Art. 36 Case Doctrines

Art.
36 - Psychological incapacity
Characteristics of psychological incapacity

Article 36 must be read with Articles 35, 37, 38, 41, 45 or 55 to determine the import
of "psychological incapacity."
Misrepresentations point to one's own inadequacy to cope with marital obligations,
kindred to psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the marriage.
The provision on psychological incapacity should be interpreted on a case-to-case
basis.
Guidelines in interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Guideline No. 2 requires testimony of psychiatrist or medical doctor to prove
psychological incapacity.
Examination by physician or psychologist is not a prerequisite for declaration of
Guidelines in evaluating the testimonies of psychologists and psychiatrists
An expert witness would have strengthened the claim of psychological incapacity.
Petition need not allege root cause of psychological incapacity.
Petition alleging physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity complies
with the requirement of the new Rules.
Psychological incapacity refers to a mental, not physical, incapacity.
Senseless and protracted refusal of a spouse to fulfill marital obligation of procreation
is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity.
"Irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" do not constitute
Sexual infidelity, per se, does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Sexual infidelity is not sufficient proof of psychological incapacity.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.
To be tired and give up on one's situation and on one's spouse are not signs of
psychological illness.
Wife's lack of attention to children, immaturity and lack of “intention of procreative
Copyright 2017 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia Third Release 2017 1
sexuality” do not constitute psychological incapacity.
Immaturity, sexual promiscuity and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
Psychological defect cannot be presumed from the mere fact of abandonment.
Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation.
Norms for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless
of nationality.
Psychological incapacity justifies judicial declaration freeing the parties from
consequences stemming from the marriage.
An inveterate pathological liar is unable to commit to the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses.
Psychological conditions that hamper performance of marital obligations do not mean
that the husband and wife suffer from psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity is confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders.
Disagreements on money matters is not a ground to declare a marriage null and void.
Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law.
"Psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses.
Art. 36 does not contemplate mere refusal, neglect, difficulty or ill will on the part of
the errant spouse.
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
Manifestations of psychological incapacity.
Mismanagement of family finances does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Annulments of the Catholic church are not controlling or decisive
Findings of the RTC on existence or non-existence of psychological incapacity is final
and binding; A marriage that is null and void ab initio is not accorded protection
Definition of "psychological incapacity
Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
Marriages entered into for considerations other than love, are equally valid
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law
Jocelyn M. Suazo vs. Angelito Suazo, et al., G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010
Susie Chan-Tan vs. Jesse C. Tan, G.R. No. 167139, February 25, 2010
Jordan Chan Paz vs. Jeanice Pavon Paz, G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010
Edward N. Lim vs. Ma. Cheryl Sta. Cruz-Lim, G.R. No. 176464, February 4, 2010
Characteristics of psychological incapacity
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a)

gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after
the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015
Article 36 must be read with Articles 35, 37, 38, 41, 45 or 55 to determine the
import of "psychological incapacity."
[I]n determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it

must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,
37, 38, and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage
void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or
Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed
so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law
were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.
Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.
Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris vs. Brix Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006
Republic of the Phil. vs. Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30,
2008
Misrepresentations point to one's own inadequacy to cope with marital

obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity.
Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled
if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which
enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article,
clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for
the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles
45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who
is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case,
the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her
marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Leonilo Antonio vs. Marie Ivonne F. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
Psychological incapacity refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a

party even before the marriage.
The psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The burden of proving the nullity of marriage is on the petitioner.
Renne Enrique Bier vs. Ma. Lourdes A. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008
To reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than just a

