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GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR.

, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP);


Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent
LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti­Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of
ARMM, PNP, Petitioners,

vs.

MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P.


ARCILLA, JR., Attorney­in­Fact, Respondent.

G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009

FACTS:

Engr. Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu.

Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim


studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.

More than a month later, Mary B. Tagitis, Engr. Tagitis’s wife, file a Petition
for the Writ of Amparo with the Court of Appeals. The petition was directed
against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army;
Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen.
Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group
(CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti­Crime and
Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM­PNP;
and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti­Terror Task Force Comet [collectively
referred to as petitioners].

On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ
of Amparo and set for hearing. On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its
decision71 confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced
disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.

Petitioners appealed the decision of the CA to the Supreme Court,


disputing, among others, the sufficiency of evidence supporting the
conclusion that Tagitis was abducted.

ISSUE:

1. WON the evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was abducted
was sufficient. 2.WON the respondent discharged the
burden of proving the allegations of the petition by substantial evidence.

RULING:

To both issues, YES.

Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an


Amparo proceeding and the degree and burden of proof the parties to the
case carry, as follows:

Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be


summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary
conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining
stipulations and admissions from the parties.

xxxx

Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. – The


parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.

These characteristics – namely, of being summary and the use of


substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual
preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court
proceedings) – reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to
have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially
conducted, in addressing Amparo situations.

Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly


comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo
petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial
evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must
then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence
required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced
disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the
victim’s constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the
part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond.

The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations151


provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence
required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To
directly quote Ang Tibay:

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant


evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that ‘ the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’
The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative
boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission
of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings
would not invalidate the administrative order. [citations omitted] But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go
so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. [Emphasis supplied]

In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez, the IACHR took note of the
realistic fact that enforced disappearances could be proven only through
circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical inference; otherwise, it was
impossible to prove that an individual had been made to disappear. It held:
130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct
evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, is not the only type of
evidence that may be legitimately considered in reaching a decision.
Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so
long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the facts.

131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in


allegations of disappearances, because this type of repression is
characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the
kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis supplied]

Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique
circumstances that enforced disappearance cases pose to the courts; to
have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be responsive to
the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary
in the admission and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails
violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective counter­measure; we
only compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of
another wrong. On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our
evidentiary rules and cannot consider evidence the way we do in the usual
criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are
administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are
not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence
rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take
into account.

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of
evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise
inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with
the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to
the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the
issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this
basic minimum test.

Assessment of the Evidence

The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced
disappearance within the meaning of this term under the UN Declaration
we have cited?

We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared.


The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY
Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was
never seen nor heard of again.

We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG


Zamboanga abducted or arrested Tagitis. If at all, only the respondent’s
allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga custody stands on
record, but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct or
circumstantial.

Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay


evidence – i.e., evidence whose probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col.
Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the
witness stand (the informant).172

To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible


evidence of what it substantively states is to acknowledge – as the
petitioners effectively suggest – that in the absence of any direct evidence,
we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate
dismissal for this reason is no different from a statement that the Amparo
Rule – despite its terms – is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the special
evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations,
particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The
Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to
make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was
promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting
from local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently, we
have no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced
disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.

To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold
that, as in Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the available
evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence – even
of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence – taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test
of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement. In
the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim
evidence before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of
Tagistis and reasonably consistent with other evidence in the case.

The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct
evidence on the above aspects of the case, as it supplies the gaps that
were never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is the
evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced
disappearance case, as it injects the element of participation by agents of
the State and thus brings into question how the State reacted to the
disappearance.

Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col. Kasim that yielded positive results.
Col. Kasim’s story, however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial
investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction), without identifying
his abductor/s or the party holding him in custody. The more significant
part of Col. Kasim’s story is that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen
talking with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam"
charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being
held at Talipapao, Sulu. None of the police agencies participating in the
investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, Task Force Tagitis to
which this information was relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger to
pursue these aspects of the case.

We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a


consistency in the government’s denial of any complicity in the
disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim
to the respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however,
eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was under
custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait
that runs through these developments is the government’s dismissive
approach to the disappearance, starting from the initial response by the
Jolo police to Kunnong’s initial reports of the disappearance, to the
responses made to the respondent when she herself reported and inquired
about her husband’s disappearance, and even at Task Force Tagitis itself.

CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY

Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure,


made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government
complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and
the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why
would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of
concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of
the disappearance? Would not an in­depth and thorough investigation that
at least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the
government’s cap under the circumstances of the disappearance? From
this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim
evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance
that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration,
heretofore cited and quoted,173the evidence at hand and the
developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance
and government complicity, under a background of consistent and
unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The
disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of
the law – a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners’ petition for


review on certiorari for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated March 7, 2008.

People vs Yatar

FACTS:

On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmother’s (Isabel


Dawang’s) house, despite her intention to go forth Tuguegarao City, as her
other former’s housemate­relatives left in the morning. At 10:00 am,
accused­appellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house
where Kathylyn stayed during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyn’s
first cousin saw Yatar, who was then wearing a white shirt with collar and
black pants, descended from the second floor and was pacing back and
forth at the back of Isabel Dawang’s house, Judilyn didn’t find this unusual
since Yatar and his wife used to live therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatar called upon
Judilyn, telling the latter that he would not be getting the lumber he had
been gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed that Yatar is now wearing a
black shirt (without collar) and blue pants; and noticed that the latter’s eyes
were “ reddish and sharp ” . Accused­appellant asked about the
whereabouts of Judilyn’s husband, as the former purports to talk with the
latter. Then, Yatar immediately left when Judilyn’s husband arrived. In the
evening, when Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her
house turned off, the door of the ground floor opened, and the containers,
which she asked Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending the
second floor to check whether the teenage girl is upstairs, Isabel found
that the door therein was tied with rope. When Isabel succeeded opening
the tied door with a knife, and as she groped in the darkness of the second
level of her house, she felt Kathylyn’s lifeless and naked body, with some
intestines protruding out from it. Soon after, police came to the scene of
the crime to provide assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyn’s clothes
and undergarments beside her body. Amongst others, a white collared
shirt splattered with blood was also found 50­meters away from Isabel’s
house. Meanwhile, semen has also been found upon examination of
Kathylyn’s cadaver. When subjected under DNA testing, results showed
that the DNA comprising the sperm specimen is identical to Yatar’s
genotype. Yatar was accused of the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide and was convicted for the same by the Regional Trial Court of
Tabuk, Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an appeal to the Honorable Supreme
Court in order to assail the court a quo’s decision. On appeal, Yatar avers
that: (1) the trial court erred in giving much weight to the evidence DNA
testing or analysis done on him, in lieu of the seminal fluid found inside the
victim’s (cadaver) vaginal canal; (2) the blood sample taken from is
violative of his constitutional right against self­incrimination; and the
conduct of DNA testing is also in violation on prohibition against ex­post
facto laws.

MAIN ISSUE

Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen
may be used as evidence for Yatar’s conviction?
HELD

Noteworthy is the fact this case was decided on 2004, which was three (3)
years before the Rules on DNA evidence took effect.

The Supreme Court in this case ruled based on the US case of Daubert
vs. Merrell Dow as a precedent. In the said US jurisprudence, it was ruled
that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be
used, so long as the same is RELEVANT and RELIABLE.

Hence, it was called then as the DAUBERT TEST.

RULE: At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNA

EVIDENCE may be used as the legal basis. Sec. 7 of the Rules on DNA
evidence, which took effect on 2007, provides for the factors to be
considered in assessing the probative weight or value to be given on
evidence derived or generated from DNA testing. Such factors, are, to wit:

(a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were
collected, how they were handled, and the possibility of contamination of
the samples;

(b) The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in


analyzing the samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the
procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in
conducting the tests;

(c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable


standards­setting institution and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not accredited, the relevant
experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be
properly established; and

(d) The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.

APPLICATION – DAUBERT TEST:


The Honorable Supreme Court in this case upheld the probative value of
the DNA test result yielded from the analysis of Yatar’s blood sample from
that of the semen specimenobtained from the cadaver’s vaginal canal.

Accordingly, it held that the DNA evidence is both reliable and relevant.

