Capili vs. People G.R. No.

183805, July 03, 2013 Bigamy

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion
to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the
second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that
the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the
pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial
question in the instant criminal case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal
of the criminal case for bigamy.

RULING:

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract
a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.9

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the
Information was filed on June 28, 2004.

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on
December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y.
Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the
bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the
prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of
bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the
first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

PEOPLE v. AMARELA and RACHO G.R. No. 225642-43 January 17, 2018 Rape, The “women’s honor”
doctrine
FACTS:

[AAA] is single, a housekeeper and a resident of Davao City.

[AAA] testified that on February 10, 2009, at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening, she was watching a
beauty contest with her aunt at a basketball court where a make-shift stage was put up. The only
lights available were those coming from the vehicles around.

She had the urge to urinate so she went to the comfort room beside the building of the Maligatong
Cooperative near the basketball court. She was not able to reach the comfort room because Amarela
suddenly pulled her towards the day care center. She was shocked and was no match to the strength
of Amarela who pulled her under the stage of the day care center. He punched her in the abdomen
which rendered her weak. Then Amarela undressed her. She tried to resist him but he was stronger.
He boxed her upper thigh and she felt numb. He placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis
inside her vagina and made a push and pull movement.

She shouted for help and then three men came to her rescue [so] Amarela fled.

The three persons brought her to a hut. But they closed the hut and had bad intentions with her. So
she fled and hid in a neighboring house. She was brought to the Racho residence and herein accused
Racho was told by his mother to bring her to her aunt’s house instead.

[AAA] said that [Racho] brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. She was told to lie
down. When she refused, [Racho] boxed her abdomen and she felt sick. She resisted by kicking him
but he succeeded in undressing her. He, then, undressed himself and placed himself on top of [AAA].
[Racho] then inserted his penis into [AAA]’s vagina. After consummating the act, [Racho] left her. So
[AAA] went home alone.

The RTC found AAA’s testimony, positively identifying both Amarela and Racho, to be clear, positive,
and straightforward. Hence, the trial court did not give much weight to their denial as these could not
have overcome the categorical testimony of AAA. As a result, Amarela and Racho were convicted

The RTC found Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
different charges of rape.

ISSUE:

Whether the identity of the was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Discuss the “women’s honor” doctrine.

RULING:

The Supreme Court in its Ruling stated that:

More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual· depredation, rape
cases are solely decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. In doing
so, we have hinged on the impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit
that she has been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her
honor. However, this misconception, particularly in this day and age, not only puts the accused at an
unfair disadvantage, but creates a travesty of justice.

The “women’s honor” doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in 1960. In the case of People
v. Tana, the Court affirmed the conviction of three (3) armed robbers who took turns raping a person
named Herminigilda Domingo. The Court, speaking through Justice Alejo Labrador, said:

It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused
unless that abuse had actually happened. This is due to their natural instinct to protect their honor.
We cannot believe that the offended party would have positively stated that intercourse took place
unless it did actually take place.

This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. And while the factual setting back then would have
been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault; today,
we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman.
We, should stay away from such mindset and accept the realities of a woman’s dynamic role in society
today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful
person, willing to fight for her rights.

In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or
cultural misconception. It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an accused
may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is
credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
Thus, in order for us to affirm a conviction for rape, we must believe beyond reasonable doubt the
version of events narrated by the victim.

In an appeal from a judgment of conviction in rape cases, the issue boils down, almost invariably, to
the credibility and story of the victim and eyewitnesses. The Court is oftentimes constrained to rely on
the observations of the trial court who had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand
and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling and at times unfriendly, examination. It
has since become imperative that the evaluation of testimonial evidence by the trial court be
accorded great respect by this Court; for it can be expected that said determination is based on
reasonable discretion as to which testimony is acceptable and which witness is worthy of belief.
Although we put a premium on the factual findings of the trial court, especially when they are
affirmed by the appellate court, this rule is not absolute and admits exceptions, such as when some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended, and
misinterpreted.

It has often been noted that if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness, the latter should be given more weight since affidavits being taken ex parte are usually
incomplete and inadequate. We usually brush aside these inconsistencies since they are trivial and do
not impair the credibility of the rape victim. In this case, however, the version in AAA’s affidavit-
complaint is remotely different from her court testimony. At the first instance, AAA claims that she
was pulled away from the vicinity of the stage; later, in court, she says that she was on her way to the
rest room when she was grabbed. By this alone, we are hesitant to believe AAA’s retraction because it
goes into whether it was even possible for Amarela to abduct AAA against her will.

If we were to take into account AAA’s initial claim that Amarela pulled her away from the vicinity of
the stage, people facing the stage would easily notice that a man was holding a woman against her
will. Thus, AAA’s version that she was on her way to the rest room, instead of being pulled away from
the crowd watching the beauty contest, would make it seem that nobody would notice if AAA was
being taken away against her will. If indeed AAA was on her way to the rest room when she was
grabbed by Amarela, why does her sworn statement reflect another story that differs from her court
testimony? To our mind, AAA’s testimony could have been concocted to just make her story believable
rather than sticking to her original story that Amarela introduced himself and pulled her away from
the stage. We cannot say that this inconsistency is simply a minor detail because it casts some doubt
as to whether AAA was telling the truth – that she was abducted against her will before she was
raped.

Although we cannot acquit Amarela solely based on an inconsistency, this instance already puts AAA’s
credibility in question. Again, we must remember that if we were to convict based solely on the lone
testimony of the victim, her testimony must be clear, straightforward, convincing, and consistent with
human experience. We must set a high standard in evaluating the credibility of the testimony of a
victim who is not a minor and is mentally capable.

