was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
Basic Guidelines in the Construction and Interpretation of Laws
Legislative Intent is determined principally from the language of the
statute.
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent,
Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation
in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs
awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case
1
petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon
M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa
'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke
member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko
sa 'yo.
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong
binalikan, sabing ganoon —
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic)
mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan
hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-
aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi
hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-
cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung
gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok
dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung
hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng
mga no (sic) ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa
hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano
ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka
papasa.
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala
kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo,
makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-
sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga
magulang ko.
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob,
nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan
nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan
na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo
kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung
baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?
2
ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako
makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and
other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An
information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6,
1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez
of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay
City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D.
Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record
the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a
tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said
recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court
granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the
violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by
a person other than a participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed
Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and
holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution
6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the
applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends
that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In
relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that
R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a
statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is
applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted
to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb
or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes," provides:
3
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or
by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of
secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the
recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not
criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for
example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the
intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous
even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their
intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor,
that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of
offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record
the observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It
is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the
intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the
observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the
board of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to
this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and
observations are being made should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say:
"Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you."
That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning,
he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot
complain any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the
observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being
taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be
used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
4
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the
bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be
penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording
is done secretly.
Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It
is the communication between one person and another person — not
between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with
the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore
plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision
seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the
law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a
third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the
ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The
word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to
share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the
act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a petitioner.
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or SO ORDERED.
expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any
doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Footnotes
Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 88-403, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their 64.
conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature
of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized 2 Rollo, p. 48.
people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free
conversations are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, 3 Rollo, pp. 47-48.
agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not
intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, 4 Rollo, p. 9.
among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to
state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature 5 Rollo, p. 37.
of conversations between individuals and the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of 6 Rollo, p. 99, Annex "H".
the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and
free exchange of communication between individuals — free from every 7 Rollo, p. 13.
unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17
8 Id.
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the
issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension 9 Rollo, p. 14.
for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization
did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither 10 Rollo, p. 14-15.
among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following
the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the 11 Pacific Oxygen and Acytelene Co. vs. Central Bank 37 SCRA 685 (1971).
accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the
applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer 12 Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 (1970).
from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as 13 Rollo, p. 33.
among the acts punishable.
14 Rollo, p. 67.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and
unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby 15 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 460 (1976).

5
16 Id.

17 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. III, No. 31, at 573 (March 10, 1964).

18 145 SCRA 112 (1986). See also, Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA 235 SCRA 111
(1994).

19 Id., at 120.

20 Id., at 121.

6
Verbal Legis Rule or Plain Meaning Rule.
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE vs. NAT'L LABOR RELATION COMMISSION,
ET AL.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR,
respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close
association with Delfin Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982,
private respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by
petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar
with whom private respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company
equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of
Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The
report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal auditor,
7
Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership
styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A.
Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a
supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report also
disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning
unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived with
Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was
recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against
Saldivar. 1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda
Salazar violated company reglations by involving herself in transactions
conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as
a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also
appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the
Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed
private respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month,
effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to,
explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three (3) days
later or on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include
illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and
damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November 8,
1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and
disprove these findings. 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985,
ordered petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her former or
equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she
would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also
ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the
questioned resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid
decision with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited
the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral
damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal
of private respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two
(2) years' backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's
acts in conflict with his position as technical operations manager,
necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee closely,
associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by
th.e discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the
apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such
circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse
available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself,
preventive suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the
employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such
disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's
property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance
committed by the employee. 5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated
Salazar's right to due process when she was promptly suspended. If at all,
the fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's
memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present
(her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor
Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her
employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we
hold that her eventual separation from employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make
whole" the victim who has not merely lost her job which, under settled
Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not to be deprived
without due process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to
her during the period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
8
Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis
supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for
a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when authorized by
existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall by entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and to backwages." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present
Constitution has gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital
social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor.
Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new
Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other
things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas
of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such
topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and
Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and
Human Rights. 9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
 The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They
shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work,
and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be
provided by law. 10 (Emphasis supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under
the Article an Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall ensure
the rights of workers to self-organization, collective baegaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The
State may provide for compulsory arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights
of labor which the State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying
the fact that the intent of the framers of the present Constitution was to give
primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least
greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the
geographical location of the workers and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who
substantially contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor
provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on Social
Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and State
Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are giving now to social
justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice
in national development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in
our Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an
employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized
9
cause provided by law has assumed greater importance under the 1987
Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on
Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in
the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized
dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand,
the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of
dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279
should find, application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor,
the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which
took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any
possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered
down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an
authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent,
she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to
full backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement
and payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed
employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of
the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc. from
which one had been removed" 15 and in the latter, to give her back the
income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to
the past, would perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when
reinstatement has not been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed
employee finds himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for
denying reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicable
thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long
passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the
situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or
that reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the
best interests of the parties involved; 19 or that the company would be
prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will not serve
any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make
execution on that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent,
due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained
relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the
employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of
backwages and separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first
place the wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof
statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim
index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid
presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly
express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently.
26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have
used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute. 27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or
from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the
provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may
be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this
should be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be
inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the
employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a
position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it
is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may
be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the
employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above
principles: where the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as
such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is the
Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is
an organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts
to organize the workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is
a warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to
facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and
10
organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment
Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied
indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement can never be possible simply
because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a
result of litigation. That is human nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of
asserting one's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could
be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on
the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become
strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as
systems analyst is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and
confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations
between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an
exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who
has been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by
engaging in transactions that may have created conflict of interest situations?
Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its
employees from involving themselves with any company that has business
dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed
as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which
in turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself
in an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a
circumstance did not create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems
analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the
procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development
of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words,
Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and
purchase of supplies and company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss
of confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or
breach of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an some basis
which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be Cruz, J., concurs in the result.
dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation
that since Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.
"presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar"
and its averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was
probably true, do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone Separate Opinions
the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the
basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.

To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
most inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her
friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations' I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings. (See
support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's Decision, p. 2.)
special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge
of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private Narvasa C.J., concurs
respondent is wanting from the records.

It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar
had already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not
have the opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained
obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt Separate Opinions
principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a
chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
should have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed
independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby, I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings. (See
justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have Decision, p. 2.)
been unlawfully dismissed.
Narvasa C.J., concurs
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda
Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of Footnotes
two (2) years only.
1 Records, pp. 34-43.
This decision is immediately executory.
2 Records, p. 22.
SO ORDERED.
3 Ibid, p.121.
Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon,
JJ., concur. 4 Rollo, p. 149.

11
5 Soriano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75510, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 124.
6 Pres. Decree No. 442, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715.
7 LABOR CODE (1991), Book VI, Rule 1, Secs. 2 and 3.
8 CONST., Art. XIII, Sec. 1, par. (1).
9 CONST., Art. XIII.
10 CONST., Art. XIII, Sec. 3, pars. (1) and (2)
11 CONST. (1973), Art. II, Sec. 9.
12 CONCOM Record, Vol. 2, p. 681.
13 The following provision on security of tenure is embodied in Article 279,
Labor Code, reproduced herein but with the amendments inserted by
Republic Act No. 6715 approved on March 2, 1989 in bold type:
In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of-an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this
Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights AND OTHER PRIVILEGES and
to his FULL backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his ACTUAL reinstatement.
14 The application of Article 279 is illustrated in the following cases: Santos
Salao v. NLRC, G.R. No. 9O786, September 21, 1991; Morales v. NLRC,
G.R. 91501, August 2, 1990, 188 SCRA 295; Carandang v. Dulay, G.R.
90492, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 792; and Santos v. NLRC, No. 76721,
September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 166.
15 Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary.
16 Balaquezon EWTU v. Zamora, Nos. L-46766-7, April 1, 1980, 97 SCRA 5.
17 San Miguel Corporation v. Deputy Minister of Labor and Employmet, No.
58927, October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 204.
12
18 Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation v. Pagalibuan, G.R. 62909,
April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 404.
19 Century Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, No. 77859, May 25, 1988, 161 SCRA
528.
20 Gubac v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81946, July 13, 1990, 187 SCRA 412
21 Sealand Service, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90500, Occtober 5, 1990, 190
SCRA 347.
22 Commercial Motors Corporation v. Commissioners, G.R. No. 74762,
December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 191; DeVera v. NLRC, G.R. No. 93212,
November 22, 1990, 191 SCRA 632; Orcino v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 92864, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 815; Maglutac v. NLRC/
Conmart v. NLRC,G.R. No. 78637, September 21, 1990,189 SCRA 767;
Carandang v. Dulay, G.R. No. 90942, August 20, 1990, 188 SC RA 792;
Esmalin v. NLRC, G.R. No. 67880, September 15,1989, 177 SCRA 537;
Fernandez v. NLRC, G.R. No. 84302, August 10, 1989, 176 SCRA 269;
Quezon Electric Cooperative v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 79718-22, April 12,1989,
172 SCRA 88, Bautista v. Inciong, No. 52824, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA
665; Citytrust Finance Corp. v. NLRC, No.75740, January 15, 1988, 157
SCRA 87; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople No. 56398, July 23,
1987, 152 SCRA 219; and Divine Word High Schol v. NLRC, No. 72207,
August 6, 1986, 143 SCRA 346
23 Chua Qua v. Clave, G.R.No. 49549, August 30,1990,189 SCRA 117;
Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 86000,
September 21, 1990 189 SCRA 881 ; ALU v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 83886-87,
September 20,1990, 189 SCRA 743; and Pizza Inn v. NLRC, No. 74531,
June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 773.
24 Maglutac v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78345, September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 767;
Conmart v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78637, 189 SCRA 767; De Vera v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 93212, November 22, 1990, 191 SCRA 632; Commercial Motors Corp. v.
Commissioners, G.R. No. 74762, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 191;
Sealand Service, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90500, October 5, 1990, 190 SRCA
347.
25 LABOR CODE, Art. 279.
26 R. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, p 94 (1990).

