VOL.
328,MARCH27,2000 749 750
OngChiavs.Republic
G.R.No.127240.March27,2000.*
ONG CHIA, petitioner,vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
andTHECOURTOFAPPEALS,respondents.
Naturalization;Evidence;Pleadings and Practice;Formal
OfferofEvidence;Judgments;Theruleonformalofferofevidence
(Rule 132,34) is clearly not applicable to a petition for
naturalization; Decisions in naturalization proceedings are not
coveredbytheruleonresjudicata.PetitionerfailedtonoteRule
143oftheRulesofCourtwhichprovidesthatTheserulesshall
not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases,naturalizationandinsolvencyproceedings,andothercases
not herein provided for,except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis
added) Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of
evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is
clearlynotapplicabletothepresentcaseinvolvingapetitionfor
naturalization.Theonlyinstancewhensaidrulesmaybeapplied
byanalogyorsuppletorilyinsuchcasesiswhenitispracticable
andconvenient.Thatisnotthecasehere,sincerelianceuponthe
documentspresentedbytheStateforthefirsttimeonappeal,in
fact,appearstobethemorepracticalandconvenientcourseof
action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings
arenotcoveredbytheruleonresjudicata.Consequently,afinal
favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on
movingforarevocationofthegrantofnaturalizationonthebasis
ofthesamedocuments.
________________
*
SECONDDIVISION.
7 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
50
OngChiavs.Republic
Same;Same;Same;Same;The reason for the rule
prohibitingtheadmissionofevidencewhichhasnotbeenformally
offeredistoaffordtheoppositepartythechancetoobjecttotheir
admissibility.Petitionerclaimsthatasaresultofthefailureof
theStatetopresentandformallyofferitsdocumentaryevidence
beforethetrialcourt,hewasdeniedtherighttoobjectagainst
their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental
righttoproceduraldueprocess. Wearenotpersuaded. Indeed,
the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence
whichhasnotbeenformallyofferedistoaffordtheoppositeparty
thechancetoobjecttotheiradmissibility.Petitionercannotclaim
thathewasdeprivedoftherighttoobjecttotheauthenticityof
thedocumentssubmittedtotheappellatecourtbytheState.He
couldhaveincludedhisobjections,ashe,infact,did,inthebrief
hefiledwiththeCourtofAppeals.
Same;Same;PublicDocuments;Whereapartyfailstomake
asatisfactoryshowingofanyflaworirregularitythatmaycast
doubtontheauthenticityofdocumentswhichhavebeenexecuted
under oath,the court may rely on them.The Court notes that
thesedocumentsnamely,thepetitioninSCNCaseNo.031767,
petitionersmarriagecontract,thejointaffidavitexecutedbyhim
andhiswife,andpetitionersincometaxreturnsareallpublic
documents.Assuch,theyhavebeenexecutedunderoath.They
arethusreliable. Sinoe petitionerfailedtomake asatisfactory
showingofanyflaworirregularitythatmaycastdoubtonthe
authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the
appellatecourtdidnoterrinrelyinguponthem.
 Naturalization;Statutory Construction;It is settled that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construedinfavorofthegovernmentandagainsttheapplicant.
Theabovediscussionwouldhavebeenenoughtodisposeofthis
case,buttosettlealltheissuesraised,weshallbrieflydiscussthe
effectofpetitionersfailuretoincludetheaddressJ.M.BasaSt.,
Iloiloinhispetition,inaccordancewith7,CA.No.473.This
address appears on petitioners Immigrant Certificate of
Residence,adocumentwhichformspartoftherecordsasAnnex
Aofhis1989petitionfornaturalization.Petitioneradmitsthathe
failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that
since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had
been fully published, with the petition and the other annexes,
suchpublicationconstitutessubstantialcompliancewith7.This
isallegedlybecausethepublicationeffectively
751
VOL.328,MARCH27,2000
OngChiavs.Republic
satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such
requirement,i.e.,togiveinvestigatingagenciesofthegovernment
theopportunitytocheckonthebackgroundoftheapplicantand
prevent suppression of information regarding any possible
misbehavioronhispartinanycommunitywherehemayhave
lived at one time or another. It is settled, however, that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construedinfavorofthegovernmentandagainsttheapplicant.
AsnotedbytheState,CA.No.473,7clearlyprovidesthatthe
applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his
present and former places of residence. This provision and the
ruleofstrictapplicationofthelawinnaturalizationcasesdefeat
petitioners argument of substantial compliance with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this
groundalone,theinstantpetitionoughttobedenied.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Algarra,Mutia&TrinidadLawOfficesforpetitioner.
TheSolicitorGeneralforrespondents.
MENDOZA,J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision1of the Court of
Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch24,Koronadal,SouthCotabato2admittingpetitionerOng
ChiatoPhilippinecitizenship.
751 Thefactsareasfollows:
PetitionerwasbornonJanuary1,1923inAmoy,China.In
1932,asanineyearoldboy,hearrivedattheportofManilaon
board the vessel Angking. Since then, he has stayed in the
Philippineswherehefoundemploymentandeventuallystarted
hisownbusiness,marriedaFilipina,withwhomhe
__________________
1
PerJusticeBernardoLl.Salas,andconcurredinbyJustices
GloriaC.ParasandMa.AliciaAustriaMartinez.
2
PresidedbyJudgeRodolfoC.Soledad.
752
752 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
OngChiavs.Republic
hadfourchildren.OnJuly4,1989,attheageof66,hefileda
verifiedpetitiontobeadmittedasaFilipinocitizenunderCA.No.
473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended.Petitioner,afterstatinghisqualificationsasrequired
in2,andlackofthedisqualificationsenumeratedin3ofthe
law,stated
17.Thathehasheretoforemade(a)petitionforcitizenshipunder
theprovisionsofLetterofInstructionNo.270withtheSpecial
Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General,
Manila,docketedasSCNCaseNo.031776,butthesamewasnot
acteduponowingtothefactthatthesaidSpecialCommitteeon
Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986
revolutionsuchthatprocessingofpetitionsfornaturalizationby
administrativeprocesswassuspended;
Duringthehearings,petitionertestifiedastohisqualifications
and presented three witnesses to corroboratehis testimony. So
impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the
testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court
whethertheStateintendedtopresentanywitnessagainsthim,
heremarked:
Actually,YourHonor,withthetestimonyofthepetitionerhimself
whichisrathersurprising,inthesensethatheseemstobewell
versedwiththemajorportionofthehistoryofthePhilippines,so,
onourpart,weareconvinced,YourHonorPlease,thatpetitioner
reallydeservestobeadmittedasacitizenofthePhilippines.And
for this reason,we do not wish to present any evidence to
counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the
petitioner,aswellasthepetitionerhimself.3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the
petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The
State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed contending that petitioner: (1) failed to state all the
namesbywhichheisorhadbeenknown;(2)failedtostateallhis
formerplacesofresidenceinviolationofCA.No.473,7;
___________________
3
TSN,p.152,June27,1991.(Emphasisadded)
753
VOL.328,MARCH27,2000 753
OngChiavs.Republic
(3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable
mannerduringhisentirestayinthePhilippines,inviolationof
2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his
previous incomes have been insufficient ormisdeclared, also in
contraventionof2;and(5)failedtosupporthispetitionwiththe
appropriatedocumentaryevidence.4
AnnexedtotheStatesappellantsbriefwasacopyofa1977
petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special
CommitteeonNaturalizationinSCNCaseNo.031767, 5inwhich
petitionerstatedthatinadditiontohisnameofOngChia,he
hadlikewisebeenknownsincechildhoodasLoretoChiaOng.
Aspetitioner,however,failedtostatethisothernameinhis1989
petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition
mustfail.6Thestatealsoannexedincometaxreturns 7allegedly
filedbypetitionerfrom1973to1977toshowthathisnetincome
could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that
petitionerfailedtoconducthimselfinaproperandirreproachable
mannerduringhisstayinthePhilippines,theStatecontended
that,althoughpetitionerclaimedthatheandRamonaVillaruel
hadbeenmarriedtwice,oncebeforeajudgein1953,andthen
againinchurch in 1977,petitioneractuallylivedwithhiswife
without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were
marriedin1977.Itwasallegedthatpetitionerfailedtopresent
his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also
annexed a copy of petitioners 1977 marriage contract 8and a
JointAffidavit9executed by petitioner and his wife. These
documentsshowthatwhenpetitionermarriedRamonaVillaruel
onFebruary23,1977,nomarriagelicensehadbeenrequiredin InstructionNo.270.Namesandpseudonymsmustbestatedin
accordancewithArt.76oftheCivilCodebecausepetitionerand the petition for naturalization and failure to include the same
RamonaVillaruelhadbeenlivingtogetherashusband militatesagainstadecisioninhisfavor...Thisisamandatory
_________________ requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by
thoseothernamestocomeforwardandinformtheauthoritiesof
4
AppellantsBrief,pp.2122;CARollo,pp.3536. anylegalobjectionwhichmightadverselyaffecthisapplication
5
AnnexB;Id.,pp.129138. forcitizenship.
6
CitingWattv.Republic,46SCRA683(1972);Id.,p.37. Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for
naturalizationthatheformerlyresidedinJ.M.BasaSt.,Iloilo
7
AnnexesF,F1,F2,F3andF4;Id.,pp.144157.
andAlimodian,Iloilo.Section7oftheRevisedNaturalization
8
AnnexD;Id.,p.139.
Lawrequirestheapplicanttostateinhispetitionhispresent
9
AnnexE;Id.,p.140. andformerplacesofresidence.Thisrequirementismandatory
754 and failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the
754 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED petition.AsexplainedbytheCourt,thereasonfortheprovisionis
OngChiavs.Republic to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the
and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, government,uponthepublicationofthepetition,anopportunity
according to the State, belies his claim that when he started to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the
livingwithhiswifein1953,theyhadalreadybeenmarried. petitioner.Byfailingtocomplywiththisprovision,thepetitioner
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioners isdeprivingthepublicandsaid
ImmigrantCertificateofResidence,10petitionerresidedatJ.M. _________________
Basa Street, Iloilo, but he did not include said address in his
petition. AnnexA;Records,p.16.
10

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its CADecision,p.8;Rollo,p.50.Citationsomitted.

11

decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial court and 755
denied petitioners application for naturalization. It ruled that VOL.328,MARCH27,2000 755
due to the importance of naturalization cases, the State is not OngChiavs.Republic
precludedfromraisingquestionsnotpresentedinthelowercourt agenciesofsuchopportunity,thusdefeatingthepurposeofthe
andbroughtupforthefirsttimeonappeal. 11Theappellatecourt law
held: ...
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and
petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this present petition for irreproachablemannerwhenhelivedinwithhiswifeforseveral
naturalization his other name, LORETO CHIA ONG, which years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the
name appeared in his previous application under Letter of consistent ruling that the applicants 8year cohabitation with
hiswifewithoutthebenefitofclergyandbegettingbyherthree
childrenoutofwedlockisaconductfarfrombeingproperand
irreproachableasrequiredbytheRevisedNaturalizationLaw,
and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the
Philippines by
...
Lastly,petitionerOngChiasallegedannualincomein1961of
P5,000.00,exclusiveofbonuses,commissionsandallowances,is
not lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax return
because he is not liable for income tax yet confirms that his
income is low . . . It is not only that the person having the
employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It
mustbeshownthattheemploymentgivesoneanincomesuch
thatthereisanappreciablemarginofhisincomeoverexpenses
astobeabletoprovideforanadequatesupportintheeventof
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid
onesbecomingtheobjectofcharityorpubliccharge....Now
thattheyareintheiroldage,petitionerOngChiaandhiswife
arelivingontheallowancegiventothembytheirchildren.The
monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant
cannotbeaddedtohisincometomakeitlucrativebecauselike
bonuses, commissions and allowances, said pensions are
contingent,speculativeandprecarious...
Hence,thispetitionbasedonthefollowingassignmentoferrors:
1. I.THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN
NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE
COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF
DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE
RECORDSOFTHECASE.
2. II.THEFINDINGOFTHECOURTOFAPPEALSTHAT
THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME
OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS
NOTSUPPORTEDBYTHEEVIDENCEONRECORD.
naturalization
756
756 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
OngChiavs.Republic
1. III.CONTRARYTOTHEFINDINGOFTHECOURTOF
APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN HIS
PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND
FORMERPLACESOFRESIDENCE.
2. IV.THEFINDINGOFTHECOURTOFAPPEALSTHAT
THEPETITIONERFAILEDTOCONDUCTHIMSELF
INAPROPERANDIRREPROACHABLEMANNERIS
NOTSUPPORTEDBYTHEEVIDENCEONRECORD.
Petitionersprincipalcontentionisthattheappellatecourterred
inconsideringthedocumentswhichhadmerelybeenannexedby
the State to its appellants brief and, on the basis of which,
justifiedthereversalofthetrialcourtsdecision.Nothavingbeen
presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere
scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value, 12so it was
argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence,thecourtshallconsidernoevidencewhichhasnotbeen
formallyoffered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule
14313oftheRulesofCourtwhichprovidesthat
These rules shallnotapply to land registration, cadastral and
election cases,naturalizationand insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for,except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient.(Emphasisadded)
Prescindingfromtheabove,theruleonformalofferofevidence
(Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not
applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization.Theonlyinstancewhensaidrulesmaybeapplied
byanalogyorsuppletorilyinsuchcasesiswhenitispracticable
andconvenient.Thatisnotthecasehere,sincerelianceuponthe
documentspresentedbytheStateforthefirsttimeonappeal,in
fact,appearstobethemorepractical
________________
Petition,p.21;Id.,p.29.
12
Now found under Rule 1, 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
13
Procedure.
757
VOL.328,MARCH27,2000
OngChiavs.Republic
and convenient course of action considering that decisions in
naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule onres
judicata.14Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not
precludetheStatefromlateronmovingforarevocationofthe
grantofnaturalizationonthebasisofthesamedocuments.
PetitionerclaimsthatasaresultofthefailureoftheStateto
present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the
trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity,effectivelydeprivinghimofhisfundamentalrightto
procedural due process.15We are not persuaded. Indeed, the
reasonfortheruleprohibitingtheadmissionofevidencewhich
hasnotbeenformallyofferedistoaffordtheoppositepartythe
chance toobject to theiradmissibility.16Petitioner cannot claim
thathewasdeprivedoftherighttoobjecttotheauthenticityof
thedocumentssubmittedtotheappellatecourtbytheState.He
couldhaveincludedhisobjections,ashe,infact,did,inthebrief
hefiledwiththeCourtofAppeals,thus:
The authenticity of theallegedpetition for naturalization (SCN
CaseNo.031767)whichwassupposedlyfiledbyOngChiaunder
LOI270hasnotbeenestablished.Infact,thecasenumberofthe
alleged petition for naturalization . . . is031767while the case
number of the petition actually filed by the appellee
is031776.Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should
notbeconsideredbytheHonorableCourtinresolvingtheinstant
appeal.17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is
trivial,and,atmost,canbeaccountedforasatypographicalerror
onthepartofpetitionerhimself.ThatSCNCaseNo.031767,a
copyofwhichwasannexedtothepetition,isthe
___________________
757
14
Republicv.Guy,115SCRA244(1982).
15
Petition,p.17;Rollo,p.25.
16
SeePeninsula Construction, Inc. v. Eisma,194 SCRA
667(1991).
17
AppelleesBrief,p.13;CARollo;p.184.
758
758 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
OngChiavs.Republic
correctcasenumberisconfirmedbytheEvaluationSheet 18ofthe
SpecialCommitteeonNaturalizationwhichwasalsodocketedas
SCN Case No. 031767. Other than this, petitioner offered no
evidencetodisprovetheauthenticityofthedocumentspresented
bytheState.
 Furthermore,theCourtnotesthatthesedocumentsnamely,
the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioners marriage
contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioners income tax returnsare all public documents. As
such,theyhavebeenexecutedunderoath.Theyarethusreliable.
Sincepetitionerfailedtomakeasatisfactoryshowingofanyflaw
orirregularitythatmaycastdoubtontheauthenticityofthese
documents,itisourconclusionthattheappellatecourtdidnot
errinrelyinguponthem.
Onelastpoint.Theabovediscussionwouldhavebeenenough
todisposeofthiscase,buttosettlealltheissuesraised,weshall CA. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for
briefly discuss the effect of petitioners failure to include the
addressJ.M.BasaSt.,Iloiloinhispetition,inaccordancewith
7,CA.No.473.ThisaddressappearsonpetitionersImmigrant
Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the
records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization.
Petitioner admits thathefailed to mention said address in his
petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of
Residence containing it had been fully published, 19with the
petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes
substantial compliance with 7.20This is allegedly because the
publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be
achievedbysuchrequirement,i.e.,togiveinvestigatingagencies
ofthegovernmenttheopportunitytocheckonthebackgroundof
theapplicantandprevent
_______________
Annex C; CA Rollo, p. 133. Said evaluation sheet
18
recommendedthatthepetitionbedismissedaspetitionerfailedto
meet the requirements under LOI 491 because his income is
insufficientforhissupportandthatofhisfamilyandalsobecause
hefailedtoshowthathebelievesintheprinciplesunderlyingthe
Constitution.
IntheOfficialGazetteandintheSaranganiJournal.
19
Petition,p.22;Rollo,p.30.
20
759
VOL.328,MARCH27,2000 759
OngChiavs.Republic
suppressionofinformationregardinganypossiblemisbehavioron
hispartinanycommunitywherehemayhavelivedatonetime
or another.21It is settled, however, that naturalization laws
shouldberigidlyenforcedandstrictlyconstruedinfavorofthe
governmentand against the applicant. 22As noted by the State,
naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and
formerplacesofresidence.23Thisprovisionandtheruleofstrict
applicationofthelawinnaturalizationcasesdefeatpetitioners
argumentofsubstantialcompliancewiththerequirementunder
the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the
instantpetitionoughttobedenied.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMEDandtheinstantpetitionisherebyDENIED.
SOORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman),Quisumbing,BuenaandDeLeon,
Jr.,JJ.,concur.
Petitiondenied,judgmentaffirmed.
Notes.A former citizen who opts to reacquire Philippine
citizenshipthrunaturalizationundertheRevisedNaturalization
Lawisdutyboundtofollowtheprocedureprescribedbysaidlaw,
and it is not for him to decide and to select the requirements
which he believes are applicable to his case and discard those
whichhebelievesareinconvenientormerelyofnuisancevalue.
(Republicvs.DelaRosa,232SCRA785[1994])
 An applicant for naturalization may only take his oath of
allegianceaftertheSolicitorGeneralfindsthatwithintheperiod
oftwoyearsfromthedatethedecisiongrantingciti
____________________

21
Wattv.Republic,supra.
22
Chan Chen v. Republic,109 Phil. 940(1960),citingCo
Quingv.Republic,104Phil.889(1958)andCo.v.Republic,108
Phil.265(1960). VOL.253,FEBRUARY20,1996 699
23
Comment,p.23;Rollo,p.110. Zuluetavs.CourtofAppeals
760 G.R.No.107383.February20,1996.*
760 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and
Peoplevs.Mamalias ALFREDOMARTIN,respondents.
zenship is promulgated, the applicant has complied with the Evidence;Illegally Obtained Evidence;Constitutional
conditionssetoutinSection2ofRepublicActNo.530.(Hermovs.
Law;Privacy of Communication and Correspondence;Privacy of
DelaRosa,299SCRA68[1998])
communication and correspondence is inviolable. The only
exceptionintheConstitutionisifthereisalawfulorder[froma]
o0o
court or when public safety or order requires, otherwise, as
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights prescribed by law.Indeed the documents and papers in
reserved. question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutionalprovisionistobeenforced.Theonlyexceptionto
theprohibitionin
_______________

*
SECONDDIVISION.
700
7 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
00
Zuluetavs.CourtofAppeals
theConstitutionisifthereisalawfulorder[froma]court
orwhenpublicsafetyororderrequiresotherwise,asprescribed
by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtainedinadmissibleforanypurposeinanyproceeding.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Apersonbycontractingmarriage
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
himortoher.Theintimaciesbetweenhusbandandwifedonot
justifyanyoneoftheminbreakingthedrawersandcabinetsof
the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shedhis/herintegrityorhisrighttoprivacyasanindividualand
theconstitutionalprotectioniseveravailabletohimortoher.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Thelawinsuresabsolutefreedom
ofcommunicationbetweenthespousesbymakingitprivileged.
Thelawinsuresabsolutefreedomofcommunicationbetweenthe
spousesbymakingitprivileged.Neitherhusbandnorwifemay
testifyfororagainsttheotherwithouttheconsentoftheaffected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication
receivedinconfidencebyonefromtheotherduringthemarriage,
save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
sharewhatoneknowswiththeother.Andthishasnothingtodo
withthedutyoffidelitythateachowestotheother.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
LeonidesS.Respicio&AssociatesLawOfficeforpetitioner.
GalileoP.Brionforprivaterespondent.
MENDOZA,J.:
ThisisapetitiontoreviewthedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(BranchX)whichorderedpetitionertoreturndocu
701
VOL.253,FEBRUARY20,1996 701
Zuluetavs.CourtofAppeals
mentsandpaperstakenbyherfromprivaterespondentsclinic
withoutthelattersknowledgeandconsent.
Thefactsareasfollows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent
AlfredoMartin.OnMarch26,1982,petitionerenteredtheclinic
ofherhusband,adoctorofmedicine,andinthepresenceofher
mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly
openedthedrawersandcabinetinherhusbandsclinicandtook
157documentsconsistingofprivatecorrespondencebetweenDr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The
documentsandpaperswereseizedforuseinevidenceinacase
forlegalseparationandfordisqualificationfromthepracticeof
medicinewhichpetitionerhadfiledagainstherhusband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the
documentsandpapersandfordamagesagainstpetitioner.The
casewasfiledwiththeRegionalTrialCourtofManila,BranchX,
which,aftertrial,renderedjudgmentforprivaterespondent,Dr.
AlfredoMartin,declaringhimthecapital/exclusiveownerofthe
properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or
thosefurther describedinthe MotiontoReturn and Suppress
andorderingCeciliaZuluetaandanypersonactinginherbehalf
to immediately return theproperties toDr. Martin and to pay
him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral
damagesandattorneysfees;andtopaythecostsofthesuit.The
writofpreliminaryinjunctionearlierissuedwasmadefinaland
petitionerCeciliaZuluetaandherattorneysandrepresentatives
wereenjoinedfromusingorsubmitting/admittingasevidence
thedocumentsandpapersinquestion.Onappeal,theCourtof
AppealsaffirmedthedecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourt.Hence
thispetition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in
question belong to privaterespondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and
thattheyweretakenbyhiswife,thehereinpetitioner,without
his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court
declaredthedocumentsandpaperstobepropertiesof
702
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Zuluetavs.CourtofAppeals
privaterespondent,orderedpetitionertoreturnthemtoprivate
respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In
appealingfromthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsaffirmingthe
trialcourtsdecision,petitionersonlygroundisthatinAlfredo
Martinv.AlfonsoFelix,Jr., 1thisCourtruledthatthedocuments
and papers (marked as Annexes A1 to J7 of respondents
commentinthatcase)wereadmissibleinevidenceand,therefore,
their use by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not
constitutemalpracticeorgrossmisconduct.Forthisreasonitis
contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private
respondentscomplaint.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty.
Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things, private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case,
chargedthatinusingthedocumentsinevidence,Atty.Felix,Jr.
committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the
injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint
against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following
defenseofAtty.Felix,Jr.whichitfoundtobeimpressedwith
merit:2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent
[AlfonsoFelix,Jr.],hemaintainsthat:
....
4.WhenrespondentrefiledCeciliascaseforlegalseparation
beforethePasigRegionalTrialCourt,therewasadmittedlyan
orderoftheManilaRegionalTrialCourtprohibitingCeciliafrom
usingthedocumentsAnnexA1toJ7.OnSeptember6,1983,
however having appealed the said order to this Court on a
petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on
702 aforesaiddatewhichordertemporarilysetasidetheorderofthe
trialcourt.Hence,duringtheenforceabilityofthisCourtsorder,
respondentsrequestforpetitionertoadmitthegenuinenessand
authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as
malpractice.Notably,petitioner
_______________
1
163SCRA111(1988).
2
Id.at120121,126.
703
VOL.253,FEBRUARY20,1996 703
Zuluetavs.CourtofAppeals
Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the
questioned annexes. At that point in time, would it have been
malpractice for respondent to use petitioners admission as
evidenceagainsthiminthelegalseparationcasependinginthe
Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not
malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his
counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath. Such verified
admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in
evidenceagainsthim.Petitionerbecameboundbyhisadmission.
ForCeciliatoavailherselfofherhusbandsadmissionanduse
thesameinheractionforlegalseparationcannotbetreatedas
malpractice.
Thus,theacquittalofAtty.Felix,Jr.intheadministrativecase
amounts to no more than a declaration that his use of the
documents andpapers for thepurposeof securing Dr.Martins
admission as to their genuineness and authenticity did not
constituteaviolationoftheinjunctiveorderofthetrialcourt.By
no means does the decision in that case establish the
admissibilityofthedocumentsandpapersinquestion.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was
acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary
injunctionissuedbythetrialcourt,itwasonlybecause,atthe
timeheusedthedocumentsandpapers,enforcementoftheorder
ofthetrialcourtwastemporarilyrestrainedbythisCourt.The
TROissuedbythisCourtwaseventuallyliftedasthepetitionfor
certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial courts order was
dismissedand,therefore,theprohibitionagainstthefurtheruse
ofthedocumentsandpapersbecameeffectiveagain.
Indeedthedocumentsandpapersinquestionareinadmissible
inevidence.Theconstitutionalinjunctiondeclaringtheprivacy
of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable 3is no
lessapplicablesimplybecauseitisthewife(whothinksherself
aggrieved byherhusbandsinfidelity)who is thepartyagainst
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is ifthere isa
lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requiresotherwise,asprescribedbylaw. 4Anyviolationofthis
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purposeinanyproceeding.5
Theintimaciesbetweenhusbandandwifedonotjustifyany
oneoftheminbreakingthedrawersandcabinetsoftheotherand
inransackingthemforanytelltaleevidenceofmaritalinfidelity.
Aperson,bycontractingmarriage,doesnotshedhis/herintegrity
or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protectioniseveravailabletohimortoher.
Thelawinsuresabsolutefreedomofcommunicationbetween
the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify foror againsttheotherwithouttheconsentofthe
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other
duringthemarriage,saveforspecifiedexceptions. 7Butonething
isfreedomofcommunication;quiteanotherisacompulsionfor
eachonetosharewhatoneknowswiththeother.Andthishas
nothingtodowiththedutyoffidelitythateachowestotheother.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionforreviewisDENIEDforlackof
merit.
SOORDERED.
Regalado(Chairman),RomeroandPuno,JJ.,concur.
Petitiondenied.
504 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Yatar
G.R.No.150224.May19,2004.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,vs.JOEL YATAR
aliasKAWIT,appellant.
Criminal Law;Witnesses;The Supreme Court will not
interferewiththejudgmentofthetrialcourtindeterminingthe
credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlookedorthesignificanceofwhichhasbeenmisinterpreted.
Theissueregardingthecredibilityoftheprosecutionwitnesses
shouldberesolvedagainstappellant.ThisCourtwillnotinterfere
withthejudgmentofthetrialcourtindeterminingthecredibility
of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstanceofweightandinfluencewhichhasbeenoverlooked
or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. Well
entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal
unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a
reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason
beingthattheformerisinabetteranduniquepositionofhearing
firsthandthewitnessesandobservingtheirdeportment,conduct
andattitude.Absentanyshowingthatthetrialjudgeoverlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weightwhichwouldaffecttheresultofthecase,thetrialjudges
assessment of credibility deserves the appellate courts highest
respect.Wherethereisnothingtoshowthatthewitnessesforthe
prosecutionwereactuatedbyimpropermotive,theirtestimonies
areentitledtofullfaithandcredit.
Same;Same;Circumstantial Evidence;An accused can be
convictedevenifnoeyewitnessisavailable,solongassufficient
circumstantial evidenceispresentedto provebeyond doubtthat
theaccusedcommittedthecrime.Theweightoftheprosecutions
evidence must be appreciated in light of the wellsettled rule
which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no
eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial
evidenceispresentedbytheprosecutiontoprovebeyonddoubt
thattheaccusedcommittedthecrime.
Same;DNATesting;WordsandPhrases;DNAisamolecule
thatencodesthegeneticinformationinalllivingorganisms,anda
persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change
throughoutapersonslifetimetheDNAinapersonsbloodisthe
sameastheDNAfoundinhissaliva,sweat,bone,therootand
shaftofhair,earwax,mucus,urine,skintissue,andvaginaland
rectalcells.Significantly,subsequenttesting
_______________
ENBANC.
*
505
VOL.428,MAY19,2004 505
Peoplevs.Yatar
showedthattheDeoxyribonucleicacid(DNA)ofthesperm
specimenfromthevaginaofthevictimwasidenticalsementobe
thatofappellantsgenetype.DNAisamoleculethatencodesthe
geneticinformationinalllivingorganisms.ApersonsDNAisthe
sameineachcellanditdoesnotchangethroughoutapersons
lifetime; theDNA in a persons blood isthe same as the DNA
found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair,
earwax,mucus,urine,skintissue,andvaginalandrectalcells.
Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic
structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the
notableexceptionofidenticaltwins.
Same;Same;DNA print or identification technology has
beenadvancedasauniquelyeffectivemeanstolinkasuspecttoa
crime,ortoexonerateawronglyaccusedsuspect,wherebiological
evidence has been left.DNA print or identification technology
hasbeenadvancedasauniquelyeffectivemeanstolinkasuspect
to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where
biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal
investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both
inculpatoryandexculpatoryevidence.Itcanassistimmenselyin
effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed,
efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the
acquittaloftheinnocent,andensuringtheproperadministration
of justice in every case. DNA evidence collected from a crime
scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
suspicioninthesameprincipleasfingerprintsareused.Incidents
involvingsexualassaultwouldleavebiologicalevidencesuchas
hair,skintissue,semen,blood,orsalivawhichcanbeleftonthe
victimsbodyoratthecrimescene.Hairandfiberfromclothing,
carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the
victims body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is
helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an
assailantandavictim.Ifproperlycollectedfromthevictim,crime
sceneorassailant,DNAcanbecomparedwithknownsamplesto
placethesuspectatthesceneofthecrime.
Same;Same;In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence,courtsshouldconsider,interalia,thefollowingfactors
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibilityofcontaminationofthesamples,theprocedurefollowed
in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualificationoftheanalystwhoconductedthetests;Admittedly,
wearejustbeginningtointegratetheseadvancesinscienceand
technologyinthePhilippinecriminaljusticesystem,sowemustbe
cautiousaswetraversetheserelativelyunchartedwatersthough
wecanbenefitfromthewealthofpersuasivejurisprudencethat
hasdevelopedinotherjurisdictions.TheU.P.NationalScience
ResearchInstitute(NSRI),whichconductedtheDNAtestsinthis
case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification
method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR
testing,
506
5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
06
Peoplevs.Yatar
tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied
exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for
analysis has become much easier since it became possible to
reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method. In
assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider,interalia,thefollowingfactors:howthesampleswere
collected,howtheywerehandled,thepossibilityofcontamination
ofthesamples,theprocedurefollowedinanalyzingthesamples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests. In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon
AbogadodeUngriawasdulyqualifiedbytheprosecutionasan
expertwitnessonDNAprintoridentificationtechniques.Based
on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene
type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the
extractssubjectofexamination.Thebloodsampletakenfromthe
appellantshowedthathewasofthefollowinggenetypes:vWA
15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are
identical with semen taken from the victims vaginal canal.
Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the
victimandthebloodsamplegivenbytheappellantinopencourt
duringthecourseofthetrial.Admittedly,wearejustbeginning
to integrate these advances in science and technology in the
Philippinecriminaljusticesystem,sowemustbecautiousaswe
traversetheserelativelyunchartedwaters.Fortunately,wecan
benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has
developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing
doctrineintheU.S.hasproveninstructive.
 Same;Same;Evidence;Evidence is relevant when it relates
directlytoafactinissueastoinducebeliefinitsexistenceornon
existence.InDaubertv.MerrellDow,itwasruledthatpertinent
evidencebasedonscientificallyvalidprinciplescouldbeusedas
longasitwasrelevantandreliable.Judges,underDaubert,were
allowedgreaterdiscretionoverwhichtestimonytheywouldallow
at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific
techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure. Under
Philippinelaw,evidenceisrelevantwhenitrelatesdirectlytoa
factinissueastoinducebeliefinitsexistenceornonexistence.
ApplyingtheDauberttesttothecaseatbar,theDNAevidence
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and
whichwasappreciatedbythecourtaquoisrelevantandreliable
since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of
humangeneticsandmolecularbiology.
Same;Same;Same;SelfIncrimination;The right against
selfincriminationissimplyagainstthelegalprocessofextracting
from the lips of the accused an admission of guiltit does not
apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.In an attempt to
excludetheDNAevidence,theappellantcontendsthattheblood
sampletakenfromhimaswellastheDNAtestswereconducted
inviolationofhisrighttoremainsilentaswellashisright
507
VOL.428,MAY19,2004
Peoplevs.Yatar
againstselfincriminationunderSecs.12and17ofArt.IIIof
theConstitution.Thiscontentionisuntenable.Thekernelofthe
right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.Therightagainstselfincriminationissimplyagainst
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an
admissionofguilt.Itdoesnotapplywheretheevidencesoughtto
beexcludedisnotanincriminationbutaspartofobjectevidence.
Same;Same;Same;Ex Post Facto Laws;No expost facto
lawisinvolvedinDNAtestingsincethescienceofDNAtyping
involvestheadmissibility,relevanceandreliabilityoftheevidence
obtainedundertheRulesofCourtwhereasanexpostfactolaw
refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a
factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence
presented.Appellant further argues that the DNA tests
conductedbytheprosecutionagainsthimareunconstitutionalon
thegroundthatresorttheretoistantamounttotheapplicationof
anexpost factolaw. This argument is specious. Noexpost
factolawisinvolvedinthecaseatbar.ThescienceofDNAtyping
involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the
evidenceobtainedundertheRulesofCourt.Whereasanexpost
factolaw refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling
requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the
evidencepresented.
Same;Same;Same;WordsandPhrases;Thelegalrelevancy
ofevidencedenotessomethingmorethanaminimumofprobative
value,suggestingthatsuchevidentiaryrelevancemustcontaina
plus valueevidence without plus value may be logically
relevant but not legally sufficient to convict.Generally, courts
507 shouldonlyconsiderandrelyupondulyestablishedevidenceand
neveronmereconjecturesorsuppositions.Thelegalrelevancyof
evidencedenotessomethingmorethanaminimumofprobative
value,suggestingthatsuchevidentiaryrelevancemustcontaina
plusvalue. Thismay be necessary toprecludethetrial court
frombeingsatisfiedbymattersofslightvalue,capableofbeing
exaggeratedbyprejudiceandhastyconclusions.Evidencewithout
plusvaluemaybelogicallyrelevantbutnotlegallysufficientto
convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the
probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that
wouldresultfromitsadmission.Thejudgmentinacriminalcase
canbeupheldonlywhenthereisrelevantevidencefromwhich
the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty
beyondreasonabledoubt.Proofbeyondreasonabledoubtrequires
moral certainty of guilt in order to sustaina conviction. Moral
certaintyisthatdegreeofcertaintythatconvincesanddirectsthe
understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty
beyondreasonable doubt.Thisrequires thatthe circumstances,
taken together, shouldbeof a conclusive nature and tendency;
leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the
accused,andno
508
5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
08
Peoplevs.Yatar
one else, committed the offense charged. In view of the
totalityofevidenceappreciatedthusfar,werulethatthepresent
casepassesthetestofmoralcertainty.
Same;Same;Same;Presumption of Innocence;Motive;As a
matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the
requirementofproofbeyondreasonabledoubt,motiveisessential
forconvictionwhenthereisdoubtastotheidentityoftheculprit.
Asamatterofprocedure,andforthepurposeofmeetingthe
requirementofproofbeyondreasonabledoubt,motiveisessential
forconvictionwhenthereisdoubtastotheidentityoftheculprit.
Thus,appellantsmotivetosexuallyassaultandkillthevictim
wasevidentintheinstantcase.Itisaruleincriminallawthat
motive,beingastateofmind,isestablishedbythetestimonyof
witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or
immediatelyafterthecommissionoftheoffense,deedsorwords
that may express it or from which his motive or reason for
committingitmaybeinferred.
Same;RapewithHomicide;Elements.Accordingly,weare
convincedthattheappellantisguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtof
the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant
sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the
occasionthereof,inordertoconcealhislustfuldeed,permanently
sealed the victims lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby
causing her untimely demise. The following are the elements
constitutiveofrapewithhomicide:(1)theappellanthadcarnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was
achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by
reasonorontheoccasionofsuchcarnalknowledgebymeansof
force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman.
However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the victims
father, stepfather, uncle, or the commonlaw spouse of her
mother, it isnotnecessary thatactual forceorintimidationbe
employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation. The fact that the victims hymen is
intactdoesnotnegateafindingthatrapewascommittedasmere
entrybythepenisintothelipsofthefemalegenitalorgan,even
withoutruptureorlacerationofthehymen,sufficesforconviction
ofrape.Thestrengthanddilatabilityofthehymenareinvariable;
it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during
intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove
sexualabuseespeciallywhenthevictimisoftenderage.
AUTOMATICREVIEWofadecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourt
ofBulanao,Tabuk,Kalinga,Br.25.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
 TheSolicitorGeneralforappellee.
509
VOL.428,MAY19,2004
Peoplevs.Yatar
PublicAttorneysOfficeforappellant.
PERCURIAM:
OnautomaticreviewisaDecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtof
Bulanao,Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch25,sentencing appellantJoel
Yatar alias Kawit toDeathfor the special complex crime of
Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the
victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of
P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00,
exemplarydamagesintheamountofP50,000.00,actualdamages
in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to
P511,410.00,andcostsoflitigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the
followingInformation:
ThatonorabouttheafternoonofJune30,1998atLiwanWest,
Rizal, Kalinga, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,theaccused,inordertohavecarnalknowledgeofacertain
KATHYLYND.UBA,didthenandtherewilfully,unlawfully,and
feloniously, and with use of a bladed weapon stab the latter
inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the
victim,andontheoccasionorbyreasonthereof,accused,wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force and violence
hadcarnalknowledgeofsaidKathlynD.Ubaagainstherwill.
CONTRARYTOLAW.2
Thefactsare:
OnJune30,1998,at8:30a.m.,JudilynPasaandherfirst
cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground
floorofthehouseoftheirgrandmother,IsabelDawang,inLiwan
West,Rizal,Kalinga.Theyweretalkingaboutthelettersentby
509 their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar,
throughKathylynsfriend,CecilCasingan.Kathylynhandedthe
lettertoappellantearlierthatmorning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband,
togetherwithIsabelDawang,leftfortheirfarminNagbitayan
sometwo
_______________
1
Decision penned by Judge Milnar T. Lammawin on 27
August2001.
2
OriginalRecords,p.1.
3
TSN, Direct Examination of Isabel Dawang, 30 September
1998,pp.296306.
510
510 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Yatar
kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed,
KathylyntoldJudilynthatsheintendedtogotoTuguegarao,but
intheeventshewouldnotbeabletoleave,shewouldjuststay
homeandwashherclothesorgotothehouseoftheiraunt,Anita
Wania.Kathylynwasleftaloneinthehouse. 4
Later,at10:00a.m.,AnitaWaniaandfifteenyearoldBeverly
DenengstoppedbythehouseofIsabel.Theysawappellantatthe
backofthehouse.Theywentinsidethehousethroughtheback
door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked
appellantwhathewasdoingthere,andherepliedthathewas
gettinglumbertobringtothehouseofhismother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from
Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder from the
secondfloorofthehouseofIsabelDawangandruntowardsthe
backofthehouse.6Shelaternoticedappellant,whowaswearing
awhiteshirtwithcollarandblackpants,pacingbackandforthat
thebackofthehouse.Shedidnotfindthisunusualasappellant
andhiswifeusedtoliveinthehouseofIsabelDawang.7
At1:30p.m.,Judilynagainsawappellantwhenhecalledher
nearherhouse.Thistime,hewaswearingablackshirtwithout
collar andbluepants. Appellanttold herthathewould not be
gettingthelumberhehadstacked,andthatIsabelcoulduseit.
She noticed that appellants eyes were reddish and sharp.
Appellantaskedherwhereherhusbandwasashehadsomething
important to tell him. Judilyns husband then arrived and
appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the
houseofIsabel.8
Intheeveningofthesameday,IsabelDawangarrivedhome
andfoundthatthelightsinherhousewereoff.Shecalledoutfor
hergranddaughter,KathylynUba.Thedoortothegroundfloor
was open. She noticed that the water container she asked
Kathylyntofillupearlierthatdaywasstillempty.Shewentup
theladder
_______________
4
Id.,atpp.317319.
5
TSN, Direct Examination of Beverly Deneng, 27 January
1999,pp.531540,568576.SeealsoExhibitW,JointAffidavit
of Anita Wania and Beverly Deneng executed on 3 July 1998,
OriginalRecords,p.17.
6
TSN, CrossExamination of Judilyn Pasa, 30 September
1998,p.377.
7
Id., at pp. 275324.See alsoTSN,supranote 7 at pp. 356
358.
8
Id.,atpp.314323,339344.
511
VOL.428,MAY19,2004
Peoplevs.Yatar
tothesecondfloorofthehousetoseeifKathylynwasupstairs.
Shefoundthatthedoorwastiedwitharope,soshewentdownto
getaknife.Whileshegropedinthedark,shefeltalifelessbody
thatwascoldandrigid.9
Isabelmovedherhandthroughouttheentirebody.Shefound
outthatitwasthenakedbodyofhergranddaughter,Kathylyn.
Shecalledforhelp.Judilynandherhusbandarrived.Isabelwas
given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw
Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines
protrudingoutofherstomach.Meanwhile,neighborshadarrived
toofferassistance.AdaughterofIsabel,Cion,calledthepolice. 10
At9:00thatevening,SPO4MelchorFaniswareceivedareport
thatadeadwomanwasfoundinIsabelDawangshouse.Together
withfellowpoliceofficers,Faniswawenttothehouseandfound
thenakedbodyofKathylynUbawithmultiplestabwounds.The
peopleinthevicinityinformedthepoliceofficersthatappellant
wasseengoingdowntheladderofthehouseofIsabelDawangat
approximately12:30p.m.
The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denim
pants,bagandsandalsbesidehernakedcadaveratthesceneof
the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with
bloodwithin50metersfromthehouseofIsabel.
Whenquestionedbythepolice authorities, appellant denied
any knowledge of Kathylyns death,11however, he was placed
underpolicecustody.
OnJuly3,1998,appellantaskedthepoliceofficersifhecould
relievehimself.PoliceOfficerCesarAbaganaccompaniedhimto
the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police
station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano
dialect,Nagtaray!(Hesrunningaway!).PoliceOfficerOrlando
511 Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw
appellantrunningaway.Appellantwasapproximately70meters THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
awayfromthesta ACQUITTINGTHEACCUSEDAPPELLANTOFTHESERIOUS
_______________ CRIMECHARGEDDUETOREASONABLEDOUBT.
Appellantscontentionsareunmeritorious.
9
Id.,atpp.267270. The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution
10
Id.,atpp.271273. witnessesshouldberesolvedagainstappellant.ThisCourtwill
11
TSN, Direct Examination of SPO4 Melchor Faniswa, 9 notinterferewiththejudgmentofthetrialcourtindetermining
the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record
September 1998, pp. 920.See alsoTSN, CrossExamination of
somefactorcircumstanceofweightandinfluencewhichhasbeen
SPO4MelchorFaniswa,9September1998,pp.2138.
overlooked or the significance of which has been
512
misinterpreted.13Wellentrenchedistherulethatthefindingsof
512 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
Peoplevs.Yatar weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented
tion when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him. 12He was necessitatingareexaminationifnotthedisturbanceofthesame;
charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on the reason being that the former is in a better and unique
July21,1998,appellantpleadednotguilty. positionofhearingfirsthandthewitnesses
Aftertrial,appellantwasconvictedofthecrimeofRapewith _______________
Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 266A of the
RevisedPenalCode,asamendedbyR.A.8353,otherwiseknown
12
TSN, CrossExamination and ReDirect Examination of
as the AntiRape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced PoliceOfficerOrlandoManuel,9September1998,pp.7684.See
toDeath. alsoTSN,DirectandCrossExaminationofSPO1FelixTuringan,
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the 9September1998,pp.8896.
RevisedPenalCode,asamended.InhisBrief,appellantassigns 13
People v. Remudo,G.R. No. 127905, 30 August 2001,364
thefollowingerrors: SCRA71.
I 513
VOL.428,MAY19,2004 513
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH
Peoplevs.Yatar
WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.14Absent
PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR
any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
DOUBTFULNESS.
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would
II affect the result of the case, the trial judges assessment of
credibilitydeservestheappellatecourtshighestrespect. 15Where
thereisnothingtoshowthatthewitnessesfortheprosecution
wereactuatedbyimpropermotive,theirtestimoniesareentitled
tofullfaithandcredit.16
Theweightoftheprosecutionsevidencemustbeappreciated
inlightofthewellsettledrulewhichprovidesthatanaccused
can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as
sufficientcircumstantialevidenceispresentedbytheprosecution
toprovebeyonddoubtthattheaccusedcommittedthecrime. 17
Referencetotherecordswillshowthatatotalofeleven(11)
wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised, were found on the
victims abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small
intestines to spill outof her body.18Rigor mortisofthe victims
bodywascompletewhenDr.Bartoloexaminedthevictimat9:00
a.m.onJuly1,1998.Accordingtohim,thetimeofdeathmaybe
approximatedfrombetweennine(9)totwelve(12)hourspriorto
the completion ofrigor mortis.19In other words, the estimated
timeofdeathwassometimebetween9:00a.m.to12:00p.m.on
June30,1998.Thiswaswithinthetimeframewithinwhichthe
lonepresenceofappellantlurkinginthehouseofIsabelDawang
wastestifiedtobywitnesses.
Itshouldalsobenotedthat,althoughthePostmortemReport
by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates
thatnohymenallacerations,contusionsorhematomawerenoted
onthe
_______________
14
Peoplev.Santos,G.R.No.137993,11April2002,380SCRA
608,613.
15
Id.
16
People v. Payot,G.R. No. 119352, 8 June 1999,308 SCRA
43,6263.
17
People v. Cabug,G.R. No. 123149, 27 March 2001,355
SCRA391.
18
SeeTSN,DirectExaminationofDr.PejEvanC.Bartolo,16
September1998,pp.106157.
19
TSN, Direct Examination of Dr. Rey Evan C. Bartolo, 16
September1998,pp.116118.
514
514 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Yatar
victim,20Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the
vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo
statedthattheintroductionofsemenintothevaginalcanalcould
only be done through sexual intercourse with the victim. 21In
addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by the
prosecutionthatthesexualviolationofthevictimwasmanifested
by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating
resistancetotheappellantsassaultonhervirtue.22
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the
vaginaofthevictimwasidenticalsementobethatofappellants
genetype.
DNAisamoleculethatencodesthegeneticinformationinall
livingorganisms.23ApersonsDNAisthesameineachcellandit
does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a
personsbloodisthesameastheDNAfoundinhissaliva,sweat,
bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin
tissue,andvaginalandrectalcells. 24Mostimportantly,becauseof
polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals
have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical
twins.25
DNAprintoridentificationtechnologyhasbeenadvancedasa
uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to
exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence
has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA
identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and
exculpatoryevidence.Itcanassistimmenselyineffectingamore
accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating
theconvictionoftheguilty,securingtheacquittaloftheinnocent,
andensuringtheproperadministrationofjusticeineverycase.
DNAevidencecollectedfromacrimescenecanlinkasuspect
toacrimeoreliminateonefromsuspicioninthesameprinciple
as
_______________
20
SeeTSN,DirectExaminationofDr.PejEvanC.Bartolo,16
September1998,pp.266304.
21
Id.,atpp.266304.
22
SeeExhibitsF1,G,H,OriginalRecords,pp.6A6C. analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
23
Peter Sudbery,Human Molecular Genetics(2nd ed. 2002);
19992000PocketPart,p.51.
24
K.M.Turman,UnderstandingDNAEvidence:AGuidefor
Victim Service Providers, OVC Bulletin (U.S. Department of
Justice,April2001),p.1.
25
84ALR4th313.
515
VOL.428,MAY19,2004
Peoplevs.Yatar
fingerprintsareused.26Incidentsinvolvingsexualassaultwould
leavebiologicalevidencesuchashair,skintissue,semen,blood,
orsalivawhichcanbeleftonthevictimsbodyoratthecrime
scene.Hairandfiberfromclothing,carpets,bedding,orfurniture
could also be transferred to the victims body during the
assault.27ForensicDNAevidenceishelpfulinprovingthatthere
was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If
properlycollectedfromthevictim,crimesceneorassailant,DNA
canbecomparedwithknownsamplestoplacethesuspectatthe
sceneofthecrime.28
TheU.P.NationalScienceResearchInstitute(NSRI),which
conductedtheDNAtestsinthiscase,usedthePolymerasechain
reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat
(STR)analysis.WithPCRtesting,tinyamountsofaspecificDNA
sequencecanbecopiedexponentiallywithinhours.Thus,getting
sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it
becamepossibletoreliablyamplifysmallsamplesusingthePCR
method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts
shouldconsider,interalia,thefollowingfactors:howthesamples
were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualificationoftheanalystwhoconductedthetests. 29
Inthecaseatbar,Dr.MariaCorazonAbogadodeUngriawas
dulyqualifiedbytheprosecutionasanexpertwitnessonDNA
print or identification techniques.30Based on Dr. de Ungrias
testi
_______________
515 26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.,atpp.12.
29
Peoplev.Vallejo,G.R.No.144656,9May2002,382SCRA
192,209.
30
Dr. de Ungria is Head of the Genetic Engineering
Laboratory,UniversityofthePhilippines,AssistantSupervisorof
theDNAAnalysisLaboratory,UniversityofthePhilippines,and
Assistant Professor at the Ateneo de Manila University. In
December 1999, Dr. de Ungria was a 1999 Jose Rizal Young
AwardeefortheProfessionalSectorforherparticipationinthe
identification of the body of a victim of the Paco fire. She
commenced working as Assistant Supervisor of the U.P. DNA
Laboratory
516
516 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Yatar
mony,itwasdeterminedthatthegenetypeandDNAprofileof
appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of
examination.31Thebloodsampletakenfromtheappellantshowed
thathewasofthefollowinggenetypes:vWA15/19,TH017/8,
DHFRP29/10andCSF1PO10/11,whichareidenticalwithsemen
taken from the victims vaginal canal. 32Verily, a DNA match
exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood
samplegivenbytheappellantinopencourtduringthecourseof
thetrial.
Admittedly,wearejustbeginningtointegratetheseadvances
in science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice
system,sowemustbecautiousaswetraversetheserelatively
unchartedwaters.Fortunately,wecanbenefitfromthewealthof
persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other
jurisdictions.Specifically,theprevailingdoctrineintheU.S.has
proveninstructive.
InDaubert v. Merrell Dow,33it was ruled that pertinent
evidencebasedonscientificallyvalidprinciplescouldbeusedas
longasitwasrelevantandreliable.Judges,underDaubert,were
allowedgreaterdiscretionoverwhichtestimonytheywouldallow
at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific
techniques.DNAtypingisonesuchnovelprocedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates
directlytoafactinissueastoinducebeliefinitsexistenceor
nonexistence.34ApplyingtheDauberttesttothecaseatbar,the
DNAevidenceobtainedthroughPCRtestingandutilizingSTR
analysis, and which was appreciated by the courta quois
relevantandreli
_______________
in February 1999 after returning from Sydney, Australia.
Prior to February 1999, she worked as a DNA Analyst. An
alumna of the Philippine Science High School, Dr. de Ungria
obtained a Bachelor of Science (Honours) degree in Biology at
Macquarie University, and a Doctor of Philosophy degree in
MolecularMicrobiologyattheUniversityofNewSouthWales,in
Australia. She is a member of the Philippine Society of
MicrobiologyandanassociatememberoftheNationalResearch
Council of the Philippines.SeeTSN, Direct Examination of Dr.
Ma.CorazonAbogadodeUngria,18February2000,pp.739743.
31
TSN,18February2000,pp.789790.SeeExhibitsXXand
YY1, Original Records, p. 144, 149150.See alsoTSN,
Continuation of Direct Examination of Dr. de Ungria, 18 April
2000,p.842.
32
TSN,18April2000,p.842.SeealsoExhibitsZ,ZZand
ZZ1,OriginalRecords,pp.152154.
33
509U.S.579(1993);125L.Ed.2d469.
34
RulesofCourt,Rule128,sec.4.
517
VOL.428,MAY19,2004 517
Peoplevs.Yatar
ablesinceitisreasonablybasedonscientificallyvalidprinciples
ofhumangeneticsandmolecularbiology.
 Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen
foundinthevictimsvaginalcanal,thetrialcourtappreciatedthe
followingcircumstantialevidenceasbeingsufficienttosustaina
conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife
were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the
victim,KathylynUba;(2)InJune1998,appellantswifeleftthe
housebecauseoftheirfrequentquarrels;(3)Appellantreceived
fromthevictim,KathylynUba,aletterfromhisestrangedwifein
the earlymorningof June30,1998; (4)Appellantwasseenby
ApoloniaWaniaandBeverlyDennengat1:00p.m.ofJune30,
1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting
strangelyandwearingadirtywhiteshirtwithcollar;(5)Judilyn
PasasawappellantgoingdowntheladderofthehouseofIsabel
at12:30p.m.,wearingadirtywhiteshirt,andagainat1:30p.m.,
thistimewearingablackshirt;(6)Appellanthurriedlyleftwhen
the husband of Judilyn Pasa was approaching; (7) Salmalina
Tandagansawappellantinadirtywhiteshirtcomingdownthe
ladderofthehouseofIsabelonthedayKathylynUbawasfound
dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of
IsabelDawangwastiedbyarope;(9)Thevictim,KathylynUba,
laynakedinapoolofbloodwithherintestinesprotrudingfrom
herbodyonthesecondfloorofthehouseofIsabelDawang,with
herstainedpants,bra,underwearandshoesscatteredalongthe
periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the
victimsvagina(ExhibitsHandJ);(11)Thestainedordirty
whiteshirtfoundinthecrimescenewasfoundtobepositivewith
blood;(12)DNAofslide,ExhibitsJandH,comparedwiththe
DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant
escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently
apprehended,suchflightbeingindicativeofguilt.35
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a
conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair
andreasonableconclusionthat the accused, totheexclusionof
others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether
thereissufficientcircumstantialevidence,threerequisitesmust
concur:(1)thereismorethanonecircumstance;(2)factsonwhich
theinferencesarederivedareproven;and(3)thecombinationof
allthecircum
_______________
Decision,pp.4648.SeeRollo,pp.300302.
35
518
518 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Yatar
stances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.36
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant
contends that the blood sampletaken from him as well as the
DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain
silentaswellashisrightagainstselfincriminationunderSecs.
12and17ofArt.IIIoftheConstitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of theright is not
againstallcompulsion,butagainsttestimonialcompulsion. 37The
rightagainstselfincriminationissimplyagainstthelegalprocess
ofextractingfromthelipsoftheaccusedanadmissionofguilt.It
doesnotapplywheretheevidencesoughttobeexcludedisnotan
incriminationbutaspartofobjectevidence.
We ruled inPeople v.Rondero38that although accused
appellantinsistedthathairsampleswereforciblytakenfromhim
and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for
forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in
evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonialcompulsionoranyevidencecommunicativeinnature
acquiredfromtheaccusedunderduress.
 Hence,apersonmaybecompelledtosubmittofingerprinting,
photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no
testimonial compulsion involved. UnderPeople
v.Gallarde,39where immediately after the incident, the police
authoritiestookpicturesoftheaccusedwithoutthepresenceof
counsel,weruledthattherewasnoviolationoftherightagainst
selfincrimination.Theaccusedmaybecompelledtosubmittoa
physicalexaminationtodeterminehisinvolvementinanoffense
ofwhichheisaccused.
It must also benoted that appellantin thiscase submitted
himselfforbloodsamplingwhichwasconductedinopencourton
March30,2000,inthepresenceofcounsel.
AppellantfurtherarguesthattheDNAtestsconductedbythe
prosecutionagainsthimareunconstitutionalonthegroundthat
resort thereto is tantamount to the application of anexpost
factolaw.
_______________
36
RulesofCourt,Rule133,sec.4.
37
Alih v. Castro,G.R. No. 69401, 23 June 1987,151 SCRA
279.
G.R.No.125687,9December1999,320SCRA383.
38
G.R.No.133025,27February2000,325SCRA835.
39
519
VOL.428,MAY19,2004
Peoplevs.Yatar
Thisargumentisspecious.Noexpostfactolawisinvolvedinthe
caseatbar.ThescienceofDNAtypinginvolvestheadmissibility,
relevanceandreliabilityoftheevidenceobtainedundertheRules
of Court. Whereas anexpost factolaw refers primarily to a
questionoflaw,DNAprofilingrequiresafactualdeterminationof
theprobativeweightoftheevidencepresented.
Appellants twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be
sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied shirt,
notwithstandingtheeyewitnessaccountsofhispresenceatIsabel
Dawangshouseduringthetimewhenthecrimewascommitted,
undeniablylinkhimtotheJune30,1998incident.Appellantdid
not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an
impossibilitytobeintwoplacesatthesametime,especiallyin
this case where the two places are located in the same
barangay.40He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius
fromthesceneofthecrime,andrequiresamerefiveminutewalk
toreachonehousefromtheother.Thisfactseverelyweakenshis
alibi.
Astothesecondassignmentoferror,appellantassertsthat
the courta quocommitted reversible error in convicting him of
the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on
reasonabledoubt.
Appellantsassertioncannotbesustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly
established evidence and never on mere conjectures or
suppositions.Thelegalrelevancyofevidencedenotessomething
morethanaminimumofprobativevalue,suggestingthatsuch
evidentiaryrelevancemustcontainaplusvalue. 41Thismaybe
necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by
mattersofslightvalue,capableofbeingexaggeratedbyprejudice
and hasty conclusions. Evidence without plus value may be
519 logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is
incumbentuponthetrialcourttobalancetheprobativevalueof
suchevidenceagainstthelikelyharmthatwouldresultfromits
admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when
thereisrelevantevidencefromwhichthecourtcanproperlyfind
orinferthattheaccusedisguiltybeyondreasonabledoubt.Proof
beyond
_______________ houseonJune25,1998. 48Inaddition,Judilynalsotestifiedthat
whenherauntieLuzDawangYatar,wifeofappellant,separated
40
SeePeople v. Manguera,G.R. No. 139906, 5 March from her husband, this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our
2003,398SCRA618. family.49Accord
41
IWigmoreonEvidence28,atpp.409410. _______________
520
520 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
42
R.J.Francisco,Evidence(3rdEd.,1996),p.577,citingShaw,
Peoplevs.Yatar C.J.,Commonwealth v. Webster, Benis Rep. Of the Trial,
reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to 469;Com.V.Costley,118Mass.1.
sustainaconviction.Moralcertaintyisthatdegreeofcertainty 43
Words and Phrases, Moral Certainty,
that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the citingCommonwealthv.Goodwin,80Mass.(14Gray)55,57.
reason and judgment of those who are bound to act 44
People v. Verzo,G.R. No. L22517, 26 December 1967,21
conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable SCRA1403.
doubt.42This requires that the circumstances, taken together, 45
TSN, CrossExamination of Judilyn Pasa, 30 September
should be of a conclusivenature and tendency; leading, on the 1998,pp.376380.
whole,toasatisfactoryconclusionthattheaccused,andnoone 46
Id.,atp.324.
else, committed the offense charged. 43In view of the totality of
evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case
47
Id., at p. 332.SeeExhibits Q, Q1 and Q2, Original
passesthetestofmoralcertainty. Records,pp.1314.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of
48
Id.,atp.334.
meeting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, 49
Id.,atp.333.
motiveisessentialforconvictionwhenthereisdoubtastothe 521
identityoftheculprit.44 VOL.428,MAY19,2004 521
Pertinently,itmustbenotedthatJudilynPasa,firstcousinof Peoplevs.Yatar
the victim, testified that she last saw the victim alive in the ingtoJudilyn,whowaspersonallypresentduringanargument
morningofJune30,1998atthehouseofIsabelDawang. 45She betweenherauntandtheappellant,theexactwordsutteredby
witnessedtheappellantrunningdownthestairsofIsabelshouse appellanttohiswifeintheIlocanodialectwas,Ifyouleaveme,I
andproceedingtothebackofthesamehouse. 46Shealsotestified will kill all your family and your relatives x x x. 50These
thatafewdaysbeforethevictimwasrapedandkilled,thelatter statementswerenotcontradictedbyappellant.
revealedtoherthatJoelYatarattemptedtorapeheraftershe Thus,appellantsmotivetosexuallyassaultandkillthevictim
came from the school.47The victim told Judilyn about the wasevidentintheinstantcase.Itisaruleincriminallawthat
incidentorattemptoftheappellanttorapeherfivedaysbefore motive,beingastateofmind,isestablishedbythetestimonyof
hernakedandviolatedbodywasfounddeadinhergrandmothers
witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or 54
Peoplev.Serrano,G.R.No.137480,28February2001,353
immediatelyafterthecommissionoftheoffense,deedsorwords SCRA161,172.
that may express it or from which his motive or reason for 55
Peoplev.Aonuevo,G.R.No.137843,12October2001,367
committingitmaybeinferred.51 SCRA249.
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty 522
beyondreasonabledoubtofthespecialcomplexcrimeofrapewith
522 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by
Peoplevs.Yatar
reasonorontheoccasionthereof,inordertoconcealhislustful
it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during
deed, permanently sealed the victims lips by stabbing her
intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove
repeatedly,therebycausingheruntimelydemise.
sexualabuseespeciallywhenthevictimisoftenderage.56
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victims
homicide:(1)theappellanthadcarnalknowledgeofawoman;(2)
aunt. He is seven years older than the victim Kathylyn Uba.
carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force,
Beforeheandhiswifeseparated,appellantlivedinthehouseof
threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of
hismotherinlaw,togetherwiththevictimandhiswife.Afterthe
suchcarnalknowledgebymeansofforce,threatorintimidation,
separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents,
appellantkilledthewoman.52However,inrapecommittedbyclose
approximatelyonehundred(100)metersfromhismotherinlaws
kin, such as the victims father, stepfather, uncle, or the
house.Beingarelativebyaffinitywithinthethirdcivildegree,he
commonlawspouseofhermother,itisnotnecessarythatactual
isdeemedinlegalcontemplationtohavemoralascendancyover
force or intimidation be employed.53Moral influence or
thevictim.
ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation. 54The
UnderArticle266BoftheRevisedPenalCode,thepenaltyof
factthatthevictimshymenisintactdoesnotnegateafinding
deathisimposedwhenbyreasonorontheoccasionoftherape,
thatrapewascommittedasmereentrybythepenisintothelips
homicideiscommitted.Althoughthree(3)JusticesofthisCourt
ofthefemalegenitalorgan,evenwithoutruptureorlacerationof
maintaintheirpositionthatR.A.7659isunconstitutionalinsofar
the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape. 55The strength and
asitprescribesthedeathpenalty,theyneverthelesssubmittothe
dilatabilityofthehymenareinvariable;
rulingofthemajoritythatthelawisnotunconstitutional,and
_______________
thatthedeathpenaltycanbelawfullyimposedinthecaseatbar.
50
Id.,atpp.336338. As to damages, civil indemnityex delictoof
P100,000.00,57actual damages incurred by the family of the
51
Barrioquintov.Fernandez,82Phil.642,649(1949).
victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to
52
Articles266Aand266B,RevisedPenalCode.
P93,190.00,58and moral damages of P75,000.0059should be
53
Peoplev.Remudo,supra. awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Exemplarydamagescannotbeawardedaspartof
_______________
56
Peoplev.Llanita,G.R.No.134101,5September2001,364
SCRA519.
57
People v. Manguera,supra;People v. Seranilla,G.R. Nos.
11302224, 15 December 2000,348 SCRA 227;People v.
Payot,G.R.No.119352,8June1999,308SCRA43.
58
Arts. 2199 and 2202, Civil Code, Art. 2199, states that
[e]xceptasprovidedbylaworbystipulation,oneisentitledtoan
adequatecompensationonlyforsuchpecuniarylosssufferedby
himashehasdulyproved.Art.2202providesthat[i]ncrimes
andquasidelicts, thedefendantshall beliable forall damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the actor
omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages
havebeenforeseenorcouldhavereasonablybeenforeseenbythe
defendant.
59
Peoplev.Magallanes,G.R.No.136299,29August2003,410
SCRA183.
523
VOL.428,MAY19,2004
Peoplevs.Yatar
thecivilliabilitysincethecrimewasnotcommittedwithoneor
moreaggravatingcircumstances.60
WHEREFORE, inview oftheforegoing, theDecision of the
RTCofBulanao,Tabuk,Kalinga,Branch25inCriminalCaseNo.
3598,sentencingappellantJoelYataraliasKawittoDeathfor
thespecialcomplexcrimeofRapewithHomicideisAFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the
familyofthevictimKathylynUbacivilindemnityexdelictointhe
amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and
P75,000.00inmoraldamages.Theawardofexemplarydamages
isDELETED.UponthefinalityofthisDecisionandinaccordance
withArt.83oftheRevisedPenalCode,asamendedbySec.25of
Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible
exerciseofthepardoningpower.
Costsdeoficio.
SOORDERED.
Vitug,Panganiban,Quisumbing,YnaresSantiago,Sand
ovalGutierrez,Carpio,AustriaMartinez,Corona,Carpio
Morales,Callejo,Sr.,AzcunaandTinga,JJ.,concur.
Davide,Jr.(C.J.)andPuno,J.,OnOfficialLeave.
Judgmentaffirmedwithmodification.
Notes.DNA,beingarelativelynewscience,hasnotyetbeen
accorded official recognition by the courtspaternity will still
havetoberesolvedbyconventionalevidence.(PeLimvs.Courtof
Appeals,210SCRA1[1997])
Being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge, but eventually, as the
appropriatecasecomes,courtsshouldnothesitatetoruleonthe
admissibilityofDNAevidence.Courtsshouldapplytheresultsof
523
sciencewhencompetentlyobtainedinaidofsituationspresented,
sincetorejectsaidresultistodenyprogress.(Tijingvs.Courtof
Appeals,354SCRA17[2001])
_______________
Article2230,CivilCode.
60
524
524 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
SMCQuarry2WorkersUnionFebruarySixMovement(FSM)LocalChapter
No.1564vs.TitanMegabagsIndustrialCorporation
DNA test is synonymous to DNA typing, DNA fingerprinting,
DNAprofiling,genetictests,andgeneticfingerprinting.(People
vs.Marquez,380SCRA561[2002])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
VOL.519,MARCH27,2007
Tatingvs.Marcella
G.R.No.155208.March27,2007.*
NENA LAZALITA**TATING, petitioner,vs.FELICIDAD
TATINGMARCELLA,representedbySALVADORMARCELLA,
CARLOSTATING,andtheCOURTOFAPPEALS,respondents.
Civil Law;Contracts;Acontractis simulatediftheparties
donotintendtobeboundatall(absolutelysimulated)orifthe
partiesconcealtheirtrueagreement(relativelysimulated).The
CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between
petitionerandDanielaissimulated.Acontractissimulatedifthe
partiesdonotintendtobeboundatall(absolutelysimulated)or
ifthepartiesconcealtheirtrueagreement(relativelysimulated).
The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a
contract is the intention of the parties. Such intention is
determinedfromtheexpresstermsoftheiragreementaswellas
fromtheircontemporaneousandsubsequentacts.
Same;Same;Themostprotuberantindexofsimulationisthe
completeabsenceonthepartofthevendeeofanyattemptinany
manner to assert his rights of ownership over the disputed
property.InSuntayv.CourtofAppeals,251SCRA430(1995),
theCourtruledthatthemostprotuberantindexofsimulationis
thecompleteabsence,onthepartofthevendee,ofanyattemptin
anymannertoasserthisrightsofownershipoverthedisputed
property.Inthepresentcase,however,theevidenceclearlyshows
thatpetitioner
_______________
*
THIRDDIVISION.
**
AlsospelledasLasalitainotherpartsoftheRollo.
80
8 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
79
0
Tatingvs.Marcella
declaredthepropertyfortaxationandpaidrealtytaxesonit
inhername.Petitionerhasshownthatfrom1972to1988she
religiouslypaidtherealestatetaxesdueonthesaidlotandthat
it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes
thereon. While tax receipts and declarations and receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not, in
themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
constituteatleastproofthattheholderhasaclaimoftitleover
theproperty.Thevoluntarydeclarationofapieceofpropertyfor
taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest
desiretoobtaintitletothepropertyandannounceshisadverse
claimagainsttheStateandallotherinterestedparties,butalso
theintentiontocontributeneededrevenuestotheGovernment.
Such an act strengthens onesbona fideclaim of acquisition of
ownership.
Same;Same;Property;Sales;Ownership;Possession along
with ownership is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the
notarized deed of conveyance.It is true that Daniela retained
physicalpossession ofthe propertyevenaftershe executed the
subjectAbsoluteDeedofSaleandevenaftertitletotheproperty
wastransferredinpetitionersfavor.Infact,Danielacontinuedto
occupythepropertyindisputeuntilherdeathin1988while,in
themeantime,petitionercontinuedtoresideinManila.However,
it is wellestablished that ownership and possession are two
entirely different legal concepts. Just as possession is not a
definiteproofofownership,neitherisnonpossessioninconsistent
withownership.ThefirstparagraphofArticle1498oftheCivil
Code states that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the
deliveryofthethingwhichistheobjectofthecontract,iffromthe
deedthecontrarydoesnotappearorcannotclearlybeinferred.
Possession,alongwithownership,istransferredtothevendeeby
virtueofthenotarizeddeedofconveyance.Thus,inlightofthe
circumstancesofthepresentcase,itisofnolegalconsequence
thatpetitionerdidnottakeactualpossessionoroccupationofthe
disputedpropertyaftertheexecutionofthedeedofsaleinher
favorbecauseshewasalreadyabletoperfectandcompleteher
ownershipofandtitleoverthesubjectproperty.
Civil Procedure;Evidence;Affidavits;The admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence; It is
settledthataffidavitsareclassifiedashearsayevidencesincethey
arenotgener
81
VOL.519,MARCH27,2007
Tatingvs.Marcella
allypreparedbytheaffiantbutbyanotherwhouseshisown
languageinwritingtheaffiantsstatements,whichmaythusbe
eitheromittedormisunderstoodbytheonewritingthem.There
isnoissueintheadmissibilityofthesubjectswornstatement.
However,theadmissibilityofevidenceshouldnotbeequatedwith
weightofevidence.Theadmissibilityofevidencedependsonits
relevanceandcompetencewhiletheweightofevidencepertains
to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade.Thus,aparticularitemofevidencemaybeadmissible,
butitsevidentiaryweightdependsonjudicialevaluationwithin
theguidelinesprovidedbytherulesofevidence.Itissettledthat
affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not
generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his
ownlanguageinwritingtheaffiantsstatements,whichmaythus
beeitheromittedormisunderstoodbytheonewritingthem.
Same;Same;As in all civil cases, the burden is on the
plaintifftoprovethematerialallegationsofhiscomplaintandhe
mustrelyonthestrengthofhisevidenceandnotontheweakness
of the evidence of the defendant.Private respondents should
have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their
allegationthatDaniela,infact,hadnointentionofdisposingof
herpropertywhensheexecutedthesubjectdeedofsaleinfavor
ofpetitioner.Asinallcivilcases,theburdenisontheplaintiffto
provethematerialallegationsofhiscomplaintandhemustrely
onthestrengthofhisevidenceandnotontheweaknessofthe
evidenceofthedefendant.AsidefromDanielasswornstatement,
private respondents failed to present any other documentary
evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their
witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different
intentionwhensheenteredintoacontractofsalewithpetitioner.
81 SPECIALCIVILACTIONintheSupremeCourt.Certiorari.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Pamplona,GenitoandValdezcoforpetitioner.
GuanzonandGuanzonLawFirmforrespondents.
82
82 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tatingvs.Marcella
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,J.:
AssailedintheSpecialCivilActionforCertioraribeforetheCourt
are the Decision1dated February 22, 2002 and the Resolution
datedAugust22,2002oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCAG.R.
CVNo.64122,whichaffirmedtheDecision 2oftheRegionalTrial
Court(RTC)ofCadizCity,NegrosOccidental,Branch60.
Thepresentcasearosefromacontroversyinvolvingaparcelof
landdenominatedasLot56ofSubdivisionplanPsd31182,located
atAbelardeSt.,CadizCity,NegrosOccidental.Thesubjectlot,
containinganareaof200squaremeters,wasownedbyDaniela
Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T4393 issued by the Registry of
DeedsoftheCityofCadiz.3
OnOctober14,1969,Danielasoldthesubjectpropertytoher
granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena).
ThecontractofsalewasembodiedinadulynotarizedDeedof
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of
Nena.4Subsequently, title over the subject property was
transferredinthenameofNena. 5Shedeclaredthepropertyin
her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due
thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and
1988.6However,thelandremainedinpossessionofDaniela.
OnDecember28,1977,Danielaexecutedaswornstatement
claiming that she had actually no intention of selling the
property;thetrueagreementbetweenherandNenawassimply
totransfertitleoverthesubjectpropertyinfavorof
_______________
1
PennedbyJusticeMartinS.Villarama,Jr.andconcurredin
by Justices Conchita CarpioMorales (now a member of this
Court)andSergioL.Pestao;Rollo,p.53.
2
OriginalRecords,pp.318342.
3
ExhibitA,Id.,atp.138.
4
ExhibitQ/1,Id.,atp.177.
5
Exhibit3,Id.,atp.179.
6
Exhibits8Ato8AA,Id.,atpp.183212.
83
VOL.519,MARCH27,2007 83
Tatingvs.Marcella
thelattertoenablehertoobtainaloanbymortgagingthesubject
property for the purpose of helping her defray her business
expenses;shelaterdiscoveredthatNenadidnotsecureanyloan
nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of
Nenacancelledandthesubjectpropertyreconveyedtoher.7
Daniela died on July 29, 1988 8leaving her children as her
heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who
predeceasedDanielaandwasrepresentedbyhereinpetitioner.
InaletterdatedMarch1,1989,CarlosinformedNenathat
when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she
executedonDecember28,1977and,asaconsequence,theyare
demandingfromNenathereturnoftheirrightfulsharesoverthe
subjectpropertyasheirsofDaniela. 9Nenadidnotreply.Efforts
tosettlethecaseamicablyprovedfutile.
Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad,
representedbyhersonSalvador,filedacomplaintwiththeRTC
of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the
nullificationoftheDeedofAbsoluteSaleexecutedbyDanielain (Exh.Q)executedbetweenDanielaSolanoVda.deTatingand
herfavor,cancellationoftheTCTissuedinthenameofNena, NenaLazalitaTatingasNULLandVOIDandfurtherordering:
and issuanceof a new titleand tax declaration in favor of the
heirs of Daniela.10The complaint also prayed for the award of 1. 1.TheRegisterofDeedsofCadizCitytocancelTCTNo.
moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and 5975andinlieuthereoftoissueanewtitleinthenames
litigation expenses. On March 19, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an of Carlos Tating,Proindivisoowner of onefourth (1/4)
amended complaint with leave of court for the purpose of portionoftheproperty;FelicidadTatingMarcella,Pro
excludingRicardo asapartyplaintiff, hehavingdied intestate
indivisoowner of onefourth (1/4) portion; Julio
and without issue in March 1991.11He left Carlos, Felicidad,
Julio,andNenaashissoleheirs. Tating,Proindivisoownerofonefourth(1/4)portionand
_______________ Nena Lazalita Tating,Proindivisoowner of onefourth
(1/4)portion,alloflot56afterpaymentoftheprescribed
7
ExhibitD,Id.,atp.142. fees;
8
ExhibitI,Id.,atp.149.
2. 2.The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax
9
ExhibitE,Id.,atp.143.
Declaration No. 14300672 and in lieu thereof issue a
10
Id.,atp.1.
new Tax Declaration in the names of Carlos Tating,
11
Id.,atp.55.
1/4Proindivisoportion; Felicidad Tating Marcella,
84
1/4Proindivisoportion; Julio Tating, 1/4Pro
84 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
indivisoportion; and Nena Lazalita Tating, 1/4Pro
Tatingvs.Marcella
indivisoportion, all of lot 56 as well as the house
InherAnswer,Nenadeniedthatanyfraudormisrepresentation
standing thereon be likewise declaredin the names of
attendedtheexecutionofthesubjectDeedofAbsoluteSale.She
thepersonsmentionedinthesameproportionsasabove
alsodeniedhavingreceivedtheletterofheruncle,Carlos.She
statedafterpaymentoftheprescribedfees;
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and in her
counterclaim,sheaskedthetrialcourtfortheawardofactual,
exemplary and moral damages as well as attorneys fees and 3. 3.Thedefendantisfurthermoreorderedtopayplaintiffs
litigationexpenses.12 the sum of P20,000.00 by way of moral damages,
Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered P10,000.00bywayofexemplarydamages,P5,000.00by
judgmentwiththefollowingdispositiveportion: wayofattorneysfeesandP3,000.00bywayoflitigation
WHEREFORE,inviewofalltheforegoing,judgmentishereby expenses;andto
renderedinfavoroftheplaintiffsandagainstthedefendant,and
hereby declaring the document of sale dated October 14, 1969 _______________
 Id.,atpp.2325.
12
85
VOL.519,MARCH27,2007
Tatingvs.Marcella
1. 4.Paythecostsofsuit.
SOORDERED.13
NenafiledanappealwiththeCA.OnFebruary22,2002,theCA
rendereditsDecisionaffirmingthejudgmentoftheRTC.14
NenasMotionforReconsiderationwasdeniedbytheCAinits
ResolutiondatedAugust22,2002.15
Hence, herein petition forcertiorarianchored on the ground
thattheCAhasdecidedtheinstantcasewithoutdueregardto
and in violation of the applicable laws and Decisions of this
HonorableCourtandalsobecausetheDecisionoftheRegional
TrialCourt,whichithasaffirmed,isnotsupportedbyandiseven
againsttheevidenceonrecord.16
Attheoutset,itmustbestatedthatthefilingoftheinstant
petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
inappropriate. Considering that the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the CA finally disposed of the case, the proper
remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
The Court notes that while the instant petition is
denominated as a Petition forCertiorariunder Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA committed
graveabuseofdiscretion.Ontheotherhand,thepetitionactually
averserrorsofjudgment,ratherthanofjurisdiction,whichare
thepropersubjectsofapetitionforreviewoncertiorari.Hence,in
accordancewith theliberalspirit pervadingtheRules ofCourt
and in the interest of justice, the Court decided to treat the
presentpetitionforcertiorariashavingbeenfiled
85 _______________
13
Id.,atp.342.
14
CARollo,p.86.
15
Id.,atp.103.
16
Rollo,p.5.
86
86 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tatingvs.Marcella
underRule45,especiallyconsideringthatitwasfiledwithinthe
reglementaryperiodforfilingthesame.17
Astothemeritsofthecase,petitionercontendsthatthecase
fortheprivaterespondentsrestsonthepropositionthattheDeed
of Absolute Sale dated October 14, 1969 is simulated because
Danielasactualintentionwasnottodisposeofherpropertybut
simply to help petitioner by providing her with a collateral.
Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both
the RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was
simulatedwastheSwornStatementofDanieladatedDecember
28,1977.However,petitionerarguesthatsaidSwornStatement
should have been rejected outright by the lower courts
consideringthatDanielahaslongbeendeadwhenthedocument
wasofferedinevidence,therebydenyingpetitionertherightto
crossexamineher.
Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was
executed on October 14, 1969, the Sworn Statement was
purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977 and was
discovered only after the death of Daniela in 1994. 18Petitioner
arguesthatifthedeedofsaleisindeedsimulated,Danielawould
have taken action against the petitioner during her lifetime.
However, the fact remains that upto the time ofher death or
almost20yearsaftertheDeedofAbsoluteSalewasexecuted,she
neverutteredawordofcomplaintagainstpetitioner.
PetitionerfurtherassertsthattheRTCandtheCAerredin
departingfromthedoctrineheldtimeandagainbytheSupreme
Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere
preponderance is required to show the falsity or nullity of a
notarialdocument.PetitioneralsoarguesthattheRTCandthe
CAerredinitspronouncementthatthetransac
_______________
17
DelsanTransportLines,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,335Phil.
1066,1075;268SCRA597,605(1997).
18
Based on the certification issued by the Civil Registry of
CadizCity,DanielaS.TatingdiedonJuly29,1988.
87
VOL.519,MARCH27,2007
Tatingvs.Marcella
tionbetweenDanielaandpetitionercreatedatrustrelationship
betweenthembecauseofthesettledrulethatwherethetermsof
acontractareclear,itshouldbegivenfulleffect.
In their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents
contend thatpetitionerfailed toshow that the CA or the RTC
committedgraveabuseofdiscretioninarrivingattheirassailed
judgments;thatDanielasSwornStatementissufficientevidence
to prove that the contract of sale by and between her and
petitioner was merely simulated; and that, in effect, the
agreement between petitioner and Daniela created a trust
relationshipbetweenthem.
TheCourtfindsforthepetitioner.
The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale
between petitioner and Daniela is simulated. A contract is
simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all
(absolutely simulated) or if the parties conceal their true
agreement(relativelysimulated).19Theprimaryconsiderationin
determiningthetruenatureofacontractistheintentionofthe
parties.20Suchintentionisdeterminedfromtheexpresstermsof
their agreement as well as from their contemporaneous and
subsequentacts.21
Inthepresentcase,themainevidencepresentedbyprivate
respondentsinprovingtheirallegationthatthesubjectdeedof
saledidnotreflectthetrueintentionofthepartiestheretoisthe
swornstatementofDanieladatedDecember28,1977.Thetrial
court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private
respondents evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also
accordedgreatprobativeweighttothisdocument.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn
statement.However,theadmissibilityofevidenceshouldnot
_______________
87
19
Peoples Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,357Phil.850,869870;297SCRA170,189(1998).
20
Ramos v. Heirs of Honorio Ramos, Sr.,431 Phil. 337,
345;381SCRA594,601(2002).
21
Id.,atp.345.
88
88 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tatingvs.Marcella
be equated with weight of evidence. 22The admissibility of
evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the
weightofevidencepertainstoevidencealreadyadmittedandits
tendency to convince and persuade.23Thus, a particular item of
evidencemaybeadmissible,butitsevidentiaryweightdepends
onjudicialevaluationwithintheguidelinesprovidedbytherules
ofevidence.24Itissettledthataffidavitsareclassifiedashearsay
evidencesincetheyarenotgenerallypreparedbytheaffiantbut
by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants
statements,whichmaythusbeeitheromittedormisunderstood
by the one writing them.25Moreover, the adverse party is
deprived of the opportunity to crossexamine the affiant. 26For
this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay,
unlesstheaffiantsthemselvesareplacedonthewitnessstandto
testifythereon.27TheCourtfindsthatboththetrialcourtandthe
CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative
weight.SinceDanielaisnolongeravailabletotakethewitness
standassheisalreadydead,theRTCandtheCAshouldnothave
givenprobativevalueonDanielasswornstatementforpurposes
ofproving thatthecontract ofsalebetweenher and petitioner
wassimulatedandthat, as aconsequence, atrust relationship
wascreatedbetweenthem.
Privaterespondentsshouldhavepresentedotherevidenceto
sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no
intentionofdisposingofherpropertywhensheexecuted
_______________
22
Ayala Land, Inc. v. Tagle,G.R. No. 153667, August 11,
2005,466SCRA521,532.
23
Id.,atp.532.
24
Heirs of Lourdes Sabanpan v. Comorposa,456 Phil. 161,
172;408SCRA692,700(2003).
25
Limv.CourtofAppeals,380Phil.60,78;323SCRA102,119
(2000)citingPeoplesBankandTrustCompanyv.Leonidas,G.R.
No.47815,March11,1992,207SCRA164;D.M.Consunji,Inc.v.
CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.137873,April20,2001,357SCRA249,
260261.
26
D.M.Consunji,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,Id.,atpp.260261.
27
Id.,atpp.260261.
89
VOL.519,MARCH27,2007 89
Tatingvs.Marcella
thesubjectdeedofsaleinfavorofpetitioner.Asinallcivilcases,
theburdenisontheplaintifftoprovethematerialallegationsof
hiscomplaintandhemustrelyonthestrengthofhisevidence
andnotontheweaknessoftheevidenceofthedefendant. 28Aside
from Danielas sworn statement, private respondents failed to
present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim.
Even the testimonies oftheir witnesses failed to establishthat
Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a
contractofsalewithpetitioner.
InSuntayv.CourtofAppeals,29theCourtruledthatthemost
protuberantindexofsimulationisthecompleteabsence,onthe
partofthevendee,ofanyattemptinanymannertoasserthis
rightsofownershipoverthedisputedproperty. 30Inthepresent
case,however,theevidenceclearlyshowsthatpetitionerdeclared
thepropertyfortaxationandpaidrealtytaxesonitinhername.
Petitionerhasshownthatfrom1972to1988shereligiouslypaid
therealestatetaxesdueonthesaidlotandthatitwasonlyin
1974and1987thatshefailedtopaythetaxesthereon.Whiletax
receipts and declarations and receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not, in themselves,
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least
proofthattheholderhasaclaimoftitleovertheproperty. 31The
voluntarydeclarationofapieceofpropertyfortaxationpurposes
manifestsnotonlyonessincereandhonestdesiretoobtaintitle
to the property and announces his adverse claim against the
Stateandallotherinterestedparties,butalsotheintentionto
contribute
_______________
 28
Dungaran v. Koshnicke,G.R. No. 161048, August 31,
2005,468SCRA676,685.
29
321Phil.809,831832;251SCRA430,450(1995).
30
Ramosv.HeirsofHonorioRamos,Sr.,supranote20,atpp.
348349;p.604.
31
HeirsofMiguelFrancov.CourtofAppeals,463Phil.417,
433;418SCRA60,72(2003).
90
90 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tatingvs.Marcella
needed revenues to the Government.32Such an act strengthens
onesbonafideclaimofacquisitionofownership. 33Ontheother
hand, private respondents failed to present even a single tax
receiptordeclarationshowingthatDanielapaidtaxesdueonthe
disputedlotasproofthatsheclaimsownershipthereof.Theonly
Tax Declaration in the name of Daniela, which private
respondents presented in evidence, refers only to the house
standing on the lot in controversy. 34Even the said Tax
Declarationcontainsanotationthathereinpetitionerownsthe
lot(Lot56)uponwhichsaidhousewasbuilt.
Moreover,theCourtagreeswithpetitionerthatifthesubject
DeedofAbsoluteSaledidnotreallyreflecttherealintentionof
Daniela,whyisitthatsheremainedsilentuntilherdeath;she
nevertoldanyofherrelativesregardingheractualpurposein
executingthesubjectdeed;shesimplychosetomakeknownher
true intentions through the sworn statement she executed on
December28,1977,theexistenceofwhichshekeptsecretfrom
her relatives; and despite her declaration therein that she is
appealingforhelpinordertogetbackthesubjectlot,shenever
took any concrete step to recover the subject property from
petitioneruntilherdeathmorethantenyearslater.
It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the
property even after she executed the subject Absolute Deed of
Sale and even after title to the property was transferred in
petitioners favor. In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the
property in dispute until her death in 1988 while, in the
meantime,petitionercontinuedtoresideinManila.However,itis
wellestablishedthatownershipandpossessionaretwoentirely
differentlegalconcepts.35Justaspossessionisnota
_______________
32
Calicdan v. Cendaa,G.R. No. 155080, February 5,
2004,422SCRA272,280.
33
Id.,atp.280.
34
ExhibitB,OR,139.
35
Spouses Sabio v. The International Corporate Bank,
Inc.,416Phil.785,820;364SCRA385,416(2001).
91
VOL.519,MARCH27,2007 91
Tatingvs.Marcella
definiteproofofownership,neitherisnonpossessioninconsistent
withownership.ThefirstparagraphofArticle1498oftheCivil
Code states that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the
deliveryofthethingwhichistheobjectofthecontract,iffromthe
deedthecontrarydoesnotappearorcannotclearlybeinferred.
Possession,alongwithownership,istransferredtothevendeeby
virtueofthenotarizeddeedofconveyance. 36Thus,inlightofthe
circumstancesofthepresentcase,itisofnolegalconsequence
thatpetitionerdidnottakeactualpossessionoroccupationofthe
disputedpropertyaftertheexecutionofthedeedofsaleinher
favorbecauseshewasalreadyabletoperfectandcompleteher
ownershipofandtitleoverthesubjectproperty.
 As to Danielas affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by
petitioner,whichconfirmedthevalidityofthesaleofthedisputed
lotinherfavor,thesamehasnoprobativevalue,asthesworn
statement earlier adverted to, for being hearsay. Naturally,
privaterespondentswerenotabletocrossexaminethedeceased
affiantonherdeclarationscontainedinthesaidaffidavit.
However, even if Danielas affidavit of June 9, 1983 is
disregarded,thefactremainsthatprivaterespondentsfailedto
prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere
preponderance of evidence37that the contract of sale between
Danielaandpetitionerwassimulated.Thelegalpresumptionis
infavorofthevalidityofcontractsandthepartywhoimpugnsits
regularity has the burden of proving its simulation. 38Since
privaterespondentsfailedtodischargethebur
_______________
36
Id.,atp.820;OngChingPov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.Nos.
11347273,December20,1994,239SCRA341,347.
37
Mendezona v. Ozamiz,426 Phil. 888, 904;376 SCRA 482,
496(2002).
38
Peoples Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, supranote 19, at p. 870; p. 189;Ramos v. Heirs of
HonorioRamos,Sr.,supranote20,atp.346;p.602.
92
92 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tatingvs.Marcella
denofprovingtheirallegationthatthecontractofsalebetween
petitioner and Daniela was simulated, the presumption of
regularityandvalidityoftheOctober14,1969DeedofAbsolute
Salestands.
ConsideringthattheCourtfindsthesubjectcontractofsale
betweenpetitionerandDanielatobevalidandnotfictitiousor
simulated,thereisnomorenecessitytodiscusstheissueasto
whetherornotatrustrelationshipwascreatedbetweenthem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
DecisionandResolutionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CV
No.64122,affirmingtheDecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtof
CadizCity,NegrosOccidental,Branch60,inCivilCaseNo.278
C, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the
privaterespondentsisDISMISSED.
Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
YnaresSantiago(Chairperson),Callejo, Sr.,Chico
NazarioandNachura,JJ.,concur.
Petitiongranted,assaileddecisionandresolutionreversedand
setaside.Complaintdismissed.
Note.Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxationpurposesarestrongevidenceofownership.(Alonsovs.
CebuCountryClub,Inc.,375SCRA390[2002])
o0o
G.R.No.173476.February22,2012.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff
appellee,vs.RODRIGO SALAFRANCAyBELLO, accused
appellant.
CriminalLaw;Alibi;Denials;Denialandalibiinterposedby
theaccusedareworthlessinthefaceofhispositiveidentification
astheassailant.Salafrancasdenialandalibiwereworthlessin
thefaceofhispositiveidentificationbyMendozaastheassailant
ofBolanon.Thelowercourtsproperlyaccordedfullfaithtosuch
incrimination by Mendoza considering that Salafranca did not
evenprojectanyillmotivethatcouldhaveimpelledMendozato
testifyagainsthimunlessitwasuponthetruth.
Same; Treachery; Treachery is present when the offender
commitsanyofthecrimesagainsttheperson,employingmeans,
methodsorformsintheexecutionthereofwhichtenddirectlyand
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
fromthedefensewhichtheoffendedpartymightmake.Basedon
Mendozasaccount,SalafrancahadattackedBolanonfrombehind
and hadencircledhisleftarm overtheneck (of Bolanon) and
delivered the stabbing blow using the right (hand) and coming
fromwnnt(sic)uprightsidewaysandanotheroneencirclingthe
blow towards below the left nipple. Relying on Mendozas
recollection of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the RTC
foundtreacherytobeattendantinthekilling.Thisfindingthe
CA concurred with. We join the CAs concurrence because
Mendozaseyewitnessaccountof themanner ofattackremained
uncontestedbySalafrancawhomerelyinsistedonhisalibi.The
method and means Salafranca employed constituted a surprise
deadly attack against Bolanon from behind and included an
aggressivephysicalcontrolofthelattersmovementsthatensured
thesuccessoftheattackwithoutanyretaliationordefenseonthe
partofBolanon.AccordingtotheRevisedPenalCode,treacheryis
presentwhentheoffendercommitsanyofthecrimesagainstthe
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereofwhichtenddirectlyandspeciallytoinsureitsexecution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offendedpartymightmake.
_______________
*FIRSTDIVISION.
502
5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
02
Peoplevs.Salafranca
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Dying
Declarations; Res Gestae; The statement of the victim an hour
beforehisdeathandrightafterthehackingincidentboreallthe
earmarkseitherofadyingdeclarationorpartoftheresgestae
eitherofwhichwasanexceptiontothehearsayrule.Itappears
from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the
residence of Estao, his uncle, to seek help right after being
stabbedbySalafranca;thatEstaohadhurriedlydressedupto
bringhisnephewtothePhilippineGeneralHospitalbytaxicab;
thatonthewaytothehospital,EstaohadaskedBolanonwho
had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao that his
assailanthadbeenSalafranca;thatatthetimeoftheutterance
Bolanonhadseemedtobehavingahardtimebreathing,causing
Estao to advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten
minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the
hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced dead.
SuchcircumstancesqualifiedtheutteranceofBolanonasbotha
dyingdeclarationandaspartoftheresgestae,consideringthat
theCourthasrecognizedthatthestatementofthevictimanhour
beforehisdeathandrightafterthehackingincidentboreallthe
earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of theres
gestaeeitherofwhichwasanexceptiontothehearsayrule.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Adyingdeclarationisgenerally
inadmissibleforbeinghearsay;Exceptions.Adyingdeclaration,
although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following
requisitesconcur,namely:(a)thatthedeclarationmustconcern
the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants
death;(b)thatatthetimethedeclarationismade,thedeclarant
is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the
declarantiscompetentasawitness;and(d)thatthedeclaration
isofferedinacriminalcaseforhomicide,murder,orparricide,in
which the declarant is a victim. All the requisites were met
herein. Bolanon communicated his antemortem statement to
Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed
him.Atthetimeofhisstatement,Bolanonwasconsciousofhis
impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest
and,accordingtoEstao,wasthenexperiencinggreatdifficulty
inbreathing.Bolanonsuccumbedinthehospitalemergencyroom
afewminutesfromadmission,whichoccurredunderthreehours
afterthestabbing.Thereisampleauthorityfortheviewthatthe
declarantsbeliefintheimminenceofhisdeathcanbe
503
VOL.666,FEBRUARY22,2012
Peoplevs.Salafranca
shown by the declarants own statements or from
circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds,
statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his
physician.Bolanonwouldhavebeencompetenttotestifyonthe
subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying
declarationwasofferedinthiscriminalprosecutionformurderin
whichBolanonwasthevictim.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res Gestae; Requisites for
declaration or an utterance as part of the res gestae to be
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.A
declarationoranutteranceisdeemedaspartoftheresgestaeand
thusadmissibleinevidenceasanexceptiontothehearsayrule
whenthefollowingrequisitesconcur,towit:(a)theprincipalact,
theres gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are
madebeforethedeclaranthadtimetocontriveordevise;and(c)
thestatementsmustconcerntheoccurrenceinquestionandits
immediately attending circumstances. The requisites for
admissibility of a declaration as part of theres gestaeconcur
herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to
Estao,Bolanonwasreferringtoastartlingoccurrence,i.e.,his
stabbingbySalafranca.Bolanonwasthenonboardthetaxicab
thatwouldbringhim tothehospital, andthushadno timeto
contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His
utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in
spontaneityandonlyinreactiontothestartlingoccurrence.The
statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the
perpetrator.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The termresgestae has
50 beendefinedasthosecircumstanceswhicharetheundersigned
incidentsofaparticularlitigatedactandwhichareadmissible
when illustrative of such act.The termres gestaehas been
defined as those circumstances which are the undesigned
incidentsofaparticularlitigatedactandwhichareadmissible
whenillustrativeofsuchact.Inageneralway,resgestaerefers
tothecircumstances,facts,anddeclarationsthatgrowoutofthe
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to
excludetheideaofdeliberationandfabrication.Theruleonres
gestaeencompasses the exclamations and statements made by
either the participants,victims, or spectators to a crime
immediatelybefore,during,orimmediatelyafterthecommission
ofthecrimewhenthecircumstancesaresuchthatthestatements
weremadeasaspontaneousreactionorutteranceinspiredbythe
excite
504
 5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
04
Peoplevs.Salafranca
mentoftheoccasionandtherewasnoopportunityforthe
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The
test of admissibility of evidence as a part of theres gestaeis,
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any
premeditationorpurposetomanufacturetestimony.
Civil Law; Damages; Civil Indemnity; Damages to be
awarded when death occurs due to a crime.We modify the
limitingofcivildamagesbytheCAandtheRTCtoonlythedeath
indemnityofP50,000.00.Wedeclarethatthesurvivingheirsof
Bolanon were entitled by law to more than such indemnity,
becausethedamagestobeawardedwhendeathoccursduetoa
crimemayinclude:(a)civilindemnityexdelictoforthedeathof
thevictim(whichwasgrantedherein);(b)actualorcompensatory
damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e)
temperatedamages.
Same; Same;Same; Thedeathindemnity compensated the
loss of life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral
damageswouldjustlyassuagethementalanguishandemotional
sufferings of the surviving family of the victim.The death
indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime, but
appropriateandreasonablemoraldamageswouldjustlyassuage
the mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving
family of the victim. Although mental anguish and emotional
sufferings of the surviving heirs were not quantifiable with
mathematicalprecision,theCourtmustnonethelessstrivetoset
an amount that would restore the heirs of Bolanon to their
moralstatus quo ante. Given the circumstances, the amount of
P50,000.00isreasonableasmoraldamages,which,pursuantto
prevailing jurisprudence, we are bound to award despite the
absenceofanyallegationandproofoftheheirsmentalanguish
andemotionalsuffering.
Same;Same;ExemplaryDamages;Exemplarydamagesmay
beimposedincriminalcasesaspartofthecivilliabilitywhenthe
crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.TheCivil Codeprovides that exemplary
damages may be imposedincriminal cases as part of the civil
liability when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravatingcircumstances.TheCivil
505
VOL.666,FEBRUARY22,2012 50
5
Peoplevs.Salafranca
Codepermits such damages to be awarded by way of
exampleorcorrectionforthepublicgood,inadditiontothemoral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Conformably
with such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have
recognizedtheentitlementoftheheirsofthevictimtoexemplary
damages because of the attendance of treachery. It was of no
moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in
murder,and,assuch,inseparableandabsorbedinmurder.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforaccusedappellant.
BERSAMIN,J.:
 Anantemortemdeclarationofavictimofmurder,homicide,
or parricide that meets the conditions of admissibility under
theRules of Courtand pertinent jurisprudence is admissible
eitherasadyingdeclarationorasapartoftheresgestae,orboth. arrestforalongperiod,despitethewarrantforhisarrestbeing
Rodrigo SalafrancayBello was charged with and tried for
murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was
ultimatelyfoundguiltyofthefelonybytheRegionalTrialCourt,
Branch 18, in Manila on September 23, 2004. On appeal, his
convictionwasaffirmedbytheCourtofAppeals(CA)throughits
decisionpromulgatedonNovember24,2005.1
SalafrancahascometotheCourtonafinalappeal,continuing
tochallengethecredibilityofthewitnesseswhohadincriminated
him.
_______________
1Rollo, pp. 211; penned by Associate Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez,Jr.(laterPresidingJustice,nowretired),withAssociate
JusticeJuan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and AssociateJustice Vicente Q.
Roxas,concurring.
506
506 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Salafranca
The established facts show that past midnight on July 31,
1993BolanonwasstabbedneartheDelPanSportsComplexin
Binondo,Manila;thatafterstabbingBolanon,hisassailantran
away;thatBolanonwasstillabletowalktothehouseofhisuncle
RodolfoB.Estaoinordertoseekhelp;thathisunclerushedhim
tothePhilippineGeneralHospitalbytaxicab;thatontheirway
tothehospitalBolanontoldEstaothatitwasSalafrancawho
had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the
hospitalat2:30amdespitereceivingmedicalattention;andthat
the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto
Mendoza,thenstillaminorof13years,whowasinthecomplex
atthetime.2
Asstated,SalafrancafledafterstabbingBolanon.Heevaded
issued.HewasfinallyarrestedonApril23,2003,anddetainedat
theManilaCityJail.
Aftertrial,theRTCconvictedSalafranca,stating:
The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who
delivered two (2) stabbing blows to the victim while holding
Johnny Bolanon with his left arm encircled around Bolanons
neckstabbingthelatterwiththeuseofhisrighthandattheright
subcostalareawhichcausedBolanonsdeath.Notonlybecauseit
wastestifiedtobyAugustoMendozabutcorroboratedbyRodolfo
Estao,thevictimsunclewhobroughtBolanontothehospital
andwhorelayedtothecourt thatwhen he aidedBolanon and
evenontheirwaytothehospitalwhilethelatterwassuffering
fromhardbreathing,victimBolanonwasabletosaythatitwas
RodrigoSalafrancawhostabbedhim.3
The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony of
ProsecutionwitnessMendozaonhowSalafrancahadeffectedhis
attack against Bolanon, observing that by encircling his
(accused)leftarm,whilebehindthevictimonthelattersneck
andstabbingthevictimwiththeuseofhisrighthand,
_______________
2Id.,pp.34.
3CARollo,p.36.
507
VOL.666,FEBRUARY22,2012 507
Peoplevs.Salafranca
Salafranca did not give Bolanon any opportunity to defend
himself.4TheRTCnotedinconsistenciesinSalafrancasandhis
witnesstestimonies,aswellasthefactthathehadfledfromhis
residence the day after the incident and had stayed away in
Bataanforeightyearsuntilhisarrest.TheRTCopinedthathad
he not been hiding, there would be no reason for him to
immediatelyleavehisresidence,especiallybecausehewasalso
workingnearthearea.5
TheRTCdisposedthus:
With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo
SalafrancaisherebyfoundguiltyofthecrimeofMurderdefined
andpunishedunderArticle248asamendedbyRepublicActNo.
7659inrelationtoArticle63oftheRevisedPenalCodewiththe
presenceofthequalifyingaggravatingcircumstanceoftreachery
(248 par. 1 as amended) without any mitigating nor other
aggravating circumstance attendant to its commission, Rodrigo
Salafrancaisherebysentencedtosufferthepenaltyofreclusion
perpetua.
He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive
imprisonmentunderArticle29oftheRevisedPenalCode.
HisbodyisherebycommittedtothecustodyoftheDirectorof
theBureauofCorrection,NationalPenitentiary,MuntinlupaCity
thrutheCityJailWardenofManila.
Heisherebyorderedtoindemnifytheheirsofthevictimthe
sumofP50,000.00representingdeathindemnity.
Therebeingnoclaimofotherdamages,nopronouncementis
herebymade.
SOORDERED.6
Onappeal,theCAaffirmedthefindingsandconclusionsofthe
RTC,7citingthedyingdeclarationmadetohisuncle
_______________
4Id.,p.38.
5Id.,pp.3638.
6Id.,p.39.
7Supra,atnote1.
508
508 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Salafranca
pointingtoSalafrancaashisassailant,8andSalafrancaspositive
identification as the culprit by Mendoza. 9It stressed that
Salafrancasdenialandhisalibiofbeinginhishomeduringthe
incidentdidnotovercomethepositiveidentification,especiallyas
hisunexplainedflightafterthestabbing,leavinghishomeand
employment,constitutedacircumstancehighlyindicativeofhis
guilt.10
Presently,Salafrancareiterateshisdefenses,andinsiststhat
theStatedidnotprovehisguiltbeyondreasonabledoubt.
Theappeallacksmerit.
Discrediting Mendoza and Estao as witnesses against
Salafrancawouldbeunwarranted.TheRTCandtheCAcorrectly
concludedthatMendozaandEstaowerecredibleandreliable.
Thedeterminationofthecompetenceandcredibilityofwitnesses
attrialrestedprimarilywiththeRTCasthetrialcourtduetoits
unique and unequalled position of observing their deportment
during testimony, and of assessing their credibility and
appreciating their truthfulness, honesty and candor. Absent a
substantialreasontojustifythereversaloftheassessmentmade
and conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing
court was bound by such assessment and
conclusions,11consideringthattheCAastheappellatecourtcould
neithersubstituteitsassessmentnordrawdifferentconclusions
withoutapersuasiveshowingthattheRTCmisappreciatedthe
circumstances or omitted significant evidentiary matters that
wouldalter the result.12Salafranca didnot persuasively show a
misappreciationoromis
_______________
8Id.,atp.6.
 9Id.,atp.9.
10CARollo,p.110.
11Peoplev.Resuma,G.R.No.179189,February26,2008,546
SCRA728,737.
12People v. Taan, G.R. No. 169432, October 30, 2006, 506
SCRA 219, 230;Bricenio v. People, G.R. No. 157804, June 20,
2006,491SCRA489,496.
509
VOL.666,FEBRUARY22,2012
Peoplevs.Salafranca
sion by the RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is in no
positiontoundoortocontradictthefindingsoftheRTCandthe
CA,whichwereentitledtogreatweightandrespect. 13
Salafrancasdenialandalibiwereworthlessinthefaceofhis
positive identification by Mendoza as the assailant of Bolanon.
The lower courts properly accorded full faith to such
incrimination by Mendoza considering that Salafranca did not
evenprojectanyillmotivethatcouldhaveimpelledMendozato
testifyagainsthimunlessitwasuponthetruth.14
Based on Mendozas account, Salafranca had attacked
Bolanon from behind and had encircled his left arm over the
neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow using the
right(hand) and coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways and
another one encircling the blow towards below the left
nipple.15Relying on Mendozas recollection of how Salafranca
hadattackedBolanon,theRTCfoundtreacherytobeattendant
inthekilling.ThisfindingtheCAconcurredwith.Wejointhe
CAs concurrence because Mendozaseyewitnessaccount of the
manner of attack remained uncontested by Salafranca who
merelyinsistedonhisalibi.ThemethodandmeansSalafranca
employed constituted a surprise deadly attack against Bolanon
frombehindandincludedanaggres
_______________
13Peoplev.DeGuzman,G.R.No.177569,November28,2007,
539 SCRA 306, 314;People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019,
February12,2007,515SCRA537,547,Peoplev.Taan,G.R.No.
169432, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 219, 230;Perez v. People,
G.R.No.150443,January20,2006,479SCRA209,219;Peoplev.
509 Tonog,Jr.,G.R.No.144497,June29,2004,433SCRA139,153
154;Peoplev.Genita,Jr.,G.R.No.126171,March11,2004,425
SCRA 343, 349;People v. Pacheco, G.R. No. 142887, March 2,
2004, 424 SCRA164, 174;Peoplev. Abolidor, G.R.No. 147231,
February18,2004,423SCRA260,265266;Peoplev.Santiago,
G.R.No.13754243,January20,2004,420SCRA248,256.
14Domingov.People,G.R.No.186101,October12,2009,603
SCRA488,508.
15TSN,September1,2003,pp.34.
510
510 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Salafranca
sivephysicalcontrolofthelattersmovementsthatensuredthe
success of the attack without any retaliation or defense on the
partofBolanon.AccordingtotheRevisedPenalCode,16treachery
ispresentwhentheoffendercommitsanyofthecrimesagainst
theperson,employingmeans,methodsorformsintheexecution
thereofwhichtenddirectlyandspeciallytoinsureitsexecution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offendedpartymightmake.
TheCourtfurthernotesEstaostestimonyontheutterance
byBolanonofstatementsidentifyingSalafrancaashisassailant
rightafterthestabbingincident.Thetestimonyfollows:
 QCanyoutellwhathappenedonthesaiddate? AHewassufferingfromhardbreathingsoItoldhimnot
AMynephewarrivedinourhousewithastabwoundon totalkanymorebecausehewilljustsuffermore.
hisleftchest. QWhathappenedwhenyoutoldhimthat?
QWhattimewasthat? AHekeptsilent.
A12:50a.m. QWhattimedidyouarriveatthePGH?
QWhenyousawyournephewwithastabwound,what AI cannot remember the time because I was already
didhesay? confusedatthattime.
ATitodalhinmoakosaHospitalsinaksakako. QWhenyouarrivedatthePGHwhathappened?
QWhatdidyoudo? AHewasbroughttoEmergencyRoom.
AIimmediatelydressedupandbroughthimtoPGH. QWhen he was brought to the emergency room what
QOnthewaytothePGHwhattranspired? happened?
AWhiletravelingtowardPGHIaskedmynephewwho AHewaspronounceddead.17
stabbedhim?,andheanswered,RodSalafranca. It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had
QDoyouknowthisRodSalafranca? gonetotheresidenceofEstao,hisuncle,toseekhelprightafter
AYes,Sir. beingstabbedbySalafranca;thatEstaohadhurriedlydressed
QHowlonghaveyouknownhim? up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by
AMatagalnahokasimagneighborkami. taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estao had asked
QIfyouseehiminsidethecourtroomwillyoubeableto Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao
identifyhim? thathisassailanthadbeenSalafranca;thatatthetimeofthe
AYes,Sir. utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time
_______________ breathing,causingEstaotoadvisehimnottotalkanymore;and
that about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency
16Article14,paragraph16,RevisedPenalCode.
ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been
511
pronounceddead.Suchcircumstancesqualifiedtheutteranceof
VOL.666,FEBRUARY22,2012 511
Bolanonasbothadyingdeclarationandaspartoftheresgestae,
Peoplevs.Salafranca
consideringthattheCourthasrecognizedthatthestatementof
QWillyoulookaroundandpointhimtous?
thevictimanhourbeforehisdeathandrightafterthehacking
A(Witnesspointingtoamanwhoansweredbythename
incidentborealltheearmarkseither
ofRodSalafranca.)
_______________
COURT
17TSN,March18,2003,pp.34.
Whenhetoldyouthenameofhisassailantwhatwas
512
hiscondition?
512 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Salafranca
ofadyingdeclarationorpartoftheresgestaeeitherofwhichwas
anexceptiontothehearsayrule.18
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as
evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be
admittedwhenthefollowingrequisitesconcur,namely:(a)that
the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstancesofthedeclarantsdeath;(b)thatatthetimethe
declarationismade,thedeclarantisunderaconsciousnessofan
impendingdeath;(c)thatthedeclarantiscompetentasawitness;
and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for
homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a
victim.19
Alltherequisitesweremetherein.Bolanoncommunicatedhis
antemortemstatementtoEstao,identifyingSalafrancaasthe
person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement,
Bolanonwasconsciousofhisimpendingdeath,havingsustained
a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao, was then
experiencinggreatdifficultyinbreathing.Bolanonsuccumbedin
the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission,
which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is
ample authority for the view that the declarants belief in the
imminence of his death can be shown by the declarants own
statementsorfromcircumstantialevidence,suchasthenatureof
hiswounds,statementsmadeinhispresence,orbytheopinionof
hisphysician.20Bolanon
_______________
18Peoplev. Loste, G.R.No. 94785, July 1, 1992, 210 SCRA
614, 621, citingPeoplev. Mision,G.R. No. 63480, February 26,
1991,194SCRA432,339340.
19Peoplev.Labagala,G.R.No.184603,August2,2010,626
SCRA267,278;seealsoPeoplev.Garma,G.R.No.110872,April
18, 1997, 271 SCRA 517, 522;People v. Elizaga, No. L78794,
November21,1988,167SCRA516,520;Peoplev.Lanza,No.L
31782,December14,1979,94SCRA613,625;Peoplev.Saliling,
No.L27874,February27,1976,69SCRA427,438.
20M. Graham,Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence
7074, Interim Edition, Vol. 30B, 2000, West Group, St. Paul,
Minne
513
VOL.666,FEBRUARY22,2012 513
Peoplevs.Salafranca
would have been competent to testify on the subject of the
declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was
offeredinthiscriminalprosecutionformurderinwhichBolanon
wasthevictim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of theres
gestaeand thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsayrulewhenthefollowingrequisitesconcur,towit:(a)the
principal act, theres gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statementsaremadebeforethedeclaranthadtimetocontriveor
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
questionanditsimmediatelyattendingcircumstances.21
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of
theresgestaeconcurherein.Surely,whenhegavetheidentityof
the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a startling
occurrence,i.e.,hisstabbingbySalafranca.Bolanonwasthenon
boardthetaxicabthatwouldbringhimtothehospital,andthus
had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the
assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him
was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling
occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified
Salafrancaastheperpetrator.
 Thetermresgestaehasbeendefinedasthosecircumstances
whicharetheundesignedincidentsofaparticularlitigatedact
andwhichareadmissiblewhenillustrativeof
_______________
sota;citingShepardv.UnitedStates,290US96,100;Mattox
v.UnitedStates,146US140,151(senseofimpendingdeathmay
be made to appear from the nature and extent of the wounds
inflicted,beingobviouslysuchthathemusthavefeltorknown
thathecouldnotsurvive.);Webbv.Lane,922F.2d390,395396
(7thCir.1991);UnitedStatesv.Mobley,491F.2d345(5thCir.
1970).
21Peoplev.Peralta,G.R.No.94570,September28,1994,237
SCRA 218, 224;People v. Maguikay, G.R. Nos. 10322628,
October14,1994,237SCRA587,600.
514
514 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Salafranca
such act.22In a general way,res gestaerefers to the
circumstances,facts,anddeclarationsthatgrowoutofthemain
factandservetoillustrateitscharacterandaresospontaneous
andcontemporaneouswiththemainfactastoexcludetheideaof
deliberationandfabrication.23Theruleonresgestaeencompasses
the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants,victims,orspectatorstoacrimeimmediatelybefore,
during,orimmediatelyafterthecommissionofthecrimewhen
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as
aspontaneousreactionorutteranceinspiredbytheexcitementof
theoccasionandtherewasnoopportunity for the declarantto
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. 24The test of
admissibilityofevidenceasapartoftheresgestaeis,therefore,
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwovenorconnectedwiththeprincipalfactoreventthatit
characterizesastoberegardedasapartofthetransactionitself,
and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or
purposetomanufacturetestimony.25
We modifythelimitingof civil damages bytheCAand the
RTCtoonlythedeathindemnityofP50,000.00.Wedeclarethat
thesurvivingheirsofBolanonwereentitledbylawtomorethan
suchindemnity,becausethedamagestobeawardedwhendeath
occurs due to a crime may include: (a) civil indemnityex
delictoforthedeathofthevictim(whichwasgrantedherein);(b)
actualorcompensatorydamages;(c)
_______________
22AlhambraBldg.&LoanAssnv.DeCelle,118P.2d19,47
C.A. 2d 409;Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp.v. Lewis, 61 N.E. 2d
297,326Ill.App.117.
23Kaikov.Dolinger,440A.2d198,184Conn.509;Southern
SuretyCo.v.Weaver,Com.App.273S.W.838.
24Peoplev. Sanchez, G.R.No. 74740, August28, 1992, 213
SCRA70,79.
25Molloyv.ChicagoRapidTransitCo.,166N.E.530,335Ill.
164;Campbellv.Gladden,118A.2d133,383Pa.144,53A.L.R.
2d1222.
515
VOL.666,FEBRUARY22,2012 515
Peoplevs.Salafranca
moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate
damages.26
WeholdthattheCAandtheRTCshouldhavefurthergranted
moral damages which were different from the death
indemnity.27Thedeathindemnitycompensatedthelossoflifedue
tocrime,butappropriateandreasonablemoraldamageswould
justlyassuagethementalanguishandemotionalsufferingsofthe
surviving family of the victim. 28Although mental anguish and
emotionalsufferingsofthesurvivingheirswerenotquantifiable
withmathematicalprecision,theCourtmustnonethelessstrive
tosetanamountthatwouldrestoretheheirsofBolanontotheir
moralstatus quo ante. Given the circumstances, the amount of
P50,000.00isreasonableasmoraldamages,which,pursuantto
prevailing jurisprudence,29we are bound to award despite the
absenceofanyallegationandproofoftheheirsmentalanguish
and emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on
humannatureandexperiencehavingshownthat:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotionalpainandanguishonthepartofthevictimsfamily.It
is inherently human tosuffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger
whenalovedonebecomesthevictimofaviolentorbrutalkilling.
Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the
familyofthedeceasedhispreciouslife,deprivesthemforeverof
hislove,affection
_______________
26People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25,
2012;People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009, 580
SCRA436,455.
27HeirsofRaymundoCastrov.Bustos,L25913,February28,
1969,27SCRA327,333.
28Article 2206, (3), in relation to Article 2217 and Article
2219,CivilCode,andArticle107,RevisedPenalCode.
29People v. Salva, G.R. No. 132351, January 10, 2002, 373
SCRA55,69;Peoplev.Osianas,G.R.No.182548,September30,
2008,567SCRA319,340;Peoplev.Buduhan,G.R.No.178196,
August6,2008,561SCRA337,367368;Peoplev.Berondo,Jr.,
G.R.No.177827,March30,2009,582SCRA547.
516
516 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Salafranca
andsupport,butoftenleavesthemwiththegnawingfeelingthat
aninjusticehasbeendonetothem.30
TheCAandtheRTCcommittedanotheromissionconsisting
in their nonrecognition of the right of the heirs of Bolanon to
temperate damages. It is already settled that when actual
damagesforburialandrelatedexpensesarenotsubstantiatedby
receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are
warranted,foritwouldcertainlybeunfairtothesurvivingheirs
of the victim to deny them compensation by way of actual
damages.31
Moreover, theCivil Codeprovides that exemplary damages
may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.32TheCivil Codepermits such damages to be
awardedbywayofexampleorcorrectionforthepublicgood,in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.33Conformablywithsuchlegalprovisions,theCAand
theRTCshouldhaverecognizedtheentitlementoftheheirsof
the victim to exemplary damages because of the attendance of
treachery.Itwasofnomomentthattreacherywasanattendant
circumstanceinmurder,and,assuch,inseparableandabsorbed
inmurder.TheCourtexplainedsoinPeoplev.Catubig:34
The term aggravating circumstances used by theCivil
Code,thelawnothavingspecifiedotherwise,istobeunderstood
initsbroadorgenericsense.Thecommissionofanoffensehasa
twopronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social
orderandtheotherupontheprivatevictimasitcausespersonal
sufferings,
_______________
 30Peoplev.Panado,G.R.No.133439,December26,2000,348
SCRA679,690691.
31People v. Lacaden, G.R. No. 187682, November 25, 2009,
605SCRA784,804805.
32Article2230,CivilCode.
33Article2229,CivilCode.
34G.R.No.137842,August23,2001,363SCRA621,635.
617
VOL.666,FEBRUARY22,2012
Peoplevs.Salafranca
each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of
heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additionaldamagestothevictim.Theincreaseofthepenaltyora
shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the
offensebytheattendanceofaggravatingcircumstances,whether
ordinaryorqualifying,initscommission.Unlikethecriminal
liabilitywhichisbasicallyaStateconcern,theawardof
damages,however,islikewise,ifnotprimarily,intended
fortheoffendedpartywhosuffersthereby.Itwouldmake
littlesenseforanawardofexemplarydamagestobedue
the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying.Withal,theordinaryorqualifyingnatureofan
aggravatingcircumstanceisadistinctionthatshouldonly
beofconsequencetothecriminal,ratherthantothecivil,
liabilityoftheoffender.Infine,relativetothecivilaspect
of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinaryorqualifying,shouldentitlethe offendedparty
toanawardofexemplarydamageswithintheunbridled
meaningofArticle2230oftheCivilCode.
Forthepurposeoffixingtheexemplarydamages,thesumof
P30,000.00isdeemedreasonableandproper,35becausewethink
thatalesseramountcouldnotresultingenuineexemplarity.
WHEREFORE,theCourtAFFIRMSthedecisionoftheCourt
ofAppealspromulgatedonNovember24,2005,butMODIFIES
the awards of civil damages by adding to the amount of
P50,000.00 awarded as death indemnity the amounts of
P50,000.00asmoraldamages;P25,000.00astemperatedamages;
andP30,000.00asexemplarydamages,allofwhichawardsshall
617
bearinterestof6%perannumfromthefinalityofthisdecision.
Theaccusedshallfurtherpaythecostsofsuit.
_______________
35SeePeople v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 188353, February 16,
2010,612SCRA738,752,Peoplev.DelRosario,G.R.No.189580,
February9,2011,642SCRA625,637638.
518
518 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Salafranca
SOORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), LeonardoDe Castro,
Villarama,Jr.andPerlasBernabe,**JJ.,concur.
Judgmentaffirmedwithmodifications.
Notes.As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay and is
inadmissible as evidence. (People vs. Labagala,626 SCRA 267
[2010])
Res gestaerefers to statements made by the participants or
thevictimsof,orthespectatorsto,acrimeimmediatelybefore,
during, or after its commissionthese statements are a
spontaneousreactionorutteranceinspiredbytheexcitementof
the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to
fabricateafalsestatement. (Peoplevs. Fallones,645SCRA 650
[2011])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
70 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
SCCChemicalsCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals
G.R.No.128538.February28,2001.*
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT
HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO HALILI,
respondents.
RemedialLaw;CivilProcedure;Evidence;Rulethathearsay
evidenceisexcludedandcarriesnoprobativevalueadmitsofan
exception;Itissettledthatitistheopportunitytocrossexamine
whichnegatestheclaimthatthematterstestifiedtobyawitness
arehearsay.Asarule,hearsayevidenceisexcludedandcarries
noprobativevalue.However,theruledoesadmitofanexception.
Whereapartyfailedtoobjecttohearsayevidence,thenthesame
isadmissible.Therationaleforthisexceptionistobefoundinthe
right of a litigant to crossexamine. It is settled that it is the
opportunity to crossexamine which negates the claim that the
matterstestifiedtobyawitnessarehearsay.However,theright
tocrossexaminemaybewaived.Therepeatedfailureofapartyto
crossexaminethewitnessisanimpliedwaiverofsuchright.
Same;Same;Same;UnderSection4,Rule129oftheRules
of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.As correctly
found bytheCourtofAppeals, petitionersadmissionas tothe
executionofthepromissorynotebyitthroughprivaterespondent
ArrietaandBermundoatpretrialsuf
_______________
SECONDDIVISION.
*
71
VOL.353,FEBRUARY28,2001 7
1
SCCChemicalsCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals
ficedtosettlethequestionofthegenuinenessofsignatures.
Theadmissionhavingbeenmadeinastipulationoffactsatpre
trialbytheparties,itmustbetreatedasajudicialadmission.
Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial
admissionrequiresnoproof.
Civil Law;Attorneys Fees;Award of attorneys fees is the
exceptionratherthantherule,henceitisnecessaryforthetrial
court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the
casewithintheexceptionandjustifythegrantoftheaward.Itis
settledthattheawardofattorneysfeesistheexceptionrather
thantherule,henceitisnecessaryforthetrialcourttomake
findingsoffactandlaw,whichwouldbringthecasewithinthe
exceptionandjustifythegrantoftheaward.Otherwisestated,
giventhefailurebythetrialcourttoexplicitlystatetherationale
fortheawardofattorneysfees,thesameshallbedisallowed.In
the present case, a perusal of the records shows that the trial
courtfailedtoexplaintheawardofattorneysfees.Weholdthat
thesameshouldtherebybedeleted.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheresolutionoftheCourt.
RomeoB.Batino&AssociatesLawOfficesforpetitioner.
EscoberandAlonLawOfficeforprivaterespondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING,J.:
Beforeusisapetitionforreview,pursuanttoRule45oftheRules
of Court, of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated in
November 12, 1996 inCAG.R. CV No. 45742entitledState
Investment House, Inc. v. Danilo Arrieta, et al., and SCC
ChemicalCorporation.Thequestioneddecisionaffirmedintoto
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33,
datedMarch22,1993,inCivilCaseNo.8425881,thedispositive
portionofwhichreads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
orderingthelattertopayjointlyandseverallytheplaintiffthe
following:a)To pay plaintiffStateInvestment House, Inc., the
sumofP150,483.16withinterestthereonat
72
72 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
SCCChemicalsCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals
30% per annum reckond (sic) from April, 1984 until the whole
amountisfullypaid;b)Topayplaintiffanamountequivalentto
25%ofthetotalamountdueanddemandableasattorneysfees
andtopaythecost(s)ofsuit.
SOORDERED.1
Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of the
appellatecourtdatedFebruary27,1997,denyingSCCChemicals
Corporationsmotionforreconsideration.
Thebackgroundofthiscase,asculledfromthedecisionofthe
CourtofAppeals,isasfollows:
OnDecember13,1983,SCCChemicalsCorporation(SCCfor
brevity)throughitschairman,privaterespondentDaniloArrieta
and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan
from State Investment House, Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the
amountofP129,824.48.Theloancarriedanannualinterestrate
of30%pluspenaltychargesof2%permonthontheremaining
balance of the principal upon nonpayment on the due date
January 12, 1984. To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo
Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a
ComprehensiveSuretyAgreementbindingthemselvesjointlyand
severallytopaytheobligationonthematuritydate.SCCfailedto
paytheloanwhenitmatured.SIHIthensentdemandlettersto
SCC,ArrietaandHalili,butnotwithstandingreceiptthereof,no
paymentwasmade.
OnAugust2,1984,SIHIfiledCivilCaseNo.8425881fora
sumofmoneywithaprayerforpreliminaryattachmentagainst
SCC,Arrieta,andHaliliwiththeRegionalTrialCourtofManila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHFs lack of cause of action.
PetitionercontendedthatthepromissorynoteuponwhichSIHI
anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding
effectforlackorfailureofconsideration.
Thecasewasthensetforpretrial.Thepartieswereallowed
tomeetoutofcourtinanefforttosettlethedisputeamicably.No
settlementwasreached,butthefollowingstipulationoffactswas
agreedupon:
_______________
1
Rollo,p.33.
73
VOL.353,FEBRUARY28,2001
SCCChemicalsCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals
1. 1.PartiesagreethatthisCourthasjurisdictionoverthe
plaintiffandthedefendantandthatithasjurisdictionto
tryanddecidethiscaseonitsmeritsandthatplaintiff
andthedefendanthaveeachthecapacitytosueandto
besuedinthispresentaction;
2. 2.Partiesagreethatplaintiffsentademandlettertothe
defendant SCC Chemical Corporation dated April 4,
1984togetherwithastatementofaccountofevendate
whichwerebothreceivedbythehereindefendant;and
3. 3.Partiesfinallyagreethattheplaintiffandthedefendant
SCC Chemical Corporation the latter acting through
defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo
executedapromissorynotelastDecember13,1983for
the amount of P129,824.48 with maturity date on
January12,1984.2
Thecasethenproceededtotrialonthesoleissueofwhetheror
notthedefendantswereliabletotheplaintiffandtowhatextent
wastheliability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross
examinationofsaidwitnesswaspostponedseveraltimesdueto
onereasonoranotherattheinstanceofeitherparty.Thecase
wascalendaredseveraltimesforhearingbuteachtime,SCCor
its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally
declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross
examinethewitnessofSIHIandthecasewasdeemedsubmitted
fordecision.
73 OnMarch22,1993,thelowercourtpromulgateditsdecision
infavorofSIHI.
Aggrievedbytheverdict,SCCelevatedthecasetotheCourt
ofAppealswhereitwasdocketedasCAG.R.CVNo.45742.
Onappeal,SCCcontendedthatSIHIhadfailedtoshow,bya
preponderanceofevidence,thatthelatterhadacaseagainstit.
SCCarguedthatthelonewitnesspresentedbySIHItoproveits
claimwasinsufficientasthecompetencyofthewitnesswasnot
established and there was no showing that he had personal
knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no
proof was shown of the genuineness of the signatures in the
documentary exhibits presented as evidence and that these
signatureswere
_______________
2
Id.at31.
74
74 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
SCCChemicalsCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals
neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally, SCC
pointed out that theoriginal copies of the documents were not
presentedincourt.
OnNovember12,1996,theappellatecourtaffirmedintotothe
judgmentappealedfrom.
On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for
reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its
resolutiondatedFebruary27,1997.
 Hence, petitioners recourse to this Court relying on the
followingassignmentsoferror:
I arederivedfromhisownperception,exceptasotherwiseprovided
THERESPONDENTCOURTOFAPPEALSGRAVELYERRED
IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROVED ITS
CAUSE OF ACTION AND OVERCAME ITS BURDEN OF
PROOF.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERREDINAWARDINGATTORNEYSFEESTOTHEPRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
Wefindthepertinentissuessubmittedforresolutiontobe:
1. (1)WhetherornottheCourtofAppealsmadeanerrorof
lawinholdingthatprivaterespondentSIHIhadproved
itscauseofactionbypreponderantevidence;and
2. (2)WhetherornottheCourtofAppealserredinupholding
theawardofattorneysfeestoSIHI.
Anent thefirst issue, petitioner contends that SIHI introduced
documentaryevidencethroughthetestimonyofawitnesswhose
competencewasnotestablishedandwhosepersonalknowledgeof
thetruthfulnessofthefactstestifiedtowasnotdemonstrated.It
arguesthatthesamewasinviolationofSections363and
_______________
3
SEC. 36.Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge;hearsayexcluded.Awitnesscantestifyonlytothose
factswhichheknowsofhispersonalknowledge;thatis,which
intheserules.
75
VOL.353,FEBRUARY28,2001 75
SCCChemicalsCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals
48,4Rule130oftheRulesofCourtanditwasmanifesterrorfor
theCourtofAppealstohaveruledotherwise.Inaddition,SCC
pointsoutthatthesolewitnessofSIHIdidnotprofesstohave
seenthedocumentpresentedinevidenceexecutedorwrittenby
SCC.Thus,noproofofitsgenuinenesswasadduced.SIHIthus
ran afoul of Section 2,5Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which
requires proof of due execution and authenticity of private
documentsbeforethesamecanbereceivedasevidence.Petitioner
likewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the
documentary evidence presented by SIHI were offered in
evidence.Itvehementlyarguesthatsuchwasinviolationofthe
requirementofSection34,6Rule132oftheRulesofCourt.Itwas
thusanerroroflawonthepartoftheappellatecourttoconsider
thesame.Finally,petitionerpositsthatthenonproductionofthe
originals of the documents presented in evidence allows the
presumption of suppression of evidence provided for in Section
3(e),7Rule131oftheRulesofCourt,tocomeintoplay.
Petitionersargumentslackmerit;theyfailtopersuadeus.
_______________
SEC. 48.General Rule.The opinion of a witness is not
4
admissible,exceptasindicatedinthefollowingsections.
 5
SEC.2.Proceedingstoberecorded.Theentireproceedings
of a trial or hearing; including the questions propounded to a
witness and his answers thereto, the statements made by the
judgeoranyoftheparties,counsel,orwitnesseswithreferenceto
thecase,shallberecordedbymeansofshorthandorstenotypeor
by other means of recording found suitable by the court.
Atranscriptoftherecordoftheproceedingsmadebytheofficial
stenographer,stenotypistorrecorderandcertifiedascorrectby
him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such
proceedings.
6
SEC. 34.Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
whichtheevidenceisofferedshallbespecified.
7
SEC. 3.Disputable presumptions.The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx
1. (e)Thatevidencewillfullysuppressedwouldbeadverseif
produced.
76
76 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
SCCChemicalsCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals
We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to
appear several times on scheduled hearing dates despite due
notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing dates,
petitionerwassupposedtocrossexaminethelonewitnessoffered
bySIHItoproveitscase.Petitionernowchargestheappellate
courtwithcommittinganerroroflawwhenitfailedtodisallow
the admission in evidence of said testimony pursuant to the
hearsayrulecontainedinSection36,Rule130oftheRulesof
Court.
Rule130,Section36reads:
SEC. 36.Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsayexcluded.Awitnesscantestifyonlytothosefactswhich
heknowsofhispersonalknowledge;thatis,whicharederived
fromhis own perception,exceptasotherwise provided in these
rules.
PetitionersrelianceonSection36,Rule130oftheRulesofCourt
ismisplaced.Asarule,hearsayevidenceisexcludedandcarries
noprobativevalue.8However,theruledoesadmitofanexception.
Whereapartyfailedtoobjecttohearsayevidence,thenthesame
isadmissible.9Therationaleforthisexceptionistobefoundin
therightofalitiganttocrossexamine.Itissettledthatitisthe
opportunity to crossexamine which negates the claim that the
matterstestifiedtobyawitnessarehearsay. 10However,theright
tocrossexaminemaybewaived.Therepeatedfailureofaparty
tocrossexaminethewitnessisanimpliedwaiverofsuchright.
Petitionerwasaffordedseveralopportunitiesbythetrialcourtto
crossexamine the other partys witness. Petitioner repeatedly
failedtotakeadvantageoftheseopportunities.Noerrorwasthus
committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial
courts finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross
examine
_______________
Waterous Drug Corporation v. NLRC,280 SCRA 735, 745
8
(1997) citingPeople v. Laurente,255 SCRA 543, 567
(1996);Batiquin v. Court of Appeals,258 SCRA 334, 342
(1996);Eugenio v. Court of Appeals,239 SCRA 207, 216 (1994)
citingPeople v. Valero,L4528384, March 19,112 SCRA
661(1982);3Jonesonevidence,2ndEd.,745(1994).
9
Krohnv.CourtofAppeals,233SCRA146,154(1994).
10
SanSebastianCollegev.CourtofAppeals,197SCRA138
146(1991).
77
VOL.353,FEBRUARY28,2001
SCCChemicalsCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals
theopposingpartyswitness.Itisnowtoolateforpetitionertobe
raisingthismatterofhearsayevidence.
Norwastheassailedtestimonyhearsay.TheCourtofAppeals
correctlyfoundthatthewitnessofSIHIwasacompetentwitness
ashetestifiedtofacts,whichheknewofhispersonalknowledge.
Thus,therequirementsofSection36,Rule130oftheRulesof
Courtastotheadmissibilityofhistestimonyweresatisfied.
Respectingpetitionersothersubmissions,thesamearemoot
and academic. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,
petitionersadmissionastotheexecutionofthepromissorynote
byitthroughprivaterespondentArrietaandBermundoatpre
trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of
signatures.Theadmissionhavingbeenmadeinastipulationof
factsatpretrialbytheparties,itmustbetreatedasajudicial
admission. Under Section 4,11Rule 129 of the Rulesof Court, a
judicialadmissionrequiresnoproof.
Nor will petitioners reliance on the best evidence
rule12advanceitscause.RespondentSIHIhadnoneedtopresent
the original of the documents as there was already a judicial
admission by petitioner at pretrial of the execution of the
promissorynoteandreceiptofthedemandletter.Itisnowtoo
late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its
admissionoftheexistenceofthesedocumentswassufficientto
establishitsobligation.Petitionerfailedtosubmitanyevidenceto
thecontraryorproofofpaymentorotherformsofextinguishment
ofsaidobligation.Noreversibleerrorwasthuscommittedbythe
appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its obligation,
pursuanttoArticle1159oftheCivilCodewhichreads:
_______________
77 11
SEC. 4.Judicial admissions.An admission, verbal or
written,madebyapartyinthecourseoftheproceedingsinthe
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradictedonlybyshowingthatitwasmadethroughpalpable
mistakeorthatnosuchadmissionwasmade.
12
RULESOFCOURT,Rule130,sec.3and4.
78
78 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
SCCChemicalsCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals
ART.1159.Obligationsarisingfromcontractshavetheforceof
lawbetweenthecontractingpartiesandshouldbecompliedwith
ingoodfaith.
Onthesecondissue,petitionerchargestheCourtofAppealswith
reversible error for having sustained the trial courts award of
attorneysfees.PetitionerreliesonRadioCommunicationsofthe
Philippines v. Rodriguez,182 SCRA 899, 909 (1990), where we
heldthatwhenattorneysfeesare awarded, the reason forthe
awardofattorneysfeesmustbestatedinthetextofthecourts
decision.Petitionersubmitsthatsincethetrialcourtdidnotstate
anyreasonforawardingthesame,theawardofattorneysfees
shouldhavebeendisallowedbytheappellatecourt.
Wefindforpetitionerinthisregard.
Itissettledthattheawardofattorneysfeesistheexception
ratherthantherule,henceitisnecessaryforthetrialcourtto
makefindingsoffactandlaw,whichwouldbringthecasewithin
the exception and justify the grant of the award. 13Otherwise Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
stated,giventhefailurebythetrialcourttoexplicitlystatethe reserved.
rationale for the award of attorneys fees, the same shall be
disallowed. In thepresentcase, a perusal oftherecordsshows
thatthetrialcourtfailedtoexplaintheawardofattorneysfees.
Weholdthatthesameshouldtherebybedeleted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
ThedecisiondatedNovember12,1996oftheCourtofAppealsis
AFFIRMEDWITHMODIFICATIONthattheawardofattorneys
fees to private respondent SIHI is hereby deleted. No
pronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Bellosillo(Chairman),Mendoza,BuenaandDeLeon,Jr.,
JJ.,concur.
Petitionpartlygranted,judgmentaffirmedwithmodification.

