CHAPTER- VI

THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897

6.1. Significance of the General Clauses Act, 1897

This chapter deals with the study of meaning of few expressions as defined

in the General Clauses Act, 1897. The significance of this Act was highlighted in

the Sixtieth Law Commission Report.1 It reads as follows:

“It is desirable, in this context, to emphasize, the

importance of statute law today. It was towards the
end of the last century, that the present General
Clauses Act was enacted; Statute law did not then
possess, in its volume and range, the importance
which it now possesses, though, of course, much of
the lawyer’s law had been codified in India by that
time. Since 1897, the number of statutes and
statutory instruments has multiplied every year. As
the position stood towards the end of 1971, there
were about 700 Central Acts of permanent duration,
and the number of statutory instruments issued
under these Acts would run literally into thousands.
Litigation involving questions of statutory
construction constitute now the bulk of the total
litigation in India. It is, therefore, obvious that an
enactment which is intended to deal with the
process of interpretation of statutes, is now of much
greater importance than it could have been in the
last century.”

It is also evident from the above report that the General Clauses Act

functions as one of the statutory aids of interpretation. The General Clauses Act,

which was enacted on March 11, 1897, consolidated the two earlier enactments of

1868 and 1887. It is largely modeled on the (English) Interpretation Act 1889.

Though it has included certain new provisions from it, yet it is not bound by the

1
lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/report 60.pdf (last visited on 7/6/ 2015).

283
said English Act any more. In Ameer-un-Nissa Begum v. Meshboob Begum,2 the

Supreme Court of India has observed that “we are not bound by the provisions of

any English Statute, but we can still apply the English Common Law rule if it

appears to us to be responsible proper”.

6.1.1. The Object and Purpose of the Act

This Act does not propose to effect any change in the law. The object of

the act is to indicate the meaning of an expression in a generic and not in a rigid or

exhaustive sense. It serves to shorten the language of statutory enactments and to

provide for uniformity of expression in cases where there is identity of subject

matter. Lord Bentham has rightly observed3 :

“The language of error is always obscure and

indefinite. An abundance of words serves to cover a
paucity and a falsity of ideas. The oftener terms are
changed, the easier it is to delude the reader. The
language of truth is uniform and simple. The same
ideas are always expressed by the same terms.”

The purpose of the Act has been stated by the Supreme Court in the case

of The Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar.4 It stated that the

purpose of this Act is to place in one single Statute different provisions as regards

interpretation of words and legal principles which would otherwise have to be

specified separately in many different Acts and regulations. 5 The purpose of the

Act is to avoid superfluity of language in statutes wherever it is possible to do so.6

The General Clauses Act thus makes provisions as to the construction of

General and other laws of all-India application.7 The section three provides that

2
. cf N.S.Bindra, The General Clauses Act, 10th Edn. (Lexis Nexis, Gurgaon, First Rep 2013) p 7.
3
Supra note 1.
4
Supra note 2, p 4.
5
ibid, p 4.
6
ibid.
7
Supra note 1.

284
the definitions given therein shall apply General Clauses Act, and all Central Acts

and regulations made after the commencement of the present Act. 8 But all such

definitions are governed by the introductory words „unless there is anything

repugnant in the subject or in the context‟. This Act has been expressly applied to

the interpretation of the Constitution of Article 367 of the Constitution.9

6.2. Immovable Property

The necessity for the interpretation of a property as a movable or

immovable one arose in the context of registration, income tax, sales tax and

stamp duty. The application of stamp duty arises in the case of sale of an

immovable property. The transaction which involve the transfer of interest in

immovable property, require mandatory registration under the Registration Act,

1908. Lease, mortgage or charges on immovable property also require

registration. The real purpose to register a deed is to secure a person dealing with

any property against fraud and to maintain a public register. It is a well settle

principle that the transaction in immovable property is valid only if all the legal

requirements are complied with. However legal dispute ensues in cases relating to

the nature of the property. In such dispute, the court resorts to the interpretation on

the facts and circumstances of each case. It determines the issue in the light of the

S.3(26) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, S.3 of the Transfer of Property Act

1892 and S.2(6) of the Registration Act 1908. These sections are as follows:

8
State of Orissa v. Gangadhar Subudhi ILR (1966) Cutt102.
9
367(1) unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act 1897, shall, subject to
any adaptation and modifications that may be made therein under Article 372, apply for the
interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the legislature
of Dominion of India.

285
Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as under:-
“Immovable property” shall include land, benefits
to arise out of land, and things attached to the
earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached
to the earth;”

Section 2(6) of the Registration Act 1908 defines “immovable property” and reads
as under:-
“Immovable property” includes land, buildings,
hereditary allowances, rights to ways, lights,
ferries, fisheries or any other benefit to arise out of
land, and things attached to the earth or
permanently fastened to anything which is attached
to the earth, but not standing timber, growing crops
nor grass;”

Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. 1892 merely says that

“Immovable property”does not include standing

timber growing crops or grass.

Section 3(6) defines the expression “attached to the earth” as follows:

“Attached to the earth” means a) rooted in the

earth, as in the case of trees and shrubs;(b)
imbedded in the earth, as in the case of walls or
buildings; or (c) attached to what is so imbedded
for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to
which it is attached.”

6.2.1. Right to catch Fish

A claim of the right to catch fish came under the consideration of the court

in Ananda Behera v. State of Orissa.10 In the instant case, the petitioners had

obtained oral licenses for catching and appropriating fish from the specified

sections of the Chilka Lake from its proprietor, the Raja of Parikud, on payment

of heavy sums. They were prohibited from fishing in specified areas by the

enactment of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951. They contended that the said

Act, which was confined to immovable property, had no application on them.

10
AIR 1956 SC 17.

286
They claimed that their transactions were of sales of future goods, namely, the

fish. They contented that the fish is a movable property.

The court tended to decide whether the right to catch or carry fish is a

movable or immovable property. It observed that the right to catch and carry away

fish in specific portions of the lake over a specified future period amounts to a

license to enter on the land coupled with a grant to catch and carry away the fish.

It was not a right to purchase of any future goods as claimed by the petitioners. It

was observed:

“Section 3 (26) of the General Clauses Act defines

"immovable property" as including benefits that
arise out of the land. The Transfer of Property Act
does not define the term except to say that
immovable property does not include standing
timber, growing crops or grass. As fish do not come
under that category the definition in the General
Clauses Act applies and as a profit a prendre is
regarded as a benefit arising out of land it follows
that it is immovable property within the meaning of
the Transfer of Property Act.”

