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ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES V. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM,


G.R. NO. 78742, JULY 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 342

FACTS:

The following are consolidated cases:

a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition
are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228
as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislature‘s
power.

b. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria‘s Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131
and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.

c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.

d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven
hectares.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the aforementioned EO‘s, PD, and RA were constitutional.

HELD:

The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain.

The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of
the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent
Domain.

RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under
the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not
a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of
said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer-beneficiary.

The Court declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in Section 18 of the
CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.
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WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM V. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORP., G.R. NO. 194239, JUNE
16, 2015

Facts:

Respondent FPIC operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: (1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, which
covers a 117-kilometer stretch from Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and transports diesel, gasoline, jet
fuel and kerosene; and (b) the Black Oil.

Pipeline (BOPL) System, which extends 105 kilometers and transports bunker fuel from Batangas to a depot in
Sucat, Parañaque. These systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and parts of
the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.

In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower
Condominium (WestTower) started to smell gas within the condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within
the condominium premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from... the wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its
inability to control the flow, WestTower’s management reported the matter to the Police Department of Makati City,
which in turn called the city’s Bureau of Fire Protection.
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What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump
pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated water
into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal.

Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of WestTower to abandon their respective units on July 23, 2010
and the condo’s power was shut down.

On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.) interposed the present
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation of the
surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower Corporation also alleged that it is joined
by the civil society and several people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and public interest groups
who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the environmental issues involved.

On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan with a Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the members of their Boards of Directors to file their
respective verified returns. The TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL
until further orders; (b) check the structural integrity of the whole span of the 117-kilometer WOPL while
implementing sufficient measures to prevent and avert any untoward incident that may result from any leak of the
pipeline; and (c) make a report thereon within 60 days from receipt thereof.

Meanwhile, on January 18, 2011, FGC and the members of its Board of Directors and Officers filed a Joint
Compliance submitting the report required by the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO. They contended that they neither own
nor operate the pipelines, adding that it is impossible for them to report on the structural integrity of the pipelines,
much less to cease and desist from operating them as they have no capability, power, control or responsibility over
the pipelines. They, thus, prayed that the directives of the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO be considered as sufficiently
performed, as to them.

On January 21, 2011, FPIC, in compliance with the writ, submitted its 4-page “Report on Pipeline Integrity
Check and Preventive Maintenance Program.”

Since after the Court’s issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO on November 19, 2010, FPIC has
ceased operations on both the WOPL and the BOPL. On May 31, 2011, however, the Court, answering a query of
the DOE, clarified and confirmed that what is covered by the Writ of Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL
System of FPIC; thus, FPIC can resume operation of its BOPL System.

To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). By
this Court’s Resolution dated November 22, 2011,[14] the appellate court was required to conduct hearings and,
thereafter, submit a report and recommendation within 30 days after the receipt of the parties’ memoranda.

On January 11, 2013, petitioners filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the CA’s Report praying that (a)
instead of the DOE, the required certification should be issued by the DOST-Metal Industry Research and
Development Center; (b) a trust fund be created to answer for future contingencies; and (c) the directors and officers
of FPIC and FGC be held accountable.

On July 30, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution adopting the recommendation of the CA in its Report and
Recommendation that FPIC be ordered to secure a certification from the DOE Secretary before the WOPL may
resume its operations.

Having received the October 25, 2013 Certification and the August 5, 2014 Letter from the DOE on the state of
the WOPL, as well as the parties’ comments thereon, the following issues defined by the parties during the March
21, 2012 preliminary conference are now ripe for... adjudication

Issues:
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I. Whether or not petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the other petitioners and
whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-
in-interest;

II. Whether or not a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to direct the respondents to
perform or to desist from performing acts in order to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected
environment;

III. Whether or not a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for future similar contingencies;
and

IV. Whether or FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may be held liable under the
environmental protection order.

Ruling:

I. Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal

As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real parties-in-interest. In other words, the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive
law, possesses the right sought to be enforced. Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium unit
owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning of
July 23, 2010, when the condominium’s electrical power... was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and residents
of West Tower could still not return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of
West Tower are real parties-in-interest.

There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its unit owners and
residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a condominium corporation has
limited powers under RA 4726, otherwise known as The Condominium Act, it is empowered to pursue actions in
behalf of its members. In the instant case, the condominium corporation is the management body of West Tower and
deals with everything that may affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or users.

Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof of juridical personality

Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang
Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International Philippines,
Inc. – San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium
Corporation, as petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their intervention in the present controversy in the
adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution.

This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7of
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an
environmental... disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.

Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the submissions to the Court,
including the periodic reports of FPIC and the results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL.
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Having disposed of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of contention in the pending motions. Suffice it to
state in the outset that as regards the substantive issues presented, the Court, likewise, concurs with the other
recommendations of the CA, with a few... modifications.

II. Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the DOE Certification of the WOPL’s Commercial Viability

To recall, petitioners’ persistent plea is for the conversion of the November 19, 2010 TEPO into a Permanent
Environmental Protection Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3,[46] Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases. For its part, respondent FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the measures that are already in place,
will sufficiently address any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL.

With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the following systems: (a) regular cleaning
scraper runs, which are done quarterly; (b) pipeline integrity gauge (PIG) tests/Intelligent PIG, now known as in-line
inspections (ILI), which is done every five years;

(c) pressure monitoring valves; and (d) 24-hour patrols. Additionally, FPIC asserted that it also undertook the
following: (a) monitoring of wells and borehole testing/vapor tests; (b) leak tightness test, also known as segment
pressure test; (c) pressure-controlled test; (d) inspection and reinforcement of patches; (e) inspection and
reinforcement of dents; and (f) Pandacan segment replacement. Furthermore, in August 2010, with the oil leak
hogging the headlines, FPIC hired NDT Middle East FZE (NDT) to conduct ILI inspections through magnetic flux
leakage (MFL) and ultrasonic tests to, respectively, detect wall thinning of the pipeline and check it for cracks.

The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and insufficient for purposes
of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence, considering the necessary caution and level of
assurance required to ensure that the WOPL system is free from leaks and is safe for commercial operation, the CA
recommended that FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification that the WOPL is already safe for commercial
operation. This certification, according to the CA, was to be issued with due consideration of the adoption by FPIC
of... the appropriate leak detection systems to monitor sufficiently the entire WOPL and the need to replace portions
of the pipes with existing patches and sleeves. Sans the required certification, use of the WOPL shall remain abated.

