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1 DMITRY STADLIN

Attorney at Law, SBN 302361


2 93 Devine Street INDORSE
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San Jose, CA 95110
Tel: (408) 645-7801
F ax: (408) 645-7802
ds@stadlinlaw.com
Attorney for Defendant
FJUL~S D
Clerk of the Court
2018
Superior Court of CA County of Santa Clara

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SUSAN BASSI BY DEPUTY

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7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

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8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF : Case No.: Cl 777801
10 CALIFORNIA, '

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; NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION
11 : TO DISMISS FOR LOSS OR
Plaintiff, : DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE
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13 vs. : Date: _ ___,$"4-\1-:t\'-'-'
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! Time: _ _---1.l..l?-i.L.O><'-----
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SUSAN HAZLETT BASSI, ; Dept: ---~ "-"'----


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16 Defendant.
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18 TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT, AND TO THE DISTRICT


ATTORNEY FOR SANTA CLARA COUNTY:
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the date and time specified above, or as
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soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, in the above named department of the
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above entitled court, the defendant, by and through counsel, will move this Court to
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dismiss the charges for the prosecution's loss and/or destruction of material and/or
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exculpatory evidence, pursuant to California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479.


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This motion will be based on the grounds set forth in the attached memorandum
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of points and authorities, the papers and records on file with the court - including the
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complaint, and any further evidence or argument which will be presented at the hearing
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on this matter.
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NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION TO DISMISS (TROMBETTA) 1


1 Dated: July 5, 2018.
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3 Respectfully Submitted,

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6 DMITRY STADLIN
7 Attorney for Defendant

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NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION TO DISMISS (TROMBETTA) 2


1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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4 Susan Bassi is charged in docket Cl 777801 with:

5 Count 1: A misdemeanor violation of California Penal Code § 166(a)(4) - willful

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6 violation of a court order - disobeying the terms of a Santa Clara County Local Court
7 Rule prohibiting the use of recording devices in a courthouse, on August 31, 2017.

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8 Count 2: A misdemeanor violation of California Penal Code § 166(a)(4) - willful
9 violation of a court order - disobeying the terms of a Santa Clara County Local Court

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10 Rule prohibiting the use of recording devices in a courthouse, on November 14, 2017.

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11 Count 3: A misdemeanor violation of California Penal Code § 148(a)(l) - resisting,
12 delaying or obstructing an officer, on November 14, 2017.
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13 Count 4: A misdemeanor violation of California Penal Code § 166(a)(4) - willful
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14 violation of a court order - disobeying the terms of a Santa Clara County Local Court
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15 Rule prohibiting the use of recording devices in a courthouse, on March 19, 2018.
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16 Three separate motions to compel discovery have been brought and litigated
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17 during the pendency of this case. Of particular interest to this motion is the Defense's
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18 second motion to compel, filed on March 1, 2018, and litigated on March 16, 2018. The
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19 very first item requested by the defense in that motion is:


20 1. "Copy of All Video Surveillance of Ms. Bassi inside the Famil Justice Center on
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21 November 14, 2018, including that of her after the incident and in the main
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22 lobby of the courtroom."


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23 The Court heard from the prosecutor assigned to the case, who relied on a report
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24 or email written by some Court staff member, that essentially claimed that such
25 evidence was destroyed - since video was only retained for a period of two weeks unless
26 it was requested. The defense has ordered a copy of the transcript from that hearing, but
27 it is not yet available.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO


DISMISS FOR LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (TROMBETTA) 3
1 The defense now seeks dismissal for the prosecution's loss or destruction of
2 material evidence, or of evidence which was exculpatory in nature.
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LEGAL ARGUMENT
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5 I. THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO

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PRESERVE EVIDENCE

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A. Legal Standard
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As the Supreme Court of California explained in People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th
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527, 549, there are two types of motions the defense can bring to enforce the
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prosecution's duty to preserve evidence: the Trombetta motion and the Youngblood
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motion. Under Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 US 51:
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If the evidence's exculpatory value is apparent and no comparable evidence is
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13 reasonably available, due process precludes the state from destroying it. (Trombetta, at
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p. 489; Alexander, at p. 878.) If, however, "no more can be said [of the evidence] than that
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15 it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the
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16 defendant" (Youngblood, at p. 57, italics added), the proscriptions of the federal


17 Constitution are narrower; "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part
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of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial
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19 of due process of law" (Youngblood, at p. 58; accord, People v. Tafoya(2007) 42 Cal.4th
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147, 187; People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 42.)


