TORTS AND DAMAGES – CASES
contract was made, and secondly, these damages are tooremote to be
1. Daywalt v. La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos (GR
135050)
Facts: in 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she
obligated herself to conveyto Geo W. Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of
land for P 4000. They agreed that a deed should beexecuted as soon as
Endencia’s title to the land was perfected in the Court of Land
Registrationand a Torrens title issued in her name. When the Torrens
title was issued, Endencia found outthat the property measured 1248
hectares instead of 452 hectares, as she initially believed.Because of
this, she became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to Daywalt,
claiming that shenever intended to sell so large an amount and that she
had been misinformed as to its area.Daywalt filed an action for
specific performance. The SC ordered Endencia to convey the
entiretract to Daywalt. Meanwhile, La Corporacion de los Padres
Agustinos Recoletos (Recoletos), was a religiouscorp., w/c owned
an estate immediately adjacent to the property sold by Endencia to
Daywalt. Italso happened that Fr. Sanz, the representative of the
Recoletos, exerted some influence andascendancy over Endencia,
who was a woman of little force and easily subject to the influence
of other people. Fr. Sanz knew of the existence of the contracts with
Daywalt and discouraged her from conveying the entire tract. Daywalt filed
an action for damages against the Recoletos on the ground that it
unlawfullyinduced Endencia to refrain from the performance of her
contract for the sale of the land inquestion and to withhold delivery of
the Torrens title. Daywalt’s claim for damages against theRecoletos
was for the huge sum of P 500000 [in the year 1919], since he claims
that because of the interference of the Recoletos, he failed to
consummate a contract with another person for thesale of the property
and its conversion into a sugar mill.
Issue: whether Recoletos is liable to Daywalt?
Held: No, it is not liable. The stranger who interferes in a contract
between other parties cannot become more extensivelyliable
in damages for the non-performance of the contract than the party in
whose behalf heintermediates. Hence, in order to determine the
liability of the Recoletos, there is first a need toconsider the liability
of Endencia to Daywalt. The damages claimed by Daywalt from
Endenciacannot be recovered from her, first, because these are special
damages w/c were not w/in thecontemplation of the parties when the
the subject of recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for damages to
Daywalt,neither can the Recoletos be held liable. As already
suggested, by advising Endencia not toperform the contract, the
Recoletos could in no event render itself more extensively liable
thanthe principal in the contract.
2. Elcano and Elccano v. Hill and Hill (GR L-24808)
FACTS:
 Reginald Hill, a minor, married but living with his father, Atty. Marvin
Hill with whom he was living and getting subsistence killed Agapito
Elcano
 CFI Civil Case: dismissed on the ground that he was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake
 Spouses Elcano appealed
ISSUES:
1. W/N the civil action should be barred by the acquittal of criminal action
- NO
2. W/N the Civil Code can be applied to Atty. Marvin Hill even though
Reginald is already married –YES
HELD: order appealed from is reversed
1. NO.
 separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil
Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
 If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only
to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import
of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life
 to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. . Otherwise.
 there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium."
 ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
 in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law
 It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case
has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is
not a bar to the instant action against him.
2. YES
 While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of
the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation
takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear
that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not
really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It
shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age,
but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without
the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in
court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
 Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible
 the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to
see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property
which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent
 Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has
become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
3. CANGCO VS MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY G.R. L-12191
OCTOBER 14, 1918
FACTS:
On January 20, 1915, Jose Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad
Company where he was an employee. As the train drew near to his destination,
he arose from his seat. When he was about to alight from the train, Cangco
accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice
because it was already 7:00pm and it was dim when it happened. As a result,
he slipped and fell violently on the platform. His right arm was badly crushed
and lacerated which was eventually amputated.
Cangco sued Manila Railroad Company on the ground of negligence of its
employees placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them
so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the
company’s trains.
The company’s defense was that granting that its employees were negligent in
placing an obstruction upon the platform, the direct and proximate cause of the
injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributing negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contributing negligence on the part of the
plaintiff.
HELD: In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing
such act – that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly –
the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances
necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.
The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to
get on and off the train at the station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty
in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required
to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. The Supreme
Court’s conclusion was that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight
while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
4. RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.] M. H.,
RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND
PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
he plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment
of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in
the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff
claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has
proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon
which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds,
so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured
to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from
slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were
either in the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that defendant,
some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot
at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either
canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his
leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable
RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to
what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In
two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his
work; and
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car
instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after
noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature
as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe
American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not
only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were
expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the
company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general
prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by
the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the
prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of
the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being
made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff
in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury
as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the
event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or
the failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for
damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron
rails.