The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, We required FPIC to obtain the
adverted DOE Certification in Our July 30, 2013 Resolution. We deemed it proper to require said certification from
the DOE considering that the core issue of this case requires the specialized knowledge and special expertise of the
DOE and various other administrative agencies. On October 25, 2013, the DOE submitted the certification pursuant
to the July 30, 2013 Resolution of the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE Secretary Carlos Jericho I.
Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and the timetable for the resumption of the WOPL
operations after conducting a dialogue between the concerned government agencies and FPIC.

After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the parties, the Court adopts the
activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC as
conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations of... the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed
with the implementation of the tests proposed in the said August 5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the
results warrant the immediate reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the...
operation of the WOPL. On the other hand, should the probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for
continued use and that its condition is irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the
closure of the WOPL may be ordered.

It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL’s compliance with pipeline structure
standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that is to be determined on the basis of the evidence
presented by the parties on the WOPL’s actual state. Hence, Our consideration of the numerous findings and
recommendations of the CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the WOPL’s present structure, and not the cited
pipeline incidents as the dissent propounds.
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Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several conditions upon FPIC for the resumption of
the operations of the WOPL. This, coupled with the submission by the DOE of its proposed activities and timetable,
is a clear and unequivocal message coming from the DOE that the WOPL’s soundness for resumption of and
continued commercial operations is not yet fully determined. And it is only after an extensive determination by the
DOE of the pipeline’s actual physical state through its proposed activities, and not merely through a... short-form
integrity audit, that the factual issue on the WOPL’s viability can be settled. The issue, therefore, on the pipeline’s
structural integrity has not yet been rendered moot and remains to be subject to this Court’s resolution.

Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE’s issuance of the certification adverted to equates to the writ of
kalikasan being functus officio at this point.

III. Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund

Anent petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note that under Sec. 1, Rule 5 of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the
environment.

A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for the
creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies.This is clearly outside the limited purpose of a special trust
fund under the Rules of Procedure for

Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably already suffered.
Hence,the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim
for damages, which is prohibited by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the
considered view that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced.

The present ruling on petitioners’ prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in the instant recourse,
however, is without prejudice to the judgment/s that may be rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by
petitioners arising from the same incident if the payment of damages is found warranted.

IV. Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers

On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective directors and officers, the CA found FGC
not liable under the TEPO and, without prejudice to the outcome of the civil case (Civil Case No. 11-256, RTC,
Branch 58 in Makati City) and criminal complaint (Complaint-Affidavit for Reckless Imprudence, Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Makati City) filed against them, the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are
not liable in their individual capacities.

The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual directors and officers of FPIC
and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition
for a writ of kalikasan,the Court cannot grant the award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec.
15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal
complaint filed by petitioners against respondents are the proper proceedings to ventilate and determine the
individual liability of respondents, if any, on their exercise of corporate powers and the management of FPIC
relative to the dire environmental impact of the dumping of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the
WOPL in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.

Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC and FGC officials which can,
however, be properly resolved in the civil and criminal cases now pending against them.
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OPOSA V. FACTORAN, G.R. NO. 101083, JULY 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792

Facts:

The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests
of the country. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

 Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

 Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of
defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the
benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits
in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

Issues:

I. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.

II. Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.

III. Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing violates the requirements of due process.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

 The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.

1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion
the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject
matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of
an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution.
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2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.

3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of
a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.

 The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind.

The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.

The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted
benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the
national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit,
licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein .

All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
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Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July
1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
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MMDA V. CONCERNED CITIZENS OF MANILA BAY, G.R. NO. 171947, DEC. 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 661

FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way
below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or
the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily
liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for
swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-
up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited
only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;

(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.

*APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality. –– Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state
will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall
take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed
water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations. ––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean -
up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses
incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when
a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary,
Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality
“has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.” Section 17 & 20 are of general
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application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila
Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the
line between a specific and a general pollution incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the implementation
of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the
very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may
be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as “continuing mandamus ,” the
Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that
its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

MEAD V. ARGEL, G.R. NO. L-41958, JULY 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 256

FACTS:

Petitioner Donald Mead assailed the legal personality of the Provincial Fiscal to file an information against him
for his alleged violation of RA No. 3931 or An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control
Commission. Petitioner averred that the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission created under the
said law has the authority to hear cases involving violations under the same.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the filing of the information by the provincial fiscal was proper.

RULING:

The filing by the Provincial Fiscal of the case was premature sans the findings of the Commission on the
matter.

Petitioner was being sued for the offense of allegedly causing pollution of a waterway (highway canal)(Sec 9).
The Court held that the exclusive authority to determine whether or not ‘pollution’ did exist is vested in the
Commission, who is in better position to determine the same for such requires specialized knowledge of technical
and scientific matters which are not ordinarily within the competence of Fiscals or of those sitting in a court of
justice (Sec 8).
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Unless the case involves that of nuisance under the Civil Code or until there is a ruling by the Commission on
the alleged act of pollution, no court action shall be initiated (Sec8).

Without a prior determination or finding by the Commission that the provisions of the subject law had been
violated, the provincial Fiscal lacked the authority to file the case against petitioner.
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POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD V. CA, G.R. NO. 93891, MARCH 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 112

FACTS:

The Pollution Adjudication Board filed a petition for review on the decision of the CA in favoring the Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation. petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and
desist from utilizing its waste water pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater
directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No.
984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when
there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of
which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends
that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River
provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on the other hand,
contends that under the Board’s own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents
discharged pose an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life.” In the
instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar’s waste water
discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had been denied due
process by the Board.

HELD:

The Supreme Court note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease
and desist order may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an
“immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life,” or (b) whenever such
discharges or wastes exceed “the allowable standards set by the [NPCC].” On the one hand, it is not essential that
the Board prove that an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life” exists
before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do
exceed “the allowable standards set by the [NPCC].” In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable
standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there
is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or
discharges have not yet been the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may
act on an ex parte basis when it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an
“immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life.” Since the applicable standards
set by the Commission existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent
or waste discharge, the general standard of an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal
and plant life” remains necessary.
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Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned Order and Writ of
Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since the SC have concluded that the Order and Writ of
Execution were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not err when it dismissed
Solar’s petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS INC. V. CA, G.R. NO. 94759, JANUARY 21, 1991, 193 SCRA 147

Facts:

Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting charcoal briquette. On February 16,
1989, they received a letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation
of the petitioner’s plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter also requested the company to show to the office of the
mayor some documents, including the Building permit, mayor’s permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environmental
and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.Since the company failed to comply in bringing the required
documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without notice, caused the padlock of company’s plant premises, effectively
causing stoppage of its operation.Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohiition,
mandamus with preliminary injuction against respondents, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse
of discretion. The lower court ruled against the company. The CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the mayor has authority to order the closure of the plant. YES.

2. Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse of discretion. NO.
16

Ruling:

1) No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determiningwhether there is a pollution
of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially addressed
to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human Settlements, now the
Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be
recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from pollution,and by
virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the
same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the
community from the emissions in the operation of the business.

2) The Acting Mayor, in the letter, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its
plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in
the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it was required to bring the
following:

a. Building permit;

b. Mayor's permit; and

c. Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit.

3) This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels.

4) The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made.It found that the fumes
emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device
has been installed.

5) Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a
building permit issued by an official of Makati.

6) While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control
Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted
any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent
any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.
17

FELIPE YSMAEL JR. & CO. INC. V. DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. NO. 79538,
OCTOBER 18, 1990

FACTS:
On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an
exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of
public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of
Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990.
However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development (Bureau), Director
Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and
Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest
concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural
Resources Teodoro Pena.
Subsequently, petitioner’s timber license agreement was cancelled. He sent a letter addressed to then
President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support
thereof its contributions to forest conservation and alleging that it was not given the opportunity to be
heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operations, but no favorable action was taken on his letter;
Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area formerly covered by petitioner’s TLA
was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation under a new TLA which was set to
expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without
the benefit of a formal award or license. The latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or
cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986
to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the
Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement
which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No.
356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in
violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to
take possession of all logs found in the concession area. However, petitioner's request was denied.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration reiterating, among others, its request that the timber license
agreement issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied this motion.
Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. The Office
of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's
appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the
issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
18

Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling his
timber license agreement and the granting of TLA to private respondent, which were issued way back in
1983 and 1984, respectively.

HELD:
NO. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders
the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches. Laches is defined as the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it of declined to assert it. The rule is that
unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon
the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant, not those
who sleep upon their rights. In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983
and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the
opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes
unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring
the reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a
writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of
a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue
of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the
government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources,
and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber licenses,
permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in
the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process
of law clause.
19

MUSTANG LUMBER V. CA, G.R. NO. 104988, JUNE 18, 1996

FACTS:
Acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside petitioner’s
lumberyard, a team of foresters and policeman was organized and sent to conduct surveillance. In the course thereof,
the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner’s truck loaded with lumber. The driver could
not produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and
impounded them.
20

ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure of the truck and its cargo without warrant was unlawful.

RULING:
NO. Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate that
no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause. Petition is DENIED.
21

PAAT V. CA, G.R. NO. 111107, JANUARY 10, 1997

FACTS:

On May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from
San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for
brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the
forest products found concealed in the truck.

LOWER COURTS:

* CENRO: Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in
Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen
(15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents,
however, failed to submit the required explanation.

* RED- DENR: On June 22, 1989,i[1] Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner
Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential
Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated
June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a
subsequent order of July 12, 1989.ii[2]

* DENR-SECRETARY (Pending resolution)

* RTC (action for replevin): denied motion to dismiss by Paat (DENR-RED)


22

* CA (review): denied, has legal questions involved.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

(1) Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to
recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines?

NO, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed
of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought.
The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.

(2) Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

YES.

“SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order
Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head
or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the
offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.”
(Underline ours)

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the
authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and
regulations. The phrase “to dispose of the same” is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in
favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made “in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations or policies on the matter.”

“SECTION 68. xxx

xxx
23

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly
[sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.” (Underline ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents' thinking not only because the
aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include “conveyances” that can be the subject of confiscation
by the courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private respondents' interpretation of the subject provision
unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A.

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only
‘conveyances,' but forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the ‘court' in a
criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation
cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at
all.

it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained
by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended.

Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the
Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of
forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative
forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
24

MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FACTORAN, 240 SCRA 100, JANUARY 16, 1995

FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture,
co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, and
prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned
corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, the DENR Secretary issued DENR
Administrative Order No. 57, series of 1989, entitled "Guidelines on Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive
Order No. 279." Under the transitory provision of said DENR Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing
mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No.
211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty
(20) hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these
guidelines.

The Secretary of the DENR then further issued DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying down the
"Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation."

The issuance and the impending implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their
respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. to file the instant petition assailing their
validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., mainly contends that the administrative orders do not conform with
Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision under
Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing
mining leases and other mining agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements within one (1)
year from its effectivity date. On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and
Mineral Production-Sharing Agreements within two (2) years from the date of effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991
shall cause the abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.

Petitioner argued that Executive Order No. 279 does not contemplate automatic conversion of mining lease agreements into
mining production-sharing agreement as provided under Article 9, Administrative Order No. 57 and/or the consequent
abandonment of mining claims for failure to submit LOIs and MPSAs under Section 3, Administrative Order No. 82 because
Section 1 of said Executive Order No. 279 empowers the DENR Secretary to negotiate and enter into voluntary agreements
25

which must set forth the minimum terms and conditions provided under Section 2 thereof. Moreover, petitioner contends that the
power to regulate and enter into mining agreements does not include the power to preterminate existing mining lease agreements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR Secretary are unconstitutional.

HELD:

NO. DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are not unconstitutional.

The questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which
they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare. The
validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be sustained, and their force and effect upheld.

Administrative Order No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. It bears mention that under the text of Executive Order
No. 211, there is a reservation clause which provides that the privileges as well as the terms and conditions of all existing mining
leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, shall be subject
to any and all modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. Hence, the strictures of the non-impairment of contract clause under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution
do not apply to the aforesaid mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211. They can be amended, modified or altered by a statute passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

Moreover, nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which would lead us to conclude that the
questioned order authorizes the automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to production-sharing agreements. The provision in Article 9 of
Administrative Order No. 57 that "all such leases or agreements shall be converted into production sharing agreements within one
(1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines" could not possibly contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of the
Government that all existing mining leases and agreements are automatically converted into production-sharing agreements. On
the contrary, the use of the term "production-sharing agreement" in the same provision implies negotiation between the
Government and the applicants, if they are so minded. Negotiation negates compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by
petitioner in the instant petition. A mineral production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a meeting of the minds of the parties
after negotiations arrived at in good faith and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the subsequent Administrative Order
No. 82.

NUCLEAR FREE PHILIPPINE COALITION, G.R. NO. L-68474, FEBRUARY 11, 1986

(G.R. No. L-68474 February 11, 1986

NUCLEAR FREE PHILIPPINE COALITION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL POWER


CORPORATION, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. 70632 February 11, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, ET


AL., respondents.)