Thus the court construed the „right to catch or carry fish‟ as an immovable

property. It further held that the petitioners‟ transactions were of oral nature, they

had no fundamental right.

6.2.2. Standing Timber

In Shantabai v. State of Bombay,11 the court was concerned with the

question whether the standing timber falls under the category of immovable

property. In the instant case, the Zamindar of Pandharpur has executed an

11
AIR 1958 SC 532.

287
unregistered document12 in favour of his wife. The deed gave her the right to enter

upon certain areas in the zamindari in order to cut and take out the bamboos, fuel

wood and teak. In 1950, the State of Madhya Pradesh enacted The Madhya

Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act,

1950.13 According to the S. (3) of the said Act, all the proprietary rights in the

land were vested in the State. Accordingly, she was prevented from cutting the

trees. Subsequently, she claimed that her fundamental right to cut and collect

timber in the forests in question has been infringed. In the light of the definitions

of the S.3 (26) of the General Clauses Act, S.(3) of the Transfer of Property Act

and S.2 (6) of the Registration Act, the court pronounced that the „trees‟ are

regarded as immovable property because they are attached to or rooted in the

earth. Therefore the trees except the standing timber are immovable property.

Further, it made a distinction between the standing timber and tree. Finally it

concluded:

“standing timber " must be a tree that is in a state

fit for these purposes and, further, a tree that is
meant to be converted into timber so shortly that it
can already be looked upon as timber for all
practical purposes even though it is still standing. If
not, it is still a tree because, unlike timber, it will
continue to draw sustenance from the soil.”

On the facts and circumstance of this case, the court held:

“Though such trees as can be regarded as standing

timber at the date of the document, both because of
their size and girth and also because of the intention

12
The term of that deed was 26th April, 1948 to 8th December, 1960 and the consideration was
Rs.26,000 that called itself a lease for a period of twelve years and the consideration was
stated to be Rs. 26,000. Certain restrictions are put on the cutting, and the felling of certain
trees is prohibited.
13
The Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act,
1950 came into force on January 26, 1951.

288
 to fall at an early date would be movable property for
the purposes of the Transfer of Property Act and the
Registration Act, the remaining trees that were
covered by the grant would be immovable property,
and as the total value was Rs.26,000, the deed
required registration and being unregistered, it did
not pass any title or interest.”

6.2.3. Manure

The court was concerned whether the document under consideration is or

is not liable to stamp duty in Haji Sukhan Beg v. Board of Revenue.14 In the

instant case, there was an agreement between the Municipal Board of Bareilly and

the contractor Haji Sukhan Beg. The Municipal Board granted the right to take out

by digging of manure and rubbish accumulated in trenches and drains within the

municipal area of Bareilly for a period of three years in lieu of periodical

payments. On taking possession, the contractor found that there was only mud

instead of manure in a number of trenches and drains. Thus he suffered lost. In

order to compensate the loss, the board entered into an agreement to extend the

period.15 But the Board of Revenue considered the instrument as an agreement of

lease of immovable property and required the contractor to pay the stamp duty.16

The court observed that a right to take out by digging manure and rubbish

accumulated in specific trenches and drains and carrying away the same and sell it

amounts to a benefit arising out of land and as such it is immovable property

14
AIR 1979 All 310.
15
The terms and conditions were to remain the same and the contractor was to pay the same
amount annually for the period from July 1, 1965 to September, 30, 1963 and the contract was
to expire on 30th June, 1967.
16
The said agreement was an agreement of lease of immovable property as defined in Section
2(16) of the Stamp Act for a period of one year 3 months on an annual rent of Rs. 60,501/-
and is chargeable under Article 35 (a) (ii) of Schedule IB of U.P. Stamp (Amendment) Act,
1962 with a duty of Rs. 2,745/-.

289
within the meaning of Transfer of Property Act. Thus the said agreement was

construed to be a subject matter relating to immovable property.

6.2.4. Right to Worship

There came a need for the court to determine whether hereditary office of

Shebait enjoyed by a person is movable or immovable property in Ram Rattan v.

Bajrang Lal.17 According to the prevalent practice, a person inherits the right to

worship by turn for ten days in a circuit of 18 months in Kalyanji Maharaj

Temple. During the said period, the person is entitled to officiate as Pujari and

receive all the offering made to the deity. In the instant case, Mrs Acharaj, who

had inherited the said right, transferred it with its ancillary rights to plaintiff Ram

Rattan. She, who died during the case, had executed it by means of a deed. A legal

dispute ensued on account of it. The plaintiff-appellant, who died pending the

appeal, sought a declaration to his right of worship by turn. He had produced the

disputed document as his evidence. The defendants raised an objection that

document was not duly stamped and registered. The court examined whether the

right to worship by turn is immovable property. The court observed:

“It may be mentioned that the definition of

immovable property in Registration Act lends
assurance to treating Shebait's hereditary office as
immovable property because the definition includes
hereditary allowances Office of Shebait is
hereditary unless provision to contrary is made in
the deed creating the endowment.”

Thus it can be concluded that the hereditary office of Shebait, which

would be enjoyed by the person by turn, was construed to be immovable property.

17
AIR 1978 SC 1393.

290
6.2.5. Machinery

The nature of the machinery of a groundnut decorticating factory was

decided in J. Kuppanna Chetty, Ambati.v. Collector of Anantapur.18 Default in

payment of income tax arrears, the groundnut decorticating factory of the plaintiff

was locked and sealed under S.25 the Madras Revenue Recovery Act.19 As the

machinery was under attachment,20 the plaintiffs could not be permitted to carry

on the decorticating operations. When they furnished the security in pursuit of the

High Court order, the lease period had expired, and hence the factory was not

released. As they suffered loss, they filed a suit against them for adopting an

unlawful procedure. The court was concerned with the issue whether the property

in question is movable property or immovable property. As there is no definition

of the land or building under the Madras Revenue Recovery Act,1864 the court

referred to the definitions of S. 3 (14) of the Madras General Clauses Act,186721

S(3) Transfer of Property Act and S 2 (6) and S 2 (9) 22 of the Indian Registration

Act. On a combined reading of the above provisions and by reference to the

judgment of Mohammed Ibrahim v. Northern Circars Fibre Trading Co.,23 the

court observed:

18
AIR 1965 AP 457.
19
The Madras Revenue Recovery Act provides for attachment of the land.
20
There was an attachment of the boiler engine and decorticator, the engine, factory building,
and the godowns of the factory.
21
'Immovable property' shall include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to
the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth."
22
Section 2 (9) defines 'immovable property' to include standing timber, growing crops and
grass, fruit upon and juice in trees, and property of every other description, except immovable
property.
23
AIR 1944 Mad 492. It was a case of machinery of a mill fixed to a cement platform and
attached to iron pillars fixed in the ground. Based on the facts and the nature of the fixture,
including the intention derived from the physical features of the fixture that the mill was to be
a permanent attachment to the earth. It was hold that the movable property so attached should
be regarded as immovable property.