_______________

Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals,256 SCRA

13

491,504(1996).
79
VOL.353,FEBRUARY28,2001 79
SCCChemicalsCorporationvs.CourtofAppeals VOL.434,JULY20,2004 543
Note.Thefailureofapartytointerposeatimelyobjectionto LandbankofthePhilippinesvs.Banal
thepresentationofprosecutionstestimonialevidenceresultsin G.R.No.143276.July20,2004.*
thewaiverofanyobjectiontotheadmissibilitythereof.(People LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.SPOUSES
vs.Sanchez,308SCRA264[1999]) VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENASBANAL,
respondents.
o0o Agrarian Reform;Just Compensation;Due Process;The
determinationofjustcompensationofthepropertytakeninvolves
80 theexaminationofthefactorsspecifiedinSection17ofR.A.6657
the trial court cannot dispense with the hearing and merely
orderthepartiestosubmittheirrespectivememoranda.TheRTC
failedtoobservethebasicrulesofprocedureandthefundamental
requirements in determining just compensation for the
property.Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely
orderedthepartiestosubmittheirrespectivememoranda.Such
action is grossly erroneous since the determination of just
compensation involves the examination of the following factors
specifiedinSection17ofR.A.6657,asamended:1.thecostofthe
acquisitionoftheland;2.thecurrentvalueoflikeproperties;3.
itsnature,actualuseandincome;4.theswornvaluationbythe
owner; the tax declarations; 5. the assessment made by
government assessors; 6. the social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
governmenttotheproperty;and7.thenonpaymentoftaxesor
loanssecuredfromanygovernmentfinancinginstitutiononthe
saidland,ifany.Obviously,thesefactorsinvolvefactualmatters
which can be established only during a hearing wherein the
contending partiespresent theirrespectiveevidence.Infact, to
underscore theintricate natureofdetermining thevaluationof
theland,Section58ofthesamelawevenauthorizestheSpecial
AgrarianCourtstoappointcommissionersforsuchpurpose.
Same;Same;Judicial Notice;Wellsettled is the rule that
courtsarenotauthorizedtotakejudicialnoticeofthecontentsof
therecordsofothercasesevenwhensaidcaseshavebeentriedor
are pending in the same court or before the same judge.Well
settledistherulethatcourtsarenotauthorizedtotakejudicial
noticeofthecontentsoftherecordsofothercasesevenwhensaid
caseshavebeentriedorarependinginthesamecourtorbefore
thesamejudge.Theymayonlydosointheabsenceofobjection property;andingrantingcompoundedinterestpursuanttoDAR
and withthe knowledge ofthe opposing party, whicharenot
obtaininghere.Furthermore,asearlierstated,theRulesofCourt
shallapplytoallproceedingsbeforetheSpecialAgrarianCourts.
In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on
Evidenceisexplicitonthenecessityofahearingbeforeacourt
takesjudicialnoticeofacertainmatter,thus:SEC.3.Judicial
notice,whenhearingnecessary.Duringthe
_______________
*
THIRDDIVISION.
544
5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
44
LandbankofthePhilippinesvs.Banal
trial,thecourt,onitsowninitiative,oronrequestofaparty,
mayannounceitsintentiontotakejudicialnoticeofanymatter
and allow thepartiesto be heard thereon. After thetrial, and
before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiativeoronrequestofaparty,maytakejudicialnoticeofany
matterandallowthepartiestobeheardthereonifsuchmatteris
decisiveofamaterialissueinthecase.(emphasisadded)
Same;Same;It is error for the trial court to apply the
formula prescribed in E.O. No. 228 and R.A. No. 3844, as
amended,indeterminingthevaluationoflandplantedtococonut
andriceandingrantingcompoundedinterestpursuanttoDAR
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994it should have
applied DAR AdministrativeOrder No. 6, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 11.The RTC erred in applying the
formulaprescribedunderExecutiveOrder(EO)No.228andR.A.
No. 3844, as amended, in determining the valuation of the
AdministrativeOrderNo.13,Seriesof1994.Itmustbestressed
that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural landsprimarily
devoted to rice and corn, while R.A. 3844 governsagricultural
leasehold relationbetween the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or
legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the
same.Here,thelandisplantedtococonutandriceanddoesnot
involve agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court
shouldhaveappliedistheformulainDARAdministrativeOrder
No.6,asamendedbyDARAdministrativeOrderNo.11discussed
earlier.
Same;Same;DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of
1994doesnotapplytolandstakenunderP.D.No.27andE.O.
No. 228 whose owners have not been compensated.As regards
the award ofcompounded interest, sufficeittostatethatDAR
AdministrativeOrderNo.13,Seriesof1994doesnotapplytothe
subjectlandbuttothoselandstakenunderPresidentialDecree
No.27andExecutiveOrderNo.228whoseownershavenotbeen
compensated.Inthiscase,thepropertyiscoveredbyR.A.6657,
as amended, and respondents have been paid the provisional
compensationthereof,asstipulatedduringthepretrial.
Same;Same;While the determination of just compensation
involvestheexerciseofjudicialdiscretion,suchdiscretionmustbe
discharged within the bounds of the law.While the
determination of just compensation involves the exercise of
judicialdiscretion,however,suchdiscretionmustbedischarged
within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly
disregardedR.A.6657,asamended,anditsimplementingrules
andregulations.(DARAdministrativeOrderNo.6,asamended
byDARAdministrativeOrderNo.11).
545
VOL.434,JULY20,2004
LandbankofthePhilippinesvs.Banal
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Miguel M. Gonzales,Rosemarie M. Ozoteo,Ricarte P.A.
ReyandNorbertoL.Martinezforpetitioner.
ManuelFerrerforprivaterespondents.
SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,J.:
Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the
registered owners of 19.3422 hectares of agricultural land
situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T6296. A portion of the land
consisting of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to
coconutand0.7600plantedtopalay)wascompulsorilyacquired
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to
RepublicAct(R.A.)No.6657,1asamended,otherwiseknownas
theComprehensiveAgrarianReformLawof1988.
In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR
AdministrativeOrderNo.6,Seriesof1992, 2asamendedbyDAR
AdministrativeOrderNo.11,Seriesof1994, 3theLandBankof
the Philippines4(Landbank), petitioner, made the following
valuationoftheproperty:
_______________
EffectiveJune15,1988.
1
Rules and Regulations Amending the Valuation of Lands
2
VoluntarilyOfferedandCompulsorilyAcquiredAsProvidedFor
UnderAdministrativeOrderNo.17,Seriesof1989,AsAmended,
545 IssuedPursuanttoRepublicActNo.6657.
 3
RevisingtheRulesandRegulationsCoveringtheValuation
of Lands Voluntarily Offered or Compulsorily Acquired as
EmbodiedinAdministrativeOrderNo.6,Seriesof1992.
4
Executive Order No. 405, dated June 14, 1990, vests the
Land Bank of the Philippines the primary responsibility to
determine the land valuation and compensation for all private
landscoveredbyR.A.6657,asamended.SeePhilippineVeterans
Bank vs. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 132767, January 18,
2000,322SCRA139,145.
546
546 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
LandbankofthePhilippinesvs.Banal
Acquiredproperty Areainhectares Value
Coconutland 5.4730 P148,675.19
Riceland 0.7600
P173,918.55
Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to
Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as amended, a summary
administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the
valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its
DecisionaffirmingtheLandbanksvaluation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet,
Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a
petitionfordeterminationofjustcompensation,docketedasCivil
CaseNo.6806.ImpleadedasrespondentsweretheDARandthe
Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation of
P100,000.00perhectareforbothcoconutlandandriceland,oran
aggregateamountofP623,000.00.
During the pretrial on September 23, 1998, the parties
submittedtotheRTCthefollowingadmissionsoffacts:(1)the
subject property is governed by the provisionsof R.A. 6657, as
amended;(2)itwasdistributedtothefarmersbeneficiaries;and
(3)theLandbankdepositedtheprovisionalcompensationbased
onthevaluationmadebytheDAR.5
Onthesamedayafterthepretrial,thecourtissuedanOrder
dispensingwiththehearinganddirectingthepartiestosubmit
theirrespectivememoranda.6
In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court
computed the just compensation for the coconut land at
P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of
P703,137.00, which is beyond respondents valuation of
P623,000.00.Thecourtfurtherawardedcompoundedinterestat
P79,732.00incash.ThedispositiveportionoftheDecisionreads:
WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedasfollows:
_______________
25,243.36
5
PretrialOrder,Rolloatpp.7677.
6
Rolloatpp.25,82.
547
VOL.434,JULY20,2004 547
LandbankofthePhilippinesvs.Banal
1. 1.OrderingrespondentLandbanktopaythepetitioners,
the spouses Dr. Vicente Banal and Leonidas Arenas
Banal,forthe5.4730hectaresofcoconutlandthesumof
SIX HUNDRED FIFTYSEVEN THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED THIRTYSEVEN PESOS (P657,137.00) in
cashandinbondsintheproportionprovidedbylaw;
2. 2.Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners
forthe.7600hectaresofricelandthesumofFORTYSIX
THOUSANDPESOS(P46,000.00)incashandinbonds
intheproportionprovidedbylaw;and
 3. 3.Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners
the sum of SEVENTYNINE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED THIRTYTWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as the
compoundedinterestincash.
ITISSOORDERED.7
Indeterminingthevaluationoftheland,thetrialcourtbasedthe
sameonthefactsestablishedinanothercasependingbeforeit
(CivilCaseNo.6679,LuzRodriguezvs.DAR,etal.),usingthe
followingformula:
Forthecoconutland
1. 1.AverageGrossProduction(AGP)x.70x9.70(priceper
kiloofcoconut)=NetIncome(NI)
2. 2.NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the
capitalizationformulaunderRepublicActNo.38448)
Forthericeland
1. 1.2.5xAGPxGovernmentSupportPrice(GSP)=Land
Value(LV)orPPH(usingtheformulaunderExecutive
OrderNo.2289
2. 2.AGPx6%compoundedannuallyfor26yearsxGSP=
Interest(pursuanttoDARAONo.13,Seriesof1994)
_______________
7
RTCDecisionatp.7,Id.,atp.68.
8
CodeofAgrarianReformsofthePhilippines.
9
Entitled Declaring Full Land Ownership to Qualified
Farmer Beneficiaries Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27,
Determining the Value of Remaining Unvalued Rice and Corn
LandsSubjectofP.D.No.27,andProvidingfortheMannerof
PaymentbytheFarmerBeneficiaryandModeofCompensation
totheLandowner,datedJuly17,1987.
548
548 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
LandbankofthePhilippinesvs.Banal
Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a
petitionforreview,docketedasCAG.R.SPNo.52163.
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a
Decision10affirmingin totothe judgment of the trial court. The
Landbanksmotionforreconsiderationwaslikewisedenied.11
Hence,thispetitionforreviewoncertiorari.
ThefundamentalissueforourresolutioniswhethertheCourt
ofAppealserredinsustainingthetrialcourtsvaluationofthe
land.Asearliermentioned,therewasnotrialonthemerits.
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405
(1990), the Landbank is charged primarily with the
determination of the land valuation and compensation for all
privatelandssuitableforagricultureundertheVoluntaryOffer
toSellorCompulsoryAcquisitionarrangement...Foritspart,
the DARrelieson thedetermination ofthe land valuation and
compensationbytheLandbank.12
Based on the Landbanks valuation of the land, the DAR
makesanoffertothelandowner. 13Ifthelandowneracceptsthe
offer,theLandbankshallpayhimthepurchasepriceoftheland
afterheexecutesanddeliversadeedoftransferandsurrenders
the certificate of title in favor of the government. 14In case the
landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR
adjudicator15conducts summary administrative proceedings to
determine the compensation for the land by requiring the
landowner,theLandbankandotherinterestedpartiestosubmit
evidence as to the just compensation for the land. 16These
functionsbytheDARarein
_______________
10
Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and
concurredbyAssociateJusticesRamonMabutas,Jr.andDelilah
VidallonMagtolis.
11
ResolutiondatedMay16,2000,Rolloatp.60.
12
Sec.1,ExecutiveOrderNo.405(1990);Republicvs.Courtof
Appeals,G.R. No. 122256, October 30, 1996,263 SCRA
758andPhilippineVeteransBankvs.CourtofAppeals,supra.
13
Sec.16(a)ofR.A.6657,asamended.
14
Sec.16(c),Id.
15
TheProvincialAgrarianReformAdjudicator(PARAD)and
theRegionalAgrarianReformAdjudicator(RARAD),depending
on the value of the land within their respective territorial
jurisdiction(RuleII,Sec.2,DARABRulesofProcedure).
16
Sec. 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as amended;Philippine Veterans
Bankvs.CourtofAppeals,supra.
549
VOL.434,JULY20,2004
LandbankofthePhilippinesvs.Banal
accordancewithitsquasijudicialpowersunderSection50ofR.A.
6657,asamended,whichprovides:
SEC.50.QuasiJudicialPowersoftheDAR.TheDARishereby
vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
DepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResources(DENR).
xxx.
ApartywhodisagreeswiththedecisionoftheDARadjudicator
may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special
AgrarianCourt17forfinaldeterminationofjustcompensation.18
IntheproceedingsbeforetheRTC,itismandatedtoapplythe
RulesofCourt19and,onitsowninitiativeorattheinstanceofany
oftheparties,appointoneormorecommissionerstoexamine,
investigateandascertainfactsrelevanttothedispute,including
thevaluationofproperties,andtofileawrittenreportthereofxx
x.20In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to
considerseveralfactorsenumeratedinSection17ofR.A.6657,as
amended,thus:
Sec. 17.Determination of Just Compensation.In determining
justcompensation,thecostofacquisitionoftheland,thecurrent
value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered.
Thesocialandeconomicbenefitscontributedbythefarmersand
thefarmworkersandbytheGovernmenttotheproperty,aswell
as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land, shall be
consideredasadditionalfactorstodetermineitsvaluation.
549 ThesefactorshavebeentranslatedintoabasicformulainDAR
AdministrativeOrderNo.6,Seriesof1992,asamendedbyDAR
AdministrativeOrderNo.11,Seriesof1994,issuedpursuantto
_______________
17
Sec.56,Id.
18
Sec.16(f),inrelationtoSec.57,Id.
19
Sec.57,Id.
20
Sec.58,Id.
550
550 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED 2. 2.thecurrentvalueoflikeproperties;
LandbankofthePhilippinesvs.Banal
theDARsrulemakingpowertocarryouttheobjectandpurposes 3. 3.itsnature,actualuseandincome;
ofR.A.6657,asamended.21
The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as 4. 4.theswornvaluationbytheowner;thetaxdeclarations;
amended,isasfollows:
LV=(CNIx0.6)+(CSx0.3)+(MVx0.1) _______________
LV=LandValue
CNI=CapitalizedNetIncome
21
Sec.49.RulesandRegulations.ThePARCandtheDAR
CS=ComparableSales shall have the power to issue rules and regulations, whether
MV=MarketValueperTaxDeclaration substantiveorprocedural,tocarryouttheobjectandpurposesof
Theabove formula shallbeusedifallthe threefactors are this Act. Said rules shall take effect ten (10) days after
present,relevantandapplicable. publicationintwo(2)nationalnewspapersofgeneralcirculation.
A.1WhentheCSfactorisnotpresentandCNIandMVare 551
applicable,theformulashallbe: VOL.434,JULY20,2004 551
LV=(CNIx0.9)+(MVx0.1) LandbankofthePhilippinesvs.Banal
A.2WhentheCNIfactorisnotpresent,andCSandMVare
applicable,theformulashallbe: 1. 5.theassessmentmadebygovernmentassessors;
LV=(CSx0.9)+(MVx0.1)
A.3WhenboththeCSandCNIarenotpresentandonlyMV 2. 6.the social and economic benefits contributed by the
isapplicable,theformulashallbe: farmersandthefarmworkersandbythegovernmentto
LV=MVx2 theproperty;and
Here,theRTCfailedtoobservethebasicrulesofprocedureand
thefundamentalrequirementsindeterminingjustcompensation 3. 7.the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any
fortheproperty.Firstly,itdispensedwiththehearingandmerely government financing institution on the said land, if
orderedthepartiestosubmittheirrespectivememoranda.Such any.
action is grossly erroneous since the determination of just
compensation involves the examination of the following factors
Obviously, these factors involvefactualmatters which can be
specifiedinSection17ofR.A.6657,asamended:
establishedonlyduringahearingwhereinthecontendingparties
present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the
1. 1.thecostoftheacquisitionoftheland; intricatenatureofdeterminingthevaluationoftheland,Section
58ofthesamelawevenauthorizestheSpecialAgrarianCourtsto
appointcommissionersforsuchpurpose.
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of
respondentspropertyisP703,137.00,merelytookjudicialnotice
oftheaverageproductionfiguresintheRodriguezcasepending
beforeitandappliedthesametothiscasewithoutconductinga
hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the
parties,thus:
xxx.Inthecasexxxofthecoconutportionoftheland5.4730
hectares,defendantsdeterminedtheaveragegrossproductionper
yearat506.95kilosonly,butintheveryrecentcaseofLuz
Rodriguezvs.DAR,etal.,filedanddecidedbythiscourtin
CivilCaseNo.6679alsoforjustcompensationforcoconutlands
andRicelandsituatedatBasud,CamarinesNortewhereinalso
thelandsintheaboveentitledcasearesituated,thevaluefixed
therein was 1,061.52 kilos per annumper hectare for
coconut land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but inthe
instantcasethepriceperkiloisP9.70.Inthepresentcase,
weconsider506.95kilosaveragegrossproductionperyearper
hectaretobeverylowconsideringthatfarmpracticeforcoconut
lands is harvest every fortyfive days. We cannot also
comprehendedwhyintheRodriguezcaseandinthiscasethere
isagreatvarianceinaverageproductionperyearwheninthe
twocasesthelandsarebothcoconutlandsandinthesameplace
of Basud, Camarines Norte. We believe that it is more fair to
adapt the 1,061.52 kilos per hectare per year as average gross
production.In theRodriguez case,the defendants fixed the
averagegrossproductionofpalayat3,000kilosor60cavansper
year.Thecourtisalsoconstrainedtoapplythisyearlypalay
productionintheRodriguezcasetothecaseatbar.
xxxxxxxxx
AsshownintheMemorandumofLandbankinthiscase,the
areaofthecoconutlandtakenunderCARPis5.4730hectares.
Butasalreadynoted,theaveragegrossproductionayearof
506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by Landbank is too low as
comparedtotheRodriguez
552
552 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
LandbankofthePhilippinesvs.Banal
casewhichwas1,061kiloswhenthecoconutlandinboth
cases arein the same town of Basud, Camarines Norte,
compelling this courtthen to adapt 1,061 kilos as the
averagegrossproductionayearofthecoconutlandinthis
case.WehavetoapplyalsothepriceofP9.70perkiloasthisis
thevaluethatLandbankfixedforthiscase.
The net income of thecoconut land is equal to 70% of the
grossincome.So,thenetincomeofthecoconutlandis1,061x.70
x9.70equalsP7,204.19perhectare.Applyingthecapitalization
formula ofR.A. 3844to thenet income of P7,204.19 divided by
6%, the legal rate of interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare.
Therefore, the just compensation for the 5.4730 hectares is
P657,137.00.
The Riceland taken underPresidential Decree No. 27as of
October 21, 1972 has an area of .7600 hectare.If in
theRodriguezcasethe Landbank fixed the average gross
productionof3000kilosor60cavansofpalayperyear,thenthe.
7600hectareinthiscasewouldbe46cavans.Thevalueofthe
ricelandthereforeinthiscaseis46cavansx2.5xP400.00equals
P46,000.00.22
PARCResolution94241of25October1994,implementedby
DAR AO 13, granted interest on the compensation at 6%
compoundedannually.Thecompoundedinterestonthe46cavans
for26yearsis199.33cavans.AtP400.00percavan,thevalueof
thecompoundedinterestisP79,732.00.23(emphasisadded)
Wellsettled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take
judicialnoticeofthecontentsoftherecordsofothercaseseven
whensaidcaseshavebeentriedorarependinginthesamecourt
orbeforethesamejudge.24Theymayonlydosointheabsence
ofobjection and with the knowledge of the opposing
party,25whicharenotobtaininghere.
Furthermore,asearlierstated,theRulesofCourtshallapply
to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this
regard,Section3,Rule129oftheRevisedRulesonEvidenceis
explicitonthenecessityofahearingbeforeacourttakesjudicial
noticeofacertainmatter,thus:
SEC. 3.Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.During the
trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a
party,mayannounceitsintentiontotakejudicialnoticeof
anymatterandallowthepartiestobeheardthereon.
Afterthetrial,andbeforejudgmentoronappeal,theproper
court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicialnoticeofanymatterandallowthepartiestobeheard
thereonifsuchmatterisdecisiveofamaterialissueinthecase.
(emphasisadded)
TheRTCfailedtoobservetheaboveprovisions.
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed
under Executive Order (EO) No. 22826and R.A. No. 3844,27as
amended, in determining the valuation of the property; and in
granting compounded interest pursuantto DAR Administrative
OrderNo.13,Seriesof1994. 28ItmustbestressedthatEONo.
228 covers private agricultural landsprimarily devoted to rice
and corn, while R.A. 3844 governsagricultural leasehold
relationbetween the person who furnishes the landholding,
eitherasowner,civillawlessee,usufructuary,orlegalpossessor,
andthepersonwhopersonallycultivatesthesame. 29Here,the
land is planted to coconut and rice and does not involve
agriculturalleaseholdrelation.Whatthetrialcourtshouldhave
applied is the formula in DAR AdministrativeOrder No. 6, as
amendedbyDARAdministrativeOrderNo.11discussedearlier.
As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to
statethatDARAdministrativeOrderNo.13,Seriesof1994does
not apply to the subject land but to those lands taken under
PresidentialDecreeNo.2730andExecutiveOrderNo.228whose
ownershavenotbeencompensated.Inthiscase,thepropertyis
covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been
paidtheprovisional compensation thereof, asstipulatedduring
thepretrial.
While the determination of just compensation involves the
exerciseofjudicialdiscretion,however,suchdiscretionmustbe
dischargedwithintheboundsofthelaw.Here,theRTCwantonly
disregardedR.A.6657,asamended,anditsimplementingrules
andregulations.(DARAdministrativeOrderNo.6,asamended
byDARAdministrativeOrderNo.11).
Insum,wefindthattheCourtofAppealsandtheRTCerred
indeterminingthevaluationofthesubjectland.Thus,wedeemit
proper to remand this case to the RTC for trial on the merits
wherein the parties may present their respective evidence. In
determiningthevaluationofthesubjectproperty,thetrialcourt
shallconsiderthefactorsprovidedunderSection17ofR.A.6657,
as amended, mentioned earlier. The formula prescribed by the
DARinAdministrativeOrderNo.6,Seriesof1992,asamended
by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, shall be
used in the valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon its own
initiative,orattheinstanceofanyoftheparties,thetrialcourt
mayappointoneormorecommissionerstoexamine,investigate
andascertainfactsrelevanttothedispute.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
DecisionoftheCourtofAppealsdatedMarch20,2000inCAG.R.
SPNo.52163isREVERSED.CivilCaseNo.6806isREMANDED
totheRTC,Branch40,Daet,CamarinesNorte,fortrialonthe
meritswithdispatch.Thetrialjudgeisdirectedtoobservestrictly
the procedures specified above in determining the proper
valuationofthesubjectproperty.
_______________
30
EntitledDecreeingtheEmancipationofTenantsfromthe
BondageoftheSoilTransferringToThemTheOwnershipofthe
LandTheyTill andProvidingthe Instruments andMechanism
Therefor,datedOctober21,1972.
555
SOORDERED.
Panganiban(Chairman)andCarpioMorales,JJ.,concur.
Corona,J.,OnLeave.
Petitiongranted,assaileddecisionreversed.
Notes.TheCARLandE.O.407werenotintendedtotake
awaypropertywithoutdueprocessoflawnorweretheyintended
toimpairtheobligationofcontracts.(DevelopmentBankofthe
Philippinesvs.CourtofAppeals,262SCRA245[1996])
Itwouldsubverttheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofthe
RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation
casesinadministrativeofficialsandmaketheRTCanappellate
courtforthereviewofadministrativedecisions.Whatagrarian
adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a
preliminary manner thereasonable compensationto be paid to
landowners,leavingtothecourtstheultimatepowertodecide
the question. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals,263 SCRA
758[1996])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
VOL.292,JULY16,1998 551
Peoplevs.Kulais
G.R.Nos.10090108.July16,1998.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff
appellee,vs.JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @
Commander Falcasantos, AWALON KAMLON HASSAN @
CommanderKamlon,MAJIDSAMSON@CommanderBungi,
JUMATIYAAMLANIDEFALCASANTOS,NORMASAHIDDAN
DEKULAIS,SALVADORMAMARILyMENDOZA,HADJIRUL
PLASINyALIH, JAINUDDIN HASSANyAHMAD, IMAM
TARUK ALAHySALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING,
FREDDIE MANUEL @ Ajid and several JOHN and JANE
DOES,accused.JAILONKULAIS,accusedappellant.
Criminal Law;Constitutional Law;Right of
Confrontation;Judicial Notice;As a general rule, courts should
nottakejudicial
_______________
 *
FIRSTDIVISION.
552
5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
52
Peoplevs.Kulais
noticeoftheevidencepresentedinotherproceedings,evenif
thesehavebeentriedorarependinginthesamecourt,orhave
been heard and are actually pending before the same judge.
True,asageneralrule,courtsshouldnottakejudicialnoticeof
theevidencepresentedinotherproceedings,evenifthesehave
beentriedorarependinginthesamecourt,orhavebeenheard
andareactuallypendingbeforethesamejudge.Thisisespecially
trueincriminalcases,wheretheaccusedhastheconstitutional
righttoconfrontandcrossexaminethewitnessesagainsthim.
Same;Kidnapping;Thefactthatthevictimsweredetained
for only three hours does not matter if said victims are public
officers.Victims Virginia San AgustinGara, Monico Saavedra
and Calixto Francisco were members of the government
monitoring team abducted by appellants group. The three
testifiedtothefactofkidnapping;however,theywerenotableto
identifytheappellant.Evenso,appellantsidentityasoneofthe
kidnapperswassufficientlyestablishedbyCalunod,Bacarroand
Perez, who were with Gara, Saavedra and Francisco when the
abduction occurred. That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were
detained for only three hours does not matter. InPeople vs.
Domasian,thevictimwassimilarlyheldforthreehours,andwas
releasedevenbeforehisparentsreceivedtheransomnote.The
accused therein argued that they could not be held guilty of
kidnapping as no enclosure was involved, and that only grave
coercion was committed, if at all. Convicting appellants of
kidnappingorseriousillegaldetentionunderArt.267(4)ofthe
RevisedPenalCode,theCourtfoundthatthevictim,aneight
yearoldboy,wasdeprivedofhislibertywhenhewasrestrained
from going home. The Courtjustified the convictionby holding
that the offense consisted not only in placing a person in an
enclosure,butalsoindetainingordeprivinghim,inanymanner,
ofhisliberty.Likewise,inPeoplevs.Santos,theCourtheldthat
sincetheappellantwaschargedandconvictedunderArticle267,
paragraph4,itwasnotthedurationofthedeprivationofliberty
whichwasimportant,butthefactthatthevictim,aminor,was
lockedup.
Same;Witnesses;Alibi and Denial;Jurisprudence gives
greaterweighttothepositivenarrationofprosecutionwitnesses
thantothenegativetestimoniesofthedefense.Theappellants
baredenialisaweakdefensethatbecomesevenweakerinthe
faceof theprosecutionwitnesses positiveidentificationofhim.
Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration of
prosecutionwitnesses
553
VOL.292,JULY16,1998 553
Peoplevs.Kulais
than to the negative testimonies of the defense. Between
positiveandcategoricaltestimonywhichhasaringoftruthtoit
on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former
generally prevails. Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and
Edilberto Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank
manner; and their testimonies were compatible on material
points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap
victimsandnonewasfoundbythisCourt.
Same;Penalties;Lifeimprisonmentisnotsynonymouswith
reclusionperpetua.Thetrialcourterredwhenitsentencedthe
appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The penalty for
kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code,
isreclusionperpetuatodeath.Sincethecrimeshappenedin1988,
whenthecapitalpenaltywasproscribedbytheConstitution,the
maximum penalty that could have been imposed wasreclusion
perpetua. Life imprisonment is not synonymous withreclusion
perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment,reclusion perpetuacarries
with it accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code
and has a definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment is
invariablyimposedforseriousoffensespenalizedbyspeciallaws,
whilereclusion perpetuais prescribed in accordance with the
RevisedPenalCode.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtof
ZamboangaCity,Br.12.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforaccusedappellant.
PANGANIBAN,J.:
Thetrialcourtserroneoustakingofjudicialnoticeofawitness
testimonyinanothercase,alsopendingbeforeit,doesnotaffect
the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming
evidence,bothtestimonialanddocumentary.TheCourttakesthis
occasion also to remind the bench and the bar thatreclusion
perpetuaisnotsynonymouswithlifeimprisonment.
554
554 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Kulais
TheCase
OnAugust22,1990,fiveInformationsforkidnappingforransom
(Crim. Case Nos. 10060, 10061, 10062, 10063 and 10064) and
threeInformationsforkidnapping(Crim.CaseNos.10065,10066
and 10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed 1before the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City against Carlos
Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan
de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de Kamming,2Salvador Mamaril,
HadjirulPlasin,JaimuddinHassan,Imam3TarukAlah,Freddie
Manuel alias Ajid, and several John and Jane Does. The
Informationsforkidnappingforransom,whichsetforthidentical
allegationssaveforthenamesofthevictims,readasfollows:
Thatonoraboutthe12thdayofDecember,1988,intheCityof
Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being all private
individuals, conspiring and confederating together, mutually
aidingandassistingoneanother,withthreatstokillthepersonof
FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060] 4and for the
purpose ofextorting ransomfrom thesaidFelix Rosarioorhis
familiesoremployer,didthenandthere,wilfully,unlawfullyand
feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said Felix Rosario, 5a male
public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, who was
then aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plateNo. SBZ976 which
was being ambushed by the herein accused at the highway of
SitioTigbaoLisomo,ZamboangaCity,and
_______________
1
These Informations were signed by Zamboanga City First
Assistant Prosecutor Manuel Tatel and approved by City
ProsecutorWilfredoM.Yu.
2
ReferredtoasJalihaHussinintheDecision.
3
AlsoreferredtoasIman.
 4
Record,p.1;ALLANBASAinCrim.CaseNo.10061,record,
p. 1; EDILBERTO PEREZySALVADOR in Crim. Case No.
10062, record, p. 1; JESSICAS. CALUNOD in Crim.CaseNo.
10063,record,p.1;ARMANDOO.BACARROinCrim.CaseNo.
10064,record,p.1.Bracketssupplied.
5
Ibid.
555
VOL.292,JULY16,1998 555
Peoplevs.Kulais
brought said Felix Rosario6to different mountainous places of
ZamboangaCityandZamboangadelSur,wherehewasdetained,
heldhostageanddeprivedofhislibertyuntilFebruary2,1989,
thedaywhenhewasreleasedonlyafterpaymentoftheransom
wasmadetohereinaccused,tothedamageandprejudiceofsaid
victim;therebeingpresentanaggravatingcircumstanceinthat
theaforecitedoffensewascommittedwiththeaidofarmedmen
orpersonswhoinsureoraffordimpunity.
ThethreeInformationsforkidnapping,alsounderArticle267of
the Revised Penal Code, likewise alleged identical facts and
circumstances,exceptthenamesofthevictims:
Thatonoraboutthe12thdayofDecember,1988,intheCityof
ZamboangaandwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,
the abovenamed accused, being all private individuals,
conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting one another, by means of threats and intimidation of
person, didthen andthere, wilfully,unlawfullyand feloniously
KIDNAP,takeanddragawayanddetainthepersonofMONICO
SAAVEDRAYLIMEN[CriminalCaseNo.10065] 7amalepublic
officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, against his will,
there being present an aggravating circumstance in that the
aforecitedoffensewascommittedwiththeaidofarmedmenor
personswhoinsureoraffordimpunity.
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely,
Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais,
Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam
TarukAlah,JalinaHassanandFreddieManuel.8
OntheirarraignmentonSeptember13,1990,alltheaccused
pleadednotguilty.Jointtrialonthemeritsensued.On
_______________
6
Ibid.
7
Record, p. 1; VIRGINIA SAN AGUSTIN GARA, a female
publicofficer,inCrim.Case No.10066, record,p. 1; CALIXTO
FRANCISCO in Crim. Case No. 10067, record, p. 1. Brackets
supplied.
8
SeeDecision, p. 3. Although the trial court listed the nine
arrestedaccused,iterroneouslywrotethattherewereonlyeight
ofthem.
556
556 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Kulais
April8,1991,JudgePelagioS.Mandirenderedtheassailed36
pageDecision,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:
WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into
consideration, this Court renders its judgment, ordering and
finding:
1. 1.FREDDIEMANUEL,aliasAJIDandIMAMTARUK
ALAH y SALIH [n]ot [g]uilty of the eight charges of
[k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping, their
guiltnothavingbeenprovedbeyondreasonabledoubt.
 TheirimmediatereleasefromtheCityJail,ZamboangaCityis VOL.292,JULY16,1998 557
ordered, unlessdetainedforsomeotheroffensebesidesthese8 Peoplevs.Kulais
cases(Crim.CasesNos.1006010067).
1. 3.JAMATIYAAMLANIDEFALCASANTOS[n]ot[g]uilty
1. 2.JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, inthethreechargesof[k]idnappingandsheisacquitted
SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA and HADJIRUL of these charges (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 and
PLASINyALIH[g]uiltyasprincipalsbyconspiracyin 10067).
allthese8 cases for[k]idnappingfor[r]ansomand for
[k]idnapping(Crim.CasesNos.1006010067).
ButJumatiyaAmlanideFalcasantosis[g]uiltyasaccomplicein
thefivechargesof[k]idnappingfor[r]ansom.
Theirguiltisaggravatedinthattheycommittedthe8offenses WHEREFORE,JumatiyaAmlanideFalcasantosissentenced
withtheaidofarmedmenwhoinsuredimpunity.Therefore,the toservefive(5)imprisonments,rangingfromTEN(10)YEARSof
penaltiesimposedonthemshallbeattheirmaximumperiod. prision mayor as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of
WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for reclusiontemporalasmaximum(Crim.CasesNos.1006010064).
[r]ansom,andpursuanttoArt. 267of theRevised Penal Code,
five life imprisonments are imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y
1. 4.NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and
Ahmad,JailonKulais,SalvadorMamarilyMendozaandHadjirul
JALIHA HUSSIN (charged as Jalina Hassan de
PlasinyAlih(Crim.CasesNos.1006010064).
Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the three
ForkidnappingMrs.VirginiaSanAgustinGara,afemaleand
charges for [k]idnapping and are, therefore,
publicofficerandpursuanttoArt.267,RevisedPenalCode(par.
ACQUITTEDofthesethreecharges(Crim.CasesNos.
4),anotherlifeimprisonmentisimposedonJainuddinHassany
10065,10066&10067).
Ahmad,JailonKulais,SalvadorMamarilyMendozaandHadjirul
PlasinyAlih(Crim.CaseNo.10066).
But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found
For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto
[g]uilty as accomplices in the five charges for [k]idnapping for
FranciscoyGaspar,andtheirkidnappingnothavinglastedmore
[r]ansom. Being minors, they are entitled to the privileged
thanfivedays,pursuanttoArt.268,RevisedPenalCode,andthe
mitigating circumstance of minority which lowers the penalty
IndeterminateSentenceLaw,thesamefouraccusedJainuddin
imposableonthembyonedegree.
Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza
WHEREFORE,NormaSahiddandeKulaisandJalinaHussin
andHadjirulPlasinyAlihare sentenced toserve two(2)jail
aresentencedtoservefiveimprisonmentsrangingfromSIX(6)
termsrangingfromten(10)yearsofprisionmayorasminimum,
YEARSofprisioncorreccionalasminimumtoTEN(10)YEARS
toeighteen(18)yearsofreclusiontemporalasmaximum(Crim.
ANDONE(1)DAYofprisionmayorasmaximum(Crim.Cases
CasesNos.10065and10067).
Nos.1006010064).
557
 Duetotheremovalofthesuspensionofsentencesofyouthful Cash P300.00
offendersconvictedofanoffensepunishablebydeathorlifeby
PresidentialDecreeNo.1179andPresidentialDecreeNo.1210 ToVirginiaSanAgustinGara
(of which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom is such an offense) the
One(1)WristWatch P850.00
sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussinde
The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive
KammingareNOTsuspendedbutmustbeservedbythem.
suspension,shallbeextendedtothosesentenced.
JanuddinHassan,JailonKulais,SalvadorMamarilandHadjirul
The cases against Majid Samson, alias Commander Bungi
Plasin are sentenced further to return the following
AwalonKamlona.k.a.CommanderKamlonCarlosFalcasantos
personaleffects taken on December 12, 1988, the day of the
andseveralJohnDoesandJaneDoesareARCHIVEDuntil
kidnapping,ortheirvalueinmoney,theirliabilitybeingsolidary.
theirarrest.
ToJessicaCalunod: Costsagainsttheaccusedconvicted.
SOORDERED.9
One(1)Seikowristwatch P250.00 OnMay7,1991,JailonKulais,JumatiyaAmlanideFalcasantos,
OneBracelet P2,400.00 Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their joint
OneShoulderBag P200.00 NoticeofAppeal.10InaletterdatedFebruary6,1997,thesame
Cash P200.00 appellants,exceptJailonKulais,withdrewtheirappealbecause
558 of their application for amnesty. In our March 19, 1997
558 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only theappeal of
KulaisremainsfortheconsiderationofthisCourt.11
Peoplevs.Kulais
ToArmandoC.Bacarro: _______________

One(1)wristwatch P800.00 9
Decision,pp.3336;rollo,pp.5255.
OneNecklace P300.00
10
Through Atty. Catherine P.C. Fabian of the Public
OneCalculator P295.00 AttorneysOffice,whorepresentedthemduringthetrial.
Eyeglasses P500.00
11
ThecasewasdeemedsubmittedforresolutiononFebruary
21, 1997, whenthe Court receiveda letterfromthe Bureauof
OneSteelTape P250.00
Cor

559
ToEdilbertoS.Perez VOL.292,JULY16,1998 559

Peoplevs.Kulais
One(1)Rayban P1,000.00
OneWristWatch P1,800.00
TheFacts
TheVersionoftheProsecution
The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as
viewedbythePeople:
OnDecember12,1988,agroupofpublicofficialsfromvarious
governmentagencies,organizedthemselvesasamonitoringteam
toinspectgovernmentprojectsinZamboangaCity.Thegroupwas
composed of Virginia Gara, as the head of the team; Armando
Bacarro, representing the Commission on Audit; Felix del
Rosario, representing the nongovernment; Edilberto Perez,
representing the City Assessors Office; Jessica Calunod and
AllanBasaoftheCityBudgetOfficeandMonicoSaavedra,the
driver from the City Engineers Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22,
1990.)
On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo
Elementary School to check on two of its classrooms. After
inspecting the same, they proceeded to the Talaga Footbridge.
Thegroupwasnotabletoreachtheplacebecauseontheirway,
theywerestoppedbynine(9)armedmenwhopointedtheirguns
atthem.(p.4,TSN,ibid.)
ThegroupalightedfromtheirCimarronjeepwheretheywere
divestedoftheirpersonalbelongings.Theywerethenorderedto
walk to the mountain by the leader of the armed men who
introducedhimselfasCommanderFalcasantos.(p.5,TSN,ibid.)
While the group was walking in the mountain, they
encountered government troops which caused their group tobe
divided. Finally, they were able to regroup themselves.
Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others. (pp. 78,
TSN,ibid.)
Thekidnappersheldtheircaptivesforfiftyfour(54)daysin
the forest. During their captivity, the victims were able to
recognizetheircaptorswhowereatalltimesarmedwithguns.
The wives of the kidnappers performed the basic chores like
cooking.(pp.910,TSN,ibid.)
CommanderFalcasantosalsoorderedtheirvictimstosignthe
ransomnoteswhichdemandedaransomofP100,000.00and
_______________
rections confirming the confinement of Appellant Jailon
KulaisattheNBP.
560
560 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Kulais
P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p. 15,
TSN,ibid.)
On February3,1989, ataround12:00 oclocknoontime,the
victimswereinformedthattheywouldbereleased.Theystarted
walkinguntilaround7:00oclockintheeveningofthatday.At
around 12:00 oclock midnight, the victims were released after
Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received the ransom
money. (p. 19, TSN,ibid.) The total amount paid was
P122,000.00. The same was reached after several negotiations
between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the
representativesofthekidnappers.(pp.2,6,TSN,Nov.11,1990)
xxx.12
The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of
the kidnap victims themselves: Jessica Calunod, Armando
Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San AgustinGara, Calixto
Francisco,andMonicoSaavedra.
TheVersionoftheDefense
Thefactsofthecase,accordingtothedefense,areasfollows: 13
OnMay28,1990,atabout10:00oclockinthemorning,while
weedingtheirfarminSinaburan,ZamboangadelSur,accused
appellant Jumatiya Amlani was picked up by soldiers and
brought to a place where one army battalion was stationed.
Thereat, her five (5) coaccused, namely Salvador Mamaril,
Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and
Freddie Manuel werealready detained. Intheafternoonof the
sameday,appellantsspousesJailonKulaisandNormaSahiddan
were brought to the battalion station and likewise detained
thereat.OnMay30,1990,theeight(8)accusedweretransported
to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here onthe same date, they
werejoinedbyaccusedappellantJalihaHussin.
_______________
AppelleesBrief,pp.810;rollo,pp.149h149j.
12
AppellantsBrief,preparedbythePublicAttorneysOffice
13
andsignedbyPublicAttorneyIIIBartolomeP.ReusandPublic
AttorneyIIRectorE.Macapagal,pp.811;rollo,pp.9295.
561
VOL.292,JULY16,1998 561
Peoplevs.Kulais
AtthetimeAmlaniwaspickedupbythemilitary,shehadjust
escaped from the captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company
who in 1988 kidnapped and brought her to the mountains.
Againsttheirwill,shestayedwithFalcasantosandhistwowives
fortwomonths,duringwhichshesleptwithFalcasantosasaide
ofthewivesandwasmadetocookfood,washclothes,fetchwater
and run other errands for everybody. An armed guard was
assignedtowatchher,sothat,forsometime,shehadtobearthe
illtreatmentofFalcasantosotherwivesoneofwhomwasarmed.
Afterabouttwomonths,whileshewascookingandFalcasantos
andhistwowiveswerebathingintheriver,andwhileherguard
wasnotlooking,shetookherchanceandmadeasuccessfuldash
forfreedom.(TSN,January29,1992,pp.215)
LikewiseakidnapvictimherselfisaccusedappellantJaliha
Hussin,whowasthirteenyearsoldatthetime(shewasfifteen
yearsoldwhenthetrialoftheinstantcasescommenced).Shewas
kidnapped by Daing Kamming and brought to the mountains
where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less than a
month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing
housekeepingerrandsforKammingandhismen.Shemadegood
herescapeduringanencounterbetweenthegroupofKamming
andmilitarytroops.ShehidinthebushesandcameoutatLigui
anwhereshetookabachelorbusingoingbacktohermothers
house atPudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga delSur. One
day, at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, while she was
harvesting palay at the neighboring village of Tigbalangao,
militarymenpickedheruptoTicbanuangwheretherewasan
armybattaliondetachment.FromTicbawuang,shewasbrought
to Vitali, then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her
arrival, she met all the other accused for the first time except
FreddieManuel.(Ibid.,pp.1621)
Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a
native of Sinaburan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about
3:00oclockintheafternoonofadayinMay,whilesheandher
husbandwereintheirfarm,soldiersarrestedthem.Thesoldiers
didnottellthemwhytheywerebeingarrested,neitherwerethey
shownanypapers.Thetwoofthemwerejustmadetoboardasix
bysixtruck.Therewerenootherciviliansinthetruck.Thetruck
broughtthespousestothearmybattalionandplacedtheminside
thebuildingwheretherewereciviliansandsoldiers.Amongthe
civilians present were her six coaccused Hadjirul Plasin,
Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah,
FreddieManuelandJumatiyaAmlani.Thatnight,theeightof
themwerebroughttoTictapul,
562
562 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
 Peoplevs.Kulais
ZamboangaCity;thentoVitali;and,finally,totheMetrodiscom,
ZamboangaCitywheretheystayedforsixdaysandsixnights.
Ontheseventhday,theaccusedwerebroughttotheCityJail,
ZamboangaCity.(TSN,January30,1991,pp.611)
The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as
heretofore narrated, was arrested with his wife the day the
soldierscametotheirfarmonMay28,1990.Hehassharedwith
hiswifetheordealsthatfollowedinthewakeoftheirarrestand
in the duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN,
January22,1991,pp.24)
TheTrialCourtsRuling
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of
kidnappingforransomandonecountofkidnappingawomanand
publicofficer,forwhichoffensesitimposeduponhimsixtermsof
life imprisonment. It also found him guilty of two counts of
slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra
andCalixtoFrancisco.Thetrialcourtratiocinatedasfollows:
Principally, the issue here is one of credibilityboth of the
witnessesandtheirversionofwhathadhappenedonDecember
12,1988,toFebruary3,1989.Onthispivotalissue,theCourt
gives credenceto[p]rosecutionwitnessesandtheir testimonies.
Prosecutionevidenceispositive,clearandconvincing.Notaintof
evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to
[p]rosecutionwitnesses.TothisCourt,whosawallthewitnesses
testify, [p]rosecutionwitnessestestifiedonly becausethey were
impelledby[a]senseofjustice,ofdutyandoftruth.
Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and
consisted only of alibis. The individual testimonies of the nine
accuseddwel[t]principallyonwhathappenedtoeachofthemon
May27,28and29,1990.Noneoftheaccusedexplainedwherehe
orshewasonandfromDecember12,1988,toFebruary3,1989,
when[p]rosecutionevidenceshow[ed]positivelysevenofthenine
accused were keeping the five or six hostages named by
[p]rosecutionevidence.
Thesevenaccusedpositivelyidentifiedtohavebeenpresent
during the course of the captivity of the five kidnapvictims
complainantsare:(1)JumatiyaAmlani;(2)JalihaHussin;(3)
563
VOL.292,JULY16,1998 563
Peoplevs.Kulais
Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6)
SalvadorMamariland(7)JainuddinHassan.
Thetwoaccusednotpositivelyidentifiedare:FreddieManuel
aliasAjid,andImamTarukAlah.Thesetwomust,therefore,be
declaredacquittedbasedonreasonabledoubt.
Thenextimportantissuetobeexaminedis:Aretheseseven
accused guilty as conspirators as charged in the eight
Informations;oronlyasaccomplices?Prosecutionevidenceshows
thatthekidnappinggrouptowhichthesevenaccusedbelonged
had formed themselves into an armed band for the purpose of
kidnappingforransom.Thisarmedbandhadcutthemselvesoff
fromestablishedcommunities,livedinthemountainsandforests,
movedfrom placetoplaceinordertohidetheir hostages. The
wives of these armed band moved along with their husbands,
attendingtotheirneeds,givingthemmaterialandmoralsupport.
These wives also attended to the needs of the kidnap victims,
sleepingwiththemorcomfortingthem.
xxxxxxxxx
II)The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador
Mamariland Hadjirul Plasin.The Courtholdsthese fourmen
guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of kidnapping. Unlike the
three womenaccused, these male accused were armed. They
activelyparticipatedinkeepingtheirhostagesbyfightingoffthe
militaryandCAFGUS,intransferringtheirhostagesfromplace
toplace,andinguardingthekidnaphostages.SalvadorMamaril
and Jailon Kulaiswere positively identified as among the nine
armed men who had kidnapped the eight kidnap victims on
December12,1988.
ThehigherdegreeofparticipationfoundbytheCourtofthe
fouraccusedissupported bytherulingsofourSupremeCourt
quotedbelow.
1. (1)Thetimehonoredjurisprudenceisthatdirectproofis
notessentialtoproveconspiracy.Itmaybeshownbya
number of infinite acts, conditions and circumstances
which may vary according to the purposes to be
accomplishedandfromwhichmaylogicallybeinferred
that there was a common design, understanding or
agreementamongtheconspiratorstocommittheoffense
charged. (People vs. Cabrera,43 Phil. 64;People vs.
Carbonel,48Phil.868.)
2. (2)Thecrimemust,therefore,inviewofthesolidarityof
the act and intent which existed between the sixteen
accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party
createdbythem,andtheyareallequallyresponsiblefor
themurderinquestion.(U.S.vs.Bundal,etal.,3Phil.
89,98.)
564
564 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Kulais
1. (3)When two or more persons unite to accomplish a
criminalobject,whetherthroughthephysicalvolitionof
one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each
individual whose evil will actively contribute to the
wrongdoingisinlawresponsibleforthewhole,thesame
as though performed by himself alone. (People vs.
Peralta,etal.,25SCRA759,772[1968].)14
TheAssignedErrors
Thetrialcourtisfaultedwiththefollowingerrors,viz.:
I
The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material
testimonygiveninanothercasebyLt.MelquiadesFeliciano,who
allegedly was the team leader of the government troops which
allegedly captured the accusedappellants in an encounter;
thereby, depriving the accusedappellants their right to cross
examinehim.
II
On the assumption that Lt. Felicianos testimony could be
validlytakenjudicialnoticeof,thetrialcourt,nevertheless,erred
in not disregarding the same for being highly improbable and
contradictory.
III
The trial court erred in finding that accusedappellants
JumatiyaAmlani,JalihaHussinandNormaSahiddanprovided
Carlos Falcasantos, et al., with material and moral comfort,
hence,areguiltyasaccomplicesinallthekidnappingforransom
cases.
IV
 ThetrialcourterredindenyingtoaccusedappellantJaliha
Hussin and Norma Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of
sentence given to youth offenders considering that they were
minorsatthetimeofthecommissionoftheoffense.15
_______________
Decision,pp.2933.
14
AppellantsBrief,pp.12;rollo,pp.8586.
15
565
VOL.292,JULY16,1998
Peoplevs.Kulais
As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma
Sahiddanhadwithdrawntheirappeal,andassuch,thethirdand
fourthassignederrors,whichpertaintothemonly,willnolonger
bedealtwith.OnlythefollowingissuespertainingtoAppellant
JailonKulaiswillbediscussed:(1)judicialnoticeofotherpending
cases,(2)sufficiencyoftheprosecutionevidence,and(3)denialas
adefense.Inaddition,theCourtwillpassupontheproprietyof
thepenaltyimposedbythetrialcourt.
TheCourtsRuling
Theappealisbereftofmerit.
First
JudicialNoticeandDenialofDueProcess
AppellantKulaisarguesthathewasdenieddueprocesswhenthe
trialcourttookjudicialnoticeofthetestimonygiveninanother
casebyoneLt.MelquiadesFeliciano,whowastheteamleaderof
the government troops that captured him and his purported
cohorts.16Becausehewasallegedlydeprivedofhisrighttocross
examineamaterialwitnessinthepersonofLieutenantFeliciano,
hecontendsthatthelatterstestimonyshouldnotbeusedagainst
him.17
True,asageneralrule,courtsshouldnottakejudicialnotice
oftheevidencepresentedinotherproceedings,evenifthesehave
beentriedorarependinginthesamecourt,orhavebeenheard
and are actually pending before the same judge. 18This is
especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the
constitutionalrighttoconfrontandcrossexaminethewitnesses
againsthim.
_______________
565 AppellantsBrief,p.11;rollo,p.95.
16
17
Ibid.,p.12;rollo,p.96.
18
Tabuenavs.CourtofAppeals,196SCRA650,May6,1991.
See alsoOccidental Land Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals,220SCRA167,March19,1993.
566
566 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Kulais
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the courta
quodid take judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant
Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases
Issue: against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied
due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive
identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely,
Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These
witnesses were subjected to meticulous crossexaminations
conductedbyappellantscounsel.Atbest,then,thetrialcourts
mention of Lieutenant Felicianos testimony is a decisional
surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor
substantiallyprejudicedAppellantKulais.
Second Issue: xxxxxxxxx
SufficiencyofProsecutionEvidence Q Now,yousaidthatyouwerewiththesemenforfiftyfourdaysand
AppellantwaspositivelyidentifiedbyCalunod,asshownbythe youreallycametoknowthem.Willyoustillbeabletorecognize
latterstestimony: thesepersonsifyouwillseethe[m]again?
CPCAJAYONDMS: A Yes,maam.
Q Andhowlongwereyouinthecustodyofthesepersons? Q NowwillyoulookaroundthisHonorableCourtandseeifanyof
A Westayedwiththemforfiftyfourdays. thoseyoumentionedarehere?
Q Andduringthosedaysdidyoucometoknowanyofthepersonswhowere A Yes,theyarehere.
withthegroup? Q Someofthemarehere?
A Wecametoknowalmostallofthemconsideringwestayedthereforfifty A Someofthemarehere.
fourdays. xxxxxxxxx
Q Andcanyoupleasenametoussomeofthemorhowyouknowthem? Q WhereisTangkong?Whatishewearing?
A Forexample,asidefromCommanderFalcasantosandCommanderKamlon A Whitetshirtwithorangecollar.(witnesspointing.)Hewasoneof
wecametoknowfirstourfosterparents,thosewhowereassignedtogiveus thoseninearmedmenwhotookusfromthehighway.
somefood. RTCINTERPRETER:
Q Youmeantosaythatthecaptorsassignedyousomemenwhowilltakecare Witnesspointedtoamansittingincourtandwhenaskedofhis
ofyou? name,hegavehisnameasJAILONKULAIS.
A Yes. CPCAJAYONDMS:
Q Andtowhomwereyouassigned? Q Asidefrombeingwiththearmedmenwhostoppedthevehicleand
A ToIlaAbdurasa. madeyoualight,whatelsewashedoingwhileyouwereintheir
567 captivity?
VOL.292, 567
A HewasthefosterparentofArmandoBacarroandthehusbandof
JULY16,
Nana.
1998
COURT:
Peoplevs.Kulais Q Who?
Q Andotherthanyourfoster[parents]ortheparentswhomyouare A Tangkong.
assignedto,whoelsedidyoucometoknow? xxxxxxxxx19
A Pagalandhiswife;TangkongandhiswifeNana;thetwo(2)wives
ofCommanderFalcasantosMatingandJaniraanotherbrother _______________
inlawofCommanderKamlon,Usman,thewifeofKamlon,Tira.
 19
TSN,October22,1990,pp.811.Italicssupplied. Mamarilwasoneofthosewhostoppedthebusandtookyoutothehilland
568 youdidnotmentionTangkong?
568 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED A IdidnotmentionbutIcanrememberhisface.
Peoplevs.Kulais xxxxxxxxx
Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarros testimony Q AndbecauseTangkongwasalwayswithyouasyourhostevenifhedidnot
pointingtoappellantasoneoftheculprits:
tellyouthathe[was]oneofthosewhostoppedyou,youwouldnot
FISCALCAJAYON:
recognizehim?
xxxxxxxxx 569
Q Andwhathappenedthen? VOL.292,JULY16, 569
A Someofthearmedmenassignedwhowillbethehostorwhowillbetheone 1998
[to]g[i]vefoodtous. Peoplevs.Kulais
Q [To]whomwereyouassigned? A No,Icanrecognizehimbecausehewastheonewho
A IwasassignedtoacertainTangkongand[his]wifeNana. tookmyshoes.
xxxxxxxxx COURT:
Q Now,yousaidyouwereassignedtoTangkongandhiswife.[D]oyou Q Who?
rememberhowhelookslike? A Tangkong,yourHonor.
A Yes. xxxxxxxxx20
Q Now,willyoupleaselookaroundthisCourtandtellusifthatsaidTangkong AlsostraightforwardwasErnestoPerezcandidnarration:
andhiswifearehere? FISCALCAJAYON:
A Yes,maam. xxxxxxxxx
Q CouldyoupleasepointthisTangkongtous? Q Whoelse?
A WitnesspointedtoapersoninCourt.[W]henaskedhisnameheidentified A Thelastman.
[himself]asJailonKulais. Q Didyoucometoknowhisname?
Q WhydidyousayhisnameisTangkong?Wheredidyougetthatname? A Onlyhisnickname,Tangkong.(WitnesspointedtoamaninCourtwho
A Well,thatisthename[bywhichheis]usuallycalledinthecamp. identifiedhimselfasJailonKulais.)
xxxxxxxxx Q AndwhatwasTangkongdoinginthemountain?
ATTY.FABIAN(counselforaccusedKulais) A Thesame,guardingus.
Q WhendidyoufirstmeetTangkong? CROSSEXAMINATIONBYATTY.SAHAK
A ThatwasonDecember11,becauseIrememberhewastheonewhotookus. Q Engr.Perez,youstatedthatyouwereambushedbyninearmedmenonyour
Q Whenyouwerequestionedbythefiscalawhileago,youstatedthatMr. wayfrom[the]Licomoto[the]TalagaFootBridge.[W]hatdoyoumeanby
 ambushed? A Hewasoneofthearmedmenwhokidnappedus.
A Imeanthattheyblockedourwayandstopped. xxxxxxxxx21
Q Theydidnotfireanyshots? ItisevidentfromtheforegoingtestimoniesofCalunod,Bacarro
A Buttheywerepointingtheirgunsatus. andPerezthatkidnappingordetentiondidtakeplace:thefive
Q Andamongthe9armedmenwhoheldyouonyourwayto[the]Talaga victims were held, against their will, for fiftythree days from
December12,1988toFebruary2,1989.Itisalsoevidentthat
Footbridge,youstated[that]oneofthem[was]CommanderFalcasantos?
AppellantKulaiswasamemberofthegroupofarmedmenwho
A Yes.
stagedthekidnapping,andthathewasoneofthosewhoguarded
Q Couldyoualsorecognizeanyoneoftheaccusedinthatgroup? the victims during the entire period of their captivity. His
A Yes. participation gives credence to the conclusion of the trial court
Q Willyoupleaseidentify? thathewasaconspirator.
A Thatone,Tangkong.(Thewitnesspointedtoamansittingincourtwho KidnappingforRansom
identifiedhimselfasJailonKulais.) Thatthekidnappingofthefivewascommittedforthepurposeof
extortingransomisalsoapparentfromthetestimonyofCalunod,
_______________ whowasquiteemphaticinidentifyingtheaccusedandnarrating
thecircumstancessurroundingthewritingoftheransomletters.
TSN,October23,1990,pp.9and25.Italicssupplied.
20

570 _______________
570 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Kulais TSN,October24,1990,pp.1823.Italicssupplied.
21