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(Id. at 549; see also People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1234 - approving of
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Trombetta rule under California law.)


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In California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, the Supreme Court of the United
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24 States held, "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the State

25 to disclose to criminal defendants favorable evidence that is material either to guilt or to


punishment." (Id. at 480.) That constitutional duty is "limited to evidence that might be
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27 expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of

28 constitutional materiality, see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S., at 109-110, evidence

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO


DISMISS FOR LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (TROMBETI'A) 4
1 must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was lost,
2 and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable
3 evidence by other reasonably available means." (Id. at 488-489.)
4 Accordingly, under a Trombetta motion, the defense need only show that "the
5 evidence's exculpatory value is apparent and no comparable evidence is reasonably

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6 available." (Ibid.) Only where the evidence is immaterial does the defense need to show
7 bad faith through a Youngblood motion. Intent is thus irrelevant here, where the defense

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8 brings a Trombetta motion because the evidence's exculpatory value is apparent and no
9 comparable evidence is reasonably available.

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10 B. Available Remedies

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11 Generally, the "trial court has discretion to fashion a remedy when the
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prosecutor's conduct has resulted in a loss of evidence favorable to the defense. (People v.

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13 Price (1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 536, 545; see also People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 99
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14 [relating to destruction of discoverable evidence].)" (People v. Conrad (2006) 145


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15 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1185.) However, the Supreme Court of the United States in Trombetta
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16 has found that the proper remedy for the prosecution's improper destruction of evidence
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17 is dismissal or the suppression of the People's most probative evidence: "But when
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18 evidence has been destroyed in violation of the Constitution, the court must choose
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19 between barring further prosecution or suppressing- as the California Court of Appeal


20 did in this case-the State's most probative evidence." (Id. at 487)
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21 Further, where government conduct far exceeds the scope of the circumstances
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22 which justified the actions in the first place, it may be characterized as misconduct that
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23 shocks the conscience and violates due process. (See United States v. Lopez (9th Cir.
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24 1993) 4 F.3d 1455, 1464.) Where "the government's conduct is so grossly shocking and so
25 outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice," dismissal is warranted. (United
26 States v. Citro (9th Cir. 1988) 842 F.2d 1149, 1152.)
27 C. Dismissal Is Appropriate In This Case Because the Destruction of the Court
28 Video Violated Ms. Bassi's Due Process Under Trombetta

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO


DISMISS FOR LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (TROMBETTA) 5
1 There are two ways that destruction of evidence by the government can violate a
2 defendant's rights: Under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 (1988) when the most
3 that can be said about the evidence is that it was potentially exculpatory and the
4 destruction is done in bad faith; and under California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104
5 (1984) when the evidence destroyed has exculpatory value apparent to the government

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6 at the time of its destruction and the defense has no comparable evidence it can use in
7 its stead.

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8 Assuming that a defendant's rights are violated by the destruction, the court can

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9 impose sanctions on the prosecution. The sanctions range from curative jury instructions
10 to dismissal of the case.

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11 1. Under the Trombetta Standard, When The Evidence Destroyed Had
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Apparent Exculpatory Value, No Bad Faith Need Be Shown.

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13 California courts analyze government destruction of evidence under the tests
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14 announced by the United States Supreme Court in Trombetta and Youngblood. (See
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15 People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal. 3d 1194, 1233-1234; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal. 3d
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16 771, 810.) Trombetta and Youngblood apply to different types of situations.


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17 In Trombetta, the United States Supreme Court analyzed whether the failure of
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18 the police to preserve breath samples of defendants charged with drunken driving
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19 violated the defendants' right to due process. The defendants claimed that had their
20 breath samples been preserved, they would have been able to analyze the samples
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21 themselves and present evidence impeaching the results of the police's breath sample
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22 analysis machine. (California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at p. 483.) The court delineated the
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23 following test for analyzing due process violations:


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24 [The destroyed evidence] must both possess an exculpatory value that was
25 apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant
26 would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.
27 (California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 489.) Here such exculpatory value is
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO


DISMISS FOR LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (TROMBETTA) 6
1 readily apparent, the video would support Ms. Bassi's account of events and would
2 contradict the Sheriffs Deputies assertions at trial.
3 The Court concluded in Trombetta that the defendant had failed to satisfy either
4 part of this test. Regarding the first prong, the evidence did not possess an exculpatory
5 value apparent before it was destroyed because "the chances are extremely low that the

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6 preserved samples would have been exculpatory." (California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at
7 p. 489.) As the court noted, the "samples were much more likely to provide inculpatory

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8 than exculpatory evidence." (California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 489.)

