Murr Case Judgement English

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Lebanese Republic
Judicial Council
Case file No.: 3/95
Judgement No.: 2/97
Date: 9 May 1997
Judgement
in the case concerning the attempted assassination
of Minister Michel Murr
__________________
Plaintiffs: 1. The Public Prosecutor‟s Office
2. Mufleh Abi Younes}

}and their counsel Youssef Germanous
3. Samir Ghossoub }
4. Youssef Ayoub Boughader
5. Jaad Samir Boughader, under the guardianship of his

grandfather Youssef Boughader, and their counsel, Fadia
Hamed
Defendants:
Present
1. Samir Farid Geagea: his counsel: Issam Karam, Edmond Rizk,

Edmond Naim, Samih Bishrawi and Jihad Abdallah
2. Manuel Dib Younes: his counsel: Abdou Boutaya and

Suleiman Lobs
STL Official Translation

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Fugitives
1. Ghassan Antoine Touma
2. Antonios Elias Elias, also known as Antonios Obeid and

Tony Obeid
3. Jean Youssef Chahine, known as Asad
4. Rushdi Tawfik Raad, known as Nabil Fawzi
5. Raji Ibrahim Abdou
6. Elias Georges Awad, known as “Giuliano”
7. Naja Anis Kaddoum
8. Jean Maroun Nejm, known as “Nadim al-Ashkar”
9. Fadi Mikhail Ghosn
10. Elie Jirjis Akiki
On behalf of the Lebanese people
The Judicial Council, chaired by the First President of the Court of Cassation,
Philippe Kheirallah, and composed of the following presidents of the Court of Cassation:
Hikmat Harmouch, Ahmad al-Mouallem, Hussein Zein, Ralph Riyashi,
Following scrutiny and deliberation,
Having considered Decision No. 627 of the Ministry of Justice of 13 December

1994 concerning the appointment of Judge Georges Ghantous as Investigating Judge in
the case that was pending before the military justice system and was referred to the
Judicial Council pursuant to article 8 of Amnesty Law No. 84 of 26 August 1991, on the
ground that it concerns an attempt to assassinate a political leader, namely Minister
Michel Murr,
Having also considered the indictment decision issued by Investigating Judge

Ghantous on 13 December 1995 and the other documents pertaining to the case:

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Chapter I
Referral and procedures
On the basis of the investigation undertaken pursuant to application No. 5 issued
by the Public Prosecution Service at the Court of Cassation on 13 December 1994, the
Investigating Judge issued a decision on 13 December 1995 in which he responded to the
defence argument regarding lack of jurisdiction and charged each of the following
defendants:
1. Samir Farid Geagea, mother‟s name Mary, born in 1952, Lebanese, notice
given in his presence on 30 August 1995;
2. Ghassan Antoine Touma, mother‟s name Alice, born in 1957, Lebanese,
notice given in his absence on 25 July 1995;
3. Antonios Elias Elias, mother‟s name Mary, born n 1961, Lebanese, known as
Antonios Obeid and Tony Obeid, notice given in his absence on 9 August
1995;
4. Jean Youssef Chahine, mother‟s name Mary, born in 1962, Lebanese, known
as “Asad”, notice given in his absence on 9 August 1995;
5. Rushdi Tawfik Raad, mother‟s name Nadia, born in 1965, Lebanese, known
as “Nabil Fawzi”;
6. Raji Ibrahim Abdou, mother‟s name Houla, born in 1954, Lebanese, known as
“Al-Capitaine”, notice given in his absence on 7 August 1995;
7. Manuel Dib Younes, mother‟s name Warda, born in 1964, Lebanese, known
as “Mano”, notice given in his presence on 16 August 1995;
With offences under articles 270, 271, 549 and 549/201 of the Criminal Code and
article 6 of the Act promulgated on 11 January 1958, and with a misdemeanour under
article 72 of the Weapons Act;
8. Elias Georges Awad, mother‟s name Nadia, born in 1962, Lebanese, known
as “Giuliano”, notice given in his absence on 12 August 1995;
9. Naja Anis Kaddoum, mother‟s name Hana, born in 1965, Lebanese, notice
given in his absence on 12 August 1995;
10. Jean Maroun Nejm, mother‟s name Loudi, born in 1958, Lebanese, known
as “Nadim al-Ashkar”;
11. Fadi Mikhail Ghosn, mother‟s name Norma, born in 1959, Lebanese, notice
given in his presence on 17 July 1995, released on 14 September 1995;
12. Elie Jirjis Akiki, mother‟s name Diba, 31 years old, Lebanese, notice given
in his absence on 16 August 1995;

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With offences under articles 270, 271, 549 and 549/201 of the Criminal Code and
article 6 of the Act promulgated on 11 January 1958, in conjunction with article 219 of
the Criminal Code;
Owing to their involvement as principals or accomplices in a criminal plan to

assassinate Minister Michel Murr, the then Minister of Defence, by placing two booby-
trapped cars on the road in Antelias that he took every morning with a view to blowing
them up when his motorcade passed by. The first car bomb exploded as the motorcade
passed on 20 March 1991, killing seven persons and injuring Minister Murr and almost
30 other people. The second car bomb failed to explode, having been deactivated by the
first explosion. As it was impossible to remove it lest it should explode or draw attention
to the perpetrators, the latter blew it up where it stood on 29 March 1991. That explosion
claimed the lives of four people and injured twenty-five others. Furthermore, the two
explosions caused material damage to buildings and vehicles.
It was decided to proceed with the prosecution of the accused before the Judicial
Council.
On 18 December 1995 the Public Prosecution Service at the Court of Cassation

charged the accused with the offences set forth in the indictment decision and demanded
that they be tried before the Judicial Council.
The accused Ghassan Touma, Antonios Elias Elias, Jean Chahine, Rushdi Raad,
Raji Abdou, Elias Awad, Naja Kaddoum Jean Maroun Nejm, Fadi Ghosn and Elie Akiki
failed to appear before the Council notwithstanding the notice given, the adoption of
decisions setting a time limit for their appearance, their notification thereof and the expiry
of the legal time limits, in accordance with the rules laid down in articles 335, 336 and
337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereupon the Council decided to regard them as
fugitives from justice and to try them in absentia.
Following the public trial in the presence of the accused Samir Geagea and
Manuel Younes;
Having read the indictment decision, the list of witnesses, and the records of the
preliminary and preparatory investigations, and having discussed them together with the
other documents pertaining to the case;
Having questioned the accused and listened to the witnesses‟ statements;

Having heard the arguments of counsel for the plaintiffs acting in a personal
capacity, the findings of the Public Prosecution Service, and the defence
pleadings of counsel for the accused Geagea and Younes;
Having heard the statements of the latter during the final stages of the
proceedings;
And having taken cognizance of the written pleadings filed, which reiterated the
oral pleadings:

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Chapter II
Pleadings and applications
I. The plaintiffs in a personal capacity

1. Attorney Youssef Germanous, acting as personal prosecutor on behalf of
the civil plaintiffs Mufleh Abi Younes and Samir Ghossoub, endorsed all the charges set
forth in the indictment decision and demanded that the accused be required, jointly and
mutually, to pay the sum of US $1 million in compensation and in respect of material and
moral damages to the relatives of the victims Zakia Abou Younes and her daughter
Micheline Noma, and the sum of US $500,000 to the plaintiff Samir Ghossoub in respect
of material and moral damages and his permanent incapacitation. He further demanded
that the accused be required to pay all court costs and counsel fees.
2. Ms. Fadia Aref Hamed, acting as personal prosecutor on behalf of the civil
plaintiffs Youssef Ayoub Boughader and Jaad Samir Boughader (under the guardianship
of his grandfather Youssef Boughader), demanded that appropriate penalties be imposed
on the accused and that they be required to pay the sum of US $10 million in
compensation for the damage suffered by the two plaintiffs.
II. The Public Prosecution Service at the Court of Cassation

The representative of the Public Prosecution Service at the Court of Cassation,
Counsel for the Prosecution Amin Bou Nassar, presented his arguments pertaining to the
case.
He reviewed the facts as he perceived them, described and discussed the evidence,
and reaffirmed the status of Minister Murr as a political leader within the meaning of the
Amnesty Law, responding to the argument that he lacked such status presented by
defence counsel in support of their claim that the crime with which the accused were
charged did not correspond to the exception in the Amnesty Law.
He concluded by reiterating the content of the indictment decision and demanding

that the maximum penalties be imposed on the accused in conformity with the articles set
out in the decision.
III. The defendants

1. The defendant Samir Geagea
(a) His counsel, Attorney Edmond Naim, argued in his pleading that an error
had been committed in conferring jurisdiction on the Judicial Council pursuant to articles
363 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in referring the case to the Judicial
Council under article 8 of the Amnesty Law concerning crimes pertaining to political
leaders. He also challenged the decision of the Minister of Justice, who appointed an

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Investigating Judge immediately after the administrative referral of the case file from the
military courts, without ascertaining whether Minister Murr was a political leader and
whether the crime in question was one of the crimes enumerated in article 363 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure in order to determine the propriety of its referral to the
Judicial Council.
Attorney Naim stated: that the decision of the Minister of Justice was absolutely
null and void and as though it had never existed;
That article 8 of the Amnesty Law contained no definition of a political leader,

that the Executive should have intervened to remedy that flaw, that the concept of a
political leader differed from that of a politician, and that Minister Murr was a politician
and not a political leader;
That there was a distinction between the explosion that occurred on 20 March
1991 and the explosion that occurred on 29 March 1991, and that the second crime did
not fall within the jurisdiction of the Judicial Council;
That the authority with competence to declare the decision of the Ministry of
Justice null and void or to rescind it was the ordinary justice system which had
jurisdiction to deal with the case;
That the nullity of the decision of the Ministry of Justice entailed the nullity of the
investigation as well as the nullity of the referral of the case to the Judicial Council and
the resulting proceedings;
That crimes referred to the Council were not covered by the Amnesty Law if the
Council considered that it had jurisdiction, while crimes that fell outside its jurisdiction,
which had been exhaustively defined, were, if referred to it erroneously, covered by the
Amnesty Law;
That article 3 of the Amnesty Law covered only acts occurring under the
circumstances defined in the article of the Criminal Code referred to in article 363 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure and that the amnesty covered all other acts; and that when
the Council realized that such was the case, it would rule against the prosecution on the
ground of amnesty;
That Dr. Samir Geagea was innocent of the charge laid against him, that there was
no evidence in the case file of the existence of relations other than those of a political
nature between him and Minister Murr, that any act performed by either of them vis-à-vis
the other could only have a purely political motive, and that malevolence, deceit and
antipathy did not negate the political description of the assassination;
And that there was no evidence of incitement by Dr. Geagea to murder Minister
Murr by means of the explosion and no evidence of the involvement of Dr. Geagea in the
explosion of 29 March 1991.
Dr. Naim concluded by making the following demands:

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- To declare null and void or to rescind the decision of the Minister of Justice
issued on 13 December 1994;
- To declare Mr. Georges Ghantous‟s handling of the investigation null and void on
account of the nullity of the decision to appoint him, and hence also to declare
null and void and non-existent the investigation that he conducted, including the
indictment decision;
- To deduce from the foregoing that the referral of the case to the Council should be
deemed non-existent in legal terms and to decide that the case should be referred
to the Public Prosecution Service at the Court of Cassation so that it may take the
requisite action;
– To proceed, in the light of the foregoing, first: to find that Dr Geagea is innocent
of all the charges laid against him;
– Second: to restrict the exception to the application of article 3 of the Amnesty

Law to crimes coming under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Council pursuant to article
363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and hence to rule that the crime attributed to
Dr. Geagea is a political crime covered by the Amnesty Law;
– Third: to apply article 198 of the Criminal Code in conjunction with article 196
and hence to hold that the attempted assassination of Minister Michel Murr is a political
crime covered by the Amnesty Law.
(b) Attorney Edmond Rizk pleaded on behalf of Mr. Geagea and concluded
his arguments by endorsing the demands of his colleague Attorney Naim.
Attorney Germanus, responding to the argument regarding the definition of a

political leader, said that Minister Murr had leadership status since he had sponsored the
Trilateral Agreement and had succeeded in rallying the adversaries to sign the agreement.
Moreover, as the war drew to a close, he had played an effective role in ending it and had
held important ministerial portfolios. He had been the Minister of Defence and had been
tasked with making procedural arrangements for the dissolution of the militias.
(c) Attorney Issam Karam presented his arguments and in his written
pleadings raised the issue of who could be regarded as a political leader and what
characteristics a person should possess in order to be recognized as a political leader. He
noted that the documents contained no definition of the concept, which should be
comprehensive and exclusive, comprising specific characteristics and barring any
confusion of these characteristics with other specific characteristics.
He referred to personalities who are recognized as political leaders: Lenin (not

Stalin), Victor Hugo, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emile Zola, André Malraux.
He concluded that Michel Murr was not a political leader,

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And that the referral of the case file to the Judicial Council had been legally
inappropriate. He wondered what motive could have led the Lebanese Forces and Samir
Geagea to kill Michel Murr, since he was not a rival either of Geagea or of the Forces. He
was not a competitor either in sectarian or regional terms. The Forces knew that killing
Minister Murr would not change anything.
The dispute between Samir Geagea and Michel Murr had begun with the
Trilateral Agreement, which was signed in late 1985. The rebellion against it had broken
out on 15 January 1986 and during the rebellion Samir Geagea had declared a ceasefire
so that Elias, Michel Murr‟s son, could escape with Elie Hobeika after reaching an
understanding with Michel Murr in that regard and with regard to other issues.
Murr had travelled to Paris after those events not because of Samir Geagea and
his group but because of Amin Gemayel and his group.
The allegation that Samir Geagea had taken possession of Murr‟s property was
untrue. All that happened was that the Forces had seized beach cabins to provide shelter
for some of their members in Halat sur Mer.
Attorney Karam reviewed Minister Murr‟s testimony before the Council,

particularly with respect to the motive for killing the Minister of Defence.
He also referred to the different stages of the investigation: the protagonists in the
first stage had been Michel Hambarsumian and Mohammed Ibrahim; the protagonists in
the second stage had been Tanius al-Haddad and Joseph Geagea. During both stages there
had been a play on words in the statements between confessions of guilt and innocence.
And how could one possibly credit what had occurred during the third stage, leading to
the indictment based on statements from witnesses who were actually perpetrators and
who lied without even being aware of doing so?
With regard to the vehicles, he drew attention to the discrepancies in the witness
statements regarding their colour, model, registration numbers and engines, concluding
that the two cars that had exploded were not the cars that had been seen by Manuel
Younes, since they had been booby-trapped by Risha Hana in early 1990 and it would
have been impossible to convey them to the site of the explosion.
The Honda motorcycle had been wrecked before Charbel Akiki left the Forces in
1988 or 1989.
Referring to the concept of the mastermind and to Samir Geagea‟s absolute

authority over the Forces, he said that the Forces, like other organizations and armies,
were infiltrated.
He concluded by demanding that the decision to refer the case to the Judicial
Council should be deemed inappropriate and that Samir Geagea should be declared
innocent.