Facts:

a. G.R. No. 70632, petitioners question the competence of respondent PAEC Commissioners to pass judgment
on the safety of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 PNPP-1 in PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77 without
26

however seeking their ouster from office, although "proven competence" is one of the qualifications prescribed by
law for PAEC Commissioners. Petitioners also assail the validity of the motion (application) filed by the National
Power Corporation (NPC) for the conversion of its construction permit into an operating license for PNPP-1 on the
principal ground that it contained no information regarding the financial qualifications of NPC, its source of nuclear
fuel, and insurance coverage for nuclear damage.

b. In G.R. No. 68474, acting on the motion filed therein dated June 8, 1985 to order PAEC to reconsider its
orders of May 31 and June 5, 1985, the urgent motion for mandatory injunction and/or restraining order dated
August 3, 1985, the second urgent motion for mandatory injunction dated August 12, 1985, and the various
pleadings and other documents submitted by the parties relative thereto, and considering the paramount need of a
reasonable assurance that the operation of PNPP-1 will not pose an undue risk to the health and safety of the people,
which dictates that the conduct of the inquiry into the safety aspects of PNPP-1 be characterized by sufficient
latitude, the better to achieve the end in view, unfettered by technical rules of evidence (Republic Act 5207, section
34), and in keeping with the requirements of due process in administrative proceedings.

Issue:

Whether or not the judgement of PAEC on the nuclear power plant is safe.

Ruling:

a. The Court therefore resolved to RESTRAIN respondent PAEC Commissioners from further acting in PAEC
Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77.the said decision is due to the pamphlets that PAEC had circulated. Having thus
prejudged the safety of the PNPP-1 respondent PAEC Commissioners would be acting with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction were they to sit in judgment upon the safety of the plant, absent the
requisite objectivity that must characterize such an important inquiry.

b. The respondent PAEC (once reconstituted) to re-open the hearing on PNPP-1 so as to give petitioners sufficient
time to complete their cross-examination of the expert witnesses on quality assurance, to cross-examine the
witnesses that petitioners have failed to cross-examine on and after August 9, 1985, and to complete the presentation
of their evidence, for which purpose, respondent PAEC shall issue the necessary subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum to compel the attendance of relevant witnesses and/or the production of relevant documents. For the said
purposes, the PAEC may prescribe a time schedule which shall reasonably assure the parties sufficient latitude to
adequately present their case consistently with the requirements of dispatch. lt is understood that the PAEC may
give NPC the opportunity to correct or supply deficiencies in this application or evidence in support thereof.
27

DE GUZMAN V. ESCALONA, 97 SCRA 619

Facts:

The defendants Florentino Rodrigo and Mariano Dayday were charged with "Illegal Possession of Explosive
locally known as 'dinamita'.” While in the seawaters of the Cebu, confederating and mutually helping with one
another, without authority of the law and without proper permit from authorities, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously possess, keep an explosive, locally known as 'DINAMITA' in their banca purposely for
use of illegal fishing and three (3) bottles of explosives, two (2) paddles, two (2) fishnets locally known as "SIBOT"
and one (1) banca were recovered from their possession and control, which acts of the above-named accused is a
gross violation of PD No. 1058. Both were found guilty of said accusation.

However, the judge only submitted possession of explosives in connection with subversion is covered by
Presidential Decree No. 9, thus, the old law on illegal possession of explosives, Act 3023, has not been completely
repealed; that having found that the possession by the two accused of two bottles of home-made explosives was
solely for fishing purposes and had no connection with subversion, the illegal act should fall not under Presidential
Decree No. 9 but under Act 3023.

Petitioner Lt. Col. Rodrigo S. De Guzman, PC Provincial Commander Integrated National Police
Superintendent at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City, instituted these certiorari proceedings alleging mainly that the
offense charged was one for possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing under Presidential Decree No. 704,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058, and not for violation of Act 3023 which had long been repealed by
several laws and decrees; that the penalty provided for by current legislation is one which falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; and that respondent Judge's Decision has no legal basis.

Issue:

W/N the responded judge erred in rendering judgment even though the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter.

Held:

Yes. Considering that the Municipal Circuit Court lacked competent jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
criminal complaint against the accused respondents.

Presidential Decree No. 1058 is an amendatory decree, which increased the penalties for certain forms of
illegal fishing and for other acts made punishable under Presidential Decree No. 704 or the "Fisheries Decree of
1975". The pertinent portion of Section 33 of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1058 reads:

Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally
caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. - It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to
28

be caught, taken gathered fish or fisheries/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives,
obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d),
respectively, of Section 3 hereof: Provided, that possession of such explosives with intent to use the same for
illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided. ... (Emphasis supplied).

Section 38, subsection a (1) of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058,
correspondingly provides:

(1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years to twenty-five (25) years in the case of mere
possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing. ... (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Comment he filed for petitioner People of the Philippines,
respondent Judge's reference to Presidential Decree No. 9 is misplaced for, indeed, there is no mention at all of, nor
any reference to, Presidential Decree No. 9 in the Complaint.

REPUBLIC V. CANSINO, 5 SCRA 103, MAY 26, 1962

Facts:

On October 3, 1960, Magdayo Ramirez, owner of 85 tubs of fish filed a complaint for replevin against Commander
Abraham Campo and manager of Royal Cold Storage. Upon the filing by Ramirez of a P2, 000 bond, Judge Roman
Cansino ordered the court sheriff to take possession of the 85 tubs of fish for five days and release it to Ramirez.
Commander Ocampo filed a petition to return the fish for the same fish were caught in TONY LEX I boat. Here, the
fish were caught through the use of dynamite, which is a violation and crime under R.A. 428. Action for prohibition
and injunction were filed by Ocampo against the Judge and the sheriff.

Issues:

1. Whether or not respondent Judge erred in posting a bond in dissolving the warrant of seizure; and

2. Whether or not Ramirez violated R.A. 428.

Held:
29

1. Yes. RTC Judge Cansino erred in dissolving the warrant of seizure because the petitioner is the R.P and the same
is exempt from the obligation to post such a bond.
2. Yes. Ramirez violated R.A. 428 because under this law, it is violative to use dynamite in fishing which the Bureau
of Fisheries strictly observes the implementation of the said law.
30

PEOPLE V. CUBELO, 106 PHIL. 496, NOV. 20, 1959

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ILLEGAL FISHING; FAILURE TO ALLEGE IN INFORMATION THAT EXPLOSION IS


FOR PURPOSE OF FISHING; DEFECT NOT SUBSTANTIAL; INTENT PRESUMED FROM RESULT OF THE ACT. —
The act charged in the information against the appellant that he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously exploded one stick of
dynamite, which explosion resulted in disabling, stupefying and killing a certain kind of fish, comes under the provisions of
Section 12 paragraph 2 of republic Act 462 although the infromation fails to state that the act was for the purpose of fishing.
Toassume that appellant exploded the dynamite in the water just for fun, and that said supposedly innocent practice unexpressly
resulted in the killing of a large fish, would involve an unreasonable presumption as well as an extarordinary coincidence. The
intent may be rightly presumed from the result of the act. Moreover, the information in the case at bar being entitled "Illegal
Fishing With Explosive," there could have been no doubt in the mind of appellant, who was then assisted by counsel, that he was
being charged with exploding dynamite for purposes of fishing illegally.

