12/23/2011 10.19% 3.74% 6.45%
1/25/2012 10.50% 3.57% 6.93%
1/27/2012 10.50% 3.56% 6.94%
2/15/2012 10.20% 3.47% 6.73%
2/23/2012 9.90% 3.44% 6.46%
2/27/2012 10.25% 3.43% 6.82%
2/29/2012 10.40% 3.41% 6.99%
3/29/2012 10.37% 3.32% 7.05%
4/4/2012 10.00% 3.30% 6.70%
4/26/2012 10.00% 3.21% 6.79%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 28 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
5/2/2012 10.00% 3.18% 6.82%
5/7/2012 9.80% 3.17% 6.63%
5/15/2012 10.00% 3.14% 6.86%
5/29/2012 10.05% 3.11% 6.94%
6/7/2012 10.30% 3.08% 7.22%
6/14/2012 9.40% 3.06% 6.34%
6/15/2012 10.40% 3.06% 7.34%
6/18/2012 9.60% 3.06% 6.54%
6/19/2012 9.25% 3.05% 6.20%
6/26/2012 10.10% 3.04% 7.06%
6/29/2012 10.00% 3.04% 6.96%
7/9/2012 10.20% 3.03% 7.17%
7/16/2012 9.80% 3.02% 6.78%
7/20/2012 9.31% 3.01% 6.30%
7/20/2012 9.81% 3.01% 6.80%
9/13/2012 9.80% 2.94% 6.86%
9/19/2012 9.80% 2.94% 6.86%
9/19/2012 10.05% 2.94% 7.11%
9/26/2012 9.50% 2.94% 6.56%
10/12/2012 9.60% 2.93% 6.67%
10/23/2012 9.75% 2.93% 6.82%
10/24/2012 10.30% 2.93% 7.37%
11/9/2012 10.30% 2.92% 7.38%
11/28/2012 10.40% 2.90% 7.50%
11/29/2012 9.75% 2.89% 6.86%
11/29/2012 9.88% 2.89% 6.99%
12/5/2012 9.71% 2.89% 6.82%
12/5/2012 10.40% 2.89% 7.51%
12/12/2012 9.80% 2.88% 6.92%
12/13/2012 9.50% 2.88% 6.62%
12/13/2012 10.50% 2.88% 7.62%
12/14/2012 10.40% 2.88% 7.52%
12/19/2012 9.71% 2.87% 6.84%
12/19/2012 10.25% 2.87% 7.38%
12/20/2012 9.50% 2.87% 6.63%
12/20/2012 9.80% 2.87% 6.93%
12/20/2012 10.25% 2.87% 7.38%
12/20/2012 10.25% 2.87% 7.38%
12/20/2012 10.30% 2.87% 7.43%
12/20/2012 10.40% 2.87% 7.53%
12/20/2012 10.45% 2.87% 7.58%
12/21/2012 10.20% 2.87% 7.33%
12/26/2012 9.80% 2.86% 6.94%
1/9/2013 9.70% 2.85% 6.85%
1/9/2013 9.70% 2.85% 6.85%
1/9/2013 9.70% 2.85% 6.85%
1/16/2013 9.60% 2.84% 6.76%
1/16/2013 9.60% 2.84% 6.76%
2/13/2013 10.20% 2.84% 7.36%
2/22/2013 9.75% 2.85% 6.90%
2/27/2013 10.00% 2.86% 7.14%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 29 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
3/14/2013 9.30% 2.88% 6.42%
3/27/2013 9.80% 2.90% 6.90%
5/1/2013 9.84% 2.94% 6.90%
5/15/2013 10.30% 2.96% 7.34%
5/30/2013 10.20% 2.98% 7.22%
5/31/2013 9.00% 2.98% 6.02%
6/11/2013 10.00% 3.00% 7.00%
6/21/2013 9.75% 3.02% 6.73%
6/25/2013 9.80% 3.03% 6.77%
7/12/2013 9.36% 3.07% 6.29%
8/8/2013 9.83% 3.14% 6.69%
8/14/2013 9.15% 3.16% 5.99%
9/11/2013 10.20% 3.26% 6.94%
9/11/2013 10.25% 3.26% 6.99%
9/24/2013 10.20% 3.31% 6.89%
10/3/2013 9.65% 3.33% 6.32%
11/6/2013 10.20% 3.41% 6.79%
11/21/2013 10.00% 3.44% 6.56%
11/26/2013 10.00% 3.45% 6.55%
12/3/2013 10.25% 3.47% 6.78%
12/4/2013 9.50% 3.47% 6.03%
12/5/2013 10.20% 3.48% 6.72%
12/9/2013 8.72% 3.48% 5.24%
12/9/2013 9.75% 3.48% 6.27%
12/13/2013 9.75% 3.50% 6.25%
12/16/2013 9.95% 3.50% 6.45%
12/16/2013 9.95% 3.50% 6.45%
12/16/2013 10.12% 3.50% 6.62%
12/17/2013 9.50% 3.51% 5.99%
12/17/2013 10.95% 3.51% 7.44%
12/18/2013 8.72% 3.51% 5.21%
12/18/2013 9.80% 3.51% 6.29%
12/19/2013 10.15% 3.51% 6.64%
12/30/2013 9.50% 3.54% 5.96%
2/20/2014 9.20% 3.68% 5.52%
2/26/2014 9.75% 3.69% 6.06%
3/17/2014 9.55% 3.72% 5.83%
3/26/2014 9.40% 3.73% 5.67%
3/26/2014 9.96% 3.73% 6.23%
4/2/2014 9.70% 3.73% 5.97%
5/16/2014 9.80% 3.70% 6.10%
5/30/2014 9.70% 3.68% 6.02%
6/6/2014 10.40% 3.67% 6.73%
6/30/2014 9.55% 3.64% 5.91%
7/2/2014 9.62% 3.64% 5.98%
7/10/2014 9.95% 3.63% 6.32%
7/23/2014 9.75% 3.61% 6.14%
7/29/2014 9.45% 3.60% 5.85%
7/31/2014 9.90% 3.60% 6.30%
8/20/2014 9.75% 3.57% 6.18%
8/25/2014 9.60% 3.56% 6.04%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 30 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
8/29/2014 9.80% 3.54% 6.26%
9/11/2014 9.60% 3.51% 6.09%
9/15/2014 10.25% 3.51% 6.74%
10/9/2014 9.80% 3.45% 6.35%
11/6/2014 9.56% 3.37% 6.19%
11/6/2014 10.20% 3.37% 6.83%
11/14/2014 10.20% 3.35% 6.85%
11/26/2014 9.70% 3.33% 6.37%
11/26/2014 10.20% 3.33% 6.87%
12/4/2014 9.68% 3.31% 6.37%
12/10/2014 9.25% 3.29% 5.96%
12/10/2014 9.25% 3.29% 5.96%
12/11/2014 10.07% 3.29% 6.78%
12/12/2014 10.20% 3.28% 6.92%
12/17/2014 9.17% 3.27% 5.90%
12/18/2014 9.83% 3.26% 6.57%
1/23/2015 9.50% 3.14% 6.36%
2/24/2015 9.83% 3.04% 6.79%
3/18/2015 9.75% 2.98% 6.77%
3/25/2015 9.50% 2.96% 6.54%
3/26/2015 9.72% 2.95% 6.77%
4/23/2015 10.20% 2.87% 7.33%
4/29/2015 9.53% 2.86% 6.67%
5/1/2015 9.60% 2.85% 6.75%
5/26/2015 9.75% 2.83% 6.92%
6/17/2015 9.00% 2.82% 6.18%
6/17/2015 9.00% 2.82% 6.18%
9/2/2015 9.50% 2.79% 6.71%
9/10/2015 9.30% 2.79% 6.51%
10/15/2015 9.00% 2.81% 6.19%
11/19/2015 10.00% 2.88% 7.12%
11/19/2015 10.30% 2.88% 7.42%
12/3/2015 10.00% 2.90% 7.10%
12/9/2015 9.14% 2.90% 6.24%
12/9/2015 9.14% 2.90% 6.24%
12/11/2015 10.30% 2.90% 7.40%
12/15/2015 9.60% 2.91% 6.69%
12/17/2015 9.70% 2.91% 6.79%
12/18/2015 9.50% 2.91% 6.59%
12/30/2015 9.50% 2.93% 6.57%
1/6/2016 9.50% 2.94% 6.56%
2/23/2016 9.75% 2.94% 6.81%
3/16/2016 9.85% 2.91% 6.94%
4/29/2016 9.80% 2.83% 6.97%
6/3/2016 9.75% 2.80% 6.95%
6/8/2016 9.48% 2.80% 6.68%
6/15/2016 9.00% 2.78% 6.22%
6/15/2016 9.00% 2.78% 6.22%
7/18/2016 9.98% 2.71% 7.27%
8/9/2016 9.85% 2.66% 7.19%
8/18/2016 9.50% 2.63% 6.87%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 31 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
8/24/2016 9.75% 2.62% 7.13%
9/1/2016 9.50% 2.59% 6.91%
9/8/2016 10.00% 2.58% 7.42%
9/28/2016 9.58% 2.54% 7.04%
9/30/2016 9.90% 2.53% 7.37%
11/9/2016 9.80% 2.48% 7.32%
11/10/2016 9.50% 2.48% 7.02%
11/15/2016 9.55% 2.49% 7.06%
11/18/2016 10.00% 2.50% 7.50%
11/29/2016 10.55% 2.51% 8.04%
12/1/2016 10.00% 2.51% 7.49%
12/6/2016 8.64% 2.52% 6.12%
12/6/2016 8.64% 2.52% 6.12%
12/7/2016 10.10% 2.52% 7.58%
12/12/2016 9.60% 2.53% 7.07%
12/14/2016 9.10% 2.53% 6.57%
12/19/2016 9.00% 2.54% 6.46%
12/19/2016 9.37% 2.54% 6.83%
12/22/2016 9.60% 2.55% 7.05%
12/22/2016 9.90% 2.55% 7.35%
12/28/2016 9.50% 2.55% 6.95%
1/18/2017 9.45% 2.58% 6.87%
1/24/2017 9.00% 2.59% 6.41%
1/31/2017 10.10% 2.60% 7.50%
2/15/2017 9.60% 2.62% 6.98%
2/22/2017 9.60% 2.64% 6.96%
2/24/2017 9.75% 2.64% 7.11%
2/28/2017 10.10% 2.64% 7.46%
3/2/2017 9.41% 2.65% 6.76%
3/20/2017 9.50% 2.68% 6.82%
4/4/2017 10.25% 2.71% 7.54%
4/12/2017 9.40% 2.74% 6.66%
4/20/2017 9.50% 2.76% 6.74%
5/3/2017 9.50% 2.79% 6.71%
5/11/2017 9.20% 2.81% 6.39%
5/18/2017 9.50% 2.83% 6.67%
5/23/2017 9.70% 2.84% 6.86%
6/16/2017 9.65% 2.89% 6.76%
6/22/2017 9.70% 2.90% 6.80%
6/22/2017 9.70% 2.90% 6.80%
7/24/2017 9.50% 2.95% 6.55%
8/15/2017 10.00% 2.97% 7.03%
9/22/2017 9.60% 2.93% 6.67%
9/28/2017 9.80% 2.92% 6.88%
10/20/2017 9.50% 2.91% 6.59%
10/26/2017 10.20% 2.91% 7.29%
10/26/2017 10.25% 2.91% 7.34%
10/26/2017 10.30% 2.91% 7.39%
11/6/2017 10.25% 2.90% 7.35%
11/15/2017 11.95% 2.89% 9.06%
11/30/2017 10.00% 2.88% 7.12%
Exhibit RBH-4
Page 32 of 32
[6] [7] [8] [9]

Date of 30-Year
11/30/2017 10.00% 2.88% 7.12%
12/5/2017 9.50% 2.88% 6.62%
12/6/2017 8.40% 2.87% 5.53%
12/6/2017 8.40% 2.87% 5.53%
12/7/2017 9.80% 2.87% 6.93%
12/14/2017 9.60% 2.86% 6.74%
12/14/2017 9.65% 2.86% 6.79%
12/18/2017 9.50% 2.86% 6.64%
12/20/2017 9.58% 2.86% 6.72%
12/21/2017 9.10% 2.85% 6.25%
12/28/2017 9.50% 2.85% 6.65%
12/29/2017 9.51% 2.85% 6.66%
1/18/2018 9.70% 2.84% 6.86%
1/31/2018 9.30% 2.84% 6.46%
2/2/2018 9.98% 2.84% 7.14%
2/23/2018 9.90% 2.85% 7.05%
3/12/2018 9.25% 2.86% 6.39%
3/15/2018 9.00% 2.87% 6.13%
3/29/2018 10.00% 2.88% 7.12%
4/12/2018 9.90% 2.89% 7.01%
4/13/2018 9.73% 2.89% 6.84%
4/18/2018 9.25% 2.89% 6.36%
4/18/2018 10.00% 2.89% 7.11%
4/26/2018 9.50% 2.90% 6.60%
5/30/2018 9.95% 2.94% 7.01%
5/31/2018 9.50% 2.94% 6.56%
6/14/2018 8.80% 2.96% 5.84%
# of Cases: 1,556
Average: 4.63%
Exhibit RBH-5
Page 1 of 3
Constant Growth Discounted Cash Flow Model with Half Year Growth Adjustment
30 Day Average Stock Price
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
Average Expected Zacks First Call Value Line Average
Annualized Stock Dividend Dividend Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Low Mean High
Company Ticker Dividend Price Yield Yield Growth Growth Growth Growth ROE ROE ROE
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.24 $75.23 2.98% 3.06% 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.67% 8.05% 8.73% 9.07%
Alliant Energy Corporation LNT $1.34 $40.60 3.30% 3.40% 5.60% 5.85% 6.50% 5.98% 8.99% 9.38% 9.91%
Ameren Corporation AEE $1.83 $57.18 3.20% 3.31% 6.50% 6.30% 7.50% 6.77% 9.60% 10.08% 10.82%
American Electric Power Company, Inc. AEP $2.48 $66.01 3.76% 3.86% 5.70% 5.79% 4.50% 5.33% 8.34% 9.19% 9.66%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.73 $51.90 3.33% 3.51% 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 10.83% 12.58% 14.34% 16.55%
Black Hills Corporation BKH $1.90 $57.15 3.32% 3.40% 4.10% 3.86% 5.00% 4.32% 7.25% 7.72% 8.41%
CMS Energy Corporation CMS $1.43 $44.60 3.21% 3.32% 6.40% 7.05% 7.00% 6.82% 9.71% 10.13% 10.37%
DTE Energy Company DTE $3.53 $100.10 3.53% 3.63% 5.30% 5.59% 7.00% 5.96% 8.92% 9.60% 10.65%
Duke Energy Corporation DUK $3.56 $75.51 4.71% 4.83% 4.70% 4.22% 5.50% 4.81% 9.03% 9.63% 10.34%
El Paso Electric EE $1.44 $56.46 2.55% 2.61% 5.10% 5.20% 4.50% 4.93% 7.11% 7.55% 7.82%
Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. HE $1.24 $33.60 3.69% 3.81% 7.10% 9.10% 3.50% 6.57% 7.26% 10.38% 12.96%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.36 $89.53 2.64% 2.68% 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.50% 5.78% 6.18% 6.59%
NextEra Energy, Inc. NEE $4.44 $159.84 2.78% 2.90% 8.60% 9.79% 8.50% 8.96% 11.40% 11.87% 12.70%
NorthWestern Corporation NWE $2.20 $53.53 4.11% 4.18% 3.00% 3.16% 3.50% 3.22% 7.17% 7.40% 7.68%
OGE Energy Corp. OGE $1.33 $34.04 3.91% 4.01% 6.00% 4.30% 6.00% 5.43% 8.29% 9.45% 10.02%
Otter Tail Corporation OTTR $1.34 $45.22 2.96% 3.09% NA 9.00% 7.50% 8.25% 10.57% 11.34% 12.10%
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation PNW $2.78 $76.97 3.61% 3.69% 4.50% 3.78% 5.00% 4.43% 7.46% 8.12% 8.70%
PNM Resources, Inc. PNM $1.06 $38.00 2.79% 2.87% 5.10% 4.30% 7.50% 5.63% 7.15% 8.50% 10.39%
Portland General Electric Company POR $1.45 $41.01 3.54% 3.59% 2.80% 2.65% 4.00% 3.15% 6.23% 6.74% 7.61%
Southern Company SO $2.40 $44.06 5.45% 5.54% 4.50% 2.72% 3.00% 3.41% 8.24% 8.95% 10.07%
WEC Energy Group, Inc. WEC $2.21 $61.25 3.61% 3.70% 4.10% 4.43% 7.00% 5.18% 7.78% 8.88% 10.73%
Xcel Energy Inc. XEL $1.52 $44.19 3.44% 3.54% 5.70% 5.89% 5.50% 5.70% 9.03% 9.23% 9.43%
Proxy Group Mean 3.47% 3.57% 5.42% 5.57% 5.91% 5.67% 8.45% 9.24% 10.12%
Proxy Group Median 3.38% 3.52% 5.30% 5.40% 5.50% 5.53% 8.27% 9.21% 10.05%
Notes:
[2] Source: Bloomberg Professional, equals indicated number of trading day average as of June 15, 2018
[3] Equals [1] / [2]
[4] Equals [3] x (1 + 0.5 x [8])
[5] Source: Zacks
[6] Source: Yahoo! Finance
[8] Equals Average([5], [6], [7])
[9] Equals [3] x (1 + 0.5 x Minimum([5], [6], [7])) + Minimum([5], [6], [7])
[10] Equals [4] + [8]
[11] Equals [3] x (1 + 0.5 x Maximum([5], [6], [7])) + Maximum([5], [6], [7])
Exhibit RBH-5
Page 2 of 3
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.24 $72.50 3.09% 3.18% 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.67% 8.17% 8.84% 9.18%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.73 $50.61 3.41% 3.60% 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 10.83% 12.67% 14.43% 16.64%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.36 $87.21 2.71% 2.75% 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.50% 5.85% 6.25% 6.66%
Proxy Group Mean 3.51% 3.61% 5.42% 5.57% 5.91% 5.67% 8.49% 9.29% 10.16%
Notes:
[3] Equals [1] / [2]
[4] Equals [3] x (1 + 0.5 x [8])
[5] Source: Zacks
[8] Equals Average([5], [6], [7])
[10] Equals [4] + [8]
Exhibit RBH-5
Page 3 of 3
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.24 $74.39 3.01% 3.10% 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.67% 8.09% 8.76% 9.10%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.73 $50.25 3.44% 3.63% 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 10.83% 12.70% 14.46% 16.66%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.36 $89.13 2.65% 2.69% 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.50% 5.79% 6.19% 6.60%
Proxy Group Mean 3.39% 3.48% 5.42% 5.57% 5.91% 5.67% 8.37% 9.16% 10.03%
Notes:
[3] Equals [1] / [2]
[4] Equals [3] x (1 + 0.5 x [8])
[5] Source: Zacks
[8] Equals Average([5], [6], [7])
[10] Equals [4] + [8]
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 1 of 55
Multi-Stage Growth Discounted Cash Flow Model

Average EPS Growth Rate Estimate in First Stage
Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Stock EPS Growth Rate Estimates Long-Term Payout Ratio Iterative Solution Terminal Terminal
Value PEG
Company Ticker Price Zacks First Call Line Average Growth 2018 2022 2028 Proof IRR P/E Ratio Ratio
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $75.23 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.67% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.55% 22.31 4.10
Alliant Energy Corporation LNT $40.60 5.60% 5.85% 6.50% 5.98% 5.45% 64.00% 64.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 9.17% 18.54 3.41
Ameren Corporation AEE $57.18 6.50% 6.30% 7.50% 6.77% 5.45% 60.00% 59.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.26% 18.12 3.33
American Electric Power Company, Inc. AEP $66.01 5.70% 5.79% 4.50% 5.33% 5.45% 67.00% 63.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 9.46% 17.25 3.17
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $51.90 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 10.83% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 8.83% 20.46 3.76
Black Hills Corporation BKH $57.15 4.10% 3.86% 5.00% 4.32% 5.45% 55.00% 60.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.41% 17.45 3.20
CMS Energy Corporation CMS $44.60 6.40% 7.05% 7.00% 6.82% 5.45% 61.00% 61.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.31% 17.89 3.28
DTE Energy Company DTE $100.10 5.30% 5.59% 7.00% 5.96% 5.45% 61.00% 60.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.74% 16.10 2.96
Duke Energy Corporation DUK $75.51 4.70% 4.22% 5.50% 4.81% 5.45% 76.00% 80.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 9.61% 16.62 3.05
El Paso Electric EE $56.46 5.10% 5.20% 4.50% 4.93% 5.45% 57.00% 61.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.45% 23.03 4.23
Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. HE $33.60 7.10% 9.10% 3.50% 6.57% 5.45% 66.00% 59.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 9.27% 18.09 3.32
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $89.53 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.50% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 8.45% 23.00 4.22
NextEra Energy, Inc. NEE $159.84 8.60% 9.79% 8.50% 8.96% 5.45% 55.00% 63.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 9.14% 18.69 3.43
NorthWestern Corporation NWE $53.53 3.00% 3.16% 3.50% 3.22% 5.45% 64.00% 64.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 9.42% 17.38 3.19
OGE Energy Corp. OGE $34.04 6.00% 4.30% 6.00% 5.43% 5.45% 69.00% 71.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.69% 16.29 2.99
Otter Tail Corporation OTTR $45.22 NA 9.00% 7.50% 8.25% 5.45% 66.00% 60.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.04% 19.24 3.53
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation PNW $76.97 4.50% 3.78% 5.00% 4.43% 5.45% 63.00% 63.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 9.40% 17.50 3.21
PNM Resources, Inc. PNM $38.00 5.10% 4.30% 7.50% 5.63% 5.45% 53.00% 50.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.05% 19.19 3.52
Portland General Electric Company POR $41.01 2.80% 2.65% 4.00% 3.15% 5.45% 64.00% 63.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 8.97% 19.61 3.60
Southern Company SO $44.06 4.50% 2.72% 3.00% 3.41% 5.45% 80.00% 74.00% 65.57% $0.00 10.43% 13.86 2.55
WEC Energy Group, Inc. WEC $61.25 4.10% 4.43% 7.00% 5.18% 5.45% 66.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.16% 18.63 3.42
Xcel Energy Inc. XEL $44.19 5.70% 5.89% 5.50% 5.70% 5.45% 62.00% 63.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 9.32% 17.86 3.28
Mean 9.23% 18.51
Max 10.43%
Min 8.45%
Projected Annual
Earnings per Share [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29]
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.31 $3.49 $3.69 $3.90 $4.12 $4.36 $4.60 $4.85 $5.12 $5.40 $5.70 $6.01 $6.34 $6.68 $7.04
Alliant Energy Corporation LNT $1.99 $2.11 $2.24 $2.37 $2.51 $2.66 $2.82 $2.98 $3.15 $3.33 $3.51 $3.70 $3.91 $4.12 $4.34 $4.58
Ameren Corporation AEE $2.77 $2.96 $3.16 $3.37 $3.60 $3.84 $4.09 $4.35 $4.62 $4.89 $5.17 $5.45 $5.75 $6.06 $6.39 $6.74
American Electric Power Company, Inc. AEP $3.62 $3.81 $4.02 $4.23 $4.46 $4.69 $4.94 $5.21 $5.49 $5.79 $6.10 $6.43 $6.78 $7.15 $7.54 $7.95
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.85 $2.05 $2.27 $2.52 $2.79 $3.07 $3.35 $3.62 $3.88 $4.13 $4.35 $4.59 $4.84 $5.10 $5.38
Black Hills Corporation BKH $3.38 $3.53 $3.68 $3.84 $4.00 $4.18 $4.36 $4.57 $4.79 $5.04 $5.30 $5.59 $5.89 $6.21 $6.55 $6.91
CMS Energy Corporation CMS $2.17 $2.32 $2.48 $2.64 $2.82 $3.02 $3.22 $3.42 $3.63 $3.84 $4.06 $4.28 $4.52 $4.76 $5.02 $5.30
DTE Energy Company DTE $5.73 $6.07 $6.43 $6.82 $7.22 $7.65 $8.10 $8.57 $9.06 $9.57 $10.10 $10.65 $11.23 $11.84 $12.49 $13.17
Duke Energy Corporation DUK $4.22 $4.42 $4.64 $4.86 $5.09 $5.34 $5.60 $5.88 $6.18 $6.50 $6.85 $7.23 $7.62 $8.03 $8.47 $8.93
El Paso Electric EE $2.42 $2.54 $2.66 $2.80 $2.93 $3.08 $3.23 $3.40 $3.57 $3.76 $3.97 $4.18 $4.41 $4.65 $4.90 $5.17
Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. HE $1.64 $1.75 $1.86 $1.98 $2.12 $2.25 $2.40 $2.55 $2.70 $2.86 $3.02 $3.18 $3.35 $3.54 $3.73 $3.93
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.36 $4.51 $4.67 $4.83 $5.00 $5.19 $5.41 $5.65 $5.92 $6.22 $6.56 $6.92 $7.30 $7.69 $8.11
NextEra Energy, Inc. NEE $6.50 $7.08 $7.72 $8.41 $9.16 $9.98 $10.82 $11.66 $12.50 $13.33 $14.14 $14.91 $15.72 $16.57 $17.48 $18.43
NorthWestern Corporation NWE $3.34 $3.45 $3.56 $3.67 $3.79 $3.91 $4.05 $4.21 $4.40 $4.60 $4.84 $5.10 $5.38 $5.67 $5.98 $6.31
OGE Energy Corp. OGE $1.92 $2.02 $2.13 $2.25 $2.37 $2.50 $2.64 $2.78 $2.93 $3.09 $3.26 $3.44 $3.62 $3.82 $4.03 $4.25
Otter Tail Corporation OTTR $1.86 $2.01 $2.18 $2.36 $2.55 $2.76 $2.98 $3.20 $3.42 $3.63 $3.85 $4.06 $4.28 $4.51 $4.76 $5.02
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation PNW $4.43 $4.63 $4.83 $5.04 $5.27 $5.50 $5.75 $6.03 $6.33 $6.65 $7.00 $7.38 $7.78 $8.21 $8.65 $9.13
PNM Resources, Inc. PNM $1.92 $2.03 $2.14 $2.26 $2.39 $2.53 $2.67 $2.82 $2.97 $3.13 $3.31 $3.49 $3.68 $3.88 $4.09 $4.31
Portland General Electric Company POR $2.29 $2.36 $2.44 $2.51 $2.59 $2.67 $2.77 $2.88 $3.00 $3.14 $3.30 $3.48 $3.67 $3.87 $4.08 $4.30
Southern Company SO $3.21 $3.32 $3.43 $3.55 $3.67 $3.80 $3.94 $4.10 $4.28 $4.48 $4.71 $4.97 $5.24 $5.53 $5.83 $6.14
WEC Energy Group, Inc. WEC $3.14 $3.30 $3.47 $3.65 $3.84 $4.04 $4.25 $4.48 $4.71 $4.97 $5.23 $5.52 $5.82 $6.14 $6.47 $6.82
Xcel Energy Inc. XEL $2.30 $2.43 $2.57 $2.72 $2.87 $3.03 $3.21 $3.39 $3.57 $3.77 $3.98 $4.20 $4.42 $4.67 $4.92 $5.19
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 2 of 55
Projected Annual
Dividend Payout Ratio [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44]
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.250% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Alliant Energy Corporation LNT 64.00% 64.00% 64.00% 64.000% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Ameren Corporation AEE 60.00% 59.75% 59.50% 59.250% 59.00% 60.10% 61.19% 62.29% 63.38% 64.48% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
American Electric Power Company, Inc. AEP 67.00% 66.00% 65.00% 64.000% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.500% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Black Hills Corporation BKH 55.00% 56.25% 57.50% 58.750% 60.00% 60.93% 61.86% 62.79% 63.71% 64.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
CMS Energy Corporation CMS 61.00% 61.00% 61.00% 61.000% 61.00% 61.76% 62.52% 63.29% 64.05% 64.81% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
DTE Energy Company DTE 61.00% 60.75% 60.50% 60.250% 60.00% 60.93% 61.86% 62.79% 63.71% 64.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Duke Energy Corporation DUK 76.00% 77.00% 78.00% 79.000% 80.00% 77.60% 75.19% 72.79% 70.38% 67.98% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
El Paso Electric EE 57.00% 58.00% 59.00% 60.000% 61.00% 61.76% 62.52% 63.29% 64.05% 64.81% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. HE 66.00% 64.25% 62.50% 60.750% 59.00% 60.10% 61.19% 62.29% 63.38% 64.48% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.500% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
NextEra Energy, Inc. NEE 55.00% 57.00% 59.00% 61.000% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
NorthWestern Corporation NWE 64.00% 64.00% 64.00% 64.000% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
OGE Energy Corp. OGE 69.00% 69.50% 70.00% 70.500% 71.00% 70.10% 69.19% 68.29% 67.38% 66.48% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Otter Tail Corporation OTTR 66.00% 64.50% 63.00% 61.500% 60.00% 60.93% 61.86% 62.79% 63.71% 64.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation PNW 63.00% 63.00% 63.00% 63.000% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
PNM Resources, Inc. PNM 53.00% 52.25% 51.50% 50.750% 50.00% 52.60% 55.19% 57.79% 60.38% 62.98% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Portland General Electric Company POR 64.00% 63.75% 63.50% 63.250% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Southern Company SO 80.00% 78.50% 77.00% 75.500% 74.00% 72.60% 71.19% 69.79% 68.38% 66.98% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
WEC Energy Group, Inc. WEC 66.00% 65.50% 65.00% 64.500% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Xcel Energy Inc. XEL 62.00% 62.25% 62.50% 62.750% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 Value
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.15 $2.26 $2.38 $2.51 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.14 $3.33 $3.53 $3.74 $3.94 $4.15 $4.38 $4.62 $157.16
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.41 $1.51 $1.61 $1.73 $1.84 $2.02 $2.20 $2.38 $2.55 $2.71 $2.85 $3.01 $3.17 $3.35 $3.53 $110.14
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.48 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.15 $3.29 $3.45 $3.63 $3.83 $4.05 $4.30 $4.54 $4.78 $5.04 $5.32 $186.56
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 3 of 55
Projected Annual Data

