560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

ANNOTATION

WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW

History and Date of Effectivity of the Law.

“The Workmen’s Compensation Act became a law on December 10,

1927, on the action of the Legislature alone and by virtue of the
provisions of the Philippine Organic Law. In view of Section 44 of
the Act, it became effective six months after it became a law, that is,
on June 10, 1928.
“Act No. 3812, which amended certain provisions of the law,
took effect on the date of its approval, December 8, 1930.
“Commonwealth Act No. 210, which also amended certain
provisions of Act No. 3428, took effect on November 20, 1936, the
date of its approval.
“Republic Act No. 772, which further amended the law, took
effect on June 20, 1952, the date of its approval as provided in
Section 25 thereof.
“Republic Act No. 889, the latest amendment to the law, was
approved on June 19, 1953 and was made effective on June 20,
1952, pursuant to Section 4, thereof.
“In harmony with the established principle that legislative
enactments, in the absence of a clearly expressed intent to the
contrary, will be deemed to be prospective and not retrospective,
workmen’s compensation acts have been held not to apply to injuries
which occurred before the law went into effect. With respect to time,
the right to compensation for an injury under the workmen’s
compensation act is governed, in the absence of any provision to the
contrary, by the law in force at the time of the occurrence of such
injury.
“But the procedure provided for in Republic Act No. 772, was
held applicable to accidents occurring prior to the

561

VOL. 32, APRIL 30, 1970 561

Vda. Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company
passage of the law, the claims for compensation of which were filed
after the passage of the law, since the rule on retroactivity does not
apply to changes which affect matters of procedure”. Labor and
Social Legislation, Carlos and Fernando, 1064 Edition.

Nature and Purpose.

The Workmen’s Compensation Act is based on a new theory of
compensation distinct from the theories of damages, payments under
the Act being made as compensation not as indemnity.
The intention of the Legislature in enacting the Workmen’s
Compensation Act was to secure the workmen and their dependents
against becoming objects of charity, by making a reasonable
compensation for such accidental calamities as are incidental to the
employment. Under such Act injuries to workmen and employees
are to be considered no longer as results of fault or negligence, but
as the products of the industry in which the employee is concerned.
Compensation for such injuries is like any other item in the cost of
production or transportation, which is ultimately charged to the
consumer. The law substitutes for liability for negligence an entirely
new conception; that is, that if the injury arises out of and in the
course of the employment, under the doctrine of man’s humanity to
man, the cost of compensation must be one of the elements to be
liquidated and balanced in the course of compensation. In other
words, the theory of the law is that, if the industry produces an
injury, the cost of that injury shall be included in the cost of the
product of the industry. Hence, the provision that the injury must
arise out of and in the course of the employment (Mobile & O.R. Co.
v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 28 F. [2d], 228, 229).

Coverage.
Section 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides:

562

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda.de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

“When an employee suffers personal injury from any accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment, or contracts tuberculosis or other
illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the
result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the sums and to the person hereinafter specified. The right
to compensation as provided in this Act shall not be defeated or impaired on
the ground that the death, injury or disease was due to the negligence of a
fellow servant or employee, without, prejudice to the right of the employer
to proceed against the negligent party.”

Employer and employee.

Employer.—One who employs the services of others; one for whom
employees work and who pays their wages and salaries. The
correlative of “employee.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Revised
Edition.
Definition of employee.—It is pretended by the petitioner that the
Court of Industrial Relations departed from the definition of the
word “employee” or “laborer” found in the Workmen’s
Compensation Law, namely; “ ‘Laborer’ ” is used as a synonym of
‘employee’ and it means every person who has entered the
employment of, or works under service of apprenticeship contract
for, an employer (Section 39(b), Workmen’s Compensation Law, as
amended). The Court of Industrial Relations of course adverted to
the following definition: “An employee is any person in the service
of another under a contract for hire, express or implied, oral or
written.” (Sec. 7, Labor Union by Dangle and Scribers, p. 7, citing
Mcdermott’s Case, 283 Mass. 74; Warner vs. Industrial
Commission, 212 Wis. 76.) In essence, however, the ruling of the
Court of Industrial Relations, does not run counter to the definition
given in the Workmen’s Compensation Law. Sunripe Coconut
Products Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, No. L-2009,
April 30, 1949; Lawyer’s Journal, Sept. 30, 1949, p. 422; 83 Phil.
518.

563

VOL. 32, APRIL 30, 1970 563

Vda.de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

Term “ employee” in Workmen’s Compensation construed.—It is a

rule of statutory construction that the words employed in the statute
must be givEn their natural ordinary and commonly accepted
meaning, unless such meaning is contrary to the object and intention
of the legislature, or would lead to an absurdity, or they must be
given their established legal meaning. All terms are to be given their
practical, popular meaning and technical constructions are to be
avoided. The word “employee” is used, under Workmen’s
Compensation Act, in its natural, common and popular sense, and
describes the conventional relation of employer and employee (71
C.J. 416; Standard Accident Ins. Company vs. Pennsylvania Car
Co., 49 F. 2d 73.) Capulong vs. L.V.N. Pictures, Inc., L-9697, Nov.
29, 1960.

