G.R. No.

168809 March 10, 2006

EDWARD ROCO TAN and EDWIN ROCO TAN, Petitioners,

vs.
BENIGNO DE LA VEGA, ANGELA TUASON STALEY and ANTONIO PEREZ Y
TUASON, Respondents.

FACTS:

Respondents owned lot 89, the subject property, which was fraudulently titled via Free Patent
by Macario Mencias who subsequently sold said lot to New Atlantis Real Estate &
Development, Inc., and eventually sold by the corporation to the petitioners. Respondents
filed a complaint for quieting of title and for declaration of nullity of patent for being void
because the area they cover is entirely within their private covered by their title long before
the patent has been issued. Petitioners asserted that they were purchasers in good faith and
for value and that they have no knowledge of any defect in the title of the Corporation from
whom they purchased the controverted lot. Petitioners were declared in default so respondents
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which was granted by the trial court declaring the
disputed lot as respondents’ property. An appeal was denied by CA so petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.

ISSUE: whether a judgment on the pleadings is proper in the instant case.

HELD:

Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, states: “Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading”.

In this case, we find that the trial court erred in rendering judgment on the pleadings because the
pleadings filed by the parties generated ostensible issues that necessitate the presentation of
evidence. Respondents’ action for declaration of nullity of Patent and the titles derived
therefrom is based on their claim that the lot titled in the name of petitioners, is a portion of a
bigger tract of land previously titled in the name of their predecessors-in-interest. The
documents presented in support thereof were only photocopies.
G.R. No. 147212 March 24, 2006

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF

LANDS, Petitioner,
vs.
VICTORIANO ABALLE, ET AL, SALVADOR WEE et al.

FACTS:

Respondent Wee acquired the subject property pursuant to an Extra-Judicial Settlement of

Estate with Sale from the heirs of Francisco Rivera, the same was applied for Judicial
Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title which was lost and/or destroyed, as evidenced by
the certification issued by the ROD of Zamboanga City. The application was opposed by OSG
authorized the City Prosecutor to appear in its behalf. Notice of Hearing was posted in the
Sheriff’s Bulletin Board, the City Hall, and the public market, and likewise published in the
Official Gazette . RTC decided in favor of respondent and Ordering the reconstitution of
OCT. Petitioner appealed the RTC Order to the CA on the sole ground that the trial court erred
in ordering the reconstitution considering respondent’s failure to comply with the jurisdictional
requisites therefor by not serving the notice to the adjoining owners.

ISSUE: W/N the court acquire jurisdiction over the case under Section 13 of R.A. No. 26

HELD:

NO. The court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because notice was not serve to
the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties pursuant to SEC. 13 of
RA 26 which states “The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding
section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official
Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal
building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the
date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail
or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is
known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other
things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the
registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the
owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and
boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must
appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing,
submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.”

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. FRANCISCO

GARCIA

G.R. No. 147081 December 9, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioner PDB acquired the disputed property from Lorenzo Bautista upon latter’s
failure to pay the loan, foreclosed on the mortgage and bought the property in a public auction. Titled in
its name, PDB sold the land to spouses Marciano Ramirez and Erlinda Camacho. Respondent had been
an agricultural lessee on said parcel of land since 1936, Certificate of Land Transfer of Title pursuant to
PD 27. Respondent ) filed a petition for redemption before the DARAB of Cabanatuan City
alleging that as an agricultural lessee, he must be allowed to redeem the land but was
denied. Upon appeal at DARAB Appeal Board, said decision was reversed. PDB elevated
the case to the CA which affirmed in toto the decision of the DARAB Appeal Board.

ISSUES:

1) whether or not Garcia was an agricultural lessee of the predecessors of

PDB under Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27);
2) whether or not the transfer of the subject land to PDB was valid and
3) whether Garcia can redeem the land under Section 12 of Republic
Act No. 3844 (RA 3844), as amended by RA 6389.

HELD:

I- YES. The land was covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to PD 27 which laid down a
system for the purchase by small farmers of the lands they tilled. Landowners of agricultural lands which
were devoted primarily to rice and corn and exceeded the minimum retention area were compelled to
sell their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and conditions through the intercession of the
government. A qualified tenant farmer was then issued a CLT. In resolving the issue of the right of
redemption, the question of tenancy must first be resolved.

II- YES. Well-settled is the rule that persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of
Title may rely on the face of the certificate. As a rule, they are not required to go beyond what appears
therein. Good faith is likewise presumed. Garcia failed to show that PDB acquired the property in bad
faith. We thus hold that PDB was a mortgagee in good faith and acquired the subject land validly.
However, Garcia, as tenant or agricultural lessee, enjoys certain legal rights under RA 3844,
“Agricultural Land Reform Code.” Section 10 of this law provides that the existence of an agricultural
leasehold relationship is not terminated by changes in ownership in case of sale or transfer of legal
possession (as in lease). Given that Garcia is a holder of a CLT but not of an emancipation patent, full
ownership of the land has not yet vested in him. Hence, there is no basis for the CA and DARAB Appeal
Board to direct the bank to turn over the land to him.

Section 12 of RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389, provides the

III- NO.
remedy of redemption to the agricultural lessee when the land is
sold, with or without his knowledge. Garcia was notified in writing
of the transfer to PDB in 1984 but filed his petition for redemption
only in 1994, his right of redemption had already prescribed.

MARIA CARLOS, rep. by Teresita Carlos Victoria vs. REPUBLIC, rep. by

Director of Lands
G.R. No. 164823 August 31, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioner, heir of Maria Carlos, represented by her daughter, Teresita Carlos

Victoria, filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel
of land at Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila, which was opposed by respondent
however it was granted. Upon appeal before CA, said decision was reversed On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the applicant at the time
she filed her application for registration of title was no longer in possession and
occupation of the land in question since on October 16, 1996, the applicant’s
mother and predecessor-in-interest sold the subject land to Ususan Development
Corporation as admitted by witness Teresita Carlos Victoria during RTC trial,
admitting further that they promised to deliver the title to the corporation right
after the proceeding in order to collect the balance of the sale.
ISSUE:

W/N the petitioner is entitle to the confirmation of imperfect title.

HELD:

NO. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a)
that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the
public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. As found by the
Court of Appeals, petitioner has met the first requirement but not the second. In
Republic vs. Alconaba, “the applicant must show that he is in actual possession
of the property at the time of the application”. The applicant no longer had
possession of the property at the time of the application in 2001 since her mother
had sold the property to the Corporation in 1996.

ANECITO CALIMPONG and wife ISA YGUAS vs. HEIRS OF FILOMENA GUMELA
represented by FLAVIA MOLINA
G.R. No. 163751 March 31, 2006

FACTS:

Respondents are the heirs of FILOMENA GUMELA who was decreed as

“the owners in fee simple” of the lot in question. Respondents learned that the lot
was being occupied by Anecito Calimpong, which land has been awarded to him
via Free Patent, so they filed a complaint for quieting of title, damages, with
prayer for preliminary injunction against Calimpong and his wife, including
PENRO and the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte. Petitioners countered
that the land had been considered long abandoned because neither the
adjudicatee[s] nor any of the heirs have pursued the titling of the land, cultivation,
improvement and possession. RTC declared respondents as the rightful owners
of the land being the hereditary successors of the adjudicatees mentioned in the
Decree .
ISSUE:

W/N the petitioner is the rightful owner of the land.

HELD:

No. Under the provision of Act No. 2874 pursuant to which the title of private respondents’
predecessor in interest was issued, the President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Director
of Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public
land and has passed to private ownership, and a title so issued is null and void. The nullity
arises not, from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. In De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, “The title of
ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal
from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such appeal having been
perfected.” Hence, the lot, for all intents and purposes, had become from said date
registered property which could not be acquired by adverse possession and was,
therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Land Management Bureau of the DENR to
subject it to free patent.
G.R. No. L-17757 May 30, 1962

MAMERTA DE LA MERCED, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EZEQUIEL M. SANTOS, and AMPARO MACAPAGAL,
respondents.

FACTS:

Respondents, heirs of spouses Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal who acquired
title over disputed land by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court in 1923 and titled in
their name, sought recovery of ownership and possession thereof from the petitioner, and of the
landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 1950-1956. Petitioner countered that
their ownership over said property as evidenced by OCT issued to their predecessor Juan de la
Merced in 1931 and their continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.

ISSUE:
What is the effect of the order of the cadastral court of December 26, 1923 adjudicating the lot in favor
of Santos, and the subsequent order dated December 17, 1925, directing the issuance of a certificate of
title to Inocencio Santos?

Did those orders constitute registration under the law even though the corresponding certificate of title
has not been issued?

In the affirmative, could the property thereby affected still be lost by adverse possession?

HELD:

The Court held that the title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon
the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral
court, without such appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be
necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land where court
proceedings would no longer be necessary.As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral
court, ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No.
395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said property had already
become final, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral
proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the
issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for all intents and purposes, had become from
that time, registered property which could not be acquired by adverse possession.

G.R. No. 133168 March 28, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
BENJAMIN GUERRERO

FACTS:

Respondent Benjamin Guerrero filed with the Bureau of Lands a Miscellaneous Sales
Application of the disputed parcel of land which was approved and titled in his name in
1982. In 1983, one Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands claiming that
respondent obtained the sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or omission of
material facts considering that 174 square meters awarded to respondent covered the land where
her house is situated and where she has been residing since 1961. The Office of the President
remanded the case to DENR to conduct investigation which was recommended for the
‘proper correction’ of the technical description of the land issued to respondent. The Director of
Lands instituted the Petition for Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of OCT of the
respondent, which was opposed by respondent but was denied. RTC decided in favor of the
respondent alleging that petitioner failed to prove its allegation that respondent obtained the
sales patent and the certificate of title through fraud and misrepresentation, rendered judgment
finding for the latter. The trial court likewise ruled that the OCT in the name of respondent
acquired the characteristics of indefeasibility after the expiration of one (1) year from the entry
of the decree of registration.

ISSUE:

whether or not petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent procured
Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT through fraud and misrepresentation.

HELD:

NO. Petitioner fails to convince the Court that the facts relied upon by it to justify a review of the
decree constitute actual and extrinsic fraud. The law requires that fraud be established, not just
by preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence.While the Torrens system is
not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a system of registration of titles to lands,
justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect
of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a
fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. Respondent’s certificate of title, having been
registered under the Torrens system, was thus vested with the garment of indefeasibility.