27 Aparri v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 30057, January 31, 1984 231 SCRA
241

28 Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, No. 569393, July 23, 1987, 152
SCRA 219

29 Citytrust Finance Corp. v. NLRC, No. 75740, January 15, 1988, 157
SCRA 87

30 Bautista v. Inciong, No. 52824, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 665.

31 Esmalin v. NLRC, G.R. No. 67880, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 537.

32 Maglutac v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78345, September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 767.

33 Anscor Transport and Terminals v. NLRC, G.R. No. 85894, September

28, 1990, 190 SCRA 147.

34 Sibal v. Notre Dame of Greater Manila, G.R. No. 75093, February 23,
1990 182 SCRA 538.

35 Reyes v. Zamora, No. L-46732, May 5, 1979, 90 SCRA 92; De Vera v.

NLRC and BPI, G.R. No. 93070, August 9, 1991.

36 Rollo, pp. 29 and 35.

13
Verbal Legis Rule. When the language of the law is clear, it should be
given its natural meaning. Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to
judgment, however, as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for
G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994 failure to file his brief.
FELICITO BASBACIO vs. FRANKLIN DRILON
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting
petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy
Republic of the Philippines between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of
SUPREME COURT Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into
Manila their hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled
that because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene
EN BANC of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.

Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec.
3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who
G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994 was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by
virtue of a judgment of acquittal." 1 The claim was filed with the Board of
FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner, Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground
vs. that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad
DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, respondent. blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the
fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner. that he was "probably guilty."

On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said

MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under
Rep. Act No. 7309, which among other things provides compensation for
persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal
are acquitted and ordered released.
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were
convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the
killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his
son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of June 26,
1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between the
Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to
imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been
cancelled.
the Secretary of Justice in his resolution dated March 11, 1993:
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly
accused, convicted and imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309
refers to an individual who was wrongly accused and imprisoned for
a crime he did not commit, thereby making him "a victim of unjust
imprisonment." In the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant
cannot be deemed such a victim since a reading of the decision of
his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on his
innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor
Rep. Act No. 7309, however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions
of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the
question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65.

14

Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to
recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the claimant must on appeal be found to
be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court.
Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and
does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was
imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is already
unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim because he was not declared
innocent would be to say that his imprisonment for two years while his appeal
was pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one
requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof, the
presumption that the accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no
reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of the crime before he can
recover compensation for his imprisonment.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an
accused is acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the
theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of
sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that when
the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It
leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that
the provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for
compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted,
imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and]
imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is
acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An
accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the
trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he may
be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of
reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to the
complainant, because while the evidence against him does not satisfy the
quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to
sustain a civil action for damages. 2 In one case the accused, an alien, was
acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because of doubt as to the ages of
the offended parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the
accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered
deported. 3 In such a case to pay the accused compensation for having been
"unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his
15
liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused
would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).
The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as
evidence of innocence of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof
that he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with
guilt," 4 so is the presumption of innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing
to say that the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to place on the
prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is
convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with
homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or
blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and
the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction
which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist.
5
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the
manner of his conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on
appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the
victim of an "unjust conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the
appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust.
That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent,
that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the
innocence of the accused.
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What
this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is
unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence,
and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do
an injustice . . . .
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment
by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown,
 according to Groizard, that although he has acted without malice, he
failed to observe in the performance of his duty, that diligence,
prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering
of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if
they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the
legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is to say, such
injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation,
even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied,
yet in the contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very
clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal
precept.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of
which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust
accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in consequence
of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note
this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been
wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful.
Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though
based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be
erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in
filing a case in court is not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt but only whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime
has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an
accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and
a conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust
judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's
conviction by the trial court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice
or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court had
reason to believe that petitioner and his co-accused were in league, because
petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner
who bore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that.
Petitioner and his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and
forced their way into it.
16
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was
no proof that he did or say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate
court.
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito
Basbacio to have committed any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito
Basbacio as having said anything at all. Both fail to show Felicito
Basbacio as having committed anything in furtherance of a
conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the defendants. It
seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to conclude that
conspiracy existed between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and
Felicito Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated murders on
that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where was the coming
together of the two defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes
of murder and frustrated murder on two counts? Where was
Basbacio's contribution to the commission of the said crimes?
Basbacio was — as the record shows — nothing but part of the dark
shadows of that night. . . .
One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be
shown by concert of action and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with
his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And what about the
fact that there was bad blood between petitioner and the victim Federico
Boyon? These questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the
acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had
been unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was released
because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these
circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did
not commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim for
compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 The statute in pertinent parts provide:
Sec. 3. Who may File Claims. — The following may file claims for
compensation before the Board:
a) any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but
subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal;
file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to
be malicious.
"If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground."
3 People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690 (1991).

b) any person who was unjustly detained and released without being 4 People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59, 64 (1971).
charged;
5 Supra note 3 at 722.
c) any victim of arbitrary or illegal detention by the authorities as defined in
the Revised Penal Code under a final judgment of the court; and 6 55 SCRA 107, 119 (1974).

d) any person who is a victim of violent crimes. For purposes of this Act,
violent crimes shall include rape and shall likewise refer to offenses
committed with malice which resulted in death or serious physical and/or
psychological injuries, permanent incapacity or disability, insanity, abortion,
serious trauma, or committed with torture, cruelty or barbarity.

Sec. 4. Award Ceiling. — For victims of unjust imprisonment or detention, the

compensation shall be based on the number of months of imprisonment or
detention and every fraction thereof shall be considered one month:
Provided, however, That in no case shall such compensation exceed One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) per month.

In all other cases, the maximum amount for which the Board may approve a
claim shall not exceed Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) or the amount
necessary to reimburse the claimant the expenses incurred for
hospitalization, medical treatment, loss of wage, loss of support or other
expenses directly related to the injury, whichever is lower. This is without
prejudice to the right of the claimant to seek other remedies under existing
laws.

2 The Civil Code provides in Art. 29: "When the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to

17
Statutes as a Whole. In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by
every part be given effect. the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993 by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award
JMM PROMOTIONS & MGNT., INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS in the judgment appealed from.
COMMISSION, ET AL.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as
amended, reading as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a
Manila monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
FIRST DIVISION bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the
Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.

The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993 in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the
appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner, employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II,
vs. Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:
SANTOS, respondent.
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner. fee of P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of P100,000 and surety
bond of P50,000 from a bonding company acceptable to the
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent. Administration and duly accredited by the Insurance Commission.
The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from
violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license,
and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. The bonds shall
CRUZ, J.: likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Code and
its implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of
National Labor Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the Department and all liabilities which the Administration may
the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas impose. The surety bonds shall include the condition that the notice
Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post the required to the principal is notice to the surety and that any judgment against
appeal bond. 1 the principal in connection with matters falling under POEA's
jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code bonds shall be co-terminus with the validity period of license.
as amended, providing that: (Emphasis supplied)

18
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000
with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II,
Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of
recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond
requirement but suggest that the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only
to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from
decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed
within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule;
shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee
and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of
this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which
shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the
appellant received the appealed decision and/or award and proof of
service on the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites
aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an
appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in
escrow the amount of P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the
petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a
decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition
to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal
19
from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to
further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if
it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are
supposed to guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the
employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees
whose contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can go
against these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its
license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O.
247 (reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of
other liabilities the recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a
standing fund, as it were, to be used only as a last resort and not to be
reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers
that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be
enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be
exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award
of about P170,000 to the dismissed employee, the herein private respondent.
The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if
this award were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but against the
bonds and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of
the other obligations the recruiter may incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to
exceed the amount of P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow
money required of the recruiter.
It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers,
as the petitioner observes, but there is a simple explanation for this
distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement
because of the special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected by
their foreign employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective
recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer.
The bonds and the escrow money are intended to insure more care on the
part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to whom our
overseas workers are to be sent.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of 373, 11 Am. Rep. 367. Charitable bequests are also governed by this maxim.
rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given Kieg v. Richardson, C.C.A. N.C., B6 F. 2d 849, 858.
effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as
a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2
Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of
the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier
bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify
Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the
contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The
rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be
avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled
whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.

Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the

overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA
Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is
necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book
VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a
decision of the POEA.

Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class,
conformably to the mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than
annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee,
this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of labor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.

It is so ordered.

Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J, is on leave.

# Footnotes

1 Order issued by NLRC Commissioner Domingo H. Zapanta, Second

Division, dated October 30, 1992.

2 "That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed." Simonds v.
Walker, 100 Mass. 113; National Pemberton Bank v. Lougee, 108 Mass.

20
Statutes as a whole.
The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate
G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991 Appellate Court, are as follows:
RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHIL. INC. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, ET AL. On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary
insolvency of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan, the private
respondents herein, the case docketed as Special Proceeding No.
Republic of the Philippines 1548 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
SUPREME COURT Pampanga and Angeles City.
Manila
On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking
THIRD DIVISION cognizance of the said petition and stating inter alia that:

. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the

G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991
RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-in-insolvency
VICENTE J. CUNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch No. LVI, EMILIO
C. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS and TERESITA
GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF ANGELES CITY, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
ANGELES CITY, SANYO MARKETING CORPORATION, S & T
ENTERPRISES INC., REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES INC., and DELTA
MOTOR CORPORATION, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
delivery of any property owing and belonging to said
respondents-debtors from other persons, or, to any other
persons for the use and benefit of the same respondents-
debtors and/or the transfer of any property by and for the
said respondents-debtors to another, upon petitioners'
putting up a bond by way of certified and reputable sureties.
(Annex 1, Comment).
Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff
Angeles City of the aforesaid order (Annex 2, Ibid) and on March 26,
1981, also communicated with counsel for the petitioner herein
regarding same order, apprising the latter that "the personal and real
property which have been levied upon and/or attached should be
preserved till the final determination of the petition aforementioned."
(Annex 3, Ibid).

Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court * in A.C-G.R. SP No. 04160 entitled "Radiola-
Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the
petition for certiorari and mandamus; and its Resolution of July 1, 1986
denying the motion for reconsideration.
On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion for
issuance of insolvency order and resolution of the case, alleging
among other things, that in November, 1982, they filed an urgent
motion to issue insolvency order; on December 2, 1982, they
presented a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of Angeles City from
disposing the personal and real properties of the insolvent debtors,
Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983,
they (sic) appealed in the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news
item to the effect that Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. has already shut
down its factory, sometime in March 1983, through their
representative, they caused to be investigated the real properties in

21
the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan and they
were surprised to find out that some of the aforesaid properties were
already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.; and that in view of
such development, it is their submission that without an insolvency
order and a resolution of the case which was ripe for resolution as
early as March 3, 1982, the rights and interest of petitioners-creditors
would be injured and jeopardized. (Annex "C").
On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion
vis-a-vis the prayer that the insolvency order (which has not been
rendered yet by the court) be annotated on the transfer certificates of
title already issued in its name (Annex "D").
On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency
of respondents-debtors Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan.
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the
same second urgent motion and motion to direct respondent sheriff
to issue a final certificate of sale for the properties covered by TCT
Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its favor (Annex "E").
On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that
ownership of certain real properties of the insolvents had passed to it
by virtue of foreclosure proceedings conducted in Civil Case No.
35946 of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig,
Metro Manila, which properties were not redeemed within the period
of redemption, respondent court issued an order disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of
Mr. Emilio C. Patino, as assignee of all the registered
claimants in this case, and, in consequence thereof, the said
assignee is hereby directed to post a bond in the amount of
P30,000.00 and to take his oath thereafter so as to be able
to perform his duties and discharge his functions, as such.
The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors with
the attendance, of course, of the assignee, on March 9,
1984, at 8:30., as by that time the proposals, which the
respective representatives of the parties-claimants desire to
clear with their principals, shall have already been reported.
22
The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the
insolvents which are now in the actual or constructive
custody and management of the receiver previously
appointed by the Court on petitioners' and claimants'
proposals be placed under this actual or constructive
custody and management, such as he is able to do so, as
the Court hereby dissolves the receivership previously
authorized, it having become a superfluity. (Annex "F").
On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig,
Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 35946, issued an order directing
respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or whoever is acting in his behalf,
to issue within seven (7) days from notice thereof a final deed of sale
over the two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of
Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430 in favor of petitioner. (Annex "G").
In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money
covering the proceeds of television sets and other appliances, the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila,
issued a writ of preliminary attachment on February 15, 1980 upon
application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a bond of
P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., levy on attachment was
done in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in the
names of spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under
TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the Registry of Deeds of Angeles
City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles. (Annex "A" and "B").
On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of
petitioner, ordering private respondents and their co-defendant
Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay petitioner, jointly and
severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus interest thereon of 14% per
annum from October 12, 1979 until fully paid; P20,000.00, for and
attorney's fees; and the costs of suit (Annex "5", Comment). After the
said decision in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became
final and executory, a writ of execution for the satisfaction thereof
issued on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981, respondent sheriff of
Angeles City sold at auction sale the attached properties covered by
TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430, to petitioner as the highest bidder, and
the certificate of sale was accordingly issued in its favor.
 On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of
ownership of petitioner over said properties; but respondent sheriff of
Angeles City refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of
petitioner.
On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition,
stating among other things, that subject motion is improper and
premature because it treats of matters foreign to the insolvency
proceedings; and premature, for the reason that the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought
to the jurisdiction of the insolvency court for the determination of the
assets of the insolvents available for distribution to the approved
credits/liabilities of the insolvents. Petitioners-creditors theorized that
the insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction to grant the motion
referring to matters involved in a case pending before a coordinate
court in another jurisdiction (Annex "l").
Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court
came out with its assailed extended order with the following decretal
portion:
WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the
aforequoted order issued in pursuance of a similar motion of
the movant, the Court denies, as it is hereby denied the
motion of Radiola-Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs
the latter to participate in the supposed meeting of all the
creditors/claimants presided by the duly elected assignee.
(Annex "J").
On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc.
(RTPI, for short) filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March
31, 1986, denied petitioner's aforesaid petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated July 1, 1986.
Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues —
23
1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR
THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION ONLY; and
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE
THE LIEN OF PETITIONER ARISING FROM A LEVY OF ATTACHMENT
NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor
of the petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against
respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.
On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended),
provides:
Sec. 32 — As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and
qualified, the clerk of the court shall, by an instrument under his hand
and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all the real
and personal property, estate, and effects of the debtor with all his
deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, and such assignment
shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication
was founded, and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such
property, estate, and effects in the assignee, although the same is
then attached on mesne process, as the property of the debtor. Such
assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of
the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. It shall
dissolve any attachment levied within one month next preceding the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and vacate and set
aside any judgment entered in any action commenced within thirty
days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency
proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered by default or
consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately prior to the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are
undisputed that the levy on attachment against the subject properties of the
Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case
No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980 while the insolvency proceeding in the
then Court of First Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding No. 1548,
was commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more than four (4) months after the
issuance of the said attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner
contends that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency
proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.
Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law,
which reads:
Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved
before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is
dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim
upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against
the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs and
disbursements of the suit, and of the keeping of the property, and the
amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.
and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the
proceedings in the insolvent case, argue that the subsequent Certificate of
Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject
properties, was issued in bad faith, in violation of the law and is not equitable
for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and pursuant to the above quoted
Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer of the subject
properties in its name.
Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of the above-
quoted Section 32, of the Insolvency Law is very clear — that attachments
dissolved are those levied within one (1) month next preceding the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated and
set aside are judgments entered in any action, including judgment entered by
default or consent of the debtor, where the action was filed within thirty (30)
days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings.
In short, there is a cut off period — one (1) month in attachment cases and
thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the
insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand, relied upon by private
respondents, provides for the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is not
dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is
dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which
the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the
debtor. Therefore, there is no conflict between the two provisions.
24
But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing
a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part
of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut maqis
valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to
the whole of the statute — its every word. Hence, where a statute is
susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such
reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof
operative and effective and harmonious with each other (Javellana vs. Tayo,
6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, p. 182).
Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the
petitioner be considered as a fraudulent transfer or preference by the
insolvent debtors, which constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency
Law. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines (100 Phil. 187,
[1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70 contemplate only acts and
transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the commencement of the
proceedings in insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside of the 30-
day period cannot possibly be considered as coming within the orbit of their
operation.
Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never
placed under the jurisdiction of respondent insolvency court so as to be
made available for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in the
insolvency proceedings.
Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the
attachment and execution of Civil Case No. 35946 of the CFI of Rizal
constitutes a freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the former
which were not within its jurisdiction; undeniably, a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction, correctable by certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and SET ASIDE. The attachment and
execution sale in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given
due course and petitioner's ownership of subject properties covered by
TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered consolidated.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* Penned by Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima and concurred in by Associate Justices
Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, Jose F. Racela, Jr., and Jorge S. Imperial.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Spirit and Purpose of the Law. A construction that gives to the
language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the
purpose for which the statute was enacted should be rejected.
G.R. No. 104712 May 6, 1992
MANUEL T. DE GUIA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 104712 May 6, 1992
MANUEL T. DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the
enforcement by respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of its
RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the
apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district
and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for
the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial
Election Supervisors and Election Registrars (Annex "A", Petition),
RESOLUTION NO. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment
25
submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313 (Annex "B", Petition), and
RESOLUTION UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first
sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992
elections (Annex "C", Petition).
Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, having been elected
in the January 1988 local elections. He prays, more particularly, for reversal
of the position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of
Parañaque and all the other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. He
claims that the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which
requires the apportionment into districts of said municipalities does not
specify when the members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by
district. He would consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which immediately
succeeds par. (c), to support his view that the elected members of these
municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be elected at large in
the May 11, 1992 elections.
Paragraph (d) states that "[F]or purposes of the regular elections on May 11,
1992, elective members of the Sangguniang Panlunsod and Sangguniang
Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. However,
beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district."
Petitioner therefore insists that the elected members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Parañaque fall under this category so that they should continue to
be elected at large until the 1995 regular elections.
Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court observes that
petitioner does not allege that he is running for reelection, much less, that he
is prejudiced by the election, by district, in Parañaque. As such, he does
not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, personal or substantial
interest. 1 He does not also allege any legal right that has been violated by
respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to have any cause of
action.
However, considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it
does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment,
and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by
respondent, We resolve to brush aside the question of procedural infirmity,
even as We perceive the petition to be one of declaratory relief. We so held
similarly through Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmeña v. Commission on
Elections. 2