2. ID.; ID.; SUBSIDIARY PENALTY APPLICABLE TO OFFENSE UNDER SPECIAL LAWS. — Appellant contention that
the trial court committed error in ordering him to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of the fine
with the reason that Act No. 4003, which prohibits fishing with the use of explosive, fails to provide for such subsidiary
imprisonment, and that being a special law, it is not subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, is untenable. The second
paragraph of Article 100 of said code provides that "this Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary." Article 100 (Civil liability) and 39 (subsidiary penalty) are applicable to offenses under special
laws (People v. Dizon, G.R. No. L-8002, November 23, 1955).

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

In the Court of First Instance of Surigao, appellant Moises Cubelo was charged with the crime of illegal fishing with explosives,
allegedly committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 7th day of May, 1955, within the jurisdictional waters of the municipality and province of Surigao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously explode one stick of dynamite without permit to do so as a result of which a certain kind of fish locally called tamban
valued at P10.00 was disabled, killed and/or stupefied in violation of Act 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 471 and
further amended by Republic Act No. 462."cralaw virtua1aw library
31

He was arraigned on March 25, 1957, the information being read and translated to him in the local dialect. To the charged, he
pleaded guilty, whereupon, the trial court declared him guilty of illegal fishing with the use of explosives as defined in Act No.
4003, as amended, and considering his plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance, sentenced him —

". . . to undergo the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year and six (6) months, as minimum, to two (2) years, as maximum, and to
pay a fine in the amount of P1,500, or to serve subsidiary imprisonment which shall not be more than one-third (1/3) of the
principal penalty or in any case to not more than one year; and to pay the costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

However, in spite of his spontaneous plea of guilty, Cubelo appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which certified the case
to us on the ground that it involved only questions of law.

Appellant contends that he may not be convicted of illegal fishing with dynamite because the information fails to allege the
intention to fish with explosives.

Act No. 4003, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 471 and further amended by Republic Act No. 462, under which appellant
was accused and convicted, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Rep. Act 462, par. 2 — Any person who shall use explosives in fishing in violation of the provisions of section twelve of this
Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by
imprisonment for not less than one year and six months nor more than five years, aside from the confiscation and forfeiture of all
explosives, boats, tackle, apparel, furniture, and other apparatus used in fishing in violation of said section twelve of this Act."
(Approved June 9, 1950)

Defendant in support of his contention, relies upon the phrase "use explosives in fishing", claiming that in order to hold him
criminally liable, the information should make it clear that the explosives or dynamite was used in fishing and not for any other
purpose. Republic Act No. 462 is but an amendment of Section 76 of Act No. 4003, providing the penalty for violation of Section
12 of said Act. The said Section 12 reads thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 12, Act 4003 - The use of dynamite or other explosives for the stupefying, disabling, killing or taking of fish or other
aquatic animals, or under water for any purpose except in the execution of bona fide engineering work and the destruction of
wrecks or obstacles to navigation, or the gathering by any means of the fishes or other aquatic animals stupefied, disabled or
killed by the action of dynamite or other explosives shall be unlawful, provided, that the use of mechanical bombs for killing
whales, crocodiles, sharks, or other large dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Sec. of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Sec. of Interior, and provided further, that the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources with the
concurrence of Sec. of Interior, may issue permits for the use of explosive in taking fish or other aquatic animals in limited
numbers for scientific purposes only. Permittees must be ready at all times to exhibit permits on demand by any peace officer or
deputy authorized in Sec. 5 hereof to enforce the provisions of this Act."cralaw virtua1aw library

The act charged in the information against Cubelo that he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously exploded one stick of dynamite,
which explosion resulted in disabling, stupefying and killing a certain kind of fish, known as tamban valued at ten pesos, comes
under the provisions of Section 12 and par. 2 of Republic Act 462, above- quoted. Of course, the Fiscal filing the complaint, to
dissipate all doubt, should or could have inserted the phrase "for the purpose of fishing", thereby avoiding any need of
interpretation, including the reading of the information in connection with Section 12 of Act 4003. But that Cubelo exploded the
dynamite in order to fish, there can be no doubt. To assume that he exploded the dynamite in the water just for fun, and that said
supposedly innocent pastime unexpectedly resulted in the killing of a large fish valued at ten pesos, would involve an
unreasonable presumption, as well as an extraordinary coincidence. People do not usually assume the risk of handling explosives
such as dynamite with its consequent dangers to human life, and waste the value of said explosives which could otherwise be
utilized for legitimate purposes, just for fun. And fishes, like those called tamban, are not so abundant and always near the
surface of the sea that any explosion of a stick of dynamite thrown at random, without any purpose other than for fun, and
without aim or deliberation, could not but hit them as a target with fatal results. The theory of appellant does not appeal to the
credulity of this Tribunal.

Moreover, the information in the present case is entitled "Illegal Fishing with Explosives", so that there could have been no doubt
in the mind of appellant who was then assisted by counsel, that he was being charged with exploding dynamite for purposes of
fishing illegally, this apart from the fact that among the exhibits which the prosecution was going to present in evidence to
support the charge, evidently confiscated from the accused at the time he was caught in the act of fishing with explosives, and
which were listed in the information, were the following:
32

One (1) bag of dried fish

One (1) Goggles

One (1) fish nets

One (1) paddle, and

One (1) baroto

The last four articles clearly show that the accused was fishing. And as already stated, he pleaded guilty to the charge. In
addition, the intent may be rightly presumed from the result of the act. Cubelo exploded a stick of dynamite in the water and
killed a large fish valued at ten pesos. The logical presumption is that the explosion was for the purpose of fishing, that is to say,
to catch that big fish which at the time he knew was near him or within the area where he threw the stick of dynamite.

