NAJERA v.

NAJERA
G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009.

FACTS:
Petitioner Digna Najera and respondent Eduardo Najera are married on January 31, 1988 as
evidenced by their marriage contract. Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage. At the
time of their marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was employed as Clerk at the
Special Services Division of the Provincial Government of Pangasinan with a monthly salary of
₱5,000.00. It was petitioner’s brother who helped respondent find a job as a seaman at the
Intercrew Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent was employed as a seaman,
and he gave petitioner a monthly allotment of ₱1,600.00. After ten months at work, he went
home in 1989 and then returned to work after three months. Every time respondent was home, he
quarreled with petitioner and accused her of having an affair with another man. Petitioner
noticed that respondent also smoked marijuana and every time he went out of the house and
returned home, he was drunk. However, there was no record in their barangay that respondent
was involved in drugs.
Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of curability of respondent’s psychological
disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the established organic damage was
minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual
drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder
and uncontrollable impulses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated.

HELD:
In Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence
submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The root cause of
respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina Gates’ conclusion that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and
was not based on her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is
unscientific and unreliable.Moreover, the trial court correctly found that petitioner failed to prove
with certainty that the alleged personality disorder of respondent was incurable as may be
gleaned from Psychologist Cristina Gates’ testimony.
 PARAS v. PARAS.
G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007

FACTS:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros
Oriental. They begot four (4)children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased), Dahlia,
and Reuel. Twenty-nine years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial
Court a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family
Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu
City. He courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in 1964, convinced
that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most
celebrated" marriages in Bindoy.
Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who
paid for her medication. Also in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was in their
rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house
as the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with the death of the children, the
entire family went to the United States. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and
left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica"
and other businesses heavy in debt and he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land.
At other times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station
free of charge. His act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw
that prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in
1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl,
Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justo‘s deceased daughter Cindy Rose
Paras.
He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not
dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar
crop loan before the bank’s authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the United
States. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy,
thus, he immediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his children’s education. At first,
he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides, their
conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there
were times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income. What caused
the inevitable family break-out was Rosa’s act of embarrassing him during his birthday
celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that
she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. This was
further aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a
mountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the charge of concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn
Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her
boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the
marriage. On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present
case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law
to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo’s alleged defects oridiosyncrasies "were
sufficiently explained by the evidence," Rosa contends that this Court’s factual findings in A.C.
No. 5333 fordisbarment are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint
sometime in May, 1993

ISSUE:
Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.

HELD:
A reading of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In
fact, the appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are
insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo's
alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are
true, such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father.
However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an
incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he
was truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a
married person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity,
they do not necessarily show ‘incurability’, such that while his acts violated the covenants of
marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of
psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage
in the future.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
 ZAMORA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 141917 February 7, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. After their
marriage, they lived together at No. 50-A Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not
produce any child. In 1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as a nurse. She
returned to the Philippines for a few months, then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made
periodic visits to Cebu City until 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen.
Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on the alleged
"psychological incapacity" of private respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family
Code. To support his position, he alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of
having children as evidenced by the fact that she had not borne petitioner a child. Furthermore,
he also alleged that private respondent abandoned him by living in the United States and had in
fact become an American citizen; and that throughout their marriage they lived together for not
more than three years. On the other hand, private respondent denied that she refused to have a
child. She portrayed herself as one who loves children as she is a nurse by profession and that
she would from time to time borrow her husband’s niece and nephews to care for them. She also
faulted her husband for the breakup of their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her.
He allegedly had two affairs with different women, and he begot at least three children with
them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC’s decision dismissing the
declaration of nullity of the marriage.

HELD:
Under Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides that:
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered in
totality, should be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party
concerned. Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is
psychologically incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to
bear a child was strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear out. Furthermore, the acts and
behavior of private respondent that petitioner cited occurred during the marriage, and there is no
proof that the former exhibited a similar predilection even before or at the inception of the
marriage.
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions reached by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
 PEREZ-FERRARIS v. FERRARIS
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006

FACTS:
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision
denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. It held
that epilepsy does not constitute as psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code
and that the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial
court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was
suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present
at the inception of the marriage. The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony
failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to
explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder;
that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an
adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from
accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists.

HELD:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here,
appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record
did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity.
There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the
marriage, or that those are incurable.
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a
mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type."
The Court finds respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house"
attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual
infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his
band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a
mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
 ANTONIO v. REYES
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner Leonilo and respondent Marie met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old
and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married
before a minister of the Gospel at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church
weddingat the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.
Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
Petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to present. Petitioner claims that respondent
persistently lied about herself as she concealed about her illegitimate child as the adopted child
of her family. Moreover, respondent also lied about the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their
marriage null and void.

HELD:
In Republic vs. CA, the Court laid down standards for the declaration of a nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. In this case the Court finds that it sufficiently satisfied the
Molina Guideline. First, Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses
who corroborated his allegations.
Second, the root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the
trial court’s decision. Third, respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have
clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends
and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Fourth, the
gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of
tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity,
as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
Fifth, Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to
see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Sixth, the marriage of the parties
was annulled by the Catholic Church. Seventh, the totality of evidence presented by the
petitioner shows that respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable.
Thus, the Court concluded that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the
Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
 CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. SIAYNGCO
G.R. No. 158896 October 27, 2004

FACTS:
On 25 September 1997, or after 24 years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the
declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He
alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish
attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that
she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his
elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical
arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she
showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the
Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house
within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional
advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that her
psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and
vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents
since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could
be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the
parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for
twenty-two (22) years.
The Regional Trial Court issued it resolution denying Manuel’s petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage. However, the Court of Appeals reversed its decision relying on Dr. Garcia’s
psychiatric evaluation that finding both petitioner and respondent are psychologically
incapacitated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not psychologically incapacity exist.

HELD:
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent
Manuel’s own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best
position to gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of
marriage. What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which
respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity,
per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. On the other hand, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of
respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling
nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are
grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception
of the marriage or that they are incurable.
 VILLALON v. VILLALON
G.R. No. 167206 November 18, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma.
Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City as he claimed that he is
psychologically incapacitated. According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological
incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of
interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to
accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other
women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the
fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged
psychological disorder of "Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder" with "Casanova
Complex". Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as "a pervasive maladaptation in terms of
interpersonal and occupational functioning" with main symptoms of "grand ideation about
oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I
personality."

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:
The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is
the fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to
their separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he
engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be
symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his
spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage
rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioner’s personal history.
In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered from Narcissistic
Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex even before the marriage and thus had
the tendency to cheat on his wife, such conclusion was not sufficiently backed by concrete
evidence showing that petitioner indeed had several affairs and finds it difficult to be faithful.
Moreover, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to establish the
incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. it appears that petitioner has
simply lost his love for respondent and has consequently refused to stay married to her.
 BUENAVENTURA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Noel filed for a petition of the declaration of nullity of marriage, on the ground of the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent.
Thereafter, petitioner amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a decision declaring the marriage
between petitioner Noel and respondent Isabel null and void ab initio.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:
As articulated by the Court of Appeals, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived
the defendant-appellee into marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that
he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-
appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would
be his first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but
also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that
in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendant–appellee and their
son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance
and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned caused defendant-
appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in
those years the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as
proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
 DEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner David met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the
advertising business of his father. Subsequently, they got married and begot four children.
However, on April 1, 1997 petitioner filed a petition seeking for the declaration of of nullity of
his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Petitioner present Dr. Dayan which declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of
Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the
marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of
Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
After trial, judgment was rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated.

HELD:
In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondent’s promiscuity
did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records
is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced
four children.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to
her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
 REPUBLIC v. DAGDAG
G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001

FACTS:
Respondent Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Parangan Dagdag were married on September 7
1975 at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. A week after the
wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for
months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he
was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk.
He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict
physical injuries on her.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. She presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, who testified
that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the
couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied
Erlinda and the children.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, the Court laid down the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with with
guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically
or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor
testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the
husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was
arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an
opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely
rendered.
 PESCA v. PESCA
G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001

FACTS:
Sometime in 1975, Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca met on board an
inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married.
However, in 1988, petitioner said that she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
"psychological incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an
emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He
was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00
o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent
would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and
threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared
from physical violence. Subsequently, petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial
Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting.

HELD:
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at
the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commiserates
with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that
relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law
has not quite given up, neither should we.
 BOLOS v. BOLOS
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010

FACTS:
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August
2, 2006. A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the
Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s
failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.Not in conformity,
Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the
RTC
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the
RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took
effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that
the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during
the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."

ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.

HELD:
Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court
promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988.The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the
Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word
"marriages."
 MALLION v. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 141528 October 31, 2006

FACTS:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
the regional trial court alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the
fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum
shopping.

ISSUE:
Is the action of the husband tenable?
HELD:
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by prior judgment” or
“estoppels by verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the second
action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it
pertains to res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of auter action
pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be
raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage celebration,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. The Court finds then that the
present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is
barred. The petition is denied for lack of merit.
 LEONOR v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R No. 112597 April 2, 1996

FACTS:
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the judgment of the lower
court. It was shown that she was married to the private respondent and they had three kids. While
her husband was studying and working abroad, he cohabited with another woman. This
prompted her to file for separation and alimony against her husband. Her husband in return filed
a divorce case against her in Swiss Courts, contending that their marriage was void for absence
of valid marriage certificate. The Swiss Court held in favour of the private respondent.
Subsequently the Private Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the marriage
certificate in the Philippines. The trial court granted his petition and denied Petitioner’s appeal.
The Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari in the CA, but the latter denied the same.
She filed this petition with the Supreme Court to assail the validity of CA’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null and void?

HELD:
Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondent’s contention is untenable. The Court explained
that the Rule only applies to cases concerning typographical or other clerical errors in the
marriage contract. It does not apply to cases where the status of the parties and their children
shall be affected. The Supreme Court held in favour of the petitioner contending that “A void
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.”
 ERIC U. YU v. REYES-CARPIO
G.R. No. 189207 June 15, 2011

FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the
RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Eric’s partial offer of
evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted for resolution after certain exhibits have been
remarked. But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the nullity of the marriage of Eric
and Caroline. On September 12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for resolution,
considering that the incidents on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues) were
mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on declaration of nullity cannot be resolved
without presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, support, and property relations.
Eric added that the incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity can both proceed and
be simultaneously resolved. RTC ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the case was re-raffled to another branch
presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio,
Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that
the case on the declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution ahead of the incidental
issues, and not simultaneously. Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying that the main cause of action is the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary incidents
thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then
filed for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be submitted for resolution first before the
reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations (incidental issues)

HELD:
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or what are alleged to have been exercised
with grave abuse of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is one which
“does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the
parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu to prove that the
assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and that those were patently
erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy
to assail an interlocutory order have not been complied with, the proper recourse for petitioner
should have been an appeal in due course of the judgment of the trial court on the merits,
incorporating the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow the presentation of evidence on the
incidents on custody, support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed orders that the trial
court judge merely deferred the reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and property
relations. And the trial judge’s decision was not without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support
in the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs.
19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property
relations after the trial court renders a decision granting the petition, or upon entry of judgment
granting the petition:
Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court
only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in
case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition,
the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a
time when a decision granting the petition is already at hand and before a final decree is issued.
Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the family court, shall proceed with the
liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children, and delivery of their
presumptive legitimes upon entry of judgment granting the petition. And following the pertinent
provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly
consistent with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what petitioner asserts.
Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children,
and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the
previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had
already provided for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence on the
subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or
annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in
issuing the assailed orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s assertion that ruling
the main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous
and fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption
that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.
Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and whimsical
manner, much less in a way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she issued the assailed
orders deferring the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. To
reiterate, this decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom and legal soundness. Consequently,
therefore, the CA cannot likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse
of discretion on her part.
 YU v. YU-LIM
GR No. 200072 June 20, 2016

FACTS:
Philip Yu and Viveca Lim Yu were married on 1984. However, in 1993, Viveca left their home
together with their children and filed a Petition for Legal Separation against her husband for
repeated physical violence, grossly abusive conduct, sexual infidelity, and attempt on her life.
Philip denied the accusations and prayed in his Counterclaim for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage.
However, in 2007, Philip moved for the dismissal of his counterclaim for nullity of marriage in
the Legal Separation case and was granted by the Pasig RTC. The same court, in 2009, rendered
a decision dismissing the Petition for Legal Separation on the ground that the same became
moot, with the decision of the RTC of Balayan, Batangas declaring the nullity of the parties’
marriage.
Viveca was unaware of the proceedings before the Batangas RTC. Thus, she filed before the CA,
a Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the said RTC’s decision. According to Viveca,
jurisdiction over her person did not properly vest since she was not duly served with Summons.
She alleged that she was deprived of her right to due process when Philip fraudulently declared
that her address was still at their conjugal home, when he clearly knew that she was in the USA.
Philip contends that Viveca was duly served summons by publication and by sending a copy of
the summons to the defendant’s last known address.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Batangas RTC validly acquired jurisdiction when Summons was duly served
to the respondent by publication

HELD:
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Through
its service, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Under Section 15 of Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served
with summons by extraterritorial service when the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff. In such case, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three
modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and
sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant's last
known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider
sufficient.
It is undisputed that when Philip filed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, an
action which affects his personal status, Viveca was already residing in the United States of
America. Thus, extraterritorial service of summons is the proper mode by which summons may
be served. Philip’s contention that the second mode of extraterritorial service of summons
mentioned above was sufficiently complied with, cannot be deemed compliant with the
requirements of the rules and is even tantamount to deception warranting the annulment of the
Batangas court's judgment.
Philip cannot be allowed to feign ignorance to the fact that Viveca had already intentionally
abandoned their conjugal abode and that of all the addresses that Viveca resided at, their
conjugal home is her least recent address. In fact, it may very well be considered as the address
she is least likely to be found considering the circumstances in which she left the same. There is,
therefore, no reason for Philip to assume, in good faith, that said address is in fact Viveca's "last
known address.” As a result, Viveca never had knowledge Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
suit, only finding out when the Pasig City RTC had promulgated its decision on the Legal
Separation case. Because of the service of summons at the erroneous address, Viveca was
effectively prevented from participating in the proceedings.
The SC deems as proper the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment issued without proper
service of summons.
 JULIAJVO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011

FACTS:
About 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanao married Estrellita twice – initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita
has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his
widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her
son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for
the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous.
The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and
that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

HELD:
The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never
invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not
availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by
way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and
the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites.
 ENRICO v. HEIRS OF MEDINACELI
G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007

FACTS:
Spouses Uelogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-medicani were married on June 14 1962. They
had seven children, herein respondents. Trinidad died on may 1 2004 and on august 26 2004,
Eulogio marries petitioner Lolita Enrico on february 10 2005. respondent filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita on two grounds: that the marriage
was entered into without the requisite marriage license and; lack of a marriage ceremony due to
Eulogio's illness.
Enrico contended that she has been living with Eulogio for 21 years hence exempt from getting a
marriage license under Art. 34 of the Family Code. More importantly, she sought the dismissal
of his action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to AM 02- 11-10 SC which provides in
sec. 2 (a) that the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage may be filled
solely by the husband or the wife. The heirs invoked the ruling in the case of Ninal vs.
Bayadong.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempt from securing marriage
license.

HELD:
Petition is dismissed. Under Art. 34 of the family code, a man and a woman who have been
living together for at least five years without any legal impediments are exempt from securing a
marriage license. The said exemption cannot possibly apply because the second marriage
contracted by Eulogio with Enrico took place barely 3 months after Trinidad dies. Moreover, the
respondent heirs have no standing to assail the validity of the second marriage even after te death
of their father, Eulogio.
While it is true that Ninal vs. Bayadog allowed the heirs therein to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the Father's 2nd marriage after the death, the court held that the same
rule cannot be applied for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the family code.Nonetheless, the heirs are not left without remedy. They can
still protect their successional rights as compulsory or intestate heirs of Eulogio by questioning
the validity of his second marriage with Enrico, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate deceased father filed in the regular courts.
 NIÑAL v. BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778 March14, 2000

FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One
year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog
got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license.

ISSUE:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34
of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license.

HELD:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.
This 5- year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should
be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved
or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived
with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20
months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as “husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception
to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element.
 CARLOS v. SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

FACTS:
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels of
land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents
Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two parcels of land
were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an
action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the
marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the
required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the
natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by
such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not both parties should file for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

HELD:
The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on
the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.
Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary
judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is
based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in reversing the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and
even in annulment of marriage
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No.
02- 11-10- SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any
party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
 ABLAZA v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010

FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,
Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby
rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He
insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue
entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby
making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the
validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

ISSUE:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage
of his deceased brother

HELD:
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December
26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as
having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or
illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from
succeeding to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the
action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late
Cresenciano's surviving heir. The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the
case.
 MAQUILAN v. MAQUILAN
G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007

FACTS:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life
and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned
bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her
paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private
respondent and the latter’s paramour. Consequently, both the private respondent and her
paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
ranging from one(1) year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum
penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision
correccional as maximum penalty.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June
15, 2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed
as Civil Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a Compromise
Agreement. The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the respondent
judge in the assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated
January 2, 2002.

ISSUE:
Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

HELD:
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the
fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. Where a
subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent spouse; while
Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case involves a
proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of
psychological capacity.
Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement partially
divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal
with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly
prohibited by Article 2035. Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is
tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the
conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such
disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for
sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This
conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still
pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to
the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary
interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CUISON-MELGAR
G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006

FACTS:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in Dagupan
City. Their union begot five children. On August 19,1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity
of her marriage on the ground of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his essential
marital obligations. According to Norma the manifestations of Eulogio’s psychological
incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, laziness,
and abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is in the nature contemplated
by Article 36.

HELD:
The Supreme Court set aside and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The marriage
between Norma and Eulogio is valid. The immaturity, habitual alcoholism, laziness, jealousy and
abandonment of respondent do not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court ruled that it is
not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person;
it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some
psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage – had to be shown. A cause has to be shown and linked with the
manifestations of the psychological incapacity.
 MALCAMPO-SIN v. SIN
G.R. No. 137590 March 26, 2001

FACTS:
On January 4, 1987, Florence and respondent Philipp Sin, a Portuguese citizen, were married at
St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the
RTC, Pasig City, a complaint for “declaration of nullity of Marriage” against Philipp. Trial
ensued and the parties presented their respective evidences.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in not ordering a prosecuting attorney or fiscal on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.

HELD:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating
his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are
bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is
remanded for proper trial.
 TUASON v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996

FACTS:
Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3,1972. Lopez alleged that at the
time of the marriage. Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations that became manifested afterwards. The same resulted in violent
fights. Emilio was also said to be using prohibited drugs, he was a womanizer and gave minimal
support to the family. Likewise, he became spendthrift and abusive of his administration of the
conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets without Victoria’s consent. Attempts for
reconciliation failed because Emilio’s refusal to reform. In the prayer of Victoria for annulment
of marriage, she further prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from
further dissipation. At variance, Emilio denied the imputation against him. Thereafter, trial
ensued and Victoria presented four witnesses including documentary evidence consisting of
newspaper articles of Emilio’s relationship with other women, his apprehension for illegal
possession of drugs and copies of prior church annulment decree. After Victoria rested her case,
reception for Emilio’s evidence was scheduled. It was postponed and on the reset date, he failed
to appear. The court then declared Emilio to have waived his right to present evidence and
deemed the case submitted for decision.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of Victoria’s marriage
to Emilio and awarded custody of the children to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition for relief
from judgment but was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstance of the
case where petitioner was declared in default due to non-appearance during the hearing.

HELD:
Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition for relief from judgment.
Under the rules, a final and executor judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set
aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the
petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or
cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case
as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. Furthermore, the failure of counsel
to notify his client on time of an adverse judgment to enable the latter to appeal there from is
negligence that is not excusable. Similarly inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to inform the
trial court of his client’s confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance
at the scheduled hearings. Indeed, a petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy,
allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.
 MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS v. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861 July 30, 2004

FACTS:
Mrs. Macias asserts before the Court that the respondent judge's actuations constitute bias,
partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and
conclusive from the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure.
For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction him.
The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision which states that the
respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he proceeded with
the trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which
was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.
The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure, which states that: "After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be
the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial." Considering
that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first
resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias' motion to set the case for pre-trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence.

HELD:
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of
the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not
exceeding six months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not
exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed. With this, Judge Wilfredo G.
Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby
FINED the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier
withheld from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the OCA is DIRECTED
to immediately release to the respondent judge the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) from the aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its
further retention.
 PACETE v. CARRIAGA
G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994

FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for
legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in
her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named
Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion
and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and
Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an
answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith
granted. The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21,
and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,
1980.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision.

HELD:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is
to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now
Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no
case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in
order to provide the parties a “cooling- off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the
inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is
not fabricated.
 SEVILLA CASTRO v. CASTRO
G.R. No. 140484 January 28, 2008

FACTS:

Lamberto filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Isabelita due to
psychological Incapacity. The sheriff’s return of the service of summons showed that it was
received by Isabelita’s nephew, but the petitioner did not file and answer, hence the trial court
allowed Lamberto to present his evidence ex-parte. Thereupon, Lamberto presented his evidence,
and on August 19, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Isabelita psychologically
incapacitated and annulling her marriage to Lamberto. Isabelita, however, moved to set aside to
declare the judgement null and void, contending that no valid service of summons was made
upon her as no nephew resided with her. She also alleged that the allegations in the petition were
false, and only intended to free Lamberto to marry his concubine. Lamberto opposed the motion.
The RTC partially granted the petition by allowing Isabelita to present his contrary evidence. On
the first setting, her counsel moved for resetting which the court allowed. However, she again
moved for postponement, to the vehement objection of Lamberto’s counsel. Thus the trial court
issued its order affirming the Decision in earlier rendered. Isabelita moved for reconsideration
upon receipt of the order, which the trial court denied. The trial court affirmed its earlier
decision, and entry of judgment made on October 29, 1999.

Isabelita filed her petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, averring that no valid
service of summons was made upon her. She also assailed the finding of psychological
incapacity as devoid of merit; as well as the fact that the trial court did not set the case for pre-
trial and allowed Lamberto to present evidence ex parte.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in devlaring Isabelita’s marriage to Lamberto void on the ground
of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The petition fails. This Court finds no reason to set aside the findings of the trial court. The
records show that petitioner was personally informed of the petition for annulment, and as stated
by the trial court, petitioner received the summons and the petition on July 15, 1998. She
“acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing her signature on the original copy of said summons
dated July 13, 1998.” Petition neither denied nor refuted this.

Petitioner’s claim that she was never informed of the proceedings in unbelievable because she
even submitted herself to a series of psychological examination performed by public
respondent’s expert witness, Regine Marmee C. Cosico, a clinical psychologist.