Now on the meat of the dispute.
On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the
President on November 26, 1991. It is "An Act Providing for Synchronized
National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes." At issue in this case is the
proper interpretation of Sec. 3 thereof which provides:
Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan. — The elective
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected as follows:
(a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the
elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be
elected by legislative districts . . .
(b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the
Commission shall divide them into two (2) districts for
purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan . . .
(c) The number and election of elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the
Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any
other city with two (2) or more legislative districts shall
continue to be governed by the provisions of Sections 2 and
3 of Republic Act No. 6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the
Commission shall divide each of the municipalities in Metro
Manila Area into two (2) districts by barangay for purposes of
representation in the Sangguniang Bayan
. . . . and,
(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992,
elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance
with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular
elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district . . . .
26
On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking authority of the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, R.A. 6636, R.A. 6646 and R.A.
7166, 3 issued Resolution No. 2313 and the subsequent resolutions in
question.
On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived ambiguity in the meaning of
par. (d), particularly in relation to par. (c), Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, petitioner filed
with COMELEC a Motion for Clarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring
whether the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and the other
municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated therein, which are all single-
district municipalities, would be elected by district in May 11, 1992 or in the
1995 regular elections.
Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379
approving the guidelines submitted by the Provincial Election Supervisors
and Municipal Election Registrars concerned pursuant to Resolution No.
2313, and stating therein its purpose in recommending to Congress the
districting/apportionment of Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Bayan seats, i.e., to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the
May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. In this Project of Apportionment,
Parañaque together with the other twelve (12) municipalities in the Metro
Manila Area was divided into two (2) districts with six (6) elective councilors
for each district.
On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion for Clarification
by interpreting Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, to mean that the election of elective
members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by district, of the thirteen (13)
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall apply in the May 11, 1992
elections (Resolution UND. 92-010, prom. March 10, 1992). Petitioner says
that he received copy of Resolution UND. 92-010 on March 13, 1992.
On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third Resolution of
COMELEC, petitioner filed the instant petition asserting that under par. (d),
Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 the elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
and the Sangguniang Bayan, for purposes of the May 11, 1992 regular
elections, shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. He
would include in this class of sanggunian members to be elected at large
those of the municipality of Parañaque.
Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in
promulgating Resolution No. 2313, Resolution No. 2379 and Resolution
UND. 92-010 which clarifies, contrary to his view, that the district
apportionment of the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area is applicable to
the May 11, 1992 regular elections.
We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166,
and its precursor bills on synchronized elections, Senate Bill No. 1861 and
House Bill No. 34811, and We realize the web of confusion generated by the
seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. Some framers of the law
were even fazed at the empirical implications of some of its provisions,
particularly Sec. 3 thereof, and they admitted in fact that said provisions were
susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne by the sponsorship and
explanatory speeches now spread in the Journals of Congress. Hence, We
can understand why petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as he would. But if we
pursue his course, we may conclude in absurdity because then there would
have been no reason for R.A. 7166 to single out the single-district provinces
referred to in par. (b), and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area
mentioned in the second proviso of par. (c), to be apportioned at once into
two (2) districts each if the members of their respective sanggunian after all
would still be elected at large as they were in the 1988 elections.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile.
We must therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its
reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the
legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute
is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute. If the
statute needs construction, as it does in the present case, the most dominant
in that process is the purpose of the act. 4 Statutes should be construed in
the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed, 5 and they should be given such construction as will advance
the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 6 A
construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a
meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was
enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained
by the enactment. 7
The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory
note of Senate Bill No. 1861 which states in part:
This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11,
1992, and provide for the necessary implementing details. It also
endorses reforms and measures to ensure the conduct of free,
27
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Specifically, it seeks
to: (1) Reduce the number of positions to be voted for by providing
therein that the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at
large, but by district . . . .
That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R.A.
7166 is reflected in the "WHEREAS" clauses constituting the preamble to
Resolution No. 2379. Thus —
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce the
number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992
synchronized elections recommended, among others, to the
Congress of the Philippines, the districting/apportionment of
sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan seats;
WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act
7166, and approved by the President of the Philippines on November
26, 1991, adopting among others, the recommendation of the
Commission on Elections aforestated;
WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic Act
7166, particularly Section 3 thereof, the Commission promulgated
Resolution No. 2313, directing the Provincial Election Supervisors
and Election Registrars concerned to submit, after consultation,
public hearings, and consensus-taking with the different sectors in
the community, the Project of District Apportionment of single
legislative-district provinces and municipalities in the Metro Manila
area;
WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the determination of
the district apportionment are as follows: a. compactness, contiguity
and adjacentness of territory; b. apportionment shall be based on the
1990 census of population; c. no municipality, in the case of
provinces, and no barangay, in the case of cities and municipalities,
shall be fragmented or apportioned into different districts.
This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also
manifest from the four corners of Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. 8 Thus, a careful
analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows that the purpose of
districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to reduce the number of
positions to be voted for in the May 11, 1992, synchronized elections and
ensure the efficiency of electoral process. Considering that the single-district
provinces and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which are all
single-districts, and under pars. (b) and (c) have already been apportioned
into two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the members of their
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming
May 11, 1992, elections, although under par. (d), the single-district cities and
all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise
single-districts, will have to continue electing at large the members of their
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be
apportioned. But beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will all have to
be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to
apportion the single-district cities and the municipalities outside the Metro
Manila Area.
As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local
government units for purposes of election under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it is
clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts
contemplated in par. (a), they shall continue to be elected by district; (2) for
provinces with single legislative districts, as they have already been
apportioned into two (2) districts each under par. (b), they shall henceforth be
elected likewise by district; (3) for cities with two (2) or more legislative
districts, e.g., the cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao, they shall also continue
to be elected by district under the first part of par. (c); and (4) for the thirteen
(13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which have already been
apportioned into two (2) districts each under the second proviso of par. (c),
they shall likewise be elected by district in the regular elections of May 11,
1992.
Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district
cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila,
which remain single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under
Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to be elected at large in the
May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by
district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166.
That is the true import of par. (d). Consequently, as We view it, where he
stands, petitioner must fall.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, on the part
of respondent, and for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No
costs.
28
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and
Nocon, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976,
73 SCRA 333; Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, G.R. No. L-28113, March
28, 1969, 27 SCRA 533.
2 G.R. No. 100318, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750.
3 R.A. 7166 was approved only on November 26, 1991, when the President
signed it into law, although it was passed by Congress on November 18,
1991, or before COMELEC promulgated its Resolution No. 2313.
4 De Jesus v. City of Manila, 29 Phil. 73 [1914]; Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Filipinas De Seguros; 107 Phil. 1055 [1960]; Garcia v. Ambler, 4
Phil. 81 [1904]; McMicking v. Lichauco, 27 Phil. 386 [1914].
5 LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Phil. Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725 [1961]; People v.
Purisima, G.R. No. 52050, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542;
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipina Compania De Seguros, 107
Phil. 1055 [1960].
6 Rivera v. Campbell, 34 Phil. 348 [1916].
7 Muñoz & Co. v. Hord, 12 Phil. 624 [1909]; Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil. 485
[1909]; Sarcos v. Castillo, G.R. No. 29755, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 853;
Republic Flour Mills. Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-28463,
May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 269; People v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664 [1958]).
8 Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41001, September
30, 1976, 73 SCRA 162.
Spirit and Purpose of the Law. Between two statutory interpretations,
that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.
G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989
ELENA SALENILLAS, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989
ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO
SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM GUERRA, respondents.
Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.
Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting
aside of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 dismissing the petition for
certiorari against Judge Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Norte and the private respondent, William Guerra, involves a pure
question of law i.e., the coverage and application of Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known otherwise as the Public
Land Act.
The facts are undisputed.
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application
29
No. 192765, in favor of the spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel
Enciso. The said original certificate of title was inscribed in the Registration
Book for the Province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On
February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed
of Sale, sold the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena
Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00.
Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the
aforementioned sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register
of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the name of the Salenillas,
cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the
petitioners mortgaged the property now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with
the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently released on
November 22, 1973 after the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later,
or on December 4, 1975, the petitioners again mortgaged the property, this
time in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte
as security for a loan of P2,500.00.
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding, pursuant to Act No. 3135, was instituted by the Philippine
National Bank against the mortgage and the property was sold at a public
auction held on February 27, 1981. The private respondent, William Guerra,
emerged as the highest bidder in the said public auction and as a result
thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to him by the Ex Officio Provincial
Sheriff of Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final
Deed" was executed in favor of the private respondent.
On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ of possession. The
public respondent, Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the
motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an order for the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of the private respondent. When the deputy sheriff of
Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the
property in the possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused
to vacate and surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to
repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984,
another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was
filed by the private respondent with the trial court. The petitioners, on August
31, 1984, opposed the private respondents' motion and instead made a
formal offer to repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners'
opposition and formal offer, the trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued
the alias writ of possession prayed for the private respondent. The petitioners
moved for a reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied.
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the
respondent Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari claiming that
the respondent trial court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the order dated October 12, 1984 granting the writ of possession, and
the order dated October 22, 1984, denying their motion for reconsider
consideration.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave
due course to the petition; required the parties to submit simultaneous
memoranda in support to their respective positions; and restrained the trial
court and the private respondent from executing, implementing or otherwise
giving effect to the assailed writ of possession until further orders from the
court. 3 However, in a decision promulgated on September 17, 1986, the
respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According
to the appellate court:
It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso
whose title, OCT No. P-1248, was issued on August 9, 1961,
executed a deed of absolute sale on February 28, 1970 of the
property covered by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas and
Bernardino Salenillas, the five year period to repurchase the property
provided for in Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended could have already started. Prom this fact alone, the
petition should have been dismissed. However, granting that the
transfer from parent to child for a nominal sum may not be the
"conveyance" contemplated by the law. We will rule on the issue
raised by the petitioners. 4
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 5 the appellate court
went on to hold that the five-year period of the petitioners to repurchase
under Section 119 of the Public Land Act had already prescribed. The point
of reckoning, ruled the respondent court in consonance with Monge is from
the date the petitioners mortgaged the property on December 4, 1973. Thus,
when the petitioners made their formal offer to repurchase on August 31,
1984, the period had clearly expired.
30
In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for
reconsideration. Their motion apparently went for naught because on May 7,
1987, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the same. Hence, this
petition.
Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts
below, their right to repurchase within five years under Section 119 of the
Public Land Act has not yet prescribed. To support their contention, the
petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. Court of Appeals 6 and Manuel vs.
Philippine National Bank, et al. 7
On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's
decision, states that the sale of the contested property by the patentees to
the petitioners disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said
property. As such, they (the petitioners) no longer enjoy the right granted to
heirs under the provisions of Section 119 of the Public Land Act. 8
In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the
petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section
119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the
affirmative, whether or not their right to repurchase had already prescribed.
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to
repurchase their property and their right to do so subsists.
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent
or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period
of five years from the date of the conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of
persons are bestowed the right to repurchase — the applicant-patentee, his
widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private
respondent sustained by the respondent appellate court that the petitioners
do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they acquired
the property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The
petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos,
patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena
Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such,
and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This
must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal
heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos.
Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the
appellate court would be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of
the Public Land Act which is to give the homesteader or patentee every
chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had
gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating it. 9
Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia
H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing her (Elena)
and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with
the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should
prevail.
Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue
here raised, we rule that the five-year period for the petitioners to repurchase
their property had not yet prescribed.
The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 10 cited as authority by the
respondent Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the present controversy. The
facts obtaining there are substantially different from those in this case. In
Monge the conveyance involved was a pacto de retro sale and not a
foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question raised there was whether the
five-year period provided for in Section 119 "should be counted from the date
of the sale even if the same is with an option to repurchase or from the date
the ownership of the land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser
because of the homesteader's failure to redeem it. 11 It is therefore
understandable why the Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de retro
immediately vests title, ownership, and, generally possession over the
property on the vendee a retro, subject only to the right of the vendor a retro
to repurchase within the stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a
resolutory condition.
The cases 12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the
other hand, present facts that are quite identical to those in the case at bar.
Both cases involved properties the titles over which were obtained either
through homestead or free patent. These properties were mortgaged to a
bank as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of the owners to pay their
31
indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed. In both instances, the Court
ruled that the five-year period to. repurchase a homestead sold at public
auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the
expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale is
executed thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not
otherwise. Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and the
mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the private respondent on
February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983,
the two offers of the petitioners to repurchase the first on November 17,
1983, and the second, formally, on August 31, 1984 were both made within
the prescribed five-year period.
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the petitioners should reimburse the private
respondent the amount of the purchase price at the public auction plus
interest at the rate of one per centum per month up to November 17, 1983,
together with the amounts of assessments and taxes on the property that the
private respondent might have paid after purchase and interest on the last
named amount at the same rate as that on the purchase price. 13
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17,
1986, and the Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the Court of Appeals, and the
Orders dated September 22, 1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984
of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one ENTERED directing the
private respondent to reconvey the subject property and to execute the
corresponding deed of reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon
the return to him by the latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any,
of assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per
month on both amounts up to November 17, 1983.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Promulgated on September 17, 1986; Ejercito, B.C., J., ponente; Coquia,
J.R. and Martinez, A.M., JJ., concurring.