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9 Regarding the second prong of the test, the court found that the defendants had
10 alternative means of impeaching the results of the police's breath analysis machine;

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11 since there was only a limited number of ways that the machine may have given
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erroneous readings, the defendants could have presented evidence showing faulty

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13 calibration, extraneous interference with machine measurements, or operator error.
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14 Trombetta noted that in its case the defendants did not establish that the State had
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15 failed to i·etain the breath samples in bad faith. (Trombetta, 467 U.S. at p. 488.) The
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16 court did not indicate, however, in what type of cases, if ever, a showing of bad faith
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17 would be required as a condition precedent to finding a violation of due process.


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18 In Youngblood, the United States Supreme Court specified precisely when bad
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19 faith was required. The police collected a sodomy victim's clothes; the police did not,
20 however, refrigerate the clothing. (Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at pp. 53-54.) Two
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21 months after the clothes were collected, the police discovered that they contained semen
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22 stains; the stains could not be examined to see if they belonged to the defendant because
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23 the clothes had not been refrigerated while they were stored by the police. (Arizona v.
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24 Youngblood, 488 U.S. at pp. 53-54.) The defendant moved to dismiss the case alleging
25 that the improper preservation of evidence by the police had deprived him of the right to
26 due process. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's challenge.
27 The court noted that as in Trombetta, the defendant had not shown that the police
28 knew that the evidence they collected had an exculpatory value before they failed to

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO


DISMISS FOR LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (TROMBETTA) 7
1 preserve it. (Youngblood, 488 U.S. at p. 56, fn. 1.) In Trombetta, the breath samples
2 appeared to the police to have only incriminatory value (they showed through the breath
3 analyzer machine results that the defendants had a high concentration of alcohol in their
4 blood) where as in Youngblood the police did not even become aware of the presence of
5 the semen on the clothing until long after the lack of refrigeration eliminated out any

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6 possibility of performing an analysis of it.
7 Youngblood stated that a showing that the police acted in bad faith would be

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8 required to establish a due process violation in a narrow set of cases: "when we deal with
9 the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said

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10 than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have

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11 exonerated the defendant." (Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at p. 57.) The Court found
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that the evidence in its case fit into this category: the "evidence was simply an avenue of

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13 investigation that might have led in any number of directions." (Youngblood, 488 U.S. at
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14 p. 56, fn. 1.) The Court thus held that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on
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15 the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a
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16 denial of due process oflaw." (Youngblood, 488 U.S. at p. 58.)


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17 Youngblood made clear, however, that a showing of bad faith would not be
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18 necessary to show a due process violation when the evidence had exculpatory value
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19 apparent before it was destroyed: "[t]he presence or absence of bad faith by the police for
20 purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of
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21 the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed." (Arizona v.
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22 Youngblood, 488 U.S. at p. 56, fn. 1.) In cases where the evidence possesses apparent
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23 exculpatory value before it is destroyed and the defendant is unable to obtain other
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24 comparable evidence--thus satisfying the second prong in Trombetta-- no showing of bad


25 faith is required.
26 Youngblood justified its difference in treatment between these two types of
27 evidence for two reasons: first, whenever evidence is lost which only might have
28 exculpatory value, "courts face the treacherous task of divining the import of materials

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO


DISMISS FOR LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (TROMBETTA) 8
1 whose contents are unknown and very often disputed." (Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S.
2 at p. 58, quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 486.) Second, the Court found it
3 onerous to "impos[e] on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to
4 preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary material in a particular
5 prosecution." (Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at p. 58.)