1. In ascertaining the relevance of the evidence in a case, it must


be determined whether or not the same directly relates to a fact
in issue, as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence. In
this case, the evidence is relevant in determining the
perpetrator of the crime;

2. In giving probative value on the DNA testing result, yielded


from the analysis of Yatar’s blood sample from that of the
biological sample (semen) obtained from the victim’s vaginal
canal, the trial court considered the qualification of the DNA
analyst, the facility or laboratory in which the DNA testing had
been performed, and the methodology used in performing the
DNA test. In the said case, the DNA test was done at the UP
National Science Research Institute (NSRI). The method used
was Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by
Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis, which enables a tiny
amount of DNA sequence to be replicated exponentially in a
span of few hours. Hence, sufficient DNA analysis may be
made easier even with small DNA samples at hand. The
analyst who performed the procedure was Dr. Maria Corazon
Abogado de Ungria, who is a duly qualified expert witness on
DNA print or identification techniques.

CONCLUSION:

Hence, apart from the other sets of circumstantial evidence correctly


appreciated by the trial court, the said DNA evidence is sufficient to be
admitted as evidence to warrant the accused­appellant’s conviction of the
crime of Rape with Homicide.

[G.R. No. 148220. June 15, 2005]ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner, vs.


ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and
HON. NIMFA CUESTA­VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional
Trial Court, Manila, respondents.

FACTS:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen­year­old Rosendo Alba (respondent),
represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition
for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On 7
August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he
denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied
physical contact with respondents mother. Respondent filed a motion to
direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings.
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not
gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing
violates his right against self­incrimination.

ISSUE NO 1:

Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine


filiation? ­ YES

ISSUE NO 2:

WON the Paternity Testing violates petitioner’s right against


self­incrimination?­ NO

RULING NO. 1: YES.

DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic


make­up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of
the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile
can determine his identity. Despite our relatively liberal rules
on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in giving credence to DNA
analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo: In assessing
the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected,
how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
We also repeat the trial courts explanation of DNA analysis used in
paternity cases:In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number
of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The
other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged
fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA
types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the mans
DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the
father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father.

RULING NO. 2: NO not violative against petitioner’s Right Against


Self­Incrimination. Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides
that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates
his right against self­incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier
pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial
evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial courts 3 February
2000 Order with approval:

Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from


the respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in
this action, will not violate the right against self­incrimination. This privilege
applies only to evidence that is communicative in essence taken under
duress (People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has
ruled that the right against self­incrimination is just a prohibition on the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial
evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his
body when it may be material. As such, a defendant can be required to
submit to a test to extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis,
Supra); the substance emitting from the body of the accused was received
as evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145);
morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu
Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of
pants for size was allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the
court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy
test (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the
restriction on testimonial compulsion.
People vs Villasan

Facts:

The prosecution charged the appellant Samson Villasan before the


RTC with the crime of murder under the following Information:

That on or about the 1st day of June, 2000, at about 6:30 in the
evening, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a .357 caliber Magnum
revolver S&W (Homemade), with treachery and evident premeditation, with
deliberate intent, with intent to kill, did then and there attack, assault and
shot one Jacinto T. Bayron, hitting him on his [sic] vital parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries, as a consequence of which
said Jacinto T. Bayron died instantaneously.

The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge upon arraignment.


Several witnesses were presented including P/Sr. Insp. Salinas which
conducted a paraffin test on the appellant at the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory on June 2, 2000 to determine the presence of gunpowder
nitrates. The appellant tested negative for the presence of gunpowder
nitrates.

On cross examination, P/Sr. Insp. Salinas explained that the


absence of gunpowder nitrates was not conclusive proof that person did
not fire a gun. According to him, a person could remove traces gunpowder
nitrates by washing his hands.

The RTC convicted the appellant of the crime of murder. Basing their claim
on the testimony of one witness which has identified the appellant And the
CA also affirmed in toto the RTC’s Decision. The appellant nonetheless
claims as his defense that his identity as the assailant was not proven with
certainty as no trace of gunpowder nitrates was found in his hand proven
by the paraffin test.

