THE PHILIPPINE CIVIL LAW CONTEXT being no pre-existing contractual relation between the

parties.
• TORT came from the latin word “tortus,” which means
crooked or twisted—a metaphor for a conduct that is
• Can there be a quasi-delict if no one is injured but
crooked or twisted.
property is damaged? YES according to Cinco v. Canonoy
• Constitutional Commission chose the term “quasi-delict”
• Elements of quasi-delict based on Art. 2176:
rather than “torts” from American laws as the latter is
a. act or omission
broad enough to encompass intentional criminal acts,
b. injury to another (injury is more precise than
which are dealt with by the Penal Code in the Philippine
damage)
legal system.
c. fault or negligence
• Elements of tort (Prosser and Keeton):
d. no pre-existing contractual relations
a. duty or obligation recognized by law, requiring a
person to conform to a certain standard of conduct
• On the relationship between tort and quasi-delict:
for the protection of others against unreasonable
- Tort is a classification of several causes of actions which
risks;
generally gives rise to an action for damages as a result of
b. failure on the person’s part to conform to the
injury caused to the plaintiff. This may include:
standard—a breach of duty;
a. Quasi-delict—a tort committed by negligence
c. a reasonably close causal connection between
b. strict liability tort
conduct and resulting injury; and
c. human relations tort
d. actual loss or damage resulting to another’s interest
- While these are elements of common law tort and d. independent civil action

therefore not binding in our jurisdiction, the Court has

• Delict vs. Quasi-delict
adopted these elements (e.g., Garcia v. Salvador)
- both the private individual and state have cause of action;
- Garcia v. Salvador: Pet. conducted tests on hepatitis on
only the private citizen injured has cause of action
the resp., initially finding the latter positive. Resp. was
- Penal Code primarily punishes or corrects act; Civil Code
then terminated form work and her father suffered from
primarily indemnifies through reparation of damages
heart attack after finding out about her ailment. Turned
- limited to acts punished by penal law; broad such that it
out that her test results are negative. Garcia guilty for
includes all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence
conducting test without supervision of pathologist and
intervenes
releasing test results without authorization.
• The primary purpose of tort law is to provide
• Culpa Aquiliana vs. Culpa Contractual
compensation for harm.
- As to vinculum juris: wrongful or negligent act or
- Additionally, this shifts the loss to responsible parties. It
omission; contractual relations
deters wrongful conduct that creates unreasonable risk of
- As to burden of proof: proof of negligence to recover
injury.
damages, and burden is on the plaintiff; proof of contract
and nonperformance is prima facie evidence to recover
• On quasi-delict:
- These are obligations that do not arise form the law, damages, and burden is on the defendant
- As to the applicability of doctrine of proximate cause:
contracts, quasi-contracts, or criminal offense.
- This is also referred to as culpa-aquiliana, culpa-extra- applicable; not applicable
- As to defense: can show that one has exercised due
contractual, or cuasi-delitos.
diligence; aforesaid defense not available