ESTATE OF SALVADOR SERRA SERRA (SPEC. PROC. NO. 242) AND ESTATE OF
GREGORIO SERRA SERRA (SPEC. PROC. NO. 240), BOTH REPRESENTED BY THE
JUDICIAL CO-ADMINISTRATOR LUIS ISASI, MARGARITA SERRA SERRA,
FRANCISCA TERESA SERRA SERRA and FRANCISCO JOSE SERRA SERRA, petitioners,
vs. HEIRS OF PRIMITIVO HERNAEZ, REPRESENTED BY PRESENTACION HERNAEZ
BELBAR, HEIRS OF LUISA HERNAEZ, REPRESENTED BY WILFREDO GAYARES,
LOLITA GAYARES, JULIETA FORTALEZA AND ROSAURO FORTALEZA, HEIRS OF
ROGACIANA HERNAEZ, REPRESENTED BY LOURDES MONCERA, respondents.

[G.R. No. 142913. August 9, 2005]

FACTS:

Respondents filed a petition for reconstitution of alleged lost original certificates of title
(OCT) and owner’s duplicate copies in the name of Eleuterio Hernaez covering Lot No. 1316 of
Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 in Negros Occidental, and the same were
granted. Petitioners moved for the cancellation of the reconstituted titles averring that they are
holders of valid and existing certificates of title over the subject properties and have been in
continuous and actual possession thereof. RTC denied the petition, so petitioners appealed
before CA but the same was denied upon failure of petitioners to present sufficient
evidence for the cancellation of reconstitution. A certiorari was instituted before SC
however it was remanded to lower court to determine ownership of the lots which was , in
turn, awarded to respondents.

ISSUE:

W/N the petitioners were deinied of due process of law in availing the Writ of Certiorari
for cancellation of the reconstituted titles.
HELD:

No. In cases of annulment and/or reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not
merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land
sought to be reconveyed is his.Petitioners failed to present in court as evidence the original
certificates of title of the aforementioned lots . Petitioners were also found to be of Spanish
citizenship and, hence, as aliens, disqualified to acquire lands in the Philippines under the
Constitution.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. PEDRO O. ENCISO,

G.R. No. 160145 November 11, 2005

FACTS:

Respondent applied a fee simple land registration before RTC of Iba, Zambales averring that
he inherited from his deceased father the land formerlyowned by his uncle who acquired the
same from Municipality of Masinloc upon the approval Resolution No. 102-A dated March
15, 1969, authorizing its mayor to execute a deed of sale in favor of his uncle. The respondent
presented tax receipts to show that the property was declared for taxation purposes in his name.

The petitioner opposed contending that the first and primordial element in order to warrant the
registration of title is to show that the land must be an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Petitioner believes that the respondent failed to adduce any evidence to show that the
subject land was already previously declared part of such alienable and disposable land of the
public domain and Further adds that under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and those not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to it.

ISSUE:
W/N the court erred in granting the registration of land.

HELD:

Yes. Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
provides: “Who may apply. –(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.” Indeed, there is nothing to support the respondent’s claim that the
property “was reclassified as residential … already segregated from the public domain and
assumed the character of private ownership.” At the
moment, it is not clear as to when the proper authorities classified the subject as alienable and
disposable. It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

REPUBLIC and Director of Lands vs. JUDGE SINFOROSO FAÑGONIL, et al.

G.R. No. L-57112 November 29, 1984

FACTS:

Private respondents filed an application for registration of lots located within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation. Reservation were private and registerable under Act No. 496 as provided in section 62 of
Act No. 926. Once so determined, no further registration proceeding would be allowed. The court issued
a notice requiring all persons claiming lots inside the reservation to file within six months from the date
of the notice petitions for the registration of their titles under Act No. 496. The court ruled in 1922 that
lots of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, being public domain, are not registerable under Act No. 496.
The court "has no Jurisdiction to entertain any land registration proceedings" under Act No. 496 and the
Public Land Law, covering any lot within the Baguio Townsite Reservation which was terminated in 1922.

After more than half a century from the 1922 decision declaring the townsite public domain, private
respondents re-filed an applications for the registration of lots inside the Baguio Townsite Reservation
alleging that in case the lots are not registerable under Act No. 496, then section 48 (b) and (c) of the
Public Land Law should be applied because they and their predecessors have been in possession of the
lots for more than thirty years. However, The Director of Lands opposed the applications on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, prescription and res judicata; that the decision in the first registration
case, a proceeding in rem, which barred all subsequent registrations of the Baguio Townsite lots.

ISSUE: W/N the registration of the land is barred by res judicata.

HELD:

Yes. The period of more than fifty years completely bars the applicants from securing relief due to the
alleged lack of personal notice to their predecessors. The law helps the vigilant but not those who sleep
on their rights. "For time is a means of destroying obligations and actions, because time runs against the
slothful and contemners of their own rights."

Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 627, the law governing military reservations, contemplate notification to two
classes of persons, namely, (1) those who are living upon or in visible possession of any part of the
military reservation and (2) persons who are not living upon or in visible possession but are absentees.
A distinction is made between these two classes of persons as to the manner in which service of the
notice shall be made. Service is complete as to absentees when publication of the notice in the
newspaper is completed and duly fixed upon the four corners of the premises. The six-month period
commences to run from that time.

UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM

•Most, if not all, ordinary applications for land registrationis based on possession and
occupation, tax declarationand tax realty receipts, and nothing more. Taxdeclaration and
realty tax receipts are not evidence of agrant of land from the State.•The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that they arenot conclusive evidence of ownership. Nevertheless theSupreme
Court has also consistently held that they aregood indicia of possession in the concept of an
owner.[Ramos-Balallo vs. Ramos, 470 SCRA 533 (January 23,2006)]

REMEDIES OF AGGRIEVED PARTIES INLAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

• An action for reconveyance does not prescribedwhen the plaintiff is in possession of the
land tobe reconveyed.” [Naval vs. CA, 483 SCRA 102(February 22, 2006); see also Cuizon
vs.Remoto, 472 SCRA 274 (October 11, 2005)]•
SPS. RAMON and ESTRELLA RAGUDO vs. FABELLA ESTATE TENANTS
ASSOCIATION, INC.

[G.R. No. 146823. August 9, 2005]

FACTS:

The parcel of land in question belongs to the estate of the late Don Dionisio M. Fabella
wherein tenants therein organized themselves and formed the Fabella Estate Tenants
Association, Inc. (FETA), for the purpose of acquiring said property and distributing it to its
members. FETA applied for a loan from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) to satisfy the amount needed and as a pre-condition for the loan , NHMFC required
all tenants to become members of FETA. Petitioners refused to join the Association so the lot
they occupied was awarded to Mrs. Miriam De Guzman, a qualified FETA member.

FETA filed a complaint for recovery of possession before RTC against the Ragudos which
was granted . Petitioners appealed before CA and while pending , FETA filed with the RTC a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, to which the Ragudos filed with
Rejoinder to Reply With Counter-Motion to Admit Attached Documentary Evidence Relevant to
the Pending Incident which was admitted and denied FETA’s motion for execution pending
appeal. Petitioners filed with the appellate court a Motion To Admit Certain Documentary
Evidence by Way of Partial New Trial, In the Interest of Justice, thereunder seeking the
admission in evidence of the very documents earlier admitted by the trial court in connection
with the then pending incident of execution pending appeal, and praying that said documents be
made part of the records and considered in the resolution of their appeal in before CA but was
denied on the ground that they could not be considered as newly discovered evidence under
Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the CA erred in not admitting petitioner’s documentary evidences.
 2. W/N the petitioners are entitled to own the land.

HELD:

I- NO. Section 34, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court provided that “The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered”. A well-entrenched is the rule that the mistake
and negligence of counsel to introduce, during the trial of a case, certain pieces of evidence bind
his client. For sure, in Aguila vs. CFI of Batangas, we even ruled that the omitted evidence by
reason of counsel’s mistake or negligence, cannot be invoked as a ground for new trial. ‘a client
is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain
that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently. If such grounds were to
be admitted and reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as
new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned.

II-

No. In Bishop vs. Court of Appeals, a registered owners of the lot has the right to eject any
person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed
that they were aware of the petitioner’s occupation of the property, and regardless of the
length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their
property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at
all. This right is never barred by laches.

SPOUSES JOSE BEJOC and JOVITA CAPUTOL BEJOC, petitioners, vs. PRIMA
CALDERON CABREROS and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

[G.R. No. 145849. July 22, 2005]

FACTS:

Petitioners are the administrators of the two parcels of land owned by the respondent
through deed of donation executed by her mother-in-law to her deceased husband. As
administrators, they were tasked to deliver the harvest to Lucinda Calderon, the mother of
respondent while she is in Hawaii. They were also responsible for paying the taxes due thereon,
to be taken from the proceeds of the sale of the crops. During the visit of respondent in the
Philippines, she discovered that tax declarations of said lots were cancelled in favor of the
petitioners and the same lot were fraudulenty titled in the name of the petitioners. In an
action for reconveyance filed by respondent, petitioners countered that they had been in
possession of the parcels of land as administrators since 1974 and as absolute owners since 1978;
that even assuming the truth of respondent’s allegations, the action for reconveyance was
already barred by prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s action for reconveyance has prescribed.

HELD:

NO. Article 1456 of the Civil Code: “If the property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of
the person from whom the property comes”. It has been held time and again that the rule on
indefeasibility of title cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner. In Viral
v. Anore, et al. we ruled that “While under ordinary circumstances the statute of limitations may
bar an action to cancel a Torrens title issued upon a free patent, yet where the registered owner x
x x knew that the parcel of land described in the patent and in the Torrens title actually belonged
to another person, such statute barring action will not apply. It may be the better procedure,
however, that the true owner bring an action to have the ownership or title to the land judicially
settled, and the court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation
of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the registered owner to reconvey the land
to the rightful owner. A well-settled rule is that an action for reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes in 10 years.

FLAVIANA LIM CAJAYON and CARMELITA LIM CONSTANTINO VS. SPOUSES

SANTIAGO and FORTUNATA BATUYONG,

G.R. No. 149118 February 16, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners and Isagani P. Candelaria were co-owners of lot with 260-sq. m.

Lot 6-A,100 sq. m., was adjudicated to the latter upon partition agreement
while Lot 6-B, 160 sq. m. , was given to petitioners. Candelaria sold his
property, including the improvements thereon, to respondents. Petitioners
constructed a seven (7)-door bungalow-type building including at least
20.61 sq. m. of the portion being used as right of way . Respondents filed an
ejectment case against petitioners before the MeTC of Caloocan attaching
the verification survey conducted by Engr. Valencia affirming the 20.61 sq. m.
encroachment of the respondnets area , which was decided in favor of
respondents. On appeal, the RTC and CA denied the petition and affirmed
the judgment of the MeTC.

ISSUES:

I- W/N the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear ejectment case.