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(d) Attorney Jihad Abdullah pleaded on behalf of the accused, Samir Geagea,
and concluded by demanding that he should be declared innocent.
(e) The accused Samir Geagea argued on his own behalf before the Council,
reiterating his statements in the written pleadings in which he had set out the material
facts. He compared what he deemed to have been established by dint of those facts with
the content of the indictment decision, drawing attention to discrepancies between the
two accounts of the facts, in terms of the cars, the type of explosives and their location in
the cars, the manner in which they were exploded which, according to the indictment
decision, was by remote control, and the blowing up of the Buick ten days later at the
same time as the first car had been blown up, which implied that the car had been
equipped with a timing device. He noted that the car which Manuel Younes had seen
being booby-trapped had been blown up one year and three months before the event for
war-related purposes, as proven by the use of the BMW on the Nahr al-Mott crossing and
by the fact that Manuel Younes had not seen the other two cars thereafter in their usual
location.
Referring to the geographical site of the crime and the motorcycle that had been
used to return Jean Chahine from Antelias to Karantina, he said that the equipment of the
Protection and Intervention Company did not include a motorcycle.
He then referred to the details of the crime and challenged the content of the
indictment decision with respect to the motorcycle and the triggering of the explosion of
the Buick from the west, because the vehicle would not have been within the field of
vision of a bystander located to the west of the scene, and any such person would have
been exposed to the blast of the explosion, and because there was nobody in the Lebanese
Forces whose real name or nickname was Mano Manolito. The indictment decision
focused exclusively on the details of the crime reported by Fadi Ghosn, although his
statements were untrue and a fabrication. The evidence provided by Fadi Ghosn was
designed to serve the authorities and to ensure his own exoneration in a case for which he
had been detained, and he was in fact released. The same applied to Elie Jabbour.
Turning to the motives, he referred to the fact that, according to the indictment
decision, the motives for the crime were related to the dissolution of the militias. He
reviewed the Lebanese Forces‟ positions on this issue in terms of the early stages and the
outcome. He discussed Minister Murr‟s testimony, arguing that his statements and the
content of the indictment decision contradicted everything that was widely known about
the facts of the Taif Agreement, the agreement process, the positions of the Forces
regarding the process of ending the war in Lebanon and disbandment of the militias, the
practical steps taken by the Forces during the process, in particular with respect to the
withdrawal from Greater Beirut in November 1990, the details of the situation on the
ground in the districts of Jbeil and Kesrouan, and the details of the strategic situation in
Lebanon at the time when the attempted assassination occurred. They also contradicted
the statements of the witnesses before the Council. Moreover, the reference in connection
with the motives to harassment that members of the Forces were allegedly experiencing
was also contrary to the facts, since the harassment in question were a residue from the
war of elimination and unrelated to the Minister of Defence. The same applied to the

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claims about the Forces‟ demand for specific units of the army, although such demands
were made by all Lebanese factions, and about the demand that the process of
disbandment should cover all militias, a demand concerning which the Forces had
received local and regional assurances. With regard to the economic and social demands,
they had been made after the attempted assassination of Murr. Complaints had been made
about the unbalanced nature of Prime Minister Karami‟s Government by the Forces and
by others, such as Minister Jumblatt. As for the statement that the Forces were seeking
greater power, it was questionable how that aim could be advanced through assassination.
There was one fact that invalidated all the motives set out in the indictment
decision, namely that the Forces, in the person of Minister Roger Dib, had joined the
Government in March 1991.
The accused, Samir Geagea, concluded by denying any personal involvement or

any involvement of the Forces in the attempted assassination and by demanding that the
Lebanese Forces and he himself should be declared innocent of all charges laid against
them in the case.
2. The defendant Manuel Younes
(a) His counsel Attorney Abdou Boutaya pleaded on his behalf.
He first reaffirmed the absolute innocence of his client, citing the statement by the
witness Zeina Qoreia to the effect that at the time of the explosion Manuel had been
present at his workplace in the Intervention Barracks in Karantina.
He then stated that Manuel had no nickname within the movement and discussed
the statement by Wifa Wahbe in that connection, referring also to statements by the other
witnesses.
He claimed that it would have been impossible for the person known as “Mano
Manolito” to take up a position to the west of the site of the explosion. He pointed out
that the only western point at which so-called Mano Manolito could have stood was the
bus stop located diametrically opposite the site of the explosion and that there was no
building on the seaward side that could have been used. Referring to the statements of
Fadi Ghosn, Elie Jabbour and Wifa Wahbe, he said that they were untrue and a
fabrication. He further referred to the statements by Mohammed Ibrahim and Michel
Hambarsumian to the military court, in which they had confessed to the crime and had
made no mention of Manuel Younes.
Attorney Boutaya responded to the arguments of Counsel for the Prosecution at

the Court of Cassation, criticizing his reliance on the statement by Minister Murr which,
in his view, lacked credibility.
In conclusion, he demanded that Manuel Dib Younes should be declared innocent

of the charge laid against him.

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(b) Attorney Suleiman Lobs also pleaded on behalf of Manuel Younes and
presented written submissions in which he reviewed the different stages of the
investigations from the time of the explosion until the judicial investigation, which had
led to an indictment decision that was contrary to the findings inasmuch as it was based
on the preliminary investigations and the confessions recorded at that stage. The context
of the indictment decision suggested that it would preclude any prosecution of Manuel
Younes. He argued that the map drawn by Fadi Ghosn of the location of the two vehicles
and the time of the two explosions did not correspond to the facts. It would have been
impossible for Mano Manolito to stand where he was supposed to have stood, and the
theory of an explosion by remote control was invalidated by the fact that it was
impossible to detect the car from that location. A link with the crime was an inadequate
ground on which to charge a person with a crime and always involved an element of
doubt.
He concluded by demanding that his client should be found innocent of the charge
laid against him.
At the close of the trial proceedings, Manuel Younes demanded that he be found
innocent.
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Chapter III
Some of the issues raised
I. Concerning the argument that the decision by the Minister of Justice

and its consequences are null and void, and concerning the jurisdiction
of the Council
Whereas the military court dealt with the case of the blowing up of the two
booby-trapped cars in Antelias, which primarily targeted the escort of the then Minister
of Defence, engineer Michel Murr, with a view to assassinating him;
Whereas the military investigator in charge of investigating the two cases, which
were joined in a single case, issued a decision on 28 October 1992 in response to the
memorandum from the government commissioner concerning the referral of the case to
the Judicial Council pursuant to article 8 of Amnesty Law No. 84/91, which stipulated
that all crimes committed prior to 28 March 1991 involving the assassination or
attempted assassination of religious figures and political leaders were to be referred to the
Judicial Council;
Whereas the Minister of Justice, acting on this judicial decision, appointed

Mr. Georges Ghantous as Investigating Judge for the case by decision No. 627 of
13 December 1994;
Whereas the said Investigating Judge received the documentation that had been
referred to him and took investigatory action on the basis of request No. 5 issued by the
Public Prosecution Service at the Court of Cassation on 13 December 1994;
Whereas defence counsel for Mr. Geagea argued that he lacked jurisdiction and
that the ordinary courts also lacked jurisdiction on the ground that facts pertaining to the
crime corresponded to the definitions set forth in the law enacted on 11 January 1958 and
hence should be tried by the military courts;
Whereas the Investigating Judge considered this defence in his final decision,
examining the wording of aforementioned article 8 of the Amnesty Law, and stated that
the purpose of the first incident, which occurred on 20 March 1991, was to assassinate
the Minister of Defence, engineer Murr, and that the second incident, which occurred on
29 March 1991, served the same purpose and constituted an additional element of the
planned crime. He added that Minister Murr was one of Lebanon‟s political leaders and
concluded, in the light of that fact, that the defence of lack of jurisdiction was legally
unfounded and devoid of merit;
Whereas the case was referred to the Judicial Council pursuant to article 8 of the
Amnesty Law, which was deemed to be applicable to the case in two concordant
decisions, the first issued by the military Investigating Officer and the second by the

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judicial Investigating Judge, and the decision by the Minister of Justice had no bearing on
the referral;
Whereas this Council also looked into the question of jurisdiction, in response to
the argument by defence counsel for Mr. Geagea, and reaffirmed, in accordance with its
settled jurisprudence, that the Investigating Judge‟s decision, which was final, conferred
jurisdiction on the Council, so that it was no longer appropriate for it (i.e. the Council) to
discuss the matter of its jurisdiction. It therefore concluded by refuting the defence
argument concerning lack of jurisdiction (preparatory Council decision dated 20
December 1992);
Two conclusions flow from the foregoing:
1. The question of jurisdiction has been finally settled and cannot be

reopened either directly or indirectly.
2. All the issues raised by the defence, such as challenging the decision by
the Minister of Justice, the referral of the case to the Council, the decision by the military
Investigating Officer, the decision by the Investigating Judge, the applicability of the
terms of article 8 of the Amnesty Law or the applicability of the terms of the Criminal
Code in conjunction with article 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, relate to the
issue of jurisdiction and hence cannot be entertained for the reason already mentioned.
II. Characterization of Minister Murr as a political leader

Whereas article 3, paragraph 3, of the Amnesty Law stipulates that the provisions
of the Law are not applicable to the crimes of assassination or attempted assassination of
political leaders;
Whereas the discussion here relates to the subject matter and the Council is in no
way bound by the outcome. Moreover, there is no ground for deferring the discussion
until a later stage in this judgement;
Whereas it remains to be established whether Minister Murr is a political leader

within the meaning of the aforementioned article 3;
Whereas Attorney Naim cites in this connection the following definition of

leadership in the Encyclopaedia Britannica:
“Leadership can generally be defined as the exercise of influence on others to

achieve the leader‟s aims and goals. This description may encompass either despotic
leadership or democratic leadership, outstanding intellectual, religious, military, technical
and scientific ability, or a close relationship whereby the person concerned steers, guides
or inspires the activities of others in a special way.
A great leader is someone who, in one way or another, enriches the personalities
of those who follow him. His power (and he certainly has power) does not stem from
seeking control or exercising control but from the deep-seated conviction of his followers

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that they will achieve, through him or with him, a kind of self-fulfilment that they would
not otherwise achieve.”
Attorney Naim concludes that these descriptions are not applicable to Minister
Murr;
While Attorney Karam, for his part, also holds that Minister Murr does not fit the
description of a political leader, he concedes that the relevant texts contain no definition
or characterization of a political leader.
He argues that a political leader is a national figurehead and he gives the

following examples of persons he regards as political leaders:
Aristotle (Athens), Ghandi (India), De Gaulle (France), Abdel Nasser (Egypt),

Tito (Yugoslavia), Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, Jamaleddin al-Afghani, Saad Zaghloul,
Jomo Kenyatta, Martin Luther King, Kennedy, John XXIII, Fidel Castro, Lenin (not
Stalin), Victor Hugo, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emile Zola, André Malraux;
Whereas it is necessary, in order to establish what is meant by the concept of a

political leader and hence the exception in article 8 of the Amnesty Law, to review the
circumstances and motives that prompted the legislature to provide for such an exception;
Whereas it is well known that the exception was included in response to the
reservations harboured by those involved in drafting and adopting the Amnesty Law in
the Government or the Chamber of Deputies. They had in mind crimes of assassination or
attempted assassination that had targeted religious figures and well-known politicians. An
amnesty in respect of such crimes would be difficult to accept and the exception was
included in response to those reservations. The politicians who were thus targeted were
characterized as political leaders and the exception denied perpetrators the right to an
amnesty;
Whereas the concept of a political leader contemplated by the Law should be

inferred by comparison with well-known victims of assassinations and attempted
assassinations who figured prominently in the minds of the legislature, rather than by
invoking mere theoretical standards or by making comparisons such as those invoked by
the defence with regard to foreign political leaders;
Whereas the following observations may be made in the light of the foregoing:
1. The legislature was not referring, specifically or exclusively, to leaders of

sectarian parties or to the originators of doctrines, programmes or ideas that have had a
major influence on the general public.
2. What the legislature meant by the term political leaders was persons
whose political and popular status in Lebanese politics set them apart from other
politicians. They may either have inherited that status from their fathers or forefathers, or
acquired it through their leadership talents and through systematic and assiduous practical
action that rallied people around them in the hope that they could achieve their ambitions

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through their agency. As a result, they rose to prominence on the political stage and
acquired leadership status, either countrywide or within a particular region or faction.
3. There is nothing in the Law or in the circumstances that led to its

enactment which indicates that devotion to political action was intended by the legislature
as a prerequisite for those denoted by the term political leadership. Moreover, there is no
contradiction, strictly speaking, between the status of a businessman and the idea of
political leadership. Indeed a politician‟s success in his professional life and business
plays an important role in securing support for his political leadership in accordance with
the aforementioned concept and requirements.
4. Mr. Michel Murr has had a lengthy career in politics and has played a role
in major events, especially in the recent past, during the phase resulting from the Taif
Agreement, in respect of which he was one of the leading figures. During the difficult
period when action focused on disbanding the militias and asserting the authority of the
state and when he was the target of the attempted assassination, he held the office of
Minister of Defence and was responsible in that capacity for implementing the
Government‟s decision in that regard and for taking the measures required to achieve that
goal.
Whereas, in the light of the foregoing, Mr. Murr may be regarded as a political
leader within the meaning of the Amnesty Law, and it follows that his attempted
assassination constituted an exception in accordance with the provisions of article 3 of
the said Law;
Whereas the implications of the conclusions that may be inferred from this for the
substance of the present case will be discussed in due course;
Furthermore, the question of political crimes and other arguments and questions
raised will also be discussed in due course.
= = = = = = = = =

- 16 -
Chapter IV
The facts of the case
On Wednesday, 20 March 1991, at about 9.10 a.m., the then Minister of Defence,
Mr Michel Murr, was travelling in his car, accompanied by his security escort, from his
home in Btighrin to the Ministry of Defence, following his normal daily route on the
main road connecting Antelias Square to the motorway leading to Beirut. On reaching the
point adjacent to the Armenian Patriarchate in that district, when the car turned to pass
under the bridge spanning the motorway, a car standing in the centre of the island
separating the two lanes of the road opposite the Patriarchate exploded at the end of the
convoy, killing seven persons, injuring about twenty-five others and damaging the
neighbouring buildings and adjacent cars. The fatalities were: Mouawen Adib Tanous,
Zakia Bou Younes and her daughter Micheline Nome, Samir Boughader, his wife
Violette Sawaya and their daughter Josianne, and Aurore Sawaya. The injured included
Minister Michel Murr and others, whose names were mentioned in the investigation.
While the investigations were under way to determine the circumstances of the
explosion, on Friday, 29 March 1991, a second explosion occurred in the same district at
around 9 a.m. from a booby-trapped car parked about 15 metres from the site of the first
car, close to the wall of the Armenian Patriarchate to the right of the main road linking
Antelias to the motorway. The human and material damage caused by the explosion
included four fatalities: the gendarme Ahmad al-Bazzaz, Corporal Kifah Olouch and two
other persons; a large number of injuries; and damage to buildings and cars.
It emerged from the immediate investigation conducted by the security services

on the site of the two explosions, from the technical investigation conducted by the
military expert and from the testimony of eyewitnesses, that the first explosion resulted
from a bomb weighing about 70 kilograms of TNT that had been placed in a white
Mercedes 200 vehicle, which caused damage within a radius of 150 metres. The second
explosion resulted from another bomb, also weighing about 70 kilograms, placed in a
brown American Buick vehicle with a beige roof. It had been parked in the same location
since the first explosion and had sustained damage from that explosion. It was not
possible to identify the owner of this vehicle because it could not be traced in the records
of the vehicle registration department from the specifications available. However, when
members of the central investigatory squad examined photographs of the first explosion
published in the newspapers, they found a photograph that showed the Buick parked on
the site where it exploded. The colour and model corresponded to those mentioned.
Data obtained from witness statements and documentary evidence at all stages of
the investigation and during the legal proceedings confirm that, prior to the occurrence of
the two above-mentioned explosions, factional wars were raging in Lebanon between
internal and external armed militias, including the Lebanese Forces militia, led by the
accused Samir Geagea. Military clashes occurred between the latter militia and Lebanese
army units led by General Michel Aoun, a situation commonly referred to as the war of
elimination. Increased Arab contacts and meetings under international auspices led to the
Taif Agreement and the adoption of a National Accord document which served as the

- 17 -
basis for the country‟s new Constitution and laid the foundations for the ending of the
Lebanese war, the disbandment of the militias and the assertion of state authority
throughout the national territory.
It marked the beginning of a new political process, the basic principles and aims
of which corresponded to the principles and aims of the above-mentioned Agreement.
Moreover, leading figures were involved in the process.
It was in this context that the portfolio of Minister of National Defence was given
to Minister Michel Murr on 24 December 1990. The state was determined to implement
the decisions agreed upon in Taif, and the Council of Ministers held a meeting on
16 January 1991 at which it decided to set up a committee, chaired by the Minister of
Defence Mr. Michel Murr and composed of the Minister of the Interior, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Agriculture, tasked with drawing up a plan for
disbandment of the militias, disarmament and assertion of state authority. It also decided
to entrust the Minister of Defence with responsibility for taking the necessary decisions
to prohibit the carrying and storage of weapons, to ensure that the ordnance of the armed
forces was fully restored, to prevent illegal taxation, and to address other matters aimed at
restoring order and stability and setting in motion a civil peace process.
Faced with the national, regional and international determination to end the
Lebanese war, the militias, including the Lebanese Forces militia, had no choice but to
join the peace process, however reluctantly. However, that goal was not achieved without
reservations on the part of the accused, Samir Geagea, in his capacity as leader of the
Forces, regarding the arrangements for implementing the decision to disband the militias.
He demanded that internal and foreign militias should be disbanded simultaneously, a
view that was not shared by a number of government ministers, including Minister
Michel Murr, who considered that the internal militias, including the Lebanese Forces
militia, should be disbanded before the foreign militias, so that the latter could continue
to offer resistance to the Israeli occupation of a part of Lebanese territory.
This situation generated fear and foreboding among the accused Samir Geagea
and his companions in the Lebanese Forces militia. They were deeply concerned and
dismayed because the decision to disband the militias without any guarantees would, as
they saw it, place them in a position that was clouded with uncertainty, especially since
the political equation remained unclear. Following the deployment of the Lebanese army
in Greater Beirut and the withdrawal of most of the Lebanese Forces to the Kesrouan and
Jbeil region, Samir Geagea insisted on maintaining the Forces militia in their political and
military positions in that region, which they controlled, so that they could serve as a
means of exerting pressure, enabling him to impose conditions on the state during the
normalization process, including the formation of a government in which the Forces
would enjoy effective representation through their own members or those of their allies.
Samir Geagea therefore refused to accept the ministerial portfolio offered to him unless
more than one third of the government was composed of persons from the regions then
known as the “eastern regions”. A further condition was that the Forces should retain the
ability to grant or withhold approval of the officer appointed to lead the Lebanese army
when it was deployed in the Kesrouan and Jbeil region.