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the
liability of an employer for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary
that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer or his
representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal
proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to
judgment.
2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The
responsibility of an employer to his employee of a fellow-servant of
the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The
doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the
employer where the injury was incurred through the negligence of a
fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.
5. SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-10134
June 29, 1957
Facts: Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts organization
and a student of Balintawak Elementary school. On March 31, they
were instructed by the school’s supervisor to attend a parade in honor
of Dr. Jose Rizal. From school, Dante and other students boarded the
jeep that was going to take them to the parade. Dante then drove the
jeep, while the driver sat by his side. They have not gone too far when
 the jeep turned turtle resulting to the death of two of its passengers,
Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperi.
Issue: Whether or not Delfin capuno may be held jointly and severally
liable with his son Dante Capuno, for the civil liability of his tortuous
act?
Held: Yes. Under Art 1903, of the Spanish Civil Code paragraph 1,
and 5 which provides: the father and in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children
who live with them. xxx Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades
are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody. But the provision applies only to an
institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational
institution. Dante was then a student of Balintawak Elem School and
as part of his extra-curricular activity; he attended the parade upon
instruction of City school’s supervisor. It was in connection with the
parade that the accident took place.
Clear that neither the head of the school nor the city supervisor could
be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a
student of an institution of arts and trades.
Civil liability of father (in case of death or incapacity, the mother) for
any damages caused by minor children is a necessary consequence of
the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the
parents the duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means,
while on the other hand, gives them the right to correct and punish
them in moderation. The only way they could relieve themselves of
liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.
6. Mercado vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 87584
May 30, 1960
Facts: Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. are both pupils
of the Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon City. A ‘pitogo’ (an
empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank) belonged to Augusto
Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it
to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the ‘pitogo’ belonged
to Augusto. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. thought it was Benedicto’s, so
when Augusto attempted to get the ‘pitogo’ from Renato, Manuel, Jr.
told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain
into the holes of the ‘pitogo’. Augusto resented his remark and pushed
Manuel, Jr., which started the fight. After successive blows to Manuel,
Jr., Augusto cut him on the right cheek with a piece of razor. Manuel,
Jr. and his father filed a complaint against Ciriaco Mercado, Augusto’s
father.
Issue: Whether or not the teacher or head of the school should be held
responsible instead of the father?
Held: NO. CHILDREN WERE NOT IN THEIR CUSTODY.
Petitioner rests his claim on the last paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code: “Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.”
That clause contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards
with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the
pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the
control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would
pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the
responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not
appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during
school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school
is over.
7. PALISOC v. BRILLANTES
G.R. No. L-29025 [October 4, 1971]
FACTS:
Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio Daffon were
automotive mechanics students at the Manila Technical Institute
(MTI). In the afternoon of March 10, 1966 during recess, an
altercation transpired between the deceased and the defendant. At the
time of the incident, Dominador was sixteen years old while Virgilio
was already of age. Virgilio was working on a machine with
Dominador looking at them. The situation prompted Virgilio to
remark that Dominador was acting like a foreman. As a result,
Dominador slapped Virgilio on the face. Virgilio retaliated by
inflicting severe blows upon Dominador’s stomach, which caused the
latter to stumble upon an engine block and faint. The latter died, the
cause of death being “shock due to traumatic fracture of the ribs”. The
parents of Dominador filed an action for damages against (1) Virgilio,
(2) Valenton, the head/president of MTI, (3) Quibule who was the
teacher in charge at the time of the incident, and (4) Brillantes who is
a member of the board of directors and former sole proprietor of MTI.
The trial court held Virgilio liable but absolved the other defendants-
officials. It stated that the clause “so long as they remain in their
custody” contained in Article 2180 of the Civil Code applies only
where the pupil lives and boards with the teachers, such that the
control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents., and
such control and responsibility for the pupil’s actions would pass from
the father and mother to the teachers. This legal conclusion was based
on the dictum in Mercado v. CA, which in turn based its decision in
Exconde v. Capuno. The trial court held that Article 2180 was not
applicable in this case, as defendant Virgilio did not live with the
defendants-officials at the time of the incident. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Who must be held liable for damages for the death of
Dominador together with the defendant?
HELD: The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and
Quibule respectively) were held liable jointly and severally with the
Virgilio for damages. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere
member of the MTI board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held
liable since it had not been properly impleaded as party defendant.