Where Employer-Employee Relationship Exists.

In determining the existence of this relationship, the following
elements are generally considered: (1) the selection and engagement
of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees’ conduct,
although the latter is the most important element. Thus it was held
that the test of the existence of employer and employee relationship
is whether there is an understanding between the parties that one is
to render personal services to or for the benefit of the other, and a
recognition by them of the right of one to order and control like the
manner and method of performance of the other. It is well settled
also that a person who is asked for help in an emergency which
threatens the employer’s interest becomes an employee under an
implied contract of hire.
Existence of employer-employee relationship the jurisdictional
foundation for recovery of compensation.—The existence of
employer-employee relationship is the jurisdictional foundation for
recovery of compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.
(Asis Steel Corp. vs.

564

564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda.de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., L-7638, June 27,

1955.) Madrigal Shipping Co. vs. Melad, 7 SCRA 331.
Employment under an implied contract of hire during an
emergency.—A person who is asked for help in an emergency which
threatens the employer’s interest becomes an employee under an
implied contract of hire. (I Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law,
sec. 47-42[c] 699; I Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, sec.
234, 627). Where a ship, therefore, had to return to port for a needed
repair of its rudder, and losing no time, the pilots engaged the
services of a sounder and an oarsman to take them to the ship in
trouble the latter shall be deemed employees of the shipping
company. Madrigal Shipping Co. vs. Melad, 7 SCRA 331.

When compensation may be granted; Resume of governing

principles.

1. Workmen’s Compensation is granted if the injuries result

from an accident which arise out of and in the course of
employment.
2. Both the ‘‘arising” factor and the “cause” factor must be
present. If one factor is weak and the other is strong, the
injury is compensable, but not where both factors are weak.
Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work-
connected.
3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is
presumed to come within the provisions of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. But a preliminary link must first be
shown to exist between the injury and the employment.
Thus if the injury occurred in the course of employment, it
is presumed to have arises out of the employment.
4. The “course” factor applies to time, place and
circumstances. This factor is present if the injury takes
place within the period of employment, at a place where the
employee may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is
engaged in doing something incidental thereto.

565
 VOL. 32, APRIL 30, 1970 565
Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee,

goes to or comes from his place of work, is not of the
employment.
6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the
employee’s premise, but while in close proximity thereto
and while using a customary means of ingress and
egress.The reason for extending the scope of “course of
employment” to off-premises injuries is that there is a
causal connection between the work and the hazard.
7. An “assault” may be, considered an “accident” within the
meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The
employment may either increase risk of assault because of
its nature or be the subject matter of a dispute leading to the
assault.

The question as to where the line should be drawn beyond which the
liability of the employer cannot continue has been held to be usually
one of fact. Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co.vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102.
Law applicable to industrial employees only.—Act No. 3428
(Workmen’s Compensation Act) as amended, specifically limits its
application to industrial employees (People vs. Contemplation, 40
Off. Gaz. 750). By “industrial employment,” in the case of private
employers, is meant, according to subsection (d) of Section 39 of the
Act, “all employment or work at a trade, occupation or profession
exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain.” (Pascasio vs.
Guido, 67 Phil. 143).
The word “business” appearing in the definition of the term
“employer”, is limited to commercial enterprises only, as
distinguished from undertakings, of a civil nature. Caro vs.
Rilloraza, L-9569, Sept. 30, 1957.
Excluded employees:

1. Charitable institutions not subject Workmen’s

566

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

Compensation Law.—It will be noticed that in Section 39-

(d) as amended by Republic Act No. 772 the words
“charitable institutions” are omitted from the exceptions to
the definition of Industrial Employment. From such
omission the respondents argue that charitable institutions
are not exempted from the operation of the Workmen’s
 Compensation Law for, otherwise they would not have been
omitted from the exceptions. Held: The Supreme Court
concluded that the omission was made because charitable
institutions would not come under the general definition of
Industrial Employment and consequently it was not
necessary to make such exception. An exception is made
when the thing excepted would fall under the scope of the
general definition, were it not for the exception. It would be
a redundance to define Industrial Employment in such a
way as to exclude charitable institutions and yet make an
exception of them. Quezon Institute vs. Velasco, 51 O.G.
6175; 97 Phil. 905; Espiritu Santo Parish vs. Habitan, 106
Phil. 619.
2. Movie actress is not covered by Workmen’s Compensation
Act.—As Judge Learned Hand said, “since ‘servant’ does
not include all cases where one must follow the directions
of another, the distinction must be found in the kind of
duties done.” Paraphrasing Judge Hand, just what kind of
services precisely constitutes as servant, an employee or
laborer xxx plaintiff, who is admittedly a movie actress
engaged in a form of dramatic art, receiving a substantial
compensation for every appearance is not an employee or
laborer in the contemplation of the Workmen’s
Compensation Law. Capulong alias Diana Recto vs. L.V.N.
Pictures, Inc., L-9697, Nov. 29, 1960.
3. Person whose employment is purely casual and not for
purposes of business of employer.—Section 39, (b) of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act does not include an
employment for labor that is purely casual and is not for the
purpose of the employer’s occupation or business. Uy Chao
vs. Aguilar and Ramos, 103 Phil. 219.