- 18 -
As the Lebanese state was not determined to assert its authority in order to allay
Samir Geagea‟s reservations and fears, it insisted on deploying in all regions, including
those under the control of the militias, and hence also in the region of Jbeil and Kesrouan,
without taking into account the Forces‟ conditions, especially the demand for
simultaneous disbandment of the internal and foreign militias. However, it endeavoured,
as far as possible, to implement its decisions without any military engagements. To that
end, the Minister of Defence, Michel Murr, had to establish direct and intermediated
contacts with Samir Geagea to iron out existing differences, and he actually had a
meeting with him prior to the two explosions to inform him of the state‟s refusal of his
demand to appoint an officer designated by Geagea as leader in the Kesrouan and Jbeil
region, since the person he designated was more loyal to the Forces than to the Lebanese
army.
In addition, the personal relationship between Minister Michel Murr and Samir
Geagea was not conducive to the resolution of pending issues, since they followed a
different political line. Moreover, Samir Geagea bore a grudge against Minister Michel
Murr on account of his support for Mr. Elie Hobeika, who was Samir Geagea‟s main
adversary since the signing of the Taif Agreement to end the Lebanese war in 1985. At
the time, Hobeika was a party to the Agreement, representing the Lebanese Forces, and
Minister Murr was one of its main sponsors. In response to the Agreement, Samir Geagea
launched a military uprising against Hobeika on 15 January 1986, as a result of which he
was ousted from the leadership of the Lebanese Forces and replaced by Samir Geagea.
Minister Murr continued to support Mr. Elie Hobeika after the beginning of the civil
peace process in 1990. This estrangement between Minister Murr and Samir Geagea was
public knowledge despite Samir Geagea‟s acceptance, during the military operations that
accompanied the uprising, of Minister Murr‟s mediation with a view to halting Geagea‟s
attack on the headquarters of the Lebanese Forces in the Karantina district, since
Mr. Elias Murr, Minister Murr‟s son, was trapped with Elie Hobeika as a result of the
bombardment of the headquarters by elements loyal to Geagea.
In view of the unbalanced and discordant relationship in both general and specific
terms between the Lebanese state and Minister of Defence Michel Murr, on the one hand,
and Samir Geagea, on the other, the latter decided, as leader of the Lebanese Forces
militia and decision maker on its behalf, to oppose the official authorities‟ determination
to disband the militias and to deploy in all regions on the basis of the state‟s conditions,
and to take action to thwart the arrangements for implementing the disbandment decision,
or at least to delay the process pending an improvement in the situation that would enable
him to strengthen his position within the existing equation, especially since he was aware
that the dispute regarding the disbandment of all the militias had regional and
international dimensions. Some of the states that supported the ending of the Lebanese
war backed his position in that regard, while others supported the position of the
Lebanese Government. Samir Geagea found, in the context of this difference of opinion,
a party that was disposed to implement what he had in mind.
As Minister Michel Murr was a mainstay of the political formation emanating

from the Taif Agreement, which was responsible for implementing the process of
disbandment of the militias, and in view of his status as Minister of Defence with

- 19 -
political responsibility for the Lebanese army which would perform the task of asserting
the state‟s authority, his assassination was intended to lead to a vacuum in areas with a
direct bearing on the arrangements to disband the militias. The plan to assert the state‟s
authority would therefore be delayed, and so would the plan to deploy the army in the
Kesrouan and Jbeil regions, clearing the way for Samir Geagea to impose his own
conditions when a replacement for Minister Murr was appointed. He would exploit the
time thus wasted to strengthen his position, banking on the emergence of circumstances
that would be more favourable to him. Geagea prepared for this move by agreeing, the
day before the explosion, to the participation of Roger Dib as a Minister representing him
in the Government, so that he could then effectively present his demands and conditions
and ward off any charges of thwarting the decision to disband the militias.
In pursuance of his aims. Samir Geagea summoned to his headquarters in

Ghadras, about two months before the first explosion on 20 March 1991, the accused
Ghassan Touma, head of the Internal Security Unit of the Lebanese Forces, and the
accused Raji Abdou, head of the Military Security Unit, and asked them to organize an
operation to assassinate Minister Michel Murr after briefing them on the motives
underlying the plan.
As soon as Touma and Abdou received the order, they took preparatory steps
separately with a view to implementing the operation. Raji Abdou summoned Elie
Jabbour, head of the Intelligence Section in his Unit, to his office in the Oberly building
and asked him whether there was an informant among the members of the Department
who had relatives serving as escorts or security guards for Minister Murr or who were
among his close companions. When Jabbour pressed him to reveal the motive for this
information, he informed him about Samir Geagea‟s decision to get rid of Minister Murr.
Jabbour understood from this reply that it was necessary to find a person who fitted the
description so that the movements of Minister Michel Murr could be monitored.
Elie Jabbour did not manage to find an appropriate person to carry out the
assignment. Ghassan Touma, however, assumed responsibility for the assassination and
entrusted the Security Unit he headed with preparatory and operational tasks. The
accused Antonios Elias Elias, known as Antonios Obeid or Tony Obeid, who was under
Touma‟s direct command as head of the Unit‟s Protection and Intervention Company,
entrusted the accused Naja Kaddoum and Elias Awad, known as Giuliano, both of whom
were members of the Unit, with the task of investigating and monitoring the movements
of Minister Michel Murr.
While carrying out the task assigned to them, the accused Naja Kaddoum and
Elias Awad met Wifa Wahbe, also known as Charoun and Sa„dan [monkey] because of
his athletic agility, about ten days before the first explosion. He had worked with the two
accused in the Protection and Intervention Company under Tony Obeid and then left to
work as a taxi driver, plying the route Beirut – Dora – Antelias. The meeting occurred in
the Antelias district close to Al-Halabi restaurant, which Wifa Wahbe frequented
regularly, carrying passengers and buying sandwiches, according to his statement during
the first investigation. The restaurant in question is located, according to Wahbe‟s
account, at a spot from which the road which runs straight to the Armenian Patriarchate is

- 20 -
clearly visible as well as the bridge on which the explosion occurred, facilitating the task
of observation for those involved. Kaddoum and Awad were travelling in an olive-green
BMW 528 belonging to the Security Unit, which was commonly used by members of the
department when on duty.
In the course of the conversation, Wifa Wahbe asked his two friends what they
were doing in the district, and Naja Kaddoum replied “You know what we‟re up to”,
accompanying this statement with a circular movement of his hand. Wahbe understood
from what he said that they were on a reconnoitring mission for security purposes.
On another day during the same period, Wifa Wahbe met the accused Kaddoum
and Awad again at Al-Halabi restaurant. And he met them on a third occasion in the same
place shortly before the date on which the first explosion occurred. Wahbe noticed that
the accused Elias Awad was reading a sheet of paper similar to the standard investigation
form used by members of the SecurityUnit involved in gathering information. He was
very familiar with such forms from his previous work within the Security Unit when he
carried out surveillance and monitoring assignments. The form was used to record
information about the number of vehicles in an escort and their passengers, the distance
between one vehicle and another, the military equipment, if any, used by the escort, and
the timing of its passage. Wahbe noticed that Awad had a wireless communication
handset that he placed opposite the front seat of the car where he was seated next to the
driver.
= = = = = = = = =
These facts were preceded by another set of facts, as follows: in early 1990,
during the so-called war of elimination, the accused Manuel Younes, also known as
Mano, who was a logistics officer in the hierarchy of the Lebanese Forces militia
attached to the Protection and Intervention Company of the Security Unit and who
worked in the Department‟s premises in the Karantina district, went to the car repair shop
in the building, where he found his close friend Risha Hana, known as Dany, who worked
under the orders of Tony Obeid, booby-trapping three saloon vehicles, the first a blue 528
BMW, the second a white Mercedes LEF [200 or 230 Series, 1977-1982 models] and the
third a brown and beige American Buick. Dany was placing explosives – sticks of
dynamite – in the seats and doors of the three cars. When Manuel asked him about it, he
replied that Tony Obeid had assigned him the task. Two days later Manuel Younes
returned and accompanied Danny to the repair shop, where the latter proceeded to test the
engines.
Subsequently, Ghassan Antonios, also known as Ghassan Nizal, fitted the three
booby-trapped cars with a Yauzo [?] remote control device, the type normally used by the
Forces. He did so in response to a request by the accused Ghassan Touma. The booby-
trapped BMW was then driven away and placed under the Nahr al-Mott bridge so that it
could be blown up as and when necessary. This was during a phase of the war that was
being waged at the time between units of the army supporting General Michel Aoun and

- 21 -
the Lebanese Forces militia. The car was later returned to the Forces building in
Karantina without having been blown up because it was damaged by the bombing. It was
then disassembled, the explosives were removed and some parts were used to repair other
vehicles belonging to the Security Unit.
In July 1990, when the accused Manuel Younes visited the repair shop containing
the three booby-trapped cars, he found only two vehicles, the brown and beige Buick and
the white Mercedes. He then lost trace of them until 13 October 1990, when he saw them
in the ground-floor repair shop of another building in the Karantina district which also
belonged to the Security Unit. He did not know who had moved them to that location.
After the death of Risha Hana, known as Dany, some time between August and
September 1990, when a bomb that he was preparing in his room in the Security Unit
building exploded, the accused Rushdi Raad, also known as Nabil Fawzi, who was
responsible for the engineering branch of the Forces Security Unit, took over the booby-
trapping work that had been performed by Risha Hana. He was assisted by the accused
Jean Chahine, also known as Asad. They both worked under the supervision and orders
of the accused Tony Obeid, who was responsible in the Protection and Intervention
Company for the security work undertaken by the Security Unit headed by Ghassan
Touma.
About two months before the explosion occurred in Antelias, the accused Raji
Abdou summoned the other accused Fadi Ghosn, a military engineer who had been
entrusted at the time by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee headed by Jacques Mansi
with keeping track of the Forces‟ entire military engineering stock, including the
explosives arsenal. Raji Abdou ordered Fadi Ghosn, in the presence of the accused Tony
Obeid, to hand over to the Forces Security Unit any TEN detonators, used to reinforce for
an explosion, that he had in stock. He carried out the order and sent the remaining 40
detonators of the type specified to the Forces by sea mail from the port of Jounieh to the
port of Al-Houdh al-Khamis, where it was collected for the Security Unit in Karantina by
the accused Rushdi Raad, who reported his arrival and collection of the goods as the
Department‟s explosives expert.
After 15 days, the accused Raji Abdou ordered the accused Fadi Ghosn again to
provide the Security Unit with a quantity of (Px, Rx) explosives, which were plastic
explosives belonging to the Unit. Ghosn carried out the order after withdrawing the
explosives, which weighed approximately 500 kilograms, from the Forces‟ warehouse
near Pasteur Hospital in Jounieh. He sent them by sea from Jounieh to the security
building in Karantina. From there Rushdi Raad got in touch with the operations room in
Kesrouan and informed them that he had received the explosives.
A few days before the first explosion occurred, the accused Rushdi Raad, acting
in pursuit of the plan to assassinate Minister Murr in his capacity as the person
responsible in the Security Unit for car-bomb operations, and with the assistance of the
accused Jean Chahine, equipped a white Mercedes and a brown and beige Buick – the
two cars that Manuel Younes had previously seen in the Security Unit building in

- 22 -
Karantina – so that they could be exploded at the time fixed for the assassination
operation.
In the meantime, the Forces Security Unit had been observing the movements and
the routes followed by Minister Michel Murr and his escort on the road leading from
Antelias to the motorway. It was decided that the car-bomb operation should take place
when he was moving through the area on 20 March 1991. Rushdi Raad and Jean Chahine
had been travelling more frequently than usual between the Security Unit building in
Karantina and Zalka and Jounieh in order to find an appropriate location for the two
booby-trapped cars. As a result, they were absent from their workplace and this was
noticed by Manuel Younes, prompting him after the explosion to link it to Rushdi Raad‟s
role in the incident, according to his statement during the investigation.
As soon as the details of the car-bomb operation had been completed and
prepared, the accused Jean Chahine drove the two booby-trapped cars to Antelias on two
separate occasions, parking them in the specified location. The white Mercedes was
parked in the centre of the island separating the two lanes of the road opposite the
Armenian Patriarchate immediately before the bridge, while the Buick was parked in
front of the first car, at a distance of some 15 metres and on the opposite side, i.e. on the
right-hand side of the road adjacent to the southern wall of the Patriarchate. In the
meantime, a member of the Security Unit, who accompanied Jean Chahine and who was
not identified during the investigation, followed the latter on a large motorbike on the two
occasions when he drove the cars to Antelias in order to give him a lift back to the
Security Unit building in Karantina. On the date that had been fixed for the car-bomb
operation, i.e. on 20 March 1991, the accused Rushdi Raad travelled to Antelias and took
up a position to the east of the site on which the cars were parked and from which they
were visible. He had in his possession the remote control device required to trigger the
explosions. At about 9.10 a.m., Minister Murr‟s escort arrived, following its usual route
down the Antelias road leading to the motorway and passing by the Armenian
Patriarchate. When the escort reached the area between the two booby-trapped cars,
Rushdi Raad set off the remote control device. The Mercedes exploded but the Buick
failed to explode on account of some kind of defect and was hit and seriously damaged
by the Mercedes explosion.
The explosion also failed to achieve its aim of killing Minister Murr, since at the
time of the explosion his car was several metres away from the exploding vehicle,
passing under the bridge and about to turn left onto the motorway leading to Beirut. The
Minister sustained an injury to the head from being thrown against the side of the car in
which he was travelling, an armoured vehicle, which was fiercely jolted by the blast of
the explosion and thrown sideways into the air before falling back onto the ground. The
explosion caused the human and material damage that has already been described.
As soon as Elie Jabbour heard the news on his radio, he headed to Raji Abdou‟s
office to find out what had happened. The latter confirmed the news, saying: “Yes, that
was Touma‟s work”. Raji Abdou then phoned Ghassan Touma and enquired about the
outcome. When he laid down the receiver, he informed Jabbour that Minister Michel

- 23 -
Murr was not dead, and added: “That ass Nabil didn‟t fix it properly”, referring to Rushdi
Raad, who is also known as Nabil Fawzi.
Some days after the first explosion, the perpetrators had to find a way of dealing
with the Buick. They tried to drive it away but failed. It was seen after the explosion by a
number of witnesses who gave statements during the investigation, but none of them
knew that it was booby-trapped. They thought that the owner had been hit by the
explosion. They included the witness Ghazar Aghoub Ghazarian, who was employed in
the Armenian Patriarchate. He stated that one night, some time after the first explosion,
Monsignor Wartan Demerjian drew his attention to the presence of two suspicious-
looking persons who were circling the Buick. So the witness went out to the car to
investigate but there was nobody there. When he approached the car to inspect it, he
found that the door was open. He got in and noticed that the car radio and a tape recorder
had not been stolen, but what also caught his attention was a small illuminated lamp on
the dashboard. He looked for the ignition key but it was not in its usual place. He
therefore left the car and returned to the Patriarchate after noting that it was a brown
American car with a beige roof. On the day of the second explosion, he heard a deafening
blast from inside the Patriarchate. When he went outside, he found that it was this car that
had exploded.
It emerged that those responsible for the first explosion, being unable to move the
Buick from the place in which it was parked and fearing that its presence might yield
evidence that would reveal their identity, decided to blow it up on the spot. They did so at
about 9 a.m. on Friday, 29 March 1991. The explosion killed and injured passersby and
caused material damage, as described above.
As in the case of the first explosion, curiosity drove Elie Jabbour to seek out Raji
Abdou in his office and enquire about the reason for the second explosion. Abdou
explained the situation to him, stating that the Buick had been set to explode at the same
time as the Mercedes. As it had not been possible to remove it from the site, it had been
decided to blow it up in order to get rid of evidence that could identify the perpetrators. In
response to a question from Elie Jabbour about Samir Geagea‟s reaction to the
unsuccessful outcome of the assassination operation, he said that the latter blamed
Ghassan Touma for the error committed in executing the plan.
One or two days after the second explosion on 29 March 1991, the accused Raji
Abdou summoned Fadi Ghosn, an explosives expert specializing in electrical
engineering, to his office in the Oberly barracks and asked him, in the presence of First
Adjutant Elie Philippe Eid, for his opinion regarding the technical reasons for the failure
of the two cars to explode simultaneously so that the desired result had not been
achieved. Elie Eid first took a sheet of paper and drew a plan of the site of the explosion
and the position of the two booby-trapped cars and of the escort. Fadi Ghosn, using the
sketch, explained the reasons for the failure of the operation, attributing it to the use of a
wireless remote control device to trigger the explosion, so that the two explosions could
not occur simultaneously. The person who organized the two booby traps had probably
made a mistake in coordinating the timing of the bombs. If there was a single detonator, it
would be technically impossible to set off the two bombs at exactly the same instant, and

