Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)

Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.

INTRODUCTION

I. Constitutional Law D. Characteristics of a good written Constitution

Constitutional Law defined. The study of the maintenance of a) Broad. Not just because it provides for the organization
the proper balance between authority as represented by the of the entire government and covers all persons and things
three inherent powers of the State and liberty as guaranteed by within the territory of the State but because it must be
the Bill of Right comprehensive enough to provide for every contingency.

Political Law defined. That branch of public law which deals
with the organization, and operations of the governmental
organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the
inhabitants of its territory [People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887;
Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77].
II. The Constitution
b) Brief. It must confine itself to basic principles to be
implemented with legislative details more adjustable to
change and easier to amend.
c) Definite. To prevent ambiguity in its provisions which
could result in confusion and divisiveness among the
people [Cruz, ibid,, pp. 5-6],

A. Definition - That body of rules and maxims in accordance
with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually
exercised [Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, p. 4].
With particular reference to the Constitution of the
Philippines: That written instrument enacted by direct
action of the people by which the fundamental powers of
the government are established, limited and defined, and
by which those powers are distributed among the several
departments for their safe and useful exercise for the
benefit of the body politic [Malcolm, Philippine
Constitutional Law, p. 6].
Purpose - To prescribe the permanent framework of a
system of government, to assign to the several departments
their respective powers and duties, and to establish certain
first principles on which the government is founded [11
Am. Jur. 606].
B. Doctrine of constitutional supremacy
E. Self-executing vs. non-self-executing provisions
A provision which lays down a general principle is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that
which supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right
it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3,
1997
Whether Article XII Section 1 of the Constitution, is self-
executing.
Doctrine: a constitutional provision is self-executing if
the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the Constitution itself, so
that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature
for action

The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to

which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land,
must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble
intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution. The
Constitution must ever remain supreme.

All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must

not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power
debase its rectitude. Right or wrong, the Constitution must
be upheld as long as it has not been changed by the
sovereign people lest its disregard result in the usurpation
of the majesty of law by the pretenders to illegitimate
power.

C. Parts

a) Constitution of Liberty. The series of prescriptions

setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the
citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of
government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those
rights, e.g., Art. III.

b) Constitution of Government. The series of provisions

outlining the organization of the government, enumerating
its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its
administration, and defining the electorate, e.g., Arts. VI,
VII, VIII and IX.

