Judge Guillermo P. Agloro Vs Court Interpreter Leslie J. Burgos, et al.; A.M. Judge Rolando J.
Judge Rolando J. Bulan, Presiding Judge, Branch 77, explained that the LRC case was
No. P-16-3550; January 31, 2017
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative matter which stemmed from an oral report made by the complainant,
Judge Guillermo P. Agloro (Judge Agloro), Presiding Judge of Branch 83, Regional Trial Court,
Malolos City, Bulacan (RTC-Malolos), regarding certain irregularities relative to the petition for
reconstitution of four (4) transfer certificates of title docketed as LRC Case No. P-335-2011
(LRC case).[1]
The Antecedents
On May 17, 2012, Judge Agloro formalized his oral report to then Executive Judge Renato C.
Francisco (EJ Francisco) of RTC-Malolos. In his Private and Confidential Memo[2] to EJ
Francisco, he reported that, based on his own investigation, the LRC case was raffled off to
Branch 77 but for “unknown reason,” the record of the case appeared in Branch 83; that the
petition was heard and granted by Branch 83 in its Order, [3] dated November 4, 2011; that he
came to know that the registration of the entry of judgment for the November 4, 2011 Order
was refused by the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) because the LRC case was raffled off to
Branch 77, and not to Branch 83; and that he was in a predicament because there was a
pending motion for execution, yet the decision was not yet final and executory.
In response, EJ Francisco issued a memorandum[4] to the OCC personnel and to the OIC/Legal
Researcher of Branch 77 to explain how the LRC case was raffled to Branch 77 and yet
appeared in Branch 83.
On July 5, 2012, the new Executive Judge, Ma. Theresa V. MendozaArcega (EJ
Arcega),[5] wrote a letter[6]addressed to Deputy Court Administrator Raul B. Villanueva, referring
the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) after she had conducted her own
investigation on the personnel of the OCC and Branch 83 regarding the apparent anomalies
surrounding the LRC case. She also forwarded the case folder of the LRC case from Branch
77 and the case folder from Branch 83, together with the affidavits of the court personnel.
In a letter,[7] dated September 28, 2012, the OCA acknowledged the letter of EJ Arcega and
directed her to conduct a more exhaustive investigation and to submit a detailed report.
The Investigation Report of EJ Arcega
In compliance, EJ Arcega submitted her Report,[8] dated February 18, 2013, confirming what
Judge Agloro had previously reported to then EJ Francisco that the LRC case was raffled off to
Branch 77. EJ Arcega further explained that the case records delivered to, and received by,
Branch 77 contained the raffle sheet bearing the signatures of the eight (8) members of the
raffle committee, and the summary of legal fees and assessment form from the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan. On the other hand, the case records found with Branch 83
did not include the summary of legal fees and assessment. Furthermore, it bore only three (3)
signatures which were already declared by EJ Francisco and the other members of the raffle
committee as forgeries. EJ Arcega also summarized the explanation given by every person
apparently involved in the irregularities, attending the LRC case, as follows:
raffled off to Branch 77 on June 6, 2011. He, however, noticed that the Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) numbers of the four (4) certificates sought to be reconstituted were not indicated in
the petition and instead, “N/A’s” were written in their respective places. Thus, he issued an
order, dated July 15, 2011, directing petitioner Felicisima B. Buendia (Buendia) to show legal
basis stating that a TCT without the corresponding number could be reconstituted. The LRC
case was, however, not set for hearing because Buendia failed to comply with the
aforementioned directive.[9]
Atty. Miguel Larida (Atty. Larida), Buendia’s counsel, claimed that sometime in June or July
2011, his office received a copy of an order from Branch 83 setting the LRC case for initial
hearing; that Atty. Renato Dilag appeared for their office as counsel for Buendia; that he was
confronted by an order issued by Branch 77, also assuming jurisdiction over the LRC case, but
he did not entertain the same because the proceedings before Branch 83 were about to be
terminated; and that he had neither knowledge nor information as to how the LRC case was
assigned to Branch 83.[10]
Liwayway S.J. Pagdangan, Administrative Officer I; Ronalie B. Reyes, Clerk III;
and Cinderella T. Canoza, Clerk III, all of the OCC, denied any participation in the anomaly.
They explained that after the raffle of the LRC case to Branch 77, the records thereof were
delivered to the said branch by Marita M. Esguerra (Esguerra), the duly authorized utility
worker assigned in the LRC Section.[11] Esguerra corroborated the aforesaid statements and
asserted that the receipt of the subject records was acknowledged by Cecilia Baesa, Clerk of
Branch 77, as evidenced by her signature in the record book Esguerra was carrying at that
time.[12]
Juliana M. Raymundo, OIC of Branch 77, confirmed the receipt of the subject records by their
branch. She further clarified that the said records remained in their custody because they
officially received the same.[13]
Leslie J. Burgos (Burgos), OIC/Interpreter of Branch 83, averred that sometime in May 2012,
she was informed by Julieta Fajardo (Fajardo), then Clerk-in-Charge for criminal cases of
Branch 83, that she came across a raffle sheet which indicated that the LRC case was actually
raffled to Branch 77, and not to their branch. Fajardo, when summoned, orally confirmed the
statement of Burgos that she confronted respondent Annaliza P. Santiago (Santiago), Clerk-in-
Charge for civil and land registration cases of Branch 83, regarding her discovery, but the latter
responded merely by pointing her lips at the direction of Marissa Garcia (Garcia), Court
Stenographer of Branch 83.[14]
To personally confirm the information, Burgos checked the logbook for land registration cases
raffled to their branch and discovered that the LRC case was not recorded therein. She further
stated that previously, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution relating to the LRC case
was filed in their branch, but the same was denied. Subsequently, however, another motion for
execution[15] was filed, but this time, a photocopy of the cancelled entry of judgment was
attached thereto. Burgos further claimed that she had nothing to do with the attempt to register
the entry of judgment on February 20, 2012 as the same did not bear her signature. The entry
of judgment was apparently prepared by Garcia who signed the same for Burgos.[16]
Annaliza P. Santiago, Clerk III, OCC, but detailed at Branch 83, claimed that sometime in
June 2011, she came across the records of the LRC case on top of her table; and that, per her
usual practice, she stamped received the said record, docketed it in their docket book, and
transmitted it to the person in charge of the preparation of the initial hearing.[17]
For her part, Branch 83 Stenographer Marissa M. Garcia admitted that she prepared the order
setting the LRC case for initial hearing, and the final order granting the petition. She reasoned,
however, that she only did the same in her capacity as a senior stenographer who merely
assisted another stenographer, Marilou de Guzman (de Guzman). She also admitted signing
the cancelled entry of judgment, but only because then OIC Burgos was absent or her
whereabouts at that time were unknown to them. Burgos, however, denied that she was absent
on February 20, 2012, as evidenced by her daily time record (DTR) for said date. She also
alleged in her supplemental affidavit that Branch 83 was using an old logbook as record book
for newly raffled cases, which she earlier checked and found that the LRC case was never
recorded, but that after the February 20, 2012 incident, the logbook turned up neatly covered
and the LRC case had already been entered in the said logbook.[18]
On March 5, 2014, the OCA Legal Office recommended that the July 5, 2012 Letter and the
February 18, 2013 Investigation Report of EJ Arcega be considered as a complaint against
Burgos, Santiago, Garcia, and Fajardo, all of Branch 83, RTC-Malolos, and that the said
respondents be directed to comment on the complaint.[19]
On April 4, 2014, the OCA directed respondents Burgos, Fajardo, Santiago, and Garcia to file
their respective comments.[20]
The Respondents’ Position
In her Comment,[21] dated May 30, 2014, Burgos reiterated the explanation she gave to EJ
Arcega and the statements contained in her previous affidavits. [22] She also claimed that in no
more that two decades of service, she had never been involved in any irregularity and she had
served the Judiciary and the public faithfully and honestly; and that her track record would
speak for the reason she was appointed the OIC of their branch. She, however, ascribed bad
faith and connivance on respondents Santiago and Garcia. Burgos alleged that after reporting
the anomaly to Judge Agloro, she conducted her own investigation on the matter. During the
course thereof, she learned from one of the administrative officers of the OCC that prior to the
raffle of the LRC case to Branch 77, Garcia went to the OCC carrying a case record/folder
apparently containing copies of the petition and inquired from the OCC whether it would be
possible for the same to be raffled to Branch 83.
Burgos further averred that on February 20, 2012, when the OCC refused to receive the entry
of judgment, Garcia personally retrieved it and caused its cancellation; and that more than a
month later on March 28, 2012 Garcia, without her knowledge, issued and signed a certified
true copy of the said entry of judgment, which was thereafter used by Buendia as an
attachment to her motion for execution. She also belied Garcia’s claim that the latter merely
assisted the other stenographer, de Guzman, to prepare the initial order because de Guzman
asked for her help. Burgos attached the DTR of de Guzman on June 8, 2011, the date of the
initial order, showing de Guzman was on leave and she could not have asked for Garcia’s help.
Burgos also dismissed Santiago’s explanations as mere flimsy excuses. Contrary to her claim,
what she did was not the usual practice in the office. According to Burgos, in receiving case
records from the OCC ‘s Raffle Section, the standard procedure was for the clerk-in-charge or
the receiving clerk to sign in the logbook carried by the OCC personnel to evidence the actual
receipt of the records. After receipt of the records, the details of the case folders would be
entered in the clerk-in-charge’s logbook. With the LRC case, however, Santiago never
bothered to comply with the usual practice. Moreover, Burgos noted that it was Santiago who
brought the entry of judgment to the OCC.
Fajardo, in her Comment,[23] dated May 30, 2014, narrated how she accidentally discovered
that the LRC case was raffled to Branch 77, while compiling their copies of the raffle sheets.
She also stated that she told OIC Burgos what she found out; that she asked Santiago about
the matter; and that she explained to EJ Arcega why she did not file any affidavit during the
investigation because she was trying to avoid conflict with Garcia who is not her friend.
In their separate comments,[24] both dated June 25, 2014 Santiago and Garcia merely
reiterated their allegations in their previous affidavits without rebutting, or offering any
explanation to, the points raised by Burgos and Fajardo.
On November 25, 2014, the Manifestation with Notice of Death[25] of respondent Fajardo was
filed by her widower, Reynaldo L. Fajardo, praying for the dismissal of the case against her on
account of her death. On June 25, 2015, her widower filed the Omnibus Motion[26] reiterating
the prayer for the dismissal of the case against her.
The OCA Recommendation
On July 28, 2016, the OCA made the following recommendation:
a) the administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter
against the respondents;
b) the administrative complaint against respondent Court Interpreter Leslie Burgos, Branch
83, RTC, Malolos City, Bulacan, be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence;
c) in view of the death of respondent Clerk III Julieta Fajardo, same court, the administrative
complaint against her be DISMISSED;
d) respondent Clerk III Annaliza Santiago, same court, be found GUILTY of Simple Neglect
of Duty and be REPRIMANDED, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of such or
any similar act shall be dealt with more severely by the Court; and
e) respondent Court Stenographer Marissa M. Garcia, same court, be found GUILTY of
grave misconduct, serious dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service. Accordingly, her
retirement and other benefits may be forfeited except accrued leave credits, and be
perpetually disqualified from re-employment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or
government financial institution.[27]
The OCA opined that the evidence gathered against Santiago was insufficient to establish a
link between her and Garcia’s scheme because her acts were done in accordance with her
usual daily routine in the office. Nevertheless, the OCA concluded that Santiago was aware of
Garcia’s misconduct but, for whatever reason, she chose to seal her lips and conceal the
latter’s wrongdoing.
As to Garcia, the OCA was convinced that she played an indispensable role in ensuring the
success of the nefarious scheme. It observed that before the actual raffle, Garcia inquired with
the OCC whether it was possible for the LRC petition to be raffled to Branch 83; that she
participated in the subject case, having prepared practically all the orders in the said case; that
she railroaded the disposition of the LRC case by issuing an entry of judgment therefor and,
thus, usurping the function of Burgos as OIC of Branch 83; and that she personally retrieved
the entry of judgment and had it cancelled, when the OCC refused to register the same.
The Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of the OCA subject to certain
modifications.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court agrees that there is a dearth of evidence to hold Burgos administratively liable.
Indeed, no participation, whatsoever, relating to the subject scheme could be attributed to her.
On the contrary, Burgos participated, not in the realization, but in the investigation and
prosecution of those responsible for the devious scheme. The records would also show that
Burgos came to know of the misdeed only after Fajardo had reported the same to her. Thus,
the Court concurs with the conclusion of the OCA that Burgos could not be made
administratively liable as she could not have prevented the devious scheme by any amount of
diligence.
As regards Fajardo, jurisprudence is settled that the death of a respondent does not preclude a
finding of administrative liability, subject to certain exception.[28] In the case of Gonzales v.
Escalona[29] (Gonzales), the Court wrote:
While his death intervened after the completion of the investigation, it has been settled that the
Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative matter by the mere fact that the
respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of the respondent’s case;
jurisdiction once acquired, continues to exist until the final resolution of the case.[30]
The above rule, however, admits of exceptions. In Gonzales, citing the case of Limliman vs.
Judge Ulat-Marrero,[31]the Court held that the death of the respondent necessitated the
dismissal of the administrative case upon a consideration of any of the following factors: first, if
the respondent’s right to due process was not observed; second, the presence of exceptional
circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian reasons; and third, the
kind of penalty imposed.
In the case against Fajardo, none of the aforesaid exceptions exists. As borne by the records,
Fajardo’s right to due process was not violated as she was given the opportunity to answer the
charges against her. In fact, Fajardo was able to file her comment before the OCA. Neither
could equitable or humanitarian reasons be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the present
case. Respondent’s demise, alone, could not be considered sufficient ground to justify the
dismissal of the administrative case on the ground of equitable or humanitarian reason. Thus,
the case against Fajardo could not be dismissed merely on account of her death.
Nevertheless, the Court is convinced that the case against Fajardo must be dismissed for want
of evidence against her. Just like in the case of Burgos, there was lack of evidence to show
that Fajardo was involved in this anomaly. In fact, it was her actions which led to the discovery
of the irregularity. If not for her discovery, this Court would not have the opportunity to mete the
appropriate penalties for the persons responsible for this reprehensible scheme. The
administrative charge against Fajardo must perforce be dismissed.
The Court likewise concurs with the recommendation of the OCA with respect to Garcia, but
modifies its findings in the case of Santiago. The Court is convinced that Santiago is also
administratively liable for grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.
Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack
of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.[32]
Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.[33] The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial
evidence.[34]
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service refers to acts or omissions that violate the
norm of public accountability and diminish – or tend to diminish – the people’s faith in the
Judiciary.[35] Understandably, dishonesty and grave misconduct constitute conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service.[36]
In this case, the record is replete with evidence pointing not only to Garcia but also to Santiago
as the persons responsible for the subject misdeed.
First, with respect to Garcia, testimonial and documentary evidence reveals her unwarranted
interest in the LRC case. Garcia performed numerous acts which led to no other conclusion
than that she was instrumental and complicit in making sure that the petition would be granted.
Garcia first approached the OCC and tried to persuade them to have the LRC case assigned to
Branch 83. Her request was denied as there was a process of raffling off the cases. This,
however, did not stop Garcia from pursuing her objective. When the LRC case mysteriously
appeared in Branch 83, it was Garcia who practically prepared all the orders relating to the said
case. More importantly, it was Garcia who prepared the draft of the November 4, 2011 Order
which granted the petition.
Moreover, apart from preparing the draft of the subject order, Garcia surreptitiously issued an
entry of judgment for the same on February 20, 2012. Garcia claimed that she only issued the
subject entry of judgment to prevent the disruption of service because Burgos was absent on
that day. It must be noted that it was the function of Burgos, as OIC, to prepare and sign the
entry of judgment. Regrettably for Garcia, Burgos was able to successfully rebut her claim by
attaching her DTR for February 20, 2012 to prove that she was present on the said date.
Likewise, aside from failing to inform Burgos of the said entry of judgment, Garcia notified
neither the latter nor Judge Agloro of the OCC’s refusal to receive the entry of judgment.
Finally, as to Santiago, the Court disagrees with the OCA that her acts were done in
accordance with her usual daily routine. Contrary to the OCA findings, Santiago’s acts, relating
to the present anomaly, could not be considered as constituting simple neglect of duty because
they were not committed due to carelessness and indifference, but as a result of a willful
violation of the established rules. In fact, her participation was an essential part of the scheme,
without which, no semblance of legitimacy could have attached to the proceedings before
Branch 83 regarding the LRC case.
As stated by Burgos, the standard procedure in the trial court was for the clerk-in-charge to
receive the case records raffled to their branch from the OCC personnel and to sign in the
logbook carried by the latter to evidence receipt of the records. A similar procedure was
explained by the OCC staff when they attested that the record of the LRC case was delivered
to and received by Branch 77.
Santiago could not claim simple negligence for failing to comply with the said procedure. It
must be recalled that Fajardo confronted Santiago regarding the irregularity but the latter
responded by pointing to Garcia with her lips. Santiago never denied this assertion. Her
response to Fajardo’s inquiry only shows that she was aware of the misdeed.
Furthermore, Santiago also failed to inform Burgos and Judge Agloro of the OCC ‘s refusal to
register the entry of judgment for the order in the LRC case. As borne by the OCC records, it
was Santiago who brought the said entry of judgment to the OCC. It was also Santiago who
was asked by the OCC personnel why she furnished the OCC an entry of judgment for the
order in the LRC case when it was officially raffled off to Branch 77. The incident was
witnessed by Fajardo and was never refuted by Santiago.
In sum, the totality of the evidence shows that Garcia and Santiago connived to guarantee
that the LRC petition would be acted on favorably. Clearly, they were united in their efforts to