- 24 -
if there were two detonators, it would be impossible for a single person to trigger them
both at exactly the same instant. In such an operation, one explosion would inevitably
precede the other and prevent it from succeeding.
Raji Abdou then asked Fadi Ghosn to submit a technical report on the matter. As
he was preparing his report, he heard Elie Eid saying to Raji Abdou that some adversaries
of the Forces were claiming that Ghassan Touma was behind the operation and that it was
Jean Chahine who had driven the two cars from Karantina to Antelias, delivering them to
a person from the Al-Ashkar group. Eid then pointed to the sketch he had made,
indicating a location close to Antelias bridge and saying: “Mano Manolito was observing
from here”. He then indicated another location on the sketch in the direction of the
Rabieh district and said: “Nabil Fawzi – that‟s Rushdi Raad‟s nickname – was there”.
The meeting then ended.
In mid-April 1991, some fifteen days after the second explosion, Wifa Wahbe
returned and again coincidentally ran into Naja Kaddoum in the vicinity of Abou André
restaurant in the area in which the two incidents had occurred. Kaddoum said that he was
afraid to go to Beirut lest he be charged with causing the two explosions. He added that
Tony Obeid was determined to kill Minister Michel Murr so that Samir Geagea could
take his place. He explained to him that the aim of the two explosions had been to kill
Minister Murr because he was responsible, in his capacity as Minister of Defence, for the
Lebanese army operations against the Lebanese Forces, who were compelled to retreat to
Kesrouan. Wifa Wahbe made no comment on these revelations and the meeting ended at
that point. Seven months later, Naja Kaddoum went to Wifa Wahbe‟s home in Anfeh.
During his visit he mentioned in connection with the case of Minister Murr that Jean
Chahine had been involved in the car-bomb operation.
= = = = = = = = =
The accused Manuel Younes, when giving testimony during the investigation
regarding his duties within the Forces militia, mentioned the existence of a working
relationship and friendship between himself and the accused Nadim al-Ashkar, who was
responsible, according to his statement, for a security intelligence station. When the
investigator enquired about Nadim al-Ashkar, the security agenciess replied that this was
the nickname of Jean Maroun Nejm, who had previously been responsible for the
Security Unit in the Forces and was currently in one of the Arab Gulf states.
Furthermore:
It was suspected in the initial stages of the investigation that the defendants
Michel Hambar Hambarsoumian and Mohammed Hobeit Ibrahim had played a role in the
car-bomb operation, but the Investigating Judge decided, in the light of his investigations
and his assessment of the evidence, not to prosecute them because of the lack of
sufficient evidence of the acts attributed to them. He further decided not to prosecute the
defendants Elie Philippe Eid, Ghassan Kamil Antonios, Georges Youssef Mesih, Wifa

- 25 -
Jamil Wahbe, Rita Georges Issa, Tanius Elias al-Haddad and Elie Said Jabbour, so that
this Council may not make any further reference to the acts attributed to them.
= = = = = = = = = =

- 26 -
Chapter V
The evidence
Whereas the following evidence has been recorded concerning the facts set out in
the preceding chapter and attributed to the accused:
I. Concerning the accused Samir Geagea

1. The evidence
The following evidence has been recorded against the accused Samir Geagea:
(a) Evidence based on the statement by Elie Jabbour
Elie Jabbour, who was responsible for the Intelligence Section of the Military
Security Unit in the Forces, stated during the preliminary investigation and before the
Judicial Council that a month before the explosion he was summoned by Raji Abdou, the
head of the above-mentioned Unit, who informed him about Samir Geagea‟s plan to
assassinate Minister Michel Murr and about the fact that Geagea wanted him, together
with Ghassan Touma, the head of the Internal Security Unit, to arrange for an operation
to eliminate Murr. To that end, Raji Abdou asked him to try to find somebody from
Minister Murr‟s escort or somebody close to him. Jabbour understood from this
conversation that the purpose of finding such a person was to monitor Minister Murr‟s
movements.
Elie Jabbour also stated that when, after his meeting with Raji Abdou and the
failure of the attempted assassination, he asked the latter about Samir Geagea‟s reaction,
Abdou replied that Geagea blamed Ghassan Touma for the failure of the operation.
(b) Evidence based on Samir Geagea’s relationship with the Lebanese

Forces
At the time when the crime was committed, the Lebanese Forces were still a
capable, effective and well-disciplined militia, which had emerged victorious from its
war with General Aoun together with the members of the regime resulting from the Taif
Agreement. The Forces were still in full control of the regions of Kesrouan and Jbeil and
still held their main positions in Beirut, especially that in Karantina, where the Security
Unit was located. It also maintained its cohesive structure within a strict administrative
and military hierarchy headed by Samir Geagea.
The Forces were basically a military organization without a legal personality and
without any link binding its members to each other or to the organization apart from the
person of the leader. Hence, all power and decision-making authority was vested in the
leader, who ran the internal machinery through persons he appointed directly, who
received their orders from him alone and who were accountable to him. He was also in

- 27 -
charge of the Forces‟ finances, holding them in the accounts of persons with fictitious
names from whom he received blank credit.
The Internal Security Unit in the Forces, which was responsible for protecting
Samir Geagea and discharging most security assignments, was headed by Ghassan
Touma. Next to him in the hierarchy came Tony Obeid, who was responsible, with the
unit he headed, for the personal protection of the leader. These two men were absolutely
devoted to Samir Geagea and linked to him by an age-old struggle dating back to Deir al-
Qitareh. Next in the hierarchy came figures such as Rushdi Raad, Jean Chahine and
others.
The leader, Geagea, generally relied on Ghassan Touma and his unit for security
work, entrusting them with assignments, including assassinations, which could only be
undertaken with the leader‟s knowledge and approval.
All these matters, having been recorded in the judgement of the Judicial Council
rendered on 24 June 1995 in the case of the murder of Dany Chamoun on 21 October
1990, were reaffirmed in the present case through witness statements given during the
investigation and trial stages.
The statements were as follows:
– Jihad Abi Ramia, a member of the Forces‟ shock squad, testified that there were
three security bodies in the Lebanese Forces: the Internal Security Unit headed by
Ghassan Touma, the Military Security Unit headed by Raji Abdou, and the External
Security Unit headed by Akram. The decision to blow up or eliminate any person was
taken by Samir Geagea, while the details of implementation were worked out by the
individual departments, which had sufficient authority to take the practical steps needed
to carry out Samir Geagea‟s orders.
– Fouad Malek, who was Chief of Staff of the Forces at the time, testified that the
security units in the Forces received their orders directly from Samir Geagea, who issued
the order and personally received the report on implementation. Ghassan Touma, as the
person responsible for security operations, took his orders from Samir Geagea, and an
operation such as the assassination attempt on Minister Michel Murr could not have been
undertaken, as a rule, without an order from the leadership.
– Karim Pakradouni, who was formerly deputy leader of the Lebanese Forces,
testified that, in theory, no unit head could assassinate a prominent figure without an
order from the leadership and that Ghassan Touma was in direct contact with Samir
Geagea.
– Georges Mesih, who was responsible for the Communications Section of the
Forces, testified that orders concerning particular issues were issued by the leader.
– As„ad Said, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Forces, testified that political
decisions were taken following a discussion in the leadership council. Security decisions

- 28 -
were taken personally by the head of the Forces, Samir Geagea, following consultations
with the Security Units.
– The accused Samir Geagea confirmed in his statement to the Investigating

Judge that, as leader of the Lebanese Forces, he had considerable authority to issue
orders, that the security units received their orders, as a rule, directly from him, and that
the operation aimed at assassinating Minister Michel Murr was not an ordinary or simple
operation and required the attention of the leadership.
It may be inferred from the foregoing that major security operations whose
outcome could have a negative or positive impact on the Forces, such as the operation to
assassinate Minister Michel Murr, as well as the implementation of such operations
through members of the militia using its equipment, could not have been undertaken by
the security units of the Forces militia in early 1991, in particular by the Internal Security
Unit, without a decision by the chief, Samir Geagea, and a direct order from him.
(c) Evidence based on surveillance of the movements of Minister Michel

Murr by the Forces Internal Security Unit
Wifa Wahbe, a member of the Security Unit of the Lebanese Forces militia,
testified during the preliminary investigation and before the Judicial Council that he had
repeatedly seen the accused Naja Kaddoum and Elias Awad from the Unit‟s Protection
and Intervention company a few days before the explosion in the Antelias district in a
location from which the site of the subsequent explosion was visible. They were in a
vehicle belonging to the Security Unit that was customarily used for security
assignments, and one of them had a data sheet concerning the escort vehicles and the
timing of their passage. The data sheet was the type used by the Security Unit for
surveillance operations. They also had a wireless communication device. When Wahbe
asked them what they were doing in that location, Kaddoum replied “You know what
we‟re up to”, accompanying this statement with a circular movement of his hand. Wahbe
understood from what he said that they were on a security assignment.
It may be inferred from the foregoing that Naja Kaddoum and Elias Awad were
on a surveillance mission, investigating the route usually taken by Minister Michel Murr
with a view to preparing the assassination operation that Samir Geagea had decided upon
and whose implementation he had assigned to the heads of the Internal Security and
Military Security Units, Ghassan Touma and Raji Abdou.
The statement by Wifa Wahbe is consistent with that of Elie Jabbour regarding
his instructions from Raji Abdou, based on the orders of Samir Geagea, to find a person
close to Minister Murr in order to monitor his movements. As Elie Jabbour was unable to
do so, Ghassan Touma had to take over – he had in fact been entrusted with the operation
from the outset – and operated through the members of his Unit, which was directly
under the orders of Samir Geagea.

- 29 -
(d) Evidence based on the sighting of two booby-trapped cars in the

repair shop of the Security Unit building
The accused Manuel Younes, a Forces officer attached to the Protection and
Intervention Company of the Security Unit, testified that, in early 1990 during the war of
elimination, he saw Risha Hana, who was in charge of explosives and car bombs in the
Security Unit, booby-trapping three saloon vehicles in the repair shop of the Security
Unit building in Karantina. One was a BMW, another a white Mercedes and the third a
brown and beige American Buick. He knew that the first car was placed near Nahr al-
Mott bridge during the war of elimination, but that it had not been blown up but had been
hit by shrapnel, whereupon it had been withdrawn and disassembled and the explosives
had been removed. On 13 October 1990 he had again seen the white Mercedes and the
Buick in a building in Karantina district that also belonged to the Security Unit.
This statement by the accused Manuel Younes regarding the model and colour of
the two cars coincided with the forensic findings, the results of the investigations
conducted in the security units and witness statements to the effect that the first booby-
trapped car was a white Mercedes and the second a brown American Buick with a beige
roof. This was borne out by the newspaper photos published after the first explosion, the
originals of which were obtained by members of the forensic team. They were exhibited
at the public session of this Council and showed the American car, which was not blown
up the first time, parked at the site where it was blown up later on. The model and colour
corresponded to the description in the statements made by Manuel Younes and the
witnesses during the investigation, a description borne out by the employee of the
Armenian Patriarchate, Ghazar Ghazarian, who examined the car before it was blown up.
He was not aware of the fact that it was booby-trapped, as already noted in the chapter
concerning the facts.
The statement by Manuel Younes summarized above must be evaluated from two
angles:
First, the discrepancy between his statement and the other statements with respect
to the dating of the car models does not undermine the probative value of the statements,
since it is impossible to establish the date of manufacture of a Mercedes accurately after
an explosion has torn it apart and its remains have been scattered about. The accurate
identification of such remains would call for specialized knowledge and experience,
which Manuel Younes and the other witnesses did not possess.
What makes the said statements credible and convincing in the context is their
consistency when it comes to describing the main features of the cars, namely their
colour and model. It is no coincidence that the witnesses‟ statements regarding the colour
and model of the cars are consistent with Manuel Younes‟s statement concerning his
sighting of the two cars in the repair shop in the Security Unit building. While a white
Mercedes is quite a common sight, the same cannot be said of the colour combination of
the Buick or of that particular model of car.

- 30 -
Second, it may be true that the two cars were booby-trapped during the war of
elimination in early 1990, as stated by Manuel Younes, so that they could be blown up
during the continuous battles that were waged during that war. However, it does not
follow that the same cars could not be used after the war for different purposes, such as
the operation aimed as assassinating Minister Michel Murr, if they had not been used
during the war, as in the case of the BMW which, instead of being blown up at Nahr al-
Mott bridge, was driven away by the Security Unit, which removed the explosives,
disassembled the car and used the spare parts. It should be noted that Manuel Younes saw
the two cars, the Mercedes and the Buick, on 13 October 1990 being handled by
members of the Security Unit in the repair shop.
The conclusive and reliable evidence in Manuel Younes‟s statement relates to the
fact that there were two booby-trapped cars in the Security Unit‟s possession and that the
purpose of such possession was to use them for car-bomb operations when necessary,
without ruling out the possibility of placing them in storage and equipping them with
bombs as and when necessary for particular operations. This is borne out by the statement
of the accused Fadi Ghosn, who stated that two months before the explosion, acting on an
order from the Security Unit, he had sent reinforced bomb detonators and a quantity of
explosives to the Unit. They were delivered to Rushdi Raad, who had taken over
responsibility for car-bomb operations after the death of the previous operator, Risha
Hana. According to the investigation, the Security Unit had no need of such material at
the time, apart from using it in car-bomb operations, such as booby-trapping the two cars
in its possession for the purpose for which they were used.
It may be concluded from the foregoing that the two booby-trapped cars used in
the operation aimed at assassinating Minister Michel Murr were in the possession of the
Security Unit during the period prior to the operation, and that the relevant staff of the
Unit equipped them, as required, with the bombs for the explosion, acting on orders
issued by the leader, Samir Geagea.
(e) Evidence based on the Forces’ investigation of the reasons for the
failure of the operation
According to the statement made by the accused Fadi Ghosn during the
preliminary investigation, the head of the Military Security Unit, Raji Abdou, summoned
him after the two explosions and asked for his technical opinion of the reasons for the
failure of the bomb placed in the Buick to explode and hence the failure of the operation
to achieve its objective.
He asked him to submit a report on the matter in the presence of one of his
assistants, Elie Eid, who drew a sketch of the site of the explosion and the location of the
two booby-trapped cars and the cars in Minister Murr‟s escort.
It may be concluded from the consistency of Fadi Ghosn‟s statement with Elie
Jabbour‟s previous statement to the effect that Samir Geagea had instructed Raji Abdou
and Ghassan Touma to make arrangements for the assassination operation, that Abdou‟s
aim in investigating the reasons for the failure of the operation was to draw up a technical

- 31 -
report for submission to Samir Geagea. This is consistent with Fouad Malek‟s statement
to the effect that the Security Units, after receiving orders from Samir Geagea, reported
directly to him on the results of the operation implemented. Abdou had learned that
Geagea was blaming Ghassan Touma for the failure of the operation, according to the
statement by Elie Jabbour.
(f) Evidence pertaining to the fact that Samir Geagea had a motive for
the assassination
The findings of the investigation and the trial show that Samir Geagea had more
than one motive to assassinate Minister Michel Murr.
First:
Although the accused Samir Geagea was fully aware of the fact that the
disbandment of the militias was inevitable, given the existence of an internal agreement
and of an international and regional understanding, and that there was no way of
preventing it, he disagreed, according to his statement to the Investigating Judge, with a
group within the Lebanese authorities, including Minister Michel Murr, concerning the
arrangements for implementing the decision to disband the militias. Geagea demanded
that the disbandment should not be fragmented but should encompass all internal and
foreign militias at the same time, while Minister Michel Murr and other government
ministers were determined to begin with the disbandment of the internal militias,
including the Lebanese Forces militia, before disbanding the foreign militias for reasons
relating to the resistance to Israel‟s occupation of part of Lebanese territory.
This fact and the seriousness of the difference of opinion were confirmed by
Georges Mesih, who was responsible for the Forces‟ Public Information Section, in his
statement to the Investigating Judge, which he repeated to this Council, explaining that
during the period in which the attempted assassination of Minister Murr occurred, the
difference of opinion regarding the arrangements to implement the decision to disband
the militias was not confined to the internal parties but was accompanied by international
and regional differences. One group demanded that the foreign militias should be
disbanded first and the internal militias later on, while another group demanded the
opposite. Each of the groups had its own supporters among the Lebanese politicians.
Georges Mesih added that the Forces were interested in changing the existing situation
and boosting their positions, and regarded Minister Murr as a leading player in the group
that opposed their ambitions in this regard.
In his statement to the Investigating Judge, which he confirmed before this

Council, Elie Jabbour said that he had heard from Raji Abdou that Geagea had spoken to
Ghassan Touma and Raji Abdou of the need to prevent the Lebanese army from
deploying in the Kesrouan and Jbeil region, stating that the best way of achieving that
aim was to create confusion by killing the Minister of Defence, Michel Murr.
The fact that Geagea was opposed to the deployment of the army was supported
by the sworn testimony of Minister Michel Murr to the Council. He stated that although

- 32 -
the militias had been ordered to disband themselves by 30 April 1991 at the latest, the
Lebanese army had been unable to deploy in the Kesrouan and Jbeil region until 1 May
1991 and then only partially and not fully. Moreover, the army had been unable to collect
heavy weaponry for fear of a military clash with the Forces militia. The state had
therefore been compelled to engage in political negotiations with the Forces concerning
conditions for the export of its heavy weaponry abroad. The Council of Ministers, at its
meeting on 12 June 1991, agreed to a proposal by Minister Roger Dib to authorize the
Economy and Trade Ministry to issue a pre-dated permit for the export of materiel,
weapons and ammunition belonging to the Forces.
It may be concluded from the foregoing that the implementation of the decision to
disband the militias was not as inevitable as was claimed by Samir Geagea, and that the
agreement in principle with the disbandment decision was not accompanied by a
consensus with respect to the arrangements for its implementation. Differences of opinion
in this regard existed not only within the country but also at the regional and international
level, providing an opportunity for Samir Geagea, who was opposed to the
implementation arrangements proposed by the Lebanese authorities and to the
deployment of the army in the Kesrouan and Jbeil region, to have the matter reconsidered
by having Minister Michel Murr assassinated, exploiting the regional and international
dispute in this regard.
While it is true that, as stated by the accused Samir Geagea, the assassination of
Minister Murr would not have led to a reversal of the decision to disband the militias and
to deploy the army in the Kesrouan and Jbeil region, since Minister Michel Murr was not
solely responsible for such matters, the targeting of the Minister by the operation may be
attributed, naturally and logically, to his status as Minister of Defence and hence as the
person responsible, at least in political terms, for the deployment of the Lebanese army in
the region in question. It may also be attributed to his position as chair of the committee
on disbandment of the militias, which was responsible for taking all practical steps aimed
at achieving that aim, as well as to his sympathy with the regional supporters of separate
disbandment. It follows that his assassination would automatically impede the
arrangements for disbandment of the militias, or at least delay them and hence also delay
the deployment of the Lebanese army in Kesrouan and Jbeil, advancing the aims of Samir
Geagea since it would ensure, at least for a certain period, that the militia he headed
would continue to operate. It would also enable him to assert his reservations from a
position of strength and with greater freedom of action, to impose his conditions
regarding the simultaneous disbandment of internal and foreign militias, and to appoint
the military leaders of the army in his region. In all of this he relied on the existing
international and regional dispute regarding the arrangements for implementing the
disbandment decision, which provided him with the opportunity that led to the
assassination operation.
Second:
A deeper and more far-reaching motive, than that relating to the concurrent
disbandment of the different militias, was the position that Mr. Geagea aspired to for
himself and his allies in the new political structure.