Petitioner was afforded due process and the trial court acquired jurisdiction over her person.
Even assuming that petitioner did not receive the summons, she was deemed to have submitted
herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when she filed a motion to set aside or declare
judgment null and void. After the trial court granted her motion and she was given the
opportunity to present contrary evidence, she and her counsel failed to appear on the scheduled
hearings for this purpose. Finally, the trial court’s decision had already become final and
executory, and judgment was entered on October 29, 1000. For this reason and on account of
private respondent’s death on January 14, 2004, the judgement binding on both parties.
 VALDES v. RTC
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
 DINO v. DINO
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011

FACTS:

January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity under
article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and
support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on
shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner
further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio.

The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be
issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to” A
DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code

HELD:

The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared
void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by absolute community
of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute
the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary
rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the
Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on
co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the
Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be
made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not necessary to
liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
 ANAYA v. PALAROAN
G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970

FACTS:

On 7 January 1954, after one month of marriage to Aurora Anaya, Fernando Palaroan filed a
complaint to annul it on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation.
The court dismissed the complaint and granted Aurora's counterclaim. While the amount of the
counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando allegedly divulged that several months prior to the
marriage, he had pre-marital relationships with a close relative of his. Anaya filed suit to annul
the marriage and to recover moral damages.

Fernando denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative and having committed
any fraud against Aurora. He did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal
"with respect to the alleged moral damages." Aurora replied stating that Fernando had no
intention of performing his marital duties and obligations since the marriage was contracted as a
means for him to escape marrying the close relative that was intimated above. The trial court
dismissed the complaint, holding that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to
invalidate her marriage. Aurora appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman a ground for annulment of marriage?

HELD:

Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit
as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest
such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her
consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was
solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not
herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to
the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
 BUCCAT v. BUCCAT DE MANGONON
GR No. 47101 April 25, 1941

FACTS:

It was established before the trial court that the Plaintiff met the defendant in March 1938. After
several interviews, both were committed on September 19 of that year. On
November 26 the same year, the plaintiff married the defendant in a Catholic Cathedral in
Baguio. They, then, cohabited for about eighty-nine days. Defendant gave birth to a child of nine
months on February 23, 1939. Following this event, Plaintiff and Defendant separated. On
March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an action for annulment of marriage before the CFI of Baguio
City. The plaintiff claimed that he consented to the marriage because the defendant assured him
that she was virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

Hence, this appeal. Godofredo Buccat (Plaintiff) and Luida Mangonon (Defendant) got married
on November 26, 1938. Luida gave birth after 89 days and on March 20, 1939 Godofredo
filedfor annulment of marriage before the CFI because he was led to believe by Luida that
shewas a virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint, so Godofredo appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the consent of Plaintiff to the marriage?

HELD:

There is no fraud because: The Supreme Court states that: “We see no reason to overturn
the ruling appealed.” It is unlikely that the plaintiff, Godofredo, had not suspected that the
defendant, Luida, was pregnant. (As she gave birth less than 3 months after they got married, she
must have looked very pregnant even before they were married.) Since Godofredo must have
known that she was not a virgin, the marriage cannot be annulled. The Sacred Marriage is an
institution: it is the foundation on which society rests. To cancel it, reliable evidence is
necessary.
 ALMELOR v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008

FACTS:
Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners. They begot 3 children. 11
years later, Leonida sought to annul her marriage with Manuel claiming that Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. Leonida testified that
Manuel is a harsh disciplinarian and that his policy towards their children are often
unconventional and was the cause of their frequent fight. Manuel has an unreasonable way of
imposing discipline towards their children but is remarkably so gentle towards his mom. He is
more affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor which is unreasonable for Leonida.

Further, Leonida also testified that Manuel is a homosexual as evidenced by his unusual
closeness to his male companions and that he concealed his homosexuality from Leonida prior to
their marriage. She once caught Manuel talking to a man affectionately over the phone and she
confirmed all her fear when she saw Manuel kiss a man. The RTC ruled that their marriage is
null and void not because of PI but rather due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his
homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC). The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by
reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.

HELD:
The Supreme Court emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage.
It is the concealment of homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it is not proven
that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower court should not have taken the public’s perception
against Manuel’s sexuality. His peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower court as an
indication of his homosexuality for those are not conclusive and are not sufficient enough to
prove so. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint
or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida
and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by such.
 VILLANUEVA VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006

FACTS:

In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- Villanueva before a trial court judge
in Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orlando filed before the trial court a petition for
annulment of his marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry
Lilia who was then pregnant. Orlando anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on
the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to Lilia.

He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from Lilia and
strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East
after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member
of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by Lilia and who
accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her. On the other hand
Lilia denied Orlando’s allegations and she said that Orlando freely cohabited with her after the
marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orlando’s affection and care towards her.

ISSUE:

Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent under Article 45
of the Family Code; and

HELD:

The court ruled that vitiation of consent is not attendant in this case. Therefore, the petition for
annulment, which is anchored to his allegation that he did not freely give his consent, should be
dismissed.

The SC ruled that Orlando’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is
obvious that Orlando is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending
appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed.

On the merits of the case, Orlando’s allegation of fear was not concretely established. The Court
is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the
time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his
employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-
defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way.

For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the
fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police
regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge
about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as
well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and
is an outright lie. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual
relationship with Lilia. Thus, the petition for annulment was granted, but the award of moral and
exemplary damages is deleted for lack of basis.
 MACARRUBO v. MACARRUBO
ADM. CASE NO. 6148 January 22, 2013

FACTS:

For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L.
Macarrubo who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

The Court disbarred him for having contracted a bigamous marriage with the complainant and a
third marriage with another while his first marriage was still subsisting, which acts constituted
gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edmundo Macarrubo should be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys

HELD:

Respondent had sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal
profession and in his personal life. He had asked forgiveness from his children by complainant
and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein attached pictures.
Records also showed that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown and devoted
his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death. He was
appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor and thereafter, assumed the position of Local
Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office he
continues to serve to date. Moreover, he became a part-time instructor in a University.
Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and
friends who are in dire need.

Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement was duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Cagayan Chapter and by his former and present colleagues. His parish priest
certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. He
was also observed to be a regular churchgoer. Records further revealed that respondent had
already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit was
tendered by complainant. He sends regular support to his children in compliance with the Court’s
directive.

While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers,
concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways, as in
this case.

After 8 years, he was reinstated to the practice of law.

 ALCAZAR v. ALCAZAR
G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009

FACTS:

In August 2000, Rey Alcazar and Veronica Cabacungan married each other. They lived together
for three weeks thereafter, Rey went to Saudi Arabia to work. In Saudi, Rey never communicated
with Veronica despite Veronica’s efforts to reach him. In March 2002, Rey returned to the
Philippines but instead of going home to Veronica, he went straight to his parents. He did not
even tell Veronica that he was coming home. Veronica had to learn of his husband’s return from
someone else. Veronica went to Rey’s parents but Rey cannot be found there (hiding).
In August 2002, Veronica filed an annulment case against Rey. Initially, the ground for
annulment was based on paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code or Rey’s failure to
consummate the marriage. But later, the ground was changed to psychological incapacity
(Article 36).

During trial, Veronica presented Dr. Nedy Tayag as expert witness who testified that Rey is
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD). Rey was found by Tayag to be having a
grandiose sense of self. He thinks he is too important, too unique, and too special.

Also alleged in the complaint for annulment was Rey’s alleged sexual infidelity because when he
came home from abroad, it was said that he lived with a certain “Sally” in his parent’s
hometown.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between Veronica and Rey should be annulled.

HELD:

No. First, the Supreme Court noted that it is correct that Veronica abandoned her cause under
paragraph 5, Article 45. The said provision states:

ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage: x x x x (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage
with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to consummate
denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual
intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife
and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it
may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from
psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or
disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage
act. No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that Rey was in any way physically
incapable to consummate his marriage with Veronica. In fact, Veronica admitted that she and
Rey had sex before and after the wedding. Thus, incapacity to consummate does not exist int his
case.

Second, psychological incapacity was not proven. Tayag’s testimony on Rey’s NPD was not
sufficient to establish psychological incapacity. The case between Veronica and Rey is merely a
simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to each other, with the
husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from his
wife. To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily signs of
psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled.

Lastly, the allegation of sexual infidelity on the part of Rey is a poor attempt to bolster the claim
against Rey. Sexual infidelity per se is not psychological incapacity. Veronica failed to establish
that Rey’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
 JIMENEZ v. CANIZARES
G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960

FACTS:

Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Joel later filed for annulment on grounds that
Remedios is impotent because her genitals were too small for copulation and such was already
existing at the time of the marriage. Remedios was summoned to answer the complaint of Joel
but she refused to do so. It was found that there was no collusion between the parties
notwithstanding the non-cooperation of Remedios in the case. Remedios was ordered to have
herself be submitted to an expert to determine if her genitals are indeed too small for copulation.
Remedios again refused to do as ordered. The trial was heard solely on Joel’s complaint. The
marriage was later annulled.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Remedios’ impotency has been established.

HELD:

In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony
of Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his
marriage he sought and seeks. Whether Remedios is really impotent cannot be deemed to have
been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings until the
entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be
examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred, because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent authority. Impotency being an abnormal
condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of
Joel that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the
ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
 ONG ENG KIAM v. ONG
G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006

FACTS:

William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when Lucita filed a
complaint for Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code. Lucita alleged that
since their third year of marriage, her husband William subjected her to physical violence
like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang her head against the
concrete wall.and been violent towards their three children. He would scold them using his belt
buckle to beat them.

One day after a violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita on several different parts of her body,
pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house which she did. Lucita’s statements about
William’s abusive behavior were corroborated by her sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan
whom Lucita consulted the day after she left her conjugal home also testified about her injuries.

The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal separation which the Court of
Appeals affirmed. William then filed this petition for review on certiorari on the decision
denying all of Lucita’s allegations and that he never inflicted physical harm on her or their
children. He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the complaint is to
deprive him of his control and ownership over his conjugal properties with Lucita. That the CA
overlooked some facts of the case which warrant an exception to the general rule that questions
of fact cannot be the subject for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The CA erred in
relying on the testimonies of Lucita her sister and their parents’ doctor Dr. ElinZano since their
testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud and since Lucita abandoned the family home
she has also given a ground for legal separation and therefore should NOT- be granted one
pursuant to Art. 56 par. 4 of The family code – Where both parties have given ground for legal
separation

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation

HELD:

The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to take control of the
conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her husband’s repeated physical violence
and grossly abusive conduct. That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were
brought to bear upon Lucita have been duly established. He can derive no personal gain from
pushing for the financial interests of her family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and
the companionship of her husband and children. The assessment of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses is given great respect. Relationship alone is not enough to discredit and
label a witness’ testimony as biased and unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr.
Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward testimonies the court finds that their testimonies are
not tainted with bias.

The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause
for more than one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute
abandonment contemplated in the said provision
 GAUDIONCO v. PENARANDA
GR No. 72984 November 27, 1987

FACTS:

Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan
Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a
criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the
provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent
judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent
thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the
criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and
await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the
criminal case for concubinage.

HELD:

Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability
arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to
the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the
legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody
of the children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree
of legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal
proceeding or conviction is necessary.

Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal
separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount
of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce
the same.
 PARTOSA-JO v. CA
G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992

FACTS:

The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The
latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a
complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an
earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the
complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose
elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the
separation of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by
agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement
between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of
her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated
permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of
conjugal property.

HELD:

The Supreme Court is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary
modification instead of dismissing the filed case. For abandonment to exist, there must be an
absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming
their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to
Prima. Hence, the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private
respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for
the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the
conjugal property of the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike. The division
will be implemented after the determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal
partnership including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons.
 ARROYO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 96602 November 19, 1991

FACTS:

A criminal complaint for adultery was filed by Dr. Neri (husband) against Ruby (wife) and
Arroyo (petitioner). After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner and the wife,
based, among others on the wife's admission to her husband that she sex with petitioner Arroyo.
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The wife later filed a motion for
reconsideration or new trial contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband. The
husband filed a manifestation praying for the dismissal of the case as he had "tacitly consented"
to his wife's infidelity.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the admission of adulterous conduct by the wife to her husband without the
presence of her counsel is admissible in evidence.

2. Whether the husband is a competent witness against his wife

HELD:

1. YES. The husband's testimony relating to the admission of adulterous conduct made by
the wife to her husband is admissible in evidence. The husband was neither a peace officer nor
an investigating officer conducting a custodial investigation. Neither was said testimony
rendered inadmissible by the constitutional provision on the right to remain silent and the right to
counsel of a "person under investigation for the commission of an offense."

The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from
respondent-accused.

2. Yes. The husband is not precluded under the Rules of Court from testifying against his
wife in criminal cases for a crime committed by one against the other (Section 22, Rule 129,
Revised Rules of Court). In short, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting
Dr. Neri's testimony as he was a competent witness.
 BUGAYONG v. GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956

FACTS:

Benjamin Bugayong, serviceman in the US Navy was married to defendant Leonila Ginez in
Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. After marriage, the couples live with the sisters of the
husband, before the latter left to report back to duty, the couple came to an agreement that
Leonila would stay with Benjamin’s sisters.

Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she informed her husband by letter that she
had gone to reside with her mother in Pangasinan. Early in July 1951, Benjamin receive letters
from his sister Valeriana Polangco that her wife informing him of alleged acts of infidelity.
Benjamin went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of Leonila’s
godmother. They lived again as husband and wife and stayed in the house of Pedro Bugayong,
cousin of the plaintiff-husband. On the second day, he tried to verify from his wife the truth of
the information he received but instead of answering, Leonila packed up and left him which
Benjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. After he tried to locate her and
upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte. Benjamin filed in CIF of Pangasinan a complaint for legal
separation against Leonila, who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the
complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of allegations of the commission of acts of
infidelity amounting to adultery have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband.

HELD:

Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were commited by the wife, the act of the
husband in persuading her to come along with him and the fact that she went with him and
together they slept as husband and wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any
action for legal separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comes within the
restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code.
 PEOPLE v. ZAPATA
G.R. No. L-3047 May 16, 1951

FACTS:

In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc
against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and
having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 14 March 1947, the date
of the filing of the complaint, Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his codefendant to be a married
woman. The defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months
of arresto mayor which penalty she served. In the same court, on 17 September 1948, the
offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her
paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17 September 1948, the date of the filing of the second
complaint. On 21 February 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of
the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial
court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed the second complaint. From the other
sustaining the motions to quash the prosecution has appealed.

The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complains must be
deemed one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same and identical
persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having taken place continuously during the years 1946,
1947 and part of 1948, and that the acts or two sets of acts that gave rise to the crimes of adultery
complained of in both cases constitute one and the same offense, within the scope and meaning
of the constitutional provision that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense.".

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants’ cohabitation should be deemed as one continuous offense.

HELD:

Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as the Supreme Court of Spain has held (S. 10
December 1945); it is a instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed
at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery
(Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569). True, two or more adulterous acts committed by
the same defendants are against the same person — the offended husband, the same status — the
union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and the same community represented by the
State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended
party, status society does not argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as many
times as there were carnal consummated, for as long as the status remain unchanged, the nexus
undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime.

There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for
adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime.
In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits perpetrate
the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need not to another or other adulterous acts to
consummate it. After the last acts of adultery had been committed as charged in the first
complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and
for which the second complaint was filed. It was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that
another crime of adultery was committed, if the defendants, after their provincional release
during the pendency of the case in which they were sent to prison to serve the penalty imposed
upon them(S. 28 February 1906; 76 Jur. Crim. pp. 208-210).

The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed
and set aside, and trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance
with law, with costs against the appellees.
 DE OCAMPO v. FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children
who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his
wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out,
he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one
year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other man other than
Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations
with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which
defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal
action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE:

Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed
by the Family Code.

HELD:

Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence
of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed
by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession
done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the
defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted
since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the
plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s
confession. The petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet
prescribed.
 MATUBIS v. PRAXEDES
G.R. No. L-11766 October 25, 1960

FACTS:

Plaintiff and defendant were legally married in 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. For failure to agree
on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple agreed to live separately from each
other, which status remained unchanged until the present. In 1948, plaintiff and defendant
entered into an agreement, stating the following: (a) that both of us relinquish our right over the
other as legal husband and wife; ( b) That both without any interference by any of us, nor either
of us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from
the separation.

In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth to a
child, who was recorded as the child of said defendant. It was shown also that defendant and
Asuncion deported themselves as husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the
community. Alleging abandonment and concubinage, plaintiff Socorro Matubis filed with the
CFI of Camarines Sur a complaint for legal separation and changed of surname against her
husband defendant Zoilo Praxedes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is standing on the legal separation case filed by petitioners.

HELD:
Article 102 of the new Civil Code provides that "an action for legal separation cannot filed
except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the
cause and within five years from after the date when cause occurred." The complaint was filed
outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she
came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted
the complaint only on April 24, 1956. It is to be noted that appellant did not even press this
matter in her brief.

Article 100 of the new Civil Code provides that the legal separation may be claimed only by the
Innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage.

The agreement between the spouses is divided in two parts. The first part having to do with the
act of living separately which he claims to be legal, and the second part —that which becomes a
license to commit the ground for legal separation which is admittedly illegal. The condonation
and consent here are not only implied but expressed. Having condoned and/or consented in
writing, the plaintiff now undeserving of the court's sympathy.
 PEOPLE v. SCHNECKENBURGER
G.R. No. 48183 November 10, 1941

FACTS:

Accused Rodolfo married the complainant Elena Ramirez Cartagena. After 7 years (due to
incompatibility of characters) they agreed to live separately from each other. Accused without
leaving the Philippines secured a divorce decree from civil court of Juarez, Bravos District of
Chihuahua Mexico. He contracted another marriage with co-accused Julia Medel before the
justice of the peace of Malabon. Because of the nullity of the divorce decree, complainant herein
instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy and another for concubinage. Charge
for bigamy culminated in the conviction of accused. Meanwhile, before the trial for the charge of
concubinage commenced, accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy and the case was
initially dismissed; upon appeal, the CA held the dismissal before trial to be premature and
without deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on
the merits. Accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused should be acquitted of concubinage in view of the agreement executed by
Rodolfo and Elena upon their separation

HELD:

The agreement constituted a consent given by Elena to Rodolfo, hence, Rodolfo should be
acquitted. Judgment is reversed. There is no double jeopardy. The defense of bigamy for which
he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial in the court are two distinct
offenses in the law Upon the other hand, the accused should have been acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and the complainant in which
they agreed , while illegal for the purpose for which it was executed , constitutes nevertheless a
valid consent to the act of concubinage within the meaning of Art. 344 of the RPC. By such
agreement, each party clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of the other

Previously, the court held that the consent which bars the offended party from instituting a
criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime has been
committed. However, in this case, the Court sees this to be a narrow view. As the term "pardon"
unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been intended
agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical
difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances
as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy
to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong Prior consent is as effective
as subsequent consent to bar the offended aprty from prosecuting the offense

An agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain
language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense
Article 344 of the RPC provides: The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution
without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
 PEOPLE v. SENSANO
G.R. No. 48183 November 10, 1941

FACTS:

Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. Shortly after, the husband
left his wife to go to the Province of Cagayan where he remained for three years without writing
to his wife or sending her anything for the support of herself and their son. Poor and illiterate,
without relatives upon whom she could call, she struggled for an existence for herself and her
son until a fatal day when she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child to live
with him. On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo
Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor.

In the opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat cruel in his treatment
of his wife, having abandoned her as he did." After completing her sentence, the accused left her
paramour. She thereupon appealed to the municipal president and the justice of the peace to send
for her husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the house of
the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a faithful wife if he would take her back.
He refused to pardon her or to live with her and said she could go where she wished, that he
would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the
second time, she and her child went back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year
1924) and they have lived with him ever since.

The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her co-defendant in 1924, did nothing to
interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as husband. Shortly thereafter he left for the
Territory of Hawaii where he remained for seven years completely abandoning his said wife and
child. On his return to these Islands, he presented the second charge of adultery here involved
with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce under the provisions of
Act No. 2710.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the husband has a proper action against the accused.

HELD:

The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders. Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he
signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence
in this case and his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations
existing between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal
proceeding. The Court cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years
of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is explained by his absence from the
Philippine Islands during which period it was impossible for him to take any action against the
accused. There is no merit in the argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any
action against the accused during the said seven years.
 BENEDICTO v. DE LA RAMA
G.R. No. 1056 March 13, 1907

FACTS:

On July 5, 1902, the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo entered a final judgment in
this case, decreeing a divorce to the plaintiff on the ground of the husband's adultery, as well as
the payment of 81,042.76 pesos due her as her unpaid share of the property belonging to the
conjugal partnership, as well as the sum of 3,200 pesos as an allowance for their support since
the date on which the action was instituted.

From the judgment the defendant appealed to this court, which, on December 8, 1903, reversed
the decree of the Court of First Instance, incorporated in its opinion certain findings of fact, and
ordered judgment absolute that the complaint be dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is mutual guilt on both of the parties which mitigates the action for legal
separation.

HELD:

Under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure the filing of a bill of exceptions as a stay of
execution. In this case, therefore, the order made by the trial court in the judgment for the
payment of alimony for the period from the institution of the action to the date of such judgment
was suspended by the filing of the defendant's bill of exceptions. The trial court might
undoubtedly, under section 144, have provided that execution should not be stayed as to the
order for the payment of alimony, but it did not do so. The whole matter rested in the discretion
of the trial court. We have no jurisdiction to take any action in the premises.

Nor we have any jurisdiction to grant alimony pending the appeal. The trial court might have
made an order in such terms as to cover the entire period till final judgment, but did not do so.
We cannot revise its action, except as far as it is brought before us for revision in the ordinary
manner, by bill of exceptions.

The right of a wife to the payment of alimony from her husband stands upon no different footing
from any other right created by the law or arising from contract or otherwise, and is to be
enforced by appropriate proceedings commenced in the court having original jurisdiction. Our
jurisdiction in such cases is appellate merely. The motion must be denied.
 BROWN v. YAMBAO
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960

FACTS:

Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children who are now
living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the
defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the
said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the
end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since
then they had lived separately.

On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another
man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal
separation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of legal separation had already prescribed

HELD:

The husband's right to legal separation on account of the defendant's adultery with Jose Arcalas
had prescribed, because his action was not filed within one year from March 1951 when plaintiff
discovered her infidelity.

As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, the appellate court found that in the night of June 18,
1955, the husband upon discovering the illicit connection, expressed his wish to file a petition for
legal separation and defendant readily agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by the
Fiscal upon orders of the court, she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation even as she
admitted having had sexual relations with Nelson Orzame. Interpreting these facts virtually to
mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court declared that under Art. 101, legal separation
could not be decreed.
 CONTRERAS v. MACARAIG
G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970

FACTS:

Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic Church of Quiapo,
Manila. Defendant was employed as manager of the printing establishment owned by plaintiff's
father known as the MICO Offset. In that capacity, defendant met and came to know Lily Ann
Alcala, who place orders with MICO Offset for propaganda materials for Mr. Sergio Osmeña,
who was then a Vice-Presidential candidate. After the elections of 1961, defendant resigned from
MICO Offset to be a special agent at Malacañang. He began to be away so often and to come
home very late.