"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it
is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and
duty of a married person. There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person — an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage — which must be linked with the
manifestations of the psychological incapacity.
Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 222541, February 15, 2017
Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply

with or comprehend essential marital obligations.
Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, Jr., G.R. No. 188400, March 8, 2017
Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a pattern of

behavior meant to dominate a partner through different tactics such as physical and
sexual violence, threats, emotional insults, and economic deprivation. Although
not specifically named, coercive control as a form of psychological abuse or harm
has been recognized in Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Children Act of 2004.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating,

stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and friends, as well as his
increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of
comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost
cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to
respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family,
respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their
marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend and perform his
marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that
respondent's mental illness is incurable.
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family.
As such, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Thus, it has consistently been held that
psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. It must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.
Republic v. Romero II, G.R. Nos. 209180 & 209253, February 24, 2016
Verily, all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits
associated with certain personality disorders and there is hardly any doubt that the
intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases. Thus, to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the
psychological incapacity must: (a) be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) have
juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and (c) be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
Republic v. Romero II, G.R. Nos. 209180 & 209253, February 24, 2016
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume.
Brenda B. Marcos vs. Wilson G. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage

under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may
have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with
certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason
that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the
human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained[.]
Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006
Republic of the Phil. vs. Laila Tanyag-San Jose, et al., G.R. No. 168328, February
28, 2007
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of

and assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. As this Court repeatedly
declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to
71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Neither should Article 36 be equated
with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the like. At
best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal
separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Rosa Yap Paras vs. Justo J. Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007
Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of marriage

under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady that is so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may
have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intention of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Nilda V. Navales vs. Reynaldo Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008
The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates

"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,
on the part of the errant spouse. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically
incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another.
Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or

be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. To hark back to what has been
earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Republic v. De Gracia, G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014
Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity,
the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the
sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code
in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the
Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the
end they decided to adopt the provision "with less specificity than expected" in
order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its application." Illustrative of the
"less specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family Code
Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would
have limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of
ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals
that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from
the Canon Law.
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty", "refusal" or

"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that
the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Republic v. Pangasinan, G.R. No. 214077, August 10, 2016, citing Marable v.
Marable, G.R. No. 178741, January 17, 2011
In sum, a person's psychological incapacity to comply with his or her essential

obligations, as the case may be, in marriage must be rooted on a medically or
clinically identifiable grave illness that is incurable and shown to have existed at
the time of marriage, although the manifestations thereof may only be evident after
marriage.
Republic v. Pangasinan, G.R. No. 214077, August 10, 2016
Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended
by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e.,
it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it
must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017
The provision on psychological incapacity should be interpreted on a

case-to-case basis.
The Civil Code Revision Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law.
Joselita Salita vs. Hon. Delilah Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994
But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read
and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version
of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application."
Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts"
in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one
in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage;
hence, every "trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court."
Guidelines in interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of

the Family Code are handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the

celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts"
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles

68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal

of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are

unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to

harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason
that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence —
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, G.R. No.
108763, February 13, 1997
Republic of the Phil. vs. Crasus L. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005
Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar vs. Rey C. Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, October 13,
2009
A straitjacket application of the Molina guidelines "has taken its toll on people
who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality
anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions." Ironically, the ultimate effect of such
stringent application of the Molina guidelines is the perversion of the family unit,
the very institution that our laws are meant to protect.
Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, Jr., G.R. No. 188400, March 8, 2017, citing
Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu Te, 598 Phil. 666, 696 (2009)
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application
to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to
the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so
strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters
to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some
resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of
nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations,
but according to its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be
on "all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground

for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with
expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of
experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to
arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the
malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by
experts.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial

antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage." Finally, the "psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated." The Court explained:
(a) Gravity — It must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Judicial Antecedence — It must be rooted in the history of the party

antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
the marriage; and
(c) Incurability — It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the

cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 159220,
September 22, 2008
2008
Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Thus,
the incapacity "must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved." In this connection, the
burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the petitioner, pursuant to
Republic v. Court of Appeals, or the Molina case.
Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016, citing Santos v. Court
of Appeals, 10 Phil. 21 (1995) and Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 676
(1997)
Guideline No. 2 requires testimony of psychiatrist or medical doctor to prove