571
xxxxxxxxx
VOL.292, 571
CROSSEXAMINATIONBYATTY.FABIAN
JULY16,
Q YousaidJailonKulaiswasamongthosewhoguardedthecamp?
1998
FISCALCAJAYON:
Peoplevs.Kulais
YourHonor,please,hedoesnotknowthenameofJulais,heusedtheword
Tangkong. CPCAJAYONDMS:
ATTY.FABIAN Q Now,youwereintheircaptivityfor54daysandyousaidthere
Q YousaidTangkongguardedyou[.W]hatdoyoumean? werethesemeetingsforpossiblenegotiationwiththeCity
A Heguardeduslikeprisoners[.A]fterguardingustheyhavetheirtimetwo Government.Whatdoyoumeanbythis?Whatwereyousupposed
hoursanotherwillbeondutyguardingus. tonegotiate?
Q WheredidyoumeetTangkong? A Becausetheytoldusthattheywillbereleasingusonlyafterthe
 terms.22
Q Andwhatweretheterms?Didyoucometoknowtheterms?
A IcametoknowthetermsbecauseIwastheoneorderedby
CommanderFalcasantostowritetheletter,theransomletter.
Q Atthispointoftime,yourememberhowmanyletterswereyou
askedtowriteforyourransom?
A Icouldnotrememberastohowmany,butIcanidentifythem.
Q Whywillyouabletoidentifythesame?
A BecauseIwastheonewhowroteit.
Q Andyouarefamiliar,ofcourse,withyourpenmanship?
A Yes.
Q Nowwehaveheresomeletterswhichwereturnedovertousby
theHonorableCityMayorVitalianoAgan.1,2,3,4,5thereare
fivelettersallhandwritten.
COURT:
Original?
CPCAJAYONDMS:
Original,yourHonor.
Q Andwewouldlikeyoutogoovertheseandsay,tellusifanyof
theseweretheonesyouwereaskedtowrite.
A (Witnessgoingover[letters])
Thisone2pages.Thisone2pages.Nomore.
Q Asidefromthefactthatyouidentifiedyourpenmanshipinthese
letters,whatelsewillmakeyourememberthatthesearereallythe
onesyouwrotewhilethere?
A Thesignatureisthere.
_______________
22
TSN,October22,1990,p.13.Italicssupplied.
572
572 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Kulais
Q Thereisaprintednamehere[,]JessicaCalunod.
A Andoveritisasignature.
Q Thatisyoursignature?
A Yes,maam.
Q Howaboutintheotherletter,didyousignitalso?
A Yes,thereistheothersignature.
Q TherearenamesothernameshereEddiePerez,AllanBasa,Armando
Bacarro,FelixRosario,JojieOrtuosteandtherearesignaturesabovethe
same.Didyoucomeuptoknowwhosignedthisone?
A Thosewhosesignaturesthereweresignedbythepersons.[sic]
Q Andwehavehereatthebottom,CommanderKamlonHassan,andthereis
thesignatureabovethesame.Didyoucometoknowwhosignedit?
A [Itwas]CommanderKamlonHassanwhosignedthat.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Jessica,Iamgoingoverthisletter...Couldyoupleasereadtousthe
portionherewhichsaystheterms?...
A (Witnessreading)Maoilanggustongaandamunnaninyoangkantidad
ngaP100,000ugP14,000baylosa20setsngauniformssaBiyernes
(Pebrero3,1989).23
xxxxxxxxx
INTERPRETER(Translation):
Thisiswhattheylikeyoutoprepare[:]theamountofP100,000.00and
P14,000.00inexchange[for]20setsofuniformonFriday,February3,
1989.
xxxxxxxxx
Q NowyoualsoearlieridentifiedthisotherletterandthisisdatedJanuary
21,1988.24Now,couldyoupleaseex
_______________ INTERPRETER:
TheyliketheP100,000.00andanadditionof20setsofcomplete
23
This letter, dated January 31, 1989 and consisting of two
uniform(7colors,marinetypenotincludingtheshoes),onehalf
pages, was marked Exhs. A and A1; Jessica Calunods
medium,onehalflarge.
signature thereon was marked Exh. A2. This quoted portion
wasmarkedExh.A3. xxxxxxxxx
24
Thisletter,datedJanuary21,1989,wasmarkedExh.B; Q Afterhavingwrittentheseletters,didyoucometoknowafter[they
the second page thereof, Exh. B1, and Jessica Calunods were]signedbyyourcompanionsandallofyou,doyouknowif
signature,Exh.B2. theselettersweresent?Ifyouknowonly.
573 A Iwouldliketomakeitclear.Thefirstletterwasorderedtomeby
VOL. 573 FalcasantostoinformtheCityMayorthatinitialasP500,000.00,
292, andwhenwewerealreadyIwasaskedagaintowrite,wewere
JULY16, orderedtoaffixoursignaturetoserveasproofthatallofusare
1998 alive.26[sic]
Peoplevs.Kulais
plaintouswhyitisdatedJanuary21,1988andtheotheroneEnero _______________
31,1989orJanuary31,1989?
ThisportionwasmarkedExh.B3.
25
A IdidnotrealizethatIplaced1989,1988,butitwas1989.
TSN,October22,1990,p.13.
26

Q January21,1989? 574
A Yes. 574 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
xxxxxxxxx Peoplevs.Kulais
Q Now,inthisletter,werethetermsalsomentioned? Calunods testimony was substantially corroborated by both
Pleasegooverthis. Armando Bacarro27and Edilberto Perez.28The receipt of the
A (Goingovertheletter) ransomletters,theeffortsmadetoraiseanddelivertheransom,
Yes,maam. andthereleaseofthehostagesuponpaymentofthemoneywere
Q Couldyoupleasereaditaloudtous? testifiedtobyZamboangaCityMayorVitalianoAgan 29andTeddy
A (Witnessreading) Mejia.30
Theelementsofkidnappingforransom,asembodiedinArticle
GustonilaangP100,000.00ngkapinannuug20setsnga
267oftheRevisedPenalCode,31havingbeensufficiently
completonguniformer(7colorsmarinetypewalanaylabotang
sapatos),tungamediumugtungalargesize.25 _______________
xxxxxxxxx
 27
TSN, October 23, 1990, pp. 1011. During his testimony, 575
BacarroconfirmedthatJessicaCalunodandEngineerPerezwere VOL.292,JULY16,1998 575
madetowriteransomletters,andthathe,alongwiththeother Peoplevs.Kulais
hostages,wasmadetosigntheletters.Healsoidentifiedanother proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been
letter,markedasExh.D,datedJanuary15,1988andaddressed clearlyidentifiedbythekidnapvictims,thisCourtthusaffirms
to Mayor Vitaliano Agan. Written in response to the mayors the trial courts finding of appellants guilt on five counts of
requesttoreducetheransommoneyfromP500,000toP350,000, kidnappingforransom.
thisletterstatedthatCommanderFalcasantosdidnotwantto
KidnappingofPublicOfficers
reduce the aforesaid amount, but he agreed to the reduced
VictimsVirginiaSanAgustinGara,MonicoSaavedraandCalixto
amountofP450,000,ashetookpityontheplightofthehostages.
Francisco were members of the government monitoring team
28
TSN,October24,1990,pp.1315.Perezstatedthathealso
abductedbyappellantsgroup.Thethreetestifiedtothefactof
wrotearansomletterandidentifiedthesame;healsoconfirmed
kidnapping;however,theywerenotabletoidentifytheappellant.
thatJessicaCalunodlikewisewroteransomnotes,andthathe
Even so, appellants identity as one of the kidnappers was
andalltheotherhostageswereaskedtosignthem.
sufficientlyestablishedbyCalunod,BacarroandPerez,whowere
29
TSN, December 11, 1990. Mayor Agan testified that he
withGara,SaavedraandFranciscowhentheabductionoccurred.
receivedransomletters;thathefacilitatedtheirdeliverytothe
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only
kidnappers; and that upon payment of the ransom money, the
three hours32does not matter. InPeople vs. Domasian,33the
kidnapvictimswerereleased.
victimwassimilarlyheldforthreehours,andwasreleasedeven
30
TSN,November7,1990,pp.27.Mr.Mejiatestifiedthathe
beforehisparentsreceivedtheransomnote.Theaccusedtherein
wasoneofthosewhodeliveredthemoneytothekidnappersand
argued that they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no
witnessedthereleaseofthevictims.
enclosure was involved, and that only grave coercion was
31
Art. 267.Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any
committed, if at all.34Convicting appellants of kidnapping or
privateindividualwhoshalldetainorkidnapanother,orinany
seriousillegaldetentionunderArt.267(4)oftheRevisedPenal
othermanner,deprivehimofhisliberty,shallsufferthepenalty
Code,theCourtfoundthatthevictim,an
ofreclusionperpetuatodeath:
_______________
1. 1.If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more
thanfivedays. 1. 3.Ifanyseriousphysicalinjuriesshallhavebeeninflicted
uponthepersonkidnappedordetained;orifthreatsto
2. 2.If it shall have been committed simulating public killhimshallhavebeenmade.
authority.
 2. 4.Ifthepersonkidnappedordetainedshallbe aminor,
femaleorpublicofficer.
Thepenaltyshallbedeathwherethekidnappingordetention
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
abovementionedwerepresentinthecommissionoftheoffense.
(This definition has been amended by Section 8, RA No. 7659,
effectiveDecember31,1993.Thecrimeshappenedin1988.)
32
TSN,November6,1990,p.9.
33
219SCRA245,March1,1993.
34
Ibid.,p.250.
576
576 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Kulais
eightyearold boy, was deprived of his liberty when he was
restrainedfromgoinghome.TheCourtjustifiedtheconvictionby
holdingthattheoffenseconsistednotonlyinplacingapersonin
an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, inany
manner,ofhisliberty.35Likewise,inPeoplevs.Santos,36theCourt
held thatsincetheappellant wascharged andconvictedunder
Article 267, paragraph 4, it wasnot the durationof the
deprivationoflibertywhichwasimportant,butthefactthatthe
victim,aminor,waslockedup.
Thus,inthepresentcase,thedetentionofGara,Saavedraand
Franciscoforonlyafewhoursisimmaterial.Theclearfactisthat
thevictimswerepublicofficers37Garawasa
_______________
35
Ibid.,p.253.
36
GR No. 117873, December 22, 1997. Citing Ramon C.
Aquino,TheRevisedPenalCode,1988ed.,Vol.III,pp.12,the
Court saidthat the Spanish version of Art. 267 of the Revised
Penal Code uses the terms lockup (encerrar) rather than
kidnap(sequestarorraptar).Lockupisincludedinthebroader
termdetention,whichrefersnotonlytotheplacingofaperson
in an enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to any other
deprivationofliberty.
37
Art.203,RevisedPenalCode,provides:
Art.203.Whoarepublicofficers.Forthepurposeofapplyingthe
provisionsofthisandtheprecedingtitlesofthisbook,anyperson
who,bydirectprovisionoflaw,popularelectionorappointment
by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of
publicfunctionsintheGovernmentofthePhilippineIslands,or
shallperforminsaidGovernmentorinanyofitsbranchespublic
dutiesasanemployee,agentorsubordinateofficial,ofanyrank
orclass,shallbedeemedtobeapublicofficer.
In defining public officers, former Chief Justice Ramon C.
AquinocitedManiegovs.People,inwhichtheCourtheld:The
definition of public officer in Art. 203 is quite comprehensive,
embracingasitdoeseverypublicservantfromthelowesttothe
highest. It obliterates the distinction between officer and
employee in the law of public officers, it does not distinguish
betweenpermanentandtemporaryemployeesxxx.Helikewise
presented a list ofpersons held to be public officers in various
cases,e.g.acustomssecretserviceagent,apublic
577
VOL.292,JULY16,1998 577
Peoplevs.Kulais
fiscalanalystfortheCityofZamboanga,Saavedraworkedatthe
CityEngineersOffice,andFranciscowasabarangaycouncilman
atthetimethekidnappingoccurred.AppellantKulaisshouldbe
punished, therefore, under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the
RevisedPenalCode,andnotArt.268,asthetrialcourtheld.
ThepresentcaseisdifferentfromPeoplevs.Astorga,38which
heldthatthecrimecommittedwasnotkidnappingunderArticle
267,paragraph4,butonlygravecoercion.Theappellantinthat
casehadtrickedhissevenyearoldvictimintogoingwithhimto
aplacehealoneknew.Hisplans,however,werefoiledwhena
groupofpeoplebecamesuspiciousandrescuedthegirlfromhim.
TheCourtnotedthatthevictimstestimonyandtheotherpieces
ofevidencedidnotindicatethattheappellantwantedtodetain
her,orthatheactuallydetainedher.
Inthepresentcase,theevidencepresentedbytheprosecution
indubitablyestablishedthatthevictimsweredetained,albeitfor
a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt that
kidnapping tookplace,and that appellantwasamemberofthe
armedgroupwhichabductedthevictims.
Third
DenialandAlibi
Theappellantsbaredenialisaweakdefensethatbecomeseven
weaker in the face of the prosecution witnesses positive
identificationofhim.Jurisprudencegivesgreaterweighttothe
positivenarrationofprosecutionwitnessesthantothe
_______________
worksinspector,asanitaryofficer,abarriolieutenant,alaborer
dischargingclericalfunctions,anemergencyhelperintheBureau
ofForestryonadailywagebasis,performingthedutiesofjanitor
andmessenger.SeeRamonC.Aquino,RevisedPenalCode,1997
ed.,Vol.II,pp.409410.
38
GRNo.110097,December22,1997.
578
578 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Kulais
negative testimonies of the defense.39Between positive and
categoricaltestimonywhichhasaringoftruthtoitontheone
hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally
prevails.40Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto
Pereztestifiedinaclear,straightforwardandfrankmanner;and
theirtestimonieswerecompatibleonmaterialpoints.Moreover,
noillmotivewasattributedtothekidnapvictimsandnonewas
foundbythisCourt.
Weagreewiththetrialcourtsobservationthattheappellant
did not meet the charges against him head on. His testimony
dweltonwhathappenedtohimonthedayhewasarrestedand
onsubsequentdaysthereafter.Appellantdidnotexplainwhere
he was during the questioned dates (December 12, 1988 to
February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and
Issue: Perez,whentheyidentifiedhimasoneoftheirkidnappers.
ReclusionPerpetua,NotLifeImprisonment
Thetrialcourterredwhenitsentencedtheappellanttosixterms
of life imprisonment. The penalty for kidnapping with ransom,
under the Revised Penal Code, isreclusion perpetuato death.
Sincethecrimeshappenedin1988,whenthecapitalpenaltywas
proscribedbytheConstitution,themaximumpenaltythatcould
havebeenimposedwasreclusionperpetua.Lifeimprisonmentis
not synonymous withreclusion perpetua. Unlike life
imprisonment,reclusion perpetuacarries with it accessory
penaltiesprovidedintheRevisedPenalCodeandhasadefinite
extentorduration.Lifeimprisonmentisinvariablyimposedfor
serious offenses penalized by speciallaws, whilereclusion
perpetuais prescribed in accordance with the Revised Penal
Code.41
 WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as
principal in five counts of kidnapping for ransom and in three
countsofkidnappingisAFFIRMED,butthepenaltyimposedis
hereby MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five
termsofreclusionperpetua,oneforeachofhisfiveconvictionsfor
kidnappingforransom;andtothreetermsofreclusionperpetua,
one each for the kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara,
MonicoSaavedraandCalixtoFrancisco.Liketheotheraccused
who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the
personaleffects,ortheirmonetaryvalue,takenfromthekidnap
victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount of
P122,000representingtheransommoneypaidtothekidnappers.
Costsagainstappellant.
SOORDERED.
Davide,
Jr.(Chairman),Bellosillo,VitugandQuisumbing,JJ.,concur.
Judgmentaffirmedwithmodification.
_______________
41
People vs. Layno,GR No. 110833, November 21,
1996;Peoplevs. Magana,GR No. 105673, July 26,1996;People
vs. Gregorio,255 SCRA 380, March 29, 1996;People vs.
Magalong,244 SCRA 117, May 12, 1995. SeePeople vs.
Samson,244 SCRA 146, May 16, 1995.NOTA BENE: It is
noteworthythatAppellantKulaiswasalsotheappellantinthis
citedcase.HeappealedtheDecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtof
ZamboangaCity,Branch12,presidedbyJudgePelagioS.Mandi
whopennedthe Decisionappealedinthepresentcase. In that
case, Kulais was convicted of kidnapping with ransom for the
abduction of one Airman Ruben Monteverde, committed on
January 30, 1990. The persons he was charged with were
thesameoneshewaschargedandconvictedwithinthecaseat
bar.SeealsoPeoplevs.Ramos, Jr.,203SCRA237,October28,
1991;andPeoplevs.Baguio,196SCRA459,April30,1991.
Notes.Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the
defenseofalibi,andthatwhenanaccusedputsupthedefenseof
alibi,thecourtshouldnotatoncehaveamentalprejudiceagainst
him.(Peoplevs.Escalante,238SCRA554[1994])
When the prosecutions cause is weak, an accuseds alibi
assumesimportanceandbecomescrucialinnegatinghiscriminal
liability, andhisalibishould beconsideredfortherearetimes
whereanaccusedhasnootherpossibledefensebutalibi,asthat
could really be the truth. (People vs. Adofina,239 SCRA
67[1994])
The exception to the right of confrontation contemplated by
lawcoversonlytheutilizationoftestimoniesofabsentwitnesses
madeinpreviousproceedings,anddoesnotincludeutilizationof
previous decisions or judgments. (People vs. OrtizMiyake,279
SCRA180[1997])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
414 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Laureanovs.CourtofAppeals
G.R.No.114776.February2,2000.*
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,vs.COURT OP
APPEALSANDSINGAPOREAIRLINESLIMITED,respondents.
Actions;Conflict of Laws;The party who claims the
applicabilityofaforeignlawhastheburdenofproof,andwhere
said party has failed to discharge the burden, Philippine law
applies.At the outset, we find it necessary to state our
concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the Regional
TrialCourtofManila,Branch9.Thetrialcourtrightlyruledon
the application of Philippine law, thus: Neither can the Court
determinewhethertheterminationoftheplaintiffislegalunder
the Singapore Laws because of the defendants failure to show
which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As
substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the
Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of
Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the
Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The
defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law
shouldbeapplied.
Same;LaborLaw;Prescription;IllegalDismissals;Inillegal
dismissal,itissettled,thatthetenyearprescriptiveperiodfixed
inArticle1144oftheCivilCodemaynotbeinvoked,fortheCivil leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no
Codeisalawofgeneralapplication,whiletheprescriptiveperiod
fixedinArticle292oftheLaborCodeisaspeciallawapplicable
toclaimsarisingfromemployeeemployerrelations.Whatrules
onprescriptionshouldapplyincaseslikethisonehaslongbeen
decidedbythisCourt.Inillegaldismissal,itissettled,thatthe
tenyearprescriptiveperiodfixedinArticle1144oftheCivilCode
maynotbeinvokedbypetitioners,fortheCivilCodeisalawof withtheCourtofAppealswhenitsaid,Itisasettledrulethat
generalapplication,whiletheprescriptiveperiodfixedinArticle
292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW
applicabletoclaimsarisingfromemployeeemployerrelations.
Same;Same;Same;Although the commencement of a civil
action stops the running of the statute of prescription or
limitations,itsdismissalorvoluntaryabandonmentbyplaintiff
leavesthepartiesinexactlythesamepositionasthoughnoaction
hadbeencommencedat
_______________
SECONDDIVISION.
*
415
VOL.324,FEBRUARY2,2000 415
Laureanovs.CourtofAppeals
all.Petitionerclaimsthattherunningoftheprescriptive
periodwastolledwhenhefiledhiscomplaintforillegaldismissal
before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations
Commission.However,thisclaimdeservesscantconsideration;it
has nolegal legtostandon.InOlympiaInternational, Inc. vs.
CourtofAppeals,weheldthatalthoughthecommencementofa
civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or
limitations,itsdismissalorvoluntaryabandonmentbyplaintiff
actionhadbeencommencedatall.
Same;Same;Same;Contracts;It is a settled rule that
contractshavetheforceoflawbetweentheparties.Astowhether
petitioners separation from the company due to retrenchment
wasvalid,theappellatecourtfoundthattheemploymentcontract
ofpetitionerallowedforpreterminationofemployment.Weagree
contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the
momentthesameisperfected,thepartiesareboundnotonlyto
thefulfillmentofwhathasbeenexpresslystipulatedbutalsoto
all consequences which, according to their nature, may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff
appelleeacceptedtheofferofemployment,hewasboundbythe
termsandconditionssetforthinthecontract,amongothers,the
rightofmutualterminationbygivingthreemonthswrittennotice
orbypaymentofthreemonthssalary.Suchprovisionisclearand
readily understandable, hence, there is no room for
interpretation.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
MontillaLawOfficeforpetitioner.
Bengzon,Narciso,Cudala,Pecson,Bengson & Jimenezfor
privaterespondent.
QUISUMBING,J.:
ThispetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45oftheRulesof
CourtseekstoreversetheDecisionoftheCourtofAppeals,dated
October29,1993,inCA.G.R.No.CV34476,
416
416 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Laureanovs.CourtofAppeals
aswellasitsResolutiondatedFebruary28,1994,whichdenied
themotionforreconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent
appellatecourtareasfollows:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein
petitioner],thenDirectorofFlightOperationsandChiefPilotof
Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant company
[hereinprivaterespondent]throughitsAreaManagerinManila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview,
defendantwrotetoplaintiff,offeringacontractofemploymentas
anexpatriateB707captainforanoriginalperiodoftwo(2)years
commencingonJanuary21,1978.Plaintiffacceptedtheofferand
commencedworkingonJanuary20,1979.Afterpassingthesix
month probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed
effectiveJuly21,1979.(AnnexB,p.30,Rollo).
OnJuly21,1979,defendantofferedplaintiffanextensionof
histwoyearcontracttofive(5)yearseffectiveJanuary21,1979
toJanuary20,1984subjecttothetermsandconditionssetforth
inthecontractofemployment,whichthelatteraccepted(Annex
C,p.31,Rec.).
DuringhisserviceasB707captain,plaintiffonAugust24,
1980,whileincommandofaflight,committedanoiseviolation
offenseattheZurichAirport,forwhichplaintiffapologized.(Exh.
3,p.307,Rec.).
Sometimein1980,plaintifffeaturedinatailscrapingincident
wherein the tail of the aircraft scraped or touched therunway
duringlanding.Hewassuspendedforafewdaysuntilhewas
investigated by a board headed by Capt. Choy. He was
reprimanded.
OnSeptember25,1981,plaintiffwasinvitedtotakeacourse
ofA300conversiontrainingatAeroformacion,Toulouse,France
atdefendantsexpense.Havingsuccessfullycompletedandpassed
thetrainingcourse,plaintiffwasclearedonApril7,1981forsolo
dutyascaptainoftheAirbusA300andsubsequentlyappointed
as captain of the A300 fleet commanding an Airbus A300 in
flightsoverSoutheastAsia.(AnnexesD,EandF,pp.3438,
Rec.).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated
costcuttingmeasures.Seventeen(17)expatriatecaptainsinthe
Airbusfleetwerefoundinexcessofthedefendantsrequirement
(t.s.n.,July6,1988,p.11).Consequently,defendantinformedits
expatriate
417
VOL.324,FEBRUARY2,2000 417
Laureanovs.CourtofAppeals
pilotsincludingplaintiffofthesituationandadvisedthemtotake
advanceleaves.(Exh.15,p.466,Rec.).
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time,
defendantdecidedtoterminateitsexcesspersonnel(t.s.n.,July6,
1988,p.17).Itdidnot,however,immediatelyterminateitsA300
pilots.Itreviewedtheirqualifications for possible promotionto
the B747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed,
twelvewerefoundqualified.Unfortunately,plaintiffwasnotone
ofthetwelve.
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his
terminationeffectiveNovember1,1982andthathewillbepaid
three(3)monthssalaryinlieuofthreemonthsnotice(AnnexI,
pp.4142,Rec.).Becausehecouldnotuproothisfamilyonsuch
short notice, plaintiff requested a threemonth notice to afford
himtimetoexhaustallpossibleavenuesforreconsiderationand
retention.Defendantgaveonlytwo(2)monthsnoticeandone(1)
monthsalary,(t.s.n.,Nov.12,1987,p.25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to
dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. Before said motion was
resolved,thecomplaintwaswithdrawn.Thereafter,plaintifffiled
theinstantcasefordamagesduetoillegalterminationofcontract
ofservicesbeforethecourtaquo(Complaint,pp.110,Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to
dismissalleginginteralia:(1)thatthecourthasnojurisdiction
overthesubjectmatterofthecase,and(2)thatPhilippinecourts
have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends
thatthecomplaintisforillegaldismissaltogetherwithamoney
claim arisingoutofandinthe courseofplaintiffs employment
thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the
jurisdictionpursuanttoArticle217oftheLaborCodeandthat,
sinceplaintiffwasemployedinSingapore,allotheraspectsofhis
employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore.
Thus,defendantpostulatesthatSingaporelawsshouldapplyand
courtsthereatshallhavejurisdiction.(pp.5069,Rec.).
In traversing defendants arguments, plaintiff claimed that:
(1) where the items demanded in a complaint are the natural
consequencesflowingfromabreachofanobligationandnotlabor
benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case
involves a question that is beyond the field of specialization of
labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on the
employeesdismissal
418
418 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Laureanovs.CourtofAppeals
persebutonthemannerofsaiddismissalandtheconsequence
thereof, the case falls under thejurisdictionofthecivilcourts.
(pp.7073,Rec.)
OnMarch23,1987,thecourtaquodenieddefendantsmotion
todismiss(pp.8284,Ibid.).Themotionforreconsiderationwas
likewisedenied,(p.95,ibid.)
OnSeptember16,1987,defendantfileditsanswerreiterating
the grounds relied upon in its motion to dismiss and further
arguing thatplaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel
frominstitutingthecomplaintandthathehasnocauseofaction.
(pp.102115)1
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in
favorofplaintiff.Thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:
WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavorofplaintiff
Menandro Laureano and against defendant Singapore Airlines
Limited,orderingdefendanttopayplaintifftheamountsof
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at
thecurrentrateofexchangeatthetimeofpayment,asandfor
unearnedcompensationwithlegalinterestfromthefilingofthe
complaintuntilfullypaid;
 SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at
the current rate of exchange at the time of payment; and the
further amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with
legalinterestfromthefilingofthecomplaintuntilfullypaid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as
and for exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as and for
attorneysfees.
Costsagainstdefendant.
SOORDERED.2
Singapore Airlinestimelyappealedbeforetherespondent court
and raised the issues of jurisdiction, validity of termination,
estoppel,anddamages.
OnOctober29,1993,theappellatecourtsetasidethedecision
ofthetrialcourt,thus,
_____________
1
Rollo,pp.3032.
2
Id.at65.
419
VOL.324,FEBRUARY2,2000
Laureanovs.CourtofAppeals
. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal
termination was filed by plaintiffappellee only on January 8,
1987ormorethanfour(4)yearsaftertheeffectivitydateofhis
dismissalonNovember1,1982.Clearly,plaintiffappelleesaction
hasalreadyprescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED
andSETASIDE.Thecomplaintisherebydismissed.
SOORDERED.3
Petitioners and Singapore Airlines respective motions for
reconsiderationweredenied.
Now,beforetheCourt,petitionerposesthefollowingqueries:
1. 1.IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON
CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS
UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
ORONEFORDAMAGESARISINGFROMANINJURY
TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH
PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER ARTICLE
1146OFTHENEWCIVILCODE?
2. 2.CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF
EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS
EMPLOYER?
3. 3.CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN
EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE
EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN
FACT,INCURRINGLOSSES?
Attheoutset,wefinditnecessarytostateourconcurrenceonthe
assumptionofjurisdictionbytheRegionalTrialCourtofManila,
419 Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of
Philippinelaw,thus:
NeithercantheCourtdeterminewhethertheterminationofthe
plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws because of the
defendantsfailuretoshowwhichspecificlawsofSingaporeLaws
apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding
paragraphs,thePhilippineCourtsdonottakejudicialnoticeof
thelawsofSingapore.Thedefendantthatclaimstheapplicability
oftheSingapore
_____________
3
Id.at40.
420
420 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
 Laureanovs.CourtofAppeals
Laws to this case has the burden of proof. The defendant has
failedtodoso.Therefore,thePhilippinelawshouldbeapplied.4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when
defendant filed its appeal before said court. 5On this matter,
respondentcourtwascorrectwhenitbarreddefendantappellant
belowfromraisingfurthertheissueofjurisdiction.6
Petitionernow raisesthe issue ofwhetherhisactionisone
based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
According to him, his termination of employment effective
November1,1982,wasbasedonanemploymentcontractwhichis
underArticle1144,sohisactionshouldprescribein10yearsas
provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the
appellatecourtbasedonArticle1146whereprescriptionisonly
four(4)years,isanerror.Theappellatecourtconcludedthatthe
action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor
ArbiteronJune29,1983,butwhichwaswithdrawn,thenfiled
again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already
prescribed.
Inourview,neitherArticle1144 7norArticle11468oftheCivil
Codeisherepertinent.WhatisapplicableisArticle291ofthe
LaborCode,viz.:
Article 291.Money claims.All money claims arising from
employeeemployer relations accruing during the effectivity of
thisCodeshallbefiledwithinthree(3)yearsfromthetimethe
causeofactionaccrued;otherwisetheyshallbeforeverbarred.
Whatrulesonprescriptionshouldapplyincaseslikethisonehas
longbeendecidedbythisCourt.Inillegaldismissal,itissettled,
thatthetenyearprescriptiveperiodfixedinArticle1144ofthe
CivilCodemaynotbeinvokedbypetitioners,fortheCivilCodeis
alawofgeneralapplication,whiletheprescriptiveperiodfixedin
Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL
LAW applicable to claims arising from employeeemployer
relations.9
MorerecentlyinDeGuzmanvs.CourtofAppeals,10wherethe
money claim was based on a written contract, the Collective
BargainingAgreement,theCourtheld:
...ThelanguageofArt.291oftheLaborCodedoesnotlimitits
application onlytomoney claimsspecificallyrecoverable under
saidCodebutcoversallmoneyclaimsarisingfromanemployee
employerrelations(CitingCadalinv.POEAAdministrator,238
SCRA 721, 764 [1994]; andUy v. National Labor Relations
Commission,261SCRA505,515[1996])....
ItshouldbenotedfurtherthatArticle291oftheLaborCodeis
aspeciallawapplicabletomoneyclaimsarisingfromemployer
employeerelations;thus,itnecessarilyprevailsoverArticle1144
of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the ruleinstatutory
construction that where two statutes are of equal theoretical
applicationtoaparticularcase,theonedesignedthereforeshould
prevail. (CitingLeveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court,157
SCRA282,294.)Generaliaspecialibusnonderogant.11
In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the
appellatecourtsconclusionthatpetitionersactionfordamages
duetoillegalterminationfiledagainonJanuary8,1987ormore
than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on
November1,1982hasalreadyprescribed.
In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal
termination was filed by plaintiffappellee only on January 8,
1987ormorethanfour(4)yearsaftertheeffectivitydateofhis
dismissalonNovember1,1982.Clearly,plaintiffappelleesaction
hasalreadyprescribed.
WebaseourconclusionnotonArticle1144oftheCivilCodebut
on Article 291 of the Labor Code, which sets the prescription
period at three (3) years and which governs, under this
jurisdiction.
Petitionerclaimsthattherunningoftheprescriptiveperiod
wastolledwhenhefiledhiscomplaintforillegaldismissalbefore
theLaborArbiteroftheNationalLaborRelationsCommission.
However,thisclaimdeservesscantconsideration;ithasnolegal
leg to stand on. InOlympia International, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, we held that although the commencement of a civil
action stops the running of the statute of prescription or
limitations,itsdismissalorvoluntaryabandonmentbyplaintiff
leaves the parties in exactly the same position as though no
actionhadbeencommencedatall.12
Now,astowhetherpetitionersseparationfromthecompany
duetoretrenchmentwasvalid,theappellatecourtfoundthatthe
employmentcontractofpetitionerallowedforpreterminationof
employment.WeagreewiththeCourtofAppealswhenitsaid,
Itisasettledrulethatcontractshavetheforceoflawbetween reasonablyneeded.14
theparties.Fromthemomentthesameisperfected,theparties
areboundnotonlytothefulfillmentofwhathasbeenexpressly
stipulatedbutalsotoallconsequenceswhich,accordingtotheir
nature,maybeinkeepingwithgoodfaith,usageandlaw.Thus,
whenplaintiffappelleeacceptedtheofferofemployment,hewas
bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract,
among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three
months written notice or by payment of three months salary.
Suchprovisionisclearandreadilyunderstandable,hence,there
isnoroomforinterpretation.
xxx
Further,plaintiffappelleescontentionthatheisnotboundby
theprovisionsoftheAgreement,asheisnotasignatorythereto,
deservesnomerit.Itmustbenotedthatwhenplaintiffappellees
employmentwasconfirmed,heappliedformembershipwiththe
SingaporeAirlinesLimited(Pilots)Association,thesignatoryto
the aforementioned Agreement. As such, plaintiffappellee is
estoppedfromquestioningthelegalityofthesaidagreementor
anyprovisocontainedtherein.13
Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that
respondentcourtsdecisionisamplysupportedbyevidenceandit
did not err in its findings, including the reason for the
retrenchment:
When defendantappellant was faced with the worldwide
recessionoftheairlineindustryresultinginaslowdowninthe
companys growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian
Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to
adopt cost cutting measures, such as cutting down services,
numberoffrequenciesofflights,andreductionofthenumberof
flyingpointsfortheA300fleet(t.s.n.,July6,1988,pp.1718).As
aresult,defendantappellanthadtolayoffA300pilots,including
plaintiffappellee, which it found to be in excess of what is
Alltheseconsidered,wefindsufficientfactualandlegalbasisto
concludethatpetitionersterminationfromemploymentwasfor
an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and
opportunitytobeheard,byrespondent
company.Noerrornorgraveabuseofdiscretion,therefore,could
beattributedtorespondentappellatecourt.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA. CV No. 34476 is
AFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.
Bellosillo(Chairman),Mendoza,BuenaandDeLeon,Jr.,
JJ.,concur.
Petitiondismissed,judgmentaffirmed.
 Notes.It is a timehonored principle that contracts are
respectedasthelawbetweenthecontractingparties.(Hensonvs.
IntermediateAppellateCourt,148SCRA11[1987])
Thepartiesarechargedwithknowledgeoftheexistinglawat
thetimetheyenterintoacontractandatthetimeitistobecome
operativeand,apersonispresumedtobemoreknowledgeable
abouthisownstatelawthanhisalienorforeigncontemporary.
(Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals,260SCRA673[1996])
Amanningagencycannotbefaultedforcomplyingwiththe
applicable foreign law. (Omanfil International Manpower
Development Corporation vs. National Labor Relations
Commission,300SCRA455[1998])
o0o
425
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R.No.195649.April16,2013.*
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, petitioner,vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA,respondents.
Citizenship; Renunciation of Philippine Citizenship;
Commonwealth Act No. 63; While the act of using a foreign
passportisnotoneoftheactsenumeratedinCommonwealthAct
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very
oathofrenunciationrequiredforaformerFilipinocitizenwhois
alsoacitizenofanothercountrytobequalifiedtorunforalocal
electiveposition.Whiletheactofusingaforeignpassportisnot
one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constitutingrenunciationandlossofPhilippinecitizenship,itis
nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciationrequiredforaformerFilipinocitizenwhoisalsoa
citizenofanothercountrytobequalifiedtorunforalocalelective
position.WhenArnadousedhisUSpassporton14April2009,or
justelevendaysafterherenouncedhisAmericancitizenship,he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he absolutely and
perpetuallyrenounce(s)allallegianceandfidelitytotheUNITED
STATESOFAMERICAand that hedivest(s)[him]self offull
employmentofallcivilandpoliticalrightsandprivilegesofthe
United States of America. We agree with the COMELECEn
Bancthat such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American
citizen,Arnadovoluntarilyandeffectivelyrevertedtohisearlier
status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it
took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an
AmericancitizenbyusinghisUSpassport.Thisactofusinga
foreignpassportafterrenouncingonesforeigncitizenshipisfatal
toArnadosbidforpublicoffice,asiteffectivelyimposedonhima
disqualificationtorunforanelectivelocalposition.
 Same;Same;ElectionLaw;Thecitizenshiprequirementfor
electivepublicofficeisacontinuingone.Itmustbepossessednot
just
_______________
*ENBANC.
421
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
atthetimeoftherenunciationoftheforeigncitizenshipbut
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation
opens the citizenship issue to attack.The citizenship
requirementforelectivepublicofficeisacontinuingone.Itmust
bepossessednotjustatthetimeoftherenunciationoftheforeign
citizenshipbutcontinuously.Anyactwhichviolatestheoathof
renunciationopensthecitizenshipissuetoattack.Weagreewith
the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that
Arnados act of consistently using his US passport effectively
negatedhisAffidavitofRenunciation.Thisdoesnotmean,that
hefailedtocomplywiththetwinrequirementsunderR.A.No.
9225, for he in fact did. It wasaftercomplying with the
requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office
pursuanttoSection40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCodeof1991.
Same; Same; Same; While those who acquire dual
citizenshipbychoiceareaffordedtherightofsuffrage,thosewho
seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public
trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided
allegiancetotheRepublicandtonoother.Citizenshipisnota
matterofconvenience.Itisabadgeofidentitythatcomeswith
attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its
citizens.Itlikewise demands theconcomitantduty to maintain
allegiancetoonesflagandcountry.Whilethosewhoacquiredual
citizenshipbychoiceareaffordedtherightofsuffrage,thosewho
seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public
trust.Holdingpublicofficedemandsfullandundividedallegiance
totheRepublicandtonoother.WethereforeholdthatArnado,
421
by using his US passport after renouncing his American
citizenship,hasrecantedthesameOathofRenunciationhetook.
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his
situation.Heisdisqualifiednotonlyfromholdingthepublicoffice
butevenfrombecomingacandidateintheMay2010elections.
ElectionLaw;Whenapersonwhoisnotqualifiedisvotedfor
andeventuallygarnersthehighestnumberofvotes,eventhewill
oftheelectorateexpressedthroughtheballotcannotcurethedefect
in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to
trampleuponandrentasundertheverylawthatsetsforththe
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.The ballot
cannotoverridethe
422
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
22
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
constitutionalandstatutoryrequirementsforqualifications
and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires
certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain
disqualificationsbenotpossessedbypersonsdesiringtoserveas
electivepublicofficials,thosequalificationsmustbemetbefore
oneevenbecomesacandidate.Whenapersonwhoisnotqualified
isvotedforandeventuallygarnersthehighestnumberofvotes,
eventhewilloftheelectorateexpressedthroughtheballotcannot
cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule
otherwiseistotrampleuponandrentasundertheverylawthat
sets forththequalificationsand disqualifications ofcandidates.
Wemightaswellwriteoffourelectionlawsifthevoiceofthe
electorateis the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed
worthytooccupyelectivepositionsinourrepublic.
Same; When there are participants who turn out to be
ineligible,theirvictoryisvoidedandthelaurelisawardedtothe
nextinrankwhodoesnotpossessanyofthedisqualificationsnor
lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.We have ruled in the recent cases ofAratea v.
COMELEC,683SCRA105(2012)andJalosjosv.COMELEC,683
SCRA1(2012),thatavoidCOCcannotproduceanylegaleffect.
Thus,thevotescastinfavoroftheineligiblecandidatearenot
consideredatallindeterminingthewinnerofanelection.Even
whenthevotesfortheineligiblecandidatearedisregarded,the
will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The
votescastinfavorofanineligiblecandidatedonotconstitutethe
soleandtotalexpressionofthesovereignvoice.Thevotescastin
favorofeligibleandlegitimatecandidatesformpartofthatvoice
and must also be respected. As in any contest, elections are
governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as
players. When there are participants who turn out to be
ineligible,theirvictoryisvoidedandthelaurelisawardedtothe
nextinrankwhodoesnotpossessanyofthedisqualificationsnor
lacksanyofthequalificationssetintherulestobeeligibleas
candidates.
Same; Knowledge by the electorate of a candidates
disqualificationisnotnecessarybeforeaqualifiedcandidatewho
placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the
winner.The electorates awareness of the candidates
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to
attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying
circumstancemakesthecandidateineli
423
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 423
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
gible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidates
disqualificationisnotnecessarybeforeaqualifiedcandidatewho
placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the
winner.Thesecondplacerinthevotecountisactuallythefirst
placer among the qualified candidates. That the disqualified
candidatehasalreadybeenproclaimedandhasassumedofficeis
of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a
substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the
proclamation.
Same; Citizenship; Dual Citizenship; The disqualifying
circumstanceaffectingArnadoishiscitizenship.Arnadowasboth
aFilipinoandanAmericancitizenwhenhefiledhiscertificateof
candidacy.Hewasadualcitizendisqualifiedtorunforpublic
officebasedonSection40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCode;The
affirmationofArnadosdisqualification,althoughmadelongafter
the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.Arnadoisdeclaredtobenotacandidateatallinthe
May 2010 elections.The disqualifying circumstance affecting
Arnadoishiscitizenship.Asearlierdiscussed,Arnadowasbotha
FilipinoandanAmericancitizenwhenhefiledhiscertificateof
candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public
office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section40startswiththestatementThefollowingpersonsare
disqualified from running for any elective local position. The
prohibitionservesasabaragainsttheindividualswhofallunder
anyoftheenumerationfromparticipatingascandidatesinthe
election. With Arnado being barred from even becoming a
candidate,hiscertificateofcandidacyisthusrenderedvoidfrom
thebeginning.Itcouldnothaveproducedanyotherlegaleffect
except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualificationpriortotheelectionsbecausehefiledhisanswer
tothepetitionwhentheelectionswereconductedalreadyandhe
was already proclaimed the winner. To hold that such
proclamationisvalidistonegatetheprohibitorycharacterofthe
disqualificationwhichArnadopossessedevenpriortothefilingof
the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnados
disqualification,althoughmadelongaftertheelections,reaches
back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is
declaredtobenotacandidateatallintheMay2010elections.
Arnadobeinganoncandidate,thevotescastinhisfavorshould
not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate
424
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
24
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the
rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not
apply.
Carpio,J.,ConcurringOpinion:
ElectionLaw;Citizenship;ViewthatPhilippinecourtshave
nopowertodeclarewhetherapersonpossessescitizenshipother
thanthatofthePhilippines.Philippinecourtshavenopowerto
declarewhetherapersonpossessescitizenshipotherthanthatof
thePhilippines.InMercadov.Manzano,307SCRA630(1999),
Constitutional Commissioner JoaquinG. Bernaswasquoted as
saying,[D]ualcitizenshipisjustarealityimposedonusbecause
wehavenocontrolofthelawsoncitizenshipofothercountries.
WerecognizeachildofaFilipinomother.Butwhetherornotshe
isconsideredacitizenofanothercountryissomethingcompletely
beyondourcontrol.Inthepresentcase,wehavenoauthorityto
declarethatArnadoisanAmericancitizen.Onlythecourtsofthe
USA,usingAmericanlaw,havetheconclusiveauthoritytomake
anassertionregardingArnadosAmericancitizenship.
Same;Same;RenunciationofCitizenship;RepublicActNo.
9225;ViewthatArnadosuseofhisAmericanpassportafterhis
execution of an Affidavit of Renunciation of his American
Citizenshipisaretractionofhisrenunciation;Itisasifhenever
renounced his American citizenship at all. Arnado, therefore,
failed to comply with the twin requirements of swearing to an
Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign
CitizenshipasfoundinRepublicActNo.9225.Arnadosuseof
his American passport after his execution of an Affidavit of
RenunciationofhisAmericanCitizenshipisaretractionofhis
renunciation.WhenArnadofiledhisCertificateofCandidacyon
30November2009,therewasnolongeraneffectiverenunciation
of his American citizenship. It is as if he never renounced his
American citizenship at all. Arnado, therefore, failed to comply
withthetwinrequirementsofswearingtoanOathofAllegiance
andexecutingaRenunciationofForeignCitizenshipasfoundin
Republic Act No. 9225. We previously discussed the distinction
betweendual citizenshipanddual allegiance, as well as the
different acts required of dual citizens, who may either have
involuntary dual citizenship or voluntary dual allegiance, who
desire to be elected to Philippine public office inCordora v.
COMELEC,580SCRA12(2009).425
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 425
 Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
Same;Same;Same;StrayVotes;ViewthatArnadousedhis
USApassportafterhisRenunciationofAmericanCitizenshipand
before he filedhis Certificate ofCandidacy.Thispositiveact of
retractionofhisrenunciationbeforethefilingoftheCertificateof
Candidacy renders Arnados Certificate of Candidacy void ab
initio.Therefore,Arnadowasneveracandidateatanytime,and
all the votes for him are stray votes.Arnado used his USA
passportafterhis Renunciation of American Citizenship
andbeforehefiledhisCertificateofCandidacy.Thispositiveact
ofretractionofhisrenunciationbeforethefilingoftheCertificate
ofCandidacyrendersArnadosCertificateofCandidacyvoidab
initio.Therefore,Arnadowasneveracandidateatanytime,and
all the votes for him are strayvotes. We reiterate our ruling
inJalosjos v. COMELEC, 683 SCRA 1 (2012), on this matter:
DecisionsofthisCourtholdingthatthesecondplacercannotbe
proclaimed winner if the firstplacer is disqualified or declared
ineligibleshouldbelimitedtosituationswherethecertificateof
candidacy ofthe firstplacerwasvalidatthetimeof filing but
subsequentlyhadtobecancelledbecauseofaviolationoflawthat
tookplace,oralegalimpedimentthattookeffect,afterthefiling
of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is
voidab initio, then legally the person who filed such void
certificateofcandidacywasneveracandidateintheelectionsat
any time. All votes for such noncandidate are stray votes and
shouldnotbecounted.Thus,suchnoncandidatecanneverbea
firstplacerintheelections.Ifacertificateofcandidacyvoidab
initioiscancelledontheday,orbeforetheday,oftheelection,
prevailing jurisprudence holds that allvotes for that candidate
are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy voidab initiois
cancelledonedayormoreaftertheelections,allvotesforsuch
candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of
candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more
equitableandlogicalapproachontheeffectofthecancellationof
a certificate of candidacy that is voidab initio. Otherwise, a
certificateofcandidacyvoidabinitiocanoperatetodefeatoneor
morevalidcertificatesofcandidacyforthesameposition.
Brion,J.,DissentingOpinion:
Citizenship;RepublicActNo.9225;ViewthatRA9225was
enacted to allow the reacquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenshipby:1)naturalborncitizenswhoweredeemedtohave
losttheirPhilippinecitizenshipbyreasonoftheirnaturalization
ascitizensof
426
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
26
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
a foreign country; and 2) naturalborn citizens of the
Philippineswho,aftertheeffectivityofthelaw,becamecitizensof
a foreign country.RA 9225 was enacted to allow the re
acquisitionandretentionofPhilippinecitizenshipby:1)natural
born citizens who were deemed to have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country; and 2) naturalborn citizens of the Philippines
who,aftertheeffectivityofthelaw,becamecitizensofaforeign
country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re
acquiredorretainedtheirPhilippinecitizenshipupontakingthe
oathofallegiance.xxxArnadofallsunderthefirstcategoryasa
naturalborn Filipino citizen who was deemed to have lost his
Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an American
citizen.
 Same; Same; Renunciation of Citizenship; View that
Arnados use of his US passport in travelling back to the
PhilippinesonNovember24,2009wasanisolatedactthatcould
not, by itself, be an express renunciation of the Philippine
citizenship he adopted as his sole citizenship under RA
9225.ArnadosPhilippinepassportwasissuedonJune18,2009,
buthewasnotimmediatelynotifiedoftheissuancesothatand
he only received his passport three months after or sometime
inSeptember2009.Clearly,whenArnadotravelledonApril
14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009, he had no
Philippinepassportthathecouldhaveusedtotraveltothe
UnitedStatestoattendtothewindingupofhisbusiness
andotheraffairsinAmerica.Atraveldocumentissuedbythe
properPhilippinegovernmentagency(e.g.,aPhilippineconsulate
officeintheUS)wouldnotsufficebecausetraveldocumentscould
not be used; they are issued only in critical instances, as
determinedbytheconsularofficer,andallowthebeareronlya
direct,onewaytriptothePhilippines.AlthoughArnadoreceived
hisPhilippinepassportbythetimehereturnedtothePhilippines
on November 24, 2009, he could not use this without risk of
complications with the US immigration authorities for using a
traveldocumentdifferentfromwhatheusedinhisentryintothe
USonJuly29,2009.Plainpracticalitythendemandedthatthe
traveldocumentthatheusedtoentertheUSonJuly29,2009be
thesametraveldocumentheshoulduseinleavingthecountryon
November24,2009.Giventhesecircumstances,Arnadosuseof
his US passport in travelling back to the Philippines on
November24,2009wasanisolatedactthatcouldnot,byitself,be
anexpressrenunciationof
427
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
thePhilippinecitizenshipheadoptedashissolecitizenship
underRA9225.
Same;Same;Same;Viewthattheponenciafailstoconsider
thatunder RA 9225, naturalborn citizens who weredeemed to
have lost their Philippine citizenship because of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country and who
subsequently complied with the requirements of RA 9225, are
deemednottohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenship.Idisagree
with the ponencias view that by using his US passport and
representinghimselfasanAmericancitizen,Arnadoeffectively
reverted to the status of a dual citizen.Interestingly, the
ponencia failed to cite any law or controlling
jurisprudence to support its conclusion, and thus merely
makes a bare assertion.Theponenciafails to consider that
underRA9225,naturalborncitizenswhoweredeemedtohave
losttheirPhilippinecitizenshipbecauseoftheirnaturalizationas
citizensofaforeigncountryandwhosubsequentlycompliedwith
therequirementsofRA9225,aredeemednottohavelosttheir
Philippine citizenship.RA 9225 cured and negated the
presumptionmadeunderCA63.Hence,asinJapzon,Arnado
assumed pure Philippine citizenship again after taking the
OathofAllegianceandexecutinganOathofRenunciationofhis
AmericancitizenshipunderRA9225.
Same; Same; Same; View that the law requires express
renunciation in order to lose Philippine citizenship. The term
meansarenunciationthatismadedistinctlyandexplicitlyandis
notlefttoinferenceorimplication;itisarenunciationmanifested
by directand appropriatelanguage, as distinguished from that
427 which is inferred from conduct.I loathe to rule that Arnados
useofhisUSpassportamountstoanexpressrenunciationofhis
Filipino citizenship, when its use was an isolated act that he
sufficientlyexplainedandfullyjustified.Iemphasizethatthelaw
requiresexpress renunciationin order to lose Philippine
citizenship. The term means a renunciation that is
madedistinctlyandexplicitlyandisnotlefttoinferenceor
implication;itisarenunciationmanifestedbydirectand
appropriatelanguage,asdistinguishedfromthatwhichis
inferredfromconduct.
Same; Same;Same; Viewthat intheabsenceofclearand
affirmative acts of reacquiring US citizenship either by
naturalizationorbyexpressacts(suchasthereestablishmentof
permanentresi
428
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
28
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
dencyintheUnitedStates),ArnadosuseofhisUSpassport
cannot but be considered an isolated act that did not undo his
renunciation of his US citizenship.In the present case, other
than the use of his US passport in two trips to and from the
United States, the record does not bear out any indication,
supported by evidence, of Arnados intention to reacquire US
citizenship.Tomymind,intheabsenceofclearandaffirmative
actsofreacquiringUScitizenshipeitherbynaturalizationorby
express acts (such as the reestablishment of permanent
residencyintheUnitedStates),ArnadosuseofhisUSpassport
cannot but be consideredanisolated act that did not undo his
renunciationofhisUScitizenship.Whathemightinfacthave
donewastoviolateAmericanlawontheuseofpassports,butthis
isamatterirrelevanttothepresentcase.Thus,Arnadoremains
to be a pure Filipino citizen and the loss of his Philippine
citizenshipcannotbepresumedorinferredfromhisisolatedactof
usinghisUSpassportfortravelpurposes.
Same;Same;Same;ViewthatArnadosufficientlyjustified
the use of his US passport despite his renunciation of his US
citizenship;whenhetravelledonApril14,2009,June25,2009
andJuly29,2009,hehadnoPhilippinepassportthathecould
haveusedtotraveltotheUnitedStatestoattendtothebusiness
and other affairs that he was leaving; He consistently used his
PhilippinepassportfortravelafterNovember24,2009,thetrue
characterofhisuseofhisUSpassportstandsoutandcannotbut
beanisolatedandconvenientactthatdidnotnegatehisOathof
Renunciation.I disagree however, with the conclusion that
Arnado effectively negated his Oath of Renunciation when he
usedhisUSpassportfortraveltotheUnitedStates.Toreiterate
ifonlyforemphasis,Arnadosufficientlyjustifiedtheuseofhis
USpassportdespitehisrenunciationofhisUScitizenship;when
hetravelledonApril14,2009,June25,2009andJuly29,2009,
hehadnoPhilippinepassportthathecouldhaveusedtotravelto
theUnitedStatestoattendtothebusinessandotheraffairsthat
he was leaving. If at all, he could be faulted for using his US
passportbythetimehereturnedtothePhilippinesonNovember
24,2009becauseatthattime,hehadpresumablyreceivedhis
Philippinepassport.However,giventhecircumstancesexplained
aboveandthatheconsistentlyusedhisPhilippinepassportfor
travelafterNovember24,2009,thetruecharacterofhisuseof
his USpassport stands out and cannot but be an isolated and
convenientactthatdidnotnegatehisOathofRenunciation.429
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 429
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
ABAD,J.,SeparateandConcurringOpinion:
 Citizenship;RepublicActNo.9225;ViewthatSection5(2)of
Republic Act 9225 provides the means by which a former
Philippine citizen who has acquired foreign citizenship to later
reacquire his old citizenship by complying with certain
requirements.Sec.5(2)ofRepublicAct9225providesthemeans
by which a former Philippine citizen who has acquired foreign
citizenship to later reacquire his old citizenship by complying
withcertainrequirements.RespondentRommelArnadocomplied
withtheserequirementsforregainingPhilippinecitizenshipbut,
becausehewantedtorunforpublicoffice,healsorenouncedhis
UnitedStates(U.S.)Citizenshipwhenhefiledhiscertificateof
candidacy,conformablywiththeprovisionsofRepublicAct9225
that reads: (2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines
shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
requiredbytheConstitutionandexistinglawsand,atthetimeof
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
swornrenunciationofanyandallforeigncitizenshipbeforeany
public officer authorized to administer an oath. But his
compliancewiththeabovewaschallengedbeforetheCommission
onElections(Comelec)becauseArnadoafterwardstwiceusedhis
U.S.passportingoingtoandcomingfromtheU.S.,thecountry
whosecitizenshiphehadrenounced.
Same;Same;RenunciationofCitizenship;ViewthatSection
349(a)(5)oftheImmigrationandNationalityAct(INA)provides
that(a)ApersonwhoisanationaloftheUnitedStateswhether
bybirthornaturalization,shalllosehisnationalitybyvoluntarily
performing any of the following acts with the intention of
relinquishing United States nationalityx x x (5) making a
formalrenunciationofnationalitybeforeadiplomaticorconsular
officeroftheUnitedStatesinaforeignstate,insuchformasmay
beprescribedbytheSecretaryofState.Hedoesnoteffectively
renounce his citizenship who does not comply with what his
countryrequiresofhim.Section349(a)(5)oftheImmigration
andNationalityAct(INA)setstheprocedurethatthosewhohave
moved their residence to other countries must observe when
renouncingtheirU.S.citizenship.Itprovidesthat(a)Aperson
who is a national of the United States whether by birth or
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by voluntarily
performing any of the following acts with the intention of
relinquishing United States nationalityxxx (5) making a
formalrenunciationofna
430
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
30
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
tionalitybeforeadiplomaticorconsularofficeroftheUnited
Statesinaforeignstate,insuchformasmaybeprescribedbythe
Secretary of State. He does not effectively renounce his
citizenshipwhodoesnotcomplywithwhathiscountryrequiresof
him.
SPECIALCIVILACTIONintheSupremeCourt.Certiorari.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Rexie Efren A. Bugaring & Associates Law Offices and
MusicoLawOfficeforpetitioner.
FedericoR.MirandaforrespondentLinogG.Balua.
Tomas O. Cabili and Rejoice S. Subejanofor respondent
MayorRommelArnado.
SERENO,C.J.:
TheCase
ThisisaPetitionforCertiorariunderRule64inconjunction
withRule65oftheRulesofCourttoreviewtheResolutionsofthe
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1in SPA
No.10109(DC)oftheCOMELECFirstDivisiondated5October
2010 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local
Government Code while the Resolution2of the COMELECEn
Bancdated2February2011isbeingquestionedforfindingthat
respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent
Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for
publicofficedespitehiscontinueduseofaU.S.passport.
Facts
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino
citizen.3However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization
_______________
1Rollo,pp.3849.
2Id.,atpp.5067.
3Id.,atp.229,Exhibit1MR,CertificateofLiveBirth.
431
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
asacitizenoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,helosthisFilipino
citizenship.
ArnadoappliedforrepatriationunderRepublicAct(R.A.)No.
9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Franciso,USAandtooktheOathofAllegiancetotheRepublicof
thePhilippineson10July2008.4OnthesamedayanOrderof
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition was
issuedinhisfavor.5
TheaforementionedOathofAllegiancestates:
I,RommelCagocoArnado,solemnlyswearthatIwillsupport
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippinesandwillmaintaintruefaithandallegiancethereto;
andthatIimposethisobligationuponmyselfvoluntarilywithout
mentalreservationorpurposeofevasion.6
On3April2009ArnadoagaintookhisOathofAllegianceto
the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
foreigncitizenship,whichstates:
I,RommelCagocoArnado,dosolemnlyswearthatIabsolutely
and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICAofwhichIamacitizen,andI
divestmyselfoffullemploymentofallcivilandpoliticalrights
andprivilegesoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica.
Isolemnlyswearthatalltheforegoingstatementistrueand
correcttothebestofmyknowledgeandbelief.7
_______________
4Id.,atp.241,Exhibit12MR,OathofAllegiance.
5Id.,atp.239,Exhibit10MR,OrderofApproval.
6Ibid.,Note2andAnnex1ofDulyVerifiedAnswer,Rollo,
431
p.160andAnnex2ofMemorandumforRespondent,Rollo,p.
178.
7Ibid.,pp.160and178.
432
432 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which
contains,amongothers,thefollowingstatements:
IamanaturalbornFilipinocitizen/naturalizedFilipinocitizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign
country.
IameligiblefortheofficeIseektobeelectedto.
IwillsupportanddefendtheConstitutionoftheRepublicofthe
Philippinesandwillmaintaintruefaithandallegiancethereto.I
willobeythelaws,legalordersanddecreespromulgatedbythe 2009,andagaindepartedon29July2009,arrivingbackinthe
dulyconstitutedauthorities. Philippineson24November2009.
Iimposethisobligationuponmyselfvoluntarilywithoutmental Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of
reservationorpurposeofevasion.8 Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
On28April2010,respondentLinogC.Balua(Balua),another Arnado, Rommel Cagoco appears in the available Computer
mayoraltycandidate,filedapetitiontodisqualifyArnadoand/or Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April
to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of 2010,withthefollowingpertinenttravelrecords:
Kauswagan,LanaodelNorteinconnectionwiththe10May2010 DATEOFArrival : 01/12/2010
local and national elections.9Respondent Balua contended that NATIONALITY : USAAMERICAN
ArnadoisnotaresidentofKauswagan,LanaodelNorteandthat
PASSPORT : 057782700
heisaforeigner,attachingtheretoacertificationissuedbythe

Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationalityofArnadoasUSAAmerican.10 DATEOFArrival : 03/23/2010
TofurtherbolsterhisclaimofArnadosUScitizenship,Balua NATIONALITY : USAAMERICAN
presented in his Memorandum a computergenerated travel PASSPORT : 05778270012
record11dated03December2009indicatingthatArnadohasbeen
usinghisUSPassportNo.057782700inenter On30April2010,theCOMELEC(FirstDivision)issuedan
_______________ Order13requiringtherespondenttopersonallyfilehisanswerand
8Id.,atp.139,AnnexBofPetitionforDisqualification;Id., memorandumwithinthree(3)daysfromreceiptthereof.
atp.177,Annex1MemorandumforRespondent. After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to
9Id.,atp.134,PetitiontoDisqualifyRommelCagocoArnado declarehimindefaultandtopresentevidenceexparte.
and/ortoCancelhisCertificateofCandidacyforMunicipalMayor Neithermotionwasactedupon,havingbeenovertakenbythe
ofKauswagan,LanaodelNorteinConnectionwithMay10,2010 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of
LocalandNationalElections. votesandwassubsequentlyproclaimedasthewinningcandidate
10Id.,atp.140,Certification. forMayorofKauswagan,LanaodelNorte.
11Id.,atp.191,ExhibitAofMemorandumforPetitioner It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his
verified answer, submitting the following documents as
filedbeforetheCommissiononElections.
evidence:14
433
_______________
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 433
12Id.,atp.192,ExhibitCofMemorandumforPetitioner
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
filedbeforetheCommissiononElections.
ing and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that
13Records,pp.7677.
Arnadoleftthecountryon14April2009andreturnedon25June
 14Rollo,p.42,Resolutiondated5October2010,pennedby
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, and concurred in by
CommissionersArmandoC.VelascoandGregorioY.Larrazabal.
434
434 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
1.Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the
RepublicofthePhilippinesdated03April2009;
2.JointAffidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno,
VirginiaBranzuela,LeoncioDaligdig,andJessyCorpin,all
neighborsofArnado,attestingthatArnadoisalongtime
residentofKauswaganandthathehasbeenconspicuously
andcontinuouslyresidinginhisfamilysancestralhousein
Kauswagan;
3.Certification from thePunong Barangayof Poblacion,
Kauswagan,LanaodelNortedated03June2010stating
that Arnado is abona fideresident of hisbarangayand
thatArnadowenttotheUnitedStatesin1985toworkand
returnedtothePhilippinesin2009;
4.Certificationdated31May2010fromtheMunicipalLocal
GovernmentOperationsOfficeofKauswaganstatingthat
Dr.MaximoP.Arnado,Sr.servedasMayorofKauswagan,
from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February
1979to15April1986;and
5.Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of
Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered
voterofKauswagansince03April2009.
TheRulingoftheCOMELECFirstDivision
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15the COMELEC First Division considered it
as one for disqualification. Baluas contentionthat Arnado isa
residentoftheUnitedStateswasdismisseduponthefindingthat
Baluafailedtopresentanyevidencetosupporthisconten
_______________
15Id.
435
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 435
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
tion, whereastheFirstDivisionstillcouldnotconcludethat
16
Arnadofailedtomeettheoneyearresidencyrequirementunder
theLocalGovernmentCode.17
Inthe matter ofthe issueofcitizenship, however,the First
Division disagreed with Arnados claim that he is a Filipino
citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially
compliedwiththerequirementsofR.A.No.9225,Arnadosactof
consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US
citizenshipon03April2009effectivelynegatedhisAffidavitof
Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnados continued use of his US passport is a strong
indicationthatArnadohadnorealintentiontorenouncehisUS
citizenshipandthatheonlyexecutedanAffidavitofRenunciation
toenablehimtorunforoffice.Wecannotturnablindeyetothe
glaringinconsistencybetweenArnadosunexplaineduseofaUS
passport six times and his claim that he reacquired his
PhilippinecitizenshipandrenouncedhisUScitizenship.Asnoted
bytheSupremeCourtintheYucase,[a]passportisdefinedas
anofficialdocumentofidentityandnationalityissuedtoaperson
intendingtotravelorsojourninforeigncountries.Surely,one
whotrulydivestedhimselfofUScitizenshipwouldnotcontinue
toavailofprivilegesreservedsolelyforUSnationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the
COMELECFirstDivisionreads:
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for
disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Rommel C. Arnado is herebyGRANTED. Rommel C. Arnados
proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of
Kauswagan,Lanao
_______________
16Id.,atp.43.
17Id.,atp.44.
18Id.
19Id.,atpp.4647,Resolutiondated5October2010.
436
436 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
del Nore is herebyANNULLED. Let the order of succession
under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take
effect.20
TheMotionforReconsiderationand
theMotionforIntervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the
COMELECEn Bancon the ground that the evidence is
insufficienttojustifytheResolutionandthatthesaidResolution
iscontrarytolaw.21Heraisedthefollowingcontentions:22
1.The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not
supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of
AllegianceandtheAffidavitofRenunciation,whichshow
thathehassubstantiallycompliedwiththerequirements
ofR.A.No.9225;
2.TheuseofhisUSpassportsubsequenttohisrenunciation
of his American citizenship is not tantamount to a
repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not
performanyacttoswearallegiancetoacountryotherthan
thePhilippines;
3.HeusedhisUSpassportonlybecausehewasnotinformed
oftheissuanceofhisPhilippinepassport,andthatheused
hisPhilippinepassportafterheobtainedit;
4.Baluas petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Arnado was filed out of time, and the First Divisions
treatmentofthepetitionasonefordis
_______________
20Id.,atp.48.
21Id.,atp.214,AmendedMotionforReconsideration.
22Id.,atpp.193211,VerifiedMotionforReconsideration;id.,
atpp.212246,AmendedMotionforReconsideration;id.,atpp.
247254, Rejoinder to Petitioners Comment/Opposition to
RespondentsAmendedMotionforReconsideration.
437
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 437
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
qualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amountingtoexcessofjurisdiction;23
5.Heisundoubtedlythepeopleschoiceasindicatedbyhis
winningtheelections;
6.His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the
COMELECfromjurisdictionoverthecase;and
7.Theproperremedytoquestionhiscitizenshipisthrougha
petition forquo warranto, which should have been filed
withintendaysfromhisproclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another
candidateformayorofKauswagan,andwhogarneredthesecond
highestnumberofvotesinthe2010elections,intervenedinthe
case and filed before the COMELECEn Banca Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnados
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that
whiletheFirstDivisioncorrectlydisqualifiedArnado,theorderof
successionunderSection44oftheLocalGovernmentCodeisnot
applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the
cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be
proclaimedasthewinner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his
Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration.
Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that
intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been
rendered, and that as a secondplacer, Maquiling undoubtedly
lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or
benefittedbythefinaladjudicationofthecase.
_______________
23Id.,atp.224,AmendedMotionforReconsideration.
438
438 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
RulingoftheCOMELECEnBanc
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELECEn
Bancheld that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the
candidatewhosequalificationsforofficeisquestioned.
AstoMaquilingsintervention,theCOMELECEnBancalso
cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in
proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final
judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that
Maquiling,asthesecondplacer,wouldnotbeprejudicedbythe
outcomeofthecaseasitagreeswiththedispositiveportionofthe
ResolutionoftheFirstDivisionallowingtheorderofsuccession
underSection44oftheLocalGovernmentCodetotakeeffect.
The COMELECEn Bancagreed with the treatment by the
FirstDivisionofthepetitionasonefordisqualification,andruled
thatthepetitionwasfiledwellwithintheperiodprescribedby
law,24havingbeenfiledon28April2010,whichisnotlaterthan
11May2010,thedateofproclamation.
However,theCOMELECEnBancreversedandsetasidethe
ruling of the First Division and granted Arnados Motion for
Reconsideration,onthefollowingpremises:
First:
ByrenouncinghisUScitizenshipasimposedbyR.A.No.9225,
therespondentembracedhisPhilippinecitizenshipasthoughhe
neverbecameacitizenofanothercountry.Itwasatthattime,
April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine
Citizenagain.
_______________
24A verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to
Sec. 68 of the OEC and the verified petition to disqualify a
candidateforlackofqualificationsorpossessingsomegroundsfor
disqualification may be filed on any day after the last day for
filingofcertificatesofcandidacybutnotlaterthanthedateof
proclamation.(Sec.4.B.1.COMELECResolutionNo.8696).
439
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 439
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
xxxx
TheuseofaUSpassport[]doesnotoperatetorevertback
hisstatusasadualcitizenpriortohisrenunciationasthereisno
lawsayingsuch.Moresuccinctly,theuseofaUSpassportdoes
notoperatetounrenouncewhathehasearlieronrenounced.
The First Divisions reliance in the case ofIn Re: Petition for 25Rollo, pp. 6466, COMELECEn BancResolution dated 2
Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. DefensorSantiago, et al.is February2011.
misplaced.Thepetitionerinthesaidcaseisanaturalizedcitizen 440
who,aftertakinghisoathasanaturalizedFilipino,appliedfor 440 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
maintainedintheconductofcitizenswhoarenotnaturalborn, In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman
who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their SixtoBrillantescitedthattheuseofforeignpassportisnotoneof
originalcitizenship.ThePhilippineStateexpectsstrictconductof thegroundsprovidedforunderSection1ofCommonwealthAct
allegiancetothosewhochoosetobeitscitizens.Inthepresent No.63throughwhichPhilippinecitizenshipmaybelost.
case,respondentisnotanaturalizedcitizenbutanaturalborn [T]heapplicationofthemoreassimilativeprincipleofcontinuity
citizenwhochosegreenerpasturesbyworkingabroadandthen
of citizenshipis more appropriate in this case. Under said
decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of
principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or
Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his
naturalization,itisassumedthathedesirestocontinuetobea
renunciation.Thusthementionedcaseisnotonallfourswiththe
citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily
caseatbar.
denationalizesorexpatriates himself.Thus, in theinstant case
xxxx
respondentafterreacquiringhisPhilippinecitizenshipshouldbe
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the
presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his
use of his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine
American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and
passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009.
competentproofofexpatriation.Accordingly,alldoubtsshouldbe
However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine
resolvedinfavorofretentionofcitizenship.26
passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3)
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento
months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his
dissented,thus:
Philippinepassport,therespondentalreadyusedthesameinhis
[R]espondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and
subsequenttravelsabroad.Thisfactisprovenbytherespondents
wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United States.
submissionofacertifiedtruecopyofhispassportshowingthathe
ThelatterscontinueduseofhisUSpassportandenjoymentofall
usedthesameforhistravelsonthefollowingdates:January31,
theprivilegesofaUScitizendespitehispreviousrenunciationof
2010,April16,2010,May20,2010,January12,2010,March31,
theaforemention[ed]citizenshiprunscontrarytohisdeclaration
2010andJune4,2010.ThisthenshowsthattheuseoftheUS
that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship.
passportwasbecausetohisknowledge,hisPhilippinepassport
Respondents submission with the twin requirements was
wasnotyetissuedtohimforhisuse.Asprobablypressingneeds
obviouslyonlyforthepurposeofcomplyingwiththerequirements
mightbeundertaken,therespondentusedwhateveriswithinhis
forrunningforthemayoraltypostinconnectionwiththeMay10,
controlduringthattime.25
2010AutomatedNationalandLocalElections.
_______________
 Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a
candidateisnotacitizenatthetimeheranforofficeorifhelost
his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to
serveassuch.Neitherdoesthefactthatrespondentobtainedthe
pluralityofvotesforthe
_______________
26Id.,atp.69,SeparateConcurringOpinion.
441
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
mayoralty post cure the latters failure to comply with the
qualificationrequirementsregardinghiscitizenship.
Sinceadisqualifiedcandidateisnocandidateatallintheeyes
ofthelaw,hishavingreceivedthehighestnumberofvotesdoes
notvalidatehiselection.Ithasbeenheldthatwhereapetitionfor
disqualificationwasfiledbeforeelectionagainstacandidatebut
was adversely resolved against him after election, his having
obtainedthehighestnumberofvotesdidnotmakehiselection
valid.Hisousterfromofficedoesnotviolatetheprincipleofvox
populi suprema est lexbecause the application of the
constitutionalandstatutoryprovisionsondisqualificationisnota
matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the
sovereignwillofthepeoplewhoexpresseditwhentheyratified
theConstitutionandwhentheyelectedtheirrepresentativeswho
enactedthelaw.27
ThePetitionbeforetheCourt
Maquilingfiledtheinstantpetitionquestioningthepropriety
ofdeclaringArnadoqualifiedtorunforpublicofficedespitehis
continueduseofaUSpassport,andprayingthatMaquilingbe
proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan,LanaodelNorte.
Ascribingbothgraveabuseofdiscretionandreversibleerror
onthepartoftheCOMELECEnBancforrulingthatArnadoisa
Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport,
MaquilingnowseekstoreversethefindingoftheCOMELECEn
BancthatArnadoisqualifiedtorunforpublicoffice.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the
COMELECEn Bancor to affirm the First Divisions
disqualificationofArnado,Maquilingalsoseeksthereviewofthe
441
applicability
_______________
27Id.,atpp.7273,DissentingOpinionofCommissionerRene
V.Sarmiento,citingthecasesofTorayno,Sr.v.COMELEC,337
SCRA 574 [2000];Santos v. COMELEC, 103 SCRA 628
[1981];Sanchezv.DelRosario,1SCRA1102[1961];andReyesv.
COMELEC,97SCRA500[1980].
442
442 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
ofSection44oftheLocal GovernmentCode, claiming that the
COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that the
successionofthevicemayorincasetherespondentisdisqualified
isinorder.
Issues
There are three questions posed by the parties before this
Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent
questionshingeontheresultofthefirst.
Thefirstquestioniswhetherornotinterventionisallowedin
adisqualificationcase.
 The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign
passportafterrenouncingforeigncitizenshipamountstoundoing
arenunciationearliermade.
Abetterframingofthequestionthoughshouldbewhetheror
not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenshipaffectsonesqualificationstorunforpublicoffice.
Thethirdquestioniswhetherornottheruleonsuccessionin
theLocalGovernmentCodeisapplicabletothiscase.
OurRuling
Interventionofarivalcandidateinadisqualificationcase
is proper
there has not yet been any proclama
tionofthewinner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage
whenrespondentArnadofiledaMotionforReconsiderationofthe
FirstDivisionResolutionbeforetheCOMELECEnBanc.Asthe
candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes,
Maquilingcontendsthathehasaninterestinthedisqualification
casefiledagainstArnado,consideringthatintheeventthelatter
isdisqualified,thevotescastfor
443
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
himshouldbeconsideredstrayandthesecondplacershouldbe
proclaimedasthewinnerintheelections.
Itmustbeemphasizedthatwhiletheoriginalpetitionbefore
the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of
candidacyand/ordisqualification,theCOMELECFirstDivision
andtheCOMELECEnBanccorrectlytreatedthepetitionasone
fordisqualification.
TheeffectofadisqualificationcaseisenunciatedinSection6
ofR.A.No.6646:
Sec.6.EffectofDisqualificationCase.Anycandidatewhohas
been declaredby final judgment to bedisqualified shall not be
votedfor,andthevotescastforhimshallnotbecounted.Iffor
anyreasonacandidateisnotdeclaredbyfinaljudgmentbefore
anelectiontobedisqualifiedandheisvotedforandreceivesthe
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action,inquiry,orprotestand,uponmotionofthecomplainantor
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspensionoftheproclamationofsuchcandidatewheneverthe
when evidenceofhisguiltisstrong.
Mercadov.Manzano28clarifiedtherightofinterventionina
disqualificationcase.Inthatcase,theCourtsaid:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedingsforthedisqualificationagainstprivaterespondentis
clear from Section 6 ofR.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate
whohasbeendeclaredbyfinaljudgmenttobedisqualifiedshall
notbevotedfor,andthevotescastforhimshallnotbecounted.If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
443 receivesthewinningnumberofvotesinsuchelection,theCourt
orCommissionshallcontinuewiththetrialandhearingofthe
action,inquiry,orprotestand,uponmotionofthecomplainantor
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspensionoftheproclamationofsuchcandi
_______________
28367Phil.132;307SCRA630(1999).
444
444 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
date whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this 30G.R.No.105919,6August1992,212SCRA309.
provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for 445
disqualificationevenafterelectioniftherehasyetbeennofinal VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 445
judgmentrendered.29 Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
Clearlythen,Maquilinghastherighttointerveneinthecase. Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under
The fact that the COMELECEn Banchas already ruled that thisActshallenjoyfullcivilandpoliticalrightsandbesubjectto
Maquilinghasnotshownthattherequisitesfortheexemptionto allattendantliabilitiesandresponsibilitiesunderexistinglawsof
the secondplacer rule set forth inSinsuat v. COMELEC30are thePhilippinesandthefollowingconditions:
presentandthereforewouldnotbeprejudicedbytheoutcomeof xxxx
thecase,doesnotdepriveMaquilingoftherighttoelevatethe (2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall
matterbeforethisCourt. meetthequalificationforholdingsuchpublicofficeasrequiredby
Arnadosclaimthatthemaincasehasattainedfinalityasthe theConstitutionandexistinglawsand,atthetimeofthefilingof
originalpetitionerandrespondentsthereinhavenotappealedthe the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The renunciationofanyandallforeigncitizenshipbeforeanypublic
elevationofthecasebytheintervenorpreventsitfromattaining officerauthorizedtoadministeranoath.xxx31
finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues RommelArnadotookallthenecessarystepstoqualifytorun
raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case forapublicoffice.HetooktheOathofAllegianceandrenounced
originallyfiledbyBaluaagainstArnadowillattainfinality. hisforeigncitizenship.Thereisnoquestionthatafterperforming
The use of foreign passport after thesetwinrequirementsrequiredunderSection5(2)ofR.A.No.
renouncing ones foreign citizen 9225ortheCitizenshipRetentionandReacquisitionActof2003,
ship is a positive and voluntary hebecameeligibletorunforpublicoffice.
act of representation as to ones Indeed,ArnadotooktheOathofAllegiancenotjustonlyonce
nationality and citizenship; it does buttwice:first,on10July2008whenheappliedforrepatriation
not divest Filipino citizenship beforetheConsulateGeneralofthePhilippinesinSanFrancisco,
USA,andagainon03April2009simultaneouswiththeexecution
regained by repatriation but it
ofhisAffidavitofRenunciation.BytakingtheOathofAllegiance
recants the Oath of Renunciation
totheRepublic,ArnadoreacquiredhisPhilippinecitizenship.At
required to qualify one to run for
the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship.
anelectiveposition.
Arnadohadthereforebecomeadualcitizen.
Section5(2)ofTheCitizenshipRetentionandReacquisition After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado
Actof2003provides: renouncedhisAmericancitizenshipbyexecutinganAffidavitof
_______________ Renunciation,thuscompletingtherequirementsforeligibilityto
29Id.,atpp.142143;p.639. runforpublicoffice.
 _______________
31Section5(2)ofR.A.No.9225.
446
446 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be
solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciationunderthelawsoftheforeigncountry.32
_______________
32See excerpts of deliberations of Congress reproduced
inAASJS v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869, 11 May 2007, 523
SCRA108.
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the
deliberationsofCongressisnecessarytodeterminetheintentof
the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law. During the
deliberations,theissueofwhetherRep.ActNo.9225wouldallow
dualallegiancehadinfactbeenthesubjectofdebate.Therecord
ofthelegislativedeliberationsrevealsthefollowing:
xxxx
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under
themeasure,twosituationsexisttheretentionofforeign
citizenship,andthereacquisitionofPhilippinecitizenship.
In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships
andtherefore,twoallegiances.Hepointedoutthatunder
the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public
interest.Hethereafteraskedwhetherwiththecreationof
dualallegiancebyreasonofretentionofforeigncitizenship
andthereacquisition ofPhilippinecitizenship, therewill
nowbeaviolationoftheConstitution.
Rep.Locsinunderscoredthatthemeasuredoesnotseek
toaddresstheconstitutionalinjunctionondualallegiance
asinimicaltopublicinterest.Hesaidthattheproposed
lawaimstofacilitatethereacquisitionofPhilippine
citizenshipbyspeedymeans.However,hesaidthat
in one sense, it addresses the problem ofdual
citizenshipby requiring the taking of an oath. He
explained that the problem ofdual citizenshipis
transferred from the Philippines to the foreign
countrybecausethelatestoaththatwillbetakenby
the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the
PhilippinesandnottotheUnitedStates,asthecase
may be. He added that this is a matter which the
Philippine government will have no concern and
competenceover.Rep.Dilangalenaskedwhythiswillno
longer be the countrys concern, when dual allegiance is
involved.
447
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 447
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
However, this legal presumption does not operate per
manentlyandisopentoattackwhen,afterrenouncingthe
_______________
Rep. Locsinclarifiedthatthiswaspreciselyhisobjection to
theoriginalversionofthebill,whichdidnotrequireanoathof
allegiance.Since the measure now requires this oath, the
problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the
Philippinestotheforeigncountryconcerned,heexplained.
xxxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the
persondidnotdenouncehisforeigncitizenshipandthereforestill
owesallegiancetotheforeigngovernment,andatthesametime,
oweshisallegiancetothePhilippinegovernment,suchthatthere
isnowacaseofdualcitizenshipanddualallegiance.
 Rep. Locsin clarified thatby swearing to the supreme
authorityoftheRepublic,thepersonimplicitlyrenounces
his foreigncitizenship. However, he said that this is not a
matterthathewishestoaddressinCongressbecauseheisnota
memberofaforeignparliamentbutaMemberoftheHouse.
xxxx
Rep.Locsinrepliedthatitisimperativethatthosewhohave
dualallegiancecontrarytonationalinterestshouldbedealtwith
bylaw.However,hesaidthatthedualallegianceproblemisnot
addressedinthebill.HethencitedtheDeclarationofPolicyin
thebillwhichstatesthatItisherebydeclaredthepolicyofthe
State that all citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
undertheconditionsofthisAct.Hestressedthatwhatthebill
doesisrecognizePhilippinecitizenshipbutsaysnothing
abouttheothercitizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual
allegiance is created wherein a naturalborn citizen of the
Philippinestakesanoathofallegiancetoanothercountryandin
that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all
allegiancetohiscountryoforiginandswearsallegiancetothat
448
448 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
foreigncitizenship,thecitizenperformspositiveactsshowinghis
continuedpossessionofaforeigncitizenship.33
_______________
foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this
stage, he explained.In the present measure, he
clarified, a person is required to take an oath and
thelastheuttersisoneofallegiancetothecountry.
Hethensaidthattheproblemofdualallegianceis
nolongertheproblemofthePhilippinesbutofthe
otherforeigncountry.(Emphasissupplied)
33See Discussion of Senators Enrile and Pimentel on Sec.
40(d) of theLocal Government Code, reproduced in Cordora v.
COMELEC,G.R.No.176947,19February2009,580SCRA12.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at
thesametimeforswearallegiancetotheothercountryof
which they arealso citizens and thereby terminate their
statusasdualcitizens.Itmaybethat,fromthepointof
viewoftheforeignstateandofitslaws,suchanindividual
hasnoteffectivelyrenouncedhisforeigncitizenship.That
is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d)
betweenSenatorsEnrileandPimentelclearlyshows:
SENATORENRILE:
Mr.President,Iwouldliketoaskclarificationofline
41, page 17: Any person with dual citizenship is
disqualifiedtorunforanyelectivelocalposition.Underthe
present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose
mother is a citizen of the Philippines but hisfather is a
foreignerisanaturalborncitizenoftheRepublic.Thereis
no requirement that such a naturalborn citizen, upon
reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up
Philippinecitizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two
passports,onebelongingtothecountryofhisorherfather
andonebelongingtotheRepublicofthePhilippines,may
such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local
governmentposition?
SENATORPIMENTEL:
Tomymind,Mr.President,itonlymeansthatatthe
momentwhen hewouldwanttorunforpublicoffice, he
hastorepudiateoneofhiscitizenships.
449
 VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
Arnadohimselfsubjectedtheissueofhiscitizenshiptoattack
when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to
use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before
filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The
pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and
exclusivelyaFilipinocitizenatthetimehefiled
_______________
SENATORENRILE:
SupposehecarriesonlyaPhilippinepassportbutthe
countryoforiginorthecountryofthefatherclaimsthat
person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce.
Therearesuchcountriesintheworld.
SENATORPIMENTEL:
Well,theveryfactthatheisrunningforpublicoffice
would,ineffect,beanelectionforhimofhisdesiretobe
consideredaFilipinocitizen.
SENATORENRILE:
But,precisely,Mr.President,theConstitutiondoesnot
require an election. Under the Constitution, a person
whosemotherisacitizenofthePhilippinesis,atbirth,a
citizenwithoutanyovertacttoclaimthecitizenship.
SENATORPIMENTEL:
Yes.Whatwearesaying,Mr.President,is:Underthe
Gentlemans example, if he does not renounce his other
citizenship,thenheisopeninghimselftoquestion.So,ifhe
isreallyinterestedtorun,thefirstthingheshoulddoisto
sayintheCertificateofCandidacythat:IamaFilipino
citizen,andIhaveonlyonecitizenship.
SENATORENRILE:
ButwearetalkingfromtheviewpointofPhilippinelaw,
Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and
449 that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the
ConstitutionoftheRepublic.
SENATORPIMENTEL:
Thatistrue,Mr.President.Butifheexercisesactsthat
will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships,
thenhewillprobablyfallunderthisdisqualification.
450
450 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
hiscertificateofcandidacy,therebyrenderinghimeligibletorun
forpublicoffice.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
citizenship,and30November2009,thedatehefiledhisCOC,he
usedhisUSpassportfourtimes,actionsthatruncountertothe
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his
foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented
himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration
authoritiesofbothcountriesthatheisanAmericancitizen,with
allattendantrightsandprivilegesgrantedbytheUnitedStates
ofAmerica.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath
thatcansimplybeprofessedatanytime,onlytobeviolatedthe
nextday.Itrequiresanabsoluteandperpetualrenunciationof
the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
politicalrightsgrantedbytheforeigncountrywhichgrantedthe
citizenship.
Mercado v.Manzano34already hintedatthissituationwhen
theCourtdeclared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will
fulfillhisundertakingmadeunderoath.Shouldhebetraythat
trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings.InYuv.DefensorSantiago,wesustainedthedenial
ofentryintothecountryofpetitioneronthegroundthat,after
taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the
renewalofhisPortuguesepassportanddeclaredincommercial
documentsexecutedabroadthathewasaPortuguesenational.A
similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippinecitizenship.
Whiletheactofusingaforeignpassportisnotoneoftheacts
enumeratedinCommonwealthActNo.63constituting
_______________
34Supranote28atp.153;pp.649650.
451
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
renunciationandlossofPhilippinecitizenship, 35itisnevertheless
anactwhichrepudiatestheveryoathofrenunciationrequiredfor
aformerFilipinocitizenwhoisalsoacitizenofanothercountry
tobequalifiedtorunforalocalelectiveposition.
WhenArnadousedhisUSpassporton14April2009,orjust
eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation 36that he absolutely and
perpetuallyrenounce(s)allallegianceandfidelitytotheUNITED
STATESOFAMERICA37andthathedivest(s)[him]selfoffull
employmentofallcivilandpoliticalrightsandprivilegesofthe
UnitedStatesofAmerica.38
WeagreewiththeCOMELECEnBancthatsuchactofusing
a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representinghimselfasanAmericancitizen,Arnadovoluntarily
andeffectivelyrevertedtohisearlierstatusasadual
_______________
35UnderCommonwealthActNo.63,aFilipino citizenmay
losehiscitizenship:
(1)Bynaturalizationinaforeigncountry;
(2)Byexpressrenunciationofcitizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitutionorlawsofaforeigncountryuponattainingtwenty
oneyearsofageormore;
(4)By accepting commission in the military, naval or air
serviceofaforeigncountry;
(5)Bycancellationofthecertificateofnaturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a
deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless
subsequently,aplenarypardonoramnestyhasbeengranted;and
(7)Incaseofawoman,uponhermarriage,toaforeignerif,
451
by virtue of the laws in force in her husbands country, she
acquireshisnationality.
36SeeNote7.
37Id.
38Id.
452
452 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the
instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by
usinghisUSpassport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones
foreigncitizenshipisfataltoArnadosbidforpublicoffice,asit
effectivelyimposedonhimadisqualificationtorunforanelective
localposition.
Arnadoscategoryofdualcitizenshipisthatbywhichforeign
citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization.Thisisdistinctfromthoseconsidereddualcitizens
byvirtueofbirth,whoarenotrequiredbylawtotaketheoathof
renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy
already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship.39Dualcitizensbynaturalization,ontheotherhand,
are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce
foreigncitizenship inordertoqualify asacandidatefor public
office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights
and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was
qualifiedtovote,butbytheexpressdisqualificationunderSection
40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCode, 40hewasnotqualifiedtorun
foralocalelectiveposition.
Ineffect,ArnadowassolelyandexclusivelyaFilipinocitizen
onlyforaperiodofelevendays, orfrom 3April 2009 until 14
April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport
afterrenouncinghisAmericancitizenship.
ThisCourthaspreviouslyruledthat:
_______________
39SeeCordorav.COMELEC,G.R.No.176947,19February
2009,580SCRA12.
40Sec.40.Disqualifications.The following persons are
disqualifiedfromrunningforanyelectivelocalposition:
xxxx
(d)Thosewithdualcitizenship;xxx.
453
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
Qualificationsforpublicofficearecontinuingrequirementsand
mustbepossessednotonlyatthetimeofappointmentorelection
orassumptionofofficebutduringtheofficersentiretenure.Once
any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonablychallenged.xxx.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a
continuingone.Itmustbepossessednotjustatthetimeofthe
renunciationoftheforeigncitizenshipbutcontinuously.Anyact
which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship
issuetoattack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First
DivisionthatArnadosactofconsistentlyusinghisUSpassport
effectivelynegatedhisAffidavitofRenunciation. 42Thisdoesnot
mean,thathefailedtocomplywiththetwinrequirementsunder
R.A.No.9225,forheinfactdid.Itwasaftercomplyingwiththe
requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office
pursuanttoSection40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCodeof1991.
Thepurposeof theLocal Government Code in disqualifying
dualcitizensfromrunningforanyelectivepublicofficewouldbe
thwartedifweweretoallowapersonwhohasearlierrenounced
hisforeigncitizenship,butwhosubsequentlyrepresentshimself
asaforeigncitizen,toholdanypublicoffice.
ArnadojustifiesthecontinueduseofhisUSpassportwiththe
explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippinepassporton18June2009,asaresultofwhichhewas
only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months
later.43
_______________
41Frivaldov.COMELEC,255Phil.934,944;174SCRA245,
453 255(1989).
42Rollo,p.46,Resolutiondated5October2010.
43Id.,atp.219,AmendedMotionforReconsideration.
454
454 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
TheCOMELECEnBancdifferentiatedArnadofromWillyYu,
thePortuguesenationalwhosoughtnaturalizationasaFilipino
citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport.ThatArnadodidnotapplyforaUSpassportafterhis
renunciationdoesnotmakehisuseofaUSpassportlessofanact
that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a
positive act of representation as a US citizen before the
immigrationofficialsofthiscountry.
TheCOMELEC,inrulingfavorablyforArnado,statedYet,as
soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels
abroad.44We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months
from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine
passportassoonashewasinpossessionofit,hewouldnothave
usedhisUSpassporton24November2009.
Besides, Arnados subsequent use of his Philippinepassport
does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign
citizenshipandpriortofilinghiscertificateofcandidacy,heused
his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign
passportdoesnotundohisOathofRenunciation,hissubsequent
useofhisPhilippinepassportdoesnotundohisearlieruseofhis
USpassport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of
identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the
concomitantdutytomaintainallegiancetoonesflagandcountry.
Whilethosewhoacquiredualcitizenshipbychoiceareafforded
therightofsuffrage,thosewhoseekelectionorappointmentto
publicofficearerequiredtorenouncetheirforeigncitizenshipto
be deserving of the publictrust. Holding public office demands
fullandundividedallegiancetotheRepublicandtonoother.
_______________
44Id.,atp.66,Resolutiondated02February2011.
455
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 455
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
WethereforeholdthatArnado,byusinghisUSpassportafter
renouncinghisAmericancitizenship,hasrecantedthesameOath
ofRenunciationhetook.Section40(d)oftheLocalGovernment
Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from
holdingthepublicofficebutevenfrombecomingacandidatein
theMay2010elections.
Wenowresolvethenextissue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisitingTopacio v.
Paredes45whichisthejurisprudentialspringoftheprinciplethat
asecondplacercannotbeproclaimedasthewinnerinanelection
contest. This doctrine must be reexamined and its soundness
onceagainputtothetesttoaddresstheeverrecurringissuethat
a secondplacer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be
proclaimedasthewinnerintheelections.
Thefactsofthecaseareasfollows:
OnJune4,1912,ageneralelectionwasheldinthetownofImus,
ProvinceofCavite,tofilltheofficeofmunicipalpresident.The
petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad,
were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430
votes,andAbad281.Abadcontestedtheelectionuponthesole
groundthatTopaciowasineligibleinthathewasreelectedthe
secondtimetotheofficeofthemunicipalpresidentonJune4,
1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having
intervened.46
 AbadthusquestionedtheeligibilityofTopacioonthebasisof
astatutoryprohibitionforseekingasecondreelectionabsentthe
fouryearinterruption.
The oftenquoted phrase inTopacio v. Paredesis that the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidatetoanyothercandidatewhenthesolequestionis
_______________
4523Phil.238(1912).
46Id.,atp.240.
456
456 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
theeligibilityoftheonereceivingapluralityofthelegallycast
ballots.47
Thisphraseisnoteventheratiodecidendi;itisamereobiter
dictum.TheCourtwascomparingtheeffectofadecisionthata
candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections xxx [with] that produced by
declaringapersonineligibletoholdsuchanoffice.
Thecompletesentencewherethephraseisfoundispartofa
comparisonandcontrastbetweenthetwosituations,thus:
Again,theeffectofadecisionthatacandidateisnotentitled
totheofficebecauseoffraudorirregularitiesintheelectionsis
quitedifferentfromthatproducedbydeclaringapersonineligible
to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an
examinationoftheballotsmayfindthatsomeotherpersonthan
thecandidatedeclaredtohavereceivedaplura[l]itybytheboard
of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in
which case the court issues itsmandamusto the board of
canvasserstocorrectthereturnsaccordingly;oritmayfindthat
themannerofholdingtheelectionandthereturnsaresotainted
withfraudorillegalitythatitcannotbedeterminedwhoreceived
a [plurality] of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no
question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of
castingandcountingtheballotsisbeforethedecidingpower,and
generallytheonlyresultcanbethattheelectionfailsentirely.In
the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word,
becauseoftheopposingpartiesarestrivingforsupremacy.Ifitbe
found that the successful candidate (according to the board of
canvassers)obtainedapluralityinanillegalmanner,andthat
anothercandidatewastherealvictor,theformermustretirein
favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest, asthe wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidatewhenthesolequestionistheeligibilityofthe
onereceivingapluralityofthelegallycastballots.Inthe
one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the
legallycastballots;inthe
_______________
47Id.,atp.255.
457
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 457
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
other, the question is confined to the personal character and
circumstancesofasingleindividual.48(Emphasissupplied)
Notethatthesentencewherethephraseisfoundstartswith
In the othercase, thereis not,strictly speaking, acontestin
contrast to the earlier statement, In the former, we have a
contestinthestrictsenseoftheword,becauseoftheopposing
partiesarestrivingforsupremacy.
TheCourtinTopaciov.Paredescannotbesaidtohaveheld
thatthewreathofvictorycannotbetransferredfroman
ineligiblecandidatetoanyothercandidatewhenthesole
questionistheeligibilityoftheonereceivingapluralityof
thelegallycastballots.
Aproperreadingofthecaserevealsthattherulingthereinis
thatsincetheCourtofFirstInstanceiswithoutjurisdictiontotry
adisqualificationcasebasedontheeligibilityofthepersonwho
obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdictionbeingconfinedtodeterminewhichofthecontestants
hasbeendulyelectedthejudgeexceededhisjurisdictionwhen
hedeclaredthatnoonehadbeenlegallyelectedpresidentofthe
municipalityofImusatthegeneralelectionheldinthattownon
4June1912wheretheonlyquestionraisedwaswhetherornot
Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of
municipalpresident.
TheCourtdidnotrulethatTopaciowasdisqualifiedandthat
Abadasthesecondplacercannotbeproclaimedinhisstead.The
Courtthereinruled:
Fortheforegoingreasons,weareoftheopinionandsohold
that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
declaringinthoseproceedingsthatnoonewaselect[ed]municipal
presidentofthemunicipalityofImusatthelastgeneralelection;
andthatsaidorderandallsubsequentproceedingsbasedthereon
arenullandvoidandofnoeffect;and,althoughthisdecisionis
rendered on respondents answer to the order to show cause,
unlessrespondents
_______________
48Id.,atpp.254255.
458
458 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
raisedsomenewandadditionalissues,letjudgmentbeentered
accordinglyin5days,withoutcosts.Soordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of
decisionsdoesnotevenhavealegalbasistostandon.Itwasa
mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with
another and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent
statement,itisevenillogical.
Letusexaminethestatement:
xxxthewreathofvictorycannotbetransferredfrom
an ineligiblecandidatetoanyothercandidatewhen the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
pluralityofthelegallycastballots.
Whatpreventsthetransferofthewreathofvictoryfromthe
ineligiblecandidatetoanothercandidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the
eligibilityoftheonereceivingapluralityofthelegallycastballots
andineligibilityisthereafterestablished, whatstopstheCourt
fromadjudginganothereligiblecandidatewhoreceivedthenext
highestnumberofvotesasthewinnerandbestowinguponhim
thatwreath?
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of
votesisawrongfulwinner.Byexpresslegalmandate,hecould
notevenhavebeenacandidateinthefirstplace,butbyvirtueof
thelackofmaterialtimeoranyotherinterveningcircumstances,
hisineligibilitymightnothavebeenpasseduponpriortoelection
date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold
himselfout totheelectorateas alegitimateand duly qualified
candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged.
Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a
candidate butnecessarily affects his right to hold publicoffice.
Thenumberofballots
_______________
49Id.,atp.258.
459
 VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
castinhisfavorcannotcurethedefectoffailuretoqualifywith
thesubstantivelegalrequirementsofeligibilitytorunforpublic
office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibilityofacandidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory
requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be
possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
qualificationsmustbemetbeforeoneevenbecomesacandidate.
Whenapersonwhoisnotqualifiedisvotedforandeventually
garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorateexpressedthroughtheballotcannotcurethedefectin
thequalificationsofthecandidate.Toruleotherwiseistotrample
upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as
wellwriteoffourelectionlawsifthevoiceoftheelectorateisthe
soledeterminantofwhoshouldbeproclaimedworthytooccupy
electivepositionsinourrepublic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court
inFrivaldov.COMELEC50whenwepronounced:
xxx.The fact that he was elected by the people of
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the
salutaryrulelimitingpublicofficeandemploymentonly
to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especiallyiftheymistakenlybelieved,asinthiscase,that
459 the candidate was qualified.Obviously, this rule requires
strictapplicationwhenthedeficiencyislackofcitizenship.Ifa
personseekstoserveintheRepublicofthePhilippines,hemust
_______________
50Supranote41.
460
460 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
owehistotalloyaltytothiscountryonly,abjuringandrenouncing
allfealtyandfidelitytoanyotherstate.51(Emphasissupplied)
ThisissuehasalsobeenjurisprudentiallyclarifiedinVelasco
v.COMELEC52wheretheCourtruledthattherulinginQuizon
and Sayaang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest
Electionvictoryxxxbecomesamagicformulatobypasselection
eligibilityrequirements.53
[W]e have ruled in the past that a candidates victory in the
electionmaybeconsideredasufficientbasistoruleinfavorofthe
candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves
defects in the candidates certificate of candidacy. We said
thatwhile provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are
mandatoryinterms,itisanestablishedruleofinterpretationas
regardselectionlaws,thatmandatoryprovisionsrequiringcertain
steps before elections will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the people.We so ruled
inQuizonv.COMELECandSayaangv.COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and
opportunitytofinetuneouraboveruling.Wesaythiswiththe
realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and
application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous
significancefortheruleoflawandtheintegrityofourelections.
For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way
around the law that effectively negates election requirements
aimedatprovidingtheelectoratewiththebasicinformationto
make an informed choice about a candidates eligibility and
fitnessforoffice.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified
readingismadeisSection39oftheLGCwhichspecifiesthebasic
qualificationsoflocalgovernmentofficials.Equallysusceptiveof
beingrenderedtoothlessisSection74oftheOECthatsetsout
what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be
emasculated
_______________
51Id.,atpp.944945,p.255.
52G.R.No.180051,24December2008,575SCRA590,614
615.
53Id.,atp.615,citingQuizonv.COMELEC,G.R.No.177927,
15February2008,545SCRA635,Sayaangv.COMELEC,462
Phil.373;416SCRA650(2003).
461
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
asmeredelayintheresolutionofthepetitiontocancelordeny
duecoursetoaCOCcanrenderaSection78petitionuselessifa
candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious,
candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they
knowthatanelectionvictorywillcureanydefectthattheirCOCs
may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to
bypasselectioneligibilityrequirements.(Citationsomitted)
Whatwillstopanotherwisedisqualifiedindividualfromfiling
a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and
employingeverystrategytodelayanydisqualificationcasefiled
againsthimsohecansubmithimselftotheelectorateandwin,if
winningtheelectionwillguaranteeadisregardofconstitutional
andstatutoryprovisionsonqualificationsanddisqualificationsof
candidates?
Itisimperativetosafeguardtheexpressionofthesovereign
voicethroughtheballotbyensuringthatitsexerciserespectsthe
ruleoflaw.Toallowthesovereignvoicespokenthroughtheballot
totrumpconstitutionalandstatutoryprovisionsonqualifications
and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or
republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are
disregarded and only the electorates voice spoken through the
ballotismadetomatterintheend,itpreciselyservesasanopen
invitationforelectoralanarchytosetin.
Maquiling is not a secondplacer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the
winnerintheelectionasheobtainedthehighestnumberofvotes
fromamongthequalifiedcandidates.462
461 462 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
We have ruled in the recent cases ofAratea v.
COMELEC54andJalosjosv.COMELEC55thatavoidCOCcannot
produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the
ineligiblecandidatearenotconsideredatallindeterminingthe
winnerofanelection.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are
disregarded,thewilloftheelectorateisstillrespected,andeven
moreso.Thevotescastinfavorofanineligiblecandidatedonot
constitutethesoleandtotalexpressionofthesovereignvoice.The
votescastinfavorofeligibleandlegitimatecandidatesformpart
ofthatvoiceandmustalsoberespected.
 As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that
determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who
areallowedtoparticipateasplayers.Whenthereareparticipants
whoturnouttobeineligible,theirvictoryisvoidedandthelaurel
isawardedtothenextinrankwhodoesnotpossessanyofthe
disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the
rulestobeeligibleascandidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited inLabo v.
COMELEC56that when the voters are well aware within the
realmofnotorietyofacandidatesdisqualificationandstillcast
their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate
obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected.Thatruleisalsoamereobiterthatfurthercomplicated
the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to
ineligibleones.
Theelectoratesawarenessofthecandidatesdisqualification
is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the
candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance
makesthecandidateineligible.Knowledgebytheelectorateofa
candidates disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidatewhoplacedsecondtoadisquali
_______________
54G.R.No.195229,9October2012,683SCRA105,145.
55G.R.Nos.193237/193536,9October2012,683SCRA1,32.
56G.R.No.105111,3July1992,211SCRA297,312.
463
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
fiedonecanbeproclaimedasthewinner.Thesecondplacerin
the vote count is actually the firstplacer among the qualified
candidates.
Thatthedisqualifiedcandidatehasalreadybeenproclaimed
and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualificationbasedonasubstantivegroundthatexistedprior
tothefilingofthecertificateofcandidacyvoidsnotonlytheCOC
butalsotheproclamation.
Section6ofR.A.No.6646provides:
Section6.EffectofDisqualificationCase.Anycandidatewho
hasbeendeclaredbyfinaljudgmenttobedisqualifiedshallnotbe
votedfor,andthevotescastforhimshallnotbecounted.Iffor
anyreasonacandidateisnotdeclaredbyfinaljudgmentbefore
anelectiontobedisqualifiedandheisvotedforandreceivesthe
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action,inquiry,orprotestand,uponmotionofthecomplainantor
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspensionoftheproclamationofsuchcandidatewheneverthe
evidenceofhisguiltisstrong.
There was no chance for Arnados proclamation to be
suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his
answertothepetitionseekinghisdisqualification.Arnadoonly
filedhis Answer on 15 June 2010, long afterthe elections and
afterhewasalreadyproclaimedasthewinner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados
candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
commission of election offenses as provided for in the first
sentenceofSection68oftheOmnibusElectionCode,theeffectof
463 which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the
office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his
citizenship.Asearlierdiscussed,ArnadowasbothaFilipinoand
anAmericancitizenwhenhefiledhiscertificateofcandidacy.
464
464 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
Hewasadualcitizendisqualifiedtorunforpublicofficebasedon
Section40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCode.
Section40startswiththestatementThefollowingpersons
aredisqualifiedfromrunningforanyelectivelocalposition.The
prohibitionservesasabaragainsttheindividualswhofallunder
anyoftheenumerationfromparticipatingascandidatesinthe
election.
With Arnadobeing barredfrom evenbecoming a candidate,
his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect
except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualificationpriortotheelectionsbecausehefiledhisanswer
tothepetitionwhentheelectionswereconductedalreadyandhe
wasalreadyproclaimedthewinner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the
prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessedevenpriortothefilingofthecertificateofcandidacy.
TheaffirmationofArnadosdisqualification,althoughmadelong
aftertheelections,reachesbacktothefilingofthecertificateof
candidacy.Arnadoisdeclaredtobenotacandidateatallinthe
May2010elections.
Arnado being a noncandidate, the votes cast in his favor
should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government
Codewillnotapply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELECEn Bancdated 2
February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
RespondentROMMELARNADOyCAGOCOisdisqualifiedfrom
running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE
MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of
Kauswagan,LanaodelNorteinthe10May2010elections.
ThisDecisionisimmediatelyexecutory.465
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 465
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the
partiesandtheCommissiononElections.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
ReyesandPerlasBernabe,JJ.,concur.
Carpio,J.,SeeConcurringOpinion.
LeonardoDeCastro,DelCastillo,MendozaandLeonen,JJ.,
JointhedissentofJusticeBrion.
Brion,J.,See:Dissent.
Abad,J.,SeeSeparateandConcurringOpinion.
CONCURRINGOPINION
CARPIO,J.:
I concur in the ponencia. Respondent Rommel Arnado
(Arnado) is disqualified from running for any local elective
position. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) should be
directed to proclaim Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling
(Maquiling)asthedulyelectedMayorofKauswagan,Lanaodel
NorteintheMay2010elections.
ArnadoreceivedthehighestnumberofvotesintheMay2010
elections and was proclaimed Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte. Respondent Linog G. Balua (Balua), one of Arnados
opponents,filedapetitionbeforetheCOMELECagainstArnado.
Baluas petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
certificateofcandidacyrestsontheallegationthatArnadolacks
the residency and citizenship requirements. Balua presented
evidence to show that Arnado used his American passport to
enteranddepartthePhilippines.Maquiling,ontheotherhand,
wasalsooneofArnadosoppo
466
466 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
nents. Maquiling received the second highest number of votes
nexttoArnado.Maquilingfiledmotionsforinterventionandfor
reconsideration before the COMELECEn Banc. Maquiling
assertedthatheshouldhavebeenproclaimedasMayorforbeing
thelegitimatecandidatewiththehighestnumberofvotes.
ArnadoisanaturalbornFilipinoCitizenwholosthisFilipino
citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen.
Arnadoappliedforrepatriation,andsubsequentlytooktwoOaths
ofAllegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippines,thenrenounced
hisAmericancitizenship.Therelevanttimelineisasfollows:
10 July 2008 Arnado pledgedhis OathofAllegianceto
theRepublicofthePhilippines.
3April2009ArnadoagainpledgedhisOathofAllegiance
totheRepublicofthePhilippinesandexecutedanAffidavit
ofRenunciationofhisAmericancitizenship.
14Aprilto25June2009ArnadousedhisUnitedStates
ofAmerica (USA)PassportNo. 057782700 todepart and
enterthePhilippines.
29Julyto24November2009ArnadoagainusedhisUSA
Passport No. 057782700 to depart and enter the
Philippines.
30 November 2009 Arnado filed his Certificate of
CandidacyforMayorofKauswagan,LanaodelNorte.
AcertificationfromtheBureauofImmigrationshowedthat
ArnadoarrivedinthePhilippineson12January2010,aswellas
on23March2010.BotharrivaldatesshowthatArnadousedthe
sameUSApassportheusedin2009.
DespiteBaluaspetitionbeforetheCOMELEC,theelections
proceededwithoutanyrulingonArnadosqualification.Arnado
receivedthehighestnumberofvotesintheMay2010
467
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 467
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
elections and was proclaimed Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.
TheCOMELEC FirstDivision issued its ruling on Arnados
qualification after his proclamation. The COMELEC First
Divisiontreated Baluas petitionto disqualifyArnadoand/orto
cancel his certificate of candidacy as a petition for
disqualification. The COMELEC First Division granted Baluas
petition and annulled Arnados proclamation. The COMELEC
First Division stated that Arnados continued use of his US
passportisastrongindicationthatArnadohadnorealintention
to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. The
COMELEC First Division decreed that the order of succession
underSection44oftheLocalGovernmentCodeof1991 1should
takeeffect.
Arnado filed a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELECEn Banc. Maquiling intervened, and asserted that
although the COMELEC First Division correctly disqualified
Arnado, the law on succession should not apply. Instead,
MaquilingshouldhavebeenproclaimedasMayorforbeingthe
legitimatecandidatewiththehighestnumberofvotes.
 TheCOMELECEnBancreversedandsetasidetherulingof
the COMELEC First Division. In granting Arnados motion for
reconsideration,theCOMELECEnBancstatedthatArnadosuse
of his USA passport does not operate to revert back [sic] his
statusasadualcitizenpriortohisrenunciationasthereisno
law saying such. COMELEC Chair Sixto Brillantes concurred,
and stated that Arnado after reacquiring his Philippine
citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino
despitehisuseofhisAmericanpassportintheabsenceofclear,
unequivocalandcompetentproofofex
_______________
1Section44.Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the
Governor, ViceGovernor, Mayor, and ViceMayor.If a
permanentvacancyoccursintheofficeofthegovernorormayor,
the vicegovernor or vicemayor concerned shall become the
governorormayor.xxx.
468
468 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
patriation. Commissioner Rene Sarmiento dissented, and
declared that Arnado failed to prove that he abandoned his
allegiance to the USA and that his loss of the continuing
requirementofcitizenshipdisqualifieshimtoserveasanelected
official. Moreover, having received the highest number of votes
doesnotvalidateArnadoselection.
Theponenciagranted Maquilings petition before this Court,
andannulledandsetasidetherulingoftheCOMELECEnBanc.
TheponenciadeclaredthatArnadosuseofhisUSApassportdid
notdivesthimofhisFilipinocitizenshipbutvestedbackinhim
theAmericancitizenshipheearlierrenounced.Theponenciaalso
directedtheCOMELECtoproclaimMaquilingasthedulyelected
MayorofKauswagan,LanaodelNorteintheMay2010elections
for being the qualified candidate who received the highest
numberofvotes.
OnArnadosUseofaNonPhilippinePassport
Philippinecourtshavenopowertodeclarewhetheraperson
possesses citizenship other than that of the Philippines.
InMercado v. Manzano,2Constitutional Commissioner Joaquin
G. Bernas was quoted as saying, [D]ual citizenship is just a
realityimposedonusbecausewehavenocontrolofthelawson
citizenshipofothercountries.WerecognizeachildofaFilipino
mother.Butwhetherornotsheisconsideredacitizenofanother
country is something completely beyond our control.3In the
presentcase,wehavenoauthoritytodeclarethatArnadoisan
American citizen. Only the courts of the USA, using American
law,havetheconclusiveauthoritytomakeanassertionregarding
ArnadosAmericancitizenship.
Arnado,asanaturalizedAmericancitizenandarepatriated
Filipino,isrequiredbylawtosweartoanOathofAlle
_______________
2367Phil.132;307SCRA630(1999)citing1Recordofthe
ConstitutionalCommission203(23June1986).
3Id.,atp.147;p.643.
469
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 469
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
giance to the Republic of the Philippines and execute a
RenunciationofForeignCitizenshipbeforehemayseekelective
Philippinepublicoffice.ThepertinentsectionsofR.A.No.9225
read:
Section3.RetentionofPhilippineCitizenship.Anyprovisionof
lawtothecontrarynotwithstanding,naturalborncitizenshipby
reasonoftheirnaturalizationascitizensofaforeigncountryare
hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon
takingthefollowingoathofallegiancetotheRepublic:
I_____________________,solemnlyswear(oraffirm)thatI
willsupportanddefendtheConstitutionoftheRepublicof
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mentalreservationorpurposeofevasion.
NaturalborncitizensofthePhilippineswho,aftertheeffectivity
ofthisAct,becomecitizensofaforeigncountryshallretaintheir
Philippinecitizenshipupontakingtheaforesaidoath.
Section5.Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those
who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
thePhilippinesandthefollowingconditions:
xxxx
(2)ThoseseekingelectivepublicofficeinthePhilippinesshall
meetthequalificationforholdingsuchpublicofficeasrequiredby
theConstitutionandexistinglawsand,atthetimeofthefilingof
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciationofanyandallforeigncitizenshipbeforeanypublic
officerauthorizedtoadministeranoath;
xxxx.
470
470 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
ArnadosuseofhisAmericanpassportafterhisexecutionof
an Affidavit of Renunciation of his American Citizenship is
aretractionof his renunciation. When Arnado filed his
Certificate of Candidacy on 30 November 2009, there was no
longeraneffectiverenunciationofhisAmericancitizenship.Itis
asifheneverrenouncedhisAmericancitizenshipatall.Arnado,
therefore, failed to comply with the twin requirements of
swearingtoanOathofAllegianceandexecutingaRenunciation
of Foreign Citizenship as found in Republic Act No. 9225. We
previously discussed the distinction betweendual
citizenshipanddual allegiance, as well as the different acts
requiredofdualcitizens,whomayeitherhaveinvoluntarydual
citizenshiporvoluntarydualallegiance,whodesiretobeelected
toPhilippinepublicofficeinCordorav.COMELEC:4
Wehavetoconsiderthepresentcaseinconsonancewithour
rulingsinMercadov.Manzano,Vallesv.COMELEC,andAASJS
v. Datumanong. Mercado and Valles involve similar operative
factsasthepresentcase.ManzanoandValles,likeTambunting,
possessed dual citizenship by the circumstances of their birth.
ManzanowasborntoFilipinoparentsintheUnitedStateswhich
followsthedoctrineofjussoli.ValleswasborntoanAustralian
mother and a Filipino father in Australia. Our rulings
inManzanoandVallesstated that dual citizenship is different
fromdualallegiancebothbycauseand,forthosedesiringtorun
for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
differentlawsoftwoormorestates,apersonissimultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other
naturalborn Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual
citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of
candidacyandsweartotheoathofallegiancecontainedtherein.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the
individuals active participation in the naturalization process.
AASJSstatesthat,underR.A.No.9225,aFilipinowhobecomesa
naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his
Filipinocitizenshipby
_______________
4G.R.No.176947,19February2009,580SCRA12.Citations
omitted.
471
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines.Theactoftakinganoathofallegianceisanimplicit
renunciationofanaturalizedcitizensforeigncitizenship.
R.A.No.9225,ortheCitizenshipRetentionandReacquisition
Act of 2003, was enacted years after the promulgation
ofManzanoandValles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225readsasfollows:
I__________,solemnlyswear(oraffirm)thatIwillsupport
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mentalreservationorpurposeofevasion.
InSections2and3ofR.A.No.9225,the framerswere not
concerned with dual citizenshipper se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countriesoforiginevenaftertheirnaturalization.Section5(2)of
R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire
Filipinocitizenshipanddesiretorunforelectivepublicofficein
the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenshipbeforeanypublicofficerauthorizedtoadministeran
oathasidefromtheoathofallegianceprescribedinSection3of
R.A.No.9225.ThetwinrequirementsofswearingtoanOathof
AllegianceandexecutingaRenunciationofForeignCitizenship
471 served as the bases for our recent rulings inJacot v.
DalandCOMELEC, Velasco v. COMELEC, andJapzon v.
COMELEC,allofwhichinvolvenaturalbornFilipinoswholater
becamenaturalizedcitizensofanothercountryandthereafterran
for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case,
Tambunting, a naturalborn Filipino, did not subsequently
becomeanaturalizedcitizenofanothercountry.Hence,thetwin
requirementsinR.A.No.9225donotapplytohim.5
_______________
5Id.,atpp.2325.
472
472 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
Hence,Arnadosfailuretocomplywiththetwinrequirements
ofR.A.No.9225isclearlyafailuretoqualifyasacandidatefor
Philippine elective public office. He is still deemed, under
Philippine law, holding allegiance to a foreign country, which
disqualifieshimfromrunningforanelectivepublicoffice.Such
failuretocomplywiththetwinrequirementsofR.A.No.9225is
includedamongthegroundsfordisqualificationinSection68of
the Omnibus Election Code: Disqualifications.xxx. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreigncountryshallnotbequalifiedtorunforanyelectiveoffice
underthisCode,unlesssaidpersonhaswaivedhisstatusasa
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in
electionlaws.
OntheSelectionoftheLawfulMayorofKauswagan,Lanao
delSur
Arnado used his USA passportafterhis Renunciation of
American Citizenship andbeforehe filed his Certificate of
Candidacy. This positive act of retraction of his renunciation
beforethefilingoftheCertificateofCandidacyrendersArnados
Certificate of Candidacyvoidab initio. Therefore, Arnado
wasnevera candidate at any time, and all the votes for him
arestray votes. We reiterate our ruling inJalosjos v.
COMELEC6onthismatter:
DecisionsofthisCourtholdingthatthesecondplacercannot
beproclaimedwinnerifthefirstplacerisdisqualifiedordeclared
ineligibleshouldbelimitedtosituationswherethecertificateof
candidacy ofthe firstplacerwasvalidatthetimeof filing but
subsequentlyhadtobecancelledbecauseofaviolationoflawthat
tookplace,oralegalimpedimentthattookeffect,afterthefiling
ofthe
_______________
6G.R.Nos.193237and193536,9October2012,683SCRA1,
3132.Citationsomitted.SeealsoCayatv.COMELEC,G.R.Nos.
163776and165736,24April2007,522SCRA23;andArateav.
COMELEC,G.R.No.195229,9October2012,683SCRA105.
473
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 473
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
certificateofcandidacy.Ifthecertificateofcandidacyisvoidab
initio,thenlegallythepersonwhofiledsuch void certificateof
candidacywasneveracandidateintheelectionsatanytime.All
votesforsuchnoncandidatearestrayvotesandshouldnotbe
counted.Thus,suchnoncandidatecanneverbeafirstplacerin
the elections. If a certificate of candidacy voidab initiois
cancelledontheday,orbeforetheday,oftheelection,prevailing
jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray
votes.Ifacertificateofcandidacyvoidabinitioiscancelledone
dayormoreaftertheelections,allvotesforsuchcandidateshould
also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void
fromtheverybeginning.Thisisthemoreequitableandlogical
approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy that is voidab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of
candidacyvoidabinitiocanoperatetodefeatoneormorevalid
certificatesofcandidacyforthesameposition.7
It is undisputed that Arnado had to comply with the twin
requirementsofallegianceandrenunciation.However,Arnados
use of his USA passport after the execution of his Affidavit of
Renunciationconstitutedaretractionofhisrenunciation,andled
tohisfailuretocomplywiththerequirementofrenunciationat
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. His certiticate of
candidacywasthusvoidabinitio.Garneringthehighestnumber
of votes for an elective position does not cure this defect.
Maquiling, the alleged second placer, should be proclaimed
Mayor because Arnados certificate of candidacy was void ab
initio.Maquilingisthequalifiedcandidatewhoactuallygarnered
thehighestnumberofvotesforthepositionofMayor.
_______________
7Id.
474
474 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
DISSENTINGOPINION
BRION,J.:
Idissentfromtheponenciasconclusionsthat:
(1)respondent Rommel C. Arnados (Arnado) use of his US
passport in traveling twice to the US violated his Oath of
Renunciation so that he reverted back to the status of a dual
citizenadistinctgroundfordisqualificationunderSection40(d)
of the Local Government Code (LGC) that barred him from
assumingtheofficeofMayorofKauswagan,LanaodelNorte;and
(2)the petitioner, Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), the
secondplacerinthe2010elections,shouldberightfullyseated
asMayorofKauswagan,LanaodelNorte.
IbasethisDissentonthefollowinggrounds:
1)ArnadohasperformedallactsrequiredbySection5(2)or
Republic Act No. 92251(RA 9225) to reacquire Philippine
citizenshipandtoqualifyandrunforpublicoffice;
2)TheevidenceonrecordshowsthatArnadosuseofhisUS
passportintwotripstotheUSafterreacquiringhisPhilippine
citizenship under RA 9225 and renouncing his US citizenship,
weremereisolatedactsthatweresufficientlyjustifiedunderthe
givencircumstancesthatArnadofullyexplained;
3)Arnados use of his US passport did not amount to an
expressrenunciationofhisPhilippinecitizenshipunderSection1
ofCommonwealthActNo.63(CA63);
4)Underthecircumstancesofthiscase,Arnadodidnotdo
anythingtonegatetheoathofrenunciationhetook;
_______________
1AnActMakingTheCitizenshipOfPhilippineCitizensWho
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending For the
PurposeCommonwealthActNo.63.AsAmendedAndForOther
Purposes.
475
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
5)At any rate, all doubts should be resolved in favor of
Arnados eligibility afterthiswas confirmedby themandate of
the people of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte by his election as
Mayor;and
6)Theassailedfindingsoffactsandconsequentconclusions
of law are based on evidence on record and are correct
applicationsoflaw;hence,nobasisexistsforthisCourttorule
thattheComelecenbanccommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionin
rulingonthecase.
TheAntecedentFacts
RespondentRommelCagocoArnadoisanaturalbornFilipino
citizen,borntoFilipinoparentsonJuly22,1957atIliganCity,
LanaodelNorte.2In1985,heimmigratedtotheUnitedStatesfor
jobpurposes.3HewasdeemedtohavelosthisFilipinocitizenship
byoperationoflaw4whenhebecameanaturalizedcitizenofthe
UnitedStatesofAmericawhileinAmerica.
In2003,CongressdeclareditthepolicyoftheStatethatall
Philippinecitizenswhobecomecitizensofanothercountryshall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship upon
compliancewiththestatuteCongresspassedRA9225.5
Arnado,likemanyotherFilipinosbeforehim,atage51and
afterastayof23yearsintheU.S.,optedtoreaffirmhisFilipino
citizenshipbyfilingtherequiredapplicationand
_______________
2Rollo,p.229.
3Id.,atp.162.
4Section1ofCommonwealthActNo.63states:
Section1.How citizenship may be lost.A Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or
events:
(1)Bynaturalizationinaforeigncountry;
475
 5Otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re 12,2010(Arrival),January31,2010(Departure),March31,2010
acquisitionActof2003. (Arrival),April11,2010
476 _______________
476 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED 6Rollo,p.239.
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections 7Id.,atp.240.
takinghisoathbeforethePhilippineConsulateGeneralinSan 8Id.,atp.160.
Francisco,USA.HisapplicationwasapprovedbyConsulWilfredo 9Id.,atp.191.
C. Santos, evidenced by an Order of Approval dated July 10,
10Id.,atp.218.
2008.6He took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
11Id.,atp.219.
Philippines (Republic) on the same day and was accordingly
477
issued Identification Certificate Number SF152408/2008
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 477
declaringhimoncemorepurelyacitizenoftheRepublic. 7
OnApril3,2009,ArnadotookanotherOathofAllegianceto Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his (Departure) April 16, 2010 (Arrival), May 20, 2010 (Departure)
foreigncitizenship.8 andJune4,2010(Arrival).12
Eleven days later or onApril 14, 2009, Arnado left the OnNovember30,2009orsixmonthsafterhefullycomplied
country for the United States. According to Bureau of with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225,Arnado filed his
Immigrationrecords,ArnadothenusedapassportUSPassport Certificate of Candidacy(CoC) for the position of Mayor of
(No. 057782700)that identified his nationality as USA Kauswagan,LanaodelNorte.13
AMERICAN.ThesamerecordalsoindicatedthatArnadoused FivemonthsafteroronApril28,2010,respondentmayoralty
thesameU.S.PassportwhenhereturnedtothecountryonJune candidate Linog C. Balua (Balua) filed a petition to disqualify
25,2009.ThishappenedagainwhenheleftfortheUnitedStates Arnadoand/ortocancelhisCoC.BaluacontendedthatArnadois
onJuly29,2009andreturnedtothecountryonNovember24, aforeignerandisnotaresidentofKauswagan,LanaodelNorte.
2009.9 Balua attached to his petition a Bureau of Immigration (BI)
TherecorddoesnotshowtheexactdatewhenArnadoapplied certificationdatedApril23,2010indicatingArnadosnationality
for a Philippine passport; it shows however that Consulate asUSAAmericanandcertifyingthatthenameArnadoRommel
General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, approved Cagoco appears in the Computer Database/Passenger Manifest
andissuedaPhilippinePassport(No.XX3979162)forArnado withthefollowingpertinenttravelrecords:14
onJune18,2009.10Hereceivedthispassportthree(3)months DATEOFArrival : 01/12/2010
later.11Thereafter,heusedhisPhilippinepassportinhistravels NATIONALITY : USAAMERICAN
onthefollowingdates:December11,2009(Departure),January PASSPORT : 057782700