- 33 -
As soon as the end of the war was confirmed, Mr. Geagea began to consider how
to translate into political capital what he had achieved through his support for the Taif
Agreement: the elimination of his adversary General Aoun and his supporters from the
political scene. He had previously murdered Dany Chamoun, another rival on the
political stage and a possible interlocutor with the authorities.
This translation into political terms required, in his view, that he should occupy
the top position in the new political structure, so that he could achieve the balance he
desired between his own group and the other political forces in Lebanon that had engaged
with him militarily during the conflict period.
But the composition of the Government failed to meet his aspirations. He began to
protest and to make incessant demands after discovering that what he was being offered
would leave him as just one figure in the new equation. He began to focus in his own
media on wrecking the balance in the Government by refusing to take part in it. He
embarked on negotiations and networking to remedy the shortcomings and boost his
position in the Government.
He believed that he would be unable to achieve this unless he was in a strong

position with access to means of exerting pressure.
The means were, of course, his weapons, which were plentiful, and his military
forces, which were large, well-organized and directly subject to his orders in hierarchical
terms. He used them to seize certain parts of Lebanese territory.
He had to rely on them to achieve his aspirations before the disbandment and
disarming of the militias and the deployment of the army in the regions in which his
influence prevailed.
However, the authorities were not deterred by his criticism and demands but were
determined to proceed with their plans, even if the use of force proved necessary. He felt
that he was being increasingly undermined and marginalized, especially after his military
power declined and he was deprived of that means of exerting pressure.
Hence, although he pretended to consent to the disbandment of the militias and

the deployment of the army and although he maintained his connection with the ruling
authorities through his representative in the Government, Minister Dib, whose job it was
to show that he was still committed to the Taif process and to serve as his spokesman
within the regime, he felt that he had no alternative but to resort to violence, which he
had used to establish his position and to consolidate his influence, in order to dissuade the
authorities from pursuing their plan to disband and disarm the militias before he had
remedied the shortcomings he complained of and imposed his own conditions.
He resolved to assassinate Minister Murr, believing that the impact of this act
would transform the situation on the ground, creating confusion that the authorities would
find it difficult to address and contain, since they were not yet in a position to endure a
deterioration in security and political convulsions on such a scale. They would therefore

- 34 -
be compelled to make concessions to him and to accede to his demands before he

relinquished his military power.
There is no more cogent proof of Geagea‟s continued reliance on military power,

even after the decision to disband the militias, than the facts set forth in the judgement
rendered by this Council on 17 July 1996 in the case concerning the bombing of the
church of Sayyidet al-Najat in Zouk in 1994. He (Samir Geagea) was convicted by that
judgement, pursuant to article 307 of the Criminal Code, of having continued,
notwithstanding the two decisions of the Council of Ministers of 21 and 28 March 1991
to disband the militias and compel them to hand over their medium-sized and heavy
weapons, to operate under cover of the Lebanese Forces party that he created and within
the previous military structure of the militias, continuously training female officers and
storing and concealing weapons so that they could be used, as and when necessary, by
members of the military militia.
Third:
The investigations brought to light a fact that was already common knowledge,
namely the personal antagonism between Minister Michel Murr and Samir Geagea on
account of the relationship between the former and Elie Hobeika, Geagea‟s main
adversary since the signing of the Trilateral Agreement in 1985 aimed at ending the
Lebanese war. Hobeika, representing the Lebanese Forces at the time, was a party to the
Agreement and was opposed by Samir Geagea whose aspirations were not met by the
Agreement. Minister Michel Murr‟s support for the Agreement prompted him to side
with Mr. Elie Hobeika, especially when the hostility between Hobeika and Geagea
escalated after the latter mounted a rebellion against Elie Hobeika and forced him to
stand down and hand over responsibility for the Forces to Geagea. Minister Murr‟s
support for Mr. Hobeika was not confined to the period during which the Tripartite
Agreement was signed but continued until after the launching of the civil peace process
that followed the Taif Agreement.
This fact is borne out by the content of Minister Roger Dib‟s statement to the
Judicial Council, in which he confirmed that Samir Geagea would have preferred
Minister Murr to side with him than with Mr. Elie Hobeika, and by Nader Saker‟s
statement regarding the dispute between Minister Michel Murr and Samir Geagea after
the Tripartite Agreement. Moreover, Georges Mesih told the Investigating Judge that
although Minister Murr was not himself a rival to the Lebanese Forces, he was an actor
within the rival force.
It follows logically from the foregoing that the personal antagonism between
Minister Michel Murr and Samir Geagea, which was based on the former‟s support for
Mr. Elie Hobeika, did not facilitate matters for Geagea when he sought to impose his
conditions and demands on the authorities. At the same time, he was aware of the
impending risk to his position from Minister Michel Murr‟s support for Mr. Elie
Hobeika, since the latter was generally known to represent a rival Christian group to that
which supported Samir Geagea. Minister Murr‟s support for Mr. Hobeika would assist
Hobeika in consolidating his position within the state and with respect to the policies it

- 35 -
was pursuing in the peace process. It thus seemed that he was achieving what he had
failed to achieve on signing the Tripartite Agreement, which was the source of the
hostility between him and Samir Geagea, who strongly opposed the Agreement. The
assassination of Minister Michel Murr would inevitably have had an impact at the time
on Elie Hobeika‟s position.
The elimination of Minister Murr was also designed to remove from the Christian
political arena, to Samir Geagea‟s advantage, a representative of that part of the
population whose views and approaches were radically different from those of Geagea.
(g) Evidence pertaining to Samir Geagea’s past record of eliminating his

political adversaries and the means employed for that purpose
It was established in the aforementioned Council judgement in the case of the

murder of Dany Chamoun:
– That it was Samir Geagea who ordered the killing of Dany Chamoun, an order
that was carried out by his Security Unit headed by Ghassan Touma;
– That Samir Geagea attempted to murder Elias Hobeika in Zahle through his
Security Unit headed by Ghassan Touma, who bombed the Greek Catholic Bishopric in
Zahle with that end in view;
– That it was Samir Geagea who ordered the bombing of Elias Hobeika‟s car in
Ashrafiyeh; the order was carried out and the driver, who was inside the car, was killed;
– That Samir Geagea attempted in summer 1990 to kill Dany Chamoun with
explosives in Dekkwaneh;
– That Elias Hobeika continued to live in western Beirut after the war and
justified that decision when he visited Dany Chamoun shortly before his assassination in
Baabda, saying: “I don‟t come here often because we are afraid that our brother Ghassan
[he means Ghassan Touma] will hit us with a booby-trapped car, and his arms are very
long.”
All of this constitutes evidence in support of the conviction that the Forces and
Samir Geagea are connected to the attempted assassination under investigation.
As in the case of Chamoun, Geagea resolved to get rid of his political adversary
Michel Murr, before the state imposed its authority on the ground, before the Forces‟
weapons were finally eliminated, and before the enactment of the expected amnesty law
that would lower the curtain on all political crimes committed prior to its enactment.
2. Discussion of the evidence
The accused Samir Geagea challenges the evidence against him on the following
grounds:

- 36 -
– The inaccuracy of the facts set out in the indictment decision and discrepancies
in the relevant statements, especially in terms of the descriptions of the two booby-
trapped cars, the type and placement of the explosives used, and the planned procedure
for triggering the explosion;
– The erroneous nature of the motives set out in the indictment decision;
– The inaccuracy of the statements by Fadi Ghosn and Elie Jabbour, since they
were made under pressure of psychological coercion due to their arrest on other grounds.
The reply thereto:
The process of verification is free in criminal proceedings and may be undertaken

by all available means. The judicial regime based on personal conviction established by
Lebanese law entitles criminal courts to assess the facts and the evidence and to evaluate
their soundness in the light of its conviction in that regard. They retain what corresponds
to their conviction and reject what does not.
This being the case, the discrepancies referred to by the accused Samir Geagea in
some details of the case do not undermine the soundness of the facts verified and
presented by this Council, since the key elements of the evidence are sufficiently
concordant and consistent to support the conviction that they are, on the whole, accurate.
As to the discrepancy in the statements regarding the date of manufacture of the

booby-trapped cars, this does not invalidate the consistency of the basic descriptions of
their colour and model. Moreover, they correspond to what Manuel Younes said in his
statement about seeing the two cars in the Security Unit building and also to the
statements given by witnesses who saw the cars at the site of the explosions. Hence, there
is sufficient evidence that they were in the possession of the Security Unit.
The fact that Manuel Younes saw the cars in the Security Unit building during the
war of elimination does not rule out the possibility that they were used for purposes other
than those pursued during the war, i.e. when the need arose, since it has not been proved
that they were actually used during that period. Younes saw them on 13 October 1990,
when they were still in the building used by members of the Security Unit. What has been
stated in that regard is also applicable to the type of explosives used in them. The
statements by Manuel Younes and Fadi Ghosn confirm that the Security Unit possessed
different types of explosives, so that it could choose whatever type suited its needs in a
particular situation. The whole of the foregoing has already been assessed earlier in this
judgement.
With regard to the claim by the accused Samir Geagea concerning the erroneous
nature of the motives, it is for the Council to assess this matter in the light of the basic
evidence set out above. That evidence supports its conviction with respect to the stated
motives.
With regard to the accuracy of the statements by Fadi Ghosn and Elie Jabbour, it
has not been demonstrated that the two statements were taken under pressure of

- 37 -
psychological coercion. Fadi Ghosn confirmed before the Investigating Judge on

23 October 1995, hence after his release, that the content of his previous statements was
accurate. Similarly, Elie Jabbour confirmed to the Judicial Council, at its public sitting on
5 February 1997, that his previous statement was accurate.
3. Accordingly
In the light of the foregoing:
(a) The objection raised by the accused Samir Geagea in his challenge to the
evidence fail in the existing legal system, which is based on the rules of evidence, and
there is nothing in the content thereof which warrants its success.
(b) The evidence presented and considered by this Council is sufficient in itself to
demonstrate the connection between the accused Samir Geagea and the operation to
assassinate Minister Michel Murr as illustrated by the facts presented.
(c) The claim that the Forces were infiltrated is without merit, since the
accumulated evidence points to the fact that it was Samir Geagea who ordered Ghassan
Touma to eliminate Minister Murr and who blamed him when he failed to achieve that
objective.
II. Concerning the accused Manuel Younes

1. The evidence
(a) Evidence based on the statement by Manuel Younes himself
In his statements during the investigation and the trial, Manuel Younes denied
playing any role in the operation to assassinate Minister Michel Murr. However, he
admitted to the following facts:
– He was an officer with the rank of Lieutenant in the hierarchy of the Lebanese
Forces and he was responsible in the Forces‟ military police for administration and
logistics until his transfer in 1987 to the Protection and Intervention Company of the
Security Unit, where he served as a logistics officer responsible for supplies, ordnance,
materials and equipment. He remained in that office until 1992 and was entrusted with
surveillance and investigation assignments relating to the safety and protection of Samir
Geagea. His nickname was “Mano” and not Manolito.
– He was friendly with Risha Hana and Rushdi Raad, so that he knew what they
were doing and was therefore able to observe Risha Hana during the war of elimination
when he booby-trapped three cars in the repair shop of the Security Unit, including a
white Mercedes and a brown and beige Buick. He saw those two cars for the last time on
13 October 1990 when he paid an inspection visit to the ground-floor repair shop of the
district building in Karantina.

- 38 -
– On the day on which the car-bomb operation occurred, he was present, as usual,
in the Security Unit in Karantina and then returned home, where he heard from his
mother and from the media that the explosion had targeted Minister Michel Murr.
(a) Evidence based on the statement by Fadi Ghosn
Fadi Ghosn stated during the preliminary investigation that Raji Abdou
summoned him to his office after the two explosions had taken place to seek his technical
opinion regarding the failure of the car-bomb operation. After he expressed his opinion of
the matter orally, Raji Abdou asked him to draw up a report on the subject. While he was
doing so, he saw Elie Eid, an assistant to Raji Abdou, pointing to a sketch he had made
during the meeting and attempting to explain how the operation had occurred, saying:
“Mano Manolito was observing from here”. He indicated a spot, to the west, in the
vicinity of Antelias bridge next to the Jounieh-Beirut motorway. Fadi Ghosn understood
from his words that Manolito was standing as an observer on the western side.
The evidence against the accused Manuel Younes may be assessed from several
different angles.
From the first angle:
While responsibility within the Forces hierarchy for decision-making on security

matters lay solely at that time with Samir Geagea, their implementation was not always
assigned to particular members of the staff of the Security Unit but to persons with
leadership responsibilities or experts in the execution of specific tasks, such as the
accused Ghassan Touma, who headed the Security Unit, the accused Antonios Elias, head
of the Protection and Intervention Company of the Unit, and the accused Rushdi Raad,
who was responsible for operations involving explosions and car bombs in the Unit.
Persons with basic responsibilities operating under the orders of Samir Geagea had to
choose from among the staff those they considered best qualified for each operation,
depending on the circumstances and requirements.
It follows that the work of the accused Manuel Younes in the Security Unit did
not in itself create a presumption with respect to his role in the operation to assassinate
Minister Michel Murr.
From a second angle:
It cannot be inferred from the fact that the accused Manuel Younes observed
Risha Hana booby-trapping the two cars that he carried out the assassination operation
and the investigations did not indicate that Risha Hana had informed the accused Manuel
Younes that the purpose of the car bombs was to carry out such an operation. It was
initially planned to use the booby-trapped cars in the war of elimination, whenever the
need arose. As they were not in fact used during the war, it was decided to use them later
on for the assassination. The investigation did not demonstrate conclusively that the
accused Manuel Younes knew about this updated purpose of the two booby-trapped cars.