II- W/N the verification survey results be given weight.

HELD:

I- Yes. It is settled that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is

determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court allows a plaintiff to bring an
action in the proper inferior court for forcible entry or unlawful detainer
within one (1) year, respectively, after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession. In forcible entry, the one-year period is counted
from the date of actual entry on the land. Records show that the ejectment
suit was instituted on 11 April 1997. Petitioners’ actual entry into the
property, according to the complaint, took place on 21 May 1996. Thus, the
suit was filed well within the one (1)-year period mandated by law.

II- Yes. There is a presumption that official duty is regularly performed, i.e.,
government officials who perform them are clothed with the presumption of
regularity, as the courts below pointed out. In this case, the verification
survey was conducted by a government functionary. Even prescinding from
the presumption of regularity, what appears on record is that the verification
survey was conducted with the agreement of both parties and in their
presence. That was the finding made by the courts below and affirmed by the
appellate court without any wrinkle.

FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC., MEGATOP REALTY DEVELOPMENT,

INC., PEAKSUN ENTERPRISES AND EXPORT CORP., ARTURO DY, AND
ELENA DY JAO,

Vs. GEORGE H. TRONO, MA. TERESA TRONO, MA. VIRGINIA TRONO,

JESSE TRONO, MA. CRISTINA TRONO, PATRICIA TRONO, MA. DIVINA
TRONO, INOCENCIO TRONO, JR., CARMEN TRONO, AND ZENAIDA
TRONO,

G. R. No. 130871 February 17, 2006

FACTS:

Respondents applied for registration of a parcel of land in Las Pinas City in

1994. Petitionersopposed alleging that as per Survey Plan, respondents’ property
partly overlaps their lot and that as early as 1989, this lot was registered in their
names. In 1995, Ayala Land, Inc. also filed an opposition to respondents’
application for registration anchored on the ground that the land applied for
overlaps the parcels of land already titled in its name. Petitioners and Ayala Land
filed their respective motions to dismiss respondents’ application for registration
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction claiming that “since the property was
previously Torrens registered in their names, the trial court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the proceedings” but the same was denied.

Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
which was granted. Petitioners then filed their motion for partial reconsideration
praying that the case before RTC be dismissed with prejudice and to declare that
the right of respondents to file any action for reconveyance of the property has
prescribed. Meanwhile, Ayala Land and respondents filed with the CA a “Motion
for Judgment Based on Compromise Agreement.” CA rendered an Amendatory
Decision, holding that in view of the Compromise Agreement, the case as between
Ayala Land and respondents has become moot and academic, while petitioners’
motion for partial reconsideration was denied.

ISSUES:

I- W/N the trial court has jurisdiction over respondents’ application for
registration of a parcel of land.

II- W/N the respondents are entitled to the registration.

HELD:

I- Yes. Sec. 2 of PD 1529 partly provides: “Judicial proceedings for the

registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem, and shall be based
on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens System. Courts of First
Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original
registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over
all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.”

II- No. The land was already registered in petitioners’ name as early as 1989, or
five (5) years before the filing of respondents’ application for registration.
Thus, it is too late for respondents to question petitioners’ titles considering that
the Certificates of Title issued to the latter have become incontrovertible after the
lapse of one year from the decree of registration. Respondents’ application for
registration of a parcel of land already covered by a Torrens title is actually a
collateral attack against petitioners’ title not permitted under the principle of
indefeasibility of a Torrens title. It is well settled that a Torrens title cannot be
collaterally attacked; the issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was
fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the
purpose.

[G.R. No. 158919. August 9, 2005]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and CAVITE COLLEGE OF FISHERIES, petitioners, vs.

MAXIMA LENSICO, RUFINA LENSICO, ROGELIO LENSICO and VICTOR LENSICO,
respondents.

FACTS:

Respondents are heirs of Melanio Lensico who acquired the property in question, originally part
of the Friar Land, through Deed of Sale entered by him and Bureau of Lands after securing
three (3) favorable endorsements recommending the sale of lot at private sale without auction to
Lensico and the same was titled in his name. Upon death of the Lensico, respondents learned
that the land occupied by Cavite College is part of their lot so they demanded a compensation
for occupancy and to either vacate or buy the premises . Ignored by Cavite College so
respondents instituted a Recovery of Possession of Property or Payment of Price of Land .

Cavite College admitted the existence of Title but insisted that by its actual occupation since
1961 and the immense improvements it had introduced, it has a better and superior right to the
property; that by virtue of RA 661 , AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A SCHOOL OF FISHERIES IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF NAIC, PROVINCE OF CAVITE
and municipal resolution passed in 1961 designating the establishment of the school for teaching
purposes. On the other hand, Republic moved to annul the title of Lensico on the ground that
the property is part of the foreshore land and could not be titled as private property. Respondents
countered that it was not true that the Cavite College had erected a building on the property as
early as 1961 because in 1964 there was as yet no building in the area; that whenCongress
approved Republic Act 2661 and the Naic Municipal Council passed its Resolution on August 5,
1961 designating the foreshore land as the school site, the exact location was not yet determined
and it was only later when it was discovered that the Cavite College already encroached on their
property that the subject area was imputed. It was also denied that the property was part of the
sea because this had long been dry land and part of the Naic Estate.

ISSUE: W/N the respondents’ predecessor was the lawful owner of the parcel of land occupied
by petitioner school.

HELD:

Yes. The evidence of respondents was not sufficiently overcome by that presented by petitioners
to establish the claim that the property was foreshore or beach land. It further said that the public
nature of the land was dispelled by its registration since 1913 under OCT 181. The TCT was
granted upon full compliance with the substantive and procedural requirements for its
acquisition, such as the appraisal and investigation by the Bureau of Lands , as well as several
endorsements from BL officers. Respondents had an indefeasible and conclusive title to the
property, by virtue of which the Municipal Council of Naic had no authority to dispose of any
part of the land. Foreshore land has been defined as that which lies between the high and the
low water marks, and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. In other
words, it is that strip of land between high and low water, the land left dry by the flux and reflux
of the tides. The land in the present case have not been proven to be covered by water during
high tide. Hence, the property cannot be considered foreshore land.
REMEDIES OF AGGRIEVED PARTIES INLAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

Sps. Cuizon and Salvador Cuizon vs. MERCEDES C. REMOTO, et al.

G.R. No. 143027/472 SCRA 274 (October 11, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners-spouses Cuizon rely on TCT No. RT-3121 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Agusan del Norte on March 15, 1984, pursuant to a notarized Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Sale dated August 3, 1983 executed by the heirs of Placida Tabada-Lambo, wherein they
adjudicated unto themselves the one-fourth share of Placida and at the same time, sold said
portion to their co-heir, Encarnacion L. Cuizon. TCT No. RT-3121 is a transfer from TCT No.
RT-183 which originally covers 16 hectares in the name of Placida , Eugenio Tabada, Raymunda
Tabada and Patrecia Tabada, each being one-fourth shareowner.

On the other hand, respondents have in their favor a notarized Deed of Sale of Real Property
dated September 19, 1968, involving a portion of the same property covered by TCT No. RT-
183, measuring 4,300 square meters, executed by Placida in favor of Angel Remoto , husband of
respondent Mercedes C. Remoto, and father of the other respondents, Leonida R. Meynard,
Celerina R. Rosales and Remedios C. Remoto.

ISSUE:

who has a better right to the property in dispute?

HELD:

Respondents have a better right to the property in dispute . As correctly ruled by both the trial
court and the CA, the 1968 Deed of Sale executed by Placida in favor of Angel should prevail
over the 1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale made by the heirs of Placida in favor of
petitioners-spouses Cuizon. Prior tempore, potior jure. It simply means, “He who is first in
time is preferred in right.” The only essential requisite of this rule is priority in time, and the
only one who can invoke this is the first vendee. Records bear the fact that when Placida sold
her one-fourth portion of the property covered by TCT No. RT-183 in 1968, the 1983 Extra-
Judicial Settlement with Sale was still inexistent, and more importantly, said portion was yet to
be transferred by succession to Placida’s heirs. The records also show that after Placida sold her
portion to Angel, the latter immediately took possession of the same. Applying the principle of
priority in time, it is clear that Angel, and consequently his heirs, the respondents herein, have a
superior right to the property.

It must be noted that the sale by Placida to Angel is evidenced by a duly notarized deed of
sale. Documents acknowledged before notaries public are public documents and public
documents are admissible in evidence without necessity of preliminary proof as to their
authenticity and due execution. They have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to
contradict the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant. Petitioners failed to present any clear and convincing evidence to prove that the
deed of sale is “void, fictitious, unenforceable and has no legal effect.”

The fraudulent registration of a parcel holds the person in whose name the land is registered as a mere trustee of
an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Registration alone without good faith
is not sufficient. Good faith must concur with registration for such prior right to be enforceable. [Portes, Sr. vs.
Arcala, 468 SCRA 343 9august30, 2005)]

NAPOLEON PORTES, SR. , et al. vs. SEGUNDA ARCALA, et al.

G.R. No. 145264 August 30, 2005

FACTS:

Respondents claimed that as early as 1908, their parents, Vicente and Felisa, had already
occupied and developed the disputed parcels of land, Lots 2 and 3 in Negros Occidental. In
1912, homestead patents were issued. Upon deaths of their parents, respondents succeeded
then took possession over it. Petitioners, the subsequent buyers, as fraudulently titled in the
name of Felomina Gustilo and sold the same, who despite the knowledge that cadastral
court issued a decree of registration excluding Lots 2 and 3 from the decree of registration since
Vicente and Felisa had already obtained a homestead patent, insisted that they and their
predecessors-in-interest acquired ownership of Lot in good faith and that the
action has prescribed and laches now bars the action.

ISSUES:
 1. WHETHER or not PETITIONERS and their predecessors-in-interest acquired the lot validly.

3. WHETHER or not THE DOCTRINES OF LACHES, PRESCRIPTION AND INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE

UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM OR REGISTRATION ARE APPLICABLE TO THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS.

HELD:

1. No. Felomina’s title is void and subsequent buyers were not innocent purchasers since all of them had notice of
the flaws of the certificates of title.

2. No. THE DOCTRINES OF LACHES, PRESCRIPTION AND INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS
SYSTEM ARE not APPLICABLE since it was acquired through fraud. The fraudulent registration of a parcels of land
holds the person in whose name the land is registered as a mere trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes. Registration alone without good faith is not sufficient.