291
 “The boiler engine and the decorticator were fixed
or embedded in the factory building for the
beneficial use of the building, as a factory.
Following the above decision, which is binding
upon us we hold that the boiler engine and the
decorticator are also immovable property, in
addition to the land and the building.”

Thus holding the machinery as immovable property, the court declared

that the attachment as illegal. This interpretation was reaffirmed in the Duncans
24
Industries Ltd. v. State of U.P. In the instant case, ICI India Ltd executed an

agreement of sale of its fertilizer business in favor of Chand Chhap Fertilizer and

Chemicals Ltd. CCFCL which was renamed as M/s.Duncans Industries Limited.

Pursuant to the said agreement, a deed of conveyance was executed by the said

ICI in favour of CCFCL. When presented for registration, it was sent by the

concerned Revenue Authority to the Collector for proper valuation. On

estimation, stamp duty and penalty was levied on account of its being movable

property. The Supreme Court examined whether the embedment of the machinery

was intended to be temporary or permanent. On examination, the Supreme Court

concurred with the view of the High court and held that the machineries of the

fertilizer plant which was permanently attached to the land as immovable. While

deciding the issue, the court took into consideration the intention of the parties in

embedding the machinery. It was found that the machineries, which formed the

fertilizer plant, were permanently embedded in the earth with an intention of

running the fertilizer factory. It was found that there was no intention to remove it.

It was embedded in order to use it for the manufacture of fertilizer at various

stages of its production.

24
AIR 2000 SC 355.

292
 Similarly the nature of turbo alternators was examined by the Supreme

Court in Triveni Engineering and Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise.25

In the instant case, the court was concerned with the question of levy of excise

duty on the turbo alternator. The appellants alleged that there was no

manufacturing process but only the combination of steam turbine and alternator.

Thereafter there was a fixation of the two components permanently on platform

raised at the premises of the customers. They contended that the emergent product

is an immovable property. Thus they claimed that it cannot be liable to the excise

duty under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.The Apex Court held that the

process involved in fixing steam turbine and alternator and in coupling and

aligning them in a specified manner to form a turbo alternator, a new commodity,

is nothing but a manufacturing process. Then it proceeded to examine whether the

installation of turbo alternators would be movable or immovable property.

Further, it examined whether the turbo alternator possess the attributes of

excisable goods. In order to ascertain the emergent product as excisable goods, it

must pass the test of mobility and marketability. In the light of the S.3 of the

Transfer of Property Act, S.3(25) of the General Clauses Act, the court

emphasized that in an immovable property there is neither mobility nor

marketability as understood in the Excise Law. It concluded that installation and

erection of turbo alternator on the platform constructed on the land would be

immovable property which does not pass the test of mobility and marketability

and as such cannot be considered as excisable goods.

25
AIR 2000 SC 2896.

293
6.3. Movable Property

There is a definition for immovable property in the Transfer of Property

Act, 1882, but it does not give any definition for movable property. The movable

property has been defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897 as „property of every

description except immovable property‟. The Registration Act, 1908 defines

movable property „to include property of every description except immovable

property, but including standing timber, growing crops and grass‟. It has to be

mentioned that if the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies to the transfer of

immovable property, the Sale of Goods Act applies to the sale of certain movable

property, being goods. The S. 2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act26 defines „goods‟ to

mean every kind of movable property. It is wide enough to include all types of

movable property other than what is expressly excluded. If a particular property

cannot be termed as goods then the Act does not apply to the same. According to

the General Clauses Act, 1897, things attached to or forming part of the land are

treated as immovable property. However, the Sale of Goods Act states that they

have been agreed to be severed before or under the Contract of sale, and then they

become goods.

6.3.1. Sludge

In the Bengal Agricultural and Industrial Corporation v. Corporation of

Calcutta, 27 the court was concerned with the question whether sludge is movable

or immovable property. The plaintiff, by means of lease from the defendant

Corporation, obtained the right to draw and remove sludge from the Pruss

26
2(7) goods” means every kind of movable property other than actionable claims and money;
and includes stock and shares, growing crops, grass, and things attached to or forming part of
the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale;
27
AIR 1960 Cal 123.

294
Sedimentation Tank including the lagoons. He had utilized and converted the

sludge into manure and sold it as a commercial product. During the subsistence of

the agreement, the corporation allowed the State of West Bengal to construct the

railway lines around the lagoons and all over the land leased. This has resulted in

the encroachment of plaintiff‟s rights. While deciding this issue, the court

observed that the sludge when stored in the lagoon retains its character as sludge

and cannot be treated in law as immovable property. It further observed:

“The sludge when dried is used as manure to enrich

land. It is very much akin to earth or land. But this
does not make it a part of the land and as such
'immovable property' in law if a large quantity of
sludge is stored on a land, it does not lose its
character as sludge and become land, unless it is
allowed to remain there for so long a time that it
becomes a part of the land.”

The sludge includes not only the matter drawn out from the sedimentation

tank but also to the matter deposited in its outfall i.e. the lagoon. The court

construed sludge within the category of the movable property.

6.3.2. Fetter Engine

There arose an occasion for the court to interpret the fetter engine as

movable or immovable in Perumal Naicker v. T.Ramaswami Kone.28 A land

owner had purchased the fetter engine and pump-set from the funds provided by

the Land Improvement Loans Act. On default of the repayment of the loan, the

fetter engine was recovered under the Revenue Recovery Act, and brought to sale.

The court was concerned with the validity of a sale of fetter engine. It was

alleged that the engine, being a permanent fixture to the land is an immovable

property. Hence the court proceeded to define the nature of the property on the
28
AIR 1969 Mad 346.