 DATEOFArrival : 01/12/2010 default.TheComelec,however,failedtoactonthemotionasthe
DATEOFArrival : 03/23/2010 casewasovertakenbytheMay10,2010elections.
Arnado won the election, garnering 5,952 votes over the
NATIONALITY : USAAMERICAN
second placer, Maquiling, who garnered 5,357 votes. The
PASSPORT : 057782700
MunicipalBoardofCanvasserssubsequentlyproclaimedhimas
(Significantly, Arnado also submitted the photocopy of his
thedulyelectedmayorofKauswagan,LanaodelNorte.18
PhilippinepassportshowingthatheusedhisPhilippinepassport
IntheAnswerwhichhefiledafterhisproclamation,Arnado
ontravelsonthesedates.)15
averredthathedidnotcommitanymaterialmisrepresentationin
Balua also presented a computer generated travel record
hisCoC,andthathewaseligibletorunfortheofficeofmayorof
datedDecember3,2009indicatingthatArnadohasbeenusing
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; he had fully complied with the
hisUSPassportNo.057782700inenteringanddepart
requirements of RA 9225 by taking the required Oath of
_______________
AllegianceandexecutinganAffidavitofRenunciationofhisU.S.
12Id.,atpp.242245. citizenship.19To support his allegations, Arnado also submitted
13Id.,atp.139. thefollowingdocumentaryevidence:
14Id.,atp.192. _______________
15Annexes A1A4 of Respondents Motion for 16Id.,atp.191.
Reconsideration,Id.,atpp.204208. 17Balua filed the petition to disqualify and/or to cancel
478 Arnados CoC on April 28, 2010, prior to the May 10, 2010
478 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED elections.Id.,atpp.134136.
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections 18Id.,atp.161.
ing the Philippines. The record showed that Arnado left the 19Id.,atpp.148156.
country on April 14, 2009 and returned on June 25, 2009; he 479
departedagainonJuly29,2009andarrivedbackinthecountry VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 479
on November 24, 2009.16In these lights, Arnados Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
disqualificationwasaliveelectionissue,wellknowntothe
Kauswaganelectorate,whoneverthelessvotedArnadointo (1)Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the
officeasMayor.17 RepublicofthePhilippinesdatedApril3,2009;
TheComelecFirstDivisionorderedArnadotofilehisAnswer (2)JointAffidavit dated May 31, 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno,
(toBaluaspetition)andaMemorandum.Withthepetitionfileda Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all
meretwoweeksfromelectionday,Arnadofailedtocomply,thus neighborsofArnado,attestingthatArnadoisalongtimeresident
givingBaluatheopportunitytomovethatArnadobedeclaredin of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and
continuously residing in his familys ancestral house in
Kauswagan;
(3)Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion,
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated June 3, 2010 stating that
ArnadoisabonafideresidentofhisbarangayandthatArnado
wenttotheUnitedStatesin1985toworkandreturnedtothe
Philippinesin2009;
(4)CertificationdatedMay31,2010fromtheMunicipalLocal
Government Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr.
Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan from
January1964toJune1974andfromFebruary15,1979toApril
15,1986;
(5)Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of
KauswagancertifyingthatArnadohasbeenaregisteredvoterof
KauswagansinceApril3,2009.20
TheComelecFirstDivisionRuling
The Comelec First Division treated Baluas petition as a
petitionfordisqualificationinsteadofapetitionforcancellationof
CoCbasedonmisrepresentation.BecauseBaluafailedtopresent
evidencetosupporthiscontentionthatArnadoisaresidentofthe
UnitedStates,theFirstDivisionfoundnobasistoconcludethat
Arnaldodidnotmeettheoneyearresidencyrequirementunder
theLGC.
Ontheissueofcitizenship,theFirstDivisionheldArnados
actofusinghisUSpassportafterrenouncinghisUScitizenship
onApril3,2009,effectivelynegatedhisOathofRenunciation.As
basis,theFirstDivisioncitedtheCourtsrulinginInRePetition
for Habeas Corpus of Willie Yu v. DefensorSantiago, et al.It
concludedthatArnadoscontinueduseof
_______________
20Id.,atpp.160164.
480
480 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
his US passport was a strong indication that he had no real
intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only
executedanOathofRenunciationtoenablehimtorunforoffice.
The Division noted in this regard the glaring inconsistency
between Arnados unexplained use of his US passport and his
claim that he had reacquired Philippine citizenship and had
renouncedhisUScitizenship.
Based on these premises, the Comelec First Division
disqualifiedArnado,annulledhisproclamation,andorderedthat
theorderofsuccessiontothemayoraltyunderSection44ofthe
LGCbegiveneffect.21
MaquilingsIntervention
While Arnados motion for reconsideration was pending,
MaquilingintervenedandfiledaMotionforReconsiderationand
anoppositiontoArnadosmotionforreconsideration.
Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly
disqualifiedArnado,theorderofsuccessionunderSection44is
notapplicable;heclaimedthatwiththecancellationofArnados
CoC and the nullification of his proclamation, he should be
proclaimedthewinnersincehewasthelegitimatecandidatewho
obtainedthehighestnumberofvotes.22
TheComelecenbancRuling
TheComelecenbancaffirmedtheFirstDivisionstreatment
ofthepetitionasapetitionfordisqualification.Italsoagreed
withthedisposition ofthe First Division to followthe orderof
succession under Section 44, thus ruling out second placer
MaquilingsentitlementtothepostofMayor.
TheComelecenbanchowever,reversedtheFirstDivision
rulingandgrantedArnadosMotionforReconsideration.Itheld
thatbyrenouncinghisUScitizenship,Arnado
 _______________
21Id.,atpp.3849.
22Id.,atpp.8996.
481
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
becameapurePhilippinecitizenagain.Itruledthattheuseofa
USpassportdoesnotoperatetorevertArnadosstatusasadual
citizen prior to his renunciation; it does not operate to un
renouncewhathadearlierbeenrenounced.
TheComelecenbancfurtherruledthattheFirstDivisions
reliance onIn Re Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willie Yu v.
DefensorSantiago,etal.,23wasmisplacedasthefactsofthiscited
casearenot thesameorcomparable withthoseof thepresent
case. Unlike the present case, the petitioner in Yu was a
naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized
Filipinocitizen,appliedforarenewalofhisPortuguesepassport.
Finally,theComelecenbancfoundthatArnadopresenteda
plausibleandbelievableexplanationjustifyingtheuseofhisUS
passport.WhilehisPhilippinepassportwasissuedonJune18,
2009,hewasnotimmediatelynotifiedoftheissuancesothathe
failed to actually get it until after three months later. He
thereafterusedhisPhilippinepassportinhissubsequenttravels
abroad.24
TheSeparateandDissentingOpinions
Significantly,Comelec Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes
issued a Separate Opinion concurring with the Comelec
majority.Heopinedthattheuseofaforeignpassportisnotone
of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of CA 63 through
whichPhilippinecitizenshipmaybelost.Hecitestheassimilative
principle of continuity of Philippine citizenship: Arnado is
presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his
American passport in theabsence of clear and unequivocal
proofofexpatriation.Inaddition,alldoubtsshouldberesolved
infavorofArnadosretentionofcitizenship.25
_______________
481 23G.R.No.L83882,January24,1989,169SCRA364.
24Rollo,pp.5067.
25Id.,atpp.6869.
482
482 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
In hisDissenting Opinion, Commissioner Rene V.
SarmientoemphasizedthatArnadofailedtoprovethathetruly
abandonedhisallegiancetotheUnitedStates;hiscontinueduse
ofhisUSpassport andenjoyment ofallthe privilegesof a US
citizenrancountertohisdeclarationthathechosetoretainonly
hisPhilippinecitizenship.Henotedthatqualificationsforelective
office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once
citizenshipislost,titletotheofficeisdeemedforfeited. 26
TheIssues
ThecompleteissuesposedfortheCourtsconsiderationare:
(1)Whetherinterventionisallowedinadisqualificationcase;
(2)Whether the use of a foreignpassport after renouncing
foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation
made, and whether the use of a foreign passport after
renouncingforeigncitizenshipaffectsonesqualificationsto
runforpublicoffice;
(3)Assuming Arnado is disqualified, whether the rule on
successionintheLGCisapplicableinthepresentcase;27
(4)Howshoulddoubtinthepresentcaseberesolvedinlight
ofArnadoselection;and
 (5)Whether,basedonthefactspresentedandtheapplicable
law, the Comelecen banccommitted grave abuse of
discretion.
_______________
26Id.,atpp.7073.
27Ponencia,p.10.
483
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 483
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
ThePonencia
Theponenciagrants Maquilings petition for certiorari, thus
holding that the Comelec en banc committed grave abuse of
discretioninconsideringthefactsandthelawpresented.Itthus
holdsthatArnadoisadualcitizendisqualifiedtorunforpublic
office under Section 40(d) of the LGC. On this basis,
theponenciarules that with Arnados disqualification, second
placerMaquilingshouldbeproclaimedasthedulyelectedMayor
ofKauswagan,LanaodelNorte.
Based on this conclusion, theponenciaresolves all doubts
against Arnado and disregards the democratic decision of the
Kauswaganelectorate.
As theponenciareasons it out, the act of using a foreign
passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship. By
representing himself as an American citizen, however, Arnado
voluntarilyandeffectivelyrevertedtohisearlierstatusasdual
citizen. It emphasizes that such reversion is not retroactive; it
took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an
AmericancitizenbyusinghisUSpassport.
Thus,bythetimeArnadofiledhisCoConNovember30,2009,
theponenciaconcludesthat Arnadowas adual citizenenjoying
therightsandprivilegesofFilipinoandAmericancitizenship;he
wasqualifiedtovote,butbytheexpressdisqualificationunder
Section40(d)oftheLGC,hewasnotqualifiedasacandidateto
runforalocalelectiveposition.28
With Arnado barred from candidacy, theponenciafurther
concludes that his CoC was void from the beginning. The
affirmationofArnadosdisqualification,althoughmadelongafter
theelections,reachesbacktothefilingoftheCoCsothathewas
notacandidateatallintheMay10,2010elections.Hence,the
votescastinhisfavorshouldnotbecountedandMaquiling,as
thequalifiedcandidatewhoobtainedthe
_______________
28Ponencia,p.17.
484
484 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
highestnumberofvote,shouldbedeclaredthedulyelectedmayor
ofKauswagan,LanaodelNorte.29Inthismanner,theponencia
effectivelydisenfranchised5,952or52.63%ofthosewhovoted
for the top two contending candidatesfor the position of
Mayor;itrulesforaminorityMayor.
RefutationofthePonencia
Arnado performed all acts required by
Section 5(2) of RA 9225 to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and run for
public office; in fact, he actively fol
lowed up his reaffirmed citizenship
byrunningforpublicoffice.
RA9225wasenactedtoallowthereacquisitionandretention
of Philippine citizenship by: 1) naturalborn citizens who were
deemedtohavelosttheirPhilippinecitizenshipbyreasonoftheir
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural
borncitizensofthePhilippineswho,aftertheeffectivityofthe
law,becamecitizensofaforeigncountry.Thelawprovidesthat
theyaredeemedtohavereacquiredorretainedtheirPhilippine
citizenshipupontakingtheoathofallegiance.30
Section3ofRA9225onthesepointsreads:
Section3.Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, naturalborn
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreigncountryareherebydeemedtohavereacquiredPhilippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
I_____________________,solemnlyswear(oraffirm)thatI
willsupportanddefendtheConstitutionoftheRepub
_______________
29Id.,atp.26.
30DeGuzmanv.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.180048,
June19,2009,590SCRA141,156.
485
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
licof thePhilippinesand obeythe lawsand legalorders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mentalreservationorpurposeofevasion.
NaturalborncitizensofthePhilippineswho,aftertheeffectivity
ofthisAct,becomecitizensofaforeigncountryshallretaintheir
Philippinecitizenshipupontakingtheaforesaidoath.
ArnadofallsunderthefirstcategoryasanaturalbornFilipino
citizen who was deemed to have lost his Philippine citizenship
uponhisnaturalizationasanAmericancitizen.
Under the given facts, Arnado indisputably reacquired
PhilippinecitizenshipaftertakingtheOathofAllegiancenotonly
oncebuttwiceonJuly10,2008andApril3,2009.Separately
fromthisoathofallegiance,Arnadotookanoathrenouncinghis
American citizenship as additionally required by RA 9225 for
thoseseekingpublicoffice.
Section5ofRA9225onthispointprovides:
Section5.Civil and Political Rights and
Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenshipunderthisActshallenjoyfullcivilandpoliticalrights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(2)ThoseseekingelectivepublicofficeinthePhilippines
shallmeetthequalificationforholdingsuchpublicofficeas
requiredbytheConstitutionandexistinglawsand,atthe
485 time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administeranoath.
486
486 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
InJapzonv.CommissiononElections,31weruledthatSection
5(2)ofRA9225requiresthetwinrequirementsoftakinganOath
ofAllegianceandtheexecutionofasimilarlyswornRenunciation
ofForeignCitizenship.Wesaid:
Breakingdowntheaforequotedprovision,foranaturalborn
Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship
underRepublicActNo.9225,torunforpublicoffice,hemust:(1)
meetthequalificationsforholdingsuchpublicofficeasrequired
bytheConstitutionandexistinglaws;and(2)makeapersonal
andswornrenunciationofanyandallforeigncitizenshipsbefore Americancitizenship,solelyretaininghisPhilippinecitizenship
anypublicofficerauthorizedtoadministeranoath.32 asthelawrequires.Inthisway,Arnadoqualifiedfortheposition
Thus,therespondentinthatcase,JaimeTyanaturalborn ofMayorofKauswagan,LanaodelNorteandfiledavalidCoC.
FilipinocitizenwhosubsequentlybecameanaturalizedAmerican The evidence on record shows that
citizenbecameapurePhilippinecitizenagainaftertakingthe Arnados use of his US passport after
OathofAllegianceandexecutinganOathofRenunciationofhis his compliance with the terms of RA
Americancitizenship.ToquoteourDecision: 9225, was an isolated act that was
He was born and raised in the Municipality of General sufficientlyexplainedandjustified.
Macarthur,EasternSamar,Philippines.However,helefttowork TherecordsbearoutthatArnadousedhisUSpassportintwo
in the USA and eventually became an American citizen. On 2 tripstoandfromtheUSafterhehadexecutedhisAffidavitof
October2005,TyreacquiredhisPhilippinecitizenshipbytaking Renunciation on April 3, 2009. He travelled on the following
hisOathofAllegiancetotheRepublicofthePhilippinesbefore dates:
NoemiT.Diaz,ViceConsulofthePhilippineConsulateGeneral
Date Destination
in Los Angeles, California, USA, in accordance with the
provisionsofRepublicActNo.9225.Atthispoint,Tystillheld April14,2009 totheU.S.
dualcitizenship,i.e.,AmericanandPhilippine.Itwasonlyon19 June25,2009 tothePhilippines
March2007thatTyrenouncedhisAmericancitizenshipbeforea July29,2009 totheU.S.
notarypublicand,resultantly,becameapurePhilippinecitizen. 33 November24,2009 tothePhilippines
In the present case, Arnado indisputably complied with the ArnadosPhilippinepassportwasissuedonJune18,2009,but
secondrequirementofSection5(2)ofRA9225.OnApril3,2009, hewasnotimmediatelynotifiedoftheissuancesothatandhe
hepersonallyexecutedanAffidavitofRenunciationan only received his passport three months after or sometime
_______________ inSeptember 2009.34Clearly, when Arnado travelled on
31G.R.No.180088,January19,2009,576SCRA331. April14,2009,June25,2009andJuly29,2009,hehadno
32Id.,atp.346. Philippinepassportthathecouldhaveusedtotraveltothe
33Id.,atp.344. UnitedStatestoattendtothewindingupofhisbusiness
487 andotheraffairsinAmerica.Atravel
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 487 _______________
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections 34Rollo,p.219.
Oath of Allegiance before notary public Thomas Dean M. 488
Quijano. Therefore, when he filed his CoC for the position of 488 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Mayor of the Municipality of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte on Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
November 30, 2009, he had already effectively renounced his
document issued by the proper Philippine government agency
(e.g., a Philippine consulate office in theUS) would not suffice
becausetraveldocumentscouldnotbeused;theyareissuedonly
incriticalinstances,asdeterminedbytheconsularofficer,and
allowthebeareronlyadirect,onewaytriptothePhilippines. 35
AlthoughArnadoreceivedhisPhilippinepassportbythetime
hereturnedtothePhilippinesonNovember24,2009,hecould
not use this without risk of complications with the US
immigration authorities for using a travel document different
from what he used in his entry into the US on July 29, 2009.
Plainpracticalitythendemandedthatthetraveldocumentthat
he used to enter the US on July 29, 2009 be the same travel
documentheshoulduseinleavingthecountryonNovember24,
2009.
Giventhesecircumstances,ArnadosuseofhisUSpassportin
travellingbacktothePhilippinesonNovember24,2009wasan
isolatedactthatcouldnot,byitself,beanexpressrenunciationof
thePhilippinecitizenshipheadoptedashissolecitizenshipunder
RA9225.
Arnados use of his US passport
was not an express renunciation of
his Philippine citizenship
Section1ofCA63.
I disagree with theponencias view that by using his US
passport and representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado effectively reverted to the status of a dual
citizen.Interestingly,theponenciafailedtociteanylawor
controlling jurisprudence to support its conclusion, and
thusmerelymakesabareassertion.
_______________
35Seehttp://www.philippineconsulatela.org/FAQs/FAQS
passport.htm#TD1(lastvisitedApril14,2013).
489
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 489
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
Theponenciafails to consider that under RA 9225, natural
born citizens who were deemed to have lost their Philippine
citizenshipbecauseoftheirnaturalizationascitizensofaforeign
countryandwhosubsequentlycompliedwiththerequirementsof
RA 9225, aredeemednot to have losttheir Philippine
citizenship.RA 9225 cured and negated the presumption
made under CA 63. Hence, as inJapzon, Arnado assumed
pure Philippine citizenship again after taking the Oath of
Allegiance and executing an Oath of Renunciation of his
AmericancitizenshipunderRA9225.
Inthislight,theproperframingofthemainissueinthiscase
shouldbewhetherArnadosuseofhisUSpassportaffectedhis
status as a pure Philippine citizen. In question formdid
ArnadosuseofaUSpassportamounttoagroundunder
the law for the loss of his Filipino citizenship under CA
63?Oralternatively,theretentionofhisdualcitizenshipstatus?
IloathetorulethatArnadosuseofhisUSpassportamounts
under toanexpressrenunciationofhisFilipinocitizenship,whenitsuse
was an isolated act that he sufficiently explained and fully
justified. I emphasize that the law requiresexpress
renunciationin order to lose Philippine citizenship. The term
means a renunciation that is madedistinctly and explicitly
and is not left to inference or implication; it is a
renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate
language, as distinguished from that which is inferred
fromconduct.36
Aclearandvividexample,takenfromjurisprudence,ofwhat
express renunction is nottranspired inAznar v.
Comelec37where the Court ruled that the mere fact that
respondentOsmeawasaholderofacertificatestatingthatheis
anAmericandidnotmeanthatheisnolongeraFilipino,
_______________
36BoardofImmigrationCommissionersv.GoCallano,G.R.
No.L24530,October31,1968,25SCRA890,899.
37G.R.No.83820,May25,1990,185SCRA703.
490
490 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
andthatanapplicationforanaliencertificateofregistrationdid
notamounttoarenunciationofhisPhilippinecitizenship.
Inthepresentcase,otherthantheuseofhisUSpassportin
twotripstoandfromtheUnitedStates,therecorddoesnotbear
outanyindication,supportedbyevidence,ofArnadosintention
toreacquireUScitizenship.Tomymind,intheabsenceofclear
and affirmative acts of reacquiring US citizenship either by
naturalizationorbyexpressacts(suchasthereestablishmentof
permanentresidencyintheUnitedStates), Arnadosuseofhis
USpassportcannotbutbeconsideredanisolatedactthatdidnot
undo hisrenunciationof hisUS citizenship. What he might in
fact have done was to violate American law on the use of
passports, but this is a matter irrelevant to the present case.
Thus,ArnadoremainstobeapureFilipinocitizenandtheloss
ofhisPhilippinecitizenshipcannotbepresumedorinferredfrom
hisisolatedactofusinghisUSpassportfortravelpurposes.
Arnado did not violate his oath of
renunciation; at any rate, all doubts
should be resolved in favor of Ar
nados eligibility considering that he
received the popular mandate of the
people of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norteastheirdulyelectedmayor
I completely agree with theponenciathat the Oath of
Renunciation is not an empty or formal ceremony that can be
perfunctorilyprofessedatanygivenday,onlytobedisregarded
onthenext.AsamandatoryrequirementunderSection5(2)of
RA9225,itallowsformernaturalbornFilipinocitizenswhowere
deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
naturalizationascitizensofaforeigncountrytoenjoyfullcivil
andpoliticalrights,foremostamongthem,theprivilegetorunfor
publicoffice.491
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 491
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
I disagree however, with the conclusion that Arnado
effectivelynegatedhisOathofRenunciationwhenheusedhisUS
passportfortraveltotheUnitedStates.Toreiterateifonlyfor
emphasis,ArnadosufficientlyjustifiedtheuseofhisUSpassport
despitehisrenunciationofhisUScitizenship;whenhetravelled
onApril14,2009,June25,2009andJuly29,2009,hehadno
Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the
UnitedStatestoattendtothebusinessandotheraffairsthathe
was leaving. If at all, he could be faulted for using his US
passportbythetimehereturnedtothePhilippinesonNovember
24,2009becauseatthattime,hehadpresumablyreceivedhis
Philippinepassport.However,giventhecircumstancesexplained
aboveandthatheconsistentlyusedhisPhilippinepassportfor
travelafterNovember24,2009,thetruecharacterofhisuseof
his USpassport stands out and cannot but be an isolated and
convenientactthatdidnotnegatehisOathofRenunciation.
The People of Kauswagan have spoken
and any doubt should be resolved in
favoroftheirverdict.
 SeparatelyfromtheissueofArnadosisolatedactofusinghis
USpassport,wecannotignorethefactinacommunityassmall
as Kauswaganwherethetwo mayoraltycandidates garnered a
totalof11,309votes,BaluasclaimofArnadosforeigncitizenship
andeventhelattersresidencystatuscouldnotbeavoidedbutbe
live election issues.The people of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte,therefore,madetheirownrulingwhentheyelected
Arnadoastheirmayordespitetheforeignerlabelsought
tobepinnedonhim.Atthispoint,eventhisCourtshouldheed
thisverdictbyresolvingalldoubtsregardingArnadoseligibility
inhisfavor.Thisap
492
492 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
proach, incidentally, is not a novel one 38as inSinaca v.
Mula,39theCourthasalreadyruled:
_______________
38SeeJ.PanganibansConcurringOpinioninBengsonIIIv.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal(G.R. No. 142840,
May7,2001,357SCRA545)whererespondentTeodoroC.Cruz
citizenshipwasalsoquestioned,viz.:
4.InCaseofDoubt,PopularWillPrevails
Fourth,thecourthasasolemndutytoupholdtheclearand
unmistakable mandate of the people. It cannot supplant the
sovereignwilloftheSecondDistrictofPangasinanwithfractured
legalism. The people of the District have clearly spoken. They
overwhelmingly and unequivocally voted for private respondent
torepresentthemintheHouseofRepresentatives.Thevotesthat
Cruzgarnered(80,119)inthelastelectionsweremuchmorethan
thoseofallhisopponentscombined(66,182).Insuchinstances,
all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the winning
candidates eligibility; to rule otherwise would be to defeat the
willofthepeople.
Wellentrenchedinourjurisprudenceisthedoctrinethatin
caseofdoubt,politicallawsmustbesoconstructedastogivelife
andspirittothepopularmandatefreelyexpressedthroughthe
ballot.Publicinterestandthesovereignwillshould,atalltimes,
betheparamountconsiderationsinelectioncontroversies.Forit
wouldbebettertoerrinfavorofthepeopleschoicethantobe
rightincomplexbutlittleunderstoodlegalisms.
Indeed,thisCourthasrepeatedlystressedtheimportanceof
givingeffecttothesovereignwillinordertoensurethesurvival
of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a
reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert
utmostefforttoresolvetheissuesinamannerthatwouldgive
effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public
policytocauseelectiveofficestobefilledbythosewhoarethe
choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning
candidates qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrativethattheineligibilityissopatentlyantagonisticto
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibilityandtherebygivingeffecttotheapparentwillofthe
people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitutionandlawssozealouslyprotectandpromote.
See alsoFernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal,G.R.No.187478,December21,2009,608SCRA733.
39373Phil.896;315SCRA266(1999).
493
VOL.696,APRIL16,2013 493
Maquilingvs.CommissiononElections
[When] a candidate has received popular mandate,
overwhelminglyandclearlyexpressed,allpossibledoubtsshould
be resolved in favor of the candidates eligibility for to rule
otherwiseistodefeatthewillofthepeople.Aboveandbeyondall,
the determination of the true will of the electorate should be
paramount.Itistheirvoice,notoursorofanyoneelse,thatmust
prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy wecontinue to hold
sacred.
No Basis to Rule that the
Comelec Committed Grave
AbuseofDiscretion.
Asmylastpoint,theComelecenbancconsideredandaccepted
asitsfactualfindingthatArnadosexplanationontheuseofhis
USpassportwassufficient justificationtoconcludethathe did
notabandonhisOathofRenunciation.Thisfindingisundeniably
basedonevidenceonrecordastheabovecitationsshow.InaRule
64petition,whetherthisconclusioniscorrectorincorrectisnot
material for as long as it is made on the basis of evidence on
record,andwasmadewithinthecontemplationoftheapplicable
law.40
In other words, the Comelecen bancproperly exercised its
discretioninactingonthematter;thus,evenifithaderredinits
conclusions,anyerrorinreadingtheevidenceandinapplyingthe
law was not sufficiently grave to affect the exercise of its
jurisdiction.41Fromtheseperspectives,thisCourthasnorecourse
buttodismissthepresentpetitionforfailuretoshowanygrave
abuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheComelec.
Intheselights,Ivoteforthedismissalofthepetition.
SEPARATEANDCONCURRINGOPINION
ABAD,J.:
I fully concur with the majority but would add another
argumentinsupportofthedecision.
Sec.5(2)ofRepublicAct9225providesthemeansbywhicha
formerPhilippinecitizenwhohasacquiredforeigncitizenshipto
later reacquire his old citizenship by complying with certain
requirements. RespondentRommelArnadocomplied withthese
requirementsforregainingPhilippinecitizenshipbut,becausehe
wanted to run for public office, he also renounced his United
States (U.S.) Citizenship when he filed his certificate of
candidacy,conformablywiththeprovisionsofRepublicAct9225
thatreads:
(2)ThoseseekingelectivepublicinthePhilippinesshall
meetthequalificationforholdingsuchpublicofficeas
requiredbytheConstitutionandexistinglawsand,at
the timeofthefilingofthecertificate ofcandidacy,
makeapersonalandswornrenunciationofanyand
all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorizedtoadministeranoath.
Buthiscompliancewiththeabovewaschallengedbeforethe
Commission on Elections (Comelec) because Arnado afterwards
twiceusedhisU.S.passportingoingtoandcomingfromtheU.S.,
thecountrywhosecitizenshiphehadrenounced.
The majority opinion amply states that by his acts, Arnado
showedthathedidnoteffectivelyrenouncehisU.S.citizenship.
To this I add that he also failed to comply with the U.S.
requirementsforcitizenswishingtorenouncetheircitizenships.
Section 349 (a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA)1sets the procedure that those who have moved their
residencetoothercountriesmustobservewhenrenouncingtheir
U.S.citizenship.Itprovidesthat(a)Apersonwhoisanationalof
theUnitedStateswhetherbybirthornaturalization,shalllose
hisnationalitybyvoluntarilyperforminganyofthefollowingacts
with the intention of relinquishing United States
nationalityxxx(5)makingaformalrenunciationofnationality
beforeadiplomaticorconsularofficeroftheUnitedStatesina
foreignstate,insuchformasmaybeprescribedbytheSecretary
of State. He does not effectively renounce his citizenship who
doesnotcomplywithwhathiscountryrequiresofhim.
Here,thereisnoshowingthatArnado,aU.S.citizen,fulfilled
the above requirement. To the eyes of the U.S. government,
Arnadoremainsitscitizen,owingobligationsofloyaltytoitand
subject to its laws wherever he may be. Indeed, the U.S.
governmenthadnotcancelledhispassport,permittinghimtouse
thesame anumberoftimes afterhe reacquiredhis Philippine
citizenship.IftheU.S.continuestoregardArnadoasitscitizen,
then he has two citizenships, a ground for cancelling his
certificateofcandidacyforapublicofficeinthePhilippines.
Petition granted, COMELEC En Banc resolution dated 2
February2011annulledandsetaside.
Notes.Itisasettledrulethatonlylegitimatechildrenfollow
the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are
under the parental authority of the mother and follow her
nationality.(Go,Sr.vs.Ramos,598SCRA266[2009])
R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands naturalborn Filipinos
who reacquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to
executeapersonalandswornrenunciationofanyandallforeign
citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to
qualifyascandidates in Philippine elections. (SobejanaCondon
vs.CommissiononElections,678SCRA267[2012])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
Caselawteachesthattheissueastotheidentityofthedrugs
allegedlysoldiscommonlyresolvedbyascrutinyofthechainof
custodyoftherecovereddrugs.(Peoplevs.Bernardino,602SCRA
270[2009])
o0o
G.R.No.188314.January10,2011.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff
appellee,vs.KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN
a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPPAL
BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a.
AbuSolaiman,ROHMATABDURROHIMa.k.a.JackieorZaky,
andotherJOHNandJANEDOES,accused,
GAMALB.BAHARANa.k.a.Tapay,ANGELOTRINIDADa.k.a.
AbuKhalil,andROHMATABDURROHIMa.k.a.AbuJackieor
Zaky,accusedappellants.
Criminal Procedure; Plea of Guilty; All trial judges must
refrainfromacceptingwithalacrityanaccusedspleaofguilty,for
whilejusticedemandsaspeedyadministration,judgesareduty
boundtobeextrasolicitousinseeingtoitthatwhenanaccused
pleadsguilty,heunderstandsfullythemeaningofhispleaand
theimportofaninevitableconviction;Therequirementforajudge
to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re
arraignment.As early as inPeople v. Apduhan, 24 SCRA 798
theSupremeCourthasruledthatalltrialjudgesmustrefrain
fromacceptingwithalacrityanaccusedspleaofguilty,forwhile
justicedemandsaspeedyadministration,judgesaredutybound
tobeextrasolicitousinseeingtoitthatwhenanaccusedpleads
guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the
importofaninevitableconviction.Thus,trialcourtjudgesare
requiredtoobservethefollowingprocedureunderSection3,Rule
116oftheRulesofCourt:SEC.3.
_______________
*THIRDDIVISION.
158
 1 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
58
Peoplevs.Baharan
Pleaofguiltytocapitaloffense;receptionofevidence.When
the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, thecourt shall
conduct a searching inquiryinto the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of his pleaand
shall requiretheprosecution toprovehisguiltand theprecise
degreeofculpability.Theaccusedmayalsopresentevidencein
his behalf. The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry
appliesmoresoincasesofrearraignment.InPeoplev.Galvez,
378 SCRA 389 (2002), the Court noted that since accused
appellantsoriginalpleawasnotguilty,thetrialcourtshould
haveexertedcarefuleffortininquiringintowhyhechangedhis
pleatoguilty.
Same;Same;Therequirementtoconductasearchinginquiry
shouldnotbedeemedsatisfiedincasesinwhichitwasthedefense
counselwhoexplainedtheconsequencesofaguiltypleatothe
accusedtheconductofasearchinginquiryremainsthedutyof
judges, as theyaremandated bythe rulestosatisfythemselves
thattheaccusedhadnotbeenundercoercionorduress;mistaken
impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects,
and consequences of their guilty plea.The requirement to
conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in
cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequencesofaguiltypleatotheaccused,asitappearsin predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on
thiscase.InPeoplev.Alborida,359SCRA495(2001),thisCourt
foundthattherewasstillanimprovidentpleaofguilty,evenif
theaccusedhadalreadysignifiedinopencourtthathiscounsel
had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he
understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused
understoodthatthepenaltyofdeathwouldstillbemetedoutto
him;andthathehadnotbeenintimidated,bribed,orthreatened.
Wehavereiteratedinalonglineofcasesthattheconductofa
searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are
mandatedbytherulestosatisfythemselvesthattheaccusedhad
not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstandingofthesignificance,effects,andconsequencesof
theirguiltyplea.Thisrequirementisstringentandmandatory.
Same; Same; Convictionsbasedonanimprovidentplea of
guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment.InPeoplev.Oden,427SCRA634(2004),theCourt
declaredthateveniftherequirementofconductingasearching
inquirywasnotcompliedwith,[t]hemannerbywhichthepleaof
guilt is made loses much of great significance where the
convictioncanbebasedonindepend
159
VOL.639,JANUARY10,2011 15
9
Peoplevs.Baharan
entevidenceprovingthecommissionbythepersonaccused
oftheoffensecharged.Thus,inPeoplev.Nadera,324SCRA490
(2000), the Court stated:Convictions based on an
improvidentpleaofguiltaresetasideonlyifsuchpleais
thesolebasisofthejudgment.Ifthetrialcourtreliedon
sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused,
the conviction must be sustained, because then it is
evidenceprovinghiscommissionoftheoffensecharged.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Principals; One who gave
instructions and training to another on how to make bombs
coupled with their careful planning and persistent attempts to
bombdifferentareasinMetroManilaandhisconfirmationthat
anotherwouldbegettingTNTfromoneoftheaccusedaspartof
theirmissionmakehimaprincipalbyinducementsinceitishis
coinducement which was the determining cause of the
commissionofthecrime.Inthelightoftheforegoingevidence,
theCourtupholdsthefindingofguiltagainstRohmat.Article17
of the Revised Penal Code reads: Art. 17.Principals.The
following are considered principals: 1. Those who take a direct
part in the execution of the act 2. Those who directly force or
induce others to commit it 3. Those who cooperate in the
commissionoftheoffensebyanotheractwithoutwhichitwould
not have been accomplished Accused Rohmat is criminally
responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on
principalbyinducement.Theinstructionsandtraininghehad
given Asali onhow to make bombscoupled with their careful
planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas in
MetroManilaandRohmatsconfirmationthatTrinidadwouldbe
getting TNT from Asali as part of their missionprove the
findingthatRohmatscoinducementwasthedeterminingcause
ofthecommissionofthecrime.Suchcommandoradvice[was]of
such nature that, without it, the crime would not have
materialized.
Same;Same;Evidence;Whileitistruethatstatementsmade
by a conspirator against a coconspirator are admissible only
whenmadeduringtheexistenceoftheconspiracy,ifthedeclarant
repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession
becomesajudicialadmission,makingthetestimonyadmissibleas
to both conspirators.Accused contend that the testimony of
AsaliisinadmissiblepursuanttoSec.30,Rule130oftheRulesof
Court.Itistruethat
160
1 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
60
Peoplevs.Baharan
undertherule,statementsmadebyaconspiratoragainsta
coconspirator are admissible only when made during the
existenceoftheconspiracy.However,astheCourtruledinPeople
v. Buntag, 427 SCRA 180 (2004), if the declarant repeats the
statementincourt,hisextrajudicialconfessionbecomesajudicial
admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators.Thus,inPeoplev.Palijon,343SCRA486(2000),the
Court held the following: [W]e must make a distinction
between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial
confessionmaybegiveninevidenceagainsttheconfessantbut
notagainsthiscoaccusedastheyaredeprivedoftheopportunity
tocrossexaminehim.Ajudicialconfessionisadmissibleagainst
the declarants coaccused since the latter are afforded
opportunitytocrossexaminetheformer.Section30,Rule130
oftheRulesofCourtappliesonlytoextrajudicialactsor
admissionsandnottotestimonyattrialwheretheparty
adversely affected has the opportunity to crossexamine
the declarant.Mercenes admission implicating his coaccused
was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence
against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are
triedtogetherforthesameoffense,thetestimonyofacoaccused
implicating his coaccused is competent evidence against the
latter.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforaccusedappellant.
SERENO,J.:
 BeforetheCourtisanappealfromtheDecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals(CA)dated30June2008,whichaffirmedtheDecisionof
theRegionalTrialCourtofMakatiCityinCriminalCaseNos.05
476 and 054777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision
convicted the three accusedappellantsnamely, Gamal B.
Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and
RohmatAbdurrohima.k.a.AbuJackieorZakyofthecomplex
crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, and
sentencedthemtosufferthepen
161
VOL.639,JANUARY10,2011
Peoplevs.Baharan
altyofdeathbylethalinjection.TheCAmodifiedthesentence
toreclusionperpetuaasrequiredbyRepublicActNo.9346(Act
AbolishingtheImpositionofDeathPenalty).
StatementofFacts
Thepertinentfacts,asdeterminedbythetrialcourt,areas
follows:
On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual
southbound route, from its Navotas bus terminal towards its
AlabangbusterminalviaEpifaniodelosSantosAvenue(EDSA).
Around6:30to7:30intheevening,whiletheywereabouttomove
out of the GuadalupeEDSA southbound bus stop, the bus
conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two
insistedongettingonthebus,sotheconductorobligedandlet
themin.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he
immediatelybecamewaryofthetwomen,because,evenifthey
gotonthebustogether,thetwosatawayfromeachotherone
sattwoseatsbehindthedriver,whiletheothersatatthebackof
the bus. Atthe time,there wereonly15passengersinsidethe
bus.Healsonoticedthattheeyesofoneofthemenwerereddish.
Whenheapproachedthepersonnearthedriverandaskedhim
whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter looked
dumbstruckbythequestion.Hethenstutteredandsaidhewas
paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned
when the other man seated at the back also paid for both
passengers.Atthispoint,Andalessaidhebecamemorecertain
that the two were up to no good, and that there might be a
holdup.
161 Afterwards,Andalessaidhebecamemoresuspiciousbecause
bothmenkeptonaskinghimifthebuswasgoingtostopatAyala
Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back
appearedtobeslouching,withhislegsstretchedoutinfrontof
himandhisarmshangingoutandhiddenfromviewasifhewas
tinkeringwithsomething.WhenAndales
162
162 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Baharan
wouldgetneartheman,thelatterwouldglareathim.Andales
admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious
characterstothepolice.
AssoonasthebusreachedthestoplightatthecornerofAyala
AvenueandEDSA,thetwomeninsistedongettingoffthebus.
AccordingtoAndales,thebusdriverinitiallydidnotwanttolet
them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited
unloadinganywhereexceptatdesignatedbusstops.Eventually,
thebusdrivergaveinandallowedthetwopassengerstoalight.
The two immediately got off the bus and ran towards Ayala
Avenue.Momentsafter,Andalesfeltanexplosion.Hethensaw
firequicklyengulfingthebus.Heranoutofthebustowardsa
nearbymall.Afterawhile,hewentbacktowherethebuswas.
Hesawtheirbuspassengerseitherlyingonthegroundorlooking
traumatized.Afewhoursafter,hemadeastatementbeforethe
MakatiPoliceStationnarratingthewholeincident.
The prosecution presented documents furnished by the
Department of Justice, confirming that shortly before the
explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf GroupAbu
Solaimanannounced over radio station DZBB that the group
had a Valentines Day gift for former President Gloria
MacapagalArroyo. After the bombing, he again went on radio
andwarnedofmorebombattacks.
As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS
CBNNewsNetworkanexclusiveinterviewsometimeafterthe
incident, confessing his participation in the Valentines Day
bombingincident.Inanotherexclusiveinterviewonthenetwork,
accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing
incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview,
confessingthathehadsuppliedtheexplosivedevicesforthe14
February2005bombing.Thebusconductoridentifiedtheaccused
Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two
men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14
February.163
VOL.639,JANUARY10,2011
Peoplevs.Baharan
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Groupnamely Khaddafy
Janjalani,GamalB.Baharan,AngeloTrinidad,GappalBannah
Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or
Zaky,andotherJohnandJaneDoeswerethenchargedwith
multiplemurderandmultiplefrustratedmurder.OnlyBaharan,
Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other
accusedremainatlarge.
Ontheirarraignmentforthemultiplemurdercharge(Crim.
CaseNo.05476),Baharan,Trinidad,andAsaliallenteredaplea
ofguilty.Ontheotherhand,uponarraignmentforthemultiple
frustrated murdercharge (Crim. Case No. 05477), accused
Asali pledguilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan plednot
guilty. Rohmat plednot guiltyto both charges. During the
pretrialhearing,thepartiesstipulatedthefollowing:
1.)Thejurisdictionofthiscourtovertheoffensescharged.
2.)Thatall three accusednamelyalias Baharan, Trinidad,
andAsaliadmittedknowingoneanotherbeforeFebruary
14,2005.
3.)Allthesamethreeaccusedlikewiseadmittedthatabomb
exploded inthe RRCG bus while thebuswas plyingthe
EDSAroutefrontingtheMRTterminalwhichisinfrontof
theMakatiCommercialCenter.
4.)AccusedAsaliadmittedknowingtheotheraccusedalias
Rohmatwhomheclaimstaughthimhowtomakeexplosive
devices.
5.)The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat
beforetheFebruary14bombingincident.
6.)TheaccusedBaharan,Trinidad,andAsalialladmittedto
causingthebombexplosioninsidetheRRCGbuswhichleft
fourpeopledeadandmoreorlessfortypersonsinjured.
163 7.)Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that
within the period March 2024 each gave separate
interviewstotheABSCBNnewsnetworkadmittingtheir
participationinthecommissionofthesaidcrimes,subject
ofthesecases.164
164 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Baharan
8.)AccusedTrinidadandBaharanalsoadmittedtopleading
guilty to these crimes, because they were guiltstricken
after seeing a man carrying a child in the first bus that
theyhadentered.
 9.)Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of
March2005hegaveatelevisionnewsinterviewinwhich
headmittedthathesuppliedtheexplosivedeviceswhich
resultedinthisexplosioninsidetheRRCGbusandwhich
resultedinthefilingofthesecharges.
10.)Finally,accusedBaharan,Trinidad,andAsaliadmitted
thattheyaremembersoftheAbuSayyaf.1
Inthelightofthepretrialstipulations,thetrialcourtasked
whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to
changing their not guilty pleas to the charge ofmultiple
frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the
heavier charge ofmultiple murder, creating an apparent
inconsistency in their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with
accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the
consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged the
inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re
arraignment.AftertheInformationwasreadtothem,Baharan
and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge ofmultiple frustrated
murder.2
Afterbeingdischargedasstatewitness,accusedAsalitestified
thatwhileundertrainingwiththeAbuSayyafin2004,Rohmat,
a.k.aAbuJackieorZaky,andtwootherpersonstaughthimhow
tomakebombsandexplosives.Thetraineesweretoldthatthey
weretowagebattlesagainstthegovernmentinthecity,andthat
theirfirstmissionwastoplantbombsinmalls,theLightRailway
Transit(LRT),andotherpartsofMetroManila.
As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was
requiredbytheAbuSayyafleadership,specificallyAbuSo
_______________
1OmnibusDecisionoftheTrialCourtat6,CARolloatp.97.
2TSN,18April2005,at317.
165
VOL.639,JANUARY10,2011 165
Peoplevs.Baharan
laimanandRohmat,tosecureeightkilosofTNT,asolderinggun,
aluminumpowder,atester,andChristmaslights,allofwhichhe
knew would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that
sometimeinNovembertoDecember2004,Trinidadaskedhimfor
a total of 4 kilos of TNTthat is, 2 kilos on two separate
occasions.RohmatallegedlycalledAsalitoconfirmthatTrinidad
wouldgetTNTfromAsalianduseitfortheirfirstmission.The
TNT was allegedly placed in two buses sometime in December
2004,butneitheroneofthemexploded.
AsalithentestifiedthatthenightbeforetheValentinesDay
bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got another two kilos of TNT
fromhim.Lateintheeveningof14February,hereceivedacall
fromAbuSolaiman.ThelattertoldAsalinottoleavehomeorgo
tocrowdedareas,sincetheTNTtakenbyBaharanandTrinidad
had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later,
Trinidad called Asali, repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman.
The next day, Asali allegedly received a call from accused
Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the
mission.3According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, Sa
wakasnagsuccessdinyungtinurokosayo.
AssignmentofErrors
Accusedappellantsraisethefollowingassignmentoferrors:
I.The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused
appellantspleaofguiltdespiteinsufficiencyofsearching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of
theconsequencesofthesaidplea.
_______________
 3CARolloatp.29.
166
166 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Baharan
II.Thetrialcourtgravelyerredinfindingthattheguiltof
accusedappellantsforthecrimeschargedhadbeenproven
beyondreasonabledoubt.4
FirstAssignmentofError
AccusedappellantsBaharanandTrinidadarguethatthetrial
courtdidnotconductasearchinginquiryaftertheyhadchanged
their plea from not guilty to guilty. The transcript of
stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 rearraignment
beforetheMakatiRegionalTrialCourtisreproducedbelow:
Court:Anyway,Ithinkwhatweshouldhavetodo,considering
the stipulations that were agreed upon during the last
hearing, is to address this matter of pleas of not guilty
entered for the frustrated murder charges by the two
accused,Mr.TrinidadandMr.Baharan,becauseifyouwill
recalltheyenteredpleasofguiltytothemultiplemurder
charges, but then earlier pleas of not guilty for
thefrustratedmultiplemurdercharges
remain [I]s that not inconsistent considering the
stipulations that were entered into during the initial
pretrialofthiscase?[If]youwillrecall,theyadmittedto
havecausedthebombexplosionthatledtothedeathofat
least four people and injury of about forty other persons
and so under the circumstances, Atty Pea, have you
discussedthismatterwithyourclients?
Atty.Pea:Thenweshouldbegivenenoughtimetotalkwith
them.Ihaventconferredwith
_______________
4BrieffortheAccusedAppellantsat12,CARolloat7374.
167
VOL.639,JANUARY10,2011 167
Peoplevs.Baharan
themaboutthiswithregardtothemultiplemurdercase.
Court:Okay.Soletusproceednow.Atty.Pea,canyouassist
the two accused because if they are interested in
withdrawingtheir[pleas],Iwanttohearitfromyourlips.
Atty.Pea:Yes,yourHonor.
(Atthisjuncture,Atty.Peaconferswiththetwoaccused,
namelyTrinidadandBaharan)
Ihavetalkedtothem,yourHonor,andIhaveexplainedto
themtheconsequenceoftheirpleas,yourHonor,andthat
thepleaofguilttothemurdercaseandpleaofnotguiltyto
thefrustrated multiple murderactually are inconsistent
withtheirpleas.
Court:Withmattersthattheystipulatedupon?
Atty. Pea:Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they
alreadypleadguilttothemurdercase,thentheyarenow
changingtheirpleas,yourHonor,fromnotguiltytotheone
of guilt. They are now ready, your Honor, for re
arraignment.
INTERPRETER:(Readagainthatportion[oftheinformation]
and translated it in Filipino in a clearer way and asked
bothaccusedwhattheirpleasare).
YourHonor,bothaccusedareenteringseparatepleasof
guilttothecrimecharged.
COURT:Allright.Soaftertheinformationwasrereadtothe
accused,theyhavewithdrawntheirpleasofnotguiltyand
changedittothepleasofguiltytothechargeoffrustrated
 murder. Thank you. Are there any matters you need to
addressatpretrial
168
168 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Baharan
now? If there are none, then I will terminate pretrial and
accommodate5
As early as inPeople v. Apduhan,the Supreme Court has
ruledthatalltrialjudgesmustrefrainfromacceptingwith
alacrityanaccusedspleaofguilty,forwhilejusticedemandsa
speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitousinseeingtoitthatwhenanaccusedpleadsguilty,he
understandsfullythemeaningofhispleaandtheimportofan
inevitable conviction.6Thus, trial court judges are required to
observethefollowingprocedureunderSection3,Rule116ofthe
RulesofCourt:
SEC.3.Pleaofguiltytocapitaloffense;receptionofevidence.
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, thecourt
shall conduct a searching inquiryinto the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his
pleaandshallrequiretheprosecutiontoprovehisguiltandthe
precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present
evidenceinhisbehalf.(Emphasissupplied)
Therequirementtoconductasearchinginquiryappliesmore
soincasesofrearraignment.InPeoplev.Galvez,theCourtnoted
thatsinceaccusedappellantsoriginalpleawasnotguilty,the
trialcourtshouldhaveexertedcarefuleffortininquiringintowhy
hechangedhispleatoguilty.7AccordingtotheCourt:
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of
guilt,especiallyinacaseinvolvingthedeathpenalty,isimposed
uponthetrialjudgeinordertoleavenoroomfordoubtonthe mandatory.11
possibilitythat
_______________
5TSN,18April2005,at34,1415.
6People v. Apduhan,G.R. No. L19491, 30 August 1968, 24
SCRA798.
7Peoplev.Galvez,G.R.No.135053,6March2002,378SCRA
389;seealsoPeoplev.Chua,G.R.No.137841,1October2001,366
SCRA283.
169
VOL.639,JANUARY10,2011 169
Peoplevs.Baharan
theaccusedmighthavemisunderstoodthenatureofthecharge
andtheconsequencesoftheplea.8
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry
should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the
defensecounselwhoexplainedtheconsequencesofaguiltyplea
totheaccused,asitappearsinthiscase.InPeoplev.Alborida,
this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of
guilty,eveniftheaccusedhadalreadysignifiedinopencourtthat
his counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea;
that he understood the explanation of his counsel; that the
accusedunderstoodthatthepenaltyofdeathwouldstillbemeted
out to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or
threatened.9
Wehavereiteratedinalonglineofcasesthattheconductofa
searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are
mandatedbytherulestosatisfythemselvesthattheaccusedhad
not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a
misunderstandingofthesignificance,effects,andconsequencesof
their guilty plea.10This requirement is stringent and
 Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under
whichtherearraignmentwasconductedorofthefactualmilieu
surroundingthefindingofguiltagainsttheaccused.TheCourt
observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled
guilty to another chargemultiple murderbased on the same
actrelieduponinthemultiplefrustrated
_______________
8Peoplev.Galvez,G.R.No.135053,6March2002,378SCRA
389,citingPeoplev.Magat,332SCRA517,526(2000).
9People v. Alborida, G.R. No. 136382, 25 June 2001, 359
SCRA495.
10Peoplev.Dayot,G.R.No.88281,20July1990,187SCRA
637;People v. Alborida, G.R. No. 136382, 25 June 2001, 359
SCRA495,citingPeoplev.Sevilleno,305SCRA519(1999)
11People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 135053, 6 March 2002, 378
SCRA389.
170
170 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Baharan
murdercharge.TheCourtfurthernotesthatpriortothechange
ofpleatooneofguilt,accusedBaharanandTrinidadmadetwo
other confessions of guiltone through an extrajudicial
confession(exclusivetelevisioninterviews,asstipulatedbyboth
accused during pretrial), and the otherviajudicial admission
(pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances,
we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the
searchinginquiryinthisinstance.Remandingthecaseforre
arraignmentisnotwarranted,astheaccusedspleaofguiltwas
not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under
consideration.12
SecondAssignmentofError
InPeople v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the
requirementofconductingasearchinginquirywasnotcomplied
with,[t]hemannerbywhichthepleaofguiltismadeloses
muchofgreatsignificancewheretheconvictioncanbebasedon
independent evidence proving the commission by the person
accusedoftheoffensecharged. 13Thus,inPeoplev.Nadera,the
Courtstated:
Convictionsbasedonanimprovidentpleaofguiltareset
asideonlyifsuchpleaisthesolebasisofthejudgment.If
thetrialcourtreliedonsufficientandcredibleevidenceto
convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained,
becausethenitispredicatednotmerelyontheguiltypleaofthe
accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged.14(Emphasissupplied.)
Intheirsecondassignmentoferror,accusedappellantsassert
thatguiltwasnotprovenbeyondreasonabledoubt.They
_______________
12People v. Alborida, G.R. No. 136382, 25 June 2001, 359
SCRA495.
13People v. Oden, G.R. Nos. 15551122, 14 April 2004, 427
SCRA634,citingPeoplev.Galas,354SCRA722(2001).
14Peoplev.Nadera,G.R.Nos.13138487,2February2000,
324SCRA490.
171
VOL.639,JANUARY10,2011 171
Peoplevs.Baharan
pointed out that the testimony of the conductor was merely
circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was
insufficient.
 Insofar as accusedappellants Baharan and Trinidad are
concerned, the evidence fortheprosecution, inadditiontothat
which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily
consistedofthetestimoniesofthebusconductor,ElmerAndales,
andoftheaccusedturnedstatewitness,Asali.Andalespositively
identifiedaccusedBaharanandTrinidadasthetwomenwhohad
acted suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted on
gettingoffthebusinviolationofaMakatiordinance;andwho
had scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb
exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had given
accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing
incidentinMakati City. Theguilt of the accused Baharanand
Trinidad was sufficiently established by these corroborating
testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions
(pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive
televisioninterviews,astheybothstipulatedduringpretrial)that
they were indeed the perpetrators of the Valentines Day
bombing.15Accordingly, the Court upholds the findings of guilt
madebythetrialcourtasaffirmedbytheCourtofAppeals.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution
consistedofthetestimonyofaccusedturnedstatewitnessAsali.
Belowisareproductionofthetranscriptofstenographicnoteson
the state prosecutors direct examination of statewitness Asali
duringthe26May2005trial:
Q:YoustatedthatZakytrainedyouandTrinidad.Under
whatcircumstancesdidhetrainyou,Mr.Witness,to
assemblethoseexplosives,youandTrinidad?
_______________
15Alanov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.111244,15December
1997, 283 SCRA269, citingPeoplev. Hernandez,260
SCRA25(1996).
172
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Baharan
A:Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the
threeofthem,thatAngeloTrinidadandmyselfbethe
onetobetrainedtomakeanexplosive,sir.
Q:Mr.witness,howlongthattraining,orhowlongdidit
takethattraining?
A:IfIamnotmistaken,wewerethoughttomakebomb
aboutonemonthandtwoweeks.
Q:Now,speakingofthatmission,Mr.witness,whileyou
were still in training at Mr. Cararao, is there any
mission that you undertook, if any, with respect to
thatmission?
A:Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls,
LRT,andotherpartsofMetroManila,sir.16
ThewitnessthentestifiedthathekepteightkilosofTNTfor
accusedBaharanandTrinidad.
Q:Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you
know what happened to the 2 kilos of bomb that
Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime in
November2004?
A:ThatwastheexplosivethatheplantedintheGliner,
whichdidnotexplode.
Q:Howdidyouknow,Mr.witness?
A:Hewastheonewhotoldme,Mr.AngeloTrinidad,sir.
Q:Whathappenednext,Mr.witness,whenthebombdid
notexplode,astoldtoyoubyTrinidad?
A:OnDecember29,AngeloTrinidadgot2morekilosof
TNTbombs.
 Q: DidTrinidadtellyouwhyheneededanotheramount
ofexplosiveonthatdate,December29,2004?Willyou
kindlytellusthereasonwhy?
_______________
16TSN,26May2005,at2436.
173
VOL.639,JANUARY10,2011
Peoplevs.Baharan
A:HetoldmethatAbuSolaimaninstructedmetogetthe
TNTsothathecoulddetonateabomb
Q:Werethere any otherperson, besidesAbu Solaiman,
whocalledyouup,withrespecttothetakingofthe
explosivesfromyou?
A:Thereis,sirAbuZaky,sir,calledupalso.
Q:WhatdidAbuZakytellyouwhenhecalledyouup?
A:Hetoldmethatthisisyourfirstmission.
Q:Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that
missionyouarereferringto?
A:Thatisthefirstmissionwherewecanshowouranger
towardstheChristians.
Q:The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr.
witness,doyouknowifthebombexplode?
A: I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos
takenbyAngeloTrinidadfrommeuntilafterIwas
caught, because I was told by the policeman that
interviewedmeafterIwasarrestedthatthe2kilos
wereplantedinabus,whichalsodidnotexplode.
Q:Sobesidesthesetwoincidents,werethereanyother
incidents that Angelo Trinidad and Tapay get an
explosiveforyou,Mr.witness?
A:IfIamnotmistaken,sir,onFebruary13,2005at6:30
p.m.
Q:WhogotfromyoutheexplosiveMr.witness?
A:ItsAngeloTrinidadandTapay,sir.
173
Q:How many explosives did they get from you, Mr.
witness,atthattime?
A:Theygot2kilosTNTbomb,sir.
Q:Didtheytellyou,Mr.witness,wherearetheygoingto
usethatexplosive?
A:No,sir.174
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Baharan
Q:Doyouknow,Mr.witness,whathappenedtothethird
batch of explosives, which were taken from you by
TrinidadandTapay?
A:ThatisthebombthatexplodedinMakati,sir.
Q:Whydidyouknow,Mr.witness?
A:BecauseIwascalledintheeveningofFebruary14by
Abu Solaiman. He told me not to leave the house
becausetheexplosivethatweretakenbyTapayand
AngeloTrinidadexploded.
Q:Was there any other call during that time, Mr.
Witness?
A:IwastoldbyAngeloTrinidadnottoleavethehouse
becausetheexplosivethathetookexplodedalready,
sir.
Q: Howsurewereyou,Mr. witness,atthattime,that
indeed,thebombexplodedatMakati,besidethecall
ofAbuSolaimanandTrinidad?
A:It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in
MakatishouldcoincidewiththebombinginGeneral
Santos.
A:He told it to me, sir I cannot remember the date
anymore, but I know it was sometime in February
2005.
Q:Anyothercall,Mr. witness,fromAbuSolaimanand
TrinidadafterthebombingexplodedinMakati,any
othercall?
A:Thereis,sirThecallcamefromAbuZaky.
Q:WhatdidAbuZakytellyou,Mr.witness?
A:Hejustgreeteduscongratulations,becausewehavea
successfulmission.
A:Hetoldmethatsawakas,nagsuccessdinyungtinuro
kosayo.
175
VOL.639,JANUARY10,2011
Peoplevs.Baharan
Q:By theway, Mr. witness, I would justliketoclarify
this. You stated that Abu Zaky called you up the
following day, that was February 15, and
congratulatingyouforthesuccessofthemission.My
questiontoyou,Mr.witness,ifyouknowwhatisthe
relation of that mission, wherein you were
congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission, which
havebeenindoctrinatedtoyou,whileyouwereinMt.
Cararao,Mr.witness?
A:Theyareconnected,sir.
Q:Connectedinwhatsense,Mr.witness?
A:Becausewhenwewereundergoingtraining,wewere
toldthattheAbuSayyafshouldnotwagewartothe
forest,butalsowageourbattlesinthecity.
Q:Wagethebattleagainstwho,Mr.witness?
A:Thegovernment,sir.17
WhatcanbeculledfromthetestimonyofAsaliisthattheAbu
SayyafGroupwasdeterminedtosowterrorinMetroManila,so
that they could show their anger towards the Christians. 18It
canalsobeseenthatRohmat,togetherwithJanjalaniandAbu
Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentines Day bombing
incident,monthsbeforeithappened.RohmathadtrainedAsali
andTrinidadtomakebombsandexplosives.Whileintraining,
Asaliandothersweretoldthattheirmissionwastoplantbombs
inmalls,theLRT,andotherpartsofMetroManila.Accordingto
Asali,Rohmatcalledhimon29December2004toconfirmthat
Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were
about to commence their first mission. 19They made two
separateattemptstobombabusinMetroManila,buttonoavail.
The day before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad got
anothertwokilosofTNTfromAsali.OnValentinesDay,theAbu
175 Sayyaf Group announced that they had a gift for the former
President,GloriaMacapagalArroyo.Ontheirthirdtry,theirplan
finally
_______________
17Id.,atpp.2451.
18Id.,atp.36.
19Id.,atpp.2451.
176
176 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Baharan
succeeded.Rightafterthebombexploded,theAbuSayyafGroup
declaredthattherewouldbemorebombingsinthefuture.Asali
thenreceivedacallfromRohmat,praisingtheformer:Sawakas
nagsuccessdinyungtinurokosayo.20
Inthelightoftheforegoingevidence,theCourtupholdsthe
findingofguiltagainstRohmat.Article17oftheRevisedPenal
Codereads:
Art. 17.Principals.The following are considered
principals:
1.Thosewhotakeadirectpartintheexecutionoftheact
2.Thosewhodirectlyforceorinduceotherstocommitit
3.Thosewhocooperateinthecommissionoftheoffenseby
another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second
paragraph, or the provision on principal by inducement. The
instructions and training he had given Asali on how to make
bombscoupled with their careful planning and persistent
attemptstobombdifferentareasinMetroManilaandRohmats
confirmationthatTrinidadwouldbegettingTNTfromAsalias
part of their missionprove the finding that Rohmats co
inducementwasthedeterminingcauseofthecommissionofthe
crime.21Such command or advice [was] of such nature that,
withoutit,thecrimewouldnothavematerialized.22
Further,theinducementwassoinfluentialinproducingthe
criminal act that without it, the act would not have been
performed.23InPeoplev.Sanchez,etal.,theCourtruledthat,
_______________
20Id.,atp.49.
21SeegenerallyU.S.v.Indanan,24Phil.203(1913);People
v.KiichiOmine,61Phil.609(1935).
22People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 74048, 14 November 1990, 191
SCRA377,385.
23Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code: Criminal Law
BookOne,529(2008).
177
VOL.639,JANUARY10,2011 177
Peoplevs.Baharan
notwithstandingthefactthatMayorSanchezwasnotatthe
crimescene,evidenceprovedthathewasthemastermindofthe
criminalactortheprincipalbyinducement.Thus,becauseMayor
Sanchezwasacoprincipalandcoconspirator,andbecausethe
actofoneconspiratoristheactofall,themayorwasrendered
liable for all the resulting crimes. 24The same finding must be
appliedtothecaseatbar.
The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of
conspiracy involving accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat.
Conspiracywasclearlyestablishedfromthecollectiveactsofthe
accusedappellantsbefore,duringandafterthecommissionofthe
crime. As correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus
Decision:
Asalis clear and categorical testimony, which remains
unrebutted on its major points, coupled with the judicial
admissionsfreelyandvoluntarilygivenbythetwootheraccused,
are sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy hatched
betweenandamongthefouraccused,allmembersoftheterrorist
groupAbuSayyaf,towreakchaosandmayheminthemetropolis
by indiscriminately killing and injuring civilian victims by
utilizingbombsandothersimilardestructiveexplosivedevices.
 Whilesaidconspiracyinvolvingthefourmalefactorshasnot
been expressly admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad,
and Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latters
participationinthecommissionofthecrimes,nonethelessithas
beenestablishedbyvirtueoftheaforementionedevidence,which
established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the
indispensableparticipationofaccusedRohmatinseeingtoitthat
theconspiratorscriminaldesignwouldberealized.
Itiswellestablishedthatconspiracymaybeinferredfromthe
acts of the accused, which clearly manifests a concurrence of
wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime (People v.
Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the accused
collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a
commondesigntowardsthe
_______________
24Peoplev.Sanchez,etal.,G.R.No.131116,27August1999,
313SCRA254.
178
178 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Baharan
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is
evidentandalltheperpetratorswillbeheldliableasprincipals
(Peoplev.Ellado,353SCRA643).25
InPeoplev.Geronimo,theCourtpronouncedthatitwouldbe
justifiedinconcludingthatthedefendantsthereinwereengaged
inaconspiracywhenthedefendantsbytheiractsaimedatthe
sameobject,oneperformingonepartandtheotherperforming
anotherpartsoastocompleteit,withaviewtotheattainmentof
thesameobject;andtheiracts,thoughapparentlyindependent,
were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of
personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.26
Accusedcontend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible
pursuanttoSec.30,Rule130oftheRulesofCourt.Itistruethat
undertherule,statementsmadebyaconspiratoragainstaco
conspiratorareadmissibleonlywhenmadeduringtheexistence
of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled inPeople v.
Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his
extrajudicialconfessionbecomesajudicialadmission,makingthe
testimonyadmissibleastobothconspirators. 27Thus,inPeoplev.
Palijon,theCourtheldthefollowing:
[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and
judicialconfessions.Anextrajudicialconfessionmaybegivenin
evidenceagainsttheconfessantbutnotagainsthiscoaccusedas
they are deprived of the opportunity to crossexamine him. A
judicial confession is admissible against the declarants co
accusedsincethelatterareaffordedopportunitytocrossexamine
the former.Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
appliesonlytoextrajudicial
_______________
25OmnibusDecisionoftheTrialCourtat6,CARolloatp.
123.
26Peoplev.Geronimo,G.R.No.L35700,15October1973,53
SCRA 246, 254, citingPeople v. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64, 66
(1922);Peoplev.Carbonell,48Phil.868(1926).
27People v. Buntag, G.R. No. 123070, 14 April 2004, 427
SCRA180;seealsoPeoplev.Palijon,343SCRA486(2000).
179
VOL.639,JANUARY10,2011 179
Peoplevs.Baharan
actsoradmissionsandnottotestimonyattrialwherethe
party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross
examinethedeclarant.Mercenesadmissionimplicatinghisco
accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in
evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several
accusedaretriedtogetherforthesameoffense,thetestimonyofa
coaccused implicating his coaccused is competent evidence
againstthelatter.28
WHEREFORE,thePetitionisDENIED.TheDecisionofthe
RegionalTrialCourtofMakati,asaffirmedwithmodificationby
theCourtofAppeals,isherebyAFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.
CarpioMorales (Chairperson), Brion, Bersaminand
Villarama,Jr.,JJ.,concur.
Appealdenied.
Notes.Itbearstonotethatasearchinginquirymustfocus G.R.No.152375.December13,2011.*
onthevoluntarinessofthepleaandthefullcomprehensionofthe REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
consequences of the plea. (People vs. Aranzado, 365 SCRA 649 petitioner,vs.SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE
[2001]) L.AFRICA(substitutedbyhisheirs),MANUELH.NIETO,JR.,
Theprocedureismandatoryandajudgewhofailstoobserveit FERDINANDE.MARCOS(substitutedbyhisheirs),IMELDAR.
MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE
commitsgraveabuseofdiscretion.(Peoplevs.Chua,366SCRA
ENRILE, and POTENCIANO ILUSORIO (substituted by his
283[2001])
heirs),respondents.
o0o
_______________ Remedial Law; Distinction between a Final Judgment or
Order and an Interlocutory Order.Case law has conveniently
28Peoplev.Palijon,G.R.No.123545,18October2000,343 demarcated the line between afinal judgment or orderand an
SCRA 486, citingPeople v. Flores, 195 SCRA 295, 308 interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made. A
judgmentororderisconsideredfinaliftheorderdisposesofthe
(1991);Peoplev.Ponce,197SCRA746,755(1991).
actionorproceedingcompletely,orterminatesaparticularstage
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an
reserved. aggrievedpartyisappeal.If
_______________
 pleading,practice,andprocedureinallcourts,theadmission
tothepracticeoflaw,theIntegratedBar,andlegalassistanceto
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensiveprocedureforthespeedydispositionofcases,shallbe
uniformforallcourtsofthesamegrade,andshallnotdiminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of Procedure of
special courts and quasijudicial bodies shall remain effective
unlessdisapprovedbytheSupremeCourt.
*ENBANC.
153
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
theorderorresolution,however,merelyresolvesincidental
matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the
meritsofthecase,theorderisinterlocutoryandtheaggrieved
partys remedy is a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65.
Jurisprudencepointedlyholdsthat:Asdistinguishedfromafinal
order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminatesaparticularproceedingoraction,leavingnothingelse
tobedonebuttoenforcebyexecutionwhathasbeendetermined
by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.
The term final judgment or order signifies a judgment or an
orderwhichdisposesofthecaseastoalltheparties,reservingno
furtherquestionsordirectionsforfuturedetermination.Onthe
otherhand,acourtorderismerelyinterlocutoryincharacterifit
leavessubstantialproceedingsyettobehadinconnectionwith
the controversy. It does not end the task of the court in
adjudicatingthepartiescontentionsanddeterminingtheirrights
and liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is
basicallyprovisionalinitsapplication.
Same; An interlocutoryorder remainsunderthe controlof
the court until the case is finally resolved on the merits.We
clarify,too,thataninterlocutoryorderremainsunderthecontrol
ofthecourtuntilthecaseisfinallyresolvedonthemerits.The
courtmaythereforemodifyorrescindtheorderuponsufficient
groundsshownatanytimebeforefinaljudgment.Inthislight,
the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolutionwhich merely denied the
adoptionoftheBanedepositionaspartoftheevidenceinCivil
CaseNo.0009couldnothaveattainedfinality(inthemanner
that a decision or final order resolving the case on the merits
15 does) despite the petitioners failure to move for its
reconsiderationortoappeal.
Same; The proscription against a second motion for
reconsideration is directed against a judgment or final order;
Althoughasecondmotionforreconsiderationofaninterlocutory
ordercanbedeniedonthegroundthatitisamererehashofthe
arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it
cannotberejectedonthegroundthatitisforbiddenbythelawor
by the rules as a prohibited motion.We also agree with the
petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a
proscribed third (actually second) motion for reconsideration of
theSandiganbayans1998resolution.AsSection5,Rule37ofthe
RulesofCourtclearlyprovides,theproscriptionagainstasecond
motion for reconsideration is directed against a judgment
orfinalorder. Although a second motion for reconsideration of
aninterlocutoryordercanbedeniedonthegroundthatitisa
mererehashofthearguments
154
1 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
54
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
 alreadypasseduponandresolvedbythecourt,itcannotbe
rejectedonthegroundthatitisforbiddenbythelaworbythe
rulesasaprohibitedmotion.
Same; Certiorari; WhileSection 1,Rule 41of the Rulesof
Court prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order, the
aggrievedpartyisaffordedthechancetoquestionaninterlocutory
orderthroughaspecialcivilactionofcertiorariunderRule65.
Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved
party may appeal from a judgment or final order which
completelydisposesofacaseorfromanorderthattheRulesof
Courtdeclarestobeappealable.Whilethisprovisionprohibitsan
appeal from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is
affordedthechancetoquestionaninterlocutoryorderthrougha
specialcivilactionofcertiorariunderRule65;thepetitionmust
befiledwithinsixtydaysfromnoticeoftheassailedjudgment,
order,resolution,ordenialofamotionforreconsideration.
Same;Same;Forapetitionforcertioraritoprosper,Section
1,Rule65oftheRulesofCourtrequiresamongothersthatneither
an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved party;
Exception.Whilethe1998resolutionisaninterlocutoryorder,
ascorrectlyarguedbythepetitionerandimpliedlyconcededby
therespondents,theclaimthatthe1998resolutionshouldhave
beenimmediatelyquestionedbythepetitioneroncertiorariisnot
totallycorrectasapetitionforcertiorariisnotgroundedsolelyon
the issuance of a disputed interlocutory ruling. For a petition
forcertioraritoprosper,Section1,Rule65oftheRulesofCourt
requires, among others, that neither an appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequateremedyin the ordinary course of law is
available to the aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the
writofcertiorarimay issuenotwithstanding theexistenceofan
available alternative remedy, if such remedy is inadequate or
insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious
effectsoftheordercomplainedof.
Same; Same; Without clear showing that its action was a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its
exercise of jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayans erroneous legal
conclusionwasonlyanerrorofjudgmentoratbestanabuseof
discretionbutnotagraveone.Inlightoftheabovediscussions
and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedlyerred on a
question of lawin its ruling, but this legal error did not
necessarilyamounttoagraveabuseofdiscretionintheabsence
ofaclearshowingthatitsactionwasacapriciousandwhimsical
exerciseofjudgmentaffectingitsexerciseofjurisdiction.Without
thisshowing,theSandiganbayanserroneouslegalconclu
155
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 15
5
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
sionwasonlyanerrorofjudgment,or,atbest,anabuse
of discretionbut not a grave one.For this reason alone, the
petitionshouldbedismissed.
Same;Evidence;UnderSection5,Rule30,afterapartyhas
adduced his direct evidence in the course of discharging the
burdenofproof,heisconsideredtohaverestedhiscase,andis
thereafterallowedtoofferrebuttingevidenceonly.Althoughthe
word rested nowhere appearsin the Rules of Court, ordinary
courtprocedurehasinferreditfromanoverviewoftrialsequence
under Section 5, Rule 30 (which capsulizes the order of
presentationofapartysevidenceduringtrial),readinrelationto
Rule18onPreTrial,bothoftheRulesofCourt.UnderSection5,
Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct evidence in the
courseofdischargingtheburdenofproof,heisconsideredtohave
rested his case, and is thereafter allowed to offer rebutting
evidence only. Whether a party has rested his case in some
measuredependsonhismanifestationincourtonwhetherhehas
concludedhispresentationofevidence.
Same;Same;TheRulesofCourtdoesnotprohibitaparty
fromrequestingthecourttoallowittopresentadditionalevidence
evenafterithasresteditscase.Ontheotherend,though,there
wasnothingintrinsicallyobjectionableinthepetitionersmotion
to reopen its case before the court ruled on its formal offer of
evidence. The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from
requesting the court to allow it to present additional evidence
evenafterithasresteditscase.Anysuchopportunity,however,
fortheultimatepurposeoftheadmissionofadditionalevidenceis
alreadyaddressedtothesounddiscretionofthecourt.Itisfrom
the prism of the exercise of this discretion that the
Sandiganbayans refusal to reopen the case (for the purpose of
introducing, marking and offering additional evidence) should
beviewed.WecandeclarethisSandiganbayanactioninvalidifit
hadactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Same;Same;UnderSection5Rule30,apartywhohasthe
burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all the
evidence he relies upon and such evidence cannot be given
piecemeal.Underthisrule,apartywhohastheburdenofproof
must introduce, at the first instance, all the evidence he relies
uponandsuchevidencecannotbegivenpiecemeal.Theobvious
rationaleoftherequirementistoavoidinjurioussurprisestothe
other party and the consequent delay in the administration of
justice.
Same; Where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose
necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of
evidencefromonepartytotheotherorwheretheevidencesought
tobepresentedisinthenatureofnewly
156
1 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
56
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
discovered evidence, the partys right to introduce further
evidence must be recognized.A partys declaration of the
completionofthepresentationofhisevidencepreventshimfrom
introducing further evidence; but where the evidence
isrebuttalincharacter,whosenecessity,forinstance,arosefrom
theshiftingoftheburdenofevidencefromonepartytotheother;
or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature
ofnewly discoveredevidence, the partys right to introduce
further evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved
partymayavailoftheremedyofcertiorari.
Same; Civil Procedure; Consolidation of Cases;
Consolidationisaproceduraldevicegrantedtothecourtasan
aidindecidinghowcasesinitsdocketaretobetriedsothatthe
businessofthe courtmay bedispatchedexpeditiouslyandwith
economywhileprovidingjusticetotheparties.Consolidationisa
proceduraldevicegrantedtothecourtasanaidindeciding
howcasesinitsdocketaretobetriedsothatthebusinessof
the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with economy
whileprovidingjusticetotheparties.Topromotethisend,the
rulepermitstheconsolidationandasingletrialofseveralcases
inthecourtsdocket,ortheconsolidationofissueswithinthose
cases.
Same;Same;Deposition;Beforeapartycanmakeuseofthe
depositiontakenatthetrialofapendingaction,Section4,Rule
23oftheRulesofCourtdoesnotonlyrequiredueobservanceofits
subparagraphs (a) to (d), it also requires as a condition for
admissibility,compliancewiththerulesonevidence.Beforea
party can makeuseof the deposition taken at the trial of a
pendingaction,Section4,Rule23oftheRulesofCourtdoesnot
only require due observance of its subparagraphs (a) to (d); it
also requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with
therulesonevidence.Thus,evenSection4,Rule23oftheRules
ofCourtmakesanimpliedreferencetoSection47,Rule130ofthe
RulesofCourtbeforethedepositionmaybeusedinevidence.By
readingRule23inisolation,thepetitionerfailedtorecognizethat
theprincipleconcedingadmissibilitytoadepositionunderRule
23shouldbeconsistentwiththerulesonevidenceunderSection
47, Rule 130. In determining the admissibility of the Bane
deposition,therefore,reliancecannotbegivenononeprovisionto
the exclusion of the other;both provisions must be
considered. This is particularly true in this case where the
evidence in the prior proceeding does not simply refer to a
witnesstestimonyinopencourtbuttoadepositiontakenunder
anotherandfartherjurisdiction.
Same;Same;Same;Depositionsarenotmeantassubstitute
fortheactualtestimonyinopencourtofapartyorwitness.A
depositionischieflya
157
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
modeofdiscoverywhoseprimaryfunctionistosupplement
the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of
dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual
basis during the preparation for trial. Since depositions are
principallymadeavailabletothepartiesasameansofinforming
themselvesofalltherelevantfacts,depositionsarenotmeant
assubstitutefortheactualtestimonyinopencourtofa
partyorwitness.Generally,thedeponentmustbepresentedfor
oralexaminationinopencourtatthetrialorhearing.Thisisa
requirementoftherulesonevidenceunderSection1,Rule132of
theRulesofCourt.
Same;Same;Same;Undercertainconditionsandforcertain
limitedpurposeslaiddowninSection4,Rule23oftheRulesof
Court, the deposition may be used without the deponent being
actually called to the witness stand.That opportunity for
crossexamination was afforded during thetakingof the
deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for
crossexamination must normally be accorded apartyat
the time that the testimonial evidence is
actuallypresentedagainsthimduringthetrialorhearing
of a case.However, under certain conditions and for
certainlimitedpurposeslaiddowninSection4,Rule23ofthe
RulesofCourt,thedepositionmaybeusedwithoutthedeponent
beingactuallycalledtothewitnessstand.
Same;Same;Same;Section47,Rule130explicitlyrequires
interalia,fortheadmissibilityofaformertestimonyordeposition
that the adverse party must have had an opportunity to cross
examine the witness or the deponent in the prior proceeding.
15
Section 47, Rule130oftheRulesofCourt isan entirely
different provision.While aformer testimony or
depositionappearsundertheExceptionstotheHearsayRule,the
classification offormer testimony or depositionas an admissible
hearsayisnotuniversallyconceded.Afundamentalcharacteristic
ofhearsayevidenceistheadversepartyslackofopportunityto
crossexamine the outofcourt declarant. However, Section 47,
Rule 130 explicitly requires,inter alia, for the admissibility of
aformertestimonyordepositionthattheadversepartymusthave
hadanopportunitytocrossexaminethewitnessorthedeponent
inthepriorproceeding.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites for the admission of a
testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding.
Section47,Rule130oftheRulesofCourtlaysdownthefollowing
requisitesfortheadmissionofatestimonyordepositiongivenata
former case or proceeding. 1. The testimony or deposition of a
witnessdeceasedorotherwiseunabletotestify;2.Thetestimony
was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative;3.Involv
158
1 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
58
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
ingthesameparties;4.Relatingtothesamematter;5.The
adversepartyhavinghadtheopportunitytocrossexaminehim.
Same;Same;Same;Thephraseunabletotestifyappearing
inbothRule23andRule130oftheRulesofCourtreferstoa
physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a
testimony; Where the deposition is taken not for discovery
purposes,buttoaccommodatethedeponent,thenthedeposition
should be rejected in evidence.The phrase unable to testify
appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules ofCourt
referstoaphysicalinabilitytoappearatthewitnessstandandto
give a testimony. Hence notwithstanding the deletion of the
phrase out of the Philippines, which previously appeared in
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,absence from
jurisdictionthe petitioners excuse for the nonpresentation of
Baneinopencourtmaystillconstituteinabilitytotestifyunder
the same rule. This is not to say, however, that resort to
deposition on this instance of unavailability will always be
upheld.Where the deposition is taken not for discovery
purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then the
depositionshouldberejectedinevidence.
Same;Same;Same;Thewitnesshimself,ifavailable,must
be produced in court as if he were testifying de novo since his
testimonygivenattheformertrialismerehearsay.Althoughthe
testimonyofawitnesshasbeengiveninthecourseofaformer
proceedingbetweenthepartiestoacaseontrial,thistestimony
aloneisnotagroundforitsadmissioninevidence.Thewitness
himself, if available, must be produced in court as if he were
testifyingdenovosincehistestimonygivenattheformertrialis
merehearsay.Thedepositionofawitness,otherwiseavailable,is
alsoinadmissibleforthesamereason.
Same;Witnesses;CrossExamination;Thefunctionofcross
examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a
witness made on direct examination; this right is available of
course,atthetakingofdeposition,aswellasontheexamination
ofwitnessesatthetrial.Thefunctionofcrossexaminationisto
test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness made on
direct examination. The opportunity of crossexamination has
been regarded as an essential safeguard of the accuracy and
completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the right of cross
examinationisabsolute,andisnotamereprivilegeoftheparty
againstwhomawitnessmaybecalled.Thisrightisavailable,of
course,atthetakingofdepositions,aswellasontheexamination
ofwitnessesatthetrial.Theprincipaljustificationforthegeneral
exclusion of hearsay statements and for the admission, as an
exceptiontothe
 159
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
hearsay rule, of reported testimony taken at a former
hearing where the present adversary was afforded the
opportunity to crossexamine, is basedon the premise that the
opportunity of crossexamination is an essential safeguard
againstfalsehoodsandfrauds.
Same;Evidence;JudicialNotice;Inadjudicatingacaseon
trial, courts are not authorized to take a judicial notice of the
contentsoftherecordsofothercases,evenwhensuchcaseshave
beentriedorarependinginthesamecourtandnotwithstanding
thatbothcasesmayhavebeentriedorareactuallypendingbefore
thesamejudge;Ruleadmitsofexceptions.Inadjudicatingacase
on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when
suchcaseshavebeentriedorarependinginthesamecourt,and
notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are
actuallypendingbeforethesamejudge.Thisrulethoughadmits
of exceptions. As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a
courtmayproperlytreatalloranypartoftheoriginalrecordofa
casefiledinitsarchivesasreadintotherecordofacasepending
before it, when,with the knowledge of,andabsent an
objectionfrom,theadverseparty,referenceismadetoit
forthatpurpose,bynameandnumberorinsomeothermanner
bywhichitissufficientlydesignated;orwhentheoriginalrecord
oftheformercaseoranypartofit,isactuallywithdrawnfrom
thearchivesatthecourtsdirection,attherequestorwiththe
consentoftheparties,andadmittedasapartoftherecordof
thecasethenpending.Courtsmustalsotakejudicialnoticeof
therecordsofanothercaseorcases,wheresufficientbasisexists
15 intherecordsofthecasebeforeit,warrantingthedismissalof
thelattercase.
CARPIO,J.,DissentingOpinion:
Civil Procedure; Consolidation of Cases; In Philippine
jurisprudence, the consolidation of cases merges the different
actionsintooneandtherightsofthepartiesareadjudicatedina
single judgment.In Philippine jurisprudence,the
consolidationofcasesmergesthedifferentactionsintoone
and the rights ofthe parties areadjudicated in a single
judgment,thus:Theeffectofconsolidationofactionsisto
uniteandmergeallofthedifferentactionsconsolidated
intoasingleaction,inthesamemannerasifthedifferent
causesofactioninvolvedhadoriginallybeenjoinedina
singleaction,andtheorderofconsolidation,ifmadebyacourt
ofcompetentjurisdiction,isbindinguponallthepartiestothe
different actions until it is vacated or set aside.After the
consolidationtherecanbenofurtherproceedingsinthe
separateactions,whicharebyvir
160
1 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
60
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
tueoftheconsolidationdiscontinuedandsuperseded
by a single action, which should be entitled in such
manner as the court may direct, and all subsequent
proceedings therein be conducted and the rights of the
partiesadjudicatedinasingleaction.
Same;Same;Same;Unlikeamereorderofajointhearingor
trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions, the
consolidation of actions merges the different actions into one
singleaction;thismeansthatevidencesuchasdepositionstaken
after the consolidation is admissible in all the actions
consolidatedwheneverrelevantormaterial.The12April1993
ResolutionoftheSandiganbayanorderedtheconsolidationofthe
incidental cases, including Civil Case No. 0130, with the main
case, Civil Case No. 0009.Unlike a mere order of a joint
hearingortrialofanyorallthematters inissueinthe
actions,theconsolidationofactionsmergesthedifferent
actionsintoonesingleaction.Thismeansthatevidence,such
asdepositions,takenaftertheconsolidationisadmissibleinall
the actions consolidated whenever relevant or material. In this
case, since the notice and the depositiontaking was after the
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130 with the main case, Civil
CaseNo.0009,thedepositioncouldbeadmittedasevidencein
theconsolidatedcases.
SPECIALCIVILACTIONintheSupremeCourt.Certiorari.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforpetitioner.
YolandaQ.JavellanaforsubstitutedheirsofJ.L.Africa.
AgcaoiliLawOfficesforP.Ilusorio.
RobertA.C.SisonandVicenteMilloraforImeldaR.Marcos.
M.M.LazaroandAssociatesforrespondentNieto,Jr.
EdgarDennisPadernalforJuanPonceEnrile.
Marcos, Ochoa, Serapio andTan Law Firmfor Ferdinand
Marcos,Jr.
161
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
BRION,J.:
Beforeusisthepetitionforcertiorari1filedbytheRepublicof
the Philippines (petitioner) to set aside the February 7, 2002
resolution (2002 resolution)2of the Sandiganbayan3denying the
petitionersMotiontoAdmitSupplementalOfferofEvidence(Re:
DepositionofMauriceV.Bane)(3rdmotion).
TheAntecedents
OnJuly22,1987,thepetitionerRepublicofthePhilippines,
through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG),fileda complaint(docketed asCivil Case No.0009)
against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E.
Marcos,ImeldaR.Marcos,FerdinandR.Marcos,Jr.,JuanPonce
Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively,therespondents)
forreconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution,
anddamagesbefore the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner
alleged,interalia,thattherespondentsillegallymanipulatedthe
purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless
LimitedinEasternTelecommunicationsPhilippines,Inc.(ETPI),
whichshareholdingsrespondentsJoseAfricaandManuelNieto,
Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the
corporations they organized, beneficially for respondents
FerdinandE.MarcosandImeldaR.Marcos. 4
CivilCaseNo.0009 isthemain casesubject ofthe present
petition.Victor Africa (Africa), son of the late Jose L.
Africa,wasnotimpleadedinandsoisplainlynotaparty
toCivilCaseNo.0009.5
161 _______________
1UnderRule65oftheRulesofCourt.
 2Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, and
concurredinbyAssociateJusticesNarcisoS.NarioandNicodemo
T.Ferrer;Rollo,pp.6067.
3FourthDivision.
4PetitionersMotiontoAdmitSupplementalOfferofEvidence
andComment/OppositionAdCautelam;Rollo,pp.370371.
5SeeRepublic v. Sandiganbayan, 334 Phil. 475; 266 SCRA
515(1997).
162
162 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental
cases,6among them, Civil Case No. 0130. 7The present
respondentswerenotmadepartieseitherinCivilCaseNo.
0130.
CivilCaseNo.0130
In the August 7, 1991 PCGGconducted ETPI stockholders
meeting,aPCGGcontrolledboardofdirectorswaselected.Later,
theregisteredETPIstockholdersconvenedaspecialstockholders
meetingwhereinanothersetofboardofdirectorswaselected.As
aresult,twosetsofETPIboardandofficerswereelected. 8
Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition
forcertiorari, with prayer for a temporary restraining
order/preliminaryinjunctionwiththeSandiganbayan(docketed
asCivilCaseNo.0130),seekingtonullifytheAugust5,1991
andAugust9,1991OrdersofthePCGG.TheseOrdersdirected
Africa:
[T]oaccountforhissequesteredsharesinETPIandtocease
anddesistfromexercisingvotingrightsonthesequesteredshares
in the special stockholders meeting to be held on August 12,
1991,fromrepresentinghimselfasadirector,officer,employeeor
agentofETPI,andfromparticipating,directlyorindirectly[,]in
themanagementofETPI.9
DuringthependencyofAfricaspetition,CivilCaseNo.0130,
AfricafiledamotionwiththeSandiganbayan,allegingthatsince
January29,1988thePCGGhadbeenillegallyexercisingthe
rightsofstockholdersofETPI,10especiallyintheelectionofthe
membersoftheboardofdirectors.Africaprayedfortheissuance
of an order for the calling and holding of [ETPI] annual
stockholdersmeetingfor
_______________
6PetitionersReply;id.,atpp.744745.
7EntitledVictorAfricav.PresidentialCommissiononGood
Government.
8 SeeRepublicofthePhils.v.Sandiganbayan,450Phil.98,
104;402SCRA84,86(2003).
9Id.,atp.103;p.85.
10Id.,atp.104;p.86.
163
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 163
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
1992underthe[c]ourtscontrolandsupervisionandprescribed
guidelines.11
In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan
favoredAfricasmotioninthiswise:
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholders
meetingofthe[ETPI],for1992beheldonFriday,November27,
1992,at2:00oclockintheafternoon,attheETPIBoardRoom,
Telecoms Plaza, 7th Floor, 316 Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati,
MetroManila.xxxThestockholdersmeetingshallbeconducted
under the supervision and control of this Court, through Mr.
JusticeSabinoR.deLeon,Jr.[O]nlytheregisteredowners,their
dulyauthorized representatives ortheir proxiesmay vote their
correspondingshares.
Thefollowingminimumsafeguardsmustbesetinplaceand
carefullymaintaineduntilfinaljudicialresolutionofthequestion
ofwhetherornotthesequesteredsharesofstock(orinaproper
case the underlying assets of the corporation concerned)
constituteillgottenwealth[.]12
The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Courtviaa
petition forcertioraridocketed asG.R. No. 10778913(PCGGs
petition), imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
Sandiganbayan for holding,inter alia, that the registered
stockholdersofETPIhadtherighttovote.14InourNovember26,
1992 Resolution, we enjoined the Sandiganbayan from
implementingitsassailedresolution.
In the meantime, in anApril 12, 1993 resolution,the
Sandiganbayan ordered theconsolidation of Civil Case No.
0130,amongothers,withCivilCaseNo.0009,withthelatter
asthemaincaseandtheformermerelyanincident.15
_______________
11Id.,atp.103;p.86.
12Id.,atpp.104105;pp.8687.
13ResolvedbythisCourtonApril30,2003.
14RepublicofthePhils.v.Sandiganbayan,supranote8.
15Rollo,p. 304. The other incident cases which were
consolidatedwiththemaincaseareasfollows:
1.CivilCaseNo.0043(PolygonInvestorsandManagers,Inc.
v. PCGG)a complaint praying that judgment be rendered
enjoiningthe
164
164 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
DuringthependencyofPCGGspetition(G.R.No.107789),the
PCGGfiledwiththisCourtaVeryUrgentPetitionforAuthority
toHoldSpecialStockholdersMeetingfor[the] SolePurpose of
Increas
_______________
PCGG, its commissioners, officers, employees, agents and/or
representatives from enforcing and/or implementing a writ of
sequestration.
2.Civil Case No. 0044 (Aerocom Investors and Managers,
Inc. v. PCGG)a complaint praying that the Writ of
SequestrationdatedJune15,1988andMissionOrderNo.MER
8820datedAugust1,1988bedeclarednullandvoidabinitio.
3.Civil Case No. 0045 (Africa v. PCGG)an amended
complaint praying that judgment be rendered restraining (a)
defendantEduardoM.Villanuevafromrepresentinghimselfand
acting as Director, President and/or General Manager of ETPI
and committing or continuing to exercise the power, authority
and functions appertaining to such office; and (b) defendant
PCGG from directly or indirectly interfering with the
managementofETPI.
4.Civil Case No. 0047 (Africa v. Gutierrez, et al.)a
complaint praying that defendants be enjoined from acting as
directorsofETPI.
5.CivilCaseNo.0131(TradersRoyalBankv.PCGG,Africa,
et al.)complaint praying that defendants be ordered to
interpleadandlitigatetheirconflictingclaims.
6.CivilCaseNo.0139(FarEastBankandTrustCompanyv.
PCGG, Africa, et al.)a complaint praying that defendants be
directedtointerpleadandlitigatetheirrespectiveclaimsonthe
proceeds of the deposit accounts maintained with plaintiff and
thatjudgmentbeaccordinglyrendered.
 7.CivilCaseNo.0143(StandardCharteredBankv.PCGG,
Africa, Nieto, et al.)a complaint praying that judgment be
rendered requiring all the defendants to interplead among
themselves and litigate to determine who are the legitimate
signatoriesofOWNIinitsaccountswiththeplaintiff.
8.Civil Case No. 0128 ( Traders Royal Bank v. PCGG)a
complaintprayingthatdefendantsbedirectedtointerpleadand
litigatetheirconflictingclaimsbetweenthem,andthatjudgment
berenderedaccordingly.
9.CivilCaseNo.0106(DomesticSatellitePhilippines,Inc.v.
PCGG and Asset Privatization Trust)a petition praying that
PCGG be ordered to withdraw its objection to the alleged
settlementagreeduponbetweenDOMSATandAPT.
165
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
ing[ETPIs]AuthorizedCapitalStock(UrgentPetition).Inour
May7,1996Resolution,wereferredthisUrgentPetitiontothe
Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence
andimmediateresolution.16TheSandiganbayanincludedthe
UrgentPetitioninCivilCaseNo.0130.17
In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the
testimonyofMr.MauriceV.Bane(formerdirectorandtreasurer
intrust of ETPI) was takenat the petitioners instance and
afterservingnoticeofthedepositiontakingontherespondents 18
on October 23 and 24, 1996 by way of deposition upon oral
examination(Banedeposition)before
_______________
10.CivilCaseNo.0114(PHILCOMSATandPOTCv.
PCGG)a complaint seeking to declare as null and void
thewritsofsequestrationissuedbyPCGGoverplaintiffs
corporationsandtoenjoinPCGGanditsofficers,agents,
andnomineesfrominterferingwiththemanagementand
operationsoftheplaintiffscorporations.(Records,Volume
III,pp.451452;841843.)
16ResolutiondatedDecember13,1996;id.,atp.300.
17Ibid.
18Petitioner sent to the respondents aNotice to Take Oral
Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Banedated August 30,
1996,pursuanttoSection1,Rule24oftheRevisedRulesof
Court (Records, Volume XXXVI, pp. 1153411535), which the
Sandiganbayan noted. Considering Victor Africas
manifestation, among others, that he was not available on the
previouslyscheduleddates,onSeptember25,1996,thepetitioner
filed and sent aSecond Amended Notice to Take Deposition of
165 Mr.MauriceV.BaneuponOralExamination(Rollo,pp.6871).
TheSecondAmendedNoticereads:
The right to take depositionde bene esseis a
precautionaryprivilegetoprevent[the]lossofevidencein
theeventtheattendanceofthewitnessatthetrialcannot
beprocured.Hence,Section1,Rule24oftheRevisedRules
of Court, specifically grants the plaintiffthe right to
depose Mr. Maurice Bane without leave of court.
xxx.
It should moreover be noted that Mr. Maurice Bane,
who resides in England, has resigned from Cable and
Wireless and is unable to travel to Manila to attend or
testify before this Honorable Court. Section 4, Rule 24,
allows Plaintiff to use Mr. Maurice V. Banes proposed
deposition in evidenceinsofar as the same may be
admissibleundertheRulesofEvidence.(underscoring
andboldfacingsupplied)
166
166 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in
London,England.
Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court),
purportedly allowing the petitioner to depose Banewithout
leaveofcourt,i.e.,asamatterofrightafterthedefendants
havefiledtheiranswer,thenoticestatedthat[t]hepurposeof
thedepositionisfor[Bane]toidentifyandtestifyonthefactsset
forthinhisaffidavit19xxxsoastoprovetheownershipissuein
favor of [the petitioner] and/or establish theprima faciefactual
foundationforsequestrationof[ETPIs]ClassAstockinsupport
of the [Urgent Petition].20The notice also states that the
petitioner shall use the Bane deposition in evidence in the
maincaseofCivilCaseNo.0009. 21Onthescheduleddeposition
date,onlyAfricawaspresentandhecrossexaminedBane.
On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the
UrgentPetitionbygrantingauthoritytothePCGG(i)tocause
theholdingofaspecialstockholdersmeetingofETPIforthesole
purposeofincreasingETPIsauthorizedcapitalstockand(ii)to
votethereinthesequesteredClassAsharesofstock. 22Thus,a
specialstockholdersmeetingwasheld,aspreviouslyscheduled,
onMarch17,1997andtheincreaseinETPIsauthorizedcapital
stock was unanimously approved.23From this ruling, Africa
wenttothisCourtviaapetitionforcertiorari24docketedasG.R.
No.147214(Africaspetition).
We jointly resolved the PCGGs and Africas petitions, and
ruled:
This Court notes that, like in Africas motion to hold a
stockholders meeting (to elect a board of directors), the
Sandiganbayan, in the PCGGs petition to hold a stockholders
meeting (to amend the articles of incorporation to increase the
authorizedcapitalstock),againfailedtoapplythetwotiered
_______________
19Rollo,pp.292297.
20Id., at pp. 6869. The records show that Maurice Bane
executedtheaforesaidaffidavitdatedJanuary1991inMakati,
MetroManila,Philippines.Records,VolumeIII,pp.683688.
21Id.,atp.69.
22Id.,atpp.299321.
23RepublicofthePhils.v.Sandiganbayan,supranote8,atp.
109.
24ResolvedbythisCourtonApril30,2003.
167
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 167
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
test.Onsuchdeterminationhingesthevalidityofthevotescast
bythePCGGinthestockholdersmeetingofMarch17,1997.This
lapse by the Sandiganbayan leaves this Court with no other
choice but to remand these questions to it for proper
determination.
xxxx
WHEREFORE,thisCourtResolvedtoREFERthepetitionsat
bartotheSandiganbayanforreceptionofevidencetodetermine
whether there is aprima facieevidence showing that the
sequestered shares in question are illgotten and there is an
imminentdangerofdissipationtoentitlethePCGGtovotethem
in astockholders meeting toelecttheETPI BoardofDirectors
and to amend the ETPI Articles of Incorporation for the sole
purposeofincreasingtheauthorizedcapitalstockofETPI.
The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within
sixty(60)daysfromreceiptofthisResolutionandinconformity
herewith.
CivilCaseNo.0009 a.CesarO.V.Parlade
AlthoughCivilCaseNo.0009wasfiledonJuly22,1987,it b.MauriceBane
wasonlyonNovember29,1996andMarch17,1997thatthefirst c.EvelynSingson
pretrialconferencewasscheduledandconcluded.25 d.LeonorioMartinez
InitsPreTrialBrief26datedAugust30,1996,thepetitioner e.RicardoCastro;and
offeredtopresentthefollowingwitnesses: f.RolandoGapud
WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF 2.[Thepetitioner]wishestoadoptin[CivilCaseNo.0009]
DESCRIPTIONOFTHEIRTESTIMONIES their testimonies and the documentary exhibits presented and
(1)MauriceV.BanerepresentativeofCableandWireless identified by them, since their testimonies and the said
Limited(C&W)atthetimeETPIwasorganized. documentaryexhibitsareveryrelevanttoprovethecaseofthe
xxxx [petitioner]in[CivilCaseNo.0009].
(2)Mr.ManuelH.Nietoxxx 3.Theadversepartiesintheaforementionedincidentshad
(3)Ms.EvelynSingsonxxx theopportunitytocrossexaminethem.
(4)Mr.SeverinoP.Buan,Jr.xxx TherespondentsfiledtheirrespectiveOppositionstothe1st
(5)Mr.ApolinarioK.Medinaxxx motion;29inturn,thepetitionerfiledaCommonReply 30tothese
_______________ Oppositions.
25Sandiganbayan Third Division PreTrial Order dated _______________
March17,1997,p.1;Rollo,p.576.PennedbyAssociateJustice 27Dated January 21, 1998;id., at pp. 322329. Originally,
Sabino R. de Leon, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices whatthepetitionerfiledwasaManifestationthatitwasadopting
CiprianoA.delRosarioandLeonardoI.Cruz. thetestimoniesofspecifiedwitnesses,amongothers.However,on
26Records,VolumeXXXVI,p.11405. January8,1998,theSandiganbayanrequiredthepetitionerto
168 file a corrected pleading in the form of a motion in lieu of the
168 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED Manifestation.(Records,VolumeXLIV,pp.128130,175).
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision) 28Civil Case Nos. 0048, 0050 and 0146 were ordered
(6)Mr.PotencianoA.Roquexxx consolidatedwithCivilCaseNo.0009bytheCourtinAfricav.
(7)CaesarParladexxx PCGG, G.R. Nos. 83831, 85594, 85597, and 85621, January 9,
IIa.MotiontoAdmittheBaneDeposition 1992,205SCRA38.
At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed 29Records,VolumeXLIV,pp.278282and497500;Volume
aMotion27(1stmotion),statingthat XLV,pp.36and2226.
1.Inthehearingsoftheincidentsof[CivilCaseNo.0009], 30DatedMarch13,1998;Rollo,pp.593597.
i.e., Civil Case Nos. 0048, 0050, 0130, 0146 28the following 169
witnesseswerepresentedtherein: VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 169
 Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan31promulgated a
resolution32(1998resolution)denyingthepetitioners1stmotion,
asfollows:
Wherefore,the[petitioners]Motionxxxis
1.partlydeniedinsofaras[thepetitioner]praysthereinto
adoptthetestimoniesonoraldepositionofMauriceV.Baneand
Rolando Gapudas part of its evidence in Civil Case No.
0009for the reason that said deponents according to the
[petitioner]arenotavailableforcrossexaminationinthis
Courtbythe[respondents].(emphasisadded)
2. partly Granted, in the interest of speedy disposition of
thislongpendingcase,insofarasplaintiffpraysthereintoadopt
certain/particular testimonies of Cesar O. Parlade, Evelyn
Singson,LeoncioMartinez,andRicardoCastroanddocumentary
exhibits which said witnesses have identified in incident Civil
CaseNos.xxx0130xxx,subjecttothefollowingconditions:
xxx
xxx
That the said witnesses be presented in this Court so that
they can be crossexamined on their particular testimonies in
incidentCivilCasesxxx[bytherespondents].
IIb.UrgentMotionand/orRequestforJudicialNotice
The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998
resolution,andinsteadmadeitsFormalOfferofEvidence
onDecember14,1999.33Significantly,theBanedeposition
wasnotincludedaspartofitsofferedexhibits.Rectifying
the omission, the petitioner filed anUrgent Motion and/or
Request for Judicial Notice34(2nd motion) dated February 21,
2000,withthealternativeprayerthat:
_______________
31FourthDivision.
32Penned by Associate Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr., and
concurredinbyAssociateJusticesNarcisoS.NarioandTeresita
J.LeonardodeCastro(nowaMemberofthisCourt);Rollo,pp.
331338.
33Id.,atp.18.
34Id.,atpp.339346.
170
170 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
1.An order forthwith be issuedreopeningthe plaintiffs
caseandsettingthesamefortrialanydayinApril2000forthe
solepurposeofintroducingadditionalevidenceandlimitedonly
to the marking and offering of the [Bane deposition] which
alreadyformspartoftherecordsandusedinCivilCaseNo.0130
xxx;
2.In the alternative, x x x the [Sandiganbayan] to take
judicialnoticeofthefactsestablishedbythe[Banedeposition],
togetherwiththemarkedexhibitsappendedthereto.[emphasis
ours]
On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
resolution35(2000resolution)denyingthepetitioners2ndmotion:
JudicialnoticeisfoundunderRule129whichistitledWhat
Need Not Be Proved. Apparently, this provision refers to the
Courtsdutytoconsideradmissionsmadebythepartiesinthe
pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in
resolvingcasesbeforeit.ThedutyoftheCourtismandatoryand
inthosecaseswhereitisdiscretionary,theinitiativeisuponthe
Court. Suchbeingthecase, theCourtfindstheUrgentMotion
and/orRequestforJudicialNoticeassomethingwhichneednot
beacteduponasthesameisconsideredredundant.
Onthematterofthe[Banedeposition],[its]admission
is done through the ordinary formal offer of exhibits
whereinthedefendantisgivenampleopportunitytoraise
objection on grounds provided by law.Definitely, it is not
underArticle(sic)129onjudicialnotice.[Emphasisours]
On November 6, 2000 and on several dates thereafter, the
respondents separately filed their respective demurrers to
evidence.36On the other hand, the petitioner moved for the
reconsiderationofthe2000resolution,butwasrebuffedbythe
SandiganbayaninitsApril3,2001resolution37(2001resolution).
_______________
35Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, and
concurredinbyAssociateJusticesNarcisoS.NarioandNicodemo
T.Ferrer;id.,atpp.352355.
36Id.,atpp.777778.
37Id.,atpp.357359.
171
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
IIc.Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of
Evidence(Re:DepositionofMauriceBane)
On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion,
seeking once more the admission of the Bane deposition. 38On
February 7, 2002 (pending resolution of the respondents
demurrers to evidence),39the Sandiganbayan promulgated
theassailed2002resolution,40denyingthepetitioners3rd
motion.TheSandiganbayanruled:
Butinthecourtsview,itisnotreallyaquestionofwhetheror
notplaintiffhasalreadyresteditscaseastoobviatethefurther
presentationofevidence.Itisnotevenaquestionofwhetherthe
nonappearingdefendantsaredeemedtohavewaivedtheirright
to crossexamine Bane as to qualify the admission of the
deposition sans such crossexamination. Indeed, We do not see
any need to dwell on these matters in view of this
CourtsResolutionrendered on April 1, 1998 which already
denied the introduction in evidence of Banes deposition
andwhichhasbecomefinalinviewofplaintiffsfailureto
file any motion for reconsideration or appeal within the
15dayreglementaryperiod.Rightlyorwrongly,theresolution
standsandforthiscourttograntplaintiffsmotionatthispoint
intimewouldineffectsanctionplaintiffsdisregardfortherules
ofprocedure.Plaintiffhassleptonitsrightsforalmosttwoyears
anditwasonlyinFebruaryof2000thatitsoughttorectifyits
ineptitudebyfilingamotiontoreopenitscaseastoenableitto
introduceandofferBanesdepositionasadditionalevidence,orin
the alternative for the court to take judicial notice of the
allegations of the deposition. But how can such a motion be
granted when it has been resolved as early as 1998 that the
deposition is inadmissible. Without plaintiff having moved for
171 reconsiderationwithinthereglementaryperiod,theresolution
has attainedfinalityand its effect cannot be undone by the
simpleexpedientoffilingamotion,whichthoughpurportingtobe
anovelmotion,isinrealityamotionforreconsiderationof
thiscourts1998ruling.[emphasesours]
_______________
38Id.,atpp.360368.
39The Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) promulgated on
April1,2003aresolutiondenyingthedemurrerstoevidencefiled
bytherespondents;id.,atpp.777790.
40Supranote2.
172
172 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Theresolutiontriggeredthefilingofthepresentpetition.
 ThePetition
The petitioner filed the present petition claiming that the
Sandiganbayancommittedgraveabuseofdiscretion:
I.
xxxINHOLDINGTHATITSINTERLOCUTORYORDER
IN1998HADBECOMEFINAL.
II.
xxx IN xxx REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE
DEPOSITION WHICH WAS ALREADY ADMITTED AS
EVIDENCE IN AN INCIDENT CASE (CIVIL CASE NO.
0130) AS PART OFPETITIONERS EVIDENCE IN THE
MAINxxxCASE(CIVILCASENO.0009).
III.
x x x IN REFUSING TO ADMIT A HIGHLY RELEVANT
AND IMPORTANT PIECE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
PETITIONERONTHEBASISOFFLIMSYANDTENUOUS
TECHNICALGROUNDS.
The petitioner41argues that the 1998 resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is merely an interlocutory order; thus, the
petitionersfailuretoquestionthis1998resolutioncouldnothave
givenitacharacteroffinalitysolongasthemaincaseremains
pending.42On this basis, the petitioner concludes that the
Sandiganbayansdenialofits3rdmotionwasplainlytaintedwith
graveabuseofdiscretion.
On the issue of the Sandiganbayans refusal (in its 2002
resolution)eithertotakejudicialnoticeofortoadmittheBane
depositionaspartofitsevidence,thepetitionerassertsthatCivil
CaseNo.0130(wheretheBanedepositionwasoriginallytaken,
introducedand
_______________
41RepresentedbytheOfficeof theSolicitor General.While
this case was pending, then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
Eduardo Antonio Nachura was appointed Solicitor General,
formerlyaMemberofthisCourt.
42Rollo,p.28,citingPeoplev.MTCofQuezonCity,333Phil.
500;265SCRA645(1996).
173
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 173
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
admittedinevidence)isbutachildoftheparentcase,Civil
Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence offered and
admittedinanyofthechildrencasesshouldbeconsideredas
evidenceintheparentcase.
Lastly,thepetitionerclaimsthatgiventhecrucialimportance
of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayan should not have
denieditsadmissiononflimsygrounds,consideringthat:
1.Itwasalsoalreadystatedinthenotice(ofthetakingofthe
Banedeposition)thatitwouldbeusedasevidencein
CivilCaseNo.0009.Noticeshavingbeendulyservedon
allthepartiesconcerned,theymustaccordinglybedeemed
to havewaivedtheir right to crossexamine the witness
whentheyfailedtoshowup.
2.TheBanedepositionwasavery vitalcoginthecaseofthe
petitioner relative to its allegation that the respondents
interestinETPIandrelatedfirmsproperlybelongstothe
government.
3.ThenoninclusionoftheBanedepositioninthepetitioners
formal offer of evidence was
obviouslyexcusableconsidering the period that had
lapsedfromthetimethecasewasfiledandthevoluminous
recordsthatthepresentcasehasgenerated.43
 THERESPONDENTSCOMMENTS
andTHEPETITIONERSREPLY
In therespondents Comments44(filed in compliance with
ourResolutionofApril10,200245),theyclaimthatthepresent
petition was filed out of timei.e., beyond the 60day
reglementaryperiodprescribedunderSection4,Rule65ofthe
RulesofCourt.46Thisas
_______________
43Id.,atpp.3550.
44InhisManifestation,respondentFerdinandR.Marcos,Jr.
statedthathewasadoptingtheCommentofrespondentNieto;id.
at856857.Ontheotherhand,respondentJuanPonceEnrileand
thesubstitutedheirsofrespondentJoseAfricamerelyreiterated
theargumentsadvancedbyrespondentNieto.
45Id.,atp.471.
46Section4,Rule65oftheRulesofCourtreads:
174
174 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
sertionproceedsfromtheviewthatthepetitioners3rdmotion,
being a mere rehash of similar motions earlier filed by the
petitioner, likewise simply assails the Sandiganbayans 1998
resolution.Alongthesame line, they positthatthepetitioners
3rd motion actually partakes of a proscribed third motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. 47They
likewise assert, on the assumption that the 1998 resolution is
interlocutoryincharacter,thatthepetitionersfailuretocontest
theresolutionbywayofcertiorariwithintheproperperiodgave
the1998resolutionacharacteroffinality.
Therespondentsfurtherclaimthatafterapartyhasrestedits
case,theadmissionofasupplementalofferofevidencerequires
thereopeningofthecaseatthediscretionofthetrialcourt;the
Sandiganbayansimplyexerciseditssounddiscretioninrefusing
toreopenthecasesincetheevidencesoughttobeadmittedwas
within the knowledge of the [petitioner] and available to [it]
before[it]rested itscase.48Therespondentsalsoadvertto the
belated filing of the petitioners 3rd motioni.e., after the
respondentshadfiledtheirrespectivedemurrerstoevidence.
On the petitioners claim of waiver, the respondents assert
that they have not waived their right to crossexamine the
deponent; the Sandiganbayan recognized this right in its 1998
resolution and the petitioner never questioned this recognition.
They also assert that the allegations in the Bane deposition
cannotbeapropersubjectofjudicialnoticeunderRule129ofthe
Rules of Court. The respondents lastly submit that the Bane
deposition is inadmissible in evidence because the petitioner
failedtocomplywiththerequisitesforadmissionunderSection
47,Rule130oftheRulesofCourt.
_______________
Whenandwherepetitionfiled.Thepetitionshallbefiled
notlaterthansixty(60)daysfromnoticeofthejudgment,order
orresolution.Incaseamotionforreconsiderationornewtrialis
timelyfiled,whethersuchmotionisrequiredornot,thesixty(60)
day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.
47RespondentNietosComment,citingGSISv.CA,334Phil.
163(1997);Rollo,p.490.
48Respondent NietosComment, citing Vicente J.
Francisco,The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, p.
338;id.,atp.489.
175
 VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 175 their comments,weresolve todispensewiththefilingofthese
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision) commentsandtoconsiderthispetitionsubmittedfordecision.
In itsReply,49the petitioner defends the timeliness of the _______________
presentpetitionbyarguingthatapartymayopttowaitoutand 49Id.,atpp.521528.
collect a pattern of questionable acts before resorting to the 50PetitionersReply(to NietosComment), citing
extraordinaryremedyofcertiorari.Thepetitionerstressesthatit Regalado,RemedialLawCompendium,p.582,2001ed.;id.,atp.
filed the 3rd motion precisely because of the Sandiganbayans 522.
2000 resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane 176
deposition should be done through the ordinary formal offer of 176 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
evidence.Thus,theSandiganbayanseriouslyerredinconsidering Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
the petitioners 3rd motion as a proscribed motion for TheIssues
reconsideration. The petitioner generally submits that the Onthebasisofthepleadings,wesummarizethepivotalissues
dictates of substantial justice should have guided the forourresolution,asfollows:
Sandiganbayantoruleotherwise. 1.Whetherthepetitionwasfiledwithintherequiredperiod.
Thepetitioneralsoclarifiesthatithasnotyetresteditscase 2.Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
althoughithasfiledaformalofferofevidence.Apartynormally discretion
restshiscaseonlyaftertheadmissionofthepiecesofevidencehe i.In holding that the 1998 resolution has already
formally offered; before then, he still has the opportunity to attainedfinality;
present further evidence to substantiate his theory of the case ii.Inholdingthatthepetitioners3rdmotionpartakes
shouldthecourtrejectanypieceoftheofferedevidence. 50 ofaprohibitedmotionforreconsideration;
The petitioner further maintains that the mere reasonable iii.In refusing to reopen the case given the critical
opportunity to crossexamine the deponent is sufficient for the importanceoftheBanedepositiontothepetitioners
admissionoftheBanedepositionconsideringthatthedeponentis cause;and
not an ordinary witness who can be easily summoned by our iv.In refusing to admit the Bane deposition
courts in light of his foreign residence, his citizenship, and his notwithstandingthepriorconsolidationofCivilCase
advancedage.ThepetitionerassertsthatRule24(nowRule23), No.0009andCivilCaseNo.0130.
andnotSection47,Rule130,oftheRulesofCourtshouldapply 3.WhethertheBanedepositionisadmissibleunder
to the present case, as explicitly stated in the notice of the i.Rule 23, Section 4, par. (c) alone orin relation to
depositiontaking. Section47,Rule130oftheRulesofCourt;and
To date, respondents Imelda Marcos and the heirs of ii.Theprincipleofjudicialnotice.
PotencianoIlusoriohaveyettofiletheirrespectivecommentson TheCourtsRuling
thepetition. Giventhetimethathadlapsedsince werequired Wedenythepetitionforlackofmerit.
I.PreliminaryConsiderations
I (a).The interlocutory nature of the
Sandiganbayans1998resolution.
Indeterminingtheappropriateremedyorremediesavailable,
aparty aggrieved byacourtorder, resolutionor decisionmust
first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or
decisionheintendstoassail.51Inthiscase,wemustpreliminarily
determinewhetherthe1998resolutionisfinalorinterlocutory
innature.
_______________
51Raymundo v. Isagon Vda. de Suarez, G.R. No. 149017,
November28,2008,572SCRA384.
177
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a
finaljudgmentororderandaninterlocutoryoneonthebasisof
thedispositionmade.52Ajudgmentororderisconsideredfinalif
the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or
terminatesaparticularstageofthesameaction;insuchcase,the
remedyavailabletoanaggrievedpartyisappeal.Iftheorderor
resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and
leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the
case,theorderisinterlocutory53andtheaggrievedpartysremedy
isapetitionforcertiorariunderRule65.Jurisprudencepointedly
holdsthat:
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the
subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
enforcebyexecutionwhathasbeendeterminedbythecourt,an
interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but
leavessomethingmoretobeadjudicatedupon.Thetermfinal
judgmentorordersignifiesajudgmentoranorderwhichdisposes
ofthecaseastoalltheparties,reservingnofurtherquestionsor
directionsforfuturedetermination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in
character if it leaves substantial proceedings yet to be had in
connectionwiththecontroversy.Itdoesnotendthetaskofthe
court in adjudicating the parties contentions and determining
theirrightsandliabilitiesasagainsteachother.Inthissense,it
is basicallyprovisional in its application.54(emphasis
supplied)
Undertheseguidelines,weagreewiththepetitionerthatthe
1998 resolution is interlocutory. The Sandiganbayans denial of
thepetitioners1stmotionthroughthe1998Resolutioncameata
177 timewhenthepetitionerhadnotevenconcludedthepresentation
ofitsevidence.Plainly,thedenialofthemotiondidnotresolve
themeritsofthecase,assomethingstillhadtobedonetoachieve
thisend.
_______________
52Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 231 Phil. 302; 147
SCRA 334 (1987), cited inDenso (Phils.), Inc. v. Intermediate
AppellateCourt,232Phil.256;148SCRA280(1987).
53RudeconManagementCorp.v.Singson,494Phil.581;454
SCRA612(2005).
54TomacruzLactaov.Espejo,478Phil.755;434SCRA588
(2004).
178
178 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Weclarify,too,thataninterlocutoryorderremainsunderthe
controlofthecourtuntilthecaseisfinallyresolvedonthemerits.
The court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon
sufficientgroundsshownatanytimebeforefinaljudgment. 55In
this light, the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolutionwhich merely
deniedtheadoptionoftheBanedepositionaspartoftheevidence
inCivilCaseNo.0009couldnothaveattainedfinality(inthe
mannerthatadecisionorfinalorderresolvingthecaseonthe
merits does) despite the petitioners failure to move for its
reconsiderationortoappeal.56
I (b).The 3rd motion was not
prohibitedbytheRules.
Wealsoagreewiththepetitionerthatits3rdmotioncannot
beconsideredasaproscribedthird(actuallysecond)motionfor
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. As
Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the
proscription against a second motion for reconsideration is
directed against a judgment orfinalorder. Althougha second
motionforreconsiderationofaninterlocutoryordercanbedenied
onthegroundthatitisamererehashof
_______________
55Jose Y. Feria and Maria Concepcion Noche, 2 Civil
Procedure Annotated, 2001 ed., pp. 151152, citingManila
ElectricCo.v.ArtiagaandGreen,50Phil.144,147(1927).This
proceeds from the courts inherent power to control its process
andorderssoastomakethemconformabletolawandjustice.
Theonlylimitationisthatthejudgecannotactwithgraveabuse
of discretion, or that no injustice results thereby (Bangko
SilanganDevelopmentBankv.CourtofAppeals,412Phil.755;
360SCRA322[2001]).
56Rule41,Section1oftheRulesofCourtreads:
Subjectofappeal.Anappealmaybetakenfroma
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
theseRulestobeappealable.Noappealmaybetakenfrom:
xxxx
(c)Aninterlocutoryorder;
xxxx
Inalltheaboveinstanceswherethejudgmentorfinalorderis
not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
specialcivilactionunderRule65.
179
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 179
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
theargumentsalreadypasseduponandresolvedbythecourt,it
cannotberejectedonthegroundthatitisforbiddenbythelawor
bytherulesasaprohibitedmotion.57
I (c).The 1998 resolution was not
ripeforapetitionforcertiorari.
UnderSection1,Rule41oftheRulesofCourt,anaggrieved
party may appeal from a judgment or final order which
completelydisposesofacaseorfromanorderthattheRulesof
Courtdeclarestobeappealable.Whilethisprovisionprohibitsan
appeal from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is
affordedthechancetoquestionaninterlocutoryorderthrougha
specialcivilactionofcertiorariunderRule65;thepetitionmust
befiledwithinsixtydaysfromnoticeoftheassailedjudgment,
order,resolution,ordenialofamotionforreconsideration.
On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in
nature,therespondentsinsistthatthe60dayperiodforfilinga
petition forcertiorarishould be reckoned from the petitioners
noticeoftheSandiganbayans1998resolution.Theyarguethat
since this ruling had long been rendered by the court, the
petitioners subsequent filing of similar motions was actually a
deviousattempttoresuscitatethelongdeniedadmissionofthe
Banedeposition.
Wedonotfindtherespondentssubmissionmeritorious.While
the1998resolutionisaninterlocutoryorder,ascorrectlyargued
bythepetitionerandimpliedlyconcededbytherespondents,the
claim that the 1998 resolution should have been immediately
questionedbythepetitioneroncertiorariisnottotallycorrectas
apetitionforcertiorariisnotgroundedsolelyontheissuanceofa
disputed interlocutory ruling.58For a petition forcertiorarito
prosper,Section1,Rule65oftheRulesofCourtrequires,among
others, that neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequateremedyintheordinarycourseoflaw
_______________
57Rollo,p.31,citingPhilgreenTradingConstructionCorp.v.
CourtofAppeals,338Phil.433;271SCRA719(1997).
58Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher
Education,408Phil.483;356SCRA367(2001).
180
180 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
isavailabletotheaggrievedparty.Asamatterofexception,the
writofcertiorarimay issuenotwithstanding theexistenceofan
available alternative remedy, if such remedy is inadequate or
insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious
effectsoftheordercomplainedof.59
Wenotethatatthetimeofits1stmotioninCivilCaseNo. Phil.1[1927].)
0009,thepetitionerhadnotyetconcludedthepresentationofits
evidence, muchlessmadeany formal offer ofevidence. At this
stage of the case, the prematurity of using the extraordinary
remedy ofcertiorarito question the admission of the Bane
depositionisobvious.Afterthedenialofthe1stmotion,theplain
remedy available to the petitioner was to move for a
reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the
admission of the Bane deposition. The petitioner could
introduce60anewtheBanedepositionandincludethisasevidence
in its formal offer61as the petitioner presumably did in Civil
CaseNo.0130.
Thus,atthatpoint,thecasewasnotyetripeforthefilingofa
petitionforcertiorari,andthedenialofthe1stmotioncouldnot
have been the reckoning point for the period of filing such a
petition.
II.The Sandiganbayans ruling on
the finality of its 1998 resolution was
legally erroneous but did not consti
tutegraveabuseofdiscretion
In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the
Sandiganbayanundoubtedlyerredonaquestionoflawinits
ruling,butthislegalerrordidnotnecessarilyamounttoagrave
abuseofdiscretion
_______________
59Africa v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,350 Phil. 846; 287 SCRA
408(1998).
60Whenadepositionispresentedattrialandadmittedbythe
court,itiscompetentevidenceforthepartyinwhosebehalfit
was taken, although it may not have been actually read when
introducedinevidence.(VicenteJ.Francisco,2TheRevisedRules
ofCourtinthePhilippines,p.127,1966,citingBaronv.David,51
61Section34,Rule132oftheRulesofCourtreads:
Offer of evidence.The court shall consider no evidence
whichhasnotbeenformallyoffered.Thepurposeforwhichthe
evidenceisofferedmustbespecified.
181
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 181
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
intheabsenceofaclearshowingthatitsactionwasacapricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of
jurisdiction.62Without this showing, the Sandiganbayans
erroneouslegalconclusionwasonlyanerrorofjudgment,or,at
best,anabuseofdiscretionbutnotagraveone.Forthisreason
alone,thepetitionshouldbedismissed.
Despitethisconclusion,however,weoptnottoimmediately
dismissthepetitioninlightoftheuniquecircumstancesofthis
case where the petitioner cannotentirelybe faulted for not
availingoftheremedyattheopportunetime,andwherethecase,
byitsnature,isundoubtedlyendowedwithpublicinterestand
hasbecomeamatterofpublicconcern. 63Inotherwords,weoptto
resolvethepetitiononthemeritstolaytheissuesraisedtorest
andtoavoidtheirrecurrenceinthecourseofcompletelyresolving
themeritsofCivilCaseNo.0009.
AlthoughthewordrestednowhereappearsintheRulesof
Court,ordinarycourtprocedurehasinferreditfromanoverview
oftrialsequenceunderSection5,Rule30(whichcapsulizesthe
orderofpresentationofapartysevidenceduringtrial),readin
relation to Rule 18 on PreTrial, 64both of the Rules of Court.
UnderSection5,
_______________
62Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17,
2010, 615 SCRA 619, 633, citingDueas, Jr. v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 185401, July 21,
2009,593SCRA316,344.
63Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil.
1059;406SCRA190(2003).
64Section6,Rule18oftheRulesofCourtrequirestheparties
tostateintheirrespectivePreTrialBriefsthefollowing:
(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into
amicable settlement or alternative modes of dispute
resolution,indicatingthedesiredtermsthereof;
(b)A summary of admitted facts and proposed
stipulationoffacts;
(c)Theissuestobetriedorresolved;
(d)Thedocuments or exhibits to be presented,
statingthepurposethereof;
(e) A manifestation of their having availed or their
intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or
referraltocommissioners;and
182
182 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct evidence in the
course of discharging the burden of proof, 65he is considered to
haverestedhiscase,andisthereafterallowedtoofferrebutting
evidence only.66Whether a party has rested his case in some
measuredependsonhismanifestationincourtonwhetherhehas
concludedhispresentationofevidence.67
In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner
expresslyadmittedthatduetooversight,[thepetitioner]closed
andresteditscase;68andthatithadterminatedthepresentation
ofitsevidenceinxxxCivilCaseNo.0009. 69Inthefaceofthese
categoricaljudicial admissions,70the petitioner cannot
suddenlymakean
_______________
(f)Thenumberandnamesofthewitnesses,and
thesubstanceoftheirrespectivetestimonies.
Failure to file the pretrial brief shall have the same
effect as failure to appear at the pretrial. (emphases
added)
65Section1,Rule131oftheRulesofCourtreads:
Burdenofproof.Burdenofproofisthedutyofapartyto
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish
hisclaimordefensebytheamountofevidencerequiredbylaw.
(emphasisadded)
66SeeManuelV.Moran,2CommentsontheRulesofCourt,
1996ed.,p.140.
67Section1,Rule33oftheRulesofCourtreads:
Demurrer to evidence.After the plaintiff
hascompleted the presentation of his evidence, the
defendantmaymovefordismissalonthegroundthatupon
thefactsandthelawtheplaintiffhasshownnorightto
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to
presentevidence.Ifthemotionisgrantedbutonappealthe
orderofdismissalisreversedheshallbedeemedtohave
waivedtherighttopresentevidence.(emphasisadded)
68PetitionersUrgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial
Notice,p.3;Rollo,p.341.
69PetitionersMotion to Admit Supplemental Offer of
Evidence,p.6;id.,atp.365.
70Section4,Rule129oftheRulesofCourtreads:
Judicial admissions.An admission, verbal or
written,madebythepartyinthecourseoftheproceedings
in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
maybecontradictedonlybyshowingthat
183
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
aboutfaceandinsistontheintroductionofevidenceoutofthe
usualorder.Contrarytothepetitionersassertion,therestingof
itscasecouldnothavebeenconditionedontheadmissionofthe
evidenceitformallyoffered.Tobeginwith,theBanedeposition,
whichisthelonepieceofevidencesubjectofthispresentpetition,
wasnotamongthepiecesofevidenceincludedinitsformaloffer
ofevidenceandthuscouldnothavebeenadmittedorrejectedby
thetrialcourt.
The Court observes with interest that it was only in this
present petition forcertiorarithat the petitioner had firmly
deniedhavingresteditscase. 71Beforethen,thepetitionernever
founditappropriatetoquestiononcertioraritheSandiganbayans
denial of its 2nd motion which prayed,inter alia, for
thereopeningofthecase.Thisisafataldefectinthepetitioners
case.
Although the denial of the petitioners first motion did not
necessitate an immediate recourse to the corrective writ
ofcertiorari, the denial of the 2nd motion dictated a different
course of action. The petitioners nonobservance of the proper
procedure for the admission of the Bane deposition, while
seemingly innocuous, carried fatal implications for its case.
Having been rebuffed on its first attempt to have the Bane
depositionadoptedinCivilCaseNo.0009,andwithoutseeking
reconsideration ofthe denial, thepetitionerpresenteditsother
pieces ofevidenceand eventuallyresteditscase. Thistime, the
petitioner forgot about the Bane deposition and so failed to
includethatpieceofevidenceinitsformalofferofevidence.
More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to
squeeze in the Bane deposition into its case. In resolving the
183 petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans
2000 resolution, the Sandiganbayan held that the Bane
depositionhasbecomepartandparcelofCivilCaseNo.0009.
Thispronouncementhasobscuredthe
_______________
itwasmadethroughpalpablemistakeorthatnosuch
admissionwasmade.
71Inpage6ofthepetitionersMotiontoAdmitSupplemental
OfferofEvidence,thepetitioneradmittedtheterminationofthe
presentation of its evidence; yet, in page 4 of the
petitionersReply(to respondent Nietos opposition to
petitionersMotiontoAdmitSupplementalOfferofEvidence),the
petitionerstatedthatithasnotyetresteditscase.
184
184 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
real status of the Bane deposition as evidence (considering
that,earlier,theSandiganbayanalreadydeniedthepetitioners
attempttoadopttheBanedepositionasevidenceinCivilCase
No. 0009 for the deponent cannot be crossexamined in court).
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayanultimately deniedthe
petitionersmotiontoreopenthecase.Havingjudiciallyadmitted
the resting of its case, the petitioner should have already
questionedthedenialofits2ndmotionbywayofcertiorari,since
thedenialofitsattempttoreopenthecaseeffectivelyforeclosed
all avenues available to it for the consideration of the Bane
deposition.Insteadofdoingso,however,thepetitionerallowed
the60dayreglementaryperiod,underSection4,Rule65
oftheRulesofCourt,tolapse,andproceededtofileits3rd
motion.
Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its
3rdmotionbydenyinghavingresteditscaseandinsistingonthe
introduction of the Bane deposition. Rebuffed once more, the
petitionerfiledthepresentpetition,invitingourattentiontothe
Sandiganbayans resolutions,72which allegedly gave it mixed
signals.73By pointing to these resolutions, ironically, even the
petitionerimpliedlyrecognizedthattheywerethenalreadyripe
forreviewoncertiorari.Whatthepetitionershouldhaverealized
wasthatits2ndmotionunequivocallyaimedtoreopenthecase
for the introduction of further evidence consisting of the Bane
deposition. Having beenultimatelydenied by the court, the
petitionercouldnothavebeenpreventedfromtakingtheproper
remedy notwithstanding any perceived ambiguity in the
resolutions.
On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically
objectionableinthepetitionersmotiontoreopenitscasebefore
thecourtruledonitsformalofferofevidence.TheRulesofCourt
doesnotprohibitapartyfromrequestingthecourttoallowitto
presentadditionalevidenceevenafterithasresteditscase.Any
such opportunity, however, for the ultimate purpose of the
admission of additional evidence is already addressed to
thesound discretion of the court. It is from the prism of the
exerciseofthisdiscretionthattheSandiganba
_______________
72DatedAugust21,2000andApril3,2001.
73Rollo,pp.31and34.
185
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 185
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
yansrefusaltoreopenthecase(forthepurposeofintroducing,
markingandofferingadditionalevidence)shouldbeviewed.We
candeclarethisSandiganbayanactioninvalidifithadactedwith
graveabuseofdiscretion.
III.TheSandiganbayangravelyabusedits
discretioninultimatelyrefusingtoreopen
thecaseforthepurposeofintroducingand
admittinginevidencetheBanedeposition
Thebasisforamotiontoreopenacasetointroducefurther
evidenceisSection5,Rule30oftheRulesofCourt,whichreads:
Sec.5.Orderoftrial.Subjecttotheprovisionsofsection2
of Rule 31, and unless the court for special reasons otherwise
directs,thetrialshallbelimitedtotheissuesstatedinthepre
trialorderandshallproceedasfollows:
 xxxx
(f)The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting
evidence only,unlessthe court, forgood reasons and in the
furtherance of justice, permits them toadduce evidence
upontheiroriginalcase[.][emphasesours]
Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must
introduce, at the first instance, all the evidence he relies
upon74and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal. 75The
obvious rationale of the requirement is to avoid injurious
surprises to the other party and the consequent delay in the
administrationofjustice.76
Apartysdeclarationofthecompletionofthepresentationof
his evidence prevents him from introducing further
evidence;77butwheretheevidenceisrebuttalincharacter,whose
necessity,forinstance,arosefromtheshiftingoftheburdenof
evidencefromonepartyto
_______________
74James M. Henderson, 6Commentaries on the Law of
EvidenceinCivilCasesBasedUpontheWorksofBurrW.Jones,
2502,pp.49504951.
75DirectorofLandsv.RomanArchbishopofManila,41Phil.
121(1920).
76Ibid.
77JohnHenryWigmore,6ATreatiseontheAngloAmerican
SystemofEvidenceinTrialsatCommonLaw,1940,p.519.
186
186 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
theother;78orwheretheevidencesoughttobepresentedisinthe
nature ofnewly discoveredevidence,79the partys right to
introduce further evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the
aggrievedpartymayavailoftheremedyofcertiorari.
Largely, the exercise of the courts discretion80under the
exceptionofSection5(f),Rule30oftheRulesofCourtdependson
theattendantfactsi.e.,onwhethertheevidencewouldqualify
as a good reason and be in furtherance of the interest of
justice.Forareviewingcourttoproperlyinterferewiththelower
courtsexerciseofdiscretion,thepetitionermustshowthatthe
lower courts action was attended by grave abuse of discretion.
Settledjurisprudencehasdefinedthistermasthecapriciousand
whimsicalexerciseofjudgment,equivalenttolackofjurisdiction;
or, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion,prejudice,orpersonalhostility,sopatentorsogrossasto
amounttoanevasionofapositiveduty,toavirtualrefusalto
performthemandatedduty,ortoactatallincontemplationof
the law.81Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare and
unsupportedimputationofcaprice,whimsicalityorarbitrariness,
and beyond allegations that merely constitute errors of
judgment82ormereabuseofdiscretion.83
InLopez v. Liboro,84we had occasion to make the following
pronouncement:
Afterthepartieshaveproducedtheirrespectivedirectproofs,
theyareallowedtoofferrebuttingevidenceonly,but,ithasbeen
held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice,
maypermitthemtoofferevidenceupontheiroriginalcase,and
itsrulingwillnotbedisturbedintheappellate
_______________
78Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,
supranote75.
79Seares v. Hernando, etc., et al.,196Phil. 487; 110 SCRA
343(1981).
 8088C.J.S.104,p.217;5AC.J.S.1606,p.102;andLopez
v.Liboro,81Phil.431(1948).
81LandBankofthePhilippinesv.CourtofAppeals,456Phil.
755;409SCRA455(2003).
82San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. v. Pampanga Omnibus
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 168088, April 4, 2007, 520
SCRA564.
83Levistev.CourtofAppeals,supranote62.
84Supranote80,atp.434.
187
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
court where no abuse of discretion appears.So, generally,
additional evidence is allowedwhen it is newly discovered,
orwhere it has been omitted through inadvertence or
mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct
evidencepreviouslyoffered.Theomissiontopresentevidenceon
the testators knowledgeof Spanishhadnot been deliberate. It
wasduetoamisapprehensionoroversight. (citations omitted;
emphasesours)
Likewise, inDirector of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of
Manila,85weruled:
Thestrictruleisthattheplaintiffmusttryhiscaseoutwhen
hecommences.Nevertheless,arelaxationoftheruleispermitted
in the sound discretion of the court. The proper rule for the
exerciseofthisdiscretion,ithasbeensaidbyaneminentauthor,
is,thatmaterialtestimonyshouldnotbeexcludedbecause
offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested,
althoughnotinrebuttal,unlessithasbeenkeptbackbya
trick,andforthepurposeofdeceivingthedefendantand
affectinghiscaseinjuriously.
These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law.
While the general rule is rightly recognized, the Code of Civil
Procedure authorizes the judge for special reasons, to change
theorderofthetrial,andforgoodreason,inthefurtheranceof
justice, to permit the parties to offer evidence upon their
original case. These exceptions are made stronger when one
considersthecharacter ofregistrationproceedings andthefact
that where so many parties are involved, and action is taken
quicklyandabruptly,conformitywithpreciselegalrulesshould
not always be expected.Even at the risk of violating
legalformul,anopportunityshouldbegiventopartiesto
187 submit additional corroborative evidence in support of
their claims of title, if the ends of justice so require.
(emphasesours)
Inhiscommentaries,ChiefJusticeMoranhadthistosay:
However,thecourtforgoodreasons,may,inthefurtherance
ofjustice,permitthepartiestoofferevidenceupontheiroriginal
case, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of
discretion appears, Generally,additionalevidenceis allowed
whenxxx;butitmaybeproperlydisallowedwhereitwas
withhelddeliberatelyandwithoutjustification.86
_______________
85Supranote75,atp.124.
86ManuelV.Moran,supranote66,atp.141,citing64C.J.
160163.
188
188 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign
jurisprudence.87
Under these guidelines, we hold that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing
to reopen the case.Instead of squarely ruling on the
petitioners 2nd motion to avoid any uncertainty on the
evidentiary status of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayans
action actually left the petitioners concern in limbo by
considering the petitioners motion redundant. This is
tantamounttoarefusaltoundertakeapositivedutyasmandated
by the circumstances and is equivalent to an act outside the
contemplationoflaw.
Ithasnotescapedournoticethatatthetimethepetitioner
moved to reopen its case, the respondents had not yet even
presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore,
would not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioners
introduction of the Bane deposition, which was concededly
omittedthroughoversight.88Thehigherinterestofsubstantial
justice,ofcourse,isanotherconsiderationthatcannotbetaken
lightly.89
Inlightofthesecircumstances,theSandiganbayanshouldnot
haveperfunctorilyappliedSection5,Rule30oftheRulesofCourt
onthepetitionersrequesttoreopenthecaseforthesubmissionof
theBanedeposition.
_______________
87InHampson v. Taylor(8 A. 331, 23 A. 732, 15 R.I. 83,
January11,1887)theRhodeIslandSupremeCourtruled:
We are of the opinion that it was entirely within the
discretion of the court to open the case for further
testimony.Thecounselfortheplaintiffsays,inexcusefor
the omission, that it was conceded at the former trial,
withoutcontest,thattheplaceoftheaccidentwasapartof
thepublichighway,andhewasthusputoffhisguard.Itis
quite common for the court to allow a party to
submitfurthertestimony,afterhehasrested,when
his opponent attempts to take advantage of some
formal point which has been inadvertently
overlooked,sinceitisoroughttobetheaimofthe
court,inorderingthecourseofproof,tofurther,not
todefeattheendsofjustice.
88Rollo,p.18.
89Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 336 Phil.
304;269SCRA316(1997).
189
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 189
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Onthebasisofthisconclusion,aremandofthiscaseshould
followasamatterofcourse.Thestateofthepartiessubmissions
andthedelaythathasalreadyattendedthisaspectofCivilCase
No.0009,however,dictateagainstthisobviouscourseofaction.
Atthispoint,thepartieshavemorethanextensivelyarguedfor
oragainsttheadmissionoftheBanedeposition.CivilCaseNo.
0009isa25yearoldsequestrationcasethatisnowcryingoutfor
complete resolution. Admissibility, too, is an issue that would
haveagainbeenraisedonremandandwouldsurelystareusin
the face after remand.90We are thus left with no choice but to
resolvetheissueofadmissibilityoftheBanedepositionhereand
now.
IV.TheadmissibilityoftheBanedeposition
IV(a).TheconsolidationofCivilCase
No.0009andCivilCaseNo.0130didnotdispense
withtheusualrequisitesofadmissibility
_______________
90InW.W.Dearingv.FredWilson&Co.,Inc.,187Phil.488,
493494;98SCRA758,764(1980),weheld:
Anentgraveabuseofdiscretion,inIcutanimv.Hernandez,xx
xitwasheldthatappealandnotcertiorari,istheproperremedy
forthecorrectionofanyerrorastothecompetencyofawitness
committedbyaninferiorcourtinthecourseoftrial,sincesucha
situationinvolvesanerroroflawconstitutingaviolationofthe
rulesofevidence,apartfromthefactthattoallowanyspecialcivil
actionunderthecircumstanceswouldleadtomultiplicityofsuits
andleadtoprotractedifnotendlesstrials.Similarlyandforthe
samereasons,thatrulewouldapplytotheadmissionorrejection
ofadepositionbeingofferedasevidence.Thus,thejurisprudential
ruleisthattheadmissionorrejectionofcertaininterrogatoriesin
thecourseofdiscoveryprocedurecouldbeanerroroflawbutnot
anabuseofdiscretion,muchlessagraveone.Again,thereason
forthisrule[isthat]theprocedureforthetakingofdepositions
whether oral or thru written interrogatories is outlined in the
rulesleavingnodiscretiontotheCourttoadoptanyothernot
substantiallyequivalentthereto.Shouldthejudgesubstantially
deviatefromwhattheruleprescribes,hecommitsalegalerror,
not an abuse of discretion. (citation omitted; emphases and
underscoringours)
190
190 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
In support of its 3rd motion, the petitioner argues that the
Banedepositioncanbeadmittedinevidencewithoutobserving
theprovisionsofSection47,Rule130oftheRulesofCourt. 91The
petitionerclaimsthatinlightofthepriorconsolidationofCivil
Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130, among others, 92the
formercaseorproceedingthatSection47,Rule130speaksofno
longer exists. Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court 93the rule in
effect at the time Civil Case Nos. 0009 and 0130 were
consolidatedprovidedthat:
Rule31
ConsolidationorSeverance
Section1.Consolidation.When actions involving a
commonquestionoflaworfactarependingbeforethecourt,it
mayorderajointhearingortrialofanyorallthemattersin
issue in the actions;it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or
delay.94(emphasesours)
Consolidationisaproceduraldevicegrantedtothecourtas
anaidindecidinghowcasesinitsdocketaretobetriedso
that thebusiness of the court may be dispatched expeditiously
and with economy while providing justice to the parties. To
promotethisend,therulepermitstheconsolidationandasingle
trialofseveralcasesinthecourtsdocket,ortheconsolidationof
issueswithinthosecases.95
_______________
91PetitionersReplytotheOpposition(filedbythesubstituted
heirsofrespondentJoseAfrica),p.7;Rollo,p.462.
92Section9ofPresidentialDecree1606,ineffectatthetime
oftheconsolidation,provides:
Rulemaking Power.The Sandiganbayan shall have the
powertopromulgateitsownrulesofprocedureand,pendingsuch
promulgation,theRulesofCourtshallgovernitsproceedings.
931964 Rules of Court. This provision was copied verbatim
underthepresentrules.
94This provision, in turn, is an exact reproduction of Rule
42(a)ofthe1938FederalRulesofCivilProcedureoftheUnited
States.
95WrightandMiller,FederalPracticeandProcedure:Civil2d
2381,p.427.
191
 VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
AreadingofRule31oftheRulesofCourteasilylendsitselfto
twoobservations.First,Rule31iscompletelysilentontheeffect/s
ofconsolidationonthecasesconsolidated;onthepartiesandthe
causesofactioninvolved;andontheevidencepresentedinthe
consolidated cases.Second, while Rule 31 gives the court the
discretioneithertoorderajointhearingortrial,ortoorderthe
actions consolidated, jurisprudence will show that the term
consolidationisusedgenericallyandevensynonymouslywith
joint hearing or trial of several causes. 96In fact, the title
consolidation of Rule 31 covers all the different senses of
consolidation,asdiscussedbelow.
These observations are not without practical reason.
Consideringthatconsolidationisbasicallyafunctiongiventothe
court, the latter is in the best position to determine for itself
(given the nature of the cases, the complexity of the issues
involved, the parties affected, and the courts capability and
resourcesvisvisall the official business pending before it,
amongother things)what consolidationwill bring,bearingin
mindtherightsofthepartiesappearingbeforeit.
Todisregardthekindofconsolidationeffectedbythe
Sandiganbayanonthesimpleandconvenientpremisethat
the depositiontaking took placeafterthe Sandiganbayan
ordered the consolidation is to beg the question.It is
precisely the silence of our Rules of Procedure and the
dearth of applicable case law on theeffectof
consolidation that strongly compel this Court to
determinethekindofconsolidationeffectedtodirectly
resolvetheveryissueofadmissibilityinthiscase.
Inthecontextoflegalprocedure,thetermconsolidationis
usedinthreedifferentsenses:97
191 (1)Whereallexceptoneofseveralactionsarestayeduntil
one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one trial is
conclusiveastotheoth
_______________
96SeePeople v. Sandiganbayan, 456 Phil. 707; 409 SCRA
419, 424 (2003);Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
37404, November 18, 1991, 203 SCRA 619;Caos v. Hon.
Peralta,etc.,etal.,201Phil.422;115SCRA843(1982).
97WrightandMiller,supranote95,atp.429.
192
192 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
ers.Thisisnotactuallyconsolidationbutisreferredtoassuch.
(quasiconsolidation)98
(2)Whereseveralactionsarecombinedintoone,losetheir
separateidentity,andbecomeasingleactioninwhichasingle
judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where
several actions are pending between the same parties stating
claimswhichmighthavebeensetoutoriginallyinonecomplaint.
(actualconsolidation)99
(3)Whereseveralactionsareorderedtobetriedtogetherbut
each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a
separatejudgment.Thistypeofconsolidationdoesnotmergethe
suitsintoasingleaction,orcausethepartiestooneactiontobe
partiestotheother.(consolidationfortrial)100
Considering that theSandiganbayans order101to consolidate
severalincidentcasesdoesnotatallprovideahintontheextent
of the courts exercise of its discretion as to the effects of the
consolidationitorderedinviewofthefunctionofthisprocedural
devicetoprincipallyaidthecourtitselfindealingwithitsofficial
businesswe arecompelled to lookdeeper intothe voluminous
recordsoftheproceedingsconductedbelow.Wenotethatthereis
nothingthatwouldeven
_______________
981C.J.S.107,p.1341;WrightandMiller,FederalPractice
andProcedure:Civil2d2382.
991C.J.S.107,id.;WrightandMiller,id.,atp.429.SeeYu,
Sr. v. Basilio G. Magno Construction and Development
Enterprises, Inc., G.R. Nos. 13870102, October 17, 2006, 504
SCRA618.
1001C.J.S.107,id.;1Am.Jur.2d131,p.804;Wrightand
Miller,id.
101The April 15, 1993 Resolution ordering consolidation
reads:
SubmittedforresolutionistheMotionforConsolidation,dated
June 22, 1992, filed by the Republic of the Philippines
(representedbythePCGG),counsel.
The record shows that there is no opposition in the above
entitledcasestothesaidmotion.Italsoappearsthatthesubject
mattersoftheaboveentitledcasesareand/ormaybetreatedas
mereincidentsinCivilCaseNo.0009.
WHEREFORE, the aboveentitled cases are hereby ordered
consolidated withCivil Case No. 0009, and shall henceforth be
consolidatedandtreatedasmereincidentsofsaidCivilCaseNo.
0009.(Records,VolumeIII,pp.843844.)
193
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a merger of
causesofaction,partiesandevidence. 102Tobesure,therewould
havebeennoneedforamotiontoadopt(whichdidnotremain
unopposed) the testimonies in the incident cases had a merger
actuallyresultedfromtheorderofconsolidation,forinthatcase,
theSandiganbayancanalreadytakejudicialnoticeofthesame.
Significantly, even the petitioner itself viewed
consolidation, at most, to be merely a consolidation for
trial.103Accordingly, despite the consolidation in 1993, the
petitioneraccededtotheSandiganbayans1998Resolution(which
denied the petitioners 1st Motion on the ground that the
witnesses,whosetestimonyintheincidentcasesissoughttobe
adopted, are not available for crossexamination in the
Sandiganbayan)bypresentingtheseotherwitnessesagaininthe
maincase,sothattherespondentscancrossexaminethem.
These considerations run counter to theconclusion that the
Sandiganbayansorderofconsolidationhadactuallyresultedin
thecompletemergeroftheincidentcaseswiththemaincase,in
thesense of actual consolidation, and that the parties in these
consolidatedcases
_______________
102SeeVictor Africas Motion (Records, Volume XVIII, pp.
67176722).
103InitsMotionforConsolidation,thepetitionerargued:
4. On various dates, several actions were filed which are
intimatelyrelatedwithCivilCaseNo.0009,involvingastheyare
thesamesubjectmatterandsubstantiallythesamepartiesxxx.
xxxx
10.Besides, the present Motion for Consolidation is not
193 without a paradigm which was recently sketched by [the
Sandiganbayan].During the hearing on April 6, 1992
ofAfricavs.PCGG
,docketedasCivilCaseNo.0127,[the
Sandiganbayan]resolvedtoconductajointtrialofthesaid
case and ofOWNI vs. Africa, docketed as Civil Case No. 0126,
inasmuch as both cases are intimately related.The
consolidation of the abovecaptioned cases would be
merely a step in the same directionalready taken by [the
Sandiganbayan]inAfricaandOWNI.(Records,VolumeXV,pp.
56175622.)
194
194 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
had(atleastconstructively)beenawareofandhadallowedactual
consolidationwithoutobjection.104
Considering,too,thattheconsolidatedactionswereoriginally
independentofoneanotherandthefactthatinthepresentcase
the party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009 (an action for
reconveyance, accounting, restitution and damages)
arenotpartiestoCivilCaseNo.0130(aspecialcivilactionfiled
byanETPIstockholderinvolving
_______________
104Inthe1966editionofVicenteJ.FranciscosRevisedRules
ofCourt,Franciscowrote:
The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and
mergeallofthedifferentactionsconsolidatedintoasingle
action, in the same manner as if the different causes of
actions involved had originally been joined in a single
action,andtheorderofconsolidation,ifmadebyacourtof
competent jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to
thedifferentactionsuntilitisvacatedorsetaside.After
theconsolidationtherecanbenofurtherproceedingsinthe
separateactions,whicharebyvirtueoftheconsolidation
discontinued and superseded by a single action, which
shouldbeentitledinsuchmannerasthecourtmaydirect,
andallsubsequentproceedingsthereinbeconductedand
therightsofthepartiesadjudicatedinasingleaction(1
C.J.S.,113,pp.13711372).
Attheverybeginningofthediscussiononconsolidation
of actions in theCorpus Juris Secundum, the following
caveatappears:
The term consolidation is used in three different
senses.First,whereseveralactionsarecombinedintoone
andlosetheirseparateidentityandbecomeasingleaction
inwhichasinglejudgmentisrendered;second,whereall
exceptoneofseveralactionsarestayeduntiloneistried,in
whichcasethejudgmentintheoneisconclusiveastothe
others;third,whereseveralactionsareorderedtobetried
together but each retains its separate character and
requirestheentryofaseparatejudgment.Thefailureto
distinguish between these methods of procedure,
which are entirely distinct, the two latter, strictly
speaking,notbeingconsolidation,afactwhichhas
not always been noted, has caused some confusion
andconflictinthecases.(1C.J.S.,107,pp.13411342)
(Emphasisadded).
In defining the term consolidation of actions, Francisco
providedacolatillathatthetermconsolidationisusedinthree
different senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1 Am. Jur. 477
(Francisco,RevisedRulesofCourt,p.348).
195
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 195
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
a corporate squabble within ETPI), the conclusion that the
Sandiganbayan in fact intended anactual consolidationand,
together with the parties affected, 105acted towards that end
where the actions become fused and unidentifiable from one
anotherandwheretheevidenceappreciatedinoneactionisalso
appreciated in another actionmust find support in the
proceedingsheldbelow.Thisisparticularlytrueinacasewith
themagnitudeandcomplexityofthepresentcase.Otherwise,to
imposeupontherespondentstheeffectsofanactualconsolidation
(which find no clear support in the provisions of the Rules of
Court, jurisprudence,106and even in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan itself and despite the aforementioned
considerations) results in an outright deprivation of the
petitioners right to due process. We reach this conclusion
especiallywheretheevidencesoughttobeadmittedisnotsimply
a testimonytaken in one of the several cases, but a deposition
uponoral examinationtakeninanotherjurisdictionandwhose
admission is governed by specific provisions on our rules on
evidence.
We stress on this point, too, that while the Sandiganbayan
ordered the consolidation in 1993 (that is,beforethe deposition
was taken), neither does the PreTrial Order 107issued by the
Sandiganbayanin 1997in Civil Case No. 0009 contain any
reference,formalorsubstan
_______________
105The respondents vigorously opposed the petitioners
motiontoadoptthetestimonyof,amongothers,MauriceBane,
andtheSandiganbayanruledinfavoroftherespondents,without
thepetitionerquestioningthisdevelopmentuntilaftertwoyears
later. This circumstance cannot be taken lightly in view of the
petitioners gross procedural deficiency in the handling of this
maincase.
106Inthose cases where the Court ordered or affirmed the
orderof consolidation,evenwithout expresslyprovidingfor the
admissibility of evidence in all of the consolidated cases, the
parties are the same and/or the issues are relatively simple
and/orthecausesofactioncouldhaveactuallybeenstatedinone
complaint (seeDomdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 18238283, February 24, 2010, 613
SCRA 528;Active Wood Products Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 86603, February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA774;DeltaMotor
SalesCorporationv.Mangosing,No.L41667,April30,1976,70
SCRA598;Sidecov.Paredes,etal.,74Phil.6(1942).
107DatedMarch17,1997;Rollo,pp.576587.
196
196 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
tive,toCivilCaseNo.0130.108Interestingly,initsPreTrialBrief
dated August 30, 1996,109the petitioner even made a
representationtopresentBaneasoneofitswitnesses.
IV (b).Use of deposition under Section
4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony un
derSection47,Rule130
SincethepresentconsolidationdidnotaffectCivilCaseNo.
0130asan original, albeit incidental, case, theadmissibility of
the Bane deposition cannot avoid being measured against the
requirementsofSection47,Rule130oftheRulesofCourtthe
ruleontheadmissibilityoftestimoniesordepositiontakenina
different proceeding. In this regard, the petitioner argues that
Section4,Rule23oftheRulesofCourt(thenRule24) 110must,at
anyrate,prevailoverSection47,Rule130111ofthesameRules.
At the outset, we notethat when thepetitioners motion to
adoptthetestimoniestakenintheincidentcasesdrewindividual
oppositions from the respondents, the petitioner represented to
theSandiganbayanitswillingnesstocomplywiththeprovisions
ofSection47,Rule130oftheRulesofCourt, 112and,infact,again
presentedsomeof
_______________
 108UnderSection7,Rule18oftheRulesofCourt,aPreTrial
Order controls the subsequent course of the action, unless
modifiedbeforetrialtopreventmanifestinjustice.
109Records,VolumeXXXVI,p.11405.
1101964RulesofCourt,Rule24,DepositionsandDiscovery.
111PetitionersReply with Manifestation to Respondent
EnrilesComment,pp.1213;Rollo,pp.679680.
112Records,VolumeXLV,pp.110112.PetitionersCommon
Replyreads:
1.WhileitistruethatSection47,Rule130oftheRulesof
Courtprovides:
xxxx
[petitioner]wishestoinformthisHonorableCourtthat
inordertosubstantiallycomplywiththeaforementioned
requirements, it would be willing to present subject
witnesses, except for Maurice Bane and Rolando Gapud
whose availability are difficult to obtain being foreign
residents,onlytobecrossexaminedbythe
197
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
the witnesses. The petitioners aboutface two years thereafter
even contributed to the Sandiganbayans own inconsistency on
howtotreattheBanedeposition,inparticular,asevidence.
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on Deposition
Pending Action (depositionde bene esse) provides for the
circumstanceswhendepositionsmaybeusedinthetrial,orat
thehearingofamotionoraninterlocutoryproceeding.
SEC.4.Use of depositions.At the trial or upon the
hearingofamotionoraninterlocutoryproceeding,anypartorall
of a deposition,so far as admissible under the rules of
evidence, may beused against any party who was present or
representedatthetakingofthedepositionorwhohadduenotice
thereof,inaccordancewithanyoneofthefollowingprovisions:
xxxx
(c)Thedepositionofawitness,whetherornotaparty, may
beusedbyanypartyforanypurposeifthecourtfinds:(1)
that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a
distancemorethanonehundred(100)kilometersfromtheplace
oftrialorhearing,orisoutofthePhilippines,unlessitappears
that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition;or(3)thatthewitnessisunabletoattendortestify
becauseofage,sickness,infirmity,orimprisonment;or(4)that
thepartyofferingthedepositionhasbeenunabletoprocurethe
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application
andnotice,thatsuchexceptionalcircumstancesexistastomake
itdesirable,intheinterestofjusticeandwithdueregardtothe
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in
opencourt,toallowthedepositiontobeused[.][emphasisours]
Ontheotherhand,Section47,Rule130oftheRulesofCourt
provides:
197 SEC.47.Testimony or deposition at a former
proceeding.Thetestimonyordepositionofawitnessdeceased
orunabletotestify,giveninaformercaseorproceeding,judicial
or administrative, involving the same parties and subject
matter,may be given in evidenceagainst the adverse party
whohadtheopportunitytocrossexaminehim.
_______________
defendants who had no opportunity to crossexamine
theminsaidpreviousproceeding.
198
198 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
 AplainreadingofRule23oftheRulesofCourtreadilyrejects
thepetitionerspositionthattheBanedepositioncanbeadmitted
intoevidencewithoutobservingtherequirementsofSection47,
Rule130oftheRulesofCourt.
Before a party can makeuseof the deposition taken at the
trialofapendingaction,Section4,Rule23oftheRulesofCourt
doesnotonlyrequiredueobservanceofitssubparagraphs(a)to
(d);italsorequires,asaconditionforadmissibility,compliance
withtherulesonevidence.Thus,evenSection4,Rule23ofthe
RulesofCourtmakesanimpliedreferencetoSection47,Rule130
of the Rules of Court before the deposition may beusedin
evidence.ByreadingRule23inisolation,thepetitionerfailedto
recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a
depositionunderRule23shouldbeconsistentwiththeruleson
evidence under Section 47, Rule 130.113In determining the
admissibilityoftheBanedeposition,therefore,reliancecannotbe
given on one provision to the exclusion of the other;both
provisions must be considered. This is particularly true in
this case where the evidence in the prior proceeding does not
simply refer to a witness testimony in open court but to a
depositiontakenunderanotherandfartherjurisdiction.
A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the
RulesofCourtandSection47,Rule130ofthesameRulesistheir
mutualreferencetodepositions.
A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary
function is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of
disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and
affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for
trial.114Since depositions are principally made available to the
parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant
facts,depositionsarenotmeantassubstitutefortheactual
testimonyinopencourtofapartyor
_______________
113Dasmarias Garments, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 108229,
August24,1993,225SCRA622.
114JonathanLandoilInternationalCo.,Inc.v.Mangudadatu,
G.R. No. 155010, August 16, 2004, 436 SCRA 559, 573,
citingFortuneCorporationv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.108119,
January19,1994,229SCRA355,362.
199
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 199
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral
examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a
requirementoftherulesonevidenceunderSection1,Rule132of
theRulesofCourt.115
Examinationtobedoneinopencourt.Theexamination
ofwitnessespresentedinatrialorhearingshallbedoneinopen
court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitatedtospeak,orthequestioncallsforadifferentmode
ofanswer,theanswersofthewitnessshallbegivenorally.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth
therein, inlieuoftheactual oral testimony ofthe deponentin
opencourt,maybeopposedbytheadversepartyandexcluded
underthehearsayrulei.e.,thattheadversepartyhadorhasno
opportunitytocrossexaminethedeponentatthetimethathis
testimonyisoffered.Thatopportunityforcrossexamination
wasaffordedduringthetakingofthedepositionaloneis
no argument, as the opportunity for crossexamination
must normally be accorded a party at the time that the
testimonial evidence is actuallypresentedagainst him
during the trial or hearing of a case. 116However, under
certainconditionsandforcertainlimitedpurposeslaiddownin
Section4,Rule23oftheRulesofCourt,thedepositionmaybe
usedwithout thedeponent being actually called tothe witness
stand.117
Section47,Rule130oftheRulesofCourtisanentirely
different provision.While aformer testimony or
depositionappearsundertheExceptionstotheHearsayRule,the
classification offormer testimony or depositionas an admissible
hearsay is not universally conceded.118A fundamental
characteristicofhearsayevidenceisthe
_______________
115DasmariasGarments,Inc.v.Reyes,supranote113.
116Ibid.
117Ibid.
118JovitoR.Salonga,PhilippineLawofEvidence,p.540,2nd
ed.,1958.JohnHenryWigmore,supranote77,at5153.Butthe
generallyacceptedview,followedbyourownrulesonevidence,is
that prior testimony or deposition is an exception to hearsay
prohibition.(McCormickonEvidencebyEdwardCleary,254,p.
759,3rded.,HornbookSeries,Lawyersed.,1984).
200
200 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
adverse partyslack ofopportunity tocrossexaminetheoutof
court declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly
requires,interalia,fortheadmissibilityofaformertestimonyor
depositionthattheadversepartymusthavehadanopportunity
to crossexamine the witness or the deponent in the prior
proceeding.
Thisopportunitytocrossexaminethoughisnottheordinary
crossexamination119afforded an adverse party in usual trials
regardingmattersstatedinthedirectexaminationorconnected
therewith. Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
contemplates a different kind of crossexamination, whether
actual or a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the
requisiteidentityofissuesintheformercaseorproceedingandin
the present case where the former testimony or deposition is
soughttobeintroduced.
Section47,Rule130requiresthattheissuesinvolvedinboth
casesmust,atleast,besubstantiallythesame;otherwise,thereis
nobasisinsayingthattheformerstatementwasorwouldhave
beensufficiently tested by crossexamination or by an
opportunity to do so.120(The requirement of similarity though
doesnotmeanthatalltheissuesinthetwoproceedingsshouldbe
thesame.121Althoughsomeissuesmaynotbethesameinthetwo
actions,theadmissibilityofaformertestimonyonanissuewhich
issimilarinbothactionscannotbequestioned.122)
These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule
130 a distinct rule on evidence and therefore should not be
confusedwiththegeneralprovisionsondepositionunderRule23
of the Rules of Court. In other words, even if the petitioner
complieswithRule23oftheRulesof
_______________
119Section6,Rule132oftheRulesofCourtreads:
Crossexamination; its purpose and extent.Upon the
terminationofthedirectexamination,thewitnessmaybecross
examinedbytheadversepartyastoanymattersstatedinthe
direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient
fullness and freedom to testhis accuracy and truthfulnessand
freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
importantfactsbearingupontheissue.
120JohnHenryWigmore,supranote77,atp.83.
121Oscar M. Herrera, 5Remedial Law, 1999, pp. 773, 774
775.
 122Id.,atp.773,citingGibsonv.Gagnon,82Colo108,257,p.
348;2Jones,Sec.9:25.
201
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 201
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Courtontheuseofdepositions,theobservanceofSection47,Rule
130 of the Rules of Court cannot simply be avoided or
disregarded.
Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane
deposition,takeninCivilCaseNo.0130,forpurposesofthisvery
same case. Thus,what the petitioner establishedandwhat the
Sandiganbayanfound,forpurposesofusingtheBanedeposition,
referonlytothecircumstanceslaiddownunderSection4(c),Rule
23oftheRulesofCourt,notnecessarilytothoseofSection47,
Rule130oftheRulesofCourt,asadistinctruleonevidencethat
imposes further requirements in the use of depositions in
adifferentcaseorproceeding.Inotherwords,theprioruseofthe
deposition under Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as
compliancewithSection47,Rule130whichconsidersthesame
deposition as hearsay, unless the requisites for its admission
underthisruleareobserved.Theachingquestioniswhetherthe
petitionercompliedwiththelatterrule.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the
followingrequisitesfortheadmissionofatestimonyordeposition
givenataformercaseorproceeding.
1.Thetestimonyor deposition ofawitnessdeceasedor
otherwiseunabletotestify;
2.The testimony was given in a former case or
proceeding,judicialoradministrative;
3.Involvingthesameparties;
4.Relatingtothesamematter;
5.Theadversepartyhavinghadtheopportunitytocross
examinehim.123
The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition
taken at a former trial or proceeding are the necessity for the
testimonyanditstrustworthiness.124However, beforetheformer
testimony or depositioncan be introduced in evidence,the
proponentmustfirstlaythe
_______________
123ManuelV.Moran,5CommentsontheRulesofCourt,1980
ed.,p.409.
124VicenteJ.Francisco,Evidence,1955,p.646.
202
202 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
proper predicatetherefor,125i.e., the party must establish the
basis for the admission of the Bane deposition in the realm of
admissibleevidence.Thisbasisisthepriorissuethatwemust
nowexamineandresolve.
IV(c).Unavailabilityofwitness
Fortheadmissionofaformertestimonyordeposition,Section
47,Rule130oftheRulesofCourtsimplyrequires,interalia,that
thewitnessordeponentbedeceasedorunabletotestify.Onthe
other hand, in using a deposition that was takenduring the
pendencyofanaction,Section4,Rule23oftheRulesofCourt
provides several grounds that will justify dispensing with the
actualtestimonyofthedeponentinopencourtandspecifies,inter
alia, the circumstances of the deponents inability to attend or
testify,asfollows:
(3)that the witness isunable toattend ortestifybecause
ofage,sickness,infirmity,orimprisonment[.][emphasesours] 126
 ThephraseunabletotestifyappearinginbothRule23and
Rule130of theRulesof Courtreferstoaphysical inabilityto
appear at the witness stand and to give a testimony. 127Hence
notwithstanding the deletion of the phrase out of the
Philippines,whichpreviouslyappearedinSection47,Rule130of
theRulesofCourt,absencefrom
_______________
125RicardoJ.Francisco,7TheRevisedRulesofCourtinthe
Philippines,Evidence,PartI,1997ed.,pp.628629.
126Priortotherevisionoftherulesonevidence,thephrase
out ofthe Philippines appearedinthecontext ofthe witness
unavailability(Section41,Rule130ofthe1964RulesofCourt).
Aftertherevision(thelatestamendmentstotherulesonevidence
becameeffectiveonJuly1,1989),thisphrasewasdeletedfrom
the present Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In
contrast, the same phrase, which appeared in Rule 24 of the
oldRules(Rule 24, Deposition and Discovery, 1964 Rules of
Court),wasretainedinthepresentRule23oftheRulesofCourt
ondepositions.Thephraseunabletotestify,however,survived
theamendmentoftherulesandwasretainedinbothSection47,
Rule130oftheRulesofCourtandSection4(c),Rule23ofthe
sameRules.
127VicenteJ.Francisco,Evidence,supranote124,atp.649.
203
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
jurisdiction thepetitionersexcuseforthenonpresentationof
128
Baneinopencourtmaystillconstituteinabilitytotestifyunder
the same rule. This is not to say, however, that resort to
deposition on this instance of unavailability will always be
upheld.Where the depositionis taken not for discovery
purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then the
depositionshouldberejectedinevidence.129
Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the
courseofaformerproceedingbetweenthepartiestoacaseon
trial, this testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in
evidence.Thewitnesshimself,ifavailable,mustbeproducedin
courtasifheweretestifyingdenovosincehistestimonygivenat
theformertrialismerehearsay.130Thedepositionofawitness,
otherwiseavailable,isalsoinadmissibleforthesamereason.
Indeed,theSandiganbayansrelianceontheBanedeposition
intheothercase(CivilCaseNo.0130)isanargumentinfavorof
the requisite unavailability of the witness. For purposes of
thepresentcase (Civil Case No. 0009), however, the
Sandiganbayanwouldhavenobasistopresume,andneithercan
or should we, that the previous condition, which previously
allowed the use of the deposition, remains and would thereby
justify the use of the same deposition inanother case or
proceeding,eveniftheothercaseorproceedingisbeforethesame
court.SincethebasisfortheadmissionoftheBanedeposition,in
principle, being necessity,131the burden of establishing its
existence rests on the party who seeks the admission of the
evidence. This burden cannot be supplantedby assumingthe
continuityofthepreviousconditionorconditionsinlightofthe
general rule against the nonpresentation of the deponent in
203 court.132
_______________
128JohnHenryWigmore,5ATreatiseontheAngloAmerican
SystemofEvidenceinTrialsatCommonLaw,1404,p.149.
129NorthwestAirlines,Inc.v.Cruz,376Phil.96;317SCRA
761(1999).
 130Ricardo J. Francisco,supranote 125, at 627, cited in
theCommentfiled by the substituted heirs of respondent Jose
Africa,p.3.
131JohnHenryWigmore,supranote128,atp.148.
132To make matters worse, by not questioning the
Sandiganbayansdenialofits1stMotion(toAdopt),thepetitioner
hasimpliedlyaccededtothe
204
204 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
IV(d).Therequirementofopportunityof
theadversepartytocrossexamine;identity
ofparties;andidentityofsubjectmatter
Thefunctionofcrossexaminationistotestthetruthfulnessof
thestatementsofawitnessmadeondirectexamination. 133The
opportunity of crossexamination has been regarded as an
essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a
testimony. In civil cases, the right of crossexamination is
absolute,andisnotamereprivilegeofthepartyagainstwhoma
witnessmaybecalled.134Thisrightisavailable,ofcourse,atthe
takingofdepositions,aswellasontheexaminationofwitnessesat
thetrial.Theprincipaljustificationforthegeneralexclusionof
hearsaystatementsandfortheadmission,asanexceptiontothe
hearsay rule, of reported testimony taken at a former hearing
where the present adversary was afforded the opportunity to
crossexamine, is based on the premise that the opportunity of
crossexaminationisanessentialsafeguard 135againstfalsehoods
andfrauds.
In resolving the question of whether the requirement of
opportunity to crossexamine has been satisfied, we have to
consider first the required identity of parties as the present
opponent to theadmissionof theBanedeposition towhomthe
opportunity to crossexamine the deponent is imputed may not
after all be the same adverse party who actually had such
opportunity.
Torenderthetestimonyofawitnessadmissibleatalatertrial
oraction,thepartiestothefirstproceedingmustbethesameas
thepartiestothelaterproceeding.Physicalidentity,however,is
not required; substantial identity136or identity of
interests137suffices,as
_______________
Sandiganbayans ruling that the nonpresentation of the
deponent in court for crossexamination is unjustified.
Unfortunately, the petitioner realized its mistake only two
preciousyearslater.
133RicardoJ.Francisco,supranote125,atp.220.
134Id.,atp.219.
135EdwardCleary,supranote118,atp.48.
136ManuelV.Moran,supranote123,atp.410.
137JovitoR.Salonga,supranote118,atp.542.
205
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 205
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
where the subsequent proceeding is between persons who
representthepartiestothepriorproceedingbyprivityinlaw,in
blood, or in estate. The term privity denotes mutual or
successiverelationshipstothesamerightsofproperty.138
Inthepresentcase,thepetitionerfailedtoimpute,muchless
establish, the identity of interest or privity between the then
opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents.
WhileAfricaisthesonofthelaterespondentJoseAfrica,atmost,
thedepositionshouldbeadmissibleonlyagainsthimasanETPI
stockholder who filed thecertioraripetition docketed as Civil
CaseNo.0130(and,unavoidably,assuccessorininterestofthe
late respondent Jose Africa). While Africa and the respondents
areallETPIstockholders,thiscommonalitydoesnotestablishat
allanyprivitybetweenthemforpurposesofbindingthelatterto
the acts or omissions of the former respecting the cross
examinationofthedeponent. Thesequestration oftheir shares
doesnotresultintheintegrationoftheirrightsandobligationsas
stockholderswhichremaindistinctandpersonaltothem,visa
visotherstockholders.139
IV(d1).Therespondentsnoticeof
takingofBanedepositionisinsuffi
cientevidenceofwaiver
The petitioner staunchly asserts that the respondents have
waivedtheirrighttocrossexaminethedeponentfortheirfailure
to appear at the depositiontaking despite individual notices
previouslysenttothem.140
_______________
138OscarM.Herrera,supranote121,atp.772.Priviesare
distributedintoseveralclasses,accordingtothemannerofthe
relationship. Thus, there are privies in estate, as donor and
donee, lessor and lessee, and jointtenants; privies in blood, as
heir and ancestor; privies in representation as executor and
testator,administratorandintestate;priviesinlawforthelaw
withoutprivityofbloodandestatecaststhelanduponanotheras
byescheat.(Id.,atp.542.)
139Notably,AfricawasnotimpleadedinCivilCaseNo.0009
(Republicv.Sandiganbayan,G.R.No.106244,January22,1997,
266SCRA515).
140PetitionersReplyto Nietos Comment, p. 4; and
petitionersReply with ManifestationtoRespondent Enriles
Comment,pp.1112.Rollo,pp.678679.
206
206 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
InitsfirstNoticetoTakeOralDepositionofMr.MauriceV.
BanedatedAugust30,1996,141thepetitioneroriginallyintended
todeposeMr.BaneonSeptember25261996.Becauseitfailedto
specifyinthenoticethepurposefortakingMr.Banesdeposition,
thepetitionersentaSecondAmendedNoticetoTakeDeposition
ofMr.MauriceV.BaneUponOralExaminationwhereitlikewise
movedthescheduleddepositiontakingtoOctober2326,1996.
The records show that Africa moved several times for
protective orders against the intended deposition of Maurice
Bane.142On the other hand, among the respondents, only
respondent Enrile appears to have filed an Opposition 143to the
petitioners first notice, where he squarely raised the issue of
reasonability ofthe petitionersnineteenday firstnotice. While
the Sandiganbayan denied Africas motion for protective
orders,144it strikes us thatno ruling was ever handed downon
respondentEnrilesOpposition.145
_______________
141Records,VolumeXXXVI,p.11534.
142Records, Volume XXXVI, pp. 1157411578; Volume
XXXVII,pp.1164911654;1170411709.
143Records,VolumeXXXVI,pp.1161011612.
144Records,VolumeXXXVII,pp.1171911720.
145WhiletheSandiganbayanrecognized thatthepetitioner
intends to use the Bane deposition in Civil Case No. 0009 (as
statedintheSecondAmendedNoticeoftheTakingoftheBane
Deposition), the Sandiganbayan denied Africas Motion as if
Africahimselfwasimpleadedinandisapartywhocanbebound
by the proceedings and the judgment in Civil Case No. 0009
(except only as a substituted heir of the late respondent Jose
Africa). In denyingVictor Africasmotion (forgetting about the
concernraisedbyrespondentEnrilewhichisequallyapplicable
totheotherrespondents),theSandiganbayanseemedobliviousof
thefactthattherespondentswhowerenonpartiestoCivilCase
0130 (where the deposition was taken) should be heard.
Apparently,theSandiganbayanreliedblindlyonthepetitioners
assertionthatthetakingofdepositionisamatterofrightand
failedtoaddresstheconsequencesand/orissuesthatmayarise
from the apparently innocuous statement that the petitioner
intendstousetheBanedepositioninCivilCaseNo.0009(where
only the respondents, and not Africa, are parties). The
Sandiganbayanruled:
Moreimportantly,underSection1ofRule24thetakingof
suchdeposition,aftertheanswerhasbeenserved,isamatterof
rightand
207
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 207
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
ItmustbeemphasizedthatevenunderRule23,theadmission
ofthedepositionuponoralexaminationisnotsimplybasedon
the fact of prior notice on the individual sought to be bound
thereby.InNorthwestAirlinesv.Cruz,146weruledthat
The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to
order that the deposition shall not be taken connotes the
authority to exercise discretion on the matter. However, the
discretionconferredbylawisnotunlimited.Itmustbeexercised,
notarbitrarilyoroppressively,butinareasonablemannerandin
consonancewiththespiritofhelaw.Thecourtsshouldalways
see to it that the safeguards for the protection of the
parties and deponents are firmly maintained.As aptly
statedbyChiefJusticeMoran:
....(T)hisprovisionaffordstheadverseparty,aswell
asthedeponent,sufficientprotectionagainstabusesthat
may be committed by a party in the exercise of his
unlimited right to discovery. As a writer said: Any
discoveryinvolvesapryingintoanotherpersonsaffairs
pryingthatisquitejustifiedifitistobealegitimateaidto
litigation,butnotjustifiedifitisnottobesuchanaid.For
this reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid
discoverywhichisintendednotasanaidtolitigation,but
merelytoannoy,embarrassoroppresseitherthedeponent
ortheadverseparty,orboth.(emphasisours)
In the present case, not only did the Sandiganbayan fail to
rule on respondent Enriles Opposition (which is equally
applicabletohiscorespondents),italsofailedtoprovideeventhe
bareminimumsafeguardsfortheprotectionof,(moreso)non
parties,147andtoensure
_______________
canberesortedtowithoutleaveofcourt.(Records,XXXVII,
pp.1171911720)
146376Phil.111112;317SCRA761(1999).
147InitsMotionforSummaryJudgment,datedJanuary28,
1997, the petitioner itself conceded that respondents
arenotpartiestoCivilCaseNo.0130,wherethedepositionwas
taken:
7.In this connection, we are not unmindful of the
observationof[theSandiganbayan]that:
The principal issue in the main case, Civil Case No.
0009 xxx which is an action for reversion, forfeiture,
accounting and damages, is whether or not there is
preponderanceofevidencethattheClassAshareholding
inETPIisillgottenwealthxxx.
208
208 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
that these safeguards are firmly maintained. Instead, the preponderance of evidence of alleged illgotten wealth of the
Sandiganbayansimplyboughtthepetitionersassertion(thatthe defendantstherein,especiallyJoseAfrica,RobertoS.Benedicto
taking ofBane depositionisamatterofright)and treatedthe and Manuel H. Nieto, Jr.,none of whom is a party either in
lingeringconcernse.g.,reasonabilityofthenotice;andthenon incidentCivilCaseNo.0130orinthesubjectG.R.No.107789.
partystatusoftherespondentsinCivilCaseNo.0130atwhose (Italicssupplied)(Records,XL,pp.1256812569.)
incident(docketedasG.R.No.107789)theBanedepositionwas 148MabayoFarms,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.140058,
takenratherperfunctorilytotheprejudiceoftherespondents.
August 1, 2002, 386 SCRA 110; andDevelopment Bank of the
Inconjunctionwiththeorderofconsolidation,thepetitioners
Philippinesv.Bautista,etal.,135Phil.201;26SCRA366(1968).
reliance on the prior notice on the respondents, as adequate
209
opportunityforcrossexamination,cannotoverridethenonparty
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 209
statusof the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130the effect of
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
consolidationbeingmerelyfortrial.Asnonparties,theycannot
Effect ofsubstitutionofparties.Substitutionof parties
beboundbyproceedingsinthatcase.Specifically,theycannotbe
doesnotaffecttherighttousedepositionspreviouslytaken;and,
bound by the taking of the Bane deposition without the
whenanactionhasbeendismissedandanotheractioninvolving
consequent impairment of their right of cross
the same subject is afterward brought betweenthe same
examination.148Opportunityfor crossexamination, too, even
assuming its presence, cannot be singled out as basis for the partiesor their representatives or successors in interest, all
depositionslawfullytakenanddulyfiledintheformeractionmay
admissibility of aformer testimony or depositionsince such
beusedinthelatterasiforiginallytakentherefor.[italicsand
admissibilityisalsoanchoredontherequisiteidentityofparties.
underscoringours]
To reiterate, although the Sandiganbayan considered the Bane
Inlightoftheseconsiderations,werejectthepetitionersclaim
deposition in resolving Civil Case No. 0130, its action was
that the respondents waived their right to crossexamination
premised on Africas status as a party in that case where the
when they failed to attend the taking of the Bane deposition.
Banedepositionwastaken.
Incidentally,therespondentsvigorousinsistenceontheirrightto
Corollarily,theideaofprivityalsopermeatesRule23ofthe
crossexamine the deponent speaks loudly that they never
RulesofCourtthroughitsSection5whichprovides:
intendedanywaiverofthisright.
_______________
Interestingly, the petitioners notice of the depositiontaking
Thatpointshouldnotbepreemptedintheresolutionof
reliedonRule23oftheRulesofCourt.Section15ofthisrule
thesubjectincidentinG.R.No.107789xxx
reads:
8.Nor are we unmindful that this Honorable Court made
Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and
clearthatthefindinginitsDecember13,1996resolutiondoes
place.A party desiring to take the deposition of any person
not render moot and academic the principal issue in the main
case, Civil Case No. 0009, which is: whether or not there is uponoralexaminationshallgivereasonablenoticeinwritingto
everyotherpartytotheaction.Thenoticeshallstatethetime
andplacefortakingthedepositionandthenameandaddressof
each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not
known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the
particularclassorgrouptowhichhebelongs.Onmotionofany
partyuponwhomthenoticeisserved,thecourtmayforcause
shownenlargeorshortenthetime.
Under this provision, we do not believe that the petitioner
couldreasonablyexpectthattheindividualnoticesitsenttothe
respondentswouldbesufficienttobindthemtotheconductofthe
thenopponents(Africas)crossexaminationsince,tobeginwith,
theywerenotevenpartiestotheaction.Additionally,weobserve
thatinthenoticeofthedepositiontaking,conspicuouslyabsent
wasanyindicationsufficienttoforewarnthenotifiedpersonsthat
theirinexcusablefailuretoappearatthedepositiontakingwould
amounttoawaiveroftheirrightofcrossexamination,without
prejudicetotherightoftherespondentstoraisetheirobjections
attheappropriatetime.149We
_______________
149Section6,Rule23oftheRulesofCourtreads:
210
210 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
wouldbetreadingondangerousgroundsindeedwerewetohold
thatonenotapartytoanaction,andneitherinprivitynor
insubstantialidentityofinterestwithanyofthepartiesin
thesameaction,canbeboundbytheactionoromissionof
the latter, by the mere expedient of a notice. Thus, we
cannotsimplydeduce aresultant waiverfromthe respondents
merefailuretoattendthedepositiontakingdespitenoticesentby
thepetitioner.
Lastly,weseenoreasonwhytheBanedepositioncouldnot
have been taken earlier in Civil Case No. 0009theprincipal
actionwhereitwassoughttobeintroducedwhileBanewasstill
here in the Philippines. We note in this regard that the
PhilippineswasnolongerundertheMarcosadministrationand
hadreturnedtonormaldemocraticprocesseswhenCivilCaseNo.
0009wasfiled.Infact,thepetitionersnoticeitselfstatesthatthe
purposeofthedepositionisforMr.MauriceBanetoidentifyand
testifyonthefactssetforthinhisAffidavit,whichMr.Banehad
longexecutedin1991inMakati,Metro
_______________
149Section6,Rule23oftheRulesofCourtreads:
Objections to admissibility.Subject to the provisions of
section 29 of this Rule, objection may be made at the trial or
hearingtoreceivinginevidenceanydepositionorpartthereoffor
anyreasonwhichwouldrequiretheexclusionoftheevidenceif
thewitnesswerethenpresentandtestifying.
Section17,Rule23oftheRulesofCourtreads:
Record of examination; oath; objections.The officer
beforewhomthedepositionistobetakenshallputthewitnesson
oath and shall personally, or by someone acting under his
directionandinhispresence,recordthetestimonyofthewitness.
Thetestimonyshallbetakenstenographicallyunlesstheparties
agree otherwise. All objections made at the time of the
examination to the qualifications of the officer taking the
deposition, or to the manner of taking it, or to the evidence
presented,ortotheconductofanyparty,andanyotherobjection
to the proceedings, shall be noted by the officer upon the
deposition. Evidence objected to shall be taken subject to the
objections.Inlieuofparticipatingintheoralexamination,parties
servedwithnoticeoftakingadepositionmaytransmitwritten
interrogatories to the officers, who shall propound them to the
witnessandrecordtheanswersverbatim.
211
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Manila. Clearly, a deposition could then have been taken
150
withoutcompromisingtherespondentsrighttocrossexaminea
witnessagainstthemconsideringthattheprincipalpurposeof
thedepositionischieflyamodeofdiscovery.These,toourmind,
are avoidable omissions that, when added to the deficient
handlingofthepresentmatter,adduptothegrossdeficiencies
ofthepetitionerinthehandlingofCivilCaseNo.0009.
AfterfailingtotakeBanesdepositionin1991andinviewof
the peculiar circumstances of this case, theleastthat the
petitionercouldhavedonewastomoveforthetakingoftheBane
deposition and proceed with the deposition immediately upon
securingafavorablerulingthereon.Onthatoccasion,wherethe
respondents would havea chance to beheard, therespondents
cannot avoid a resultant waiver of their right of cross
examination if they still fail to appear at the deposition
taking.Fundamental fairness dictates this course of
action.Itmustbestressedthatnotonlyweretherespondents
nonpartiestoCivilCaseNo.0130,theylikewisehavenointerest
in Africascertioraripetition asserting his right as an ETPI
stockholder.
Setting aside the petitioners flipflopping on its own
representations,151thisCourtcanonlyexpressdismayonwhythe
petitionerhadtoletBaneleavethePhilippinesbeforetakinghis
depositiondespitehavingknowledgealreadyofthesubstanceof
whathewouldtestifyon.ConsideringthatthetestimonyofBane
is allegedly a vital cog in the petitioners case against the
respondents,theCourtislefttowonderwhythepetitionerhadto
take the depositionin anincidentcase (instead of the main
case)atatimewhenitbecamethetechnicalrightofthepetitioner
todoso.
211 _______________
150Records,VolumeXXXVII,pp.1162811623.
151See the petitioners PreTrial Brief (Records, Volume
XXXVI,p.11405)wherethepetitionermadearepresentationto
present Mr. Maurice Bane. See the petitioners Common Reply
(Records, Volume XLV, pp. 110112) where the petitioner
conceded the applicability of Section 47, Rule 130; see the
petitionersMotionforSummaryJudgment(Records,VolumeXL,
pp. 1256812569) where the petitioner admitted that the
respondentswerenotpartiestoCivilCaseNo.0130(wherethe
deposition wastaken)andVictor Africawasneither a partyto
CivilCaseNo.0009.
212
212 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
V.The petitioner cannot rely on principle of
judicialnotice
ThepetitioneralsoclaimsthatsincetheBanedepositionhad
already been previously introduced and admitted in Civil Case
No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial
noticeoftheBanedepositionaspartofitsevidence.
Judicialnoticeisthecognizanceofcertainfactsthatjudges
mayproperlytakeandactonwithoutproofbecausethesefacts
arealreadyknowntothem.152Putdifferently,itistheassumption
byacourtofafactwithoutneedoffurthertraditionalevidentiary
support.Theprincipleisbasedonconvenienceandexpediencyin
securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not
ordinarilycapableofdisputeandarenotbonafidedisputed.153
 Thefoundationforjudicialnoticemaybetracedtothecivil
and canon law maxim,manifesta(or notoria)non indigent
probatione.154Thetakingofjudicialnoticemeansthatthecourt
will dispense with the traditional form of presentation of
evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is so
notoriousthatitwouldnotbedisputed.
TheconceptofjudicialnoticeisembodiedinRule129ofthe
RevisedRulesonEvidence.Rule129eitherrequiresthecourtto
take judicial notice,inter alia, of the official acts of the xxx
judicialdepartmentsofthePhilippines, 155orgivesthecourtthe
discretiontotakejudicialnoticeofmattersoughttobeknownto
judgesbecauseoftheirjudicialfunctions.156Ontheotherhand,a
partylitigant may ask the court to take judicial notice of any
matterandthecourtmayallowthepartiestobeheardonthe
proprietyoftakingjudicialnotice
_______________
152RicardoJ.Francisco,supranote125,atp.69.
153OscarM.Herrera,supranote121,atp.72.
154Manifest things requirenoproof; what is knownbythe
magistrateneednotbeproved;JovitoR.Salonga,supranote118,
at p. 45; and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr.,Perspectives of Evidence,
2005,p.52,citing1JonesonEvidence,p.209.
155Section1,Rule129oftheRevisedRulesonEvidence.
156Id.,Section2.
213
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
ofthematterinvolved.157Inthepresentcase,afterthepetitioner
filed itsUrgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice, the
respondents were also heard through their corresponding
oppositions.
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not
authorizedtotakejudicialnoticeofthecontentsoftherecordsof
othercases,evenwhensuchcaseshavebeentriedorarepending
inthesamecourt,andnotwithstandingthatbothcasesmayhave
beentriedorareactuallypendingbeforethesamejudge. 158This
rulethoughadmitsofexceptions.
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a
courtmayproperlytreatalloranypartoftheoriginalrecordofa
casefiledinitsarchivesasreadintotherecordofacasepending
before it, when,with the knowledge of,andabsent an
objection from,theadverse party,reference is made toit
forthatpurpose,bynameandnumberorinsomeothermanner
bywhichitissufficientlydesignated;orwhentheoriginalrecord
oftheformercaseoranypartofit,isactuallywithdrawnfrom
thearchivesatthecourtsdirection,attherequestorwiththe
consentoftheparties,andadmittedasapartoftherecordof
thecasethenpending.159
_______________
157Id.,Section3.
158Manuel V. Moran,supranote 123, at pp. 4748,
citingMunicipalCouncilofSanPedroLagunav.ColegiodeSan
Jose,65Phil.318(1938);andPrietov.Arroyo,121Phil.1335;14
SCRA549(1965).
159InOccidental Land Transportation Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 96721, March19, 1993, 220 SCRA 167, 176,
213
citingTabuena v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650 (1991), we
stated:
AndunlikethefactualsituationinTabuenav.CA,the
decisioninCivilCaseNo.3156formedpartoftherecords
of the instant case (Civil Case No. 2728) with the
knowledge of the parties and in the absence of their
 objection.Thisfactwaspointedoutbythelowercourt,to
wit:
ThexxxfindingsoftheOroquietaCourtbecame
as conclusive upon the company and its driver by
their acquiescence and silence x x x. (Decision of
lowercourt,p.12;records,p.239)
xxxx
Returning to Exhibit O,supra(Decision, Civil
CaseNo.3156,CFI,BranchIII,OroquietaCity),the
Courthastenstoadd:
214
214 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Courtsmustalsotakejudicialnoticeoftherecordsofanother
caseorcases,wheresufficientbasisexistsintherecordsofthe
casebeforeit,warrantingthedismissalofthelattercase. 160
_______________
Said exhibit has not been objected to nor commented
upon by the defendants Company and Enerio, through
theircounsel,xxx.
Thisbeingthecase,petitionerswereawarethatExhibitO
(DecisioninCivilCaseNo.3156)hadformedpartoftherecordsof
thecaseandwouldtherebybeconsideredbythetrialcourtinits
decision.
160Section1,Rule9oftheRulesofCourtreads:
Defensesandobjectionsnotpleaded.Defensesand
objectionsnotpleadedeitherinamotiontodismissorin
theansweraredeemedwaived.However,whenitappears
fromthepleadingsortheevidenceonrecordthatthecourt
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is
another action pendingbetween thesameparties forthe
same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall
dismisstheclaim.(underscoringours)
InLewinv.Galang,etc.,109Phil.1041,1045(1960),citedby
thepetitioner,theCourtheld:
Inviewofthisspecialdefense[resjudicata],thecourt
below should have taken judicial notice of thehabeas
corpusproceedingsinstitutedbypetitionerbeforethesame
Court of First Instance of Manila and before the same
judge, Case No. 28409,Ted Lewin v. Commissioner of
Immigration and Commissioner of Customs, and we find
thatpracticallythesamefactsrelieduponinpetitioners
presentpetitionfordeclaratoryjudgmentaretheveryfacts
uponwhichpetitionerbasedhisrequestfortheissuanceof
thewritofhabeascorpusinthepreviouscase.
InTiburcio, et al. v. Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation,etal.,106Phil.477,483484(1959),likewisecitedby
thepetitioner,weheld:
Appellants finally claim that thelower court erred in
dismissingthecomplaintonthegroundofresjudicataby
taking judicial notice of its own records in Land
Registration Case No. L3 invoking in support of their
contention theprinciple thatacourtcannottakejudicial
notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when such cases had been tried by the same court and
notwithstandingthe[fact]thatbothcasesmayhavebeen
triedbeforethesamejudge.Whiletheprincipleinvokedis
consideredtobethegeneralrule,thesameisnotabsolute.
215
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 215
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
 Theissuebeforeusdoesnotinvolvetheapplicabilityofthe
rule on mandatory taking of judicial notice; neither is the
applicabilityoftheruleondiscretionarytakingofjudicialnotice
seriouslypursued.Rather,thepetitionerapproachestheconcept
of judicial notice from agenealogical perspectiveof treating
whatever evidence offered in any of the children casesCivil
Case0130asevidenceintheparentcaseCivilCase0009or
ofthewholefamilyofcases. 161Tothepetitioner,thesupposed (1959);Lewinv.Galang,etc.,supranote160;andTiburcio,etal.
relationshipofthesecaseswarrantsthetakingofjudicialnotice.
We strongly disagree.First, the supporting cases162the
petitioner cited are inapplicable either because these cases
involveonlyasingleproceedingoranexceptiontotherule,which
proscribesthecourtsfromtakingjudicialnoticeofthecontentsof
therecordsofothercases.163Second,thepetitionerspropositionis
obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The
petitioneritselfadmitsthatthe
_______________
There are exceptions to this rule. Thus, as noted by
formerChiefJusticeMoran:
In some instance[s], courts have taken judicial
notice of proceedings in other causes, because of
their close connection with the matter in
controversy.xxx
Moreover,appellantsobjectiontotheactionofthetrial
courtonthismatterismerelytechnicalbecausetheydonot
dispute the fact that appellant x x x, who instituted the
presentcase,isthesamepersonwhofiledtheapplication
inLandRegistrationCaseNo.L3fortheregistrationof
thesameparceloflandwhichapplicationwasdeniedby
the court xxx. It may therefore besaid thatin the two the case, except those which have been adduced judicially in
cases there is not only identity of subject matter but
identity of parties and causes of action. Indeed, the trial
courtdidnoterrindismissingthecomplaintontheground
ofresjudicata.
161PetitionersReply with Manifestation(to respondent
EnrilesComment)enumeratesthevariousfamilymembercases
whicharosefromthepresentandmaincase,CivilCaseNo.0009.
162De los Angeles v. Hon. Cabahug, et al., 106 Phil. 839
v.PeoplesHomesiteandHousingCorporation,etal.,supranote
160.
163Lewin v. Galang,etc., supra; andTiburcio, et al. v.
PeoplesHomesiteandHousingCorporation,etal.,supra.
216
216 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
presentcasehasgeneratedalotofcases,which,inalllikelihood,
involveissuesofvaryingcomplexity.Ifwefollowthelogicofthe
petitionersargument,wewouldbeespousingjudicialconfusion
by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one
case, which was presumably found competent and relevant in
anothercase,simplybasedonthesupposedlineageofthecases.
Itisthedutyofthepetitioner,asapartylitigant,toproperlylay
beforethecourttheevidenceitreliesuponinsupportoftherelief
it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court. We
invitethepetitionersattentiontoourprefatorypronouncement
inLopezv.Sandiganbayan:164
Downtheofttroddenpathinourjudicialsystem,bycommon
sense,traditionandthelaw,theJudgeintryingacaseseesonly
withjudicialeyesasheoughttoknownothingaboutthefactsof
evidence.Thus,whenthecaseisupfortrial,thejudicialheadis
emptyastofactsinvolvedanditisincumbentuponthelitigants
totheactiontoestablishbyevidencethefactsuponwhichthey
rely.(emphasisours)
Wethereforerefuse,inthestrongestterms,toentertainthe
petitionersargumentthatweshouldtakejudicialnoticeofthe
Banedeposition.
VI.Summation
Torecapitulate,weholdthat:(1)theSandiganbayansdenial
ofthepetitioners3rdmotiontheMotiontoAdmitSupplemental
OfferofEvidence(Re:DepositionofMauriceBane)wasalegal
error that did not amount to grave abuse of discretion;(2)the
Sandiganbayans refusal to reopen the case at the petitioners
instance was tainted with grave abuse of discretion;
and(3)notwithstanding the grave abuse of discretion,the
petition must ultimately failas the Bane deposition is not
admissibleundertherulesofevidence.165
_______________
164319Phil.387,389;249SCRA281,282(1995).
165RulesofCourt,Rule130,Section47.
217
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
VII.RefutationofJusticeCarpiosLastMinuteModified
Dissent
At the last minute, Justice Carpio circulated a modified
dissent,quotingtheBanedeposition.Hiscoveringnotestates:
I have revised my dissenting opinion to include the Bane
depositionsothattheCourtandthepublicwillunderstandwhat
theBanedepositionisallabout.(underliningadded)
In light of this thrust, a discussion refuting the modified
dissentisinorder.
First:ContentsoftheBanedepositionnotanIssue.The
dissent perfectly identified what is at issue in this casei.e.,
theadmissibilityof the Bane deposition. Admissibility is
concerned with the competenceandrelevance166of the evidence,
whoseadmissionissought.Whilethedissentquotedatlengththe
Bane deposition, it may not be amiss to point out thatthe
relevance of the Bane deposition(or, to adopt the dissents
characterization,whetherMauriceV.Baneisavitalwitness)
isnotan issue here unless it can be establishedfirstthat the
Banedepositionisacompetentevidence.
Second:Misrepresentation of Cited Authority.The
dissent insists that in Philippine Jurisprudence, the
consolidationofcasesmergesthedifferentactionsintooneand
therightsofthepartiesareadjudicatedinasinglejudgment,
citingVicenteJ.Francisco.Inourdiscussiononconsolidation,we
footnotedthefollowinginresponsetothedissentsposition,which
wewillrestatehereforemphasis:
Inthe1966editionofVicenteJ.FranciscosRevisedRulesof
Court,Franciscowrote:
217 Theeffectofconsolidationofactionsistouniteandmergeall
ofthedifferent actions consolidatedintoasingleaction,inthe
samemannerasifthe differentcausesof actionsinvolvedhad
originally been joined in a single action, and the order of
consolidation, if made by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
bindinguponallthepartiestothedifferentactionsuntilitisva
_______________
166REVISEDRULESONEVIDENCE,Rule128,Section3.
218
218 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
catedorsetaside.Aftertheconsolidationtherecanbenofurther
proceedingsin the separate actions, whichare by virtueofthe
consolidation discontinued and superseded by a single action,
whichshouldbeentitledinsuchmannerasthecourtmaydirect,
and all subsequent proceedings therein be conducted and the
rightsofthepartiesadjudicatedinasingleaction(1C.J.S.,113,
pp.13711372).
At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of
actions in theCorpus Juris Secundum, the following caveat
appears:
Thetermconsolidationisusedinthreedifferentsenses.First,
where several actions are combined into one and lose their
separateidentity and become a single action in which a single
judgment is rendered;second, where all except one of several
actionsarestayeduntiloneistried,inwhichcasethejudgment
in the one is conclusive as to the others;third, where several
actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its
separate character and requires the entry of a separate
judgment.Thefailuretodistinguishbetweenthesemethods
of procedure, which are entirely distinct, thetwolatter,
strictlyspeaking,notbeingconsolidation,afactwhichhas
not always been noted, has caused some confusion and
conflictinthecases.(1C.J.S.,107,pp.13411342)(Emphasis
added).
In defining the term consolidation of actions,Francisco
providedacolatillathatthetermconsolidationisused
inthreedifferentsenses,citing1C.J.S.1341and1Am.Jur.
477(Francisco,RevisedRulesofCourt,p.348).
Fromtheforegoing,itisclearthatthedissentappearstohave
quotedFranciscosstatementoutofcontext.Asitis,theissueof
the effect of consolidation on evidence is at most an unsettled
matter that requires the approach we did in the majoritys
discussiononconsolidation.167
_______________
167ThedissentthencomparestheproceedingsintheCourt
when cases are consolidated to support its position that
consolidation results in the merger of the different causes of
action.However,itisnotexactlyappropriatetocomparethe
consolidation of cases in the Supreme Court with the
consolidationorderedbytheSandiganbayanbecausethe
SupremeCourtisNOTatrieroffacts.First,thescopeofour
reviewislimitedgenerallytoquestionsoflaw.Hence,noissue
of prejudice to other parties can arise should petitions in the
Court be consolidated.Second,unlike consolidated cases in
theSupremeCourt,theSandiganbayan
219
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 219
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Third:Misappreciation of the Purpose of Consoli
dation.Thedissentthenturnstothepurposeofconsolidation
to expeditiously settle the interwoven issues involved in the
consolidatedcasesandthesimplificationoftheproceedings.It
arguesthatthiscanonlybeachievediftherepetitionofthesame
evidenceisdispensedwith.
Itisunfortunatethatthedissentrefusestorecognizethefact
that since consolidation is primarily addressed to the court
concernedtoaiditindispatchingitsofficialbusiness,itwouldbe
in keeping with the orderly trial procedure if the court should
have a say on what consolidation would actually
bring168(especiallywhere several cases are involved which have
becomerelativelycomplex).Inthepresentcase,thereisnothing
in the proceedings below that would suggest that the
Sandiganbayanorthepartiesthemselves(thepetitionerandthe
respondents)hadinmindaconsolidationbeyondjointhearingor
trial.WhyshouldthisCourtwhichisnotatrialcourtimposea
purportedeffectthathasnofactualorlegalgrounds?
 Fourth:The Due Process Consideration.The dissent
argues that even if the consolidation only resulted in a joint
hearing or trial, the respondents are still bound by the Bane
deposition considering that they were given notice of the
depositiontaking.Theissuehereboilsdowntooneofdue
processthefundamentalreasonwhyahearsaystatement(not
subjectedtotherigorofcrossexamination)isgenerallyexcluded
intherealmofadmissibleevidenceespeciallywhenreadinlight
ofthegeneralrulethatdepositionsarenotmeantassubstitute
fortheactualtestimony,inopencourt,ofapartyorwitness.
RespondentEnrilehadapendingOppositiontothenoticeof
depositiontaking (questioning the reasonableness thereofan
issue applicable to the rest of the respondents) which the
Sandiganbayanfailedtoruleon.TomaketheSandiganbayans
omission worse, the Sandiganbayan blindly relied on the
petitionersassertionthatthe
_______________
itselfhad,infact,separatelyadjudgedanincidentofCivil
CaseNo.0130andthefewotherincidentcasesindependentof
CivilCaseNo.0009.
168CorrectibleunderRule65oftheRulesofCourt.
220
220 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
depositiontaking was a matter of right and, thus, failed to
addresstheconsequencesand/orissuesthatmayarisefromthe
apparentlyinnocuousstatementofthepetitioner(thatitintends
tousetheBanedepositioninCivilCaseNo.0009,whereonlythe
respondents,andnotAfrica,aretheparties). 169Thereissimply
theabsenceofdueindueprocess.
Fifth:MisstatementoftheSandiganbayansAction.The
dissent repeatedly misstates that the Sandiganbayan granted
the request for the depositiontaking. For emphasis,
theSandiganbayan did not grant the requestsince the
petitioner staunchly asserted that the depositiontaking was
amatterofright.Noonecandenythecomplexityoftheissues
that these consolidated cases have reached. Considering the
consolidation of cases of this nature,the most minimum of
fairness demands upon the petitioner tomovefor the
takingoftheBanedepositionandfortheSandiganbayan
to make a ruling thereon(including the opposition filed by
respondent Enrile which equally applies to hiscorespondents).
Theburgeoningomissionandfailuresthathaveprevailedinthis
casecannotbecuredbythisCourtwithoutitselfbeingguiltyof
violatingtheconstitutionalguaranteeofdueprocess.
Sixth:Issues Posed and Resolved Go Beyond
Technicalities.The above conclusions, contrary to the
petitioners claim, are not only matters of technicality.
Admittedly,rulesofprocedureinvolvetechnicality,towhichwe
haveappliedtheliberalitythattechnicalrulesdeserve.Butthe
resolution of the issues raised goes beyond pure or mere
technicalities as the preceding discussions show. They involve
issues of due process and basic unfairness to the respondents,
particularlytorespondentEnrile,whoisportrayedintheBane
deposition to beacting in behalf of the Marcoses so that these
shares should be deemed to be those of the Marcoses. They
involved, too, principles upon which our rules of procedure are
foundedandwhichwecannotdisregardwithoutflirtingwiththe
violation of guaranteed substantive rights and without risking
thedisorderthattheseruleshavesoughttoavertinthecourseof
theirevolution.
_______________
169WhenitdeniedAfrica'sseparateopposition.
221
 VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
IntheCourtEnBancdeliberationsofDecember6,2011,the
Courtfailedtoarriveataconclusivedecisionbecauseofatievote
(77,withoneJusticetakingnopart).Thesamevoteresultedin
therevotingofDecember13,2011.Inthislight,theponenciais
deemedsustained.
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,weDISMISSthepetition
forlackofmerit.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Corona (C.J.), Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
PerezandMendoza,JJ.,concur.
Carpio,J.,SeeDissentingOpinion.
Velasco,Jr.,J.,IjointheopinionofJ.A.T.Carpiowiththe
qualification that the Bane deposition cannot be used against
respondentJuanPonceEnrilebecauseofhisoppositionthereto.
LeonardoDeCastro,J.,NoPart.
Abad,J.,IjointhedissentofJ.Carpio.
Villarama,Jr.,J.,IjointhedissentofJ.Carpio.
Sereno,J.,IjointhedissentofJ.Carpio.
Reyes,J.,IjointhedissentofJ.Carpio.
PerlasBernabe,J.,IjointhedissentofJ.Carpio.
DISSENTINGOPINION
CARPIO,J.:
Thisisaspecialcivilactionforcertiorari1filedbytheRepublic
of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Presidential
CommissiononGoodGovernment(PCGG), seekingtosetaside
the Resolution dated 7 February 2002 of the Sandiganbayan,
whichdeniedpetitionersMotiontoAdmitSupplementalOfferof
Evidence(Re:DepositionofMauriceV.Bane).
221 _______________
1UnderRule65ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure.
222
222 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
The case pertains to the complaint filed before the
Sandiganbayan by petitioner against private respondents for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages.
Thecomplaint,whichwasfiledon22July1987,wasdocketedas
CivilCaseNo.0009.CivilCaseNo.0009involves,amongothers,
thesharesofprivaterespondentsinEasternTelecommunications
Philippines,Inc.(ETPI),whichwereallegedlyillgottenandwere
eventuallysequesteredbythegovernment.2
The issue in thiscertiorariproceeding concerns the
admissibility of the deposition of Maurice V. Bane, taken
primarilyfortestimonyregardingtheinterlocutoryissueinCivil
CaseNo.0130,whichisoneoftheincidentcasesofCivilCaseNo.
0009.
CivilCaseNo.0130isapetitionforcertiorarifiledwiththe
SandiganbayanbyVictorAfrica,sonofJoseL.Africa, 3whoisone
of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0009, against the PCGG.
Victor Africa filed the petition, seeking to nullify the PCGG
ordersdirectinghim,amongothers,toaccountforhissequestered
shares in ETPI.In aResolution dated 12 April 1993,4the
Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of the main
case, Civil Case No. 0009, with several incident cases
includingCivilCaseNo.0130.5
On25September1996,inCivilCaseNo.0009inconnection
withIncidentCaseNo.0130andG.R.No.107789,petitionerfiled
with the Sandiganbayan aSecond Amended Notice to Take
DepositionofMr.MauriceV.BaneUponOralExamination. 6On
23and24October1996,thedepositionuponoralexaminationof
MauriceV.Bane,formerdirectorandtreasurerintrustofETPI,
was taken before Consul General Ernesto Castro at the
PhilippineEmbassyinLondon,Eng
_______________
2SeePetition forCertiorari, dated 14 March 2002, p.
12;Rollo,p.13.
3Uponhisdemise,JoseL.Africawaseventuallysubstituted
byhisheirsasdefendantsinCivilCaseNo.0009.VictorAfricais
one of the legal representatives/forced heirs of deceased
respondentJoseL.Africa;SandiganbayanResolutionissuedon1
April1998,p.6;Rollo,p.336.
4Promulgatedon15April1993.
5SeeSandiganbayan Resolution issued on 1 April 1998, p.
5;Rollo,p.335;Records,pp.66466649.
6Rollo,pp.6871.
223
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
land.AmongthedefendantsinthemainCivilCaseNo.0009,only
VictorAfricaappearedduringthetakingofthedeposition.
On22January1998,petitionerfiledamotion 7prayingthatit
beallowedtoadoptthetestimoniesofseveralofitswitnessesin
incidentalCivilCaseNos.0048,0050,0130and0146,including
the depositionof Maurice V.Bane,asitsevidence in themain
case,CivilCaseNo.0009.On1April1998,theSandiganbayan
issuedaResolution,denying in partthe motionas regards the
adoptionofthetestimonyonoraldepositionofMauriceV.Bane
(andRolandoGapud)aspartofpetitionersevidenceinCivilCase
No. 0009, for the reason that said deponents according to the
plaintiff,arenotavailableforcrossexaminationinthisCourtby
thedefendants.8
On 14 December 1999, petitioner made itsFormal Offer of
EvidenceconsistingofExhibitsAtoXX27.However,through
oversight, petitioner failed to include among its exhibits the
depositionofMauriceV.Bane.Thus,initsUrgentMotionAnd/Or
Request for Judicial Noticedated 21 February 2000, petitioner
prayedthatitbeallowedtointroduceasadditionalevidencethe
deposition of Maurice V. Bane, or in the alternative, for the
Sandiganbayantotakejudicialnoticeofthefactsestablishedby
the said deposition. On 21 August 2000, the Sandiganbayan
issuedaResolutiondenyingpetitionersmotion.TheResolution
stated:
AllegedlythedepositionofMauriceV.Banewasintroduced
asPCGGsevidenceinCivilCaseNo.0130(inrelationtoG.R.No.
107789)whichisanincidentofandconsolidatedwiththeabove
entitledcaseinconnectionwithPCGGsVeryUrgentPetitionfor
AuthoritytoHoldSpecialStockholdersMeetingforthePurposeof
Increasing ETPIs Authorized Capital Stock and the said
223
deposition of Maurice V. Bane is now a part and parcel of the
recordofthismaincase.
JudicialnoticeisfoundunderRule129whichistitledWhat
Need Not Be Proved. Apparently, this provision refers to the
Courtsdutytoconsideradmissionsmadebythepartiesinthe
pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in
resolvingcasesbeforeit.ThedutyoftheCourtis
_______________
7Id.,atpp.322329.
8SeeSandiganbayan Resolution issued on 1 April 1998, p.
6;Rollo,p.336.
224
224 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the
initiativeisupontheCourt.Suchbeingthecase,theCourtfinds
theUrgentMotionand/orRequestforjudicialnoticeassomething
which need not be acted upon as the same is considered
redundant.
On the matter of the deposition of Maurice V. Bane, the
admissionofthesameisdonethroughtheordinaryformalofferof
exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to
raiseobjectionongroundsprovidedbylaw.Definitely,itisnot
underArticle129onjudicialnotice.9
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the
Sandiganbayan denied in a Resolution issued on 3 April 2001.
TheResolutionstated:
In the subject Resolution [issued on 21 August 2000], this
CourtruledthattheUrgentMotionand/orRequestforJudicial
Noticewassomethingthatneednotbeacteduponasthesame
wasalreadyconsideredredundant,thedepositionofBane,
havingbecomepartandparceloftherecordofthismain
casesinceCivilCaseNo.0130isanincidenttothesame.
This Courtfurtherheldthattheadmission ofsame isdone
through ordinary formal offer of exhibits wherein defendant is
givenampleopportunitytoraiseobjectionongroundsprovidedby
law,andnotunderRule129onjudicialnotice.
WHEREFORE, there being no other issue which merit
consideration of this Court, the Motion for Reconsideration is
herebydenied.10(Emphasissupplied)
On 16 November 2001, petitioner filed aMotion to Admit
Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane),seekingonceagaintheadmissionofthedeposition.On7
February 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed
Resolution, denying petitioners motion. The Sandiganbayan
ruled:
The only issue that the court is actually called upon to
addressinthependingincidentiswhetherornotWeshouldallow
plaintiffmovantsSupplemental Offer of Evidenceconsisting of
thedepositionofMauriceV.Bane.
_______________
9SandiganbayanResolutionissuedon21August2000,pp.3
4;Rollo,pp.354355.
10Sandiganbayan Resolution issued on 3 April 2001, p.
2;Rollo,p.358.
225
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 225
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
xxx
DefendantsOppositionto the pending incident as well as
plaintiffsReplyto theOppositiongave various reasons why the
motionshouldorshouldnotbegranted.Butinthecourtsview,it
isnot really a question of whether or not plaintiffhas already
resteditscaseastoobviatethefurtherpresentationofevidence.
Itisnotevenaquestionofwhetherthenonappearingdefendants
aredeemedtohavewaivedtheirrighttocrossexamineBaneas
to qualify the admission of the deposition sans such cross
examination.Indeed,Wedonotseeanyneedtodwellonthese
matters in view of this courtsResolutionrendered in April 1,
1998whichalreadydeniedtheintroductioninevidenceofBanes
depositionandwhichhasbecomefinalinviewofplaintiffsfailure
tofileanymotionforreconsiderationorappealwithinthe15day
reglementary period. Rightly or wrongly, the resolution stands
andforthiscourttograntplaintiffsmotionatthispointintime
would in effect sanction plaintiffs disregard for the rules of
procedure.Plaintiffhassleptonitsrightsforalmosttwoyears
anditwasonlyinFebruaryof2000thatitsoughttorectifyits
ineptitudebyfilingamotiontoreopenitscaseastoenableitto
introduceandofferBanesdepositionasadditionalevidence,orin JOSE L. AFRICA, ET AL.,
the alternative for the court to take judicial notice of the Defendants.
allegations of the deposition. But how can such a motion be It should be noted that the late Jose L. Africa, one of the
granted when it has been resolved as early as 1998 that the defendantsinCivilCaseNo.0009,hasbeensubstitutedbyhis
deposition is inadmissible. Without plaintiff having moved for heirs, including his son Victor Africa. Thus, Justice Brions
reconsideration within the reglementary period, the resolution statementthatVictorAfricaisplainlynotapartytoCivilCase
hasattainedfinalityanditseffectcannotbeundonebythesimple No. 000912is misleading. Although Victor Africa was not
expedient of filing a motion, which though purporting to be a originallyimpleadedinCivilCaseNo.0009,VictorAfricabecame
novel motion, is in reality a motion for reconsideration of this oneofthesubstitutedefendantsinCivilCaseNo.0009uponthe
courts1998ruling.Hence,thesubsequentmotions,includingthe demise of Jose L. Africa. In fact, Victor Africa, as substitute
presentincidentaredeemedmootandacademic. 11 defendant in Civil Case No. 0009, has filed with the
Hence,thispetitionforcertiorari. Sandiganbayanseveralpleadings13andhisOfferofEvidence.14
Ivotetograntthepetition. AllthedefendantsofCivilCaseNo.0009weregivennoticeof
It is important to note that theSecond Amended Notice to thescheduledtestimonybyoraldepositionofMauriceV.Bane.
TakeDepositionofMr.MauriceV.BaneUponOralExamination, Furthermore, the notice stated that [t]he deposition of said
filedon25September1996,wasaftertheconsolidationofCivil witnessshallbeusedinevidenceinIncidentCaseNo.0130G.R.
No.107789aswell
CaseNo.0130withthemaincase,CivilCaseNo.0009,through
_______________
the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 12 April 1993. This is
12JusticeBrionsmodifieddraftDecision,p.2.
evidentinthecaptionofthenotice,thus:
_______________ 13CommentcumOpposition,filedon18July2008,SBrecords
11Rollo,pp.63,6567. (CivilCaseNo.0009),Volume66,pp.126136;Rejoinder,filedon
226 14September2009,SBrecords(CivilCaseNo.0009),Volume67,
226 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED pp. 206210;Comment cum Opposition, filed on 14 September
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision) 2009, SB records (Civil Case No. 0009), Volume 67, pp. 212
REPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES 213;Memorandum, filed on 8 February 2010, SB records (Civil
SANDIGANBAYAN CaseNo.0009),Volume68,pp.6273.
MANILA 14OfferofEvidencefiledon14May2008,SBrecords(Civil
ThirdDivision CaseNo.0009),Volume65,pp. 539545;SupplementalOfferof
Republic of the Philippines, Evidencefiledon4September2008,SBrecords(CivilCaseNo.
Plaintiff, CIVIL CASE NO. 0009 0009),Volume66,pp.242243.
versus (IncidentCaseNo.0130 227
andG.R.No.107789) VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 227
 Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
asinthemaincaseofCivilCaseNo.0009.15Sincenoticeshave
beendulyservedonallthedefendants,thosewhofailedtoshow
upatthedepositiontakingaredeemedtohavewaivedtheirright
toappearandcrossexaminethedeponent.Indeed,underSection
4,Rule23oftheRulesofCivilProcedure,thedepositionmaybe
usedagainstanypartywhowaspresentorrepresentedat
the taking of the deposition or who had due notice
thereof.Section4,Rule23reads:
Sec.4.Useofdepositions.Atthetrialoruponthehearing
ofamotionoraninterlocutoryproceeding,anypartorallofa
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of
evidence,maybeusedagainstanypartywhowaspresent
orrepresentedatthetakingofthedepositionorwhohad
duenoticethereof,inaccordancewithanyoneofthefollowing
provisions:
(a)Anydepositionmaybeusedbyanypartyforthepurpose
of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as
witness;
(b)Thedepositionofapartyorofanyonewhoatthetimeof
thetakingofthedepositionwasanofficer,director,ormanaging
agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or
associationwhichisapartymaybeusedbyanadversepartyfor
anypurpose;
(c)Thedepositionofawitness,whetherornotaparty,may
beusedbyanypartyforanypurposeifthecourtfinds:(1)that
the witness is dead; or (2)that the witness resides at a
distancemorethanonehundred(100)kilometersfromthe
placeoftrialorhearing,orisoutofthePhilippines,unless
itappearsthathisabsencewasprocuredbythepartyofferingthe
deposition;or(3)thatthewitnessisunabletoattendortestify
becauseofage,sickness,infirmity,orimprisonment;or(4)that
thepartyofferingthedepositionhasbeenunabletoprocurethe
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application
andnotice,thatsuchexceptionalcircumstancesexistastomake
itdesirable,intheinterestofjusticeandwithdueregardtothe
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in
opencourt,toallowthedepositiontobeused;and
(d) ifonlypartofthedepositionisofferedinevidencebya
party,the adverse partymayrequire him to introduceallof it
whichisrelevanttothe
_______________
15Underscoringintheoriginal.
228
228 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
partintroduced,andanypartymayintroduceanyotherparts.
(Emphasissupplied)
GrantingthatamongthedefendantsinthemainCivilCase
No.0009,onlyVictorAfricaisapartytotheincidentCivilCase
No. 0130, still all the other defendants in Civil Case No. 0009
weregivennoticeofthescheduleddepositiontaking.Thereason
whyallthedefendantsweregivennoticeofthesaiddeposition
takingwasbecauseatthattime,CivilCaseNo.0130wasalready
consolidatedwithCivilCaseNo.0009andasemphasizedinthe
secondamendednotice,[t]hedepositionofsaidwitnessshall
be used in evidence in Incident Case No. 0130G.R. No.
107789aswellasinthemaincaseofCivilCaseNo.0009.16
The Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 12 April 1993 which
consolidated the main case, Civil Case No. 0009, with several
incidentcasesincludingCivilCaseNo.0130,reads:
RepublicofthePhilippines
SANDIGANBAYAN
Manila
 JOSE L. AFRICA, ET AL.,
THIRDDIVISION Plaintiffs,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, versusCIVILCASENO.0045
Plaintiff, EDUARDO M. VILLANUEVA and
versusCIVILCASENO.0009 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
JOSE L. AFRICA, ET AL., GOOD GOVERNMENT,
Defendants. Defendants.
xx xx
VICTOR AFRICA, ET AL., JOSE L. AFRICA, ET AL.,
Intervenors, Plaintiffs,
xx versusCIVILCASENO.0047
_______________ MELQUIADES GUTIERREZ, ET AL.,
16Underscoringintheoriginal;boldfacingsupplied. Defendants.
229 xx
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 229 VICTOR AFRICA, ET AL.,
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision) Plaintiffs,
POLYGON INVESTORS AND MANAGERS, versusCIVILCASENO.0130230
INC., 230 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Plaintiff, Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
versusCIVILCASENO.0043 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, ET AL.,
GOOD GOVERNMENT, ET AL., Defendants.
Defendants. xx
xx TRADERS ROYAL BANK,
AEROCOM INVESTORS AND MANAGERS, Plaintiff,
INC., versusCIVILCASENO.0131
Plaintiff, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
versusCIVILCASENO.0044 GOOD GOVERNMENT, ET AL.,
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON Defendants.
GOOD GOVERNMENT, ET AL., xx
Defendants. FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO.,
xx Plaintiff,
versusCIVILCASENO.0139
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON Plaintiffs,
GOOD GOVERNMENT, ET AL., versusCIVILCASENO.0114
Defendants. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION Present:
xx ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, HERMOSISIMA,J.,
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, Defendant. Chairman,
Plaintiff, DEL ROSARIO &
versusCIVILCASENO.0143 DE LEON,JJ.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON Promulgated:April15,1993
GOOD GOVERNMENT, ET AL., xx
Defendants. RESOLUTION
xx
DELEON,J.
TRADERS ROYAL BANK,
SubmittedforresolutionistheMotionforConsolidation,dated
Plaintiff,
June 22, 1992, filed by the Republic of the Philippines
versusCIVILCASENO.0128
(representedbythePCGG),throughcounsel.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
The record shows that there is no opposition in the
GOOD GOVERNMENT, ET AL.,
aboveentitled cases to the said motion. It also appears
Defendants.
that the subject matters of the aboveentitled cases are
xx231
and/ormaybetreatedasmereincidentsinCivilCaseNo.
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 231
0009.232
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
232 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
DOMESTIC SATELLITE
PHILIPPINES, INC., Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Petitioner, WHEREFORE, the aboveentitled cases are hereby
versusCIVILCASENO.0106 ordered consolidated withCivilCaseNo. 0009, andshall
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON henceforthbeconsideredandtreatedasmereincidentsof
GOOD GOVERNMENT AND THE saidCivilCaseNo.0009.
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, SOORDERED.
Respondents. Manila,Philippines,April12,1993.17
xx Section1,Rule31oftheRulesofCourtprovides:
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS Section1.Consolidation.When actions involving a
SATELLITE CORPORATION AND commonquestionoflaworfactarependingbeforethecourt,it
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS TELECOM mayorderajointhearingortrialofanyorallthemattersinissue
MUNICATIONS CORPORATION,
intheactions;itmayorderalltheactionsconsolidated;and
itmaymakesuchordersconcerningproceedingsthereinasmay
tendtoavoidunnecessarycostsordelay.(Emphasissupplied)
The 12 April 1993 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
orderedaconsolidationofallthecases,notmerelyajoint
hearingortrial.
Justice Brion maintains that to resolve the issue of the
admissibility of the Bane deposition, the effect of the
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130 with Civil Case No. 0009
shouldfirstbedetermined.JusticeBrionemphasizesthatdespite
the consolidation, the two cases remain distinct and separate
from each other, such that a mere notice of deposition taking,
even if under the expressed intent of using the testimony in
evidenceinthemaincase,cannotautomaticallybindtheprivate
respondentswhowerenotpreviouslyheardthereon.
InhismodifieddraftDecision,JusticeBrionpositsthatthe
consolidationofCivilCaseNo.0009withseveralincidentcases
includingCivilCaseNo.0130ismerelyaconsolidationfortrial.
Onpage31ofthemodifiedDraftDecision,aconsolidationfor
trial,asdefinedinAmericanjurisprudenceis:
Whereseveralactionsareorderedtobetriedtogetherbuteach
retains its separate character and requires entry of a separate
judgment.Thistypeof
_______________
17SB Records (Civil Case No. 0009), Volume 18, pp. 6646
6649.(Boldfacingsupplied)
233
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or
causethepartiestooneactiontobepartiestotheother.
In this kind of consolidation, the cases are merely tried
togetherbutadecisionisrenderedseparatelyineachcase.
In Philippine jurisprudence,the consolidation of cases
mergesthedifferentactionsintooneandtherightsofthe
partiesareadjudicatedinasinglejudgment,thus:
The effect ofconsolidationofactionsis tounite and
mergeallofthedifferentactionsconsolidatedintoasingle
action, in the same manner as if the different causes of
action involved had originally been joined in a single
action, and the order of consolidation, if made by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to the
different actions until it is vacated or set aside.After the
consolidationtherecanbenofurtherproceedingsinthe
separateactions,whicharebyvirtueoftheconsolidation
discontinued and superseded by a single action, which
shouldbeentitledinsuchmannerasthecourtmaydirect,
andallsubsequentproceedingsthereinbeconductedand
the rights of the parties adjudicated in a single
action.18(Emphasissupplied)
Indeed,whenconsolidatedcasesareappealedtotheSupreme
CourtorwhentheCourtordersconsolidationofcases,theJustice
to whom the consolidated cases are assigned renders a single
decision, adjudicating all the rights of the parties in the
consolidated cases.19The Chief Justice assigns the consolidated
cases to the MemberinCharge to whom the case having the
lowerorlowestdocketnumberhasbeenraffled.20
233 _______________
182 V. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines352353(1973).
19SeeRepublic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 166859, 169203 & 180702, 12 April 2011, 648 SCRA
47;RaquelSantosv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.Nos.174986,175071
& 181415, 7 July 2009, 592 SCRA 169;Grefalde v.
Sandiganbayan,401Phil.553;348SCRA367(2000).
20Active Wood Products, Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 260
Phil.825;181SCRA774(1990).Section5,Rule9oftheInternal
RulesoftheSupremeCourtreads:
234
234 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
The12April1993ResolutionoftheSandiganbayanordered
theconsolidationoftheincidentalcases,includingCivilCaseNo.
0130,withthemaincase,CivilCaseNo.0009.Unlikeamere
orderofajointhearingortrialofanyorallthemattersin
issue in the actions, theconsolidation of actions merges
thedifferentac
_______________
SEC.5.Consolidationofcases.TheCourtmayorder
the consolidation of cases involving common questions of
laworfact.TheChiefJusticeshallassigntheconsolidated
casesto theMemberinCharge towhomthecasehaving
thelowerorlowestdocketnumberhasbeenraffled,subject
toequalizationofcasesloadbyraffle.TheJudicialRecords
Officeshallseetoitthat(a)therollosoftheconsolidated
casesarejoinedtogethertopreventtheloss,misplacement
or detachment of any of them; and (b) the cover of
eachrolloindicates the G.R. or UDK number of the case
withwhichtheformerisconsolidated.
TheMemberinChargewhofindsafterstudythatthe
casesdonotinvolvecommonquestionsoflaworoffactmay
requesttheCourttohavethecaseorcasesreturnedtothe
originalMemberinCharge.
The Sandiganbayan has a similar rule regarding the
consolidationof cases.Section 2,Rule XII ofthe Revised
Internal Rules of Sandiganbayan (A.M. No. 02607SB
dated28August2002)provides:
SEC.2.Consolidation of Cases.Cases arising from
the same incident or series of incidents, or involving
commonquestionsoffactandlaw,maybeconsolidatedin
theDivisiontowhichthe casebearing thelowest docket
numberisraffled.
(a)BeforeCasesAreRaffledShouldtheproprietyof
consolidationappearuponthefilingofthecasesconcerned
asdeterminedbytheRaffleCommittee,allsuchcasesshall
beconsolidatedandconsideredasonecaseforpurposesof
theraffleandinventoryofpendingcasesassignedtoeach
oftheDivisions.
(b)After Cases Are RaffledShould the propriety of
such consolidation become apparent only after the cases
are raffled, consolidation may be effected upon written
motionofalitigantconcernedfiledwiththeDivisiontaking
cognizanceofthecasetobeconsolidated.Ifthemotionis
granted, consolidation shall be made to the Division in
whichthecasewiththelowestdocketnumberisassigned.
The Division to which the cases are consolidated shall
transfertotheDivisionfromwhichtheconsolidatedcases
came,anequivalentnumberofcasesofapproximatelythe
sameage,natureandstageintheproceedings,withproper
noticetothepartiesinsaidcases.
235
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 235
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
tionsintoonesingleaction.Thismeansthatevidence,suchas
depositions,takenaftertheconsolidationisadmissibleinallthe
actionsconsolidatedwheneverrelevantormaterial.Inthiscase,
since the notice and the depositiontaking was after the
consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130 with the main case, Civil
CaseNo.0009,thedepositioncouldbeadmittedasevidencein
theconsolidatedcases.21
Thepurposeofconsolidationistoavoidmultiplicityofsuits,
preventdelay,clearcongesteddockets,simplifytheworkofthe
trial court, and save unnecessary costs and expenses. 22The
consolidation of actions involving a common question of law or
fact seeks to prevent a repetition of evidence, such that the
testimonyofwitnessesmaybeusedinalltheconsolidatedcases
wheneveritisrelevantormaterial.
InBank of Commerce v. PerlasBernabe,23the Court ordered
theconsolidationoftwocaseswhichinvolvethesamefocalissue
and require substantially the same evidence on the matter.
Similarly, inDomdom v. Third and Fifth Division of the
Sandiganbayan,24theCourtorderedtheconsolidationofcasesin
the Sandiganbayan, where the core element of the cases is
substantially the sameandthemainwitness isalso thesame.
TheCourtheld:
InTestonv.DevelopmentBankofthePhilippines,theCourt
laiddowntherequisitesfortheconsolidationofcases,viz.:
Acourtmayorderseveralactionspendingbeforeittobetried
together where they arise fromthe same act, event or
transaction,involve the same or like issues, and depend
largelyorsubstantiallyonthesameevidence,providedthat
thecourthasjurisdictionoverthecasestobeconsolidatedand
thatajointtrialwillnotgiveonepartyanundueadvantageor
prejudicethesubstantiverightsoftheparties.
_______________
21ItisevenheldinAmericanjurisprudencethat[w]heretwo
or more actions are consolidated, a deposition taken in one of
thempriortotheconsolidationisadmissibleonthetrialofthe
consolidatedaction.(1C.J.S.1375)
22Philippine National Bank v. Gotesco Tyan Ming
Development, Inc.,G.R. No. 183211, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA
798;RepublicofthePhilippinesv.CourtofAppeals,451Phil.497;
403SCRA403(2003).
23G.R.No.172393,20October2010,634SCRA107.
24G.R.Nos.18238283,24February2010,613SCRA528.
236
236 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
The rule allowing consolidation is designed to avoid
multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression or abuse, to
prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, and to simplify the
workofthetrialcourtinshort,theattainmentofjusticewith
theleastexpenseandvexationtothepartieslitigants.
xxx
Inthepresentcase,itwouldbemoreinkeepingwithlawand
equityifallthecasesfiledagainstpetitionerwereconsolidated
with that having the lowest docket number pending with the
Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The only notable
differencesinthesecaseslieinthedateofthetransaction,the
entitytransactedwithandtheamountinvolved.Thechargeand
core element are the sameestafathrough falsification of
documents based on alleged overstatements of claims for
miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses. Notably, the main
witnessisalsothesameHilconedaP.Abril.
Itneednotbeunderscoredthatconsolidationofcases,when
proper, results in the simplification of proceedingswhich saves
time, the resources of the parties and the courts and the
abbreviation of trial. It contributes to the swift dispensation of
justice,andisinaccordwiththeaimofaffordingthepartiesa
just,speedyandinexpensivedeterminationoftheircasesbefore REPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES
the courts. Above all, consolidation avoids the possibility of SANDIGANBAYAN
renderingconflictingdecisionsintwoormorecaseswhichwould MANILA
otherwise require a single judgment.25(Emphasis and ThirdDivision
underscoringintheoriginal) Republic of the Philippines,
Inthiscase,MauriceV.Baneisavitalwitnessinthemain Plaintiff,
CivilCaseNo.0009andtheincidentalCivilCaseNo.0130.In CIVIL CASE NO. 0009
fact, as pointed out by Justice Brion, in petitioners PreTrial versus (IncidentCaseNo.0130
Briefdated30August1996,petitionerofferedtopresentMaurice andG.R.No.107789)
V.BaneasoneofthewitnessesinthemainCivilCaseNo.0009. JOSE L. AFRICA, ET AL.,
Thus, when petitioner filed on 25 September 1996 itsSecond Defendants.
AmendedNoticetoTakeDepositionofMr.MauriceV.BaneUpon xx
Oral Examination, in Civil Case No. 0009 in connection with SECONDAMENDEDNOTICETOTAKEDEPOSITIONOFMR.
Incident Case No. 0130 and G.R. No. 107789, petitioner MAURICEV.BANEUPONORALEXAMINATION
emphasized that [t]he deposition of said witness shall be
usedinevidenceinIncidentCaseNo.0130G.R.No.10779
aswellasinthemaincaseofCivilCaseNo.0009.Infact, PursuanttoRule2426oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,noticeis
alltherespondentsweregiventhechancetobeheardconsidering herebygiventodefendantsJoseL.Africa(deceased)thru
thatallthedefendantsofCivilCaseNo.0009weregivennoticeof hisEstaterepresentedbyVictorAfricaandAtty.Juande
_______________ OcampoandAtty.YolandaJavellana,ManuelH.Nieto,Jr.,
25
Id.,atpp.535536. Ferdinand E. Marcos (deceased) thru his Estate
237 representedbySpecialAdministratrixBIRCommissioner
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 237 LiwaywayVinzonsChato,ImeldaR.Marcos,FerdinandR.
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision) Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio
thescheduledtestimonybyoraldepositionofMauriceV.Bane, thru their counsels on records that Plaintiff thru the
whichwastakenon23and24October1996.Thisisveryclear undersigned counsel will take the testimony by oral
from petitionersSecond Amended Notice to Take Deposition of depositionofMr.MauriceV.Banec/oCable&WirelessPlc.,
Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination, filed on 25 124TheobaldsRoad,LondonWC1X8RX,EnglandonOctober23,
September 1996, in Civil Case No. 0009 in connection with 24and25,1996at9:00a.m.and2:00p.m.,untilfinishedbefore
IncidentCaseNo.0130andG.R.No.107789,thus: thePhilippineConsulGeneralinLondon,England,inhisofficeor
inasuitableplaceinLondonorinWales,England,asmaybe
advisedtotheparties.
 _______________
26NowRule23ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure.
238
238 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
ThepurposeofthedepositionisforMr.MauriceBane
toidentifyandtestifyonthefactssetforthinhisAffidavit
heretoattachedasAnnexAsoastoprovetheownership
issue in favor of plaintiff and/or establishprima
faciefactual foundation for sequestration of Easterns
ClassAstockinsupportoftheVeryUrgentPetitionFor
AuthorityToHoldSpecialStockholdersMeetingForthe
Sole Purpose of Increasing Easterns Authorized Capital
Stock (Incident Case No. 0130 G.R. No. 107789).The
deposition of said witness shall be used in evidence in
Incident Case No. 0130G.R. No. 107789 as well as in the
main case of Civil Case No. 0009.(Underscoring in the
original;boldfacingsupplied)
InhismodifieddraftDecision,JusticeBrionmaintainsthat
respondents notice of the taking of the Bane deposition is
insufficientwaiveroftheirrighttoappearandcrossexaminethe
deponentwhentheyfailedtoshowupatthedepositiontaking.
JusticeBrioninsiststhatrespondentscannot be boundby the
takingoftheBanedepositionwithouttheconsequentimpairment
oftheirrighttocrossexamine.27
I disagree. The 12 April 1993 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan,orderingtheconsolidationoftheincidentalcases,
includingCivilCaseNo.0130,withthemaincase,CivilCaseNo.
0009, effectively merged the different actions into one single
action.Theconsolidationofthecaseswasmeanttoexpeditiously
settle the interwovenissuesinvolved inthe consolidated cases.
Thesimplificationoftheproceedingswiththeaimofaffordingthe
parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
cases before the courts can be achieved when repetition of the
sameevidenceorpresentationofidenticalwitnessesisdispensed
with.Thismeansthatevidence,suchasdepositions,takenafter
the consolidation is admissible in all the actions consolidated
wheneverrelevantormaterial.Inthiscase,sincethenoticeand
thedepositiontakingwasaftertheconsolidationofCivilCaseNo.
0130 with the main case, Civil Case No. 0009, the deposition
could be admitted as evidence in the consolidated cases. This
CourthasevenheldinYu,Sr.v.BasilioG.MagnoConstruction
andDevel
_______________
27JusticeBrionsmodifieddraftDecision,p.47.
239
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 239
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
opment Enterprises, Inc.28that in consolidated cases, [t]he
evidenceineachcaseeffectivelybecametheevidenceofboth,and
there ceased to exist any need for the deciding judge to take
judicialnoticeoftheevidencepresentedineachcase.Besides,
even assuming that the 12 April 1993 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayanmerelyorderedajointhearingoraconsolidation
for trial, private respondents are still bound by the Bane
deposition considering that they were given notice of the
depositiontaking.Theevidenceadducedinajointtrialbindsall
theparties.Otherwise,whatwouldbethepointofholdingajoint
trialifcommonwitnesseshavetobepresentedagainineachof
the cases and the same evidence offered again and again?
Precisely,ajointtrialaimstopreventrepetitionofthesameor
commonevidenceand tosparethecommonwitnesses from the
unnecessary inconvenience of testifying on the same issues in
separateproceedingsifthecaseswerenotjointlytried.Torule
otherwiseistofrustratethepurposeofajointtrialwhichisto
preventdelayandsaveunnecessarycostsandexpense.29
InTanv.Lim,30theCourtevenallowedevidencethathasnot
been formally offered in a case which was jointly heard with
another case because evidence offered during the joint hearing
wasdeemedevidenceforbothcaseswhichwerejointlyheard.The
Courtruled:
ItmaybetruethatSection34,Rule132oftheRulesdirects thehearingofamotionoraninterlocutoryproceeding,anypart
the court to consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered and that under Section 35, documentary evidence is
offered after presentation of testimonial evidence. However, a
liberal interpretation of these Rules would have convinced the
trialcourtthataseparateformalofferofevidenceinCivilCase
No. 6518 was superfluous because not only was an offer of
evidence made in Civil Case No. 6521 that was being jointly
heardbythetrialcourt,counselforJoseRenatoLimhadalready
declaredhewasadoptingtheseevidencesforCivilCaseNo.6518.
Thetrialcourtitselfstatedthatitwouldfreelyutilizeinonecase
evidenceadducedintheotheronlytolaterabandonthisposture.
JoseRenatoLimtestifiedinCivilCaseNo.6518.Thetrialcourt
shouldhaveatleastconsideredhistestimonysinceatthetimeit
wasmade,the
_______________
28G.R.Nos.13870102,17October2006,504SCRA618,634.
29Mendozav.CourtofAppeals,240Phil.561;156SCRA597
(1987).
30357Phil.452;296SCRA455(1998).
240
240 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Rulesprovidedthattestimonialevidenceisdeemedofferedatthe
timethewitnessiscalledtotestify.Rulesofprocedureshouldnot
be applied in a very rigid, technical case as they are devised
chieflytosecureandnotdefeatsubstantialjustice.31
Furthermore, Justice Brion posits that in determining the
admissibilityoftheBanedeposition,notonlySection4,Rule23
must be considered but also Section 47, Rule 130. The said
provisionsread:
Sec.4.[Rule 23]Use of depositions.At the trial or upon
orallofadeposition,sofarasadmissibleundertherules
of evidence, may be used against any party who was
presentorrepresentedatthetakingofthedepositionor
whohadduenoticethereof,inaccordancewithanyoneofthe
followingprovisions:
(a)Anydepositionmaybeusedbyanypartyforthepurpose
of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as
witness;
(b)Thedepositionofapartyorofanyonewhoatthetimeof
thetakingofthedepositionwasanofficer,director,ormanaging
agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or
associationwhichisapartymaybeusedbyanadversepartyfor
anypurpose;
(c)Thedepositionofawitness,whetherornotaparty,may
beusedbyanypartyforanypurposeifthecourtfinds:(1)that
the witness is dead; or (2)that the witness resides at a
distancemorethanonehundred(100)kilometersfromthe
placeoftrialorhearing,orisoutofthePhilippines,unless
itappearsthathisabsencewasprocuredbythepartyofferingthe
deposition;or(3)thatthewitnessisunabletoattendortestify
becauseofage,sickness,infirmity,orimprisonment;or(4)that
thepartyofferingthedepositionhasbeenunabletoprocurethe
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application
andnotice,thatsuchexceptionalcircumstancesexistastomake
itdesirable,intheinterestofjusticeandwithdueregardtothe
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in
opencourt,toallowthedepositiontobeused;and
(d) ifonlypartofthedepositionisofferedinevidencebya
party,the adverse partymayrequire him to introduceallof it
which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may
introduceanyotherparts.
_______________
31Id.,atpp.478479;p.482.
241
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Sec.47.[Rule 130]Testimony or deposition at a former
proceeding.Thetestimonyordepositionofawitnessdeceasedor
unable to testify,given in a former case or proceeding,
judicialoradministrative,involvingthesamepartiesandsubject
matter,maybegiveninevidenceagainsttheadversepartywho
hadtheopportunitytocrossexaminehim.(Emphasissupplied)
Inmyopinion,Section47,Rule130doesnotapplyinthiscase
since the Bane deposition was not taken in a former case or
proceeding. The records show that theBane deposition was
taken when the cases were already consolidated.Clearly,
thereisnoformerproceedingtospeakofwhichwouldrequire
the application of Section 47, Rule 130.The Bane deposition
wastakeninCIVILCASENO.0009(IncidentCaseNo.0130
andG.R.No.107789).Infact,intheSecondAmendedNoticeto
Take Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral
Examination,filedon25September1996,thetitleofthecasewas
REPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,versusJOSEL.
AFRICA,ETAL.,DefendantswithcasenumberCIVILCASE
NO.0009(IncidentCaseNo.0130andG.R.No.107789).Thus,
Justice Brions reliance on Section 47, Rule 130 is misplaced.
Besides,evenifSection47isapplicable,theBanedepositionmay
stillbegiveninevidenceagainsttherespondentssinceallofthem
weregivennoticeofthedeposition,andthushadtheopportunity
to crossexamine the deponent had they participated in the
depositiontaking.Sincenoticeshavebeendulyservedonallthe
respondents,thosewhofailedtoshowupatthedepositiontaking
are deemed to have waived their right to appear and cross
examinethedeponent.
Inthiscase,theSandiganbayangrantedtherequestforthe
241 takingofthedepositionofMauriceV.Bane,whowasExecutive
VicePresident and Treasurer of ETPI from 1974 until his
retirement in 1987.32In October 1996, during the deposition
taking,MauriceV.Banewasalready72yearsoldandresidingat
1EctonHall,Church
_______________
32Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane,p.10;Rollo,p.89.
242
242 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Way,Ecton,Northants(England).33Clearly,underSection4(c)(2)
of Rule 23,34the deposition of Maurice V. Bane can be used as
direct evidence. Infact, initsResolutions issuedon21August
2000 and 3 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan stated that the
depositionofMauriceV.Banehasbecomepartandparcelof
the record of this main case (Civil Case No. 0009) since
CivilCaseNo.0130isanincidenttothesame.
AcursoryreadingoftheBanedeposition,whichtooktwodays
tocompleteandcovers211pagesofthetranscriptofrecordofthe
proceedings and the testimony, reveals that it is a critical and
vital evidence in the case of petitioner against private
respondentswithregardtoitsallegationinCivilCaseNo.0009
that private respondents shareholdings in ETPI were illegally
purchasedandrightlybelongstotheGovernment.
Thetestimonyofthewitness,MauriceV.Bane,wasofferedfor
thefollowingpurposes:
[I]ngeneralthetestimonyisofferedtoprovethattheClassA
stockholdingsinEasternTelecommunicationsPhilippinesInc,or
Eastern for short, otherwise referred to as the Filipino 60%
equity, isill gotten in nature; that theactual and/or beneficial
ownerofsaidshareswasthelatePresidentFerdinandMarcos;
andthataccordingly,saidsharesaresubjecttoreversion
_______________
33Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane,p.8;Rollo,p.87.
34Sec.4.[Rule23]Useofdepositions.Atthetrialorupon
thehearingofamotionoraninterlocutoryproceeding,anypart
orallofadeposition,sofarasadmissibleundertherules
of evidence, may be used against any party who was
presentorrepresentedatthetakingofthedepositionor
whohadduenoticethereof,inaccordancewithanyoneofthe
followingprovisions:
xxx
(c)Thedepositionofawitness,whetherornotaparty,may
beusedbyanypartyforanypurposeifthecourtfinds:(1)that
the witness is dead; or (2)that the witness resides at a
distancemorethanonehundred(100)kilometersfromthe
placeoftrialorhearing,orisoutofthePhilippines,unless
itappearsthathisabsencewasprocuredbythepartyofferingthe
deposition;(Emphasissupplied)
243
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
and/or forfeiture in favor of the Plaintiff Republic of the
Philippinesinthiscase.Specifically,thetestimonyisofferedto
establish the environmental facts and attendant circumstances
surroundingtheformationandorganizationofEasternin1974;
thattherewasduressand/orcompulsionexerteduponCable&
Wirelessanditswhollyownedsubsidiary,theEasternExtension
Australasia Telegraph Company, of which the witness was the
then General Manager in the Philippines, such that Cable &
Wireless and Eastern Extension Australasia were forced or
compelled to give up their legitimate business activities in the
Philippineswhichwas100%BritishownedinfavorofEastern,
which was tobe newly organized as a 60/40 Filipinocompany,
with40%beingfortheaccountofthecompanyofthewitness,Mr.
Bane.
Inshort,thewitnesswillestablishintheseproceedingsthat
PresidentMarcosand/orhisemissariesorpartiesactingonhis
behalfgavethewitnessonlytwopossibleoptionswhichwas:(1)a
40% equity in the company to be newly organized, which is
Eastern in exchange for surrendering all of the assets and
franchiseofEasternExtensionAustralasia;or100%ofnothing,
meaningthatifthewitnessandhiscompanyrefusedtogiveup
theirlegitimatebusinessinthePhilippinesthenMarcosmadeit
clearthattherewillbenomoreEasternExtensionAustralasia
thatwouldbeoperatinginthePhilippines.
Lastly,thetestimonyisofferedtoprovetheownershipissue
that is involved in this case in favor of the Plaintiff, and also
supportthependingpetitionofEasternTelecomstoincreaseits
authorizedcapitalstockfromthepresent250millionpesosto4
billionpesosbyallowingthePCGGtovotethesequesteredClass
A stock in the company. Hence, the testimony will establish
theprima faciefactual foundation for maintaining the
243 sequestrationoftheClassAstock.35
 In the deposition of Maurice V. Bane, he identified and
affirmed his Affidavit36dated 9 January 1999. Excerpts from
Banestestimony
_______________
35Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane,pp.89;Rollo,pp.8788.
36AFFIDAVIT Telecommunications Corp. (POTC) which at that time was
I,MAURICEV.BANE,oflegalagemarried,aBritish[words
missingfromphotocopy],andwithbusinessaddressatEastern
Telecommunications [missing words] Inc., Telecoms Plaza, Sen.
Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati, Manila, after being duly sworn, do
herebydeposeandsay,
244
244 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
duringthedepositiontakingareasfollow:
_______________
1.I am presently the Senior Adviser of Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), a Philippine
corporation duly registered and authorized to engage in the
businessoftelecommunicationsinthePhilippinessince1974;
2. Until my retirement, I served as the representative of
Cable and Wireless, Ltd., (C&W) a British company that
presentlyowns40%oftheoutstandingcapitalstocksofETPI,
C&W,throughitswhollyownedsubsidiary,EasternExtension
AustralasiaandChinaTelephoneCo.,(EEATC),wasformerly
thesoleownerandoperatorofthefranchisethatisnowowned
and held by ETPI. The company has been operating in the
Philippinessince1880initiallyunderaroyaldecreefromSpain.
FollowingthePacificWarin1945,thefranchisewasrenewedin
1952bythePhilippineGovernmentunderthenPresidentElpidio
Quirino;
3.In the late 60s the possibility of establishing earth
satellite stations in the Philippines arose as a result of heavy
pressurefromtheU.S.Militarywhoweretobeitsmajorusers.
Manycompaniesandconsortiums,includingEEATCbiddedfor
thecontract.ThenPresidentMarcosfinallyawardedthecontract
together with the franchise to the Philippines Overseas
relatively unknown in the international communications
industry.TheprimemoversofPOTCwereMessrs.Potenciano
Ilusorio,HonorioPoblador,ManuelH.Nieto,Jr.andRobertoS.
Benedicto, who were all known Marcos associates. This group
becameverymuchapartofthePhilippinestelecommunications
scene.
4. EEATC forged a partnership with POTC for the
establishment of a tropospheric scatter system communications
with Taiwan. A franchise, Oceanic Wireless Network, Inc. was
purchased and all government approvals were obtained by
Messrs.NietoandIlusorio.Thesystemwasinstalledandduring
its inauguration, the principal guests were President and Mrs.
Marcos, showing perhaps the political influence of Nieto and
Ilusorio.
5.When President Marcos declared Martial Law in
September 1972, it was clearthat his grip on the country was
virtuallycomplete.C&Wwasfullyawareofitsuneasytenurein
the Philippines. In March 1973, then Secretary of National
Defense Juan Ponce Enrile called us to a conference at Camp
Crame. I attended the said meeting together with the
representatives of RCA and Globe Mackay. Secretary Enrile
firmlytoldusthatwehaduntilJuly,1974toorganizeourselves
into60/40corporationswithFilipinomajorityownershipand,if
we did not comply, the Government would take the necessary
action.
 6.I pointed out that EEATC was not covered by the
LaurelLangley Act since we were a British corporation with a
fullyconstitutionalfranchise.SecretaryEnrilesaidthatifwedid
notcomplywithhisdirective,therewouldbenomoreEEATC;
245
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
MR.LIM:Mr.Bane,paragraph2ofyouraffidavitrefers
to a company ETPI, the acronym in letter ETPI.
MayIaskyou,sir,whatisETPI?
_______________
7.Whilewemighthavelegalandvalidgroundstocontest
the directive, under the prevailing martial law
restrictionswehadlittlerecoursebuttocomply.After
considering all economic and political factors, it was
felt that some form of partnership with the POTC
groupwouldbethemostadvantageousoption;
8. Prior to the above, discussions had been held with
IlusorioandPoblador,whothenappearedinchargeof
POTCdiscussionsweregenerallyunsatisfactorysince
itwasquitehardtopinIlusoriodownandwegained
theimpressionthattheywantedustogivethemtheir
participation in EEATC with minimal monetary
considerationinreturnforpoliticalprotection;
9.In approximately April/May 1973, rapid changes took
placeinPOTC.IlusorioandPobladorappearedtohave
losttheir control inPOTCandNietoemergedasthe
controllingfigure.Welearnedmuchlaterthatthiswas
upon the instructions of President Marcos. Thus,
discussions concerning EEATC were continued with
Nieto;
10.ThetimefactorwasimportantwithJuly1974overthe
horizonanditwasagreedtocallameetingwiththe
accounting group of SyCip, Gorres and Velayo as
intermediary.Atthesaidmeeting,wefoundthatAtty.
Jose Africa was the main representative of
Nieto/POTC. He had previously not seemed a major
figureinthegroupalthoughhehadattendedseveral
245 board meetings of Oceanic Wireless. Africa quickly
speltouttherulesthattheywereinterestedinthe
proposition and that we were to deal only with the
DANgroup(composedofRobertoBenedicto,JoseAfrica
and Manuel Nieto, Jr.). We were informed that this
wasattheexpresswishofPresidentMarcoswhohad
appointed their group to control the
telecommunicationsinterests;
11. Negotiations were thereafter commenced with Mr.
EduardoM.VillanuevaofSGVasintermediary,David
West and W. H. Davies were the major C&W
participants.WealsorequestedAtty.LucianoSalazar
LawOfficetorepresentusonlegalmatters;
12. The figure eventually negotiated for the assets (net
book value only and no good will) was Ten Million
Pesos(P10,000,000.00)onthebasisofwhichtheBAN
group will put up Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00).
Furthermeetingstookplacetofinalizethedetailsbut
Africalaterinformedusthattheycouldnotraisethe
requiredamount.Asacompromise,hesuggestedthat
the new corporation raise a bank loan from which
C&Wcouldbepaid.Whilewewerenothappywith
this arrangement, we resigned ourselves to the fact
that we would have to accede. It was agreed that
stockholderscontributionwouldbeFiveMillionPesos
(P5,000,000.00)plusabankloanofSevenMillionPesos
(P7,000,000.00) to cover asset payment and working
capital.Africathenadvisedthattheycouldonlyraise
 246
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
AThats Eastern Telecommunications Philippines,
Incorporated.
QETPIandEasternrefertothesamecompany,whichis
Eastern Telecoms or the full name thereof, Eastern
TelecommunicationsPhilippines,Inc?
AThatscorrect,yes.
QAgain,yourHonor,forconsistencyintheproceedings,
insteadofETPI,thequestionsandtheanswerswill
refer to Eastern Telecommunications Philippines,
Inc as simply Eastern. Paragraph 2 also of your
affidavitrefers to EEATC. Please, sir, tell us, Mr.
Bane,whatposition,whatparticularpositionyouheld
inEEATCwhenitwasoperatinginthePhilippines?
AIwasthegeneralmanager.
QWasthatthehighestpositioninthePhilippines?Was
that the highest office in EEATC in the Philippine
operation?
_______________
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and C&W could loan
them Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00). Again, we
wereunhappybutagainwecomplied;
13. All the necessary documents, articles, bylaws and
stockholdersagreementsweredrawnupbytheSalazar
Law Office. Of particular delicacy was the issue of
franchise.Itwasdecidedthattheoldfranchiseshould
beretainedinalldetailbutthiswastobetransferred
to a new company to be called Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. Atty. Salazar
draftedthePresidentialDecreeforthetransferofthe
franchise.ThedraftwaspersonallydeliveredtoNieto
who committed to secure President Marcos approval
and signature. True enough, Marcos signed the P.D.
Drafted by Atty. Salazar in its entirety, without any
revisionoramendment.Thiswasconvincingevidence
ofthepoliticalpowerandinfluenceoftheBANgroup;
14. Aftercomplyingwithalltheregistrationrequirements
andothergovernmentregulations,ETPIcommenced
to fully operate as a telecommunications company
underitsnewfranchiseinAugust1974;
15. Iamexecutingthisaffidavittoattesttothetruthof
theforegoingfactsinordertoelucidateontheevents
andcircumstancesthatledtothetransferoftheassets
andfranchiseofEEATCinfavorofETPIandthe
emergenceofBANgroupthereat.
Affiantfurthersayethnaught.
09January1991,Makati,MetroManila.
(signed)
MAURICE V. BANE
Affiant
247
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 247
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
AYes, it was, yes, the British terminology for these
thingsquiteoftenisthatwealwaysusedtoreferto
managersbuttheAmericanterminology,ofcourse,
isusuallypresidentitwastheequivalentof.
QThankyou,sir.Now,justforclaritycanyouelaborate
onwhatwasEEATCinrelationtoCableandWireless
orC&W?
MR.AFRICA:Hehasalreadyanswered,yourHonor.
 AYes,itwasawholly,100%ownedsubsidiaryofCable
andWireless.37
xxx
QxxxMr.Bane,Iwouldreferyoubacktoparagraph3
ofyouraffidavit,sir.Inotedfromyournarrationin
paragraph3thattheearthsatellitestationscontract
which you had just explained was awarded after
bidding by President Marcos to a company you
mentioned here which is Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation, or POTC. My
questionis:doyouknowthisPOTC,whatwasit?
AYes,itwastheIthinkImcorrectinsayingitwas
the management arm of Philcomsat. Philcomsat,
Philippines Telecommunications
Corporation.POTC,wellthemanagersofPhilcomsat,
and I understand that the shareholders were the
sameineachcase.
QIn this paragraph, sir, you stated in reference to
PhilippineOverseasTelecommunicationsCorporation
or POTC that it was relatively unknown in the
international telecommunications industry. Could
youexplainthat?38
xxx
AWell,thereweresome,Ishouldimagine,sometenor
twelve companies were bidding or hoping to be
awardedtheearthstationcontract.Amongthosewas
my own company, Eastern EEATC. We had not
heard of, any of us: RCA, ITT, the large number of
otherdomesticcompaniessuchasClaviciliandothers,
wereallbiddingforthisearthstationandnoneofus
hadheardofPOTCuntilitsuddenlyemergedthatit
wasacompanythathadbeen
_______________
37TranscriptofthenotesontheDepositionofMauriceV.
Bane,pp.1617;Rollo,pp.9596.
38TranscriptofthenotesontheDepositionofMauriceV.
Bane,pp.1920;Rollo,pp.9899.
248
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
formedandthatveryshortlyafterourbidsallwentin,we
heard that it had been, that the contract had been
awardedtoPhilippinesOverseasTelecommunications
Corporation.
QThank you, sir. (Off the record) May I proceed, your
Satellite Honor?Didyoufindoutwhowerethepeoplebehind
POTC?
AYes.
QAndwhowerethey?
ATo the best of my recollection the incorporators were
Potenciano Ilusorio, Honorio Poblador, Ambassador
Nieto,AmbassadorBenedicto,andIthinktherewere
two other gentlemen, one of them I think was the
brotherinlawofMr.NietoandtheotheroneIcannot
recall no, I cant recall his name. He died fairly
soonafter,Ithink,thatwasformed.39
xxx
MR. LIM:Mr. Bane, you mentioned personalities like
PotencianoIlusorio,HonorioPoblador,ManuelNieto
Jr., Roberto Benedicto. My question to you, sir, is:
what was your personal impression of these
gentlemenvisavis, for instance, the Marcos
administration?
 AWell, it was common knowledge among the expatriate,
senior expatriate community that these gentlemen
werecloseassociatesofPresidentMarcos.
MR.AFRICA:MayIalsoobjectagain,yourHonorplease,
to the statement of the witness. Again, its not a
statement of fact but only a matter of discussion
among his coworkers, but facts again are different
fromwhathisperceptionwas.
MR.LIM:Thatisnoted,yourHonor.
CONSULGENERAL:Thatisnoted,Mr.Africa.
MR. LIM:Mr. Witness, was this group of people, these
gentlemenorpersonalitiesthatyouhavementioned,
doyouknowiftheywerelateronidentifiedwithany
particular business or industry sector in the
Philippines?
AYes, they were identified with telecommunication
interests.
QWas there an occasion when your own company,
EEATC,forgedapartnershiporbusinesswithPOTC?
_______________
39TranscriptofthenotesontheDepositionofMauriceV.
Bane,pp.2021;Rollo,pp.99100.
249
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
AYes,therewas.
QWhatwasthebusinessthatthetwocompaniesforged
orengagedin?
AThat business was to establish a tropospheric scatter
systembetweenthePhilippinesandTaiwan.Inactual
fact, it was three companies involved: it was POTC
andalsoWesternUnionInternationalintheUnited
States,andEasternExtensionorEEATC.
xxx
QSo that tropospheric scatter system became
operational?
AOhyes,yes.
QDoyouknowifthesystemwasinaugurated?
AItwas,yes.
QWho were the principal guests during the
inauguration?
APresidentandMrs.Marcos.
QNow what technical qualification did your company,
EEATC, have to operate that tropospheric scatter
system?
AIn addition to being a 20% stockholder, my company
was appointed as managers. Eastern, with the
backingofCable&Wireless,wasabletoprovideall
the necessary technical expertise for the
implementationandoperationofthesystem.Cable&
Wireless as such has done these systems, a large
numberofthesesystemsworldwide,sowehadallthe
experiencenecessary.
QAt that time, meaning at the time this tropospheric
scatter system was established, what was your
companythen,whatwasyourcompanyatthattime?
249 AEasternExtensionAustralasiaandChinaTelegraph.
QEEATC?
AEEATC.
QIfyoudontmind,sir,kindlyrefertothatasEEATC
instead of Eastern. What technical qualification did
POTChavetobeabletobeEEATCspartnerinthis
troposphericsystembusiness?
ATo the best of my knowledge little or no technical
qualification.40
xxx
_______________
40TranscriptofthenotesontheDepositionofMauriceV.
Bane,pp.2325;Rollo,pp.102104.
250
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
QNowMr.Bane,letmenowtakeyoutoparagraph5of
youraffidavitandifImayreadtoyou,sir.Paragraph
5: When President Marcos declared Martial Law in
September 1972, it was clear that his grip on the
countrywasvirtuallycomplete.C&Wwasfullyaware
of its uneasy tenure in the Philippines. In March
1973,thenSecretaryofNationalDefenseJuanPonce
Enrile called us to a conference at Camp Crame. I
attended said meeting together with the
representativesofRCAandGlobeMackay.Secretary
EnrilefirmlytoldusthatwehaduntilJuly1974to
organize ourselves into 60/40 corporations with
Filipinomajorityownershipand,ifwedidnotcomply,
the Government would take the necessary action.
First of all, please explain and elucidate on your
statement C&Wwasawareofitsuneasytenure in
thePhilippines.
AWell, prior to Martial Law we were operating quite
comfortably as a company, but with the
implementationofMartialLawtherewasgreatdeal
ofuncertaintyastowhatmighthappeninthecountry
under Martial Law. In other countries it had been
knownthatthingswere,shallwesay,nationalizedor
takenoverand,ofcourse,therewasacertaindegree
ofuneaseamonguswhenwediscussedintheCable&
Wirelessthatsomethingsimilarmighthappeninthe
Philippines.
QNowyoumadementioninthisparagraphthatIreadof
other companies, namely RCA and Globe Mackay.
Whatwerethesecompanies?
ATheyweresimilartoEEATC,operatinginexactlythe
same fashion, doing the same type of business, all
three of us were competing against each other for
internationalbusiness.
QDo you know the nationality of RCA and Globe
Mackay?
ATheywereboth100%Americancorporations.
QWhereasEEATCwas,accordingtoyou,100%British?
AThatiscorrect,yes.
QExceptforthatdifferenceinthenationalitythethreeof
you,meaningEEATC,RCAandGlobeMackay,were
engaged in the same kind of business which was
telecommunicationsinthePhilippines?
ACorrect.
xxx251
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 251
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
QNow, can you remember where in Camp Crame this
meetingtookplace?
AYes,itwasinafairlylargeboardroom.Iwouldimagine
thetablewaslargeenoughtoaccommodateabout16
people. I had the impression that it was the board
roomperhapsattachedtotheSecretaryofDefenses
officeinCampCrame.
QNow, was it actually Secretary of National Defense
JuanPonceEnrilewhometwithyou?
AYes,itwas.
QInperson?
AInperson.
QNow, in paragraph 6 of your affidavit which is a
reference to what transpired in that meeting, you
stated,andIwouldliketoquotetheshortsentencein
paragraph6:IpointedoutthatIwithdrawthe
question. Mr. Witness, what transpired in this
meetingwithSecretaryEnrile?Inotherwords,why
didhecallyoutogetherwithRCAandGlobeMackay
peopletoameeting?
AWell,hesaid,asfarasIcanrecallandafterallitsa QYoumeantotellthecourtthatSecretaryEnrilealso
longtimeago,herecalledthatthemeetingwastoin
effect spell out the rules in terms of
telecommunications.HepointedouttoRCAandITT
thatundertheLaurelLangleyAct,whichwasdueI
thinkinJuly1974toexpire,thattheywouldhaveto
go60%Philippineownership.IthinkthatImpretty
surethat Mr. Vossor hislawyer didsay that their
franchiseinactualfactwasestablishedin1924and
therefore it fell without, beyond the LaurelLangley
Act,butIseemtorecallthatAttorneyEnrilesaidthat
thatsnotgermane,youwillgo60/40.Healsosaidto
us,EEATC,thatyouwillgo60/40.
xxx
MR. LIM:x x x My question, sir, is: what exactly did
SecretaryEnriletellyou,andIrefertoyourperson,
andyourlawyerwhowaswithyou,AttorneyLuciano
Salazar?
AAfterhedealtwithRCAandGlobeMackay,Isaidto
him:well, the LaurelLangleyAct doesnotapply to
EEATC; we are 100% British corporation, our
franchise goes back to 1880 and we were the first
company, actually, to connectthePhilippinestothe
outsideworldin communications, grantedbyQueen
Isabella of Spain, I think, and after the War, the
SecondWorldWar,the
252
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
franchise was renewed by President Quirino in 1952, I
thinkitwas.
xxx
includedyourcompanyEEATCtobemade60/40?
AOhyes.
QNow, your companion, Attorney Luciano Salazar, did
hesayanythingtoMr.Enrile?
AYes,hedid.
QWhatwashisremarkorexplanationifany?
AHesaidthatthefranchisewasperfectlyconstitutional
andthatMr.Banewasquitecorrectandthatlegally
therewasnoreasonforEasterntogo60/40.
QWhenyousaynow,justnowEasternyouarereferring
toEEATC?
AEEATC,yes.
xxx
MR.LIM:DidSecretaryEnrilerespondfavorablytothe
explanationsofAttorneySalazar?
ANo,hedidnot.HesaidthatifEEATCdidnotmovetoa
60/40positionthentherewouldbenoEEATC.
xxx
QWhatoptionsdidSecretaryEnrilegiveyouduringthis
meeting?
MR.AFRICA:Sameobjection,yourHonorplease,which
is that Secretary Enrile is the best witness for this
particularaspect.
 MR.LIM:Samerequestforsubjecttoacourtruling
later.
ATwooptionsreally:tobecome60/40Filipinocorporation
orto,ineffect,have100%ofnothing,becausethere
wouldnotbeanyEEATC.41
xxx
MR. LIM:Thank you, your Honor. Mr. Bane, we ended
yourtestimonywithyourconfirmationthattheevents
narratedinparagraph7uptoparagraph14ofyour
affidavit all transpired after that meeting in March
1973withSecretaryEnrile,somyquestionnow
_______________
41TranscriptofthenotesontheDepositionofMauriceV.
Bane,pp.2631,33,35;Rollo,pp.105110,112,114.
253
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 253
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
is: in particular what followed after that meeting with
SecretaryEnrile,wastheformationandorganization
ofEasternin1974?
AMmm.
QIsthatcorrect?
AWell,yes,theeventsreallywereIhadtoadviseCable
& Wireless Hong Kong, who were very closely
connectedwiththePhilippines,ofthesituationandI
said we had no alternative but to go to a 60/40
corporation.ItwasdecidedthatIshouldcomebackto
LondonanddiscussitwiththedirectorsofCable&
Wireless in London. Also, we were asked at the
meeting, which perhaps I forgot earlier on, by
Secretary Enrile for progress reports of moving to
60/40 corporation. So I wrote a letter to Secretary
Enrileandsaidthatwewerenowactivelyplanning
and that I had already spoken to one or two other
telecommunication corporations but that I had to
return to London to discuss it with my senior
directors.Itwasdifficultatthattimebecauseitwas
Martial Law. No people were allowed to leave the
Philippines so, through that letter, I made an
applicationtoleaveandIwasgrantedleavetocome
backtotheUKtodiscusswithCable&Wirelessthe
formationofa60/40corporation.
QEventually,afterclearingallthosehurdles,afterdoing
allthegroundwork,Imeanafterpassingthroughall
the groundwork and the details, eventually what
transpiredwastheorganizationofEasternin1974as
a60/40Filipinocorporation?
AThatiscorrect,yes.
QAnd the 40% or minority equity was taken by your
company,Cable&Wireless?
ACorrect,yes.
QMr.Bane,wouldyou,andIrefertoyourperson,have
agreed to divest of 100% British owned EEATC if
pressurewasnotexertedonyoubySecretaryEnrile?
MR. AFRICA:Objected to, your Honor please, no
relevance.
MR.LIM:Iamaskingthewitnessforhisanswertothe
basicfactsthatnowpresentthemselvesasaresultof
theprevioustestimony.
MR.AFRICA:Thesameobjection,yourHonor.Itcallsfor
apersonalopinion.254
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
MR. LIM:Subject to the courts ruling may I ask the
witness to answer? May I repeat the question, sir?
Wouldyou,andIrefertoyouperson,haveaccededor
 agreed to divesting yourself of 100% British owned
EEATC in favor of only 40% equity in a new
corporation, if pressure was not exerted on you by
SecretaryEnrile?
ANo,Iwouldnot;IwouldhavecontinuedwithEEATC
as 100% British Corporation. You see, you have to
appreciate that I had all the resources and all the
backing and all the financial support of Cable &
Wireless who were the largest telecommunications
operatorin the world. Wecould have quite easily
and I know that finance would have been available
fromthemwecouldhavequiteeasilycontinuedas
100%Britishcorporation.
QWould Cable & Wireless, your own company, have
agreed to the divestment of 100% British owned
EEATC if pressure was not exerted by Secretary
Enrile?
ANo,Idontthinktheywould.
xxx
MR.LIM:Inotherwords,youaresayingthathaditnot
been for that fateful meeting with Secretary Enrile
andthepressurewasbroughttobearonyourperson
and your company you would not have agreed to
organizingEasternin1974?
MR.AFRICA:Sameobjection,yourHonor,please,calling
foranopinionandaconclusion.
ANo,Iwouldnot.
MR.LIM:Andthesamethingistruewithyourcompany,
C&W, there would have been no permission or
approvalfromC&W?
MR.AFRICA:Sameobjection,yourHonor,please.
ANo,theywouldnot.
MR.LIM:Andwhenyousayno,youwouldnot,youare
saying that your person and C&W would not have
agreedtodivestingEEATCof100%Britishcontrol?
MR.AFRICA:Sameobjection,yourHonor,please.
ACorrect.
MR.LIM:HesaidThatscorrect.Didyou,andIreferto
yourperson,orAttorneySalazarcheckortrytofind
out if Secretary Enrile was acting for President
MarcosinreferencetothisMarch1973meeting?255
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 255
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
ANo,nowedidnt.ItwasunderMartialLawandImean
when you spoke of President Marcos you spoke of
SecretaryEnrile,theywerethetwoveryclosepeople.
MartialLaw,afterall,wasdeclaredasaresultofan
apparent attempted assassination on Secretary
Enrile.Therewasnopointinustryingtoappealto
President Marcos. We had to accept that what
SecretaryEnrilesaidwasineffectPresidentMarcos. 42
xxx
MR LIM.:Now, subject to the same request for a later
rulingfromthecourt,doIunderstandit,Mr.Bane,
that initially you were talking to Ilusorio and
Poblador?
AThatscorrect.
QButlaterinthenegotiationsthetwowereoutandyou
werenowjusttalkingtoMrNieto?
ANotjusttoMr.Nieto;wewerealsotalkingtoAttorney
JoseAfrica.
QSo let me clarify that. After the Enrile meeting and
because of your decision to just goalong with what
Enrilewanted,therewasthisprocesssetintomotion
 to organize a new outfit and at the start you were
talkingtoIlusorioandPoblador,isthatright?
ACorrect.
QLateron,andthiswasbeforeEasternwasorganized,
you continued the negotiations, this time with
AmbassadorManuel Nieto juniorandAttorney Jose
L.Africa,isthatcorrect?
ACorrect.
QNow,thereisastatementinparagraph9:Welearned
much later that this was upon the instructions of
President Marcos. Who told you that President
Marcoshadissuedtheinstructiontobedealingwith
Nieto?
MR.AFRICA:Objectedto,yourHonor,askingfor
MR.LIM:Iamaskingthesourceofthestatement.
MR. AFRICA:My objections, I am just putting it on
record:objectedtoforaskingforhearsayevidence.
MR.LIM:Subjecttoalaterruling,yourHonor.
_______________
42TranscriptofthenotesontheDepositionofMauriceV.
Bane,pp.3741;Rollo,pp.116120.
256
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
AItwaseitherAmbassadorNietoorAttorneyAfrica.
QNow,Ishowyouparagraph10ofyouraffidavitwhich
iscontinued,IamsorryIshowyouparagraph10,I
drawyourattentiontoparagraph10ofyouraffidavit
whichisfoundonpage4.Doyouconfirmandratifyin
particular what is stated in paragraph 10 of the
affidavit?
MR. AFRICA:Subject to question and answer later on,
yourHonor,please.
AYes.
MR.LIM:Thankyou,sir.MayIrequest,yourHonor,that
theentireparagraph10besubmarkedasExhibitC
12C1 and that the last sentence therein reading:
Africa quickly speltout the rules that they were
interestedinthepropositionandthatweweretodeal
only with the BAN group (composed of Roberto
Benedicto, Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr.,). We
were informed that this was at the express wish of
President Marcos who had appointed their group to
control telecommunications interests; that that
particular sentence be now underscored but same
would be part of C12C1 which is the entire
paragraph10,butthelastsentenceIrequestthatit
beunderlinedorunderscoredforemphasis.(Marked)
QWhatparticipationdidyouhaveintheorganizationof
Eastern?
AIwasverydeeplyinvolved,togetherwithourdirector
fromLondon,WilfredH.Daviesandalsoourfinance
director,DavidWest.
QWereyouoneoftheincorporatorsofEastern?
AIwas,yes.
QDidyousigntheArticlesofIncorporationofEastern?
AIdid.
QWouldyouhaveagreedtobeoneoftheincorporatorsof
Eastern and signed its Articles if no pressure was
exertedonyoubySecretaryEnrile?
MR.AFRICA:Objectedto,yourHonor,please.
MR.LIM:Irequestananswerforthesamereason.
ANo,IdontthinkIwould.
QWhatisthat,MrBane?
ANo,Iwouldnot,no.257
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 257
 Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
QYouaretellingthehonorablecourtthatyouragreeing
to incorporate Eastern and your having signed the
Articles of Eastern was the result of that pressure
duringtheEnrilemeetinginMarchof1973?
MR.AFRICA:Sameobjection,yourHonor.
AYes,thatiscorrect,becausewewouldhavecontinued
as 100% British corporation. So the pressure was
broughttobearuponustogotoa60/40corporation.
MR. LIM:I notice from the Articles of Incorporation of
EasternthatyouaretheTreasurerinTrust,thatyou
weretheTreasurerinTrust,meaningtheTreasurer
upontheincorporationofEastern?
AYes,thatstrue.43
xxx
MR.LIM:Thatisthetenoroftheaffidavit.Justtosatisfy
that concern I will rephrase the question. Do you
know what happened to the assetsof EEATC when
EasternwasincorporatedonJune10,1974?
AYes,EasternpurchasedalltheassetsofEEATC.
QIwouldliketodrawyourattentiontoparagraph12of
your affidavit which I read: The figure eventually
negotiatedfortheassets(netbookvalueonlyandno
goodwill)wastenmillionpesos(P10,000,000.00)on
the basis of which the BAN group will put up six
millionpesos(P6,000,000.00).Furthermeetingstook
placetofinalizethedetailsbutAfricalaterinformed
usthattheycouldnotraisetherequiredamount.Asa
compromise, he suggested that the new corporation
raise a bank loan from which C&W could be paid.
Whilewewerenothappywiththisarrangement,we
resignedourselvestothefactthatwewouldhaveto
accede.Itwasagreedthatstockholderscontribution
would be five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) plus a
bank loan of seven million pesos (P7,000,000.00) to
coverassetpaymentandworkingcapital.Africathen
advisedthattheycouldonlyraiseonemillionpesos
(P1,000,000.00) and C&W could loan them two
million pesos (P2,000,000.00). Again, we were
unhappybutagainwecomplied.Myquestionis:do
youconfirmthecorrectnessofthisnarrationincluding
thefiguresmentionedhere?
_______________
43TranscriptofthenotesontheDepositionofMauriceV.
Bane,pp.4750;Rollo,pp.126129.
258
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
MR. AFRICA:Subject to question and answer, your
Honor please, as there are statements which are of
conclusionand/orhearsay.
AYes,Idoconfirmthatthatspreciselywhathappened.
MR. LIM:What this one million pesos which was the
amount that the Africa group said they could only
raise,whatwasthisonemillion?
AWell, it was their contribution to the capital of the
company.
QAside from the one million pesos contribution to the
capital of Eastern from the Filipino group of
Benedicto, Africa, and Nieto, do you know if
additionalcontributionsintermsofmoneyweremade
bythemafterwards?
AWell, in as much as that they repaid the loans that
C&W granted them out of the dividends yes, there
wereineffectcontributions,Isuppose.
QHowmuchwastheamountoftheloan?
ATwomillionpesos.
QThattwomillionpesosloanwasrepaidbytheFilipino
groupoutofstockdividends?
ANo,outofyes,stockdividends,yes,cashdividends.
QCashdividends?
ACashdividendsasIrecall.
QNow, aside from that were there any subsequent
contributions to the capital of Eastern from the
Filipinogroup?
ANotasfarasIcanrecall,no.
QSo in terms of cold cash or money, what they
contributedinitiallywasonlyonemillionpesos?
ACorrect.
QTheloanthattheygotfromC&Woftwomillionwas
repaid to the company, or to C&W in terms of the
dividends?
MR.AFRICA:Alreadyanswered,yourHonor.
AYes,yes,correct.
MR.LIM:WhograntedtheloantotheFilipinogroup?
ATheHongKongandShanghaiBank.Well,theydidnt
grant it to the Filipino group; they granted it to
Eastern.
QAndwasthereaguaranteemadeforthatloan?
MR.AFRICA:Leading,yourHonorplease.259
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
AYes,aguaranteewasmadebyCable&Wireless.
MR. LIM:I request, your Honor, for emphasis that
paragraph12oftheaffidavitwhichhasbeenreadinto
the record and which has been confirmed by the
witnessbebracketedandsubmarkedasExhibitC
12d1,paragraph12.(Marked)
Mr. Bane, wouldyou or your company Cable& Wireless
have agreed to that kind of payment arrangement,
which is to pay in dividends, if it were not for the
pressurefromSecretaryEnrile?
MR.AFRICA:Sameobjection,yourHonorplease.
ANo, we would not; it wasnt, it was not standard
business practice in any way at all. We would not
normallyhaveagreedtoaconditionsuchasthat.
xxx
QMrBane,whatwasthepositionofManuelNietoJr.in
Easternafterincorporation?
AHewasthePresident.
xxx
QNow,MrBane,paragraph13ofyouraffidavitmentions
that: Attorney Luciano Salazar drafted the
Presidential Decree for the transfer of EEATCs
franchise to Eastern, that said draft decree was
personally delivered to Manuel Nieto, Jr., who
committedtosecurePresidentMarcosapprovaland
signature. Do I take it that this was in 1974
contemporaneouslywiththeorganizationofEastern?
AYes,itwas.
QYousaidManuelNietoJr.,wastheEasternPresident?
AThatscorrect.
259 QWasMr.NietoabletosecuretheapprovalofPresident
Marcos to the transfer of EEATCs franchise to
Eastern?
AYes,hewas,itwasissuedunderPresidentialDecree.
QIfIshowyouacopyofthatPresidentialDecreewould
youbeabletorecognizeitinthesensethatitrefersto
your company, the former EEATC, not former, the
EEATC?
AYes.(Handed)
QAt this point, yourHonor,Imakeofrecordthatthis
representation has handed to Mr. Maurice Bane
ExhibitCMotionIncreaseinCapital.260
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
AYes,thatisindeedthePresidentialDecree.
QYour Honor, may I make a little correction in my
manifestation. What I handed to the witness is a
photocopy of Presidential Decree 48944with the
Exhibit marking being reproduced as part of the
document,thedocumentactuallymarkedasExhibitC
is now part of the case records. Now, Mr. Witness,
please tell the court whether you had any personal
participation in the preparation of this particular
decreePD489?
AYes,Idid.IconsultedwithAttorneySalazar.Wewent
throughtheEasternfranchiseandsotothatextent,
in putting this together, yes I did cooperate with
AttorneySalazar,althoughofcourseAttorneySalazar
wastheprimepersonbehinddraftingthedocument.
QYour affidavit mentions that this was approved by
PresidentMarcosintheentiretyofthedraftdecreeas
prepared by Attorney Salazar and you, meaning no
correctionwasmadebyMalacaang.Myquestionis:
what did that convey to you, meaning the fact that
Marcos approved thePresidential Decree drafted by
Attorney Salazar and yourself without revision or
amendment?
MR.AFRICA:Objectedto,yourHonorplease,askingfor
anopinionandaconclusion.
MR.LIM:Thatisveryrelevant,yourHonor,thewitness
havingparticipatedinpreparingthis.
MR.AFRICA:Anyway,myobjectionisontherecord.
AWell,Mr.Nietoundertookandpromisedusthathewould
getthedraftPresidentialDecreesignedintolawby
PresidentMarcos.
MR.LIM:Andwasheabletodeliveronhispromise?
AHe certainly was. You can see the signature on the
bottom.
QWitnessreferringto
AIdorecognizethatsignature,yes,asPresidentMarcos
signature.
QYourHonor,atthispointmayIrequestthatthisdraft
ImsorrythatthiscopyofPD489beagainmarked
inthisdepositionpro
_______________
44Authorizing The Eastern Extension Australasia and
China Telegraph Company, Limited to Transfer the
Franchise Granted to that Company Under Republic
ActNo.808,asAmendedbyRepublicActNo.5002,to
theEasternTelecommunicationsPhilippines,Inc.
261
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 261
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
ceedingsasExhibitDDepositionBaneandthesignatureof
PresidentMarcosatthebottomofpage2pointedat
bythewitnessbesubmarkedandbracketedasD1
Deposition Bane. (Marked) Mr. Bane, did you also
serve as director of Eastern, one of the directors, I
mean,ofEastern?
AYes,Iwasforatime,ashortperiodoftime.
QNow, after Easterns incorporation in 1974 did you
carryonasanofficerofEastern?
AYes,Idid.
QWhatpositions?
AExecutiveVicePresidentandTreasurer.
QAndasyousaidthiswasupto1987?
AYes.
xxx
QWouldyouhaveaccededtothatkindofsetup,meaning
havingFilipinopartnersinthepersonsofMr.Nieto
and later Attorney Africa if it were not for the
pressure from Secretary Enrile during your March
1973meeting?
MR.AFRICA:Alreadyanswered,yourHonorplease.
AIcanonlyrepeatwhatIsaidbefore,thatno,ofcourseI
wouldnot.
MR. LIM:Now, during your stint with Eastern in
association with Mr. Nieto and later with Attorney
JoseAfrica,doyouknowofinstanceswhenPresident
Marcos intervened on behalf of Eastern, or showed
personalinterestforEastern?
MR.AFRICA:Questionisvagueandinterveneisanall
encompassingword.
MR.LIM:Ireform,yourHonor.MrBane,yousaidthat
from 1974 continuously up to 1987 you were
associatedwithEastern,youwereoneofitsofficers
and you were working with Filipino directors or
officers. During this time the President of the
Philippines of course was continuously Mr. Marcos.
My question, sir, is: during your incumbency in
Eastern do you know of instances when President
Marcos helped your company obtain
correspondenceships, or in its competition with
PLDT?
AYes,Ido,yes.262
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
QInwhatwaydidMarcoshelpEastern?
AWell, once the company was formed and under the
formation of the company Eastern or Cable &
Wirelesshadamanagementcontracttomanagethe
company, we could see that telecommunications
development was very badly needed in the
Philippines. The satellite earth station had been
constructedandtheTropohadgonein,buttherewas
still a very large demand for circuits. We therefore
devised a plan to put underseas cables, telephone
cables, from the Philippines to Japan, from the
Philippines to Hong Kong, Philippines to Singapore
andthenlatterlyPhilippinestoTaiwan.Forthatwe
obviouslyneededapprovalsrightatthetop,because
wewere,ineffect,incompetitionwithPLDT.PLDT
were really dragging their heels in development,
perhapsbecauseoflackoffinancingorwhatever.So
wesawanopportunitytoperhapsestablishEastern
as a major player in the Philippines
telecommunications.Ithereforedraftedaletterwhich
was what is the word Im looking for perhaps
which was fine tuned perhaps is the best word, by
AttorneyJoseAfrica.AndthissetoutEasternsplans
for development of submarine cable systems and
everything else, and we asked at the bottom of the
letter for Presidential approval. And this letter was
signed by Ambassador Nieto; it was taken to
Malacaanganditwassigned,writtenacrossthetop
ofthepage,Ithinkthe wordswere justApproved,
President Marcos so we received approval, direct
approvalfromPresidentMarcostoproceedwiththe
implementationofthisverybigcableproject.Itmeant
to say that we had bypassed the national
telecommunications commission under whose
 authority thiswould normally havebeen submitted,
but knowing as wedid thatwithPLDTs opposition
weprobablywouldnthavegotitthroughtheNTC.
QSo it was President Marcos himself who gave the
approvalforEasterntoundertaketheconstructionof
thesesubmarinecablesthatyoumentioned?
AThatscorrect,yes.
QAndcanyoutellusthesignificanceofthatdesignation,
whathappenedtoEasternbecauseitgotthisproject?
AWell,byputtinginthesubmarinecablesystems,since
wewerefinancingthem,wehadtohavetheapproval
of,ofcourse,thedistantadministrationinthiscase
Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, so one of the
benefitsthataccruedfromthiswasthatwe
263
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 263
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
becameatelephonecorrespondenttothesecountries.After
all, these cableswerevery high capacity. Ithinkto
Hong Kong they were 1380 telephone circuits, to
Japan 960 telephone circuits, so that what it did it
wasforthegreatbenefitofthePhilippines.Weused
thephraseinthelettertomakethePhilippinesthe
huboftelecommunicationsinSouthEastAsia,which
wehopedweweregoingtodoandIthinktoalarge
extentwediddo.TheultimatebenefittoEasternwas
quiteconsiderable,itenormouslyincreasedcashflow
andofcoursefromthatwefinancedthecables.45
xxx
QMr.Bane,youstatedthatyouwerewithEasternfor21
years?
AThatscorrect,yes.
Q21continuousyears.
AWithEEATCandwithEastern.
xxx
QMr. Bane, were there other stockholders of Class A
duringthis21yearperiod?
ATheonlychangesthatIwasawareofthatweremade
wasthatAttorneyJoseAfricapointedouttome,after
theincorporation,thattheywantedtoputsomeofthe
stock,ortheywouldputsomeofthestockinthename
of various companies. He also mentioned that of
course they were going to put some small, a very
small minority of shares in the names of family
members.ThatsasfarasIknew.
QThese companies, what companies were these? Or
rather, excuse me sir, rather what would be the
natureofthesecompanies?
AIdontknow,Idontknowwhatthecompanieswere.I
doknowthenames.IthinkAmbassadorNietoswas
Aerocom, was Ambassador Benedictos Universal
Molasses,Icantremember?AndthenAttorneyJose
Africa,Ithink,wasPolygon.
QNowhavingbeenassociatedwithManuelNietoJr.and
JoseL.AfricaandalsoMr.Benedictoformanyyears,
didyoucometoknowatanytimeduringthatperiod
of association with them whether President Marcos
hadanyparticipationorcontrolintheirstockholdings
inEastern?
_______________
45TranscriptofthenotesontheDepositionofMauriceV.
Bane,pp.5665;Rollo,pp.135144.
264
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
 MR. AFRICA:Please, objected to, your Honor, witness
isnt competent. The best witnesses would be the
persons themselves, notwhatthiswitness has been
told.
MR.LIM:Ifthewitnessknows,yourHonor.
MR.AFRICA:Butwhathewastold,notwhatistrue,or
whatistrueandcorrect?
ANo, I was not told that President Marcos had a
stockholding in Eastern. There was, of course,
speculationamongourselvesastoinavaguesortof
wayweoftenwondered.TheonlytimethatIactually
knew that President Marcos had a significant
stockholding in Eastern was when, after
sequestration,AmbassadorNietowentontotelevision
and stated on television that I think first of all he
statedsomethingaboutPhilcomsatPOTCandhethen
statedontelevisionthatPresidentMarcosowned40%
of the stock of Eastern. Thats the only time that I
was, I had any direct, shall we say, or had been
directly informed by television of course that
PresidentMarcoswasastockholder.46
Inthe2006caseofYuchengcov.Sandiganbayan,47thisCourt
overturned the ruling of the Sandiganbayans Partial Decision
andheldthatthetestimoniesthroughdepositionsofCampos,
Gapud and de Guzman established the Marcoses beneficial
ownershipofPrimeHoldingIncorporated(PHI).TheCourtruled
thatthetestimoniesofCampos,Gapud,anddeGuzman,persons
who actually participated in the formation and early years of
operationofPHI,constituteevidencethatdirectlyaddressesthe
criticalissue.48
Inthiscase,thedeponentMauriceV.BanewastheExecutive
VicePresident and Treasurer of ETPI from 1974 until his
retirementin1987.MauriceV.Banehadpersonalknowledgeof
andinvolvementinthecircumstancesleadingtotheformationof
ETPI in 1974, which is crucial to petitioners allegation that
private respondents interest in ETPI rightfully belongs to the
Government. To dismiss the Bane deposition as inadmissible
basedonthetenuousgroundthatthere
_______________
46Transcript of the notes on the Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane,pp.7678;Rollo,pp.155157.
47515Phil.1;479SCRA1(2006).
48Id.,atp.46;p.54.
265
VOL.662,DECEMBER13,2011 265
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
wasnoactualconsolidationofcasesistodisregardtheobvious
fact that the Bane deposition was taken inCIVIL CASE NO.
0009(IncidentCaseNo.0130andG.R.No.107789)andthat
all the defendants (now private respondents) in Civil Case No.
0009weredulynotifiedofthescheduleddepositiontaking.
Although petitioner, in its formal offer of evidence in Civil
CaseNo.0009,inadvertentlyomittedthedepositionofMauriceV.
Bane,petitionerthereafterfiledanurgentmotionprayingthatit
beallowedtointroduceasadditionalevidencethedepositionof
MauriceV.Bane.TheSandiganbayanshouldhavegrantedthis
motionorthesucceedingMotiontoAdmitSupplementalOfferof
Evidence (Re: Deposition ofMaurice V. Bane)filed on 16
November 2001. As held in the 1997 case ofRepublic v.
Sandiganbayan(ThirdDivision):49
Inallcasesinvolvingallegedillgottenwealthbroughtbyor
againstthePresidentialCommissiononGoodGovernment,itis
thepolicyofthisCourttosetasidetechnicalitiesandformalities
thatservemerelytodelayorimpedetheirjudiciousresolution.
This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits
beforetheSandiganbayan.Substantialjusticetoallparties,not
merelegalismsorperfectionofform,shouldnowberelentlessly
pursued.Elevenyearshavepassedsincethegovernmentstarted
itssearchforandreversionofsuchallegedillgottenwealth.The
definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long
overdue. If there is adequate proof of illegal acquisition,
accumulation,misappropriation,fraudorillicitconduct,letitbe
broughtoutnow.50
Accordingly,theSandiganbayanResolutiondated7February
2002shouldbereversedandsetaside.ThedepositionofMaurice
V. Bane taken on 23 to 24 October 1996, together with the
accompanyingdocumentaryexhibits,shouldbeadmittedaspart
of petitioners evidence. I vote toGRANTthe petition
andREMANDthis case to the Sandiganbayan for further CASESREPORTED
proceedings. SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Petitiondismissed.
_______________ ____________________
49G.R.No.113420,7March1997,269SCRA316.
G.R.No.200751.August17,2015.*
50Id.,atp.334.
MONICO LIGTAS, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE
266
PHILIPPINES,respondent.
266 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
RemedialLaw;CivilProcedure;Appeals;PetitionforReview
Republicvs.Sandiganbayan(FourthDivision)
Note.Lestitbeforgotten,therationaleforconsolidationis onCertiorari;Onlyquestionsoflawareallowedinapetitionfor
tohaveallcaseswhichareintimatelyrelated,acteduponbyone reviewunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt.Factualfindingsofthe
branchofthecourttoavoidthepossibilityofconflictingdecisions Regional Trial Court (RTC) are conclusive and binding on the
being rendered. (Philippine Airlines, Incorporated vs. Zamora, SupremeCourt(SC)whenaffirmedbytheCourtofAppeals(CA).
564SCRA50[2008]) Onlyquestionsoflawareallowedinapetitionforreviewunder
Rule45oftheRulesofCourt.FactualfindingsoftheRegional
o0o TrialCourtareconclusive
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved. _______________
 *SECONDDIVISION.
2
2 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
and binding on this court when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.Thiscourthasdifferentiatedbetweenaquestionoflaw
andquestionoffact:Aquestionoflawexistswhenthedoubtor
controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudencetoacertainsetoffacts;orwhentheissuedoesnot
call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.
Aquestionoffactexistswhenthedoubtordifferencearisesasto
the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibilityofthewitnesses,theexistenceandrelevancyofspecific
surroundingcircumstancesaswellastheirrelationtoeachother
andtothewhole,andtheprobabilityofthesituation.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Thereareexceptionstotherule
thatonlyquestionsoflawshouldbethesubjectofapetitionfor
reviewunderRule45.PetitioneradmitsthatthePetitionraises
substantiallyfactualissuesthatarebeyondthescopeoftheRule
heseeksredressfrom.However,thereareexceptionstotherule
thatonlyquestionsoflawshouldbethesubjectofapetitionfor
reviewunderRule45:(1)whenthefindingsaregroundedentirely
on speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when
thereisgraveabuseofdiscretion,(4)whenthejudgmentisbased
on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting,(6)wheninmakingitsfindings,theCAwentbeyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissionsofboththeappellantandtheappellee,(7)whenthe
CAsfindingsarecontrarytothosebythetrialcourt,(8)whenthe
findingsare conclusionswithoutcitationofspecificevidenceon
whichtheyarebased,(9)whentheactssetforthinthepetitionas
wellasinthepetitionersmainandreplybriefsarenotdisputed
bytherespondent,(10)whenthefindingsoffactarepremisedon
thesupposedabsenceofevidenceandcontradictedbytheevidence
on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered,wouldjustifyadifferentconclusion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The issue of tenancy, in that
whetherapersonisanagriculturaltenantornot,isgenerallya
questionoffact.Theissueoftenancy,inthatwhetheraperson
isanagriculturaltenantornot,isgenerallyaquestionoffact.To
beprecise,however,theexistenceofatenancyrelationshipisa
legalconclusion
3
VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015 3
Ligtasvs.People
based on facts presented corresponding to the statutory
elementsoftenancy.
Administrative Proceedings; Generally, decisions in
administrative cases are not binding on criminal
proceedings;Thus,anabsolutionfromacriminalchargeisnota
bartoanadministrativeprosecution,orviceversa.Weholdthat
aDARABdecisionontheexistenceofatenancyrelationshipis
conclusive and binding on courts if supported by substantial
evidence. Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not
binding on criminal proceedings. This court has ruled in a
number of cases that: It is indeed a fundamental principle of
administrative law that administrative cases are independent
from criminal actions for the same act or omission.Thus, an
absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an
administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is
administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal
liabilityforthesameact....Thus,consideringthedifferencein
thequantumofevidence,aswellastheprocedurefollowedand
the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative
proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not
necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence
presentedintheadministrativecasemaynotnecessarilybethe
sameevidencetobepresentedinthecriminalcases.
Tenancy Relationship; Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board; Jurisdiction; The Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) is the quasijudicial
tribunalthathastheprimaryjurisdictiontodeterminewhether
there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties.The
DARAB is the quasijudicial tribunal that has the primary
jurisdictiontodeterminewhetherthereisatenancyrelationship
between adverse parties. This court has held that judicial
determinations[oftheDARAB]havethesamebindingeffectas
judgmentsandordersofaregularjudicialbody.Disputesunder
thejurisdictionoftheDARABincludecontroversiesrelatingto:
tenurialarrangements,whetherleasehold,tenancy,stewardship
orotherwise,overlandsdevotedtoagriculture,includingdisputes
concerningfarmworkersassociationsorrepresentationofpersons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrangetermsorconditionsofsuchtenurialarrangements.
4
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
RemedialLaw;Evidence;JudicialNotice;Itistruethattrial
courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of
othercourtsorevenrecordsofothercasesthathavebeentriedor
arependinginthesamecourtorbeforethesamejudge.Itistrue
that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of
decisionsofothercourtsorevenrecordsofothercasesthathave
beentriedorarependinginthesamecourtorbeforethesame
judge. In declaring that the DARABs findings on the tenancy
relationship between petitioner and private complainant are
immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court ofAppeals
reliedonCornes,etal.v.LealRealtyCentrumCo.,Inc.,560SCRA
545(2008).
CriminalLaw;Theft;Elementsof.Theessentialelements
oftheftare:(1)takingofpersonalproperty;(2)thepropertytaken
belongstoanother;(3)thetakingwasdonewithouttheowners
consent;(4)therewasintenttogain;and(5)thetakingwasdone
without violence against or intimidation of the person or force
uponthings.
AgrarianReform;Tenants,Defined;WordsandPhrases.
Tenantshavebeendefinedas:personswhointhemselvesand
with the aid available from within their immediate farm
households cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latters consent, for purposes of production,
sharingtheproducewiththelandholderunderthesharetenancy
system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or
ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold
tenancysystem.(Citationomitted)Underthisdefinition,atenant
isentitledtotheproductsofthelandheorshecultivates.The
landowners share in the produce depends on the agreement
betweentheparties.Hence,theharvestingdonebythetenantis
withthelandownersconsent.
ConstitutionalLaw;RighttobePresumedInnocent;Noless
thantheConstitutionprovidesthattheaccusedshallbepresumed
innocentofthecrimeuntilprovenguilty.Inthiscase,petitioner
harvestedtheabaca,believingthathewasentitledtotheproduce
as a legitimate tenant cultivating the land owned by private
complainant. Personal property may have been taken, but it is
with the consent of the owner. No less than the Constitution
providesthattheaccusedshallbepresumedinnocentofthecrime
untilprovenguilty.[I]tisbettertoacquittenguiltyindividuals
thantoconvictoneinnocentperson.Thus,courtsmustconsider
[e]verycircumstanceagainstguiltandinfavorofinnocence[.]
Equally settled is that [w]here the evidence admits of two
interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and the
other with innocence, the accusedmust be given thebenefit of
doubtandshouldbeacquitted.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforrespondent.
LEONEN,J.:
Bakitniyababawiinangakingsaka?tanongniTataSelo.
Dinayakonabasiyasapartihan?Tinusokonabasiya?Siya
angmayaringlupaatkasamalangniyaako.Hindibatkaya
maramingnagagalitsaakinaydahilsaayawkongmagpamigay
ngkahitisangpinangkokunganihan?
Hindi pa rin umaalis sa harap ng istaked si Tata Selo.
Nakahawakparinsiyasarehas.Nakatinginsiyasalabasngunit
walasiyangsinomangtinitingnan.
....
Binabawiponiyaangakingsaka,sumbongniTataSelo.
Saanpapoakopupuntakungwalanaakongsaka?
....
Habangnakakapitsarehasatnakatinginsalabas,sinasabi
niyang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila, lahat, ay! ang lahat ay
kinuhanasakanila.
TataSelo(1963)byRogelioR.Sikat
The uncontested declaration of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board that Monico Ligtas was a tenant
negates a finding of theft beyond reasonable doubt. Tenants
havingrightstotheharvestcannotbedeemedtohavetakentheir
ownproduce.
ThisisaPetitionforReviewonCertiorari1underRule45ofthe
Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 2dated
March16,2010andtheResolution 3datedFebruary2,2012.4The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision 5of the Regional Trial
Court finding Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty beyond reasonable
doubtoftheft.6
LigtaswaschargedwiththecrimeoftheftunderArticle308of
theRevisedPenalCode.7TheInformationprovides:
That on or about the 29thday of June 2000
atSitioLamak,BarangaySan Juan, Municipality of Sogod,
Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused,
withintentofgain,enteredintotheabacaplantationbelongingto
oneAnecitaPacate,andonceinsidetheplantation,didthenand
therewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslyharvested1,000kilosof
abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo,
withouttheconsentofsaidowner,AnecitaPacate,toherdamage
and prejudice in the aforestated amount of TwentyNine
ThousandPesos(Php29,000.00),Philippinecurrency.
CONTRARYTOLAW.8
Ligtaspleadednotguilty.9
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses during trial:
EfrenCabero(Cabero),ModestoCipres(Cipres),AnecitaPacate,
SPO2EnriqueVillaruel,andErnestoPacate.10
According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was
the owner of an abaca plantation situated
atSitioLamak,BarangaySan Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte. On
June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantations administrator, and
severalmen,includingCipres,wenttotheplantationtoharvest
abaca upon Anecita Pacates instructions. At about 10:00 a.m.,
Cabero and his men were surprised to find Ligtas harvesting
abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by three (3)
unidentifiedmen.Allegedly,Ligtasthreatenedthattherewould
belossoflifeiftheypersistedinharvestingtheabaca.Cabero
reportedtheincidenttoAnecitaPacateandthepolice.11
_______________
uponthesameorshallgatherfruits,cereals,orotherforestor
farmproducts.
8Id.,atp.93.
9Id.
10Id.
11Id.,atpp.9398.
8 16Id.,atpp.45and99.RecordsshowthatAnecitaPacate
8 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
On July 2, 2000, Cabero and Cipres went back to the
plantation and conducted a survey on the condition of the
plantation.Theyfoundthat1,000kilosofabaca,valuedatP28.00
perkilo,wereharvestedbyLigtas.12
OnJuly3,2000,LigtasandAnecitaPacateconfrontedeach
other before the Sogod Police Station. 13Ligtas admitted to
harvesting the abaca but claimed that he was the plantation
owner.14
Thedefensepresentedthree(3)witnessesduringtrial:Ligtas;
PabloPalo,hisneighbor;andDeliaLigtas,hiswife. 15Accordingto
Ligtas, he had been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late
husband,AndresPacatesince1993. 16AndresPacateinstalledhim
as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in the
criminalcase.17
Ligtas allegedly made his first harvest in 1997. 18He then
gaveAnecitaPacatehersharetotheharvest. 19However,hecould
not remember the exact amount anymore. 20Previously, Ligtas
andPabloPalowereworkersinanotherland,around15hectares,
ownedbyAnecitaPacateandAndresPacate.21
Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacate sent
workerstoharvestabacafromthelandhecultivated.Ligtas
_______________
12Id.,atpp.94and96.
13Id.,atpp.94and9699.Theconfrontationwaspursuantto
asummonssenttoLigtasbytheSogodpolice.
14Id.,atp.94.
15Id.,atpp.4247.
and Andres Pacate, Sr. (id., at p. 17) had two sons: Ernesto
Pacate and Andres Pacate, Jr. (id., at p. 42). However, Andres In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial
Pacate,Sr.isreferredtointherecordsasAndresPacate. Courtheldthattheprosecutionwasabletoprovetheelementsof
17Id. theft[.]30Ligtas defense of tenancy was not supported by
concrete and substantial evidencenor washis claim of harvest
18Id.,atp.45.
sharingbetweenhimand[AnecitaPacate]dulycorroboratedby
19Id.
anywitness.31Hisdefenseofalibicannot
20Id.
21Id.,atpp.4247. _______________