567

VOL. 32, APRIL 30, 1970 567

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

Same.—The repair of dismantling of the eaves was not for

the purpose of the petitioner’s occupation or business. The
petitioner was a glassware dealer. He bought and sold
glassware. It is difficult to see the connection of the repair
or dismantling with the buying and selling of glassware.
Repair is restoration to a sound or good state after decay,
dilapidation, injury or partial destruction, or fixing broken
or damaged parts of a structural whole. On the other hand,
selling glassware is transferring the ownership over
commodities or goods from the seller to the buyer for a
certain valuable consideration. Ibid.
4. Independent contractor is not liable for death of laborer.—
When the Workmen’s Compensation Act make the owner
 of the factory the employer of the laborers employed
therein notwithstanding the intervention of an independent
contractor, it refers to laborers engaged in carrying on the
usual business of the factory, and not the laborers of an
independent contractor doing some work separate and
distinct from the usual business of the owner of the
factory.” (De los Santos vs. Javier, 58 Phil. 82.) Philippine
Manufacturing Company vs. Geronimo, 96 Phil. 275.
5. Who are independent contractors.—An independent
contractor has been defined as one who exercises
independent employment and contracts to do a piece of
work according to his own methods and without being
subject to control of his employer except as to the result of
his work (Andoyo vs. Manila Railroad Company, L-34772
cited in Francisco, Labor Laws, p. 817). Some
circumstances taken into account to determine whether a
person is an independent contractor are: whether he has
capital or money of his own to pay his laborers; whether he
filed a bond to answer for the fulfillment of his contract
with his employer. Mansol vs. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96
Phil. 941.
6. Casual employees.—It will be noted that in order

568

568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

that an employer may not be responsible for an injury to a

laborer it is necessary that the “employment is purely casual
and as not for the purpose of the occupation or business of
the employer.” Casual means occasional, coming without
regularity. The work is purely casual when it is not a part of
the business in which the employer is engaged. ‘The clause
“is not for the purpose of the occupation or business of the
employer” compliments and explain the term “purely
casual.”

Compensable Injuries, Illness and Death.

A. Arising out of and in the course of employment.

Conditions for requirement that death occur while in the course of

or arising out of employment.—The requirement that to be
compensable the death must occur while the worker is performing
some work in the course of or arising out of his employment
requires three things to concur: the injury must be received during
the period covered by the employment, the worker must be shown to
have been injured at the time and place where the performance of his
work requires him to be, and the worker must have been doing
something in pursuance of his work. A. L. Amen Transportation Co.,
Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 12 SCRA 27.
Where employment extends.—Employment includes not only the
actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space
where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while
passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or
from his work by a way over the employer’s premises, or over those
of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect
a part of the employer’s premises, the injury is one arising out of and
in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened
in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the
employment may

569

VOL. 32, APRIL 30, 1970 569

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point
of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached.
Probably, as general rule, employment may be said to begin when
the employee reaches the entrance to the employer’s premises where
the work is to be done; “but it is clear that in some cases the rule
extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a
means of ingress and egress with the express or implied consent of
the employer.” Bountiful Brick Company v. Giles, 72 L. ed. 507,
Feb. 20, 1928). Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102.
Long years of employment before appearance of illness no
evidence that it did not arise out of employment.—Once the disease
has been shown to have arisen in the course of the employment, it is
presumed by law, in the absence of substantial evidence to the
contrary, that arose out of it. Where claimant’s tuberculosis
admittedly arose in the course of his employment, the fact alone that
23 years had elapsed before the disease appeared is not substantial
evidence that it did not arise out of the employment. Hernandez vs.
Workmen’s Compensation, 14 SCRA 219.
Death while presiding meeting of labor association not
compensable.—Facts: The deceased when assaulted was not
performing any work in pursuance of his duties and was neither in
the place where his work required him to be, but was at the time
presiding a meeting of a labor association the internal affairs of
which was entirely independent of the company where he was then
employed. Held: Not compensable because the requirements that
death must arise out of or in the course of employment are not
present. A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, 12 SCRA 27.
Injuries sustained while performing acts related or incidental to
employee’s duties compensable.—Even if the injury occurred while
the worker was not performing acts
 570