Issue:

Whether or not paraffin test can be conclusive as evidence

Held:

While the appellant tested negative for gunpowder nitrates, Forensic


Chemist Salinas testified that a paraffin test is not conclusive proof that
one has not fired a gun. This view is fully in accord with past findings and
observations of this Court that paraffin tests, in general, are inconclusive;
the negative findings in paraffin tests do not conclusively show that a
person did not discharge a firearm.

Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has proved
extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is
the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be
established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites
was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more
of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for
nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers,
pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa.
A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his
hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of
tobacco. In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors
which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of
a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun,
wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind
is against the gunman at the time of firing.

In sum, the positive, clear and categorical testimonies of the


prosecution witnesses deserve full merit in both probative weight and
credibility over the negative results of the paraffin test conducted on the
appellant.

People vs Adoviso 309 SCRA 1

Facts

PabloAdoviso, and four JohnDoes, were tried for the MURDER of Rufino
Agunosand Emeterio Vazquez. Pablo Adoviso was positively identified by
Bonifacio Agunos,the son of one of the victims, because the former did not
wear a mask in the perpetration of the crime.

Aside from denial and alibi, the defense also offered in evidence the
testimony of ErnestoA.Lucena, Polygraph Examiner II of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila ,who conducted a polygraph test
on Adoviso. In Polygraph Report No.900175,Lucena opined that Adoviso’s
“ polygrams revealed that there were no specific reactions indicative of
deception to pertinent questions relevant ” to the investigation of the
crimes.

The trial court found Adoviso guilty.

On the premise that the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction on
the basis of “mere

Conjectures and speculations,” appellant argues that the negative result of


the polygraphtest should be given weight to tilt the scales of justice in his
favor. A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously
measures and records certain physiological changes in the human body
that are believed to be involuntarily caused by anexaminee’s conscious
attempt to deceive the questioner. The theory behind a polygraphorlie
Detector test is that a person who lies deliberately will have arising blood
pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which will be recorded on
the graph.However, American courts almost uniformly reject the result sof
polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing
the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or
the prosecution seek sits introduction, for the reason that polygraph has
not asyet attained scientific accept anceas are liable and accurate means
of ascertaining truth or deception. The rule is no different in this
jurisdiction. Thus, in Peoplev. Daniel, stating that much faith and credit
should not bevested upon a lie detector test as it is not conclusive.
Appellant, in this case, has not advanced any reason why this rule should
not apply to him. Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two
counts of Murder. Treachery qualified the killings to murder. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. In other words, the
reis treachery when the attack on an unarmed victim who has not given
the slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected and without warning. The
victims in this case were totally unaware of an impending assault– Rufino
was sleeping and Emeterio was going down the stairs when they were
shot.
People vs. Tumimpad 235 SCRA 483

FACTS:

Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15­year old Mongoloid
and daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a
mind of a five­year old child, who still needed to be fed and dressed up.
Her vocabulary was limited and most of the time she expressed herself by
motions. Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of
Misamis Occidental. Four security men were assigned to him, two of whom
were accused Constable Ruel Prieto and accused­appellant Moreno
Tumimpad.

It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs.


Salcedo then brought her to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a checkup.
Medication was given to Sandra but her condition did not improve. Sandra
became irritable and moody. She felt sick and unhappy. The following day,
August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out from the
kitchen and told her mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos." 2
Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup.
Dr. Conol, the examining physician, ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a
Medical Technologist, conducted the urinalysis. The result revealed that
Sandra was pregnant. 3

During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood
Grouping Test" and "Pheno Blood Typing" be conducted on the offended
party, her child Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test
conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a
type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B," accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and
accused­appellant type "O."

ISSUE:

W/N Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto are guilty of the crime of rape?

HELD:

Accused­appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial


evidence given by the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was
adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one of
many others of the same blood type may have been the father of the child.
As held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals 19 :
Paternity ­­­­ Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood
samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be
established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular child.
But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is. Statutes
in many states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and the
limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the
conclusive presumption of non­paternity where the results of the test,
made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged
paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court
may scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results avoided,
such as have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on oral
testimony conflicting with the results of the test. The findings of such blood
tests are not admissible to prove

the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father
or any one of many others with the same blood type may have been the
father of the child. WHEREFORE, accused­appellant's guilt of the crime of
rape having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED.

“I can do things you cannot, you can do things I cannot; together we can
do great things.” ~ Mother Teresa

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