c) Constitution of Sovereignty. The provisions pointing

out the mode or procedure in accordance with which
formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought
about, e.g., Art. XVII. III. The Constitutions of the Philippines
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.
A. Pre-1987 Constitution
Planas v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-35925, January 22, 1973
also Sanidad vs. Comelec [GR L-35929], Roxas vs. Comelec [GR L-35940],
Monteclaro vs. Comelec [GR L-35941], Ordonez vs. National Treasurer of
the Philippines [GR L-35942], Tan vs. Comelec [GR L-35948], Diokno vs.
Comelec [GR L-35953], Jimenez vs. Comelec [GR L-35961], Gonzales vs.
Comelec [GR L-35965], and Hidalgo vs. Comelec [GR L-35979]
(collectively known as the Plebiscite Cases
Facts: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondents from
implementing PD 73, which called for a plebiscite (to be
held on January 15, 1973) for the constitution approved by
the CONCON on 1972, on the theory that: (a) the power to
submit is lodged exclusively in Congress, and (b) there is no
proper submission to the people.
Held: Petition dismissed. The issue of validity of
calling for a plebiscite (submission) is justiciable; BUT,
issue became moot.
The cases were eventually dismissed for being moot
and academic when President Marcos issued
Presidential Proclamation 1102, declaring that the
Constitution had been ratified and has come into force
and effect.
Javellana vs. Exec. Sec., 50 SCRA 33
(collectively known as the Ratification Cases)
Facts: Petitioners seek to enjoin the respondents from
implementing any of the provisions of the “new
constitution” not found in the 1935 Constitution, on the
theory that it was not validly ratified in accordance with
the provisions of Art.1, Section XV.
Held: Although the question of whether a Constitution
was validly ratified is a justiciable question, the question of
whether a Constitution has come into force and effect is a
political question beyond the competence of the Courtto
decide.
The basic issues and the votes of the SC justices were: (1) Whether the
validity of Proclamation 1102 is a political or a justiciable question - Six
justices said it is justiciable, three said it is political, and one justice qualified
his vote. (2) Whether the new Constitution was validly ratified (with
substantial if not strict compliance) conformably with the 1935 Constitution -
Six justices said no, three said there was substantial compliance, and one
qualified his vote. (3) Whether the people had acquiesced in the new
Constitution (with or without valid ratification) - Four justices said the people
had already accepted the new Constitution, two said that there can be no free
expression by the people qualified to vote of their acceptance or repudiation
of the proposed Constitution under martial law, one said he is not prepared to
state that a new Constitution once accepted by the people must be accorded
recognition independently of valid ratification, and three expressed their lack
of knowledge or competence to rule on the question because under a regime
of martial law with the free expression of opinions restricted, they have no
means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have
accepted the Constitution. (4) Whether the petitioners are entitled to relief -
Six justices voted to dismiss the petitions, while four were for giving due
course to the petitions. (5) Whether the new Constitution is already in force -
Four said yes by virtue of the people’s acceptance of the same, four said they
could not with judicial certainty whether or not the people had accepted the
Constitution, and two declared that the new Constitution is not in force, “with
the result that there are not enough votes to declare tha the new
Constitution is not in force”. The SC decision concluded: “Accordingly, by
virtue of the majority of six votes x x x. with four dissenting votes x x x
all of the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the
vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution
Aquinobeing considered
v. Enrile, 59 SCRA in183
force and effect. ”
Topic: Judicial Review
Doctrine: The power of the courts to test the validity of
executive and legislative acts in light of their conformity
with the Constitution. This is not an assertion of superiority
by the courts over the other departments, but merely an
expression of the supremacy of the Constitution.
The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. The power is inherent in the
Judicial Department, by virtue of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
(affirming the validity of Javellana)
Topic: Judicial Review of Amendments
Facts: Petitioners question the authority of the
President in issuing several PDs proposing amendments to
the New Constitution and calling for a national
referendum-plebiscite for the said amendments.
Held: (1) The amending process, both as to proposal
and ratification, raises a justiciable question. (2) In a crisis
government, the President shall have the power to assume
the constituent power to propose amendments lodged in
the Legislative body.
Doctrine:
- The question is now regarded as subject to judicial
review, because invariably, the issue will boil down to
whether or not the constitutional provisions had been
followed.
-Presidential exercise of legislative powers (and
proposing amendments) is valid in martial law.
-Amending process is a sovereign act, although the
authority to institute the same and the procedure to be
followed reside somehow in a particular body (Pres.
Marcos).
Occeña v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
(affirming the validity of Javellana)
Doctrine:
-The question is now regarded as subject to judicial
review, because invariably, the issue will boil down to
whether or not the constitutional provisions had been
followed.
-Authority for the principle that the choice of method
of proposal, i.e., whether made directly by Congress or
through a Constitutional Convention, is within the full
discretion of the legislature.
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition
proceedings against the validity of three Batasang
Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional
amendments, goes further than merely assailing their
alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon
A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and
former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention
that framed the present Constitution, are suing as
taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions
is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the
fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Held:
1. Citing the case of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary
where they dismissed the petitions for prohibition and
mandamus to declare invalid its ratification with a vote of
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.
six(6) to four(4), the Supreme Court said: “This being the
vote of majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the
new constitution being considered in force and effect”(in
force and effect on January 17, 1973). With such the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court, and with the
recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the
Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must
also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed.
Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts are resolved. The
1973 constitution isa fundamental law.
The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable provision of the
1976 amendment is quite explicit, which reads: “The
Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and
its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities,
rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim
National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and
the Members thereof." One of such powers is precisely that
of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose amendments
upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the
majority of its members to be ratified in accordance
with the Article on Amendments.
The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a
constituent body, can propose amendments. In that
capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth
votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as
well when it has been convened as the agency through
which amendments could be proposed. That is not a
requirement as far as a constitutional convention is
concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this
case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its
constituent power to propose amendments.
Phil. Bar Association v. Comelec, G.R. No. 72915, Dec. 20,
1985
Topic: Snap presidential election of 1986; A petition to
prohibit the holding of the snap election was filed with
the SC but the petition was dismissed because
considerations other than legal had already set in, the
candidates were in the thick of the campaign, and the
people were already looking forward to the election.
Doctrine: The issue turned into a political question
(from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned
constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual
vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly
decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity
at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more
political than the election. The Court cannot stand in
the way of letting the people decide through their
ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new
mandate or to elect a new president.
B. 1987 Constitution
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/jul2003/104768.htm
Doctrine: the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government were the supreme law
because no constitution limited the extent and scope of
such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the
1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there
was no municipal law higher than the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during
this interregnum, a person could not invoke an
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there
was neither a Constitution nor a Bill of Rights
In Re: Letter of Associate Justice Renato S. Puno,
A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA, June 29, 1992
Doctrine: A revolution has been defined as the
complete overthrow of the established government in
any country or state by those who were previously
subject to it as as sudden, radical, and fundamental
change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence. A government as a result of
people's revolution is considered de jure if it is already
accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US,
Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others.
Facts: The Court of Appeals and the Intermediate Appellate
Court existing prior to EO 33 were phased out as part of the
legal system abolished by the revolution. The Court of Appeals
established under EO 33 is an entirely new court; hence
reference to preference in rank contained in BP 129 refers to
prospective situations, not retroactive ones. As head of the
revolutionary government, President Aquino can disregard
any seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
Held: The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct
from the CA or the IAC, for it was created in the wake of the
massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary
government of Corazon Aquino in the people power. In the
new government under Pres. Aquino, it was installed
through direct exercise of the Filipino power. Therefore, it is
the present CA that would negate the claims of Justice Puno
concerning his seniority ranking.
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.
I. Elements of a state
Definition of a State. A community of persons, more or less
numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of
territory, independent of external control, and possessing a
government to which a great body of inhabitants render
habitual obedience.
Distinguished from Nation. State is a legal or juristic concept,
while nation is an ethnic or racial concept.
Distinguished from Government. Government is merely an
instrumentality of the State through which the will of the State is
implemented and realized.
A. People – refers simply to the inhabitants of the State.
Different meanings as used in the Constitution: (i) Inhabitants
[Sec. 2, Art. Ill; Sec. 1, Art. XIII]; (ii) Citizens [Preamble; Secs. 1 & 4,
Art. II; Sec. 7, Art. Ill]; (iii) Electors [Sec. 4, Art. VII].
As requisite for Statehood: Adequate number for self-sufficiency
and defense; of both sexes for perpetuity.
B. Territory [Art. I; R.A. 3046; R.A. 5446]
The National Territory: “The national territory comprises the
Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its
terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial
sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas” [1st sentence, Sec. 1, Art. II].
Components: Terrestrial, Fluvial, Maritime and Aerial domains.
Archipelago Doctrine: “The waters around, between and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their
breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines” (2nd sentence, Sec. 1, Art II)
C. Government
Defined. The agency or instrumentality through which the will of
the State is formulated, expressed and realized. See U.S. v. Dorr, 2
Phil 332)
1. functions: constituent vs. ministrant