Investor Cash Flows [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] [76] [77]
Initial
Company Ticker Outflow 6/15/18 12/31/18 6/30/19 6/30/20 6/30/21 6/30/22 6/30/23 6/30/24 6/30/25 6/30/26 6/30/27 6/30/28 6/30/29 6/30/30 6/30/31 6/30/32
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($75.23) $0.00 $1.17 $2.21 $2.38 $2.51 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.14 $3.33 $3.53 $3.74 $3.94 $4.15 $4.38 $161.77
Alliant Energy Corporation LNT ($40.60) $0.00 $0.74 $1.39 $1.52 $1.61 $1.70 $1.81 $1.92 $2.04 $2.17 $2.29 $2.43 $2.56 $2.70 $2.85 $87.94
Ameren Corporation AEE ($57.18) $0.00 $0.97 $1.83 $2.01 $2.13 $2.27 $2.46 $2.66 $2.88 $3.10 $3.33 $3.57 $3.77 $3.97 $4.19 $126.51
American Electric Power Company, Inc. AEP ($66.01) $0.00 $1.39 $2.62 $2.75 $2.85 $2.96 $3.14 $3.33 $3.53 $3.75 $3.97 $4.22 $4.45 $4.69 $4.95 $142.39
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($51.90) $0.00 $0.77 $1.48 $1.61 $1.73 $1.84 $2.02 $2.20 $2.38 $2.55 $2.71 $2.85 $3.01 $3.17 $3.35 $113.67
Black Hills Corporation BKH ($57.15) $0.00 $1.06 $1.98 $2.21 $2.35 $2.51 $2.66 $2.83 $3.01 $3.21 $3.43 $3.66 $3.86 $4.07 $4.30 $125.06
CMS Energy Corporation CMS ($44.59) $0.00 $0.77 $1.46 $1.61 $1.72 $1.84 $1.99 $2.14 $2.30 $2.46 $2.63 $2.81 $2.96 $3.12 $3.29 $98.21
DTE Energy Company DTE ($100.10) $0.00 $2.02 $3.81 $4.12 $4.35 $4.59 $4.94 $5.30 $5.69 $6.10 $6.53 $6.98 $7.36 $7.77 $8.19 $220.61
Duke Energy Corporation DUK ($75.51) $0.00 $1.83 $3.44 $3.79 $4.02 $4.27 $4.34 $4.42 $4.50 $4.58 $4.66 $4.74 $5.00 $5.27 $5.55 $154.33
El Paso Electric EE ($56.45) $0.00 $0.79 $1.48 $1.65 $1.76 $1.88 $2.00 $2.12 $2.26 $2.41 $2.57 $2.74 $2.89 $3.05 $3.21 $122.41
Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. HE ($33.60) $0.00 $0.63 $1.19 $1.24 $1.28 $1.33 $1.44 $1.56 $1.68 $1.81 $1.95 $2.09 $2.20 $2.32 $2.45 $73.75
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($89.53) $0.00 $1.35 $2.53 $2.80 $2.97 $3.15 $3.29 $3.45 $3.63 $3.83 $4.05 $4.30 $4.54 $4.78 $5.04 $191.88
NextEra Energy, Inc. NEE ($159.84) $0.00 $2.12 $4.07 $4.96 $5.59 $6.29 $6.86 $7.45 $8.04 $8.63 $9.21 $9.77 $10.31 $10.87 $11.46 $356.55
NorthWestern Corporation NWE ($53.53) $0.00 $1.20 $2.24 $2.35 $2.43 $2.50 $2.61 $2.72 $2.85 $2.99 $3.16 $3.34 $3.53 $3.72 $3.92 $113.75
OGE Energy Corp. OGE ($34.04) $0.00 $0.76 $1.43 $1.58 $1.67 $1.78 $1.85 $1.92 $2.00 $2.08 $2.17 $2.25 $2.38 $2.51 $2.64 $72.02
Otter Tail Corporation OTTR ($45.22) $0.00 $0.72 $1.38 $1.49 $1.57 $1.66 $1.82 $1.98 $2.15 $2.32 $2.49 $2.66 $2.81 $2.96 $3.12 $99.85
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation PNW ($76.97) $0.00 $1.59 $2.98 $3.18 $3.32 $3.47 $3.65 $3.85 $4.07 $4.30 $4.56 $4.84 $5.10 $5.38 $5.67 $165.67
PNM Resources, Inc. PNM ($37.99) $0.00 $0.59 $1.11 $1.17 $1.21 $1.26 $1.40 $1.55 $1.72 $1.89 $2.08 $2.29 $2.41 $2.54 $2.68 $85.56
Portland General Electric Company POR ($41.01) $0.00 $0.82 $1.54 $1.60 $1.64 $1.68 $1.76 $1.84 $1.93 $2.03 $2.15 $2.28 $2.41 $2.54 $2.68 $87.19
Southern Company SO ($44.06) $0.00 $1.45 $2.70 $2.73 $2.77 $2.81 $2.86 $2.92 $2.99 $3.07 $3.16 $3.26 $3.44 $3.62 $3.82 $89.19
WEC Energy Group, Inc. WEC ($61.25) $0.00 $1.19 $2.24 $2.37 $2.48 $2.59 $2.73 $2.89 $3.05 $3.23 $3.42 $3.62 $3.82 $4.02 $4.24 $131.63
Xcel Energy Inc. XEL ($44.19) $0.00 $0.82 $1.55 $1.70 $1.80 $1.91 $2.03 $2.16 $2.30 $2.44 $2.59 $2.75 $2.90 $3.06 $3.23 $96.05
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 4 of 55

High EPS Growth Rate Estimate in First Stage
Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value High PEG
Company Ticker Price Zacks First Call Line Growth Growth 2018 2022 2028 Proof IRR P/E Ratio Ratio
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $75.23 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 6.00% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.61% 21.83 4.01
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $51.90 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 13.00% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 9.30% 17.92 3.29
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $89.53 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.90% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 8.53% 22.39 4.11
PNM Resources, Inc. PNM $38.00 5.10% 4.30% 7.50% 7.50% 5.45% 53.00% 50.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 9.50% 17.08 3.14
Mean 9.45% 17.54
Max 10.80%
Min 8.50%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.32 $3.52 $3.73 $3.95 $4.19 $4.44 $4.69 $4.96 $5.24 $5.53 $5.83 $6.15 $6.49 $6.84 $7.21
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.89 $2.13 $2.41 $2.72 $3.08 $3.44 $3.80 $4.15 $4.48 $4.78 $5.04 $5.31 $5.60 $5.91 $6.23
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.37 $4.54 $4.72 $4.91 $5.10 $5.31 $5.54 $5.80 $6.09 $6.41 $6.75 $7.12 $7.51 $7.92 $8.35
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 5 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.250% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.500% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.500% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.16 $2.28 $2.40 $2.54 $2.68 $2.85 $3.03 $3.22 $3.41 $3.61 $3.83 $4.03 $4.25 $4.48 $4.73 $157.43
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.43 $1.57 $1.71 $1.87 $2.03 $2.27 $2.50 $2.73 $2.94 $3.14 $3.30 $3.48 $3.67 $3.87 $4.09 $111.66
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.49 $2.66 $2.83 $3.02 $3.21 $3.37 $3.54 $3.73 $3.94 $4.17 $4.43 $4.67 $4.92 $5.19 $5.47 $186.94
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 6 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($75.23) $0.00 $1.18 $2.22 $2.40 $2.54 $2.68 $2.85 $3.03 $3.22 $3.41 $3.61 $3.83 $4.03 $4.25 $4.48 $162.16
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($51.90) $0.00 $0.78 $1.53 $1.71 $1.87 $2.03 $2.27 $2.50 $2.73 $2.94 $3.14 $3.30 $3.48 $3.67 $3.87 $115.75
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($89.53) $0.00 $1.36 $2.54 $2.83 $3.02 $3.21 $3.37 $3.54 $3.73 $3.94 $4.17 $4.43 $4.67 $4.92 $5.19 $192.42
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 7 of 55

Low EPS Growth Rate Estimate in First Stage
Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value Low PEG
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $75.23 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.41% 23.32 4.28
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $51.90 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 9.10% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 8.48% 22.83 4.19
CMS Energy Corporation CMS $44.60 6.40% 7.05% 7.00% 6.40% 5.45% 61.00% 61.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 9.21% 18.37 3.37
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $89.53 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.10% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 8.37% 23.63 4.34
Southern Company SO $44.06 4.50% 2.72% 3.00% 2.72% 5.45% 80.00% 74.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 10.21% 14.51 2.66
Mean 9.05% 19.48
Max 10.21%
Min 8.36%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.29 $3.45 $3.62 $3.80 $3.99 $4.20 $4.41 $4.64 $4.89 $5.15 $5.43 $5.73 $6.04 $6.37 $6.72
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.82 $1.99 $2.17 $2.37 $2.58 $2.80 $3.02 $3.24 $3.46 $3.67 $3.87 $4.08 $4.30 $4.53 $4.78
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.34 $4.48 $4.61 $4.76 $4.90 $5.08 $5.27 $5.50 $5.75 $6.05 $6.37 $6.72 $7.09 $7.47 $7.88
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 8 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.250% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.500% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.500% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.14 $2.23 $2.34 $2.44 $2.56 $2.70 $2.85 $3.01 $3.18 $3.37 $3.56 $3.76 $3.96 $4.18 $4.40 $156.62
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.38 $1.46 $1.54 $1.62 $1.70 $1.85 $1.99 $2.13 $2.27 $2.41 $2.53 $2.67 $2.82 $2.97 $3.13 $109.09
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.47 $2.62 $2.77 $2.93 $3.09 $3.22 $3.37 $3.53 $3.72 $3.94 $4.18 $4.41 $4.65 $4.90 $5.17 $186.19
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 9 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($75.23) $0.00 $1.16 $2.19 $2.34 $2.44 $2.56 $2.70 $2.85 $3.01 $3.18 $3.37 $3.56 $3.76 $3.96 $4.18 $161.03
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($51.90) $0.00 $0.75 $1.45 $1.54 $1.62 $1.70 $1.85 $1.99 $2.13 $2.27 $2.41 $2.53 $2.67 $2.82 $2.97 $112.23
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($89.53) $0.00 $1.35 $2.51 $2.77 $2.93 $3.09 $3.22 $3.37 $3.53 $3.72 $3.94 $4.18 $4.41 $4.65 $4.90 $191.36
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 10 of 55

Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value PEG
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $72.50 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.67% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.66% 21.49 3.95
Alliant Energy Corporation LNT $40.29 5.60% 5.85% 6.50% 5.98% 5.45% 64.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.20% 18.40 3.38
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $50.61 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 10.83% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.91% 19.96 3.66
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $87.21 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.50% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.53% 22.40 4.11
NextEra Energy, Inc. NEE $158.65 8.60% 9.79% 8.50% 8.96% 5.45% 55.00% 63.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.17% 18.56 3.41
Mean 9.28% 18.21
Max 10.40%
Min 8.53%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.31 $3.49 $3.69 $3.90 $4.12 $4.36 $4.60 $4.85 $5.12 $5.40 $5.70 $6.01 $6.34 $6.68 $7.04
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.85 $2.05 $2.27 $2.52 $2.79 $3.07 $3.35 $3.62 $3.88 $4.13 $4.35 $4.59 $4.84 $5.10 $5.38
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.36 $4.51 $4.67 $4.83 $5.00 $5.19 $5.41 $5.65 $5.92 $6.22 $6.56 $6.92 $7.30 $7.69 $8.11
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 11 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.250% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.500% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.500% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.15 $2.26 $2.38 $2.51 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.14 $3.33 $3.53 $3.74 $3.94 $4.15 $4.38 $4.62 $151.40
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.41 $1.51 $1.61 $1.73 $1.84 $2.02 $2.20 $2.38 $2.55 $2.71 $2.85 $3.01 $3.17 $3.35 $3.53 $107.42
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.48 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.15 $3.29 $3.45 $3.63 $3.83 $4.05 $4.30 $4.54 $4.78 $5.04 $5.32 $181.67
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 12 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($72.50) $0.00 $1.17 $2.21 $2.38 $2.51 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.14 $3.33 $3.53 $3.74 $3.94 $4.15 $4.38 $156.02
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($50.61) $0.00 $0.77 $1.48 $1.61 $1.73 $1.84 $2.02 $2.20 $2.38 $2.55 $2.71 $2.85 $3.01 $3.17 $3.35 $110.95
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($87.21) $0.00 $1.35 $2.53 $2.80 $2.97 $3.15 $3.29 $3.45 $3.63 $3.83 $4.05 $4.30 $4.54 $4.78 $5.04 $186.99
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 13 of 55

Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value High PEG
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $72.50 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 6.00% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.73% 21.03 3.86
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $50.61 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 13.00% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.40% 17.48 3.21
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $87.21 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.90% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.62% 21.80 4.00
Mean 9.50% 17.28
Max 10.77%
Min 8.62%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.32 $3.52 $3.73 $3.95 $4.19 $4.44 $4.69 $4.96 $5.24 $5.53 $5.83 $6.15 $6.49 $6.84 $7.21
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.89 $2.13 $2.41 $2.72 $3.08 $3.44 $3.80 $4.15 $4.48 $4.78 $5.04 $5.31 $5.60 $5.91 $6.23
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.37 $4.54 $4.72 $4.91 $5.10 $5.31 $5.54 $5.80 $6.09 $6.41 $6.75 $7.12 $7.51 $7.92 $8.35
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 14 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% ###### 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Alliant Energy Corporation LNT 64.00% 64.00% 64.00% ###### 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Ameren Corporation AEE 60.00% 59.75% 59.50% ###### 59.00% 60.10% 61.19% 62.29% 63.38% 64.48% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
American Electric Power Company, Inc. AEP 67.00% 66.00% 65.00% ###### 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% ###### 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Black Hills Corporation BKH 55.00% 56.25% 57.50% ###### 60.00% 60.93% 61.86% 62.79% 63.71% 64.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
CMS Energy Corporation CMS 61.00% 61.00% 61.00% ###### 61.00% 61.76% 62.52% 63.29% 64.05% 64.81% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
DTE Energy Company DTE 61.00% 60.75% 60.50% ###### 60.00% 60.93% 61.86% 62.79% 63.71% 64.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Duke Energy Corporation DUK 76.00% 77.00% 78.00% ###### 80.00% 77.60% 75.19% 72.79% 70.38% 67.98% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
El Paso Electric EE 57.00% 58.00% 59.00% ###### 61.00% 61.76% 62.52% 63.29% 64.05% 64.81% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. HE 66.00% 64.25% 62.50% ###### 59.00% 60.10% 61.19% 62.29% 63.38% 64.48% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% ###### 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
NextEra Energy, Inc. NEE 55.00% 57.00% 59.00% ###### 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
NorthWestern Corporation NWE 64.00% 64.00% 64.00% ###### 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
OGE Energy Corp. OGE 69.00% 69.50% 70.00% ###### 71.00% 70.10% 69.19% 68.29% 67.38% 66.48% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Otter Tail Corporation OTTR 66.00% 64.50% 63.00% ###### 60.00% 60.93% 61.86% 62.79% 63.71% 64.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation PNW 63.00% 63.00% 63.00% ###### 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
PNM Resources, Inc. PNM 53.00% 52.25% 51.50% ###### 50.00% 52.60% 55.19% 57.79% 60.38% 62.98% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Portland General Electric Company POR 64.00% 63.75% 63.50% ###### 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Southern Company SO 80.00% 78.50% 77.00% ###### 74.00% 72.60% 71.19% 69.79% 68.38% 66.98% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
WEC Energy Group, Inc. WEC 66.00% 65.50% 65.00% ###### 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Xcel Energy Inc. XEL 62.00% 62.25% 62.50% ###### 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.16 $2.28 $2.40 $2.54 $2.68 $2.85 $3.03 $3.22 $3.41 $3.61 $3.83 $4.03 $4.25 $4.48 $4.73 $151.68
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.43 $1.57 $1.71 $1.87 $2.03 $2.27 $2.50 $2.73 $2.94 $3.14 $3.30 $3.48 $3.67 $3.87 $4.09 $108.94
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.49 $2.66 $2.83 $3.02 $3.21 $3.37 $3.54 $3.73 $3.94 $4.17 $4.43 $4.67 $4.92 $5.19 $5.47 $182.06
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 15 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($72.50) $0.00 $1.18 $2.22 $2.40 $2.54 $2.68 $2.85 $3.03 $3.22 $3.41 $3.61 $3.83 $4.03 $4.25 $4.48 $156.41
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($50.61) $0.00 $0.78 $1.53 $1.71 $1.87 $2.03 $2.27 $2.50 $2.73 $2.94 $3.14 $3.30 $3.48 $3.67 $3.87 $113.02
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($87.21) $0.00 $1.36 $2.54 $2.83 $3.02 $3.21 $3.37 $3.54 $3.73 $3.94 $4.17 $4.43 $4.67 $4.92 $5.19 $187.53
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 16 of 55

Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value Low PEG
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $72.50 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.52% 22.46 4.12
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $50.61 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 9.10% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.55% 22.26 4.09
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $87.21 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.10% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.45% 23.01 4.22
Mean 9.09% 19.19
Max 10.18%
Min 8.45%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.29 $3.45 $3.62 $3.80 $3.99 $4.20 $4.41 $4.64 $4.89 $5.15 $5.43 $5.73 $6.04 $6.37 $6.72
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.82 $1.99 $2.17 $2.37 $2.58 $2.80 $3.02 $3.24 $3.46 $3.67 $3.87 $4.08 $4.30 $4.53 $4.78
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.34 $4.48 $4.61 $4.76 $4.90 $5.08 $5.27 $5.50 $5.75 $6.05 $6.37 $6.72 $7.09 $7.47 $7.88
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 17 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.250% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.500% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.500% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.14 $2.23 $2.34 $2.44 $2.56 $2.70 $2.85 $3.01 $3.18 $3.37 $3.56 $3.76 $3.96 $4.18 $4.40 $150.87
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.38 $1.46 $1.54 $1.62 $1.70 $1.85 $1.99 $2.13 $2.27 $2.41 $2.53 $2.67 $2.82 $2.97 $3.13 $106.37
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.47 $2.62 $2.77 $2.93 $3.09 $3.22 $3.37 $3.53 $3.72 $3.94 $4.18 $4.41 $4.65 $4.90 $5.17 $181.30
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 18 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($72.50) $0.00 $1.16 $2.19 $2.34 $2.44 $2.56 $2.70 $2.85 $3.01 $3.18 $3.37 $3.56 $3.76 $3.96 $4.18 $155.28
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($50.61) $0.00 $0.75 $1.45 $1.54 $1.62 $1.70 $1.85 $1.99 $2.13 $2.27 $2.41 $2.53 $2.67 $2.82 $2.97 $109.51
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($87.21) $0.00 $1.35 $2.51 $2.77 $2.93 $3.09 $3.22 $3.37 $3.53 $3.72 $3.94 $4.18 $4.41 $4.65 $4.90 $186.47
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 19 of 55

Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value PEG
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $74.39 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.67% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.58% 22.06 4.05
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $50.25 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 10.83% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.94% 19.82 3.64
Black Hills Corporation BKH $57.41 4.10% 3.86% 5.00% 4.32% 5.45% 55.00% 60.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 9.39% 17.53 3.22
Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. HE $34.70 7.10% 9.10% 3.50% 6.57% 5.45% 66.00% 59.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.15% 18.68 3.43
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $89.13 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.50% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 8.47% 22.89 4.20
Mean 9.14% 18.88
Max 10.12%
Min 8.47%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.31 $3.49 $3.69 $3.90 $4.12 $4.36 $4.60 $4.85 $5.12 $5.40 $5.70 $6.01 $6.34 $6.68 $7.04
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.85 $2.05 $2.27 $2.52 $2.79 $3.07 $3.35 $3.62 $3.88 $4.13 $4.35 $4.59 $4.84 $5.10 $5.38
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.36 $4.51 $4.67 $4.83 $5.00 $5.19 $5.41 $5.65 $5.92 $6.22 $6.56 $6.92 $7.30 $7.69 $8.11
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 20 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.250% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.500% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.500% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.15 $2.26 $2.38 $2.51 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.14 $3.33 $3.53 $3.74 $3.94 $4.15 $4.38 $4.62 $155.38
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.41 $1.51 $1.61 $1.73 $1.84 $2.02 $2.20 $2.38 $2.55 $2.71 $2.85 $3.01 $3.17 $3.35 $3.53 $106.66
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.48 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.15 $3.29 $3.45 $3.63 $3.83 $4.05 $4.30 $4.54 $4.78 $5.04 $5.32 $185.72
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 21 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($74.39) $0.00 $1.17 $2.21 $2.38 $2.51 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.14 $3.33 $3.53 $3.74 $3.94 $4.15 $4.38 $160.00
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($50.25) $0.00 $0.77 $1.48 $1.61 $1.73 $1.84 $2.02 $2.20 $2.38 $2.55 $2.71 $2.85 $3.01 $3.17 $3.35 $110.19
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($89.13) $0.00 $1.35 $2.53 $2.80 $2.97 $3.15 $3.29 $3.45 $3.63 $3.83 $4.05 $4.30 $4.54 $4.78 $5.04 $191.04
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 22 of 55

Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value High PEG
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $74.39 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 6.00% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.65% 21.58 3.96
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $50.25 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 13.00% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.43% 17.36 3.19
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $89.13 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.90% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 8.55% 22.29 4.09
Mean 9.36% 17.89
Max 10.47%
Min 8.55%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.32 $3.52 $3.73 $3.95 $4.19 $4.44 $4.69 $4.96 $5.24 $5.53 $5.83 $6.15 $6.49 $6.84 $7.21
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.89 $2.13 $2.41 $2.72 $3.08 $3.44 $3.80 $4.15 $4.48 $4.78 $5.04 $5.31 $5.60 $5.91 $6.23
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.37 $4.54 $4.72 $4.91 $5.10 $5.31 $5.54 $5.80 $6.09 $6.41 $6.75 $7.12 $7.51 $7.92 $8.35
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 23 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.250% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.500% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.500% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.16 $2.28 $2.40 $2.54 $2.68 $2.85 $3.03 $3.22 $3.41 $3.61 $3.83 $4.03 $4.25 $4.48 $4.73 $155.66
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.43 $1.57 $1.71 $1.87 $2.03 $2.27 $2.50 $2.73 $2.94 $3.14 $3.30 $3.48 $3.67 $3.87 $4.09 $108.18
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.49 $2.66 $2.83 $3.02 $3.21 $3.37 $3.54 $3.73 $3.94 $4.17 $4.43 $4.67 $4.92 $5.19 $5.47 $186.10
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 24 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($74.39) $0.00 $1.18 $2.22 $2.40 $2.54 $2.68 $2.85 $3.03 $3.22 $3.41 $3.61 $3.83 $4.03 $4.25 $4.48 $160.39
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($50.25) $0.00 $0.78 $1.53 $1.71 $1.87 $2.03 $2.27 $2.50 $2.73 $2.94 $3.14 $3.30 $3.48 $3.67 $3.87 $112.27
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($89.13) $0.00 $1.36 $2.54 $2.83 $3.02 $3.21 $3.37 $3.54 $3.73 $3.94 $4.17 $4.43 $4.67 $4.92 $5.19 $191.58
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 25 of 55

Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value Low PEG
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $74.39 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.45% 23.05 4.23
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $50.25 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 9.10% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.57% 22.10 4.06
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $89.13 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.10% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 8.39% 23.52 4.32
Mean 8.96% 19.87
Max 9.91%
Min 8.39%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.29 $3.45 $3.62 $3.80 $3.99 $4.20 $4.41 $4.64 $4.89 $5.15 $5.43 $5.73 $6.04 $6.37 $6.72
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.82 $1.99 $2.17 $2.37 $2.58 $2.80 $3.02 $3.24 $3.46 $3.67 $3.87 $4.08 $4.30 $4.53 $4.78
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.34 $4.48 $4.61 $4.76 $4.90 $5.08 $5.27 $5.50 $5.75 $6.05 $6.37 $6.72 $7.09 $7.47 $7.88
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 26 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.250% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.500% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.500% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.14 $2.23 $2.34 $2.44 $2.56 $2.70 $2.85 $3.01 $3.18 $3.37 $3.56 $3.76 $3.96 $4.18 $4.40 $154.85
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.38 $1.46 $1.54 $1.62 $1.70 $1.85 $1.99 $2.13 $2.27 $2.41 $2.53 $2.67 $2.82 $2.97 $3.13 $105.62
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.47 $2.62 $2.77 $2.93 $3.09 $3.22 $3.37 $3.53 $3.72 $3.94 $4.18 $4.41 $4.65 $4.90 $5.17 $185.35
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 27 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($74.39) $0.00 $1.16 $2.19 $2.34 $2.44 $2.56 $2.70 $2.85 $3.01 $3.18 $3.37 $3.56 $3.76 $3.96 $4.18 $159.25
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($50.25) $0.00 $0.75 $1.45 $1.54 $1.62 $1.70 $1.85 $1.99 $2.13 $2.27 $2.41 $2.53 $2.67 $2.82 $2.97 $108.75
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($89.13) $0.00 $1.35 $2.51 $2.77 $2.93 $3.09 $3.22 $3.37 $3.53 $3.72 $3.94 $4.18 $4.41 $4.65 $4.90 $190.51
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 28 of 55
Multi-Stage Growth Discounted Cash Flow Model - Terminal P/E Ratio Equals 20.54
Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value
Company Ticker Price Zacks First Call Line Average Growth 2018 2022 2028 Proof IRR P/E Ratio PEG Ratio
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $75.23 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.67% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.04% 20.54 3.77
American Electric Power Company, Inc. AEP $66.01 5.70% 5.79% 4.50% 5.33% 5.45% 67.00% 63.00% 65.57% $0.00 10.50% 20.54 3.77
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $51.90 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 10.83% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 8.85% 20.54 3.77
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $89.53 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.50% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 7.76% 20.54 3.77
Otter Tail Corporation OTTR $45.22 NA 9.00% 7.50% 8.25% 5.45% 66.00% 60.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 9.44% 20.54 3.77
Portland General Electric Company POR $41.01 2.80% 2.65% 4.00% 3.15% 5.45% 64.00% 63.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.25% 20.54 3.77
Mean 9.89% 20.54
Max 12.65%
Min 7.75%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.31 $3.49 $3.69 $3.90 $4.12 $4.36 $4.60 $4.85 $5.12 $5.40 $5.70 $6.01 $6.34 $6.68 $7.04
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.85 $2.05 $2.27 $2.52 $2.79 $3.07 $3.35 $3.62 $3.88 $4.13 $4.35 $4.59 $4.84 $5.10 $5.38
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.36 $4.51 $4.67 $4.83 $5.00 $5.19 $5.41 $5.65 $5.92 $6.22 $6.56 $6.92 $7.30 $7.69 $8.11
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 29 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.25% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.50% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.50% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.15 $2.26 $2.38 $2.51 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.14 $3.33 $3.53 $3.74 $3.94 $4.15 $4.38 $4.62 $144.70
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.41 $1.51 $1.61 $1.73 $1.84 $2.02 $2.20 $2.38 $2.55 $2.71 $2.85 $3.01 $3.17 $3.35 $3.53 $110.58
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.48 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.15 $3.29 $3.45 $3.63 $3.83 $4.05 $4.30 $4.54 $4.78 $5.04 $5.32 $166.65
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 30 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($75.23) $0.00 $1.17 $2.21 $2.38 $2.51 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.14 $3.33 $3.53 $3.74 $3.94 $4.15 $4.38 $149.32
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($51.90) $0.00 $0.77 $1.48 $1.61 $1.73 $1.84 $2.02 $2.20 $2.38 $2.55 $2.71 $2.85 $3.01 $3.17 $3.35 $114.11
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($89.53) $0.00 $1.35 $2.53 $2.80 $2.97 $3.15 $3.29 $3.45 $3.63 $3.83 $4.05 $4.30 $4.54 $4.78 $5.04 $171.97
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 31 of 55
Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value High
Company Ticker Price Zacks First Call Line Growth Growth 2018 2022 2028 Proof IRR P/E Ratio PEG Ratio
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $75.23 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 6.00% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.24% 20.54 3.77
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $51.90 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 13.00% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 10.13% 20.54 3.77
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $89.53 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.90% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 8.01% 20.54 3.77
Mean 10.42% 20.54
Max 13.40%
Min 7.91%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.32 $3.52 $3.73 $3.95 $4.19 $4.44 $4.69 $4.96 $5.24 $5.53 $5.83 $6.15 $6.49 $6.84 $7.21
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.89 $2.13 $2.41 $2.72 $3.08 $3.44 $3.80 $4.15 $4.48 $4.78 $5.04 $5.31 $5.60 $5.91 $6.23
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.37 $4.54 $4.72 $4.91 $5.10 $5.31 $5.54 $5.80 $6.09 $6.41 $6.75 $7.12 $7.51 $7.92 $8.35
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 32 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.25% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.50% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.50% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.16 $2.28 $2.40 $2.54 $2.68 $2.85 $3.03 $3.22 $3.41 $3.61 $3.83 $4.03 $4.25 $4.48 $4.73 $148.16
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.43 $1.57 $1.71 $1.87 $2.03 $2.27 $2.50 $2.73 $2.94 $3.14 $3.30 $3.48 $3.67 $3.87 $4.09 $128.00
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.49 $2.66 $2.83 $3.02 $3.21 $3.37 $3.54 $3.73 $3.94 $4.17 $4.43 $4.67 $4.92 $5.19 $5.47 $171.53
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 33 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($75.23) $0.00 $1.18 $2.22 $2.40 $2.54 $2.68 $2.85 $3.03 $3.22 $3.41 $3.61 $3.83 $4.03 $4.25 $4.48 $152.89
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($51.90) $0.00 $0.78 $1.53 $1.71 $1.87 $2.03 $2.27 $2.50 $2.73 $2.94 $3.14 $3.30 $3.48 $3.67 $3.87 $132.09
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($89.53) $0.00 $1.36 $2.54 $2.83 $3.02 $3.21 $3.37 $3.54 $3.73 $3.94 $4.17 $4.43 $4.67 $4.92 $5.19 $177.01
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 34 of 55
Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value Low
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $75.23 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 7.63% 20.54 3.77
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $51.90 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 9.10% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 7.83% 20.54 3.77
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $89.53 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.10% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% ($0.00) 7.51% 20.54 3.77
Mean 9.40% 20.54
Max 12.19%
Min 7.48%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.29 $3.45 $3.62 $3.80 $3.99 $4.20 $4.41 $4.64 $4.89 $5.15 $5.43 $5.73 $6.04 $6.37 $6.72
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.82 $1.99 $2.17 $2.37 $2.58 $2.80 $3.02 $3.24 $3.46 $3.67 $3.87 $4.08 $4.30 $4.53 $4.78
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.34 $4.48 $4.61 $4.76 $4.90 $5.08 $5.27 $5.50 $5.75 $6.05 $6.37 $6.72 $7.09 $7.47 $7.88
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 35 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.25% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.50% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.50% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.14 $2.23 $2.34 $2.44 $2.56 $2.70 $2.85 $3.01 $3.18 $3.37 $3.56 $3.76 $3.96 $4.18 $4.40 $138.00
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.38 $1.46 $1.54 $1.62 $1.70 $1.85 $1.99 $2.13 $2.27 $2.41 $2.53 $2.67 $2.82 $2.97 $3.13 $98.19
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.47 $2.62 $2.77 $2.93 $3.09 $3.22 $3.37 $3.53 $3.72 $3.94 $4.18 $4.41 $4.65 $4.90 $5.17 $161.89
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 36 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($75.23) $0.00 $1.16 $2.19 $2.34 $2.44 $2.56 $2.70 $2.85 $3.01 $3.18 $3.37 $3.56 $3.76 $3.96 $4.18 $142.40
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($51.90) $0.00 $0.75 $1.45 $1.54 $1.62 $1.70 $1.85 $1.99 $2.13 $2.27 $2.41 $2.53 $2.67 $2.82 $2.97 $101.32
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($89.53) $0.00 $1.35 $2.51 $2.77 $2.93 $3.09 $3.22 $3.37 $3.53 $3.72 $3.94 $4.18 $4.41 $4.65 $4.90 $167.06
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 37 of 55
Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $72.50 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.67% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.39% 20.54 3.77
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $50.61 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 10.83% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.09% 20.54 3.77
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $87.21 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.50% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.01% 20.54 3.77
NorthWestern Corporation NWE $52.95 3.00% 3.16% 3.50% 3.22% 5.45% 64.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 10.53% 20.54 3.77
Xcel Energy Inc. XEL $44.41 5.70% 5.89% 5.50% 5.70% 5.45% 62.00% 63.00% 65.57% $0.00 10.10% 20.54 3.77
Mean 10.02% 20.54
Max 12.59%
Min 8.01%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.31 $3.49 $3.69 $3.90 $4.12 $4.36 $4.60 $4.85 $5.12 $5.40 $5.70 $6.01 $6.34 $6.68 $7.04
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.85 $2.05 $2.27 $2.52 $2.79 $3.07 $3.35 $3.62 $3.88 $4.13 $4.35 $4.59 $4.84 $5.10 $5.38
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.36 $4.51 $4.67 $4.83 $5.00 $5.19 $5.41 $5.65 $5.92 $6.22 $6.56 $6.92 $7.30 $7.69 $8.11
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 38 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.25% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.50% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.50% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.15 $2.26 $2.38 $2.51 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.14 $3.33 $3.53 $3.74 $3.94 $4.15 $4.38 $4.62 $144.70
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.41 $1.51 $1.61 $1.73 $1.84 $2.02 $2.20 $2.38 $2.55 $2.71 $2.85 $3.01 $3.17 $3.35 $3.53 $110.58
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.48 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.15 $3.29 $3.45 $3.63 $3.83 $4.05 $4.30 $4.54 $4.78 $5.04 $5.32 $166.65
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 39 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($72.50) $0.00 $1.17 $2.21 $2.38 $2.51 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.14 $3.33 $3.53 $3.74 $3.94 $4.15 $4.38 $149.32
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($50.61) $0.00 $0.77 $1.48 $1.61 $1.73 $1.84 $2.02 $2.20 $2.38 $2.55 $2.71 $2.85 $3.01 $3.17 $3.35 $114.11
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($87.21) $0.00 $1.35 $2.53 $2.80 $2.97 $3.15 $3.29 $3.45 $3.63 $3.83 $4.05 $4.30 $4.54 $4.78 $5.04 $171.97
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 40 of 55
Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value High
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $72.50 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 6.00% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.59% 20.54 3.77
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $50.61 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 13.00% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% $0.00 10.37% 20.54 3.77
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $87.21 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.90% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.25% 20.54 3.77
Mean 10.55% 20.54
Max 13.34%
Min 8.25%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.32 $3.52 $3.73 $3.95 $4.19 $4.44 $4.69 $4.96 $5.24 $5.53 $5.83 $6.15 $6.49 $6.84 $7.21
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.89 $2.13 $2.41 $2.72 $3.08 $3.44 $3.80 $4.15 $4.48 $4.78 $5.04 $5.31 $5.60 $5.91 $6.23
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.37 $4.54 $4.72 $4.91 $5.10 $5.31 $5.54 $5.80 $6.09 $6.41 $6.75 $7.12 $7.51 $7.92 $8.35
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 41 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.25% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.50% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.50% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.16 $2.28 $2.40 $2.54 $2.68 $2.85 $3.03 $3.22 $3.41 $3.61 $3.83 $4.03 $4.25 $4.48 $4.73 $148.16
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.43 $1.57 $1.71 $1.87 $2.03 $2.27 $2.50 $2.73 $2.94 $3.14 $3.30 $3.48 $3.67 $3.87 $4.09 $128.00
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.49 $2.66 $2.83 $3.02 $3.21 $3.37 $3.54 $3.73 $3.94 $4.17 $4.43 $4.67 $4.92 $5.19 $5.47 $171.53
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 42 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($72.50) $0.00 $1.18 $2.22 $2.40 $2.54 $2.68 $2.85 $3.03 $3.22 $3.41 $3.61 $3.83 $4.03 $4.25 $4.48 $152.89
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($50.61) $0.00 $0.78 $1.53 $1.71 $1.87 $2.03 $2.27 $2.50 $2.73 $2.94 $3.14 $3.30 $3.48 $3.67 $3.87 $132.09
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($87.21) $0.00 $1.36 $2.54 $2.83 $3.02 $3.21 $3.37 $3.54 $3.73 $3.94 $4.17 $4.43 $4.67 $4.92 $5.19 $177.01
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 43 of 55
Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value Low
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $72.50 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 7.98% 20.54 3.77
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $50.61 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 9.10% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.06% 20.54 3.77
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $87.21 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.10% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% $0.00 7.76% 20.54 3.77
Mean 9.53% 20.54
Max 12.13%
Min 7.76%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.29 $3.45 $3.62 $3.80 $3.99 $4.20 $4.41 $4.64 $4.89 $5.15 $5.43 $5.73 $6.04 $6.37 $6.72
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.82 $1.99 $2.17 $2.37 $2.58 $2.80 $3.02 $3.24 $3.46 $3.67 $3.87 $4.08 $4.30 $4.53 $4.78
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.34 $4.48 $4.61 $4.76 $4.90 $5.08 $5.27 $5.50 $5.75 $6.05 $6.37 $6.72 $7.09 $7.47 $7.88
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 44 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.25% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.50% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.50% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.14 $2.23 $2.34 $2.44 $2.56 $2.70 $2.85 $3.01 $3.18 $3.37 $3.56 $3.76 $3.96 $4.18 $4.40 $138.00
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.38 $1.46 $1.54 $1.62 $1.70 $1.85 $1.99 $2.13 $2.27 $2.41 $2.53 $2.67 $2.82 $2.97 $3.13 $98.19
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.47 $2.62 $2.77 $2.93 $3.09 $3.22 $3.37 $3.53 $3.72 $3.94 $4.18 $4.41 $4.65 $4.90 $5.17 $161.89
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 45 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($72.50) $0.00 $1.16 $2.19 $2.34 $2.44 $2.56 $2.70 $2.85 $3.01 $3.18 $3.37 $3.56 $3.76 $3.96 $4.18 $142.40
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($50.61) $0.00 $0.75 $1.45 $1.54 $1.62 $1.70 $1.85 $1.99 $2.13 $2.27 $2.41 $2.53 $2.67 $2.82 $2.97 $101.32
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($87.21) $0.00 $1.35 $2.51 $2.77 $2.93 $3.09 $3.22 $3.37 $3.53 $3.72 $3.94 $4.18 $4.41 $4.65 $4.90 $167.06
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 46 of 55
Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $74.39 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.67% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.15% 20.54 3.77
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $50.25 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 10.83% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.15% 20.54 3.77
Duke Energy Corporation DUK $80.74 4.70% 4.22% 5.50% 4.81% 5.45% 76.00% 80.00% 65.57% $0.00 10.15% 20.54 3.77
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $89.13 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.50% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% $0.00 7.80% 20.54 3.77
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation PNW $81.85 4.50% 3.78% 5.00% 4.43% 5.45% 63.00% 63.00% 65.57% $0.00 9.75% 20.54 3.77
Mean 9.67% 20.54
Max 12.00%
Min 7.80%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.31 $3.49 $3.69 $3.90 $4.12 $4.36 $4.60 $4.85 $5.12 $5.40 $5.70 $6.01 $6.34 $6.68 $7.04
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.85 $2.05 $2.27 $2.52 $2.79 $3.07 $3.35 $3.62 $3.88 $4.13 $4.35 $4.59 $4.84 $5.10 $5.38
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.36 $4.51 $4.67 $4.83 $5.00 $5.19 $5.41 $5.65 $5.92 $6.22 $6.56 $6.92 $7.30 $7.69 $8.11
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 47 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.25% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.50% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.50% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.15 $2.26 $2.38 $2.51 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.14 $3.33 $3.53 $3.74 $3.94 $4.15 $4.38 $4.62 $144.70
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.41 $1.51 $1.61 $1.73 $1.84 $2.02 $2.20 $2.38 $2.55 $2.71 $2.85 $3.01 $3.17 $3.35 $3.53 $110.58
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.48 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.15 $3.29 $3.45 $3.63 $3.83 $4.05 $4.30 $4.54 $4.78 $5.04 $5.32 $166.65
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 48 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($74.39) $0.00 $1.17 $2.21 $2.38 $2.51 $2.64 $2.80 $2.97 $3.14 $3.33 $3.53 $3.74 $3.94 $4.15 $4.38 $149.32
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($50.25) $0.00 $0.77 $1.48 $1.61 $1.73 $1.84 $2.02 $2.20 $2.38 $2.55 $2.71 $2.85 $3.01 $3.17 $3.35 $114.11
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($89.13) $0.00 $1.35 $2.53 $2.80 $2.97 $3.15 $3.29 $3.45 $3.63 $3.83 $4.05 $4.30 $4.54 $4.78 $5.04 $171.97
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 49 of 55
Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value High
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $74.39 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 6.00% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.35% 20.54 3.77
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $50.25 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 13.00% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% $0.00 10.44% 20.54 3.77
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $89.13 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.90% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.05% 20.54 3.77
Mean 10.21% 20.54
Max 12.73%
Min 8.05%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.32 $3.52 $3.73 $3.95 $4.19 $4.44 $4.69 $4.96 $5.24 $5.53 $5.83 $6.15 $6.49 $6.84 $7.21
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.89 $2.13 $2.41 $2.72 $3.08 $3.44 $3.80 $4.15 $4.48 $4.78 $5.04 $5.31 $5.60 $5.91 $6.23
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.37 $4.54 $4.72 $4.91 $5.10 $5.31 $5.54 $5.80 $6.09 $6.41 $6.75 $7.12 $7.51 $7.92 $8.35
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 50 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.25% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.50% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.50% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.16 $2.28 $2.40 $2.54 $2.68 $2.85 $3.03 $3.22 $3.41 $3.61 $3.83 $4.03 $4.25 $4.48 $4.73 $148.16
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.43 $1.57 $1.71 $1.87 $2.03 $2.27 $2.50 $2.73 $2.94 $3.14 $3.30 $3.48 $3.67 $3.87 $4.09 $128.00
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.49 $2.66 $2.83 $3.02 $3.21 $3.37 $3.54 $3.73 $3.94 $4.17 $4.43 $4.67 $4.92 $5.19 $5.47 $171.53
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 51 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($74.39) $0.00 $1.18 $2.22 $2.40 $2.54 $2.68 $2.85 $3.03 $3.22 $3.41 $3.61 $3.83 $4.03 $4.25 $4.48 $152.89
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($50.25) $0.00 $0.78 $1.53 $1.71 $1.87 $2.03 $2.27 $2.50 $2.73 $2.94 $3.14 $3.30 $3.48 $3.67 $3.87 $132.09
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($89.13) $0.00 $1.36 $2.54 $2.83 $3.02 $3.21 $3.37 $3.54 $3.73 $3.94 $4.17 $4.43 $4.67 $4.92 $5.19 $177.01
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 52 of 55
Inputs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Value Low
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $74.39 6.00% 6.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.45% 65.00% 64.00% 65.57% $0.00 7.74% 20.54 3.77
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $50.25 9.10% 10.40% 13.00% 9.10% 5.45% 76.00% 66.00% 65.57% $0.00 8.13% 20.54 3.77
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $89.13 3.90% 3.10% 3.50% 3.10% 5.45% 57.00% 63.00% 65.57% $0.00 7.55% 20.54 3.77
Mean 9.19% 20.54
Max 11.53%
Min 7.55%
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $3.13 $3.29 $3.45 $3.62 $3.80 $3.99 $4.20 $4.41 $4.64 $4.89 $5.15 $5.43 $5.73 $6.04 $6.37 $6.72
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.67 $1.82 $1.99 $2.17 $2.37 $2.58 $2.80 $3.02 $3.24 $3.46 $3.67 $3.87 $4.08 $4.30 $4.53 $4.78
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $4.21 $4.34 $4.48 $4.61 $4.76 $4.90 $5.08 $5.27 $5.50 $5.75 $6.05 $6.37 $6.72 $7.09 $7.47 $7.88
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 53 of 55
Projected Annual
Company Ticker 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032
ALLETE, Inc. ALE 65.00% 64.75% 64.50% 64.25% 64.00% 64.26% 64.52% 64.79% 65.05% 65.31% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Avangrid, Inc. AGR 76.00% 73.50% 71.00% 68.50% 66.00% 65.93% 65.86% 65.79% 65.71% 65.64% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
IDACORP, Inc. IDA 57.00% 58.50% 60.00% 61.50% 63.00% 63.43% 63.86% 64.29% 64.71% 65.14% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57% 65.57%
Projected Annual
Cash Flows [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]
Terminal
ALLETE, Inc. ALE $2.14 $2.23 $2.34 $2.44 $2.56 $2.70 $2.85 $3.01 $3.18 $3.37 $3.56 $3.76 $3.96 $4.18 $4.40 $138.00
Avangrid, Inc. AGR $1.38 $1.46 $1.54 $1.62 $1.70 $1.85 $1.99 $2.13 $2.27 $2.41 $2.53 $2.67 $2.82 $2.97 $3.13 $98.19
IDACORP, Inc. IDA $2.47 $2.62 $2.77 $2.93 $3.09 $3.22 $3.37 $3.53 $3.72 $3.94 $4.18 $4.41 $4.65 $4.90 $5.17 $161.89
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 54 of 55