22Id.,atpp.46and99.
9 23Id.
VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015
24Id.,atpp.28and196.
Ligtasvs.People
25Id.,atpp.2834.ThecasewasdocketedasDARABCase
preventedthemenfromharvestingtheabacasincehewasthe
No. VIII319SL2000. The Decision was penned by Provincial
rightfultenantoftheland.22
AdjudicatorMiguelG.Polinar.
Furthermore, Ligtas denied harvesting abaca at the
26Id.,atp.33.
plantationonJune29,2000.HeclaimedthathewaswithCabero
27Id.,atp.49.
and Cipres attending abarangay fiestaatSitioHubasan, San
Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting 28Id.,atp.104.
happened.23 29Id.,atp.178.
Meanwhile,LigtasfiledaComplaintbeforetheDepartmentof 30Id.,atp.48.
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, 31Id.
Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on
November21,2000.24OnJanuary22,2002,theDARABrendered
the Decision25ruling that Ligtas was abona fidetenant of the 10
land.26 10 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
WhilerecordsarebereftastowhentheDARABDecisionwas Ligtasvs.People
formally offered as evidence before the trial court, records are prevail over the positive identification ... by prosecution
clearthattheDARABDecisionwasconsideredbyboththetrial witnesses.32
court27andCourtofAppeals28andwithoutanyobjectiononthe ThedispositiveportionoftheDecisionreads:
partofthePeopleofthePhilippines.29
 WHEREFORE, finding the accused Monico Ligtas guilty
beyondreasonabledoubtofthecrimeofTheft,thiscourthereby
rendersjudgment,sentencinghim:
1.Tosuffertheindeterminatepenaltyoffour(4)years,nine
(9)monthsandten(10)daysasminimumtoeight(8)yearsand
eight(8)monthsasmaximum;
2.Toindemnifytheoffende[d]party:
a.The amount of P29,000.00 for the value of the abaca
stole[n];
b.TheamountofP5,000.00asmoraldamages;
c.TheamountofP10,000.00aslitigationexpenses/attorneys
fees;
3.Topaythecosts.
SOORDERED.33
I
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial
court.34Accordingtoit,theburdentoprovetheexistenceofthe
ten
_______________
32Id.,atp.100.
33Id.,atp.49A.Perthetestimoniesofthewitnessesbefore
the trial court and as adopted by the Court of Appeals, the
Kasabutan or Agreement dated February 24, 2007 was
previously executed between Ligtas and Anecita Pacate. The
AgreementinvolvedanotherincidentoftheftcommittedbyLigtas
againstAnecitaPacate.Hewasalsochargedwiththeftin1988;
however,thecasewasultimatelydismissed(id.,atpp.1819,37,
40,4143,4647,and49).
34Id.,atp.109.
11
VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015 11
Ligtasvs.People
ancy relationship35belonged to Ligtas. He was not able to
establishalltheessentialelementsofatenancyagreement.36
The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas reliance on the
DARABDecisiondeclaringhimasabonafidetenantofthe...
landisirrelevantinthecaseatbar:37
Jurisprudenceisrepletewithcasesdeclaringthatfindingsof
orcertificationsissuedbytheSecretaryofAgrarianReform,or
hisauthorizedrepresentative,inagivenlocalityconcerningthe
presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contendingparties,aremerelypreliminaryorprovisionalandare
notbindinguponthecourts.[]38
Astotheownershipoftheland,theCourtofAppealsheldthat
Ligtashadtakenconflictingpositions.Whileheclaimedtobea
legitimatetenant,LigtasalsoassailedAnecitaPacatestitleover
the land. Under Rule 131, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a
tenantcannotdenythetitleofhisorherlandlordatthetimeof
thecommencementofthetenancyrelation.39
The Court of Appeals remained unconvinced as to Ligtas
allegations on ownership. He claims that the parcel of land
owned by [Anecita Pacate] is different from the subject abaca
land.However,suchassertionwasbasedmerelyonthetestimony
of the municipal assessor, not an expert competent to identify
parcelsofland.40
More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas
committedtheftbyharvestingabacafromAnecitaPacates
_______________ established. [W]here an accusedsalibiis established only by
himself,hisrelativesandfriends,hisdenialofculpabilityshould
35Id.,atp.101. beaccordedthestrictestscrutiny.48
36Id.,atpp.101103. Ligtas attack on the credibility of the witnesses did not
37Id.,atp.104. prosper.49He failed to show that the case was initiated only
38Id., citingCornes v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., 582 through Anecita Pacates quest for revenge or to ensure that
Ligtaswouldbeevictedfromtheland.50
Phil.528,552;560SCRA545,571(2008)[PerJ.ChicoNazario,
TheCourtofAppealsdismissedLigtasappealandaffirmed
ThirdDivision].
thetrialcourtsDecisionfindingLigtasguiltybeyondreason
39Id.,atp.108.
40Id. _______________