- 39 -
From a third angle:
Fadi Ghosn‟s statement in which he repeated what he had heard Elie Eid saying –
that Manolito was observing the site of the explosion from a point to the west – is an
inadequate basis from which to draw convincing evidence against the latter, since there is
no evidence that Elie Eid was familiar with the details of the assassination operation or
that he knew who was involved in its implementation and what role they had been
assigned. What he said about Manuel Younes formed part of a personal assessment of the
general information regarding the explosion that he possessed. Given its very general
content, it cannot be used to determine the precise role played by Manuel Younes in the
operation and the consistency of that role with the actual facts of the situation, especially
since Fadi Ghosn confirmed in his own statement to the Investigating Judge that the
information he heard Elie Eid providing could not correspond to the facts: it was
impossible to undertake surveillance from the location in which he was standing
according to Eid‟s evidence, in other words from the western side, because he would be
unable to see anything. This contrasted with Rushdi Raad‟s location on the eastern side,
where there was nothing to prevent him from undertaking surveillance and triggering the
explosion.
From a fourth angle:
The witness Zeina Qoreia, a member of the switchboard staff in the Security Unit
building, stated before the Judicial Council that she saw the accused Manuel Younes
immediately after one of the explosions, without specifying which explosion. He went to
her office overlooking the Dora district and enquired about the blast he had heard.
Looking out the window of the office, they saw smoke rising from that direction.
The content of this witness statement, although it is not in itself sufficient to

refute the charge laid against Manuel Younes, nonetheless may, in the absence of
conclusive evidence to the contrary, be accepted as a point in favour of the
aforementioned accused.
3. Accordingly
In the light of the foregoing,
The evidence against the accused Manuel Younes is insufficient to convince this
Council of the veracity of the facts attributed to him by the prosecution and the
indictment decision. The evidence is vitiated by doubts regarding both its lack of
precision and clarity and its lack of consistency with the facts. Such doubts redound to
the benefit of the accused, exonerating him of the charges against him.
III. Concerning the accused Fadi Ghosn

1. The evidence
The evidence against the accused Fadi Ghosn consists solely of his statement
during the preliminary investigation, the content of which is as follows:

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(a) As an expert in weapons, ammunition and explosives, he was a member of

the military engineering staff of the Lebanese Forces and was entrusted by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee with keeping track of the Forces‟ entire military engineering
stock, including the explosives warehouses in the districts of Dbayeh, Jounieh, Jeita and
Qitareh.
During the war he disassembled mines and bombs to be placed in booby-trapped

cars and performed engineering tasks aimed at military reinforcement. He claims to have
had nothing to do with the two explosions that occurred in the district of Antelias.
(b) About a month and a half or two months prior to the explosion, Raji
Abdou, the head of the Military Security Unit, summoned him and ordered him, in the
presence of Tony Obeid, to hand over to the Internal Security Unit of the Forces any TEN
detonators, meant to reinforce explosions, that were currently in stock. He carried out the
order and sent 40 detonators to the Security Unit in Karantina, where they were collected
by Rushdi Raad.
(c) After 15 days he returned, responding to an order from Raji Abdou, and
provided the Security Unit in Karantina, in the person of Rushdi Raad, with a quantity of
(Px Rx) plastic explosives weighing between 400 and 500 kilograms, which he had taken
from the warehouse near Pasteur Hospital in Jounieh.
He was not informed on either occasion of the reason for the delivery of the
detonators and explosives. However, he understood from Raji Abdou that they belonged
to the Security Unit and were to be returned to it.
(d) In August 1990, after an explosion in the security building in Karantina,

he carried out an investigation of the site and proposed that the engineering workshop and
the explosives stock should be moved from within the security building to another
location between there and Al-Houd al-Khamis close to the repair shop used for
metalwork and car repairs. However, he did not say what he was doing there, since he
was based at the time in Kesrouan.
(e) After the two explosions in Antelias, Raji Abdou summoned him and
asked, in the presence of his assistant Elie Eid, for his technical opinion of the reasons for
the failure of the two explosions. During the meeting Elie Eid drew a sketch showing the
place in which the two booby-trapped cars were parked and the location of the targeted
cars, and pointed to the place where Rushdi Raad and Mano Manolito were standing. He
gave his technical opinion of the reasons for the failure and then drew up a written report
in response to Raji Abdou‟s request.
The following conclusions may be drawn from the content of the statements made
by the accused Fadi Ghosn as set out above:
(a) The accused Fadi Ghosn is an explosives expert who is well versed in
such matters, and this is why the top decision makers in the Forces entrusted him with the

- 41 -
task of investigating its stores and summoned him whenever any difficulties arose in
order to seek his technical advice. For instance, after the explosion in the Security Unit
building in August 1990, they asked him to propose an appropriate storage location to
which their explosives could be transferred. It was for the same reason that Raji Abdou
called him in after the two explosions in Antelias, namely to enquire about the technical
reasons for the failure of the operation. As soon as he arrived, Abdou said to him: “We
want to consult you about a technical matter.”
(b) The details of the conversation that took place during the said meeting
between Ghosn and Raji Abdou and Elie Eid, as set out above, indicate that he was
unaware of the plan to carry out the assassination operation, and this accounts for Elie
Eid‟s decision to draw a sketch showing where the two booby-trapped cars were parked,
the route taken by the motorcade and the location of Rushdi Raad and Mano Manolito.
Fadi Ghosn could then assess the material facts of the plan and the reason for its failure.
This initiative would not have been necessary if Fadi Ghosn was already familiar with the
facts of the plan before its implementation. It should further be noted in this regard that
the locations of the two cars and of the explosions shown in the sketch drawn by Fadi
Ghosn before the investigator did not correspond to the facts. Hence, Fadi Ghosn‟s
admission cannot be relied upon as evidence that he played a role in the assassination
operation, especially since Elie Jabbour confirmed in his statements that Fadi Ghosn had
not been given the job of booby-trapping the cars because Ghassan Touma was unwilling
to trust him on the ground that he was a protégé of Elie Hobeika.
(c) The fact that the accused Fadi Ghosn sent the detonators and explosives to
the Security Unit in response to Raji Abdou‟s order does not in itself constitute evidence
of his awareness of the purpose they were to serve. This occurred one and a half or two
months before the explosions. The assignment was a natural concomitant of his ordinary
responsibilities, namely to supervise the Forces‟ arsenal of explosives. Raji Abdou
explained to him that the explosives were being returned because they originally
belonged to the Security Unit.
(d) The fact remains that the accused Fadi Ghosn failed to appear before the
Judicial Council, although he had made a statement during the preliminary investigations.
He was therefore held to be a fugitive from justice who would be tried in absentia. While
the evidence of the acts attributed to the fugitive accused is broadly sound, it is still
insufficient in itself to charge him with a crime without the support of additional
evidence, which is not available in the present case.
3. Accordingly
It may be concluded from the foregoing that there is insufficient evidence of Fadi
Ghosn‟s involvement in the two car-bomb operations, that the charge against him was
unfounded and that he must therefore be declared innocent of that charge.

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IV. Concerning the accused Raji Abdou

1. The evidence
The evidence against the accused Raji Abdou is as follows:
– Elie Jabbour stated during the investigation and the trial that Raji Abdou
summoned him a month before the explosion and ordered him to look for somebody from
Minister Murr‟s escort or somebody close to him, making it clear, according to Jabbour‟s
interpretation, that Samir Geagea had instructed him (i.e. instructed Raji Abdou) and
Ghassan Touma to arrange an accident in order to eliminate Minister Michel Murr.
– He further stated that he tried to find such a person but failed. When he
reported this to Abdou, the latter asked him to continue looking and to inform him of the
result, but he was still unsuccessful.
– Jabbour also stated that after the first explosion he asked Raji Abdou about the
operation, having heard the news on the radio, and Abdou replied: “Yes, that was
Touma‟s work”. He then telephoned Ghassan Touma and had a conversation with him.
On laying down the receiver, Abdou said to Jabbour: “He didn‟t fix it properly … the
Minister managed to escape.” He described Rushdi Raad as inexperienced.
– He stated that, on the day after the second explosion, he asked Raji Abdou
about the incident and he replied: “It appears that those two idiots set up the two cars the
last time … one exploded and the other didn‟t go off.” He added that the second car had
been blown up because it could not be moved and it was necessary to conceal the
evidence. He said that Samir Geagea blamed Ghassan Touma for the flaw in the
execution of the operation.
(b) Evidence based on the statement by Fadi Ghosn
– Fadi Ghosn stated during the preliminary investigation that about two months
before the explosion Raji Abdou ordered him to send detonators and explosives to the
Security Unit in Karantina. The details have already been set out above.
– He also stated that Raji Abdou called him in two days after the explosions to
ask for his technical opinion of the reasons for the failure of the operation. He also asked
him to draw up a written report on the matter. During the meeting, he heard Raji Abdou
asking his assistant Elie Eid for the latest news about the operation. When the latter
reported what was being said about the role of Ghassan Touma and Jean Chahine in the
operation, Abdou replied at the end of the conversation that it was untrue.
2. Discussion of the evidence:
The following conclusions may be drawn from the two statements mentioned
above:

- 43 -
– Raji Abdou and Ghassan Touma were instructed by Samir Geagea to make all
the necessary arrangements for the assassination of Minister Michel Murr. In carrying out
these instructions, Abdou tried to get Elie Jabbour to find someone who could monitor
the Minister‟s movements, but Jabbour was unable to find any such person.
– Ghassan Touma undertook, with Raji Abdou‟s knowledge, to carry out the
instructions through his Unit.
– Raji Abdou, in his capacity as head of the Military Security Unit and having
received direct instructions from Samir Geagea to carry out the operation with Ghassan
Touma, was an accomplice to the operation even though he did not participate personally
in its execution.
The fact that he was an accomplice to the operation and concerned to ensure its
success is borne out by his answer to Jabbour‟s question immediately after the explosion:
“Yes, that was Touma‟s work”; and by the fact that he immediately called Ghassan
Touma to enquire about the outcome of the explosion; it is also borne out by his
statement when he laid down the receiver: “He didn‟t fix it properly … the Minister
managed to escape”; by his calling Rushdi Raad an ass: “That ass Nabil didn‟t fix it
properly”; and by his description of the perpetrators as “idiots” after the second
explosion: “It appears that those two idiots set up the two cars the last time: one exploded
and the other didn‟t go off.”
He (i.e. Abdou) felt throughout these developments that he was directly involved
in achieving the result that the leader had demanded from him and from Ghassan Touma,
who took the requisite operational steps. It follows that his statements, as cited above,
after the failure of the operation were an expression of disappointment. He hastened to
obtain a technical explanation for the failure from Fadi Ghosn and asked him to write a
report for him on the subject so that he could present it to Samir Geagea.
– Raji Abdou, who kept track of the operation as the officer responsible for the
military apparatus and who was involved in investigating the result that he was originally
instructed to achieve, participated in the preparatory acts intended to facilitate the
operation, such as providing for the delivery of detonators and explosives to the Security
Unit. He was well aware of the possibility that these materials would be used in the
assassination operation, especially since it was clear that the return of explosives and
detonators to Beirut at a time when the scope for deployment of the Forces in Beirut had
been restricted and most of the troops had been withdrawn to Kesrouan and Jbeil, and
when it was anticipated that the militias would actually be disbanded and disarmed and
that the authority of the state would be asserted in their former positions, meant that
security operations involving the explosives were being prepared in Beirut and the
surrounding area.
The operation targeting Minister Murr was then effectively implemented.

- 44 -
3. Accordingly
In the light of the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence, borne out by the
evidence of flight, of Raji Abdou‟s involvement in the first car-bomb operation,
bolstering the perpetrators‟ resolve and assisting them in the preparatory acts that
facilitated the crime. There is no evidence of his involvement in the second explosion,
and his conversation with Elie Jabbour does not indicate that he was aware of the plan to
blow up the second car in order to eliminate the evidence or that he participated in it. He
must therefore be declared innocent of the second explosion.
V. Concerning the accused Jean Nejm

1. The evidence
The evidence against the accused Jean Nejm is as follows:
According to the official report of the military Investigating Officer dated 15 July
1995, Fadi Ghosn stated that, during his meeting with Raji Abdou and Elie Eid after the
two explosions, Elie Eid told Abdou that, according to the information circulating about
the incident, when Jean Chahine drove the two cars to Antelias, he handed them over to
somebody from the Al-Ashkar group. Fadi Ghosn reaffirmed this statement before the
Investigating Judge.
(b) Evidence based on the statement by Manuel Younes
In his statement of 11 August 1995 to the military Investigating Officer, Manuel

Younes stated that he had a working relationship and friendship with the person known as
Nadim al-Ashkar, who was responsible for a security intelligence station.
In response to a request for assistance from the Investigating Judge, the official
report of the military Investigating Officer dated 15 August 1995 stated that Nadim al-
Ashkar‟s real name was Jean Maroun Nejm, that he was an officer in the Forces Security
Unit and that he was currently in an Arabian Gulf state.
The following conclusions may be drawn from the two statements mentioned
above:
– There is nothing in Fadi Ghosn‟s statement that conclusively links what Elie Eid
heard about the delivery of two booby-trapped cars to somebody from the Al-Ashkar
group with the involvement of Jean Nejm, also known as Nadim al-Ashkar, in the
assassination operation.

- 45 -
– There is no material evidence in Manuel Younes‟s statement about his

acquaintance with Nadim al-Ashkar, i.e. Jean Nejm, from which it might be concluded
that the latter played a role in the assassination operation.
3. Accordingly
It follows from the foregoing that there is no evidence of the involvement of Jean
Nejm, also known as Nadim al-Ashkar, in the operation, and that the evidence based on
his flight, in the absence of other evidence, is vitiated by the same flaws as those set out
above. He must therefore be declared innocent.
VI. Concerning the accused Ghassan Touma

1. The evidence
The evidence against the accused Ghassan Touma is as follows:
(a) Evidence based on the assassination order issued to him by Samir

Geagea
Elie Jabbour confirmed in his statements at all stages of the investigation and
before the Judicial Council that Raji Abdou had told him about two months before the
explosion that Samir Geagea had decided to assassinate Minister Michel Murr and that
Abdou and Ghassan Touma had been informed of the decision at a meeting between
them, i.e. between Abdou, Touma and Geagea. Samir Geagea regularly held security
meetings of this kind with the heads of the Security Units, including Raji Abdou and
Ghassan Touma, to consult them about the security decisions to be taken, which were
eventually taken personally by Geagea, according to the statement by As‟ad Said, Deputy
Chief of Staff responsible for administration and logistics in the Lebanese Forces, to the
Investigating Judge.
The fact that Ghassan Touma executed the order he received from Samir Geagea
is confirmed by Elie Jabbour‟s statement to the effect that when he asked Raji Abdou
about the operation immediately after it occurred, the latter replied spontaneously “Yes,
that was Touma‟s work”, adding subsequently that Samir Geagea blamed Ghassan
Touma for the failure of the operation. A person is not normally blamed unless he or she
was given an order and failed to achieve the desired result.
(b) Evidence based on the fact that Ghassan Touma was immediately
aware of the details of the operation and of its outcome
Elie Jabbour confirmed in his statements that when he questioned Raji Abdou
about the first explosion immediately after it occurred, the latter telephoned Ghassan
Touma and enquired about it. After conversing with Touma, he said as soon as he laid
down the receiver: “The guy isn‟t dead”.
It may be concluded that Raji Abdou was well aware that it was Ghassan Touma
who was responsible for carrying out the operation and that he was keeping track of it

- 46 -
and monitoring the outcome. This is what prompted him to make the phone call
immediately to ascertain what had occurred, and he was then informed of the failure of
the attempted assassination.
(c) Evidence based on Ghassan Touma’s assignments in the Forces

militia
Ghassan Touma was the head of the Forces Internal Security Unit. One of the
tasks of this Department was to arrange for car bombs and explosions and to perform
other security operations based on instructions from Samir Geagea to Ghassan Touma.
The latter ordered Ghassan Antonios to install a remote control device in the two booby-
trapped cars. These facts have been confirmed in one way or another by the testimony of
Abi Ramia, Fouad Malek, Rashid Daw, Manuel Younes, Nader Saker and As‟ad Said.
It follows that Ghassan Touma‟s role in planning and supervising the

assassination operation was a natural consequence of the assignments entrusted to him
within the Internal Security Unit of the Forces.
(d) Evidence based on the flight of the accused Ghassan Touma
While the evidence against an accused stemming from his flight is insufficient in
the absence of other clear evidence against him, this is not the case when such evidence
exists, as in the case of the accused Ghassan Touma. The evidence of flight then plays a
greater role and backs up the other evidence available. It follows that the failure of the
accused Ghassan Touma to appear before the Investigating Judge and before this Council
constitutes evidence of the veracity of the acts attributed to him as set out in the chapter
concerning the facts. This is not contradicted by the argument that his flight is due to
judgements against him in other cases, inasmuch as these convictions confirm his
criminal record, which in turn affords evidence of the fact that he effectively committed
the acts attributed to him in the present case.
3. Accordingly
It may be concluded from the foregoing that the accuracy of the facts attributed to
the accused Ghassan Touma, as set forth in this judgement, has been demonstrated and
that his participation in the attempted assassination of Minister Michel Murr has been
confirmed.
VII. Concerning the accused Antonios Elias Elias, also known as Tony
Obeid
1. The evidence
The evidence against the accused is as follows:
(a) Evidence based on his duties in the Forces militia

- 47 -
It has been ascertained that the accused Antonios Elias Elias, also known as
Antonios Obeid or Tony Obeid, was employed in the Forces Security Unit as head of the
Protection and Intervention Company. In that capacity he was directly subordinate to
Ghassan Touma and was responsible for explosives, ammunition and weapons in the
Department, a fact confirmed by the statements of Rafik Saade and Milad Helou. This
accounts for the presence of Obeid in Raji Abdou‟s office when the latter asked Fadi
Ghosn to send detonators to the Security Unit in Karantina. Manuel Younes confirmed
that it was Tony Obeid who instructed Risha Hana to booby-trap the cars at the time
when he saw them in the Security Unit building.
It may be concluded from the fact that Tony Obeid was responsible for carrying
out such assignments in the Security Unit that he was certainly aware of and supervised
all the Department‟s actions involving explosions and car-bombs, including the booby-
trapping of the two cars used in the operation aimed at assassinating Minister Michel
Murr. Such operations could not be conducted without complying with the conditions
imposed by members of the usual Forces hierarchy, and the Security Unit in particular,
which acted on the orders issued in turn by its chief, the accused Ghassan Touma.
(b) Evidence based on the fact that the work of surveillance and execution
was performed by staff reporting to him
Wifa Wahbe confirmed in his statement that Naja Kaddoum and Elias Awad, who
had been tasked with monitoring the movements of Minister Michel Murr and whom he
saw performing their duties in the vicinity of Al-Halabi restaurant in Antelias, were
members of the Protection and Intervention Company headed by Tony Obeid and worked
under his orders.
Wifa Wahbe further confirmed that Jean Chahine, who was responsible for
driving the two booby-trapped cars, was worked under the orders of Tony Obeid.
It may be concluded from the foregoing that the surveillance and preparatory
arrangements for the planned assassination operation could not have been made by staff
under the orders of Tony Obeid without his involvement and consent, a fact that is borne
out by Wifa Wahbe‟s statement that when he saw Naja Kaddoum some time after the two
explosions, the latter informed him during a conversation about Tony Obeid‟s intention
to assassinate Minister Murr so that Samir Geagea could replace him and restore the
Forces to their former status.
(c) Evidence based on the flight of the accused Tony Obeid
As far as the evidence is concerned, the flight of the accused Tony Obeid tends to
corroborate the acts attributed to him, as in the case of the flight of Ghassan Touma.
2. Accordingly
The foregoing evidence supports the conviction that Tony Obeid actually
committed the acts pertaining to the attempted assassination, as set out in the chapter
concerning the facts.

