 A person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS BATCH 2: BAIL
1. PADERANGA vs. CA
FACTS:
 Paderanga was charged as a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder.
 Before an arrest warrant could be served on him, Paderanga who was then confined at the
hospital Hospital due to "acute costochondritis," through counsel filed a motion for admission
to bail with the trial court on on October 28, 1992.
 He duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong.
 The trial court proceeded to hear the application for bail. Paderanga’s counsel manifested
that they were submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapter
president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines (*Paderanga is a lawyer) and that, for
purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered being in the custody of the law.
 The Prosecution, through Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo, informed the trial court that it
was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting
the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge. Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was
waiving any further presentation of evidence.
 In a resolution dated November 5, 1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the
amount of P200,000.00. The following day, petitioner posted bail in the amount thus fixed.
 Prosecutor Gingoyon filed Motion for Reconsideration contending that he received his copy of
the petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing. RTC DENIED his motion.
 Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to r Court of Appeals who favoured him and
ANNULLED the RTC resolution granting bail to Paderanga.
 CA ruled that at the time of petitioner's application for bail, he was not yet "in the custody of
the law," apparently because he filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually
arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It further noted that apart from the circumstance
that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of
guilt was strong as borne out by the fact that no bail was recommended by the prosecution,
for which reasons it held that the grant of bail was doubly improvident.
 In this appeal, Paderanga argues that (1) in accordance with the ruling of this Court
in Santiago vs. Vasquez etc., et al.,9 his filing of the application for bail with the trial court
effectively conferred on the latter jurisdiction over his person, therefore he was in the
custody of the law; (2) that the evidence on record negates the existence of such strong
evidence as would bar his provisional release on bail.
ISSUE: W/N the grant of bail proper?
RULING: YES.
 Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearing before any court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main
purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction
and yet secure his appearance at the trial.
 Bail is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted
before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful
arrest or voluntary surrender.
 The rationale behind the rule that only those in the custody of the law is granted bail is that it
discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice whereby an accused could
just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court
by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor.
of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under
Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
surrendering to the proper authorities.
 In this case, although Paderanga filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually
and physically placed under arrest, however, at that point and in the factual ambience
therefore, he is considered as being constructively and legally under custody of the law.
 Paderanga made it known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail
that he could not personally appear as he was then confined at the hospital. The prosecution
and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of
petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him.
 Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person,
firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true
information of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing
the jurisdiction of the said court.
 Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all
indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of
Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a
regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.
 A hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion
of the court,24 is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified
representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt
is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof is on the
prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum.
 In this case, the prosecution manifested that it was "submitting (the motion) to the sound
discretion of the Honorable Court” and dispensed with the introduction of evidence en
contra and this it did at the proper forum and stage of the proceedings, that is, during the
mandatory hearing for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself that such was the
position of the prosecution.
 CA resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC resolution and omnibus order
granting bail to petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.
2. FELICIANO vs. PASICOLAN
(July 31, 1961)
FACTS :
• Pablo Feliciano, was one of the eighteen persons charged with the crime of
kidnapping with murder in an amended information filed on October 24, 1958, in Criminal
Case No. 1984 (People vs. Carlos Pabustan, et al)
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
• Upon learning of the filing of said information and that a warrant for his arrest had
been issued, the petitioner, fearing, according to his lawyer, that he might fall into the hands
of irresponsible police officers, and to avoid disgrace and humiliation consequent to an arrest
and incarceration, went into hiding, however , Attorney Filemon Cajator, at the instance of
petitioner’s wife, filed in the case a motion asking that the Court fix at P10,000.00 the amount
of the bond for petitioner's release pending trial..
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 • The Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga opposed this motion, on the ground that the
filing thereof was premature as the petitioner had not yet been arrested, CFI Pampanga
dismissed the petitioner’s motion on the ground that "pending his arrest or surrender, Pablo
Feliciano has not the right to ask this court to admit him to bail,” hence the instant
proceeding.