295
basis of the manner, extent and strength of attachment of the chattel to the earth or

building. Validating the sale, the court observed:

“The Fetter Engine, which has been the subject-

matter of sale in the instant case, may be assumed
to have been mounted on cement base and fastened
to it by bolts and nuts, Actually, there is no evidence
in this case to that effect, It is surprising that when
the main question which the Courts below had to
decide was whether the chattel should be regarded
as immovable property, no effort was made to put
on record the nature of the attachment or fixture.
But proceeding on the assumption we made just
now, we are of opinion that by the very nature of
things, it is not possible, to our minds, to regard the
Fetter Engine as immovable property merely
because for the beneficial enjoyment of it during its
use, it is fixed to the earth in that manner, The
engine cannot be used except by fixing it to the
earth. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
intention, as disclosed by the fixture, is to make it a
permanent part of the earth and so it is immovable
property. The nature of the engine and the purpose
of its fixtures, both show that it cannot be regarded
as immovable property. No doubt, the evidence in
this case is that the Fetter engine stood affixed to
the earth from 1952. But this is because during that
period the engine was used for that purpose the
fixture was necessary. On that account, the fixture
cannot be viewed as a permanent one.”

By interpretation, the fetter engine and pump set fell within the category of

movable property. Similarly the question relating to paper making machine was

movable or immovable property arose in Sirpur Paper Mill Ltd. v. the Collector of

Central excise Hyderabad.29 The court dealt with the leviability of excise duty on

paper making machine. The appellant had assembled a paper making machine and

installed it in his factory. As the machine was erected and embedded in the

ground, he contended that it was a really an immovable property. The court held

29
AIR 1998 SC 1489.

296
that the whole purpose behind attaching the machine to a concrete base was to

prevent wobbling of the machine and to secure maximum operational efficiency

and also for safety. It further held that the paper-making machine was saleable as

such by simply removing the machinery from its base. Hence the machinery

assembled and erected at its factory site was not immovable property because it

was not something attached to earth like a building or a tree. The court observed

that a new marketable commodity has emerged as a result of the manufacturing

activity of the appellant. Thus it was construed as a movable property. In another

case,30 court had to determine whether the said C.I. sheets which were removed

from the disputed "Mandov" could "be attached under S. 145 Cr.P.C.31 The

petitioner claimed that C.I. sheets which were already removed by him and kept in

his house in the light of the Clause (26) of S. (3) of the General Clauses Act and

S.3 of the Transfer of Property Act, the court observed that “ as soon as the C.I.

sheets were removed and taken away, they ceased to be immovable property”

6.3.3. Superstructure

In Thangammal v.Murugammal,32 the superstructure of the suit property

came for interpretation. In pursuance of the decree passed by the Court of Small

Causes, a superstructure belonging to deceased Ponnuswamy was brought under

attachment order and sold in the court auction. The plaintiffs33 contended that

property sold in the court auction was movable property. In order to determine the

nature of the superstructure, the court examined the definitions of various acts.

30
P.Amumacha Sarma v. Manimacha Sarma (1968) Cri. LJ 188.
31
Section 145 (2) Cr.P.C. lays down that for the purpose of Section 145Cr.P.C the expression
'land or water' includes building, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce of land and the
rents or profits of any such property.
32
AIR 1970 Mad 325.
33
The 1st plaintiff is the wife of Muniswami and plaintiffs are his sons, that is, the grandsons of
Ponnuswami.

297
According to the Transfer of Property Act and the General Clauses Act, the

superstructure, as a thing attached to earth, would be immovable property. But the

Presidency Small Cause Courts Act,1882 makes a departure and statutorily

requires the superstructure to be regarded as movable property. In the context of

provision 2834 contained in the Small Cause Courts Act, the court observed that

the auction purchaser has a title to the superstructure not as an immovable

property but as a movable property.

6.3.4. Live –Stock

In K. Srinivasulu v. Deputy Commercial-Tax Officer35 the petitioners,

who were dealers in goats and sheep, were assessed to sales tax by the

Commercial Tax Officer on the basis of their income tax return. They contended

that though the live-stock" such as goats and sheep constituted movable property,

still it could not be considered to be goods. The thrust of their argument was on

the definition of the clause (12) of Art.366 of the Constitution. The clause

included only the inanimate object but not the live-stock. The court proceed to

determine whether live-stock fall under "goods" within the meaning of S.2(h) of

the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act,1957.36 It interpreted the meaning of

the expression "movable property” in the light of the S.3(19) of the

34
Things attached to immovable property and removable by tenant to be deemed movable in
execution. When the judgment- debtor under any decree of the Small Cause Court is a tenant
of immovable property, anything attached to such property, and which he might before the
termination of his tenancy lawfully remove without the permission of his landlord, shall, for
the purpose of the execution of such decree 2 and for the purpose of deciding all questions
arising in the execution of such decree], be deemed to be movable property and may, if sold in
such execution, be severed by the purchaser, but shall not be removed by him from the
property until he has done to the property whatever the judgment debtor would have been
bound to do to it if he had removed such thing.
35
(1975) Tax L R.1791.
36
2(h) 'goods' means all kinds of movable property other than action able claims, stocks, shares
and securities and includes all materials, articles.

298
Andhra Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1891.37 It found the definition of “goods”

under Clause (12) Art.366,38 to be an inclusive one. The learned judge observed

that 'All kinds of movable property' is comprehensive enough to include within its

ambit both animate as well as inanimate kinds of movable properties. Further he

concluded:

“I am, therefore, of the opinion that live-stock is

movable property and the expression "goods" as
defined in the Act includes all kinds of movable
property and that expression takes within its ambit
live-stock, which is admittedly movable property.”

Hence the livestock “goats and sheep” came under the category of

movable property.

6.3.5. Electrical Energy

The electrical energy was construed to be movable property' in The

Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya v. M.P. Electricity.39 The Electricity Board

sold, supplied and distributed electric energy to various consumers. It also

supplied steam to Nepa Mills. There was an arrangement relating to supply of

steam in return of water supplied by the mills on payment of actual cost. In a

dispute, the Supreme Court had to interpret whether electricity was 'goods' within

the meaning of the two Acts the C.P. and Bearar Sales Tax Act, 1947 'and the

Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1959. As there was no definition of

37
The expression "movable property" is defined in the General Clauses Act as meaning property
of every description except immovable proper.
38
Clause (12) of Article 366 defines goods as including all materials, commodities and articles
39
AIR 1970 SC 732.

299
movable property” in the said two Acts, the court made a reference to S. 2(24)

and S. 2(18) of the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act.40 The court observed:

“The term 'movable property' when considered with

reference to 'goods' as defined for the purposes of
sales tax cannot be taken in a narrow sense and
merely because electric energy is not tangible or
cannot be moved or touched like, for instance, a
piece of wood or a book it cannot cease to be
movable property when it has all the attributes of
such property.”

In the light of these definitions, the Supreme Court held that electric

energy was “goods.” Thus electrical energy which is by no means 'immovable

property' is construed to be movable property.