Appellant also claims that the trial court committed error in ordering him to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
in the payment of the fine, contending that Act No. 4003 fails to provide for such subsidiary imprisonment, and being a special
law, it is not subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. The second paragraph of Article 10 of said code provides that
"this Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary." In the cases of People v.
Dizon (G. R. No. L-8002, November 23, 1955), it has been held that Articles 100 (civil liability) and 39 (subsidiary penalty) are
applicable to offenses under special laws, citing the cases of People v. Moreno (60 Phil., 178) and Copiaco v. Luzon Brokerage
(66 Phil., 184).

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.

PEOPLE V. LIM, G.R. NO. L-14432, JULY 26, 1960

FACTS:

In March 1954, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant tothe authority granted him by
Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4003 (Fisheries Act) issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 37. Section 2 of said
order prohibits trawl fishing in certain areas in Samar. FAO No. 37 was subsequently amended with FAO No. 37.

Leoncio Lim, the accused in violation of said order, challenged its legality on the ground that FAO No. 37 was
contrary to Act No. 4003, the former having no fixed period and thus establishing a ban for all time while the latter
stating that prohibition was for any single period of time not exceeding five years duration.

ISSUE: W/N Section 2 of FAO No. 37 was invalid.


33

HELD:

No. Section 2 of FAO No. 37 1 was valid. Although FAO No. 37 1 was defective because it failed to specify a
period for the ban, it was ruled that in case of discrepancy between a basic law and a rule issued to implement it, the
basic law prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law. FAO No. 37 1 would be
inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years for any single period of time, but it was not necessarily
rendered void by the omission.
34

PEOPLE V. VERGARA, 270 SCRA 624, APRIL 2, 1997

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

From the decision, dated 10 February 1993, of the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 7, in
Tacloban City, finding accused Renerio P. Vergara guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 92-09-508
of a violation of Section 33 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1508, an appeal to this
Court has been interposed.

Vergara was charged, together with his three co-accused, namely Ernesto T. Cuesta, Jr., Pedro G. Dagao and
Bernardo P. Cuesta, on 25 September 1992, in an information that read:

"The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte accuses Ernesto T. Cuesta, Jr., Pedro G. Dagao, Renerio P.
Vergara and Bernardo P. Cuesta of the crime of Violation of Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1058, committed as follows:

"That on or about the 4th day of July, 1992, in the Municipal waters of Palo, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
catch, take and gather fish belonging to the anchovies species known locally as 'bolinao', with the use
of explosives contained in a bottle and called in the vernacular as 'badil', which bottled explosives after being ignited
and hurled to the sea, produced explosion and caused the death of the said fish which were hit or affected by such
explosion.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."

Vergara alone was arraigned and brought to trial; his co-accused escaped and remained at large.

It would appear that at about 7:30 in the morning of 04 July 1992, a team composed of deputized Fish Warden
and President of the Leyte Fish Warden Association Jesus P. Bindoy, Police Officers Casimiro Villas and Diosdado
Moron of the Palo PNP Station, Leyte, Fish Wardens Mario Castillote and Estanislao Cabreros and Fish Examiner
Nestor Aldas of the Department of Agriculture were on board, "Bantay-Dagat," a pumpboat, on "preventive patrol"
along the municipal waters fronting barangays Baras and Candahug of Palo, Leyte, when they chanced upon a blue-
colored fishing boat at a distance of approximately 200 meters away. The boat, 30 feet long, had on board appellant
Renerio Vergara and his three co-accused Bernardo Cuesta, Pedro Dagao and Ernesto Cuesta, Jr., and was on
35

parallel course toward the general direction of Samar. Momentarily, the team saw appellant throw into the sea a
bottle known in the locality as "badil" containing ammonium nitrate and having a blasting cap on top which, when
ignited and thrown into the water, could explode. The explosion would indiscriminately kill schools and various
species of fish within a certain radius. Approximately three seconds after appellant had thrown the "badil" into the
sea, the explosion occurred.Vergara and Cuesta dove into the sea with their gear while Dagao and Cuesta, Jr., stayed
on board to tend to the air hose for the divers.

The team approached the fishing boat. SPO2 Casimiro Villas boarded the fishing boat while Fish Warden Jesus
Bindoy held on to one end of the boat. Moments later, Vergara and Cuesta surfaced, each carrying a fishnet or
"sibot" filled with about a kilo of "bolinao" fish scooped from under the water. Having been caught red-handed, the
four accused were apprehended and taken by the patrol team to the "Bantay-Dagat" station at Baras, and later to the
police station in Palo, Leyte. The fishing boat and its paraphernalia, as well as the two fishnets of "bolinao," were
impounded. The accused, however, refused to sign and acknowledge the corresponding receipts therefor.

On 10 February 1993, following the submission of the evidence, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
Vergara, viz:

"WHEREFORE, said Renerio Vergara is hereby sentenced to a penalty of Twenty (20) years to life imprisonment as
punished under Sec. 2, of PD 1058.

"This Court further orders the confiscation of the fishing boat of Mario Moraleta including the following
equipments: 1 air compressor, 3 sets of air hoses, and the 3 pieces of 'sibot' having been found to be instruments of
the crime.

"SO ORDERED "

In his appeal, Vergara submitted the following assignment of errors:

"1. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY WHEN IT COMPLETELY
IGNORED THE TESTIMONY OF EMILIO LINDE.

"2. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY WHEN IT GAVE MUCH
WEIGHT TO BIASED WITNESSES WHOSE TESTIMONIES WERE GLARINGLY INCONSISTENT.

"3. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY WHEN IT OPENLY SHOWED
BIAS AGAINST THE ACCUSED DURING THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE."

Emilio Linde sought to corroborate the claim of appellant that it was another unidentified group of fishermen
who threw the bottle of explosives at a school of "bolinao" fish. It was obvious, however, said the trial court, that the
statement of this defense witness was incredulous since he apparently had not at all been on board the fishing boat in
the company of the accused at the time of the incident. Even the rather lengthy counter-affidavit of the four accused
completely missed to mention Linde. The court a quo went on to observe that the demeanor of the accused at the
witness stand and the substance of his testimony failed to elicit belief.

Trial courts are tasked to initially rule on the credibility of witnesses for both the prosecution and the
defense. Appellate courts seldom would subordinate, with their own, the findings of trial courts which concededly
have good vantage points in assessing the credibility of those who take the witness stand. Nevertheless, it is not all
too uncommon for this Court, in particular, to peruse through the transcript of proceedings in order to satisfy itself
that the records of a case do support the conclusions of trial courts.

Fish Warden Jesus Bindoy gave a detailed account of the 4th July 1992 incident. Thus

"FISCAL DAGANDAN:

"Q In the morning of the 4th day of July, 1992 do you recall where you were?