• Petitioner contended that under the Constitution, "all persons shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong” (Article III, Section 1, paragraph (16), Constitution of the
Philippines), the word “all person” have been interpreted to mean "all persons, without
distinction, whether formally charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense." (citing
Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756).
ISSUE: WON responded may post bail without surrendering his person to the law or proper
authority.
RULING:
• NO, petitioner is not entitled to the remedy prayed for. While it is true that the
right to bail is conferred to “all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or
information has already been formally filed,” but only persons who have been either arrested,
detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of
said provision. But in order that a person can invoke the constitutional precept, it is not
necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him.
From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law,
he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is
charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong. (citing Herras Teehankee vs.
Rovira, 75 Phil. 634)
• The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant
bail to one who is free. Thus, `bail is the security required and given for the release of a
person who is in the custody of the law.'
• In the instant case, the petitioner upon learning that an amended information
charging him and seventeen others with the crime of kidnapping with murder had been filed,
and that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, immediately went into hiding and until now
is at large. Without surrendering himself, he filed the motion in which he asks that the court
fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial. It is, therefore, clear that the
petitioner is a free man and is under the jurisprudence not entitled to admission to bail.
3. DINAPOL v BALDADO, A.M. No. RTJ-92-898 August 5, 1993
Principle: Bogo Judge cannot set the motion for bail for hearing if the accused has not yet
been in the custody of the law; accordingly, the accused cannot file a motion for bail if the
court has not acquired jurisdiction over them
FACTS:
1. Crime: Murder
FACTS
2. Respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused Sps. Palermo. Before the
trial court could acquire jurisdiction over their persons, accused filed a motion to grant and fix
bail which the respondent Judge set for hearing despite the vigorous opposition of the
complaining witness. Thereafter, the respondent Judge denied the motion because the
accused failed to appear; however, he acted favorably on the MR of the accused by resetting
the hearing of the petition for bail subject to the condition that "the accused shall surrender
to the custody of the court.” The accused failed again to appear. The Judge again reset the
hearing for the motion.
3. Complainant charges the respondent Judge because notwithstanding the fact that the
accused had not yet been arrested, said respondent Judge entertained a petition for bail and
set the same for hearing.
Issue:
WON the Judge erred in setting the motion for bail for hearing
Alternatively, whether the accused can file a motion for bail even if the court has not acquired
jurisdiction over them
Answer: Yes, No
1. It is axiomatic that a court cannot entertain an accused's motion or petition for bail unless
he is in the custody of the law. Elsewise stated, the purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an
accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial.
Accordingly, it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.
2. A person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by
virtue of a warrant of arrest or even without a warrant or (b) when he has voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities.
3. Since the accused were not arrested and did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, they had no standing in court to file a motion for bail. Nor did the court have any
business setting the same for hearing. By setting the said motion for hearing despite the fact
that his court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused, the
respondent Judge blatantly disregarded established rule and settled jurisprudence. While he
subsequently rectified his error by denying the motion, he nevertheless backtracked by
granting the motion for reconsideration and setting anew the hearing of the motion for bail
this time
4. SANTIAGO v. VASQUEZ G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993
DOCTRINE: Where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of
the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to
the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.
voluntary appearance is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits or by filing bail.
1. May 13, 1991: Information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation
of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019
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 2. May 14, 1991: Sandiganbayan issued Order of Arrest with bail fixed at P15,000.00.
 Petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and
in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago.” Petitioner prayed that because of injuries
from a vehicular accident, she be considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of the court for purposes of trial and other proceedings and that her bail
bond of P15,000.00 be accepted.
 Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to cash bond without need for her physical
appearance until June 5, 1991.
3. May 21, 1991: Respondent filed a manifestation with the Sandiganbayan that accused visited
him and left unaided. Acting on this, Sandiganbayan set arraignment on May 27, 1991.
4. May 22, 1991: Petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and she be allowed provisional
liberty upon a recognizance.
 Petitioner then filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Manila RTC from proceeding
with criminal cases against her.