570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

strictly within the scope of his duties, but engaged in an activity

either related or incidental to his duties, or doing an act in the
interest of his employer, the same is compensable. Thus, injury to an
employee of a bus firm, occurring outside of assigned territory, in
undertaking to retrieve personal belongings of a passenger, was held
compensable (Verzosa vs. Arnas Vda. de Cruz, L-7305. December
15, 1953); so was that of a laborer who, trying to alight from a truck
to pick up a sack which had fallen belonging to his employer, was
caught between the wheels (Ramos vs. Poblete, 40 Off. Gaz. 3474);
likewise, the death of a worker who tried to recover a piece of board
which had fallen into a molasses tank, and died from the deadly
fumes therein (Estandarte vs. Phil. Motor Alcohol Corp., No. 39733,
Nov. 1933). Chua Yeng vs. Roma, 109 Phil. 1022.
Same.—If a workman is acting within the scope of his
employment, his protection “in the course of” the employment
usually continues regardless of the place of the injury. Thus, in one
case, an employee went to the house of the employer across the
warehouse where he worked to get a drink of water, that there, while
trying to drive away a puppy that he saw eating fish in employer’s
kitchen, he was bitten in the hand, as a result of which he later died
of hydrophobia. The death of the employee was held compensable,
on the ground that his trip to the kitchen was occasioned by the
employer’s fault in not providing adequate drinking water at the
warehouse. In the present case, it cannot be disputed that it is
inherent in the stevedoring work for the petitioner that the laborers,
like the deceased, stay in the pier and wait for the docking of
petitioner’s vessels. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, 27 SCRA 1132.
Acts reasonably necessary to health and comfort of employee are
incidental to the employment.—Acts reasonably necessary to health
and comfort of an employee while at work, such as satisfaction of
his thirst (like in the present case), hunger, or other physical
demands, or protecting

571

VOL. 32, APRIL 30, 1970 571

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

himself from excessive cold, are incidental to the employment, and

injuries sustained in the performance of such acts are compensable
as arising out of and in the course of the employment (58 Am. Jur.,
sec. 236, p. 742, citing numerous cases). Chua Yeng vs. Roma, 109
Phil. 1022.
 Injuries Sustained During Rest Period or Outside Working
B. Hours.

Murder outside of office hours arose out of and in the course of

employment.—Although the deceased concession guard was
murdered outside of office hours, his death arose out of and in the
course of his “employment, because he was required to live and
sleep in the quarters provided by the employer, thereby making
himself available, regardless of time, for the protection of the rights
and interest of the employer. Martha Lumber Mill, Inc. vs.
Lagradante, 99 Phil. 435.
Death during temporary stoppage of work.—The Workmen’s
Compensation Commission found that the deceased had gone to the
stock room to get some “jabilla” which he would use in his work,
with the result that, regardless of the time, he was in the
performance of his duties.

“An injury sustained by an employee outside his regular working hours or

during a temporary stoppage or cessation of work may, nevertheless, under
some circumstances, be compensable as arising out of and in the course of
the employment, and is generally held to be so where the employee was at
the time engaged in the performance of some service for the benefit of the
employer in connection with his usual duties. (Mosley vs. Royal Indemnity
Co. CCA 5th Tex./68 F. 2d 220, citing RCL: Anno. 7 ALR 1078).”

C. Injuries Inflicted by Third Persons.

Assault by third persons in the course of employment.

—Jurisprudence is to the effect that injuries sustained by an
employee while in the course of his employment, as the result of an
assault upon his person by another employee, or by a third person,
no question of the injured employee’s own culpability being
involved, is compensable

572

572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

where, from the evidence presented, a rational mind is able to trace

the injury to a cause set in motion by the nature of the employment,
or some conditions, obligation or incident therein, and not by some
other agency. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, 27 SCRA 1132.
Same.—The ruling in Kelty v. Travellers Insurance Company,
391 SW 2d 558, is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road
where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employer’s
premises. It is an “access area” “so clearly related to the employee’s
premises.” That portion of the road bears “so intimate a relation” to
the company’s premises. It is the chief means of entering the IDEGO
premises, either for the public or for its employees. The IDECO uses
it extensively in pursuit of its business. It has rights of passage over
the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual, if by
reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his
work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the
IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe for its
employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might
encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault by third
persons. Having failed to take the proper security measures over the
said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries
suffered by Pablo resulting in his death. Iloilo Dock & Engineering
Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102.

D. Injuries Inflicted by Co-Employee.

Death caused by co-employee while on leave of absence.

—The presumption of the law that the claim is deemed to be
valid unless the contrary is shown does not apply in the case at bar
where the employee was on leave of absence at the time he was
killed by a co-employee. A. L. Transportation Co., Inc. vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 12 SCRA 27.

573

VOL. 32, APRIL 30, 1970 573

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

E. Presumption of Compensability.

The law presumes, in the absence of substantial evidence to the

contrary, that the claim is compensable. The burden disconnect, by
substantial evidence, the injury or sickness from employment is laid
at the employer’s door. So rigid is the rule that even where the cause
of the employee’s death is unknown, the right to compensation
subsists. Reason for this is that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is
a social legislation; it is designed to give relief to the workmen;
therefore, to effectuate its purpose, it must be liberally construed.
Manila Railroad Co vs. Work-men’s Compensation Commission, 21
SCRA 99; Operator, Inc. vs. Cacatian, 30 SCRA 218.
Once it has been established that the employee’s death has been
due to a disease contracted in the course of his employment, the
presumption is that the nature thereof is the cause of said disease and
the burden is upon the employer to prove the contrary. Red Line
Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Barriso, 11 SCRA 801.