ensure the realization of their scheme without being found out. Despite the positive evidence
and allegations hurled against them, Garcia and Santiago chose to simply deny their complicity
without addressing the actions attributed to them. Verily, their responsibility and culpability with
regard to the misdeed were established by substantial evidence. Their respective participation
in this misdeed and their continuous feigning of innocence, constitute gross misconduct,
serious dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Under Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty are grave offenses which merit the penalty of
dismissal from service even for the first offense. Such penalty shall carry with it the cancellation
of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement and other benefits, and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any
government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution.[37]
WHEREFORE, the complaints against respondents Leslie J. Burgos, Court Interpreter, and
Julieta Fajardo, Clerk III, both of Branch 83, Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan,
are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Respondents Marissa M. Garcia, Court Stenographer, and Annaliza P. Santiago, Clerk III, both
of Branch 83, Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan, are found GUILTY of Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and are,
thus, DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all their retirement and other benefits,
except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government office,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.
ROSA YAP PARAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS,
respondent., A.C. No. 5333, 2000 October 18, 3rd Division
DECISION
MELO, J:
This has reference to a case for disbarment initiated by complainant Rosa Yap Paras against
her husband, Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras. The parties exchanged tirades and barbs in their
copious pleadings, hurling invectives, cutting remarks and insults at each other. Reduced to its
essentials, Rosa Paras charged her husband with dishonesty and falsification of public
documents, harassment and intimidation, and immorality for siring a child with another
woman. Respondent denied the allegations, contending that his wife, in cahoots with her
family, is out to destroy and strip him of his share in their multi-million conjugal assets.
The parties come from wealthy families in Negros Oriental. They were married on May 21,
1964 and have two grown-up children. They have vast sugarlands and other
businesses. Respondent was a Municipal Judge for 14 years and served as Mayor in their
town for 2 terms during the administration of President Aquino. Complainant is a
businesswoman. Sometime in 1988, their marriage fell apart when due to marital strain that
has developed through the years, respondent left his wife and children to live with his mother
and sister in Dumaguete City and thence started his law practice. Complainant, in the
meantime, filed a case for the dissolution of their marriage, which case is still pending in court.
The complaint charged:
DISHONESTY, FALSIFICATION and FRAUD
… respondent obtained loans from certain banks in the name of complainant by counterfeiting
complainant’s signature, falsely making it appear that complainant was the applicant for said
loans. Thereafter, he carted away and misappropriated the proceeds of the loans.
. . . to guarantee the above loans, respondent mortgaged some personal properties belonging
to the conjugal partnership without the consent of complainant.
GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT AND CONCUBINAGE
Respondent is . . . engaged in the immoral and criminal act of concubinage as he maintained
an illicit relationship with one Ms. Jocelyn A. Ching, siring an illegitimate child with her while
married to complainant.
UNETHICAL AND UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Respondent abused courts of justice and misused his legal skills to frighten, harass and
intimidate all those who take a position diametrically adverse to his sinister plans by unethically
filing complaints and other pleadings against them. He utilized strategies to obstruct justice.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
(Respondent) utilized strategies to obstruct justice. In the criminal actions initiated against him,
respondent used his legal skills not to prove his innocence but to derail all the proceedings.
In his Answer, respondent interposed the following defenses:
(1) On the Charge of Falsification of Public Documents:
That during the sugarboom in the 1970’s, his wife executed in his favor a Special Power of
Attorney to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan authorizing him to borrow money and
apply for and secure any agricultural or crop loan for sugar cane from the Bais Rural Bank,
Bais City . . . (Rollo, Annex [3], p. 262)
(2) On the Charge of Forgery:
That the Report of the National Bureau of Investigation which found that the questioned
signatures (referring to the alleged forged signatures of complainant) and the standard sample
signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same person (Annex [B] of the
Complaint, Rollo, p. 26) was doctored, and that his wife filed against him a string of cases for
falsification of public documents because he intends to disinherit his children and bequeath his
inchoate share in the conjugal properties to his own mother.
(3) On the Charge of Grossly Immoral Conduct and Concubinage:
That this is a malicious accusation fabricated by his brother-in-law, Atty. Francisco D. Yap to
disqualify him from getting any share in the conjugal assets. He cites the dismissal of the
complaint for concubinage filed against him by his wife before the City Prosecutor of Negros
Oriental as proof of his innocence.
Respondent, however, admits that he, his mother and sister, are solicitous and hospitable to
his alleged concubine, Ms. Jocelyn Ching and her daughter, Cyndee Rose (named after his
own deceased daughter), by allowing them to stay in their house and giving them some
financial assistance, because they pity Ms. Ching, a secretary in his law office, who was
deserted by her boyfriend after getting her pregnant.
(4) On the Charge of Obstruction of Justice:
That the legal remedies pursued by (him) in defense and offense are legitimate courses of
action done by an embattled lawyer.
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines investigated
the complaint against respondent summarizing the causes of action as follows:
(1) Falsification of complainant’s signature and misuse of conjugal assets; and
(2) Immorality and criminal acts of concubinage with one Ms. Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching (for)
siring an illegitimate child with her while married to complainant, and, abandonment of his own
family.
(Rollo, Report of the IBP, p. 34)
No actual hearing was conducted as the parties agreed to merely submit their respective
memoranda, depositions, and other pieces of evidence attached to their pleadings.
Thereafter, the CBD found respondent guilty as charged and recommended:
(1) Respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months on the first
charge; and
(2) Respondent’s indefinite suspension from the practice of law on the second charge.
(ibid., p. 57)
The CBD held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent for falsification and
use of falsified documents (Criminal Case No. 11768) and for concubinage (I.S. No. 93-578)
will not bar the filing of an administrative case for disbarment against him. In a criminal case,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for conviction, while in an administrative complaint,
only a preponderance of evidence is necessary.
The CBD gave credence to the NBI Report that “the questioned signatures (referring to the
signatures appearing in the loan agreements, contracts of mortgage, etc.) and the standard
sample signatures of respondent were written by one and the same person.” This affirms the
allegation of complainant Rosa Yap Paras that her husband forged her signatures in those
instruments. Respondent denies this but his denial was unsubstantiated and is, therefore, self-
serving.
In finding respondent liable for Immorality, the CBD relied heavily on the uncontroverted sworn
affidavit-statements of respondent’s children and three other eyewitnesses to respondent’s
illicit affair with Ms. Jocelyn Ching. For a better appreciation of their statements, their affidavits
are hereby reproduced in full. Thusly,
I, DAHLIA Y. PARAS, of legal age, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, but presently
living in Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn hereby depose and say:
1. I am a nurse by profession. I finished my BSN degree at the College of Nursing, Silliman
University.
2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras and my father Justo J. Paras. My father has left the family
home in Bindoy and now lives at his mother’s house at San Jose Ext., Dumaguete City.
3. My father has a "kabit" or concubine by the name of Ma. Jocelyn Ching. They have a child
named Cyndee Rose, who was delivered at the Silliman University Hospital Medical Center on
July 19, 1990.
4. Jocelyn used to be the secretary of my father and Atty. Melchor Arboleda when they
practice law together in 1988 to 1989. Their relationship started in 1989. When she became
pregnant, my father rented an apartment for her at the Amigo Subdivision, Dumaguete City.
5. Following delivery of the baby, my father built a house for Jocelyn in Maayong Tubig, Dauin,
Negros Oriental. My father spend time there often with Jocelyn and their child.
6. I used to visit my father at San Jose Extension these past years, and almost every time I
was there, I would see Jocelyn, sitting, watching TV, serving coffee in my father’s law office,
and one time, she was washing my father’s clothes.
7. I first saw their child Cyndee Rose in 1992, about early May, at San Jose Extension. I was
there to ask for my allowance. He was there at the time, and when I looked at Cyndee Rose
closely, I became convinced that she was my father’s daughter with Jocelyn.
8. Incidentally, I had an elder sister also named Cindy Rose (now deceased).
9. In September 1992 when I went to visit my father, I saw toys and child’s clothes in my
father’s room.
10. Whenever, I saw Jocelyn at San Jose Extension, I wanted to talk to her or be alone
with her, but she would deliberately avoid me. I could see that she was hiding something from
me. p. 109, Records.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
xxx xxx xxx
1. . . . sometime during the period of April-September, 1992, I made several visits to my father
at his mother’s house in San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, where he had moved after he
left our home in Bindoy;
2. That these visits were made on different times and different days of the week;
3. That most of my visits, I would meet a woman who was also living at my father’s place. This
woman is now known to me to be Ma. Jocelyn Ching;
4. That my basis for observing that Ms. Ching was living in my father’s house is that during my
visits, whether during office hours or after office hours, I would meet her at my father’s place,
not his office; she was wearing house clothes and slippers, such as skimpy clothes, shorts and
T-shirt, not street or office clothes; she was generally unkempt, not made up for work or going
out; on one occasion, I even saw her, washing my father’s clothes as well as a small child’s
clothing; and she conducted herself around the house in the manner of someone who lived
there;
5. That on one of my visits, I confirmed that Ms. Ching was living with my father from Josie
Vailoces, who was then a working student living at my father’s place;
6. Ms. Vailoces subsequently confirmed under oath the fact that my father and Ms. Jocelyn
Ching were living together as husband and wife at my father’s place in a deposition taken in
connection with Civil Case No. 10613, RTC-Dumaguete City, Branch 30, the Honorable
Enrique C. Garovillo, presiding. A copy of the transcript of the deposition of Ms. Vailoces is
already part of the record of this case. For emphasis, photocopies of the pertinent portion of
the written deposition of Josie Vailoces is hereto attached as Annexes "A"and "A-1." p. 111,
Records
Respondent’s son has this to say:
“I, RHOUEL Y. PARAS, 15 years old, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, but presently
living in Dumaguete City, after being duly sworn according to law, depose and say:
1. I am a high school student at the Holy Cross High School, Dumaguete City.
2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras, and my father Justo J. Paras, a lawyer.
3. My father has left our home in Bindoy, and now lives at his mother’s house in San Jose
Extension, Dumaguete City. He is not giving us support any more.
4. However, from October 1991 to December 1992, I was getting my allowance of P50.00 a
week. I would go to their house at San Jose Extension and personally ask him for it.
5. In October 1992, between 11:30 AM and 1:00 PM, I went to San Jose Extension for my
weekly allowance. I asked Josephus, an adopted son of my father’s sister, if my father was
around. Josephus said my father was in his room.
6. So I went direct to his room and because the door was not locked, I entered the room
without knocking. There I saw my father lying in bed side by side with a woman. He was only
wearing a brief. The woman was wearing shorts and T-shirt.
7. They both appeared scared upon seeing me. My father hurriedly gave me P100.00 and I
left immediately because I felt bad and embarrassed.
8. Before that incident, I used to see the woman at my father’s house in San Jose
Extension. Every time I went to see my father, she was also there.
9. I later came to know that she was Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and that she was my father’s "kabit"
or concubine.
10. I am no longer getting my weekly allowance from my father. p. 112, Records
Added to the foregoing sworn statements of respondent’s children is the damaging statement
under oath of Virgilio Kabrisante who was respondent’s secretary when respondent was a
mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental which reads as follows:
I, VIRGILIO V. KABRISANTE, of legal age, married, Filipino, a resident of Malaga, Bindoy,
Negros Oriental, after having been sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and state
that:
1. I personally know Justo J. Paras, having been his secretary during his incumbency as
Mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental. In fact, through the latter’s recommendation and
intercession, I was later on appointed as OIC Mayor of the same town from December 1986 to
January 1987.
2. When Justo J. Paras decided to practice law in Dumaguete City, I became his personal aide
and performed various chores for the same. As his personal aide, I stayed in the same house
and room with the latter.
3. Sometime in January 1989, Justo J. Paras confided to me that he felt attracted to my lady
friend named Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. He then requested me to invite the latter to a dinner date
at Chin Loong Restaurant.
4. Conveying the invitation which was accepted by Ma. Jocelyn Ching, the latter, Justo J.
Paras and myself then had dinner at the above-mentioned restaurant.
5. At the behest of Justo J. Paras, I invited Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching, on several occasions,
always to a picnic at a beach in Dauin, Negros Oriental. Said invitations were always accepted
by the latter.
6. At each of the above-mentioned picnics, I observed that Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A.
Ching had become more and more intimate with each other.
7. Sometime in March 1989, at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening on a Friday, I accompanied
Justo J. Paras to the area in front of the Silliman University Medical Center, where he said he
was going to meet someone.
8. After waiting for a few minutes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching arrived and immediately boarded at the
back seat of the Sakbayan vehicle I was driving for Justo J. Paras. The latter then requested
me to drive both of them (Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching) to Honeybee Motel
somewhere in Sibulan, Negros Oriental.
9. When we arrived there, Justo J. Paras asked me to wait for them outside the room, while he
and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching entered the said room.
10. I waited outside the room for about two (2) hours after which the two of them
emerged from the room. We then proceeded to Chin Loong to eat supper.
11. After eating supper, we dropped Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching off in front of the Dumaguete
City Cockpit.
12. This meeting was repeated two more times, at the same place and always on a
Friday.
13. On April 3, 1988, I went home to Bindoy and stopped working for Justo Paras.” pp.
56-57, Records.
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
xxx xxx xxx
1. Sometime in May 1989, I returned to Dumaguete City to look for a job, having been jobless
since I left Dumaguete City to go home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
2. While looking for a job, I stayed at the house where my friend, Bernard Dejillo was staying
at Mangnao, Dumaguete City. My friend Bernard Dejillo was occupying a room at the second
floor of the said house which he shared with me.
3. Sometime in the last week of May 1989, in the course of my job hunting, I met Justo J.
Paras. Having not seen each other for some time, we talked for a while, discussing matters
about the barangay elections in Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
4. When our discussion was finished, Justo J. Paras asked me where I was staying, to which I
answered that I was staying at the aforementioned house. He then requested me to find out if
there was an available room at the said house which he could rent with Ma. Jocelyn A.
Ching. I told him that I would have to ask my friend Bernard Dejillo about the matter.
5. When I arrived at the house that evening, I asked my friend Bernard Dejillo about the
matter, to which the latter signified his approval. He told me that a room at the first floor of the
same house was available for rental to Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching.
6. The next day, I immediately informed Justo J. Paras of Bernard Dejillo’s approval of his
request.
7. Sometime in the first week of June 1989, Ma. Jocelyn Ching moved in to the room she had
rented at the first floor of the house I was also staying at.
8. Almost every night thereafter, Justo J. Paras would come to the house and stay
overnight. When he came at night Justo J. Paras and I would converse and while conversing,
drink a bottle of Tanduay Rum. Oftentimes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching would join in our conversation.
9. After we finish drinking and talking, Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn Ching would enter the
room rented and sleep there, while I would also go upstairs to my room.
10. The next morning I could always observe Justo J. Paras came out of said room and
depart from the house.
11. The coming of Justo J. Paras to the house I was staying ceased after about one (1)
month when they transferred to another house.
12. I myself left the house and returned to Bindoy, Negros Oriental some time in June
1989.
13. Sometime in January 1993, on a Saturday at about noontime, I went to the house of
Justo J. Paras to consult him about a Kabataang Barangay matter involving my son. When I
arrived at his house, I noticed that the same was closed and there was no one there.
14. Needing to consult him about the above-mentioned matter, I proceeded to the
resthouse of Justo J. Paras located at Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental.
15. When I arrived at the said resthouse, Justo J. Paras was not there but the person in
charge of the said resthouse informed me that Justo J. Paras was at his house at Barangay
Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. The same person also gave me directions so that I
could locate the house of Justo J. Paras he referred to earlier.
16. With the help of the directions given by said person, I was able to locate the house
of Justo J. Paras.
17. At the doorway of the said house, I called out if anybody was home while knocking
on the door.
18. After a few seconds, Ma. Jocelyn Ching opened the door. Upon seeing the latter, I
asked her if Justo J. Paras was home. She then let me in the house and told me to sit down
and wait for a while. She then proceeded to a room.
19. A few minutes later, Justo J. Paras came out of the same room and sat down near
me. I noticed that the latter had just woke up from a nap.
20. We then started to talk about the matter involving my son and sometime later, Ma.
Jocelyn Ching served us coffee.
21. While we were talking and drinking coffee I saw a little girl, about three (3) years old,
walking around the sala, whom I later came to know as Cyndee Rose, the daughter of Justo J.
Paras and Ma. Jocelyn Ching.
22. After our conversation was finished, Justo J. Paras told me to see him at this office
at San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, the following Monday to discuss the matter some
more.
23. I then bid them goodbye and went home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
24. I am executing this affidavit as a supplement to my affidavit dated 22 July 1993. pp.
58-60, Records