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VIII. Concerning the accused Rushdi Raad, also known as Nabil Fawzi
1. The evidence
The evidence against the accused Rushdi Raad is as follows:
Elie Jabbour confirmed in his statement that Raji Abdou, after ending his
telephone conversation with Ghassan Touma who informed him about the failure of the
operation, said in reply to Jabbour‟s question about the reasons for the failure: “That
donkey Nabil didn‟t fix it properly”, referring to Rushdi Raad, also known as Nabil
Fawzi.
(b) Evidence based on the statement by Manuel Younes
Manuel Younes stated that, following Risha Hana‟s death in an explosion, Rushdi
Raad, assisted by Jean Chahine, took charge of the two booby-trapped cars and assumed
responsibility for the booby-trapping work formerly performed by Risha Hana.
He also stated that, when he was present in Rushdi Raad‟s office in the Security
building a few days after the explosion, Georges Feghali came in and asked Rushdi Raad
about his connection with the Murr affair. Rushdi was annoyed and warned him against
asking that kind of question, denying any connection with the affair. Manuel Younes
gathered from this response that Rushdi Raad had information about the explosion. He
had noticed his absence and that of Jean Chahine from work prior to the explosion, and
had observed their unusually frequent trips between the Security building, Zalka and
Jounieh.
(c) Evidence based on the statement by Fadi Ghosn
Fadi Ghosn confirmed in his statement that he had heard Elie Eid saying, in a
conversation with Raji Abdou in his presence after the explosion, that Rushdi Raad was
standing to the east of the site of the explosion when it occurred. Ghosn stated that, from
a technical point of view, he thought that there was nothing to prevent Rushdi Raad from
doing surveillance work and triggering an explosion from that location.
(d) Evidence based on Rushdi Raad’s assignments in the Security Unit
The accused Rushdi Raad was responsible for booby-trapping work in the
engineering branch of the Security Unit, according to the statements by Khalil Wakim,
Wifa Wahbe, Fadi Ghosn and Manuel Younes.
(e) Evidence based on the flight of the accused Rushdi Raad
The failure of the accused Rushdi Raad to appear and his flight corroborate the
evidence against him set out above.

- 49 -
2. Accordingly
The foregoing supports the conviction that the accused Rushdi Raad was involved
in the assassination operation, both in preparing the booby-trapped cars and in triggering
the explosions.
IX. Concerning the accused Jean Chahine, also known as Asad

1. The evidence
The evidence against the accused is as follows:
Fadi Ghosn confirmed that he had heard Elie Eid stating that, according to his
information, it was Jean Chahine who had driven the two cars from Karantina to Antelias,
using identity cards and licences belonging to the army.
(b) Evidence based on the statement by Wifa Wahbe
Wifa Wahbe reported a conversation between him and Naja Kaddoum, when the
latter visited him in his home about eight months after the explosion. Kaddoum told
Wahbe that it was Jean Chahine who had parked the two booby-trapped cars in Antelias,
adding that if Chahine had managed to eliminate Murr by means of a third assassination,
they would erect a monument in his honour if it led to the return of the Forces to Beirut.
(c) Evidence based on the statement by Manuel Younes
According to Manuel Younes, after the death of Risha Hana, Rushdi Raad and
Jean Chahine were in charge of the two booby-trapped cars in the Security Unit building
and were jointly responsible for booby-trapping work.
(d) Evidence based on the flight of Jean Chahine
The evidence pertaining to the flight of Jean Chahine supports the other evidence
presented against him for the reasons set out in the case of the other accused.
2. Accordingly
It may be concluded from the foregoing that the evidence against the accused Jean
Chahine demonstrates that he took part in the assassination operation, by preparing the
two booby-trapped car and by driving them to the location of the two explosions.
X. Concerning the accused Elias Awad and Naja Kaddoum

The acts of the two accused Elias Awad and Naja Kaddoum, as set out in the
chapter concerning the facts, are borne out by the statement of Wifa Wahbe that he saw
them repeatedly in the Antelias area with the data forms commonly used by the Security

- 50 -
Unit for surveillance. Kaddoum told him at the time that he could see “what they were up
to”. They were using a civilian vehicle belonging to the Security Unit and had parked in
an open area overlooking the Armenian Patriarchate, in the vicinity of which the
explosion occurred, which indicates that they were aware of the objective, i.e. the
assassination.
This evidence is supported by the evidence of their flight and failure to appear
during either the investigation or the trial stage.
XI. Concerning the accused Elie Akiki

1. The evidence
Fadi Ghosn stated during the investigation that he had heard Elie Eid saying that a
person whose real name he did not know accompanied Jean Chahine on a motorcycle
when he moved the two cars, so that he could give him a lift back from Antelias to the
Security Unit building in Karantina. Wifa Wahbe stated that the Protection and
Intervention Department had a large Honda motorbike that was used by a person known
as Charbel Akiki and also by Elie Akiki. The latter was employed in the car repair shop
in the barracks. Manuel Younes stated that the Elie in question was an aide to Tony
Obeid and it was he who had ridden the motorcycle that belonged to the Security Unit.
Charbel Akiki also stated that he, Elie Akiki and many other members of the
Forces used to ride the motorbike in question, and that he had purchased it after it broke
down and used the spare parts to repair a similar motorbike that he owned. Many
different members used this motorbike, including Elie Akiki.
The evidence against the accused Elie Akiki based on the statement by Fadi
Ghosn reporting what he had heard from Elie Eid is insufficient to prove that it was the
said accused who rode the motorcycle that was used to return Jean Chahine to the
Security Unit headquarters, since it cannot be concluded from the statement that Elie
Akiki was the person referred to.
The fact that Elie Akiki used that motorcycle during his presence at the Security
Unit building and also used the motorcycle belonging to Charbel Akiki does not
substantiate the charge against him, since they were used not only by him but also by
other members of the staff of the Security Unit.
3. Accordingly
It may be concluded from the foregoing that there is insufficient evidence against
the accused Elie Akiki to support the charge against him, so that he must be declared
innocent.

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XII. Concerning the relevance of the evidence set out above to the
explosions that occurred both on 20 March 1991 and on 29 March 1991
While the purpose of the evidence set out above was to demonstrate the
responsibility of the accused Samir Geagea, Ghassan Touma, Antonios Elias Elias,
Rushdi Raad and Jean Chahine for the attempted assassination of Minister Michel Murr
and its consequences on 20 March 1991, it may also be invoked to demonstrate their
responsibility for the second related explosion, which occurred on 29 March 1991.
The facts are as follows:
1. Although the second explosion, which occurred on 29 March 1991, was

not designed to assassinate Minister Michel Murr, its aim was to eliminate all traces of
the American car so that they could not be used to identify the perpetrators of the first
explosion, as stated by Elie Jabbour. It follows that its execution would serve the interests
only of those who had participated in and were responsible for the first explosion, in
terms of decision-making, planning or implementation, including the above-mentioned
accused.
2. The security implications of the second explosion, which occurred on 29

March 1991, were just as great as those of the first operation, from the point of view of
the means used, the location and the possible impact in national, security and political
terms. It follows that, as in the case of the first operation, its execution was associated
with a decision by Samir Geagea, since he was the sole authority when the relevant
departments dealt with major security issues.
Accordingly, the evidence that demonstrates the responsibility of the above-

mentioned accused for the first car-bomb operation is equally applicable to them in the
case of the second operation.
Lastly,
As sufficient evidence exists on which to base the conviction of this Council, it

sees no need to hear statements from other witnesses or to resort to other means that have
not hitherto been used in the case, such as televised interviews, etc.

- 52 -
Chapter VI
The law
I. With reference to the accused Samir Geagea

1. Concerning the application of the Amnesty Law
Whereas the Council has already held that Minister Murr is a political leader and
that the crimes targeting him in this case constitute an exception to article 3, paragraph 3,
of the Amnesty Law, regardless of whether they were political or non-political crimes;
2. Concerning the characterization of the crimes and the charges
Whereas the acts perpetrated by the accused Samir Geagea, as described in the
chapter concerning the facts and as substantiated by the evidence set out above, entail the
following legal consequences:
(a) Concerning the crimes defined in articles 549 and 549/201 of the
Criminal Code
Whereas it has been ascertained that the accused Samir Geagea decided and
resolved to assassinate Minister Michel Murr; that he instructed his organization,
including the Internal Security Unit which he directed and which was headed by Ghassan
Touma, to carry out the assassination; and that Ghassan Touma, acting on Samir
Geagea‟s instructions, drew up the assassination plan and implemented it through his
assistants in the Security Unit in the manner described in the chapter concerning the facts,
a process that resulted in the first explosion on 20 March 1991, which caused a number of
deaths and injuries as well as enormous damage to buildings and vehicles;
Whereas it has also been ascertained that the accused Samir Geagea, with the aim
of eliminating evidence of the identity of the perpetrators of the first explosion, including
himself, contained in the Buick vehicle that failed to explode, decided and resolved to
blow it up, using the same organization under his leadership and orders, and that this was
executed on 29 March 1991, leading also to a number of deaths and injuries and causing
major damage to buildings and vehicles;
Whereas the process whereby the accused Samir Geagea created a determination
among his subordinates in the departments he directed, and drove them to commit the
crime of blowing up the two cars by issuing the relevant orders, constitutes incitement to
commit the crime of intentional homicide by means of explosives as well as intent to
eliminate evidence of the perpetrators of the first explosion by means of the second
explosion on 29 March 1991;
Whereas his act constitutes the crimes defined in article 549, paragraphs 1, 7 and
8, of the Criminal Code, in conjunction with articles 217 and 218 thereof, and there is no
need in this context to apply the provisions of article 201 of the Criminal Code because

- 53 -
article 218 thereof stipulates that the instigator shall be punishable with the penalty for
the crime that he wished to commit, whether it was executed, planned or inchoate;
(b) Concerning the criminal offence defined in article 6 of the Law of

11 January 1958
Whereas article 6 of the Law of 11 January 1958 prescribes an aggravated penalty

for a terrorist act, if the act in question leads to the death of a person or destroys
residential or commercial property;
Whereas article 314 of the Criminal Code defines terrorist acts as acts aimed at
creating panic, which are carried out by means of explosives and similar materials, and
which are designed to bring about a public emergency;
Whereas the attempted assassination of Minister Michel Murr on 20 March 1991

and the second car-bomb operation on 29 March 1991 involved the use of explosives,
created panic among the population, killed and injured a number of persons, and
destroyed residential and commercial buildings, they constituted terrorist acts within the
meaning of article 314 of the Criminal Code, entailing the penalty prescribed in article 6
of the Law of 11 January 1958;
Whereas it has been ascertained that the accused Samir Geagea, given his
command authority over the departments under his control and his familiarity with their
work and the means they used to executive their assignments, was fully aware that the act
he had instigated would be executed by means of the explosives in the possession of the
militia which he led, and must have approved the plan that was drawn up and the means
used, since he was the decision-maker. He nevertheless determined to proceed in order to
achieve his aim, and therefore instigated the terrorist act that was committed, an act that
constitutes the crime defined in article 6 of the Law of 1 January 1958 in conjunction
with articles 217 and 218 of the Criminal Code;
(c) Concerning the criminal offence defined in articles 270 and 271
Whereas the indictment decision charged Samir Geagea with the two criminal
offences defined in articles 270 and 271 of the Criminal Code;
Whereas the said articles 270 and 271 define the offence of conspiracy and
specify cases involving an attack on state security, but contain no provisions regarding
charges or penalties, it would be inappropriate to apply their provisions in the context of
the offences defined and the penalties prescribed in respect of the facts ascertained in the
case of the accused. The conclusion that may be drawn from this with respect to the
accused Samir Geagea is also applicable to the other accused mentioned in the indictment
decision in connection with those two articles;

- 54 -
(d) Concerning the criminal offence defined in article 72 of the Weapons

Act
Whereas it has been ascertained that the accused Samir Geagea was in direct
possession through the Security Unit that he directed of explosives and detonators, which
constitutes the misdemeanour defined in article 76 of the Weapons and Ammunition Act,
and not in article 72 as stated in the indictment decision. This offence is not covered by
the Amnesty Law, since the explosives were not handed over within the time limit of one
month fixed in article 2 (e) of the Law.
II. With reference to the accused Ghassan Touma and Antonios Elias
(a) Concerning the criminal offences defined in articles 549 and 549/201
of the Criminal Code
Whereas it has been ascertained that the accused Ghassan Touma, in his capacity
as head of the Security Unit, drew up the plan to blow up the two cars, acting on orders
from the accused Samir Geagea, and supervised its implementation in the manner
described in the chapter concerning the facts. The accused Antonios Elias, in his capacity
as head of the Protection and Intervention Company of the Security Unit and acting on
direct orders from Ghassan Touma, assisted in drawing up the said plan, making
preparations and arranging through his staff for surveillance and investigation of the
movements of Minister Michel Murr. He further made arrangements, on Ghassan
Touma‟s orders, for participation in the crime and managed the work of those involved. It
follows that the two men participated in bringing about elements of the crimes of
intentional homicide and attempted homicide, through the use of explosives which were
designed, in one case, to eliminate the traces;
Whereas the acts of the accused Ghassan Touma and Antonios Elias constitute the
criminal offences defined in article 549, paragraphs 1, 7 and 8, of the Criminal Code in
conjunction with article 213 thereof, and those defined in article 549, paragraphs 1, 7 and
8, of the Criminal Code in conjunction with articles 201 and 213 thereof;

11 January 1958
Whereas it has been ascertained that the accused Ghassan Touma and Antonios
Elias, through their involvement in planning the explosion, agreed with the accused
Samir Geagea to use explosives in its execution, an act that created panic, led to deaths
and injuries, and destroyed residential and commercial buildings, it follows that their acts
constitute collusion in terrorist acts and therefore correspond to the criminal offence
defined in article 6 of the Law of 11 January 1958 in conjunction with article 213 of the
Criminal Code;

- 55 -
(c) Concerning the criminal offence defined in article 72 of the Weapons

Act
Whereas it has been ascertained that the accused Ghassan Touma and Antonios
Elias possessed explosions and detonators through the Security Unit that they ran, and
that this act constitutes the misdemeanour defined in article 76 of the Weapons and
Ammunition Act, and not in article 72 thereof, a crime that is not covered by the
Amnesty Law for the reasons already stated above.
III. With reference to the accused Rushdi Raad and Jean Chahine
Whereas it has been ascertained that the accused Rushdi Raad and Jean Chahine
were responsible for the two booby-trapped cars when they were in the Security Unit
building, and that Rushdi Raad booby-trapped them again so that they could be used for
the car-bomb operation that is the subject of this case, and that Jean Chahine drove them
both to Antelias where they were blown up. The explosion was triggered by the accused
Rushdi Raad with the consequences described above;
Whereas the accused Rushdi Raad and Jean Chahine thus participated in bringing
about elements of the crimes of intentional homicide and attempted homicide, through
the use of car bombs, which were designed, in one case, to eliminate the traces of the first
explosion;
Whereas the acts of the accused Rushdi Raad and Jean Chahine constitute the
criminal offences defined in article 549, paragraphs 1, 7 and 8, of the Criminal Code in
conjunction with article 213 thereof, and those defined in article 549, paragraphs 1, 7 and
8, of the Criminal Code in conjunction with articles 201 and 213 thereof;

11 January 1958
were involved in the operation through the use of explosives, acts that created panic, led
to deaths and injuries, and destroyed residential and commercial buildings, it follows that
their acts constitute collusion in terrorist acts and therefore correspond to the criminal
offence defined in article 6 of the Law of 11 January 1958 in conjunction with article 213
of the Criminal Code.