F. Where Illness Aggravated by Employment.

Under the law, it is not required that the employment be the sole
factor of the growth, development or acceleration of his illness to
entitle petitioner to the benefits provided therein. It is enough if his
employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the
development or acceleration of the disease. Red Line Transportation
Co., Inc. vs. Barriso, 11 SCRA 801.
 Illness contracted in or aggravated by employment; Factors
considered.—Where an employee was found in good physical
condition at the start of his employment, but was found later to have
contracted pulmonary tuberculosis during his employment, it is held
that two factors establish that his subsequent death was compensable
despite the fact that his work was not strenuous, namely; (a) his
night work service, and (b) his place of work. Manila Railroad Co.
vs. Vda. de Chavez, 12 SCRA 142. Aggra-

574

574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda.de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

vation of a pre-existing disease, when caused by working conditions,

entitles the claimant to compensation. National Shipyards and Steel
Corp. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 10 SCRA 255.
Employee’s sickness aggravated by employment, compensable.—
Where a person affected with pulmonary tuberculosis in an
advanced stage, must have not only complete rest but also refrain
from performing the work activities of even a normal individual, it
may be drawn that the pulmonary tuberculosis which caused his
death was aggravated by the nature, conditions and incidents of his
employment. Chiong Shipping Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, 25 SCRA 76.
Aggravation of illness before effectivity of Rep. Act 772,—An
employer is liable for compensation despite the fact that the
aggravation of a pre-existing illness and the consequent disability
took place before June 20, 1952, the date of effectivity of Republic
Act No. 772. Manila Railroad Co. vs. Perez, 14 SCRA 504.
The application of aggravation theory, doubt on; Doubt resolved
in favor of claimant.—When there exists some doubt as to the
deceased pulmonary tuberculosis having been aggravated by his
employment, such doubt, for the purpose of carrying out the intents
of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, should be resolved in favor of
the claimant. CA. Chiong Shipping Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, 25 SCRA 76.
Effect of absence of word “ aggravation” in law.—That Section 8
of the Law, which defines the death benefit, does not mention
aggravation is inconsequential, because Section 8 itself speaks of
death caused by a disease contracted or injury oil illness aggravated
by the nature of the employment. It does not matter that the word
“aggravated” was only inserted in Section 2 by later amendment
through Republic Act 772, which took effect on June 20, 1952. It
bears repetition that death here took place October 7, 1959. And a
rule, elementary in legal
575

VOL. 32, APRIL 30, 1970 575

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company
hermeneutics, is that an amended statute should be construed if it
had been originally passed in its amended form. Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 99.
Hypertension aggravated by nature of employment.—Respondent
suffered from hypertension. On the question of aggravation, there is
the testimony of the physician that “claimant’s hypertensive-ailment
has been aggravated by the nature of his work with respondent, as
evidenced by the fact that during his first stroke in 1952, he was
working in a hot place near boiler and in 1957 said ailment began to
assert itself as a result of his continuous overtime services and
exerting strenuous efforts and worse, performing said duties, in a hot
place thereby culminating in his second stroke on March 29, 1958
while helping lift a 500-lb. bale of cloth.” National Development Co.
vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 17 SCRA 1006.

G. Aggravated by Employees Fault.

Illness even when contracted during employment but aggravated by

worker’s fault—The illness of an employee even when contracted
during his employment but was not aggravated by tie nature of his
work but by factors that can only be attributed to his fault is not
compensable, Rebodos vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 6
SCRA 717.

H. Defenses by Employer.

Notorious negligence of employee as a defense.—In order that

notorious negligence of the employee may be a defense under Act
No. 3428, as amended, it must be negligence that has caused the
“injuries” for which compensation is sought (section 4, Act No.
3428), and not where the claim is based, not upon “injuries,” but
upon illness aggravated by the nature of the employment. Pacific
Line, vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., 108 Phil.
382.
Employee’s negligence which will exempt employer from

576

576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

liability.—The kind of negligence on the part of the employee which

will exempt the employer from liability for injuries suffered by the
former is notorious negligence. Such negligence must be proved, the
burden of proof resting on the employer. The correct presumption to
be followed is that when a warning of danger is given, the laborer by
instinct of self-preservation takes precaution to avoid such danger
unless an intention is attributed end his life. In the casd at bar, P.I., in
jumping overboard upon waking up and finding the vessel on fire,
was not guilty of gross negligence because his act was rather
impelled by fright or by the instinct of self-preservation. Victory
Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 106
Phil 550.
Defense deemed waived when not raised in the Commission.—A
defense against compensability of a workman’s claim for disability
which was not raised before the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission must be deemed waived and cannot be raised for the
first time in petitioner’s brief in the Supreme Court. Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Perez, 14 SCRA 505.