Initial
ALLETE, Inc. ALE ($74.39) $0.00 $1.16 $2.19 $2.34 $2.44 $2.56 $2.70 $2.85 $3.01 $3.18 $3.37 $3.56 $3.76 $3.96 $4.18 $142.40
Avangrid, Inc. AGR ($50.25) $0.00 $0.75 $1.45 $1.54 $1.62 $1.70 $1.85 $1.99 $2.13 $2.27 $2.41 $2.53 $2.67 $2.82 $2.97 $101.32
IDACORP, Inc. IDA ($89.13) $0.00 $1.35 $2.51 $2.77 $2.93 $3.09 $3.22 $3.37 $3.53 $3.72 $3.94 $4.18 $4.41 $4.65 $4.90 $167.06
Exhibit RBH-6
Page 55 of 55
Multi-Stage DCF Notes:

[1] Source: Bloomberg; based on 30-, 90-, and 180-day historical average as of June 15, 2018
[2] Source: Zacks
[5] Equals indicated value (average, minimum, maximum) of Columns [2], [3], [4]
[6] Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Blue Chip Financial Forecast
[10] Equals Column [1] + Column [61]
[11] Equals result of Excel Solver function; goal: Column [10] equals $0.00
[12] Equals Column [60] / Column [29] or Proxy Group 30-day average PE ratio. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence
[13] Equals Column [12] / (Column [6] x 100)
[15] Equals Column [14] x (1 + Column [5])
[20] Equals (1 + (Column [5] + (((Column [6] − Column [5]) / (2028 − 2023 + 1)) x (2023 − 2022)))) x Column [19]
[30] Equals Column [7]
[31] Equals Column [30] + ((Column [34] − Column [30]) / 4)
[45] Equals Column [15] x Column [30]
[60] Equals (Column [60] x (1 + Column [6])) / (Column [11] − Column [6]), or Column [12] x Column [29]
[61] Equals negative net present value; discount rate equals Column [11], cash flows equal Column [63] through Column [77]
[62] Equals $0.00
[63] Equals Column [45] x (12/31/2018 - 6/15/2018) / 365
[64] Equals Column [45] x (1 + (0.5 x Column [5]))
[77] Equals Column [59] + [60]
Exhibit RBH-7
Page 1 of 2
Authorized ROEs by RRA State Commission Ranking
State Company Parent Company Docekt No. Case Type Date Return on Equity RRA Rank Average/1 and Average/2 Average/3 and
Ticker (%) Higher Lower
North Dakota Northern States Power Co. - MN XEL C-PU-12-813 Vertically Integrated 2/26/2014 9.75 Average / 1 9.75
New Mexico Southwestern Public Service Co XEL C-12-00350-UT Vertically Integrated 3/26/2014 9.96 Below Average / 2 9.96
Texas Entergy Texas Inc. ETR D-41791 Vertically Integrated 5/16/2014 9.80 Average / 3 9.80
Wisconsin Wisconsin Power and Light Co LNT D-6680-UR-119 (Elec) Vertically Integrated 6/6/2014 10.40 Above Average / 2 10.40
Louisiana Entergy Louisiana LLC ETR D-UD-13-01 Vertically Integrated 7/10/2014 9.95 Average / 2 9.95
Wyoming Cheyenne Light Fuel Power Co. BKH D-20003-132-ER-13 Vertically Integrated 7/31/2014 9.90 Average / 3 9.90
Vermont Green Mountain Power Corp. D-8190, 8191 Vertically Integrated 8/25/2014 9.60 Average / 2 9.60
Utah PacifiCorp BRK.A D-13-035-184 Vertically Integrated 8/29/2014 9.80 Average / 1 9.80
Florida Florida Public Utilities Co. CPK D-140025-EI Vertically Integrated 9/15/2014 10.25 Above Average / 2 10.25
Nevada Nevada Power Co. BRK.A D-14-05004 Vertically Integrated 10/9/2014 9.80 Average / 2 9.80
Illinois MidAmerican Energy Co. BRK.A D-14-0066 Vertically Integrated 11/6/2014 9.56 Average / 2 9.56
Wisconsin Wisconsin Public Service Corp. WEC D-6690-UR-123 (Elec) Vertically Integrated 11/6/2014 10.20 Above Average / 2 10.20
Wisconsin Wisconsin Electric Power Co. WEC D-05-UR-107 (WEP-Elec) Vertically Integrated 11/14/2014 10.20 Above Average / 2 10.20
Virginia Appalachian Power Co. AEP C-PUE-2014-00026 Vertically Integrated 11/26/2014 9.70 Above Average / 2 9.70
Wisconsin Madison Gas and Electric Co. MGEE D-3270-UR-120 (Elec) Vertically Integrated 11/26/2014 10.20 Above Average / 2 10.20
Oregon Portland General Electric Co. POR D-UE-283 Vertically Integrated 12/4/2014 9.68 Average / 2 9.68
Mississippi Entergy Mississippi Inc. ETR D-2014-UN-0132 Vertically Integrated 12/11/2014 10.07 Average / 1 10.07
Wisconsin Northern States Power Co - WI XEL D-4220-UR-120 (Elec) Vertically Integrated 12/12/2014 10.20 Above Average / 2 10.20
Colorado Black Hills Colorado Electric BKH D-14AL-0393E Vertically Integrated 12/18/2014 9.83 Average / 2 9.83
Wyoming PacifiCorp BRK.A D-20000-446-ER-14 Vertically Integrated 1/23/2015 9.50 Average / 3 9.50
Colorado Public Service Co. of CO XEL D-14AL-0660E Vertically Integrated 2/24/2015 9.83 Average / 2 9.83
Washington PacifiCorp BRK.A D-UE-140762 Vertically Integrated 3/25/2015 9.50 Average / 3 9.50
Minnesota Northern States Power Co. - MN XEL D-E-002/GR-13-868 Vertically Integrated 3/26/2015 9.72 Average / 2 9.72
Michigan Wisconsin Public Service Corp. WEC C-U-17669 Vertically Integrated 4/23/2015 10.20 Above Average / 3 10.20
Missouri Union Electric Co. AEE C-ER-2014-0258 Vertically Integrated 4/29/2015 9.53 Average / 3 9.53
West Virginia Appalachian Power Co. AEP C-14-1152-E-42T Vertically Integrated 5/26/2015 9.75 Below Average / 2 9.75
Missouri Kansas City Power & Light EVRG C-ER-2014-0370 Vertically Integrated 9/2/2015 9.50 Average / 3 9.50
Kansas Kansas City Power & Light EVRG D-15-KCPE-116-RTS Vertically Integrated 9/10/2015 9.30 Below Average / 1 9.30
Wisconsin Wisconsin Public Service Corp. WEC D-6690-UR-124 (Elec) Vertically Integrated 11/19/2015 10.00 Above Average / 2 10.00
Michigan Consumers Energy Co. CMS C-U-17735 Vertically Integrated 11/19/2015 10.30 Above Average / 3 10.30
Michigan DTE Electric Co. DTE C-U-17767 Vertically Integrated 12/11/2015 10.30 Above Average / 3 10.30
Texas Southwestern Public Service Co XEL D-43695 Vertically Integrated 12/17/2015 9.70 Average / 3 9.70
Idaho Avista Corp. AVA C-AVU-E-15-05 Vertically Integrated 12/18/2015 9.50 Average / 2 9.50
Wyoming PacifiCorp BRK.A D-20000-469-ER-15 Vertically Integrated 12/30/2015 9.50 Average / 3 9.50
Washington Avista Corp. AVA D-UE-150204 Vertically Integrated 1/6/2016 9.50 Average / 3 9.50
Arkansas Entergy Arkansas Inc. ETR D-15-015-U Vertically Integrated 2/23/2016 9.75 Average / 1 9.75
Indiana Indianapolis Power & Light Co. AES Ca-44576 Vertically Integrated 3/16/2016 9.85 Average / 1 9.85
New Mexico El Paso Electric Co. EE C-15-00127-UT Vertically Integrated 6/8/2016 9.48 Below Average / 2 9.48
Indiana Northern IN Public Svc Co. NI Ca-44688 Vertically Integrated 7/18/2016 9.98 Average / 1 9.98
Tennessee Kingsport Power Company AEP D-16-00001 Vertically Integrated 8/9/2016 9.85 Above Average / 3 9.85
Arizona UNS Electric Inc. FTS D-E-04204A-15-0142 Vertically Integrated 8/18/2016 9.50 Average / 3 9.50
Washington PacifiCorp BRK.A D-UE-152253 Vertically Integrated 9/1/2016 9.50 Average / 3 9.50
Michigan Upper Peninsula Power Co. C-U-17895 Vertically Integrated 9/8/2016 10.00 Above Average / 3 10.00
New Mexico Public Service Co. of NM PNM C-15-00261-UT Vertically Integrated 9/28/2016 9.58 Below Average / 2 9.58
Wisconsin Madison Gas and Electric Co. MGEE D-3270-UR-121 (Elec) Vertically Integrated 11/9/2016 9.80 Above Average / 2 9.80
Oklahoma Public Service Co. of OK AEP Ca-PUD201500208 Vertically Integrated 11/10/2016 9.50 Average / 3 9.50
Wisconsin Wisconsin Power and Light Co LNT D-6680-UR-120 (Elec) Vertically Integrated 11/18/2016 10.00 Above Average / 2 10.00
Florida Florida Power & Light Co. NEE D-160021-EI Vertically Integrated 11/29/2016 10.55 Above Average / 2 10.55
California Liberty Utilities CalPeco Ele AQN A-15-05-008 Vertically Integrated 12/1/2016 10.00 Above Average / 3 10.00
Exhibit RBH-7
Page 2 of 2
State Company Parent Company Docekt No. Case Type Date Return on Equity RRA Rank Average/1 and Average/2 Average/3 and
Ticker (%) Higher Lower
South Carolina Duke Energy Progress LLC DUK D-2016-227-E Vertically Integrated 12/7/2016 10.10 Average / 2 10.10
Colorado Black Hills Colorado Electric BKH D-16AL-0326E Vertically Integrated 12/19/2016 9.37 Average / 2 9.37
Nevada Sierra Pacific Power Co. BRK.A D-16-06006 Vertically Integrated 12/22/2016 9.60 Average / 2 9.60
North Carolina Virginia Electric & Power Co. D D-E-22, Sub 532 Vertically Integrated 12/22/2016 9.90 Average / 1 9.90
Idaho Avista Corp. AVA C-AVU-E-16-03 Vertically Integrated 12/28/2016 9.50 Average / 2 9.50
Wyoming MDU Resources Group Inc. MDU D-20004-117-ER-16 Vertically Integrated 1/18/2017 9.45 Average / 3 9.45
Arizona Tucson Electric Power Co. FTS D-E-01933A-15-0322 Vertically Integrated 2/24/2017 9.75 Average / 3 9.75
Minnesota Otter Tail Power Co. OTTR D-E-017/GR-15-1033 Vertically Integrated 3/2/2017 9.41 Average / 2 9.41
Oklahoma Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. OGE Ca-PUD201500273 Vertically Integrated 3/20/2017 9.50 Average / 3 9.50
Florida Gulf Power Co. SO D-160186-EI Vertically Integrated 4/4/2017 10.25 Above Average / 2 10.25
Missouri Kansas City Power & Light EVRG C-ER-2016-0285 Vertically Integrated 5/3/2017 9.50 Average / 3 9.50
Minnesota Northern States Power Co. - MN XEL D-E-002/GR-15-826 Vertically Integrated 5/11/2017 9.20 Average / 2 9.20
Arkansas Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. OGE D-16-052-U Vertically Integrated 5/18/2017 9.50 Average / 1 9.50
North Dakota MDU Resources Group Inc. MDU C-PU-16-666 Vertically Integrated 6/16/2017 9.65 Average / 1 9.65
Kentucky Kentucky Utilities Co. PPL C-2016-00370 Vertically Integrated 6/22/2017 9.70 Average / 1 9.70
Kentucky Louisville Gas & Electric Co. PPL C-2016-00371 (elec.) Vertically Integrated 6/22/2017 9.70 Average / 1 9.70
Arizona Arizona Public Service Co. PNW D-E-01345A-16-0036 Vertically Integrated 8/15/2017 10.00 Average / 3 10.00
California San Diego Gas & Electric Co. SRE Advice No. 3120-E Vertically Integrated 10/26/2017 10.20 Above Average / 3 10.20
California Pacific Gas and Electric Co. PCG Advise No. 3887-G/5148-E Vertically Integrated 10/26/2017 10.25 Above Average / 3 10.25
California Southern California Edison Co. EIX Advice No. 3665-E Vertically Integrated 10/26/2017 10.30 Above Average / 3 10.30
Florida Tampa Electric Co. EMA D-20170210-EI Vertically Integrated 11/6/2017 10.25 Above Average / 2 10.25
Alaska Alaska Electric Light Power AVA D-U-16-086 Vertically Integrated 11/15/2017 11.95 Below Average / 1 11.95
Washington Puget Sound Energy Inc. D-UE-170033 Vertically Integrated 12/5/2017 9.50 Average / 3 9.50
Texas Southwestern Electric Power Co AEP D-46449 Vertically Integrated 12/14/2017 9.60 Average / 3 9.60
Texas El Paso Electric Co. EE D-46831 Vertically Integrated 12/14/2017 9.65 Average / 3 9.65
New Mexico Public Service Co. of NM PNM C-16-00276-UT Vertically Integrated 12/20/2017 9.58 Below Average / 2 9.58
Vermont Green Mountain Power Corp. C-17-3112-INV Vertically Integrated 12/21/2017 9.10 Average / 2 9.10
Idaho Avista Corp. AVA D-AVU-E-17-01 Vertically Integrated 12/28/2017 9.50 Average / 2 9.50
Nevada Nevada Power Co. BRK.A D-17-06003 Vertically Integrated 12/29/2017 9.51 Average / 2 9.51
Kentucky Kentucky Power Co. AEP C-2017-00179 Vertically Integrated 1/18/2018 9.70 Average / 1 9.70
Oklahoma Public Service Co. of OK AEP Ca-PUD201700151 Vertically Integrated 1/31/2018 9.30 Average / 3 9.30
Iowa Interstate Power & Light Co. LNT D-RPU-2017-0001 Vertically Integrated 2/2/2018 9.98 Average / 1 9.98
North Carolina Duke Energy Progress LLC DUK D-E-2, Sub 1142 Vertically Integrated 2/23/2018 9.90 Average / 1 9.90
Minnesota ALLETE (Minnesota Power) ALE D-E-015/GR-16-664 Vertically Integrated 3/12/2018 9.25 Average / 2 9.25
Michigan Indiana Michigan Power Co. AEP C-U-18370 Vertically Integrated 4/12/2018 9.90 Above Average / 3 9.90
Kentucky Duke Energy Kentucky Inc. DUK C-2017-00321 Vertically Integrated 4/13/2018 9.73 Average / 1 9.73
Washington Avista Corp. AVA D-UE-170485 Vertically Integrated 4/26/2018 9.50 Average / 3 9.50
Indiana Indiana Michigan Power Co. AEP Ca-44967 Vertically Integrated 5/30/2018 9.95 Average / 1 9.95
Total Cases 95 45 21 29
Mean 9.81 10.00 9.58 9.66
Median 9.75 10.00 9.56 9.50
Maximum 11.95 10.55 10.10 11.95
Source: Regulatory Research Associates Minimum 9.10 9.50 9.10 9.30
Exhibit RBH-8
Page 1 of 1
Moody's Utility A and BAA Bond Yields
MOODUA MOODUBAA
Index Index Average
Dates PX_LAST PX_LAST
6/15/2018 4.25 4.68 4.47
6/14/2018 4.27 4.71 4.49
6/13/2018 4.30 4.74 4.52
6/12/2018 4.29 4.72 4.51
6/11/2018 4.29 4.74 4.52
6/8/2018 4.27 4.72 4.50
6/7/2018 4.27 4.71 4.49
6/6/2018 4.32 4.77 4.55
6/5/2018 4.27 4.71 4.49
6/4/2018 4.27 4.71 4.49
6/1/2018 4.24 4.67 4.46
5/31/2018 4.17 4.60 4.39
5/30/2018 4.20 4.63 4.42
5/29/2018 4.17 4.65 4.41
5/28/2018 4.24 4.65 4.45
5/25/2018 4.24 4.65 4.45
5/24/2018 4.28 4.69 4.49
5/23/2018 4.32 4.73 4.53
5/22/2018 4.36 4.77 4.57
5/21/2018 4.35 4.77 4.56
5/18/2018 4.36 4.78 4.57
5/17/2018 4.39 4.81 4.60
5/16/2018 4.37 4.78 4.58
5/15/2018 4.36 4.78 4.57
5/14/2018 4.28 4.70 4.49
5/11/2018 4.26 4.69 4.48
5/10/2018 4.27 4.70 4.49
5/9/2018 4.29 4.74 4.52
5/8/2018 4.26 4.72 4.49
5/7/2018 4.25 4.69 4.47
30-day Avg 4.28 4.71 4.50
Source: Bloomberg Professional

Exhibit RBH-9
Page 1 of 2
Value Line Financial Strength Ratings and Beta Coefficients
Financial Financial
Value Line Strength Strength
Company Name Ticker Industry Beta Rating Rating
AES Corp AES Power 1.15 B 4.00
Ameresco Inc AMRC Power 1.25 C++ 3.00
American Superconductor Corp AMSC Power 1.25 C++ 3.00
Apollo Solar Energy Inc ASOE Power 2.60 C 1.00
Atlantic Power Corporation AT Power 1.25 C+ 2.00
Ballard Power Systems Inc BLDP Power 1.70 B 4.00
BioSolar Inc BSRC Power 0.20 C 1.00
Broadwind Energy Inc BWEN Power 1.40 C+ 2.00
8point3 Energy Partners LP CAFD Power 1.00 C++ 3.00
CBAK Energy Technology Inc CBAK Power 1.90 C+ 2.00
China Clean Energy Inc CCGY Power 0.55 C++ 3.00
China Energy Recovery Inc CGYV Power -0.30 C 1.00
Chesapeake Energy Corp CHK Natural Gas (Div.) 2.15 C+ 2.00
CNX Resources CNX Natural Gas (Div.) 1.55 B 4.00
Callon Petroleum CPE Natural Gas (Div.) 2.00 B 4.00
Capstone Turbine Corp CPST Power 1.20 C+ 2.00
California Resources Corp CRC Natural Gas (Div.) 3.30 C 1.00
China Recycling Energy Corporation CREG Power 1.50 C 1.00
China Solar and Clean Energy Solutions InCSOL Power 0.15 C 1.00
Covanta Holding Corporation CVA Power 1.00 B 4.00
Encana Corporation ECA Natural Gas (Div.) 1.75 C++ 3.00
Enel Americas SA. ENIA Power 1.00 B 4.00
Enphase Energy Inc ENPH Power 1.65 C++ 3.00
Enova Systems Inc ENVS Power 0.25 C 1.00
EP Energy Corporation EPE Natural Gas (Div.) 2.85 C+ 2.00
Energy Quest Inc EQST Power 0.10 C 1.00
Enerplus Corporation ERF.TO Natural Gas (Div.) 2.05 B 4.00
Escalera Resources Co ESCRQ Natural Gas (Div.) 2.00 C 1.00
EnSync Inc ESNC Power 1.00 C++ 3.00
Eurosite Power Inc EUSP Power 0.45 C++ 3.00
FuelCell Energy Inc FCEL Power 1.80 C++ 3.00
Global Environmental Energy Corp GEECF Power 0.35 B 4.00
Granite Falls Energy LLC GFGY Natural Gas (Div.) 0.35 C++ 3.00
Genie Energy Ltd GNE Power 1.35 B 4.00
Hoku Corporation HOKUQ Power 0.10 C 1.00
Highpower International Inc HPJ Power 2.10 C++ 3.00
Hydrogenics Corporation New HYGS Power 1.40 C++ 3.00
Ideal Power Inc IPWR Power 0.80 C++ 3.00
LDK Solar Co Ltd LDKYQ Power 0.60 C++ 3.00
Lightbridge Corp LTBR Power 1.30 C+ 2.00
Mass Megawatts Wind Power Inc MMMW Power 0.10 C 1.00
NextEra Energy Partners LP NEP Power 1.25 C++ 3.00
New Global Energy Inc NGEY Power 1.00 C+ 2.00
Northland Power Inc NPI.TO Power 0.70 B 4.00
Next Fuel Inc NXFI Power 1.20 C++ 3.00
NRG Yield Inc NYLD Power 1.35 C++ 3.00
NRG Yield Inc NYLDA Power 1.20 C+ 2.00
Exhibit RBH-9
Page 2 of 2
Financial Financial
Value Line Strength Strength
Company Name Ticker Industry Beta Rating Rating
1pm Industries Inc OPMZ Natural Gas (Div.) 0.35 C 1.00
Ocean Power Technologies Inc OPTT Power 1.80 C++ 3.00
NanoFlex Power Corp. OPVS Power -0.30 C+ 2.00
Ormat Technologies Inc ORA Power 0.90 C++ 3.00
Pacific Gas and Electric Company PCG Electric Utility (West) 0.65 B 4.00
PDC Energy PDCE Natural Gas (Div.) 1.55 B 4.00
Pacific Ethanol Inc PEIX Power 2.25 C+ 2.00
Pengrowth Energy Corporation PGHEF Natural Gas (Div.) 1.55 C 1.00
Plug Power Inc PLUG Power 1.75 B 4.00
Premier Power Renewable Energy Inc PPRW Power -0.70 C 1.00
Power Solutions International Inc PSIX Power 1.55 C+ 2.00
PowerVerde Inc PWVI Power 0.55 C+ 2.00
Qep Resources Inc QEP Natural Gas (Div.) 1.80 B 4.00
Renewable Energy Group Inc REGI Power 1.20 C++ 3.00
REX American Resources Corporation REX Power 1.50 B 4.00
Real Goods Solar Inc RGSE Power 1.95 C 1.00
Sunrun Inc RUN Power 1.05 C+ 2.00
SCANA Corporation SCG Electric Utility (East) 0.70 B 4.00
Synthesis Energy Systems Inc SES Power 1.45 C++ 3.00
CleanTech Innovations Inc New SIXD Power -0.40 B 4.00
Solar Energy Initiatives Inc SNRY Power 0.40 C++ 3.00
Spark Energy Inc SPKE Power 0.45 C++ 3.00
SunPower Corporation SPWR Power 1.80 C++ 3.00
Sunworks Inc. SUNW Power 1.30 C++ 3.00
Southwestern Energy SWN Natural Gas (Div.) 1.40 B 4.00
TransAlta Corp TA.TO Power 0.95 C++ 3.00
TerraForm Power Inc TERP Power 1.85 C++ 3.00
Ultralife Corporation ULBI Power 0.80 B 4.00
Vivint Solar Inc VSLR Power 1.60 C+ 2.00
Vista Intl Technologies Inc VVIT Power -0.30 C 1.00
Energous Corporation WATT Power 1.80 B 4.00
Wave Sync Corp. WAYS Power 1.40 C++ 3.00
WPX Energy Inc WPX Natural Gas (Div.) 2.05 C++ 3.00
Cross Border Resources Inc XBOR Natural Gas (Div.) 1.75 C 1.00
Xsunx Inc XSNX Power 0.20 C+ 2.00
Average 1.16
Median 1.25
OVERALL
Std. Dev. 0.77
Skew -0.11
Count 82
Average 1.22
Median 1.38
FSR = B
Std. Dev. 0.62
Skew -0.89
Source: Value Line Count 20
Exhibit E
D.E. 55-3
EXHIBIT 3