ACCFA vs. FLU, 30 SCRA 649
Topic: Two-fold Function of the Government – Free
Enterprise – Ministrant vs Constituent Functions
Doctrine: The functions of the government are
classified into governmental or constituent and
proprietary or ministrant. The former involves
exercise of sovereignty and therefore compulsory; the
latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary
functions and thus considered as optional.
PVTA vs. CIR, 65 SCRA 416
Doctrine:
-The Court noted that the distinction between the two
functions had become blurred.
-Government has to provide for general welfare.
Traditionally, the functions of the government have been classified
into constituent, which are mandatory for the Government to
perform because they constitute the very bonds of society, such
as the maintenance of peace and order, regulation of property and
property rights, the administration of justice, etc; and ministrant,
those intended to promote the welfare, progress and
prosperity of the people, and which are merely optional for
Government to perform.
Under this traditional classification, such constituent
functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare,
progress and prosperity of the people — these latter
functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is
optional on the part of the government. Nonetheless, as he
explained so persuasively: "The growing complexities of
modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite
unrealistic, not to say obsolete.
2. types of government: de jure vs. de facto
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945
Doctrine:
De Jure - has a rightful title but no power or control,
either because the same has been withdrawn from it or because
it has not yet actually entered into the exercise thereof.
De Facto - actually exercises power or control but
without legal or legitimate authority.
 Continuity of Law: Law, once established, continues until
changed by some competent legislative power (not changed
by mere change of sovereignty)
 All acts and proceedings of the 3 gov. depts. of a de facto
government are good and valid.
 Kinds of De facto government:
(1) de facto proper – government obtained by force or voice of
the majority
(2) paramount force – by military forces who invade the
territory
(3) independent government – established by inhabitants
through insurrection
 Republic of the Philippines (during Japanese occupation)
was a de facto government.
It has been held that the Second Republic of the Philippines was a de
facto government of paramount force, having been established by the
Japanese belligerent during the occupation of the Philippines in
World War II.
The characteristics of this kind of de facto government are:
1. Its existence is maintained by active military power within the
territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and
lawful government.
2. During its existence, it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by
private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to
such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts,
though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual
governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly
in extent and conditions. They are usually administered by military
authority, supported more or less directly by military force.
Doctrine: “the people have made the judgment; they have
acceptedLeague
Lawyer’s the government
v. Aquino, of President
G.R. Corazon
No. 73748, Aquino which is
5/22/86
in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a
de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.
Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government.”
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.
FACTS: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel
were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was
issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of
power by stating that the “new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”
Held: The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made
the judgment; they accepted the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country. It is not
merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government.
Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146710, 3/2/01
- EDSA 1 is extraconstitutional and the legitimacy of the new
government that resulted. Whereas EDSA II is
intraconstitutional and the resignation of the sitting
president had caused the succession.
- The Supreme Court said that the resignation of President
Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacanang. In the press release containing his final
statement, [i] he acknowledged the oathtaking of the
respondent as President; [ii] he emphasized he was leaving the
palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of
disability and he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon
as the disability disappears); [iii] he expressed his gratitude to
the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity; [iv] he
assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that
may come in the same service of the country; and [v] he called
on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
3. The Government of the Republic of the Phils.
Government of the Philippines is “the corporate governmental
entity through which the functions of government are exercised
throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears
from the context, the various arms through which political authority
is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
subdivisions or other forms of local government" [Sec. 2 (1),
Administrative Code of 1987].
4. “government” vs. “administration”
Government is the institution through which the state exercises
power. Administration consists of the set of people currently running
the institution
D. Sovereignty
1. Definition
Defined: The supreme and uncontrollable power inherent
in a State by which that State is governed.
2. types: legal vs. political sovereignty
Bernas: Political writers distinguish between legal
sovereignty and political sovereignty.
Legal is described as the supreme power to make laws
and Political as the sum total of all influences in a
state, legal or non-legal, which determine the course of
law.
Sinco prefers not to make the distinction and places
legal sovereignty in the state itself considered as a
juridical person.
3. doctrine of jus postliminium
Political laws, except the law on treason, are suspended
[Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856]; municipal laws remain in
force unless repealed by the belligerent occupant. At the
end of the belligerent occupation, when the occupant is
ousted from the territory, the political laws which had
been suspended during the occupation shall
automatically become effective again, under the doctrine
of jus postliminium.
4. effect of suspension or change in sovereignty
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez, supra
Doctrine:
 Continuity of Law: Law, once established, continues
until changed by some competent legislative power
(not changed by mere change of sovereignty)
 All acts and proceedings of the 3 gov. depts. of a de
facto government are good and valid.
 Republic of the Philippines (during Japanese
occupation) was a de facto government.
Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil 285
Effects of belligerent occupation:
- No change in sovereignty
Facts: After the Japanese lost in the Second World War and left
the Philippines, Peralta who was convicted of robbery as defined
and penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 enacted by the
National Assembly under the Japanese rule, filed a petition for
habeas corpus based on the ground that the Court of Special and
Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was
a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese
Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are repugnant to
those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America”.
Held: The habeas corpus is granted and Peralta was released.
The Court argued that it was within the power and competence
of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National
Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65,
which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by
imprisonment, and to try those who are accused of crimes in the
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.
Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction as an
instrument of the Japanese-controlled government. However,
by the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines and
restoration of the Commonwealth Government the punitive
sentence ceased to be valid as the belligerent occupants
also ceased to exercise power and control over the
Philippine territory.
The punitive sentence under consideration, although good and
valid during the military occupation of the Philippines by the
Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the
reoccupation of these Island and the restoration therein of the
Commonwealth Government.
Alcantara v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil 749
Doctrine: No change in sovereignty
 The rule that laws of political nature or affecting
political relations are considered superseded or held in
abeyance during the military occupation, is intended
for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the
occupied territory and not for the enemies in arms.
(Ruffyv. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875)
FACTS: Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime
of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical
injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to an
indeterminate penalty from arresto mayor to prison
correccional. Petitioner now questions the validity of the
decision on the sole ground that said court was only a creation
of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during Japanese
military occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance of writ of
habeas corpus from petitioner.
HELD: Judgments of such court were good and valid and remain
good and valid for the sentence which petitioner is now serving
has no political complexion. A penal sentence is said to be of a
political complexion when it penalizes a new act not defined in
the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a
crime against the legitimate government but taken out of
territorial law and penalized as new offenses committed against
the belligerent occupant which is necessary for the control of
the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the
occupier.
Such is the case at hand, the petition for writ of habeas
corpus is denied.
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856
Doctrine:
• Nature of Allegiance to sovereign: Absolute and
permanent
• Effect of enemy occupation: sovereignty of the government
– not transferred to occupier
Characteristics: permanence, exclusiveness,
comprehensiveness, absoluteness, indivisibility,
inalienability, imprescriptibility.
FACTS: A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio
Laurel who gave the enemy aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation and was prosecuted for the crime of treason.
Petitioner contended that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime
of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens there to was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over
these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
His claim is that he cannot be tried under a change of
sovereignty since his acts were against the Commonwealth
which was already replaced by the Republic.
HELD: Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance
of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed
by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to
the occupier and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government. There
is no such thing as suspended allegiance; sovereignty can
may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it
cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty
cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or
divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called
period of suspension. What may be suspended is the exercise of
the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the
territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the
occupant.
Laurel is subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal code as
there was merely a change of the name of government from
Commonwealth to Republic and does not affect the act of
treason made by the petitioner as the offense is made to the
same sovereign people and the same government as
expressed in the Constitution: "Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them"
(Section 1, Article II). Furthermore, a crime against the
Government of the Philippines established by authority of the
people of the Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides
according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, by virtue of the provision of Section 2, Article XVI
provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all
references in such laws to the Government or officials of the
Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to
refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
constitution.
People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil 887
Doctrine: Political laws are abrogated
FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine
Senate, Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the documents
regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of
oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day
following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion –
edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an
article against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was
alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code –
provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the
Crown. Hence, the issue.
REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish
Government, Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect
Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the
Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings
nor its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with
the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to
American, it means that the invoked provision of the SPC had
been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256
of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of
the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is
a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of
territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are
totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no
longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case.
Therefore, respondent was acquitted.
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.
Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77
Effects of change in sovereignty: Political laws are
abrogated, municipal laws remain in force.
It is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory the previous political relations of
the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here
used to denominate the laws regulating the relations
sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. xxx Every
nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must
hold it subject to the Constitution and laws of its own
government, and not according to those of the government
ceding it.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and
later to RP, the provisions of the Code of Commerce must
be deemed to have been abrogated because where there
is a change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the
new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, UNLESS they
are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new
sovereign.
Vilas v. City of Manila, 42 Phil 953
Doctrine: The mere change of sovereignty of a country does
not necessarily dissolve the municipal corporation
organized under the former sovereign; only the
governmental functions that are not compatible with the
present sovereignty are suspended.
Facts: Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under
the Republic Act No. 183, petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the
City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover
the sum of money owed to him by the city. The City of Manila
that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the
cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and
its contention now is founded on the theory that by virtue of
the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished.
Held: The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not
necessarily dissolve the municipal corporation organized under
the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a legal
sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is
entitled to all property and property rights of the
predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court
held that only the governmental functions that are not
compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended.
Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the
predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the creditors of the
old City of Manila.
Doctrine: Doctrine of Parens Patriae which literally means,
parent of the people. As such, the Government may act as
guardian of the rights of people who may be disadvantaged or
suffering from some disability or misfortune.
II. Doctrine of the state as parens patriae
Under the Principle of Parens Patriae, the Philippine
Gov’t v. Monte debeing
Government Piedad,the
35 Phil 728 of the “rights of the
guardian
people” can represent the legitimate claimants of the
beneficiary and therefore has the capacity to file a suit
against the appellant. The Philippine Government is not
merely a nominal party that’s why it can bring and prosecute
Facts: About $400,000 were paid into the treasury of the
Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions for
the relief of those damaged by the earthquake on June 3, 1863 in the
Philippines. Upon the petition of the governing body of respondent,
the Philippine government directed its treasurer to turn over to the
respondent the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in instalments of
$20,000 each. Petitioner now bring suit to recover said amount with
interest against respondents in behalf of the various petitions of the
persons and heirs to whom the relief was intended. Defendant
contends that the amount was given as a donation and that the court
erred in stating that the Philippine Islands has subrogated the
Spanish government in its rights.
Ruling: The legislature or government of the State, as parens
patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature. The
court further asserted that said amount was not a donation and that
respondent is liable for the debt regardless of the cession of the
Philippine Islands to the United States. It is said that there is total
abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the
ceded region, however, the circumstances present in the case are not
political in nature. The great body of municipal law which
regulates private and domestic rights continue in force until
abrogated or changed by the new ruler, as such, the government
has the authority to file a suit in behalf of its people by virtue of
the principle of parens patriae.
Cabanas v. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94
Doctrine: It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that
the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting
as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of
litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his
best interest.
Facts: Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his
child to be his sole beneficiary and the proceeds shall be
administered by his brother Francisco when he dies, while the
child is still a mino. Melchora Cabanñ as filed a complaint seeking the
delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be the
child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy
and contended that as a private contract its terms and obligations
must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.
RULING: The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the
family as the basic social unit, and that whenever
any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced
and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been
filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person.
It may happen; family relations may press their respective claims. It
would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of
things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. It
could have been different if the conflict were between father and
mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority.
Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its
role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity
of her plea.
III. State immunity from suits
Doctrine of State Immunity. As a consequence of independence,
territorial supremacy and equality, a state enjoys immunity from
the exercise of jurisdiction (legislative, executive or judicial) by
another state, unless it has given consent, waived its immunity,
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.
or voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court
concerned. Neither may its public property be attached or taxed,
nor its public vessels be boarded, arrested or sued. This is based
on the principle of par in parem non habet imperium. The
state’s immunity extends to the Head of State who is the
personification of the state
A. Constitutional Basis
Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides “the State
may not be sued without its consent”.
Elements of the Provision:
a. “State” – when the provision refers to the State it includes
both the host state and foreign states. As such sovereign
immunity is likewise available to foreign states in so far as
they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local state.
Under the doctrine of sovereign equality of states, a state
cannot assert jurisdiction over another. (Par en parem non
habet imperium)
b. “Suit” - When is a suit considered as a suit against the state?
State immunity, as a matter of defense, may only be invoked
if the state is considered the real party in interest. State is the
real party in interest as defendant in a suit if it produces
adverse consequences to the public treasury in terms of the
need to appropriate funds or property to satisfy the
judgment.
c. Consent” - Sovereign immunity may be waived by the
state. Thus, giving its consent to be sued either expressly or
impliedly. Expressly, thru the enactment of general laws or
special laws or impliedly, when the government into
business contracts or for reasons of equity.
Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 US 349
Argued March 21, 1907 / Decided April 8, 1907, 205 U.S. 349
Doctrine: “A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any
. formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”
It is an international law principle which is founded on the
positivist theory that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
Facts: This is an appeal from a decree affirming a decree of
foreclosure and sale under a mortgage executed by the appellants to
the appellee, Sister Albertina. 17 Haw. 82. The defendants
(appellants) pleaded to the jurisdiction that after the execution of the
mortgage a part of the mortgaged land had been conveyed by them to
one Damon, and by Damon to the Territory of Hawaii, and was now
part of a public street. The bill originally made the Territory a party,
but the Territory demurred and the plaintiffs dismissed their bill as
to it before the above plea was argued. Then the plea was overruled,
and after answer and hearing the decree of foreclosure was made, the
appellants having saved their rights. The decree excepted from the
sale the land conveyed to the Territory and directed a judgment for
the sum remaining due in case the proceeds of the sale were
insufficient to pay the debt. Eq. Rule 92.
B. Concept of Restrictive State Immunity
 This immunity, however, is recognized only with respect
to sovereign or public acts of the state, and cannot be
invoked with respect to private or proprietary acts.
C. Typologies of suits against the state
1. Suits Against Public Officials
The doctrine of State immunity also applies to complaints
filed against officials of the State for acts performed by
them in the discharge of their duties within the scope of
their authority.
a. Test: will require an affirmative act from the state
On the assumption that decision is rendered against
the public officer or agency impleaded, will the
enforcement thereof require an affirmative act from
the State, such as the appropriation of the needed
amount to satisfy the judgment? If so, then it is a
suit against the State.
Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120
Doctrine: When a public officer is sued for damages
in the performance of official duties and the
judgment if the claim is allowed would need
appropriation of public funds, this is considered as
suit against the state.
Ruiz v. Cabahug, 102 Phil 110 (1957)
Facts:
On July 31, 1950 Hon. Sotero B. Cabahug (Secretary of National
Defense) accepted the bid of the Allied Technologists, Inc., to
furnish the architectural and engineering services in the
construction of the Veterans Hospital at a price of P302,700.00 .
The plans, specifications, sketches and detailed drawings and
other architectural requirements submitted by the Allied
Technologists through its architects, Enrique J. L. Ruiz, Jose V.
Herrera and Pablo D. Panlilio were approved by the United
States Veterans Administration in Washington, D.C. Because of
the technical objection to the capacity of the Allied
Technologists, Inc. to practice architecture and upon the advice
of the Secretary of Justice, the contract was signed on the part of
the Allied Technologists,Inc. by Mr. Ruiz as President and Mr.
Panlilio as Architect. When the officials of the Department of
National Defense paid the Allied Technologists the contract
price for the architectural engineering service, they retained 15
per cent of the sum due, for the reason that Mr. Panlilio has
asserted that he is the sole and only architect of the Veterans
Hospital to the exclusion of his fellow architects Ruiz and
Herrera, an assertion aided and abetted by Col. Nicolas Jimenez.
This action deprived Mr. Ruiz andMr. Herrera monetary value of
their professional services and damaged their professional
prestige and standing.
Issue: Whether the suit filed by the appellants against the
government without its consent qualify.
Held: Based from the facts and circumstances surrounding this