The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students remain in
their custody” means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students
for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess
time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to
attach the pupil or student who commits the tortuous act must live and
board in the school. The dicta in the cases of Mercado as well as in
Exconde v. Capuno on which it relied are deemed to have been set
aside. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for
the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in
their custody, is that they stand, in loco parentis to a certain extent to
their pupils and students and are called upon to “exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the child.” In this case, The
unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-
students could have been avoided, had said defendants complied with
their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the
students in the school premises to protect their students from harm.
Since Valenton and Quibule failed to prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage, they cannot
likewise avail of the exemption to the liability. The judgment of the
appellate court was modified, while claim for compensatory damages
was increased in accordance with recent jurisprudence and the claim
for exemplary damages denied in the absence of gross negligence on
the part of the said defendants.
8. Amadoras vs. CA
GR No. L47745
April 15, 1988
Facts: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was
mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the former’s death.
Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The
victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages
against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school
principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and
2 other students. Complaints against the students were dropped.
Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed
CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was
an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades
2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the
semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the
fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary
diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in
maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their
son was under school custody because he went to school to comply
with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).
Issue: Whether or not Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held
liable.

Held: No. The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of
the authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally
ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the
school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was
important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other
hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be
held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined
in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the
students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher
placed in-charge of particular classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably
be held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed
gun from a student and later returned to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities.
Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to
necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the
provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and
trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence,
under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for
the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.
9. PSBA v. CA (G.R. No. 84698)
March 23, 2017
Facts:
Private respondents sought to adjudge petitioner PSBA and its officers liable
for the death of Carlitos Bautista, a third year commerce student who was
stabbed while on the premises of PSBA by elements from outside the school.
Private respondents are suing under the law on quasi-delicts alleging the school
and its officers’ negligence, recklessness and lack of safety precautions before,
during, and after the attack on the victim. Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit
but were denied by the trial court. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not PSBA may be held liable under quasi-delicts.
Ruling: NO.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation
between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really
govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-
delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between
parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which
both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip
him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school’s
academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Necessarily, the
school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order
within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no
finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached
thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security measures. This
would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only.
10. MAXIMO SOLIMAN JR. represented by guardian VIRIGINIA
SOLIMAN vs. HON. JUDGE TUAZON and REPUBLIC
CENTRAL COLLEGES
FACTS:
1. Security guard JIMMY SOLOMON, who was on duty at the time of
the incident in the Republic Central Colleges, shot petitioner
Maximino on the abdomen. Maximino was treated at the Angeles
Medical Center and as per doctor’s opinion, he may not be able to
attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the
performance of his usual work for a duration of three to four months.
2. Petitioner Maximino filed a civil complaint for damages against
Republic Central Colleges and Jimmy Solomon.
 3. Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss stating that the
complaint stated no cause of action against it.
a. It was not the employer of the security guard.
b. Art. 2180 does not apply to it because said par. Holds teachers
and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices
while security guard Jimmy was not a pupil, student or
apprentice of the school.
4. Lower court granted the MTD.
5. Hence this petition. It is contended that the trial judge committed GAD
when he refused to apply the provisions of Article 2180 as well as 349,
350 and 352 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Colleges is liable.
HELD: YES
The first par. Of 2180 offers no basis for the liability of the Colleges for the
alleged wrongful acts of the security guard because it is not the employer of
the said security guard.
Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches
to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such
agency. 3 As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no
hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen
employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; thse duty to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in
the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client whose premises or
property are protected by the security guards.
Similarly the 7th par. Of the same article is not available in imposing liability
since clearly Security Guard Solomon is not a pupil, student or apprentice of
the school. The school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon.
School is liable on the basis of its contractual obligation.
In the case of PSBA vs. CA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code
was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an
outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or
control or supervision. At the same time, however, the Court stressed that an
implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts
students for enrollment, on the one hand, and the students who are enrolled,
on the other hand, which contract results in obligations for both parties.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment,
there is established a contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with.
For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with
an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with
the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide
by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules
and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-
in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere
that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the
intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the
realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the
school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily,
the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof
As PSBA, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may
at the same time constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal, obligation.
Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner
could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss
but rather should have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove
acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of
respondent Colleges.
11. Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology
FACTS: Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student
at Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor
family, Regino went to college mainly through the financial support of her
relatives. During the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled
in logic and statistics under Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad,
respectively, as teachers. Sometime in February, PCST held a fund raising
campaign dubbed the “Rave Part and Dance Revolution,” the proceeds of
which were to go to the construction of the school’s tennis and volleyball
courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100.00
each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who
purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused
to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations. Financially
strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and
celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On the scheduled dates of
the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers disallowed her from
taking the tests. Regino’s pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and
Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance with
PCST’s policy.
As a result, Regino filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for damages against
PCST, Gamurot and Baladad (PCST et al.). In her complaint, she prayed from
P500,000 as nominal damages, P500,000 as moral damages; at least
P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the costs
of litigation and attorney’s fees. PCST et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, contending that the
complaint should have been lodged with the Commission of Higher Education
(CHED). The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
Aggrieved, Regino filed the present Petition on pure questions of law.
ISSUE: Whether PCST et al. can be made liable for damages
HELD: Court ruled in favor of Regino. PCST et al. can be made liable for
damages.
RATIO DECIDENDI: In her Complaint, Regino also charged that PCST et
al. “inhumanly punish students x x x by reason only of their poverty, religious
practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon [petitioner] the feelings
of guilt, disgrace and unworthiness”; as a result of such punishment, she was
allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the second semester of that
school year and had to lag behind in her studies by a full year. The acts of
respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and
“demoralization of unimaginable proportions” in violation of Articles 19, 21
and 26 of the Civil Code. These provisions of the law state thus:
“Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.”
“Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
“Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly
station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal
condition.”
Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by
a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even
if it has an existing contract with its students, since the act that violated the
contract may also be a tort. We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA, from which we
quote:
“x x x A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as
extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise
bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France
v. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722; 18 SCRA 155), the private respondent
was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class
seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court
referred to the petitioner­airline’s liability as one arising from tort, not
one arising form a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is
authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is
a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. x x x
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this
 Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco v. Manila Railroad
(38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus: ‘x x x. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under
such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the
contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the parties.’
“Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on
Human Relations, particularly Article 21 x x x.”
12. FLORDELIZA MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. MUTYA SORIANO
and Minor JULIE ANN SORIANO duly represented by her
natural mother and guardian ad litem MUTYA SORIANO,
respondents (PLEASE CHECK AGAIN
G.R. 164012, June 8, 2007
FACTS:
- At around 1:00 a.m., July 14, 1997, Sonny Soriano, while
crossing Commonwealth Avenue near Luzon Avenue in Quezon
City, was hit by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer
Macasasa. Soriano was thrown five meters away, while the vehicle
only stopped some 25 meters from the point of impact. Gerard
Villaspin, one of Soriano’s companions, asked Macasasa to bring
Soriano to the hospital, but after checking out the scene of the
incident, Macasasa returned to the FX, only to flee. A school bus
brought Soriano to East Avenue Medical Center where he later
died. Subsequently, the Quezon City Prosecutor recommended the
filing of a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide
against Macasasa.
- On August 20, 1997, respondents Mutya Soriano and Julie Ann Soriano,
Soriano’s wife and daughter, respectively, filed a complaint for damages
against Macasasa and petitioner Flordeliza Mendoza, the registered
owner of the vehicle
- Respondents prayed that Macasasa and petitioner be ordered to pay
them: P200,000 moral damages; P500,000 for lost income; P22,250
for funeral services; P45,000 for burial lot; P15,150 for interment and
lapida; P8,066 for hospitalization, other medical and transportation
expenses; P28,540 for food and drinks during the wake; P50,000
exemplary damages; P60,000 indemnity for Soriano’s death; and
P25,000 for attorney’s fees plus P500 per court appearance
- In her answer, petitioner Mendoza maintained that she was not liable
since as owner of the vehicle, she had exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family over her employee, Macasasa.
- Upon respondents’ motion, the complaint for damages
against Macasasa was dismissed.
- After trial, the trial court also dismissed the complaint against
petitioner. It found Soriano negligent for crossing Commonwealth
Avenue by using a small gap in the island’s fencing rather than the
pedestrian overpass. The lower court also ruled that petitioner was not
negligent in the selection and supervision of Macasasa since
complainants presented no evidence to support their allegation of
petitioner’s negligenceRespondents appealed. The Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court.