6.3.6. The Future Accrual of Salary

In Bhagwat Baburao Gaikwad v. Baburao Bhaiyya Gaikwad,41 the

petitioners, who were the minor sons, applied for recovery of the arrears of

maintenance allowance from their father. Since the father had defaulted in

payment, they filed a suit for seeking attachment of the father‟s salary. It was

contended that the future accrual of the salary of the father was not a 'movable

property' within the meaning of the definition in the Indian Penal Code. The court

highlighted that the definition of the expression “movable property”, as contained

42
in S.22 of the Indian Penal Code is not useful in interpreting the certain

40
The Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act has been defined to mean "property of every
description, except immovable property". Section 2(18) of that Act says that "immovable
property" includes land, benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth, or
permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth."
41
(1994) Cr. L 2393 (Bom)
42
“Movable property.” - The words “movable property” are intended to include corporeal
property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently
fastened to anything which is attached to the earth.

300
 43
provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the light of the

Sub-clause (36) of the General Clauses Act, the court observed:

“It is very clear from this definition that the

General Clauses Act defines the expression
"movable property" so as to include therein not
only the tangible corporeal movable property, but
also the intangible movable assets such as debts,
choses in action and consequently, a right to
receive the salary and wages from an employer.”

Thus the court construed the future accrual of the salary to be movable

property for the purpose of S. 421(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

6.4. Month

The need for interpretation of “month” arises only when there is no

specific description of the month as lunar month or calendar month. The Lunar

month is composed of twenty-eight days only. By the law of England, a month

means ordinarily, in common contracts, leases, a lunar month.44 While deciding

the issue relating to the term „month‟ in South British Fire & Marine v. Brojo

Nath Shaha 45 Chief Justice Maclean stated:

“The ordinary meaning of the word 'month' in the

English language is a lunar month and not the
artificial month in the Gregorian calendar. This is
sufficiently shown by the fact that until the year
1850 the word 'month' in an Act of Parliament
meant 'lunar month', since which date, however, by
virtue of a statutory enactment, the word 'month' is
used in Acts of Parliament to mean a calendar
month. But the rule as to 'month' meaning a 'lunar
month' in contracts still remains the law in.
England.”

43
The provisions contained in Sections 82 to 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure show that if
the context requires otherwise, the expression 'movable property' as used in the Code of
Criminal Procedure does not necessarily have the same connotation as it has under S. 22 of
the Indian Penal Code. The court resorted to the definition given in the General Clauses Act in
order to determine the connotation of the expression 'movable property' for the purposes of
various provisions contained in Code of Criminal Procedure.
44
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Month (last visited 14/8/2015).
45
(1909) ILR 36 Cal 516.

301
 Among the Greeks and Romans the months were lunar and probably the mode

of computation adopted in the English law has been adopted from the codes of

these countries.46 Regarding the description of month in Indian law, the Chief

Justice Maclean has expressed the following view:

“But I think the course of legislation shows that the

word "month" in India as in England means prima
facie lunar month. In the Penal Code it is enacted
that where the word month is used, it is to be
understood that the month is to be reckoned
according to the British calendar, and a similar
provision is to be found in the Succession Act and
General Clauses Act.”

While interpreting the meaning to be attributed to the word "month"

occurring in an insurance policy in South British Fire and Marine,47 his lordship

came to the above conclusion. As there was no statutory meaning in the Contract

Act, he inferred it to mean lunar month in line with the English Law. It can be

stated that the interpretation of „month‟ arose chiefly in the income-tax

calculation, insurance, lease and rent related cases.

In The Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur v. Laxmi Rattan Cotton

Mills,48 did not file his return for the assessment year 1958-59 by November 15,

1958. The return was filed on February 18, 1959, after about three months of the

expiry of that date. After the assessment had been completed on April 1, 1962,

the Income-tax Officer imposed a penalty of Rs. 1, 00,348 under S. 271(1)(a) of

the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee contended that the period of default

would be only of two months, inasmuch as a part of November and a part of

February. As it was not for the whole calendar month, it had to be excluded. The
46
http://legal-dictionary thefreedictionary.com/Month (last visited on 14/8/2015).
47
Supra note 45.
48
(1973) 2ITJ 35.

302
Allahabad High Court proceeded to examine the meaning of the word "month"

occurring in the S.271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act. The Allahabad High Court

had held as under:

“The word "month" occurring in section 271(1)(a)

must be taken to mean a period of thirty days.
Section 271(1)(a) was enacted for the purpose of
imposing a penalty on an assessee who has not filed
his returns within the prescribed time and its object
was to serve as a deterrent for such lapses. Penalty
is imposable for every month during which the
default continues. If the meaning ascribed to this
word in the General Clauses Act, i.e., if the English
calendar month is adopted, it may in some cases
lead to a defaulting assessee escaping penalty
altogether. For example, if the time given to an
assessee to file his returns is up to the 31st of
January of a particular year and he files it on the
27th of February, he would not be liable to pay any
penalty. Such a result is not contemplated by the
sub-section. The sub-section in clear and
unambiguous terms makes every assessee liable for
penalty during the period of default. In the
circumstances, "month" should be taken to mean a
period of thirty days and not an English calendar
month.”

By reversing the decision of the tribunal, the court construed the word

"month" occurring in the Section 271(1)(a) to mean a period of thirty days and

not an English calendar month. This view, however, was dissented from by a

Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the Commissioner of Income Tax v.

Kadri Mills.49 In the instant case, the Kadri mills applied for extension of time for

filing the return of income through various letters. The Income-tax Officer had

extended the time to the Kadri mills assessee company to file the return of income

till January 15, 1962. Even by January 15, 1962, the company did not file its

49
(1977)106 ITR 846 Mad.

303
return. On February 2, 1962, it issued a show cause notice regarding the

imposition of penalty. The notice was to be discharged on February 15, 1962, and

the assessee filed a return on that date. Thereafter, an order was issued on March

4, 1968, imposing a penalty of Rs. 8,639. The Madras High Court was concerned

with the interpretation of month. According to the income tax department, the

word "month" means a period of 30 days. On application of the said period of 30

days, a default had taken place. On the contrary, assessee contended that the word

"month should be reckoned according to the English calendar as provided in

S.3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The court observed that the word

"month" occurring in S. 271(1) (a) of the IT Act has to be reckoned according to

the British calendar as provided for in S.3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

Further it held:

“The default commenced only on January 15, 1962.