• QUASI-DELICT: fault or negligence that accompanies an

BARREDO v. GARCIA
act or omission which causes damage to another, there
FACTS: There was a head-on collision between a taxi of the
Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela
guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned,
and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia,
suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A
criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, where he was convicted and
sentenced accordingly. The court in the criminal case
granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil
action be reserved. The parents of Garcia then filed an
action for damages against the petitioner Barredo as the
sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro
Fontanilla.
HELD: Barredo argued that his liability is only subsidiary,
and as there has been no civil action against Fontanilla, the
person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible
in the case. The Court disagrees. There were two liabilities
of Barredo: first, the subsidíary one because of the civil
liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal
negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an
employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to
choose which course to take, and they preferred the second
remedy. The plaintiffs chose the more expeditious and
effective method of relief. Barredo’s negligence lies on the
fact that he did not exercise due diligence when he hired
Fontanilla who has multiple records of violation of the
Automobile Law and speeding—a violation which appeared
in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be
public.
ELCANO v. HILL
FACTS: Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of the
plaintiffs named Agapito Elcano. A criminal complaint was
instituted against him but he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of lack of intent to
kill, couple with mistake. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a
complaint for recovery of damages against defendant
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the
occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with
who he was living and getting subsistence, for the same
killing. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants. The
Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the motion.
Nevertheless, the civil case was finally dismissed upon
motion for reconsideration.
HELD: The present civil action for damages is not barred by
the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case. Firstly, there is
a distinction as regards the proof required in a criminal case
and a civil case. To find the accused guilty in a criminal
case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient
to make the defendant pay in damages. Furthermore, a civil
case for damages on the basis of quasi-delict is
independently instituted from a criminal act. As such the
acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
CANGCO v. MANILA RAILROAD
FACTS: On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of
Manila Railroad Co (MRC). When he was about to alight from
the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally
stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice
due to the fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his
balance at the door and fall. His arm was crushed as he was
dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.
HELD: The Court held that the foundation of the legal
liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that
the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has
suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by
reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
performance.
The fundamental distinction between obligation of this
character and those which arise from contract, rest upon the
fact that in cases of non-contractual obligations it is the
wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates
the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the
vinculum exists independently of the breach of the
voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into
the contractual relation. The liability of and employers for
the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents,
when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount
to the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere
presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or
control, which is the case under Any. 1903. In contractual
undertaking, proof of the contract and of its
nonperformance is suffient prima facie to warrant recovery.
Defendant was therefore liable for the injury suffered by
plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded
as constituting culpa aquiliana or contractual.
AIRFRANCE v. CARROSO
FACTS: Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists
en route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first
class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a stop-over
in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air
France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has
a “better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but when
things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on
board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to
the plane’s tourist class. After their tourist trip when
Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air
France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered
during his trip.
HELD: It appears that Air France’s liability is based on
culpa-contractual and on culpa aquiliana.
A. Culpa Contractual: There exists a contract of carriage
between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract
to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second,
That said contract was breached when Air France failed
to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and
Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s
employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth “after he was already, seated” and
to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and
humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
B. Culpa Aquiliana: Here, the SC ruled, even though there is
a contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa
aquiliana. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is,
that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action
for damages against the carrier. Air France’s contract
with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The
stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air
France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL INC V. CORDERO
FACTS: Nilda Cordero, wife of respondent Noel Cordero,
was issued an American Express charge card. An extension
charge card, was likewise issued to respondent Noel
Cordero which he also signed. While they were in Watson’s
Chemist Club, Noel picked up chocolate candies and handed
his American Express extension charge card to the sales
clerk to pay for his purchases. Susan Chong, the store
manager, informed respondent that she had to confiscate
the card. Thereupon, she cut respondent’s American
Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according
to respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation.
Apparently, a purchase was made in Hong Kong in 1991
using the same card when the respondent was in fact in
Manila. The card was then placed in the Inspect Airwarn
Support System, a system utilized by petitioner as a
protection both for the company and the cardholders
against the fraudulent use of their charge cards. Once a
card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the system,
the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the
identity of the holder. If the true identity of the card owner
is established, the card is honored and the charges are
approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated.
Respondent then filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner.