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6 The Court of Appeal in People v. Pastor Cruz (1993) 16 Cal. App. 4th 322, 325,
7 specifically ruled that Youngblood's bad faith requirement does not apply when evidence

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8 has apparent exculpatory value. In Cruz, the police arrested the defendant for assault

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9 with a deadly weapon, a knife, taking the knife into their custody. Subsequently, the
10 knife was destroyed by the police. The trial court dismissed the case finding a violation of

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11 due process, even though no bad faith was shown regarding the destruction of the knife.
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The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that since neither bad faith nor exculpatory

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13 value were shown, due process had not been violated. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal
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14 stated that, "even in the absence of bad faith, the failure of the prosecution to preserve
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15 evidence that 'might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense' does
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16 violate due process." (People v. Pastor Cruz, 16 Cal. App. 4th 322, 325 (2d Dist. 1993),
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17 quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-489, emphasis added.) Regarding the
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18 knife's exculpatory value when the police took it into their possession, the Court of
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19 Appeal reasoned that to a reasonable officer the knife had inculpatory value, not
20 exculpatory value.
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21 2. The Video From the Courthouse Had Apparent Exculpatory Value


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22 In a case where Youngblood's bad-faith requirement does not apply, the court
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23 must apply the two-part test in Trombetta: (1) "[The destroyed evidence] must both
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24 possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed" and
25 (2) "be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable
26 evidence by other reasonably available means." (California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at
27 489.)
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO


DISMISS FOR LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (TROMBE1TA) 9
1 Regarding the first test, Trombetta did not define the term "apparent exculpatory
2 value" nor did it specify precisely what type of showing a defendant must make in order
3 to satisfy this part of the test. Nonetheless, if the showing required was for the
4 defendant to prove through independent evidence that the evidence in question had
5 exculpatory value, then the defendant would always fail the second prong of Trombetta:

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6 the defense would inevitably possess "other comparable evidence" to that destroyed.
7 Because such a showing would then render the constitutional protection against

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8 destruction of evidence all but nugatory, the court could not have intended to set the
9 required showing at this "Catch-22"-like level. (See J. Gorelick, S. Marzen & L. Solum,

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10 Destruction of Evidence, (2001).)

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11 On the other hand, if all a defendant needed to do to satisfy the first prong would
12 be to show that the items in question might have had some conceivable exculpatory
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13 value, then this type of evidence would be akin to the "potentially useful" type for which
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14 Youngblood held that a showing of bad faith is additionally required.


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15 "Apparent exculpatory value" should be defined to mean that there is a


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16 "reasonable probability" that the evidence which was destroyed was exculpatory. (See J.
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17 Gorelick, S. Marzen & L. Solum, Destruction of Evidence, supra.) These commentators


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18 have argued that Trombetta obtained its requirement that the destroyed evidence have
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19 an apparent exculpatory value from the definition of constitutional materiality in the


20 case of U.S. v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 109-110, and that the Supreme Court
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21 subsequent to Trombetta explained that the test for constitutional materiality is fulfilled
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22 if the defendant can show a "reasonable probability'' that the evidence in question had
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23 exculpatory value. (See U.S. v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 682.)
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24 One of the handful of courts in California to discuss the definition of the


25 Trombetta requirement that the evidence have an apparent exculpatory value stated
26 without much discussion that the standard is met "if the evidence could have been
27 expected to play a significant role in the defense" of the case. (People v. Huston (1989)
28 210 Cal. App. 3d 192, 214.)

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO


DISMISS FOR LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (TROMBETTA) 10
1 This court should adopt either the Huston standard for the showing needed to
2 pass the first Trombetta prong or that urged by the commentators in Destruction of
3 Evidence; setting the standard at either a "reasonable probability" or at mandating a
4 showing that "the evidence could be expected to play a significant role in the defense" of
5 the case does not present an insurmountable barrier wherein the defendant always fails

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6 the second prong of Trombetta while it also does not make the standard so lax that it
7 collapses into Youngblood's definition of evidence which is merely "potentially useful."

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8 Regarding Trombetta's second test, that the destroyed evidence "be of such a
9 nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other

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10 reasonably available means" (California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at p. 489), the Supreme

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11 Court also failed to define this term. Several cases have, however, set forth what type of
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evidence meets this standard.

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13 Photographs of the destroyed evidence are generally considered comparable
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14 evidence. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal. 3d 1194; People v. McKinney (1979) 95
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15 Cal. App. 3d 712.) Thus, if pictures were taken of the item that was destroyed, usually no
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16 due process violation will exist.