41Id.,atp.105.
12 42Id.
12 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED 43Id.
Ligtasvs.People 44Id.,atpp.105106.
plantation.41Ligtashadconstructivepossessionofthesubjectof
45Id.,atp.106.
thetheftwithouttheownersconsent. 42Thesubjectofthecrime
neednotbecarriedawayoractuallytakenoutfromthelandin 46Id.
ordertoconsummatethecrimeoftheft.43 47Id.
Furthermore, Ligtas argument that the abaca did not 48Id.,atpp.107108.
constituteaspersonalpropertyunderthemeaningofArticle308 49Id.,atp.107.
of the Revised Penal Code was erroneous. 44Following the 50Id.,atp.108.
definitionofpersonalproperty,theabacahempwascapableof
appropriation [and] [could] be sold and carried away from one
placetoanother.45TheCourtofAppealsaffirmedthetrialcourts 13
finding that about 1,000 kilos of abaca were already VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015 13
harvested.46Hence,alltheelementsoftheftunderArticle308of
Ligtasvs.People
the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently established by the
able doubt of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
prosecution.
Code.51ThedispositiveportionoftheDecisionreads:
TheCourtofAppealsruledthatLigtasdefenseofalibicould
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal isDISMISSED.
notexcusehimfromcriminalliability. 47Hisalibiwasdoubtfully Accordingly,theassailedDecisiondated...August16,2006of
theRegionalTrialCourtofSogod,SouthernLeyte,Branch39,in
Criminal Case No. R225, finding accusedappellant Monico
LigtasguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofTheftunderArticle308
of the Revised Penal Code, is herebyAFFIRMED in all
respects.
SOORDERED.52
LigtasfiledaMotionforReconsideration, 53whichtheCourtof
AppealsdeniedonFebruary2,2012.54
II
OnApril4,2012,LigtasfiledthisPetitionassailingtheCourt
ofAppealsDecisionandResolution.55ThiscourtrequiredPeople
ofthePhilippinestofileitsCommentonthePetitionwithin10
daysfromnotice.56
_______________
51Id.,atp.109.
52Id.
53Id.,atpp.112115.
54Id.,atpp.118119.
55Id., at p. 21. Petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of
TimetoFilePetitionforReviewfor30daysdatedMarch2,2012
(id.,atpp.24),whichthecourtgranted(id.,atp.122).
56Id.,at p.122.TheResolutionwasdatedMarch4,2013.
Respondent,throughtheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral,filedits
CommentonJune27,2013(id.,atpp.128143).IntheResolution
(id., at p. 145) dated August 14, 2013, this court noted the
CommentandrequiredpetitionertofileaReplytotheComment.
PetitionerfiledhisReply(id.,atpp.147149)datedOctober14,
2013,whichwenotedonJanuary15,2014(id.,atp.152).Inthe
Resolution (id., at pp. 165167) dated July 14, 2014, this court
gaveduecoursetothepetitionandrequiredthepartiestosubmit
their respective Memoranda within 30 days from notice.
PetitionersMemorandum(id.,atpp.184201)datedOctober8,
2014waspostedonOctober10,2014(id.,atp.184).Re
14
14 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
Theissuesforconsiderationofthiscourtare:
First,whetherquestionsoffactmayberaisedinapetitionfor
reviewoncertiorariunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt;
Second, whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner
MonicoLigtasastenantofthelandownedbyprivatecomplainant
AnecitaPacateandlocatedatSitioLamak,BarangaySanJuan,
Sogod, Southern Leyte is conclusive or can be taken judicial
noticeofinacriminalcasefortheft;and
Third, whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible
errorwhenitupheldtheconvictionofpetitionerMonicoLigtasfor
theftunderArticle308oftheRevisedPenalCode.
ThePetitionismeritorious.
III
Petitioner argues that the findings of fact of both the trial
court and Court of Appeals must be revisited for being
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on record and
premised on the supposed absence of evidence on the claim of
petitioner[as]tenant.57
Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review
under Rule 4558of the Rules of Court. 59Factual findings of the
RegionalTrialCourtareconclusiveandbindingonthiscourt
_______________
spondent filed its Memorandum (id., at pp. 174182) dated
October2,2014beforethiscourtonOctober3,2014(id.,atp.
174).
57Id.,atp.190.
58RulesofCourt,Rule45,Sec.1provides:
SECTION1.Filing of petition with Supreme Court.A
party desiring to appeal bycertiorarifrom a judgment or final
orderorresolutionoftheCourtofAppeals,theSandiganbayan,
theRegionalTrialCourtorothercourtswheneverauthorizedby
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
reviewoncertiorari.Thepetitionshallraiseonlyquestionsoflaw
whichmustbedistinctlysetforth.
59SeeDelosReyesVda.DelPradov.People,G.R.No.186030,
March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 768, 778 [PerJ.Reyes, Second
Division].
15
VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015
Ligtasvs.People
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 60This court has
differentiatedbetweenaquestionoflawandquestionoffact:
Aquestion of lawexists when the doubt or controversy
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a
certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an
examinationoftheprobativevalueoftheevidencepresented,the
truthorfalsehoodoffactsbeingadmitted.Aquestionoffactexists
whenthedoubtordifferencearisesastothetruthorfalsehoodof
factsorwhenthequeryinvitescalibrationofthewholeevidence
consideringmainlythecredibilityofthewitnesses,theexistence
and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as
theirrelationtoeachotherandtothewhole,andtheprobability
ofthesituation.61(Emphasissupplied)
PetitioneradmitsthatthePetitionraisessubstantiallyfactual
issues that are beyond the scope of the Rule he seeks redress
from.62However, there are exceptions to the rule that only
questions of law should be the subject of a petition for review
underRule45:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures, (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting,(6)wheninmakingitsfindings,theCAwentbeyond
the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissionsofboththeappellantandtheappellee,(7)whenthe
CAsfindingsarecontrarytothosebythetrialcourt,(8)whenthe
findingsare
15
_______________
 60SeePeoplev.Cardenas,G.R.No.190342,March21,2012,
668 SCRA 827, 844845 [PerJ.Sereno (nowCJ.), Second
Division].
61Ruizv.People,512Phil.127,135;475SCRA476,484485
(2005)[PerJ.Callejo,Sr.,SecondDivision],quotingRepublicv.
Sandiganbayan, 425 Phil. 752, 765766; 375 SCRA 145, 154
(2002)[PerCJ.Davide,Jr.,EnBanc].
62Rollo,p.190.
16
16 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
conclusionswithoutcitationofspecificevidenceonwhichtheyare
based,(9)whentheactssetforthinthepetitionaswellasinthe
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent,(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposedabsenceofevidenceandcontradictedbytheevidenceon
record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. 63(Emphasis
supplied,citationomitted)
Thiscourthasheldbeforethatareexaminationofthefactsof
the case is justified when certain material facts and
circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if
takenintoaccount,wouldaltertheresultofthecaseinthatthey
would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would
entitletheaccusedtoacquittal.64
The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an
agriculturaltenantornot,isgenerallyaquestionoffact. 65Tobe
precise,however,theexistenceofatenancyrelationshipisalegal
conclusion based on facts presented corresponding to the
statutoryelementsoftenancy.66
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its
assailedDecisionwhenitheldthatalltheessentialelementsof
the crime of theft were duly proven by theprosecution despite
petitionerhavingbeenpronouncedabonafidetenantofthe
_______________
63Supranote59atpp.779780.
64Pitog v. People, 268 Phil. 413, 420; 190 SCRA 386, 393
(1990)[PerCJ.Fernan,ThirdDivision].
65Cornesv.LealRealtyCentrumCo.,Inc.,supranote38at
p.548;p.567,citingMonv.CourtofAppeals,471Phil.65,78;
427SCRA165,173(2004)[PerJ.Carpio,FirstDivision].
66SeeHeirsofNicolasJugalbotv.CourtofAppeals,547Phil.
113, 120; 518 SCRA 202, 210 (2007) [PerJ.YnaresSantiago,
Third Division]: Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship
dependentonwhattheallegedtenantdoesupontheland.Itis
alsoalegalrelationship[.]
17
VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015 17
Ligtasvs.People
landfromwhichheallegedlystole. 67Areviewoftherecordsofthe
caseis,thus,propertoarriveatajustandequitableresolution.
IV
 Petitionerclaimsthatprivatecomplainantsfilingofcriminal
chargeswasmotivatedbyillwillandrevenge. 68Thechargeswere
designedtoremovepetitionerfromthelandhehaslegitimately
occupiedastenant.69Telling is the fact thatpetitioner filedhis
ComplaintbeforetheDARABonNovember21,2000,whilethe
InformationforTheftwasfiledonDecember8,2000.70
Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his
statusasprivatecomplainantstenant. 71TheDARABDecisionis
entitledtorespect,evenfinality,astheDepartmentofAgrarian
Reform is the administrative agency vested with primary
jurisdiction and has acquired expertise on matters relating to
tenancyrelationship.72
ThefindingsoftheDARABwerealsosupportedbysubstantial
evidence.73To require petitioner to prove tenancy relationship
through evidence other than the DARAB Decision and the
testimonies of the witnesses is absurd and goes beyond the
requiredquantumofevidence,whichissubstantialevidence.74
Also, according to petitioner, the DARAB Decision has
attainedfinalitysinceprivatecomplainantdidnotfileanap
_______________
67Rollo,p.33.
68Id.,atpp.194195.
69Id.,atp.195.
70Id.,atp.196.
71Id.,atp.191.
72Id.
73Id.,atpp.193194.
74Id.,atp.194.
18
18 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
peal.TheDARABsfindingastothepartiestenancyrelationship
constitutesasresjudicata.75
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of
Appeals correctly disregarded the DARAB Decision. 76The trial
courtcouldnothavetakenjudicialnoticeoftheDARABDecision:
While the DARAB . . . ruled that petitioner is abona
fidetenantofPacate,courts arenotauthorized totakejudicial
noticeofthecontentsoftherecordsofothercasesevenwhensuch
cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstandingthefactthatbothcasesmayhavebeenheardor
areactuallypendingbeforethesamejudge.77(Citationomitted)
Moreover, according to respondent, petitioner invokes
conflicting defenses: that there is a legitimate tenancy
relationshipbetween himandprivatecomplainantandthathe
did not take the abaca hemp.78Nevertheless, respondent
maintains that petitioner failed to prove all the essential
elements of a tenancy relationship between him and private
complainant.79Privatecomplainantdidnotconsenttothealleged
tenancy relationship.80Petitioner alsofailedto provideevidence
astoanysharingofharvestbetweentheparties. 81
WeholdthataDARABdecisionontheexistenceofatenancy
relationshipisconclusiveandbindingoncourtsifsupportedby
substantialevidence.
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding
on criminal proceedings. This court has ruled in a number of
casesthat:
_______________
 75Id.,atp.192.
76Id.,atp.177.
77Id.,atp.178.
78Id.,atp.179.
79Id.,atpp.179180.
80Id.,atp.180.
81Id.,atp.178.
19
VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015
Ligtasvs.People
Itisindeedafundamentalprincipleofadministrativelawthat
administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for
the same act or omission.Thus, an absolution from a criminal
chargeisnotabartoanadministrativeprosecution,orviceversa.
Onethingisadministrativeliability;quiteanotherthingisthe
criminalliabilityforthesameact.
....
Thus,consideringthedifferenceinthequantumofevidence,
aswellastheprocedurefollowedandthesanctionsimposedin
criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and
conclusionsinoneshouldnotnecessarilybebindingontheother.
Notably,theevidencepresentedintheadministrativecasemay
not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the
criminalcases.82(Emphasissupplied,citationsomitted)
However,thiscasedoesnotinvolveanadministrativecharge
stemming from the same set of facts involved in a criminal
proceeding. This is not a case where one act results in both
criminalandadministrativeliability.DARABCaseNo.VIII319
SL2000 involves a determination of whether there exists a
tenancyrelationshipbetweenpetitionerandprivatecomplainant,
whileCriminalCaseNo.R225involvesdeterminationofwhether
petitionercommittedtheft.However,thetenancyrelationshipisa
factor in determining whether all the elements of theft were
provenbytheprosecution.
InitsDecisiondatedJanuary22,2002,theDARABfound:
All the necessary requisites in order to establish tenancy
relationship as required in the above quoted Supreme Court
ruling, has been established by the evidence submitted by
plaintiff; And these evidences were not controverted by any
19 evidencesubmittedbytherespondent.
_______________
82Paredesv. Court ofAppeals,555 Phil.538,549550;528
SCRA577,587589(2007)[PerJ.ChicoNazario,ThirdDivision].
20
20 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
In fine, this board found plaintiff abona fidetenant of the
landinquestionandassuchisentitledtoasecurityoftenure,in
which case he shall not be dispossessed of his holdings by the
landownerexceptforanyofthecausesprovidedbylawandonly
afterthesamehasbeenprovedbefore,andthedispossessionis
authorized by the Court and in the judgment that is final and
executory[.]83(Citationsomitted)
ThedispositiveportionoftheDARABDecisionprovides:
 WHEREFORE, premises being considered, judgment is
herebyrendered,findingMonicoLigtasabonafidetenantofthe
landsubjectinthiscaseandwelldescribedinparagraphthree(3)
inthecomplaint,andorderingasfollows,towit:
1.Therespondentandallotherpersonsactingforandinher
behalftomaintainplaintiffinthepeacefulpossessionoftheland
indispute.
2.TheMAROofSogod,SouthernLeyte,andconcurrentlythe
clusterManagerofSogodBayDARClustertocallthepartiesand
assistthemintheexecutionofaleaseholdcontractcoveringthe
landindispute,andforthepartiestorespectandobeysuchcall
ofthesaidMAROincompliancewiththelegalmandate.
3.OrderingtherespondenttopayplaintifftheamountofFive
Thousand(P5,000.00)Pesosrepresentingtheexpensesincurred
by plaintiff in vindicating his right and other actual expenses
incurredinthislitigation.
Otherreliefsoughtareherebyordereddismissedforlackof
evidence.
Nocost.
SODECIDED.84
_______________
83Rollo,p.33.
84Id.,atpp.3334.
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VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015
Ligtasvs.People
PrivatecomplainantdidnotappealtheDARABsfindings.
Findingsoffactofadministrativeagenciesintheexerciseof
theirquasijudicialpowersareentitledtorespectifsupportedby
substantial evidence.85This court is not tasked to weigh again
the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to
substituteitsownjudgment[asto]thesufficiencyofevidence.86
V
The DARAB is the quasijudicial tribunal that has the
primary jurisdiction to determine whether there is a tenancy
relationshipbetweenadverseparties.87Thiscourthasheldthat
_______________
85SeeMirov.MendozaVda.deErederos,G.R.Nos.172532&
17254445,November20,2013,710SCRA371,383[PerJ.Brion,
SecondDivision].
86SeeAutenciov.Maara,489Phil.752,761;449SCRA46,
56(2005)[PerJ.Panganiban,ThirdDivision].
87Rep.ActNo.6657(1988),Sec.50provides:
SEC.50.QuasiJudicial Powers of the DAR.The DAR is
hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementationofagrarianreform,exceptthosefallingunderthe
exclusivejurisdictionoftheDepartmentofAgriculture(DA)and
theDepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResources(DENR).
21 Itshallnotbeboundbytechnicalrulesofprocedureandevidence
but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or
controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in
accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case.
Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to
achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of
everyactionorproceedingbeforeit.
Itshallhavethepowertosummonwitnesses,administeroaths,
take testimony, require submission of reports, compel the
production of books and documents and answers to
interrogatories and issue subpoena, andsubpoenaduces
tecumand
22
22 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
judicialdeterminations[oftheDARAB]havethesamebinding
effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial
body.88Disputes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB include
controversiesrelatingto:
tenurialarrangements,whetherleasehold,tenancy,stewardship
orotherwise,overlandsdevotedtoagriculture,includingdisputes
concerningfarmworkersassociationsorrepresentationofpersons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrangetermsorconditionsofsuchtenurialarrangements.89
InSalazarv.DeLeon,90thiscourtupheldtheDepartmentof
Agrarian Reforms primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes,
whichincludestherelationshipbetweenlandowners
_______________
to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized
officers. It shall likewise have the power to punish direct and
indirectcontemptsinthesamemannerandsubjecttothesame
penaltiesasprovidedintheRulesofCourt.
Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent
themselves, their fellow farmers, or their organizations in any
proceedingsbeforetheDAR:Provided,however,Thatwhenthere
aretwoormorerepresentativesforanyindividualorgroup,the
representatives should choose only one among themselves to
representsuchpartyorgroupbeforeanyDARproceedings.
NotwithstandinganappealtotheCourtofAppeals,thedecision
oftheDARshallbeimmediatelyexecutory.(Emphasissupplied)
88Martillanov.CourtofAppeals,447Phil.226,236237;433
SCRA 195, 202 (2004) [PerJ.YnaresSantiago, First
Division],citingRep.ActNo.6657(1988),Secs.50and51.
89Suarez v. Saul, 510 Phil. 400, 409; 473 SCRA 628, 637
(2005) [PerJ.YnaresSantiago, First Division],citingRep. Act
No.6657(1988),Sec.3(d)inrelationtoSec.50andDARABRules
ofProcedure,RuleII,Sec.1.
90596Phil.472;576SCRA447(2009)[PerJ.ChicoNazario,
ThirdDivision].
23
VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015 23
Ligtasvs.People
andtenants.91TheDARABDecisionisconclusiveandbindingon
courtswhensupportedbysubstantialevidence. 92Thiscourtruled
thatadministrativeresjudicataexistsinthatcase:
Significantly,respondentdidnotappealtheDecisiondated17
November1995oftheDARABinDARABCase#II380ISA94;
consequently,thesamehasattainedfinalityandconstitutesres
judicataon the issue of petitioners status as a tenant of
respondent.
Resjudicataisaconceptappliedinthereviewoflowercourt
decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts.But
jurisprudencehasalsorecognizedtheruleofadministrativeres
judicata:Therulewhichforbidsthereopeningofamatteronce
judiciallydeterminedbycompetentauthorityapplies as wellto
the judicial and quasijudicial facts of public, executive or
administrativeofficersandboardsactingwithintheirjurisdiction
astothejudgmentsofcourtshavinggeneraljudicialpowers.It
has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons
investedwithpowertodecideonthepropertyandrightsofthe
citizenisexaminablebytheSupremeCourt,uponawritoferror
or acertiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded asres
judicata.To be sure, early jurisprudence was already mindful
thatthedoctrineofresjudicatacannotbesaidtoapplyexclusively
to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts
withoutunreasonablycircumscribingthescopethereof;andthat
themoreequitableattitudeistoallowextensionofthedefenseto
decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been
conferred.93(Emphasissupplied,citationsomitted)
InEncinas v. Agustin, Jr.,94this court clarified thatres
judicataappliesonlytodecisionsrenderedbyagenciesinjudi
_______________
91Id.,atpp.484486;p.457.
92Id.,atp.489;p.462.
93Id.,atpp.488489;p.461.
94G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013, 696 SCRA 240
[PerCJ.Sereno,EnBanc].
24
24 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
cialorquasijudicialproceedingsandnottopurelyadministrative
proceedings:
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine ofres
judicataappliesonlytojudicialorquasijudicialproceedings,and
not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative
powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as
opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi
judicialcharacter.
Inadministrativelaw,aquasijudicialproceedinginvolves(a)
takingandevaluatingevidence;(b)determiningfactsbasedupon
the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision
supported by the facts proved. The exercise of quasijudicial
functionsinvolvesadetermination,withrespecttothematterin
controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and
obligationsofthecontendingpartiesare;andbasedthereonand
thefactsobtaining,theadjudicationoftherespectiverightsand
obligationsoftheparties.95(Citationsomitted)
Wefinditnecessarytoclarifythetwoconceptsofresjudicata:
barbypriorjudgmentandconclusivenessofjudgment.InSocial
SecurityCommissionv.RizalPoultryandLivestockAssociation,
Inc., et al.,96this court discussed and differentiated the two
conceptsofresjudicata:
 Resjudicataembracestwoconcepts:(1)barbypriorjudgment
as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure;and(2)conclusivenessofjudgmentinRule39,Section
47(c).
Thereisbarbypriorjudgmentwhen,asbetweenthefirst
casewherethejudgmentwasrenderedandthesecondcasethat
issoughttobebarred,thereisidentityofparties,subjectmatter,
andcausesofaction.Inthisinstance,thejudgmentinthefirst
caseconstitutesanabsolutebartothesecondaction.
_______________
95Id.,atpp.260261.
96665 Phil. 198; 650 SCRA 50 (2011) [PerJ.Perez, First
Division].
25
VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015
Ligtasvs.People
Butwherethereisidentityofpartiesinthefirstandsecond
cases, but noidentity ofcauses of action, the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is the concept ofres judicataknown as
conclusivenessofjudgment.Stateddifferently,anyright,factor
matterinissuedirectlyadjudicatedornecessarilyinvolvedinthe
determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgmentisrenderedonthemeritsisconclusivelysettledbythe
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose,orsubjectmatterofthetwoactionsisthesame.
Thus,ifaparticularpointorquestionisinissueinthesecond
action,andthejudgmentwilldependonthedeterminationofthat
particularpointorquestion,aformerjudgmentbetweenthesame
partiesortheirprivieswillbefinalandconclusiveinthesecondif
thatsamepointorquestionwasinissueandadjudicatedinthe
first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely
identityofissue.
Theelementsofresjudicataare:(1)thejudgmentsoughtto
barthenewactionmustbefinal;(2)thedecisionmusthavebeen
renderedbyacourthavingjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter
andtheparties;(3)thedispositionofthecasemustbeajudgment
on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and
secondaction,identityofparties, subjectmatter, andcausesof
action.Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
actionbeshowninthetwocases,thenresjudicatainitsaspectas
a bar by prior judgment would apply. If as between the two
cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical
25
causesofaction,thenresjudicataasconclusivenessofjudgment
applies.97(Emphasissupplied,citationsomitted)
_______________
97Id.,atpp.205206;pp.5658.
26
26 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
InMartillano v. Court of Appeals,98the DARAB Decision
finding for the existence of a tenancy relationship betweenthe
parties was declared by this court as conclusive on the
parties.99As in this case, the DARAB
Decision100inMartillanoattained finality when the landowner
didnotappealtheDecision.101Thiscourtruledthatthedoctrine
ofresjudicataapplies:
UndertheaforecitedsectionsofRA6657,theDepartmentof
AgrarianReformisempowered,throughitsadjudicatingarmthe
regionalandprovincialadjudicationboards, toresolveagrarian
disputes and controversies on all matters pertaining to the
implementationoftheagrarianlaw.Section51thereofprovides
thatthedecisionoftheDARABattainsfinalityafterthelapseof
fifteen(15)daysandnoappealwasinterposedtherefrombyany
oftheparties.
In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in
DARABCaseNo.062Bul89,therebeingnoappealinterposed
therefrom,attainedfinality.Accordingly,thematterregardingthe
status of Martillano asa tenant farmer and the validity of the
CLTandEmancipationPatentsissuedinhisfavoraresettledand
nolongeropentodoubtandcontroversy.
....
We recall that DARAB Case 062Bul 89 was for the
cancellationofpetitionersCLTandEmancipationpat
_______________
98Supranote88.
99Id.,atpp.236237;p.205.
100Id.,atpp.229230;p.197.TheDARABDecisionpertains thedoctrineofresjudicata,andevenunderthedoctrineoflawof
to DARAB Case No. 062Bul 89, which resolved Abelardo
Valenzuela,Jr.sComplaintforthecancellationoftheCertificate
ofLandTransfer(CLT)No.0042751and/orEmancipationPatent
Nos.A308399issuedinfavorof[petitioner]NicanorMartillano.
OnApril4,1990,Valenzuelasold19parcelsofland[,]...moreor
less1.3785hectares[,]toprivaterespondent[William]PoCham.
101Id.,atpp.236237;p.202.
27
VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015 27
Ligtasvs.People
ents. The same effect is sought with the institution of DARAB
Case No. 512Bul 94, which is an action to withdraw and/or
cancel administratively the CLT and Emancipation Patents
issuedtopetitioner.ConsideringthatDARABCase062Bul89
hasattainedfinalitypriortothefilingofDARABCaseNo.512
Bul 94, no strenuous legal interpretation is necessary to
understandthattheissuesraisedinthepriorcase,i.e.,DARAB
CaseNo.062Bul89,whichhavebeenresolvedwithfinality,may
notbelitigatedanew.
The instant case is complicated by the failure of the
complainanttoincludeMartillanoaspartydefendantinthecase
beforetheadjudicationboardandtheDARAB,althoughhewas
finallyimpleadedonappealbeforetheCourtofAppeals.
The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in the
petitionwillnotaffecttheapplicabilityofthedoctrineofbarby
prior judgment.What is decisive is that the issues which have
already been litigated in a final and executory judgment
precludes,bytheprincipleofbarbypriorjudgment,anaspectof
thecase,therelitigationofthesameissueinanotheraction.Itis
wellestablishedthatwhenarightorfacthasbeenjudiciallytried
anddeterminedbyacourtofcompetentjurisdiction,solongasit
remainsunreversed,itshouldbeconclusiveuponthepartiesand
thoseinprivitywiththem.Thedictumthereinlaiddownbecame
thelawofthecaseandwhatwasonceirrevocablyestablishedas
the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be binding
betweenthesamepartiesaslongasthefactsonwhichthedecision
was predicated, continue to be the facts of the case before the
court.Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of
thatdictumcan no longer be resurrected anew since said issue
hadalreadybeenresolvedandfinallylaidtorest,ifnotbythe
principle ofres judicata, at least by conclusiveness of
judgment.102(Emphasissupplied,citationsomitted)
_______________
102Id.,atpp.237239;pp.203205.
28
28 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
InCov.People,etal.,103thiscourtheldthatthedoctrineof
conclusiveness of judgment also applies in criminal
cases.104Petitionerinthatcasewaschargedwiththeviolationof
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, for the alleged non
remittanceofSocialSecuritySystemcontributions. 105Thiscourt
upheldthefindingsoftheNationalLaborRelationsCommission
inaseparatecase,whichdeclaredtheabsenceofanemployer
employeerelationshipandhadattainedfinality. 106Thiscourtheld
that:
Thereasonsforestablishingtheprincipleofconclusivenessof
judgmentarefoundedonsoundpublicpolicy....Itisallowableto
reason back from a judgment to the basis on which it stands,
upon the obvious principle that where a conclusion is
indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain
premises, the premises are equally indisputable with the
conclusion.Whenafacthasbeenoncedeterminedinthecourseof
ajudicialproceeding,andafinaljudgmenthasbeenrenderedin
accordance therewith, it cannot be again litigated between the
samepartieswithoutvirtuallyimpeachingthecorrectnessofthe
formerdecision,which,frommotivesofpublicpolicy,thelawdoes
notpermittobedone.
Res judicatahas two concepts. The first is bar by prior
judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(b), and the second is
conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(c). Both
conceptsarefoundedontheprincipleofestoppel,andarebased
onthesalutarypublicpolicyagainstunnecessarymultiplicityof
suits. Like the splitting of causes of action,res judicatais in
pursuance of such policy. Matters settled by a Courts final
judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again. Re
litigationofissuesalreadysettledmerelyburdensthe
_______________
103610Phil.60;592SCRA381(2009)[PerJ.Corona,First
Division].
104Id.,atp.69;p.390.
105Id.,atpp.6364;p.384.
106Id.,atp.67;p.387.
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VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015 29
Ligtasvs.People
Courtsandthetaxpayers,createsuneasinessandconfusion,and
wastes valuable time and energy that could be devoted to
worthiercases.107(Citationsomitted)
InVHJConstructionandDevelopmentCorporationv.Courtof
Appeals,108this court ruled that tenancy relationship must be
dulyproven:
[A]tenancyrelationshipcannotbepresumed.Theremustbe
evidence to prove this allegation. The principal factor in
determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.
Tenancyisnotapurelyfactualrelationshipdependentonwhat
the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship.109(Citationomitted)
TheDARAB,inDARABCaseNo.VIII319SL2000,heldthat
alltheessentialelementsofatenancyrelationshipwereproven
bypetitioner.110Itfoundthatthere wassubstantialevidenceto
support petitioners claim as tenantof theland. 111In rendering
theDecision,theDARABexaminedpleadings
_______________
107Id.,atpp.7071;pp.392393.
108480 Phil. 28; 436 SCRA 392 (2004) [PerJ.Callejo, Sr.,
SecondDivision].
109Id.,atp.35;p.398.
110Rollo, p. 33. SeeVHJ Construction and Development
Corporationv.CourtofAppeals,id.,atp.35;pp.398399:The
requisitesofatenancyrelationshipareasfollows:(1)theparties
arethelandownerandthetenant;(2)thesubjectisagricultural
land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is
agriculturalproduction;(5)thereispersonalcultivation;and(6)
thereissharingoftheharvests.
111Rollo,p.33.SeeRulesofCourt,Rule133,Sec.5provides:
SECTION5.Substantial evidence.In cases filed before
administrative or quasijudicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
acceptasadequatetojustifyaconclusion.
30
30 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
and affidavits of both petitioner and private complainant. 112It
wasconvincedbypetitionersevidence,whichconsistedofsworn
statementsofpetitionerswitnessesthatpetitionerwasinstalled
astenantbyAndresPacatesometimein1993. 113Petitionerand
Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the produce after
harvest.114However, Andres Pacate had died before the first
harvest.115Petitionerthengavethelandownerssharetoprivate
complainant, and had done so every harvest until he was
disturbedinhiscultivationofthelandonJune29,2000.116
WeemphasizethatafterfilingherAnswerbeforetheDARAB,
private complainantfailed toheed the Notices sent to her and
refused to attend the scheduled hearings. 117The DARAB even
quotedinitsDecisionthereasonofferedbyprivatecomplainants
counselinhisMotiontoWithdrawascounsel:
That as early as the preliminary hearings of the case, the
respondenthasalreadyshownherintentionnottoparticipatethe
proceedingsofthecaseforreasonsknownonlytoher;
 Thatdespitetheadvi[c]eoftheundersigned,respondentstood
patwithherdecisionnottoparticipateintheproceedingsofthe
case;
That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can do
nothingexcepttowithdrawasheisnowwithdrawingascounsel
fortherespondentoftheaboveentitledcase[.]118
_______________
112Rollo,pp.2932.
113Id.,atpp.2930.
114Id.,atp.30.
115Id.
116Id.The DARAB Decision states that Ligtas had
peacefullycultivatedthelandfrom1993toJune29,2000,when
respondentAnecitaPacateorderedmentoharvestabacafromthe
land.
117Id.,atp.28.
118Id.,atp.29.
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VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015
Ligtasvs.People
Itistruethattrialcourtsarenotmandatedtotakejudicial
noticeofdecisionsofothercourtsorevenrecordsofothercases
thathavebeentriedorarependinginthesamecourtorbefore
thesamejudge.119IndeclaringthattheDARABsfindingsonthe
tenancyrelationshipbetweenpetitionerandprivatecomplainant
are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of
Appeals120relied onCornes, et al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co.,
Inc.121
InCornes, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21hectare
agriculturallandinTarlacthatwasprincipallydevotedtosugar
and rice and who claim the rights of their predecessorsin
interest, filed separate Complaints before the Provincial
AdjudicationBoardofRegionIIIinTarlac,Tarlac.Theyclaimed
that when the registered owner of the land, Josefina Roxas
Omaa,soldthelandtorespondents,respondentswereawareof
thetenancyrelationshipbetweenpetitionersandJosefinaRoxas
Omaa.122
_______________
119SeeRulesofCourt,Rule129,Secs.1and2provide:
SECTION1.Judicial notice, when mandatory.A court
shalltakejudicialnotice,withouttheintroductionofevidence,of
the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history,formsofgovernmentandsymbolsofnationality,thelaw
ofnations,theadmiraltyandmaritimecourtsoftheworldand
their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
31
judicialdepartmentsofthePhilippines,thelawsofnature,the
measureoftime,andthegeographicaldivisions.
SECTION2.Judicial notice, when discretionary.A court
maytakejudicialnoticeofmatterswhichareofpublicknowledge,
orarecapable ofunquestionabledemonstration,oroughtto be
knowntojudgesbecauseoftheirjudicialfunctions.
SeealsoTabuenav.CourtofAppeals,274Phil.51,5657;196
SCRA650,655656(1991)[PerJ.Cruz,FirstDivision].
120Rollo,p.104.
 121Cornesv.LealRealtyCentrumCo.,Inc.,supranote38.
122Id.,atpp.533534;p.551.
32
32 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
Respondentsofferedacompensationpackagetopetitionersin
exchangefortherenunciationoftheirtenancyrightsunderthe
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. However, they failed to
comply with their obligations under the terms of the
compensation package.123Petitioners then filed a series of
ComplaintsbeforetheDARAB.Thecaseswereconsolidatedand
resolvedbytheProvincialAdjudicator.124
The Provincial Adjudicator ruled, among other things, that
there was no tenancy relationship [that] existed between the
parties.125He found that petitioners and their predecessorsin
interestweremerehiredlaborers,nottenants.Tenancycannotbe
presumedfromrespondentsofferofacompensationpackage.126
Onappeal,theDARABreversedtheDecisionoftheProvincial
Adjudicator.Itfoundthattherewasanimpliedtenancybetween
theparties.Petitionersweredeemedtenantsofthelandformore
than30years.Theywereentitledtosecurityoftenure.127
The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB Decision and
reinstated the Provincial Adjudicators Decision. It held that
therewasnosubstantialevidencetoprovethatalltherequisites
of tenancy relationship existed. However, despite the lack of
tenancyrelationship,thecompensationpackageagreementmust
beupheld.128
ThiscourtaffirmedtheCourtofAppealsDecision. 129Itheld
that petitioners failed to overcome the burden of proving the
existenceofatenancyrelationship:
_______________
123Id.,atp.534;pp.551552.
124Id.,atpp.533537;pp.551554.
125Id.,atp.537;p.554.
126Id.
127Id.,atpp.540541;p.559.
128Id.,atpp.543544;p.560.
129Id.,atp.558;p.577.
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VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015 33
Ligtasvs.People
Attheoutset,thepartiesdonotappeartobethelandowner
and the tenants. While it appears that there was personal
cultivationbypetitionersandtheirpredecessorsininterestofthe
subject landholding, whatwasestablishedwasthatpetitioners
claim of tenancy was founded on the selfserving testimony of
petitioner Rodolfo Cornes that his predecessorsininterest had
beeninpossessionofthelandholdingformorethan30yearsand
had engagedina5050sharingschemewithJOSEFINA and
JOSEFINAs grandmother, the previous owner thereof. Self
serving statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must be
adduced.Suchclaimsdonotsufficeabsentconcreteevidenceto
supportthem.Theburdenrestsontheshouldersofpetitionersto
provetheiraffirmativeallegationoftenancy,whichburdenthey
failedtodischargewithsubstantialevidence.Suchajuridicaltie
mustbeaptlyshown.Simplyput,hewhoallegestheaffirmative
oftheissuehastheburdenofproof,andfromtheplaintiffina
civilcase,theburdenofproofneverparts.Thesameruleapplies
toadministrativecases.Infact,ifthecomplainant,uponwhom
reststheburdenofprovinghiscauseofaction,failstoshowina
satisfactorymannerthefactsuponwhichhebaseshisclaim,the
respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense....
Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that
there existeda sharing ofharvestsinthe context of atenancy
relationship between petitioners and/or their predecessorsin
interest and JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is illuminating to the
effect that to prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any
otherevidencemustbepresented.Nonewasshown.Noreceipts
werepresentedastestamentstotheclaimedsharingofharvests.
Theonlyevidencesubmittedtoestablishthepurportedsharingof
harvests was the testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes. The
sharing arrangement cannot be deemed to have existed on the
basisaloneofpetitionerRodolfoCornesclaim.Itisselfserving
and is without evidentiary value. Selfserving statements are
deemedinadequate;competentproofmustbeadduced.Ifatall,
34
34 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
thefactaloneofsharingisnotsufficienttoestablishatenancy
relationship.
We also sustain the conclusion reached by the Provincial
AdjudicatorandtheCourtofAppealsthatthetestimonyofAraceli
Pascua, an employee of the DAR in Victoria, Tarlac, that the
subject landholding was tenanted cannot overcome substantial
evidencetothecontrary.Toprovetheallegedtenancynoreliance
may be made upon the said public officers testimony. What
cannotbeignoredistheprecedentrulingofthisCourtthatthe
findings of orcertifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality
concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship
between the contending parties, are merely preliminary or
provisionalandarenotbindinguponthecourts.Thisrulingholds
with greater effect in the instant case in light of the fact that
petitioners,ashereinshown,werenotabletoprovethepresenceof
all the indispensable elements of tenancy.130(Emphasis supplied,
citationsomitted)
Thus,inCornes,thiscourtdidnotcategoricallyholdthatthe
DARABsfindingsweremerelyprovisionaland,thus,notbinding
oncourts.Whatwasdeemedasapreliminarydeterminationof
tenancywasthetestimonyoftheDepartmentofAgrarianReform
employeestatingthatthelandinvolvedwastenanted.Further,
the tribunals had conflicting findings on whether petitioners
werebonafidetenants.
In this case, records are bereft as to whether private
complainantappealedtheDARABDecision.Thus,itispresumed
thattheDecisionhaslonglapsedintofinality.131Itisalsoes
_______________
130Id.,atpp.550552;pp.568571.
131SeeRep.ActNo.6657(1988),Sec.51provides:
SEC.51.Finality of Determination.Any case or controversy
before it shall be decided within thirty (30) days after it is
submittedforresolution.Onlyone(1)motionforreconsideration
shallbeallowed.Anyorder,rulingordecisionshallbefinalafter
thelapseoffifteen(15)daysfromreceiptofacopythereof.