Consequently, one month of default would have
been completed on February 15, 1962. But on
February 15, 1962. itself, the assessee has filed the
return. Consequently, the default had not lasted for
a month as provided for in s. 271 (1)(a) of the IT
Act, r/w s. 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897,
so as to attract the liability to penalty.”

The same view was reiterated in Harnand Rai Ramanad v. Commissioner

of Wealth-Tax.50 The assessee, who was required to file a return of wealth by

August 15, 1973, dispatched it by the registered post on September 12, 1973. The

Wealth-tax Officer, who received it on September 15, 1973, imposed a penalty of

Rs. 1,577 for a delay of 31 days (one month) in filing the return. The assessee was

50
(1985) 1 WLN 742.

304
held to be a defaulter within the meaning of S.18(1) (a) of the Act.51 The High

Court was concerned with interpretation of the term “every month" used in

S.18(1) (i) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The court found that the provisions of

S. 18(1) (i) are in pari materia with S. 271(1)(i)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

On the basis of the Kadri Mills Case, the court construed month to be English

Calendar month. In this regard, it observed:

“The word "month" used in Section 18(1)(i) of the

Act should be the English calendar month and it has
to be reckoned as provided for in Section 3(35) of
the General Clauses Act, 1897. In this view of the
matter, the return which was received by the
Wealth-tax Officer on September 15, 1973, was
within a month and not after a completed month
and, therefore, the Tribunal was not right in
holding that there was a delay of one month in filing
the return under Section 14(1) of the Act.”

In Daryodh Singh v. UOI.,52 the owners of the land instituted a suit for the

ejectment of the defendant tenant Daryodh Singh from their land and for recovery

of the arrears of rent. On the basis of a compromise between the parties, the court

issued an ejectment order to the tenant dated July 30, 1959. Accordingly, the

plaintiffs were required to pay an amount of Rs. 4,500.00 to the defendant “two

months prior to 15th July, 1960 ". It further ordered that the decree was not to be

executed before the prescribed date. As May 15 1960 happened to be a Sunday,

the plaintiffs deposited the said amount in the Stale Bank of India on the next day.

It was contended that the payment was made one day late and no advantage could

be taken of the fact that May 15, 1960 happened to be a Sunday. The court held:

51
Section 18(1) (i) is "for every month during which the default continued.
52
AIR 1973 Del 58.

305
 “The deposit of the amount of Rs. 4500.00 was
actually made on May16. 1960. It has, therefore, to
be seen whether the deposit was made "two months
prior to 15th July, 1960." In its ordinary accepted
sense the expression "month" means a "calendar
month" and not a "lunar month." As to how a
calendar month is to be counted from a date which
is not the first of the month has been described in
paragraph 143 of Halsbury's Laws of England
Volume 37 (third Edition) in the following words:-
"When the period prescribed is a calendar month
running from any arbitrary date the period expires
with the day in the succeeding month immediately
preceding the day corresponding to the date upon
which the period starts; save that, if the period
starts at the end of a calendar month which
contains more days than the next succeeding month,
the period expires at the end of the latter month."
Thus one month counted from July 15, 1960 would
be on June 16 and the second month counted from
June 16 would be on May 17, 1960. Evidently,
therefore, the deposit made on May 16, 1960 was
two months prior to July 15, 1960.”

The court gave the verdict based on the interpretation of the month as the

calendar month. In Tamal Lahiri v. Kumar P.N.Tagore,53 the court was concerned

with the question whether six months means six calendar months or 180 days

under 533 of the Bengal Municipal Act (Act XV), 1932. The respondent had

erected an obstruction over the main municipal drain without the permission of

the Municipality. On December 5, 1967, the Baranagore Municipality served him

a notice to remove the same within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the

notice. A similar notice was sent to the respondent by registered post which he

received on Dec, 7 1967. On his failure to comply its requisition, Municipality

lodged a complaint against him under S. 240(1) (b) read with S. 500(1)(b) of the

Bengal Municipal Act, XV of 1932.The respondent objected the maintainability

53
AIR 1978 SC 1811

306
of the complaint on the ground that it was barred by limitation under S. 533 of the

Act.54 The court proceeded to examine whether the prosecution was instituted

within six months next after the commission of the offence as required by S. 533

of the Act. Thus it observed:

“S. 3(27) of the Bengal General Clauses Act, I of

1899, defines "a month" to mean a month reckoned
according to the British calendar. The expression
"six months" which occurs in S. 533 of the Act must
accordingly be construed to mean six calendar
months and not 180 days.”

The court considered the respondent‟s failure to remove the obstruction as

the offence. Thus the offence was deemed to be committed from the expiry of

fifteen days after the receipt of notice. It further held that the offence, being

alleged to have been committed on the expiry of December 20, 1967, and the

prosecution having been instituted on June 19, 1968, the provisions of S. 533 must

be held to have been duly complied with. Thus the court interpreted “six months"

which occurs in S. 533 of the Act to mean six calendar months and not 180 days.

When legal dispute arose relating to the rights and claims of the members

of the family, the court oriented towards the interpretation of such relationships.

The court was bound to interpret the term “son” “mother” and “father” in

appropriate cases.

6.5. Son

“Son" in common parlance means a natural son born to a person after

marriage. In legal parlance, it includes not only the natural son but also son's son,

54
Section 533 of the Act prescribes a period of limitation for filing prosecutions under the Act
by providing that no prosecution for an offence under the Act shall be instituted "except
within six months next after the commission of such offence.

307
namely, the grand child, and where the personal law permits adoption, it also
55
include an adopted son. According to S.3(57) of the General Clauses Act, the

expression “son “is defined as “in the case of any one whose personal law permits

adoption, shall include an adopted son.." The court interpreted the tem „son‟ on

the facts and circumstances of a particular case.56

6.5.1. Foster Son

In Hathibudi Anandar v. Govindan57 the tenant petitioner, who has

occupied the non-residential building, refused to vacate it. The landlord has

required the building bona fide for establishing retail business for his foster son.

On the petitioner‟s refusal, the landlord obtained an eviction order under

S.10(3)(a) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1961.

But in the revision petition, the tenant questioned the validity of the eviction

order. He contended that he could not be evicted to accommodate the land lord's

foster son. The court examined whether the „foster son‟ would be a 'member of

the family' occurring in S. 10(3) (a) (iii)58 and S. 2(6-A), of the said Act.59 The

Court observed:

“A son, in the generally accepted sense, is one who

is begotten. Most legal systems also recognize, as a
son, one who is taken in adoption. But a foster son
is neither begotten, nor taken in adoption. He is
merely fostered, that is so say, brought up by his
foster parent. He lacks the vital element which
attaches to a natural-born son. He lacks too the
legal cognition which is accorded to an adopted

55
AIR 1997 SC 628.
56
ibid.
57
(1981) 1 MLJ 250.
58
Landlord can apply for an order for possession under Section 10(3) (a) (iii) either for his own
benefit or for that of a member of his family.
59
2 (6-A), "member of his family" in relation to a landlord means his spouse, son, daughter,
grand-child or dependent parent.