case, the court decided that the suit should be answered not
by the government but to its officials to compel them to act in
accordance with the rights to be established by the contending
architects, or to prevent them from making payment and
recognition until the contending architects have established
their respective rights and interest in the funds retained and in
the credit for the work done. The order of dismissal is hereby
reversed and set aside, and the case is remanded to the court a
quo for further proceedings. With costs against the defendants-
appellees
b. Effect when public officer acts without, or in
excess of, jurisdiction
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.
Del Mar v. PVA, 51 SCRA 340
Doctrine: However, when the suit is to compel a public officer
to perform a ministerial duty to pay the plaintiff with amounts
already appropriated, this is no longer a suit against the state
because there is no more need to appropriate funds for the
purpose.
Festejo v. Fernando, GR No. L-5156, March 11, 1954
Doctrine: When the case clearly indicates that the public
official is sued in his personal capacity/or for acts beyond his
authority, the suit is not against the state.
2. Suits Against Government Agencies
a. Tests
i. If incorporated: consult charter
If the charter provides that the agency can sue and be sued,
then suit will lie, including one for tort. The provision in the
charter constitutes express consent on the part of the State
to be sued.
*If incorporated there are always be a charter, special
laws passed by congress in creating them.
*Is the charter silent or not? If not then there’s no
question whether it has a governmental function, it
can be sued
Bermoy v. PNC, GR No. L-8670, May 18, 1956
Note: *General Corp. Law – charter is silent but makes
reference to this law
*Since the Gen Corp Law contains provision that allows
you to sue or be sued, then PNC can be sued
*Be careful of waivers
Facts: On July 6, 1954, (24) twenty four employees from its
dormitory known as Normal Hall of the Philippine Normal
College, filled an action in the COF of Manila against the PNC for
the recovery of salary differentials and overtime pay. The
Solicitor General on behalf of the defendant answers and denies
the latter liability. The court ordered it dismissed before the case
was tried on the merits, on the ground that neither one of the
defendants was a corporation or a juridical entity with capacity
to be sued. The plaintiffs took an appeal to Supreme Court,
alleging that it was an error to dismiss their case on the ground
that, R.A. No. 416 took effect July, 1949 converted PNS to PNC,
thus created a Board of Trustees to administer the affairs as a
corporation under section 13 of the amended Act 1455
(Corporate Law), with the power “to sue and to be sued in any
court.”
Held: The state has already given the consent by investing the
college with express power to be sued in the court. The act
Authorizes the College to be sued is also made clear in Section 6,
where it is provided that “all process against the Board of
Trustees shall be served on the President or Secretary thereof”.
The order appealed from is re revoked and the case remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings. No cost
Arcega v. CA, 66 SCRA 229
FACT: The petitioner Alicia O. Arcega, doing business under the
firm name “Fairmont Ice Cream Company,” filed a complaint
before the court against the respondents Central Bank of the
Philippines and Philippine National Bank, for the refund from
allegedly unauthorized payments made by her of the 17%
special excise tax on foreign exchange. The Central Bank moved
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds, among others, that the
trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
action, because the judgment sought will constitute a financial
charge against the Government, and therefore the suit is one
against the Government, which cannot prosper without its
consent, and in this case no such consent has been given. The
petitioner appealed, but the court dismissed the complaint on
the ground set forth in the Central Bank’s motion to dismiss. The
petitioner Arcega filed a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution to which an opposition was filed by the Central Bank.
This time, the Central Bank submitted a certification that the
balance of the collected special excise tax on sales of foreign
exchange was turned over to the Treasurer of the Philippines.
Then the court denied the petitioner’s motion
forreconsideration as a result Arcega appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Holding that the suit is indirectly against the Republic
of the Philippines which cannot be sued without its consent, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Finally
the petitioner filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether a suit against the Central Bank for refund a suit
against the State?
Held: It is not a suit against the state. The charter of the
Central Bank of the Philippines authorize that it can sue and be
sued. The consent of the State to be sued, therefore, has been
given.
Rayo v. CFI, 110 SCRA 460
Doctrine: If the charter provides that the agency can
sue and be sued, then suit will lie, including one for
tort. The provision in the charter constitutes express
consent on the part of the State to be sued
FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the
respondent opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of
the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden, precipitate and
simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns in
Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for damages
against the respondent corporation. Petitioners opposed the
prayer of the respondents forn dismissal of the case and
contended that the respondent corporation is merely
performing a propriety functions and that under its own organic
act, it can sue and be sued in court.
HELD:
The government has organized a private corporation, put money
in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its
charter.
As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a
personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the
government. Moreover, the charter provision that it can sue
and be sued in any court.
PNR (Philippine National Railways) v. IAC, 217 SCRA 401
It was held that although the charter of PNR is silent on
whether it may sue or be sued, it had already been ruled in
Malong v. PNR, 185 SCRA 63, that the PNR “is not performing
any governmental function” and may, therefore, be sued.
By the doctrine of implied powers, the power to sue and be
sued is implicit from the faculty to transact private business.
PNR is not exercising governmental powers, as such it is not
immune from suit.
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.
FACTS: The passenger express train of Philippine National
Railways (PNR) and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit Inc.
collided at the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit
Bulacan at 1:30 in the afternoon of August 10, 1947 causing
damage to the bus and its passengers, 18 of whom died and 53
suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleges that the collision was
due to the negligence and imprudence of PNR and its engineer
Honorio Cirbado in operating in a busy intersection without any
bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman.
ii. If unincorporated: determine nature
primary function
 If governmental: NO suit without consent
 If proprietary: suit will lie^ because when the State
engages in principally proprietary functions, then it
descends to the level of a private individual, and may,
therefore, be vulnerable to suit
Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Employees Ass’n,
1 SCRA 340
Doctrine:
- Acceptance of outside work and payment of overtime
compensation does not make work of Bureau of Printing
proprietary.
- Non-suability of the State is available to the agency even if
it is shown that it is engaged not only in governmental
functions but also, incidentally, in proprietary enterprises
(unincorporated agency).
Facts: Upon complaint of the respondents of the Bureau of
Printing Employees Association against the Bureau of Printing,
the complaint alleged that the latter have been engaging in
unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing their
employees, in the exercise of their right to self-organization and
discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment
in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities.
The Petitioners of Bureau of Printing denied the charges of
unfair labor practices attributed to and, by way of affirmative
defenses, alleged, among other things, that the respondents of
the Bureau of Printing Employees Association were suspending
the pending result of an administrative investigation against
them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petition;
that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue
and be sued; that said bureau is not an industrial concern
engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic
performing government functions. The petitioners filed an
"Omnibus Motion" asking for a preliminary hearing on the
question of jurisdiction raised by them in their answer and for
suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the
determination of such juridical question.
Doctrine: If an agency‘s function is deemed proprietary, if
such is a necessary incident of the primary and gov. function
of such
Mobil Phils.agency, such
v. Customs agencyService,
Arrastre is not18 suable (for an
SCRA 1120
unincorporated agency only).
It was held that the Customs Arrastre Service is merely an
adjunct of the Bureau of Customs. A suit against it is,
therefore, a suit against the Bureau of Customs, an
unincorporated agency performing primarily governmental
functions.
[NOTE: Even in the exercise of proprietary functions
incidental to its primarily governmental functions, an
unincorporated agency still cannot be sued without its
consent.]
FACTS: Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from
abroad on S.S. "Leoville", consigned to Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment was discharged to the
custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau
of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The
Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the
of consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of
Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the
amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages. Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being
persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued. Appellant
contends that not all government entities are immune from suit;
that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre
service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary
functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.
3. Suits Against Foreign States
Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil 312
(read also the dissent of Justice Perfecto)
It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly
considering that the ‘action must be considered as one
against the U.S. Government.’ The opinion of Justice
Montemayor continued: ‘It is clear that the courts of the
Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no
jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The
question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at
the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has
not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is
essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is
not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own
Government without the latter’s consent but it is of a citizen
filing an action against a foreign government without said
government’s consent, which renders more obvious the lack
of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of
law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general
acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities
in support thereof.”
FACTS: The plaintiffs Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all
surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint owners of three
apartment buildings situated in the City of Manila known as the
North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel
Apartments. About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs
executed three lease contracts, one for each of the three
apartments, in favor of the United States of America at a
monthly rental of P1,775 for the North Syquia Apartments,
P1,890 for the South Syquia Apartments, and P3,335 for the
Michel Apartments. The term or period for the three leases was
to be "for the duration of the war and six months thereafter,
unless sooner terminated by the United States of America." The
apartment buildings were used for billeting and quartering
officers of the U. S. armed forces stationed in the Manila area.
Dissenting by Judge Perfecto
The petition must be granted. The government of the United
States of America had entered into a private contract with
private citizens of the Philippines and the deed executed in our
country concerns real property located in Manila, places said
government, for purposes of the jurisdiction of our courts, on
the same legal level of the lessors. Although, generally, foreign
governments are beyond the jurisdiction of domestic courts
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.