PRESUMPTIVE INDEFEASIBILITY,CONCLUSIVENESS AND INCONTOVERTIBILITYOF A

TORRENS TITLE

•“T.C.T. No. M-19968 and T.C.T. No. 19973, being genuine and valid, on their face, are
incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against the petitioners and the whole
world.Thus, the unregistered deed of sale and the subdivision contract upon which
petitioners rely,cannot prevail over the certificate of title in the name of Cruz. To hold
otherwise is to defeat the primary object of the Torrens System which is to make the Torrens
title indefeasible and valid against the whole world.” [Santos vs. Cruz, 484SCRA 66 (March 3,
2006)]

RICARDO SANTOS and PAULA SANTOS WONG vs. ILUMINADA CRUZ,

G.R. Nos. 170096-97 March 3, 2006

FACTS:

Respondent is the owner of a two parcels of land and titles were issued by ROD of Malabon; portions
of which were occupied by petitioners . Respondent filed two actions for ejectment against petitioners
alleging that the latter entered her lot without her consent and built thereon structures without her
permission; that petitioners, being her relatives, were allowed to stay free of charge on condition that they
will vacate the premises upon demand; despite repeated demands, petitioners refused to vacate the said
lots.
 Petitioners admitted respondent’s ownership of the lots they occupied but alleged that portion of it was
sold to them by respondent. RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent.Without moving for
reconsideration at CA, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before SC decrying the alleged violation
by the Regional Trial Court of their right to procedural and substantive due process. The Court issued a
Resolution on October 3, 2005 ordering the petitioners to: a) PAY the docket and other legal fees as
required under Sec. 3, Rule 46 in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 56; and b) SUBMIT: (1) a certification
against forum shopping, (2) a statement of material date (3) proof of service and (4) proof of
authority . In compliance, the petition they submitted was written in old and torn piece of scratch paper,
which does not look like a formal pleading. The petition lacked certification against forum shopping, a
statement of the material date showing when notice of the assailed decision was received, proof of
service, and proof of authority of Ricardo Santos to sign the verification on behalf of the other petitioner.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioners were deprived of their right to procedural and substantive due process.

HELD:

No. Petitioners did not file a prior motion for reconsideration from the decision of the trial court. Even
as they alleged in the petition that the lower court acted without jurisdiction when it rendered a decision
without due process in the proceedings, the averment of facts was incomplete. Moreover, the instant
petition for certiorari should have been filed with the Court of Appeals pursuant to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Disregard of this rule warrants the dismissal of the petition. While the Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court
of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not allow an unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. Petitioners have not alleged sufficient ground why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed.
Thus, we reaffirm the established rule that this Court will not entertain a direct appeal unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify the resort to the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari.

T.C.T. No. M-19968 and T.C.T. No. 19973, being genuine and valid, on their face, are incontrovertible,
indefeasible and conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world.Thus, the unregistered deed of
sale and the subdivision contract upon which petitioners rely,cannot prevail over the certificate of title in
the name of Cruz. To hold otherwise is to defeat the primary object of the Torrens System which is to
make the Torrens title indefeasible and valid against the whole world.

EXCEPTION TO THE RULE OF INDEFEASIBILITY OF A TORRENS TITLE

• A title emanating from a free patent whichwas secured through fraud andmisrepresentation
does not becomeindefeasible, precisely because the patentfrom whence the title sprung is
itself voidand of no effect whatsoever.

HEIRS OF CARLOS ALCARAZ vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, BENJAMIN DAYOR and ADELA ALCARAZ,
G.R. No. 131667 July 28, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners are heirs of Carlos Alcaraz who owns 1/3 of the subject property, the other 2/3 are co-
owned by his siblings Timotea and Igmedio respectively. Petitioners secured free patent covering the
entire area, so the heirs of Timotea and Igmedio , together with the Republic, filed a formal protest
assailing the validity of the free patent alleging that the same was obtained thru fraudulent acts and
misrepresentation. OSG complaint for annulment and cancellation of Free Patent and the reversion of
the same land to the public domain . Petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint,
averring that they have complied with all the requirements for the issuance of a free patent and have not
committed any fraud or misrepresentation in their application; that their title become indefeasible
under the Torrens System.

ISSUE:

W/N THE RULE OF INDEFEASIBILITY OF A TORRENS TITLE APPLIES TO THE PETITIONERS.

HELD:

NO. In Bagiuo vs. Republic, et al , once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of
title is issued, the land becomes private property, and Title becomes indefeasible after one year from
the date of issuance . However, in Director of Lands v. De Luna, even after the lapse of one year, the
State may still bring an action under Sec.101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 for the reversion to the
public domain of land which has been fraudulently granted to private individuals. Such action is not
barred by prescription, and this is settled law.
CHAVEZ v. PEA and AMARI
GR No. 133250; July 9, 2002

FACTS:

The government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay and for the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road Project (MCCRRP). CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty
percent of the total reclaimed land.

PD 1084 was enacted creating Public Estates Authority (PEA) tasked "to reclaim land,including
foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x xlease and sell any and all
kinds of lands" and transfer to PEA the "lands reclaimed the foreshore and offshore of the Manila
Bay" under the MCCRRP. CDCP and PEA entered into a Memorandum agreement to execute the
provisions contained in PD 1084. Subsequently, ROD of Parañaque issued Title in the name of PEA,
covering the three reclaimed islands known as the"Freedom Islands". PEA entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The
JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding
these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan. All these happened
without public bidding. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the JVA, contending that provisions
on the JVA transferring ownership to PEA is contrary to law since reclaimed lands form part of public
domain and cannot be sold, only leased.

ISSUE:

(a)WON the reclaimed areas were validly reclassified into alienable or disposableands of public domain
(b)WON the AMARI may acquire ownership over the disputed reclaimed lands, including the submerged areas
still to be developed.

HELD:

We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:

1. Yes. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands titled in the name of
PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain which may be leased to private corporations but may
not sell . PEA may only sell except to Filipino citizens. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of
Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service.

2. NO. The JVA seeks to transfer the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands to AMARI,
a private corporation, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands
of the publicdomain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can
classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for
public service.

Laurel vs Garcia
G.R. No. 92013. July 25, 1990
G.R. No. 92047, July 25, 1990
OJEDA, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., et al

FACTS:

These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from
proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 sq. m. of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku,
Tokyo, Japan .The subject property is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, and is part of the
indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War
II.As intended, the subject property became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred
to Nampeidai . Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has
remained undeveloped since that time.

A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos
J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm where, at the end of the
lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine government. President
Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo
and Kobe. Thereafter, EO No. 296 was issued entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations’
capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.

ISSUES:

I- W/N Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government.
II- W/N Executive Order No. 296 is constitutional.
III- W/N the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi
property.
HELD:

I- No, under Par. 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code, Roppongi lot and its kind is property of public dominion
and intended for some public service and outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.

II- Yes, Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an “authority to sell”, does not have a provision in
this text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for the government sector. It
merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease
or other disposition.

III- No, Rep Act No. 6657, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It
merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform
Fund created under Executive Order No. 299. Assuming that the Roppongi property is no longer of public
dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the respondents. There is no law authorizing its conveyance.

RUMARATE v. HERNANDEZ
487 SCRA 317 April 18, 2006

FACTS:

Sps. Rumarate filed an action for reconveyance of real property and quieting of title against the heirs of sps.
Hernandez. Rumarate averred that Santiago Guerrero orally bequeathed his rights over lot 379 to him in 1929.
Thereafter, their family cleared the land, built a house, and planted on it. A quitclaim was also executed by
Santiago in their favor in 1960.In 1970, Rumarate discovered that sps. Hernandez were able to obtain title over
lot 379 but he did not file a case immediately.Respondent heirs of sps. Hernandez claimed that Santaigo sold
the lot to them in 1964 but they were not able to possess the land.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners are entitled for the award of lot 379.

RULLING:

Yes, Rumarate’s open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of lot 379 for more than
30 years vested them title over the lot. Action for quieting of title is aimed to determine the respective rights of
the parties and to prevent future disturbances thereon; it is merely a confirmation proceeding and; is
imprescriptible. The requisites for an action for quieting of title are :

1.Plaintiff has legal or equitable title to or interest in the subject property.

2.The deed, claim, incumberance, or proceeding casts cloud on his title even if it appears to be valid or legally
efficient but was really invalid.

Only a positive and categorical assertion of their supposed rights against petitioners would rule out the
application of laches. It means taking the initiative by instituting means to rest possession. Respondent’s
payment of taxes alone, without possession, could hardly be considered as an exercise of ownership. What
stands out is their overwhelming passivity by allowing petitioners to exercise acts of ownership and to enjoy the
fruits of the litigated lot for 32 years without any interference.”
PRESUMPTIVE INDEFEASIBILITY,CONCLUSIVENESS AND INCONTOVERTIBILITYOF A
TORRENS TITLE

Emilio Pacioles v. Miguela Chuatoco-Ching

466 SCRA 90 August 9,2005

Facts:

Petitioner survived his wife who owned real property and died intestate and the same was
petitioned by petitioner for administration. Petition was opposed by deceased mother averring that
said property, being paraphernal, she has direct and material interest in the estate because she
gave half of her inherited properties to the deceased on condition that they would undertake a
business endeavor as partners. Court appointed Emilio and Emmanuel as joint-administrator.
Thereafter, Emilio filed an inventory while Emmanuel failed to file one. Court declared Emilio and his
children as the only compulsory heirs of the deceased. Emilio then petitioned the court for the
payment of estate tax and the partition and distribution of the estate. RTC denied the petition as to
the partition and distribution.

Issue:

W/N the RTC has the power to determine questions of ownership that arise during proceedings.

Held:

No. General Rule, jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only
to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but
does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction. A well-
recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and
pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should
be included in the inventory.
If a property covered by a Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title
should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the
holder thereof should be considered the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified
or modified in an appropriate ordinary action.

ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE

NAVAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL

G.R. No. 167412 / 483 SCRA 102 February 22, 2006

FACTS:

In 1969, petitioner sold a parcel of land located in Camarines Sur to Galarosa. The sale was
recorded in the ROD pursuant to Act No. 3344, the law governing registrations of all instruments on
unregistered lands. Thereafter , Galarosa sold portions of the land to respondents Balilla, Nacion,
spouses Moya, and Camalla. All buyers occupied the portion they bought, built improvements
thereon, and paid the taxes due thereto.

Petitioner Juanita Naval, the great grand daughter of Ildefonso, was issued by the ROD an OCT
covering a portion of the subject land. She claimed that she bought the subject land from Ildefonso in
1972. Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Aguirre, Balila, Moya, and
Nacion. However, the case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute the action for an
unreasonable length of time. After 20 years, petitioner re-filed the complaint for recovery of
possession which was granted declaring her as the legal owner of the land. Upon appeal, finding the
prior registration of the deed of sale between Ildefonso and Galarosa with the ROD as a constructive
notice to subsequent buyers, the appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: W/N respondents have the superior right over the parcel of land .