COLUMBIA DIVISION
Plaintiff, Case No. 3:18-CV-01795-JMC
v.
Swain E. Whitfield, in his official capacity

as Chairman of the South Carolina Public
Service Commission, et al.,
Defendants.
Declaration of Ellen Lapson, CFA
I, Ellen Lapson, declare and state, under penalty of perjury, that the following is
true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. If called to testify, I
could and would testify competently to the following:
I. Scope of Analysis
1. I am issuing this declaration in connection with the above-captioned case, in
which Plaintiff South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (“SCE&G” or the
“Company”) seeks a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief from the
implementation of 2018 South Carolina Laws Act 287 (H.B. 4375) (“Act 287”),
which became law on June 28, 2018, and 2018 South Carolina Laws Resolution
285 (S. 0954) (the “Joint Resolution” or “Resolution 285”).
2. Counsel for the Plaintiff has retained me to offer my opinion as to the impact that
Act 287 and Resolution 285 (henceforth, “the Act”) will have upon SCE&G, and
its customers or stakeholders, if its implementation is not enjoined.
1
II. Qualifications and Remuneration
3. After receiving a BA degree from Barnard College in 1969, I earned a Master’s of
Business Administration degree with a concentration in Accounting from New
York University’s Stern School of Business in 1975. I have also earned the
designation of Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA).
4. Since 1969, I have worked in the financial services industry with special focus on
the financial analysis of utility debt and equity securities. I started my career as a
utility equity analyst at Argus Research Corporation. Subsequently, I was an
officer of a predecessor bank of JP Morgan from 1974 to 1994, where I structured
and arranged debt funding and advised companies in the utility sector and related
fields, such as power generation and fuels, on financing.
5. In 1994, I joined Fitch Ratings (“Fitch”) as a Senior Director, and later became a
Managing Director in the utilities, power, and gas analytical team. For seventeen
years at Fitch, I evaluated or supervised other analysts evaluating the credit of
hundreds of electric, gas, and water utilities. From 2004 through 2011, I also led
the development of the credit rating criteria applied to the electric, gas, and water
sector. A major part of my responsibility was to initiate and maintain ongoing
contact with major U.S. fixed-income investors, portfolio managers, and debt and
equity securities analysts.
6. I established Lapson Advisory in 2012 to provide consulting and credit ratings
advisory services, design and conduct executive training programs on utility
finance, and serve as an expert witness on utility finance in state and federal
regulatory commission proceedings.
2
7. I am active in professional organizations within the investment community and
specifically among the investors and analysts who specialize in electric and gas
utilities and related wholesale power markets and midstream gas businesses. I
regularly attend investor meetings in the utility sector in order to interact with
institutional investors and securities analysts involved in the sector and to remain
current on investors’ issues and how they judge investment opportunities and risks
under current market conditions.
8. I am a member of the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts and a member of
the Wall Street Utilities Group, an organization of professional equity and debt
analysts who focus on utility sector securities. My curriculum vitae appears in
Appendix 1.
9. My firm is being compensated for my services in this proceeding on a non-
contingent basis at my standard hourly rate of $600 plus compensation for out-of-
pocket expenses.
IV. Summary of Opinions
10. My opinions are summarized as follows:
If the Act and the implementation of the experimental rate are not enjoined,
SCE&G will suffer immediate, severe, and adverse consequences, including a
reduction in investor confidence and constrained access to critical funding. An
initial and major adverse consequence, of course, is that SCE&G will be deprived
forever of the right to approximately $367 million of cash that would be collected
by the Company annually absent implementation of the Act. Beyond this material
loss, other adverse consequences are more difficult to measure but are certainly
3
grave and substantially likely to occur if the Act is implemented. These include,
but are not limited to, the following:
a. Reputational risk, lower credit ratings: SCE&G’s credit rating would
almost certainly be immediately downgraded by one or more of the credit
rating agencies.
b. Constrained access to short-term funding: SCE&G will have at best only
limited access to sources of short-term liquidity through the sale of
commercial paper notes, and during any period of investor caution or
market distress, that access would likely disappear. With constrained
availability of short-term borrowings in the commercial paper market,
SCE&G would be forced to rely on borrowing under committed revolving
credit facilities from banks at higher borrowing costs.
c. Collateral requirements adding to a liquidity crunch: SCE&G’s liquidity
constraints would be further exacerbated by commercial counterparties
such as suppliers of fuel and equipment demanding collateral in order to
provide supplies. Demands for collateral would increase the Company’s
liquidity stress at a time of constrained supply of funds from internal
sources (reduced cash flow) and external sources (fewer lenders willing to
lend to a distressed or low-rated borrower).
d. Extreme vulnerability to financial market stresses: The adverse financial
consequences listed above are mutually linked; in aggregate, they will
make SCE&G more susceptible to a liquidity crisis in the event of
individual circumstances affecting the Company or any adverse capital
4
market or credit market conditions over the immediate weeks and months
following implementation of the Act.
e. Operational consequences: With its financial resources substantially
limited, SCE&G would not have adequate funds to carry out normal
capital improvements for the benefit of customer service or to keep up a
high degree of operational strength. Furthermore, weak finances would
constrain SCE&G from making robust preparations for natural calamities
and hobble its ability to recover after hurricanes, floods, or other storms, a
consequence that would adversely affect not only SCE&G but also the
interests of customers and the public at large.
f. This cascade of financial problems would devastate the Company, and that
devastation would not be limited to the Company itself. It also would have
consequences on the Company’s stakeholders and customers, as SCE&G
would not have the financial strength and resilience that it needs to meet
demands for safe and reliable electric service.
g. These conclusions are discussed further in the balance of this declaration.
V. Materials Considered
11. Sources and materials used to prepare this declaration are listed in Appendix 2.
VI. Reputational Harm; Lower Credit Ratings
12. Currently, the fixed income market and credit rating agencies are awaiting the
results of this proceeding to see if the 14.8% rate reduction, the “experimental
rate”, imposed by the Act and carried out by the Public Service Commission will
remain in force, or if this Court will provide the injunctive relief sought by
5
SCE&G. The results of this proceeding will have a notable impact on SCE&G’s
credit rating for a number of reasons.
13. As an initial matter, the credit worthiness and good credit standing of SCE&G,
like any U.S. rate-regulated utility, depends highly upon investors’ confidence
that the rates of rate-regulated U.S. utilities are subject to constitutional
protections, including protections against government takings of private property
and a right to due process. The leading credit rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s
(“S&P”), Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”), and Fitch place high weight in
their published criteria for rating utilities on the protective nature of the legal
framework in a jurisdiction and the degree of assurance of recovery of
investments and costs. If the Act is not enjoined, it will indicate to fixed income
investors and the analysts at rating agencies that investments in SCE&G (and
perhaps in other South Carolina rate-regulated utilities) are not subject to normal
protections.
14. Another important factor in the rating process of S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch is the
sufficiency of operating cash flow in relationship to expenses and all financial
obligations. The rate imposed by the Act will materially reduce SCE&G’s
operating cash flow unless it is enjoined, another factor likely to depress credit
ratings and credit sentiment in the marketplace.
15. The three credit rating agencies that rate SCE&G and its parent company,
SCANA Corporation (“SCANA”), have already published their reactions to the
Act. All three of which were unfavorable, as explained below.
16. S&P published a credit update on SCANA and SCE&G on July 2, 2018. S&P
6
states that its current issuer credit rating is BBB, and the rating is on a negative
credit alert status pending the outcome of SCE&G’s petition for injunctive relief
from the rate imposed by the Act. Significantly, S&P states that it will lower the
issuer credit ratings for SCANA and its subsidiaries including SCE&G by one
notch if SCE&G’s request for injunctive relief is not granted:
We are maintaining the CreditWatch [Negative] to reflect

the potential for a downgrade if the Court does not issue an
injunction prohibiting the SCPSC from implementing the
new law. The rate reduction would significantly weaken the
company's financial measures, despite its recent announced
plan to reduce its dividend by about 80%.1
17. A one-notch downgrade by S&P would result in an issuer credit rating of BBB-
for SCE&G, only one notch above speculative grade, while a rating downgrade of
two notches would result in an issuer credit rating of BB+, a speculative grade
rating. If S&P lowers SCE&G’s issuer credit rating to BBB-, it will
simultaneously lower the short-term credit rating, applicable to commercial paper
notes, to A3. As discussed in more detail below, there is very limited market
access in the commercial paper market for issuers with short-term ratings of A3,
and that access disappears during periods of investor anxiety.
18. Fitch also published an update on July 3, 2018, stating that it is maintaining the
ratings for SCE&G of BBB- and for SCANA of BB+ on Ratings Watch Evolving
status. Explaining its continuing alert status, Fitch’s report states:
The CreditWatch with negative implications on SCANA

and its subsidiaries reflects our view of ongoing uncertainty

1 S&P RatingsDirect, Research Update, SCANACorp. And Subsidiaries 'BBB' Ratings
Remain On CreditWatch Negative On Passage Of South Carolina Bill, 3 July 2018 at 2.
7
regarding cost recovery of the abandoned V.C. Summer

nuclear construction project. We could lower the ratings if
the Court does not issue an injunction prohibiting the
SCPSC from implementing the new law. A rate decrease of
the magnitude reflected in the law would weaken credit
metrics significantly. We could also lower ratings even if
the Court issues an injunction that is subsequently followed
by a SCPSC order to reduce rates or an order to provide
rate credits for Summer-related costs that results in weaker
financial measures. 2
A one-notch downgrade of Fitch’s issuer credit rating for SCE&G would result in
a rating of BB+, a speculative grade rating (below investment grade). It would
also have the effect of lowering SCE&G’s short-term rating from the current
weak rating of F3 to a sub-investment grade rating, off-limits for nearly all
commercial paper investors.
19. Furthermore, Fitch mentions concerns about the future liquidity of SCANA and
SCE&G, noting the companies’ very high degree of dependence upon its
committed credit lines. Fitch states that a negative rating action would result if
“[a]vailability under committed liquidity facilities and anticipated internally
generated cash flows [fall] short of expected obligations due in the next 12 to 18
months.”3
20. Thus, both S&P and Fitch warn of an expected credit rating downgrade if this
Court does not provide injunctive relief. In the case of S&P, the Company’s credit
rating is almost certain to be downgraded promptly after the Court’s ruling if the
Court refuses to enjoin the Act, and that may be true for Fitch as well.

2 Fitch Ratings, Fitch Maintains Watch Evolving on SCANA and Subsidiaries, 03 July
2018, at 2.

3 Ibid.
8
21. One rating agency, Moody’s, confirmed its current rating of Baa3 for SCE&G
(equivalent to the S&P and Fitch category of BBB-), and established a Negative
Outlook on July 3, 2018. Moody’s alone of the three does not warn of a near-
term credit downgrade in the event that the Court denies SCE&G’s petition for
injunctive relief. However, Moody’s states that it would downgrade the rating
under certain circumstances that are more likely to occur if the Act is not
enjoined: “if the company's liquidity becomes constrained, such as being unable
to draw on its credit lines or to issue additional debt, there could also be
downward movement in the ratings.”4 If Moody’s downgrades its current credit
rating for SCE&G by even a single notch, the resulting issuer rating would be
Ba1, a non-investment grade rating, and the short-term rating would be “Not
Prime”, effectively off-limits for commercial paper investors.
22. While Moody’s is the sole credit agency that has not already indicated that it will
downgrade SCE&G’s rating if the Court fails to enjoin the Act, my experience in
the credit market leads me to believe that market participants, particularly the
highly risk-averse commercial paper investors, will place greater weight upon the
more adverse opinions of two out of three rating agencies. Thus, SCE&G’s
access to critical funding in the marketplace would be further diminished.
23. The expected effect of lower credit ratings is to drive up the cost of funding in
both the short-term and long-term debt markets. The mechanism by which that
operates is as follows. Lower credit ratings reduce the pool of buyers eligible or

4 Moody’s Investors Service, Rating
Action: Moody's Confirms SCANA, SCE&G and
PSNC, Rating Outlook Negative, 2 July 2018 at 1.

9
willing to purchase and hold the debt instruments of a company. Some major
institutional investors have investment rules that restrict the percentage of their
portfolio that can be in obligations with lower credit ratings, and some investors
by charter or policy may not hold any amount of an instrument below a certain
threshold rating. At progressively lower ratings, the amount of investable funds
eligible to buy a debt security diminishes, and consequently the interest rate that
investors will demand to take that added risk goes up. The interest rate differential
between credit rating categories (known as the “credit spread”) gets wider at long-
term ratings below BBB (or Moody’s Baa2) and widens further with each
progressive notch below BBB- (or Moody’s Baa3).
VII. Constrained Access to Short-Term Funding
24. Commercial paper notes (CP Notes or CP) are unsecured notes that borrowers
issue for short periods, from one day to a maximum of 270 days, but generally
under 90 days. Buyers of utility CP are typically highly risk-averse, and they seek
to buy the notes of issuers with the most assured ability to repay the notes at their
maturity. Frequently, CP Notes are repaid with operational cash flow or with the
proceeds of the issuance of long-term bonds or common stock, but most
frequently they are repaid with the proceeds of new CP issuance (i.e., “rolling
over” CP Note issuance). Risk-averse investors make a broad and competitive
market for highly rated CP Notes, that is, those with ratings of A1+ or A1 (S&P),
P-1 (Moody’s), and F1+ or F1 (Fitch), collectively referred to as “Tier 1” ratings.
25. Currently, SCE&G’s short-term ratings are A2 (S&P), P-3 (Moody’s), and F3
(Fitch). As such, SCE&G is deemed by investors to be “Tier 3” for short-term
10
issuance quality, since two out of three ratings are Tier 3 and S&P’s Tier 2 rating
is on a Watch Negative alert status. As SCANA CFO Iris Griffin has explained,
SCE&G has already suffered from a greatly reduced market for its CP since
September of 2017.5 There would be a profound further contraction in the market
for SCE&G’s CP Notes if SCE&G’s short-term ratings are lowered to the sub-
investment grade category, for example upon a one-notch downgrade by Fitch or
Moody’s, or a two-notch downgrade by S&P, as may occur if the Act is not
enjoined. In that event, effectively, SCE&G’s ability to roll over maturing CP
Notes would be called into doubt. 6 SCE&G thus would be forced to borrow

5 See Iris N. Griffin’s Declaration at 36‐38.

6 Regarding CP tier levels, Rule 2a‐7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940
(administered by the SEC) limits the credit risk that money market mutual funds
may bear by restricting their investments to "eligible" securities. An eligible security
must carry one of the two highest ratings (Tiers "1" or "2") for short‐term
obligations from one of the nationally recognized statistical ratings agencies
(NRSRO), and, if the security is rated by two or more agencies, it must carry one of
the two highest ratings from at least two NRSROs. A tier‐1 security is an eligible
security rated "1" by an NRSRO, and, if the security is rated by two or more NRSROs,
it must be rated "1" by at least two of the NRSROs; a tier‐2 security is an eligible
security that is not a tier‐1 security.

CP issues that would be in a given tier are excluded when (1) the issuer's credit
ratings are under review and (2) a one‐notch upgrade or downgrade would result in
the issue no longer meeting the tier level credit rating requirement. Money funds
generally may hold no more than five percent of their assets in the tier‐1 securities
of any individual issuer and no more than one‐half of one percent of their assets in
the Tier‐2 securities of any individual issuer; moreover, a money fund's holdings of
Tier‐2 securities may constitute no more than three percent of the fund's
assets. Tier‐3 securities are ineligible for holding by money market mutual funds;
ineligible securities make up only a small percentage of all outstanding CP, due to
the limited number of buyers able to hold such notes; when an issuer’s short‐term
ratings are below the investment grade, the market is so small that the Federal
Reserve reports no data regarding such issuance.
(See: https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/cp/about.htm )

11
under its committed credit lines at higher costs in order to repay maturing short-
term notes and to fund its operational needs and normal capital investments.
VIII. Collateral Requirements May Exacerbate a Liquidity Crunch
26. SCE&G’s liquidity needs would be further increased and a liquidity crunch
worsened by any credit downgrades below investment grade, which would result
in a demand for collateral by suppliers of fuel, equipment, or similar supplies.
Collateral postings to suppliers may take the form of cash or letters of credit, but
in either case, they would reduce dollar for dollar the remaining availability under
SCE&G’s committed credit facilities. This is reflected in the references made by
two rating agencies to a potential liquidity crisis as a cause for further rating
downgrades (see supra at 19 regarding Fitch and supra at 21 regarding Moody’s.)
27. If credit downgrades trigger a liquidity crunch, rating agencies may react with
more downgrades, thus precipitating a downward spiral of investor flight and
reduced supplier and banker confidence.
IX. Extreme Vulnerability to Financial Market Stress
28. The low credit ratings and uncertainty caused by the implementation of the Act
would expose SCE&G to even greater liquidity risks as a result of any stressful
conditions in the general financial markets.
29. There are periodic and frequent reversals of financial market sentiment during
which investors become more risk-averse and flee from investments in companies
with lower credit ratings or unusual risks (known as a “flight to quality” or “risk-
off” market condition). Companies with sound investment-grade ratings can
generally manage through such circumstances better than weaker and sub-
12
investment grade entities. Such cyclical “flights to quality” are normal and are
not rare occurrences. They may occur once or twice in the same year, at varying
degrees of severity and duration. During such an event, an issuer with an
unfunded bond maturity or operational cash need may not be able to access
funding. Bank lenders may balk at providing waivers to weak borrowers under
committed facilities (for example, in the case of a write-down or loss that may
trigger a default in a financial covenant). Weak borrowers suffer further harm as a
result, and these market stress events can exacerbate a situation of poor liquidity
and turn it into a full liquidity crisis.
X. Adverse Operational Consequences
30. In my nearly five decades of experience in the utility sector, I have observed that
when utilities are financially stressed and have insufficient cash flow and
inadequate access to funding, their operational capability is frequently affected. It
may become prohibitive to do preventive maintenance, vegetation management,
or routine types of capital expenditures that are essential to maintaining high
service quality. This does not bode well for meeting the needs and expectations of
customers and promoting safety and security.
31. Furthermore, sound investment-grade credit ratings and access to funding are
essential for SCE&G to maintain the financial flexibility to prepare for or respond
to emergencies and extreme events such as Hurricanes Irma, Matthew, or Hugo.
During major storms in recent years, SCE&G has needed access to short-term
funding and the confidence of its suppliers and creditors in order to make robust
preparations in advance of the storms and to fund its storm recovery efforts
13
immediately. SCE&G’s customers and the local and regional economy benefited
in the past from the utility’s financial capability to address storm recovery and
replacements for infrastructure damaged in the storm.
32. During 2016, for example, SCE&G’s system suffered major damage as a result of
Hurricane Matthew, which at its peak resulted in more than 290,000 SCE&G
electric customers losing power. In order to restore and reinforce service, SCE&G
made immediate and extraordinary expenditures of approximately $32 million,
including for supplies and extra work crews, despite lower sales revenues as a
result of customer outages. Similarly, when Hurricane Hugo struck South
Carolina in 1989, it caused approximately $52 million in damages to SCE&G’s
transmission and distribution assets. And if such a storm were to hit the same area
in South Carolina today, it is expected to cost SCE&G more than $100 million. In
these prior instances, there was no question about the utility’s financial capability
or access to capital and credit. However, if a natural disaster occurs when SCE&G
is financially strained by the effects of the Act, SCE&G may not be in a position
to restore service and safeguard the interests of the public at large for reliable and
safe power service.
XI. Conclusions
33. In summary, I find that SCE&G will suffer immediate, severe, and adverse
financial consequences if the Act is not enjoined.
a. SCE&G’s credit rating is almost certain to be downgraded by one or more
credit rating agencies—indeed, two out of three credit rating agencies
14
have already indicated that they are likely to lower their credit ratings of
SCE&G if injunctive relief is not granted.
b. Failure to obtain injunctive relief will indicate to the investing market and
analysts that SCE&G is not protected by constitutional protections that
have long formed the foundation for investment in U.S. rate-regulated
utilities and extensions of credit to such companies.
c. Lower credit ratings and the failure to obtain injunctive relief in this
proceeding will impair SCE&G’s reputation with fixed income investors,
creditors, and counterparties.
d. The result will be a reduced investor base for SCE&G’s fixed income
securities, and particularly for short-term funding with CP Notes.
e. When the investor base shrinks, the cost of borrowing will rise.
f. SCE&G would be at risk of losing access to short-term CP funding and, in
that case, it would be fully dependent on borrowing under committed bank
credit facilities at higher cost.
g. If SCE&G has sub-investment grade issuer credit ratings from two
agencies, it will be required to post collateral either in the form of cash or
letters of credit with major suppliers. Either of those options would
diminish SCE&G’s available credit under its bank facilities and contribute
to a liquidity crunch. This risk is avoided if the injunction is granted.
h. Absent the requested injunction, SCE&G will be vulnerable to further
liquidity stress circumstances during any adverse financial market
conditions, such as an investor flight to quality.
15
i. Finally, SCE&G and its customers face greater operational risks if
SCE&G’s financial condition, liquidity, and investor confidence are
weakened by the Act; in particular if a major storm or flood affects South
Carolina during the effectiveness of the Act.
16
Appendix 1
Page 1 of 7
EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS

ELLEN LAPSON, CFA
LAPSON ADVISORY 370 Riverside Dr., 9D

Financial Consulting New York, NY 10025
Expert Testimony +1-212-866-1040
Financial Training www.lapsonadvisory.com
SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS
Industry expert on financing utilities and infrastructure projects. Over 40 years of
professional experience in commercial and investment banking, securities analysis, and
credit ratings. Focus on utilities, power generation and alternative energy sources, natural
gas and fuels, corporate and project finance. Provide credit rating advisory services.
Develop financial training programs and materials; provide executive training in utility
financial analysis and credit analysis.
Consult and provide expert witness testimony in matters involving capital access for
infrastructure, energy and utilities. (See pages 3-5.)
MBA in accounting and finance; Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA).
EMPLOYMENT
Lapson Advisory Financial consulting services to utilities and

Principal developers of infrastructure projects. Financial
Dec. 2011 - present strategy and credit advisory for power, energy,
infrastructure companies, and utilities. Expert
witness testimony on financial and regulatory topics
relating to utilities and infrastructure finance. Design
and conduct financial and credit training.
Fitch Ratings Chair of Fitch’s global Corporate Finance Criteria

Utilities, Power & Gas Committee overseeing criteria for rating
Managing Director corporations, financial institutions, insurers, REITs,
1999-2011 and project finance transactions (2010-2011).
Senior Director Manager or primary analyst on credit ratings of over
1994-1999 200 utility, pipeline, power generation companies.
Utility tariff monetization. Senior member of rating
committees for utilities and energy and power-
related projects.
Liaison with utility sector fixed income investors,
focusing on 50 largest institutional investors holding
utility and power bonds, buy-side and sell-side
analysts, and utility bankers.

Appendix 1
Page 2 of 7
JP Morgan Chase Managed financial advisory transactions, structured debt

(formerly Chemical NY private placements, syndicated credit facilities for
Corp.) utilities, mining and metals, project finance. Structured
Vice President financing for utility regulatory assets (first of its kind
1975-94 “stranded cost” securitization transaction) for Puget
Asst. Vice President Energy, 1992-94.
1974-1975 Led financing for bankrupt utility as debtor-in-
possession; prepared financing plans for distressed
utilities; structured exit financing for reorganization of
two utilities emerging from Chapter 11.
Divisional Controller - 1981-1986
Argus Research Corp. Equity analysis of U.S. electric and gas utilities, natural
Equity Security Analyst – gas pipelines, and telecommunications companies.
Utilities Modeling and projecting corporate financial statements.
1969-1974 Research coverage and reports.
EDUCATION & CHARTER
Stern School of Business, New York University, MBA, 1975

Major concentration: Accounting
Master’s Thesis: Cash Flow vs. Accrual Accounting Data in Utility Equity Valuation
Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) since 1978
Barnard College, Columbia University, BA, 1969
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts, 1978 - present

Wall Street Utility Group, 1996 - present
ADVISORY COUNCILS AND BOARD SERVICE

Rocky Mountain Institute Sustainable Finance Advisory Board member. 2016 to present.
Represented U.S. investment community in advisory panel on International Accounting
Standard Board proposals for financial reporting for rate-regulated activities, sponsored by
Edison Electric Institute and American Gas Association, Dec. 2014
National Academy of Sciences/ National Research Council, Resilient America Forum, July
2014.
MIT Energy Institute, External Advisory Council, The Future of Solar Energy, 2012-2014.
Electric Power Research Institute, Advisory Council, 2004-2011; Chair, 2009 and 2010.