The wife failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root
cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as
to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9,
2001
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the ultimate task of
decision-making, must give due regard to expert opinion on the psychological and
mental disposition of the parties.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground

for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with
expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of
experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to
arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the
malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by
experts.
Examination by physician or psychologist is not a prerequisite for declaration

of psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a

marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no
requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as

hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist,
since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The
totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is
generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other."
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, 642 Phil. 602 (2010)
Molina does not require a physician to examine a person and declare him/her to
be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of evidence
presented establishes the party's psychological condition.
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000)
Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that an expert opinion is

not absolutely necessary and may be dispensed with in a petition under Article 36
of the Family Code if the totality of the evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established. The evidence need not necessarily come from the allegedly
incapacitated spouse, but can come from persons intimately related to the spouses,
i.e., relatives and close friends, who could clearly testify on the allegedly
incapacitated spouse's condition at or about the time of the marriage.
In other words, the Molina guidelines continue to apply but its application calls
for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity. To be clear, however, the totality of
the evidence must still establish the characteristics that Santos laid down: gravity,
incurability, and juridical antecedence.
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly
result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion
should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such
other evidence on the causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as

conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of
other evidence to establish causation. The expert's findings under such
circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as
evidence. This is so, considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and
technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be
eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the
parties' upbringing and psychodynamics.
[E]ven if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in
the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical
examination of [the husband] was to be dispensed with only if the totality of
evidence presented was enough to support a finding of his psychological
incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any form of medical or
psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity would have
automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the "presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition," as the
Court said in Marcos. But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to
present the professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause,
gravity and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity, then the opinions
should be presented and be weighed by the trial courts in order to determine and
decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the marriages. It bears repeating that
the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments
not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.
Arabelle J. Mendoza vs. Republic of the Phil., et al., G.R. No. 157649, November
12, 2012
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the

psychological incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would have
automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try,
must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by
the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings.
Guidelines in evaluating the testimonies of psychologists and psychiatrists
Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the
testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of
nullity of marriage, viz.:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the
respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by
only one side — the petitioner — whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be
doubted. . . . To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our
mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of
the content of such evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
respondent's exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her testimony
and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars. . .
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because
it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. . . . If a psychological
disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such
independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent
evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case,
particularly about the respondent's early life and associations, and about events on
or about the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony
and report appear to us to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the
one-sided and meagre facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to
support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the
marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities of the respondent's life were
examined and given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with
the better qualities. . . The evidence fails to mention also what character and
qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage . . . To be sure, these are
important because not a few marriages have failed, not because of psychological
incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities
and marital developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity.
Viñas v. Parel-Viñas, G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015, citing 612 Phil. 1061
(2009)
An expert witness would have strengthened the claim of psychological

incapacity.
[I]n order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not be considered
a mere fabrication, evidence other than [the wife's] lone testimony should have
been adduced. While an actual medical, psychiatric or psychological examination
is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert
witness would have strengthened [the wife's] claim of [the husband's] alleged
psychological incapacity. [Her] omission to present one is fatal to her position.
There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely
no showing that the "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage
or that they are incurable.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Norma Cuison-Melgar, et al., G.R. No. 139676, March 31,
2006
It is already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on
the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the
nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the
courts, "despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015, citing Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,
G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009
The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage

based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis
of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. The
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of
her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts
in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon
which the logic of her conclusion is founded.
Petition need not allege root cause of psychological incapacity.
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of

their passage. The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that "expert opinion
need not be alleged" in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological
and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of
psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege
expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need
to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.
Diana M. Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003
Petition alleging physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity

complies with the requirement of the new Rules.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work,
respond to and control the human body. Scientists still do not understand
everything there is to know about the root causes of psychological disorders. The
root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science even as
their outward, physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules
require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations indicative of
Diana M. Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003
Psychological incapacity refers to a mental, not physical, incapacity.
Correlated with existing precepts in our law on marriage, "psychological

incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration
of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." plpecdtai
Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must concomitantly be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, to observe love,
respect and fidelity, and to render help and support. We have also held that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. To
qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground for nullification of marriage, a
person's psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to indicate an utter
incapacity to comprehend and comply with the essential objects of marriage,
including the rights and obligations between husband and wife. The affliction must
be shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
12, 2012
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of

the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical —
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among
others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who
imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully
substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party
alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
Senseless and protracted refusal of a spouse to fulfill marital obligation of

procreation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
"to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
Thus, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997
Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not
by themselves constitute psychological incapacity.
Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do

not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, and not merely due to private respondent’s youth and self-conscious
feeling of being handsome.
Lucita Estrella Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8,
1999
In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the