(ibid., pp. 44-52)
The CBD likewise gave credence to the sworn affidavits and the deposition of two other
witnesses, namely, Salvador de Jesus, a former repairman of the Paras’ household, and, Josie
Vailoces, a working student and former ward of the Paras’ family, who both gave personal
accounts of the illicit relationship between respondent and Jocelyn Ching, which led to the birth
of Cyndee Rose. De Jesus swore that while doing repair works in the Paras’ household he
observed Ms. Ching and Cyndee Rose practically living in the Paras’ house (p. 85, Rollo,
Annex [H]). Vailoces, on the other hand, deposed that she was asked by respondent Paras to
deliver money to Ms. Ching for the payment of the hospital bill after she gave birth to Cyndee
Rose. Vailoces was also asked by respondent to procure Cyndee Rose Paras’ baptismal
certificate after the latter was baptized in the house of respondent; she further testified that in
said baptismal certificate, respondent appears as the father of Cyndee Rose which explains
why the latter is using the surname Paras. (p. 87, Annex [I], Rollo)
The findings and the recommendations of the CBD are substantiated by the evidentiary record.
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT’S SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the
signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis-à-vis the
questioned signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents,
contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the following results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one
and the same person.
2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not written
by one and the same person.
(Annex [B], Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures of
complainant. However, an analysis of the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that
the questioned or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by
respondent as said falsified signatures were the same as the sample signatures of respondent.
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in
his favor by complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank
of Bais City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot
water. For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from the banks, then why did he have to
falsify his wife’s signatures in the bank loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is to
especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of the principal using his own
name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE
The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his children and
three other persons who used to work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his
infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The
baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was named as the father of the
child (Annex [J], Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his deceased first-born daughter
Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete
City bolster the allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the
mother of his illegitimate child.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law (People vs. Tunda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]; Leda vs. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395
[1992]). In the case at hand, respondent has fallen below the moral bar when he forged his
wife’s signature in the bank loan documents, and, sired a daughter with a woman other than his
wife. However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer
of the Court and as a member of the bar (Tapucar vs. Tapucar, Adm. Case No. 4148, July 30,
1998). Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired (Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129
[1998]).
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife’s signature in bank documents and other
related loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of
immorality and abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served simultaneously. Let
notice of this decision be spread in respondent’s record as an attorney, and notice of the same
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts concerned.
Romulo De Mesa Festin Vs. Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri; A.C. No. 11600; June 19,
2017
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint[1] filed by complainant Romulo
De Mesa Festin (complainant) against respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri (respondent) before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for gross violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Complainant alleged that he was elected as Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro in the May 2013 elections. His opponent, Jose Tapales Villarosa (Villarosa), filed an
election protest against him before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
Branch 46 (RTC).[2] After deciding in favor of Villarosa, the RTC issued an Order[3] dated
January 15, 2014 (January 15, 2014 Order), granting his motion for execution pending
appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal is GRANTED.
The OIC-Branch Clerk of Court [(COC)] is hereby directed to issue a Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal after the lapse of twenty (20) working days to be counted from the time
[complainant’s] counsel receives a copy of this Special Order, if no restraining order or
status quo order is issued pursuant to Section 11 (b),[4] Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-
SC.[5](Emphasis supplied)
Distressed, complainant filed a petition for certiorari[6] before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), seeking a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the issuance of the writ of
execution pending appeal.[7] In an Order[8]dated February 13, 2014, the COMELEC issued a
TRO, directing Hon. Gay Marie F. Lubigan-Rafael (RTC Judge), in her official capacity as
Presiding Judge of the RTC, to cease and desist from enforcing the January 15, 2014 Order,
effective immediately.[9] Accordingly, the RTC issued another Order[10] dated February 25, 2014
(February 25, 2014 Order), pertinent portion of which reads:
In view thereof, the OIC-Branch [COC] is directed NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution in
accordance with the [January 15, 2014] Order until further notice.[11]
Despite the TRO and the RTC’s February 25, 2014 Order, respondent, as counsel of Villarosa,
filed five (5) manifestations[12] addressed to the COC insisting on the writ’s issuance. Notably,
he did not serve copies of these manifestations to the other party. [13]
In these manifestations, respondent claimed that his client received the RTC’s January 15,
2014 Order on January 18, 2014, and counting from said date, the twenty-day period ended on
February 12, 2014.[14] Since the COMELEC only issued the TRO on February 13, 2014, the
TRO no longer had any effect. Respondent further asserted that the TRO was addressed only
to the RTC Judge, and not to the COC; therefore, the COC is not bound by the TRO. For these
reasons, respondent insisted that the COC could legally issue the writ of execution pending
appeal.[15]
The COC eventually issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal addressed to the sheriff.
However, complainant only found out about respondent’s manifestations when the sheriff
attempted to serve the writ on him.[16] Soon thereafter, complainant filed the disbarment
complaint.
In his complaint, complainant argued that respondent violated his ethical duties when he misled
and induced the COC to defy lawful orders – particularly, the COMELEC’s TRO and the RTC’s
February 25, 2014 Order.[17] As a result, respondent allegedly violated Canons 1, 10, 15, and
19 of the CPR.[18]
In his answer,[19] respondent claimed that, first, since the case records had been transmitted to
the COMELEC on January 31, 2014, the RTC was divested of jurisdiction over the case;
therefore, it had no more power to issue the February 25, 2014 Order.[20] Respondent put
forward the same reason for filing the five manifestations with the COC instead of the RTC
Judge.[21]Second, the manifestations contained no misleading statements or factual deviations.
He merely stated in his manifestations his honest belief that the twenty-day period had already
lapsed when the COMELEC issued its TRO; hence, it no longer had any binding effect. He
explained that the filing of manifestations to highlight his position did not violate any
rule.[22] Third, he allegedly filed those manifestations pursuant to his duty under Canon 18 of
the CPR to represent his client with competence and diligence.[23]
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation[24] dated September 1, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. [25] He
observed that by filing manifestations instead of motions, respondent was able to disregard the
rule that motions shall be served on the other party and shall contain a notice of hearing. In this
regard, the Investigating Commissioner noted that a manifestation merely informs the court
about a certain matter involving the case, and does not require affirmative action by the court.
In the present case, however, the manifestations filed by respondent were actually motions as
these contained arguments to support his prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal. Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner also held that respondent acted in bad faith
when he convinced the COC to disregard the COMELEC’s TRO. He pointed out that when the
TRO enjoins the court, it includes the judge and all officers and employees of the court,
including the clerk of court. Hence, respondent was unfair to the other party and employed
deceit when he filed the manifestations. As a result, the other party was not afforded due
process by being deprived of an opportunity to oppose the manifestations. [26]
In a Resolution[27] dated December 14, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigation Commissioner.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,[28] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[29] dated
May 28, 2016.
On October 10, 2016, respondent filed a petition for review[30] before the Court purportedly
pursuant to the procedure laid out in Ramientas v. Reyala (Ramientas).[31]
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
for the acts complained of.
The Court’s Ruling
I. At the outset, the Court deems it proper to clarify that respondent’s filing of the instant
petition for review does not conform with the standing procedure for the investigation of
administrative complaints against lawyers.
Section 12 (b) and (c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645
dated October 13, 2015,[32] states:
Section 12. Review and Recommendation by the Board of Governors. –
xxxx
b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership,
shall recommend to the Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of
disciplinary action against the respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which
it is based. The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from
the next meeting of the Board following the submission of the Investigator’s report.
c) The Board’s resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented
and submitted, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10)
days from issuance of the resolution.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Under the old rule, the IBP Board had the power to “issue a decision” if the lawyer complained
of was either exonerated or meted a penalty of “less than suspension of disbarment.” In this
situation, the case would be deemed terminated unless an interested party files a petition
before the Court.[33] The case of Ramientas,[34] which was cited as respondent’s basis for filing
the present petition for review, was pronounced based on the old rule. [35]
In contrast, under the amended provisions cited above, the IBP Board’s resolution is merely
recommendatory regardless of the penalty imposed on the lawyer. The amendment stresses
the Court’s authority to discipline a lawyer who transgresses his ethical duties under the CPR.
Hence, any final action on a lawyer’s administrative liability shall be done by the Court based
on the entire records of the case, including the IBP Board’s recommendation, without need for
the lawyer-respondent to file any additional pleading.
On this score, respondent’s filing of the present petition for review is unnecessary. Pursuant to
the current rule, the IBP Board’s resolution and the case records were forwarded to the Court.
The latter is then bound to fully consider all documents contained therein, regardless of any
further pleading filed by any party – including respondent’s petition for review, which the Court
shall nonetheless consider if only to completely resolve the merits of this case and determine
respondent’s actual administrative liability.
II. After a judicious review of the case records, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent
should be held administratively liable for his violations of the CPR. However, the Court finds it
proper to impose a lower penalty.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the
legal processes.[36] Additionally, Canon 8 and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the CPR require lawyers
to conduct themselves with fairness towards their professional colleagues, to observe
procedural rules, and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. These provisions read
thus:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAW OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
xxxx
CANON 8 – A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND
CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL
xxxx
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
xxxx
Rule 10.03 – A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.
Contrary to these edicts, respondent improperly filed the five (5) motions as “manifestations” to
sidestep the requirement of notice of hearing for motions. In effect, he violated his professional
obligations to respect and observe procedural rules, not to misuse the rules to cause injustice,
and to exhibit fairness towards his professional colleagues.
The difference between a manifestation and a motion is essential in determining respondent’s
administrative liability.
A manifestation is usually made merely for the information of the court, unless otherwise
indicated. In a manifestation, the manifesting party makes a statement to inform the court,
rather than to contest or argue.[37] In contrast, a motion is an application for relief from the court
other than by a pleading[38]and must be accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of
service to the other party, unless the motion is not prejudicial to the rights of the adverse
party.[39] Settled is the rule that a motion without notice of hearing is pro forma or a mere scrap
of paper; thus, the court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it.
The reason for the rule is simple: to afford an opportunity for the other party to agree or object
to the motion before the court resolves it. This is in keeping with the principle of due process. [40]
In the present case, respondent filed five (5) manifestations before the COC praying for
affirmative reliefs. The Court agrees with the IBP that these “manifestations” were in fact
motions, since reliefs were prayed for from the court – particularly, the issuance of the writ of
execution pending appeal. By labelling them as manifestations, respondent craftily sidestepped
the requirement of a notice of hearing and deprived the other party of an opportunity to oppose
his arguments. Moreover, the fact that he submitted these manifestations directly to COC,
instead of properly filing them before the RTC, highlights his failure to exhibit fairness towards
the other party by keeping the latter completely unaware of his manifestations. Undoubtedly,
respondent violated his professional obligations under the CPR.
He attempts to justify his acts by arguing that he merely represented his client with competence
and diligence. However, respondent should be reminded that a lawyer is ethically bound not
only to serve his client but also the court, his colleagues, and society. His obligation to
represent his client is not without limits, but must be “within the bounds of the law” pursuant to
Canon 19 of the CPR. Accordingly, he is ethically bound to employ only fair and honest means
to attain their clients’ objectives.
Respondent further argues that his filing of the manifestations with the COC is justified
considering that the RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the case and the COC had the
ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution. His argument fails to persuade. The Court has
ruled that a COC has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution when the judge directs its
issuance.[41] In this case, however, the RTC Judge had issued the second Order (dated
February 25, 2014) explicitly directing the COC “NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution.”
Therefore, the COC in this case did not have a ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution. If
respondent honestly believed that his client was entitled to the writ, then he should not have
clandestinely submitted ex parte manifestations directly to the COC to coerce the latter to grant
his intended relief. Instead, respondent should have filed the proper motions before the court,
which alone has the inherent power to grant his prayer pursuant to Section 5 (c), (d), and (g),
Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.[42]
The Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers. In the exercise of its sound
judicial discretion, it may to impose a less severe punishment if such penalty would achieve the
desired end of reforming the errant lawyer.[43] In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court
deems that a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is sufficient
and commensurate with respondent’s infractions.[44]
As a final note, the Court stresses that a lawyer’s primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede, or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes this obligation.[45] Indeed, a lawyer must champion his
client’s cause with competence and diligence, but he cannot invoke this as an excuse for his
failure to exhibit courtesy and fairness to his fellow lawyers and to respect legal processes
designed to afford due process to all stakeholders.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating
Canon 1, Canon 8, and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective from the
finality of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be attached to
respondent’s personal record as a member of the Bar. Furthermore, let copies of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which
is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
Anonymous Complaint Vs. Presiding Judge Exequil L. Dagala, etc., A.M. No.
MTJ-16-1886. July 25, 2017
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case arose from an anonymous letter-complaint[1] filed against Judge
Exequil L. Dagala (Judge Dagala), presiding judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Dapa-Socorro,
Dapa, Surigao Del Norte, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and indorsed to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.
In a letter-complaint dated September 30, 2015, an unnamed resident of San Isidro, Siargo
Island, Surigao Del Norte, wrote to report, among others, an altercation involving his neighbors
and Judge Dagala. According to the unnamed complainant, on September 29, 2015, he was in
his hut when he witnessed an argument between his neighbors and Judge Dagala over the
ownership of his neighbor's lot and the trees planted thereon (September 29 incident). There,
he saw Judge Dagala walking back and forth, shouting invectives at the lot's occupants and
brandishing an M-16 armalite rifle to intimidate them.[2] He further claims that while police
officers were at the scene, they did nothing to pacify the situation. Complainant alleged that no
inquiries were made as to the legality of the logging activities being undertaken at Judge
Dagala's apparent behest nor his authority to carry a high-powered firearm. According to the
complainant, while his neighbors were able to take photos and make a video recording of the
incident, they were too afraid to file a complaint against Judge Dagala and instead wanted to
arrange for a confidential transmittal of their evidence to the Office of the Ombudsman. The
complainant also recounted rumors of Judge Dagala's involvement in illicit activities, namely:
illegal drugs, illegal fishing, illegal gambling, illegal logging, maintaining a private army, owning
high-powered firearms and having several mistresses.[3]
The Office of the Ombudsman indorsed the letter-complaint to the OCA for appropriate
action.[4] The OCA, in turn, directed Executive Judge Victor A. Canoy (Judge Canoy) of the
Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Surigao Del Norte, to conduct a discreet investigation.[5]
In his report, Judge Canoy reported that the altercation described in the complaint arose from
an existing boundary dispute among owners of adjacent lots in the area. One of the disputants
allegedly sold the trees planted on the contested lot to Dagala. According to Judge Canoy, the
chief of police could not confirm whether Judge Dagala was armed with a high-powered
weapon at the time but that the incident was subject of an ongoing police investigation. He
concluded, however, that unless the anonymous complainant comes forward and substantiates
his allegations, the complaint should be dismissed.[6]
On November 13, 2015, the OCA also requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct further discreet investigation.[7]The investigation yielded the following findings, among
others: (1) Judge Dagala is legally married to "A," on July 18, 2006, in Del Carmen, Surigao del
Norte; (2) they have no children; (3) Judge Dagala sired children with three different women;
(4) these children were born on October 13, 2000, March 5, 2007, and March 24, 2008,
respectively; (5) in 2008, Judge Dagala and "A" agreed to live separately; (6) "A" is currently
working in the City Tr
easury Office and receiving P10,000.00 as monthly support from him; (7) "B," the mother of
Judge Dagala's youngest child, appeared before the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) relative to certain hardwood furniture confiscated by the government; (8)
Sergio Tiu Commendador[8] (Commendador), a court interpreter in Judge Dagala's court, was
arrested during a recent buy-bust operation; (9) Judge Dagala is alleged to be the owner of
Sugba Cockpit in Del Carmen, Surigao del Norte, and thereafter sold the same to one Marites
Borchs[9] (B-orchs).[10]
In an Indorsement dated April 25, 2016, the OCA required Judge Dagala to file his comment in
relation to the anonymous letter-complaint as well as the findings of its preliminary
investigation. Attached to the Indorsement were a copy of the anonymous letter-complaint, a
certificate of marriage between Judge Dagala and "A," and the certificates of live birth of his
alleged children.[11]
In his comment,[12] Judge Dagala admitted that he was married to "A" but that, due to their
constant fighting, they decided to separate. "A" returned to Surigao City while Judge Dagala
stayed in Siargao Island.[13] Judge Dagala also admitted, "without any remorse," that he has
three children with three different women. He added that his wife knew about his children and
that she has already forgiven and forgotten him for his unfaithfulness.[14] He denied any
involvement in illegal logging, asserting that it was "B" who managed a furniture
business.[15] He also denies engaging in any illegal drug activity, asserting that the only
connection linking him to the same is Commendador, who simply happened to work as a court
interpreter in his sala. Judge Dagala also admitted to having owned a cockpit but asserts that
he had sold it to Borchs in 2008 to dispel any suspicion that he was involved in illegal
gambling.[16]
Earlier, however, Judge Dagala submitted a letter[17] "irrevocably resigning" his post but this
was rejected by the Court on August 9, 2016 because he was still under investigation. [18] On
August 19, 2016, the OCA received a Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash disk by mail from "a
concerned citizen" containing a video recording of the September 29 incident complained of.[19]
According to the OCA, while Judge Dagala may be "excused" for having sired two children
prior to his marriage, the record is clear that he had his third child with "B" during the
subsistence of his marriage with "A." The OCA found it morally reprehensible for Judge Dagala,
a married man, to maintain intimate relations with a woman other than his spouse. That he has
already separated from his wife and that she had forgiven him for his extramarital affair do not
justify his conduct. The OCA asserted that Judge Dagala's act of successively siring children
with different women displays his proclivity to disregard settled norms of morality.[20]
The OCA also noted Judge Dagala's failure to disclose that he already had a child in his
Personal Data Sheet (PDS) which he filed with the Judicial and Bar Council for his application
to the Judiciary in 2006. For the OCA, this omission is a deliberate attempt to mislead. As a
former prosecutor, Judge Dagala knew or ought to know that making false statements in the
PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of a public document. Hence, his failure to
disclose the fact that he fathered a child in his PDS constitutes dishonesty.[21]
The OCA also found that Judge Dagala committed gross misconduct for openly carrying a
high-powered firearm during the reported altercation of September 29, 2015. Republic Act No.
10591[22] (RA 10591) provides that only small arms may be registered by licensed citizens or
juridical entities for ownership, possession, and concealed entry. The OCA noted that Judge
Dagala neither refuted the allegation that he brandished a high-powered weapon nor
questioned the veracity of the video recording of the September 29, 2015 incident. A
certification from the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosives Office further
disclosed that, per their records, Judge Dagala is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of
any kind or caliber.[23]
I. a. The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all courts and their
personnel.[24] This supervision includes the power to discipline members of the Judiciary. Rule
140 of the Rules of Court outlines the process by which judges and justices of lower courts
shall be held to answer for any administrative liability. A disciplinary case against a judge or
justice brought before this Court is an administrative proceeding. Thus, it is subject to the rules
and principles governing administrative procedures.
Section 1 of Rule 140 states that proceedings for the discipline of judges and justices of lower
courts may be instituted in three ways: by the Supreme Court motu proprio, through a verified
complaint, and through an anonymous complaint. A verified complaint must be supported by
affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged or by documents which
may substantiate the allegations. An anonymous complaint, on the other hand, should be
supported by public records of indubitable integrity. [25]
While anonymous complaints should always be treated with great caution, the anonymity of the
complaint does not, in itself, justify its outright dismissal.[26] The Court will act on an anonymous
complaint—
xxx provided its allegations can be reliably verified and properly substantiated by competent
evidence, like public records of indubitable integrity, "thus needing no corroboration by
evidence to be offered by the complainant, whose identity and integrity could hardly be material
where the matter involved is of public interest," or the declarations by the respondents
themselves in reaction to the allegations, where such declarations are, properly speaking,
admissions worthy of consideration for not being self-serving.[27] (Citations omitted.)
Since a disciplinary case is an administrative proceeding, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense.[28] Administrative due process essentially means "an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of."[29] When the Court acts motu proprio, this opportunity arises through the
filing of a comment upon order of the Court. In a case where the proceedings are initiated by a
complaint, the Rules of Court state that the complaint must state the acts or omissions
constituting a violation of our ethical rules. To our mind, this is the standard of what suffices as
information as to the allegations against a respondent. It is sufficient that the acts or omissions
complained of are clearly identified.
b. In this case, the OCA's Indorsement informed Judge Dagala: (1) that an anonymous letter-
complaint was filed against him; and (2) that it conducted a preliminary investigation "on the
matter [anonymous letter-complaint]." It thereafter informed Judge Dagala of the results of its
preliminary investigation,[30] attaching copies of the anonymous letter-complaint, the certificate
of marriage[31] between "A" and Judge Dagala, and the birth certificates [32] of his alleged
children. Judge Dagala was directed to comment "on the matter" within ten (10) days from
receipt of the Indorsement.[33]
Plainly, when the OCA referred to the "matter," it meant not only the information that the
preliminary investigation yielded and were stated in the Indorsement, but also the allegations of
the anonymous letter-complaint. In its first sentence, the OCA defined "matter" to be the
anonymous letter-complaint. The last sentence of the Indorsement therefore directed Judge
Dagala to comment on the "matter," it was using that word as a defined term.
To recall, the anonymous complaint stated that Judge Dagala "carried [an] armalite firearm"
during the September 29 incident and that he "maintained several mistresses."[34] The
anonymous letter-complaint also stated that there were pictures and a video recording of Judge
Dagala's participation in the September 29 incident.
Justice Leonen admits, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, that Judge Dagala's act of
brandishing an M-16 armalite rifle and his lack of registration for the firearm would be
sufficiently proven with the photographs and video on file. He nevertheless faults the OCA for
failing to specifically require Judge Dagala to comment on these photographs and videos. We
disagree. The duty to disprove the allegation of the anonymous letter-complaint that he carried
a firearm, as supported by photographs and a video, rested on Judge Dagala. In fact, we note
that Judge Dagala never denied the allegation that he carried an M-16 armalite rifle during the
September 29 incident. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Judge Dagala was
reasonably informed of allegations of fact which, if left uncontroverted or unexplained, may
constitute ground for disciplinary action.
Justice Leonen argues that "immorality as a ground was not properly pleaded." [35] Again, the
Court disagrees. The anonymous letter-complaint clearly alleged that Judge Dagala was
known for maintaining "several mistresses." The certificate of marriage between Judge Dagala
and "A" on July 18, 2006 and the certificate of live birth of an alleged child born to "B" on March
24, 2008 also clearly allege that Judge Dagala sired a child not with his wife during the
subsistence of his marriage. To the Court's mind, all these sufficiently plead the commission of
acts of immorality as to enable Judge Dagala to properly prepare his defense.
We agree, however, that Judge Dagala was not sufficiently warned that he may be charged
with dishonesty in connection with how he accomplished his PDS. His PDS was not mentioned
in either the OCA Indorsement or the anonymous letter-complaint. Penalizing him for a charge
he was not reasonably informed of will violate his right to due process. Nevertheless,
considering that this Court here finds Judge Dagala liable for the separate counts of immorality
and grave misconduct, no useful purpose will be served by remanding the charge of dishonesty
to the OCA.