I. Effect of Receipt of Benefits Under the Social Security Act.

Effect of receipts of benefits under the Social Security Act.—In

several cases, the employee’s right to demand compensation from
the employer, notwithstanding previous receipt of benefits under the
Social Security Law, was upheld (Rural Transit Employees Assn. vs.
Bachrach Transp. Co., L-21441, Dec. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 1263;
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. vs. SSS, L-19254, March 31, 1964, etc.).
For, by their nature and purpose, the sickness or disability benefits to
which a member of the System may be entitled under the Social
Security Law are not the same as the compensation that may be
claimed against the employer under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act or the Civil Code, so that payment to the member employee of
social security benefits would not wipe out or extinguish the
employer’s liability for the injury or illness contracted by his
employee

577

VOL. 32, APRIL 30, 1970 577

Vda.de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

in the course of or during the employment. It must be realized that,

under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (or the Civil Code, in a
proper case), the employer is required to compensate the employee
for the sickness or injury arising in the course of the employment
because the industry is supposed to be responsible therefor; whereas,
under the Social Security Act, payment is being made because the
hazard specifically covered by the membership, and for which the
employee had put up his own money, had taken place. Valencia vs.
Manila Yatch Club, Inc., 28 SCRA 724.

J. Agreement between Employer and Employee as to

Compensation.

Two requisites necessary to make agreement valid.—Under section

29 of Act 3428, two requisites must be fulfilled for any agreement
concerning compensation to be valid, namely, the amount agreed
upon must be at least equal to that provided by the Act and the
agreement must be approved by the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission or its authorized representative. The limitations
imposed by law on the right of the parties to settle amicably should
be viewed in the light of the avowed policy of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. of securing the employee and his dependents
from becoming objects of charity (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil.
689). The law frowns upon any agreement, scheme or device which
seeks to exempt the employer from any liability under the Act either
partially or totally and condemns such schemes as nullities (Sec. 7,
Act 3428) National Mirror Factory vs. Vda. de Anure, 27 SCRA
719.
Agreement without prior approval of Commissioner not valid.—
The prior approval of the Commissioner not having been secured,
the agreement is invalid and cannot be invoked for the dismissal of
either the case or the appeal. Where the matter in dispute is settled
only as to one or more appellants or appellees the appeal cannot be
dismissed. Ibid.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission must be cautious

578

578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

in appraising agreements.—Any agreement of settlement modifying

the award of the Commission be viewed, and with more reason
should the Supreme Court, charged with vigilance over the rights of
the ignorant, indigent and underprivileged, proceed with caution in
appraising such agreements, in orders to endure protection of the
party at a disadvantage and effect fulfillment of its sacred duty
imposed by law. Ibid.
Affidavit of claimant effecting release of employer is null.—The
affidavit executed by a widow will not estop her from claiming
compensation for the reason that such affidavit had the effect of
releasing the employer from his liability under the Act and is
consequently, a nullity, pursuant to section 7 of the Act which
provides: “ Contract prohibited.—Any contract, regulation or device
of any sort intended to exempt the employer from all or part of the
liability created by this Act shall be null and void.” Ibid.
Any contract or device of any sort intended to exempt the
employer from all or part of the liability created by the Workmen’s
Compensation Act (Act 3428) is null and void. Aquino vs. Donato,
15 SCRA 631.

A. Workmen’s Compensation Commission; Remedies;

Procedure; Jurisdiction.

Power to hear and decide claims for compensation.—The power to

hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act is, pursuant to Section 46 thereof, under the
“exclusive jurisdiction” of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. The hearing
officers in Regional Offices of the Commission are mere “referees”
thereof. Although section 48 of said Act, as amended by R.A. No.
4119, approved on June 20, 1964, provides that referees “shall
assume original jurisdiction over all Workmen’s Compensation cases
in the regional offices where they are assigned,” such original
jurisdiction does not exclude that of the Commission, for Section 49
of the same Act explicit-

579

VOL. 32, APRIL 30, 1970 579

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

ly states that hearings under the provisions thereof “may be held

before the Commissioner or any of the referees.” Indeed, the same
section expressly authorizes the Commissioner to “receive”
evidence, a power inconsistent with the exclusively “appellate”
character of the jurisdiction of the Commission and that of its
members, as postulated by petitioner herein. What is more said
section provides that in the exercise of the power to review decisions
or orders of a referee, the Commissioner may, in his discretion, “take
or order the taking of additional testimony.” Republic vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, 30 SCRA 811.
As to the law now stands, however, the power to enforce awards
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is expressly vested in the
Commission or the duly deputized officials in the Regional Offices
of the Department of Labor (R.A. 4119). This grant of power does
not contravene the Constitution. Execution is a necessary step in the
enforcement of the award, and while it is procedural in nature and
therefore essentially falls within the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court, it may be legislated upon by Congress under its
constitutional authority to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure x x x.” (Section 13,
Article VIII, Constitution of the Philippines). In Republic Act 4119
the legislative intent to vest in the Commission the power to enforce
its awards is clear, in contrasts of Republic Act 997, which did not
authorize the Reorganization Commission to transfer such judicial
power from the courts of justice to the officials appointed or offices
created under Reorganization Plan 20-A. In Lo Chi, et al. v. De
Leon, et al, L-18584, Jan. 30, 1967, where the Regional
Administrator issued a writ of execution to enforce a compensation
award, the Supreme Court, held that “inasmuch as the writ of
execution was issued by Regional Administrator De Leon on Dec. 2,
1960, before the effectivity of Republic Act 4119, the said writ is
therefore null and void, thus impliedly upholding the
constitutionality of Republic Act 4119. Apolega vs. Hizon 25 SCRA
337.
580

580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company
 VI. Procedure.