of justice, such rule is inapplicable to cases in which the

foreign government enters into private contracts with the
citizens of the court's jurisdiction. Once a foreign government
enters into a private contract with the private citizens of another
country, such foreign government cannot shield its non-
performance or contravention of the terms of the contract under
the cloak of non- jurisdiction.

Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88
Test to determine if suit is against the State:
 On the assumption that decision is rendered against the
public officer or agency impleaded, will the enforcement
thereof require an affirmative act from the State, such as
the appropriation of the needed amount to satisfy the
judgment? If so, then it is a suit against the State.
• Mere allegation that a government functionary is being
sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove
him from the protection of the laws of public officers and
doctrine of state immunity;
• Doctrine of state immunity applicable also to other states.
FACTS: Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services
director of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City.
Private respondents, Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers, are
American citizens permanently residing in the Philippines and
were employed as game room attendants in the special services
department of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents
were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time. In a letter
addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the
hearing officer’s report of the reinstatement of private
respondents to permanent part-time plus back wages.
Respondents allege that the letters contained libelous
imputations which caused them to be ridiculed and, thus, filed
for damages against petitioners.
RULING: Sanders, as director of the special services department
of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel,
including the private respondents. Given the official character of
the letters, the petitioners were being sued as officers of the
United States government because they have acted on behalf of
that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus,
it is that government and not the petitioners personally that
is responsible for their acts.
FACTS: This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of
land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the
Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot was contiguous with two
other lots. These lots were sold to Ramon Licup. In view of the
refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as
to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and
clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the
parties was the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to
Tropicana
HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke
sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in
Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have
adopted the generally accepted principles of International
Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of
International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of
the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the
society of nations. In the present case, if petitioner has bought
and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business,
surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure
gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition
and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but
claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission
or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the
lot of concern is non-proprietary in nature. The lot was
acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but
for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of
residence of the Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer the
property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise
clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell
the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same
because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible
for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.

Doctrine: Pursuant to the 1961 Vienna Convention on

Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is granted
immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of
the receiving state over any real action relating to private
immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving USA v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 (GR No. 76607)
Holy See
state v. Rosario,
which 238holds
the envoy SCRAon524
behalf of the sending state for
A state may be said to have descended to the level of an
the purposes of the mission
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business
Note: The Holy See has all the constituent elements of
contracts.
statehood (people: less than 1000 individuals; territory: 108.7
acres; government with the Pope as head; and independence by
where the contract involved a concession for a barber shop
virtue of the Lateran Treaty of February 11, 1929, which
facility in the naval base, and was considered a contract in jus
constituted the Vatican as a territory under the sovereignty of
gestionis
the Holy See). It has all the rights of a state, including diplomatic
intercourse, immunity from foreign jurisdiction, etc.. FACTS: The private respondents are suing several officers of the
US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding
The Supreme Court distinguished Vatican City from the
Holy See. The Holy See is an international person with
which the Philippines had diplomatic ties since 1957.
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.

conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said

base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to
cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included
in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also,
to conduct a rebidding.
Facts: An action for the recovery of the value of the property
RULING: The contract bidded out for barbershop facilities in taken by the government and converted into a public street
the Clark Field US Air Force Base was deemed commercial. without payment of just compensation was allowed, despite
the failure of the property owner to file his claim with the
Auditor General.