HELD:

Yes. Act No. 3344, provides for the registration of all instruments on land neither covered by the
Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System. Under this law, registration by the first buyer is
constructive notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith; it binds
third person who may subsequently deal with the same property.
Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that “upon the expiration of said period of one
year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible.” However, it
does not deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title or ownership which is represented by such certificate. Ownership is
different from a certificate of title. The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her name did
not vest ownership upon her. Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not
create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. It cannot be used to
protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud;
neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others.

G.R. No. L-35778 January 27, 1983

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS
vs.
HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and LUISITO MARTINEZ

G.R. No. L-35779 January 27, l983

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS
vs.
HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, judge, CFI, Bataan, Branch I, and THELMA TANALEGA

FACTS:

In both cases, petitioners opposed the registration of parcels of land instituted by respondents
on the ground that said land, being forest land, was declared public lands and can no longer
be subject to registration by voluntary proceedings, for they have already been subjected to
compulsory registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act which the lower court has no
jurisdiction over the application since respondents failed to file their answers in the aforesaid
cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they were then
occupying..

ISSUE:

W/N the land in question is registrable under cadastral proceeding.

HELD:

No. A parcel of forest land sought to be registered is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens
System .Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land,
under the doctrine of res judicata. A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world.
Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by
final judgment.
In a cadastral proceedings ,Section 9 of Act No. 2259 requires applicant to file an answer on or
before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court, giving the details
required by law, such as:

(1) Age of the claimant;

(2) Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot numbers, as the case may be;
(3) Name of the barrio and municipality, township or settlement in which the lots are situated;
(4) Names of the owners of adjoining lots;
(5) If claimant is in possession of the lots claims and can show no express grant of the land by the
Government to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answer need state the length of
time property was held in possession and the manner it was acquired, giving the length of
time, as far as known, during which his predecessors, if any, held possession;
(6) If claimant is not in possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall set forth the interest
claimed by him and the time and manner of its acquisition;
(7) If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value; and
(8) Encumbrance, if any, affecting the lots and the names of adverse claimants as far as known. In
the absence of successful claimants, the property is declared public land.

REPUBLIC vs. SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (SHAI)

G. R. No. 156951 & 173408, September 22, 2006

FACTS:

Proclamation No. 423 which established a military reservation known as Fort William McKinley later
renamed Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, was issued by former President Carlos Garcia. Areas
specified in the Proclamation were withdrawn from sales and settlements and were reserved for
military purposes. Several presidential proclamations would be later be issued excluding certain
defined areas from the operation of Proclamation 423.

SHAI, a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers, was able to secure
title in its name and TCT was issued by ROD of Rizal on the basis of a notarized deed of sale
purportedly executed by then Land Management Bureau Director Abelardo Palad Jr. Petitioner
questioned the title averring that the same has not been effectively separated from the military
reservation and declared as alienable and disposable. The investigation conducted by the DOJ,
however, reported land scams at the FBMR and also finding that the signature of Palad was forged.
Hence, then Pres. Ramos ordered the cancellation of TCT in SHAI’s name as well as the title
acquired by the Navy Officer’s Village Association over a bigger parcel of land within the reservation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable .

RULING:

No. The Court upheld the contention of the Republic that the area is inalienable, the same having
not effectively been separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and
disposable. Until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the military
reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable,
its status as part of a military reservation remains, even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose
other than as a military camp or for defense.

SHAI had not pointed to any proclamation or legislative act for that matter segregating the property
from the reservation and classifying the same as alienable lands of public domain. Furthermore, the
Constitution also forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable public land except
through lease for a limited period.

BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BUREAU OF LANDS and PHILIPPINE FISHERIES COMMISSION

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO
G.R. No. L-37995 August 31, 1987

FACTS:

Petitioners opposed the application of four (4) parcels of land in Buenavista, Iloilo instituted by
Mercedes Diago in 1961 on the ground that certain portions of the land are mangrove swamps and
are within Timberland. In 1965, respondent Filomeno Gallo purchased the property and substituted
Mercedes Diago in the application, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for Registration
of Title. Petitioner Philippine Fisheries Commission was substituted by Bureau of Forestry as
oppositor over a portion of the land sought to be registered, supervision and control of said portion
having been transferred to Bureau of Forestry . The trial court ordered the registration of the four
(4) parcels of land in the name of respondent. Upon appeal, petitioners contended that respondent
court completely ignored the undisputed facts that 1) the controverted area is within Timberland
Block of Buenavista, Iloilo and that 2) the certification of the then Director of Forestry to the effect
that the area in question is needed for forest purposes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the classification of lands of the public domain by the Executive Branch of the
Government into agricultural, forest or mineral can be changed or varied by the court depending
upon the evidence adduced before it.

HEELD:
No. Under Sec. 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which was lifted from Act No. 2874, the
classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest
lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of the
courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court
which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
mineral but the Executive Branch of the Government, through the Office of the President.

Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for the respondent court to ignore the
uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland block and (2) as
certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes.

Republic vs. Naguiat (Jan. 24, 2006)

Facts:

Respondent applies for registration of title to 4 parcels of land contending she is the owner of the
said land which she acquired from the LID Corporation which in turn acquired the same from
persons who have been in possession thereof for more than 30 years. The Republic filed in
opposition that said lands belong to the public domain being forest land and not subject to private
appropriation.

Issue:

Whether or not the land is forest land and cannot be registered.

Ruling:

Yes, For a public forest land/reserves to be subject for private appropriation, it requires an
express and positive act of the government of reclassification that it will become a part of
alienable and disposable agricultural lands of public domain. Occupation in the concept of an
owner cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered to as a title.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DENR vs.
HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR.,PNB, ROD of ROXAS CITY
G.R. No. 146030. December 3, 2002

FACTS:

In December 28 1978, respondent Felipe Alejaga, Sr. filed Free Patent application covering a
parcel of land with an area of .3899 hectares, more or less . December 27, 1978 , the
Investigation & Verification Report prepared by Land Inspector was submitted so
[26]

application was granted and OCT was issued by ROD. In 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang,
requested the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation for irregularities in the issuance of the
title of a foreshore land in favor of respondent. Respondent obtained a NACIDA loan under the
Cottage Industry Guarantee and Loan Fund by PNB and the same was secured by a real estate
mortgage in favor of defendant PNB.

OSG instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against
respondent, the PNB of Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City covering Free
Patent Application of the parcel of land . While the case is pending, respondent died and was
substituted by his heirs. The OCT and Free Patent was declared null and void ab initio so
respondent appealed and thereby obtained favorable decision from CA stating that “assuming there
was misrepresentation or fraud as claimed by petitioner, the action for reversion should
have been brought within one (1) year from the registration of the patent with the ROD.

ISSUES:

I- W/N the grant of Free Patent was valid.

II- W/N action for reversion is unavailing due to indefeasibility of title after 1 year.

HELD:

I- No, Section 91 of CA 141 or Public Land Act requires that after the filing of the application,
an investigation should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set
out in the application are true. Application for Free Patent was dated and filed on December 28,
[25]

1978 while the Investigation & Verification Report prepared by Land Inspector Elfren L. Recio of the
[26]

District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands of Roxas City was dated December 27, 1978. Hence,
the grant was fraudulently obtained so it is void for it would have been highly anomalous for Recio
to conduct his own investigation and verification prior to the application..

II- No, Section 101 of CA 141, the State -- even after the lapse of one year -- may still bring an
[49]

action for the reversion to the public domain of land that has been fraudulently granted to private
individuals. Further, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as to how
[50]

the title has been acquired, if the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether fraud has in
fact been committed in securing the title. [51] [52][53]

ULIO FLORES vs. MARCIANO BAGAOISAN,

G.R. No. 173365 April 15, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioners acquired the property through homestead patent and later executed a Deed of
Confirmation and Quitclaim in favor of Vicente T. Lazo to “sell, cede, convey, grant, and transfer by way
of QUITCLAIM” the subject property within 5 year prohibitory period. Respondent, Marciano Bagaoisan
as tenant of Lazo, bought the subject property. Petitioners executed an Affidavit attesting to the fact
that they conveyed to Lazo the subject property through the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim; that
Lazo and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the disputed portion since 1940 and
that the same was mistakenly included in the patent application of Victor Flores.

ISSUE:

W/N the Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim executed within 5 year prohibitory period is valid.

HELD:

NO. Sec. 118 of CA 141 provides, “Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or
institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years
from and after the date of issuance of the patent and grant, nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops
on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations”.No
alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five years after
the issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds. Mere possession of the
property and payment of real property taxes would not suffice.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANATALIA ACTUB TIU ESTONILO and ANDREA ACTUB TIU PO
G.R. No. 157306 November 25, 2005

FACTS:

Respondents-claimants filed an application for registration of a parcel of land known as Lot

4318 in Cagayan de Oro claiming that said parcel of land was owned and possessed by them and
their predecessors-in-interest since 1894. Such application was opposed by AFP and the Director
of the Bureau of Lands alleging that said lot is not a registrable land pursuant to Presidential
Proclamation No. 265, which declared Lot 4318 reserved for the use of the Philippine Army.
During the pendency of the appeal, Presidential Proclamation No. 330 took effect in 2000,
excluding Lot 4318 from the operation of Presidential Proclamation No. 265.

ISSUE:

W/N the respondents can register the land it under the Public Land Act.

HELD:

No. The Public Land Act requires applicants for confirmation of imperfect titles to prove (1)
that the land is alienable public land; and (2) that their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the property has taken place either since time immemorial or for the
period prescribed by law. When the legal conditions are complied with, the possessor of the land -- by
operation of law -- acquires a right to a government grant, without necessitating the issuance of a
certificate of title.

The petitioners are not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens system simply
because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must show,
even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee
simple, otherwise, the court may deny the registration.
MELITON GALLARDO V. IAC AND Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana
G.R. No. L-67742 October 29, 1987

FACTS:

Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first cousin of the private
respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana. The controversy involves a parcel of land owned and
registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva. Petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was
sold to them in a private document, written in Tagalog that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro
Villanueva conveying and transferring the property in question in favor of the petitioners.
Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and a new certificate of title was issued in
the name of the petitioners

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the names of
petitioners.

HELD:

No. Section 127 of Act 496 requires that the conveyance be executed "before the judge of a court of
record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall certify such
acknowledgment substantially in form next hereinafter stated." was violated in this case. The action
of the ROD of Laguna in allowing the registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized and did
not lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale. The “Deeds of Conveyance, ...
affecting lands, whether registered under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made
substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to convey, encumber, ...
or bind the lands as though made in accordance with the more prolix forms heretofore in use.” No
title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also
against his hereditary successors.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS, et al.
G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974

FACTS:
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint to
declare free patent and OCT in the name of defendant Isagani Du Timbol null and void ab initio and to
order the reversion of the land in question to the mass of public domain on the ground that the land
covered thereby is a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act; that the
land in question is inside the area which was reverted to the category of public forest; that the said
patent and title were obtained fraudulently as private respondent never occupied and cultivated the
land .

ISSUE:

W/N land already titled has become indefeasible and cannot be subjected to reversion to mass of
public domains.

HELD:
NO. Timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable lands of public domain. The defense of
indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the state in an
action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest
reservation.Public land fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or
reverted to the state in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act or CA No. 141.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989

FACTS:

Petitioner opposed the joint application of Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar, who claimed to have been in
open, continuos, exclusive and notorious possession of forest lands for a long time, for registration of
title to two (2) parcels of land in Capiz, on the grounds that the classification or reclassification of
public lands into alienable or disposable agricultural land, mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of
the Executive Department of the government and not of the courts; that possession of forest lands, no
matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership; and, that an applicant for registration of title has
the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as amended.

ISSUE:

W/N the lands may be titled under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended.

HELD:

No. Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural
land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded . In confirmation of imperfect title cases,
the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption
that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient
to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish
grants or that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30)
years preceding the filing of his application. The possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens
System.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAND NATURAL RESOURCES, et al. vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, et al.
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
and
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, et al. vs.

THE SECRETARY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, et al.
G.R. No. 173775

FACTS:

These consolidated cases involves the lands of private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No.
167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775. Private claimants insisted that they have been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island
into a tourist spot. They said that their continued possession and investments give them a vested right
which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064. Petitioners-claimants contended that
there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as
neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for
the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

ISSUE:
whether OR NOT private claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.

HELD:

NO. Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No.
141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two
requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element
of possession. The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay.
Antipolo v. Zapanta

FACTS:

A single application for the registration of two distinct parcels of land was filed by
two distinct applicants before the then CFI Rizal. One of the two applicants was
Conrado Eniceo who applied for registration under the Torrens system of a
parcel of land containing 258 sq. m. The other applicant was "Heirs of Joaquin
Avendaño", and the land they were applying for registration was a parcel
containing 9,826 sq. m. (the disputed property) surveyed in the name of the
Municipality of Antipolo. Both parcels were situated in the Municipality of
Antipolo. Due to the approval of application , ANTIPOLO appealed but because it
failed to amend the Record on Appeal, its appeal was disallowed. Antipolo
petitioned averring that said land cannot be alienated because it is public
domain.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property is of public domain, and thus, could not be alienated.

HELD:

Yes. At the time the application for registration was filed , the disputed property
was already devoted to public use and public service. Therefore, it was outside
the commerce of man and could no longer be subject to private registration. The
claim of the Avendano heirs that they merely tolerated occupancy by ANTIPOLO
which had borrowed the disputed property from them, since they had been in
possession, since as far back as 1916, erroneously presupposes ownership
thereof since that time.

CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC. v. PROVINCE OF NegrosOccidental

G.R. No. L-16257 January 31, 1963

FACTS:

Jose Benares ( Jose) owned the disputed Lot 378, part of Hacienda Mandalagan, acquired through
sale and thereafter obtained OCT. He mortgaged the Hacienda to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. then
to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) subsequently. These transactions were duly recorded in the
office of the Register of Deeds . The mortgage in favor of the PNB was foreclosed and the PNB
acquired the Hacienda and had the titled in its name.

Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease so the PNB agreed to
sell the Hacienda to Carlos P. Benares (Carlos), son of Jose . Thereafter, Carlos transferred his rights to
herein petitioner, which completed the payment of the installments due to the PNB. Petitioner
discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental.
Defendant claims that it acquired Lot 378 through expropriation proceedings in 1924,it took
possession of said lot and began the construction thereon . It maintains that it paid to Jose Benares
the assessed value of Lot 378.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant had acquired Lot 378 in the expropriation proceedings.

HELD:

The mortgages were duly registered and annotated on TCT. Hence, Lot 378 would not have possibly
been expropriated without the intervention of the aforementioned mortgagees. The deed executed
by the Bank promising to sell the Hacienda to Carlos Benares explicitly states that portions of Lot 405,
407 and 410,had been expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, thus
indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated. The main purpose of the
Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to facilitate transactions
relative thereto giving the public the right to rely upon the face of Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry.
BARANDA v. GUSTILO
GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988

FACTS:

Petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera
and Susan Silao), both claimed ownership and possession over the disputed land. However, during
the trial, it was found that the transfer certificate of title (TCT) held by respondents was fraudulently
acquired. So the TCT was ordered to be put in the name of petitioners. The Acting Register of Deeds
(ROD) Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT of respondents null and void, cancelled the
same and issued new TCT in the name of petitioners. A separate case is pending in the Court of
Appeals (CA), a notice of lis pendens was annotated in the new TCT . Petitioners move for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the
Acting ROD for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting ROD filed a motion for
reconsideration which was sustained by herein respondent judge.

ISSUE:

1W/N Judge Gustilo erred in sustaining the motion for reconsideration filed by ROD.
2.W/N the ROD has legal standing to file a motion in lieu of notice of lis pendens in a Torrens
certificate of title?

HELD:

1. Yes. Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting ROD’s stand that the notice of lis
pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the CA.

2. No. The function of the ROD with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances,
instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The acting ROD did not have any legal standing to file
a motion for reconsideration of the Judge’s Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens.
Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: “It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to immediately register an
instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all
the requisites for registration. If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground and
reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of
this decree.”

On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD 1529states that: “When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with
regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage
or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree
with the action taken by theRegister of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question
shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in
interest thru the Register of Deeds.”

Aurelio Balbin & Franciso Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur

G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969
FACTS:

Petitioners presented to the register of deeds (ROD) of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered
owner's OCT and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation” , executed by Cornelio Balbin who is
registered owner of said parcel of land and appears to have donated an undivided two-thirds
portion thereof in favor of petitioners, with the request that the same be annotated on the title. The
ROD denied the request for it appears that it was annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances
on the certificate are three separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by
Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different buyers. The ROD required the petitioners to present the
other three duplicate copies of the certificate of title, coming from the previous sales.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners should present the other three duplicate copies before ROD.

HELD:

Yes. Section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate certificate of
title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive authority
from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in
accordance with such instrument."

The production, whenever a voluntary instrument is presented, constitutes sufficient authority from
registered owner for the ROD to make the corresponding memorandum of registration. Should there
be existence of other duplicates and if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations,
non-presentation of it would cease the reliability of the whole system of Torrens registration.

TEODORO ALMIROL V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN

G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

FACTS:

Petitioner purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in Esperanza, province of Agusan,
and covered by OCT in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to NicolasaM. Abalo." Petitioner went to
the office of the Register of Deeds (ROD) of Agusan to register the deed of sale and to secure in his
name a TCT. Registration was denied on the following grounds:
1.) The land is considered conjugal property;
2.) In the sale of a conjugal property , both spouses must sign the document;
3.) Since the wife has already died when the sale was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of
the whole property.

Petitioner instituted mandamus to compel the ROD to register the deed of sale and to issue to him
the TCT, however it was denied declaring that " mandamus does not lie . . . because the adequate
remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151".

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ROD erred in refusing the registration.
HELD:

Yes. Although the refusal of respondent show a sincere desire to maintain inviolate the law on
succession and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for
his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the ROD to determine
but to a court of competent jurisdiction. A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of
Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the
problem of whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. Whenever he is
doubtful as to the validity of presented instrument, he must submit and certify the question to the
Commissioner of Land Registration for determination.

Ledesma vs. VILLASENOR

FACTS:

Felix Villasenor, administrator of the estate of his deceased father, filed a petition in the CFI of Negros
Occidental to enjoin the ROD from registering a deed of sale of two lots which the deceased conveyed
to Jose Ma. Ledesma, for the reason of fictitious sale averring that the signature of the vendor was
forged. The court lifted the preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition. Ledesma filed his own
petition in the cadastral record of said lots, asking that the ROD be ordered to register the
aforementioned deed of sale. On the same day the court, without notice either to the ROD or to
appellant, and solely on the basis of the allegations in the petition, issued the corresponding order for
registration which was complied by ROD.

ISSUE:

Whether or not lifting of injunction and dismissal of petition is valid.

HELD:

No. The lifting of the injunction or even the dismissal of the petition, was no authority for the court in
the cadastral proceeding to issue the orders complained of without notice to the Register of Deeds or
to appellant, considering that the dismissal of case was not yet final. The ROD only exercises his
ministerial duties under the law to register an instrument which in his opinion is registrable, and quite
another thing for the court itself to order the registration. The former does not contemplate notice to
and hearing of interested parties such as are required in a judicial proceeding nor carry with it the
solemnity and legal consequences of a court judgment

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD &VENEER CO. INC.,
ETC.
FACTS:

Petitioner filed for certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a
decision of the CFI of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.
of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired from members of the
Dumagat tribe. Petitioner seeks as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter
asserting that the registration proceedings have commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the
1973 Constitution took effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law. Section 11 of its Article XIV
prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain,
except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which
was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands).

Issue:

Whether or not the 1935 Constitution is applicable during the sale ..

Held:

No . Even though the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the
tribes and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings
under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the
time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit
corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already
acquired "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. As shown in the evidence, both original owner and
corporations are Filipino duly qualified to hold and own private lands. Hence, Acme is entitled to
acquire the disputed land and have it tilted in its name.

Director of Forestry v. Villareal

[G.R. No. L-32266. February 27, 1989.]

Facts:

Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration of land consisting of 178,113 sq. m. of mangrove
swamps located in Sapian, Capiz, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land for more than 40 years. He was opposed by several persons, including the
Director of Forestry on behalf of the government. The application was approved by the CFI
Capiz.

ISSUE:

Whether or not mangrove swamps can be titled?

HELD:

No. Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now,
mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not
alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they
are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 103882/105276; Nov. 25, 1998

FACTS:

RA 1899 was approved on June 22, 1957 granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry
out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to
establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities
and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications . Pursuant to the said law, Pasay City passed Ordinance No. 121, amended by Ordinance No. 158 for the
reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation
(RREC) for the said project. Republic questioned the agreement as void because foreshore land is outside thecommerce of
man; the terms and conditions of the contract being violative of RA1899, and; no public bidding was executed prior to the
said agreement and hence,violates the requirement provided by law.

Pasay City and RREC counters that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA1899 gives a broader
meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary. RTC ruled in favour of Pasay
City and RREC, affirmed by the CA with modifications.

ISSUE:

(a)WON the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area

(b)WON Ordinance No. 158 is valid .
(c)WON the execution of the contract was valid despite absence of public bidding

HELD:

The petition is impressed with merit.

(a) No.
The term "foreshore lands" refers to: The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the
part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace andthe upper limit of
wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. In Ponce v. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v. City of Cebu (L-
22669) , the Court said that the term "foreshore" refers to "that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately
covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides."
(b) NO.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, asamended by Ordinance No. 158, and the
Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore null and void.

(c) No
In an Agreement , public bidding remained indispensable and non-compliance therewith restrained any entity, like RREC,
from lawfully resuming the reclamation work.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Director of Lands) v. THE HON. COURTOF APPEALS AND SANTOS DEL
RIO
G.R. No. L-43105 August 31, 1984

FACTS:

A parcel of land purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili is situated near the shore of Laguna
de Bay. It was recorded in Registry of Deeds. When Benedicto del Rio died, the subject parcel passed
on to his son, Santos del Rio. Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent, filed his application
for registration of said parcel of land. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by
private oppositors, petitioners.

Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio to construct duck
houses on the land in question. Although there was no definite commitment as to rentals, some of
them had made voluntary payments to private respondent. In violation of the original agreement,
private oppositors constructed residential houses on the land which prompted private respondent to
file an ejectment suit against the former. Director of Lands aver that since a portion of the land sought
to be registered is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of
Laguna de Bay, or is atleast, a foreshore land, which cannot be the subject of registration.

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and

2.Whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.

HELD:

1. Yes. The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" itcannot be
considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as
private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title.

2. Yes. The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but
only the registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land. While it is true that by
themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Applicant by himself and through his
father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful,exclusive and adverse possession of
the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts.
Applicant has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the
registration in hisfavor of said land.

CACHO v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 123361 March 3, 1997

FACTS:

Dona Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two (2) parcels of land situated in Lanao, Moro
Province. Both parcels were within the limits of the Military Reservation No. 43 known as “Camp
Overton” The application was tried and decided in favor of the applicant. Teofilo Cacho, the sole heir
of the deceased Demetria Cacho filed for a petition for the reconstitution of the two (2) original
certificates of title under RA 26. The petition was opposed to by the Republic of thePhilippines,
National Steel Corporation and the City of Iligan on the basis of the Regalian Doctrine – that states –
all lands of whatever classification belong to the State. The matter was elevated to the Court of
Appeals (CA), the CA denied the petition for reconstitution of title and ordered that the decree of
registration be reopened. Thus, the instant petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not reconstitution original certificates of title is allowed.

HELD:

No. A land registration proceeding is “in rem”. The decree of registration is binding upon and
conclusive against all persons including the Government and its branches,irrespective of whether or
not they were personally notified of the filing of the application, because all persons are considered as
notified by the publication required by law. A decree of registration that has become final shall be
deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined but also upon all
matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings. It is no doubt that the
decrees of registration had been issued and such decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one year
from entry thereof.

Legarda vs Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590; GR No. 8936, October 2, 1915

(Land Titles and Deeds – Purpose of the Torrens System of Registration)

Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the strip of land
where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of
registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the Torrens system in
1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.

Issue: W/N petitioner is the lawful owner of the land?

Held: Yes.

The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can be construed that where two certificates
purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of
the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.

Antipolo v. Zapanta

FACTS:

A single application for the registration of two distinct parcels of land was filed by
two distinct applicants before the then CFI Rizal. One of the two applicants was
Conrado Eniceo who applied for registration under the Torrens system of a
parcel of land containing 258 sq. m. The other applicant was "Heirs of Joaquin
Avendaño", and the land they were applying for registration was a parcel
containing 9,826 sq. m. (the disputed property) surveyed in the name of the
Municipality of Antipolo. Both parcels were situated in the Municipality of
Antipolo. Due to the approval of application , ANTIPOLO appealed but because it
failed to amend the Record on Appeal, its appeal was disallowed. Antipolo
petitioned averring that said land cannot be alienated because it is public
domain.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property is of public domain, and thus, could not be alienated.

HELD:

Yes. At the time the application for registration was filed , the disputed property
was already devoted to public use and public service. Therefore, it was outside
the commerce of man and could no longer be subject to private registration. The
claim of the Avendano heirs that they merely tolerated occupancy by ANTIPOLO
which had borrowed the disputed property from them, since they had been in
possession, since as far back as 1916, erroneously presupposes ownership
thereof since that time.
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC. v. PROVINCE OF NegrosOccidental
G.R. No. L-16257 January 31, 1963

FACTS:

Jose Benares ( Jose) owned the disputed Lot 378, part of Hacienda Mandalagan, acquired through
sale and thereafter obtained OCT. He mortgaged the Hacienda to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. then
to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) subsequently. These transactions were duly recorded in the
office of the Register of Deeds . The mortgage in favor of the PNB was foreclosed and the PNB
acquired the Hacienda and had the titled in its name.

Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease so the PNB agreed to
sell the Hacienda to Carlos P. Benares (Carlos), son of Jose . Thereafter, Carlos transferred his rights to
herein petitioner, which completed the payment of the installments due to the PNB. Petitioner
discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental.
Defendant claims that it acquired Lot 378 through expropriation proceedings in 1924,it took
possession of said lot and began the construction thereon . It maintains that it paid to Jose Benares
the assessed value of Lot 378.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant had acquired Lot 378 in the expropriation proceedings.

HELD:

The mortgages were duly registered and annotated on TCT. Hence, Lot 378 would not have possibly
been expropriated without the intervention of the aforementioned mortgagees. The deed executed
by the Bank promising to sell the Hacienda to Carlos Benares explicitly states that portions of Lot 405,
407 and 410,had been expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental, thus
indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated. The main purpose of the
Torrens System is to avoid possible conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to facilitate transactions
relative thereto giving the public the right to rely upon the face of Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry.
BARANDA v. GUSTILO
GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988

FACTS:

A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta.Barbara, Iloilo covered by
OCT no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute between petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed
ownership and possession over the said land. However during the trial, it was found that the TCT held
by respondents was fraudulently acquired. So the TCT was ordered to be put in the name of
petitioners.

In compliance with the order , the Acting Register of Deeds (ROD) Avito Saclauso annotated the order
declaring TCT null and void, cancelled the same and issued new TCT in the name of petitioners.
However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals (CA), a notice of lis pendens
was annotated in the new TCT . This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens in the new certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting ROD for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting ROD filed a motion for reconsideration
invoking that it cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the CA.

ISSUE:

W/N the ROD has any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration?

HELD: no

Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting ROD stand that the notice of lis pendens
cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the CA. The function of the ROD with
reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in nature.
The acting ROD did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the Judge’s
Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens.

Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: “It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to immediately register an
instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all
the requisites for registration. If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground and
reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of
this decree.” On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: “When the ROD is in doubt with regard
to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or
other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with
the action taken by ROD with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to
the Commission of Land Registration by the ROD, or by the party in interest thru the ROD.”

Aurelio Balbin & Franciso Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur

G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969

FACTS:

Petitioners presented to the register of deeds (ROD) of Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered
owner's certificate of title (OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation” , with the
request that the same be annotated on the title. Under the terms of the instrument sought to be
annotated one Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548,
appears to have donated an undivided two-thirds portion thereof in favor of petitioners. The ROD
denied the requested annotation for being "legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law." It
appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are three
separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of three
different buyers. Mainly because these three other co-owner's copies of thecertificate of title No. 548
had not been presented by petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested
annotation. Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration,
who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution dated April 10, 1962.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners should present the other three duplicate copies of the certificate of
title, coming from the previous sales, before the register of deeds annotate their transaction.

HELD:

Yes. Section 55 of Act 496, which provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate certificate of
title whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall be conclusive authority
from the registered owner to the register of deeds to make a memorandum of registration in
accordance with such instrument."obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title
in question,namely, that of the registered owner himself, such that its production whenever a
voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for theregister of deeds to
make the corresponding memorandum of registration. In the caseat bar, the three other copies of the
title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 of Act 496. As correctly observed by the
Land Registration Commissioner,petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized
or illegal isbeside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of
competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in existence, it iseasy to see how
their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or anoutright conveyance, is annotated
on one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a
duplicate of the original, whichmeans that both must contain identical entries of the transactions,
particularlyvoluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this would not be followed, if
different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens
registration would cease to be reliable.

TEODORO ALMIROL V. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN

G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968

FACTS:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of land situated in the
municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered byoriginal certificate of title P-1237 in the
name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to NicolasaM. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the
office of the Register of Deedsof Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his
name atransfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds uponthe
following grounds: 1.) That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered inthe name of Arcenio
Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, isconsidered conjugal property; 2.)
That in the sale of a conjugal property acquiredafter the effectivity of the New Civil Code it is
necessary that both spouses sign thedocument; but 3.) Since, as in this case, the wife has already died
when the sale wasmade, the surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole property without
violatingthe existing law. In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan
on a petition for mandamus to compel the Register of Deeds to register thedeed of sale and to issue
to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title. In itsresolution of October 16, 1963 the lower
court, declaring that "
mandamus
does notlie . . . because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act
1151",dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner. Hence, this present appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified in refusing to register thetransaction appealed to
by the petitioner.

HELD:

No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent show a sincere desireon his part to maintain
inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights overreal properties, these do not constitute
legal grounds for his refusal to register thedeed. Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the
register of deeds todetermine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.
Aregister of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 fromexercising his personal
judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or
instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For underthe said section, when he is in doubt as to the
proper step to be taken with respect toany deed or other instrument presented to him for
registration, all that he issupposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of
LandRegistration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step tobe taken
on the doubtful question.

MELITON GALLARDO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-67742 October 29, 1987
FACTS:

Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first cousinof the private
respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latter being thedaughter of Pedro Villanueva. The
subject matter of this controversy involves a parcelof land situated in Cavinti, Laguna consisting of
81,300 square meters, more or less,initially covered by an original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued
on April 2, 1924owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva. On August 10,
1937,petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was sold to them in a private document,an
unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog that was allegedly signed by the latePedro Villanueva
conveying and transferring the property in question in favor of thepetitioners. Subsequently, the
Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and a newcertificate of title was issued in the name of the
petitioners covered by TransferCertificate of Title No. RT- 6293 (No. 23350) on January 4, 1944. On
November 17,1976, defendant Marta Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto
R.Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Office of theRegister of Deeds
of Laguna. When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of AdverseClaim, attempt was made to settle
said controversy amicably, but they failed. So,petitioners instituted court suit against the private
respondent and her husband, Dr.Marcelo S. Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Title and
Damages with theCourt of First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977. The Court of First Instance of
Laguna rendered its decision declaring the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well asthe reconstituted
transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio. Thus,petitioners filed notice of appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court. However, theIntermediate Appellate Court, on May 22, 1984, affirmed
in toto
the decision of thetrial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. RT-6293 (No. 23350)
issued in the names of petitioners.

HELD:
No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that theconveyance be executed
"before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the
peace, who shall certify suchacknowledgment substantially in form next hereinafter stated." was
violated in thiscase. The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the registration of
theprivate deed of sale was unauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to thedefective private
document of sale. With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration Act, Act 496
“Deeds of Conveyance, ... affecting lands, whetherregistered under this act or unregistered shall be
sufficient in law when madesubstantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as
effective toconvey, encumber, ... or bind the lands as though made in accordance with the moreprolix
forms heretofore in use.” It is therefore evident that Exhibit "E" in the case atbar is definitely not
registerable under the Land Registration Act. Also, the contentionthat ownership over registered
property may be acquired by prescription or adversepossession is absolutely without merit. No title to
registered land in derogation of thatof the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against
hishereditary successors.
Ledesma vs. VILLASENOR

FACTS:

Felix Villaseñor, in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of his deceased father, Eusebio
Villaseñor, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (Civil Case No. 5662) to
enjoin the Register of Deeds of the same province from registering a deed of sale by which the
deceased conveyed to Jose Ma. Ledesma two lots registered in his name. The reason given for seeking
injunctive relief was that the deed of sale was fictitious and that the signature of the vendor was
forged. The court lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition.Ledesma filed his
own petition in the cadastral record of said lots, asking that the Register of Deeds be ordered to
register the aforementioned deed of sale. On the same day the court, without notice either to the
Register of Deeds or to appellant, and solely on the basis of the allegations in the petition, issued the
corresponding order for registration. In compliance therewith the Register of Deeds cancelled the two
certificates of title in the name of the deceased Eusebio Villaseñor and issued new ones in Ledesma's
name. Villaseñor moved for reconsideration of the two orders and then perfected this appeal upon
their denial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not lifting of injunction and dismissal of petition is no authority for court to order
registration.

HELD:

The lifting of the injunction, however, or even the dismissal of the petition, was no authority for the
court in the cadastral proceeding to issue the orders complained of without notice to the Register of
Deeds or to appellant, considering that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3662 was not yet final.It is one
thing for the Register of Deeds, in the exercise of his ministerial duties under the law, to register an
instrument which in his opinion is registrable, and quite another thing for the court itself to order the
registration. The former does not contemplate notice to and hearing of interested parties such as are
required in a judicial proceeding nor carry with it the solemnity and legal consequences of a court
judgment

Baranda v. Gustilo
G.R. No. 81163. September 26, 1988

FACTS:

This case involves a parcel of land known covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name
of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, said was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was
issued in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda. The Court issued a writ of possession
which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that they also
have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court finds that TCT No. 25772 was fraudulently
acquired and ordered that the writ of possession be carried out. Perez and Gotera filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The motion for reconsideration was denied and
the judgment became final. The petitioners contend that Civil Case No. 00827 was filed only to delay
the implementation of the writ.

The TCT No. T-25772 was declared null and void and TCT No. T-106098 was declared valid and
subsisting title concerning the ownership of Baranda and Hitalia. A motion for reconsideration and
manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the ground
that there was a pending case before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction
under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former which remained unresolved.
A notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a separate case (Civil Case No. 15871) still
pending in the Court of Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new certificates of titles issued
to the petitioners.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of Appeals
prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the certificate of titles of petitioners
which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court.

(2) Whether or not the Register of Deeds has the duty to annotate or annul the notice of lis pendens
in a Torrens Certificate of Title.

HELD:
(1) No. Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the private respondents, in filing Civil Case
No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well
as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the writs of possession
and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517. Lis pendens has been
conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the registration thereof. The private
respondents are not entitled to this protection. It was once held that while ordinarily a notice of
pendency which has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and
undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances,
as for instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main
allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is
responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the
defendant. Respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the respondent Acting
Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners
over Lot No. 4571 cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the
Court of Appeals.

(2) No. Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of
Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal
property which complies with all the requisites for registration…”

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are
clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The statute concerning the function of the
Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for
construction. According to Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language — the
word shall means "ought to, must, ...obligation used to express a command or exhortation, used in
laws, regulations or directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of
Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is
ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a
motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In
case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument
presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now,
the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance
with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD &VENEER CO. INC.,
ETC.

FACTS:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
AppellateCourt affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered
registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390
square meters, more orless, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe. The Director of Landstakes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of
the 1935 Constitution to thematter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration
proceedings have been commenced onlyon July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone
into effect, the latter is the correctlyapplicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits
private corporations or associations fromholding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease
not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibitionnot found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in
1962 when Acme purchased the lands inquestion from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree
registration in favor of Acme Section 48,paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141.

Issue:

Whether or not the 1935 Constitution is applicable as the sale of the disputed land took place
onOctober 29, 1962.

Held:

When the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor
isdeemed to have acquired,
by operation of law
, a right to a grant, a government grant, without thenecessity of a certificate of title being issued. The
land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain andbeyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of.
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent
.

Even on the proposition that theland remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors,until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act,there can be no serious question of Acmes right to
acquire the land at the time it did, there also being
nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing
oracquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-
called"incomplete" or "imperfect" title.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, thatthe majority ruling in
Meralco
must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent.

Theends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation
asamended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as
naturalpersons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired
byconclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the
hereincorporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private
lands) andgranting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold
or exchanged.There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the
latter fromthemselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title
in their names,deeding the lands back to Acme. There being no reversible error in the appealed
judgment of theIntermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this
instance.

Director of Forestry v. Villareal

[G.R. No. L-32266. February 27, 1989.]
Facts:

Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on 25 January 1949, a land consisting of 178,113 sq.
m. of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz, alleging that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 40 years. He was
opposed by several persons,including the Director of Forestry on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. After trial, the applicationwas approved by the CFI Capiz. The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to the Supreme Court in a
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation?

HELD:The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the
application forregistration of title of Villareal

Republic vs. Naguiat (Jan. 24, 2006)

Facts:
Respondent applies for registration of title to 4 parcels of land contending she is the owner of the said
land which she acquired from the LID Corporation which in turn acquired the same from persons who
have been in possession thereof for more than 30 years. The Republic filed in opposition that said lands
belong to the public domain and not subject to private appropriation.

Issue:
Whether or not the land in dispute as a forest land belonging to public domain may be appropriated as
private property.

Ruling:
For a public forest land/reserves to be subject for private appropriation, it requires an express and
positive act of the government that it will become a part of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of
public domain. Occupation in the concept of an owner cannot ripen into private ownership and be
registered to as a title.
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 103882/105276; Nov. 25, 1998

FACTS:

RA 1899 was approved on June 22, 1957 granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry
out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to
establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities
and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications . Pursuant to the said law, Pasay City passed Ordinance No. 121, amended by Ordinance No. 158 for the
reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation
(RREC) for the said project. Republic questioned the agreement as void because foreshore land is outside thecommerce of
man; the terms and conditions of the contract being violative of RA1899, and; no public bidding was executed prior to the
said agreement and hence,violates the requirement provided by law.

Pasay City and RREC counters that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA1899 gives a broader
meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary. RTC ruled in favour of Pasay
City and RREC, affirmed by the CA with modifications.

ISSUE:

(a)WON the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area

(b)WON Ordinance No. 158 is valid .
(c)WON the execution of the contract was valid despite absence of public bidding

HELD:

The petition is impressed with merit.

(a) No.
The term "foreshore lands" refers to: The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the
part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace andthe upper limit of
wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. In Ponce v. Gomez (L-21870) and Ponce v. City of Cebu (L-
22669) , the Court said that the term "foreshore" refers to "that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately
covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides."

(b) NO.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, asamended by Ordinance No. 158, and the
Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore null and void.

(c) No
In an Agreement , public bidding remained indispensable and non-compliance therewith restrained any entity, like RREC,
from lawfully resuming the reclamation work.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Director of Lands) v. THE HON. COURTOF APPEALS AND SANTOS DEL
RIO
G.R. No. L-43105 August 31, 1984

FACTS:

A parcel of land purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili is situated near the shore of Laguna
de Bay. It was recorded in Registry of Deeds. When Benedicto del Rio died, the subject parcel passed
on to his son, Santos del Rio. Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent, filed his application
for registration of said parcel of land. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by
private oppositors, petitioners.

Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santos del Rio to construct duck
houses on the land in question. Although there was no definite commitment as to rentals, some of
them had made voluntary payments to private respondent. In violation of the original agreement,
private oppositors constructed residential houses on the land which prompted private respondent to
file an ejectment suit against the former. Director of Lands aver that since a portion of the land sought
to be registered is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of
Laguna de Bay, or is atleast, a foreshore land, which cannot be the subject of registration.

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and

2.Whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.

HELD:

1. Yes. The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" itcannot be
considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as
private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title.

2. Yes. The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but
only the registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land. While it is true that by
themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Applicant by himself and through his
father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful,exclusive and adverse possession of
the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts.
Applicant has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the
registration in hisfavor of said land.

CACHO v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 123361 March 3, 1997

FACTS:
Dona Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two (2) parcels of land situated in Lanao, Moro
Province. Both parcels were within the limits of the Military Reservation No. 43 known as “Camp
Overton” The application was tried and decided in favor of the applicant. Teofilo Cacho, the sole heir
of the deceased Demetria Cacho filed for a petition for the reconstitution of the two (2) original
certificates of title under RA 26. The petition was opposed to by the Republic of thePhilippines,
National Steel Corporation and the City of Iligan on the basis of the Regalian Doctrine – that states –
all lands of whatever classification belong to the State. The matter was elevated to the Court of
Appeals (CA), the CA denied the petition for reconstitution of title and ordered that the decree of
registration be reopened. Thus, the instant petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not reconstitution original certificates of title is allowed.

HELD:

No. A land registration proceeding is “in rem”. The decree of registration is binding upon and
conclusive against all persons including the Government and its branches,irrespective of whether or
not they were personally notified of the filing of the application, because all persons are considered as
notified by the publication required by law. A decree of registration that has become final shall be
deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined but also upon all
matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings. It is no doubt that the
decrees of registration had been issued and such decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one year
from entry thereof.