The procedure in the hearing of workmen’s compensation claims

before the Regional Offices and the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission is provided for in Section 49 of the Act and in the
Rules promulgated by the Commission, Appeals to the Supreme
Court are governed by Rules 43 and 56 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

B. Notice.

Notice of injury.—With respect to the period to file claim for

compensation discussed in the Peter Paul case, Section 24 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act requires the claimant to perform two
different acts: notify the employer of the injury or sickness; and file
with the employer a claim for compensation within two (2) months.
The statutes distinguishes clearly a notice of injury from a claim of
compensation in the extent of prescribing different periods for the
filing of each. As to the notice of injury the same is to be given “as
soon as possible” without any fixed period. For the filing of the
claim for compensation the law allows a fixed period of two months
(for three months in case of death). Cf. Pangasinan Transportation
Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 10 SCRA 14.
Peter Paul Corp. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 11
SCRA 545.
Notice of claim; Substantial compliance by oral demand.—An
oral demand for compensation made by the injured employee hardly
a month after he was laid off is substantial compliance with the
provisions of Section 24, Act 3438. National Development Co. vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 12 SCRA 381.
Notice and claim for compensation; When not necessary. While
Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act requires the timely
filing of the notice and claim for compensation, however, such
notice and claim are no longer necessary where the employer has
furnished vo-

581

VOL. 32, APRIL 30, 1970 581

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

luntarily the employee with such medical and hospital services he

needed during his illness and where upon the said employee’s
retirement, the employer had voluntarily paid him a retirement
compensation. Central Azucarera Don Pedro vs. De Leon, 105 Phil.
1141; Hernandez vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 14
SCRA 219.
Notice of inquiry and claim for compensation; Actual knowledge
of Company sufficient compliance.—Where the evidence shows that
the Company had actual knowledge of the illness of the employee
and of his death, as well as the cause thereof, it is held that the
absence of a formal notice of either cannot exempt the Company
from its liability under section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act. Manila Railroad Co. vs. Vda. de Chavez, 12 SCRA 142;
National Development Company Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, 17 SCRA 1006.
Failure of claimant to give notice within the prescribed period is
non-jurisdictional.—The fact remains that petitioner failed to
controvert in due time the right of the claimants to compensation, as
required by section 45 of Act 3428. And the rule is now well-settled
that the requirements (for claimants) of giving of notice of injury
and filing of claim within the prescribed period is non-jurisdictional
and does not constitute a bar to compensation proceedings if the
employer, who had knowledge of the accident, failed to controvert
the claimant’s right to compensation pursuant to section 45 of the
law. For such failure of the employer to controvert the claim
constitutes a waiver (or a forfeiture by law) of its right to question
the validity and reasonableness of the claim and precludes the
setting up of all non-jurisdictional defenses, such as non-
compensability of injuries, prescription, and the like. Luzon
Stevedoring Corp. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 27
SCRA 1132.
Employer’s failure to report employee’s death to commission;
Voluntary payment of part of Compensation.—Pursuant to section
45 of Act No. 3428, as amended, the

582

582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

company’s failure to report the employee’s death to the Commission

within the statutory period of 14 days after the death or 10 days after
the notice thereof, constitutes a renunciation of the right to
controvert the claim, thereby constructively admitting that it is
compensable (Victoria’s Milling Co., Inc. vs. Compensation
Commissioner, et al., G.R. No. L-10533, May 13, 1957; Tan Lim Le
vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., 104 Phil. 522; 55
Off. Gaz., 1950). The voluntary payment of part of the
compensation made by the employer likewise indicates admission of
the compensability of the claim (Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs.
Domingo Panaligan, 99 Phil. 238; 52 Off. Gaz. 3583). |Such steps
taken are admission against interest and admissible in evidence
against the employer. (Sec. 7, Rule 123, Rules of Court). Gen.
Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission and
Vda. de Ricardo, 109 Phil. 60.

C. Evidence.

Claimant may testify in workmen’s compensation case.—The right

of a claimant to be present at the hearing of his claim for workmen’s
compensation includes the right to testify in his own behalf. While a
party’s interest may to some extent affect his credibility, his interest
alone is not a ground for disregarding his testimony. Self-serving
evidence made by a party out of court at one time does not include a
party’s testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded on the same
ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of opportunity for
cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration
that its admission would open the door to fraud and fabrication of
evidence. On the other hand, a party’s testimony in court is sworn
and affords the other party the opportunity for cross-examination.
National Development Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, 19 SCRA 861.
Findings of fact; General rule; Exception.—As a rule, findings of
fact by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission are final and
conclusive (Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc.