2 CA-G.R. S.P. No. 04603, Elena Salenillas et al. vs. Hon. Raymundo Seva,
etc., et al.

3 Rollo, 20.

4 Id., 16.

5 101 Phil. 563 (1957).

6 91 Phil. 389 (1952).

7 101 Phil. 968 (1957).

8 Rollo, Id., 44.

9 Santana vs. Mariñas, No. L-35537, December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 853;
Vargas vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-35666, June 29, 1979, 91 SCRA 195;
Simeon vs. Peña, No. L-29049, December 29, 1970, 36 SCRA 610.

10 Supra.

11 Id., 564.

12 Paras vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra; and Manuel vs. Philippine
National Bank, et al., supra.

13 PNB vs. Court of Appeals, et al., No. L-60208, December 5, 1985, 140
SCRA 360; Dulay vs. Carriage, No. L-52831, July 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 794;
DBP vs. Zaragosa, No. L-23493, August 23, 1978, 84 SCRA 668.

32
Spirit and the Purpose of the Law. When the reason of the law ceases,
the law itself ceases.
G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991
JOSE COMENDADOR vs. RENATO S. DE VILLA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT.
DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC.
ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ,
LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO
LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ.
CESAR DE LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO
FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER
AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI
INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA,
COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and
MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14
COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A.
MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY
FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, respondents.
No. 95020 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL.
DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA., respondents.
33
No. 96948 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT.
DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO
PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC.
TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO
LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS
PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA,
CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO
LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT.
JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL.
DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT
AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.
No. 97454 August 2, 1991
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL
MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO,
Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT
SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT.
ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS
CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO
CABREROS PMM 2LT MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L.
CANTACO PC, respondents.
Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez,
Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel
Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza.
Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.
Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No.
93177.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:p
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically
the same parties and related issues arising from the same incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in
G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup
d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
34
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny),
AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94
(Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(Murder).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, they are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation
PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against them and the
creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to try them.
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM
No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory
challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City are assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no
jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling
denying bail to the private respondents.
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing
the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise
raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
I
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation
PTI Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated
January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and
96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990,
individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-
Trial Investigating Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp
Crame Quezon City, then and there to submit your counter-affidavit and the
affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation of the
charge/charges against you for violence of AWs _______________. DO
NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above
specified shall be deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting
evidence.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the
charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical
certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on
various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which
to file their objections in writing This was done through a Motion for Summary
Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and
gave the petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-
affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the
foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce
their motion to writing. This was done on March 14,1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the
charges as mandated by Article of War 71, which provides:
Art. 71. Charges Action upon. — Charges and specifications must be
signed by a person subject to military law, and under the oath either
that he has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters
set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his
knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a
thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This
investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said
charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be made
in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full opportunity
shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if they
are available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either
in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available
witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after such
investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of
the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
35
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a
roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their
affidavits. while the motion for summary dismissal was denied, the motion for
reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not been able to
submit their counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested
that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against
the president and members of GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com.
Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory
challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the
application was denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer
for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After considering
the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of
GCM No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting
provisional liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order
for his release and to declare in contempt the commanding officer of the
PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He later also complained that
Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final
resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of
Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson
and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino
Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right
to bail to all persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all
military men facing court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed
orders of General Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and
intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not apply to military
men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no
precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent
General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on
the applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as well
include other persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-
Martial No. 14, this Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional
liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and
Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with
this Court a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being
detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent
Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had
been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the
trial court ordered their release.
II
The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given
several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at
the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial
of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7,
1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a
verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in
writing. This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied
when the PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be referred to
the General Court Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process
because the investigation was resolved against them owing to their own
failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been expressly warned In
the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned counter-
affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their)
right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning.
As their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in
referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to
submit their defense.
36
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be
heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation
of the Bill of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the
PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-
trial investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction." We
so held in Arula v. Espino, 1 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a
general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not
mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In
Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The
Philippine counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can
properly be construed as an indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of the
Army General court martial jurisdiction.. The Article does serve important
functions in the administration of court-martial procedures and does provide
safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could
object to trial in the absence of the required investigation. In that event the
court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the investigation. And the
military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a
court- martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has
substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress
intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void
because pre-trial investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by
Article 70. That Congress has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for
Navy court-martial is an indication that the investigatory plan was not
intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.
xxx xxx xxx
Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of
the Army did hold that where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-
martial proceedings were void ab initio. But this holding has been expressly
repudiated in later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later
interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are
directory, not mandatory, and in no way effect the jurisdiction of a court-
martial. The War Department's interpretation was pointedly called to the
attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended Article 70 but
left unchanged the language here under consideration. compensable pre-
requisite to the exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial
investigation under article of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular
but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction. Significantly, this
rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to
the effect that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the
jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation,
that issue was resolved more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa, 2
where we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of law as provided in the
Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended
charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny and
conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person
subject to military law, after he had investigated the matter through an
evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of respondent AFP
Board of Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on
record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in
accordance with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of
War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of
suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in
the manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering
the oath has personally examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said
charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was conducted by
respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended
by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their
counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading
seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. That petitioners were not
able to confront the witnesses against them was their own doing, for they
never even asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they
37
may be made to answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P. D, No.
77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in
accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of War because General Order No.
M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato
de Villa as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. — The President of the Philippines, the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary
and, when empowered by the President, the commanding officer of a major
command or task force, the commanding officer of a division, the
commanding officer of a military area, the superintendent of the Military
Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troops
may appoint general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the
accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall
be appointed by superior competent authority. ...
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa,
there is no doubt that he authorized it because the order itself said it was
issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has not been shown to be
spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition
Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted
GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is significant that
General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned
the said order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had been
improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No.
93177, he sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and
the other respondents by the Solicitor General.
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was
originally provided for under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War),
as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:
Art. 18. Challenges. — Members of general or special courts-martial may be
challenged by the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the
court. The court shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall
not receive a challenge to more than one member at a time. Challenges by
the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented and decided before
those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled to the
peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be
challenged except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro, 3
thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in
1935 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense
Act), except for a handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the
United States military and naval academies who were on duty with the
Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of officers learned in military
law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was
numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of
the national defense program. Because of these considerations it was then
felt that peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted and
that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus Article
18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on
September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or
reference to any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a
court- martial or by the accused. After December 17,1958, when the Manual
for Courts-Martial of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge
Advocate General's Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing
and intensive program of training and education in military law,
encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was
pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7,
1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer
corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large
number, and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military
law. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was
amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory
challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be
challenged except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8,
empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals
"to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may
be referred to them.
38
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation,
Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military
Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be
entertained to insure impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall
immediately be heard and determined by a majority of the members
excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the
challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately
replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the
National Security Code, which was a compilation and codification of decrees,
general orders, LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing threats to
the existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule on
challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree.
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming
the termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The
proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of
the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the
cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other
general orders mentioned therein. With the termination of martial law and the
dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the
existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law
ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This
principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of
law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory
challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial
law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a result,
the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically
revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to
peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for
emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on
January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be
considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new
dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the
"iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial
law. It is curious that the present government should invoke the rules of that
discredited body to justify its action against the accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge
may be exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the
proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is hoped that the
accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the
wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a
matter addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. The judiciary can
only interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their
adverse effects. This is a problem only the political departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the
petition for certiorari and mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed
by the private respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is
argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces
accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no
authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of
Appeals is vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions."
Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of
Appeals 4 where this Court held that "appeals from the Professional
Regulation Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of
Appeals.
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to
ordinary appeals and not to the remedies employed by the accused officers
before the respondent courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
39
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power
over the proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their
proceedings are not open to consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is
jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in the exercise of their undoubted
discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion — what in
the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" — as to
give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in
this action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for
habeas corpus and quo warranto. 5 In the absence of a law providing that
the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of
Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos.
95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the
military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.
This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail
does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General
as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt
military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers
operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary
use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and
responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All
other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the
existing political system.
xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable
Court that release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent.
Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the
Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order were sustained, on
"provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But, the
truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity
which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities,
including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system
consonant with their own concept of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the
equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal
treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply
where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The
accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of
the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated
against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to
civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had
not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, our finding is
that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process
and the right to a speedy trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February
18, 1991, and was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the
respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the charge memorandum
and specifications against the private respondents dated January 30, 1991.
On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel
was created and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at
2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991, the private respondents received the copies of
the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required to submit
their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay
of more than one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges
against the private respondents. However, this was explained by the Solicitor
General thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-
charge investigation only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and
thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. All of them, as
40
well as other witnesses, had to be interviewed or investigated, and these
inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge investigation was rendered
doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed and scattered
throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the
Scout Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the charges were
completed, the same still had to pass review and approval by the AFP Chief
of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the
following admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that
if the participation of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is
confined on orders of Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established
and no charges can be filed against him or the existence of a prima facie
case warranting trial before a military commission is wanting, it behooves
respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now General) to release
petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military officer
is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite
confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate
steps must be taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the charge and
release him. Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in
investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may even be punished
as a court martial may direct. 6
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge
Solano on February 26, 1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad
cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the latter was ultimately denied,
after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour period for appeal under Rule
41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after notice of such
denial was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the
private respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become
final and executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed
with this Court on March 12, 1991.
III
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the
following observations of the Court in Arula:
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment
and discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be
based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent acted
with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or
corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by
itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not
acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to
justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of
by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948,
where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been
denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents
should not have been ordered released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are
DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory
challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent
courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
41
I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I
dissent insofar as he would deny bail to accused military personnel.
The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before
conviction, with the only exception of "those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong." 1 The
Charter also states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be impaired even if the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended." 2 To deny the military officers here
concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all
persons" — the coverage of the right.
I believe that military officers fall within "persons".
The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000
putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July
25, 1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer number
alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly disquieting thought is that
they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in
the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court,
and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of
government and justice." 3 But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug
pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the right to
bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be
reproduced by 1,000 "equally dangerous" elements of society?
We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the
petitioners should not be granted the same right.
The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an
argument to deny bail. I submit, however, that tradition is no argument. First,
the Constitution does not say it. Second, we are a government of laws, not
tradition.
If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a
reexamination is in order.
Separate Opinions
 1 28 SCRA 540,
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
2 168 SCRA 264.
I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I
dissent insofar as he would deny bail to accused military personnel. 3 32 SCRA 106.

The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before 4 186 SCRA 287.
conviction, with the only exception of "those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong." 1 The 5 Sec. 5, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines;
Charter also states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be impaired even if the Sec. 9l and Sec. 21(l), B.P. 129.
writ of habeas corpus is suspended." 2 To deny the military officers here
concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all 6 Elepante v. Madayag, G.R. No. 93559, April 26, 1991.
persons" — the coverage of the right.
SARMIENTO, J.
I believe that military officers fall within "persons".
1 CONST., art. III, sec. 13.
The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000
putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 2 Supra.
25, 1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer number
alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly disquieting thought is that 3 Decision, 20.
they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in
the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court,
and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of
government and justice." 3 But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug
pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the right to
bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be
reproduced by 1,000 "equally dangerous" elements of society?

We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the
petitioners should not be granted the same right.

The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an

argument to deny bail. I submit, however, that tradition is no argument. First,
the Constitution does not say it. Second, we are a government of laws, not
tradition.

If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a

reexamination is in order.

Footnotes

42
Implications. Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992
LYDIA O. CHUA vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ET AL., ET AL.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992
LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy,
Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for
benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government
service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed
qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as
follows:
Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive officials and
employees of the National Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the
personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized
under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at
least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of
43
the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the
coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of
the program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same;
instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2)
month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. A
recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative
results. 1 Her letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:
xxx xxx xxx 2
With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of
RA 6683 does not conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law
merely requires that a government employee whether regular, temporary,
emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of government
service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the
requirement. Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and
contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law provides that the
Department of Budget and Management will shoulder a certain portion of the
benefits to be allotted to government corporations. Moreover, personnel of
these NIA special projects art entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic)
leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. There is no reason why we
should not be entitled to RA 6683.
xxx xxx xxx 2
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
emphasized:
xxx xxx xxx
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision
of Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only
require an applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of
separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a casual,
emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2,
1988, the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate
contractual employees in the coverage.
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your
separation from the service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is
contractual in nature, this Commission shall sustain its original decision.
xxx xxx xxx 3
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil
action for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under
Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:
It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC
Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency,
temporary or regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions of Section
23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing
guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides:
"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the
following:
a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to
perform specific activities or services with a definite expected output:
i.e. membership in Task Force, Part-Time, Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
including those of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated
National Police (PC-INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be
separated from the service for optional retirement with gratuity under
R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186, as
amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or vice-
versa.
d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the
enactment of this law and have received the corresponding benefits
of that retirement/separation.
44
e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by
mandatory separation from the service under existing civil service
laws, rules and regulations; provided that if such officials and
employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for the
availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only if
acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application accepted and
approved by the head of office concerned."
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one
of them. Ms. Chua is a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular
benefits provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a permanent
status as Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the
Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and emergency employees were given
the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner who was
holding a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A and has rendered
almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the government should be
similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law. 4
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment
petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per
appointment papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head
office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed
Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan,
Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed
as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's position became
functus officio.
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA — her
position is not included in its regular plantilla. She belongs to the
non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-
lived, temporary and transient; on the other hand, retirement
presupposes employment for a long period. The most that a non-
career personnel can expect upon the expiration of his employment
is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under
the GSIS law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent,
security of tenure is available only for the term of office (i.e., duration
of project).