Second, we also find it dubious how AAA was able to identify Amarela considering that the whole
incident allegedly happened in a dark place. In fact, she had testified that the place was not
illuminated and that she did not see Amarela’s face

From AAA’s testimony, we are unsure whether she was able to see Amarela given the lighting
conditions in the crime scene. In her re-direct examination, AAA clarified that she identified Amarela
while she was being pulled to the day care center. Even so, the prosecution failed to clarify as to how
she was able to do so when, according to AAA herself, the way to the day care center was dark and
covered by trees. Thus, leaving this material detail unexplained, we again draw reservations from
AAA’s testimony.

Proving the identity of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution’s primary responsibility. The
identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction
without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt

Undeniably, the defenses of denial and alibi are commonly raised in rape cases. Nevertheless, we have
dismissed such defenses for being inherently weak, self-serving, and, more often than not,
uncorroborated. To recall, Racho did not deny that he accompanied AAA to her aunt’s house, but he
said he left her when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home. Racho’s mother corroborated this part
of the story. To our mind, if the denial and alibi are readily available, Racho could have easily raised
these defenses and denied that AAA ever came to the house. His mother could have likewise covered
up this story, but she did not and confirmed that Racho was with AAA that night. If indeed Racho
raped AAA that night, the best defense available for him was alibi which he thought he did not have to
raise, given that he was telling the truth when he left AAA by herself to go home. To our mind, these
are badges of truth which persuade us that Racho might be telling the truth.

In the end, what needs to be stressed here is that a conviction in a criminal case must be supported by
proof beyond reasonable doubt or moral certainty that the accused is guilty. Absolute guarantee of
guilt is not demanded by the law to convict a person of a criminal charge but there must, at least, be
moral certainty on each element essential to constitute the offense and on the responsibility of the
offender. Thus, the prosecution has the primordial duty to present its case with clarity and persuasion,
to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion.

The prosecution in this case miserably failed to present a clear story of what transpired. Whether
AAA’s ill-fated story is true or not, by seeking relief for an alleged crime, the prosecution must do its
part to convince the court that the accused is guilty. Prosecutors are given ample resources of the
government to present a logical and realistic account of every alleged crime, and they should, to the
best of their ability, present a detailed story to get a conviction. But here we cannot ascertain what
happened based on the lone testimony of AAA. It should have been the prosecution’s duty to properly
evaluate the evidence if it had enough to convict Amarela or Racho.

The Court is constrained to reverse the R TC and the CA rulings due to the presence of lingering
doubts which are inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as quantum of
evidence to convict an accused in a criminal case. Amarela and Racho are entitled to an acquittal, as a
matter of right, because the prosecution has failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Hence, the Joint Judgment of the RTC was REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accused-appellants Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho were ACQUITTED of the charge of rape on
the ground of reasonable doubt. Their IMMEDIATE RELEASE from custody was ordered unless they are
being held for other lawful cause.

PEOPLE V. JUGUETA G.R. No. 202124 April 5, 2016 Murder, Attempted Murder
FACTS:
Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina were all lying down side by side about to
sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack
was stripped off by appellant and his companions.

They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired
at them successively and indiscriminately, having hit and killed his two daughters, Mary Grace Divina
and Claudine who were 13 years old and 3 ½ years old respectively.

In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was
charged with Multiple Attempted Murder.

However, based on the sworn statement of one Danilo Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no
prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.

Appellant was then convicted by the trial court of Double Murder and Multiple Attempted Murder.

Aggrieved by the trial court’s judgments, appellant appealed to the CA, which rendered a Decision
affirming appellant’s conviction for the crimes charged.

ISSUE:

Whether the appellant is guilty of the crimes charged.

RULING:

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person,
which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident
premeditation.

The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery attended the killing
of Norberto’s two children.

Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When
an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.

As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown
by the use of firearms, the words uttered during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the
crime.

The Court quoted with approval the trial court’s finding that appellant is liable for attempted murder.

Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling
as an ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos.
7698-G and 7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect.
In People v. Agcanas, the Court stressed that “[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is
aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to
another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.”
Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party
provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor.

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties
imposed on appellant.

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties
imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of
murder.

However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the
penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of
murder without eligibility for parole.

With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each count is
prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its
maximum period.

PEOPLE vs. OPIANA G.R. No. 200797 January 12, 2015 R.A. No. 9165, Illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs
JULY 10, 2018
FACTS:

Appellant Manolito Opiana was charged with the crimes of violations of Section 5 (sale of illegal drugs;
0.05 gram) and Section 11 (possession of dangerous drugs; 0.74 gram) of R.A. 9165 in a buy-bust
operation on appellant who was reportedly engaged in illegal drug trade. Appellant was apprehended
and when bodily frisked, 19 heat-sealed sachets were recovered from his possession. Laboratory
examination revealed that all 20 heat-sealed sachets yielded positive results for shabu.

Appellant was convicted by the trial court.

Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the CA. The appeal was denied and the tria court’s Decision was
affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant was correctly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of Sections
5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165.

RULING:

For the violation of Section 5, the prosecution satisfactorily established the following elements:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug
in evidence.

Similarly, the prosecution satisfactorily established the following elements for the illegal possession of
dangerous drugs in violation of Section 11, to wit:

appellant was shown to have been in possession of 0.74 gram of shabu, a prohibited drug;
his possession was not authorized by law; and
that he freely and consciously possessed the said illegal drug.

Appellant Manolito Opiana is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violations
of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.