- 56 -
(c) Concerning the criminal offence defined in article 72 of the Weapons

Act
possessed explosions and detonators for the purposes of the crime that they committed,
and that this constitutes, contrary to what is stated in the indictment decision, the
misdemeanour defined in article 76 of the Weapons and Ammunition Act.
IV. With reference to the accused Naja Kaddoum and Elias Awad
Whereas it has been ascertained that the accused Elias Awad and Naja Kaddoum
participated in the preparation of the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide
committed by the other accused through their surveillance of the movements of Minister
Michel Murr‟s escort, which made it possible to execute the plan to assassinate him, it
follows that they are accomplices to the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide
resulting from the explosion that occurred on 20 March 1991, and that they were fully
aware that the purpose of their acts was to facilitate the assassination operation;
Whereas the acts of the accused Naja Kaddoum and Elias Awad constitute
complicity in the criminal offences of homicide and attempted intentional homicide
through the use of explosives, as defined in article 549, paragraphs 1 and 7, of the
Criminal Code in conjunction with article 219, paragraph 4, thereof, and in article 549,
paragraphs 1 and 7, of the Criminal Code in conjunction with articles 219, paragraph 4,
and 201 thereof;
Furthermore,
Whereas there is no evidence that the accused Naja Kaddoum and Elias Awad
played a role in the second car-bomb operation on 29 March 1991, so that their
involvement was confined to the first operation on 20 March 1991, they must be declared
innocent of crimes of homicide and attempted homicide committed on 29 March 1991;

11 January 1958
Whereas there is no evidence that the accused Naja Kaddoum and Elias Awad
were aware of the fact that the assassination operation was to be executed by means of
explosives, so that they cannot be charged with involvement in the terrorist act defined
and punishable under article 6 of the Law of 11 January 1958, it follows that they must be
declared innocent of that charge.

- 57 -
V. With reference to the accused Raji Abdou

Whereas the accused Raji Abdou was involved, as already demonstrated, in

preparing the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide that were executed by the other
accused members of the Security Unit, it follows that he was an accomplice to the crimes
resulting from the first explosion that occurred on 20 March 1991, the purpose of which
was to assassinate Minister Murr;
The following articles are applicable to this act: article 549, paragraphs 1 and 7, in
conjunction with paragraph 219, paragraph 4, of the Criminal Code and article 549,
paragraphs 1 and 7, in conjunction with articles 210 and 219, paragraph 4, thereof;

11 January 1958
Whereas it has been ascertained that Raji Abdou was aware that the operation in
which he was involved would be executed by means of explosives, which would create
panic, cause deaths and injuries, and destroy residential and commercial buildings, it
follows that he was an accomplice to the terrorist acts and is therefore punishable under
article 6 of the Law of 11 January 1958 in conjunction with article 219, paragraph 4, of
the Criminal Code;
(c) Concerning article 72 of the Weapons Act
Whereas it has not been ascertained that Raji Abdou possessed military weapons
and explosives, it follows that he must be declared innocent of the offence set forth in
articles 72 and 76 of the Weapons Act.
VI. Concerning the political characterization of the acts being

prosecuted
Whereas, contrary to the argument advanced by counsel for Samir Geagea:
A political offence is an offence committed for a political motive or an offence

that violates both public and individual political rights (art. 196 of the Criminal Code);
An offence committed under article 197 of the Criminal Code is thus political in
terms of the motive or in terms of the political rights targeted, which are in turn based on
individual rights such as the right to life;
Whereas the offences committed forfeit their political character, according to

article 197 of the Criminal Code, if they constitute “the most serious crimes in moral
terms and in terms of public law, such as homicide, grievous bodily harm, attacks on
property involving arson, explosives or flooding, and aggravated robbery, especially if

- 58 -
such acts involve the use of weapons and violence, as well as attempts to commit such
crimes”;
Whereas the offence of the attempted assassination of Minister Michel Murr

contains elements of homicide, grievous bodily harm and attacks on property, it follows
that the offence forfeits its political character, if it ever merited such a characterization, so
that the provisions governing political offences cannot be applied to it.
VII. Concerning extenuating circumstances

Whereas the Council,
Bearing in mind that the date on which the crimes pertaining to this case were
committed preceded the date of the Amnesty Law, which was promulgated on 26 August
1991, as well as the date specified by that Law, i.e. 28 March 1991, as the date
demarcating the war period, concerning which a new page was to be turned and the
curtain lowered on crimes committed during the hostilities, and the period involving the
return of the state, the assertion of its authority and the consolidation of civil peace;
That the crimes were committed at a time when the militias had not yet been
disbanded;
Bearing in mind also that the crimes were linked to the aftermath of the Lebanese
war;
Referring by analogy to the Council‟s ruling in its judgement of 24 June 1995 in

the case concerning the homicide of Dany Chamoun;
Exercising its unlimited discretionary authority under article 253 of the Criminal
code with respect to this case, which concerns crimes committed prior to the date of Act
No. 302 of 21 March 1994;
Decides to grant extenuating circumstances to the persons who are found guilty.
= = = = = = = = = =

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Chapter VII
Personal reparations
I. Samir Ghossoub
Whereas Samir Saad Alaleh Ghossoub filed a private suit on 23 August 1995,
stating that he was the head of a household composed of himself, his wife and three
children, that he was standing under the bridge, ensuring the safe passage of lorries
entering the premises of the Youssef Khoury enterprise, when the Mercedes parked there
was blown up, causing veins to burst all over his body, semi-paralysis of his right side
and loss of memory. He was unable to speak, both of his eyes were injured and he lost his
sight. He remained in hospital for almost two months, undergoing laser eye surgery on
more than fifty occasions. He suffered major injuries and permanent damage to several of
his sensory organs, and has been rendered incapable of performing any productive work;
He estimated the amount of compensation for material and non-material damages

at 1 million dollars;
During the proceedings before the Council, his counsel Attorney Germanous
demanded that he be awarded half a million dollars‟ compensation for material and non-
material damages and for his permanent incapacitation;
Whereas the above-mentioned plaintiff presented photocopies of the medical

reports dating from 1994 and 1995, which confirmed that the 52-year-old has been left
semi-paralysed on the right side, that he suffers from a speech disorder due to a capsular
haematoma in the left side of the brain, and that his eyes have been injured;
Whereas nobody has contested the relationship between his injuries and the first
explosion, which occurred a few metres from where he was standing, and as it was not
inconceivable that the explosion would result in such injuries;
The Council hereby decides to set the amount of compensation for his
incapacitation and damages at seventy-five million Lebanese pounds.
II. Mufleh Abi Younes

Whereas Mufleh Abi Younes filed a private suit on 29 August 1995, stating that
his sister Zakia was travelling with her daughter, Micheline Noma, from Ashrafiyeh to
Qornet Shehwan in a car belonging to her neighbour, who was accompanied by his wife
and daughter, when they were caught up in the explosion as they passed the site in which
it occurred. Their car and all inside went up in flames;
He demanded that he be awarded the sum of two million dollars in compensation

for the loss and damages sustained from the killing of his sister and her daughter;

- 60 -
His counsel demanded during the proceedings the sum of one million United
States dollars in compensation for the loss and the material and moral damages sustained
by the relatives of the two victims;
Whereas the suit he has brought is a private one, since it has not been shown that
he is acting in any other capacity, and whereas it has not been ascertained that he suffered
material damages from the killing of his sister and her daughter Micheline;
Whereas it may be assumed that he sustained moral damages owing to the pain he
suffered from the manner in which his sister and her daughter were killed, the Council
decides to award the plaintiff compensation for these damages in the sum of ten million
Lebanese pounds.
III. Youssef Ayoub Boughader and his grandson Jaad Samir

Boughader
Whereas the plaintiff Youssef Ayoub Boughader filed a private suit through
counsel on 12 December 1996 in his personal capacity as the guardian of his grandson
Jaad Samir Boughader, born on 10 September 1981, stating that his son Samir and his
family were killed as their car passed the site in which the Mercedes was blown up on
20 March 1991. The car burst into flames, killing Samir, Jaad‟s father, his wife Violette
and their daughter Josianne, and Violette‟s mother, Aurore;
Immeasurable material damages have been sustained by the two plaintiffs,

inasmuch as Samir was his father‟s only provider and Jaad has been left without a
provider and in extreme poverty, since he is being looked after by his grandfather who is
unable to work;
The plaintiffs have also suffered severe moral damages: Youssef has lost his son
and the whole of his family, and Jaad has been left alone in the world, having lost his
father, mother, sister and grandmother;
The two plaintiffs have demanded that the accused be declared jointly liable for
payment of the sum of 10 million United States dollars;
Attached to the suit is a copy of Samir‟s family civil-status book and two probate
decisions, fixing Samir‟s bequest to his father Youssef at 400 shares and to his son Jaad
at 2,000 shares, and Violette‟s bequest to her two children Jaad and Josianne, the
inheritance of Josianne having been transferred to her brother Jaad. A copy of the
decision appointing Youssef as his grandson‟s guardian is also attached;
Counsel for the two plaintiffs confirmed during the proceedings the demand for
an award to her two clients of the sum of 10 million dollars;
Whereas the Council hereby decides to award compensation amounting to 100

million Lebanese pounds to the plaintiff Youssef Boughader for material and moral

- 61 -
damages, and to award the minor plaintiff Jaad compensation amounting to 250 million
Lebanese pounds;
Whereas the accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly the sums fixed above to the
beneficiaries of the decision.
= = = = = = = = =

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Chapter XIII
Containing the rulings
based on the grounds set out above
The Judicial Council,
Having rejected, in its ruling of 20 December 1996, the argument of lack of

jurisdiction and the argument concerning the nullity of the preliminary investigations,
Unanimously decides:
I. To declare the accused Manuel Dib Younes innocent of the charges laid
against him in this case because of the existence of doubt, and to release him immediately
unless he has been detained in connection with another case;
II. To declare the fugitive accused Fadi Mikhail Ghosn, Jean Maroun Nejm
and Elie Jirjis Akiki innocent of the charges laid against them in this case because of the
inadequacy of the evidence, and to withdraw the fugitive arrest warrants, the time-limit
decisions, and the other arrest warrants issued against them in this case without acting
upon them;
III. To convict the accused Samir Farid Geagea of the offences specified in
article 549, paragraphs 1, 7 and 8, of the Criminal Code in conjunction with articles 217
and 218 thereof, and of the offences specified in article 6 of the Law of 11 January 1958,
and to impose the death penalty on him for all the aforementioned offences, commuted,
pursuant to article 253 of the Criminal Code, to a life sentence of hard labour;
To convict him of the misdemeanour specified in article 76 of the Weapons Act

and to sentence him to a term of imprisonment of six months;
– To amalgamate the penalties inasmuch as he will be serving a life sentence of

hard labour;
IV. To convict the fugitive accused Ghassan Antoine Touma, Antonios Elias
Elias, also known as Antonious Elias Obeid and as Tony Obeid, Rushdi Tawfik Raad,
also known as Nabil Fawzi, and Jean Youssef Chahine, also known as Asad, of the
offences specified in article 549, paragraphs 1, 7 and 8, of the Criminal Code in
conjunction with article 213 thereof, of the offences specified in article 549, paragraphs
1, 7 and 8, of the Criminal Code in conjunction with articles 201 and 213 thereof, and of
the offence specified in article 6 of the Law of 11 January 1958 in conjunction with
article 213 of the Criminal Code, and to impose the death penalty on each one of them for
all the aforementioned offences, commuted, pursuant to article 253 of the Criminal Code,
to a life sentence of hard labour for each one;
To convict them of the misdemeanour specified in article 76 of the Weapons and

Ammunition Act and to sentence each of them to a term of imprisonment of six months;

- 63 -
– To amalgamate the penalties inasmuch as they will each be serving a life

sentence of hard labour;
V. To convict the fugitive accused Naja Anis Kaddoum and Elias Georges
Awad of the offence specified in article 549, paragraphs 1 and 7, of the Criminal Code in
conjunction with article 219, paragraph 4, and article 220, paragraph 2, thereof, and of
the offence specified in article 549, paragraphs 1 and 7, of the Criminal Code in
conjunction with article 219, paragraph 4, article 201 and article 220, paragraph 2,
thereof, because of their complicity in the car-bomb operation of 20 March 1991, to
impose a life sentence of hard labour on them for each offence, commuted, pursuant to
article 253 of the Criminal Code, to 20 years of hard labour, and to amalgamate the two
sentences imposed, so that they each serve one 20-year sentence;
– To declare them innocent of the charge pertaining to the explosion that occurred
on 29 March 1991 and that pertaining to the offence specified in article 6 of the Law of
11 January 1958, owing to lack of evidence;
VI. To convict the fugitive accused Raji Ibrahim Abdou of the offence
specified in article 549, paragraphs 1 and 7, of the Criminal Code in conjunction with
article 219, paragraph 4, and article 220, paragraph 2, thereof, of the offence specified in
article 549, paragraphs 1 and 7, of the Criminal Code in conjunction with article 201,
article 219, paragraph 4, and article 220, paragraph 2, thereof, and of the offence
specified in article 6 of the Law of 11 January 1958, because of his complicity in the car-
bomb operation of 20 March 1991, to impose a life sentence of hard labour on him for
each offence, commuted, pursuant to article 253 of the Criminal Code, to 20 years of hard
labour, and to amalgamate the sentences imposed, so that he serves one 20-year sentence;
– To declare him innocent of the charge pertaining to the explosion that occurred
on 29 March 1991 and that pertaining to the misdemeanour specified in articles 72 and 76
of the Weapons and Ammunitions Act, owing to lack of evidence;
VII. To order the accused Samir Farid Geagea, Ghassan Antoine Touma,
Antonios Elias Elias, also known as Antonios Elias Obeid, Rushdi Tawfik Raad, Jean
Youssef Chahine, Naja Anis Kaddoum, Elias Georges Awad and Raji Abdou to pay,
jointly, to the civil plaintiffs the following sums:
– The sum of 75 million Lebanese pounds to the plaintiff Samir Saad Alaleh
Ghossoub;
– The sum of 10 million Lebanese pounds to the plaintiff Mufleh Abi Younes;
– The sum of 100 million Lebanese pounds to the plaintiff Youssef Boughader
personally;
– The sum of 250 million Lebanese pounds to the minor plaintiff Jaad Samir
Boughader.
VIII. To confiscate the crime-related materials that have been seized;

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IX. To reject all other demands that exceed the bounds of this judgement or
that are contrary thereto;
X. To order the accused to share the court costs.
Judgement rendered in the presence of the convicted prisoner Samir Farid

Geagea, and of Manuel Dib Younes and the civil plaintiffs, and in the absence of the
others.
[Signed by the members of the Council]
Judge Riyashi, Judge Zein, Judge Al-Moullem, Judge Harmouch

and President Kheirallah
[Signed by the Court Clerk]
Court Clerk Al-Hajj
This Judgement was delivered on the basis of the relevant record on the ninth day of
March 1997.
[Signed] [Signed]
The President Court Clerk

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-1-

Judgement No.: 2/97

Date: 9 May 1997

Plaintiffs: 1. The Public Prosecutor‟s Office

2. Mufleh Abi Younes}

4. Youssef Ayoub Boughader

5. Jaad Samir Boughader, under the guardianship of his

1. Samir Farid Geagea: his counsel: Issam Karam, Edmond Rizk,

2. Manuel Dib Younes: his counsel: Abdou Boutaya and

STL Official Translation

1. Ghassan Antoine Touma

2. Antonios Elias Elias, also known as Antonios Obeid and

3. Jean Youssef Chahine, known as Asad

4. Rushdi Tawfik Raad, known as Nabil Fawzi

5. Raji Ibrahim Abdou

6. Elias Georges Awad, known as “Giuliano”

7. Naja Anis Kaddoum

8. Jean Maroun Nejm, known as “Nadim al-Ashkar”

9. Fadi Mikhail Ghosn

10. Elie Jirjis Akiki

On behalf of the Lebanese people

Following scrutiny and deliberation,

Having considered Decision No. 627 of the Ministry of Justice of 13 December

Having also considered the indictment decision issued by Investigating Judge

STL Official Translation

STL Official Translation

Owing to their involvement as principals or accomplices in a criminal plan to

On 18 December 1995 the Public Prosecution Service at the Court of Cassation

Having questioned the accused and listened to the witnesses‟ statements;

STL Official Translation

I. The plaintiffs in a personal capacity

II. The Public Prosecution Service at the Court of Cassation

He concluded by reiterating the content of the indictment decision and demanding

III. The defendants

STL Official Translation

That article 8 of the Amnesty Law contained no definition of a political leader,

Dr. Naim concluded by making the following demands:

STL Official Translation

– Second: to restrict the exception to the application of article 3 of the Amnesty

Attorney Germanus, responding to the argument regarding the definition of a

He referred to personalities who are recognized as political leaders: Lenin (not

He concluded that Michel Murr was not a political leader,

STL Official Translation

Attorney Karam reviewed Minister Murr‟s testimony before the Council,

Referring to the concept of the mastermind and to Samir Geagea‟s absolute

STL Official Translation

STL Official Translation

The accused, Samir Geagea, concluded by denying any personal involvement or

2. The defendant Manuel Younes

(a) His counsel Attorney Abdou Boutaya pleaded on his behalf.

Attorney Boutaya responded to the arguments of Counsel for the Prosecution at

In conclusion, he demanded that Manuel Dib Younes should be declared innocent

STL Official Translation

STL Official Translation

I. Concerning the argument that the decision by the Minister of Justice

Whereas the Minister of Justice, acting on this judicial decision, appointed

STL Official Translation

Two conclusions flow from the foregoing:

1. The question of jurisdiction has been finally settled and cannot be

II. Characterization of Minister Murr as a political leader

Whereas it remains to be established whether Minister Murr is a political leader

Whereas Attorney Naim cites in this connection the following definition of

“Leadership can generally be defined as the exercise of influence on others to