ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs.
COMELEC and MONTEJO Domicile versus Residence
G.R. No. 119976; September 18, 1995
Ponente: Kapunan
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) in the First district
of Leyte in order that she will be able to run for Congress of that district in the
1995 elections. Her COC stated that she was a resident of Leyte for seven
months. Private Respondent Montejo, a rival candidate filed a petition to cancel
the COC and to disqualify Marcos on the ground that she did not meet the one
year residency requirement as provided for in the Constitution. In response,
Marcos amended her COC changing the entry "seven" months to "since
childhood". Marcos claimed that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence." She further claimed that she is entitled to the correction of
her COC on the ground that her original entry of "seven months" was the result of
an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake".
The COMELEC granted the petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos. It
held that the animus revertendi of Marcos was not Tacloban, but San Juan,
Manila, because that where she chose to live after she went back to the
Philippines after her well-publicized exile in the US. It explained that while
Petitioner grew up in Tacloban, after her graduation, however, she moved to
Manila where she became a registered voter, became a member of the Batasang
Pambansa as a representative of Manila and eventually became Governor of
Manila. This, according to the COMELEC debunks her claim that she was a
resident of Leyte 1st District "since childhood".
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Petitioner is a resident of Leyte for election purposes.
2. Whether or not Petitioner lost her domicile after she married and lived with
her husband in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan.
HELD:
1. YES.
The Supreme Court declared in this case that for purposes of election law,
residence is synonymous with domicile. The decision of the COMELEC however,
shows that they confused the concept of "Domicile" with "actual residence".
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of
habitual residence." In a past case, the Court took the concept of domicile to
mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Thus, domicile is composed
of the two elements of:
1. The fact of residing/physical presence in a fixed place; and
2. Animus manendi - the intention of returning permanently
Residence on the other hand merely refers to the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is mere physical presence. Residence involves the
intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode
ends. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to
leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. Domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.
A person can have different residences in various places, but he can only have a
single domicile. Note however, that a person may abandon a domicile in favor of
another.
Domicile of Petitioner is in Tacloban
Petitioner Marcos' domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. The fact that she has a
residence in Manila does not mean that she has lost her domicile in that
province. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to
study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not
constitute loss of residence. Applying this doctrine to the case of petitioner, the
fact that she has registered to vote and resided in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan
do not unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile in Tacloban.
Even while residing in various places, petitioner kept close ties to her domicile of
origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized
projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political
power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either
through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent.
These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore
of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely
ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not
know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte.
2. NO
The domicile of origin
Note further that when petitioner Imelda Marcos was born, her domicile followed
that of her parents. Hence, her domicile of origin was Tacloban. Once acquired,
domicile is retained until a new one is gained. The domicile of origin is not easily
lost. To effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence
of origin should be deemed to continue.
women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a
product of mutual agreement between the spouses.
Even assuming that Petitioner's domicile was lost, her acts unequivocally show an
intent to reestablish a domicile in Tacloban, Leyte because Petitioner, as early as
in 1992, already obtained her residence certificate in Tacloban.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May
7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is
hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner
as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Effect of marriage as to the domicile of origin

Article 110 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in
the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to this article or to the concepts of domicile or

residence does not suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her
domicile of origin in favor of the husband upon marriage. This article clearly
refers to actual residence and not domicile and merely establishes the default rule
in fulfilling the obligation of the spouses "to live together" in article immediately
preceding Art. 110.

When Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner

was obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband's
actual place of residence fixed by him. Mr. Marcos had several places of residence
at the time: San Juan and Ilocos Norte. Assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any
of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage
was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

This rule has changed with the advent of the Family code with the introduction of
the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile". This underscores the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters,
the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new
provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in
Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of