Philippines, the Court ruled that the respondent's act of living an adulterous life
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no
specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish that the respondent's
unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality, which made her
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Ligeralde v.
Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010
"Irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" do not constitute

This case is of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wife's

outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wife's obsession with cleanliness
and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of
support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. However, these
inadequacies do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The totality of the evidence shows simple case of a
married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband
consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
Juanita Carating-Siayngco vs. Manuel Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27,
2004
It has been held that mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and

"conflicting personalities" does not constitute psychological incapacity nor does
failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.
These differences do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code and are not manifestations thereof which may be a ground
for declaring their marriage void. If at all, these are difficulties that couples
ordinarily deal with in the course of their marriage.
Republic v. Pangasinan, G.R. No. 214077, August 10, 2016
The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and not
inclined to perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and is
romantically-involved with another man. She has not been maintaining lines of
communication with Glenn at the time the latter filed the petition before the RTC.
Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite
of Mary Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible personalities,
the latter's acts and traits do not necessarily indicate psychological incapacity.
Viñas v. Parel-Viñas, G.R. No. 208790, January 21, 2015
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity

and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the
respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered
personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential
obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from complying with the
obligation to be faithful to his spouse. It is indispensable that the evidence must
show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
Sexual infidelity, per se, does not constitute psychological incapacity.
The only essential marital obligation which the husband was not able to
fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does
not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. It must be shown that his unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a
child of his own flesh and blood.
Juanita Carating-Siayngco vs. Manuel Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27,
2004
Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal
separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital
obligations.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Cesar Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013
In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the

respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered
personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the essential
obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor that effectively incapacitated her from complying with the
obligation to be faithful to her spouse.
Ricardo P. Toring vs. Teresita M. Toring, et al., G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010
Sexual infidelity is not sufficient proof of psychological incapacity.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering

from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
Jaime F. Villalon vs. Ma. Corazon N. Villalon, G.R. No. 167206, November 18,
2005
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to
establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
2009
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with

Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with

psychological incapacity. Marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family that the State cherishes and protects. While the Supreme
Court commiserates with the wife in her unhappy marital relationship with her
husband, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither
should the Court.
Lorna Guillen Pesca vs. Zosimo A. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001
The medical report failed to show that [the husband's] actions indicated a
psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or
clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his
dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity. His inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel remorse over
his misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of
immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that
was incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with
psychological incapacity. Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal
offenses manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute
a ground only for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code.
12, 2012
To be tired and give up on one's situation and on one's spouse are not signs of
psychological illness.
To be tired and give up on one's situation and on one's spouse are not
necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so
labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to
allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not
available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very
specific situation — a relationship where no marriage could have validly been
concluded because the parties; or where one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not
appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered
into a marriage.
Renato Reyes So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, 5 June 2009
2009
Wife's lack of attention to children, immaturity and lack of "intention of

procreative sexuality" do not constitute psychological incapacity.
Even if taken as true, the husband's testimony basically complains about
three aspects of the wife's personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to
their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an "intention of procreative
sexuality." None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes "psychological
incapacity."
Leni O. Choa vs. Alfonso C. Choa, G.R. No. 143376, November 26, 2002
Immaturity, sexual promiscuity and abandonment do not by themselves

constitute psychological incapacity.
The wife’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by

themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be
equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to
her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied
upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation.
David B. Dedel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004
[The wife’s] immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. To

rule that such immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown
that the immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made
the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state, which inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity.
Republic of the Phil. vs. CA (Ninth Division), et al., G.R. No. 159594, November
12, 2012
The respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated

with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown
that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The
petitioner must be able to establish that the respondent's unfaithfulness was a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which made her completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Ligarde v.
Patalinghug, G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010
Psychological defect cannot be presumed from the mere fact of abandonment.
The husband’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was
never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. This
could have been done through an expert witness. Psychological defect cannot be
presumed from the mere fact that he abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. As ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Lolita Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004
[A]bandonment [of the conjugal home to live with another man] was not one of
the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also
constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation
under Article 55 (10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, [the wife’s] sexual
infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, considering that there should be a showing that such marital
infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
12, 2012
Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation and divorce
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the

grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence,
moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
2008
Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves, nor with legal separation in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.
2008
Norms for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an

alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the
rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological
incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Lolita Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004
Psychological incapacity justifies judicial declaration freeing the parties from

consequences stemming from the marriage.
The inviolability of marriage depends on whether the marriage exists and is

valid. If it is void ab initio, the "permanence" of the union becomes irrelevant, and
the Court can step in to declare it so. Article 36 of the Family Code is the
justification. Where it applies and is duly proven, a judicial declaration can free
the parties from the rights, obligations, burdens and consequences stemming from
their marriage.
Florence Malcampo-Sin vs. Philipp T. Sin, G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001
An inveterate pathological liar is unable to commit to the basic tenets of

relationship between spouses.
Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations

as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular,
enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support. [I]t is difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Leonilo Antonio vs. Marie Ivonne F. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
Psychological conditions that hamper performance of marital obligations do

not mean that the husband and wife suffer from psychological incapacity.
We cannot see how their personality disorder would render the husband and
wife unaware of the essential marital obligations or to be incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to a marriage. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper
their performance of their marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from
psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity.
Rodolfo A. Aspillaga vs. Aurora A. Aspillaga, G.R. No. 170925, October 26, 2009
Psychological incapacity is confined to the most serious cases of personality

disorders.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty", "refusal" or

"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. The intention of the law
is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. Because of
this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. In this regard, psychological incapacity as a
ground to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended,
should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. It should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical —
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage,
which, as provided under Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and
render help and support. In other words, it must be a malady that is so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
[T]he expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage

based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
12, 2012
To the Court's mind, [the wife's] refusal to live with [her husband] and to
assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity
that would justify the nullification of the parties' marriage. Indeed, to be declared
clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform
one's duties is another. . . . [P]sychological incapacity refers only to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Disagreements on money matters is not a ground to declare a marriage null

and void.
While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other

aspects of one's marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a
ground to declare a marriage null and void. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice
of the fact that disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and even
normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.
Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. Article 36
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. The malady must be so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume.
It must be reiterated, however, that the remedy [for a failed marriage] is not
always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; rather, it
must be limited to cases where there is a downright incapacity or inability to
assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Republic v. Romero II, G.R. Nos. 209180 & 209253, February 24, 2016, citing
Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is not a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest
themselves; a marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void
marriage.
"Psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of

psychoses.
"Psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to

comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability
2009
Art. 36 does not contemplate mere refusal, neglect, difficulty or ill will on the
part of the errant spouse.
The remedy for a marriage that has failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. We stress that Article 36 of the Family Code
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic
marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on
the part of the errant spouse. It is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves. The
State, fortunately or unfortunately, has not seen it fit to decree that divorce should
be available in this country. Neither should an Article 36 declaration of nullity be
equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and
the like. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties
or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at
the time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of
marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a marriage), then we
are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
Enrique A. Agraviador vs. Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador, et al., G.R. No. 170729,
December 8, 2010
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a

"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory
marriage is not a null and void marriage.
Noel B. Baccay vs. Maribel C. Baccay, et al., G.R. No. 173138, December 1, 2010
Manifestations of psychological incapacity.
The husband's pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological

incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1)
sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed
business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is
not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
Ma. Socorro Camacho-Reyes vs. Ramon Reyes-Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August
18, 2010
Mismanagement of family finances does not constitute psychological

incapacity.
Irresponsibility in managing the family's finances does not rise to the level of a
psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the Family Code. At most,
the wife's mismanagement of the family's finances merely constituted difficulty,
refusal or neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds intended for the
family's financial support.
Ricardo P. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010
Annulments of the Catholic church are not controlling or decisive
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under