308
 son. His relationship to the foster parent is not a
jural relationship; it is a sentimental relationship,
pure and simple. A foster son is thus no son at all.
The suffix 'son' is permitted to him only as a matter
of common courtesy. It follows, therefore, that he
cannot be held to be a member of the landlord's
family within the meaning of Section 2(6-A) of the
Act.”

Thus the Madras High Court did not include the „foster son‟ within the

meaning of „Son‟. On the basis of this interpretation, it further held that a landlord

cannot invoke S. 10(3)(a) (iii) of the said Act to compel his tenant to make way

for his foster son. But this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in

K.V.Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal,60 A similar question under S.2 (6A) of the

Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act came before the Supreme

Court. In the instant case, the deceased Thiruvannamalai Bakthar, who carried on

the lime-shell business, executed a will61 in favour of his wife (respondent) and

his foster son Arunachala Bakthar, who was the son of his real brother. In order

to carry on her husband business on the said premises, she applied for an

eviction order. The appellant took the plea that Arunachala Bakthar was not the

natural son of the deceased Thiruvannamalai Bakthar. The Supreme Court made

a reference to the ancient and modern Hindu Law and Re Divi Dita. 62 In the light

of the above mentioned references, the court found the term „son‟ to be a flexible

one. It also resorted to dictionary meaning of the following words: foster son,

60
AIR 1997 SC 628.
61
According to the Will, a life estate was created in favour of his wife (respondent) in respect of
the residential house and the remainder was vested in the children of Arunachala Bakthar. The
Will further recited that the lime-shell business would be carried on by the respondent and
Arunachala Bakthar but after the death of the respondent, Arunachala Bakthar alone would
carry on the business.
62
AIR (1931) Lah 661. According to was held that where the personal law of the parties permits
adoption, the word "Son" will include an adopted son.

309
foster brother, foster mother and foster sister.63 On the basis of the above

mentioned references, the court made the following observation:

“These definitions indicate that a "Foster Child"

need not be the real legitimate child of the person
who brings him up. He is essentially the child of
another person but is nursed, reared and brought
up by another person as his own son… If a child
comes to a person or is found by that person as
forlorn child or the parents of that child, may be, on
account of their poverty or their family
circumstances, bring that child to the other person
and request him to bring up that child which is
accepted by that person and such child is brought
up from the infancy as the own son by that person
who loves that child as his own, nourishes and
brings him up, looks after his education in the
school, college or university and bears all the
expenses, such child has to be treated as the son of
that person particularly if that person holds the
child out as his own. Care, therefore, in rearing up
the child need not always be parental. It can be
even that of a "Foster Father", In such a situation,
the son so brought up would be the "Foster Son" of
that person and since the devotion with which he
was brought up, the love and care which he
received from that person were like those which that
person would have given to his real son, the "Foster
Son" would certainly be a member of the family.”

After an intense study of the matter, the court interpreted that the „Foster

Son‟ is a son who is not the real son or direct descendant of a person after his

marriage. Regarding the issue of the instant case, the court found that the foster

63
In Shorter Oxford Dictionary, "Foster Son" is defined as "one brought up as a son though not
a son by birth." The word "Foster", in the same dictionary, is indicated to mean, to supply
with food; to nourish, feed, support; to bring up with parental care; to nurse, tend with care to
grow.
Foster brother is a male child nursed at the same breast as, or reared with, another of different
parentage.
Foster father is described as one who performs the duty of a father to another's child.
Foster mother is indicated to mean a woman who nurses and brings up another's child, either
as an adoptive mother or as a nurse.
Foster sister means a female child nursed at the same breast as, or reared with, another of
different parentage.

310
son was a blood relation of the deceased and heir64 to his property. He was also

very devoted to his foster father and carried on his business. Based on the above

facts, the Supreme Court observed that Arunachala Bakthar was clearly a member

of the family of the respondent husband within the meaning of S.2 (6A) of the Act

6.5.2. Adopted Son

In Suresh Babu v. State of Kerala,65 the petitioner was the adopted son of

the deceased government servant Achuthan. At that time, Achuthan was employed

as a Lay Secretary and Treasurer in the Women's and Children's Hospital. The

petitioner was abandoned in the hospital by his parents a day or two after his birth.

As the duty of care of the child was entrusted to Achuthan, he adopted him as his

son in conformity with the legal and religious formalities. In the event of his

father‟s death, he made an application for employment assistance under the dying-

in-harness scheme. But his application was rejected on the ground that there is no

provision to extend the benefit to adopted sons and daughters. The petitioner

challenged the impugned notes 66 as illegal and void. On the basis of the definition

of „father‟ in the General Clauses Act,67 he claimed that a son includes an adopted

son. He also stated that the benefits conferred by the scheme cannot be denied to

an adopted son provided he is a dependent. Having examined the object of the

scheme, it was held:

64
He is heir only under the old Mitakshara Law (as brother's son) but also under the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 as a class-Il heir.
65
(2001) Cr LJ 1483
66
Note 3 to Clause 11 of Ext. P10 G.O. dated January 21, 1970 and note 3 to Clause 16 of Ext.
P11 G.O. Dt. December 17, 1987 which states that sons and daughters will not include
adopted sons and adopted daughters.
67
Section 3(20), „father‟ means in the case of anyone whose Personal Law permits adoption,
shall include an adoptive father.

311
 “In the case of Government servants who have not
left behind any of the categories specified in the
G.O., a nephew or a niece can also be considered
for appointment under the scheme provided he or
she has been a dependant of the deceased
Government servant. They also are blood relations.
The reason for exclusion of adopted sons and
adopted daughters may be to exclude persons who
are not blood relations. There is also a possibility
of the scheme being misused by ineligible persons
claiming themselves to be adopted sons or adopted
daughters.”

Justifying the validity of the impugned notes, the High Court excluded the

petitioner, being foster son and not a blood relation, from the category of sons.

Thus the term „adopted son‟ was not included within the meaning of the term

„son‟.