4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant
separation or retirement benefits but reorganization 5 to streamline
government functions. The application of the law must be made
consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the
expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it will
not have any application to special projects such as the WMECP
which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the
nature of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its
personnel early retirement benefits just to induce voluntary
separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need
of reorganizing the WMECP considering its short and limited life-
span. 6
5. The law applies only to employees of the national government,
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters
and local government units.
Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the
parties, the Court is called upon to define the different classes of employees
in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as
amended) deems an employment regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can be
found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded
the Civil Service Act of 1965 — R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code
of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early
Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of
employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such
specie is employed in the public sector.
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is
classified as follows:
1. permanent — one issued to a person who has met the
requirements of the position to which appointment is made, in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules
and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; 7
45
2. temporary — In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it
becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a
temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all
the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed
except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such
temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the
appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible
becomes available. 8
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification
in an appropriate examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in
nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges
and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or
research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own
merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely,
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant
Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,
Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as
may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of
whom are appointed by the President.
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service,
who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service
Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which
shall maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do
not fall under the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 9
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:

. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit
and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is
limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that
of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is
limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made.
Included in the non-career service are:
1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their
positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal
confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed
terms of office and their personal or confidential staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the
government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a
specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available
in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period,
which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility
with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10
There is another type of non-career employee:
Casual — where and when employment is not permanent but
occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v.
Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil.
945)
Consider petitioner's record of service:
46
Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated
as a laborer holding emergency status with the NIA — Upper Pampanga
River Project, R & R Division. 11 From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975,
she was a research aide with temporary status on the same project. On 1
September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R
Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA — UPR
IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June
1980, she went to NIA — W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management & Erosion
Control Project) retaining the status of temporary employee. While with this
project, her designation was changed to personnel assistant on 5 November
1981; starting 9 July 1982, the status became permanent until the completion
of the project on 31 December 1988. The appointment paper 12 attached to
the OSG's comment lists her status as co-terminus with the Project.
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign — assisted projects
is considered co-terminous, that is, they are considered employees for the
duration of the project or until the completion or cessation of said project
(CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two
(2) consecutive years government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22,
1984, the Civil Service Commission is charged with the function of
determining creditable services for retiring officers and employees of
the national government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966
provides that all previous services by an officer/employee pursuant
to a duly approved appointment to a position in the Civil Service are
considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that
services rendered on contractual, emergency or casual status are
non-creditable services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions
inasmuch as some contractual, emergency or casual employment
are covered by contracts or appointments duly approved by the
Commission.

NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on
contractual, emergency or casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner
of payment therefor shall be considered as creditable for retirement purposes
subject to the following conditions: (emphasis provided)
1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official
records and/or other competent evidence. Parties/agencies
concerned shall submit the necessary proof of said services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22,
1984, the effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and
3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are
continuous and fulfill the service requirement for retirement.
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency,
seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial
employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989
CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's employment as co-
terminous with the NIA project which in turn was contractual in nature. The
OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the
status of a co-terminous employee —
(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the
service is characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that
which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the
following:
a) co-terminous with the project — When the appointment is co-
existent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the
same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing authority — when appointment is
co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority.
47
c) co-terminous with the incumbent — when appointment is co-
existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation
or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be
deemed automatically abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period
of 3 years" — the appointment is for a specific period and upon
expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished.
It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is
termed co-terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee.
Further, in (c) the security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his
incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific period.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and
emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the latter are extended
benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be
noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early
retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But
specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP
including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific
enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning
and confine its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus
omissus pro omisso habendus est — A person, object or thing omitted from
an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 15 Yet
adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where, workers
belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one project to
another were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects
during a span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a
work pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
 . . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled
that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or
things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification
is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same
class. 17
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate
the equal protection clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that
the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees
who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim of
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim in
this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its
application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular
situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing
legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the
future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the
rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of
necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is
as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights,
powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral
and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its
terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or
privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is
so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo
plus sit, simper inest et minus. 18
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early
Retirement Law), in response to Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on
coverage of state university employees who are extended appointments for
one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, 19 he explained:
48
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and
voluntary separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or nature of the
appointment one received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is
covered.
It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399
(a proposal to extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording
supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a
qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of
early retirement, would provide:
Sec. 3. Coverage. — It will cover all employees of the national
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits
authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age,
who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
government service as of the date of separation. The term
"contractual employees" as used in this Act does not include experts
and consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform
specific activities or services with definite expected output.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those
of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis
supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim
the bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon
early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-
terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case,
upon termination of the project and separation of the project personnel from
the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the office functus
officio. Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter
periods, and yet, they only have to establish two (2) years of continuous
service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that co-
terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and
transient, whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period.
Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes
glaring because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are
entitled to the benefits of early retirement. How can the objective of the Early
Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by granting early
retirement benefits to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla
positions? There would, in such a case, be no abolition of permanent
positions or streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of excess
personnel; but the positions remain, and future appointments can be made
thereto.
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of
petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683,
in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision.
SO ORDERED.

Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-
years of continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of
their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for
such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of
1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a
condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven
(7) years of government service which need not be continuous, in the career
or non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency,
seasonal, contractual or co-terminous including military and police service, Separate Opinions
as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. 21 A similar
regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of
co-terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in
keeping with the coverage of "all social legislations enacted to promote the GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
physical and mental well-being of public servants" 22 After all, co-terminous
personnel, are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants.
medicare and income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of
transience.

In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents Separate Opinions
NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under
Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period
and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application was filed I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants.
after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she
originally filed the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. Footnotes
In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all
she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum 1 Letter of Commissioner Samilo Borlongay, 17 March 1989.
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4)
successive governmental projects. 2 Annex "E", Rollo, P. 11

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. 3 Annex "F", Rollo, p. 14.

4 Rollo, p. 24-25.

49
5 AN ACT PROVIDING BENEFITS FOR EARLY, RETIREMENT AND
VOLUNTARY SEPARATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE, AS
WELL AS INVOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS
AND EMPLOYEES PURSUANT TO VARIOUS EXECUTIVE ORDERS
AUTHORIZING GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION AFTER THE
RATIFICATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
6 See Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, 12 December 1988, Rollo,
61.
7 Sec. 25, a and b, P.D. No. 807; see also CSC Memorandum Circular No.
11, S. of 1991, 5 April 1991.
8 Ibid., also Perez v. City of San Carlos, G.R. No. L-48196-R, 11 July 1978;
Ata v. Namocatcat, G.R. No. L-35703, 30 October 1972, 47 SCRA 320.
1970, 35 SCRA 435 (1970); People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679 (1957) and
People v. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 (1949).
19 Deliberations House Bill No. 4942 — 8 March 1988, 6:30. p.m.
20 An Act to Grant Civil Service Eligibility Under Certain Conditions to
Government Employees Under Provisional or Temporary Status Who have
rendered a Total of Seven (7) Years of Efficient Service and for other
Purposes.
21 Rule 1, Sec. 2(c) as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 25, series of
1990, 21 May 1990.
22 See Joint CSC-DBM Circular No. 1, series of 1991, 27 June 1991.

9 Executive Order No. 292, Section 7, 83 O.G. No. 39, 75 (September 1987)

10 Ibid, Section 9, p. 77.

11 Per Service Record, Rollo, p. 7.

12 Rollo, p. 70.

13 Page 3, this decision.

14 See Agpalo, Ruben. Statutory Construction, 1986 ed. p. 161.

15 People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 664.

16 G.R. No. 54083, 28 February 1983, 120 SCRA 910.

17 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, L-23794, 17 February 1968.

18 Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, 1986 ed., p. 118-119 citing In

re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918); City of Manila v. Gomez, G.R. No. L-37251,
August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 98; Escribano v. Ovila, G.R. No. L-30375,
September 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245 (1978), also Go Chico v. Martinez, 45
Phil. 256 (1923); Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32560, October 22,
Implications.