Article 36 would be legislating from the bench. . . . [I]nterpretations given by the
NAMT [National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal] of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or
decisive.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 676-678 (1997)
Findings of the RTC on existence or non-existence of psychological incapacity

is final and binding; A marriage that is null and void ab initio is not accorded
protection
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or
non-existence of a party's psychological incapacity should be final and binding for
as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other
evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every situation
where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and
evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from
substituting its own judgment. It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and
evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only
because the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable
social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional
mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only
relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null
and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
Definition of "psychological incapacity."
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article

36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the
party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the term
psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by
reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the
provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee
were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the
provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow
some resiliency in its application." Illustrative of the "less specificity than
expected" has been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give
any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability
of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive
effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.
[A]s the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals, the deliberations of
the Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the
term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code "has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken and construed
independently of "but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law
on marriage."
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015, citing Santos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

Church
Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,
the Court stated that interpretations given by the NAMT (National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal) of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts, still it is
subject to the law on evidence. Thus: Since the purpose of including such
provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally
— subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as [canonically] invalid
should be decreed civilly void . . . .
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the basis
of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT (National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines) was not the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological nature similar
to Article 36 of the Family Code, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which
refers to those who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted.
In Santos v. Santos, the Court referred to the deliberations during the sessions of
the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an
insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It went out to state that a
part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of
Canon Law . . .
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Santos v.
Santos, 310 Phil. 21, 37 (1995)
In Najera v. Najera, the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of
whether to consider an annulment by the NAMT as also covering psychological
incapacity, the only ground recognized in our law. In the said case, the NAMT
decision was also based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095. The Court ruled
that it was not similar to, and only annulments under the third paragraph of, Canon
1095 should be considered. . .
To repeat, the decision of the NAMT was based on the second paragraph of
Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be
mutually given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under Article
36 of the Family Code.
Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, G.R. No. 192718, February 18, 2015, citing Najera v.
Najera, 609 Phil. 316, 336 (2009)
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under

Article 36 would be legislating from the bench. As stated in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina, interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling
or decisive.
Marriages entered into for considerations other than love, are equally valid
That he married [his wife] not out of love, but out of reverence for the latter's
parents, does not mean that [the husband] is psychologically incapacitated in the
context of Article 36 of the Family Code. In Republic v. Albios, the Court held
that:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The
State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses
to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of
their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The
right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages
in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have
children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus,
marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such
as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided
that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love,
though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only
valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law,
may validly support a marriage.
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law
It must be reiterated, however, that the remedy [for a failed marriage] is not
always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves;
rather, it must be limited to cases where there is a downright incapacity or inability
to assume and fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.

Art. 36 Case Doctrines

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Art. 36 Case Doctrines

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Art.

Characteristics of psychological incapacity

Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a)

[I]n determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it

Misrepresentations point to one's own inadequacy to cope with marital

Psychological incapacity refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a

To reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than just a

Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply

Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a pattern of

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating,

The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of

Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of marriage

The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates

Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty", "refusal" or

In sum, a person's psychological incapacity to comply with his or her essential

The provision on psychological incapacity should be interpreted on a

Guidelines in interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code.

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to

Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, Jr., G.R. No. 188400, March 8, 2017

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial

(b) Judicial Antecedence — It must be rooted in the history of the party

(c) Incurability — It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the

Guideline No. 2 requires testimony of psychiatrist or medical doctor to prove

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground

Examination by physician or psychologist is not a prerequisite for declaration

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a

Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015

The non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as

Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that an expert opinion is

Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as

The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the

Guidelines in evaluating the testimonies of psychologists and psychiatrists

xxx xxx xxx

An expert witness would have strengthened the claim of psychological

The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage

Petition need not allege root cause of psychological incapacity.

Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of

Petition alleging physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity

Psychological incapacity refers to a mental, not physical, incapacity.

Correlated with existing precepts in our law on marriage, "psychological

"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of

Senseless and protracted refusal of a spouse to fulfill marital obligation of

Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not

Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do

In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of the

"Irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" do not constitute

This case is of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wife's

It has been held that mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and

Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity

Sexual infidelity, per se, does not constitute psychological incapacity.

In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the

Sexual infidelity is not sufficient proof of psychological incapacity.

Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering

Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with

Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with