D. Waiver of Immunity: Consent to be Sued Held: The government, when it takes away a property from a
private land owner for public use without going through the
The state is deemed to have waived its immunity legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
 when it gives consent at the time the proceeding is aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
instituted; government without thereby violating the doctrine of
 when it takes steps relating to the merits of the case governmental immunity from suit. This doctrine cannot be
before invoking immunity; used in perpetrating injustice to a citizen.
 when, by treaty or contract, it had previously given
consent; or
 when, by law or regulation in force at the time the
complaint arose, it has indicated that it will consent to
the institution of the proceedings ii. Thru a special law
Special laws granting a particular person/entity to sue
In order that suit may lie against the state, there must government agencies may be granted by congress thru a
be consent, either express or implied. Where no resolution.
consent is shown, state immunity from suit may be
invoked as a defense by the courts sua sponte at any stage CASE: Merrit v. Government of the Phil. Islands, 34 Phil 311
of the proceedings, because waiver of immunity, being in Doctrines:
derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly and
must be construed in strictissimi juris. Accordingly, the ■ The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
complaint (or counterclaim) against the State must allege through a special agent; but not when the damage has
the existence of such consent (and where the same is been caused by the official to whom the task done
found), otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed properly pertains. (Art. 2180 par. 6, Civil Code)
[Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424].
■ The state is not responsible for the damages suffered
by private individuals in consequence of acts performed
by its employees in the discharge of the functions
1. Forms of Consent pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in
the organization of branches of public service and in the
a. Express
appointment of its agents. (Merritt vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands)
Express consent can be given only by an act of
the legislative boyd, in a general or a special
■ The State is not liable for the torts committed by its
law. officers or agents whom it employs, except when
expressly made so by legislative enactment. The
i. Thru a general law (Read Act No. 3083 government does not undertake to guarantee to any
and C.A. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445) person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it
employs since that would involve it in all its operations in
General laws granting consent to be sued include: endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which
 Money claims arising from contract under Act No. would be subversive of the public interest. (Merritt vs.
3048, CA 327, Art. IX-A – Sec. 7, 1987 Const. Must be Government of the Philippine Islands)
filed with COA which has 60 days within which to act.
Once a decision is made, claimant has 30 days to ■ By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives its
appeal by certiorari to the CA. immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to the plaintiff, or create any cause of action in
his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
 Article 2180 of the Civil code which allows
previously recognized. It merely gives remedy to enforce
complainants to sue the state for quasi-delicts a pre-existing liability and submit itself to the
committed by special agents. jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose
any lawful defense.
FACTS: Merrit who was a constructor was riding a motorcycle
 Incorporation of Government Owned and Controlled
along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance of
Corporation granting it a separate personality from
the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him
the national government.
unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457
authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to
 Local Government Code (RA 7160) which grants local
fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
government units the power to sue and be sued.
ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of
the damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court
held that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the
ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered
Amigable
Doctrine: v. Cuenca,
Even if,43
inSCRA 360 the power of eminent
exercising
the government to pay the same.
domain, the State exercises a power jus imperii (sovereign
acts), as distinguished from its proprietary right of jus
gestionis (commercial or proprietary acts) , where property
has been taken without just compensation being paid, the
defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up in an action
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.
ACT 2457 reads:
"An act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of
the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said
Islands to appear in said suit.
"Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the
Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting
from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and
thirteen;
"Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it
possible to determine the amount of damages, if any , to which the
claimant is entitled; and
"Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General
recommend that an act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E.
Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order
that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine
Legislature, that:
"SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the
Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital,
and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.
Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the attorney-
General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to
appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to
defend said Government at the same.
"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
"Enacted, February 3, 1915."
HELD:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from
suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any
cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a
special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by
the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. A
special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official. This concept does not apply to any executive agent
who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the
regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was
not a special agent; thus the Government is not liable.
b. Implied
i. When state commences litigation
Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., GR No. L-6060, Sept.
30, 1950
Doctrine: When the State commences litigation, it
becomes vulnerable to a counterclaim.
Facts: Fernando A. Froilan purchased the vessel FS-197 from
the Shipping Commission for P200,000, paying P50,000 down
and agreeing to pay the balance in installments. However, the
installments were not paid and the Shipping Commission took
possession of the vessel and considered the sale cancelled.
The Shipping Commission then chartered the vessel to Pan
Oriental Shipping Co.
Froilan then filed a complaint against Pan Oriental Shipping
Co. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed its answer denying the
right of Froilan to the vessel. Following this, the Republic of
the Philippines, as intervenor, filed a complaint in
intervention alleging that Froilan had failed to pay to the
Shipping Commission the balance. Froilan then tendered to
the Board of Liquidators (which was liquidating the affairs of
the Shipping Administration) a check in payment of his
obligation for the vessel. The lower court held that the check
constituted a payment and a discharge of Froilan's obligation
to the government.
However, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had also filed an answer
to the government's complaint in intervention saying that the
government was obligated to deliver the vessel to it by
contract. In response, the government filed a motion to
dismiss the counterclaim of Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against
it on the grounds that the action of delivering the vessel to
Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was no longer feasible and was
barred by prior judgment, and also that the court has no
jurisdiction over the intervenor government of the Republic
of the Philippines.
Held: Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the
counterclaim was untenable, because by filing its complaint
in intervention the Government in effect waived its right
to non-suability.
Lim v. Brownell, 107 SCRA 345
Doctrine: Intervention by the State would constitute
commencement of litigation, except when the State
intervenes not for the purpose of asking for any
affirmative relief, but only for the purpose of resisting the
claim precisely because of immunity from suit.
The claim for damages for the use of property against the
intervenor dependant Republic of the Philippines to which
it was transferred cannot be maintained because of the
immunity of the State from suit. The claim obviously
constitutes a charge against, or financial liability to, the
Government and consequently cannot be entertained by
the courts except with the consent of the government
Facts: The property in dispute consists of 4 parcels of land in
Tondo, city of Manila, with a total area of 29,151 sq. meters. The
lands were, after the last world war, found by the Alien Property
Custodian of the US to be registered in the name of Asaichi
Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan, as evidenced by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 64904 to 65140.
On March 14, 1946, the Alien Property Custodian issued a
vesting order on the authority of the Trading with the Enemy
Act of the United States, vesting in himself the ownershi over
two of the said lots – lots 1 and 2.
On July 6, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator
(Successor of the Alien Property Custodian), under the same
statute, issued a supplemental vesting order, vesting in himself
title to the remaining lots 3 and 4.
On August 3, 1948, The Philippine Alien Property administrator
transferred all the said four lots to the Republic of the
Philippines upon the latter’s undertaking fully to indemnify the
US for all claims in relation to the property transferred, which
claims are payable by the US or the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator of the US under the Trading with the Enemy Act.
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.
On November 15, 1948, Benito E. Lim, son of Arsenia Enriquez,
filed a formal notice of claim to the property on the theory that
the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia and that she
mortgaged these lots to the Mercantile Bank of China. And that
the mortgaged having been foreclosed, the property was sold at
public auction to Asaichi Kagawa, who, by means of threat and
intimidation succeeded in preventing Arsenia to exercise her
rights of redemption; and that Kagawa never acquired any valid
title to the property because he was ineligible under the
Constitution to acquire residential land in the Philippines by
reason of alien age.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the
case over the reason that it does not have jurisdiction over the
claim for rentals since the action in that regard constituted a suit
against the US to which it had not given its consent.
Ruling: The court decided that the order of dismissal couldn’t
be sustained in its entirety. The immunity of the state from suit
cannot be invoked where the action is instituted by a person
who is neither an enemy nor ally of an enemy for the purpose of
establishing his right, title or interest in vested property, and of
recovering his ownership and possession. Congressional
consent to such suit has expressly been given by the US.
The order of dismissal with respect to plaintiff’s claim for
damages against Atty. General of the US must be upheld because
congressional consent to such suit has not been granted. The
relief available to a person claiming enemy property which has
been vested by the Philippines Alien Property Custodian is
limited to those expressly provided for in the Trading with the
Enemy Act, which does not include a suit for damages for such
use of such vested property.
The claim for damages for the use of the property against the
intervenor defendant Republic of the Philippines cannot be
maintained because of the immunity of the state from suit which
needs the consent of that said government. The Republic of the
Philippines did not waive its right of non-suability because
Republic intervened in the case merely to unity with the
defendant Attorney General of the United States in resisting
plaintiff’s claims, and for that reason asked no affirmative relief
against any party in the answer in intervention it filed
ii. When state enters into a contract
US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487
Doctrine: where the Supreme Court classified contracts
entered into by the state into those in jure imperii and
those in jure gestionis
by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign
functions. No implied consent.
Thus, the contract for the repair of wharves was a
contract in jus imperii, because the wharves were to be
used in national defense, a governmental function.
FACTS: The United States of America had a naval base in
Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the
US. On May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of
bids for some projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc.
responded to the invitation and submitted bids. But the US
informed the company that it did not qualify to receive an
award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory
performance rating.
Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by
the US for the construction of wharves in said base that was
wrongly awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for
specific performance was filed by him against the US.
HELD: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a
State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality
of States. However, the rules of International Law are not
petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving.
And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has
been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that, State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may
be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued
only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United
States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
USA v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644
Doctrine: the contract bidded out for barbershop
facilities in the Clark Field US Air Force Base was
deemed commercial. Similarly, in a companion case,
U.S. v. Rodrigo, a contract for restaurant services within
the Camp John Hay Air Station was likewise held
commercial in character.
FACTS: The cases have been consolidated because they all
involve the doctrine of state immunity. In GR No. 76607,
private respondents re suing several officers of the US Air
Force in connection with the bidding for barbering services in
Clark Air Base. In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista was arrested
following a buy-bust operation for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Bautista then filed a complaint for damages
claiming that because of the acts of the respondents, he lost
his job. In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner for his dismissal as cook in the US
Air Force. In GR No. 80258, complaint for damage was filed by
the respondents against petitioners for injuries allegedly
sustained by plaintiffs. All cases invoke the doctrine of state
immunity as ground to dismiss the same.
HELD: It is clear that the petitioners in GR No. 80018 were
acting in the exercise of their official functions. They cannot
be directly impleaded for the US government has not given its
consent to be sued. In GR No. 79470, petitioners are not
immune for restaurants are commercial enterprises, however,
claim of damages by Genove cannot be allowed on the
strength of the evidence presented. Barber shops are also
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.
commercial enterprises operated by private persons, thus,
petitioners in GR No. 76607 cannot plead any immunity from
the complaint filed. In GR No. 80258, the respondent court
will have to receive the evidence of the alleged irregularity in
the grant of the barbershop concessions before it can be
known in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the
time of the incident.
E. Suit allowed even without consent to be sued
Santiago v. Republic, 87 SCRA 294
Doctrine: The government's waiver of immunity was
implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of
donation.
an action for the revocation of a donation because of the
failure of the defendant to comply with stipulated
conditions was allowed, inasmuch as the action did not
involve a money claim.
Facts:
Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to
the Bureau of Plant Industry on the terms that the Bureau
should construct a building and install lighting facilities on
the said lot.
When time passed and there were still no improvements on
the lot, Santiago filed a case pleading for the revocation of
such contract of donation but the trial court dismissed the
petition claiming that it is a suit against the government
and should not prosper without the consent of the
government.
Held: The doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen. It would be manifestly unfair for the
Republic, as done, alleged to have violated the conditions
under which it received gratuitously certain property, to
use the concept of non-suitability as its defence. The
government is the beneficiary and therefore should adhere
to the highest ethical standards, which can only be ignored
at the risk of losing the confidence of the people, the
repository of the sovereign power.
The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation
but it did not comply with such terms. Thus, the donor
Santiago has the right to be heard in the court. Also, to not
allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to
equity which the government so advances. The Court of First
Instance is hereby directed to proceed with the case.
F. Scope of Consent: Consent to be Sued not Consent to
Execution of Judgment
When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not
thereby consent to execution of judgment against it.
The mere fact that the state is suable does not mean that it is
liable, or to put in another way, waiver of immunity does not
mean concession of liability. (Cruz, Phil. Pol. L aw, 1996 Ed.
P. 46)
Assuming for the sake of argument that complainant wins
the case against the state, the extent of consent granted by
the state is only until the finality of judgment. Execution of
the judgment may not be done thru the ordinary means of
satisfying the award because public funds or property
cannot be garnished or levied upon just like any private
property. (Phil Video, Inc. vs TESDA, G. R. No. 155504, June
26, 2009).
The victorious claimant against the government must wait
until the funds to satisfy the award are appropriated by the
pertinent legislative body
Rep. v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84
Doctrine:
- Judgment against the State cannot be enforced by
execution. It may limit claimant’s action only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the state of
execution. Power of courts end when judgment is
rendered. [suability vs. liability]. Such execution will
require another waiver, because the power of the court
ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment, unless such disbursement is
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required
by law
- Functions and public services cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the disruption of public funds.
Facts: The decision that was rendered in favor of
respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan and
International Construction Corporation was declared final
and executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias
Writ of Execution was issued. And for the strength of this
writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment
with several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits; the
Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of
garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public
funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of
pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and
civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations of
AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in
excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the
properties of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are
null and void.
Issue: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor
valid?
Held: What was done by respondent Judge is not in
conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from
the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as
its government is immune from suit unless it gives its
consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. The State may not be sued without its consent. A
corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a
basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had
been previously granted and the state liability adjudged.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent
Tobe sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may limit claimant’s action only up to the completion
of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that
the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since the government funds and properties may
 Constitutional Law 1 (INTRODUCTION, CONCEPT OF STATE, STATE IMMUNITY)
Instructor: Atty. Edgardo Luardo Jr.