II. a. We agree with the findings of the OCA that Judge Dagala committed acts amounting to
gross misconduct.
There is sufficient evidence to hold Judge Dagala accountable for gross misconduct in
connection with the September 29 incident, as recounted in the anonymous complaint. The
OCA identified Judge Dagala as the man brandishing an M-16 armalite rifle in the video
footage. In his comment and manifestation, however, Judge Dagala failed to deny or refute the
allegation. We emphasize that Judge Dagala was given sufficient notice of this allegation
against him because the anonymous letter-complaint was included in the OCA's Indorsement.
Although Judge Dagala was informed of the existence of the accusation and ought to have
understood the implications, he made no efforts to refute the claims against him. We thus rule
that there is substantial evidence before us to prove that Judge Dagala brandished a high-
powered firearm during an altercation in Siargao.
This finding of fact has various consequences. A certification issued by the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Office also disclosed that Judge Dagala is not a licensed/registered firearm holder
of any kind and caliber. Even assuming that he is licensed to own, possess, or carry firearms,
he can only carry those classified by law as small arms pursuant to RA 10591 which provides
that only small arms may be registered by licensed citizens or juridical entities for ownership,
possession, and concealed carry. Small arms refer to firearms intended to be, or primarily
designed for, individual use or that which is generally considered to mean a weapon intended
to be fired from the hand or shoulder, which are not capable of fully automatic bursts or
discharge. An M-16 armalite rifle does not fall within this definition. Being a light weapon, only
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, PNP, and other law enforcement agencies authorized by
the President in the performance of their duties can lawfully acquire or possess an M-16
armalite rifle. It baffles us how Judge Dagala came to possess such a high-powered weapon.
Worse, he had the audacity to brandish it in front of the police and other civilians.
In light of these findings, we concur with the OCA's conclusion that Judge Dagala is guilty of
gross misconduct. Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official.
Misconduct is considered grave where the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of established rules are present.[36]
Judge Dagala's actuations, as recorded in the video, are unacceptable for a member of the
bench and should merit a finding of administrative liability. This is without prejudice to any
criminal action that may also be filed against him.
b. We also agree with the OCA's findings that Judge Dagala is guilty of immorality.
In his Comment, Judge Dagala has admitted "without any remorse" that he "was able to
impregnate" three different women.[37] This is an admission that he is the father of "B's" son,
who was born on March 24, 2008,[38] while his marriage with "A" was subsisting.[39] He is listed
as the father in the child's certificate of live birth.[40] Dagala, in an obvious appeal directed to the
Court, pleads: [T]o err is human your honors and to forgive is divine.[41] He claims he is
separated from his wife, "A," because of "constant fighting in our married life" and claims that
she knew about his children out of wedlock. She did not object because she understood his
desire to have children. "A" has learned to "forgive" and "forget" him because she impliedly
submits to the "notion that we are not really meant for each and for eternity."[42]
Under the above facts, we find Judge Dagala guilty of immorality, for siring a child out of
wedlock during the subsistence of his marriage.
We have repeatedly said that members of the Judiciary are commanded by law to exhibit the
highest degree of moral certitude and is bound by the highest standards of honesty and
integrity.[43] In Regir v. Regir,[44] we held:
It is morally reprehensible for a married man or woman to maintain intimate relations with a
person other than his or her spouse. Moreover, immorality is not based alone on illicit sexual
intercourse. It is not confined to sexual matters, but includes conducts inconsistent with
rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful,
flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members
of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. [45]
Immorality is a recognized ground for the discipline of judges and justices under the Rules of
Court.[46] The New Canon of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to
avoid "impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities."[47]
In Castillo v. Calanog, Jr.[48] (Castillo), we laid down the doctrine of no dichotomy of
morality. We explained why judges as public officials are also judged by their private morals:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a
public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge's official life [cannot] simply
be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion.[49]
Thus, in Castillo, we dismissed a judge from service for siring a child outside of wedlock and for
engaging in an extramarital affair. The absence of a public and private dichotomy when it
comes to the ethical standards expected of judges and justices has since become an
unyielding doctrine as consistently applied by the Court in subsequent cases.[50]
Here, the record is clear. The certificate of live birth of "B's" male child indicates that Judge
Dagala is the father as shown by his signature in the affidavit of acknowledgment of
paternity.[51] The date of birth (March 24, 2008) is during the subsistence of Judge Dagala's
marriage to "A," there being neither proof nor allegation that said marriage was annulled or
voided in the meantime. Judge Dagala himself admits to the paternity of his son with "B." He
does not dispute the entry in the certificate of live birth attesting to his paternity. He admits his
mistake and merely pleads for the Court's forgiveness.
Justice Leonen opines that even if the filiation of the child is proven, this fact alone is
insufficient to prove immorality on the part of Dagala. He suggests that only evidence which
would qualify to prove the commission of an illegal act, e.g. concubinage or adultery under the
Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995,[52] and the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004[53] (VAWC), will suffice to establish immorality.
Again, we reject this argument.
While we agree with Justice Leonen that the circumstances in this case may not be sufficient to
successfully prosecute Judge Dagala for the crime of concubinage, the spirit that moves our
criminal law in penalizing criminal infidelity is not the same as the rationale which compels us to
sanction acts of immorality.
The Court has consistently held that absence of criminal liability does not preclude disciplinary
action.[54] As in the case of disciplinary action of lawyers, acquittal of criminal charges is not a
bar to administrative proceedings. In Pangan v. Ramos,[55] we held that "[t]he standards of the
legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties
of criminal law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases." [56]
Justice Leonen next argues that a complaint for immorality should be commenced only by its
victims, namely, the spouse betrayed, the paramour who has been misled, or the children who
have to live with the parent's scandalous indiscretions. According to Justice Leonen, a third
party is not a victim, so he/she cannot initiate the complaint unless there is a showing that
he/she is doing so for the benefit of the victims. The inability of these victims to press the
charges themselves must likewise be pleaded and proven. [57]
For the avoidance of doubt, the Court, in the clearest terms, strongly holds otherwise.
Time and again, this Court has reminded judges that their acts of immorality are proscribed and
punished, even if committed in their private life and outside of their salas, because such acts
erode the faith and confidence of the public in the administration of justice and in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary. The public's continued faith and confidence in our justice
system is no less a victim of the commission of acts of immorality by a judge. The resulting
harm to the justice system vests the State with the interest to discipline judges who commit
acts of immorality, independent of the view or feelings of the judge's spouse and their children.
For society, judges are the most tangible representation of the Judiciary. Judges, in particular,
are not just magistrates who hear and decide cases; they are immersed in the community and,
therefore, in the best position to either bolster or weaken the judicial system's legitimacy.
In Tuvillo v. Laron[58] (Tuvillo), we said:
As the judicial front-liners, judges must behave with propriety at all times as they are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the people's sense of
justice. These most exacting standards of decorum are demanded from the magistrates in
order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary. No position
is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual
than a seat on the Bench. As the epitome of integrity and justice, a judge's personal
behavior, both in the performance of his official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion. For moral integrity is not only a virtue but a necessity in the
judiciary.[59] (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
We reiterate what Justice Leonen said in his well-reasoned dissent in Tuvillo, "[a]nyone
applying for the judiciary is expected to have a thorough understanding of community
standards and values."[60] How a judge behaves impacts the Judiciary's legitimacy. Society
communicates not just through language but through symbols as well. Judges are symbols of
justice. They are symbols not only when they are in the actual performance of our duties but
also when they move through social circles in a community. When a judge exhibits a
willingness to flout the accepted standards of society, the Judiciary's legitimacy takes a hit.
There arises a dissonance between the notion that they are symbols of justice and the fact that
they do not act with justice in their own lives. When the Judiciary chooses to dispense justice
through a judge who refuses to respect the fundamental values of a society, it effectively sends
out a message that its judges can tell society to observe the law and excuse themselves from it
at the same time. As we held in Leynes v. Veloso,[61] "[a] judge suffers from moral obtuseness
or has a weird notion of morality in public office when he labors under the delusion that he can
be a judge and at the same time have a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of
morality of the community."[62]
We see no cogent reason in law or policy to depart from our time-tested procedure for the
discipline of judges and justices of lower courts which allows complaints to be instituted in three
ways: by the Court motu proprio, through a verified complaint, or through an anonymous
complaint.[63]
Any citizen or member of the public who knows a judge who commits acts of immorality
qualifies as, and has the civic duty to be, a complainant or a witness against the errant judge.
These persons, usually members of the community whom the judge serves, have a direct
interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial process and in keeping the faith of the public in
the justice system. The harm inflicted by the judge upon the members of his family is distinct
from the harm wreaked by an erring judge upon the judicial system. The family and the State
are each imbued with the autonomy to exact their response to acts of immorality by a rogue
judge. The State cannot intrude into the family's autonomy any more than the family cannot
intrude upon the autonomy of the State.
Justice Leonen ominously warns the Court not to be complicit to the "State's over-patronage
through its stereotype of victims."[64]
The Court cannot agree with this rather constricting view.
First. He appears to proceed from the notion that the State stereotypes all women to be victims
who are weak and cannot address patriarchy by themselves.
Second. This view is based on a faulty presumption that all erring judges are husbands who
victimize their wives. Thus, if the argument is to be pursued, when we discipline judges even in
cases where the wife did not file the complaint, we "over-patronize" women because we believe
that they are not capable of invoking legal remedies on their own and, thus, the Court must
step in to protect them. This is an unfortunately limited view.
The disciplinary procedure adopted by the Court is gender-neutral. The prohibition
against immorality applies to all judges regardless of gender or sexual orientation.
Further, in resolving immorality cases, the Court does not discourage or prevent the spouse
and the children of the erring judge from exercising their autonomy to come before us and
express their sentiments. Nevertheless, we proceed despite their absence because, as we
said, administrative proceedings against judges do not dwell on private injuries inflicted by
judges on private people. Administrative proceedings do not exist so that a betrayed spouse
can seek redress of his or her grievance. Administrative proceedings are not a remedy for a
judge's betrayal of his or her marital vows. These proceedings go into the question of whether
a judge, by his or her actions and choices, is still fit to dispense justice and encourage the
people's faith in the judiciary.
Moreover, we reject the position that proceeding in cases such as this, where the wife does not
bring the action herself, amounts to the "over-patronage" of women because we allegedly feel
the need to hear the case to protect a victim who cannot look out for herself. This position is
out of touch with reality.
Women empowerment is an advocacy taken seriously by the Judiciary. We have made
consistent efforts to make our ranks more inclusive to female judges and justices. The Court
itself is headed by our first-ever female Chief Justice. Similar efforts are being made in other
branches of the government. There are efforts, as well, in our communities to provide equal
opportunities for women. The status of women in our society has improved. We agree with
Justice Leonen that there are women in our society who are perfectly capable of not only
protecting themselves from the oppression of the patriarchy but even of shattering gender
glass ceilings. However, this is a very limited view of the plight of women empowerment in this
country.
Violence against women is a serious and prevalent problem in the Philippines. This is, in fact,
the spirit that compelled the passing of the VAWC, which recognizes the need to provide
further protection to women and that violence against them can take many forms.
In 2013, this Court, speaking through Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, affirmed the
constitutionality of the VAWC. In Garcia v. Drilon,[65] we explained:
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely
than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against
women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. xxx
xxx
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender
Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely
linked with the unequal power relationship between women and menotherwise known as
"gender-based violence[."] Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the
leaders, pursuers, providers and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers,
men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception
leads men to gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain
that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain
power.[66] (Emphasis in the original; citations omitted.)
Statistics from the Philippine National Demographic and Health Survey 2013[67] show that one
in every five women aged 15-49 years old has experienced physical violence. Forty-four
percent (44%) of the married women who participated in this survey and claimed that they have
suffered physical violence revealed that their current husbands or partners are the
perpetrators.[68] Violence is, however, not only physical, and in this survey, about 26% of the
married women interviewed revealed that they suffered some form of emotional, physical,
and/or sexual violence from their husbands or partners.[69]
The inequality does not end there.
These same statistics show that almost three in five married women earn less than their
husbands. Only 10% of women own a house alone, while 19% own a house jointly with
someone else. Further, only 18% of women own land, either alone or co-owned.[70]
While there are indeed serious efforts to empower women in this country, the foregoing
remains to be our reality. Much work remains to be done. It is the height of insensitivity and a
display of a limited view to insist that when we are perceived to take the cudgels for women, we
are over-patronizing them. To even go as far as to say that the State over-patronizes women
by stereotyping them as victims is unacceptable. The reality—as shown by the Congress'
decision to enact the VAWC and the statistics showing the imbalance of power in this
country—is that there are women in this country who are in peril and are in real need of
protection. While it is true that there are certain groups of women who are able to protect
themselves and even to successfully compete in a male-dominated society, this is not the
reality for many women in the Philippines. To say that the State is over-patronizing and
stereotyping women just because some of our women are empowered is, to borrow the words
of United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "throwing away your umbrella in
a rainstorm because you are not getting wet."[70] We are not over-patronizing women when
we take measures to help them. We are simply doing our part in the great endeavor of
women empowerment.
Finally, we reject the proposal because it will cause the Court to be beset with intractable
problems of proof. It will require the Court to inquire into whether the "victims" are genuinely
exercising their autonomy, an invasive process that will, in turn, intrude into the family's
autonomy. To illustrate, a judge who sires innumerable children outside of wedlock, maintains
multiple mistresses, and flaunts these misdeeds, is immunized from the Court's disciplinary
authority should the spouse and children choose not to press charges. Authorizing private
attorney generals to act on behalf of the Court to vindicate the public's interest is no solution.
Justice Leonen himself recognizes that violence against women and children may prevent
them from coming forward. Thus, he concedes that third parties may be allowed to act on
behalf of the State provided they can plead and prove that they are acting for the benefit of the
victims, not "as a means to cause more harm on them."[71] How can this be shown to the
satisfaction of the Court without resolving, as a triable question of fact, the question of whether
the wife and children truly and freely exercised their individual autonomy? What about the
reality of the violence of economic need and dependence, which arguably prompts far more
wives and children into silently accepting the wrong done them? This is a quagmire the Court is
not wont to enter.
It is safer to go back to basics. Simply put, the State does not recognize any sexual autonomy
on the part of judges to have children with persons other than their spouses or to have
extramarital affairs. It would be completely unprincipled for the Court to reward a judge's
commission of such grievous a wrong to the public with an absolution based on the forgiveness
of the spouse and child. This is, of course, assuming we will ever have the ability to ascertain
whether their forgiveness flows from the free exercise of their autonomy. In the case of male
judges, such a result will abet the very patriarchy that Justice Leonen wants the Court to reject.
No one is forced to be a judge, just as Justice Leonen pointed out in his concurring opinion
in Tuvillo.[73] To add to that, no judge is forced to remain one.
The Judiciary, to maintain its legitimacy, must be able to convince that it makes principled
decisions.[74] This requires that the Judiciary resolve cases fairly, impartially, and convincingly.
Decisions must be based on a logical interpretation and application of laws. The Judiciary's
institutional legitimacy is also impacted by its members. Members of the Judiciary must act in a
way that will encourage confidence among the people.
To be clear, we do not seek to interfere with a judge's relationships. Thus, while we have
sanctioned lawyers, judges, and even justices, who have extramarital affairs, we have refused
to do so in cases where the parties, without any legal impediment, live together without the
benefit of marriage.[75] We have also been adamant in holding that a person's homosexuality
does not affect his or her moral fitness.[76]Nevertheless, immorality is a valid ground for
sanctioning members of the Judiciary because it (1) challenges his or her capacity to dispense
justice, (2) erodes the faith and confidence of the public in the administration of justice, and (3)
impacts the Judiciary's legitimacy.
Finally, while a disciplinary case for immorality may proceed even without the participation of
the spouse, the children or the alleged paramour, steps must be taken to protect their decision
not to air out their grievances in administrative proceedings before us. As a matter of policy, in
cases such as this, the names of concerned parties who are not before the Court should not be
used. Care should be taken so as not to disclose personal information and circumstances that
are not relevant to the resolution of the case. If necessary, aliases should be used when
referring to these parties.
Taking all these into consideration, we find that Judge Dagala is also guilty of committing acts
of immorality.
III. Under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, immorality and gross misconduct each
constitute a serious charge. Section 11 of the same Rule provides that serious charges are
punishable by:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits
shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) years but
not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than [P]20,000.00 but not exceeding [P]40,000.00.
We affirm the recommendation of the OCA to impose on Judge Dagala the supreme penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits.
Because of the gravity of Judge Dagala's infractions, we also impose on him the penalty of
perpetual disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government owned or controlled corporations.
Without staking a position on the proper penalty to impose on Judge Dagala on the immorality
charge, Justice Leonen discusses circumstances that may be considered mitigating or
aggravating in the determination of an immorality case.[77] We will comment only on one
circumstance cited, namely, where the "marriage does not work."[78]
The Court unequivocally reminds justices and judges that until the Congress grants absolute
divorce, or unless they have secured a court annulment of their marriage or a judgment of
nullity, a failed marriage does not justify acts of immorality.
Judge Dagala seeks this Court's forgiveness. He claims that he and his wife separated
because of "constant fighting;" that his wife knew of his children with other women but did not
interpose any objection because she knew of his desire to have children; his wife had learned
to "forgive and forget" him; and both have arrived at the "notion that [they] are not really meant
for each other and for eternity."[79]
We understand the undeniable sadness of a failed marriage. We commiserate with Judge
Dagala and his wife, as well as his children, who must live with circumstances far different from
what society recognizes as ideal. We understand the pain of accepting certain stark realities—
that some relationships must come to an end and not even the legal ties of marriage can save
them; that some married couples soon discover that they are not right for each other; that in
certain cases, not even the legal bonds of marriage can fill the void; that sometimes, happiness
can be found in finding the strength to get out of a relationship and begin again. We understand
that judges and justices are also human, and are naturally inclined to search for what is good
and what gives meaning, including happy and fulfilling relationships. In this case, we do not
seek to pontificate that there is only one honorable way to live. Judges are free to choose how
to live their lives. Nevertheless, choices are made within particular contexts and in
consideration of duties and obligations that must be honored. More importantly, choices
have consequences. Judge Dagala made his choice. He must now face the repercussions.
Thus, as much as we commiserate with Judge Dagala, we remain a court of law with a
mandate to dispense even-handed justice.
We thus compare the grounds offered by Judge Dagala in mitigation of his wrong to similar
pleas made by judges similarly situated, namely, married judges who sired children outside of
wedlock or engaged in affairs during the subsistence of their marriage.
Only last year, in Tuvillo, the Court rejected a plea in mitigation by a judge. The judge
explained that both he and his mistress were "mature lonely people" whose marriage to their
legally wed spouses had "lessened sheen" and that his mistress brought him a "soul
connection, understanding and great company." Further, his own wife "was distant to him."
In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Rotilla Marcos,[79] which Justice Leonen also quotes in his dissent
in Tuvillo, we dismissed a judge who publicly carried on a relationship with a woman not his
wife. We found him liable notwithstanding the fact that he had already been physically
separated from his wife for three (3) years.[80]
In Anonymous v. Achas,[81] we reprimanded a judge for going out in public with a woman not
his wife. We imposed this penalty notwithstanding the fact that Judge Achas had been
estranged from his wife for the last 26 years. We held that the fact remains that he is still legally
married to her. It was not therefore commendable, proper, or moral for a married judge to be
perceived as going out with a woman not his wife.[82]