35
VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015
Ligtasvs.People
tablished that private complainant participated in the initial
stagesoftheDARABproceedings. 132Therefore, theissueofthe
existenceofatenancyrelationshipisfinalasbetweentheparties.
WecannotcollaterallyreviewtheDARABsfindingsatthisstage.
The existence of the final Decision that tenancy exists creates
seriousdoubtsastotheguiltoftheaccused.
VI
Accordingtopetitioner,theelementsoftheftunderArticle308
of the Revised Penal Code were not established since he was
abona fidetenant of the land.133The DARABs recognition of
petitioner as a legitimate tenant necessarily implie[d] that he
ha[d] the authority to harvest the abaca hemp from [private
complainants land].134This shows that petitioner had no
criminalintent.
As to the existence of another element of theft that the
takingwasdonewithouttheconsentoftheownerpetitioner
argues that this, too, was negated by his status as private
complainantstenant:
The purported lack of consent on the part of the private
complainantasallegedbytheprosecution,ismisplaced.Infact,it
was even improper for...Anecita Pacate to stop or prevent
petitionerfromharvestingtheproduceofthelandholdingbecause
astenant,petitionerisentitledtosecurityoftenure.Thisright
entitled him to continue working on his landholding until the
leaseholdrelationisterminatedoruntilhisevictionisauthorized
by the DARAB in a judgment that is final and
executory.135(Citationomitted)
35
_______________
132Rollo,pp.2829and42.
133Id.,atp.199.
134Id.
135Id.
36
36 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
Petitioner argues that the constitutional presumption of
innocencemustbeupheld:
Wellsettled is the rule that where inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
otherconsistentwithhisguilt,thentheevidencedoesnotfulfill
the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.Inacquittinganappellant,wearenotsayingthathe
islilywhite,orpureasdrivensnow.Rather,wearedeclaringhis
innocence because theprosecutionsevidencefailedtoshow his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law
requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, then his
acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental
law.136(Citationsomitted)
 TheCourtofAppealserredwhenitaffirmedthefindingsof
thetrialcourtfindingpetitionerguiltybeyondreasonabledoubt
oftheft.
Article308oftheRevisedPenalCodeprovides:
ARTICLE308.Who are Liable for Theft.Theft is committed
by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall
takepersonalpropertyofanotherwithoutthelattersconsent.
Theftislikewisecommittedby:
1.Anypersonwho,havingfoundlostproperty,shallfailto
deliverthesametothelocalauthoritiesortoitsowner;
2.Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the
property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or
objectofthedamagecausedbyhim;and
_______________
136Id.,atpp.199200.
37
VOL.767,AUGUST17,2015
Ligtasvs.People
3.Anypersonwhoshallenteranenclosedestateorafield
where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and
withouttheconsentofitsowner,shallhuntorfishuponthesame
orshallgatherfruits,cereals,orotherforestorfarmproducts.
The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal
property;(2)thepropertytakenbelongstoanother;(3)thetaking
was done without the owners consent; (4) there was intent to
gain; and (5) the taking was done without violence against or
intimidationofthepersonorforceuponthings.137
Tenantshavebeendefinedas:
personswhointhemselvesandwiththeaidavailablefrom
within their immediate farm households cultivate the land
belongingtoorpossessedbyanother,withthelattersconsent,for
purposesofproduction,sharingtheproducewiththelandholder
under theshare tenancy system,orpayingtothe landholdera
pricecertainorascertainableinproduceormoneyorbothunder
theleaseholdtenancysystem.138(Citationomitted)
Underthisdefinition,atenantisentitledtotheproductsof
the land he or she cultivates. The landowners share in the
producedependsontheagreementbetweentheparties.Hence,
the harvesting done by the tenant is with the landowners
consent.
TheexistenceoftheDARABDecisionadjudicatingtheissueof
tenancybetweenpetitionerandprivatecomplainantnegatesthe
existence of the element that thetaking was done withoutthe
ownersconsent.TheDARABDecisionimpliesthatpetitionerhad
legitimateauthoritytoharvesttheabaca.
_______________
37
137SeeGanv.People,550Phil.133,159;521SCRA550,577
(2007)[PerJ.ChicoNazario,FirstDivision];UnitedStatesv.De
Vera, 43 Phil. 1000, 1003 (1921) [PerJ.Villamor,En Banc];
andPeople v. Yusay, 50 Phil. 598, 607 (1927) [PerJ.Villa
Real,EnBanc].
138Cornesv.LealRealtyCentrumCo.,Inc.,supranote38at
p.548;p.566.
38
38 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ligtasvs.People
Theprosecution,therefore,failedtoestablishalltheelementsof
theft.
InPitogv.People,139thiscourtacquittedpetitioneroftheftof
sugarcane and banana crops on the basis of reasonable
doubt.140Theprosecutionfailedtoprovelackofcriminalintenton
petitionerspart.141Itfailedtoclearlyidentifythepersonwho,as
aresultofacriminalact,withouthisknowledgeandconsent,was
wrongfully deprivedof athingbelongingto him. 142There were
doubtsastowhethertheplantstakenbypetitionerwereindeed
plantedonprivatecomplainantslotwhenpetitionerhadplanted
herownplantsadjacenttoit. 143Thus,itwasnotprovenbeyond
reasonable doubt that the property belonged to private
complainant.Thiscourtfoundthatpetitionertookthesugarcane
andbananasbelievingthemtobeherown.Thatbeingthecase,
shecouldnothavehadacriminalintent.144
Inthiscase,petitionerharvestedtheabaca,believingthathe
wasentitledtotheproduceasalegitimatetenantcultivatingthe
landownedbyprivatecomplainant.Personalpropertymayhave
beentaken,butitiswiththeconsentoftheowner.
NolessthantheConstitutionprovidesthattheaccusedshall
bepresumedinnocentofthecrimeuntilprovenguilty. 145[I]tis
bettertoacquittenguiltyindividualsthantoconvictoneinnocent
person.146Thus, courts must consider [e]very circumstance
againstguiltandinfavorofinnocence[.] 147Equallysettledisthat
[w]heretheevidenceadmitsoftwoin
terpretations,oneofwhichisconsistentwithguilt,andtheother
withinnocence,theaccusedmustbegiventhebenefitofdoubt
andshouldbeacquitted.148
Inviewofpetitionersacquittalbasedonreasonabledoubt,we
finditunnecessarytodiscussfurthertheothererrorsraisedby
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Petition isGRANTED. The Court of
AppealsDecisiondatedMarch16,2010andtheResolutiondated
February 2, 2012 areREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. Petitioner
MonicoLigtasisACQUITTEDofthecrimeoftheftunderArticle
308 of the Revised Penal Code. If detained, he is ordered
immediatelyRELEASED, unless he is confined for any other
lawful cause. Any amount paid by way of a bailbond is
orderedRETURNED.
SOORDERED.
Carpio(Chairperson),Brion,DelCastilloandMendoza,JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set
aside. Petitioner Monico Ligtas acquitted and ordered
immediatelyreleased.
Notes.In adjudicating a case on trial, courts are not
authorizedtotakeajudicialnoticeofthecontentsoftherecords
of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are
pendinginthesamecourtandnotwithstandingthatbothcases
may have been tried or are actually pending before the same
judge; Rule admits of exceptions. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
[FourthDivision],662SCRA152[2011])
TheSupremeCourttakesjudicialnoticethatproceedingsat
thefirstlevelcourts,especiallyincitiesandcapitaltowns,are
relativelyslowerthanthoseattheRegionalTrialCourtbecause
ofitsmorenumerouspendingcases.(Botovs.Villena,706SCRA
1[2013])
 o0o
_______________
148Id.,atpp.257258;p.271,citingPeoplev.Mijares,358
Phil. 154, 166; 297 SCRA 520, 534 (1998) [PerJ.Panganiban,
FirstDivision];Peoplev.Corpuz,459Phil.100,113;412SCRA
479,489(2003)[PerJ.YnaresSantiago,FirstDivision].
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R.No.172953.April30,2008.*
JUNIE MALILLIN y LOPEZ, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondent.
CriminalLaw;Appeals;Althoughthetrialcourtsfindingsof
fact are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on
appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and
substancehavebeenoverlooked,misapprehendedormisappliedin
acaseunderappeal.Althoughthetrialcourtsfindingsoffact
areentitledtogreatweightandwillnotbedisturbedonappeal,
thisruledoesnotapplywherefactsofweightandsubstancehave
beenoverlooked,misapprehendedormisappliedinacaseunder
appeal.Inthecaseatbar,severalcircumstancesobtainwhich,if
properlyappreciated,wouldwarrantaconclusiondifferentfrom
thatarrivedatbythetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppeals.
Same; Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs; Chain of
CustodyRule;Themerefactofunauthorizedpossessionwillnot
sufficetocreateinareasonablemindthemoralcertaintyrequired
tosustainafindingofguiltmorethanjustthefactofpossession,
thefactthatthesubstanceillegallypossessedinthefirstplaceis
the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be
establishedwiththesameunwaveringexactitudeasthatrequisite
tomakeafindingofguilt.Prosecutionsforillegalpossessionof
prohibiteddrugsnecessitatesthattheelementalactofpossession
of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty,
togetherwiththefactthatthesameisnotauthorizedbylaw.The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the verycorpus delictiof the
offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction.Essentialthereforeinthesecasesisthattheidentity
oftheprohibiteddrugbeestablishedbeyonddoubt.Bethatasit
may,themerefactofunauthorizedpossessionwillnotsufficeto
create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to
sustainafindingofguilt.Morethanjustthefactofpossession,
thefactthatthesubstanceillegallypossessedinthefirstplaceis
the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that
requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody
requirementperformsthis
_______________
*SECONDDIVISION.
620
6 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
20
Malillinvs.People
function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerningtheidentityoftheevidenceareremoved.
Same;Same;Same;Asamethodofauthenticatingevidence,
thechainofcustodyrulerequiresthattheadmissionofanexhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be; The
likelihoodoftampering,lossormistakewithrespecttoanexhibit
isgreatestwhentheexhibitissmallandisonethathasphysical
characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to
substancesfamiliartopeopleintheirdailylives.Asamethodof
authenticatingevidence,thechainofcustodyrulerequiresthat
theadmissionofanexhibitbeprecededbyevidencesufficientto
support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponentclaimsittobe.Itwouldincludetestimonyaboutevery
linkinthechain,fromthemomenttheitemwaspickeduptothe
timeitisofferedintoevidence,insuchawaythateveryperson
whotouchedtheexhibitwoulddescribehowandfromwhomit
wasreceived,whereitwasandwhathappenedtoitwhileinthe
witness possession, the condition in which it was received and
the condition in which it was delivered tothe next link inthe
chain.Thesewitnesseswouldthendescribetheprecautionstaken
toensurethattherehadbeennochangeintheconditionofthe
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possessionofthesame.Whiletestimonyaboutaperfectchainis
notalwaysthestandardbecauseitisalmostalwaysimpossibleto
obtain,anunbrokenchainofcustodybecomesindispensableand
essentialwhentheitemofrealevidenceisnotdistinctiveandis
not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of
testingortrialiscritical,orwhenawitnesshasfailedtoobserve
itsuniqueness.Thesamestandardlikewiseobtainsincasethe
evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination
andevensubstitutionandexchange.Inotherwords,theexhibits
level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering
withoutregardtowhetherthesameisadvertentorotherwisenot
dictatesthelevelofstrictnessintheapplicationofthechainof
custodyrule.Indeed,thelikelihoodoftampering,lossormistake
withrespecttoanexhibitisgreatestwhentheexhibitissmall
and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature
andsimilarinformtosubstancesfamiliartopeopleintheirdaily
lives.621
VOL.553,APRIL30,2008 621
Malillinvs.People
Same; Same; Same; A unique characteristic of narcotic
substancesisthattheyarenotreadilyidentifiableasinfactthey
are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition
andnaturehence,inauthenticatingthesame,astandardmore
stringentthanthatappliedtocasesinvolvingobjectswhichare
readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard
that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completenessifonlytorenderitimprobablethattheoriginalitem
haseitherbeenexchangedwithanotherorbeencontaminatedor
tamperedwith.Auniquecharacteristicofnarcoticsubstancesis
thattheyarenotreadilyidentifiableasinfacttheyaresubjectto
scientificanalysistodeterminetheircompositionandnature.The
Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at
least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of
custody over the same there could have been tampering,
alteration or substitution of substances from other casesby
accidentorotherwiseinwhichsimilarevidencewasseizedorin
which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing.
Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent
than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily
identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that
entailsachainofcustodyoftheitemwithsufficientcompleteness
ifonlytorenderitimprobablethattheoriginalitemhaseither
beenexchangedwithanotherorbeencontaminatedortampered
with.
Same; Same; Same; Section 21 of the Implementing Rules
andRegulationsofR.A.No.9165clearlyoutlinesthepostseizure
procedureintakingcustodyofseizeddrugsitmandatesthatthe
officeracquiringinitialcustodyofdrugsunderasearchwarrant
mustconductthephotographingandthephysicalinventoryofthe
itemattheplacewherethewarranthasbeenserved.Section21
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165
clearly outlines the postseizure procedure in taking custody of
seized drugs. In a language too plain to require a different
construction,itmandatesthattheofficeracquiringinitialcustody
ofdrugsunderasearchwarrantmustconductthephotographing
and the physical inventory of the item at the place where the
warranthasbeenserved.Esternondeviatedfromthisprocedure.
It was elicited from him that at the close of the search of
petitionershouse,hebroughttheseizeditemsimmediatelytothe
policestationfortheallegedpurposeofmakingatrueinventory
thereof,butthereappearstobenoreasonwhyatrueinventory
couldnotbemadeinpetitionershousewhenin622
6 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
22
Malillinvs.People
facttheapprehendingteamwasabletorecordandmarkthe
seized items and there and then prepare a seizure receipt
therefor.Lestitbeforgotten,theraidingteamhashadenough
opportunity to cause the issuance of the warrant which means
thatithashadasmuchtimetoprepareforitsimplementation.
WhilethefinalprovisoinSection21oftheruleswouldappearto
excuse noncompliance therewith, the same cannot benefit the
prosecution as it failed to offer any acceptable justification for
Esternonscourseofaction.
Same;Same;Same;SearchesandSeizures;Theapprovalby
the court which issued the search warrant is necessary before
policeofficerscanretainthepropertyseizedandwithoutit,they
wouldhavenoauthoritytoretainpossessionthereofandmoreso
todeliverthesametoanotheragencymeretolerancebythetrial
court of a contrary practice does not make the practice right
becauseitisviolativeofthemandatoryrequirementsofthelaw
and it thereby defeats the very purpose for the enactment.
Esternons failure to deliver the seized items to the court
demonstrates a departure from the directive in the search
warrant that the items seized be immediately delivered to the
trial court with a true and verified inventory of the same, as
requiredbyRule126,Section12oftheRulesofCourt.Peoplev.
Go, 411 SCRA 81 (2003)characterized this requirement as
mandatoryinordertoprecludethesubstitutionofortampering
with said items by interested parties. Thus, as a reasonable
safeguard,Peoplevs.DelCastillo,439SCRA601(2004)declared
thattheapprovalbythecourtwhichissuedthesearchwarrantis
necessarybeforepoliceofficerscanretainthepropertyseizedand
without it, they would have no authority to retain possession
thereofandmoresotodeliverthesametoanotheragency.Mere
tolerancebythetrialcourtofacontrarypracticedoesnotmake
the practice right because it is violative of the mandatory
requirementsofthelawandittherebydefeatstheverypurpose
fortheenactment.
Same;Same;Same;PresumptionofInnocence;Presumption
ofRegularity;Thepresumptionofregularityismerelyjustthata
merepresumptiondisputablebycontraryproofandwhichwhen
challengedbytheevidencecannotberegardedasbindingtruth,
anditcannotpreponderateoverthepresumptionofinnocencethat
prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
GiventheforegoingdeviationsofpoliceofficerEsternonfromthe
standard and normal procedure in the implementation of the
warrantandintak623
VOL.553,APRIL30,2008
Malillinvs.People
ingpostseizurecustodyoftheevidence,theblindreliance
bythetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealsonthepresumptionof
regularityintheconductofpolicedutyismanifestlymisplaced.
The presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challengedbytheevidencecannotberegardedasbindingtruth.
Sufficeittosaythatthispresumptioncannotpreponderateover
thepresumptionofinnocencethatprevailsifnotoverthrownby
proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case the lack of
conclusiveidentificationoftheillegaldrugsallegedlyseizedfrom
petitioner,coupledwiththeirregularityinthemannerbywhich
thesamewereplacedunderpolicecustodybeforeofferedincourt,
stronglymilitatesafindingofguilt.
Same;Same;PresumptionofInnocence;EquipoiseRule;In
dubioproreowhenmoralcertaintyastoculpabilityhangsinthe
balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a
matter of right.In our constitutional system, basic and
elementaryisthepresuppositionthattheburdenofprovingthe
guiltofanaccusedliesontheprosecutionwhichmustrelyonthe
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense.Theruleisinvariablewhatevermaybethereputationof
theaccused,forthelawpresumeshisinnocenceunlessanduntil
thecontraryisshown.Indubioproreo.Whenmoralcertaintyas
toculpabilityhangsinthebalance,acquittalonreasonabledoubt
inevitablybecomesamatterofright.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
LynetteJ.Tanforpetitioner.
TheSolicitorGeneralforrespondent.
623
TINGA,J.:
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions cannot by its lonesome overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt beyond reasonable
doubtandnothingelsecaneclipsethehypothesisofguiltlessness.
Andthisburdenismetnotbybestowingdis624
624 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Malillinvs.People
trust on the innocence of the accused but by obliterating all
doubtsastohisculpability.
In this Petition for Review1under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court,JunieMalillinyLopez(petitioner)assailstheDecision2of
the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2006 as well as its
Resolution3dated 30 May 2006 denying his motion for
reconsideration. The challenged decision has affirmed the
Decision4of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon City,
Branch525whichfoundpetitionerguiltybeyondreasonabledoubt
of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally
knownasshabu,aprohibiteddrug.
Theantecedentfactsfollow.
Onthestrengthofawarrant6ofsearchandseizureissuedby
theRTCofSorsogonCity,Branch52,ateamoffivepoliceofficers
raidedtheresidenceofpetitionerinBarangay Tugos, Sorsogon
City on 4 February 2003. The team was headed by P/Insp.
Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon
(Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2
RomeoGallinera(Gallinera)asmembers.Thesearchconducted
in the presence ofbarangay kagawadDelfin Licup as well as
petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma
allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets ofshabuand five (5)
empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said
substance.
Accordingly,petitionerwaschargedwithviolationofSection
11,7ArticleIIofRepublicActNo.9165,otherwiseknown
_______________
1Rollo,pp.822.
2InCAG.R.No.28915.PennedbyAssociateJusticeRenato
C. Dacudao and concurred in by Associate Justices Lucas P.
BersaminandCeliaC.LibreaLeagogo.CARollo,pp.8190.
3Id.,atp.109.
4InCriminalCaseNo.20035844.Records,pp.114119.
5PresidedbyJudgeHonestoA.Villamor.
6Records,pp.1112.
7Sec.11.Possession ofDangerousDrugs.Thepenalty oflife
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thou
625
VOL.553,APRIL30,2008 625
Malillinvs.People
as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in a
criminalinformationwhoseinculpatoryportionreads:
_______________
sand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)
shallbeimposeduponanyperson,who,unlessauthorizedbylaw,
shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities,
regardlessofthedegreeofpuritythereof;
(1)10gramsormoreofopium;
(2)10gramsormoreofmorphine;
(3)10gramsormoreofheroin;
(4)10gramsormoreofcocaineorcocainehydrochloride;
(5)50gramsormoreofmethamphetaminehydrochlorideor
shabu;
(6)10gramsormoreofmarijuanaresinormarijuanaresin
oil;
(7)500gramsormoreofmarijuana;and
(8)10gramsormoreofotherdangerousdrugssuchas,but
not limited to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or
ecstasy, paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA),
trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamide
(LSD), gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB), and those similarly
designedornewlyintroduceddrugsandtheirderivatives,without
havinganytherapeuticvalueorifthequantitypossessedisfar
beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and
promulgatedbytheBoardinaccordancetoSection93,ArticleXI
ofthisAct.
 Otherwise,ifthequantityinvolvedislessthantheforegoing
quantities,thepenaltiesshallbegraduatedasfollows:
(1)Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is ten (10)
gramsormorebutlessthanfifty(50)grams;
(2)Imprisonmentoftwenty(20)yearsandone(1)day
tolifeimprisonmentandafinerangingfromFourhundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs
arefive(5)gramsormorebutlessthanten(10)gramsof
opium,morphine,heroin,cocaineorcocainehydrochloride,
marijuanaresinormarijuanaresinoil,methamphetamine
hydrochloride
626
626 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Malillinvs.People
Thatonoraboutthe4thdayofFebruary2003,atabout8:45
in the morning inBarangay Tugos, Sorsogon City, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2)
plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] shabu
withanaggregateweightof0.0743gram,andfouremptysachets
containing shabu residue, without having been previously
authorizedbylawtopossessthesame.
CONTRARYTOLAW.8
Petitionerenteredanegativeplea. 9Attheensuingtrial,the
prosecution presented Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon as
witnesses.
Takingthewitnessstand,Bolanos,theleaderoftheraiding
team, testified on the circumstances surrounding thesearch as
follows:thatheandhismenwereallowedentry
_______________
or shabu, or other dangerous drugs such as, but not
limited to, MDMA or ecstasy, PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB,
and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs
and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic
valueorifthequantitypossessedisfarbeyondtherapeutic
requirements; orthree hundred(300)gramsormorebut
lessthanfivehundred(500)gramsofmarijuana;and
(3)Imprisonmentoftwelve(12yearsandone(1)day
to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuanaresinormarijuanaresinoil,methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, or other dangerous drugs such
as, but not limited to, MDMA or ecstasy, PMA, TMA,
LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly
introduceddrugsandtheirderivatives,withouthavingany
therapeuticvalueorifthequantitypossessedisfarbeyond
therapeuticrequirements;orlessthanthreehundred(300)
gramsofmarijuana.
8Records,p.2.
9Id.,atpp.41,43.
627
VOL.553,APRIL30,2008 627
 Malillinvs.People
intothehousebypetitionerafterthelatterwasshownthesearch
warrant;thatuponenteringthepremises,heorderedEsternon
andbarangay kagawadLicup, whose assistance had previously
beenrequestedinexecutingthewarrant,toconductthesearch;
thattherestofthepoliceteampositionedthemselvesoutsidethe
housetomakesurethatnobodyflees;thathewasobservingthe
conductofthesearchfromaboutameteraway;thatthesearch
conducted inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty
plastic sachets with suspectedshaburesidue contained in a
denimbagandkeptinoneofthecabinets,andtwoplasticsachets
containingshabuwhichfellofffromoneofthepillowssearched
by Esternona discovery that was made in the presence of
petitioner.10Oncrossexamination,Bolanosadmittedthatduring
thesearch,hewasexplainingitsprogresstopetitionersmother,
Norma, but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the
searchbeingconductedbyEsternon.11
Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty
plasticsachetswasfoundbehindthedoorofthebedroomand
notinsidethecabinet;thathethenfoundthetwofilledsachets
under a pillow onthebed andforthwith calledon Gallinerato
havetheitemsrecordedandmarked. 12Oncross,headmittedthat
itwashealonewhoconductedthesearchbecauseBolanoswas
standingbehindhiminthelivingroomportionofthehouseand
thatpetitionerhandedtohimthethingstobesearched,which
included the pillow in which the two sachets ofshabuwere
kept;13that he brought the seized items to the Balogo Police
Station for a true inventory, then to the trial court 14and
thereaftertothelaboratory.15
_______________
10TSN,22April2003,pp.69.
11Id.,atpp.1516.
12TSN,23July2003,pp.67,10.
13Id.,atpp.1617.
14TSN,23July2003,pp.1315.
15Id.,atp.9.
628
628 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Malillinvs.People
Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who
administeredtheexaminationontheseizeditems,waspresented
as an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the
laboratory.Sherevealedthatthetwofilledsachetswerepositive
ofshabuandthatofthefiveemptysachets,fourwerepositiveof
containingresidueofthesamesubstance. 16Shefurtheradmitted
that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory by
Esternonintheafternoonofthesamedaythatthewarrantwas
executed except that it was not she but rather a certain Mrs.
Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the
laboratory.17
Theevidenceforthedefensefocusedontheirregularityofthe
searchandseizureconductedbythepoliceoperatives.Petitioner
testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom with
Licupandpetitionerhimselfinside.However,itwasmomentarily
interrupted when one of the police officers declared to Bolanos
thatpetitionerswife,Sheila,wastuckingsomethinginsideher
underwear.Forthwith,aladyofficerarrivedtoconductthesearch
ofSheilasbodyinsidethesamebedroom.Atthatpoint,everyone
exceptEsternonwasaskedtostepoutoftheroom.So,itwasin
his presence that Sheila was searched by the lady officer.
Petitionerwasthenaskedbyapoliceofficertobuycigarettesata
nearbystoreandwhenhereturnedfromtheerrand,hewastold
thatnothingwasfoundonSheilasbody.18Sheilawasorderedto
transfertotheotherbedroomtogetherwithherchildren. 19
Petitionerassertedthatonhisreturnfromtheerrand,hewas
summoned by Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the
officerclosedthedoorandaskedhimtoliftthemattressonthe
bed.Andashewasdoingastold,Esternonstopped
_______________
16TSN, 28 May 2003, p. 14. The results of the chemical
analysis are embodied in Chemistry Report No. D03703. See
Records,p.18.
17Id.,atp.3.
18TSN,2December2003,pp.610.
19Id.,atp.13.
629
VOL.553,APRIL30,2008
Malillinvs.People
himandorderedhimtolifttheportionoftheheadboard.Inthat
instant,Esternonshowedhimsachetofshabuwhichaccording
tohimcamefromapillowonthebed. 20Petitionersaccountinits
entirety was corroborated in its material respects by
Norma,barangaykagawadLicupandSheilaintheirtestimonies.
NormaandSheilapositivelydeclaredthatpetitionerwasnotin
the house for the entire duration of the search because at one
pointhewassentbyEsternontothestoretobuycigaretteswhile
Sheilawasbeingsearchedbytheladyofficer. 21Licupforhispart
testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the
plastic sachets. He recountedthat after the five empty sachets
werefound,hewentoutofthebedroomandintothelivingroom
andafteraboutthreeminutes,Esternon,whowasleftinsidethe
bedroom,exclaimedthathehadjustfoundtwofilledsachets.22
On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision
declaringpetitionerguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtoftheoffense
charged.Petitionerwascondemnedtoprisonfortwelveyears(12)
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of
P300,000.00.23The trial court reasoned that the fact
thatshabuwas found in the house of petitioner wasprima
facieevidenceofpetitionersanimuspossidendisufficientto
_______________
20Id.,atpp.1112.
21TSN,11November2003,p.3;TSN,23March2004,p.4.
22TSN,4February2004,pp.45,9.
23Records,p. 119. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds
629 accused Junie Malillin y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable
doubtofthecrimeofViolationofSec.11,ArticleIIofR.A.
No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive
DangerousDrugsActof2002andheisherebysentence[d]
tosufferthepenaltyofTwelve(12)yearsandone(1)dayto
Twenty(20)yearsandfineofP300,000.00.
Theshaburecoveredisherebyorderedforfeitedinfavor
ofthegovernmentandthesameshallbeturnedovertothe
Boardforproperdisposalwithoutdelay.
SOORDERED.
630
630 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Malillinvs.People
convict him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person
possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership are
presumptivelyownedbyhim.Italsonotedpetitionersfailureto
ascribe ill motives to the police officers to fabricate charges
againsthim.24
Aggrieved,petitionerfiledaNoticeofAppeal.25InhisAppeal
Brief26filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner called the
attentionofthecourttocertainirregularitiesinthemannerby
which the search of his house was conducted. For its part, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advanced that on the
contrary, the prosecution evidence sufficed for petitioners
convictionandthatthedefenseneveradvancedanyprooftoshow
thatthemembersoftheraidingteamwasimproperlymotivated
tohurlfalsechargesagainsthimandhencethepresumptionthat
theyhadregularlyperformedtheirdutiesshouldprevail.27
On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision affirming the judgment of the trial court but
modifyingtheprisonsentencetoanindeterminatetermoftwelve
(12) years as minimum to seventeen (17) years as
maximum.28Petitionermovedforreconsiderationbutthe
_______________
24Id.,atpp.117118.
25Id.,atp.121.
26CARollo,pp.3547.
27Id.,atpp.6573.
28Id.,atp.89.TheCourtofAppealsdisposedoftheappealas appeal.32Inthecaseatbar,severalcircumstancesobtainwhich,if
follows:
UPONTHEVIEWWETAKEOFTHISCASE,THUS,
the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the
judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONinthesensethattheaccusedappellantis
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term
rangingfromtwelve(12)years,asminimum,toseventeen
(17)yearsasmaximum.Inallotherrespects,thejudgment
appealed from is hereby MAINTAINED. Costs against
accusedappellant.
SOORDERED.
631
VOL.553,APRIL30,2008 631
Malillinvs.People
same was denied by the appellate court. 29Hence, the instant
petitionwhichraisessubstantiallythesameissues.
InitsComment,30theOSGbidstoestablishthattheraiding
team had regularly performed its duties in the conduct of the
search.31It points to petitioners incredulous claim that he was
framedupbyEsternononthegroundthatthediscoveryofthe
two filled sachets was made in his and Licups presence. It
likewise notes that petitioners bare denial cannot defeat the
positiveassertionsoftheprosecutionandthatthesamedoesnot
suffice to overcome theprima facieexistence ofanimus
possidendi.
Thisargument,however,hardlyholdsuptowhatisrevealed
bytherecords.
Prefatorily, although the trial courts findings of fact are
entitledtogreatweightandwillnotbedisturbedonappeal,this
rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance have
beenoverlooked,misapprehendedormisappliedinacaseunder
properlyappreciated,wouldwarrantaconclusiondifferentfrom
thatarrivedatbythetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppeals.
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs
necessitatesthattheelementalactofpossessionofaprohibited
substancebeestablishedwithmoralcertainty,togetherwiththe
factthatthesameisnotauthorizedbylaw.Thedangerousdrug
itselfconstitutestheverycorpusdelictioftheoffenseandthefact
ofitsexistenceisvitaltoajudgmentof
_______________
29Id.,atp.109.
30Rollo,pp.102112.
31Id.,atp.107.
32People v. Pedronan, G.R. No. 148668, 17 June 2003, 404
SCRA 183, 188;People v. Casimiro, G.R. No. 146277, 20 June
2002, 383 SCRA 390, 398;Peoplev. Laxa, G.R. No. 138501, 20
July2001,361SCRA622,627.
632
632 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Malillinvs.People
conviction.33Essentialthereforeinthesecasesisthattheidentity
oftheprohibiteddrugbeestablishedbeyonddoubt. 34Bethatasit
may,themerefactofunauthorizedpossessionwillnotsufficeto
create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to
sustainafindingofguilt.Morethanjustthefactofpossession,
thefactthatthesubstanceillegallypossessedinthefirstplaceis
the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that
requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of theevidence are
removed.35
Asamethodofauthenticatingevidence,thechainofcustody
rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
questioniswhattheproponentclaimsittobe. 36Itwouldinclude
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
itemwaspickeduptothetimeitisofferedintoevidence,insuch
awaythateverypersonwhotouchedtheexhibitwoulddescribe
how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happenedtoitwhileinthewitnesspossession,theconditionin
whichitwasreceivedandtheconditioninwhichitwasdelivered
tothenextlinkinthechain.Thesewitnesseswouldthendescribe
theprecautionstakentoensurethattherehadbeennochangein
the
_______________
33People v. Simbahon, G.R. No. 132371, 9 April 2003, 401
SCRA94,100;Peoplev.Laxa,G.R.No.138501,20July2001,361
SCRA622,634;Peoplev.Dismuke,234SCRA51(1994);Peoplev.
Mapa,220SCRA670(1993).
34People v. Simbahon, G.R. No. 132371, 9 April 2003, 401
SCRA94,100;Peoplev.Kimura,G.R.No.130805,27April2004,
428SCRA51,70.
35An Analytical Approach to Evidence,Ronad J. Allen,
RichardB.Kuhns,byLittleBrown&Co.,USA,1989,p.174.
36UnitedStatesv.HowardArias,679F.2d363,366;United
Statesv.Ricco,52F.3d58.
633
VOL.553,APRIL30,2008 633
Malillinvs.People
conditionoftheitemandnoopportunityforsomeonenotinthe
chaintohavepossessionofthesame.37
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the
standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an
unbrokenchainofcustodybecomes indispensableand essential
whentheitemofrealevidenceisnotdistinctiveandisnotreadily
identifiable,orwhenitsconditionatthetimeoftestingortrialis
critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness.38The same standard likewise obtains in case the
evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination39and even substitution and exchange.40In other
words,theexhibitslevelofsusceptibilitytofungibility,alteration
ortamperingwithoutregardtowhetherthesameisadvertent
or otherwise notdictates the level of strictness in the
applicationofthechainofcustodyrule.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with
respecttoanexhibitisgreatestwhentheexhibitissmallandis
one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and
similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily
lives.41Graham vs. State42positively acknowledged this danger.
In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroinwas
handledbytwopoliceofficerspriortoexaminationwhohowever
didnottestifyincourtontheconditionandwhereaboutsofthe
exhibitatthetimeitwasintheirpossessionwasexcludedfrom
theprosecutionevidence, the courtpointingoutthat thewhite
powderseizedcouldhavebeenindeedheroinoritcouldhavebeen
sugarorbakingpowder.Itruled
_______________
37EvidenceLaw,RogerC.Park,DavidP.Leonard,StevenH.
Goldberg,1998,610OppermanDrive,St.PaulMinnesota,p.507.
38EvidenceLaw,RogerC.Park,DavidP.Leonard,StevenH.
Goldberg,1998,610OppermanDrive,St.PaulMinnesota,p.507;
29AAm.Jur.2dEvidence946.
3929AAm.Jur.2dEvidence946.
40SeeGrahamv.State,255N.E.2d652,655.
41Grahamv.State,255N.E2d652,655.
42Grahamv.State,255N.E2d652.
634
634 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Malillinvs.People
that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the
continuouswhereaboutsoftheexhibitatleastbetweenthetimeit
cameintothepossessionofpoliceofficersuntilitwastestedin
thelaboratorytodetermineitscomposition,testimonyofthestate
astothelaboratorysfindingsisinadmissible.43
Auniquecharacteristicofnarcoticsubstancesisthattheyare
not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific
analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court
cannotreluctantlycloseitseyestothelikelihood,oratleastthe
possibility,thatatanyofthelinksinthechainofcustodyover
the same there could have been tampering, alteration or
substitution of substances from other casesby accident or
otherwisein which similar evidence was seized or in which
similarevidencewassubmittedforlaboratorytesting.Hence,in
authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that
appliedto cases involving objectswhicharereadilyidentifiable
mustbeapplied,amoreexactingstandardthatentailsachainof
custodyoftheitemwithsufficientcompletenessifonlytorender
itimprobablethat theoriginal itemhas eitherbeenexchanged
withanotherorbeencontaminatedortamperedwith.
Amerefleetingglanceattherecordsreadilyraisessignificant
doubtsastotheidentityofthesachetsofshabuallegedlyseized
frompetitioner.Ofthepeoplewhocameintodirectcontactwith
the seized objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified for the
specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence.
Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the
confiscatedsachetsforrecordingandmarking,aswellasGarcia,
the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the seized
items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not
presented in court to establish the circumstances under which
theyhandledthesubjectitems.Anyreasonablemindmightthen
askthequestion:Arethe
_______________
43Grahamv.State,255N.E2d652,655.
635
VOL.553,APRIL30,2008
Malillinvs.People
sachets ofshabuallegedly seized from petitioner the very same
objectslaboratorytestedandofferedincourtasevidence?
The prosecutions evidence is incomplete to provide an
affirmative answer. Considering that it was Gallinera who
recordedandmarkedtheseizeditems,histestimonyincourtis
crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same items
handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and
acknowledgetheinitialsmarkedthereonashisown.Thesameis
trueofGarciawhocouldhave,butneverthelessfailed,totestify
on the circumstances under which she received the items from
Esternon,whatshedidwiththemduringthetimetheywerein
herpossessionuntilbeforeshedeliveredthesametoArroyofor
analysis.
The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its
burdenofestablishingtheidentityoftheseizeditemsbecauseit
failedtooffernotonlythetestimonyofGallineraandGarciabut
alsoanysufficientexplanationforsuchfailure.Ineffect,thereis
no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits
inasmuchasitfailedtoruleoutthepossibilityofsubstitutionof
theexhibits,whichcannotbutinuretoitsowndetriment.This
holdstruenotonlywithrespecttothetwofilledsachetsbutalso
tothefivesachetsallegedlycontainingmorselsofshabu.
Also, contrary to what has been consistently claimed by the
prosecution that the search and seizure was conducted in a
regular manner and must be presumed to be so, the records
discloseaseriesofirregularitiescommittedbythepoliceofficers
fromthecommencementofthesearchofpetitionershouseuntil
thesubmissionoftheseizeditemstothelaboratoryforanalysis.
TheCourttakesnoteoftheunrebuttedtestimonyofpetitioner,
635 corroboratedbythatofhiswife,thatpriortothediscoveryofthe
two filled sachets petitioner was sent out of his house to buy
cigarettesatanearbystore.Equallytellingisthetestimonyof
Bolanosthathepostedsomeofthemembersoftheraidingteam
atthedoorofpeti636
636 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Malillinvs.People
tioners house in order to forestall the likelihood of petitioner
fleeing the scene. By no stretch of logic can it be conclusively
explainedwhypetitionerwassentoutofhishouseonanerrand
when in the first place the police officers were in fact
apprehensive that he would flee to evade arrest. This fact
assumes prime importance because the two filled sachets were
allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately after petitioner
returnedtohishousefromtheerrand,suchthathewasnotable
towitnesstheconductofthesearchduringthebriefbutcrucial
interludethathewasaway.
It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was
petitionerhimselfwhohandedtohimtheitemstobesearched
includingthepillowfromwhichthetwofilledsachetsallegedly
fell. Indeed, it is contrary to ordinary human behavior that
petitionerwouldhandoverthesaidpillowtoEsternonknowing
fully wellthat illegaldrugs areconcealed therein. Inthesame
breath, the manner by which the search of Sheilas body was
broughtupbyamemberoftheraidingteamalsoraisesserious
doubtsastothenecessitythereof.Thedeclarationofoneofthe
police officers that he saw Sheila tuck something in her
underwear certainly diverted the attention of the members of
petitionershouseholdawayfromthesearchbeingconductedby
Esternonpriortothediscoveryofthetwofilledsachets.Lestitbe
omitted, theCourt likewise takes note of Esternons suspicious
presence inthebedroomwhileSheilawasbeing searched by a
lady officer. The confluence of these circumstances by any
objectivestandardofbehaviorcontradictstheprosecutionsclaim
ofregularityintheexerciseofduty.
Moreover, Section 2144of the Implementing Rules and
RegulationsofR.A.No.9165clearlyoutlinesthepostseizure
_______________
44Section21.Custody and Disposition of Confiscated,
Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
DangerousDrugs,ControlledPrecursorsandessentialChemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernaliaand/orLaboratoryEquipment.xxx
637
VOL.553,APRIL30,2008
Malillinvs.People
procedureintakingcustodyofseizeddrugs.Inalanguagetoo
plain to require a different construction, it mandates that the
officeracquiringinitialcustodyofdrugsunderasearchwarrant
mustconductthephotographingandthephysicalinventoryofthe
itemattheplacewherethewarranthasbeenserved.Esternon
deviatedfromthisprocedure.Itwaselicitedfromhimthatatthe
close of the search of petitioners house, he brought the seized
itemsimmediatelytothepolicestationfortheallegedpurposeof
making a true inventory thereof, but there appears to be no
reason why a true inventory could not be made in petitioners
housewheninfacttheapprehendingteamwasabletorecordand
mark the seized items and there and then prepare a seizure
receipttherefor. Lestit be forgotten,theraidingteam hashad
enoughopportunitytocausetheissuanceofthewarrantwhich
means that it has had as much time to prepare for its
implementation.WhilethefinalprovisoinSection21oftherules
would appear to excuse noncompliance therewith, the same
cannotbenefittheprosecutionasitfailedtoofferanyacceptable
justificationforEsternonscourseofaction.
Likewise,Esternonsfailuretodelivertheseizeditemstothe
courtdemonstratesadeparturefromthedirectiveinthesearch
warrant that the items seized be immediately delivered to the
trial court with a true and verified inventory of the same, 45as
requiredbyRule126,Section1246oftheRulesofCourt.Peoplev.
Go47characterized this requirement as mandatory in order to
preclude the substitution of or tampering with said items by
interested parties.48Thus, asa reasonable safeguard,Peoplevs.
Del Castillo49declared that the approval by the court which
issuedthesearchwarrantisnecessarybeforepoliceofficerscan
retain the property seized and without it, they would have no
637 authoritytoretainpossessionthereofandmoresotodeliverthe
sametoanotheragency.50Meretolerancebythetrialcourtofa
contrarypracticedoesnotmakethepracticerightbecauseitis
violativeofthemandatoryrequirementsofthelawanditthereby
defeatstheverypurposefortheenactment.51
GiventheforegoingdeviationsofpoliceofficerEsternonfromthe
standard and normal procedure in the implementation of the
warrantandintakingpostseizurecustodyoftheevidence,the
blindreliancebythetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealsonthe
presumptionofregularityintheconductof
 Malillinvs.People
police duty is manifestly misplaced. The presumption of
regularityismerelyjustthatamerepresumptiondisputableby
contraryproofandwhichwhenchallengedbytheevidencecannot
be regarded as binding truth. 52Suffice it to say that this
presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of
innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.53In the present case the lack of conclusive
identificationoftheillegaldrugsallegedlyseizedfrompetitioner,
coupledwiththeirregularityinthemannerbywhichthesame
wereplacedunderpolicecustodybeforeofferedincourt,strongly
militatesafindingofguilt.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the
presuppositionthattheburdenofprovingtheguiltofanaccused
liesontheprosecutionwhichmustrelyonthestrengthofitsown
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is
invariablewhatevermaybethereputationoftheaccused,forthe
law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is
shown.54Indubioproreo.Whenmoralcertaintyastoculpability
hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably
becomesamatterofright.
WHEREFORE,theassailedDecisionoftheCourtofAppeals
dated27January2006affirmingwithmodificationthejudgment
ofconvictionoftheRegionalTrialCourtofSorsogonCity,Branch
52,anditsResolutiondated30May2006denyingreconsideration
thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Junie
Malillin y Lopez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is
accordinglyorderedimmediatelyreleasedfromcustodyunlesshe
isbeinglawfullyheldforanotheroffense.
_______________
52People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427
SCRA312,318citingPeoplev.Tan,382SCRA419(2002).
53People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427
SCRA312,318citingPeoplev.Tan,382SCRA419(2002).
54Peoplev.Laxa,id.,atp.627;Peoplev.Diopita,4December
2000, 346 SCRA 794;People v. Malbog, 12 October 2000, 342
SCRA620;Peoplev.Ferras,289SCRA94(1998).
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R.No.179029.August9,2010.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,vs.FELIMON
PAGADUANyTAMAYO,appellant.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of
ProhibitedDrug;Evidence;Toremoveanydoubtoruncertaintyon
the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must
definitelyshowthattheillegaldrugpresentedincourtisthesame
illegaldrugactuallyrecoveredfromtheappellant;otherwise,the
prosecutionforpossessionorfordrugpushingunderRepublicAct
(R.A.) No. 9165 fails.In a prosecution for illegal sale of a
prohibiteddrugunderSection5ofR.A.No.9165,theprosecution
mustprovethefollowingelements:(1)theidentityofthebuyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these
require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled
withthepresentationincourtofthecorpusdelicti,i.e.,thebody
or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has
actuallybeencommitted,asshownbypresentingtheobjectofthe
illegal transaction. To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the
identityandintegrityoftheseizeddrug,evidencemustdefinitely
showthattheillegaldrugpresentedincourtisthesameillegal
drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No.
9165fails.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Requiredprocedureontheseizure
and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.The required
procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in
Section21,paragraph1,ArticleIIofR.A.No.9165,whichstates:
(1)Theapprehendingteam
_______________
*THIRDDIVISION.
309
VOL.627,AUGUST9,201
Peoplevs.Pagaduan
having initial custody and control of the drugsshall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation,physically
inventoryandphotographthe same in the presence of the
accusedortheperson/sfromwhomsuchitemswereconfiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
signthecopiesoftheinventoryandbegivenacopythereof[.]
Same; Same; Same; Same; Strict compliance with the
prescribed procedure is required.Strict compliance with the
prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drugs
unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily
identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or
substitutioneitherbyaccidentorotherwise. Therecordsofthe
present case are bereft of evidence showing that the buybust
team followed the outlined procedure despite its mandatory
terms.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Procedurallapseshowevermust
berecognizedandexplainedintermsoftheirjustifiablegrounds,
andtheintegrityandevidentiaryvalueoftheevidenceseizedmust
be shownto have been preserved.We recognize thatthe strict
compliancewiththerequirementsofSection21ofR.A.No.9165
may not always be possible under field conditions; the police
operatesundervariedconditions,andcannotatalltimesattend
toallthenicetiesoftheproceduresinthehandlingofconfiscated
evidence.Forthisreason,thelastsentenceoftheimplementing
rules provides that noncompliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiaryvalueoftheseizeditemsareproperlypreservedby
theapprehendingofficer/team,shallnotrendervoidandinvalid
309 such seizures of and custody over said items[.] Thus,
noncompliancewiththestrictdirectiveofSection21ofR.A.No.
9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case; police
proceduresinthehandlingofconfiscatedevidencemaystillhave
some lapses, as in the present case.These lapses, however,
must be recognized and explained in terms of their
justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary
valueoftheevidenceseizedmustbeshowntohavebeen
preserved.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; The justifiable ground for
noncompliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.We
emphasizethatforthe
310
310 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Pagaduan
savingclausetoapply,itisimportantthattheprosecution
explainthe reasonsbehind the procedural lapses, andthat the
integrityandvalueoftheseizedevidencehadbeenpreserved.In
other words, the justifiable ground for noncompliance must be
provenasafact.Thecourtcannotpresumewhatthesegrounds
areorthattheyevenexist.
Same;Same;Same;Same;ChainofCustodyRule;Definition
of Chain of Custody.Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board
RegulationNo.1,Seriesof2002whichimplementsR.A.No.9165
definesChainofCustodyasfollows:ChainofCustodymeans
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugsorcontrolledchemicalsorplantsourcesofdangerousdrugs
or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeepingtopresentationincourtfordestruction.Suchrecord
of movements and custody of seized item shall include the
identityandsignatureofthepersonwhoheldtemporarycustody
of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custodyweremadeinthecourseofsafekeepinganduseincourt
asevidence,andthefinaldisposition[.]
Same; Same; Same; Same; Chain of Custody explained in
Malillinv.People,553SCRA619(2008).InMalillinv.People,
553 SCRA 619 (2008), the Court explained that the chain of
custodyrulerequiresthattherebetestimonyabouteverylinkin
thechain,fromthemomenttheobjectseizedwaspickeduptothe
timeitisofferedinevidence,insuchawaythateverypersonwho
toucheditwoulddescribehowandfromwhomitwasreceived,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness
possession, the condition in which it was received and the
conditioninwhichitwasdeliveredtothenextlinkinthechain.
Same; Same; Same; Evidentiary presumption that official
dutieshavebeenregularlyperformedcannotbyitselfovercomethe
constitutional presumption of innocence.In sustaining the
appellants conviction, the CA relied on the evidentiary
presumptionthatofficialdutieshavebeenregularlyperformed.
This presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive. It
cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.Anytaintofirregularityaffectsthewholeperformance
and should make the presumption unavailable. In the present
case,thefailureoftheapprehending
311
VOL.627,AUGUST9,201 311
Peoplevs.Pagaduan
teamtocomplywithparagraph1,Section21,ArticleIIof
R.A.No.9165,andwiththechainofcustodyrequirementofthis
Acteffectivelynegatesthispresumption.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforappellant.
BRION,J.:
Wereviewthedecision1oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCA
G.R.CRH.C.No.01597whichaffirmedintotothedecision2ofthe
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, inCriminal Case No. 4600, finding appellant Felimon
PagaduanyTamayo(appellant)guiltybeyondreasonabledoubtof
illegalsaleofshabu,underSection5,ArticleIIofRepublicAct
(R.A.) No. 9165 or theComprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
BackgroundFacts
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under an
Informationthatstates:
ThatonoraboutDecember27,2003atabout4:30oclock(sic)
intheafternoon,intheMunicipalityofSolano,ProvinceofNueva
Vizcaya,PhilippinesandwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorable
Court, the abovenamed accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfullyandfeloniouslysell,trade,dispense,deliverandgive
away0.01
_______________
1PennedbyAssociateJusticeMarianoC.delCastillo(nowa
member of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justice
Arcangelita Romilla Lontok and Associate Justice Romeo F.
Barza;Rollo,pp.215.
2PennedbyJudgeJoseB.Rosales;CARollo,pp.915.
312
312 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Pagaduan
gram,moreorless,ofmethamphetaminehydrochloride(shabu),a
dangerousdrug,ascontainedinaheatsealedtransparentplastic
sachettoPO3PeterC.Almarez,amemberofthePhilippineDrug
EnforcementAgency(PDEA)whoposedasabuyerofshabuin
the amount of P200.00, to the damage and prejudice of the
RepublicofthePhilippines.
CONTRARYTOLAW.3
Theappellantpleadednotguiltyonarraignment.Trialonthe
merits,thereafter,followed.
Theevidencefortheprosecutionrevealsthefollowingfacts.
After having received information that the appellant was
selling illegal drugs in Nueva Vizcaya, Captain Jaime de Vera
called, on his cellular phone, PO3 Peter Almarez and SPO1
DomingoBalidowhowerebothinSantiagoCityandinformed
themofaplannedbuybustoperation.Theyagreedtomeetatthe
SSS Building near LMN Hotel in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya.4On their arrival there, Captain de Vera conducted a
briefing and designated PO3 Almarez as theposeurbuyer.
Thereafter, Captain de Vera introduced PO3 Almarez to the
policeinformant(tipster),5andgavehim(PO3Almarez)twoP100
bills (Exhibits D and E) which the latter marked with his
initials.6
Afterthisbriefing,thebuybustteamwenttoBintawanRoad,
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya to conduct the entrapment
operation.7PO3Almarezandtheinformantrodeatricycle,while
Captain de Vera and SPO1 Balido followed on board a tinted
van.8Thebuybustteamarrivedatthetargetareaat
_______________
3Id.,atp.8.
 4TSN,July5,2004,pp.34;TSN,July26,2004,p.3;seealso Dulnuan.15Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero, the
JointAffidavit,Records,p.4. Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted an
5TSN,July5,2004,p.4;Records,p.4. examination on the specimen submitted, and found it to be
6TSN,July19,2004,pp.7,1314;TSN,July26,2004,p.11; positiveforthepresenceofshabu(Exh.B).16
Records,p.4.
7TSN,July5,2004,p.4. _______________
8TSN,July19,2004,pp.4and6.
313 9 TSN, July 5, 2004, pp. 68; TSN, July 19, 2004, pp. 56;
VOL.627,AUGUST9,201 313 Records,p.4.
Peoplevs.Pagaduan 10TSN,July5,2004,p.9;TSN,July19,2004,pp.1617.
around4:30p.m.,andsawtheappellantalreadywaitingforthe 11TSN,July26,2004,p.5.
informant. The informant approached the appellant and 12TSN,July5,2004,p.10.
introducedPO3Almareztohimasabuyer.PO3Almareztoldthe 13Id.,atpp.1011.
appellant that he neededshabuworth P200, and inquired from 14Id.,atp.10;TSN,July19,2004,p.11;Records,pp.2324.
him(appellant)ifhehadastock.Theappellantrepliedinthe 15Records,p.5.
affirmative,andthenhandedoneheatsealedtransparentplastic 16TSN,July19,2004,pp.2223;Records,p.12.
sachet containing white crystalline substance to PO3 Almarez. 314
PO3Almarez,inturn,gavethetwopremarkedP100billstothe 314 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
appellant.9Immediately after, PO3 Almarez made the pre Peoplevs.Pagaduan
arranged signal to his companions, who then approached the
appellant. Captain de Vera took the marked money from the OnthehearingofAugust13,2004,theprosecutionofferedthe
appellantsrightpocket,andthenarrestedhim.10PO3Almarez, followingasexhibits:
forhispart,markedthesachetwithhisinitials. 11Thereafter,the ExhibitAtheshabuconfiscatedfromtheappellant
buybustteambroughttheappellanttotheDiadiPoliceStation ExhibitBthereportbythePNPCrimeLaboratory
forinvestigation.12 ExhibitCtherequestforlaboratoryexamination
Atthepolicestation,CaptaindeVerapreparedarequestfor ExhibitsDandEthebuybustmoney
laboratory examination (Exh. C).13The appellant was Exhibit Fthe request for laboratory examination
transferred to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was receivedbyForensicChemistQuintero
detained.14Two days later, or on December 29, 2003, PO3
Almarez transmitted the letterrequest, for laboratory The defense presented a different version of the events,
examination, and the seized plastic sachet to the PNP Crime summarizedasfollows:
Laboratory, where they were received by PO2 Fernando
 Ataround4:30p.m.ofDecember27,2003,JojoJosecameto
theappellantshouseandinformedhimthatCaptaindeVerawas
invitinghimtobeanasset.TheappellantandJojoboardeda
tricycle and proceeded to the SSS Building where Captain de
Vera was waiting for them. 17As the tricycle approached the
Methodist Church along Bintawan Road, Jojo dropped his
slippersandorderedthedrivertostop.Immediatelyafter,avan
stoppedinfrontofthetricycle;CaptaindeVeraalightedfromthe
vanandhandcuffedtheappellant.CaptaindeVerabroughtthe
appellant inside the van, frisked him, and took P200 from his
pocket.18Afterwards,CaptaindeVeratooktheappellanttothe
SSS Building, where he (Captain de Vera) and the building
manager drank coffee. Captain de Vera then brought the
appellanttotheDiadiMunicipalJailwherehewasdetainedfor
almosttwodays.19
On the morning of December 29, 2003, the appellant was
transferredtotheProvincialJail.Hesignedadocumentwithout
theassistanceofalawyerafterbeingtoldthatitwouldresultin
hisimmediaterelease.20
_______________
17TSN,September13,2004,pp.56.
18Id.,atpp.78.
19Id.,atpp.89.
20Id.,atp.10.
315
VOL.627,AUGUST9,201
Peoplevs.Pagaduan
TheRTC, inits decision21ofAugust 16, 2005, convicted the
appellantofthecrimecharged,andsentencedhimtosufferthe
penalty of life imprisonment. The RTC likewise ordered the
appellanttopayaP500,000.00fine.
TheappellantappealedtotheCA,docketedasCAG.R.CR
H.C. No. 01597. The CA, in its decision 22dated May 22, 2007,
affirmedtheRTCdecision.
The CA found unmeritorious the appellants defense of
instigation, and held that the appellant was apprehended as a
resultofalegitimateentrapmentoperation.Itexplainedthatin
inducementorinstigation,aninnocentpersonisluredbyapublic
officerorprivatedetectivetocommitacrime.Inthecaseatbar,
the buybust operation was planned only after the police had
receivedinformationthattheappellantwassellingshabu.
TheCAalsoheldthatthefailureofthepolicetoconducta
prior surveillance on the appellant was not fatal to the
prosecutionscase.Itreasonedoutthatthepolicearegivenwide
discretiontoselecteffectivemeanstoapprehenddrugdealers.A
priorsurveillanceis,therefore,notnecessary,especiallywhenthe
policearealreadyaccompaniedbytheirinformant.
The CA further ruled that the prosecution was able to
sufficientlyproveanunbrokenchainofcustodyoftheshabu.It
explainedthatPO3Almarezsealedtheplasticsachetseizedfrom
theappellant,markeditwithhisinitials,andtransmitteditto
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. PSI Quintero
conducted a qualitative examination and found the specimen
positive for the presence ofshabu. According to the CA, the
prosecutionwasabletoprovethatthesubstanceseizedwasthe
same specimen submitted to the laboratory and presented in
315 court,notwithstandingthatthisspecimenwasturnedovertothe
crimelaboratoryonlyaftertwodays.
_______________
 21Supranote2.
22Supranote1.
316
316 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Pagaduan
Inhisbrief,23theappellantclaimsthatthelowercourtserred
inconvictinghimofthecrimechargeddespitetheprosecutions
failuretoprovehisguiltbeyondreasonabledoubt.Heharpson
thefactthatthepolicedidnotconductapriorsurveillanceonhim
beforeconductingthebuybustoperation.
Theappellantfurthercontendsthattheprosecutionfailedto
showanunbrokenchainofcustodyinthehandlingoftheseized
drug. He claims that there was no evidence to show when the
markingsweredone.Moreover,aperiodoftwodayshadelapsed
from the time theshabuwas confiscated to the time it was
forwardedtothecrimelaboratoryforexamination.
TheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG)counterswiththe
argumentthatthechainofcustodyoftheshabuwassufficiently
established.Itexplainedthattheshabuwasturnedoverbythe
policeofficerstothePNPCrimeLaboratory,whereitwasfound
bytheforensicchemisttobepositiveforthepresenceofshabu.
TheOSGlikewiseclaimedthattheappellantfailedtorebutthe
presumptionofregularityintheperformanceofofficialdutiesby
thepolice.TheOSGfurtheraddedthatapriorsurveillanceisnot
indispensabletoaprosecutionforillegalsaleofdrugs.24
TheCourtsRuling
Afterdueconsideration,weresolvetoacquittheappellantfor
the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.Specifically,theprosecutionfailedtoshowthatthepolice
compliedwithparagraph1,Section21,ArticleIIofR.A.No.9165,
andwiththechainofcustodyrequirementofthisAct.
_______________
23CARollo,pp.3044.
24Id.,atpp.5770.
317
VOL.627,AUGUST9,201 317
Peoplevs.Pagaduan
The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act:ABriefBackground
R.A.No.9165wasenactedin2002topursuetheStatespolicy
tosafeguardtheintegrityofitsterritoryandthewellbeingofits
citizenry particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerousdrugsontheirphysicalandmentalwellbeing,andto
defend the sameagainstacts or omissions detrimental to their
developmentandpreservation.
R.A.No.9165repealedandsupersededR.A.No.6425,known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of1972. Realizing that dangerous
drugs are one of the most serious social ills of the society at
present,Congresssawtheneedtofurtherenhancetheefficacyof
thelawagainstdangerousdrugs.Thenewlawthusmandatesthe
government to pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign
against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other
similar substances through an integrated system of planning,
implementation and enforcement of antidrug abuse policies,
programsandprojects.25