"A We were on the sea fronting barangays Baras and Candahug.


36

"Q What municipality?

"A Palo, Leyte.

"Q Did you have anyone with you in this particular incident?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q Who were they?

"A Two policemen Casimiro Villas, Jr. and Diosdado Moron and my fellow fish warden and one from the
Department of Agriculture.

"Q Will you identify your co-fish warden who were present at that time?

"A Mario Castillote, Estanislao Cabreros, Jr.

"Q How about that employee from the Department of Agriculture, who was he?

"A Nestor Aldas.

"Q What were you doing at that particular time on this place fronting barangay Baras and Barangay Candahug, Palo,
Leyte?

"A We were watching for illegal fishers.

"Q What is your authority in this particular task?

"A We are the bantay dagat members of Palo.

Q Do you have any written authoriting evidencing that position?

"A Yes, maam, our deputized ID (witness is showing ID No. 1432-91)

"FISCAL DAGANDAN:

For the records your honor I will quote this ID: This is to certify that Jesus P. Bindoy is a deputy fish warden vested
with full power and authority to enforce all existing fishery laws, rules and regulations (SGD) Leopoldo Romano,
[D]irector, Department of Agriculture, Region 8.

"FISCAL DAGANDAN:

"Q Since you claimed that you were on the sea fronting barangays Baras and Candahug in what vehicle were you in
at that moment?

"A We were in a motorized pumpboat.

"Q So, what unusual incident if any that transpired?

"A In that morning we saw a blue pump boat which is about 200 meters away from us.

"COURT

What time in the morning?

"A About 7:30 in the morning more or less.

"FISCAL DAGANDAN:

"Q About how long is this colored blue pumpboat?

"A More or less 30 feet.


37

"Q At about this distance of 200 meters were you able to visualize or see if there were any passengers in that blue
colored pumpboat?

"A Yes, maam.

"Q Were you able to identify them?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q Who were they?

"A The one in front of the pumpboat was Renerio Vergara, Bernardo Cuesta, Pedro Dagao and Ernesto Cuesta, Jr.

"Q You mentioned of Renerio Vergara, whom you saw in that blue colored pumpboat and you identified earlier
Renerio Vergara. Is he the same person?

"A Yes, they are one and the same person.

"Q At the time you saw these persons loaded in that color blue pumpboat what were they doing?

"A I saw them paddling.

"Q Towards what direction?

"A Towards the direction of Samar.

"Q And where were you in relation with that pumpboat that was paddled towards Samar area?

"A We were situated parallel to them.

"Q So what happened at this particular time?

"A That was when we saw Renerio Vergara threw a bottle to the sea and after that we heard an explosion.

"Q Did you come to know what particular bottle was it thrown to the sea?

"A It was a dynamite (badil).

"Q As a member of this bantay dagat are you familiar with this 'badil' which you earlier mentioned?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q Will you describe this particular device?

"A This bottle is filled with ammonium nitrate and on top is a blasting cap.

"Q So in case this is used by fishermen, how do they operate this 'badil'?

"A It is ignited and then thrown to the sea and this result in the killing of fishes at the sea.

"Q In this particular instance when you heard the explosion how far were you to this blue pumpboat?

"A About 200 meters.

"Q So what did you do after you heard this explosion?

"A After the explosion we slowly approached them.

"Q From the time you saw this bottle being thrown to the sea by Vergara up to the time you heard this explosion
about how many minutes elapsed?

"A About 3 seconds.


38

"Q At about how near were you to this blue pumpboat?

"A We went near to a distance of one hundred meters.

"Q So, what did you do at this distance?

"A We kept on watching them first and after we knew that the two persons dived to the sea that was the time that we
approached the pumpboat.

"Q Were you able to recognize these two persons who dived?

"A Yes, maam.

"Q Who were they?

"A Renerio Vergara and Bernardo Cuesta.

"Q You said there were four persons loaded in that pumpboat. How about the other two what were they doing?

"A The two persons were there, one watching the hose that was used by the two persons who dived for breathing.

"Q So, what else did you do?

"A When we approached the pumpboat it was Casimiro Villas, a policeman who boarded the pumpboat.

"Q How about you what did you do when Casimiro Villas boarded the pumpboat?

"A I was the one holding on to the blue pumpboat.

"Q So, what else was done if any by the members of your team?

"A While we were there we let the two persons who dived surface and they were carrying with them fishnet filled
with 'bolinao' fish and then we told them that we will bring them to our temporary station at Baras, Palo.

"Q Do you know the specie of this bolinao?

"A Anchovies.

"Q About how heavy were these fishes of bolinao in the fishnet?

"A About one kilo per fishnet.

"Q How many contraption were carried by them?

"A Each one of them was carrying one 'sibot' (fishnet).

"COURT

So, two divers two nets?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q And each has a catch of one kilo?

"A Almost one kilo.

"Q So, two nets two kilos more or less?

"A Yes, sir.

"FISCAL DAGANDAN:
39

"Q So, after that what did you do?

"Q When we arrived at our temporary station at Baras, Palo we gave the fishes to the fish examiner and we had the
pumpboat inventoried and told them to sign the receipt we made.

"Q Do you recall if you made an apprehension report of the incident you witnessed?

"A Yes, maam.

"Q I show you a original copy of apprehension report dated July 4, 1992 addressed to the Regional Director,
Department of Agriculture, Tacloban City stating that the following offenders namely Renerio Vergara y Prisno,
Pedro Dagao y Gadin, Ernesto Cueta y Tobilla and Bernardo Cuesta y Pedrero were apprehended and the violation
is fishing with the use of dynamite, the original of which is found on page 4 of the records. Will you examine the
same and tell this court what relation has that to the report you said you made?

"A This is the apprehension report that we prepared on July 4, 1992."[6]

Nestor Aldas, an Agricultural Technologist and Fish Examiner working with the Department of Agriculture, Palo,
Leyte, who examined the fish samples taken from the accused, testified that he was with the team patrolling, on 04
July 1992, the waters of San Pedro Bay, Baras, Palo, Leyte, when he, like the other members of his team, witnessed
the use of explosives by the accused. Fish samples from the catch showed ruptured capillaries, ruptured and blooded
abdominal portion, and crushed internal organs indicating that explosives were indeed used.

The Court is convinced that the trial court has acted correctly in finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense
charged.