6.6. Mother

The expressions "mother" and "step-mother" have not been defined either

in the Criminal Code or in the General Clauses Act. These expressions have also

not been defined by the Hindu Law or the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,

1956 or by any other Law. In this regard, there is an explanation in S.20 of the

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. According to the explanation of the

S.20 of HAMA, t the word 'parent' occurring in the section includes a childless

step-mother. Hence the court resorted to the interpretation of the term „mother‟

and „step-mother‟ in the light of the definitions of 'father' and 'son' contained in

S. 2 (20) and 2 (57) of the General clauses Act and S. 20 of HAMA, 1956.

6.6.1. Step Mother

In Havaben Karimbhai Belim v. Razakbhai @ Bachubhai Kartmbhai,68

the Muslim petitioner after the death of her husband, claimed maintenance under

68
(1978) 19 GLR 237.

312
S.125 of CR, P.C. from her step children. It was contended that the petitioner

being a step-mother does not fall within the expression 'mother' of the said

section. The court made a reference to definitions of 'father' and 'son' contained in

S.2 (20) and 2 (57) of the General clauses Act. Then it made a reference to the

provisions of personal law of Hindus 69and Mohmedans70 as well as the dictionary

meanings.71After an analysis , the court observed that the word 'mother' occurring

in Clause (d)72 of S.125(1) includes a woman who has the status of a 'step-mother'

by reason of her lawful marriage with the father of the person sought to be made

liable for maintenance under Section 125. Thus the word „mother‟ is construed to

include „step mother‟. Similarly issue was raised in Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v.

State of Gujarat,73 The respondent step mother Smt. Manjulaben has claimed

maintenance from her step son. An earlier claim by the father was dismissed. The

appellant asserted that his father has sufficient means and property besides the

monthly income from a snuff business. In addition, his three step brothers out of

five had sufficient income to maintain their mother. The Supreme Court was

concerned with the question is whether the expression "mother" used in clause (d)

of sub- section (1) of S.125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short the

Code), includes „step-mother‟. Reference to earlier cases unfolded controversial

69
S.20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, while providing, inter alia, for the
obligation of a Hindu to maintain his aged parents, states in its Explanation that the word
'parent' occurring in the section includes a childless step-mother.
Hindu Succession Act, 1956. S.8 of the Schedule attached thereto dealing with general rules
of succession in the case of males. Class I contemplates a mother, and Class II, Entry No. 2,
includes father's widow which, in the context, would mean 'step-mother'.
70
The obligation of a Muslim is to maintain a step-mother in certain specified circumstances.
That obligation does not arise unless the father is weak and infirm and without the means to
maintain the step-mother.
71
Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, 1976 Edition definition of 'mother' that the
expression is extended to a 'step-mother' also. The Oxford English Dictionary in its 1970
Edition, defines 'mother' as 'A female parent', as well as 'a woman who has given birth to a
child'. The same dictionary in its definition of 'step-mother' defines her as 'A woman who has
married one's father after one's mother's death.
72
Supra note70.
73
(1996) SCC (Cri) 762.

313
judgments. Thus the Supreme Court made a reference to a number of

dictionaries74 for the interpretation of term „mother‟ and „step mother‟. On a

conspectus view of dictionary meaning of the two expressions in various

dictionaries, the court found that there is inherent distinction between the status of

a mother and 'step-mother' and they are two distinct and separate entities and both

could not be assigned the same meaning. It explained that the expression "mother"

clearly means only the natural mother who has given birth to the child and not the

one who is the wife of one's father by another marriage. It also made reference to

Hindu law.75 Keeping in view the aims and objects of S.125 of the Code, the

Supreme Court made the following observation:

“A childless step- mother may claim maintenance

from her step-son provided she is widow or her
husband, if living, is also incapable of supporting
and maintaining her. When she claims maintenance
from her natural born children, she does so in her
status as their 'mother'. Such an interpretation
would be in accord with the explanation attached to
“Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and
maintenance Act.1956 because to exclude
altogether the personal Law applicable to the
parties from consideration in matters of
maintenance under Section 125 of the Code may not
be wholly justified.”

74
In Words and Phrases, the word "mother" has been given the meaning to denote a woman who
has borne a child or a female parent, especially one of the human race.
The expression "step-mother" has been given the meaning as to be the 'wife of one's father by
virtue of marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring. It has
been further stated that a "stem-mother" is a relative by affinity and the relationship continues
after the death of the faster.
According to Black's Law Dictionary, has given the meaning of "mother" as a woman who
has borne a child, a female parent. Further, the meaning of "step- mother" is stated to mean
the wife of one's father by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken
of is the offspring.
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the meaning of the word "mother" is given as a
woman who has given birth to a child or a female parent. The expression "step-mother" has
been assigned the meaning as the wife of one's father by a subsequent marriage.
According to Webster Dictionary (international Edition), the expression "mother" means a
female parent and that which was produced or given birth to anyone.
75
A son has to maintain his mother irrespective of the fact whether he inherits any property or
not from his father, as on the basis of the relationship alone he owns a duty and an obligation,
legal and moral to maintain his mother who has given birth to him.

314
 Regarding the facts and circumstances of the case of the appellant, it

opined that the step mother is not entitled to claim any maintenance from the step-

son. It reasoned that respondent has her well-off husband and natural born sons to

maintain her. It also found that the step-mother proceeded against her step-son

with a view to punish and cause harassment to the appellant, which is wholly

unjustified.

6.6.2. Adopted Mother

In Baban alias Madhav Dagadu Dange v. Parvatibai Dagadu Dange,76 the

respondent mother claimed the monthly allowance by way of maintenance from

her adopted son under S.125 of Cr, P.C. Though the adopted son secured

substantial property in his adoptive family, yet he reused to maintain the

respondent mother. He contended that the expression „mother‟ used S.125 was

restricted only to natural mother. He argued that the natural mother can claim

maintenance from her natural son. But the adoptive mother could not claim it

from her adopted son. In the light of S.2 (20) and 2 (57) of the General Clauses

Act, the court observed:

“Now if expression "father" and "son" is to be given

wider interpretation, we do not see any valid reason
why the expression "mother" also should not be
given similar wider interpretation so as to include
an "adoptive mother" as well.”

The court interpreted that the expression "mother" in S.125 of the Code to

include an 'adoptive mother'.

76
(1978) 80 BOM LR 305.

315
6.7. Conclusion

It is pertinent to note that the interpretation of legislative enactments is a

frequently arising phenomenon before courts of law. This Act contains the

definitions of the certain words and phrases commonly found in various

enactments. While interpreting legal provisions, the court construes the meaning

of the said expressions in the light of the definition of the words in the S.3 of the

Act. Thus it ensures uniformity and avoids repetition.

316