- While the appellate court agreed that Soriano was negligent, it also
found Macasasa negligent for speeding, such that he was unable to
avoid hitting the victim. It observed thatSoriano’s own negligence did
not preclude recovery of damages from Macasasa’s negligence. It
further held that since petitioner failed to present evidence to the
contrary, and conformably with Article 2180[8] of the Civil Code, the
presumption of negligence of the employer in the selection and
supervision of employees stood. Dispositive portion reads:
1. Hospital and Burial
Expenses P80,926.25
2. Loss of earning
capacity P77,000.00
3. Moral
Damages P20,000.00
4. Indemnity for the death of Sonny
Soriano P50,000.00
Actual payment of the aforementioned amounts
should, however, be reduced by twenty (20%) per
cent due to the presence of contributory negligence
by the victim as provided for in Article 2179 of the
Civil Code.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied
ISSUE:
(1) Did the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to try the case?
(2) Was there sufficient legal basis to award damages?
(3) WON Mendoza, owner of the vehicle, was still liable

RATIO:
- Petitioner argues that the amount claimed by respondents is within the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. She posits that to
determine the jurisdictional amount, what should only be considered
are the following: P22,250 for funeral services; P45,000 for burial
lot; P15,150 for interment and lapida; P8,066 for hospitalization and
transportation; P28,540 for food and drinks during the wake;
and P60,000 indemnity for Soriano’s death. She maintains that the
sum of these amounts, P179,006, is below the jurisdictional amount of
the Regional Trial Court. She states that under Section 19(8) of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the following claims of
respondents must be excluded: P200,000 moral damages, P500,000
for lost income; P50,000 exemplary damages; P25,000 attorney’s fees
plus P500 per court appearance. Petitioner thus prays that the decision
of the Court of Appeals be reversed, and the dismissal of the case by
the trial court be affirmed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
- Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[11] as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691, states the pertinent law.
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.–Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases
in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
- But relatedly, Administrative Circular No. 09-94[12] expressly states:
xxxx
2. The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever
kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under
Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of BP Blg. 129, as
amended by RA No. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of
the main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or
one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim
shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of
the court. (Underscoring supplied.)
- Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, are
primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of
money for the damages for tortious acts. In this case,
respondents’ claim of P929,006 in damages and P25,000
attorney’s fees plus P500 per court appearance represents the
monetary equivalent for compensation of the alleged
injury. These money claims are the principal reliefs sought by
respondents in their complaint for damages. Consequently then,
we hold that
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan Citypossessed and
properly exercised jurisdiction over the case.
- Petitioner further argues that since respondents caused the
dismissal of the complaint against Macasasa, there is no longer
any basis to find her liable. She claims that “no iota of
evidence” was presented in this case to
prove Macasasa’s negligence, and besides, respondents can
recover damages in the criminal case against him.
- Respondents counter that as Macasasa’s employer, petitioner
was presumed negligent in selecting and supervising
Macasasa after he was found negligent by the Court of
Appeals.
- The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic rules
under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. First, he
failed to maintain a safe speed to avoid endangering
lives.[16] Both the trial and the appellate courts found
Macasasa overspeeding.[17] The records show also
that Soriano was thrown five meters away after he was
hit.[18] Moreover, the vehicle stopped only some 25 meters
from the point of impact.[19]
- Both circumstances support the conclusion that the FX vehicle
driven by Macasasa was overspeeding. Second, Macasasa, the
vehicle driver, did not aid Soriano, the accident victim, in
violation of Section 55,[20] Article V of the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code. While Macasasa at first agreed to bring
Soriano to the hospital, he fled the scene in a hurry. Contrary
to petitioner’s claim, there is no showing of any factual basis
that Macasasa fled for fear of the people’s wrath. What
remains undisputed is that he did not report the accident to a
police officer, nor did he summon a doctor. Under Article
2185[21] of the Civil Code, a person driving a motor vehicle is
 presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating traffic regulations.
- While respondents could recover damages from Macasasa in
a criminal case and petitioner could
become subsidiarily liable, still petitioner, as owner and
employer, is directly and separately civilly liable for her
failure to exercise due diligence in
supervising Macasasa.[22] We must emphasize that this
damage suit is for the quasi-delict of petitioner, as owner and
employer, and not for the delict of Macasasa, as driver and
employee.
- Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for
the damages caused by their employees acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the
presumed negligence of the employers in supervising their
employees unless they prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
- In this case, we hold petitioner primarily and solidarily liable
for the damages caused by Macasasa. Respondents could
recover directly from petitioner since petitioner failed to prove
that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
supervising Macasasa. Indeed, it is unfortunate that petitioner
harbored the notion that the Regional Trial Court did not have
jurisdiction over the case and opted not to present her evidence
on this point.