5. May 24, 1991: Court issued a TRO enjoining said courts.
6. January 18, 1992: Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and lifted the TRO.
7. July 6, 1992: Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner due to
announcement that she would be leaving to accept a fellowship offered at Harvard University.
ISSUE/S
1. WON The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner.
RULING
1. No. The Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and the hold
departure order is valid.
2. Petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent
court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail
Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago.” Petitioner is estopped from asserting
the contrary after she recognized the jurisdiction of the court and it to exercise jurisdiction over
her pleadings.
3. “Where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused
is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or
was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.”
4. Voluntary appearance is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits or by filing bail.
5. Bail, as a rule, cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by judicial
authorities either by arrest or voluntary surrender
5. ALMEDA VS VILLALUZ
ALMEDA v. VILLALUZ (taas tan-awn pero actually mubo ra gyud na basahon guys—word by word from SC
ruling rana gipang copy paste, balik2 ang thought)
Petitioner Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five others, with the crime
of qualified theft of a motor vehicle. The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release
of Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by the respondent judge with a direction that it be
posted entirely in cash. Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash
bond required of him. This request was denied, and so was an oral motion for reconsideration, on the
ground that the amended information imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism on the part of
Almeda.
(IRRELEVANT FACT BUT FUNNY)
At the same hearing, the respondent city fiscal, thru his assistant, reiterated his oral motion made at a
previous hearing for amendment of the information so as to include allegations of recidivism and
habitual delinquency in the particular case of Almeda. The trial court granted the respondent fiscal's
motion in open court. An oral motion for reconsideration was denied. Immediately thereafter, the
assistant fiscal took hold of the original information and, then and there, entered his amendment by
annotating the same on the back of the document. The petitioner forthwith moved for the dismissal of
the charge on the ground of double jeopardy, but this motion and a motion for reconsideration were
denied in open court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge has the authority to require a strict cash bond and disallow
the petitioner's attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional liberty.
RULING: NO. As defined in Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail is "the security required and
given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in
which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of
requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial.
In this jurisdiction, the accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to conviction except when he is
charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and may not be denied even where the accused has previously escaped detention, or by
reason of his prior absconding. In order to safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the Constitution
further provides that "EXCESSIVE BAIL SHALL NOT BE REQUIRED." This is logical because the imposition
of an unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself.
The condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is
abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose of bail is to
insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of
penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a cash
bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for it.
Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced
because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the
body of the prisoner can be delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in
lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. This is clearly deducible from the language of
section 14 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court:
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SEC. 14. Deposit of money as bail. — At any time after the amount of bail is fixed by order, the
defendant, instead of giving bail, may deposit with the nearest collector of internal revenue, or
provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the sum mentioned in the order, and upon delivering to the court
a proper certificate of the deposit, must be discharged from custody. Money thus deposited, shall be
applied to the payment of the fine and costs for which judgment may be given; and the surplus, if any,
shall be returned to the defendant.
Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain his
provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.
But while we repudiate the particular measure adopted by the respondent judge, we cannot fault the
motive that caused him to demur to the petitioner's offer of a surety bond. Based on the petitioner's
past record. Fortunately, the court is not without devices with which to meet the situation:
First, it could increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level.
Second, as part of the power of the court over the person of the accused and for the purpose of
discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant while on provisional liberty, the
latter could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond, to report in person periodically to the
court and make an accounting of his movements.
Third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to the requirements of due
process, that under the 1973 Constitution. "Trial may proceed notwithstanding his absence provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified."
With respect to the amount of the bail bond, the trial court is well advised to consider, inter alia, the
following factors, where applicable:
1. the ability of the accused to give bail
2. nature of the offense;
3. the penalty for the offense charged;
4. the character and reputation of the accused
5. the health of the accused;
6. the character and strength of the evidence;
7. the probability of the accused's appearance or non-appearance at the trial;
8. forfeiture of previous bonds;
9. whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
10. whether the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases
6. MANOTOC V. CA
7. TEEHANKEE VS DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
8. COMENDADOR VS. DE VILA
9. BRAVO VS. BORJA
FACTS: In the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, petitioner Jojo Pastor Bravo, Jr., is charged with
murder for the killing of one Ramon Abiog. Detained in the city jail of Naga after his arrest,
petitioner filed a motion for bail based on two reasons: (a) that the evidence against him is not
strong in view of the retraction by Ferdinand del Rosario, one of the prosecution witnesses, of his
previous statement naming petitioner as the assailant; and (b) that he is a minor of 16 years,
entitled as such to a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code
which would make the murder charge against him non-capital.