HELD: To constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence
must be the proximate cause of the damage or injury
suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which the result would not have occurred.
According to TC, petitioner’s inexcusable failure to inform
the respondent that someone tried to use his card in Hong
Kong is the proximate cause of the confiscation and cutting
of the extension card which exposed the respondent to
public humiliation for which petitioner should be held liable.
The Court disagrees. As explained by respondent himself,
he could have used his card upon verification by the sales
clerk of Watson that indeed he is the authorized cardholder.
This could have been accomplished had respondent talked
to petitioners representative, enabling the latter to
determine that respondent is indeed the true holder of the
card. However, this is not what respondent did. Instead, he
refused to talk to the petitioner’s representative, prompting
the latter to have the respondent’s card confiscated.
CALALAS V. CA
FACTS: Sunga took a jeepney owned by Calalas. Because the
jeepney was full, Sunga was given by the conductor an
“extension seat”, a wooden stool at the back of the door at
the rear end of the vehicle. On the way, the jeepney stopped
to let a passenger off, Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passenger. As she was doing so, an Isuzu truck bumped the
left rear portion of the jeepney. Sunga was injured,
sustained fractures with severe necrosis. Sunga filed a
complaint for damages against Calalas alleging a violation
of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to
exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier.
HELD: The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in
Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the
truck liable for quasI-delict ignores the fact that she was
never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res
judicata does not apply. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490
was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for
quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioners jeepney.
On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether
petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first,
quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in
quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport
his passenger safely to his destination. It is immaterial that
the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney
and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract.
TOLOSA V. NLRC
FACTS: Captain Tolosa was master of the vessel M/V Donna
owned by Quana-Kaiun, and was hired through its manning
agent, Asia Bulk Transport Phils., Inc. (Asia Bulk). During
channeling activities upon the vessel’s departure from
Yokohama, Capt. Tolosa was drenched with rainwater.
Subsequently, he contracted fever on which was later on
accompanied by loose bowel movement for the succeeding
12 days. His condition was reported to Asia Bulk and the US
Coast Guard Headquarters in Hawaii on November 15.
However, before he could be evacuated, he died. Evelyn
Tolosa, the widow, filed a complaint before the POEA for
damages against Pedro Garate, Chief Mate of the vessel,
Mario Asis, Second Mate, Asia Bulk and Quana-Kaiun. The
case was transferred to the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in
favor of the widow, awarding actual damages plus legal
interest, as well as moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the
Labor Arbiter was vacated and the complaint was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
pursuant to the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended.
HELD: The SC held that the NLRC and the labor arbiter had
no jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim for damages, because
that ruling was based on a quasi delict or tort per Article
2176 of the Civil Code. From the complaint of the
petitioner, it is evident that she sued Pedro Garate and
Mario Asis for gross negligence. It must be noted that
Garate and Asis had no employer-employee relation with
Captain Tolosa. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the
NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to
disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship
which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code,
other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining
agreement.
TAN V. NITAFAN
FACTS: Limketkai was shot and his assailant was convicted
and the others were acquitted by the Military Commision no.
1. 10 years after, heirs filed a civil action for damages
against those charged in the RTC. Tan file a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the cause of action was
extinguished by the acquittal of the the defendants. This
was denied because action for damages was sanctioned by
Art. 33 of the CC which allowed independent civil action in
case of physical injuries including death. Petitioners filed
another motion to dismiss based on prescription as
prescription for independent civil action was 4 years.
Respondent judge dismissed such again.
HELD: The SC in this case ruled that prescription has not yet
set in. It agreed with the TC that the prescriptive period was
coterminous with the crime so that, in this case where the
accused were charged with murder, the prescriptive period
for the offense being twenty (20) years, the action had not
yet prescribed it having been instituted less than ten (10)
years from the time the cause of action accrued.
CONCURRING (J. Vitug):
GR: The Civil Code on civil actions is a complete law on
prescriptive periods, and these periods apply except when
provided otherwise by special laws.
Specific Propositions:
(a) Absent any period specifically set out by the Civil Code
on particular causes of action, the 5year statutory limitation
prescribed in Article 1149 of the Civil Code applies.
Article 1149. All other actions whose period are not
fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought
within five years from the time the right of action
accrues.
(b) In the case of felonies (acts or omissions punishable by
the Revised Penal Code) —
(1) The Civil liability prescribes in ten years if the offender is
found to be liable for the offense. Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code renders the offender civilly liable only when he,
in effect, is found guilty. Such civil liability, being an
obligation explicitly created by law, Article 1144 of the Civil
Code, prescribing a 10year prescriptive period, would apply.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
Exceptionally, civil liability may arise even without the
accused being found guilty of the felony. A good example,
apropos the instant case, is Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Article 33. In cases of defamation fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Obviously the term "physical injuries" includes cases when,
as a result of those injuries, the victim dies. In the above
instances, the civil liability, being an obligation created by
law (that does not require the offender to be convicted), the
prescriptive period would be ten years (Art. 1144, Civil
Code, supra.)
(2) When, in general (e.g., those not falling under Article 33
of the Civil Code), an accused is acquitted of a felony, it may
still be possible, subject to the provisions of Article 29 of
the Civil Code, for the complainant to file a civil action for
damages, based, not on "delict", but on quasidelict, which is
another source of obligation under Article 1157 (5) of the
Civil Code. Here, however, the prescriptive period would be
four years.
Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted
within four years:
(1) Upon a injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasidelict.
In the case at bar, where petitioners are sanctioned under
Article 33 of the Civil Code, it was filed seasonably, i.e.,
within the prescriptive period of ten years under Article
1144 of the Civil Code.