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17 Having persons that can testify regarding the nature and aspects of the destroyed
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18 evidence is also considered comparable evidence. (See People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal. 4th
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19 792.) For example, ifthe government destroys a tape of a conversation yet persons can
20 testify regarding its contents, no due process violation will have been shown.
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21 One type of evidence which will never constitute comparable evidence to that
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22 destroyed is the availability of the defendant to testify regarding the evidence. (See
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23 People v. Von Villas (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 201, 243.) Comparable evidence thus does
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24 not encompass a defendant's testimony.


25 In this case, the Court personnel and the Sheriffs Office were on notice that Ms.
26 Bassi had requested the video and that it was crucial to her defense. Nevertheless, the
27 video was either lost or destroyed. On November 14, 2017, Ms. Bassi had emailed the
28 Court and Counsel for the Court to request that the video be preserved. She has also

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO


DISMISS FOR LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (TROMBETTA) 11
1 asked Sergeant Rick Alanis and Sergeant Brett Moore, of the Sheriffs Office -Internal
2 Affairs - to preserve the video surveillance footage, as part of her complaint.
3 Ms. Bassi is prepare to subpoena and call both officers of the Sheriffs Office to
4 testify at the hearing on this motion, once a hearing date is set. The defense is also
5 prepared to call the recipients of Ms. Bassi's email, or to subpoena the records directly

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6 from the Court to prove that such a request had been made.
7 D. Dismissal of the Complaint Constitutes Appropriate Sanctions

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8 Once a violation of due process is established, sanctions should be imposed against

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9 the government's representative in the case: the prosecutor.
10 Dismissal of the case is an appropriate sanction for a due process violation

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11 resulting from destruction of evidence. (See People v. Moore (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 215; Banks
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v. F. A. A. (5th Cir. 1982) 687 F.2d 92.) Here, such a remedy is appropriate, particularly

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13 when this action is viewed in the totality of the government's conduct throughout the
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14 case they have pursued against Ms. Bassi.


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15 Accordingly, under Trombetta, because the evidence's exculpatory value is


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16 apparent and no comparable evidence is reasonably available to the defense, this Court
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17 should dismiss the charges against Ms. Bassi.


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CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss the charges against Ms.
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21 Bassi.
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23 Dated: July 5, 2018.


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24 Respectfully Submitted,

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27 DMITRY STADLIN
28 Attorney for Defendant

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO


DISMISS FOR LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (TROMBETTA) 12
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EXHIBIT A e
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO


DISMISS FOR LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (TROMBETTA) 13
From: Susan Bassi <gilroybassi@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 8:52 PM
Subject: Preservation of Evidence - Request for Records and Security Camera Recordings
To: lherrick@scscourt.org, plucas@scscourt.org, jemede@scscourt.org, marand@scscourt.org,
rflem i ng@scscourt.org

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Dear Ms Herrick, Ms.Lucas, and Ms. Fleming,

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In addition to the requirements under the Law, this is my formal request that you

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preserve all of the court security camera footage taken at the Santa Clara Family

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Courthouse on November 14, 2017 from 10am until 3pm. Specifically the security
footage for the main entrance, the clerk's office and the computer records area off
the clerk's office.

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As I am sure you are aware, an altercation occurred in the court file room involving

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two court users and a member of the press and a formal complaint has been Lodged as
a result. I anticipate more complaints being filed.
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The information contained in the security footage may be evidence for administrative

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complaints and formal criminal proceedings and I am asking that evidence be
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preserved.
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This is my formal request for copies of that footage, and for copies of all orders made
on the court computers (for copies of court judicial public records and parentage
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case access) for the same time period.


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This is again my claim that the court has acted in a retaliatory manner related to my
newsgathering activities and I again request the court move my dissolution matter,
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and my civil matter out of the county and appoint an independent investigator with
whom I can Lodge a formal complaint with the court.
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Thank you,
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Susan Bassi
Publisher
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P.O. Box 2220


Los Gatos, CA 95031
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Cell (831) 320-6421


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1 PROOF OF SERVICE
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6 I, the undersigned, declare:

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8 I am over eighteen years of age and not a party to the above action. My business address
9 is 93 Devine Street, San Jose, California 95110.

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10

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11 On the date below, I personally served copies of the attached by giving a copy to the
12 Deputy District Attorney in Department 48.
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And by email to:
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15 DDA Daniela Rich


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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
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17
Executed on July 5, 2018, in San Jose, California.
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19
20 DMITRY STADLIN
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28

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO


DISMISS FOR LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (TROMBE'ITA) 14