In Resngit-Marquez v. Llamas, Jr.,[83] we dismissed a judge upon finding that he had a long
standing relationship with a married woman. We found the judge liable in spite of the fact that
both he and his partner were estranged from their respective husband and wife. Notably, we
took cognizance of the complaint in this case even if neither the estranged husband nor wife of
the parties participated in the proceedings.[84]
In Perfecto v. Esidera,[85] the Court, through Justice Leonen, disciplined a female judge who
earned on a relationship with a man not her husband, even if the judge had never lived with her
legal husband and had long been estranged from him.
The reason for the Court's consistent position is not difficult to discern. The Philippines is a
society that values monogamy in marriages, except as to certain ethnicities and religions where
monogamy is not the norm. Our legal system is replete with laws that enforce monogamy in a
marriage and penalize those who go against it. Save for religions that accept and embrace
multiple marriages, bigamy in the Philippines is a crime.[87] In the same vein, our criminal law
penalizes adultery[88] and concubinage.[89]
No less than the Constitution emphasizes the value of a marriage as the foundation of the
family.[90] The Philippines is a legal regime that intensely protects marriages by limiting the
grounds for its nullity or annulment. Until today, we do not have divorce, with the exception
provided for in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. We only recognize legal
separation. There have been calls for allowing divorce here but no law has been passed so far.
Ultimately, we are the branch of government tasked with interpreting the law. We do not
meddle with policies or with the endeavor to have our laws reflect the developments in our
values and morality. It is not our place to ascertain whether our laws on marriage have failed to
adjust to the demands of the times.
For the Judiciary, this is the legal and social context within which we must understand
immorality in connection with extramarital affairs. In penalizing judges for engaging in
extramarital affairs, we merely seek to dis-incentivize judges' propensity to disregard accepted
standards of morality because these acts impact their capacity to properly perform their jobs.
These acts affect the judiciary's legitimacy—an element essential in its role as a branch of
government charged with interpreting rules. We value monogamous marriages and consider
them worthy of strict legal protection. A judge who disregards this fundamental value opens
himself or herself up to questions about his or her capacity to act with justice in his or her own
dealings. This affects the people's perception of his or her moral fitness. As we said in Resngit-
Marquez v. Llamas, Jr., a magistrate "cannot judge the conduct of others when his own needs
judgment."[91]
No one is forced to be a judge.[92] The judiciary is an institution reserved for those who, when
they apply for a judicial position, are expected to have a thorough understanding of community
standards and values which impose exacting standards of decorum and strict standards of
morality.[93] We highlight that judges are bound to uphold secular, not religious, morality. Thus,
the values that a judge must uphold are those in consonance with the dictates of the
conscience of his or her community. Among these community values is respect for the sanctity
of marriage.[94] All applicants to the Judiciary must, therefore, decide for themselves whether
the community values that the Court has recognized conform to their own personal values,
lifestyle, or proclivities. All who desire to be part of the Judiciary must first decide if he or she
can live up to the highest standards of morality expected of judges and justices.
How applicants to the Judiciary will choose to construe the values that this Court upholds is
their choice. Those who have a fervent belief in a God may find that the values of this Court
compel them to live the lives of the faithful. Those who are predisposed to pursue a strict code
of morality may choose to perceive our values as moral codes, proper and worthy of being
adhered to. Those who have the inclinations to bend the rules or to live outside societal norms
may find that these rules are like straightjackets—pretentious, unreasonable, or constricting.
Whether applicants to the Judiciary will choose to construe these secular strictures as rules
that require them to live the life of a saint, or of a priest, imam, or other religious person, is a
purely personal decision. They are free to choose their own metaphors. But once a lawyer joins
the Judiciary, he or she should abide by the rules. We remind all judges that no position
demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than the judicial
office. A judge's personal behavior outside the court, not only while in the performance of his
official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and
justice.[95]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Exequil L. Dagala is hereby
found GUILTY of IMMORALITY and GROSS MISCONDUCT. Accordingly, he
is DISMISSED from the service with FORFEITURE of his retirement and other benefits except
accrued leave credits, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled
corporation or government financial institution.
RE: REPORT ON THE PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE SPOT AUDIT IN THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 170, MALABON CITY.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This administrative matter refers to the report on the preliminary results of the spot audit
conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
170, Malabon City.
The Factual Antecedents
On April 26, 2016, the OCA sent a team to conduct a spot audit of search warrant applications
raffled to Branch 170, due to persistent reports pertaining to the alleged irregular issuance of
search warrants by Presiding Judge Zaldy B. Docena (Judge Docena).
The Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit
On May 26, 2016, the OCA submitted to the Court its Report[1] dated May 23, 2016 on the
preliminary results of the spot audit. In the Report, the OCA made the following observations:
First, a total of 938 applications for search warrants were filed before the RTC of Malabon City
from January 2015 up to April 13, 2016. These applications were distributed among the
following judges: Judge Docena, Branch 170, with 761 applications; then Executive Judge
Celso Raymundo L. Magsino, Jr. (Judge Magsino), Branch 74, with 175 applications; and
Judge Jimmy Edmund G. Batara (Judge Batara), Branch 172, with two applications. [2]
Second, the RTC of Malabon City exceeded the number of search warrants issued by the RTC
of Manila (with 56 branches) and the RTC of Quezon City (with 48 branches), notwithstanding proceed with the operation because of new developments and/or information that the subject
the fact that the latter courts are allowed to issue search warrants which are enforceable has already moved out, when the proper procedure is for the applicant to file a motion to set
nationwide.[3] aside the search warrant.[9]