583

VOL. 32, APRIL 30, 1970 583

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

vs. Nieves Baens Del Rosario, et al., L-13130, Oct. 31, 1959; St.
Thomas Aquinas Academy vs. WCC, et al., L-12297, April 22, 1955;
NLU vs. Sta. Ana, 102 Phil. 302; 54 Off. Gaz. 2529) unless the lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion, or said findings, find
absolutely no support in the evidence on record, or are unsupported
by substantial or credible evidence on record, or are unsupported by
substantial or credible evidence (PAL vs. PAL Employees
Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1959; Donato vs. Phil. Marine
Officers’ Association, L-12506, May 18, 1959; 15c and Up
Employees Association vs. Dept. and Bazar Free Workers’ Union, L-
9168, Oct. 18, 1956; NLU vs. Dinglasan, 98 Phil. 609; 52 Off. Gaz.
1933). Batangas Transportation Co. vs. Rivera, 109 Phil. 175.

D. Construction of the Law.

HOW Workmen’s Compensation Law should be construed.—The

Workmen’s Compensation Law should be construed fairly,
reasonably, or liberally in favor of and for the benefit of employees
and their dependents and that all doubts as to right of compensation
should be resolved in their favor and all presumptions should be
indulged in their favor (Caro vs. Rilloraza, et al., L-9569, Sept. 30,
1957; Francisco vs. Consing, 63 Phil. 354). Madrigal Shipping Co.
vs. Melad, 7 SCRA 330.
Liberal construction in favor of worhingman.—The Workmen’s
Compensation Act being a social legislation, and in line with the
intent of the law to effect social justice, the provisions thereof
should be liberally construed, in favor of the workingman (Luzon
Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Dayao, et al., 106 Phil. 525; Madrigal
Shipping Co. vs. Baens del Rosario, et al., L-13130, October 31,
1959). Chua Yeng vs. Roma, et al., 109 Phil. 1022.

VII. Awards
Computation of amount of compensation.—Under Section 14 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act as amended, an employee or worker
disabled for labor shall be entitled

584

584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

to 60% of his average weekly wage during the entire period of his
disability but not to exceed 208 weeks nor the aggregate sum in its
entirety exceed P4,000. Definitely from May 7, 1954 up to the filing
of case is more that 208 weeks. Records sWy that claimant’s average
weekly wage was P60 (P10 x 6). Sixty per cent of P60 is P36 or P35
the maximum allowed by the Act and for 208 weeks cliamant is
entitled to P7,280 or P4,000, the maximum allowed under the Act.
Operators, Inc. vs. Cacatian, 30 SCRA 218.
Overtime pay an$ night service premium included.—Section 19
of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the average weekly wages
should be computed in such manner that it shall be the best
computation that can be made of the weekly earnings of the laborer
during the 12 weeks next preceding his injury, and under section 39
(g) of said Act “wages” includes the commercial value of the board
and lodging, subsistence, fuel and other amount which the employee
receives from the employer as part of his compensation. If the
commercial value of the board and lodging, subsistence and fuel
covered in “wages”, there is more reason to include overtime pay
and night service premium which, at any rate, may fall under other
amounts which the employee receives from the employer as part of
his compensation.” Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, et al., 99 Phil. 239.
Total disability means disability for kind of work previously
performed.—An award for total disability is proper where the
employee was totally disabled for the kind of carpentry work that he
did for his employer many years, although subsequent to his being
laid off he was still able to undertake “contracting carpentry jobs”,
this being entirely different from doing actual carpentry work.
National Development Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, 12 SCRA 381.
Medical expenses.—Where claimant’s claim for expenses for
medical services had been decided in an award which

585

VOL. 32, APRIL 30, 1970 585

Vda. de Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company

is already final, the claimant is entitled to recover no more than that

amount already awarded in ‘the decision within the period of time
 covered or embraced by the decision. (Republic vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, 30 SCRA 811).
Enforcement of award; Court’s function ministerial.—When a
party in interest files in the proper court a certified copy of the
decision of a referee or commissioner which has become final, the
function of the court is merely to render judgment in accordance
with the award of the referee or commissioner, and not to modify or
alter it as a party may desire, for if the same is allowed over the
objection of the opposing party, it may become controversial which
would be a proper subject of appeal. Yet the law expressly provides
that from such judgment or decree no appeal may be taken, which
shows that the function of the court is to enforce the award as
certified by the commissioner. (Section 51, Act No. 3428, as
amended by Republic Act No. 772). Vda. de Suataron vs. Hawaiian-
Phil. Co., 103 Phil. 647.

IX. Prescription.

Prescription of compensation is 10 years.—Compensation under the

Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, is a liability created by
statute which prescribes in ten (10) years, pursuant to Article
1144(2) of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Manila Railroad
Company vs. Perez, 14 SCRA 505.

X. Attorney’s Fees.

Workmen’s Compensation Commission may grant attorney’s fees.—

The Workmen’s Compensation Commission has authority to grant
attorney’s fees (Caltex [Phil.] vs. Derpo, L-19698, January 31, 1966,
and previous cases). The statutory basis is Article 2208 of the Civil
Code which

586

586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Publico vs. Metro Drug Corporation

allows a grant of attorney’s fees “in actions for indemnity under

workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws.” National
Development Company vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
17 SCRA 1006.—ATTY.JULIANA DE CASTRO.

_______________

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.