In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was
living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following October, returned to
the conjugal home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report from defendant in her desire
not to anger nor drive defendant away. All this while, defendant, if and whenever he returned to
the family fold, would only stay for two or three days but would be gone for a period of about a
month. After plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent
Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her father's employee, to verify the reports. The latter saw defendant
was carrying a baby in his arms.

In November, 1963, plaintiff requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs.
Enriqueta Majul, and the latter obliged and arranged a meeting at her home in Buendia between
plaintiff and Lily Ann Alcala. Lily Ann said she was willing to give up defendant as she had no
desire to be accused criminally but it was defendant who refused to break relationship with her.
In December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, went to talk to defendant at his
place of work on España Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak,
a nearby restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to
return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant
informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate
family.

ISSUE:

Whether the prescription should start on 1962 or in 1963.

HELD:

After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only time
when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of
December 1963 when, quoting from the appealed decision, the following happened — In the
early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, Victoria and
Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of work on
España Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby
restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the
conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff
that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.

From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding
paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave
Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation
to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal
period of one year must be deemed to have commenced.
 ARANETA v. CONCEPCION
G.R. No. L-9667 July 31, 1956
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action against his wife for legal separation on the ground of adultery.
Defendant filed a petition to secure the custody of their three minor children, a monthly support
of five thousand pesos for herself and said children, and the return of her passport, to enjoin
plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her, and to have the plaintiff
therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action.
Plaintiff opposed the petition denying the misconduct imputed to him, alleging that defendant
abandoned the children, committed adultery, unable to give the children the love, respect and
care of a true mother and without the means to educate them.
The respondent Judge resolved the petition, granting custody of the children to the defendant and
a monthly allowance of two thousand and three hundred pesos for support for her and the
children, three hundred pesos for the house and two thousand pesos as attorney’s fees.
Upon refusal of the Judge to reconsider the order, petitioner filed the present petition for
certiorari against the said order and for mandamus to compel the respondent Judge to require the
parties to submit evidence before deciding on the petition. The main reason of the Judge for
refusing the plaintiff’s request that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues is the
prohibition contained in Article 58 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect?

RULING:
Article 58 of the Family Code provides that “An action for legal separation shall in no case be
tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.”
It should be noted that since more than six months have elapsed since the filing of the petition,
the question offered may not be allowed. It is, however, believed that the reasons for granting the
preliminary injunction should be given the scope of the article cited may be explained.
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 58 of the Family Code is
evidently intended as a cooling off period to make a possible reconciliation between the spouses.
The recital of their grievances against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to
give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection.
The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the courts according to the
circumstances. The rule is that all provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory, should
be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them if necessary. Thus the determination of
the custody and alimony should be given force and effect provided that it does not go to the
extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause
of the separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means conducive to their welfare
and convenience during the pendency of the case. These should be allowed so that the court may
determine which is best for their custody.
 SOMOSA-RAMOS v VAMENTA, JR.
G.R. No. L-34132 July 29, 1972
FACTS:
On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 5274 in the sala of respondent Judge against
respondent Clemente Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage on the respondent's part and an
attempt by him against her life being alleged. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal
and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of respondent Clemente
Ramos. There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion, dated July 3, 1971, based on
Article 103 of the Civil Code. It was further manifested by him in a pleading dated July 16,
1971, that if the motion asking for preliminary mandatory injunction were heard, the prospect of
the reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim. Respondent Judge ordered the
parties to submit their respective memoranda on the matter. Then on September 3, 1971,
petitioner received an order dated August 4, 1971 of respondent Judge granting the motion of
respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary
injunction. That is the order complained of in this petition for certiorari. Respondents were
required to answer according to our resolution of October 5, 1971. The answer was filed
December 2 of that year. Then on January 12, 1972 came a manifestation from parties in the case
submitting the matter without further arguments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for
preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period.

RULING:
A suit for legal separation, however, is something else again. It involves a relationship on which
the law for the best reasons would attach the quality of permanence. That there are times when
domestic felicity is much less than it ought to be is not of course to be denied. Grievances,
whether fancied or real, may be entertained by one or both of the spouses. There may be constant
bickering. The loss affection on the part of one or both may be discernible. Nonetheless, it will
not serve public interest, much less the welfare of the husband or the wife, to allow them to go
their respective ways. Even then, the hope that the parties may settle their differences is not all
together abandoned. The healing balm of time may aid in the process. Hopefully, the guilty
parties may mend his or her ways, and the offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity.
Hence, the interposition of a six-month period before an action for legal separation is to be tried.
 PACETE v CARRIAGA
G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994
FACTS:
In October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between her husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, for legal separation
between her and Pacete, and accounting and separation of property.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an
answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court granted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion in denying the defendants’ motion for
extension of time to file their answer, and in declaring defendants in default?

RULING:
Yes, there was a grave abuse of discretion in denying the defendants’ motion for extension of
time to file their answer, and in declaring defendants in default.
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant,
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since
the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
 SABALONES v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994
FACTS:
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and
their children. He filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and belonging to the
conjugal partnership.
The private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.
She alleged that the house in was being occupied by her and their six children and that they were
depending for their support on the rentals from another conjugal property. She also informed the
court that despite her husband he had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead
maintaining a separate residence with Thelma Cumareng and their three children.
After trial, it was found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage on with
Thelma Cumareng. The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture
of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to
support from his respondent wife.
This decision was appealed to the respondent court. Pendente lite, the respondent wife alleged
inter alia that he had harassed the tenant of the property by informing him that his lease would
not be renewed. The petitioner opposed this motion and filed his own motion to prevent his wife
from entering into a new contract of lease over the Forbes Park property with its present tenant,
or with future tenants, without his consent. After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated
April 7, 1992, granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the pending appointment of an administrator over the whole mass of conjugal
assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her
administration.

RULING:
Article 61 states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the
absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third
person to act as the administrator. While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator
has been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the
petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator
thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor
of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or
threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the
petitioner's legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal
separation), the private respondent has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate.
There is also, in our view, enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate
to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and
children.
 ESPIRITU AND LAYUG v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
FACTS:
Reynaldo and Teresita began to a common-law relationship of husband and wife. On August 16,
1986, their daughter, was born. When they went on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo
and Teresita got married, their second child was born on January 12, 1988, thereafter.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines and Pittsburgh. He had to leave his
children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a
criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. Teresita filed the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the
children.
The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental
authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over
them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the
Court. The Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court's decision. It gave custody to Teresita and
visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the trial court.

RULING:
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over
seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the
record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found
in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second
paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that
the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age
of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations
not to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their
mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.
 LAPUZ SY v EUFEMIO
G.R. No. L-30977. January 31, 1972
FACTS:
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging,
in the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30
September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when
her husband abandoned her; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese
woman. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation and would ordered that the
defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership
profits.
Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other
claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab
initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But
before the trial could be completed (the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal
evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on
31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death and issued the order
under review, dismissing the case.

ISSUE:
Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the
action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?

RULING:
It is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the
absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the
profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy
from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms
of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature
and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible.
Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies,
under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a
substitute of the deceased party.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their
source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that
before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes
during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical
and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
 LAPERAL v REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962
FACTS:
On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio alleging that on
March 24, 1939, she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that she naturally used, instead of her
maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation which became
final, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now, it is desirable that she be allowed
to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name.
The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same violates
the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by
the Rules of Court.
In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of
the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to
continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can use her maiden name again.

RULING:
There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the procedure
prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has been observed. But from the
petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the
change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in fact,
ceased to live with him for many years.
It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner
owns extensive business interests, the continued used of her husband surname may cause undue
confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding is
however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the petition was
based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Secondly, with the issuance
of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and her
husband had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil Cod).
Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
 SIOCHI v GOZON
G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
FACTS:
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against
her husband Alfredo. On 2 January 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which was then
annotated on TCT No. 5357.
On 31 august 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi
(Mario) entered into an agreement involving the property for the price of P18 million. On 29
June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision which granted legal separation case.
On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a deed of donation over the property in favor of their
daughter, Winifred Gozon without annotating the agreement and the notice of lis pendens on
TCT No. M-10508.
On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a special power of attorney executed in his favor by
Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million. IDRI paid
Alfredo P18 million, representing full payment for the property. Subsequently, the register of
deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT no. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for specific performance and damages,
annulment of donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.
The Malabon RTC rendered its decision which the Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by
the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn.

RULING:
Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited
in favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that [f]or purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No.
(2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal
partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.
 PELAYO v LAURON
G.R. No. L-4089 January 12, 1909
FACTS:
On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a complaint
against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the 13th of October of
said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas,
and that upon arrival he was requested by them to render medical assistance to their daughter-in-
law who was about to give birth to a child; that therefore, and after consultation with the
attending physician, Dr. Escaño, it was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to
remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation was performed by the plaintiff, who also
had to remove the afterbirth, in which services he was occupied until the following morning, and
that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the patient several times; that the just and equitable
value of the services rendered by him was P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without
alleging any good reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that the judgment be entered in
his favor as against the defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together with
any other relief that might be deemed proper.
As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties, judgment was entered by the court below on
the 5th of April, 1907, whereby the defendants were absolved from the former complaint, on
account of the lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action against the defendants,
with costs against the plaintiff, who excepted to the said judgment and in addition moved for a
new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not judgment was correct.

RULING:
It is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional
services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, is the
husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact that
it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is no bar
to the fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger, to
which the life of the patient was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was
urgently needed, and the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable
services of a physician at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been
seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is
entitled to recover his fees, must direct his action against the husband who is under obligation to
furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such an emergency.
Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the
obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing of
medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it does not
appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which
reason it is obvious that the former cannot be compelled to pay fees which they are under no
liability to pay because it does not appear that they consented to bind themselves
 Go v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 114791
May 29, 1997
Facts:
Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The video
coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1, 650.00. Three
times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of their wedding and thrice they
failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. The parties then agreed that the tape
would be ready upon private respondents' return.
When private respondents came home from their honeymoon, however, they found out
that the tape had been erased by petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered.
Respondents filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before
the Regional Trial Court which granted the damages. Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which, on September 14, 1993, dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the trial court's decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence presented.

Ruling:
Petitioners and private respondents entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, the former
undertook to cover the latter's wedding and deliver to them a video copy of said event. For
whatever reason, petitioners failed to provide private respondents with their tape. Clearly,
petitioners are guilty of contravening their obligation to said private respondents and are thus
liable for damages.
Considering the attendant wanton negligence committed by petitioners in the case at bar,
the award of exemplary damages by the trial court is justified to serve as a warning to all entities
engaged in the same business to observe due diligence in the conduct of their affairs.
Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code), the wife may
exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In
the instant case, we are convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the
contract with private respondent. Consequently, we rule that she is solely liable to private
respondents for the damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce
effect only as between the parties who execute them.
 Arroyo v Vasquez-Arroyo
G.R. No. 17014
August 11, 1921
Facts:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of
wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of
separation, they have lived together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when
the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate
from her husband. An action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial
home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the fact of
marriage, and that she had left her husband's home without his consent; but she averred by way
of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the
part of her husband, which was granted.
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion
that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her
furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent
breaking off of marital relations with him. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a
disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are chiefly
traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have attended their married life. The tales of
cruelty on the part of the husband towards the wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are
no more than highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed
themselves from time to time to become involved and would have little significance apart from
the morbid condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must therefore be recorded that the
abandonment by her of the marital home was without sufficient justification in fact.

Issue:
Whether or not Mariano B. Arroyo is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for
the return of the wife to the marital domicile.

Ruling:
The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty
universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the
Civil code. The enforcement of this obligation by the wife against the husband is not conditioned
upon the procurance of a divorce by her, nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce.
Accordingly it had been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode
and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision
for her separate maintenance and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorney's
fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation. From this consideration it follows that
provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that
the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the
fault of the husband.
 ILUSORIO v BILDNER-ILUSORIO
G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000
FACTS:
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for habeas
corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium. On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision dismissing the petition. Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio
filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her
husband Potenciano Ilusorio. This case was consolidated with another case filed by Potenciano
Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order
giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her. On May 12, 2000,
petition for habeas corpus was dismissed for lack of merit and granted the petition to nullify the
Court of Appeals' ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio. On November 29, 2000,
the Court noted the manifestation and compliance of the parties with the resolution of October
11, 2000. On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and motion
praying that Potenciano Ilusorio be produced before the Court and be medically examined by a
team of medical experts appointed by the Court. On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality
Erlinda's motion to reconsider the Court's order of January 31 , 2001.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner is relevant.

RULING:
Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano
Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that
Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental state.
The Court was not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose
whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court
of Appeals. As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are
matters that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.
 GOITIA v CAMPOS RUEDA
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
FACTS:
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately
thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for
about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent allegations
of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of
her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned
the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made
similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which
just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word
and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as
the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant
desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take
refuge in the home of her parents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife can claim support against her husband outside of the conjugal domicile.

RULING:
At least there are strong indications to this effect, for the court says, "should the doctrine
maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond
and separate from each other of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the
supreme court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not be
controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by the
other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and the wife seeks to force him to
furnish support.
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife.
This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of
marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which
is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his
own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for
separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in
the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty
made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to
preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base
demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation
resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which
marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy
overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of
preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever
impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
 IMBONG v OCHOA, JR.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
FACTS:
The Reproductive Health Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH
Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are
hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is
contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon
their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive
health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the
right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their
family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a
miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-
intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy
and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack
standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory
relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took
effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the
Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to
determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which
these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August
6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was
ordered extended until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60)
days and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of
the parties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RH Law violates the provision on the family?

RULING:
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving
absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse
from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly
result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing
the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution.
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to
the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a
family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The
decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both
spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed
private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the
State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family. At any rate, in case of
conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
 VALINO v ADRIANO
G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014
FACTS:
Atty. Adriano Adriano, married respondent Rosario Adriano on November 15, 1955. The
marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually
separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided
to live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide
financial support to Rosario and their children.
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States
spending Christmas with her children. Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and
burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she
requested Valino to delay the interment for a few days but her request was not heeded. Claiming
that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more
than 20 years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the time they were together,
he had introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife. Although they were living
together, Valino admitted that he never forgot his obligation to support the respondents. She
contended that, unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical
expenses when he got seriously ill. She also claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was
in a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the United States. According to Valino, it was Atty.
Adriano’s last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila
Memorial Park.

ISSUES:
Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.

RULING:
It is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to
the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner. It is clear that the law
gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal
wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the
United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect,
waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the
funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements,
like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon
clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that
end.9 While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when
he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens
the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator.
 PANA v HEIRS OF JUANITE, SR.
G.R. No. 164201 December 10, 2012
FACTS:
Efren Pana, his wife Melecia, and another person, were charged with murder before the RTC of
Surigao City. On July 9, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision acquitting Efren of the charge but
finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of death.
The RTC also ordered those found guilty to pay civil indemnity and damages to the heirs of the
victim. The conviction was affirmed of both accused but modified the penalty. Upon motion for
execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the
levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Efren and his wife Melecia
filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal
assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia. The RTC denied the motion. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition. Efren filed the instant petition arguing that his marriage with
Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, given that they were married
prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial
agreement. On the other hand, the heirs argued that the regime of absolute community of
property governs the marriage of Efren and Melecia since the transitory provision of the Family
Code gave its provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired, and that
the property relation between the couple was changed when the Family Code took effect in
1988.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed
upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case?

HELD:
While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or
unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them
can be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the
Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into absolute community
of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only
those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified
except prior to marriage. Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the
marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except
before the celebration of that marriage. What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains
established by Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of
their separate property and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund. This means
that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their separate
properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who got
married under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family
Code took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.
The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on Melecia may be enforced
against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family
Code have been covered. Article 121 allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his
wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that
such indemnities.
 ARCABA vs TABANCURA VDA DE BATOCAEL
G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No.
437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in
January 1956.
Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property
in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his
retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the
petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the
other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that
Cirila was his mistress.
Cirila defended herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s bedroom when
Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual
intercourse with Francisco.
Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the
public streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house
to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This
was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya
notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
In October 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of
P57, 105 and assessed value of P28, 550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was
valid?

HELD:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation
is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents
bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit
and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already
old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least; cohabitation is a public assumption
of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such. Hence, the deed of donation by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
 MATABUENA v. CERVANTES
G.R. No. L-28771 March 31, 1971
FACTS:
Felix cohabitated with, donated to a parcel of land and married the respondent.
After the Felix’s death, his sister, the petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation, citing
Article 133 of the Civil Code that “Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall
be void.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners?

RULING:
Yes, the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners. It is a fundamental principle in
statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what
is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to
prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on
the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law
relationships. The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased
to the respondent does not necessarily mean that the petitioner will have exclusive rights to the
disputed property because the relationship between Felix and the respondent was legitimated by
marriage.
 VILLANUEVA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 143286 April 14, 2004
FACTS:

Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya, having been
married to the latter on October 7, 1926. They begot 5 children. Spouses Retuya resided at
Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements
situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu.
Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which
he inherited from his parents. In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his
legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein defendant, Procopio
Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income
of the properties. Defendant, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no
occupation, she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income. In 1985,
Nicolas suffered a stroke. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical condition of her father because
they visited him at the hospital. She told defendant, Procopio that their father was already
incapacitated and they had to talk things over and the latter replied that it was not yet the time to
talk about the matter. Plaintiff, then, complained to the Barangay Captain for
reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached.

ISSUE:
Whether the court of appeals erred in sustaining the declaration of the trial court that the
properties listed in paragraph 2 of the complaint are conjugal properties of Nicolas Retuya and
Eusebia Retuya although this was not one of the causes of action in Eusebias complaint.

RULING:
Petitioners contention that Eusebias complaint failed to state that the subject properties are
conjugal is absolutely without basis. A cursory reading of the complaint readily shows that the
complaint maintains that the subject properties are conjugal. The same claim is restated and
repleaded throughout the complaint. Petitioners should know better than to clutter their appeal
with useless arguments such as this. The other issues petitioners raise contest in essence the
finding that the subject properties are conjugal in nature. Apart from this, the only other issue
raised is whether prescription or laches bars Eusebias complaint. We shall resolve first the issue
of prescription and laches.
 TAN v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120594 June 10, 1997
FACTS:
The petitioner Ramon Tan, a businessman from Puerto Princesa, secured a cashier’s check from
Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank (PCIB) to P30, 000.00 payable to his order to avoid
carrying cash while en route to Manila. He deposited the check in his account in Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in its Binondo Branch. Relying on common
knowledge that the check was as good as cash, he issued two (2) personal checks in the name of
Go Lak and MS Development Trading Corporation a month after the deposit, both of which
bounced due to “insufficiency of funds.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not a cashier’s check is as good as cash, so as to have funded the two (2) checks.

RULING:
Reliance on the layman’s perception that a cashier’s check is as good as cash is not entirely
misplaced, as it is rooted in practice, tradition and principle. A cashier’s check is a primary
obligation of the issuing bank and accepted in advance by its mere issuance. By its very nature, it
is a bank’s order to pay what is drawn upon itself, committing in effect its total resources,
integrity and honor beyond the check. Herein, PCIB by issuing the check created an
unconditional credit in favor any collecting bank.
 CHING v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124642 February 23, 2004
FACTS:
On September 26, 1978, PBMCI obtained a loan from the ABC. The PBMCI, executed a
promissory note for the said amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978 at an interest rate
of 14% per annum and executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to
jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC. On
December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the amount of payable in
eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As in the previous loan, the PBMCI, through
Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note to evidence the loan maturing on June 29, 1981. The
PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, on August 21, 1981, the ABC filed a
complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI.
On August 26, 1981, the trial court issued an Order denying the ABC’s application for a writ of
preliminary attachment. Meanwhile, on April 1, 1982, the PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly
filed a petition for suspension of payments with the SEC, at the same time seeking the PBMCI’s
rehabilitation. On December 17, 1986, the ABC filed a Motion to Reduce the amount of his
preliminary attachment bond. On March 2, 1988, the trial court issued an Order granting the
motion of the ABC. On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside
the levy on attachment. On December 10, 1993, the Spouses Ching filed their Reply/Opposition
to the motion to expunge records. The trial court issued on December 15, 1993 an Order lifting
the writ of preliminary attachment on the shares of stocks and ordering the sheriff to return the
said stocks to the petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy on attachment on
the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines.

RULING:
The petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of
stocks in the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in
nature; hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and
suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for
said relief.
 MATTHEWS v. TAYLOR
G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 2009
FACTS:
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn
C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting,
Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot. The sale was allegedly financed
by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements
thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the
Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were
obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister. Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen.
On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin,
authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with
third parties with respect to their Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and
petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving
the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The
agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter
took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that
the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamins)
consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the
acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was
Joselyn’s husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
The RTC considered the Boracay property as community party of Benjamin and Joselyn, which
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used
in purchasing the same?

RULING:
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989. Said acquisition was
evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee. The property was also declared for
taxation purposes under her name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin
sought the nullification of the contract on two grounds: first, that he was the actual owner of the
property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the same; and second, that Joselyn could
not enter into a valid contract involving the subject property without his consent.
The Court finds and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease
between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring
private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This
is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By
entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor;
no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the
subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he
had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property
by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband
in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this
would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then
have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not
permit him to have.
 IN RE: MULLER v. MULLER
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by
respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992.
Respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal and the construction of a house.
The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner. Due to incompatibilities and
respondent’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court terminated the regime of absolute community of property
between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them
and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those
acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court
held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that
respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section
7, Article XII of the Constitution.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the
trial court’s Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase
of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered
petitioner’s ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the
Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from
acquiring the same. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition for
the property of the Antipolo property?

RULING:
Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly
and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. the finding that his
wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the
proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used
conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part
thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money
used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal
funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise.
 NAVARRO v. ESCOBIDO
G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009
FACTS:
On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 98-599 (first complaint) and 98-598 (second complaint), before the RTC for replevin and/or
sum of money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the
RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles in Navarro’s possession. On
October 12, 1998 and October 14, 1998, the RTC issued writs of replevin for both cases; as a
result, the Sheriff seized the two vehicles and delivered them to the possession of Karen Go.mIn
his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no
cause of action. In its May 8, 2000 order, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the
complaints did not state a cause of action. On October 16, 2001, the CA denied Navarros petition
and affirmed the RTCs order. The CA also denied Navarros motion for reconsideration in its
resolution of May 29, 2002, leading to the filing of the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

RULING:
Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this
Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. In other words, the property relations of
the husband and wife shall be governed primarily by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains
of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the spouses marriage settlement and by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In the absence of any evidence of a marriage settlement
between the spouses Go, we look at the Civil Code provision on partnership for guidance. Glenn
and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under
this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties. Applying
Article 484 of the Civil Code, which states that in default of contracts, or special provisions, co-
ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title, we find further support in Article 487
of the Civil Code that allows any of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment with respect to
the co-owned property. In this case, one spouse filed an action for the recovery of credit, a
personal property considered conjugal property, without including the other spouse in the action.
 IMANI v. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.
G.R. No. 187023 November 17, 2010
FACTS:
Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favour of Metrobank with 6 other co-
sureties binding themselves to pay whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI)
incurs, but not exceeding P6, 000, 000.00. CPDTI incurred an indebtedness around P164,000 to
which it defaulted in paying Metrobank. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit
against CPDTI and its sureties. Metrobank won, and the sheriff levied a property owned by
Imani and filed to consolidate the title to its name.
Imani opposed, stating that it is part of her conjugal property. The RTC ruled in favour of Imani,
reasoning that the loan proceeds never redounded to the benefit of the family of Imani. RTC
annulled the sale and levy. Metrobank appealed, and the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Thus, petitioner appeals to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC.

HELD:
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply,
the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.
Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua nonto the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired
is material.
As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-
Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that
registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. Indubitably, petitioner
utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership.
Thus, it cannot be rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis
 DELA PENA v. AVILA
G.R. No. 187490 February 8, 2012
FACTS:
Antonia obtained from Aguila a loan with interest pegged at 5% per month. Antonia executed a
promissory note and a notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, situated in Marikina City and
previously registered in the name of petitioner Antonia, “married to Antegono A. Dela Peña”
(Antegono). Antonia executed another notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in
favor of Gemma, for the stated consideration of P600, 000.00. As such Gemma caused the
transfer of the aforesaid property to her name. Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage
over same property in favor of FEBTC-BPI, to secure a loan facility with a credit limit of P1,
200, 000.00. Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit
of Adverse Claim, that she was the true and lawful owner of the property and, that the Deed of
Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her title was simulated. The Register of Deeds
inscribed the adverse claim. FEBTC-BPI caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage constituted over the property due to Gemma’s failure to pay the loan. Antonia and her
son, petitioner Alvin, filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed of sale as the
subject realty was conjugal property, and that the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono who
was already dead by that time.
The Regional Trial Court held that the subject property was conjugal in nature and that the Deed
of Absolute Sale Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the
liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code. CA reversed the RTC decision,
stating that the property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peñas to prove that the
same was acquired during Antonia’s marriage to Antegono. Furthermore, that the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Avila and the subsequent sale on auction of the subject property to
FEBTC-BPI are upheld as valid and binding. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the house and lot conjugal property of
the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Peña.
HELD:
Pursuant to Article 160 of the NCC, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case of Francisco vs. Court
of Appeals, the Court said that the party who invokes the presumption under Art. 160 of the
NCC, must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof
of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must
first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property
acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is
rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality, the Dela Peñas did not even come close
to proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and
Antegono. Beyond Antonia’s bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was purchased
when she was already married, the record is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of
acquisition of the realty can be ascertained.
 TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. MANUEL DAVID SR.
G.R. No. 16954 March 15, 2010

FACTS:

Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were married on March 25, 1957.
In 1970, the spouses acquired a lot located at White Plains, Quezon City. In 1976, the spouses
separated, and no longer communicated with each other. March 1995, Manuel discovered that
Martha had previously sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) with which
the previous title registered in the Register of Deeds was replaced. March 13, 1996, Manuel filed
a Complaintfor Annulment of Contract against Titan CC. Manuel alleged that the sale executed
by Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge therefore void. He prayed that the Deed
of Sale be invalidated, that the property be returned to the spouses with a new title be issued in
their names.

Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for value because it relied on a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of
the spouses. Manuel claimed that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature purporting to be
his was a forgery; hence, Martha was wholly without authority to sell the property.
Subsequently, Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaintwhich was granted
by the trial court. Thus, on October 15, 1996, Manuel filed an Amended Complaint. Martha
failed to file an answer so she was declared in default.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of sale is null and void.

RULING:

Yes, since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan
required the consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that ―the
husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership‖. Likewise, Article 172 of the Civil Code
ordains that ―the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband‘s consent,
except in cases provided by law‖. Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other
spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void.
 TAN v. ANDRADE
GR No. 171904 and 172017 August 7, 2013

FACTS:

Property Relations Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered owner of four parcels of which
she mortgaged to one Simon Diu, who foreclosed on the same. When the redemption period was
about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan who agreed to redeem the subject
properties. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale. Proceso executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding to Bobby his interests
over the properties. The Deed of Assignment was signed by Henry, one of Rosario’s sons,
asinstrumental witness. Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject properties to Proceso,
giving the latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the properties for the sum
of P310,000. When Proceso failed to purchase them, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the
properties, and the TCTs were issued in his name.

On October 7, 1997, Rosario’s children, including Proceso and Henry, filed acomplaint for
reconveyance and annulment of deeds and damages against Bobby before the RTC. They alleged
that the initial transaction between Rosario and Bobby was actually an equitable mortgage which
was entered into to secure Rosario’s indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed that since the
subject properties were inherited by them from their father, the subject properties were conjugal
in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares. The RTC dimissed
the complaint. On appeal, the CA upheld the trial court’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether the properties belong to the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her late husband and
co-owned by her and her children

HELD:

NO, Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code38 which
states that "[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this
presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the
property was indeed acquired during the marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane: x x x As a
condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in favor of the conjugal partnership, the
party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage
 MICHEAL A. ONSTTOT v.UPPER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.
GR No. 22104 September 14, 2016

FACTS:

Albert, an American citizen, was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an approximate
area of 18,589 square meters, covered by OCT No. (-2645-) M-5565 situated in the Province of
Rizal (subject property). Due to non-payment of realty taxes, the Provincial Government of Rizal
sold the subject property at public auction to one Amelita A. De Sena (De Sena), the highest
bidder, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale6 dated June 29, 2004. Respondent UTNAI, an
association representing the actual occupants of the subject property, subsequently redeemed the
same from De Sena.

Thereafter, or on March 31, 2008, UTNAI filed a complaint for cancellation of OCT No. (-2645-
) M-556 and for the issuance of a new title in its name before the RTC against Albert and
Federico M. Cas (Cas),

The RTC found that UTNAI •was able to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that it is the
owner of the subject property after having legally redeemed the same from De Sena

CA found UTNAI's appeal meritorious. Although it found that the March 30, 2009 Decision of
the RTC did not attain finality

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in directing the issuance of a title in favor of UTNAI
notwithstanding the failure to implead his mother, Josephine, as an indispensable party

RULING:

That the RTC Decision was null and void for failure to implead an indispensable party,
Josephine, on the premise that the subject property is conjugal in nature, is likewise specious.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife. However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the
property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove the said time
element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the
marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only
with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership
of one of the spouses.\
 AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 1185305 February 12, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC) granted a loan to Philippine
Blooming Mills (PBM) amounting P50,300,000.00 loan. Respondent Alfredo Ching, Exec. Vice
President PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him
jointly and severally liable with PBM‘s indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan with
that, AIDC filed a complaint against PBM and Ching.

In the RTC‘s decision it ordered PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal
amount plus the interests. RTC issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. Then, deputy sheriff
Magsajo caused issuance and service upon respondents- Ching spouses of a notice of sheriff sale
on three of their conjugal properties. Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction against petitioner
alleging that petitioner cannot enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the
ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon
application of private respondents, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to
prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale
of the said properties at public auction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo
Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

RULING:

The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM as a corporation has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse
to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate ownership.

The contract of loan between AIDC and PMB guaranteed by Ching was clearly for the benefit of
PMB and not for the Ching with his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted
with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
profession. With that, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety
agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
 DEWARA V. LAMELA
GR No. 17901 April 11, 2011

FACTS:

Spouses Dewara were married before the enactment of the Family Code. Elenita worked in
California while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod. While driving a private jeepney registered in the
name of Elenita, Eduardo hit Ronnie. Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against Eduardo. The lower court found Eduardo guilty of the
charge and sentenced him to suffer thepenalty of imprisonment, and to pay civil indemnity. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the lower court and it became final and executory. The
writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied
because he had no property in his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, respondent Alvero, to
levy on a lot in the name of Elenita, Eduardo’s wife, to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability
of Eduardo. The City Sheriff served a notice of embargo on the title of the lot and subsequently
sold the lot in a public auction. In the execution sale, there were no interested buyers other than
Ronnie. The City Sheriff issued a certificate of sale to spouses Ronnie and Gina Lamela to
satisfy the civil liability in the decision against Eduardo. Ronnie then caused the consolidation of
title in a Cadastral Proceeding before the RTC, which ordered the cancellation of the TCT in the
name of Elenita and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of respondent spouses.
The above incidents happened while Elenita was working in California. Elenita, represented by
her attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of sale and for damages
against Spouses Lamela and ex-officio sheriff Alvero. Elenita claimed that the levy on execution
of the subject lot was illegal because the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive property
and could not be made to answer for the personal liability of her husband. Furthermore, as the
registered owner of the property, she received no notice of the execution sale.

On the other hand, the Spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal property of Elenita
and Eduardo. They asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during her marriage to
Eduardo; that the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at the time of the
acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in the accident
was registered in the name of petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any objection pending
the levy on execution of the property. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Elenita. The RTC
declared that said property was paraphernal in nature. It arrived at this conclusion by tracing how
Elenita acquired the subject property. Based on the documentary evidence submitted, Elenita’s
grandfather, Exequiel, originally owned the lot. Upon his death, his children Jesus, Elenita’s
father, Salud and Concepcion, inherited the property, and subsequently a new title on their favor
was issued. As to how Elenita acquired the lot, the RTC gave credence to the testimony of
Elenita on the circumstances surrounding the sale of the property. First, it was sold to her by her
father and her aunt so that the family would remain on the lot. Second, the minimal and
inadequate consideration for the 1,440 sq m property was for the purpose of helping her expand
her capital in her business at the time. Thus, the sale was essentially a donation and was therefore
gratuitous in character. Having declared that the property was the paraphernal property of
Elenita, the RTC ruled that the civil liability of Eduardo, which was personal to him, could not
be charged to the exclusive property of his wife.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA elucidated that the gross
inadequacy of the price alone does not affect a contract of sale, except that it may indicate a
defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract.
The CA ruled that Elenita and Eduardo acquired the property by onerous title during their
marriage through their common fund. Thus, it belonged to the conjugal partnership of gains and
might be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities adjudged against Eduardo.

ISSUE:

Whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal
property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo

HELD:

The Court ruled that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. The
separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not affect the
conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal
ownership applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.
The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise.
 THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. v. ESTER L. SERVACIO
G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011

FACTS:

Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio Jr.). Twenty three years
later Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under
oath that it was his father, Protacio Go Sr. (Protacio Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two
parcels of land (the property). Marta Barola Go died wife of Protacio, Sr. Protacio, Sr. and his
son Rito B. Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio).

The petitioners, Heirs of Go Sr., demanded the return of the property, but Servacio did not follow
their demand in which the petitioners decided to sue Servacio. According to the petitioners, they
contend that with the Protacio Jr.‘s renunciation, the property became conjugal property of the
spouses Go Sr. and his wife. They also contend that the sale of the property to Servacio without
the prior liquidation of the community property between spouses Go Sr. and his Marta was null
and void.

RTC affirmed the validity of the sale declaring that the property was the conjugal property of
Protacio Sr. and Marta, not then exclusive property of Protacio Sr., because the sale includes the
children of Marta, that the participation had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta-
that under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The law states that when the property all property
acquired by either spouse during the marriage is conjugal unless there is a proof that the property
thus acquired pertained exclusively.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale by Protacio Sr with some of his children to Servacio was void because it
was made without prior liquidation.

RULING:

No. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the Family Code. Their
property relation was properly considered as a conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code.
With Marta‘s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved pursuant to Article175 (1) of the
Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other
heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a
liquidation following its liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his
children in respect of Marta‘s share in the conjugal partnership, could not claim title to any
specific portion of Marta‘s share without an actual partition of the property being first done
either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract
quota in Marta‘s share and as a co-owner he could sell his undivided share, he had the right to
freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.
 JOE A. ROS v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG BRANCH
G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011

FACTS:

Joe Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as
security for the loan, petitioner, Ros, executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land
with all the. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered
in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978.
Estrella Agueta, wife of Joe Ros claims that she has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her
husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property. On January 13,
1983, spouses Ros and Agueta filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and
consolidation of the property – interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the
documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family. PNB seeks
for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was petitioners‘
own acts of omission that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of
estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.

The Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring deed of real estate mortgage Null and
Void and ordered the Register of Deeds to rename the title of the lot to the petitioners. Upon
PNB‘s appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the decision of the Trial Court and dismissed the
complaint of the petitioners. The Petitioner‘s then petitioned for review to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the debt/loan was chargeable to the conjugal property.

RULING:

Yes. At the time of the mortgage the Civil Code was the applicable law. Article 161 of the Civil
Code enumerated the instances of which the spouses-conjugal partnership shall be liable and
paragraph (1) one of the said provision states ―all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the
same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership‖. The loan was used for
additional working capital for their family business hence, it is considered that such loan was
acquired for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and not merely for the benefit of Ros.
 MARIO SIOCHI v. ALFREDO GOZON
March 18, 2010 G.R. No. 169900

FACTS:

A parcel of land was registered TCT No. 5357 in the name of

AlfredoGozon.On23December1991,Elvira Gozon, Alfredo‘s wife, fileda petition for legal
separation against her husband Alfredo. After a month, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which
was then annotated on the title of the land. While the legal separation case of the spouses was
still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell which was
also annotated on the title of the land. After granting the decree of legal separation, Alfredo
executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon. The
Register of Deeds of Malabon, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-10508 in the
name of Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendis on TCT No.M-
10508.

October 26, 1994 when Alfredo sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc (IDRI).
Through a Special Power of Attorney executed in favor of Winifred. Subsequently, the Register
of Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI. Mario
then filed a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale
with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not Mario can invoke his right over the property due to the Agreement to
Buy and Sell he entered with Alfredo.

b) Whether or not IDRI can invoke right over the property due to the Sale entered with
Alfredo.

RULING:

No. Alfredo was the sole administrator of the conjugal property because Elvira, with whom
Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
property. Still, Alfredo can‘t sell said property without the written consent of Elvira or given
authority of the court. Without consent or authority, the agreement is void.

No. IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. IDRI had actual knowledge of facts regarding the property
hence it should seek further inquiries about the vendor‘s title to the property. Besides, had IDRI
been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that Alfredo‘s donation
of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125 of the Family
Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other
spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good faith.
 SPOUSES AGGABAO v. PARULAN, JR.
G.R. No. 165803 September 1, 2010

FACTS:

Real estate broker Marta Atanacio offered 2 lots to the spouses Aggabao on January 1991. On
February 2, 1991, the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of the property and
showed them the following documents: (a.) Owner‘s original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots; (b.)
tax declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney dated January 7, 1991 executed by
Dionisio Parulan authorizing Elena to sell the property. On March 18, 1991, the petitioners
delivered the final amount of their balance to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their
favor. However, Elena did not turn over the owner‘s duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that
said copy was in the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that
the owner‘s duplicate copy of TCT would be turned over after a week.

On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners.
Elena did not turn over the duplicate owner‘s copy of TCT as promised. Thus, on April 15, 1991,
Dionisio commenced an action vs Elena Parulan and the Aggabao spouses praying for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation
of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners, Aggabao spouses
and Elena Parulan, filed on July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance with
damages against the respondent. On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136,
in Makati City annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the petitioners.

ISSUE:

Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply
to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio

RULING:

The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family
Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that
any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family
Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.

Article 124 of the Family Code provides: The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband‘s
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the
event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. Next, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the
provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired.
Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to
August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code.
Also, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the
administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration
of the property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan
the authority for the administration.
 MANUEL FUENTES v. CONRADO ROCA
G.R. No. 178902 April 21, 2010

FACTS:

Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar, Zamboanga City and she sold it to her son, Tarciano T.
Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell
the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses) and eventually they
entered into an agreement. After 6 months, a new title was issued in the name of the spouses who
immediately constructed a building on the lot. Thereafter Tarciano passed away, followed by his
wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.

Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents
(collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and re-conveyance of the land
against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was
void since Tarciano‘s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit
of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconvened to them upon
reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.The spouses denied the
Rocas‘ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally saw Rosario
sign the affidavit at her residence. All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of
forgery was personal to Rosario andshealonecouldinvokeit.Besides,thefour-
yearprescriptiveperiodfornullifyingthe sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the signature of Rosario representing her consent was forged.

b) Whether or not the Rocas‘ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses
already prescribed
c) WhetherornotonlyRosario,the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul
that sale

RULING:

Yes it was forged as the Supreme Court ruled. A defective notarization will merely strip the
document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument that falsified jurat, taken
together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario‘s
consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit
as proof of Rosario‘s consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.

No. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to
the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988. The Family Code applied for this case. The Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of
the Civil Code on Property Relations between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code
provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to
vested rights. Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife
who gave no consent may assail her husband‘s sale of the real property. It simply provides that
without the other spouse‘s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be
void. Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale
and re- conveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother‘s (his wife‘s)
written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.

Yes. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained
the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the
ownership of the property to their heirs.
 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. v. NICHOLSON PASCUAL
G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008

FACTS:

Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga got married on 1985. During the union,
Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot in with an
apartment standing thereon. On year 1994, Florencia filed suit for the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on part of Nelson under Article 36 of the
Family Code. RTC declared the marriage null and void. Also, it ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of the ex- spouses' conjugal partnership of gains. The spouses weren‘t able to
liquidate their conjugal partnership even after the declaration of their legal separation.

Sometime in 1997, Florencia with Sps. Norberto and Elvira Oliveros obtained a loan from
petitioner, Metrobank secured the obligation several Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on their
properties including one involving the lot bought from Sering and showed a waiver made in
favor of Florencia, covering the conjugal properties with her ex-husband, but did not incidentally
include the lot in question (bought from Sering).

When Florencia and Sps. Oliveros failed to pay their loan due, Metrobank initiated foreclosure
proceedings and caused the publication of auction sale on 3 issues of the REM‘s. Nicholson filed
a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property alleging that the
property, which is conjugal, was mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank in its answer:
Alleged that the lot registered in the name of Florencia was paraphernalia. Metrobank also
asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith. Florencia was declared in default for
failure to file an answer within reglementary period. RTc declared the REM Invalid and
Metrobank is mortgagee in bad faith on account of negligence. The CA affirmed the RTC‘s
decision. Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondents dissolved the
regime of community of property of the spouses.

b) Whether the lot in question was conjugal and rendered the REM over the lot invalid.

RULING:

No. The mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not automatically result in a
regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal
assets.While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital
bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such
declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition
of the partnership.
No. Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former
spouses, where: Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her 1⁄2 undivided interests in the disputed party
even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are
limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void,
Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
 DOMINGO v. MOLINA
GR No. 200274 April 20, 2016

FACTS:

In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling,
Tarlac, The sale was annotated on the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354 covering the
subject property. Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena
Molina. In 1986, Anastacio died. In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio’s interest was registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 272967 and transferred the entire one-half
undivided portion of the land to the spouses Molina.

Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint
for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership. Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the
subject property to the spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the money that Anastacio
borrowed. Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without
Flora’s consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale. Meanwhile, the spouses
Molina died during the pendency of the case and were substituted by their adopted son, Cornelio
Molina.

The RTC dismissed the case because Melecio failed to establish his claim that Anastacio did not
sell the property to the spouses Molina. the CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora’s consent is
valid and legal

HELD:

In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna, we held that the properties of a
dissolved conjugal partnership fall under the regime of co-ownership among the surviving
spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse until final liquidation and partition. The surviving
spouse, however, has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does
not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and partition of the
conjugal partnership.

An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora’s surviving heirs, including Anastacio,
with respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation and partition;
Anastacio, on the other hand, owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his
share, but this is an undivided interest.

Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal
properties without an actual partition being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree.
Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the
subject property.
 BRIGIDO QUIOA v. RITA QUIAO
G.R. No. 176556 July 4, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent Rita Quiao, the offended spouse, filed a legal separation against the petitioner
Brigido Quiao on October 26, 2000 before the RTC. The decision of the court dated October 10,
2005 declared the legal separation, custody of children to Rita, equal partition on the personal
and real properties, and forfeiture on the part of Brigido the net profits earned from the conjugal
properties in favor of the common children. Neither party filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
appealed within the required period for legal separation. December 12, 2005, Rita filed a Motion
for Execution and was later on granted.

Brigido file a Motion for Clarification on the ―net profit earned‖. The Court defined it asthe
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the]
spouse and the debts basing on Articles 63 and 43 of the Family Code. Brigido filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on September 8, 2006. Though the petition was after the required prescriptive
period, the court granted the petition since its purpose was to clarify the meaning of the ―net
profit earned‖. With that on November 8, 2006 the court ordered that the ―net profit earned‖ be
based on the Article 102 of the family Code.
November 21, 2006, the respondent, Rita, filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) praying for
the reversal of the Nov. 8, 2006 court order. The Court then granted the MR. Brigido then filed a
Petition for Review questioning the following: dissolution and liquidation of the common
properties, meaning of the ―net profit earned‖, and the law governing the property relation
between him and Rita.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can question decision by the RTC dated October 10, 2005.

RULING:

No. Brigido wasn‘t able to timely appeal the decision of the court dated October 10, 2005, thus,
the decision on that date is deemed final and executory hence, he had slept on his right to
question.The respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the
exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No.
386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gain. And under this property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a common fund the
fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry." The husband and
wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains. the time of the
dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative law is already the
Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the
Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable
because according to Article 256 of the Family Code "this Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other law."
 YAO v. PERELLO
G.R. No. 153828 October 24, 2003

FACTS:

The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued a writ of execution for the
satisfaction of its judgment in favor of petitioner and against PR Builders, Inc. and its managers,
which included Pablito Villarin, private respondent’s husband. Pursuant to the writ, the deputy
sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in the names of spouses Villarin and the property was
scheduled for public auction. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition alleging that the
subject property could not be levied on to answer for the separate liability of her husband. The
trial court granted the petition and exempted the subject property from execution. Hence, the
scheduled auction sale did not materialize. Consequently, petitioner filed a motion for
intervention, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not lower Court grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
intervention on the ground that the same was filed late.

HELD:

Petitioner’s claim that he had the right to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the said provision
requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for prohibition. On the other
hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the
intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must
concur as the first is not more important than the second.

Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the right to
intervene, he must exercise said right in accordance with the rules and within the period
prescribed therefor.

As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court, in this case Petitioner filed his motion way beyond the
period set forth in the rules.
 OCAMPO v. OCAMPO
GR No. 198908 August 3, 2015

FACTS:

On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the ground of psychological incapacity. The decision
became final, since no party appealed the judgment annulling the marriage. On March 31, 1999,
the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties,
and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be held on the factual issues with regard to said
properties. Having failed to agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing
ensued where the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective stand. On January 13,
2004, the trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the properties declared by the parties
belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by
reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.

RULING:

No. The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family Code
provides: xxx In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

xxx This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate,
the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void, as in the instant case. The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the
provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry
has not been shown to have existed on the part of either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be void
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. From the
foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry should, therefore,
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Thus, the trial court and
the appellate court correctly held that the parties will share on equal shares considering that
Virginia failed to prove that the properties were acquired solely on her own efforts.

We note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired the subject properties
during the subsistence of their marriage.
The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the
presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during
the marriage, regardless in whose name the properties are registered, are presumed conjugal
unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of
title of the property or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses only. Article 116
expressly provides that the presumption remains even if the property is "registered in the name of
one or both of the spouses."

Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties were obtained by the
spouses' joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.
Accordingly, the partition of the former spouses' properties on the basis of co-ownership, as
ordered by the RTC and the appellate court, should be affirmed, and not on the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains
 BARRIDO v. NONATO
GR No. 176492 October 20, 2014

FACTS:

Leonardo and Marrieta’s marriage was dissolved by reson of psychological incapacity in 1996,
hence Leanardo filed a complaint for partition over their co-ownership. In her defense, Marrieta
claimed that the property had been sold to their children Joseph Raymod and Joseph Leo. She
also moved for the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdictionof the part of the MTCC
Bacolod City, the action for partition being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Per
decision of the MTXX, it ruled in favour of Marrietta and adjudicated the land to her, being the
spouse with shom the majority of the common children choose to remain. It also awarded moral
damages in favour of Marrieta.

Leonardo appelad the ruling to the RTC, which reversed the MTCC ruling and ordered the
partition of the property, hence Marrietta appealed the RTC decision to the CA by petition for
review. The appellate court denied MArrietta’s appeal, ruling that since the assessed value of the
property is only PHP8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTXX jurisdiction. Though the RTC
applied ART. 129 instead of ART 147 thereof, it still correctly ordered the partition of the
property.

Marrieta elevated her case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in holding that article 129 of the family code
has no application in the present case, on the assumption

HELD:

The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s marriage had been declared void for psychological
incapacity under Article 3610 of the Family Code. During their marriage, however, the conjugal
partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 12911 provides for the
procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically
covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations. Article 147 reads:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed tohave been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall beowned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.

Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, however,
claims that the ownership over the property in question is already vested on their children, by
virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered in the
names of the former spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary
public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private and
cannot be converted into a public document,21 making it inadmissible in evidence unless
properly authenticated.22 Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and
authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the
subject property remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be
divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.
 ALAIN DIÑ O v. MA CARIDAD DIÑ O
G.R. No. 17804 January 19, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner Alain M. Diño and respondent Caridad L. Diño have beenchildhood friends and s
weethearts. They lived together for ten years thenseparated. After two years, they reunited and
later on decided to get married. However, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
marriage based on the psychological incapacity (Article 36 of the Family Code) of Caridad.

He alleged that Caridad failed to give him love and support throughout their marriage and was
irresponsible, unfaithful, and prodigal. He also alleged that Caridad tends to be violent toward
him. Extrajudicial service of summons was sent to Caridad who was living in the United Stated
at that time. She did file any answer within the reglementary period. It was also learned that she
already filed a divorce in the United States, which was granted by the Superior Court of
California, and is now married to another man. The prosecutor of Las Piñas declared that there
was no collusion between the two parties.
A psychological report was submitted stating that Caridad was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder which rooted from her early formative years and which was founded to be
long-lasting and incurable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties‘ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.

RULING:

Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present: 1. The man and
the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between Alian and Caridad. The Court agrees with Alain
that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued
only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties‘ properties under Article 147 of
theFamily Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to
cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section19(1) of the Rule
provides: Sec. 19.
 MARGARET MAXEY v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-45870 May 11, 1984

FACTS:

Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. They were united in 1903
in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". During the period of their (Melbourne and
Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey acquired the
parcels of land before their 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919
sometime after the church wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia
Pamatluan, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and
Mrs. Beato C. Macayra.

Plaintiffs, children of Maxey and Morales, instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before
the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of sale
covering the subject parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the
herein defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common
properties of their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint
effort and capital.

The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provide ―When a man and a woman
live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.‖ Thus, the property in
question is owned both by Maxey and Morales in which the sale of the property by Maxey alone
was invalid.

The Court of Appeals adjudged that the property was exclusive property of Melbourne Maxey
thus the sale was valid making the buyer, Spouses Macayra, the absolute owner of the land.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the military fashion marriage of Maxey and Morales was recognized as valid.

b) Whether or not the property in question is co-owned by Maxey and Morales applying Article
144 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

No. Maxey and Morales were legally married at a church wedding solemnized on February 16,
1919. Since Act No. 3613 was approved on December 4, 1929 and took effect six months
thereafter, it could not have applied to a relationship commenced in 1903 and legitimized in 1919
through a marriage performed according to law. The marriage law in 1903 was General Order
No. 70. There is no provision in General Order No. 68 as amended nor in Act No. 3613 which
would recognize as an exception to the general rule on valid marriages, a so called "Military
fashion" ceremony or arrangement.
Yes. As far as there was no vested right that would be impaired or prejudiced by applying Article
144 then it shall be applied retroactively. The properties were sold in 1953 when the new Civil
Code was already in full force and effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of the private
respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties are concerned as this was
still open to controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a share under
the applicable law. The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and
the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the
petitioners should return one-half of the purchase price of the land while the private respondents
should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable
considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return on the other.
 SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑ O v. SUSAN YEE CARIÑ O
GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001

FACTS:

SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had
two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married respondent
Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died
on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various
government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from
MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000
from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao
be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to
file her answer, NIcdao was declared in default.

Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and Cariño. But
she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral where
she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Cariño‘s
marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the required marriage license.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void.

b) Whether or not the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from
government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.

RULING:

No. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However,
for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Under the Civil Code
which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to
certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio.

No. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab
initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the
Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise,
the second marriage would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property
regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime
would be not absolute community nor conjugal partnership of property, but governed by the
provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage.
 ANTONIO VALDES v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez
filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while
the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in ―unions without marriage‖. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party‘s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family.
 NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 127358 & G.R. Nos. 127449 March 31, 2005

FACTS:

Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The RTC in its decision, declared the
marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and violation ordered the
liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support
in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity
arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed before
the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent‘s motion issued a resolution
increasing the support pendants. The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

RULING:

Yes. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do
not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio,
the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
ownership.

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC
and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by
the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been
included or involved in said distribution.
 BARRETO GONZALES vs. GONZALES
G.R. No. 159521 March 7, 1933

FACTS:

The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together from
January 1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived
together as man & wife, they had 4 minor children together. After negotiations, both parties
mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her children‘s support of P500
(five hundred pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the
title of certain properties be put in her name.

Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured in
that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. On
that same date he went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had
3children with her. When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to
pay monthly for the support of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the payments
fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony. Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and
shortly after, Barreto brought an action at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the
decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada & invoked sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested
to be enforced, and deliver to the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due
to their children as their legal portion from respective estates had their parents died intestate on
November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage existing between Barreto & Gonzales be
declared dissolved & Gonzales be ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000
& all the expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children also
filed as intervenors in the case.

After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the plaintiff & intervenors,
but reduced the attorney‘s fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the action against the
defendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be
recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts
of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce.

RULING:

No. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the divorce, because:
The court said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the divorce
done in Reno, Nevada cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on the
question of divorce. It‘s clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS.
Campos Rueda that the entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the
case was submitted praying the ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of
the law regarding divorce & will be done under conditions not authorized by our laws. The
matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines & the residence acquired by
the husband in Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & did not confer jurisdiction upon the
court of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had entered in 1919.

Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such to
be done, the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the
courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the
Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out
government believes is contrary to public order & good morals.
 MERCADO-FEHR v. FEHR
G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003

FACTS:

In March 1983, after 2 years of long-distance courtship, Elna left Cebuand moved in with Bruno
in Manila. They had their first child in December thesame year. They purchased a condominium
unit (Suite 204) at LGCcondominium by a contract TO sell dated July 26, 1983. They got
married inMarch 1985. In 1998, trial court declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno,void
ab initio under FC 36 and subsequently ordered the liquidation of theirconjugal partnership. The
court found Suite 204 to be exclusive property of Bruno because it was purchased on installment
also divided into 3 (1/3-Elna;1/3-Bruno; 1/3-2 children).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Suite 204 is Bruno‘s exclusive property

RULING:

No. The Family Code, Article 147 applies in this case because 1) both of them were capacitated
tomarry each other; 2) they lived exclusively as husband and wife; and 3) theirunion is without
the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Evidenceshows that the property was acquired
during their cohabitation and in applyingFC 147, the rules on co-ownership should govern. Suite
204 must be consideredas common property of Elna and Bruno. 3-way partition of properties
does not apply also. Property regime should be divided in accordance with the law on co-
ownership
 SALAS . AGUILA
GR No. 202370, September 23, 2013

FACTS:

On September 7 1985, Juan Sevilla Salas Jr. and Eden Villena Aguila were married. Aguila gave
birth to their daughter on June 7 1986. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling.
Since then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their child. On October 7, 2003, Aguila
filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they “have no conjugal properties
whatsoever”. On May 7, 2007, RTC nullify their marriage and further provides the dissolution of
their conjugal property, if any. On September 10, 2007, Aguila filed a manifestation and motion
stating that she discovered 3 properties registered to Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.

However, Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the Discovered Properties in
consideration of other properties waived by Salas in favour of Aguila. Thus, he contends that
conjugal properties were deemed partitioned. RTC directed Salas and Aguila to partition by
proper instruments of conveyance the discovered properties. CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the discovered properties are acquired during the marriage of Salas and Aguila,
thus a conjugal property and subject for partition between them.

RULING:

Yes. Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during the validity of
their marriage. The phrase “married to” in the title is merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner, Salas. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this property regime, property
acquired during marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s
joint efforts and governed by the rules of co-ownership. Thus, the Discovered Properties should
be partitioned on the basis of co-ownership.
 JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO AND HUSBAND DR. GERARD C. SALGADO V
LUIS G. ANSON
G.R. No. 20449 July 27, 2016

FACTS:

On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint5 docketed as Civil Case No. 69611
against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along
with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the
annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale6 dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25, 2002.

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surv1vmg spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson
(Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the
celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December
30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship. According to Luis,
because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina But without his knowledge
and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002
transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of Luis, holding that the marriage
between Luis and Severina was valid. On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another
Decision44 which ordered the "ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and
DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
the Deceased Severina De Asis. The RTC also ordered the cancellation of new TCTs issued by
virtue of the said Deeds.

The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses Salgado did not
present and formally offer any testimonial and documentary evidence to controvert the evidence
presented by Luis.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC decision which declared the
marriage between Luis and Severina valid and the subject lands as conjugal properties.

HELD:

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time
of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a
valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code,89 in relation to Article 147 of the Family
Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations. Article 147 of the
Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like
absence of a marriage license."90 "Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household."'

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of
the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code
that "partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common
among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how
partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that "partition may be
made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not
impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the
partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition
Agreement.

Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition
Agreement. It also remains uncontroverted that he already received his share as stipulated in the
Partition Agreement. As such, the Court finds no reason to have the said agreement declared null
and void or annulled, in the absence of any circumstance which renders such contract invalid or
at least, voidable.
 SUSAN NICDAO-CARINO v. SUSAN YEE CARINO
GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001

FACTS:

SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he had
two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married respondent
Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died
on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various
government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from
MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee received a total of P21,000
from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao
be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to
file her answer, Nicdao was declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased
took place during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of
the marriage between Nicdao and Cariño. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of
the previous marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the
wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that Cariño‘s marriage to Nicdao was void because it was
solemnized without the required marriage license.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void;

b) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death
benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage.

RULING:

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.

However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the
absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not
follow, however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death
benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property.
 GUILLERMA TUMLOS v
.SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000

FACTS:

On July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment
building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that
through tolerance they had allowed Guillerma, petitioner, Toto and Gina Tumlos to occupy the
apartment building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that
it was agreed upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a
month while the other promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was
not complied with by the said defendants.

She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a
co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that
she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez.

Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property
in question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment
building with their two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that Guillerma administered
the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered
that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Guillerma Tumlos is the co-owner of the property by virtue of
cohabiting with Mario Fernandez who is legally married to Lourdez Fernandez.

RULING:

In the present case Article 148 of the family Code shall apply. Article 148 states that ―In cases
of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.‖
Guillerma Tumlos fail to present an evidence of her actual contribution to the purchase of the
property. In Article 148 did not include also administration of the property as contribution, it is
unsubstantiated.
 JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO v. MASTER IRON WORKS
G.R. No. 151967 February 16, 2005

FACTS:

On January 15, 1983, Eduardo and Josefina Francisco got married. On August 31, 1984, Josefina
purchased two parcels of lands. The Registry of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of title in the
name of ―Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco‖. On January 13, 1986,
Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando. It appears that Eduardo affixed his
marital conformity to the deed.

On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works and
Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay the same. The court issued writ of
execution levying the two parcel of land as for payment to MIWCC.

On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcel of land
in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her husband had no
proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver, a copy of which
she attached to her affidavit.

Before she could commence presenting her evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition to
annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Parañaque, on the ground that when they were
married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio.

On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Parañaque rendered judgment, declaring the marriage
between Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and cannot be held
liable for the Eduardo‘s personal obligations.

RULING:

No. The subject properties are not the paraphernal property of Josefina and can be held to answer
the liabilities of Eduardo.

Even though Eduardo and Josefina‘s marriage is bigamous, the properties cannot be held
conjugal, Josefina failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of
such. Also, the Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of age, she had
enough funds to pay for it. Her claim that the funds for the property were provided by her mother
and sister, the Court believed, was just an afterthought.
 MILAGROS JOAQUINO A.KA. MILAGROS J. REYES v. LOURDES REYES ET. AL
G.R. No. 154645 July 13, 2004

FACTS:
Before Rodolfo died, he was he was employed at Warner and Barnes Company wherein he
received a sizeable amount of income and retirement benefits. Lourdes was his widow yet he was
also cohabiting with Milagros. A Deed of Sale of Property, a house and lot, was executed in
favor of Milagros where respondent alleges that the funds used to purchase the said property
came from the conjugal funds and earnings of her late husband.
Petitioner contends that she has also contributed in the purchase of the property using her own
funds as it was only for convenience that Rodolfo has facilitated the same through mortgage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the disputed property belongs to the conjugal ownership of Lourdes and Rodolfo
or it is exclusively owned by Milagros, or co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros.

HELD:
The Court ruled that because the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo and
Lourdes, it is therefore conjugal. The loans obtained were used to pay for the property, and the
same were paid from his salaries and earnings which are, under the Civil Code, conjugal funds.
Petitioner’s argument that she has contributed in the purchase of the property lacks proof that she
was gainfully employed and be financially capacitated on her own.
Moreover, the registration of the property in petitioner’s name is an act of donation by Rodolfo
but Article 87 of the Family Code also prohibits donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage hence, the property is conjugal even if acquired in a
common-law relationship during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Under Article 1456, a constructive trust is created because the registration of the property was
under petitioner’s name that she cannot be because it is a deprivation of right ownership of the
legal spouse and heirs. Milagros is deemed to hold the property in trust for them.
 JACINTO SAGUID v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003

FACTS:
Gina S. Rey was previously married when she met petitioner. They cohabited and built a house
on a lot owned by the latter’s father. Jacinto was a patron of their fishing vessel while Gina
worked as a fish dealer and later decided to work in Japan as an entertainer. Soon they decided to
end their relationship. Gina filed for Partition of Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership because she claimed that because of her work as an entertainer, she was able to
contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of the house. Furthermore, she also said that she has
acquired personal properties such as appliances and household effects from her earnings as a fish
dealer with a value of P111, 375.00; she prayed for reimbursement of these amounts.
Petitioner argued that the expenses for the construction of their house were solely borne through
his income and that Gina did not work continuously in Japan but only for six months each year.
He alleged that she did not contribute in the expenses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is correct in claiming for partitions over the contributions she claimed
to have made in the building of their house and in the total amount of the said personal
properties.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held the case at bar according to Article 148 of the Family Code, wherein it
states that properties acquired by both parties through actual joint contribution of property …
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. However, in
the case at bar, Gina failed to prove how much was the exact amount she has contributed hence,
it shall be presumed to be equal. The disputed properties aggregates to P111, 375.00 and which
half is equivalent to P55, 687.50. Private respondent’s extent of ownership of the house only
amounts to P11,413.00 based on the receipts she presented as evidence. She is the declared as
co-owner of the house and Jacinto is ordered to reimburse the former in the amount of P11,413
and P55,687.50 totalling to P67,100.50. Furthermore, the house is subject to public auction.
 VICTOR JUANIZA v. EUGENIO JOSE
G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 30, 1979

FACTS:
Eugenio Jose is married to Socorro Ramos and is cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo. Eugenio, also
the registered owner of a passenger jeepney, was involved in an accident of collision with a
freight train of the Philippine National Railways. The accident caused the death of seven persons
and physical injuries of five of the passengers.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered a decision stating that Eugenio and Rosalia to
jointly and severally pay Victor Juaniza the sum of P1,600.00 plus legal interest, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Josefa P. Leus. Fausto Retrita, Nestor del Rosario Anonuevo,
and Arceli de la Cueva in the sum of P12,000.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalia Arroyo be deemed as co-owner of the passenger jeepney and should also
be held liable for the damages with Eugenio.

HELD:
The Court said under Article 144 of the Civil Code that the man and woman living together must
not in any way be incapacitated to marry. However, in the case at bar, respondent is legally
married to Socorro hence he and Rosalia are incapacitated to contract marriage. Rosalia, here
also cannot be held liable for damages because she cannot be deemed as co-owner of the
passenger jeepney such belongs to the conjugal property of Eugenio and Socorro.
 ADRIANO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124118 March 27, 2000

FACTS:
Lucio Adriano was previously married to Gliceria Dorado and has soon separated. Gliceria then
died, and five months after her death Lucio contracted a subsequent marriage with Vicenta Villa.
He executed a last will and testament wherein he assigned all his properties to Vicenta and to all
his children in both first and second marriages.
Petitioners argue that the last will and testament be annulled because it disposes the entire
rightful share of Vicenta. They also alleged that before the marriage of Lucio and Vicenta, the
latter had acquired properties and are part of their conjugal partnership.
But the respondents presented evidence which indicated that the purchase money of the disputed
properties came from the earnings of Lucio in a business partnership during the subsistence of
his marriage to Gliceria. It was obtained from the conjugal fund of his first marriage.
The Regional Trial Court of Lucena City rendered the decision that the last will and testament be
declared as valid and effective. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision in toto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property covered in the last will and testament constitutes the co-ownership
of Vicenta Villa.

HELD:
Petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of conjugality because respondents presented
sufficient evidence to support their claim. The disputed properties were purchased by Lucio with
proceeds of the conjugal fund of the first marriage. There was no evidence presented to support
that Vicenta actually contributed to the acquisition of the property in question. The Court held
that the property acquired by a man while living with a common-law wife during the subsistence
of his marriage is conjugal property, even when the property was titled in the name of the
common-law wife. According to Article 1456 of the Civil Code, a constructive trust is deemed to
have been created over the property which lawfully pertains to the conjugal partnership of the
subsisting marriage.
 YASUO IWASAWA v. GANGAN
G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013

FACTS:
Yasuo Iwasawa is a Japanese national and has married Felisa Gangan. After getting married they
went to reside in Japan. On July 2009, respondent confessed to petitioner that her husband has
previously died which the former found out that Felisa was previously married to one Raymond
Arambulo. Petitioner filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy.
Petitioner presented to the Court a certificate of marriage between him and respondent, a
certificate of marriage between respondent and Raymond Arambulo, certificate of death of
Raymond, and a certification from the National Statistics Office (NSO) that two marriages of
respondent has been recorded.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the NSO certification is admissible as evidence and should be accorded with
evidentiary weight.

HELD:
The Court ruled in accordance with Article 410 of the Civil Code which provides that, books
making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of facts stated therein hence the NSO certification
is a public document and therefore admissible due to their execution and genuineness. The
marriage was a bigamous marriage hence it is declared null and void as provided for under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines.
 GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN, JR.
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

FACTS:
Benjamin Bangayan Jr. filed for decalaration of nullity of marriage between him and Sally Go-
Bangayan because it was a bigamous one. Benjamin was previously married to Azucena Alegre
and had cohabited with Sally. Petitioner’s father was against the relationship, so to please her
father, she made Benjamin sign a simulated marriage contract.
During their cohabitation, they acquired properties. Sally then file for a criminal case against
Benjamin alleging that he falsified a public document and for contracting a bigamous marriage,
using the simulated marriage contract.
On the other hand, Benjamin alleged that their marriage was bigamous because it lacked formal
requisites of a valid marriage and that he should be the owner of the properties acquired therein.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Benjamin and Sallly’s marriage is bigamous.
2. Whether or not the properties be solely owned by Benjamin or that Sally is also
entitled a part of the partition of the properties.

HELD:
The marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous rather it is void ab initio.Their
marriage was one made in jest or a simulated one, and it lacked a valid marriage license hence
there was no marriage to speak of in the first place.
The property relations of both parties are governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. They
cohabitated without the benefit of marriage thus only properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
proportion to their respective contributions. In the case at bar, Benjamin and his siblings own the
37 properties being claimed by Sally, which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as
advance inheritance. The other property which was registered in their names as “spouses” is
solely owned by Benjamin because the words “married to” and “spouses” are merely descriptive
of the civil status of the registered owner and do not prove co-ownership. Sally has no proof
either that she had actual contributions to be entitled of co-ownership of the same.
 VENTURA vs. SPOUSES ABUDA
G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013

FACTS:

In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where they had a son Edilberto Sr. who was married
to Leonora. Edilberto Sr. and Leonora are the parents of herein petitioner Edilberto Jr.
(Edilberto). In 1980, Socorro married Esteban even if she had a subsisting marriage with Crispin.
Esteban on the other hand was also married before but the same was dissolved by virtue of the
death of his previous wife. Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline.

Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of lot in Tondo, Manila, while the remaining
portion was purchased by Evangeline on her fathers behalf (Vitas Property). In 1978, Esteban
and Evangeline also had small business establishments located in Delpan st. Tondo (Delpan
Property). When Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer, he decided to sell the properties to
Evangeline.

Esteban passed away on September 1997, while Socorro on July 1999. When Leonora,
petitioners mother discovered the sale sometime in 2000, they filed a petition for annulment of
the sale, claiming that petitioner is entitled to a right or interest over the properties purchased by
Esteban. . Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to
Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her
heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.

The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents, ruling that Vitas and Delpan properties
were not conjugal properties of Socorro and Esteban. CA affirmed the decision, applying Article
148 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to any right or interest over the subject properties

HELD:

According to the Family Code, in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to
marry each other, the ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that
relationship shall be based on the actual contribution of the parties
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition
of.property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership
and equal contribution do not apply.

This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed
decision:

Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.

Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common
property if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there
is evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry.

Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of
land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued on 11 December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the
land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres."

The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married to
Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-
owned the property.The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the
Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the
celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and
does not vest title.

Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was
not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations.Thus, the law
presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property.

Under Art. 1238, it provides that payment made by a third person who does not intend to be
reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor s consent. But
the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.

Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the
Delpan property would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.
 GUERRERO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
229 SCRA 274
FACT:

Gaudencio Guerrero and Pedro Hernando are brothers-in-law. Gaudencio filed a case against
Pedro without alleging that earnest efforts were resorted to settle the dispute before the case was
filed. Pedro overlooked such fact and did not file a motion to dismiss, but during the pre-trial, the
judge noticed their relationship, so, he gave five (5) days for Gaudencio to file amend his
complaint. When Gaudencio failed to amend, the judge dismissed the case on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction because of the absence of an allegation of previous efforts towards reconciliation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a need for an earnest effort toward a compromise in this case?

HELD:

There is no need. It has been held in Gayon vs. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104, that the enumeration of
brothers and sisters as members of the same family, does not comprehend brothers or sisters-in-
law; hence, there is no need to exert efforts towards a compromise before filing the present case.
 INING v. VEGA
G.R. No. 14727 August 12, 2013
FACTS:

Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land
(subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by
his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both
deceased. The first sibling, Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and
grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in
turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena
Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents. Gregoria, on the other hand, was
survived by her six children. In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles
(Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof
(Gregoria’s heirs). Tresvalles and Tajonera are transferees of the said property.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s
surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case
No. 5275 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s
heirs.

In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed that
Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the
subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan
Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this
fact.

ISSUE:

Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate.

HELD:

The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had
become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leon’s
estate. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria. Gregoria’s and
Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property. no prescription shall run in favor of one of
the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. The CA held that
prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it has been
made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed
sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275
in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under
Article 1141.

Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely
Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora.
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot
become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of
the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs.
 TAMBUYAT v. TAMBUYAT
G.R. No. 202805 March 23, 2015

FACTS:

Adriano Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda Balcom – Tambuyat were married on

September 16, 1965.

During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties, including a 700 sq. m. parcel
of land located at Brgy. Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which was bought on
November 17, 1991. The Deed of Sale was signed by Adriano alone as vendee.

One of the signing witnesses was petitioner Rosario Banguis – Tambuyat, who signed therein
as “Rosario Tambuyat”. All this time petitioner Banguis remained married to Eduardo
Nolasco.

When TCT covering the subject property was issued, it was made under the name of Adriano
M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis. When Adriano died intestate on June 7, 1998,
Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of the subject TCT. She alleged that she was the
surviving spouse of Adriano. That the TCT was erroneously registered and made in the name
of “Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis.” That per annexed marriage
contract, Banguis was still married to Nolasco. Wenifreda prayed that the TCT be cancelled.
That a new certificate of title be made out in Adriano’s name, with her as the spouse
indicated, and that Banguis be ordered to surrender her copy of TCT.

On her defense, Banguis claimed that she and Adriano were married on Sept. 2, 1988, and
thereafter lived together as married couple; that their union produced a son; and that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation, which is merely a summary
proceeding – considering that a thorough determination will have to be made as to whether the
property is conjugal or exclusive property, and since she and Adriano have a child whose rights
will be adversely affected by any judgment in the case

ISSUE:
Whether the cancellation of the TCT filed by Wenifreda be granted by the court.

HELD:
Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a
certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances, included are (1) when any error,
omission or mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any
duplicate certificate andwhen there is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.
The present case falls under the two instances because the RD of Bulacan committed and error in
issuing the disputed TCT, in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis”
when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is Adriano’s lawful spouse.
As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence points to the fact that
Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano. Thus, it cannot be said that Adriano and Banguis
were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even be said that they have a common law
relationship at all.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public
as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they
live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in
our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by
law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co ownership requires that the
man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. that
the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144,
when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.
 HIYAS v. ACUNA

FACT:

Alberto filed a case against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., his wife Remedios, and 3 more
defendants. Hiyas filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Alberto failed to comply with
Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Hiyas invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code?

HELD:

Since the requirement under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which
are exclusively between or among members of the same family, it necessarily follows that the
same may be invoked only by a party who is a member of that same family.
 HONTIVEROS vs. RTC
GR No. 125465 June 29, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private
respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the
owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a
result of the filing of the land registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied that they
were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They also
denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary,
according to the private respondents, the possession of the property in question had already been
transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioner’s
motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a
compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted
towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant
and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this
provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife, parents and
children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or half-
blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this
jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers to the
Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151. In several jurisprudence, the Court already
decided that “whenever a stranger is a party in the case involving the family members, the
requisite showing the earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory”
 MANALO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001

FACTS:

Troadio Manalo, died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S.
Manalo, and his eleven (11) children who are all of legal age. At the time of his death he left
several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under
the name and style Manalo’s Machine Shop in Manila and QC. Eight (8) of his children filed a
petition with respondent RTC for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for
the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. RTC set the hearing.
Herein petitioners, the mother and three other children, opposed the petition, contending that
such petition is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family and that
there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family.
Motion denied by RTC. Petition for certiorari denied by CA. Motion for reconsideration
likewise dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for
judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest
efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the
filing of the petition but that the same have failed.

RULING:

The Court denied petitioner’s claim. It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein
petitioners) are not being sued for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded
therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of
Estate is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.Private respondents herein merely seek to establish
the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the
said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the
probate court.

Art 151 of FC which prohibits suit between members of the family absent a compromise, is
not applicable in the case at bar for such is only a special proceeding and not an ordinary civil
action.
 SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are brother
and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased. Sometime
in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement of
Partition" covering properties they inherited from their parents.

Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero
(collectively, the "Guerreros"), filed suit with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal
against petitioner Nicanor and two (2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court has no application

RULING:

A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers. Thus, the
provision making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition precedent for the maintenance
of an action between members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in ordinary civil
actions involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code, now pursuant to
Article 151 of the Family Code.Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under Section 1(j),
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.Admittedly, the complaint filed in this case contains no such
allegation. But a complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by the introduction of
evidence effectively supplying the necessary averments of a defective complaint.
 TRINIDAD-RAMOS v. PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010
FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company
owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered
Ramos and the company to pay the respondents’ back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay &
service incentive leave pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was
issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name situated in Pandacan.

Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to
satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution.
Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that
the Pandacan address is actually the business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was
likewise denied by the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.

RULING:

Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law
applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the
judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are
applicable. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as
provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242
governs extrajudicial constitution.

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is
effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art.
154 actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community
or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with
consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area
where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as
provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved.

In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August
3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code.
There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially
constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby
making the levy upon the Pandacan property valid
 ARRIOLA v. ARRIOLA
G.R. No. 177703 January 28, 2008
FACTS:

The RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by TCT No
383714 (84191) left by Fidel S. Arriola to his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and
Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third each. John Nabor Arriola proposed to
sell it though public auction. Vilma and Anthony Ronald Arriola initially agreed but refused to
include in the auction the house standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed a petition
for certiorari and prayed that he be allowed to push through with the auction of the subject land
including the house built on it. The CA granted the petition and ordered the public auction sale of
the subject lot including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
the CA denied the said motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the house built inside the land is considered part of partition.

HELD:

No. Under Article 153 the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by
law. According to Article 159 the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is
a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the
family home.
 MONDEQUILLO v. BREVA
GR. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

FACTS:

The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on
July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A motion to
quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is
built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article
155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of
those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the
public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a
member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a family home
by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

HELD:

The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was
occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family
Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences
insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are
exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability which was the basis of
the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the FC.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on
whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed.
 ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS
G.R. No. 165060 November 27, 2008

FACTS:

In Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant, which is a case for
collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that petitioner
failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on various dates in
1994. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City found petitioner liable to respondent.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision in Toto.
Petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed in a
Resolution dated February 18, 2002. The Judgment became final and executory on May 21,
2002.

A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003 and enforced on August 21, 2003. On August
29, 2003, certain personal properties subjects of the writ of execution were auctioned off.
Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully
satisfy the judgment credit.

On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, questioning the sheriff’s levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real
properties. Petitioner claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his
children; and that the real property was his family home thus exempt from execution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal belongings of the petitioner’s children as well as
the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the judgment award in
favor of respondent is legal.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a
sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during one’s
lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred
institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and
strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our
nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as
a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family
shall be recognized or given effect, the trial court’s failure to observe the proper procedures to
determine the veracity of petitioner’s allegations, is unjustified.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite
petitioner’s allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the
nature of the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they
belonged to petitioner or to someone else.
 SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY vs. PLANTERS
PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA,
G.R. No. 172263 July 9, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment
from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther’s failure to pay despite
demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of
execution. After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris
A. Kelley filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati City on the
ground that the subject property was their family home which was exempt from execution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property is the family home of the petitioners.

RULING:

Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3,
1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3,
1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.

The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts
as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the
family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that
is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have
been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.

The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the
following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or
after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of
the building.
 MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO
vs. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES
G.R. No. 132537 October 14, 2005

FACTS:

Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia
Socorro C. Gomez-Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela Cruz Sta. Ines.
Josephine and Socorro demanded for an accounting of the produce of said rice lands while under
the management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of the
property.

Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and ordered her to deliver the owner’s copy of
the TCT and pay damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue
of which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya registered in Marietta’s name was sold at a public
auction wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Marietta’s husband, Hinahon together with
their children, filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya
on the ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence and
is thus exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the
house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home from the
time they occupied it in 1972

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property can be sold.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be
exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other things, debts
incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. While the respondent contends that the
house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is
not deemed constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her debts.

Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as the family home only upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta was instituted
in 1986 to for acts committed as early as 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied
property was constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred by Marietta falls
within the exception provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home.
 MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 104875 November 13, 1992

FACTS:

Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a
bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to
a deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein (FF
Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the
provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City
owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached
property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is
therefore exempt from attachment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

HELD:

The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under
Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it
preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment.
 TANEO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999

FACTS:

Two of the petitioner’s properties were levied to satisfy the judgement amount of about P5,000. One was a
parcel of land located in Bario Igpit, Municipality of Opol Misamis Oriental and the other was
the family home also located at Igpit, Opol Misamis Oriental. On February 12, 1966, the said
properties were sold at a public auction to the private respondent as the highest bidder. The
petitioners failed to redeem the same so a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9,
1968, definitely selling, transferring and conveying said properties to the private respondent. On
November 5, 1985, the petitioner filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance void and to
quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. They argued that the
property was acquired through free patent therefore it is inalienable and not subject to any
encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141. They further alleged that the
Sheriff’s Deed of Conveyance issued by Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay on February 1968
in favor of the private respondent over the subject property including their family home was
extrajudicially constituted. Private respondent refuted the petitioner’s contentions alleging that the lawfully
acquired the subject properties described as Lot No. 5545, Cad. 237 which was a private land, by virtue of a
Sheriff’s Sale on February 12, 1966.Private respondent averred that the subject land was originally
owned by Lazaro Ba-a who sold the land to Pablo Taneo on September 18, 1941, as evidenced
by an Escritura de Venta. Despite it being aprivate land, Pablo Taneo filed an application for free
patent which was made final only in 1979.RTC ruled in favor of Gilig. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.

HELD:

The house is not exempt from execution. A debt was incurred before the house was deemed a
family home. Before the effectivity of the Family Code, a family home must be constituted
judicially (filing of petition) and extra-judicially (registration). It turns out that the instrument
constituting the family home was registered only in JAN 24, 1966 while the money judgement
was rendered on JAN 24 1964. The family home is not exempt from execution since there was a
debt incurred before the registration of the house as a family home.
 FORTALEZA V. LAPITAN
G.R. No. 178288 August 15, 2012

FACTS:

Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza (spouses Fortaleza) obtained a loan from spouses Rolando
and Amparo Lapitan (creditors) in the amount of P1.2 million subject to 34% interest per annum.
As security, spouses Fortaleza executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over their residential house and lot and registered under TCT No. T-412512. ςrνll

When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness including the interests and penalties, the
creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage . The public auction
sale was set on May 9, 2001. At the sale, the creditors son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona
(spouses Lapitan) emerged as the highest bidders with the bid amount of P2.5 million. Then, they
were issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered and annotated at the back of TCT No. T-
412512. The one-year redemption period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming the
mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership on
November 20, 2003 and caused the cancellation of TCT No. T-412512 and the registration of the
subject property in their names under TCT No. T-535945 on February 4, 2004. Despite the
foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitan s formal demand to vacate and
surrender possession of the subject property.

On August 27, 2004, spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of
possession as new registered owners of the subject property. In their opposition, spouses
Fortaleza questioned the validity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale. They
argued that the mortgage was void because the creditors bloated the principal amount by the
imposition of exorbitant interest. Spouses Fortaleza added that the foreclosure proceeding was
invalid for non-compliance with the posting requirement. The RTC ordered the issuance of a
writ of possession explaining that it is a ministerial duty of the court especially since the
redemption period had expired and a new title had already been issued in the name of the
spouses Lapitan, Spouses Fortaleza moved for reconsideration, claiming that the subject
property is their family home and is exempt from foreclosure sale. The RTC denied their
motion. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property is exempt from forced sale because it is a family home

HELD:

The spouses Fortaleza’s argument that the subject property is exempt from forced sale because it
is a family home deserves scant consideration. As a rule, the family home is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment. However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly
allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before
or after such constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily
executed on January 28, 1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property which
was even notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming that the property is exempt
from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from
forced sale before it was sold at the public auction.

As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of Appeals:

While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale
of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the
exemption.

As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:

Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption,
the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to
the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself
at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period thereafter.

Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on exemption does not mean a time after the
expiration of the one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the property. ςrνll

Equally without merit is spouses Fortaleza s reliance on the cases of Tolentino and De Los
Reyes in praying for the exercise of the right of redemption even after the expiration of the one-
year period. In Tolentino, we held that an action to redeem filed within the period of redemption,
with a simultaneous deposit of the redemption money tendered to the sheriff, is equivalent to an
offer to redeem and has the effect of preserving the right to redemption for future enforcement
even beyond the one-year period. And in De Los Reyes, we allowed the mortgagor to redeem the
disputed property after finding that the tender of the redemption price to the sheriff was made
within the one-year period and for a sufficient amount.

The circumstances in the present case are far different. The spouses Fortaleza neither filed an
action nor made a formal offer to redeem the subject property accompanied by an actual and
simultaneous tender of payment. It is also undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to
lapse from the registration of the certificate of sale without redeeming the mortgage. For all
intents and purposes, spouses Fortaleza have waived or abandoned their right of redemption.

Lastly, we agree with the CA that any question regarding the regularity and validity of the
mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the petition for the
issuance of the writ of possession. The said issues may be raised and determined only after the
issuance of the writ of possession. Indeed, "[t]he judge with whom an application for writ of
possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its
foreclosure." The writ issues as a matter of course. "The rationale for the rule is to allow the
purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such possession being
founded on the right of ownership." To underscore this mandate, Section 8 of Act No. 3135 gives
the debtor-mortgagor the right to file a petition for the setting aside of the foreclosure sale and
for the cancellation of a writ of possession in the same proceedings where the writ was issued
within 30 days after the purchaser-mortgagee was given possession. The court’s decision thereon
may be appealed by either party, but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the
pendency of the appeal.

"Clearly then, until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of
competent jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the
trial court. The same is true with its implementation; otherwise, the writ will be a useless paper
judgment a result inimical to the mandate of Act No. 3135 to vest possession in the purchaser
immediately."
 OLIVA-DE MESA v. ACERO
G.R. No. 185064 January 16, 2010

FACTS:

Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They purcahsed a parcel of land located in

Meycauayan, Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property, which became their family
home. A year after, Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of P100,000 from Claudio Acero,
which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel of land and house. Araceli issued a check
for the payment of the loan. When Acero presented the check to the bank it was dishonored
because the checking account was already closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses
De Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The
RTC acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of
execution was issued to levy on the said property.

The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest bidder. Acero leased
the property to Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment for several years. Oliva contends that the
Acero spouses are not the owners of the property.

The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero’s complaint and ordering the
Spouses De Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa contend that they
are the rightful owners of the property. The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title
over the subject property was issued in Claudio’s name up to the time the complaint for
ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by the Sheriff,
the regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Acero’s
Torrens title that was resultantly issued.

Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend
that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family
Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of
execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in this case.

HELD:

YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution.In general, the family home
is exempt from execution. However, the person claiming this privilege must assert it at the time
it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.

For the family home to be exempt from execution,distinction must be made as to what law
applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the
judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution,
could be summarized as follows:

First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August
3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it
was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family
home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as
family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987 when Spouses
De Mesa got married. There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.
Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family
home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners
were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.

Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt
from execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject property being a family home
and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time
thereafter. They are stopped from claiming the exemption of the property from execution.
 JOANIE SURPOSA UY v. JOSE NGO, CHUA
G.R. No. 183965 September 18, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner filed for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. She
alleged in her complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with
Irene Surposa and that the respondent and Irene had two children namely, petitioner (Joanie) and
her brother, Allan. Respondent attended at the birth of the latter instructed that petitioner’s birth
certificate be filled out with the following names: “ALFREDO F. SURPOSA” as father and
“IRENE DUCAY” as mother. Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irene’s father, and Ducay was
the maiden surname of Irene’s mother. However, respondent Chua financially supported
petitioner and Allan and even provided employment for her. He and Allan were introduced to
each other and became known in the Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children.
During petitioner’s wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his
representative and Respondent’s relatives even attended the baptism of petitioner’s daughter.
Later, Respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his
daughter.
Hearings then ensued and petitioner presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of
illegitimate filiation. Petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of
illegitimate affiliation against respondent. And latter filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground
that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 barred by res judicata. A Compromise Agreement was
made between the two parties prior where petitioner Joanie declares, admits and acknowledges
that there is no blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one
hand and the respondent, in exchange the latter paid the Two Million Pesos each. The court ruled
in favor of the respondent hence this appeal

ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a
compromise agreement on cases enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;

HELD:
Res judicata is based upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law,
namely public policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there should
be an end to litigation and that the hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice for
the same cause.
The requisites must also concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court
rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.
The court rules held that res judicata does not exist in this case. The compromise agreement is a
contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end
to one already commenced. In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, the Court
pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a
compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits. A contract must have requisites and no
according to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, one of the requisites of such to be valid is that the
compromise must not pertain to the Civil Status of a person and the issue of Future Support and
Future Legitime. The agreement in this case is intended to settle the question of petitioner’s
status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for
petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent,
respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a
necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her
rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the
Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered
by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code as espoused in the case of Advincula v.
Advincula. It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child
cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and
filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be
judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left
to the will or agreement of the parties. Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise
Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests
no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot
be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective
prestations.
 DE ASIS v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 127578 February 15, 1999

FACTS:

Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for
maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide
support and maintenance despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in
1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it
seems useless to pursue the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the
complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim. However in 1995,
Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the minor’s legal
guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. He
maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of paternity between
the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the minor is barred from action for support.

HELD:

The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The
original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a
compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. With respect to Manuel’s
contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in
not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial
relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be
decided by the Court itself. While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity
must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially
established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the
parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same
relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was
untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver.
 FERNANDEZ v. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 143256 August 28, 2001

FACTS:
Dr. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia owns a parcel fo land located at Dagupan City
which consists if 194 sq. meters and two-storey building constructed thereon. They were
childless but it was discovered that they bought a baby and was later identified as Rodolfo
Fernandez. Jose died and left the properties to his wife’s care.
On August 31, 1989, a Deed of Extra-judicial partition dividing and allocating to themselves the
land and the residential house. On the same day, she also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of appellant’s son.
But the nephews and nieces of the deceased of Jose contested the Extra-judicial Partition of the
estate and the Deed of Absolute Sale because they alleged that it is motivated by greed and
malicious acts to deprive plaintiffs, and taking advantage of Generosa’s physical and mental
incapacity.The defendant conteded that he is their son and has been acknowledged during their
lifetime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodolfo is their legitmate child.

RULING:
First, the action filed was only to annul two documents and not to impugn one’s legitimacy.
According to Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the said child by;
1. It was physically impossible to have sexual intercourse with his wife within 120 days of the
300 days, 2. For biological and scientific reasons, he is not his child, 3. That if conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification was made through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
The Court found that it is necessary to pass to the spouses the relationship between them and
Rodolfo for the purpose of determining his legal right. Due to their findings, Rodolfo is not a
child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez, thus the
subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa
and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned.puruant to Article 1105 of the New
Civil Code.
 AGUILAR v. SIASAT
G.R. 200169 January 28 2015

FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died, intestate and
without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in their estate
are two parcels of land (herein subject properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the subject titles).

In June 1996, petitioner filed with the RTC of Bacolod a civil case for mandatory injunction with
damages against respondent and alleged that the former is the only son and sole surviving heir of
the Aguilar spouses; that the petitioner discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus
he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same.

In her Answer, respondent claimed that the petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the
Aguilars, but mere stranger who has raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness
of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that petitioner is
not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his
wife, Candelaria Siasat- Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon
the death of he latter, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the
subject titles were not stolen but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria who is her aunt.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner can not prove filiation to the Spouses Aguilar who is the owner of the
land due to the lost of his Certificate of Libe Birth and Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 is a
mere proof of pen and continuous possession.

HELD:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In
the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of
the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just
a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.
 CONCEPCION v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 123450 August 31, 2005

FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, was married
in December 1989 and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband
filed on December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since
the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the
husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an
illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation
rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting “visitation rights in favor of the
putative father of an illegitimate child”. She further wanted to have the surname of the son
changed from “Concepcion to Almonte”, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use
his mother’s surname. After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held
the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of
Theresa and Mario.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of
Mario and not petitioner Gerardo.

HELD:
Considering that Theresa’s marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the
former’s husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresa’s
contention was to have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her
illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because
maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the son’s
legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family Code, “the child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress”. Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was
upheld by the Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of
Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo
cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is
not related to him in any way.

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES v. ALELI ANGELES MAGLAYA

G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005

FACTS:

Corazon Angeles-Maglaya, herein respondent, filed a petition for letters of administrator and her
appointment as administrator of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles. She claims that she is
the sole legitimate heir of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, and together with Belen
Angeles, herein petitioner and 2nd wife of Francisco, they are the surviving heirs of the decedent.
Franscisco died intestate in 1998 leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a building. Belen opposed
this petition and prayed that she, instead of Corazon, be proclaimed the administrator of
Francisco‘s estate. After establishing the circumstances of her marriage to Francisco(i.e. married
before a Judge and ratified two months later in religious rites; Francisco presented himself to be
single that time, Belen attacked the legitimacy of Corazon, saying that her birth certificate was
not signed by Francisco. She has also failed to present the marriage contract between her parents,
Francisco and Genoveva. Furthermore, Belen averred that she and Francisco legally adopted
Concesa Yamat during their marriage. Trial court dismissed petition for lack of proof of filiation
as legitimate child, but the Court of Appeals reversed this on the grounds that petitioner‘s motion
being a demurrer (under Sec 1, Rule 33) thereby waived her right to present opposing evidence,
and that respondent has sufficiently established her filiation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Corazon is a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva.

HELD:

The court ruled in the negative. Presumption of legitimacy may only be availed upon proof of the
factual basis that child‘s parents were legally married and that his/her conception of birth
occurred during the marriage. In the case at bar, there is no absolute proof of the decedent’s
marriage to respondent‘s mother Genoveva. No marriage certificate or contract was offered in
evidence. No solemnizing officer was called to witness. Also, respondent never questioned what
would necessarily be a bigamous marriage between Belen and Francisco. In fact, in her petition,
she alleged that petitioner is the ―surviving spouse‖ of the decedent. Respondent also filed a
petition against the adoption of Consesa Yamat, alleging that as the legitimate child of Francisco,
she should have been notified of the adoption proceedings. Since the lower court has ruled with
finality that she is not legitimate since no proof has been given as to the marriage of her parents,
this petition has become moot and academic. On the matter of administration, it should be noted
that the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of decedent. Next of kin refers to the
heirs.

JANICE MARIE JAO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND PERICO JAO

G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987

FACTS:

In 1968, Janice Jao, a minor represented by her mother Arlene filed a case for support against
Perico Jao. It seems from evidence that Perico Jao was introduced to Arlene in a club. After
which, they had sexual intercourse. Jao accompanied Arlene to a hospital for a check-up, Jao
paid the rentals in the hospital. Arlene then gave birth to Janice on August 16,1968. Arlene said
that they had intercourse on November 30, 1967 but Jao contested that they had consummated
the act on January 18 1968. The NBI, upon order by the court, conducted a blood grouping test
which results say that Janice could not have been the offspring of Perico Jao and Arlene Salgado.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Perico Jao is the father of Janice Marie.

HELD:

The court ruled in the negative. There could only be compulsory recognition when the child was
conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father. Janice should‘ve
been conceived between November 20, 1967 to December4, 1967 according to the court.
However, Arlene herself said that they only started to cohabit on December 16, 1967. Hence,
Janice was NOT conceived during cohabitation. Moreover, Arlene cohabited with 2 other men.
Lastly, the blood grouping test which showed that Janice could not have been a child of Perico
and Arlene is conclusive on non-paternity. Hence, it cannot be said with certainty that Perico Jao
is indeed the father.

TEOFISTA BABIERA V. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL

G.R. NO.. 138693 June 15, 2000

FACTS:
Presentacion B. Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, Iligan
City, a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry
of Iligan City. Presentacion asserted that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990
respectively. Presentacion alleged that a baby girl was delivered by a ‘hilot’ on September 20,
1996 on , in the house of the spouses, by their housemaid Flora Guinto, who without the
knowledge of the parents of the petitioner, caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth
of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and
Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging
her signature. Presentacion, who was then fifteen, said that she witnessed the livebirth. The
Regional Trial Court found the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Teofista Guinto
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that 'the petition states no cause of action, it being an
attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition
pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by
prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.' The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss. The CA upheld the ruling of the RTC and held that Teofista is not the
biological child of Hermogena Babiera.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff has no legal capacity to file instant petition pursuant to Article 171
of the Family Code.

HELD:
The court ruled in the negative. The court held that respondent had the requisite standing to
initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in
interest is one "who stands to be benefited orinjured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present
case. A close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child
was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena
did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is
an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all.
Verily, the present action does not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first p

WILLIAM LIYAO v. JUANITA TANHOTI- LIYAO ET. AL.

G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002

FACTS:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother Corazon,
filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to
recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to
all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the
child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent
during his lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and the
deceased were legally married but living separately for more than 10 years and that they
cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased. On the other hand, one of the children of the
deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that her parents were
not separated legally or in fact.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate
of the deceased.

HELD:
The court ruled in the negative. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right
of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should
be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and
economic interest involved. Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be
impugned in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period
limited by law. Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive
evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his
paternity.

JINKIE CHRISTIE DE JESUS ET. AL. v. THE ESTATE OF DIZON

G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001

FACTS:
The case involves two illegitimate children who having been born in a lawful wedlock; claim to
be the illegitimate children of the decedent, Juan G.Dizon in order to enforce their respective
shares in the latter’s estate under the rules on succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves
de Jesus got married on August 23,1964 and during this marriage, herein petitioners, Jacqueline
A. de Jesus andJinkie Christie A. de Jesus were born. However, in a notarized document dated
June 07, 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Subsequently in the following year, Juan Dizon
died intestate leaving behind a considerable amount of assets. Thus, on the strength of his
notarized acknowledgment, herein petitioners filed a complaint for Partition with Inventory and
Accounting of the Dizon estate. On the other hand, herein respondents, the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of the decedent Juan Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased
was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case. They argued that the complaint, even while
denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. But,
the trial court denied their motion to dismiss as well as their motion for reconsideration, which
prompted the respondents to elevate the issue before the Court of Appeals but still the latter
upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered that case be remanded for further proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate off springs of the decedent.

HELD:
The court ruled in the negative. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact,
any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order
to establish the child’s acknowledgment. However, based on the records presented, they showed
that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth
would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. In an attempt to establish their
illegitimate filiation to the late Juan Dizon, petitioners would impugn their legitimate status as
being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done
because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents.

SPOUSES TIJING v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioners are husband and wife with 6 children, the youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr. On August
1989 Angelita Diamante went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job; she made
Bienvenida wait while she went to the market and left her 4-month-old son Edgardo, Jr. under
the care of Angelita. When she returned, both Angelita and Edgardo Jr. were gone. On October
1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law
husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan; Bienvenida
went to Bulacan and allegedly saw Edgardo, Jr. for the first time in 4years. She claims that her
son was already named John Thomas Lopez. Bienvenida avers that Angelita refused to return the
boy to her despite her demand. Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus.
Two witnesses, Vasquez, who assisted in the delivery of Edgardo, Jr.; and Benjamin Lopez,
brother of Tomas Lopez, testified that his brother couldn‘t have possibly fathered John Thomas
Lopez as the latter was sterile and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only
an adopted son. Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child and at 42years old,
she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989. The birth of John Thomas was
registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the Local Civil Registry of Manila
on August 4, 1989. The RTC concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband
couldn‘t have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The minor
and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity and so the court granted petition for habeas
corpus. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr. and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is
the son of the petitioners.

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative. Evidences purporting to the fact that John Thomas Lopez is
Edgardo Tijing, Jr. were evident. Angelita could no longer bear children also, Tomas Lopez is no
longer capable of siring a son. It was unusual that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was
filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife 4 months after alleged birth. Additionally, the
strong facial similarities between the child and Bienvenida also point out that they may well be
related. Lastly, clinical records presented by Vasquez were conclusive in proving such filiation.

CAMELO CABATANIA v. COURT OF APPEALS AND CAMELO REGODOS

G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004

FACTS:

Controversy stems from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in
behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos. Camelo Regodos was born on
September 9,1982. Florencia testified that she was the one supporting her child. Florencia
recounted that after her husband left in 1981, he went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for
work and was eventually hired as Camelo‘s household help. On January 2, 1982, Camelo
brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual
intercourse. Camelo promised to support her if she got pregnant. Florencia claimed that she
discovered she was carrying Camelo‘s child 27 days after their sexual encounter. On suspicion
that Florencia was pregnant, Camelo‘s wife sent her home. But Camelo instead brought her to
Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a
hilot in her aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent
Camelo Regodos. Camelo Cabatania alleges that the father of the child is Florencia‘s husband
and when they had sex, she was already pregnant. Petitioner refused support, denying the alleged
paternity. He denied going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He
vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in
Singcang, Bacolod City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its application of Article 283 of the Civil Code on
the compulsory recognition and award of supporting favor of respondent appellee Camelo
Regodos.

HELD:

The court ruled in the negative. Trial court and CA decided that the child was Camelo‘s. The
trial courts finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent was
based on the testimony of the child’s mother and the personal appearance of the child. The fact
that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives
rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulterous.
The trial court and CA should not have overlooked this fact.

ROSALINA B. ECETA v. MARIA THERESA VELL LAGURA ECETA

G.R. No. 157037 May 20, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926. During the
subsistence of their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The couple acquired several properties,
among which is the disputed property. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as
his compulsory heirs. In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria
Theresa, an illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory heirs were his
mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case
before the RTC of Quezon City for "Partition and Accounting with Damages" against Rosalina
alleging that by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and co-owner of the
property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus
belonged to her exclusively.

ISSUE:

Whether the certified photocopy from a photocopy of the certificate of live birth is competent
evidence to prove the alleged filiation of the respondent as an "illegitimate daughter" of her
alleged father Vicente Eceta.

HELD:

The court ruled in the negative. Notably, what was filed and tried before the trial court and the
Court of Appeals is one for partition and accounting with damages only. The filiation, or
compulsory recognition by Vicente Eceta of Maria Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact, both
parties have already agreed and admitted, as duly noted in the trial court’s pre-trial order, that
Maria Theresa is Rosalina’s granddaughter. Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa successfully
established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente
himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter.
By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa.

RIVERO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 141273, May 17, 2005

FACTS:

In behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother filed a complaint against defendants
for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their deceased father. During trial, Mary
Jane Dy-Chiao De Guzman, one of the sister entered a compromised agreement with plaintiff
whereby she is acknowledging the petitioner as the illegitimate son of her father and pay
petitioner P6M as a share in the estate of their deceased father. RTC granted the compromised
agreement. Meanwhile, the Dy Chiao Brothers represented by their uncle filed for annulment
of judgment and TRO for the writ of execution of judgment and motion to dismiss. CA directed
Mary Jane on the other hand to file a comment on the opposition of her uncle. In her reply, she
question assailed decision of RTC since the illegitimate filiation of Benedick could not be the
subject of a compromise agreement. She further alleged that the parties thereunder did not
recognize the validity of the compromise agreement, as in fact she and the petitioners were
exploring the possibility of modifying their extrajudicial settlement. CA ruled in favor of the
defendants, hence a petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the compromise regarding filiation is valid?

HELD:

The ruling of RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is null and void.
Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status
of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship
that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Such recognition by Mary Jane , however,
is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the putative
parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SGT. MORENO BAYANI

G.R. No. 120894 October 3, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them and
private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint or Annulment of Title
and Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to recover their
alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. To prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were
presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a
certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, attesting to the fact that records of
birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948were all destroyed due to
ordinary wear and tear. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment on 11 July
1997, dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary
value and that petitioners’ inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches. Not satisfied,
petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which ruled that they were able to prove their
filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru "other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws," but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover
their share of the subject property because of laches.

ISSUE:

Whether or not baptismal certificates are valid to prove filiation.

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative. The Court granted the petition and recognized and declared as
children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. The
Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is declared not binding upon petitioners who
were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof. The subject property in the name
of private respondents is ordered to be partitioned and distributed in accordance with the decision
and appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs of the late
Cristobal Buenaventura. Article 172 of the Family Code provides: “Art. 172. The filiation of
legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the
foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:(1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws, may
consist of the child's baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the
child’s name has been entered, common reputation respecting the child's pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL MANAHAN

G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999

FACTS:

Teresita Tibigar, 16 years old, worked at the Espiritu Canteen in Dagupan City. Manuel
Manahan is the brother-in-law of Josefina Espiritu, owner of the canteen. His wife Primadonna is
the sister of Josefina Espiritu. Manuel and Primadonna temporarily reside at the canteen together
with the family of Josefina as Primadonna was then pregnant. On 5 January 1995, at about two
o’clock in the morning, Teresita who was asleep was suddenly awakened when she felt someone
beside her. Upon opening her eyes she saw accused Manuel Manahan as he immediately placed
himself on top of her. Manuel Manahan, by the use of force succeeded in having carnal
knowledge over Teresita. Manuel then threatened Teresita’s life in case she will report such
incident. Teresita went home to her parents in Pangasinan. The sexual encounter resulted in her
pregnancy. Afterwards, her parents learned about the incident which led them to the filing of a
criminal offense of rape against Manuel Manahan. On October 2 1995, she gave birth to a
healthy baby girl and christened her Melanie Tibigar. Manuel was convicted by the RTC of
Dagupan on the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can be ordered to acknowledge and provide support for Melanie
Tibigar.

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative. On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a
correction of the view of the court a quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code
provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless
the law should prevent him from doing so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the
case before us, compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there
being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As
pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero," the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he
cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is
accordingly deleted. In any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as
it is in accordance with law.

MA. THERESA ALBERTO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 86639 June 2, 1994

FACTS:

On September 18, 1953, Maria Teresa R. Alberto was born to Aurora Reviva and Juan M.
Albert, both were not married. Then sometime on September 18, 1967, the alleged father of
Maria Teresita, Juan M. Alberto was assassinated and died intestate. His lawful wife, Yolanda R.
Alberto was appointed as administrator of his estate. After the Inventory and Appraisal and the
Administrator’s Accounting approved, the proceedings were closed and terminated. On
September 15, 1978, Maria Teresa R. Alberto filed a motion to leave and to intervene as
oppositor and to reopen the proceedings. The motion was granted by the probate court. Upon
presentation of evidences by both parties, the court was convinced that Maria Teresa R. Alberto
had been in continuous possession of a natural child, thereby compelling the descendants’ heirs
and estate to recognize her as such and allow her to participate in the estate proceedings.
However the Court of Appeals reversed the probate court’s decision, finding no satisfaction in
the degree of proof to establish Maria Teresa R. Alberto as a child of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Maria Albert be legally be recognized by the heirs of the estate of Juan
Alberto as a natural child of the latter.

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative. The Supreme Court recognized the intent and effort of Juan
M. Alberto to introduce Maria to the family as one of his flesh and blood, by allowing Maria to
use his family name and by giving her mother money to support her support and by openly
introducing her to members of his family, relatives, and friends as his daughter. By the effect of
the operation of Article 285 of the Civil Code, Maria seeking a judicial declaration shall be
recognized as a natural child to enable her to participate in the estate of her deceased father.

BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO v. ARCHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ

G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Archbencel Ann Lopez, filed a complaint for recognition and support of filiation
against petitioner Ben-Hur Nepomuceno. She was represented by her mother, Araceli Lopez. She
assailed that she is the illegitimate daughter of Nepomuceno submitting as evidence the
handwritten note allegedly written and signed by Nepomuceno. She also demanded for financial
support along with filial recognition. On the other hand, Nepomuceno denied the assertions
reasoning out that he was compelled to execute the handwritten note due to the threats of the
National People’s Army. As the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City ruled in favor of
Archbencel, Nepomuceno thereafter proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted
by the trial court stating insufficiency of evidence as the reason for dismissing the case against
Nepomuceno. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals and the trial court’s decision was
reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filiation of Archbencel as illegitimate daughter of Ben-Hur Nepomuceno is

established by the handwritten note submitted as documentary evidence.

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative. Arhbencel’s demand for support, being based on her claim of
filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As such, her
entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child
referred to in Herrera for it is not even notarized and Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement
must be accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence
of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not admitted filiation through
contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it. The only other documentary evidence
submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish
filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same. At bottom, all that Arhbencel really
has is petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without
more, fails to establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of the
child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful
of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits causeto the privacy and peace of the putative
father’s legitimate family.

CRUZ v. CRISTOBAL
G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006

FACTS:

Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa
Cristobal-Sikat claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his
first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose
are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata
Enriquez. Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535 square meters
located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila. More than six decades later,
petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject
property and transferred its title to their names. A Complaint for Annulment of Title and
Damages was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to recover their
alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. To prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were
presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on January 31, 1909, she produced a
certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, attesting to the fact that records of
birth were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. The trial court rendered a judgment
dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary
value and that petitioners’ inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches. Petitioners
sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which ruled that they were able to prove their filiation
with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal through "other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws," but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover because
of laches.

ISSUE:

Whether or not baptismal certificates are valid to prove filiation.

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative. The Court granted the petition and recognized and declared as
children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. The
Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is declared not binding upon petitioners who
were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof. The subject property in the
name of private respondents is ordered to be partitioned and distributed in accordance with the
decision and appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs of
the late Cristobal Buenaventura. Article 172 of the Family Code provides: “Art. 172. The
filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and Special Laws, may consist of the child's baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family bible in which the child’s name has been entered, common reputation
respecting the child's pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds
of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.”
 PERLA v. BARING
G.R. No. 172471 November 12, 2012

FACTS:
Herein respondent Mirasol Baring and petitioner Antonio Perla were neighbors. Eventually, they
became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio allegedly assured her that he
would support her. However, Antonio started to evade her.
Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for
support against Antonio. Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to support
Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal
Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and
Antonio supplied the information in the said certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering
Antonio to support Randy, which was affirmed by CA.

ISSUE

Whether or not the evidence presented is sufficient proof for the illegitimate filiation of Antonio

RULING:

Mirasol and Randys Complaint for support is based on Randys alleged illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with
sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for x xx support may create an unwholesome situation or may be
an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy
failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The Certificate of Live Birth and
baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio
since the latter had not signed the same. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs
paternity. Thus, x xx baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of
filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

TIJING v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioners are husband and wife with 6 children, the youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr. On August
1989 Angelita Diamante went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job; she made
Bienvenida wait while she went to the market and left her 4-month-old son Edgardo, Jr. under
the care of Angelita. When she returned, both Angelita and Edgardo Jr. were gone. On October
1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law
husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan; Bienvenida
went to Bulacan and allegedly saw Edgardo, Jr. for the first time in 4years. She claims that her
son was already named John Thomas Lopez. Bienvenida avers that Angelita refused to return the
boy to her despite her demand.

Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus. Two witnesses, Vasquez, who
assisted inthe delivery of Edgardo, Jr.; and Benjamin Lopez, brother of Tomas Lopez, testified
that his brother couldn‘t have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile and
that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Angelita claimed
that she is the natural mother of the child and at 42years old, she gave birth to John Thomas
Lopez on April 27, 1989. The birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband,
Tomas Lopez, with the Local Civil Registry of Manila on Aug. 4, 1989. The RTC concluded that
since Angelita and her common-law husband couldn‘t have children, the alleged birth of John
Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity
and so the court granted petition for habeas corpus. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the decision.

ISSUE:

Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subjected child?

RULING:

Bienvenida. She presented sufficient clinical records, presenting the proper and credible
witnesses who assisted her in her child’s birth. Not to mention that it could be readily observed
that Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head
shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence
to establish parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation years
before the alleged birth of the child and the admission of Tomas’ own brother that Tomas was
sterile makes it impossible that he and Angelita sired subject child. More importantly, the birth
certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married which is
false because even Angelita had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to
doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

In this case, the Supreme Court made mention of the DNA test for identification and parentage
testing. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. The use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge, but as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on its admissibility. Though it is not necessary in this
case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.
 AGUSTIN v. COURT OF APPEALS
460 SCRA 315

FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin‘s alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite Arnel supposedly impregnated
Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999 The baby‘s birth certificate was purportedly
signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later
refused Fe‘s repeated requests for Martin‘s support despite his adequate financial capacity and
even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the
child Arnel is actually married and has a family of his own at the time he impregnated Fe Arnel
claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the
acknowledgment of Martin‘s birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his
marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it
should have been 1964 July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing
all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUES:

Whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition; and whether
DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioner‘s
constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

RULING:

The petition is without merit. It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed
a sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual
relationship produced the child, Martin. Being the first case where DNA testing was the focal
issue the court examines the history of DNA testing The court opened the possibility of
admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals In People
where the rape and murder victim‘s DNA samples from the blood stained clothes of the accused
were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain
whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The
samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile The
SC upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results
thereof as evidence since both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does
not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not incrimination but as part of object
evidence there is no violation of the right of self-incrimination in DNA testing.

HERRERA v. ALBA
460 SCRA 197

FACTS:
 On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi
Alba before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against
petitioner (Rosendo Herrera) Rosendo Herrera denied that he is the biological father of
respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent‘s mother Respondent filed a
motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity. respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C.
Halos, Ph.D who testified that the test is 99.99% accurate Petitioner opposed DNA paternity
testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA
paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination trial court and CA granted the
motion to conduct DNA paternity testing.

ISSUE:

Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation.

RULING:

The Court moved from the issue of according official recognition to DNA analysis as
evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis - People v.
Vallejo It all boils down to evidence and its admissibility. Evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court
Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert
testimony, provides as follows The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge,
skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence This Rule
does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even
evidence on collateral matters is allowed when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue The court goes on to discuss the Vallejo case on
the caution with the method employed in the actual testing DNA. In assessing the probative
value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following
data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analysing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests Nevertheless, the petition is dismissed.

PEOPLE v. VALLEJO
G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City,
sentencing Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino to death and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the
rape-slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy Diolola, in Rosario, Cavite on July 10, 1999. The
Information charging accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo with the crime of Rape with Homicide
alleged: "That on or about the 10th day of July 1999, in Barangay Ligtong I, Municipality of
Rosario, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Trial
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Daisy Diolola Y
Ditalo, a nine-year old child against the latter's will and while raping the said victim, said
accused strangled her to death."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

RULING:

Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The
court reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the
accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-
slay case. The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case
and for the first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus: DNA is an organic
substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical
twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique. When a crime is committed, material is
collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This is
the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from
the suspect and the victim. The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association
exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are
subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile.

ESTATE OF ONG v. DIAZ

G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007

FACTS:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and the Resolution of
the same court dated March 1, 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70125. A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending
litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky
Diaz, against Rogelio G. Ong before The Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City. In her Complaint,
Jinky prayed that judgment be rendered, ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin
Diaz as his daughter, ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of P20,000.00
pendente lite and thereafter to fix monthly support, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff
attorney’s fees in the sum of P100,000.00 and Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as
maybe just and equitable in the premises. As alleged by Jinky in her complaint in November
1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later
blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa
Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on February 19, 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge
Panfilo V.Valdez.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it remanded the case to the court a quo for DNA
analysis despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio G. Ong.

RULING:

As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for
purposes of support in favor of the said minor. Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to
adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects
of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and
child. A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides: Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

LUCAS v. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710 June 6, 2011
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that
he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila.
He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b)
petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated
from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of
Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers
about petitioner, as a musical prodigy. Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance
and Comment manifesting that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons
should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case
which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a
Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse
failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated
in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima faciecase, affirmative defences, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. This prompted
Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled
where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition
is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that
the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA
testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE:
Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

RULING:
Yes. Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to
safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may,
at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to
the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The
DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not
preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including
law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean,
however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the
said conditions are established. In the case of Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant
proceduralaspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called
procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They
are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when
only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed
to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s
evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.

GUY v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

FACTS:
The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy
Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. On June 13,1997 the minors were
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration before the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner who is one of the children of the
deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father
left no debts hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The
other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping
should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel. Petitioners further alleged that the
claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in
exchange for financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor
children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.The lower court denied
the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not the
duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver. It
also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance.