not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations
of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law
1. Exception
But funds belonging to government corporations
(whose charters provide that they can sue and be sued)
that are deposited with a bank are not exempt from
garnishment [Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan, 83
SCRA 595; Rizal Commercial Bank v. De Castro, 168
SCRA 49].
In National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Quivelondo,
G.R. No. 154411, June 19, 2003, it was held that if the
funds belong to a public corporation or a government-
owned or controlled corporation which is clothed
with a personality of its own, then the funds are not
exempt from garnishment. This is so because when
the government enters into commercial business, it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated
like any other corporation. NHA is one such
corporation; thus, its funds are not exempt from
garnishment or execution.
1. Read also The Local Government Code of 1991
Merrit v. Government of the Phil. Islands, supra
Principle: By consenting to be sued, a state simply
waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to the plaintiff, or create any cause
of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause
not previously recognized. It merely gives remedy to
Palafox v. Ilocos Norte, GR No. L-10659, Jan. 31, 1958
enforce a pre-existing liability and submit itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose
any lawful defense. The Government of the Philippines
is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers, and
employees when they act as special agents. A special
agent is one who receives a definite and fix order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his
office if he is a special official
Ruling: While consent to be sued was granted through a
special law, the government was held not liable for
damages, because under the attendant circumstances
the government was not acting through a special agent.

PNB v. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595

Doctrine:
- State immunity from suit cannot be validly invoked
with regard to funds of public corporations.

- [suable corporations] Public funds of corporations

which can sue and be sued are not exempt from
garnishment.

But funds belonging to government corporations (whose

charters provide that they can sue and be sued) that are
deposited with a bank are not exempt from garnishment.
[also see: Rizal Commercial Bank v. De Castro, 168 SCRA
49]

FACTS: Judgment was rendered against respondent

Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA). Judge
Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution followed
thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of PVTA.
The full amount mentioned in such writ is P12, 724.66.
Philippine National Bank allege that such funds are public
in character, thus, the doctrine of non-suability of a state is
applicable.

HELD: It is well-settled that when the government

enters into commercial business, it abandons its
sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other
corporation. Petitioner cannot set bar to the
garnishment for funds of public corporations which can
sue and be sued, as is the case of PVTA, are not exempt
from garnishment.

G. Suability vs. liability

Suability not equated with outright liability. Liability

will have to be determined by the Court on the basis of
the evidence and the applicable law.