Appendix 1
Page 3 of 7
EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY
Jurisdiction Proceeding Topic

Public Utilities Docket No. 48401, Texas-New Mexico Cash flow and credit
Commission Texas Power Co. Application to Change Retail impacts of tax reform
Rates, on behalf of TNMP (2018)
Public Utilities Docket No. 48371, Entergy Texas Inc., Cash flow and credit
Commission Texas Application to Change Retail Rates, on impacts of tax reform
behalf of ETI (2018)
Public Utilities Docket No. 47527, Southwestern Public Adverse cash flow
Commission Texas Service Co. Application for Retail Rates, impacts of tax reform
on behalf of SPS Co. (2018)
New Mexico Public Case No. 17-00255-UT, Southwestern Adverse cash flow
Regulation Public Service Co. Application for Retail impacts of tax reform
Commission Rates, on behalf of SPS Co. 2018)
South Carolina Public Docket No. 2017-305-E, Response to ORS Adverse financial
Service Commission Request for Rate Relief, on behalf of S. implications of rate
Carolina Electric and Gas (2017) reduction sought by ORS
DC Public Service Formal Case No. 1142, Merger Application Ring-fencing for utility
Commission of AltaGas Ltd. and Washington Gas Light, merger; financial strength
Inc. (2017)
Public Service Docket No. 9449, In the Matter of the Ring-fencing for utility
Commission of Merger of AltaGas Ltd. and Washington merger; financial strength
Maryland Gas Light, Inc. (2017)
Public Utilities Docket No. 46957, Application of Oncor Appropriate capital
Commission Texas Electric Delivery LLC to Change Rates, on structure. Financial
behalf of Oncor. (2017) strength.
Public Utilities Docket No. 46416, Application of Entergy Debt equivalence and
Commission Texas Texas, Inc. for a Certificate of Convenience capital cost associated
and Necessity, Montgomery County, on with capacity purchase
behalf of Entergy Texas (2016-2017) obligations (PPA)
U.S. Federal Energy Dockets No. EL16-29 and EL16-30, Capital market
Regulatory NCEMC, et al. vs Duke Energy Carolinas environment affecting the
Commission and Duke Energy Progress, on behalf of the determination of the cost
Respondents (2016) of equity capital
Hawaii Public Utilities Docket No. 2015-0022, Merger Ring-fencing and
Commission Application on behalf of NextEra Energy financial strength
and Hawaiian Electric Inc. (2015)
U.S. Federal Energy Dockets EL13-48 and EL15-27, Delaware Capital market
Regulatory Div. of the Public Advocate vs. Baltimore environment affecting the
Commission Gas and Electric Company and PEPCO determination of the cost
Holdings et al., for Respondents (2015) of equity capital

Appendix 1
Page 4 of 7

U.S. Federal Energy Dockets No. EL14-12 and EL15-45, Capital market
Regulatory ABATE, vs MISO, Inc. et al., on behalf of environment; capital
Commission MISO Transmission Owners (2015) spending and risk
U.S. Federal Energy Dockets No. EL12-59 and 13-78, Golden Capital market
Regulatory Spread Electric Coop., on behalf of South- environment; capital
Commission western Public Service Co. (2015) spending and risk
U.S. Federal Energy Dockets No. EL13-33 and EL14-86, ENE Capital market
Regulatory et al. vs. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co. et al., environment affecting the
Commission on behalf of New England Transmission measurement of the cost
Owners. (2015) of equity capital
U.S. Federal Energy Dockets No. ER13-1508 et alia, Entergy Capital market
Regulatory Arkansas, Inc. and other Entergy utility environment affecting the
Commission subsidiaries, on behalf of Entergy Services measurement of the cost
Inc. (2014) of equity capital
Delaware Public DE Case 14-193, Merger of Exelon Corp. Ring-fencing for utility
Service Commission and Pepco Holdings, Inc. on behalf of the merger; avoidance of
Joint Applicants (2015) financial harm
Maryland Public Case No. 9361, Merger of Exelon Corp. Ring-fencing for utility
Service Commission and Pepco Holdings, Inc. on behalf of the merger; avoidance of
Joint Applicants (2015) financial harm
New Jersey Board of BPU Docket No. EM 14060581, Merger of Ring-fencing for utility
Public Utilities Exelon Corp. and Pepco Holdings, Inc., on merger; avoidance of
behalf of the Joint Applicants (2015) financial harm
U.S. Federal Energy Docket ER15-572 Application of New Incentive compensation
Regulatory York Transco, LLC, on behalf of NY for electric transmission;
Commission Transco, LLC. (2015) capital market and
financial strength
U.S. Federal Energy Docket EL 14-90-000 Seminole Electric Capital market
Regulatory Cooperative, Inc. and Florida Municipal environment affecting the
Commission Power Agency vs. Duke Energy FL on determination of the cost
behalf of Duke Energy (2014) of equity capital
DC Public Service Formal Case No. 1119 Merger of Exelon Ring-fencing for utility
Commission Corp. and Pepco Holdings Inc., on behalf merger; avoidance of
of the Joint Applicants (2014-2015) financial harm
U.S. Federal Energy Docket EL14-86-000 Attorney General of Return on Equity; capital
Regulatory Massachusetts et. al. vs. Bangor Hydro- market environment
Commission Electric Company, et. al on behalf of New
England Transmission Owners (2014)
Arkansas Public Docket No. 13-028-U. Rehearing direct Investor and rating
Service Commission testimony on behalf of Entergy Arkansas. agency reactions to ROE
(2014) set by Order.

Appendix 1
Page 5 of 7

Illinois Commerce Docket No. 12-0560 Rock Island Clean Access to capital for a
Commission Line LLC, on behalf of Commonwealth merchant electric
Edison Company, an intervenor (2013) transmission line;
financial capability
U.S. Federal Energy Docket EL13-48-000 Delaware Division Return on Equity; capital
Regulatory of the Public Advocate, et. al. vs. Baltimore market view of
Commission Gas and Electric Company and PEPCO transmission investment
Holdings et al., on behalf of (i)Baltimore
Gas and Electric and (ii) PEPCO and
subsidiaries (2013)
U.S. Federal Energy Docket EL11-66-000 Martha Coakley et. Return on Equity; capital
Regulatory al. vs. Bangor Hydro-Electric Company, et. market view of
Commission al on behalf of a group of New England transmission investment
Transmission Owners (2012-13)
New York Public Cases 13-E-0030; 13-G-0031; and 13-S- Cash flow and financial
Service Commission 0032 on behalf of Consolidated Edison strength; regulatory
Company of New York. (2013) mechanisms
Public Service Case. 9214 “In The Matter Of Whether Effect of certain power
Commission of New Generating Facilities Are Needed To contracts on the credit and
Maryland Meet Long-Term Demand For Standard financial strength of MD
Offer Service”, on behalf of Baltimore Gas utility counterparties
and Electric Co., Potomac Electric Power
Co., and Delmarva Power & Light (2012)
CONSULTING & ADVISORY ASSIGNMENTS
NJ American Water Co. Analyzed impacts of tax reform on cash flow and ratings
2018
Utility (Undisclosed) Credit advisory on ratings under a specific scenario.
2017 Objective: Compare strategic alternatives M&A
Entergy Texas, Inc. Research study on debt equivalence and capital cost associated
2016 with capacity purchase obligations. Impact of new GAAP lease
accounting standard on PPAs.
Objective: Economic comparison of resource options.
Utility (Undisclosed) Evaluated debt equivalence of power purchase obligations.
2014 Objective: Clarify credit impact of various contract obligations.
Bank (Undisclosed) Research study and recommendations on Loss Given Default and
2014 historical experience of default and recovery in the regulated
utility sector.
Objective: Efficient capital allocation for loan portfolio.
GenOn Energy Inc. White Paper on appropriate industry peers for a competitive
2012 power generation and energy company.
Objective: Improve peer comparisons in shareholder
communications and for compensation studies.

Appendix 1
Page 6 of 7
Transmission Recommended the appropriate capital structure and debt leverage

Utility during a period of high capital spending.
(Undisclosed) Objective: Make efficient use of equity during multi-year capex
2012 project; preserve existing credit ratings.
Toll Highway Advised on adding debt while minimizing risk of downgrade.
(Undisclosed) Recommended strategy for added leverage and rating agency
2011 communications.
Objectives: Increase leverage and free up equity for alternate
growth investments, while preserving credit ratings.
District Thermal Cooling Recommended a project loan structure to deal with seasonal cash
Company flow. Optimized payment schedule, form and timing of financial
(Undisclosed) covenants.
Objectives: Reduce default risk; efficient borrowing structure.
PROFESSIONAL AND EXECUTIVE TRAINING

In-house Training, Designed and delivered in-house training program on evaluating
Southern California Edison the credit of energy market counterparties, Nov. 2016
Co., Rosemead CA
In-house Training, Developed corporate credit case for internal credit training program
Undisclosed Financial and coordinated use in training exercise, 2016
Institution, NYC
CoBank, Denver CO Designed and delivered “Midstream Gas and MLPs: Advanced
Credit Training”, 2014
Empire District Electric Designed and delivered in-house executive training session
Co., Joppa MO Utility Sector Financial Evaluation, 2014
PPL Energy Corp, Designed and delivered in-house Financial Training, 2014
Allentown PA
SNL Knowledge Center “Credit Analysis for the Power & Gas Sector”, 2011-2014
Courses “Analyst Training in the Power & Gas Sectors: Financial Statement
Analysis”, 2013-2014
EEI Transmission and “Financing and Access to Capital”, 2012

Wholesale Markets School
National Rural Utilities “Credit Analysis for the Power Sector”, 2012
Coop Finance Corp.
Judicial Institute of “Utility Regulation and the Courts: Impact of Court Decisions on
Maryland (Private seminar Financial Markets and Credit”, Annapolis MD, 2007
for MD judges)
Edison Electric Institute “New Analyst Training Institute: Fixed Income Analysis and Credit
Ratings”, 2008 and 2004

Appendix 1
Page 7 of 7
PUBLICATIONS/
BOOK CHAPTERS
“Managing Credit Risk in the Electricity Market”, Ellen Lapson and Denise Furey, chapter 21
in Managing Energy Price Risk, 4th Edition, Vincent Kaminski ed., Risk Publications, London,
2016.
“Standard Market Design: Credit of Some Sectors Will Be Affected by SMD”, Ellen Lapson.
Chapter in: Electric & Natural Gas Business: Understanding It, 2003 and Beyond, Robert E. Willett
ed., Financial Communications Company, Houston, TX, 2003.
Energy Modeling and the Management of Uncertainty, Robert Jameson ed., Risk Publications,
London, 1999. “Managing Risks Through Contract Technology: Know Your Counterparty”,
Ellen Lapson, pp 154-155.
“Managing Credit Risk in the Electricity Market”, Ellen Lapson (pp 281-291). Chapter in: The
US Power Market: Restructuring and Risk Management, Robert Jameson ed., Risk Publications,
London, 1997.
Deregulation of the Electric Utility Industry – Proceedings of the AIMR Seminar; ed. AIMR
(CFA Institute), Charlottesville, VA, 1997. Speaker 3: E. Lapson.

Appendix 2
Appendix 2: Documents Relied Upon

Baker Tilly, South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff, Docket No. 2017‐
305‐E, Order No. 2018‐102 – Financial Impact Review of South Carolina
Electric and Gas Under Scenarios Relative to the Base Load Review Act,
S.C. Code 58‐33‐210, FINAL REPORT, June 12, 2018.

Baker Tilly, Interpretation Letter of Baker Tilly’s June 12, 2018 Report on
the Potential Financial Ramifications on SCE&G of the Eight Scenarios in
Commission Order No. 2018‐102, Letter dated June 20, 2018.
Berry, Carolyn A. and Roach, Craig, Bates White Economic Consulting,

Preliminary Analysis of an Interim Reduction in SCE&G Rates, March 22,
2018.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Commercial Paper
Rates and Outstanding Summary, About Commercial Paper, May 15,
2017; https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/cp/about.htm

Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement No. 71: Accounting for
the Effects of Certain Types of Regulation, December 1982.

Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement No. 101: Regulated
Enterprises – Accounting for the Discontinuation of Application of FASB
Statement No. 71. December 1988.

Fitch Ratings, Master Criteria: Corporate Rating Criteria, 23 March 2018

Fitch Ratings, Special Report, U.S. Utilities Power and Gas: Ratings
Navigator Companion, 25 April 2018.

Fitch Ratings, Fitch Maintains Watch Evolving on SCANA and
Subsidiaries, 03 July 2018.

Fitch Ratings, Fitch Revises Rating Watch on SCANA and Subsidiaries to
Evolving, 03 January 2018.

Appendix 2
Fitch Ratings, Fitch Downgrades SCANA to 'BB+' / SCE&G to 'BBB‐';

Negative Watch Maintained. 29 September 2017.

Moody’s Investors Service, Rating Methodology, Regulated Electric and
Gas Utilities, 23 June, 2017.

Moody’s Investors Service, Rating Scale and Definitions,
https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/ProductAttachments/AP075
378_1_1408_KI.pdf

Moody’s Investors Service, Special Report, Short‐Term Ratings
Performance and Corporate Commercial Paper Defaults, 1972‐2014,
October 2004.

Moody’s Investors Service, Rating Action: Moody's places SCANA and
SCE&G on review for downgrade, 1 November 2017.

Moody’s Investors Service, Rating Action: Moody's downgrades SCE&G to
Baa3 and SCANA to Ba1, ratings remain under review, 5 February 2018.

Moody’s Investors Service, Rating Action: Moody's Confirms SCANA,
SCE&G and PSNC, Rating Outlook Negative, 2 July 2018.

Pro Forma Financials for SCE&G assuming Implementation of the Act.

S&P Global, Ratings, Criteria, Corporates, Utilities: Key Credit Factors for
the Regulated Utilities Industry, 19 November 2013.

S&P RatingsDirect, Research Update, SCANA Corp. And Subsidiaries
'BBB' Ratings Remain On CreditWatch Negative On Passage Of South
Carolina Bill, 3 July 2018.

Van Orman Jr. Jerome B., General Motors Acceptance Corporation,
Commercial Credit Ratings. April 17 2001 as corrected November 8,
2002, (for SEC Hearings on Credit Rating Agencies, November 21, 2002)
https://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/generalmotors1.htm

Exhibit F
D.E. 55-4
EXHIBIT 4

COLUMBIA DIVISION
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS )

COMPANY, )
Plaintiff, )
v. )
) CASE NO. 3:18-CV-01795-JMC
SWAIN E. WHITFIELD, in his official capacity as
Chairman of the South Carolina Public Service )
Commission; et al. )
)
Defendants.
)
Declaration of Ian Ratner, CPA/ABV, ASA, CFE

Table of Contents
1.0 PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS AND BACKGROUND OF IAN RATNER ....................................3
2.0 SCOPE OF REVIEW .................................................................................................................4
3.0 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................4
4.0 BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................7
4.1 Parties ........................................................................................................................................... 7
4.2 General Timeline of Relevant Information ................................................................................. 10
5.0 OVERVIEW OF SCE&G’S HISTORICAL FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE ........................................... 12
5.1 Overview of Income Statements, Balance Sheets and Statements of Cash Flow ...................... 12
5.2 Share Price History ...................................................................................................................... 15
6.0 POTENTIAL HARM AND DAMAGES TO SCE&G AND ITS INVESTORS ....................................... 17
6.1 Financial Status and Outlook for SCE&G is Significantly Weakened........................................... 17
6.2 The Act Has Led to Dividend Reductions and Further Reductions Will Be Necessary ................ 20
6.3 Increased Risk has Concerned Investors Leading to Share Price Declines ................................. 24
6.4 Cost of Capital (debt and equity) ................................................................................................ 25
6.5 SCE&G’s Access to Short and Long-term Debt............................................................................ 29
6.6 SCE&G’s Ability to Fund Capital Expenditures and Remain Operationally Ready ...................... 31
7.0 CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................... 31
GlassRatner Advisory Page 2

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1.0 PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS AND BACKGROUND OF IAN RATNER
1. I, Ian Ratner, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, declare and state under penalty of perjury,
that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
If called to testify, I could and would testify competently to the following:
2. I am a CPA with approximately 30 years’ experience in Public Accounting, Forensic

Accounting including the quantification of damages, Business Valuations, Mergers &
Acquisitions, Due Diligence Services, Corporate Finance and Bankruptcy Consulting. I co-
founded GlassRatner in 2001 with Ron Glass. The firm has approximately 100 employees
in multiple offices across the United States. I am also a shareholder in GlassRatner
Securities, LLC, a member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority and Securities
Investor Protection Corporation. Before founding GlassRatner, I held senior leadership
positions with Kroll Inc., a worldwide risk mitigation firm, and the Financial Advisory
Services (FAS) practice at Ernst & Young.
3. My practice is diverse and includes assignments such as Special Master, Receiver and
other fiduciary roles, creditor committee representations, due diligence engagements,
monitoring borrowers on behalf of lenders, serving as liquidating agent, and leading
difficult multi-bank restructuring assignments on behalf of borrowers. I have been
designated as an expert witness in complex commercial litigation cases, damages cases,
valuation disputes, and bankruptcy litigation including solvency disputes on numerous
occasions over the last 25 plus years. Further, I have testified at trials, arbitrations, and
depositions on more than 140 occasions and have worked on matters throughout the
United States, Canada and the Caribbean on behalf of law firms and Fortune 500
companies. As a damages expert, I have worked on hundreds of damages matters in a
variety of industries, where damages have been quantified under various damages
methodologies including lost profits/royalties, extra expenses, and diminution of value,
among others. I have been retained as a solvency expert on dozens of occasions and
have lectured extensively on solvency litigation and the various aspects of solvency
opinions. My Curriculum Vitae is attached as Appendix 1 to this Report, which sets out
additional information about my qualifications, a list of cases where I have provided
testimony, and publications I have authored.
4. I am a Certified Public Accountant (“CPA”) and also hold the specialty designation
Accredited in Business Valuations (“ABV”) from the American Institute of Certified Public

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Accountants (“AICPA”). In addition to the above, I am an Accredited Senior Appraiser

(“ASA”) and hold the designation Certified Fraud Examiner (“CFE”) granted by the
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. In 2010 I was inducted as a Fellow of the
American College of Bankruptcy. I hold graduate and undergraduate business degrees
from McGill University in Montreal, Canada. I co-authored a Wiley text titled “Business
Valuation and Bankruptcy.”
5. In the area of corporate financial analysis, I have performed hundreds of engagements

wherein I was asked to perform analyses on private and public corporate entities to gain
an understanding of their financial and operational performance in connection with matters
such as ability to pay punitive damages and/or regulatory fines. For example I was
retained by the Department of Justice, and ultimately testified at trial on BP’s ability to pay
an $18 Billion fine under the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq.) (1972). In
another example, I have been retained by Plaintiff’s counsel on numerous occasions in the
Engle Progeny cases (Big Tobacco litigation) to testify on the ability of various Tobacco
companies to pay large compensatory damage awards. These are only two examples, of
matters where I have performed sophisticated financial analysis on billion dollar
companies.
2.0 SCOPE OF REVIEW
6. The conclusions set out herein are based on my review of documents, information, and
data. Those relied upon are set out in Appendix 2 to this report. For ease of reference, I
have cited to the specific documents relied on in this Report and Tables in footnotes.
3.0 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS
7. GlassRatner Advisory & Capital Group LLC (“GlassRatner”) was retained by King &
Spalding LLP (“Counsel”) on behalf of South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (“SCE&G”
or the “Company”) to prepare this Declaration in connection with SCE&G’s efforts to seek
temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief in connection with the 2018 South
Carolina Laws Act 287 (“the Act”) and the 2018 South Carolina Laws Resolution 285 (the
“Resolution”).1 Specifically, we were asked to:
1
For convenience, I refer to the Act and Resolution herein as simply the Act.

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a) Review the Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Temporary,

Preliminary, and Permanent Injunctive Relief dated June 29, 2018 (“the Complaint”)
and gain a general understanding of the background of the events surrounding the
dispute as more fully explained in the Complaint;
b) Review the publicly available financial information relating to the operations of

SCE&G to gain an understanding of its historical financial performance, capital
structure and dividend history;
c) Assess the potential harm and damages to SCE&G; its parent, SCANA; and their
investors should injunctive relief not be ordered, specifically including the impact of
the “experimental rate” on:2
(i) SCE&G’s cash flow; Section 6.1
(ii) The ramifications from the suspension of dividends; Section 6.2
(iii) SCE&G’s ability to attract investors; Section 6.3
(iv) The Cost of Capital (debt and equity); Section 6.4
(v) SCE&G’s access to short- and long-term debt; and Section 6.5
(vi) SCE&G’s ability to fund CAPEX, operational readiness, etc. Section 6.6
8. In order to perform this engagement, I relied on other GlassRatner professionals with

extensive experience in financial analysis, economic damages, business valuations,
solvency opinions, corporate finance, and forensic accounting, all of whom worked under
my direct supervision and control. I have relied on the work of the team to support my
review of information related to this matter, and references to “our” and “we” recognize this
reliance.
9. Any minor differences in the amounts calculated or referenced in supporting

documentation or schedules to this report are due to rounding.
2
Bill 4375 says: … the Public Service Commission, by order, is directed to exercise its authority pursuant to
Section 58-27-870(F) to provide an experimental rate that customers of the utility identified in Section 58-34-10
shall pay during the pendency of litigation currently before the commission which shall include full and final
compliance by the utility with the order issued by the Public Service Commission under this section or until
replaced by an order of the commission under Section 58-34-30.

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10. My work and analyses were performed in accordance with the professional standards
required by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in connection with the
provision of litigation services. My opinions are expressed to a reasonable degree of
certainty.
11. The hourly rates charged by GlassRatner for professional services provided in this matter
range from $195 to $525 for staff and my time is billed at $595 per hour.
12. I reserve the right to revise and supplement my analyses, opinions and Declaration to the
extent additional relevant information becomes available, or to the extent permitted by the
Court in this case.
Summary Conclusions
13. Based on my review of the documents and evidence produced, and from my analyses,
research, education, experience and training, it is my opinion that:
a) Implementation of the 2018 South Carolina Laws Act 287 and the 2018 South
Carolina Laws Resolution 285, will have a substantial impact on SCE&G and, in turn,
SCANA.
b) Specifically, the 2018 South Carolina Laws Act 287 and the 2018 South Carolina
Laws Resolution 285 will: 3
(i) Reduce SCE&G’s profitability and cash flow in an amount equal to

approximately 8.8% reduction in 2018 total revenues;
(ii) Diminish SCANA/SCE&G’s ability to pay dividends consistent with past

practices and market expectations, which will disrupt investor expectations;
(iii) Lead to further reductions in SCANA’s stock price and cause further investor
losses;
3
While South Carolina Electric and Gas Company is the Plaintiff in this matter, given that SCANA Corporation
wholly owns SCE&G, the damages, risks and business threats described herein on one or the other of these entities
is applicable to the other. I have reached this conclusion because SCE&G constitutes a major portion of SCANA’s
balance sheet, earnings and cash flows.

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(iv) Impair SCE&G’s ability to raise capital through substantial increases in costs
for debt and equity financing and the potential to impair access to credit
markets entirely; and
(v) Threaten SCE&G’s ability to fund planned capital expenditures required to

operate in the future in a manner consistent with increasing customer service
level expectations driven by technological and renewable energy
advancements.4
c) In the absence of injunctive relief from the experimental rate provided for in the Act,
SCE&G will be significantly weakened from both a financial and operational
readiness perspective.
4.0 BACKGROUND5
14. This Declaration has been prepared in connection with The United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina Columbia Division action styled South Carolina Electric &
Gas Company (Plaintiff) v. Swain E. Whitfield, in his official capacity as Chairman of the
South Carolina Public Service Commission; et al (Defendants), File No. 3:18-CV-01795-
JMC.
4.1 Parties
15. SCE&G, the plaintiff in this case, is a subsidiary of SCANA Corporation (“SCANA”), a
South Carolina corporation created in 1984 as a holding company. All of SCE&G’s
common stock is owned by SCANA and no established public trading market exists for
SCE&G common stock.6 SCANA and its subsidiaries had full-time, permanent employees
as of February 20, 2018 and 2017 of 5,228 and 5,910, respectively.7 SCANA does not
directly own or operate any significant physical properties, but it holds directly all of the
capital stock of its subsidiaries, including SCE&G.8 A majority of SCANA’s external
dividend payments are funded through its receipt of dividends from SCE&G. In 2017,
4
For example, customers will expect to benefit from new smart meter implementations, as well as to partner with
their electric utility to implement and benefit from solar systems.
5
The events discussed in the Background section of this report are not intended to represent an exhaustive history of
all important facts and events surrounding this dispute.
6
Combined Form 10-K filing of SCANA and SCE&G for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, page 32.
7
8

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SCANA paid total dividends of $344 million,9 of which it received dividends from SCE&G
of $319 million.10
16. The flow of dividends between SCANA and SCE&G is as follows:
SHAREHOLDERS
100% of Dividends
92.7% of external Dividends

in 2017 came from SCE&G
SCANA owns
100% of SCE&G
9
Ibid p. 65.
10
Ibid p. 74.

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17. As shown in the Tables 1 and 2 below, the majority of SCANA’s assets, revenues and
earnings are derived from the consolidated operations of SCE&G. Moreover, in 2017,
92.7% of SCANA’s dividends to its shareholders were funded from dividends it received
from SCE&G. In Q1 2018 94.25% of SCANA’s dividends to its shareholders were funded
from dividends it received from SCE&G. Any significant financial impact to SCE&G will
impact SCANA, its publicly-traded parent company.
Table 1 – SCANA and SCE&G Balance Sheet Comparison
Comparative Summary of SCE&G's Assets, Liabilities and Equity as a Percentage of SCANA [1]
2017 2016
SCE&G SCE&G SCE&G SCE&G
and as % of and as % of
Description SCANA Affiliates SCANA SCANA Affiliates SCANA
Assets
Current assets $ 1,851 $ 1,477 79.8% $ 1,506 $ 1,020 67.7%
Utility Plants (net) 10,648 8,620 81.0% 14,324 12,603 88.0%
Non-utility and other investments 474 209 44.1% 475 195 41.1%
Other assets 5,766 5,640 97.8% 2,402 2,273 94.6%
Total Assets 18,739 15,946 85.1% 18,707 16,091 86.0%
Liabilities
Current liabilities 2,113 1,804 85.4% 2,065 1,736 84.1%
Other liabilities 5,465 4,721 86.4% 4,444 3,729 83.9%
Long-term debt 5,906 4,441 75.2% 6,473 5,154 79.6%
Total Liabilities 13,484 10,966 81.3% 12,982 10,619 81.8%
Equity 5,255 4,980 94.8% 5,725 5,472 95.6%

Total Liabilities and Equity 18,739 15,946 85.1% 18,707 16,091 86.0%
Notes:
[1] Combined Form 10-K for SCANA and SCE&G for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017. All dollar
amounts are in millions.
Table 2 – SCANA and SCE&G Income Statement Comparison
Comparative Summary of SCE&G's Revenues, Expenses and Dividends as a Percentage of SCANA [1]
2017 2016 2015
SCE&G SCE&G as SCE&G SCE&G SCE&G SCE&G

and % of and as % of and as % of
Description SCANA Affiliates SCANA SCANA Affiliates SCANA SCANA Affiliates SCANA
Operating Revenues $ 4,407 $ 3,070 69.7% $ 4,227 $ 2,986 70.6% $ 4,380 $ 2,930 66.9%
Operating Expenses 4,331 3,160 73.0% 3,074 1,973 64.2% 3,306 1,996 60.4%
Gain - - 0.0% - - 0.0% 234 - 0.0%
Operating Income 76 (90) -118.4% 1,153 1,013 87.9% 1,308 934 71.4%
Other Income (Expenses) 56 35 62.5% 55 31 56.4% 42 25 59.5%
Gain on Sale of non-operating assets - - 0.0% - - 0.0% 107 - 0.0%
Interest (363) (288) 79.3% (342) (270) 78.9% (318) (248) 78.0%
Income (Loss) before income taxes (231) (343) 148.5% 866 774 89.4% 1,139 711 62.4%
Income tax expense (Benefit) (112) (171) 152.7% 271 248 91.5% 393 231 58.8%
Net Income (Loss) (119) (172) 144.5% 595 526 88.4% 746 480 64.3%
Dividends[2] 344 319 92.7% 325 301 92.6% 309 285 92.2%
Notes:
[1] Combined Form 10-K for SCANA and SCE&G for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017. All dollar amounts are in millions.
[2] Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows on pages 65 and 74, respectively, to the Combined Form 10-K for SCANA and SCE&G for the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2017.

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18. The Defendants are Commissioners of the South Carolina Public Services Commission
(“PSC”) and have been sued in their official capacities.11
4.2 General Timeline of Relevant Information
19. SCE&G is engaged in the generation, transmission, distribution and sale of electricity to
approximately 719,000 customers and the purchase, sale and transportation of natural
gas to approximately 368,000 customers (each as of December 31, 2017). SCE&G’s
business experiences seasonal fluctuations, with generally higher sales of electricity
during the summer and winter months because of air conditioning and heating
requirements, and generally higher sales of natural gas during the winter months due to
heating requirements. SCE&G’s electric service territory extends into 24 counties
covering nearly 16,000 square miles in the central, southern and southwestern portions of
South Carolina. The service area for natural gas encompasses all or part of 35 counties in
South Carolina and covers approximately 23,000 square miles. More than 3.4 million
persons live in the counties where SCE&G conducts its business. Predominant industries
served by SCE&G include chemicals, educational services, paper products, food products,
lumber and wood products, health services, textile manufacturing, rubber and
miscellaneous plastic products, automotive and tire and fabricated metal products.12
20. I understand that in order to meet the projected energy demands of its customers, and for
other benefits, SCE&G entered into a series of contracts in 2008 for the design and
construction of two nuclear power plants (“Nuclear Plants”) referred to as V.C. Summer
Units 2 and 3.13 I understand that the Base Load Review Act (“BLRA”), enacted by the
South Carolina General Assembly, provides, among other things, for the recovery of
certain costs associated with the construction of new base load plants when constructed
by investor-owned utilities.14 I further understand that SCE&G relied on the investment
incentive benefits provided under the BLRA to finance the massive investment required to
build the new Nuclear Plants.15 The South Carolina Public Service Commission is the
regulatory agency with exclusive authority over SCE&G’s retail electric rates and approved
11
The Complaint, ¶ 14.
12
13
14
https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess117_2007-2008/bills/431.htm (Section 1a).
15

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its construction budgets and the costs it incurred in constructing the Nuclear Plants under
the provisions of the BLRA.16
21. The construction of the Nuclear Plants commenced in 2013.17
22. By July 2017 SCE&G determined that due to cost escalations, construction delays,
contractor performance issues, and the bankruptcy of the lead contractor,18 among other
things, the most prudent course was to cease the construction of the Nuclear Plants and
pursue recovery of costs incurred in connection with the construction under the
abandonment provisions of the BLRA.19
23. As of September 30, 2017 SCE&G had incurred approximately $4.73 billion of
unrecovered project costs prior to impairment losses booked in the last quarter of 2017. 20
After the recording of impairment losses in the last quarter of 2017, the balance of
unrecovered project costs as of December 31, 2018 was $3.976 billion.21
24. On January 2, 2018, SCANA entered into a Merger Agreement whereby it would become
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dominion Energy, Inc. (“Dominion”). The merger is subject
to a variety of closing conditions including the receipt of approvals from several regulators
and from SCANA's shareholders.22 Legislative actions to reduce SCE&G’s electric rates
are casting a shadow on SCANA’s valuation and credit rating.23 The reduction in rates is
discussed below. For these reasons, Dominion has the right to back away from the
merger. 24
25. On June 27, 2018, the South Carolina Legislature adopted legislation (2018 South
Carolina Laws Act 285) which became effective June 28, 2018, to reduce the amount
SCE&G has been approved to collect from customers under the BLRA related to the
16
17
https://www.chooseenergy.com/news/article/failed-v-c-summer-nuclear-project-timeline/
18
Combined Form 10-K filing of SCANA and SCE&G for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, page 110-111.
19
20
21
Ibid.
22
23
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-19/dominion-s-8-billion-scana-merger-dealt-another-blow-in-
s-c.
24
Ibid.

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Nuclear Plants.25 The legislation will reduce the portion of SCE&G’s electric rates
associated with the Nuclear Plants from approximately 18% of the average residential
electric customer’s bill to approximately 3.2%, or a reduction of approximately $31 million
per month which equates to approximately $367 million per year.26
26. I conclude, as SCE&G alleges, that the passage of the Act and the reduction of the
electric rates will result in massive and irreparable harm, including millions of dollars in
damages that cannot be recovered, a substantial loss of goodwill, and other permanent
injuries.27
27. On June 28, 2018, SCANA announced that its Board of Directors declared a quarterly
dividend of 12.37 cents per share for the quarter ending June 30, 2018. The quarterly
cash dividend was reduced from the 61.25 cents per share dividend paid in the previous
quarter. The 80% reduction in the dividend corresponds to the portion of the dividend
attributable to the electric portion of SCE&G.28
5.0 OVERVIEW OF SCE&G’S HISTORICAL FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
28. The following sections of this report provide additional financial information about SCE&G
and its share price history.
5.1 Overview of Income Statements, Balance Sheets and Statements of Cash Flow
29. As part of my review, I analyzed SCE&G’s historical financial operating performance as

reported in its Form 10-K filings. Table 3 below summarizes SCE&G’s historical Income
Statements for the years 2015 through 2017.29
25
SCANA Form 8-K filed July 16, 2018.
26
SCANA Form 8-K filed July 16, 2018 and Tab 3 to the SCE&G Pro-Forma analysis (i.e. December 2017
Abandonment Petition Exhibits – H4375) - Pro Forma Financials for SCE&G Assuming Implementation of the
Act.
27
As discussed in the Summary Conclusions section to this report.
28
SCANA press release dated June 28, 2018 titled SCANA Reduces Quarterly Dividend Rate by 80 Percent and
Declares Dividend on Common Stock for Second Quarter 2018. (1- ($0.1237/$0.6125)).
29

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Table 3 – Historical Income Statements SCE&G
30. As shown above, SCE&G’s revenues have marginally increased over the 3-year period
2015 through 2017 to approximately $3 billion annually. While SCE&G’s historical
operating income in 2015 and 2016 was strong at approximately $1 billion, the decision to
abandon the construction of the Nuclear Plants negatively affected the 2017 operating
income and net income. In 2017 SCE&G realized a Net Loss of $172 million due
principally to an impairment charge of $1.118 billion in connection with the abandonment
of its Nuclear Plant construction.30 The impairment charge represents a non-cash
expense. However, absent this charge, SCE&G would have otherwise reported net
income and profits consistent with its historical performance.
31. Table 4 below presents the historical balance sheet for SCE&G as of December 31, 2016
and 2017.31
Table 4 – Historical Balance Sheets SCE&G
30
Combined Form 10-K filing of SCANA and SCE&G for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, page 113. The
$1.118 billion charge is net of receipt of approximately $1.0 billion in a settlement with Toshiba. The $1.118
billion impairment charge includes $0.18 billion in connection with a gas generating station.
31
Combined Form 10-K filing of SCANA and SCE&G for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, pages 71-72.

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32. Although the balance sheets for 2016 and 2017 show that total assets were relatively
similar, the mix of the assets changed significantly. In 2017, as a result of the decision to
abandon construction on the Nuclear Projects, approximately $4.7 billion (prior to an
estimated impairment loss of $1.1 billion) was reclassified from construction work in
progress, within Utility Plant (net), into the Regulatory Assets category (Other Assets). 32
Regulatory Assets are assets that may be recoverable from ratepayers but the amount is
uncertain pending regulatory orders.33 However, of the $4.7 billion reclassified as
Regulatory Assets, a pre-tax impairment loss of $1.1 billion was recorded because
SCE&G determined that a disallowance of recovery of part of the cost of the abandoned
Nuclear Plants is both probable and reasonably estimable.34
33. Of the $15.9 billion in total SCE&G assets as of December 31, 2017, $7.9 billion relates to
its retail electric rate base.35
34. While modest, relative to its revenues, SCE&G has generated positive cash flow over the
years as shown below in Table 5.36
Table 5 – Historical Cash Flows SCE&G
35. As of December 31, 2017, SCE&G projected to incur capital expenditures of $520 million
and $538 million in 2018 and 2019, respectively.37
32
33
Baker & Tilly Report dated June 12, 2018, Glossary of Terms, pages 9 and 10.
34
35
Source - SCE&G Excel file: December 2017 Abandonment Petition Exhibits – H4375 NO LINKS. - Pro Forma
Financials for SCE&G Assuming Implementation of the Act.
36
37

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5.2 Share Price History
36. Over the past several years and through 2018, SCANA’s share price has fallen
dramatically. When SCANA took its first major Nuclear Plant impairment charge of more
than $1 billion in July 2017, its stock continued to trade in the range of approximately $61
to $63 per share.38 However, according to Moody’s Investors Service, the political and
regulatory environment around SCE&G and SCANA became exceedingly contentious and
uncertain, leading to stock price declines.39 By the end of September 2017 SCANA’s
stock value stood at roughly $48 per share. As pressures continued to mount over time,
the stock price continued to fall and today trades at approximately $38 per share.
37. SCANA’s stock price trends are shown in Chart 2 below.40
Chart 2 – SCANA’s Share Price History
38. Table 6 shows the end of month prices of SCANA’s shares and its equity market
capitalization.
38
Source: Google Finance at web search “SCANA stock price history.”
39
Moody’s Investor Service Rating Action: Moody’s downgrades SCE&G to Baa3 and SCANA to Ba1, ratings
remain under review (February 05, 2018).
40
See Table 6 for detailed end of month stock prices.

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Table 6
SCANA Share Price and Market Cap by Month End

from August 2017 to July 2018
Market Cap in
Month Per Share Price $ Billions
Aug-17 $ 60.38 $ 8.63
Sep-17 $ 48.49 $ 6.93
Oct-17 $ 43.14 $ 6.57
Nov-17 $ 43.17 $ 6.16
Dec-17 $ 39.78 $ 5.67
Jan-18 $ 40.64 $ 5.83
Feb-18 $ 39.67 $ 5.66
Mar-18 $ 37.55 $ 5.32
Apr-18 $ 36.77 $ 5.35
May-18 $ 36.30 $ 5.11
Jun-18 $ 38.52 $ 5.49
Jul-18 $ 38.83 $ 5.58
Source: PitchBook
39. As indicated in the above table, since August 2017, SCANA’s market capitalization has
declined by more than $3 billion, or 35%.
40. For the reasons explained more fully below, and as shown below in Table 7, 41 SCANA’s
stock (Ticker Symbol: “SCG”) has declined much more rapidly than that of U.S. utilities in
general and the stock market as a whole.
Table 7 – SCANA’s Rapid Share Price Decline
Reported figures are as of the writing of this report.
41
Charles Schwab Client Center Research Data: https://client.schwab.com/secure/cc/research/stocks.

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6.0 POTENTIAL HARM AND DAMAGES TO SCE&G AND ITS INVESTORS
41. As previously discussed, SCE&G alleges the passage of the Act and the reduction of
electric rates will result in massive and irreparable harm, including millions of dollars in
damages that cannot be recovered, a substantial loss of goodwill, and other permanent
injuries.42 In the following paragraphs I explain my agreement with these allegations.
42. The United States has a long-standing history of regulating public utilities such as electric,
water, gas and communications in order to eliminate the disruptive impact of overbuilding
these facilities into homes and businesses. Given the protected status of utilities as
monopolies or near monopolies, utilities have historically generated very stable revenue
and paid consistent dividends to their shareholders. Until recently, SCE&G has fit this
stable and steady norm. However, I have reached the conclusion that as a direct
consequence of the Act, SCE&G’s financial trajectory has been dramatically altered and
investors no longer perceive the business as a favorable investment compared to other
comparable entities. It is my opinion that SCE&G’s finances are now strained as a result
of the Act, and is resulting in a variety of harm, including enhanced credit default risks,
diminished access to credit markets and the associated ability to fund operations through
credit arrangements, and a risk of diminished ability to meet the needs of its customers.43
6.1 Financial Status and Outlook for SCE&G is Significantly Weakened
43. As previously discussed, were it not for a non-cash impairment charge taken by SCE&G,
the Company would have continued to operate profitably through 2017. In 2016 and
2015, SCE&G had a net income margin of 17.6% and 16.4% respectively.44
44. Beginning with 2016 actual financial results, Table 8 presents a pro-forma cash flow
profile for SCE&G, inclusive of ongoing customer rate reductions under the Act.
42
43
SCE&G’s shareholder value has declined, and as a direct consequence, SCANA’s public market value has also
declined nearly in half.
44
Calculated from Table 3 ($526 million / $2,986 million = 17.6% for 2016) ($480 million / $2,930 million =
16.4% for 2015).

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Table 8 - Historical and 2018 Pro-forma Cash Flows of SCE&G Assuming Suspension of
Rates Currently Being Collected Under the BLRA
Estimation of SCE&G's Proforma Annual Cash Flows
2016 % of 2017 % of Proforma 2018 % of

$ in Millions Actual 2016 Revenue Actual 2017 Revenue 2018 Revenue
Operating Revenues [1] $ 2,986 100.0% $ 3,070 100.0% $ 3,071 100.0%
Less: Operating Expenses, excluding Interest Expense [1] 1,973 66.1% 3,160 102.9% 2,043 66.5%
Operating Income (Loss) $ 1,013 33.9% $ (90) -2.9% $ 1,028 33.5%
Less: Reduced Customer rates as per the Act [2] - 0.0% - 0.0% 270 8.8%
Adjusted Operating Income (Loss) $ 1,013 33.9% $ (90) -2.9% $ 758 24.7%
Less: Interest Expense [3] 270 9.0% 288 9.4% 287 9.3%
Equals Pre-tax Operating Income (Loss) $ 743 24.9% $ (378) -12.3% $ 471 15.3%
Add: Other Income (Expense) 31 1.0% 35 1.1% 35 1.1%
Less: Income Taxes [4] 248 8.3% (171) -5.6% - 0.0%
Equals After-tax Operating Income (Loss) $ 526 17.6% $ (172) -5.6% $ 506 16.5%
Add: Depreciation and Amortization Expense 310 10.4% 312 10.2% 312 10.2%
Add: Non-cash Impairment Charge - 0.0% 1,118 36.4% - 0.0%
(Increase) / Decrease in Non-cash Working Capital (135) -4.5% 522 17.0% - 0.0%
Less: Capital Expenditures [6] 1,399 46.9% 928 30.2% 520 16.9%
Available to Repay Debt Principal $ (698) -23.4% $ 852 27.8% $ 298 9.7%
Less: Scheduled Principal Repayment (2018) [7] 112 3.8% 564 18.4% 550 17.9%
Less First Quarter 2018 Dividends [8] 82
Less Estimated Second Quarter 2018 Dividends [9] 16
[10]
Cash Flow $ (810) -27.1% $ 288 9.4% $ (350) -11.4%
Notes:
[1] Basic proforma Income statement figures taken from the 2017 Combined Form 10K of SCANA and SCE&G. Revenues in 2018 are adjusted upward by management at $1
million to reflect the estimate of customer growth. Operating expenses in 2018 do not include any impairment charges.
[2] Act-related reduced customer rates per SCE&G Form 8K investor update as of July 16, 2018 (9 month April 1 to December 31 in 2018). Figure provided by SCE&G
management.
[3] Source: 2017 Combined SCANA / SCE&G Form 10K at page 73, as well as SCE&G Excel file - December 2017 Abandonment Petition Exhibits - H4375 NO LINKS.
[4] Tax computations equal to $0 due to prior year loss carryforward.
[5] Proforma working capital is assumed not to change since revenues are essentially flat.
[6] SCANA Form 10K - December 31, 2017 p. 48 - Estimated Capital Expenditures
[7] As provided by SCE&G management.
[8] Source: SCANA 2018 Q1 Form 10-Q, page 16.
[9] Assuming the dividend relationship for Q1 2018 is the same for Q2 2018 of 94.25%, the SCE&G dividend paid would be $16 million calculated as $87 million*20%*.9425.
[10] For meaningful comparison to pro-forma amounts, cash flow in historical years ignores one-time and unusual items such as the $1+ billion Toshiba settlement, as well as
new borrowings.
GlassRatner’s Assessment of the Act on SCE&G’s Financial Outlook
45. Table 8 highlights a number of projected financial implications:
a) The Act will result in a downward adjustment to profits, stated as a percent of

revenue, equal to 8.8% in 2018;
b) The Act will lead to a loss of cash collections from customers of $270 million in
2018;45
c) The Act will result in a negative cash flow generation of $350 million in 2018, and will
affect the Company’s ability to meet its debt obligations as they come due; and
d) The Act will restrict the ability of the Company to pay dividends and projected capital
expenditures.
45
Source: SCE&G management.

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46. My discussions of the ramifications of the Act on SCE&G are continued below through an
analysis:
 Of SCE&G’s capacity to pay dividends;
 The implications of not paying adequate dividends as a Utility; and
 The Act’s impact on SCE&G’s access to and cost of capital.
47. However, before moving into further analysis, I summarize in the following paragraphs
SCE&G management’s Form 10K comments and concerns to investors surrounding
financial ramifications of the Act.
SCANA/SCE&G Management’s Financial Assessment of Nuclear Regulatory Events
48. SCANA/SCE&G 10K reporting is instructive with respect to the financial outlook presented
above. Management states that: SCE&G has experienced significant adverse effects in
connection with the regulatory events surrounding the decision to stop construction on the
Nuclear Plants. This has led to downgrades by credit rating agencies.46 SCANA and its
subsidiary SCE&G have significant obligations that must be repaid within the next 12
months including:47
a) Long term debt maturities and capital lease payments of $727 million, of which $723
million are debts of SCE&G;48
b) Short-term borrowings of $350 million, of which $252 million relate to SCE&G;
c) Interest payments of approximately $335 million, of which $259 relates to SCE&G;

and
d) Working capital requirements.
49. While SCE&G’s management believes it has access to available sources of cash to pay
obligations when due, this belief is predicated on the ability to continue to collect the
46
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.

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customer electric rate amounts previously approved under the BLRA.49 As a result of the
turmoil surrounding recent events, SCANA’s credit rating has fallen below investment
grade which has constricted its ability to issue commercial paper.50 The temporary or
permanent suspension of the portion of the electric rates collected under the BLRA will
reduce SCANA’s cash flow by approximately $445 million annually. 51
50. At a daily amount of $1 million,52 the temporary suspension of BLRA approved rates will
likely result in significant financial consequences to SCE&G such as the increased cost of
debt and the ramifications associated with the discontinuance of dividend payments to
conserve cash.
6.2 The Act Has Led to Dividend Reductions and Further Reductions Will Be Necessary
51. Public utilities such as SCE&G are particularly sensitive to shareholder expectations in
connection with dividend payments. Utilities are generally perceived as “income stocks”
because the dividends provide income to its shareholders who expect and rely on the
income. When a utility is faced with financial cash flow challenges such as those that may
result from customer rate reductions, the utility’s decision to implement a corresponding
dividend reduction is not taken lightly. SCANA has made this dividend rate reduction and
it is contributing to its sustained share price decline. As previously observed, over 90% of
SCANA’s dividends flow up from SCE&G (see Table 2).
52. While corporate dividend history is an important investment consideration in any type of
business, dividend payment expectations placed on utilities is extremely high. By way of
example, Chart 3 shows the long-term history of not just dividend payments made by
utilities, but even increases in these dividend payments over time.53
49
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid. Pro Forma Financials for SCE&G Assuming Implementation of the Act. This analysis show an annual Act-
induced customer rate reduction to the Retail Electric portion of SCE&G’s business of an annual amount equal to
$372 million. This lower $372 million figure was used in the construction of SCE&G’s pro-forma financial
results set forth herein at Table 8.
52
$275 million from April 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018 is approximately 275 days ($275 million / 275 days = $1
million per day).
53
Source: https://marketrealist.com/2018/01/these-utilities-have-raised-dividends-for-more-than-40-years.

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Chart 3 – Peer Utilities Dividend History
53. Chart 3 cites specific examples of consistent and rising dividends by select utilities, but
there are others as well. Southern Company (SO - NYSE) has been paying consecutive
quarterly dividends for the past 70 years, and it increased its per-share dividend for the
last 15 consecutive years.54 Duke Energy (DUK - NYSE) has been paying dividends for
the past 90 years, and it increased its per-share dividend in the last 11 years.55
54. As taught in business schools around the nation, the consistent payment of dividends
signals future prospects, financial health and stability – things many investors covet.
Commenting on the empirical evidence of dividend policy, Professor of Finance, Aswath
Damodaran, of the Stern School of Business at NYU wrote:
“We observe several interesting patterns when we look at the dividend policies of
firms in the United States in the past fifty years. First, dividends tend to lag behind
earnings; that is, increases in earnings are followed by increases in dividends, and
decreases in earnings sometimes by dividend cuts. Second, dividends are “sticky”
because firms are typically reluctant to change dividends; in particular, firms
avoid cutting dividends even when earnings drop. Third, dividends tend to follow
a much smoother path than do earnings. Finally, there are distinct differences in
dividend policy over the life cycle of a firm, resulting from changes in growth rates,
cash flows, and project availability.”56 [Emphasis added]
54
Source: https://marketrealist.com/2018/01/these-utilities-have-raised-dividends-for-more-than-40-years.
55
Ibid.
56
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/acf3E/book/ch10.pdf.

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55. By contrast to higher risk businesses in the U.S., utilities are generally looked upon as
stable, protected, and dividend-paying. Dividend paying policies communicate to
investors that the company is stable, growing steadily and rewarding investors for their
commitment to the company. Missed or reduced dividends at a utility signals trouble and
will negatively affect a company in various areas including:
a) Ability to attract capital from the capital markets;
b) Decline in share value and market capitalization;
c) Potentially triggering activist investors seeking short term objectives over long term
objectives; and
d) Decreases in credit standing and related financing difficulties.
56. Notwithstanding its recent share price decline, SCANA continued to pay dividends through
Q1 2018 consistent with its dividend history and the expectations of investors in public
utility companies. Chart 4 below summarizes the dividend history and trending of
SCANA’s annual dividend payments from 2010 through 2017, as well as Q1 2018,
compared to its stock price over the same period.57 Table 9 below compares the yield on
SCANA’s dividends to those of peer utilities. Annual dividend payments made by SCE&G
in 2017 that flowed up to its parent were $319 million.58
Chart 4 – SCANA Stock Price and Dividend History
57
Charles Schwab Client Center Research Data: https://client.schwab.com/secure/cc/research/stocks.
58
Combined Form 10-K filing of SCANA and SCE&G for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2017, p. 74.

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Table 9 – SCANA vs. Peer Utility Dividend Comparisons
Industry Peer Dividend Comparison
Symbol Company Name Annual Dividend Rate Annual Dividend Yield
SCG SCANA Corp $2.45 6.37%
BKH Black Hills Corp $1.90 3.13%
AVA Avista Corp $1.49 2.82%
MDU MDU Resources Group Inc $0.79 2.76%
VVC Vectren Corp $1.80 2.52%
Source: Charles Schwab Client Research Center at

https://client.schwab.com/secure/cc/rsearch/stocks/stocks.html?path=/research/Client/Stocks/Dividends&symbol=SCG
57. Leading up to 2018, SCANA/SCE&G had a steady dividend history consistent with market
expectations. However, with recent share price declines due to the Act, while continuing
to hold its dividends into Q1 2018 at the same annual rate paid in 2017, SCANA’s dividend
yield climbed to 6.37%. The equivalent yield at a 2016 $75 per share price would be
equal to 3.3%. It became clear to management that this dividend rate was no longer
sustainable. Accordingly, as disclosed in a press release on June 28, 2018, SCANA
slashed its quarterly dividend by approximately 80% from 61.25 cents per share to 12.37
cents to preserve its options as it continues to seek a resolution to the recovery of costs
for the Nuclear Plants.59 The reduced dividend rate equates to an annualized dividend of
49.48 cents per share, resulting in a dividend yield of 1.28%.60 This reduction in the
SCANA dividend rate, if sustained, will conserve approximately $250 million in cash per
year,61 but will leave investors disenchanted with the Company. As stated above,
investors in utilities expect financial stability, operational readiness, and steady dividend
payouts. Cutting dividends to help bolster cash flows in order to meet ongoing financing
and operational needs sends a negative signal to utility investors – particularly when
strong and stable alternative utility investments are available to investors.
58. In summary, all investors expect to receive a return on their investments, and investors in
utility companies view stable dividends as an integral piece of their return. With the
59
SCANA press release dated June 28, 2018 titled SCANA Reduces Quarterly Dividend Rate by 80 Percent and
Declares Dividend on Common Stock for Second Quarter 2018. (1- ($0.1237/$0.6125)).
60
($0.1237 X 4) = $0.4948. $0.4948 / $38.46 a spot price per share = 1.28%.
61
2017 reported dividends of $319 million x 80% savings = $255.2 million in savings. Total dividends sourced
from SCE&G cash flow statement in 2017 10K filing.

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reduction of the BLRA portion of the rates, SCANA investors will not receive their
expected return.
6.3 Increased Risk has Concerned Investors Leading to Share Price Declines
59. In support of my discussion of cost of capital, presented below, I have researched

SCE&G’s return on equity (“ROE”) as compared to several peer utilities. I found SCE&G’s
net income returns on equity to be reasonably aligned to these entities as of 2016.
Table 10 – SCE&G’s Return on Equity as Measured Against Peer Utilities
Return on Equity
Company 2016
SCE&G 9.6%
Black Hills Corp 14.3%
Avista Corp 6.3%
MDU Resources Group Inc. 12.3%
Vectren Corp 12.2%
Source: Yahoo Finance
60. As discussed later, reduced revenues under the Act cause the SCE&G ROE of 9.6% to
drop to a level of 5.16% - a significant decrease and now the lowest of the Peers shown
above.
61. When viewing SCANA’s public market price along a timeline of events, SCE&G’s
profitability has deteriorated, resulting in a loss of market confidence. These facts are
clearly observed by the downward re-pricing of SCANA’s stock while the company
remained a strong operating business. Upon initial announcement in July 2017 of its
intention to abandon the Nuclear Plant construction, SCANA’s stock price remained strong
into August. However, in months that followed, the stock dropped from more than $60 per
share to less than $50 per share. As publicity around SCE&G’s issues continued to swirl,
SCANA’s stock price has decreased further to less than $40 per share.62 The downward
trend is likely to continue if the Act is not enjoined.
62
These per share amounts have been previously discussed and can be seen in Chart 2 and Table 6.

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6.4 Cost of Capital (debt and equity)
62. The term cost of capital is generally referred to as the Weighted Average Cost of Capital
(“WACC”). This term is defined in the AICPA’s Statement on Standards for Valuation
Services No. 1 as:
the cost of capital (discount rate) determined by the weighted average, at

market value, of the cost of all financing sources in the business
enterprise’s capital structure.63
63. Capital components consist of two basic forms – debt and equity. The higher a capital
component’s perceived risk, the higher the expected return to compensate the investor for
taking on such risk.
64. The lowest perceived level of risk is referred to as the risk-free rate of return. An example
of a risk-free rate of return is the expected return on a U.S. government zero coupon bond.
Investments in corporate securities demand rates of return in excess of those provided
through risk-free instruments.
65. Corporate debt instruments are riskier than risk-free investments, but less risky than
corporate equities. Corporate debt carries with it varying amounts of default risk
depending upon such factors as the financial, industry, and competitive aspects of a given
company.
66. Just as an entity’s debt holders expect to be compensated for perceived default risk,
equity investors demand to be compensated for taking on risks such as competition,
project variances and market factors. In addition, equity investors expect premium
compensation to assume the risk associated with having the last claim on assets in the
event of a bankruptcy. Here too, the higher the perceived risk for a particular investment,
the higher the expected return as a reward for assuming such risk.64 The following
graphic illustrates these concepts.
63
AICPA Statement on Standards for Valuation Services No. 1 (Appendix B, P. 50) at
https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/interestareas/forensicandvaluation/membership/downloadabledocuments
/intl-glossary-of-bv-terms.pdf
64
The risk averse investor concept.

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Chart 5 – The Risk to Return Concept
67. Equity investors earn their returns through two components - Dividends and Share
Appreciation. Neither of these components is contractually set as might be the case for
government or corporate bonds. Therefore, the cost of equity for a given business must
be estimated.
68. Multiple different and widely-published models exist for the quantification of cost of equity
capital, each of which has its own theoretical and data peculiarities, and none of which
could ever possibly mirror the real world with complete predictability. Indeed, uncertainty
is the very reason that corporate investors seek returns in excess of risk-free rates.
Real World Market Reaction
69. The mere threat of legislated action to cease BLRA reimbursements on V.C, Summer
Units 2 and 3 caused SCANA’s stock price to drop precipitously starting in the August –
September 2017 timeframe (see Table 6). Today, SCANA’s existing shareholders stand
to lose both their dividends and share value.
70. Using actual data related to its Retail Electric business, SCE&G management addressed
the risk/return and cost of capital concepts discussed herein by performing an analysis

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that I reviewed.65 This analysis reflects a total retail electric rate base of $7.921 billion.66
Simply put, SCE&G management calculates a Return on Rate Base – e.g., Net Income
divided by Allowed Asset Base. Since a balance sheet must balance, mathematically it
makes sense that a fair return on assets must be equal to a fair return on debt plus equity.
Recognizing this relationship, and understanding what its net income divided by equity will
be with and without the impacts of the Act, management easily solves for:
 Net Income Return on Rate Base (or Qualifying Assets); and
 Return on Debt + Return on Equity = Net Income Return on Qualifying Assets.
71. Management’s computations are outlined in a series of schedules and are based on: 67
 Actual interest costs;
 Actual debt levels;
 The Company’s actual authorized equity base;
 Anticipated customer rate cuts under the Act.68
72. The computational output from this analysis results in the following:
Table 11 – Returns With and Without the Act
With Act Impacts

Return on Rate Base (Assets) with the Act 5.49%
Return on Debt 5.86%
Return on Equity with the Act 5.16%
Without Act Impacts

Return on Rate Base (Assets) without the Act 8.18%
Return on Debt 5.86%
Return on Equity without the Act 10.25%
65
I have accepted the inputs to these computations (e.g., approved rate base) as accurate. My focus on the
computations was such that I might be in a position to comment on the implications from a rate of return,
shareholder expectation, cost of capital and valuation perspective.
66
Source – SCE&G Excel file: December 2017 Abandonment Petition Exhibits – H4375 NO LINKS. This is
referred to as the Pro Forma Financials for SCE&G Assuming Implementation of the Act.
67
Pro Forma Financials for SCE&G Assuming Implementation of the Act.
68
While the July 16, 2018 Form 8-K filing disclosed that the Act would reduce the rates charged by SCE&G by $31
million per month, the retail electric analysis summarized here reflects the requirement for a monthly $28.8
million in recovery of costs to achieve a reasonable rate of return.

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73. My observations with respect to the computations and figures presented above are as
follows:
a) The computed 5.49% rate of return is low as measured against SCANA/SCE&G’s

cost of debt and cost of equity.
b) The computed 5.16% rate of return on equity is low as measured against SCE&G’s
5.86% cost of debt. Costs of equity for a company should always exceed the same
company’s cost of debt given the priority claims to earnings and assets afforded
debt instruments. Because of the Act, this relationship is inappropriately
inversed.69
c) The spread between the 5.85% cost of debt and the revised 10.25% cost of equity
that assumes elimination of the Act’s revenue restrictions, is 439 basis points.70
This spread is typical of corporate debt to equity spreads. According to Rice
University Professor of Finance, James Weston, the approximate 100 year spread
in yield between corporate bonds and corporate equity is 4.2%.71
d) The 509 basis point spread72 between the 5.16% return on equity with the Act in
force, and the 10.25% return on equity without the Act is highly significant from an
equity valuation perspective.73 Existing equity holders are fairly rewarded at a
10.25% rate of return, but this will only be achieved if customer rate restrictions
under the Act are reversed. If not reversed, returns to existing shareholders will fall
to an unacceptably low rate of 5.16%.
e) At this time, this rate issue has left investors in SCANA’s shares speculating as to
the outcome. Investors do not like uncertainty. Because of the uncertainty and
increased risk, investors flee and the resulting sell off of stock drives down a
stock’s price. How much the stock price declines is reflected in the stock market.
69
The debt return is 5.86%, whereas the equity return is lower at 5.16%.
70
(1025 – 586) = 439.
71
https://www.coursera.org/learn/finance-for-non-finance.
72
(1025 – 516) = 509.
73
Instead of the stock market’s dealing with risk by lowering the value of a stock in order to provide a sufficient rate
of return to a prospective equity investor, the preferable alternative is to lower risk and improve operating
performance, thereby leading to an increase in the value of a stock.

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74. In summary, an equity investor, such as shareholders of SCANA, require a higher rate of
return on their investment than lenders to SCANA because investors assume greater
risks. For example, debtholders are paid their principal and interest payments ahead of
investors whereas investors typically only get paid (i.e. dividends) if and when there are
profits. To attract investors, SCANA must provide a rate of return to shareholders greater
than the interest rates paid to debtholders. As shown above, this will not be the case
unless the Act is enjoined because the reduced cash flow under the Act will diminish
SCE&G’s ability to pay dividends. Moreover, not only does SCANA have to pay a
sufficient rate of return to shareholders in excess of that paid to debtholders, but the rate
of return paid to shareholders must be competitive to the rates paid by other utilities
seeking to access investor funds. The result of the Act, therefore, will be to make
SCE&G’s ability to access new cash flow both difficult and costly.
6.5 SCE&G’s Access to Short and Long-term Debt
75. Once SCE&G’s risk profile changed with legislative efforts to cut its reimbursements under
BLRA, a series of financial events ensued. Most noticeably, the value of the Company
dropped as reflected in its parent’s share price. It is well established that when share
prices decline, investors are seeking higher returns to compensate for greater risk.
76. SCE&G moved from a position of stable and industry-normal earnings (see Tables 3 and
10) to a financially strained pro-forma outlook (see Table 8). Its margins fell, as did its
ratio of equity to total capitalization – a key risk indicator for creditors.
77. Providers of debt capital seek pricing in line with a company’s risk profile.
78. Moody’s credit scoring system is depicted in the following schedule.

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Table 12 – Moody’s Rating Scale
Moody’s credit
rating of
SCANA has
dropped to Non-
Investment
Grade (Ba1)
79. According to the financial press, SCANA’s credit rating has been downgraded. The Post
and Courier reported the following on February 5, 2018: 74
Moody’s says SCANA is no longer an "investment grade" borrower because
politicians are eager to make the Cayce-based owner of South Carolina
Electric & Gas pay for part of its abandoned nuclear reactors.
“The downgrade of SCE&G and SCANA is driven by a political and regulatory

environment that has become exceedingly contentious and uncertain, and our
assumption that SCE&G will ultimately be required to make considerable rate
concessions to move forward," Moody’s senior credit officer Laura Schumacher
said in a statement.
The downgrade from Moody’s comes less than a week after lawmakers in the
state House of Representatives voted to strip the nuclear project’s costs from
SCE&G’s electric rates. The failed expansion of the V.C. Summer Nuclear
Station accounts for nearly a fifth of its customers’ electric bills.
74
https://www.postandcourier.com/business/sce-g-s-parent-company-downgraded-by-moody-s-
amid/article_4917fe76-0aae-11e8-ad4a-d7cdc57c2ec2.html

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6.6 SCE&G’s Ability to Fund Capital Expenditures and Remain Operationally Ready
80. Referring back to Table 8, SCE&G’s pro-forma cash flows for 2018 are insufficient to
cover all of its obligations. The pro-forma 2018 cash flows reflect a negative cash flow of
$350 million. What this indicates is that SCE&G management will have to deal with an
impending cash problem since the negative cash flow position will quickly drain the
Company’s existing end of 2017 cash balance of $395 million and cause problems
elsewhere in the business.75 Because access to new capital will be difficult and costly, the
Company will likely need to cut back on its capital expenditures. SCANA has projected
that its capital expenditures for SCE&G will be $520 million for 2018.76 With projected
negative cash flow of $350 million and assuming no dividends for the balance of 2018, the
outlook for quality maintenance of the existing electric infrastructure looks perilous.
Indeed, customer needs and expectations are increasing as reflected in the following
quote from PWC’s utility partner, Earl Simpkins.77
For years, utilities have been asked merely to keep the lights on and power
costs stable, but now customers want better responsiveness, along with
services targeted to their specific needs — from programmable thermostats
to “smart meters” that help them better tailor their electrical usage. They want
a utility to act like their partner. Meeting these needs requires more
resources, which often means a higher cost.
7.0 CONCLUSIONS
81. In summary, the implementation of the 2018 South Carolina Laws Act 287 and the 2018
South Carolina Laws Resolution 285, will have a substantial impact on SCE&G and, in
turn, SCANA.
a) Specifically, the 2018 South Carolina Laws Act 287 and the 2018 South Carolina
Laws Resolution 285 will: 78
75
The Company’s existing cash is earmarked for normal working capital needs to meet day-to-day payroll and other
expenses, not to be re-directed toward things like capital expenditures.
76
77
Earl Simpkins and Josh Stillman, Shaping the Right Experience – The Customer Conundrum in the Utilities
Industry, PWC, 2014 at www.strategyand.pwc.com.
78
While South Carolina Electric and Gas Company is the Plaintiff in this matter, given that SCANA Corporation
wholly owns SCE&G, the damages, risks and business threats described herein on one or the other of these entities

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(i) Reduce SCE&G’s profitability and cash flow in an amount equal to

approximately 8.8% reduction in 2018 total revenues;
(ii) Diminish SCANA/SCE&G’s ability to pay dividends consistent with past

practices and market expectations, which will disrupt investor expectations;
(iii) Lead to further reductions in SCANA’s stock price and cause further investor
losses;
(iv) Impair SCE&G’s ability to raise capital through substantial increases in costs
for debt and equity financing and the potential to impair access to credit
markets entirely; and
(v) Threaten SCE&G’s ability to fund planned capital expenditures required to

operate in the future in a manner consistent with increasing customer service
level expectations driven by technological and renewable energy
advancements.79
82. In the absence of injunctive relief from the experimental rate provided for in the Act,
SCE&G will be significantly weakened from both a financial and operational readiness
perspective.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on: July 23, 2018
Ian Ratner, CPA/ABV, ASA, CFE
is applicable to the other. I have reached this conclusion because SCE&G constitutes a major portion of SCANA’s
balance sheet, earnings and cash flows.
79
For example, customers will expect to benefit from new smart meter implementations, as well as to partner with
their electric utility to implement and benefit from solar systems.

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Appendix 1
Ian Ratner Curriculum Vitae

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CURRICULUM VITAE
Ian Ratner
CPA CA ASA ABV CBV CFE
SUMMARY Mr. Ratner has approximately 30 years’ experience in public accounting, forensic
accounting, damage calculations, business valuation services, transaction advisory
services, due diligence and bankruptcy consulting.
RELEVANT GlassRatner Advisory & Capital Group LLC

EXPERIENCE 2001 - present
Principal
Atlanta, Georgia
GlassRatner is a financial advisory services firm that specializes in troubled company
and bankruptcy consulting, forensic accounting / litigation support and mergers and
acquisition advisory services.
KROLL (formerly Lindquist Avey Macdonald Baskerville) 1

1995-2000
Principal
Atlanta, Georgia
Kroll is the world’s largest risk mitigation consulting firm. Mr. Ratner was a Principal in
the firm’s financial services division that specializes in providing fraud investigation,
business valuation, litigation support and due diligence services.
ERNST & Young, LLP, 1990 - 1995

Manager – Dispute Resolution and Litigation Services
Atlanta, Georgia, 1993 – 1995,
Manager – Forensic and Litigation Accounting Group
Toronto, Ontario, 1990 – 1993
1 From November 2000 through July 2001 Ian was the CFO and acting COO of TIC Enterprises, a $90 million dollar a year
sales outsourcing company that specialized in the telecommunications industry. The company was sold in mid-2001.
Manager in two Ernst & Young practice groups that provided forensic and litigation
accounting services to attorneys, corporations and government entities. Routinely
managed and worked on numerous cases concurrently. Responsible for the
development of training material and supervision of new staff to these groups.
RICHTER USHER & VINEBERG, * 1987 - 1990

Chartered Accountants* part time in 1987
Senior Accountant
Montreal, Quebec
Assisted in the performance of audits, reviews and compilations of financial
statements for large privately held companies and small publicly traded firms. Also
provided tax and accounting assistance to these clients.
CERTIFICATIONS
 Fellow of the American College of Bankruptcy – 2010
 Accredited Senior Appraiser (ASA) – American Society of Appraisers, Business
Valuation Section – 1997
 Certified Public Accountant (CPA) – Georgia/South Carolina – 1998/1996
 Accredited in Business Valuation (ABV) from the AICPA
 Accredited Member (AM) – American Society of Appraisers, Business Valuation
Section – 1994
 Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) – 1994
 Chartered Business Valuator (CBV) – Canada – 1992
 Chartered Accountant (CA) – Ontario, Canada – 1990
EDUCATION
 McGill University, Montreal Quebec
Graduate Diploma in Public Accounting
 McGill University, Montreal Quebec
Bachelor of Commerce
MEMBERSHIPS
 Georgia Society of CPAs
 South Carolina Society of CPAs
 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
 American Society of Appraisers
 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
 Canadian Institute of Chartered Business Valuators
 Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
 Ontario Institute of Chartered Accountants
GlassRatner 2
Appendix 2

1187651.01
& Capital Group LLC
Appendix 2
SCE&G Matter
Documents Considered
# Description Location
Court Related Documents
1 Complaint - FINAL.PDF
2 2018-06-29 001 Complaint (without exhs).pdf
3 2018-07-02 005 Motion for Preliminary Injunction - SCE&G.PDF
Other Documents
SCE&G Excel File: December 2017 Abandonment Petition Exhibits - H4375 NO
4 SCE&G Proforma / Cost of Capital Analysis
LINKS.pdf
5 2018 South Carolina Laws Act 287 (Bill 4375) https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess122_2017-2018/bills/4375.htm
6 2018 South Carolina Laws Resolution 285 https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess122_2017-2018/bills/954.htm
7 SCANA Web Site - entity structure www.scana.com
8 Base Load Review Act https://www.scstatehouse.gove/sess117_2007-2008/bills/431.htm
Financial
9 2017 Combined Form 10-K SCANA/SCE&G (file: 2017-10-k Scana.pdf) www.scana.com (Investor Relations)
10 Scana 8-K 7.16.18.pdf www.scana.com (Investor Relations)
Research
SCANA / SCE&G Investor alert: SCANA Corporation Evaluating Legal
11 06272018-scana-corporation-evaluating-legal-options.pdf
Options Regarding Bill Passed by South Carolina eneral Assembly
Article: After This Week, The SCANA Story Will Change - SCANA
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4183622-week-scana-story-will-change
12 Corporation (NYSE_SCG) _ Seeking Alpha.pdf
https://www.chooseenergy.com/news/article/failed-v-c-summer-nuclear-project-
Chooseengery Nuclear Project Timeline.pdf
13 timeline/
Article: Dominion's $8 Billion Scana Deal Dealt Another Blow in S.C. - https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-19/dominion-s-8-billion-scana-
14 Bloomberg.pdf merger-dealt-another-blow-in-s-c
Article: Groups Fight Rate Hikes For Abandoned S.C. Nuclear Project.pdf http://wfae.org/post/groups-fight-rate-hikes-abandoned-sc-nuclear-project
15
How WGL Holdings' Dividend Profile Fares against Peers - Market https://api.marketrealist.com/api/serie/2018/01/vectrens-stable-dividends-over-the-
16 Realist.pdf years/pdf
https://marketrealist.com/2018/01/these-utilities-have-raised-dividends-for-more-
Blog: These Utilities Have Raised Dividends for More than 40 Years
17 than-40-years
https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/interestareas/forensicandvaluation/membe
AICPA: intl-glossary-of-bv-terms.pdf
18 rship/downloadabledocuments/intl-glossary-of-bv-terms.pdf
Nuclear reactor maker Westinghouse, energy company Scana find buyers _ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/01/nuclear-reactor-maker-
19 Ars Technica.pdf westinghouse-energy-company-scana-find-buyers/
SC Legislature overrides McMaster's veto of 15% rate cut _ The State.pdf https://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/article213983044.html
20
Scana Cuts Dividend 80% Amid Tumult Over $8 Billion Power Merger - https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-27/south-carolina-lawmakers-
21 Bloomberg.pdf are-said-to-reach-scana-rate-cut-deal
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/scana-reduces-quarterly-dividend-rate-
Press Release: SCANA Reduces Quarterly Dividend Rate by 80 Percent and
by-80-percent-and-declares-dividend-on-common-stock-for-second-quarter-2018-
Declares Dividend on Common Stock for Second Quarter 2018.pdf
22 300673978.html
https://www.thestate.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/cindi-ross-
SCE&G rate cut is least important part of SC nuclear fix _ The State.pdf
23 scoppe/article214060979.html
Moody's Investor Service Rating Action: Moody's downgrades SCE&G to https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-downgrades-SCEG-to-Baa3-and-
24 Baa3 abd SCANA to Ba1, ratings remain under review (February 05, 2018) SCANA-to-Ba1-ratings--PR_379024
SCE&G's Parent Company downgraded by Moody's amid report over failed https://www.postandcourier.com/business/sce-g-s-parent-company-downgraded-by-moody-s-
25 Nuclear Project amid/article_4917fe76-0aae-11e8-ad4a-d7cdc57c2ec2.html
PWC Article: Shaping the Right Experience - The Customer Conundrum in Earl Simpkins and Josh Stillman, Shaping the Right Experience – The Customer
26 the Utilities Industry. Conundrum in the Utilities Industry , PWC, 2014 at www.strategyand.pwc.com.
Google Finance web site

27 www.googlefinance.com
Yahoo Finance web site at Table 10

28 www.yahoofinance.com
Chapte 10 Dividend Policy - NYY Stern Scool http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pdfiles/acf3E/book/ch10.pdf

29
SCANA Stock Price History www.schwab.com. Charles Schwab Client Center Research Data:
30 https/client.schwab.com/secure/cc/research/stocks.
Schwab Scana Dividend Payment History.pdf

31 www.schwab.com
GlassRatner Advisory & Capital Group LLC Page 1 of 1

Exhibit G
Declaration of Allen W. Rooks

SCE&G's Emergency Motion For An Injunction Pending Appeal With The U.S. Court of Appeals

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SCE&G's Emergency Motion For An Injunction Pending Appeal With The U.S. Court of Appeals

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Appeal: 18-1899 Doc: 6-1 Filed: 08/08/2018 Pg: 1 of 39 Total Pages:(1 of 383)

COMER H. RANDALL, in his official capacity as Chairman of the

DATED: August 8, 2018 *additional counsel on inside front cover

I.S. Leevy Johnson

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed

an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in

Richardson Plowden & Robinson, P.A.

I.S. Leevy Johnson

George Craig Johnson

Johnson, Toal & Battiste, P.A.

King & Spalding LLP

Halligan Mahoney Williams Smith

Fawley & Reagle, P.A.

Robinson, Gray, Stepp & Lafitte, LLC

Robert E. Tyson, Jr.

Vordman Carlisle Traywick, III

Hon. Jay Lucas

Hon. Hugh K. Leatherman

John C. Moylan, III

James E. Cox, Jr.

Hon. J. Michelle Childs

Further, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1(a), the undersigned counsel

certifies the following:

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of

/s/ Ashley C. Parrish

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS .................................................. i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................ 3

A. The Base Load Review Act ................................................................3

B. The PSC Approves The Project And Revised Rates .........................6

C. The Act ...............................................................................................7

STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................ 11

I. SCE&G Is Likely To Succeed On The Merits. .........................................11

A. The Act’s Targeted, Punitive Taking Of SCE&G’s Property

B. The Act Takes SCE&G’s Property And Violates Its Due

III. The Balance Of Equities And Public Interest Favor An Injunction

Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett,

Horne v. Dept. of Agriculture,

S.C. Code Ann. § 58-27-2310 ............................................................................ 22

Fed. R. App. P. 8 ................................................................................................ 11

Andrew Brown, State Lawmakers Demand Action over Cancelled South

In 2007, the South Carolina General Assembly passed the Base

Load Review Act (“BLRA”) to encourage the construction of new clean

energy facilities. To incentivize investment, the BLRA permits utilities

to recover their construction costs in revised consumer electricity rates.

Pursuant to the BLRA, the state Public Service Commission (“PSC”)

SCE&G to construct a nuclear power project and to recover its capital

costs in revised rates. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 55-33-275(C), 55-33-275(A)-(H).

In 2016, SCE&G’s contractor went bankrupt and SCE&G

determined that completing the project was no longer feasible. SCE&G

relied on statutory provisions entitling it to recover abandonment costs

and construction costs not already approved in existing rate orders.

These abandonment costs could be disallowed “only to the extent” the

PSC determines that abandonment was imprudent. Id. § 58-33-280(K).

Having exercised its rights under the BLRA, SCE&G is stuck in

the middle of a political firestorm. The General Assembly recently

SCE&G for perceived wrongdoing. The Act requires SCE&G to refund

almost $120 million collected under PSC-approved rates since April

2018, purports to nullify final orders of the PSC approving recovery of

approximately $3.5 billion, and erects a new prudency standard for

evaluating SCE&G’s decision to abandon construction.

The Act is confiscatory in both effect and purpose. As its text