Sections 33 and 38 of P.D. No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1058, read:

"Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally caught fish
or fishery/aquatic products. It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught, taken
or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of section 3
hereof: Provided, That mere possession of such explosives with intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein
defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided: Provided, That the Secretary may, upon recommendation of the
Director and subject to such safeguards and conditions he deems necessary, allow for research, educational or
scientific purposes only, the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or
gather fish or fishery/aquatic products in specified area: Provided, further, That the use of chemicals to eradicate
predators in fishponds in accordance with accepted scientific fishery practices without causing deleterious effects in
neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance within the meaning of this
section: Provided, finally, That the use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other large
dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.

"Section 38. (1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years to twenty-five (25) years in the case
of mere possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; by imprisonment ranging from twenty (20) years to life
imprisonment, if the explosive is actually used: Provided, That if the use of the explosive results in 1) physical
injury to any person, the penalty shall be imprisonment ranging from twenty-five (25) years to life imprisonment, or
2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be life imprisonment to death."

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo appealed from is affirmed in toto. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
40

ROLDAN V. ARCA, 65 SCRA 336, JULY 25, 1975

Facts:

On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats, Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta.
Winnie and Srta. Agnes, were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. Fish caught with dynamite and sticks
of dynamite were then found aboard the two vessels.

It was alleged that at the time of the seizure of the fishing boats in issue, the same were engaged in legitimate
fishing operations off the coast of Palawan; that by virtue of the offer of compromise dated September 13, 1965 by
respondent company to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the numerous violations of the Fishery
Laws, if any, by the crew members of the vessels were settled. However, the ships were apprehended without
warrant for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act and the rules and regulations promulgated
there under.

Respondent filed with the Court against petitioner Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Roldan, Jr., for the
recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex VI (one of two fishing boats in question) which had been seized and impounded
by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. The court dismissed the complaint for failure of
the petitioner to prosecute and failure of the defendant to appear.

It was held that Hon. Roldan acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: W/N is it lawful to apprehend fishing boats without warrant.

Held:

Yes. In the case at bar, it is lawful to apprehend the fishing boats without warrant.
41

The word boat in its ordinary sense, means any water craft, the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI are
likewise vessels within the meaning of the term vessel. the accepted definition of vessel includes "every description
of water craft, large or small, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water."

Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of the customs laws have been
the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be
secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally
effected.

Since the crew of certain fishing vessels were caught, in flagrante, illegally fishing with dynamite and without
the requisite license, their apprehension without a warrant of arrest and the seizure of the vessel, as well as its
equipment and the dynamites found therein, as an incident to a lawful arrest was held to be lawful.

US V. HERNANDEZ, 31 PHIL. 343, AUGUST 26, 1915


42

Facts:

In 1947, Liberato Jimenez was appointed as a temporary legal investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board
(PVB). In 1949, he was promoted as the Chief of the Investigation Section but still in a temporary capacity because
he is not civil service eligible. In 1950, he took a promotional civil service exam. In July 1951, Jimenez received a
letter from PVB Chairman Gen. Guillermo Francisco advising him that he is being replaced by a civil service
eligible. In September 1951, Jimenez received the results of the civil service exam he took in 1950; he passed. He
then appealed his separation from service.

ISSUE: W/N Jimenez should be reinstated.

HELD:

No. In fact, he should have been separated from the service even before 1951. Under the law, he was supposed
to only hold such temporary appointment for three months while the appointing power is still looking for a civil
service eligible. His extended stay in the service is only upon the grace of the appointing power. Further, there is no
law which provides that a temporary appointment may ripen to a permanent one. When he met the civil service
eligibility, Jimenez did not become entitled to a permanent position in the PVD. The power to appoint is in essence
discretionary on the part of the proper authority, in this case the head of the department. The appointing power has
the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best
qualified for any competitive position in the Civil Service. Mere certification as a civil service eligible does not
amount to an appointment. The Civil Service Commission does not insure any appointment; it only certifies an
eligible to be possessed of the qualification as required for a position classified under its rules.
43

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. CA, G.R. NO. 110120, MARCH 16, 1994, 231 SCRA 292

Facts:

This is a petition made by Laguna Lake Development Authority to declare an exclusive power on the
regulation of issuing a fish open permits over the businessmen engage in the Laguna de bay. The power to issue a
permit was then transferred to the office of the mayor on the different municipalities of Laguna thus making the
Laguna de bay crowded and unhealthy for living of natural resources and danger to the livelihood among the folks
of Laguna.

Issue:

Whether or not the Local Government Code Code of 1991 repealed the Charter of Laguna Lake Developmental
Authority (RA NO. 4850) in the issuance of fish pen permits and other related activity involving Laguna de Bay.

Ruling:

No, the court holds that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the
Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake
region. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly
repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to
repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments.
44

It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law.
Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction
that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It
is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not
repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter
is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special
law."

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to
the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. A special law cannot be
repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.Thus, it has to be concluded that the
charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.
45

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS, 67 SCRA 408, FEBRUARY 3, 1997

Facts:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to
sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila
Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the
necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching
bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who
believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the
Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues
that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a
part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.

Issue:

Whether or not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of
Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.

Held:

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest
bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an
authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the
Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the
Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect
the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA
PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at
P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for purpose.
46

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of
the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel.

According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.

The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also
reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the hands of
foreigners.

TANO V. GOV. SOCRATES, G.R. NO. 110249, AUGUST 21, 1997

Facts:
On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-
92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: “AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL
LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THEREOF.
To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23,
Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows:
“In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74, otherwise known as
‘AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY
BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION
ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A
MAYOR’S PERMIT” and “City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF
ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on
cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa
Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via aircraft or
seacraft.
On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted
Resolution No. 33 entitled: “A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING,
POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING
AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS
(SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS
AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER
PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-
BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND
47

FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND
COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS,
and,
ORDINANCE NO. 2, Series of 1993
Entitled, “Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live
marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus
(Suno), 3. Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4. Tridacna
Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other species), 6.
Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green Grouper) and
8. Family: Balistidae (Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and coming from Palawan
Waters.
Respondents implemented the said ordinances, thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole province
of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline
Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and
trade.
Petitioners filed this petition directly with the COURT alleging that the Ordinances deprived them of due
process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of
Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; that the Office Order No.
23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayor’s permit could be granted or denied; in other
words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit and; that Ordinance
No. 2 of the Province of Palawan “altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling
and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or
gathered through lawful fishing method,” the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn
their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are
concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering “into contracts which are
proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion.”
And finally, to declare Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as null and void,

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed ordinances are unconstitutional.

HELD:
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the
Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be
no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.
After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to
have been violated, we find petitioners’ contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any
infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact
ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests
48

municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or
charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous
substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other methods of
fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing laws. Finally, it imposes upon the
sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact
ordinances to “[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other activities which
result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance.”

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