The data provided by the Statistical Reports Division of the Court Management Office show the There are also several cases where the returns have yet to be submitted to the court despite
number of search warrants issued by selected RTCs in the National Capital Judicial Region the lapse of the 10-day period within which to do so. The OCA considered this to be a failure
from January 2015 up to March 2016:[4] on the part of Branch 170 "to ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, [to] summon
the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was
made."[10]
ISSUING COURT NUMBER OF SEARCH WARRANTS ISSUED
RTC of Malabon City 763 And sixth, the OCA noted that Branch 170:
RTC of Manila 675
RTC of Makati City 75
RTC of Quezon City 68 xxx issues search warrants even [though] the application is not accompanied with
RTC of Pasig City 9 a) pertinent papers to establish that the applicant [had] conducted a surveillance prior to the
Third, out of the 761 applications assigned to Branch 170, Judge Docena issued 113 search filing of said application xxx;
warrants which are enforceable outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon
City, viz.:[5] xxx issues search wan-ants even when the authority of the head of the agency to file the
b)
application is a mere photocopy;

PLACE WHERE SEARCH [admits] mere photocopies of the inventory of the seized items and inventories that are not
SEARCH WARRANTS c)
WARRANTS WERE JUDICIAL REGION under oath; and,
ISSUED
ENFORCED
xxx always grants custody of the seized items to the applicant and/or his agency for
d)
Manila National Capital Judicial Region 46 forensic examination or due to lack of space in the court premises.[11]
Makati City National Capital Judicial Region 19
Pasig City National Capital Judicial Region 14 Upon the OCA's recommendation, the Court issued a Resolution[12] dated May 31, 2016
Quezon City National Capital Judicial Region 8 placing Judge Docena under immediate preventive suspension for a period of six months.
Taguig City National Capital Judicial Region 7 Thus:
Mandaluyong City National Capital Judicial Region 6
Pasay City National Capital Judicial Region 4
Caloocan City National Capital Judicial Region 3 xxx The Court resolved, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator
Valenzuela City National Capital Judicial Region 2 (OCA), to:
Paranaque City National Capital Judicial Region 2
Muntinlupa City National Capital Judicial Region 1 (a) PREVENTIVELY SUSPEND, effective immediately, Judge Zaldy B. Docena, Regional Trial
Laguna 4th Judicial Region 1 Court (RTC), Branch 170, Malabon City, for six (6) months pending the completion of a more
TOTAL 113 comprehensive and detailed investigation on the issuance of search warrants;
The OCA found this to be in violation of Section 2(a) of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which
provides that an application for a search warrant shall be filed with "[a]ny court within whose (b) RELIEVE Judge Celso Raymundo L. Magsino, Jr., Branch 74, same court, from his duties
territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed."[6] as Executive Judge of RTC, Malabon City, and INCLUDE him IN THE INVESTIGATION in
view of the apparent irregularity in the raffle of applications for search warrants;
Fourth, Judge Docena issued 418 search warrants which are also enforceable outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City, but this time the applicants specifically (c) DESIGNATE Judge Jimmy Edmund G. Batara, Branch 72, same court, and Judge
invoked Section 2(b) of Rule 126 which allows, for compelling reasons, the filing of the Emmanuel D. Laurea, Branch 169, same court, as Executive Judge and Vice-Executive Judge,
application with any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed or where respectively, of RTC, Malabon City; and
the warrant shall be enforced.[7]
(d) DIRECT the OCA to IMMEDIATELY SEAL/SECURE all records/folders pertaining to
The OCA, however, pointed out that said search warrant applications merely cited the bare applications for search warrant received by Judge Docena.
allegations of possible leakage of information and/or that the person subject of the application
is influential in the area, or has friends working in the local government offices and the courts. [8] Let this resolution be personally and immediately served on the parties concerned. xxx[13]