After a hearing during which the witness (del Rosario) presented by petitioner made another turn-
about and declared against the latter, respondent Judge Melecio B. Borja denied the motion for
bail on the finding that the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong and his minority was not proved.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration stating that his minority had been proved by his
birth certificate which was attached to the memorandum in support of his motion for bail, showing
that he was born on February 26, 1967, that his minority had never been challenged by the fiscal,
and that the offense charged, as regards petitioner, is not capital because even if convicted, he
could not be sentenced to death because of his minority.
The Fiscal opposed the motion on the ground that the evidence of guilt is strong, but did not
contest the minority of petitioner. In his order respondent Judge denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Failing in his bid for bail, petitioner then filed a motion with the lower court praying that he be
placed in the care and custody of the Ministry of Social Services and Development (MSSD) pursuant
to Article 191 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code)
Respondent judge denied the motion for lack of merit. Explaining that the quoted Article 191 is not
applicable since it could be invoked only where the minor is charged with a bailable offense, as
could be gleaned from the phrase "if unable to furnish bail."
Subsequently the NBI Regional Office at Naga City submitted its report, copy of which was sent to
the City Fiscal of Naga. It found that it was the prosecution witness, Ferdinand del Rosario, and not
the petitioner, who killed the deceased Ramon Abiog. When the murder case was next called for
hearing on October 19, 1983, the defense unilaterally moved orally that the trial of petitioner be
reset in order to give the City Fiscal more time to study the NBI report, but the motion was denied
as dilatory.
petitioner has filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus, with two supplementary
petitions, seeking the release of petitioner on bail or his transfer to the custody of the MSSD
pending trial pursuant to Article 191 of PD No. 603. In view of the aforesaid NBI report, the petition
also seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding respondent Judge to remand the case
to the City Fiscal of Naga for reinvestigation.
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ISSUE: whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right?
RULING: Under the Constitution, "all persons, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties." (Article IV,
Section 18.) Generally, therefore, bail is a matter of right before conviction, unless the accused is
charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong.
The charge against petitioner is murder qualified by treachery and attended by two aggravating
circumstances: evident premeditation and nocturnity. Punishable by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, the crime is therefore a capital offense.
Nevertheless, where it has been established without objection that the accused is only 16 years
old, it follows that, if convicted, he would be given "the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
law," which effectively rules out the death penalty.
The Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from one who is accused of a capital offense where
the evidence of guilt is strong. This reason does not hold where the accused has been established
without objection to be a minor who by law cannot be sentenced to death.
It results that petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right, which makes it unnecessary to
decide whether he, being a minor, is entitled to be placed pending trial in the care and custody of
the MSSD pursuant to Article 191 of P.D. No. 603.
10. Libarios vs. Dabalos
FACTS:
1. On 10 March 1988, former Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr. was shot by Pablo Macapas inside the
courtroom of respondent Judge Dabalos, after a hearing in a frustrated murder case against said Pablo
Macapas. Corvera, Sr. was the private complainant in the aforesaid criminal case, while Mayor
Tranquilino Calo, Jr. was appearing as counsel of Macapas. As a result of the killing of Corvera Sr., a
formal charge of murder (I.S. No. 88-138) was filed with the City Fiscal's Office of Butuan City against
Pablo Macapas, Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr., and his driver-bodyguard Belarmino Alloco, and (2) other
"John Does". Macapas was a bodyguard of respondent Calo, Jr.
2. On 22 June 1988, Investigating Fiscal Macario Balansag issued a resolution, finding a prima facie
case for murder against the respondents in I.S. No. 88-138.
3. Before the motion for reconsideration could be resolved, Investigating Fiscal Balansag was himself
gunned down in cold blood while on his way to his office. Based on the investigation conducted by the
NBI linking the death of Fiscal Balansag to the killing of Corvera, Sr., another formal complaint for
murder was filed against Calo. Jr. and four (4) others.
4. On 29 September 1988, the information earlier signed by Investigating Fiscal Balansag, carrying a
NO BAIL recommendation, was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch IV,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3464. On 14 October 1988, upon motion of the prosecution and with
the approval of the court, the information was withdrawn for being fatally defective in form, the same
having been signed by Fiscal Balansag who was already dead at the time of the filing of said
information.
5. On 29 November 1988, a new information signed by Acting Fiscal Brocoy carrying also a NO BAIL
recommendation, was filed with the court without the necessary supporting affidavits and papers.
The case was erroneously assigned to Branch IV of the RTC of Butuan City, where the original
information prior to its withdrawal was assigned. The accused filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or
Opposition to the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest Without Bail, and in the alternative, accused sought
the fixing of bail for their temporary release.2 Said motion was set for hearing on 15 December 1988.
6. Respondent-judge, issued an order of 8 December 19883 in his capacity as Executive Judge,
directing the raffle of the case with due notice to the parties. Without conducting any prior hearing,
in the same order of 8 December 1988, respondent judge directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against the accused, fixing at the same time the bail for accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod at P50,000.00
each; however, no bail was recommended for the temporary release of accused Macapas. Respondent
judge fixed bail for the temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod on the ground that they
were not charged as co-principals by cooperation or inducement, and that the evidence of guilt against
them was merely circumstantial.
7. On 14 December 1988, a petition for certiorari was filed by herein complainant with the Court of
Appeals, assailing the 8 December 1988 order of respondent judge, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 16383.
In response to the urgency of the petition, a resolution dated 20 December 1988 was issued by the
Court of Appeals restraining the execution and implementation of the assailed order, pending the
resolution of the petition on the merits. However, on 26 December 1988, respondent judge and Calo,
Jr. informed the Court of Appeals that accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod had already put up their respective
bail bonds of P50,000.00 as of 9 December 1988 and that both have been released, thus rendering
the primary objective of the CA temporary restraining order moot and academic.
8. On 31 January 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision4 setting aside the questioned 8
December 1988 order as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The warrants of arrest as well as the bail bonds filed by the accused in said
Criminal Case No. 3464 were declared void and without force and effect; the court of origin was
ordered to immediately issue and serve new warrants of arrest upon the accused. To determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, the trial court was ordered to
conduct a heating and thus resolve the motion for fixing the bald for the temporary release of the two
(2) accused, Calo, Jr. and Allocod. The decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory on
23 February 1989.5
9. In the administrative complaint at bar, complainant claims that the act of respondent judge in
granting bail to the accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod without a hearing, is tantamount to gross ignorance
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and willful, malicious and blatant disregard of the provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which require a hearing before an accused charged with a capital offense can be
granted bail. The impartiality of respondent judge in issuing the questioned warrants of arrest but
allowing bail is also questioned on the ground of his "close association" with the accused Calo, Jr.
Issue:
WON respondent judge in granting bail to the accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod without a hearing, is
tantamount to gross ignorance and willful, malicious and blatant disregard of the provisions of Sec. 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which require a hearing before an accused charged with
a capital offense can be granted bail.

Ruling:
YES. It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a
capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the
prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce
to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for
the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the instant
case amounted to a violation of due process.12 Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the
evidence of guilt against herein accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demanded
that a hearing be conducted before bail was fixed for the temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and
Allocod, if bail was at all justified. Respondent judge's disregard of an established rule of law by
depriving the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused
was strong, amounted to gross ignorance of the law, which is subject to disciplinary action.

11. PP. VS. DACUDAO

12. PP. VS. CALO

Estrañero / Galinato / Inot / Nillas / Ortiz / Quiles / Yase /