50
G.R. No. L-37251 August 31, 1981
CITY OF MANILA vs. AMADOR E. GOMEZ
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37251 August 31, 1981
CITY OF MANILA and CITY TREASURER, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ of the Court of First Instance of Manila and
ESSO PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the legality of the additional one-half percent (½%) realty
tax imposed by the City of Manila.
Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which
took effect on June 18, 1949, fixes the annual realty tax at one and one-half
percent (1-½ %).
On the other hand, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, Republic
Act No. 5447, which took effect on January 1, 1969, imposed "an annual
additional tax of one per centum on the assessed value of real property in
addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon under existing laws"
but "the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per
centrum.
That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea of fixing the
realty tax at three percent. So, by means of Ordinance No. 7125, approved
by the city mayor on December 26, 1971 and effective beginning the third
quarter of 1972, the board imposed an additional one-half percent realty tax.
The ordinance reads:
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SECTION 1. An additional annual realty tax of one-half percent (1/2%), or in
short a total of three percent (3%) realty tax (1-½% pursuant to the Revised
Charter of Manila; 1% per Republic Act No. 5447; and ½% per this
Ordinance) on the assessed value ... is hereby levied and imposed.
Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest the sum of P16,092.69 as additional
one-half percent realty tax for the third quarter of 1972 on its land and
machineries located in Manila.
On November 9, 1972, Esso filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the recovery of the said amount. It contended that the additional
one-half percent tax is void because it is not authorized by the city charter
nor by any law (Civil Case No. 88827).
After hearing, the trial court declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the
city treasurer of Manila to refund to Esso the said tax. The City of Manila and
its treasurer appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440 (which
superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court).
The only issue is the validity of the tax ordinance or the legality of the
additional one-half percent realty tax.
The petitioners in their manifestation of March 17, 1981 averred that the said
tax ordinance is still in force; that Ordinance No. 7566, which was enacted on
September 10, 1974, imposed a two percent tax on commercial real
properties (like the real properties of Esso and that that two percent tax plus
the one percent tax under the Special Education Fund Law gives a total of
three percent realty tax on commercial properties.
Esso Philippines, Inc., now Petrophil Corporation, in its manifestation of
March 2, 1981, revealed that up to this time it has been paying the additional
one-half percent tax and that from 1975 to 1980 it paid the total sum of
P4,206,240.71 as three percent tax on its real properties.
In this connection, it is relevant to note that section 39(2) of the Real Property
Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 464, which took effect on June 1, 1974,
provides that a city council may, by ordinance, impose a realty tax "of not
less than one half of one percent but not more than two percent of the
assessed value of real property".
Section 41 of the said Code reaffirms the one percent tax on real property for
the Special Education Fund in addition to the basic two percent realty tax.
So, there is no question now that the additional one-half percent realty tax is
valid under the Real Property Tax Code. What is in controversy is the legality
of the additional one-half percent realty tax for the two-year period from the
third quarter of 1972 up to the second quarter of 1974.
We hold that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction sustains the
City of Manila's contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is
sanctioned by the provision in section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law
that "the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per
centum.
The doctrine of implications means that "that which is plainly implied in the
language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed" (In re
McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41, 45, 90; 82 C.J.S. 632, 73 Am Jur 2nd 404).
While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and a
half percent, on the other hand, the 1968 Special Education Fund Law
definitively fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax of which
one percent would accrue to the Special Education Fund.
The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be
imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent
the realty tax that would accrue to a city or municipality.
And the fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specifically fixes the real
property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to
impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That was also the avowed
intention of the questioned ordinance.
In invalidating the ordinance, the trial court upheld the view of Esso
Philippines, Inc, that the Special Education Fund Law refers to a contingency
where the application of the additional one percent realty tax would have the
effect of raising the total realty tax to more than three percent and that it
cannot be construed as an authority to impose an additional realty tax
beyond the one percent fixed by the said law.
At first glance, that appears to be a specious or reasonable contention. But
the fact remains that the city charter fixed the realty tax at 1-½% and the later
52
law, the Special Education Fund Law, provides for three percent as the
maximum realty tax of which one percent would be earmarked for the
education fund.
The unavoidable inference is that the later law authorized the imposition of
an additional one-half percent realty tax since the contingency referred to by
the complaining taxpayer would not arise in the City of Manila.
It is true, as contended by the taxpayer, that the power of a municipal
corporation to levy a tax should be expressly granted and should not be
merely inferred. But in this case, the power to impose a realty tax is not
controverted. What is disputed is the amount thereof, whether one and one-
half percent only or two percent. (See sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 2264.)
As repeatedly observed, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as
confirmed by the Real Property Tax Code, in prescribing a total realty tax of
three percent impliedly authorizes the augmentation by one-half percent of
the pre-existing one and one- half percent realty tax.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed and set aside. The
complaint of Esso Philippines, Inc. for recovery of the realty tax paid under
protest is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Justice Abad Santos is on leave.
Justice Fernandez was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Casus Omissus. The rule os “casus omissus pro omisso habendus this Court to the fact that when the charge against him was dismissed by the
esi” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been lower court, jeopardy had already attached to his person. To support his
clearly established. claim, he cites the case of People vs. Labatete, G.R. No. L-12917, April 27,
1960.
G.R. No. L-14129 August 30, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. GUILLERMO MANANTAN Defendant-appellee's plea of double jeopardy should be rejected. The
accused cannot now invoke the defense of double jeopardy. When the
Republic of the Philippines government appealed to this Court the order of dismissal, defendant
SUPREME COURT Manantan could have raised that issue by way of resisting the appeal of the
Manila state. Then again, when defendant-appellee filed his brief, he could have
argued therein his present plea of double jeopardy. Yet, on neither occasion
EN BANC did he do so. He must, therefore, be deemed to have waived his
constitutional right thereunder. This is in accord with this Court's ruling in the
G.R. No. L-14129 August 30, 1962 cases of People vs. Rosalina Casiano, G.R. No. L-15309, February 16, 1961
and People vs. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, May 30, 1958, hereunder quoted:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. . . . defendant herein has filed a brief in which she limited herself to a
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee. discussion of the merits of the appeal. Thus, she not only failed to question,
in her brief, either expressly or impliedly, the right of the prosecution to
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant. interpose the present appeal, but also, conceded in effect the existence of
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee. such right. She should be deemed, therefore, to have waived her
aforementioned constitutional immunity.1äwphï1.ñët
RESOLUTION
It is true that in People vs. Hernandez (49 O.G. 5342), People vs. Ferrer, L-
REGALA, J.: 9072 (October 23, 1956), People vs. Bao, L-12102 (September 29, 1959)
and People vs. Golez, L-14160, we dismissed the appeal taken by the
This resolution refers to a motion for reconsideration filed by the counsel for Government from a decision or order of a lower court, despite defendant's
defendant-appellee, Guillermo Manantan. failure to object thereto. However, the defendants in those cases, unlike the
defendant herein, did not file any brief. Hence, they had performed no
Defendant-appellee does not dispute the correctness of this Court's ruling in affirmative act from which a waiver could be implied. (People vs. Casiano,
the main case. He concedes that a justice of the peace is covered by the supra).
prohibition of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, he takes
exception to the dispositive portion of this Court's ruling promulgated on July In his appeal brief, appellant's counsel does not raise this question of double
31, 1962, which reads: jeopardy, confining himself as he does, to the discussion of the evidence in
the record, contending that the guilt of the appellant has not been proven
For the above reasons, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court beyond reasonable doubt. One aspect of this case as regards double
should be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits. jeopardy is that defense may be waived, and, that failure to urge it in the

It is now urged by the defendant-appellee that the ultimate effect of appeal may be regarded as a waiver of said defense of double jeopardy.
remanding the case to the lower court for trial on the merits is to place him (People vs. Pinuila, supra).
twice in jeopardy of being tried for the same offense. He calls the attention of

53
There are other grounds raised by the defendant-appellee in this motion for
reconsideration. The Court, however, does not believe that they were well
taken.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the motion for reconsideration filed in this
case, is, as it is hereby, denied.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has
been settled. Matters already decided on the merits cannot be
relitigated again and again.
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., ET AL. vs. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, ET AL.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON,
TERESA TUASON, CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A. TUASON,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M.
CORDOVA and SATURNINA C. CORDOVA, respondents.
Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.
Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.
54
AQUINO, J.:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates
of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625
hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra).
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in
forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X,
wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land
located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the
north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the
east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land,
which has an area of three hundred eighty-three quiñones was allegedly
acquired by their father by means of a Spanish title issued to him on May 10,
1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).
They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently
or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and
that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan,
Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on
July 6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No.
735, were issued to defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the
Philippines and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa)
which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be
declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding.
They asked for damages.
Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior
judgment. The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The
grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the
answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted
that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses.
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C.
Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares of the disputed land from the
plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.
On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties
the Register of Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT
No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title derived from that first or basic
title. Later, the court required the production in court of the plan of the land
covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of determining whether
the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included therein.
On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the
instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial
court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding in
the said case. After the petitioners had filed the proper bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova
answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in
lieu of oral argument.
Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre,
117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J.
M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs.
Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA
1031.
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere
(follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes
evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in
Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that
OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.
It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be
relitigated again and again, consuming the court's time and energies at the
expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills,
Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).

The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be
questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The
supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding, which led to the
issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the same
issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court.
The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating
OCT No. 735, is annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them
to support their support their action and it might have encouraged them to
ventilate their action in court.
Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial
court is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without
costs. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J, took no part.

On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT
No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs.
Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-
26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).

The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs.
Estrella, L-40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a
reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the following cases directly or
incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acuña, 59 Phil.
183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447; Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de
la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95

55