Fifth, Branch 170 has admitted returns on search warrants where the seizing officer did not
In compliance with the May 31, 2016 Resolution of the Court, the OCA's Audit Team conducted
an investigation on the raffle of applications for and issuance of search warrants in the RTC of
Malabon City. The investigation was thereafter concluded on June 17, 2016.
The Result of the Investigation
3. Raffle of TRO/TPO/SW shall be special and shall require notices/Returns/complete
documentation and presence of witness/applicant in case of SW;
4. Due to its confidentiality, only the Clerk of Court and the Clerk In Charge shall receive any
application for SW. Raffle of this nature shall be held at the chambers/office of the EJ/Vice EJ
and only the ordinary courts (170 and 74) are eligible for raffle unless the nature subject of
application falls exclusively under the powers of EJ or in his absence, the Vice EJ;

In a Memorandum[14] dated August 4, 2016, the Audit Team submitted the result of the 5. Ratio of cases between the EJ and Branch 170 shall be in accordance with the Guidelines
investigation to Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez. on the Selection and Designation of EJs (A.M. 03-8-02-SC) which is 2:3;

On the Distribution/Raffle of Search Warrant Applications 6. SW shall be raffled on 1:2 daily basis and counted per applicant.
Since Br. 74 is also the EJ, then, SW shall be raffled exclusively to the remaining ordinary court
The Audit Team noted that only two out of the five branches[15] in the RTC of Malabon City, when the EJ is on official leave, official business, official meeting.
specifically, Branches 74 and 170, took cognizance of search warrant applications, as
Branches 72 (Drugs Court), 73 (Family Court), and 169 (Family Court and Agrarian Court) xxx
which exclusively handle drugs and family court cases, respectively, are not included in the
raffle of said applications.[16] (Sgd.)
ATTY. ESMERALDA G. DIZON
The distribution of applications for search warrants in the RTC of Malabon City from January Clerk of Court VI[19]
2015 up to May 10, 2016 is as follows:[17]
After a thorough examination of the records of the OCC, the Audit Team concluded that the
RTC of Malabon City failed to observe the existing rules in the distribution of search warrant
BRANCH/JUDGE APPLICATIONS RECEIVED applications involving ordinary criminal cases as provided in Chapter V of the Guidelines on the
Selection and Designation of Executive Judges.[20]
Branch 170 (Judge Docena) 795
Branch 74 (Judge Magsino) The Audit Team cited three instances where the raffle of search warrant applications was
- Involving ordinary criminal cases (received by185 clearly inequitable:
raffle) (152)
- Involving special criminal cases (received in (33) a) in January 2016, Branch 170 received all 16 search warrant applications filed in the RTC of
his capacity as Executive Judge) Malabon City;[21]
Branch 72 (Judge Batara)
- Involving special criminal cases (received in 4 b) in February 2016, 44 search warrant applications were assigned to Branch 170, while only
his capacity as the Vice Executive Judge) five ordinary criminal cases were given to Branch 74;[22] and,
TOTAL 984
According to Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon (Atty. Dizon), Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of c) in March 2016, 87 search warrant applications went to Branch 170, while only three ordinary
Court (OCC), this distribution system is in accordance with their internal policies on the raffle of criminal cases were raffled to Branch 74.[23]
cases.[18] The pertinent portions of said internal policies are quoted as follows:
In addition, the Audit Team also made the following observations:

INTERNAL OFFICE MEMO First, the application docketed as SW 16-183 was raffled to Branch 170, when it should have
been directly assigned to the Executive Judge as it involved violations of Republic Act No.
TO: CLERK IN CHARGE OF RAFFLE (Millet/Pam, Mark, Paul) 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and Presidential Decree No. 1866,
RE: SW/TRO/TPO as amended, or the law on the illegal possession of firearms. [24]
DATE: MAY 2014
______________________________________________________________ Second, it could not be ascertained whether a special raffle for applications for search warrant
was actually conducted in the RTC of Malabon City because the OCC did not prepare the
Per executive session with the Executive Judge, the following are the innovations with respect minutes of the raffle.[25]
to raffling:
Third, there are discrepancies between the date of receipt of some search warrant applications
xxx appearing in the OCC's logbook and the date stamped on the face of said applications as
received by Branch 170.[26]

For instance, SW 15-120-MN appears to have been received by the OCC on May 6, 2015 at
9:00 a.m. and thereafter raffled to Branch 170 on the same day, based on the date stamped on
the face of the application.[27] However, the case was recorded in the OCC's logbook only on
May 7, 2015.[28] The corresponding search warrant was also issued on May 7, 2015. [29]
The same observation is true for the following applications: SW 15-427 to SW 15-432 - logged
as filed with the OCC on September 9, 2015,[30] but the applications were all stamped received
on September 8, 2015 at 10:30 a.m.;[31] and SW 15-592 to SW 15-596 - logged as filed with the
OCC on November 27, 2015,[32] but the applications were stamped received on November 26,
2015, at 1:00 p.m.[33]
And fourth, there are cases where the caption of search warrant applications already indicates
that it is being filed with Branch 170, and typewritten at the bottom of the applications is the
name of Judge Docena to whom the application would be subscribed and sworn to.[34]
pertaining to Judge Docena's issuance of search warrants:
a) There are search warrants that were issued ahead of the date of filing of the application.[41]
b) Judge Docena is the signatory of the jurat of all the applications for search warrants before
Branch 170. In some cases, the signature appearing thereon is not his customary signature.[42]
c) There are some applications that are not under oath although the affidavits were signed by
Judge Docena.[43]
d) Page 3 of the application in SW 15-588 is missing, but Judge Docena signed on another
page containing the sketch of the place to be searched.[44]
e) Judge Docena signed the jurat of some affidavits of witnesses, despite the lack of signature
of the affiant.[45]

On the Issuance of Search Warrants by Branch 170
The Audit Team noted that Judge Docena granted all 790 search warrant applications raffled to
Branch 170 from January 2015 up to May 10, 2016, and 192[35] of which are John/Jane Doe
search warrants. Out of the 790 search warrants issued, 442 or 55.95% thereof have yielded
negative results, remained unserved, or were otherwise never returned to the court.[36]
The Audit Team also found that Judge Docena granted 758 search warrant applications even
though the places of commission of the crimes involved therein were outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City. Out of 758 applications, [37] 130 had completely failed to
cite compelling reasons to warrant their filing in the RTC of Malabon City.[38] Thus:
f) Some affidavits of witnesses are replicated, where only the dates and the addresses relating
to the supposed surveillance are changed.[46]
g) Judge Docena has admitted as proof of surveillance the attachment of a map and pictures of
the door of the unit to be searched, as well as the screen of a computer. [47]
The Audit Team also noted several lapses in the management of case records in Branch 170:
a) Case records have no minutes of the proceedings.[48]
b) There were two sets of stenographic notes found in 16 search warrant applications. [49]

c) In most applications, there are no searching questions and answers in writing and under
PLACES WHERE oath, in violation of Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[50]
NO COMPELLING WITH COMPELLING
SEARCH WARRANTS TOTAL
REASON REASON
ENFORCEABLE d) The search warrant case folders of Branch 170 are not paginated.[51]

Laguna 1 - 1 e) In cases where an applicant filed several search warrant applications, some of the
Caloocan City 7 8 15 documents attached are not original copies.[52]
Las Piñas City - 6 6
Makati City 18 170 188 f) Case folders are not properly stitched, and some folders haye loose pages. Other folders,
Mandaluyong City 6 13 19 too, are merely attached using fasteners.[53]
Manila 54 116 170
Muntinlupa City 1 15 16 g) Stenographic notes are not attached to the records. [54]
Parañaque City 2 65 67
Pasay City 6 75 81 h) Transcripts of stenographic notes are similarly not attached to the records. [55]
Pasig City 15 68 83
Quezon City 11 50 61 i) Branch 170 does not maintain a logbook where entries shall be made within 24 hours after
Taguig City 7 33 40 the issuance of the search warrant.[56]
Valenzuela City 2 9 11
TOTAL 130 628[39] 758 Issuance of Search Warrants by Branch 74
The Audit Team likewise observed that there are instances where the compelling reasons cited
by the applicant appear to be without merit, and Judge Docena failed to ask the required The Audit Team noted that Judge Magsino also granted a considerable number of search
probing and exhaustive inquiry on the veracity of the compelling reason invoked.[40] warrant applications from January 2015 up to May 10, 2016, where the offenses involved were
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City. [57] Thus:[58]
In addition to its preliminary findings, the Audit Team pointed out the following irregularities
PLACES WHERE
NO COMPELLING WITH COMPELLING
SEARCH WARRANTS TOTAL Judge Docena clarifies that he had no control over which search warrant applications will be
REASON REASON
ENFORCEABLE filed in the RTC of Malabon City, much less those that will be raffled to Branch 170. [69] Neither
does he or the court personnel under him have any hand in the implementation of the search
Rizal 1 - 1 warrants issued by him or the outcome or results thereof. [70]
Caloocan City 1 1 2
Makati City - 35 35 Judge Docena likewise contends that there is nothing irregular in his issuance of 192
Mandaluyong City 13 2 15 John/Jane Doe search warrants, considering that the crimes involved therein are mostly
Manila 1 18 19 violations of the Cybercrime Prevention Act and the E-Commerce Act, where there is indeed
Marikina City - 2 2 difficulty in obtaining the identities of the alleged perpetrators.[71]
Muntinlupa City - 2 2
Parañaque City 7 10 17 As for his issuance of search warrants involving crimes committed outside the territorial
Pasay City - 16 16 jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City, Judge Docena denies having violated Section 2(a) of
Pasig City 4 10 14 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02, given that the
Quezon City 3 3 6 issuance of search warrants is inherent in all courts and venue in search warrant applications is
Taguig City 3 7 10 merely procedural and not jurisdictional.[72]
TOTAL 33 106 139
Nevertheless, the Audit Team found no patent irregularities in Judge Magsino's issuance of Judge Docena further argues that he "cannot consider the issues of absence of compelling
search warrants assigned to Branch 74,[59]considering that: reasons in the [search warrant] application[s], and improper venue motu proprio to deny [said]
applications outright," as "these have to be raised by the respondent/accused in a motion to
1. There is no instance where the date of receipt by the OCC and the date of raffle of the quash."[73] And as for those respondents in the search warrants who did not question the venue
search warrant application to Branch 74, as stamped on the face of the application, are ahead of the pertinent search warrant applications, they should be deemed to have waived said
of the date recorded in the logbook of the OCC.[60] defense and considered to have acquiesced to the venue of said applications. [74]

2. There is also no instance where the date of the search warrant issued is ahead of the date of
filing of the application in court.[61]
3. The minutes of the proceedings are attached to the case records, but the contents are not
complete.[62]
4. Aside from the issuance of search warrants, Judge Magsino also issues an order stating,
among others, that the court conducted a hearing and examined the applicant and his
witness/informant.[63]
5. The stenographic notes are all attached to the records, although some have yet to be
transcribed.[64]
6. Branch 74 observes the guidelines on the custody of computer data under Sections 15 and
16, Chapter IV of Republic Act No. 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act. [65]
For these reasons, the Audit Team no longer discussed the details of the rest of the acts and
omissions of Branch 74.
In its 1st Indorsement[66] dated September 27, 2016, the OCA directed Judge Docena and
Judge Magsino, as well as the concerned court personnel, to submit their comments on the
final report of the Audit Team.
In addition, Judge Docena maintains that "he granted the search warrant applications in the
good faith belief that there is merit to the compelling reasons provided by the applicants." He
insists that "this determination should be respected unless it is shown that [he] is guilty of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction." [75]
Judge Docena also explains that "the rule requiring judges to conduct a probing and exhaustive
inquiry is applicable only to the determination of probable cause" and not to the compelling
reasons cited by an applicant in a search warrant application,[76] as the existence of compelling
reasons does not relate to the existence of probable cause which is the basis for the issuance
of the search warrant.[77]
While Judge Docena admits that there are search warrants that appear to have been issued
ahead of the date of filing of their respective applications, he argues that the incorrect dates on
said warrants are typographical errors which are attributable to honest mistake and
inadvertence.[78] He claims that Branch 170 uses previous documents as templates in order to
save time and effort,[79] and he surmises that the dates in the orders pertaining to some search
warrant applications were unfortunately not properly edited to reflect the correct date. [80]
Finally, Judge Docena begs the Court for understanding and leniency for his failure to properly
monitor the submission of returns of the search warrants he issued and to summon those
applicants who have yet to file their respective returns, given the extraordinarily high number of
search warrants raffled to Branch 170.[81]