RULING:
The Court ruled, no. Repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians
must necessarily obtain judicial approval. Repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's
scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court,
the release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived
their supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent.
It would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner,
the latter do not have. The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of
the claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its
jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the
determination of the capacity to be an heir included. As held in previous decision, two causes of
action may be brought together in one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to
claim inheritance.

MARQUINO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 72078 June 27, 1994

FACTS:
Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition,
Support and Damages against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of
Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew
her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete. She likewise
received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of
an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The
Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she
died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still
alive. Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs.
Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding that
the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed
by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action
and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.

ISSUES:
a) Whether or not right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to
the heirs and;
b) Whether or not Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never
be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an
exception. The right is purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in
an action for recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the heirs of the former since
the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself.
Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the case at
bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of death
of their father. Hence, IAC decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against Marquino is
dismissed

TAYAG v. TAYAG- GALLOR

G.R. No. 174680

FACTS:
On January 15, 2001, respondent, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. The respondent alleged that she is one
of the illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester Angeles.
On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two real properties both of
which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October
2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give
respondent and her brothers P100, 000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale.
However, petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised.
In a Motion dated August 31, 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and
presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary
to allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate
child. There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which
cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. To prevent further encroachment upon
the court’s time, petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses. The motion was
denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently
states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an
illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized
as such by the latter.

RULING:
The appellate court held that the mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices.
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person. The Court, applying the provisions of the Family Code
which had then already taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation
under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the death of the
alleged father.

GRANDE v. ANTONIO
G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014

FACTS:
Herein respondent, Antonio filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of
the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from
Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. Along with
such petition, He also filed for a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and
an official declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.Respondent avers that

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent father could compel his illegitimate children to use his surname

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled the father could not. the SC voided the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) of Republic Act 9255 insofar as the IRR makes it mandatory for the
illegitimate child to use the recognizing father’s surname, since this was contrary to the express
permissive wording of Republic Act 9255 amending Art 176 which states: Art. 176. Illegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall
be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

DELA CRUZ v. GRACIA

G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009
FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the
Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the
signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock and the father
unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to
the child.”

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia.
The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian
can be considered as a recognition of paternity.

RULING:

Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to
use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring
through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative
father in the private handwritten instrument.

The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging
parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:

1. Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be
signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2. Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and

competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made
and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.

BRIONES v. MIGUEL
GR. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
FACTS:

On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to obtain
custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael
Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on
September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is
now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that
the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and has
demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in
the absence of the mother who is away.

RULING:

Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is
the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.

Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was
vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority was
to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the
rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case, parental authority resided
jointly in the father and the mother.

REPUBLIC v. ABADILLA
GR. No. 133054 January 28, 1999
FACTS:

Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children,
Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with
the surname ―Abadilla‖ and the name of their father was entered as ―Herson‖ Abadilla.
Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the children‘s parents appeared as June
19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.

On February 5, 1997, Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor children,
Emerson and Rafael,filed a petition for correction of the birth certificates.The petition was
granted. The instant petition for review on certiorari is now being interposed by the Office of the
Solicitor General on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed
the deletion of the ―date and place of marriage of parents‖ from the birth certificates of minors
Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors‘
surname from ―Abadilla‖ to ―Celestino.‖

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court committed an error in their ruling of the case.

RULING:

Yes. According to Article 176 "Illegitimate children shall use zthe surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a
legitimate child.‖Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of
their mother, Luzviminda Celestino.

VERCELES v. POSADA
GR. No. 15978 April 27, 2007
FACTS:
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Verceles fetched Clarissa Posada from "My
Brother‘s Place" where the seminar was being held.Clarissa avers that he told her that they
would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they
reached the place her companions were nowhere. After Verceles ordered food, he started making
amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room where
she stayed until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the
mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was
following-up barangay road and maintenance projects.

On December 22, 1986, on orders of Verceles, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up
funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel
on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at
the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at
the upper floor.

Instead, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told
her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he
could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But
again she kept the incident to herself.Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her
menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was
proven.

RULING:

The letters are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza‘s
filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the arrays of evidence presented
by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable
evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner‘s illegitimate child.

Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no evidence of his
own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot
be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.

PEOPLE v. GLABO
GR. No. 12924 December 7, 2001
FACTS:
One afternoon in October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila Lobrico, a mental retardate, and her 11-
year old sister, Judith, were summoned by Justiniano Glabo, their maternal uncle, to his house.
He told them to wash the clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their chore, accused-
appellant ordered Judith to wash the dishes in the nearby creek, about 200 meters away from his
house. When Judith was gone, accused-appellant dragged Mila from the yard, where she was
hanging the washed clothes, into the house. He pushed her to the floor and made her lie down.
He undressed the victim, and then he inserted his penis into her private organ and made push and
pull motions. Mila was overpowered by accused-appellant‘s brute strength. She shouted for
help, but there were no neighbors nearby.

Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith had to run back to the house for shelter. She went
directly under the house, which was elevated 3 feet above the ground. While underneath the
house, she heard someone crying on the floor above. She looked up through the bamboo floor
and saw accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both were naked. Judith went to the
kitchen, and she saw accused-appellant‘s penis as he stood up and raised his briefs.

The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word about the incident. However, the
victim became pregnant as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition could no
longer be concealed. Severino Lobrico, Mila‘s father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It
was her sister, Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant raped Mila. Severino brought
Mila to the police and filed a complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the offspring is illegitimate.

RULING:

Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be
imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the
law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the
passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural
children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate
children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother
and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to
exercise parental authority over his children, no ―further positive act is required of the parent as
the law itself provides for the child‘s status.‖ Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to
indemnify and support the victim‘s child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the
Family Code.
 DINAH B. TONOG v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002

FACTS:
Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child with Edgar V. Daguimol.
The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister. A year after Dinah left for
US where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and
grandparents. Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and the trial court granted
the petition and appointed Edgar as the legal guardian. Dinah filed a petition for relief from
judgment and the court set aside the original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her opposition
to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the court
issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin.

Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified their previous decision and
granted Edgar custody over Gardin. Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the
minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental
authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dinah is entitled to the custody of Gardin.

RULING:

No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen
her baby torn away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for ―compelling
reasons‖ for the good of the child. A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is
below seven years of age for ―compelling reasons.‖ Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than
seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that
choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child‘s preference should the
parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent,
or even to a third person.

Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, SC find that the
appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over
her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust
into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed
an attachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be
properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court.

MOSSESGELD v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 111455 December 23, 1998
FACTS:

Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld , single, gave birth to a baby boy on December 2, 1989. The
presumed father is Eleazar Siriban Calasan, a married lawyer. The father signed the birth
certificate of the child as the informant, indicating hat the child‘s name is Jonathan Mossesgeld
Calasan. He also executed an affidavit admitting the paternity of the child. The person in charge
at the hospital refused to place the presumed father‘s surname as the child‘s surname in the
certificated of live birth. Thus, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong for registration.

Again, the municipal treasurer, as officer in charge of the local civil registrar‘s office, rejected
the registration on the basis of the Civil Registrar General‘s Circular No. 4, which provides that
under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988 shall
use the surname of their mother. Upon inquiring about the status of the status of the registration
of his child, Calasan was furnished with a copy of the letter of the Civil Registrar General
denying the registration of the certificate of live birth on the grounds that it is contrary to law.
Calasan, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus with the Pasig RTC to compel the local civil
registrar to register the certificate of live birth of his illegitimate son using his surname. His
petition was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to for leave to amend the
petition to substitute the child‘s mother as the petitioner. His motion to amen was granted, but
motion for reconsideration was denied. He elevated the petition to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the RTC‘s decision

ISSUE:

Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register thecertificate of
live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father‘s surname where the latter admitted
paternity.

RULING:

No. Local Civil Registrar correctly refused. Illegitimate children must use the surname of their
mother, regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their fathers in their record
of birth. Article 176 of the Family Code effectively repealed Article 366 of the Civil Code,
which gives a natural child the right to use the surname of his/her father where he/she has been
acknowledged by both parents. Article 176 explicitly states that illegitimate children shall use the
surname of their mother, be under her parental authority, and be entitled to support inconformity
with the provisions of the Family Code.
 SILVA v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 114742 July17, 1997

FACTS:

Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress,
cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon
Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began,
according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous
objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had
never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted
ways.

The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow
Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company
on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that
Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and
social values of the children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Father can visit his children.

RULING:

The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right is
personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him. Silva
(the father) may have won with the Supreme Court‘s upholding of his visitation rights, but this
favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority
from immigrating to Holland with her two children.

DAVID v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
FACTS:

Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss Ramon Villar, who is married, and a
father of 4 children, all grown-up. They first had a son, Christopher, who was eventually
followed by 2 more girls, Christine and Cathy Mae. The relationship became known to Villar‘s
wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to his house and introduced him to Villar's wife. After this,
Daisie‘s were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were even accepted by his legal
family.

Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 years old, to go with his family to
Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give Christopher back and had
enrolled him at the HolyFamilyAcademy for the next school year. Daisie filed a petition for
habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. which the RTC granted, giving custody to Daisie and
ordering Villar to give temporary support of P3K a month to the 3 kids and to pay the costs of
suit.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not custody should be given to Daisie

RULING:

Yes. CA ruling reversed, custody granted to Daisie and Villar ordered to givetemporary support
in the amount of P3K, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action.
Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father Villar, was
married to another woman other than his mother.

As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is under the parental authority of his mother, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. And because she has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by Villar, Daisie is entitled to issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.

Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her
husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child
who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her
child. The fact that Villar has recognized the Christopher may be a ground for ordering him to
give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Article 213, FC, "no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise."

DE SANTOS v. ANGELES
GR. No. 105619 December 12, 1995

FACTS:

On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with
a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship became
strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita
Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by
obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949. Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in
1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de
factoseparation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died
in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent
contracted a marriage in TagaytayCity celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981,
Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of P15, 000,000.00.

On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other
things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten
surviving children, and petitioner. After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however,
petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she
argued inter aliathat private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by
private respondent although the latter admitted during the hearing that all her children were born
prior to Sofia's death in 1967.

The court, declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and
declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only
natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half
brothers and sisters.

ISSUE:

Whether or not natural children by legal fiction be legitimized.

RULING:

Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents,
who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other, are natural. In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified
to marry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."

In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and
deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid marriage to
petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married
abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada,U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife
does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this jurisdiction at
the time. Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the
marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that he was
likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged
wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private respondent, this time here in
Tagaytay, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the
provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of
children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure
fiction.

ABADILLA v. TABILIRAN
AM No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995

FACTS:

Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds of
gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge. With respect to the
charge on gross immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and publicly cohabited
with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran
and Priscilla got married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the charge on deceitful
conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with Priscilla be
registered as legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits stating the delayed registration
was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in fact, he knew these children
cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed
since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was
neither bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970, based on the record, Priscilla had
begotten her 3 children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 3 children can be considered legitimate.

RULING:

The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since the time they
were born, there was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only natural
children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are
natural.

Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation: 1) The rationale
of legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of
successional rights; 3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy
the sanctity of marriage; 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years
after the birth of the child.

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 100835 October 26, 1993

FACTS:

James Hughes, a natural born citizen of the UnitedStates of America, married Lenita Mabunay, a
Filipino Citizen,who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country.The spouses jointly
filed a petition with the RTC to adopt theminor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been
living withthe couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, aswell as their parents,
gave consent to the adoption. The RTCrendered a decision granting the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the spouses can adopt the minors.

RULING:

While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional
cases, Lenita, however, can qualify. Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a
joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be read alongtogether with
Article 184. Art 185 provides: Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following
cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse
seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential
Decree No. 603 had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of
them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality. The
Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the
necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances: (1) When one spouse
seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of the other. It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the subject of
parental authority, can aptly find governance. Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly
adaptor one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.

REPUBLIC v. TOLEDANO
GR. No. 94147 June 8, 1994

FACTS:

Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to adopt the
minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable
of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2,
1989 upto the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of
private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a
widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate
her son. The RTC granted the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the spouses can adopt Solomon.

RULING:

Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code
of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.Article 184, paragraph three of Executive Order No. 209expressly
enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino
citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included
in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-
country adoption as may be provided by law. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other
hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph three of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a
former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a
joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly
adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185
requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together
with Article 184.

REPUBLIC v. ALARCON VERGARA

GR. No. 9555 March 20, 1997

FACTS:

On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before
the RegionalTrialCourtofAngelesCity to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12
years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United
States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His
wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two children.
Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption.

The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the spouses
Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. As a general rule, aliens
cannot adopt Filipino citizens.

Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting
the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three afore quoted
exceptions in the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt
with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina
was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from
the coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a
former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt.

On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint
adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603
(Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision that husband and wife may
jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional character of joint
adoption and making it now mandatory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the adoption is valid.

RULING:

Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following
cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; (2) When one spouse seeks to
adopt the legitimate child of the other."

None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to
adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister. Accordingly, the law should be construed
liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be
applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not
in a position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is
clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation.
Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the
respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.

IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE LIM

GR No. 168992-93 May 21, 2009
FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless.
Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a
certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the
parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel
Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty
given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed
separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then
25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and
her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an
affidavit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

RULING:

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the
word ―shall‖ signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The
affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he
must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of
RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien‘s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects
of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

LANDINGIN v. REPUBLIC
GR No. 164948 June 27, 2006

FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3
minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former‘s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged
in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for
their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second
marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption.
After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner
and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social Worker of the
DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the
biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to present the said
social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent
to the adoption.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee‘s
biological mother

RULING:

No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the
child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will
suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained. The general
requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. The written
consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before
his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to adopt. Moreover,
abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not
such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be
shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

CANG v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot
three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and
Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang
couple‘s relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her
husband‘s alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.

Upon learning of her husband‘s alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Cebuwhich rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing
that they agreed to ―live separately and apart or from bed and board. Petitioner then left for the
United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District
Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody
of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving ―rights of visitation at all reasonable times
and places‖ to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a
naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never
remarried.Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald
and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances
were ―too meager‖ compared to theirs, he could not ―in conscience, allow anybody to strip
him of his parental authority over his beloved children.‖

Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his
children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of
their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody
over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then
directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner.

ISSUE:

Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them?

RULING:

This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts and
circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether petitioner
has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary. In its
ordinary sense, the word ―abandon‖ means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly.
The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of ―putting under a ban.‖ The emphasis is on the
finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the
meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one‘s rights or interests. In
reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports ―any
conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish
all parental claims to the child.‖ It means ―neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.‖

In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner‘s conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute
abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then
in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. t
abandoned them.The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for
adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT v. JUDGE ANTONIO

M. BELEN
A.M. No. RTJ-96-136 July 18, 1997
FACTS:
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized
American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell
Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge Belen granted the petition after finding that petitioner spouses
were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his decree primarily on the "findings
and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on
the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have
been demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and
proceeded to dispense with trial custody. He asserted that the DSWD findings and
recommendations are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report"
prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaña. However, when
the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD
in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the DSWD found that it did not have
any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent
judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore,
there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to
coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption.

ISSUE:

May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case study reports made by a social welfare
officer of the court?

RULING:

No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that: No
petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social
Work and Counseling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a
case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting
parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing
such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds,
after such case study, that the petition should be denied. Circular No. 12, as a complementary
measure, was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by
judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance
with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be
adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts
hearing adoption cases: (1) To NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru
its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those
cases already filed; (2) To strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid
decree . . .
The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with
the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal
of such case study. .The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all
too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have
taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No.
5830 so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said
department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the
court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge
should never have merely presumed that it was routinely for the social welfare officer to
coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise
caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together
with all the other requirements of the law.

By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy
the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all,
is in a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate
childlike Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain, the
social welfare officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto herself a matter that
pertained exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the
preparation and submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and
recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to act.

ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating
Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this Court; and respondent
Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.

REPUBLIC v. HERNANDEZ
GR No. 117209 February 9, 1996

FACTS:
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously
granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to
complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for
adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of
name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two
separate proceedings.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special
proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other,
being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that
what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform
with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is
sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a
substantial change of one‘s legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should
accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being
conformably satisfied.

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for
change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of
action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted
and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder
of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a
single petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper
name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.

RULING:

No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption: (1) For
civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee‘s surname to
follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption
and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by
petitioner. However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an
adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee‘s
registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the
adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere
incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing
therein. If a change in one‘s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly
complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change
of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds
therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order
to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special
proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by
means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another
special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy
available under our remedial law system.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996

FACTS:
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B.
Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who
had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When
private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with
them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered: a)
Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes; b.)
Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and c) That the surname of the
child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name this was mistakenly
registered as ―MIDAEL‖ be corrected to ―MICHAEL."

The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his contention that the
correction of names cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. As additional
ground for his appeal, he argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for
adoption because in the notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael,"
instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.

On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the case of Cruz v. Republic, invoked by the petitioner in support of its
plea that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because that
case involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held that to require the petitioners to file a
separate petition for correction of name would entail "additional time and expenses for them as
well as for the Government and the Courts."

ISSUE:

Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the present case?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the minor
Midael C. Mazon and the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, correctly
did so. With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court
of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for the correction of
the name of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its provision was not complied with, the
decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void
and without force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be
applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the civil status of persons
 IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005

FACTS:

Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga
Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her
mother‘s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie‘s middle name be changed to Garcia, her mother‘s
surname, and that her surname ―Garcia‖ be changed to ―Catindig‖ his surname. The RTC
granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code, the
minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for classification
and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her natural
mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioner‘s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

RULING:

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter
for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article
V of RA 8557.

Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

TEOTICO v. DEL VAL

G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
FACTS:
Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. The testatrix Josefina
Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise
disposed of in the will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the CIF
of Manila which was set for hearing after the requisite publication and service to all parties
concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
same testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no
legal personality to intervene. The probate court, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an
adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the
additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico.

After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision admitting
the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the
statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by
way of intestate succession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding.

RULING:
Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir,
executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will,
because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of
any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix.
Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.

The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the
adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created
between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is
an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014

FACTS:

John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled
under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident
while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus,
petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole
remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of
John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who
qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to
the restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

HELD:

Yes. The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant
factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have
reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling
that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue
of adoption, who was then left to care for the minoradopted child if the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the
provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and
the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological
parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for
himself at such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession
tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the
death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the
pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the
biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too
should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in
the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. The Court held that
Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the
benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise
during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under
the Employees’ Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole
remaining beneficiary.
 GERONIMO v. SANTOS
G.R. No. 19709 September 28, 2015

FACTS:

Rufino and Claridad died intestate leaving a property consisting of one half of the parcel of land.
Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of Rufino executed a document
entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of the spouses
and adjudicating to themselves the property. They took possession and were able to transfer the
tax declaration of the property to their names. Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and
recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo. Eugenio and
Emiliano denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother.
They disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as
their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridad’s sister. They claimed that the birth
certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. According to Eugenio, when Rufino’s wife
could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was Caridad’s niece from
Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972, 13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her
adoptive parents’ household. Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiff’s alleged birth
certificate. It had irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in the
box date of birth was erased and the word and figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma
Daño was superimposed on the entry in the box intended for the informant’s signature. Basing
on the secondary evidence of Karen’s open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondent Karen

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents, even if she is not a natural child of the latter, is a valid adoption.

HELD:

No. A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it was
tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the name of
the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent – April 6, 1972 – and the name of
the informant – Emma Daño – were both superimposed on the document. The appellate court
itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and
the name of the informant made the document questionable. The corroborating testimony of
Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth
and the signature of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the
document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to
explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the
following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow
the presumption of regularity attached to respondent’s birth certificate. Finally, we also find that
the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both courts a quo does not sufficiently
establish the one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased
spouses. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her putative
parents because she was allowed to bear their family name "Geronimo", they supported her and
her education, she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy,
Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the estate left by
Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino as his
legal heirs.

Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:

But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted
child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document. Furthermore, it is well-
settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is
not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested
parties.

LAHOM vs. SIBULO

G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

FACTS:

A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred. That despite the proddings and pleadings
of said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the
frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death
he had made known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's
supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever
properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future. Respondent continued using his
surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the
Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally
issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his
practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.

That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household helps
to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent
remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year. for the last three or
four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg
ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care and support from a
love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner
which is not expected of a son.

That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and nieces whenever
they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their
desire for some material benefits from petitioner.

That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable

relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that
after all respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the
properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil
Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection
towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of
petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its
existence, hence this petition for revocation,"

ISSUE:

Can the adoption be rescinded?

RULING:

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to
rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex
sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an
adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.

SUSAN LIM-LUA v. DANILO Y. LUA

GR Nos. 175279-80 June 05, 2013

FACTS:
On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the
amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent's huge earnings from salaries and
dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad. After due hearing, Judge
Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order granting support pendente lite. From the evidence
already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos
would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff. This amount excludes the One
hundred thirty-five (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by
plaintiff for the operation of both her eye[s] which is demandable upon the conduct of such
operation. The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of
defendant, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed
the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal
support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children
and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well-being in
accordance with family's social and financial standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial
court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as the P1,750,000.00 retroactive support,
respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having
considered the needs of the respondent.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision, nullified and set aside and instead a new one is
entered to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00
ORDERING the deduction of the amount of PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of
PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan
Lim Lua and their two (2) children;
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses
incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of
tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and
books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother
(petitioner) as well.
It also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to
support their children. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court
of Appeals.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the honorable court erred in ordering the deduction of the amount of
php2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of php3,428,813.80 from the current total support in
arrears of the respondent to the petitioner and their children.
RULING:
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family
relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for
annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding,
the court, motu proprio or upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or designated
custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the
case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine
the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application.
It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing
in the record. In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two
children was determined after due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the
parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on appeal, it is clear that the
monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended primarily for the
sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house
helpers, and other household expenses.
Petitioner's testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
vitamins/medicines.
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely provide for
the subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities of his
children, as well as those of petitioner who was then unemployed and a full-time housewife.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the
spouse.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either
party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the
deductions made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of petitioner,
should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.

LAM v. CHUA
G.R. No. 131286 March 18, 2004

FACTS:

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana Chua against Jose Lam in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she and
Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of said marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua
Lam; Jose was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage but said incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological incapacity of Jose
became manifest only after the celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to go home,
indulged in womanizing and irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal
partnership of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal properties, she was forced to
agree with Jose on the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the separation of
present and future properties; said agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994; they had long been separated
in bed and board; they have agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, subject to
visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the marriage between her and Jose be declared null
and void but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their child, John Paul.

ISSUE:

Should Jose give the corresponding support?

RULING:

The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining the amount of support to be
awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles 194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code. It is
incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it.
The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to
support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly
expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation of the child.