- Lastly, we agree that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling
that Soriano was guilty of contributory negligence for not using
the pedestrian overpass while crossingCommonwealth
Avenue. We even note that the respondents now admit this
point, and concede that the appellate court had properly reduced
by 20% the amount of damages it awarded. CA affirmed.
13. Ramos v. CA (1999)
Facts:
Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year old robust woman, was normal except for her
experiencing occasional pain due to the presence of stone in her gall bladder.
She was advised to undergo an operation for its removal. The results in the
examinations she underwent indicate that she was fit for the operation. She and
her husband Rogelio met Dr. Hosaka, one of the defendants, who advised that
she should undergo cholecystectomy. Dr. Hosaka assured them that he will get
a good anaesthesiologist. At 7:30 a.m. on the day of the operation at Delos
Santos Medical Center, Herminda Cruz, Erlinda’s sister-in-law and the dean
of the College of Nursing in Capitol Medical Center, was there to provide
moral support. Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez was to administer the anaesthesia. Dr.
Hosaka arrived only at 12:15 p. m. Herminda saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the
patient, and heard the latter say “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O, lumalaki ang tiyan.” Herminda saw bluish discoloration of
the nailbeds of the patient. She heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone
to call Dr. Calderon. The doctor arrived and placed the patient in trendelenburg
position, wherein the head of the patient is positioned lower than the feet,
which indicates a decrease of blood supply in the brain. Herminda knew and
told Rogelio that something wrong was happening. Dr. Calderon was able to
intubate the patient. Erlinda was taken to the ICU and became comatose.
Rogelio filed a civil case for damages. The trial court ruled in his favor, finding
Dr. Gutierrez, Dr. Hosaka, and the hospital, guilty of negligence, but the Court
of Appeals reversed the decision. Hence, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period. However, it was found that the notice of the
decision was never sent to the petitioner’s counsel. Rather, it was sent to the
petitioner, addressing him as Atty. Rogelio Ramos, as if he was the legal
counsel. The petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari. On the
procedural issue, the Supreme Court rules that since the notice did not reach
the petitioner’s then legal counsel, the motion was filed on time.
Issue:
Whether a surgeon, an anaesthesiologist, and a hospital, should be made liable
for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for
cholecystectomy
Held:
Res Ipsa Loquitor
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for the
rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence,
or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing which caused the
injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant
or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care. It is
grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis
of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from
the mere occurrence of the accident itself. However, much has been said
that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not
create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. Mere
invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such
proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident,
enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an
inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant
the burden of going forward with the proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine
may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown.
(1) The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence;
(2) It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant or defendants; and
(3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated.
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine.
Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant
upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of
negligence as the cause of that harm. Although generally, expert medical
testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done
a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure,
when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides
the proof of negligence. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is
applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper
proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the
court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard
of care. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove
a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury
sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without
need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care.
Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under
usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for
injury suffered by him.
Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used
but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each
case. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the
occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service
or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that
particular practice. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process
of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the
routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary
professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would
themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or
causes of the untoward consequence.
We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. Erlinda
submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery
to be performed on her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her
person over to the care, custody and control of private respondents who
exercised complete and exclusive control over her. At the time of submission,
Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a few minor discomforts, was
likewise physically fit in mind and body. However, during the administration
of anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered
irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went
out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated.
Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not
normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of
situation does not in the absence of negligence of someone in the
administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Furthermore,
the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the
endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents,
who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have
been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the influence of
anesthetics which rendered her unconscious.
Negligence of the Anaesthesiologist
The pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of
anesthesia is universally observed to lessen the possibility of anesthetic
accidents. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time
only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act
of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. Her failure to
follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence.
Erlinda's case was elective and this was known to respondent Dra. Gutierrez.
Thus, she had all the time to make a thorough evaluation of Erlinda's case prior
to the operation and prepare her for anesthesia. However, she never saw the
patient at the bedside. She herself admitted that she had seen petitioner only in
the operating room, and only on the actual date of the cholecystectomy. She
negligently failed to take advantage of this important opportunity. As such, her
attempt to exculpate herself must fail.
Opinion of Expert Witness
An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-induced bronchospasm properly
falls within the fields of anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and clinical
pharmacology. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to the field of
neurology. While admittedly, many bronchospastic-mediated pulmonary
diseases are within the expertise of pulmonary medicine, Dr. Jamora's field,
the anesthetic drug-induced, allergic mediated bronchospasm alleged in this
case is within the disciplines of anesthesiology, allergology and
pharmacology. On the basis of the foregoing transcript, in which the
pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with
medical authority, it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to
Dr. Jamora's testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental
Sodium. Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired
special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify,
either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical
experience. Clearly, Dr. Jamora does not qualify as an expert witness based on
the above standard since he lacks the necessary knowledge, skill, and training
in the field of anesthesiology. Oddly, apart from submitting testimony from a
specialist in the wrong field, private respondents' intentionally avoided
providing testimony by competent and independent experts in the proper areas.