Judge Docena's Comment Recommendations of the OCA

In his Comment[67] dated October 28, 2016, Judge Docena submits that he granted the search In a Memorandum[82] dated February 20, 2017, the OCA made the following recommendations:
warrant applications before him "in the good faith belief that there was probable cause for their
issuance and in compliance with law and procedure."[68]
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended for the consideration of
the Honorable Court that:
1. Hon. CELSO R. L. MAGSINO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 74, Malabon City, and
then Executive Judge, RTC, Malabon City, be found GUILTY of (a) violation of Supreme Court
rules and circulars concerning the raffle of search warrant applications, and Section 2, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court and Section 12, Chapter V of the Guidelines in the Selection and
Designation of Executive Judges and. Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties on the
issuance of search warrants, and Section 12(b), Rule 126, Rules of Court on, among others,
the filing of the returns; and (b) inefficiency in the performance of his duties as Presiding Judge
of Branch 74, same court, and FINED in the amount of P20,000.00;
2. Atty. ESMERALDA G. DIZON, Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Malabon
City, be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and SUSPENDED from the service for six (6)
months, effective immediately;
3. Hon. ZALDY B. DOCENA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 170, Malabon City, be
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law, gross negligence, and gross misconduct
and DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, and disqualification from re-employment in any government institution;
4. Atty. JESUS S. HERNANDEZ, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 170, Malabon City, be
found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and SUSPENDED from the service for six (6) months,
effective immediately;
5. MS. OLIVIA M. LABAGNAO, MS. DEBHEM E. FARDO, MS. ROSARIO [M. SAN PEDRO],
and MS. GIGI M. MENDOZA, Court Stenographers, and MS. ZENAIDA Z. SALONGA, Clerk-
in-Charge, all of RTC, Branch 170, Malabon City, be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty
and ADMONISHED to be more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties; and
6. Atty. EVELYN M. LOZANO-AGUILAR, Branch Clerk of Court, MA. ALICIA C. MALUBAY,
Court Interpreter, and DALISAY C. CASUGA, MYRA D. SANTOS, SHERREE ANN R.
RUZGAL, MA. THERESA P. REYES, Court Stenographers, all of RTC, Branch 74, Malabon
City, be REMINDED to henceforth strictly comply with existing court issuances on search
warrants without necessarily giving up their endeavor to preserve the confidentiality of the
information in the records.
Considering the herein recommendation of the OCA that Judge Docena be dismissed from the
service, and considering further that the preventive suspension of Judge Docena will in the
meantime expire on 1 March 2017, it is likewise hereby recommended that the PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION of Judge Docena expiring on 1 March 2017 BE INDEFINITELY
EXTENDED until such time the Court has resolved this administrative matter.
In a Resolution[83] dated February 28, 2017, the Court extended the preventive suspension of
Judge Docena for another three (3) months reckoned from March 1, 2017. Finally, on June 20,
2017, the Court resolved to extend Judge Docena's suspension until such time that this
administrative matter would have been resolved.[84]
The Court's Ruling
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides for the proper venue where applications for
search warrant should be filed:
SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or
any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the
court where the criminal action is pending.[85]
It is settled that the inclusion of a statement of compelling reasons in a search warrant
application that is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of
commission of the alleged crime is a mandatory requirement, and the absence of such
statement renders the application defective.[86]
The absence of a statement of compelling reasons, however, is not a ground for
the outright denial of a search warrant application, since it is not one of the requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant. Section 4 of Rule 126 is clear on this point:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.[87]
In other words, the statement of compelling reasons is only a mandatory requirement in so far
as the proper venue for the filing of a search warrant application is concerned. It cannot be
viewed as an additional requisite for the issuance of a search warrant.
It is also important to stress that an application for a search warrant merely constitutes
a criminal process and is not in itself a criminal action.[88] The rule, therefore, that venue is
jurisdictional in criminal cases does not apply thereto.[89] Simply stated, venue is only
procedural, and not jurisdictional, in applications for the issuance of a search warrant.
In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Romars International Gases Corporation,[90] the
Court ruled that the issue on the absence of a statement of compelling reasons in an
application for a search warrant does not involve a question of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, as the power to issue search warrants is inherent in all courts.[91] Thus, the trial court
may only take cognizance of such issue if it is raised in a timely motion to quash the
search warrant. Otherwise, the objection shall be deemed waived, pursuant to the Omnibus
Motion Rule.[92]
Consequently, the Court in Pilipinas Shell upheld the validity of the questioned search
warrants despite the lack of a statement of compelling reasons in their respective
applications,[93] as the objection was not properly raised in a motion to quash.[94]
Note, too, that the determination of the existence of compelling reasons under Section 2(b) of
Rule 126 is a matter squarely addressed to the sound discretion of the court where such
application is filed, subject to review by an appellate court in case of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.[95]
Clearly, this administrative proceeding is not the proper forum to review the search warrants
issued by Judge Docena and Judge Magsino in order to determine whether the compelling
reasons cited in their respective applications are indeed meritorious.
Given these circumstances, we cannot agree with the OCA's findings that Judge Docena and
Judge Magsino violated Section 2 of Rule 126 by simply issuing search warrants involving
crimes committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City where: a) there
is no compelling reason to take cognizance of the applications; and b) the compelling reasons
alleged in the applications appear to be unmeritorious.[96]
It is obvious that Judge Docena and Judge Magsino simply exercised the trial court's ancillary
jurisdiction over a special criminal process[97] when they took cognizance of the
applications and issued said search warrants. And as previously discussed, the propriety of the
issuance of these warrants is a matter that should have been raised in a motion to quash or in
a certiorari petition, if there are allegations of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
issuing judge.
The Administrative Liabilities
To hold a judge administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or
incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown
that his acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice.[98] Absent such proof, the judge is presumed to have
acted in good faith in exercising his judicial functions.[99]
In this case, the OCA found Judge Docena's issuance of the subject search warrants to have
been motivated by bad faith,[100] as evidenced by the following attendant circumstances:
First, the high incidence of search warrant operations that yielded negative results, remained
unserved, or otherwise were never returned to the court; [101]
Second, Judge Docena appears to have thrown leading questions during the examination of
the applicant and the witness in SW 16-257 and SW 14-134;[102]
Third, four search warrants issued by Judge Docena, i.e. Search Warrant Nos. 13-160-MN, 13-
161-MN, MN-13-162, and MN-13-163, have been nullified by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 132860 for insufficiency of the compelling reasons alleged in the search warrant
applications;[103]
And fourth, there were search warrants that appear to have been issued ahead of the dates of
filing of their respective applications; search warrants that were released to the witness instead
of the applicant; and search warrants which were issued on the date of filing of the application,
but appear to have been received by the applicant a day in advance.[104]
We are not convinced. These circumstances alone are clearly insufficient to overturn the
presumption that Judge Docena acted in good faith in issuing the subject search
warrants.
For one thing, it is unfair to hold the low rate of success of search warrant operations against
Judge Docena, given that the courts have absolutely no participation in the implementation of
the search warrants that they issue.
For another, it is a grave error to consider the CA's nullification of four search warrants issued
by Judge Docena as an indication that all warrants issued by him suffer from the same infirmity.
After all, not every mistake or error of judgment of a judge in the performance of his official
duties makes him liable therefor.[105]
Nevertheless, we find sufficient evidence to hold Judge Docena administratively liable
for gross neglect of duty for the serious mismanagement of search warrant applications in
Branch 170.
Section 12. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. -
a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant,
together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the
return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was
issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made,
the judge shall ascertain whether Section 11 of this Rule has been complied with and shall
require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection
(a) hereof has been complied with.
c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on
search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of
the judge.[106]
The records show that Judge Docena has failed to properly monitor the submission of returns
as required under Section 12(b) and (c) of Rule 126, considering that:
1. the returns on 172 search warrants[107] have yet to be submitted, and Judge Docena
failed to summon each of the 39 applicants thereof to court to explain why no return
was made.[108]
2. 350 returns[109] were filed by applicants well beyond the 10-day period to do so, with
the delay ranging from 11 days up to six months and five days(in SW 15-477).[110]
3. 43 returns[111] were not immediately acted upon, with the delay ranging from one
month and 22 days up to five months and 12 days (in SW 15-435).[112]
4. 29 returns[113] have yet to be acted upon.
Judge Docena likewise committed several lapses in ascertaining whether Section 12(a) of Rule
126 was complied with by the applicants in: a) SW 15-503-IVIN, where mere photocopies of
the inventory of the seized items were submitted;[114] b) in SW 16-286-MN, where the
inventories are not under oath and the signatures of the witnesses are unidentifiable because
their printed names are not indicated in the inventory;[115] and c) in SW 16-273-MN, where only
one witness signed the inventory sheet.[116]
We also find that Judge Docena failed to comply with his administrative responsibilities under
Rules 3.08 and 3.09 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provide:
RULE 3.08 - A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain
professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the
administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
RULE 3.09 - A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high
standards of public service and fidelity.[117]
as it appears that the concerned court personnel in Branch 170, namely Atty. Jesus S.
Hernandez (Atty. Hernandez), the Branch Clerk of Court, Ms. Zenaida Z. Salonga, the Clerk-in-
Charge, together with Ms. Olivia M. Labagnao, Ms. Rosario M. San Pedro, Ms. Debhem N.
Fajardo, and Ms. Gigi M. Mendoza, all court stenographers, too, are all guilty of simple
neglect of duty for failure to diligently perform their respective administrative duties.
Atty. Hernandez, as the administrative officer in Branch 170, fell short of the diligence and care
required of him in the following instances:
a. Case records have no minutes of the proceedings.[118]
b. Some search warrants are incorrectly dated, thus making it appear that they were issued
ahead of the date of filing of their respective applications.[119]
c. Some search warrants were handed over to the witnesses instead of the applicants.[120]
d. There is no date and time of receipt of the case folder by Branch 170 on the face of the
search warrant applications.[121]
e. The search warrant case folders in Branch 170 are not paginated.[122]
f. In several applications, some documents attached thereto are not original copies.[123]
g. Case folders are not property stitched, and some folders have loose pages. Other folders,
too, are merely attached using fasteners.[124]
The court stenographers were likewise remiss in the performance of their duties under Section
17, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, given that they failed to produce a total of 34 stenographic
notes or seven sets of consolidated notes, and to properly label their stenographic notes.[125] It
also appears that they only prepared transcripts of stenographic notes upon request of the
applicants.[126]
As for the Clerk-in-Charge, she clearly violated Section 12(c) of Rule 126,[127] when she
unjustifiably failed to maintain the required log book for search warrant applications in Branch
170.
It is settled that "[a] judge presiding over a branch of a court is, in legal contemplation, the head
thereof having effective control and authority to discipline all employees within the
branch."[128] Consequently, Judge Docena shares accountability for the administrative lapses
of his staff that contributed to the clearly disorganized and inefficient dispatch of business in
Branch 170.
Finally, we hold Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon administratively liable for simple misconduct,
in their capacities as the Executive Judge and the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Malabon,
respectively, for imposing their own internal policies and practices[129] in lieu of the existing
rules in the raffle of applications involving ordinary cases covered by Chapter V of the
Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers,
Prerogatives and Duties (Guidelines).
To be specific, Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon failed to observe the pertinent portion of Section
6 of the Guidelines which requires the search warrant applications assigned to a branch during
the special raffle to be deducted from the number of cases allotted to on the next scheduled
regular raffle. This, however, was not implemented in the RTC of Malabon City.[130]
Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon also failed to observe the proper ratio of the raffling of cases
prescribed under par. 1, Chapter V of Administrative Order No. 6 dated June 30,
1975,[131] which states:
V. CASELOAD AND HONORARIUM
1. The caseload of the Executive Judge shall be as follows:
xxxx
c. In case of multiple branches (salas) of more than five (5), the distribution of cases shall be in
the proportion of one (1) case for the Executive Judge and two (2) for each of the other
judges.[132]
Their use of an improvised system of counting the applicants (instead of the applications)[133] in
the special raffle is simply unacceptable, as the Executive Judge, much less the Clerk of Court,
has absolutely no discretion to deviate from the prescribed ratio for the raffling of cases without
prior approval from this Court.
This resulted in an inequitable distribution of search warrant applications between Branches
170 and 74 at a ratio of almost 6:1, or a six out of seven chance that an application will be
raffled to Branch 170, thereby removing the unpredictability of the raffling process, so much so
that some applicants already indicate that their applications are being filed with Branch 170.[134]
The Penalties
On the one hand, gross neglect of duty or gross negligence "refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to the consequences, in so far as other persons may be affected. xxx In cases
involving public officials, [there is gross negligence] when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable."[135]
It is important to stress, however, that the term "gross neglect of duty" does not necessarily
include willful neglect or intentional wrongdoing. It can also arise from situations where "such
neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious
in its character" that it ends up endangering or threatening the public welfare. [136]
In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee to give proper attention
to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference.[137]
Under Section 46(A), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), gross neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal from
the service (even for the first offense), while simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense,
punishable by suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for
the first offense.
In this case, we find the gravity of Judge Docena's neglect in the performance of his duties to
be so serious in character that the Court may unquestionably impose against him the penalty of
dismissal from the service.
Nevertheless, we take into consideration his length of service of thirty (30) years in various
sectors of the government, with eight (8) years spent rendering service in the Judiciary as a
Technical Assistant in the Supreme Court from 1985 to 1987 and as an RTC Judge from 2010
up to present,[138] his candid admission of his lapses and his commitment to undertake stringent
steps to address the matters brought to his attention by the OCA [139] as mitigating factors that
serve to temper the penalty to be imposed upon him.[140] We also note that this is Judge
Docena's first time to be administratively sanctioned by this Court. Thus, instead of imposing
the penalty of dismissal, we deem it proper to impose against Judge Docena the penalty of
suspension for two (2) years without pay.
As for Atty. Hernandez, we agree with the OCA's conclusion that he undoubtedly failed to meet
the standards required of him as an effective and competent clerk of court.[141] The OCA
recommended that Atty. Hernandez be suspended without pay for six (6) months.[142] We,
however, modify this recommendation and reduce the penalty to suspension without pay for
one (1) month and (1) day, considering the fact that this is his first offense,[143] and the errors he
committed are purely administrative in nature and are not gross or patent.
We likewise agree with the OCA's finding that Ms. Salonga (the Clerk-in-Charge) and Ms.
Labagnao, Ms. Fardo, Ms. San Pedro, and Ms. Mendoza (the court stenographers) also failed
to diligently perform their respective duties.[144] Since this, too, is their first offense, we adopt
the OCA's recommendation[145] and impose the penalty of admonition that they be more
circumspect in the performance of their respective duties.
On the other hand, "[m]isconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence.
Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple."[146]
In this case, there is no substantial evidence to show that Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon's
actions involved the elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules to qualify their misconduct as grave. Absent such malicious intent or bad faith
on their part, they may only be held administratively liable for simple misconduct.
Although the penalty for simple misconduct is suspension without pay of one (1) month and
one (1) day to six (6) months,[147] the RRACCS allows the payment of a fine in place of
suspension if the offense is committed without abusing the powers of one's position or
office.[148] Considering that this is also the first offense for both Judge Magsino and Atty. Dizon,
we find the imposition of a fine of P20,000.00 to be proper and commensurate for their
transgressions.
Four of the Justices voted for the dismissal of Judge Docena from the service.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. FINDS Hon. Celso R. L. Magsino, Jr., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 74,
Malabon City, and then Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Malabon City, GUILTY of
simple misconduct, and hereby orders him to pay a FINE in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely;
2. FINDS Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Malabon City, GUILTY of simple misconduct, and hereby orders her to pay a FINE in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with a STERN WARNINGthat a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely;
3. FINDS Hon. Zaldy B. Docena, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon
City, GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, and hereby SUSPENDS him from office for a period of
two (2) years without pay, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely;
4. FINDS Atty. Jesus S. Hernandez, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 170,
Malabon City, GUILTY of simple neglect of duty, and hereby SUSPENDS him from office for a
period of one (1) month without pay, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely;
5. FINDS Ms. Zenaida Z. Salonga, Clerk-in-Charge, and Ms. Olivia M. Labagnao, Ms. Debhem
E. Fardo, Ms. Rosario M. San Pedro, and Ms. Gigi M. Mendoza, Court Stenographers,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, GUILTY of simple neglect of duty, and
are ADMONISHED to be more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties.