DE FACTO: REQUISITES
Cuerva contends that
G.R. No. L-21114 November 28, 1967
FEDERICO FERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. P. CUERVA and CO.,
defendant-appellee.
Federico Fernandez was employed as salesman by P. Cuerva & Co.
from March, 1949 to October, 1959. After his separation from the
service, he filed a claim against P. Cuerva before the Regional Office
of DOLE to recover unpaid salaries and commissions, and separation
pay (July 26, 1960).
During the pendency of said case, Fernandez again instituted a
similar complaint with the CFI (December 17, 1962) alleging, among
others, that the agreed upon increase of P100.00 a month in his
salary (P200 -> P300) and 10% commission were not actually
received by him. Apprently, there was a verbal understanding
between him and P. Cuerva that the same would be retained by the
latter as bond or deposit for the goods being handled by Fernandez.
All in all, the total sum sought to be recovered by Fernandez is
P11,570.00.
CFI dismissed the case mainly on the ground of prescription. Under
the Minimum Wage Law, the action to recover the withheld
commissions was already barred inasmuch as it was not brought
within 3 years from the time the right of action accrued (Sec. 17).
On his part, Fernandez mainly argue that the fact that his having
filed a similar claim with Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of
Labor had suspended the running of the prescriptive period insofar
as his claim for refund of unauthorized deductions and withheld
commissions was concerned. To this, P.
inasmuch as plaintiff's claim was lodged with the regional office of
the Department of Labor, which is not a court, the same could not
be considered a judicial demand that would suspend the running of
the prescriptive period.
ISSUE: Did the filing by plaintiff of that claim with the DOLE RO
suspend the running of the period of prescription?
HELD: YES
It is true that the claim filed by plaintiff with the regional office of
the Department of Labor is not a judicial demand in the same sense
of the term "judicial demand" because the same was not instituted
in a court of justice. However, pursuant to Reorganization Plan No.
20-A, each regional office of the Department of Labor was vested
with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases affecting all
money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working
conditions to the exclusion of courts. Consequently, when
Fernandez wanted to enforce his claim after his dismissal from the
service, RO 4 of the DOLE was empowered to take cognizance of the
claim. He could not institute the action to recover his claim in the
court of justice.
We believe that the filing of a claim before an administrative agency
which is vested with authority to decide said claim would produce
the effect of a judicial demand for the purpose of interrupting the
running of the period of prescription. The purpose of the law on
prescription and the statute of limitations is to protect the person
who is diligent and vigilant in asserting his right, and conversely to
punish the person who sleeps on his right.
NOTE: While the said Sec. 25 of the reorganization plan was
declared unconstitutional, Fernandez had filed his claim about one
year before said declaration of unconstitutionality. The actual
existence of a statute prior to such declaration is an operative fact,
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.
It was precisely because Section 25 of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A
was declared unconstitutional that Fernandez, without awaiting the
action of Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor on the
claim that he filed on July 26, 1960, instituted his action in the CFI.
The move of plaintiff was precisely intended to protect his right of
action from the adverse effect of the decision of this Court.
Considering that the running of prescriptive period was deemed
interrupted, it is clear that Fernandez's action to enforce his claim
was not yet barred by the statute of limitations when he filed his
complaint in the CFI. Plaintiff's action may be considered as brought
before the court still within the period of three years from the time
his right of action accrued in accordance with the provisions of
theMinimum Wage Law. And considering further that the amount
sought to be recovered in the complaint is more than P10,000.00
(NOTE: P10,070.00), it follows that the CFI has the exclusive and
original jurisdiction to entertain the action.
NOTE: law applicable is the Minimum Wage Law because the bond
or deposit sought to be recovered by Fernandez was actually the
sum total of the unauthorized deductions from his salaries and
withheld commissions under Section 10 thereof.
NOTE: A right of action accrues only from the moment the right to
commence the action comes into existence, and prescription begins
to run from that time.
NOTE: while the amounts withheld by P. Cuerva were actually
deductions from plaintiff's salaries and unpaid commissions, they
were, however, constituted as a bond or a deposit to answer for any
liability that he might incur in connection with the goods handled by
him. It was, therefore, not feasible for Fernandez to demand every
month or every payday, or during the period of his employment the
return or refund of those amounts withheld, because the
undertaking for which the bond or deposit was constituted was still
subsisting. And so the right of plaintiff to commence an action for
the return or refund of the amounts representing such bond or
deposit would accrue only when the same was no longer needed,
and the time when it was no longer needed only came in October
1959 when plaintiff was separated from the service. Having ceased
to be employed by the defendant, the bond put up by plaintiff
thereby became unnecessary or useless.