Proximate Cause
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is
proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in
bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or
damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the
act or omission. Instead of the intended endotracheal intubation what actually
took place was an esophageal intubation. During intubation, such distention
indicates that air has entered the gastrointestinal tract through the esophagus
instead of the lungs through the trachea. Entry into the esophagus would
certainly cause some delay in oxygen delivery into the lungs as the tube which
carries oxygen is in the wrong place. That abdominal distention had been
observed during the first intubation suggests that the length of time utilized in
inserting the endotracheal tube (up to the time the tube was withdrawn for the
second attempt) was fairly significant. Due to the delay in the delivery of
oxygen in her lungs Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis.
Responsibility of the Surgeon
As the so-called "captain of the ship," it is the surgeon's responsibility to see
to it that those under him perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent
Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper
authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia
protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr.
Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient.
Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled
another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation.
Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist
regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his
professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for
the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.
Responsibility of the Hospital
Hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
"consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point
which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's
condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate
consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee
relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether
such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly,
on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship
in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of
its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a
person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based
on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such
responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have
observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In the
instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its
responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and
supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree
of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer
such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to
discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed to
do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its
physicians for Erlinda's condition.
Damages
At current levels, the P8000/monthly amount established by the trial court at
the time of its decision would be grossly inadequate to cover the actual costs
of home-based care for a comatose individual. The calculated amount was not
even arrived at by looking at the actual cost of proper hospice care for the
patient. What it reflected were the actual expenses incurred and proved by the
petitioners after they were forced to bring home the patient to avoid mounting
hospital bills. And yet ideally, a comatose patient should remain in a hospital
or be transferred to a hospice specializing in the care of the chronically ill for
the purpose of providing a proper milieu adequate to meet minimum standards
of care. Given these considerations, the amount of actual damages recoverable
in suits arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct minimum
cost of proper care, not the cost of the care the family is usually compelled to
undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy.
Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time
of litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has
been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions
neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case, where the resulting
injury might be continuing and possible future complications directly arising
from the injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict. Temperate
damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages
in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the
unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and
temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages cover
two distinct phases. As it would not be equitable - and certainly not in the best
interests of the administration of justice - for the victim in such cases to
constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments
to the compensatory damages previously awarded - temperate damages are
appropriate. The amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain
extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper care. In the
instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based nursing care for
a comatose patient who has remained in that condition for over a decade.
Having premised our award for compensatory damages on the amount
provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now much more
in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for temperate damages
would allow petitioners to provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility
which generally specializes in such care. They should not be compelled by dire
circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of
professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the
circumstances, an award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would
therefore be reasonable.
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred.
She has been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now. The burden of
care has so far been heroically shouldered by her husband and children, who,
in the intervening years have been deprived of the love of a wife and a mother.
Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of the care of
petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify. Even the temperate
damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner's condition remains
unchanged for the next ten years. The husband and the children, all petitioners
in this case, will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient's
illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have fashioned their
daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner, altering their long term goals
to take into account their life with a comatose patient. They, not the
respondents, are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the victim.
The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. For
the foregoing reasons, an award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be
appropriate.
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00
are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we
are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at P100,000.00 are likewise
proper.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed
from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily
against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages
computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly
payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or
miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00
as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages and
attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
14. Professional Services Inc. (PSI) v. Natividad and Enrique Agana
Natividad and Enrique Agana v. Juan Fuentes
Miguel Ampil v. Natividad and Enrique Agana
2007 / Sandoval-Gutierrez / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decisions
Standard of conduct > Experts > Medical professionals
FACTS
Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel
movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering
from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection
surgery on her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her left ovary, he
obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to
perform hysterectomy on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his
work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it and found it in order, so he allowed Dr.
Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to complete the
procedure when the attending nurses made some remarks on the Record of
Operation: “sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done but
to no avail continue for closure” (two pieces of gauze were missing). A
“diligent search” was conducted but they could not be found. Dr. Ampil
then directed that the incision be closed.
A couple of days after, she complained of pain in her anal region, but
the doctors told her that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery. Dr.
Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous
nodes which were not removed during the operation. After months of
consultations and examinations in the US, she was told that she was free of
cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a piece of gauze (1.5 in)
protruding from her vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring
Natividad that the pains will go away. However, the pain worsened, so she
sought treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was found
in her vagina. She underwent another surgery.
Sps. Agana filed a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of
Medical City), Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable
for negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividad’s body,
and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique Agana also
filed an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice
against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the case against Dr.
Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad). Pending the outcome of the
cases, Natividad died (now substituted by her children). RTC found PSI and
the two doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC dismissed the
case against Dr. Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against Fuentes.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
1. WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and
malpractice. NO; DR. AMPIL IS GUILTY
2. WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. NO
3. WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil’s
negligence. YES
RATIO
DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE
His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American doctors were
the ones who put / left the gauzes; did not submit evidence to rebut the
correctness of the operation record (re: number of gauzes used); re: Dr.
Fuentes’ alleged negligence, Dr. Ampil examined his work and found it in
order].
Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been
closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. Even if
it has been shown that a surgeon was required to leave a sponge in his patient’s
abdomen because of the dangers attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal duty
to inform his patient within a reasonable time by advising her of what he had
been compelled to do, so she can seek relief from the effects of the foreign
object left in her body as her condition might permit. What’s worse in this case
is that he misled her by saying that the pain was an ordinary consequence of
her operation.
Medical negligence; standard of diligence
To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must only
prove that a health care provider either failed to do something [or did
something] which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done
[or wouldn’t have done], and that the failure or action caused injury to the
patient.
 Duty – to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of
the incision; if he fails to do so, it was his duty to inform the patient
about it
 Breach – failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform patient
 Injury – suffered pain that necessitated examination and another
surgery
 Proximate Causation – breach caused this injury; could be traced from
his act of closing the incision despite information given by the
attendant nurses that 2 pieces of gauze were still missing; what
established causal link: gauze pieces later extracted from patient’s
vagina
DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE
The res ipsa loquitur [thing speaks for itself] argument of the Aganas’ does
not convince the court. Mere invocation and application of this doctrine does
not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence.
Requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur
1. Occurrence of injury
2. Thing which caused injury was under the control and management
of the defendant [DR. FUENTES] — LACKING
SINCE CTRL+MGT WAS WITH DR. AMPIL
3. Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not
have happened if those who had control or management used proper
care
4. Absence of explanation by defendant
Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in
complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the
operation. That Dr. Ampil discharged such role is evident from the following:
 He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy
 He examined Dr. Fuentes’ work and found it in order
 He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave
 He ordered the closure of the incision
HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL [NCC
2180], AND DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS [NCC 2176]
Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its
professionals. However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to
realize that modern hospitals are taking a more active role in supplying and
regulating medical care to its patients, by employing staff of physicians, among
others. Hence, there is no reason to exempt hospitals from the universal rule
of respondeat superior. Here are the Court’s bases for sustaining PSI’s
liability:
 Ramos v. CA doctrine on E-E relationship

o For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical
negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in
effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians. [LABOR LESSON: power to hire, fire, power of
control]
 Agency principle of apparent authority / agency by estoppel

o Imposes liability because of the actions of a principal or
employer in somehow misleading the public into believing
that the relationship or the authority exists [see NCC 1869]
o PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the names and
specializations of their physicians. Hence, PSI is now
estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose
names it proudly paraded in the public directory, leading the
public to believe that it vouched for their skill and
competence.
o
 If doctors do well, hospital profits financially, so
when negligence mars the quality of its services, the
 hospital should not be allowed to escape liability for
its agents’ acts.
 Doctrine of corporate negligence / corporate responsibility

o This is the judicial answer to the problem of allocating
hospital’s liability for the negligent acts of health
practitioners, absent facts to support the application
of respondeat superior.
o This provides for the duties expected [from hospitals]. In this
case, PSI failed to perform the duty of exercising reasonable
care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility
for medical treatment. PSI failed to conduct an
investigation of the matter reported in the note of the
count nurse, and this established PSI’s part in the dark
conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes.
o
 PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter,
through the report of the attending nurses + the fact
that the operation was carried on with the assistance
of various hospital staff
o It also breached its duties to oversee or supervise all persons
who practice medicine within its walls and take an active step
in fixing the negligence committed
 PSI also liable under NCC 2180

o It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of the family in the accreditation
and supervision of Dr. Ampil.