Illegal Sale of Drugs under Section 5
visvis the Inventory and Photograph
RequirementunderSection21
In a prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the
followingelements:(1)theidentityofthebuyerandtheseller,the
object,andtheconsideration;and(2)thedeliveryofthethingsold
andthepaymenttherefor.Alltheserequireevidencethatthesale
transactiontranspired,coupledwiththepresentationincourtof
thecorpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that
establishesthatacrimehasactuallybeencommitted,asshown
bypresentingtheobjectofthe
_______________
25IntegrityofEvidenceinDangerousDrugsCasesbyJustice
(ret.)JosueN.Bellosillo,596SCRA278(2009).
318
318 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Pagaduan
illegaltransaction.26Toremoveanydoubtoruncertaintyonthe
identityandintegrityoftheseizeddrug,evidencemustdefinitely
showthattheillegaldrugpresentedincourtisthesameillegal
drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No.
9165fails.27
Therequiredprocedureontheseizureandcustodyofdrugsis
embodiedinSection21,paragraph1,ArticleIIofR.A.No.9165,
whichstates:
(1)Theapprehendingteamhavinginitialcustodyandcontrolof
the drugsshall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation,physically inventoryandphotographthe same
inthepresenceoftheaccusedortheperson/sfromwhomsuch
itemswereconfiscatedand/orseized,orhis/herrepresentativeor
counsel,arepresentativefromthemediaandtheDepartmentof
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
requiredtosignthecopiesoftheinventoryandbegivenacopy
thereof[.]
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of
theImplementingRulesandRegulationsofR.A.No.9165,which
reads:
(a)Theapprehendingofficer/teamhavinginitialcustodyand
control of the drugsshall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation,physically inventoryandphotographthe same
inthepresenceoftheaccusedortheperson/sfromwhomsuch
itemswereconfiscatedand/orseized,orhis/herrepresentativeor
counsel,arepresentativefromthemediaandtheDepartmentof
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
requiredtosignthecopiesoftheinventoryandbegivenacopy
thereof:Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served;oratthenearestpolicestationoratthenearestofficeof
theapprehendingofficer/team,whicheverispracticable,incaseof
warrantlessseizures;Provided,
_______________
26Peoplev.Garcia,G.R.No.173480,February25,2009,580
SCRA259,266.
27SeePeoplev.Denoman,G.R.No.171732,August14,2009,
596SCRA257,267.
319
VOL.627,AUGUST9,201
Peoplevs.Pagaduan
further, that noncompliance with these requirements under
justifiablegrounds,aslongastheintegrityandtheevidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehendingofficer/team,shallnotrendervoidandinvalidsuch
seizuresofandcustodyoversaiditems[.]
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required
because of the illegal drugs unique characteristic rendering it
indistinct,notreadilyidentifiable,andeasilyopentotampering,
alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. 28The
recordsofthepresentcasearebereftofevidenceshowingthatthe
buybust team followed the outlined procedure despite its
mandatory terms. The deficiency is patent from the following
exchangesatthetrial:
PROSECUTOR[EMERSONTURINGAN]:
Q:Afteryouhandedthisbuybustmoneytotheaccused,what
happenednext?
[PO3ALMAREZ:]
A:WhentheshabuwasalreadywithmeandIgavehimthe
money[,] I signaled the two, Captain Jaime de Vera and
SPO1Balido,sir.
xxxx
Q:Afteryougavethatsignal,whathappened?
A:Then they approached us and helped me in arresting
FelimonPagaduan,sir.
Q:AfterPagaduanwasarrested,whathappenednext?
A:After arresting Pagaduan[,] we brought him directly in
DiadiPoliceStation,sir.
Q:WhathappenedwhenyoubroughttheaccusedtothePolice
StationinDiadi?
A:WhenwewerealreadyinDiadiPoliceStation,wefirstput
319 himinjailintheMunicipalJailofDiadi,NuevaVizcaya,
sir.
_______________
28Peoplev.Kamad,G.R.No.174198,January19,2010,610
SCRA295.
320
320 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Pagaduan
Q:Whatdidyoudowiththeshabu?
A:Therequestforlaboratoryexaminationwasprepared
andwasbroughttotheCrimeLab.ofSolano,Nueva
Vizcaya,sir.
xxxx
Q:Aftermakingtherequest,whatdidyoudonext[,]if
any[,]Mr.Witness?
A:AftersubmissionoftherequesttotheCrimeLab.[,]
wepreparedourjointaffidavitforsubmissionofthe
casetotheCourt,sir.29
Fromtheforegoingexchangesduringtrial,itisevidentthat
the apprehending team, upon confiscation of the drug,
immediately brought the appellant and the seized items to the
policestation,and,oncethere,madetherequestforlaboratory
examination.Nophysicalinventoryandphotographoftheseized
itemsweretakeninthepresenceoftheaccusedorhiscounsel,a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice,
andanelectiveofficial.PO3Almarez,oncrossexamination,was
unsure and could not give a categorical answer when asked
whether he issued a receipt for theshabuconfiscated from the
appellant.30Atanyrate,nosuchreceiptorcertificateofinventory
appearsintherecords.
In several cases, we have emphasized the importance of
compliance with the prescribed procedure in the custody and
dispositionoftheseizeddrugs.Wehaverepeatedlydeclaredthat
thedeviationfromthestandardproceduredismallycompromises
theintegrityoftheevidence.InPeoplev.Morales,31weacquitted
theaccusedforfailureofthebuybustteamtophotographand
inventorytheseizeditems,withoutgivinganyjustifiableground
for the nonobservance of the required procedures.People v.
Garcia32likewiseresultedinanacquit
_______________
29TSN,July5,2004,pp.913.
30TSN,July19,2004,pp.1718.
31G.R.No.172873,March19,2010,616SCRA223.
32Supranote26.
321
VOL.627,AUGUST9,201
Peoplevs.Pagaduan
tal because no physical inventory was ever made, and no
photograph of the seized items was taken under the
circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing
rules.InBondad,Jr.v.People,33wealsoacquittedtheaccusedfor
thefailureofthepolicetoconductaninventoryandtophotograph
theseizeditems,withoutjustifiablegrounds.
We had the same rulings inPeople v. Gutierrez,34People v.
Denoman,35People v. Partoza,36People v. Robles,37andPeople v.
dela Cruz,38where we emphasized the importance of complying
withtherequiredmandatoryproceduresunderSection21ofR.A.
No.9165.
Werecognizethatthestrictcompliancewiththerequirements
ofSection21ofR.A.No.9165maynotalwaysbepossibleunder
fieldconditions;thepoliceoperatesundervariedconditions,and
cannotatalltimesattendtoallthenicetiesoftheproceduresin
the handling of confiscated evidence. For this reason, the last
sentenceoftheimplementingrulesprovidesthatnoncompliance
withtheserequirementsunderjustifiablegrounds,aslongasthe
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items[.]Thus,noncompliancewiththestrictdirectiveofSection
21ofR.A.No.9165isnotnecessarilyfataltotheprosecutions
case; police procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence
maystillhavesomelapses,asinthepresentcase.Theselapses,
however, must be recognized and explained in terms of
their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and
evidentiaryvalueoftheevidenceseizedmustbeshownto
havebeenpreserved.39
Inthepresentcase,theprosecutiondidnotbothertoofferany
321 explanation to justify the failure of the police to conduct the
requiredphysicalinventoryandphotographoftheseizeddrugs.
The apprehending team failed to show why an inventory and
photographoftheseizedevidencehadnotbeenmadeeitherinthe
place of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police station (as
required by the Implementing Rules in case of warrantless
arrests).Weemphasizethatforthesavingclausetoapply,
it is important that the prosecution explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, andthat the integrity and
valueoftheseizedevidencehadbeenpreserved. 40Inother
words,thejustifiablegroundfornoncompliancemustbe
proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what these
groundsareorthattheyevenexist.41

TheChainofCustodyRequirement
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering
exactitude be observed in establishing thecorpus delictithe
bodyofthecrimewhosecoreistheconfiscatedillicitdrug.Thus,
everyfactnecessarytoconstitutethecrimemustbeestablished.
Thechainofcustodyrequirementperformsthisfunctioninbuy
bustoperationsasitensuresthatdoubtsconcerningtheidentity
oftheevidenceareremoved.42
BlacksLawDictionaryexplainschainofcustodyinthiswise:
In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as the
narcoticsinatrialofdrugcase,mustaccountforthecustodyof
the evidence from the moment in which it reaches his custody
until the moment in which it is offered in evidence, and such
evidencegoestoweightnottoadmissibilityofevidence.Com.V.
White,353Mass.409,232N.E.2d335.
Likewise,Section1(b)ofDangerousDrugsBoardRegulation
No. 1, Series of 2002 which implements R.A. No. 9165 defines
chainofcustodyasfollows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized
movementsandcustodyofseizeddrugsorcontrolledchemicalsor
plantsourcesofdangerousdrugsorlaboratoryequipmentofeach
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction.Suchrecordofmovementsandcustodyofseizeditem
shallincludetheidentityandsignature ofthepersonwhoheld
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when
suchtransferofcustodyweremadeinthecourseofsafekeeping
anduseincourtasevidence,andthefinaldisposition[.]
InMalillinv.People,43theCourtexplainedthatthechainof
custodyrulerequiresthattherebetestimonyabouteverylinkin
thechain,fromthemomenttheobjectseizedwaspickeduptothe
timeitisofferedinevidence,insuchawaythateverypersonwho
toucheditwoulddescribehowandfromwhomitwasreceived,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness
possession, the condition in which it was received and the
conditioninwhichitwasdeliveredtothenextlinkinthechain.
In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to
establish the chain that would have shown that theshabupre
sented in court was the very same specimen seized from the
appellant.
Thefirstlinkinthechainofcustodystartswiththeseizureof
theheatsealedplasticsachetfromtheappellant.PO3Almarez
mentionedoncrossexaminationthatheplacedhisinitialsonthe
confiscated sachet after apprehending the appellant. Notably,
this testimony constituted the totality of the prosecutions
evidenceonthemarkingoftheseizedevidence.PO3Almarezs
testimony,however,lackedspecificsonhowhemarkedthesachet
andwhowitnessedthemarking.InPeoplev.Sanchez,weruled
thatthemarkingoftheseizeditemstotrulyensurethatthey
arethesameitemsthatenterthechainandareeventuallythe
onesofferedinevidenceshouldbedone(1)inthepresenceof
theapprehendedviolator(2)immediatelyuponconfiscation.In
thepresentcase,nothingintherecordsgivesusaninsightonthe
manner and circumstances that attended the marking of the
confiscated sachet. Whether themarking had been doneinthe
presenceoftheappellantisnotatallclearfromtheevidencethat
merelymentionedthattheevidencehadbeenmarkedafterthe
appellantsapprehension.
 Thesecondlinkinthechainofcustodyisitsturnoverfromthe
apprehendingteamtothepolicestation.PO3Almareztestified
thattheappellantwasbroughttotheDiadiPoliceStationafter
his arrest. However, he failed to identify the person who had
control and possession of the seized drug at the time of its
transportation to the police station. In the absence of clear
evidence, we cannot presume that PO3 Almarez, as
theposeurbuyer,handledtheseizedsachettotheexclusionof
othersduring its transfer from the place of arrest and
confiscationtothepolicestation.Theprosecutionlikewisefailed
to present evidence pertaining to the identity of the duty desk
officerwhoreceivedtheplasticsachetcontainingshabufromthe
buybust team. This is particularly significant since the seized
specimen was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratoryonly
after two days. It was not, therefore, clear who had temporary
custody of the seized itemsduring this significant intervening
period of time. Although the records show thatthe request for
laboratoryexaminationoftheseizedplasticsachetwasprepared
byCaptaindeVera,theevidencedoesnotshowthathewasthe
officialwhoreceivedthemarkedplasticsachetfromthebuybust
team.
Asforthesubsequentlinksinthechainofcustody,therecords
showthattheseizedspecimenwasforwardedbyPO3Almarezto
thePNPCrimeLaboratoryonDecember29,2003,whereitwas
receivedbyPO2Dulnuan,andlaterexaminedbyPSIQuintero.
However,thepersonfromwhomPO3Almarezreceivedtheseized
illegaldrugfortransfertothecrimelaboratorywasnotidentified.
As earlier discussed, the identity of the duty desk officer who
received theshabu, as well as the person who had temporary
custodyoftheseizeditemsfortwodays,hadnotbeenestablished.
Theprocedurallapsesmentionedaboveshowtheglaringgaps
inthechainofcustody,creatingareasonabledoubtwhetherthe
drugsconfiscatedfromtheappellantwerethesamedrugs
that were brought to the crime laboratory for chemical
analysis,andeventuallyofferedincourtasevidence.Inthe
absenceofconcreteevidenceontheillegaldrugsboughtandsold,
the body of the crimethecorpus delictihas not been
adequatelyproven.44Ineffect,theprosecutionfailedtofullyprove
theelementsofthecrimecharged,creatingreasonabledoubton
theappellantscriminalliability.
Presumption of Regularity in the
PerformanceofOfficialDuties
Insustainingtheappellantsconviction,theCAreliedonthe
evidentiarypresumptionthatofficialdutieshavebeenregularly
performed.Thispresumption,itmustbeempha
_______________
sized, is not conclusive.45It cannot, by itself, overcome the
constitutionalpresumptionofinnocence.Anytaintofirregularity
affectsthewholeperformanceandshouldmakethepresumption
unavailable.Inthepresentcase,thefailureoftheapprehending
teamtocomplywithparagraph1,Section21,ArticleIIofR.A.
No.9165,andwiththechainofcustodyrequirementofthisAct
effectivelynegatesthispresumption.AsweexplainedinMalillin
v.People:46
The presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challengedbytheevidencecannotberegardedasbindingtruth.
Sufficeittosaythatthispresumptioncannotpreponderateover
thepresumptionofinnocencethatprevailsifnotoverthrownby
proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case the lack of
conclusiveidentificationoftheillegaldrugsallegedlyseizedfrom
petitioner,coupledwiththeirregularityinthemannerbywhich
thesamewereplacedunderpolicecustodybeforeofferedincourt,
stronglymilitatesafindingofguilt.
Wearenotunmindfuloftheperniciouseffectsofdrugsinour
society; they are lingering maladies that destroy families and
relationships,andengendercrimes.TheCourtisonewithallthe
agencies concerned in pursuing an intensive and unrelenting
campaignagainstthissocialdilemma.Regardlessofhowmuch
wewanttocurbthismenace,wecannotdisregardtheprotection
providedbytheConstitution,mostparticularlythepresumption
ofinnocencebestowedontheappellant.Proofbeyondreasonable
doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce moral
certaintythatwouldconvinceandsatisfytheconscienceofthose
who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome this
constitutionalpresumption.Iftheprosecutionhasnotproved,in
the firstplace, allthe elementsof thecrimecharged,whichin
thiscaseisthecorpusdelicti,thentheappellantdeservesnoless
thananacquittal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE
and SET ASIDE the May 22, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. CRH.C. No. 01597. Appellant Felimon
PagaduanyTamayo is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is
ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless he is
confinedforanotherlawfulcause.
LetacopyofthisDecisionbefurnishedtheDirector,Bureau
of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation.
TheDirectoroftheBureauofCorrectionsisdirectedtoreportthe
actionhehastakentothisCourtwithinfivedaysfromreceiptof Inpersonalactionssuchastheinstantcase,theRulesgivethe
thisDecision.
SOORDERED.
CarpioMorales (Chairperson), Bersamin,
Abad andVillarama,Jr.,JJ.,concur.
**
Judgmentreversedandsetaside,appellantFelimonPagaduan
yTamayoacquitted.
Note.Thepresumptionofregularityintheperformanceof
official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of
innocencenorconstituteproofbeyondreasonabledoubt.(People
vs.Agulay,566SCRA571[2008])
o0o
G.R.No.180284.September11,2013.*
NARCISO SALAS, petitioner,vs. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM,
respondent.
RemedialLaw;CivilProcedure;Venue;Inpersonalactions,
theRulesgivetheplaintifftheoptionofchoosingwheretofilehis
complaint.Hecanfileitintheplace(1)wherehehimselforanyof
themresides,or(2)wherethedefendantoranyofthedefendants
residesormaybefound.Itisalegaltruismthattherulesonthe
venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the
plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the
principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a
plaintiffscaprice;thematterisregulatedbytheRulesofCourt.
plaintifftheoptionofchoosingwheretofilehiscomplaint.Hecan
fileitintheplace(1)wherehehimselforanyofthemresides,or
(2)wherethedefendantoranyofthedefendantsresidesormay
befound.Theplaintifforthedefendantmustberesidentsofthe
placewheretheactionhasbeeninstitutedatthetimetheaction
iscommenced.
Same;Same;Same;UndertheRulesofCourtbeforethe1997
amendments, an objection to an improper venue must be made
beforearesponsivepleadingisfiled.Otherwise,itwillbedeemed
waived.Petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for the
first time in the Answer itself and no prior motion to dismiss
basedonsuchgroundwasfiled.UndertheRulesofCourtbefore
the1997amendments,anobjectiontoanimpropervenuemustbe
madebeforearesponsivepleadingisfiled.Otherwise,itwillbe
deemed waived. Not having been timely raised, petitioners
objectiononvenueisthereforedeemedwaived.
Same; Same; Motion for Postponement; A motion for
continuanceorpostponementisnotamatterofright,butarequest
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.A motion for
continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a
request addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Parties
askingforpostponementhave
_______________
*FIRSTDIVISION.
561
VOL.705,SEPTEMBER11,2013
Salasvs.Matusalem
absolutelynorighttoassumethattheirmotionswouldbe
granted.Thus,theymustbepreparedonthedayofthehearing.
Indeed, anorderdeclaring aparty to have waived theright to
presentevidenceforperformingdilatoryactionsupholdsthetrial
courtsdutytoensurethattrialproceedsdespitethedeliberate
delayandrefusaltoproceedonthepartofoneparty.
DueProcess;Whereapartywasaffordedanopportunityto
participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot
complain of deprivation of due process.With our finding that
therewasnoabuseofdiscretioninthetrialcourtsdenialofthe
motionforpostponementfiledbypetitionerscounsel,petitioners
contentionthathewasdeprivedofhisdayincourtmustlikewise
fail. The essence of due process is that a party is given a
reasonableopportunitytobeheardandsubmitanyevidenceone
mayhaveinsupportofonesdefense.Whereapartywasafforded
anopportunitytoparticipateintheproceedingsbutfailedtodo
so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If the
opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited
withoutviolatingtheconstitutionalguarantee.
Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Filiation;
IllegitimateChildren;UnderArticle175oftheFamilyCodeofthe
Philippines,illegitimatefiliationmaybeestablishedinthesame
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.Under
Article 175 of theFamily Code of the Philippines, illegitimate
filiation may be established inthe same way and on the same
evidenceaslegitimatechildren.Article172oftheFamilyCodeof
the Philippinesstates: The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth
56 appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)
Anadmission of legitimate filiationin a public document or
aprivate handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) Theopen and
continuous possession ofthe status ofalegitimate child;or (2)
AnyothermeansallowedbytheRulesofCourtandspeciallaws.
 Same; Same; Paternity; Evidence; Birth Certificates; A
certificateoflivebirthpurportedlyidentifyingtheputativefather
isnotcompetentevidenceofpaternitywhenthereisnoshowing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate.We have held that a certificate of live birth
purportedlyidentifyingthe
562
5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
62
Salasvs.Matusalem
putativefatherisnotcompetentevidenceofpaternitywhen
thereisnoshowingthattheputativefatherhadahandinthe
preparationofthecertificate.Thus,ifthefatherdidnotsignin
the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother,
doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity. Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a
recognitioninapublicinstrumentandithasnoprobativevalue
toestablishfiliationtotheallegedfather.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Baptismal Certificates; While
baptismalcertificatesmaybeconsideredpublicdocuments,they
canonlyserveasevidenceoftheadministrationofthesacraments
on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent
evidenceoftheveracityofentriesthereinwithrespecttothechilds
paternity.As to the Baptismal Certificate (Exhibit B) of
ChristianPauloSalasalsoindicatingpetitionerasthefather,we
haveruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered
public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administrationofthesacramentsonthedatessospecified.They
arenotnecessarilycompetentevidenceoftheveracityofentries
thereinwithrespecttothechildspaternity.
Same; Same; Evidence; Pictures; Pictures taken of the
mother and her child together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.Pictures taken of the
mother and her child together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove paternity. Exhibits E and F
showingpetitionerandrespondentinsidetherentedapartment
unitthushavescantevidentiaryvalue.TheStatementofAccount
(ExhibitC)fromtheGoodSamaritanGeneralHospitalwhere
respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise
incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child
notwithstanding petitioners admission in his answer that he
shoulderedtheexpensesinthedeliveryofrespondentschildas
anactofcharity.
Same; Same; Same; Handwritten Notes; As to the
handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their
exchangeofaffectionatewordsandromantictrysts,thesearenot
sufficienttoestablishChristianPaulosfiliationtopetitioneras
theywerenotsignedbypetitionerandcontainednostatementof
admissionbypetitionerthatheisthefatherofsaidchild.Asto
thehandwrittennotes(ExhibitsDtoD13)ofpetitionerand
respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and
romantictrysts,these,too,arenotsuffi
563
VOL.705,SEPTEMBER11,2013 56
3
Salasvs.Matusalem
cienttoestablishChristianPaulosfiliationtopetitioneras
theywerenotsignedbypetitionerandcontainednostatementof
admissionbypetitionerthatheisthefatherofsaidchild.Thus,
even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under
Article 172 (2) visvis Article 175 of the Family Code which
admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an
admissionoffiliationinaprivatehandwritteninstrumentsigned
bytheparentconcerned.
Same; Same; Same; Filiation; Illegitimate Children; An
illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed
filiationbyanyothermeansallowedbytheRulesofCourtand
speciallaws,likehisbaptismalcertificate,ajudicialadmission,
a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.An illegitimate child is
nowalsoallowedtoestablishhisclaimedfiliationbyanyother
meansallowedbytheRulesofCourtandspeciallaws,likehis
baptismalcertificate,ajudicialadmission,afamilyBibleinwhich
his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admissionbysilence,thetestimoniesofwitnesses,and
other kindsofproofadmissible under Rule130 ofthe Rules of
Court.Reviewingtherecords,wefindthetotalityofrespondents
evidenceinsufficienttoestablishthatpetitioneristhefatherof
ChristianPaulo.ThetestimoniesofrespondentandMurilloasto
the circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo, petitioners
financialsupportwhilerespondentlivedinMurillosapartment
andhisregularvisitstoheratthesaidapartment,thoughreplete
with details, do not approximate the overwhelming evidence,
documentaryandtestimonialpresentedinIlano.
Same;Same;Same;Paternity;TheSupremeCourthasruled
thata high standard of proof isrequiredto establishpaternity
andfiliation.Timeandagain,thisCourthasruledthatahigh
standardofproofisrequiredtoestablishpaternityandfiliation.
Anorderforrecognitionandsupportmaycreateanunwholesome
situationormaybeanirritanttothefamilyorthelivesofthe
partiessothatitmustbeissuedonlyifpaternityorfiliationis
establishedbyclearandconvincingevidence.564
5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
64
Salasvs.Matusalem
Same; Same; Support; Illegitimate Children; The death of
theputativefatherisnotabartotheactioncommencedduring
his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child.The
action for support having been filed in the trial court when
petitionerwasstillalive,itisnotbarredunderArticle175(2)of
theFamilyCode.Wehavealsoheldthatthedeathoftheputative
fatherisnotabartotheactioncommencedduringhislifetimeby
oneclaimingtobehisillegitimatechild.Theruleonsubstitution
ofpartiesprovidedinSection16,Rule3ofthe1997RulesofCivil
Procedure,thusapplies.SEC.16.Deathofparty;dutyofcounsel.
Wheneverapartytoapendingactiondies,andtheclaimisnot
therebyextinguished,itshallbethedutyofhiscounseltoinform
the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply
withhisdutyshallbeagroundfordisciplinaryaction.Theheirs
ofthedeceasedmaybeallowedtobesubstitutedforthedeceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administratorandthecourtmayappointaguardianadlitemfor
the minor heirs. The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear and be substituted
within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. If no legal
representativeisnamedbythecounselforthedeceasedparty,or
if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified
period,thecourtmayordertheopposingparty,withinaspecified
timetoprocuretheappointmentofanexecutororadministrator
forthe estate ofthe deceased and the latter shall immediately
appearforandonbehalfofthedeceased.Thecourtchargesin
procuring suchappointment,ifdefrayedby theopposingparty,
mayberecoveredascosts.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
JenniferPatacsilArceoforpetitioner.
OscarC.Sahagunforrespondent.
565
VOL.705,SEPTEMBER11,2013 565
Salasvs.Matusalem
VILLARAMA,JR.,J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review oncertiorariwhich
seekstoreverseandsetasidetheDecision 1datedJuly18,2006
andResolution2datedOctober19,2007oftheCourtofAppeals
(CA)inCAG.R.CVNo.64379.
Thefactualantecedents:
OnMay26,1995,AnnabelleMatusalem(respondent)fileda
complaint3for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas
(petitioner)intheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofCabanatuanCity
(CivilCaseNo.2124AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son
Christian Paulo Salas who was born on December 28, 1994.
Petitioner,already56yearsoldatthetime,enticedherasshe
was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a
widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent
stayedandshoulderedallexpensesinthedeliveryoftheirchild,
including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital
confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of
petitioners family to take the child from her, petitioner
abandonedrespondentandherchildandleftthemtothemercyof
relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that she
attemptedsuicideduetodepressionbutstillpetitionerrefusedto
supportherandtheirchild.
Respondentthusprayedforsupportpendenteliteandmonthly
supportintheamountofP20,000.00,aswellasactual,moraland
exemplarydamages,andattorneysfees.
_______________
1Rollo,pp.7584.PennedbyAssociateJusticeArcangelitaM.
RomillaLontok with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and
MarioL.GuariaIII,concurring.
2Id., at p. 93. Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M.
RomillaLontokwithAssociateJusticesMarioL.GuariaIIIand
LucenitoN.Tagle.
3Records,pp.16.
566
566 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Salasvs.Matusalem
Petitioner filed his answer4with special and affirmative
defensesandcounterclaims.Hedescribedrespondentasawoman
ofloosemorals,havingborneherfirstchildalsooutofwedlock
whenshewenttoworkinItaly.Joblessuponherreturntothe
country, respondent spent time riding on petitioners jeepney
which was then being utilized by a female real estate agent
namedFelicisimadeGuzman.Respondenthadseducedasenior
policeofficerinSanIsidroandherchargeofsexualabuseagainst
said police officer was later withdrawn in exchange for the
quashingofdrugchargesagainstrespondentsbrotherinlawwho
was then detained at the municipal jail. It was at that time
respondentintroducedherselftopetitionerwhomshepleadedfor
charityasshewaspregnantwithanotherchild.Petitionerdenied
paternityofthechildChristianPaulo;hewasmotivatedbyno
otherreasonexceptgenuinealtruismwhenheagreedtoshoulder
the expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of
respondentschicaneryanddeceitdesignedtoscandalizehimin
exchangeforfinancialfavor.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo
testified. Petitioner was declared to have waived his right to
present evidence and the case was considered submitted for
decisionbasedonrespondentsevidence.
Respondenttestifiedthatshefirstmetpetitioneratthehouse
of his kumadre Felicisima de Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San
Isidro,NuevaEcija.Duringtheirsubsequentmeeting,petitioner
toldherheisalreadyawidowerandhehasnomorecompanionin
lifebecausehischildrenareallgrownup.Shealsolearnedthat
petitionerownsaricemill,aconstructionbusinessandahousing
subdivision(petitionerofferedherajobattheirfamilyownedMa.
CristinaVillage).Petitioneratthetimealreadyknowsthatsheis
a single mother as she had a child by her former boyfriend in
Italy.Hethenbroughthertoamotel,promisingthathewilltake
care
_______________
4Id.,atpp.2426.
567
VOL.705,SEPTEMBER11,2013
Salasvs.Matusalem
of her and marry her. She believed him and yielded to his
advances, with the thought that she and her child will have a
betterlife.Thereafter,theysaweachotherweeklyandpetitioner
gavehermoneyforherchild.Whenshebecamepregnantwith
petitionerschild,itwasonlythenshelearnedthatheisinfact
not a widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner
opposeditbecausehewantedtohaveanotherchild.5
Onthefourthmonthofherpregnancy,petitionerrentedan
apartmentwhereshestayedwithahousemaid;healsoprovided
foralltheirexpenses.ShegavebirthtotheirchildonDecember
28, 1994 at the Good Samaritan Hospital in Cabanatuan City.
Beforedelivery,petitionerevenwalkedheratthehospitalroom
andmassagedherstomach,sayinghehadnotdonethistohis
wife.Shefilledouttheformforthechildsbirthcertificateand
wrotealltheinformationsuppliedbypetitionerhimself.Itwas
also petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove her baby
home.Hewasexcitedandhappytohaveasonathisadvanced
age who is his lookalike, and this was witnessed by other
boarders,visitorsandGraceMurillo,theowneroftheapartment
unitpetitionerrented.However,onthe18thdayafterthebabys
birth,petitionerwenttoBaguioCityforamedicalcheckup.He
confessed to her daughter and eventually his wife was also
informedabouthishavingsiredanillegitimatechild.Hisfamily
thendecidedtoadoptthebabyandjustgiverespondentmoneyso
shecangoabroad.Whensherefusedthisoffer,petitionerstopped
seeingherandsendingmoneytoher.Sheandherbabysurvived
throughthehelpofrelativesandfriends.Depressed,shetriedto
commitsuicidebydrugoverdoseandwasbroughttothehospital
by Murillo who paid the bill. Murillo sought the help of the
Cabanatuan City Police Station which set their meeting with
petitioner.However,itwasonlypeti
567
_______________
5TSN,October6,1995,p.21;TSN,November17,1995,pp.4
7,13;TSN,March22,1996,pp.1425;TSN,June3,1996,pp.19
29,3337.
568
568 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Salasvs.Matusalem
tioners wife who showed up and she was very mad, uttering
unsavorywordsagainstrespondent.6
Murillo corroborated respondents testimony as to the
paymentbypetitionerofapartmentrental,hisweeklyvisitsto
respondentandfinancialsupporttoher,hispresenceduringand
after delivery of respondents baby, respondents attempted
suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for
which she paid the bill, her complaint before the police
authorities and meeting with petitioners wife at the
headquarters.7
OnApril5,1999,thetrialcourtrendereditsdecision8infavor
ofrespondent,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby renderedinfavor ofthe plaintiff and against the
defendantasfollows:
1.Orderingthedefendanttogiveasmonthlysupport
of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS for the child
ChristianPaulothroughthemother;
2.Directingthedefendanttopaytheplaintiffthesum
ofP20,000.00bywayoflitigationexpenses;and
3.Topaythecostsofsuit.
SOORDERED.9
PetitionerappealedtotheCAarguingthat:(1)thetrialcourt
decided the case without affording him the right to introduce
evidenceonhisdefense;and(2)thetrialcourterred
_______________
6Id.,atpp.821;id.,atpp.1012;id.,atpp.711;id.,atpp.9
10,1418,4346;TSN,February19,1996,pp.6,1012.
7TSN,July8,1996,pp.511;TSN,November29,1996,pp.4
9,1526.
8Rollo,pp.6573.PennedbyActingPresidingJudgeJohnson
L.Ballutay.
9Id.,atpp.7273.
569
VOL.705,SEPTEMBER11,2013
Salasvs.Matusalem
infindingthatpetitioneristheputativefatherofChristianPaulo
andorderinghimtogivemonthlysupport.
ByDecisiondatedJuly18,2006,theCAdismissedpetitioners
appeal.Theappellatecourtfoundnoreasontodisturbthetrial
courts exercise of discretion in denying petitioners motion for
postponement on April 17, 1998, the scheduled hearing for the
initial presentation of defendants evidence, and the motion for
reconsideration of the said order denying the motion for
postponementandsubmittingthecasefordecision.
Onthepaternityissue,theCAaffirmedthetrialcourtsruling
thatrespondentsatisfactorilyestablishedtheillegitimatefiliation
of her son Christian Paulo, and consequently no error was
committedbythetrialcourtingrantingrespondentsprayerfor
support.Theappellatecourtthusheld:
Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the
benefitofarecordofbirthinthecivilregistrywhichbears
acknowledgmentsignedbyNarcisoSalas.Hecannotclaim
open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimatechild.
Ithadbeenestablishedbyplaintiffsevidence,however,
that during her pregnancy, Annabelle was provided by
NarcisoSalaswithanapartmentatarentalofP1,500.00
whichhepaid for(TSN, October 6, 1995, p. 18). Narciso
provided her with a household help with a salary of
P1,500.00 a month (TSN, October 6, 1995, ibid). Healso
providedheramonthlyfoodallowanceofP1,500.00(Ibid,
p. 18). NarcisowaswithAnnabelleat the hospital while
the latter was in labor, walking her around and
massaging her belly (Ibid, p. 11). Narciso brought home
569 ChristianPaulototherentedapartmentafterAnnabelles
discharge from the hospital. People living in the same
apartment units were witnesses to Narcisos delight to
 fatherasonathisagewhichwashislookalike.Itwas
onlyafterthe18thdaywhenAnnabellerefusedtogivehim
ChristianPaulothatNarcisowithdrewhissupporttohim
andhismother.570
570 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Salasvs.Matusalem
Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been
corroboratedbyGraceMurillo,theowneroftheapartment
which Narciso rented, was never rebutted on record.
Narciso did not present any evidence, verbal or
documentary,torepudiateplaintiffsevidence.
InthecasesofLimvs.CA(270SCRA1)andRodriguez
vs.CA(245SCRA150),theSupremeCourtmadeitclear
that Article 172 of the Family Code is an adaptation of
Article283oftheCivilCode.Saidlegalprovisionprovides
that the father is obliged to recognize the child as his
naturalchildxx3)whenthechildhasinhisfavorany
evidenceorproofthatthedefendantishisfather.
Infact,inIlanovs.CA(230SCRA242,258259),itwas
heldthat
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a
blanketprovisionthatpracticallycoversalltheother
cases in the preceding paragraphs. Any other
evidenceorproofthatthedefendantisthefatheris
broad enough to render unnecessary the other
paragraphs of this article. When the evidence
submittedintheactionforcompulsoryrecognitionis
notsufficienttomeet[the]requirementsofthefirst
threeparagraphs,itmaystillbeenoughunderthe
lastparagraph.Thisparagraphpermitshearsayand
reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of
Court,withrespecttoillegitimatefiliation.
As a necessary consequence of the finding that
ChristianPauloisthesonofdefendantNarcisoSalas,heis
entitledtosupportfromthelatter(Ilanovs.CA,supra).
Itshallbedemandablefromthetimethepersonwho
hastherighttorecoverthesameneedsitformaintenance
xx.(Art.203,FamilyCodeofthePhilippines).10
_______________
10Id.,atpp.8283.
571
VOL.705,SEPTEMBER11,2013 571
Salasvs.Matusalem
Petitionerfiledamotionforreconsiderationbutitwasdenied
bytheCA.
Hence,thispetitionsubmittingthefollowingarguments:
1.THE VENUE OF THE CASE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID
BEFORETHEREGIONALTRIALCOURTOFCABANATUAN
CITY CONSIDERING THAT BOTH PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT ARE ACTUAL RESIDENTS OF BRGY.
MALAPIT,SANISIDRO,NUEVAECIJA.
2.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
PRONOUNCING THAT PETITIONER WAS AFFORDED THE
FULLMEASUREOFHISRIGHTTODUEPROCESSOFLAW
AND IN UPHOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
GRAVELYABUSEITSDISCRETIONAMOUNTINGTOLACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECIDED THE
INSTANT CASE WITHOUT AFFORDING PETITIONER THE
RIGHTTOINTRODUCEEVIDENCEINHISDEFENSE.
3.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE FILIATION OF CHRISTIAN PAULO
WASDULYESTABLISHEDPURSUANTTOARTICLE175IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE AND
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND THEREFORE ENTITLED
TOSUPPORTFROMTHEPETITIONER.11
Wegrantthepetition.
It isa legal truismthattherulesonthevenue of personal
actionsare fixed fortheconvenienceoftheplaintiffsandtheir
witnesses.Equallysettled,however,istheprinciplethatchoosing
thevenueofanactionisnotlefttoaplaintiffscaprice;thematter
isregulatedbytheRulesofCourt.12
Inpersonalactionssuchastheinstantcase,theRulesgivethe
plaintifftheoptionofchoosingwheretofilehiscomplaint.
_______________
11Id.,atpp.180181.
12Angv.Ang,G.R.No.186993,August22,2012,678SCRA
699,705,citingHyattElevatorsandEscalatorsCorp.v.Goldstar
Elevators, Phils., Inc., 510 Phil. 467, 476; 473 SCRA 705, 714
(2005).
572
572 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Salasvs.Matusalem
Hecanfileitintheplace(1)wherehehimselforanyofthem
resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants
residesormaybefound.13Theplaintifforthedefendantmustbe
residentsoftheplacewheretheactionhasbeeninstitutedatthe
timetheactioniscommenced.14
However,petitionerraisedtheissueofimpropervenueforthe
first time in the Answer itself and no prior motion to dismiss
basedonsuchgroundwasfiled.UndertheRulesofCourtbefore
the1997amendments,anobjectiontoanimpropervenuemustbe
madebeforearesponsivepleadingisfiled.Otherwise,itwillbe
deemed waived.15Not having been timely raised, petitioners
objectiononvenueisthereforedeemedwaived.
Astothedenialofthemotionforpostponementfiledbyhis
counsel for the resetting of the initial presentation of defense
evidenceonApril17,1998,wefindthatitwasnotthefirsttime
petitioners motion for postponement was denied by the trial
court.
Recordsdisclosedthataftertheterminationofthetestimony
ofrespondentslastwitnessonNovember29,1996,thetrialcourt
asprayedforbytheparties,setthecontinuationofhearingfor
the reception of evidence for the defendant (petitioner) on
January 27, February 3, and February 10, 1997. In the Order
datedDecember17,1996,petitionerwasadvisedtobereadywith
his evidence at those hearing dates earlier scheduled. At the
hearing on January 27, 1997, petitioners former counsel, Atty.
RolandoS.Bala,requestedforthecan
_______________
131997RulesofCivilProcedure,Rule4,Section2.
14Angv.Ang,supranote12,atpp.705706,citingBarituav.
CourtofAppeals,335Phil.12,1516;267SCRA331,335(1997).
15Fernandezv.InternationalCorporateBank,374Phil.668,
677;316SCRA326,334(1999),citingRule14,Section4ofthe
pre1997 Rules of Court which provides that [w]hen improper
venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed
waived.TheComplaintinthiscasewasfiledonMay26,1995
andtheAnswerwasfiledonJuly3,1995.
573
VOL.705,SEPTEMBER11,2013 573
Salasvs.Matusalem
cellationoftheFebruary3and10,1997hearingsinordertogive
himtimetoprepareforhisdefense,whichrequestwasgrantedby
thetrialcourtwhichthusresetthehearingdatestoMarch3,14
and17,1997.OnMarch3,1997,uponoralmanifestationbyAtty.
Bala and without objection from respondents counsel, Atty.
FelicianoWycoco,thetrialcourtagainresetthehearingtoMarch
14and17,1997.Withthenonappearanceofbothpetitionerand
Atty. Bala on March 14, 1997, the trial court upon oral
manifestationbyAtty.Wycocodeclaredtheirabsenceasawaiver
oftheirrighttopresentevidenceandaccordinglydeemedthecase
submittedfordecision.16
OnJuly4,1997,Atty.Balawithdrewascounselforpetitioner
and Atty. Rafael E. Villarosa filed his appearance as his new
counsel on July 21, 1997. On the same date he filed entry of
appearance,Atty.Villarosafiledamotionforreconsiderationof
the March 14, 1997 Order pleading for liberality and
magnanimityofthetrialcourt,withoutofferinganyexplanation
forAtty. Balas failure to appear for the initial presentation of
theirevidence.ThetrialcourtthereuponreconsidereditsMarch
14, 1997 Order, finding it better to give petitioner a chance to
presenthisevidence.OnAugust26,1997,Atty.Villarosareceived
a notice of hearing for the presentation of their evidence
scheduledonSeptember22,1997.OnAugust29,1997,thetrial
court received his motion requesting that the said hearing be
resettoOctober10,1997forthereasonthathehadrequestedthe
postponementofahearinginanothercasewhichwasincidentally
scheduledonSeptember22,23and24,1997.Asprayedfor,the
trialcourtresetthehearingtoOctober10,1997.Onsaiddate,
however,thehearingwasagainmovedtoDecember15,1997.On
February16,1998,thetrialcourtitselfresetthehearingtoApril
17, 1998 since it was unclear whether Atty. Wycoco received a
copyofthemotion.17
_______________
16Records,pp.8183,109,111and113.
17Id.,atpp.115126,128and130.
574
574 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Salasvs.Matusalem
OnApril17,1998,petitionerandhiscounselfailedtoappear
butthetrialcourtreceivedonApril16,1998anurgentmotionto
cancelhearingfiledbyAtty.Villarosa.Thereasongivenbythe
latter was the scheduled hearing on the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction in another case under the April 8, 1998
OrderissuedbytheRTCofGapan,NuevaEcija,Branch36in
CivilCaseNo.1946.Butasclearlystatedinthesaidorder,itwas
the plaintiffs therein who requested the postponement of the
hearing and it behoved Atty. Villarosa to inform the RTC of
Gapanthathehadapreviouscommitmentconsideringthatthe
April 17, 1998 hearing wasscheduled as early asFebruary 16,
1998. Acting on the motion for postponement, the trial court
deniedforthesecond timepetitionersmotionforpostponement.
Even at the hearing of their motion for reconsideration of the
April17,1998OrderonSeptember21,1998,Atty.Villarosafailed
toappearandinsteadfiledanothermotionforpostponement.The
trialcourtthusorderedthatthecasebesubmittedfordecision
stressingthatthecasehadlongbeenpendingandthatpetitioner
and his counsel have been given opportunities to present their
evidence.Itlikewisedeniedasecondmotionforreconsideration
filed by Atty. Villarosa, who arrived late during the hearing
thereofonDecember4,1998.18
Amotionforcontinuanceorpostponementisnotamatterof
right,butarequestaddressedtothesounddiscretionofthecourt.
Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to
assumethattheirmotionswouldbegranted.Thus,theymustbe
preparedonthedayofthehearing.19Indeed,an
_______________
18Id.,atpp.131138,140and142146.
19Gochanv.Gochan,446Phil.433,454;398SCRA323,341
(2003),citingTiomicov.CourtofAppeals,363Phil.558,571;304
SCRA216,229(1999);PepsiColaProductsPhils.,Inc.v.Courtof
Appeals,359Phil.859,867;299SCRA518,525(1998);Republic
of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 361 Phil. 186, 196; 301
SCRA237,246(1999)andIrigaTelephoneCo.,Inc.v.NLRC,350
Phil.245,252;286SCRA600,606(1998).
575
VOL.705,SEPTEMBER11,2013
Salasvs.Matusalem
order declaring a party to have waived the right to present
evidenceforperformingdilatoryactionsupholdsthetrialcourts
dutytoensurethattrialproceedsdespitethedeliberatedelayand
refusaltoproceedonthepartofoneparty.20
Atty. Villarosas plea for liberality was correctly rejected by
thetrialcourtinviewofhisownnegligenceinfailingtoensure
there will be no conflict in his trial schedules. As we held
inTiomicov.CourtofAppeals:21
Motionsforpostponementaregenerallyfrownedupon
by Courts if there is evidence of bad faith, malice or
inexcusable negligence on the part of the movant. The
inadvertenceofthedefensecounselinfailingtotakenote
ofthetrialdatesandinbelatedlyinformingthetrialcourt
of any conflict in his schedules of trial or court
appearances,constitutesinexcusablenegligence.Itshould
be borne in mind that a client is bound by his counsels
conduct,negligenceandmistakesinhandlingthecase.22
Withourfindingthattherewasnoabuseofdiscretioninthe
trial courts denial of the motion for postponement filed by
petitionerscounsel,petitionerscontentionthathewasdeprived
ofhisdayincourtmustlikewisefail.Theessenceofdueprocess
isthatapartyisgivenareasonableopportunitytobeheardand
submitanyevidenceonemayhaveinsupportofonesdefense.
Whereapartywasaffordedanopportunitytoparticipateinthe
proceedingsbutfailedtodoso,hecannotcomplainofdeprivation
ofdueprocess.Iftheopportunityis
_______________
20Memita v. Masongsong, G.R. No. 150912, May 28, 2007,
523 SCRA 244, 254, citingRockwell Perfecto Gohu v. Spouses
575 Gohu,397Phil.126,135;343SCRA114,122(2000).
21Supranote19.
22Id.,atp.572,citingCingHongSov.TanBoonKong,53
Phil.437(1929)andSuarezv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.91133,
March22,1993,220SCRA274,279.
576
576 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Salasvs.Matusalem
notavailedof,itisdeemedwaivedorforfeitedwithoutviolating
theconstitutionalguarantee.23
We nowproceedtothe mainissue ofwhetherthetrialand
appellate courts erred in ruling that respondents evidence
sufficientlyprovedthathersonChristianPauloistheillegitimate
childofpetitioner.
Under Article 175 of theFamily Code of the Philippines,
illegitimatefiliationmaybeestablishedinthesamewayandon
thesameevidenceaslegitimatechildren.
Article172oftheFamilyCodeofthePhilippinesstates:
Thefiliationoflegitimatechildrenisestablishedbyany
ofthefollowing:
(1)Therecordofbirthappearinginthecivilregister
orafinaljudgment;or
(2) Anadmission of legitimate filiationin a public
documentoraprivatehandwritteninstrumentandsigned
bytheparentconcerned.
Intheabsenceoftheforegoingevidence,thelegitimate
filiationshallbeprovedby:
 (1)Theopenandcontinuouspossessionofthestatus
ofalegitimatechild;or
(2)AnyothermeansallowedbytheRulesofCourtand
speciallaws.(Underscoringsupplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth 24(Exhibit
A1)ofChristianPauloSalasinwhichthenameofpetitioner
appearsashisfatherbutwhichisnotsignedbyhim.Admittedly,
itwasonlyrespondentwhofilleduptheentriesandsignedthe
saiddocumentthoughsheclaimsit
_______________
23Memitav.Masongsong,supranote20,atp.253,citingAir
Phils. Corp. v. International Business Aviation Services Phils.,
Inc.,481Phil.366,386;438SCRA51,6667(2004)andTiomico
v.CourtofAppeals,supranote19,atpp.570571;p.228.
24Records,p.88.
577
VOL.705,SEPTEMBER11,2013
Salasvs.Matusalem
waspetitionerwhosuppliedtheinformationshewrotetherein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternitywhenthereisnoshowingthattheputativefatherhada
handinthepreparationofthecertificate.25Thus,ifthefatherdid
notsigninthebirthcertificate,theplacingofhisnamebythe
mother,doctor,registrar,orotherpersonisincompetentevidence
of paternity.26Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a
recognitioninapublicinstrument 27andithasnoprobativevalue
toestablishfiliationtotheallegedfather. 28
As to the Baptismal Certificate29(Exhibit B) of Christian
PauloSalasalsoindicatingpetitionerasthefather,wehaveruled
that while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents,theycanonlyserveasevidenceoftheadministration
of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarilycompetentevidenceoftheveracityofentriestherein
withrespecttothechildspaternity.30
_______________
25Cabataniav.CourtofAppeals,484Phil.42,51;441SCRA
96,103(2004).
26Berciles,etal.v.GSIS,etal.,213Phil.48,71;128SCRA
53,77(1984);Rocesv.LocalCivilRegistrarofManila,102Phil.
1050,1054(1958).
27Reyes,etal.v.CourtofAppeals,etal.,220Phil.116,128
(1985),citingIntestateEstateofParejav.Pareja,95Phil.167,172
(1954).
28SeeNepomuceno v. Lopez, G.R. No. 181258, March 18,
2010,616SCRA145,153andPunov.PunoEnterprises,Inc.,G.R.
No.177066,September11,2009,599SCRA585,590591.
29Records,p.90.
577
30Fernandezv.Fernandez,416Phil.322,339;363SCRA811,
825826(2001);Fernandezv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.108366,
February16,1994,230SCRA130,136;Reyes,etal.v.Courtof
Appeals,etal.,supranote27;Macadangdangv.CourtofAppeals,
No.L49542,September12,1980,100SCRA73,84.
578
578 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Salasvs.Matusalem
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of
handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs
takenofpetitionerandrespondentinsidetheirrentedapartment
unit.
Picturestakenofthemotherandherchildtogetherwiththe
alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove
paternity.31Exhibits E and F32showing petitioner and
respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant
evidentiaryvalue.TheStatementofAccount 33(ExhibitC)from
theGoodSamaritanGeneralHospitalwhererespondentherself
wasindicatedasthepayeeislikewiseincompetenttoprovethat
petitioneristhefatherofherchildnotwithstandingpetitioners
admissioninhisanswerthatheshoulderedtheexpensesinthe
deliveryofrespondentschildasanactofcharity.
As to the handwritten notes34(Exhibits D to D13) of
petitionerandrespondentshowingtheirexchangeofaffectionate
words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to
establishChristianPaulosfiliationtopetitionerastheywerenot
signedbypetitionerandcontainednostatementofadmissionby
petitionerthatheisthefatherofsaidchild.Thus,evenifthese
noteswere authentic,theydonotqualifyunderArticle 172 (2)
visvis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as
competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of
filiationinaprivatehandwritteninstrumentsignedbytheparent
concerned.35
Petitioners reliance on our ruling inLim v. Court of
Appeals36ismisplaced.Inthesaidcase,thehandwrittenletters
_______________
31Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, id., at pp. 135136,
citingTan v. Trocio, A.C. No. 2115, November 27, 1990, 191
SCRA764,769.
32Records,pp.103104.
33Id.,atp.92.
34Id.,atpp.93102.
35Nepomucenov.Lopez,supranote28.
36G.R.No.112229,March18,1997,270SCRA1,57.
579
VOL.705,SEPTEMBER11,2013
Salasvs.Matusalem
ofpetitionercontainedaclearadmissionthatheisthefatherof
privaterespondentsdaughterandweresignedbyhim.TheCourt
therein considered the totality of evidence which established
beyondreasonabledoubtthatpetitionerwasindeedthefatherof
private respondents daughter. On the other hand, inIlano v.
Court of Appeals,37the Court sustained the appellate courts
finding that private respondents evidence to establish her
filiation with and paternity of petitioner was overwhelming,
particularly the latters public acknowledgment of his amorous
relationship with private respondents mother, and private
respondent as his own child through acts and words, her
testimonial evidence to that effect was fully supported by
documentaryevidence.TheCourtthusruledthatrespondenthad
adduced sufficient proof of continuous possessionof status of a
spuriouschild.
Here,whiletheCAheldthatChristianPauloSalascouldnot
claimopenandcontinuouspossessionofstatusofanillegitimate
child, it nevertheless considered the testimonial evidence
sufficientprooftoestablishhisfiliationtopetitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his
claimed filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of
Courtandspeciallaws,likehisbaptismalcertificate,ajudicial
admission,afamilyBibleinwhichhisnamehasbeenentered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by
silence,the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissibleunderRule130oftheRulesofCourt. 38Reviewingthe
records,wefindthetotalityofrespondentsevi
_______________
37G.R.No.104376,February23,1994,230SCRA242.
38Gotardov.Buling,G.R.No.165166,August15,2012,678
SCRA436,443,citingCruzv.Cristobal,529Phil.695,710711;
579
498 SCRA 37, 51 (2006),Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of
Appeals, 360 Phil. 536, 548549; 300 SCRA 345, 357 (1998)
andTrinidadv.CourtofAppeals,352Phil.12,3233;289SCRA
188,206207(1998);Uyguangcov.CourtofAppeals,258APhil.
467,472473;178SCRA684,689690(1989).
580
580 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Salasvs.Matusalem
dence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of
ChristianPaulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the
circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo, petitioners
financialsupportwhilerespondentlivedinMurillosapartment
andhisregularvisitstoheratthesaidapartment,thoughreplete
with details, do not approximate the overwhelming evidence,
documentaryandtestimonialpresentedinIlano.Inthatcase,we
sustainedtheappellatecourtsrulinganchoredonthefollowing
factualfindingsbytheappellatecourtwhichwasquotedatlength
intheponencia:
ItwasArtemiowhomadearrangementforthedelivery
ofMerceditas(sic)attheManilaSanitariumandHospital.
Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal
examinationaccompaniedbyArtemio(TSN,p.33,5/17/74).
Afterdelivery,theywenthometotheirresidenceatEDSA
inacarownedanddrivenbyArtemiohimself(id.,atp.36).
Merceditas(sic)borethesurnameofIlanosincebirth
withoutanyobjectiononthepartofArtemio,thefactthat
sinceMerceditas(sic)hadherdiscernmentshehadalways
knownandcalledArtemioasherDaddy(TSN,pp.2829,
10/18/74);thefactthateachtimeArtemiowasathome,he
would play with Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or
restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping with
Merceditas(sic)(id.,atp.34)anddoesallwhatafather
shoulddoforhischildbringinghomegoodies,candies,
toysandwhateverhecanbringherwhichachildenjoys
which Artemio gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 3839,
5/17/74)arepositiveevidencethatMerceditas(sic)isthe
childofArtemioandrecognizedbyArtemioassuch.Special
attentioniscalledtoExh.E7whereArtemiowastelling
Leoncia the need for a frog test to know the status of
Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for
LeonciaandMerceditas(sic)wassometimesintheformof
cashpersonallydeliveredtoherbyArtemio,thruMelencio,
thruElynia(Exhs.E2andE3,andD6),
581
VOL.705,SEPTEMBER11,2013 581
Salasvs.Matusalem
orthruMerceditas(sic)herself(TSN,p.40,5/17/74)and
sometimesintheformofacheckastheManilaBanking
CorporationCheckNo.81532(Exh.G)andthesignature
appearingthereinwhichwasidentifiedbyLeonciaasthat
of Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and
ArtemiowouldwritethecheckathomeandsawArtemio
sign the check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and
Nildaadmittedthatthecheckandsignaturewerethoseof
Artemio(TSN,p.53,10/17/77;TSN,p.19,10/9/78).
DuringthetimethatArtemioandLeonciawereliving
as husband andwife, Artemio has shown concern as the
father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in
Grade1attheSt.JosephParochialSchool,Artemiosigned
the Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. H) for the
fourthandfifthgradingperiod(s)(Exh.H1andH2)as
theparentofMerceditas(sic).ThosesignaturesofArtemio
 [were] both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic)
because Artemio signed Exh. H1 and H2 at their petitionerscounselinformingthisCourtthatpetitionerhaddied
residenceinthepresenceofLeoncia,Merceditas(sic)andof
Elynia(TSN,p.57,7/18/73;TSN,p.28,10/1/73).xxx.
xxxxxxxxx
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial
Board of Cavite[,] Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with
the following dedication: To Nene, with best regards,
Temiong.(Exh.I).(pp.1920,AppellantsBrief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not
sufficienttooffsetthetotalityoftheevidenceindubitably
showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The
entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and
Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not
mean that Leoncia is not appellees daughter. This
particularentrywascausedtobemadebyArtemiohimself
inordertoavoidembarrassment.39
_______________
39Supranote37,atpp.255256.
582
582 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Salasvs.Matusalem
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and
Murillo,bythemselvesarenotcompetentproofofpaternityand
thetotalityofrespondentsevidencefailedtoestablishChristian
Paulosfiliationtopetitioner.
Timeandagain,thisCourthasruledthatahighstandardof
proofisrequiredtoestablishpaternityandfiliation.Anorderfor
recognitionandsupportmaycreateanunwholesomesituationor
maybeanirritanttothefamilyorthelivesofthepartiessothat
itmustbeissuedonlyifpaternityorfiliationisestablishedby
clearandconvincingevidence.40
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion 41filed by
onMay6,2010.
The action for support having been filed in the trial court
whenpetitionerwasstillalive,itisnotbarredunderArticle175
(2)42oftheFamilyCode.Wehavealsoheldthatthedeathofthe
putativefatherisnotabartotheactioncommencedduringhis
lifetimebyoneclaimingtobehisillegitimatechild. 43Theruleon
substitutionofpartiesprovidedinSection16,Rule3ofthe1997
RulesofCivilProcedure,thusapplies.
SEC.16.Deathofparty;dutyofcounsel.Whenevera
partytoapendingactiondies,andtheclaimisnot
_______________
40Cabataniav.CourtofAppeals,supranote25,atp.50;pp.
102103, citingBaluyut v. Baluyut, G.R. No. 33659, June 14,
1990, 186SCRA 506, 513 andConstantino v. Mendez,G.R.No.
57227,May14,1992,209SCRA18,2324.
41Rollo,pp.212213.
42ART.175.xxx
The action must be brought within the same period
specifiedinArticle173,exceptwhentheactionisbasedon
the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
43Mendozav.CourtofAppeals,278Phil.687,694;201SCRA
675, 682 (1991), citingMasecampo v. Masecampo, 11 Phil. 1, 3
(1908).
583
VOL.705,SEPTEMBER11,2013 583
Salasvs.Matusalem
therebyextinguished,itshallbethedutyofhiscounselto
informthecourtwithinthirty(30)daysaftersuchdeathof
 thefactthereof,andtogivethenameandaddressofhis 584
legalrepresentativeorrepresentatives.Failureofcounsel 584 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
tocomplywithhisdutyshallbeagroundfordisciplinary Salasvs.Matusalem
action. Notes.To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
properaction,firstestablishthefiliationofthechild,ifthesame
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
is not admitted or acknowledged; Illegitimate children are
appointmentofanexecutororadministratorandthecourt
entitledtosupportandsuccessionalrightsbuttheirfiliationmust
mayappointaguardianadlitemfortheminorheirs.
bedulyproved.(Dolinavs.Vallecera,638SCRA707[2010])
Thecourtshallforthwithordersaidlegalrepresentative
Timeandagain,thisCourthasruledthatahighstandardof
or representativesto appearandbesubstitutedwithina
proofisrequiredtoestablishpaternityandfiliation.Anorderfor
periodofthirty(30)daysfromnotice.
support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an
Ifnolegalrepresentativeisnamedbythecounselfor
irritanttothefamilyorthelivesofthepartiessothatitmustbe
the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to
issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
appearwithinthespecifiedperiod,thecourtmayorderthe
convincingevidence.(Perlavs.Baring,685SCRA101[2012])
opposing party, within a specified time to procure the
appointmentofanexecutororadministratorfortheestate o0o
ofthedeceasedandthelattershallimmediatelyappearfor
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
reserved.
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing
party,mayberecoveredascosts.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review
oncertiorariisGRANTED.TheDecisiondatedJuly18,2006and
ResolutiondatedOctober19,2007oftheCourtofAppealsinCA
G.R. CV No. 64379 are herebyREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.
Civil Case No. 2124AF of the Regional Trial Court of
CabanatuanCity,Branch26isDISMISSED.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), LeonardoDe Castro,
BersaminandReyes,JJ.,concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set
aside.

G.R.No.209588.February18,2015.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,vs.ERIC
ROSAUROyBONGCAWIL,accusedappellant.
RemedialLaw;CriminalProcedure;Appeals;Wherethereis
noshowingthatthetrialcourtoverlookedormisinterpretedsome
materialfactsorthatitgravelyabuseditsdiscretion,theSupreme
Court(SC)willnotdisturbthetrialcourtsassessmentofthefacts
andthecredibilityofthewitnessessincetheRegionalTrialCourt
(RTC)wasinabetterpositiontoassessandweightheevidence
presentedduringtrial.Itisapropostoreiterateherethatwhere
there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or
misinterpretedsomematerialfactsorthatitgravelyabusedits
discretion,theCourtwillnotdisturbthetrialcourtsassessment
ofthefactsandthecredibilityofthewitnessessincetheRTCwas
inabetterpositiontoassessandweightheevidencepresented
duringtrial.Settledtooistherulethatthefactualfindingsofthe
appellatecourtsustainingthoseofthetrialcourtarebindingon
thisCourt,unlessthereisaclearshowingthatsuchfindingsare
taintedwitharbitrariness,capriciousnessorpalpableerror.
_______________
*FIRSTDIVISION.
205
VOL.751,FEBRUARY18,2015 205
Peoplevs.Rosauro
CriminalLaw;DangerousDrugsAct;BuyBustOperations;
DecoySolicitation;Itisnodefensetotheperpetratorofacrime
thatfacilitiesforitscommissionwerepurposelyplacedinhisway,
or that the criminal act was done at the decoy solicitation of
personsseekingtoexposethecriminal,orthatdetectivesfeigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its
commission.The RTC and the CA both found the arrest of
accusedappellant to be the result of a legitimate entrapment
procedure, and we find nothing inthe records as to warrant a
contrary finding. InPeople v. Bartolome,690 SCRA 159 (2013),
we had the occasion to discuss the legitimacy of a decoy
solicitation,towit:Itisnodefensetotheperpetratorofacrime
that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his
way,orthatthecriminalactwasdoneatthedecoysolicitation
of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives
feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently
assistingitscommission.Especiallyisthistrueinthatclassof
cases where the office is one habitually committed, and the
solicitationmerelyfurnishesevidenceofacourseofconduct.As
here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant
utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of a course of
conduct.Thepolicereceivedanintelligencereportthatappellant
hasbeenhabituallydealinginillegaldrugs.Theydulyactedonit
by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with
appellant.Therewasnoshowingthattheinformantinducedthe
appellanttosellillegaldrugstohim.
Same; Same; Informants; As a rule, the informant is not
presented in court for security reasons, in view of the need to
protecttheinformantfromtheretaliationoftheculpritarrested
throughhisefforts.Similarly,thepresentationofaninformant
as witnessisnotregarded asindispensable to thesuccessofa
prosecutionofadrugdealingaccused.Asarule,theinformantis
notpresentedincourtforsecurityreasons,inviewoftheneedto
protecttheinformantfromtheretaliationoftheculpritarrested
throughhisefforts.Thereby,theconfidentialityoftheinformants
identityisprotectedindeferencetohisinvaluableservicestolaw
enforcement. Only when the testimony of the informant is
consideredabsolutelyessentialinobtainingtheconvictionofthe
culpritshouldtheneedtoprotecthissecuritybedisregarded.In
thepresentcase,asthebuybustoperationwasdulywitnessedby
the Provincial AntiIllegal DrugsSpecial Operation Task Unit
(PAIDSOTU)elementsledbySPO4
206
206 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Rosauro
LorenzoLarot(SPO4Larot)andPO3JuanchoDizon,their
testimonies can take the place of that of the confidential
informant.
Same;Same;BuyBustOperations;Thedeliveryoftheillicit
drugtotheposeurbuyerandthereceiptofthemarkedmoneyby
thesellersuccessfullyconsummatethebuybusttransaction.Ina
catenaofcases,thisCourtlaiddowntheessentialelementstobe
dulyestablishedforasuccessfulprosecutionofoffensesinvolving
the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, likeshabu,
underSection5,ArticleIIofR.A.No.9165,towit:(1)theidentity
of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the
consideration;and(2)thedeliveryofthethingsoldandpayment
therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur
buyer and the receipt of the marked money by the seller
successfully consummate the buybust transaction. What is
material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction or sale
transpired,coupledwiththepresentationincourtofthecorpus
delicti.
Same; Same; Same; Chain of Custody; The identity of the
prohibiteddrugmustbeprovedwithmoralcertainty.Itmustalso
beestablishedwiththesamedegreeofcertitudethatthesubstance
boughtorseizedduringthebuybustoperationisthesameitem
offered in court as exhibit.Indeed, as we held inPeople v.
Torres,697 SCRA 452 (2013), equally important in every
prosecutionforillegalsaleofdangerousorprohibiteddrugsisthe
presentationofevidenceoftheseizeddrugasthecorpusdelicti.
Theidentityoftheprohibiteddrugmustbeprovedwithmoral
certainty. It must also be established with the same degree of
certitudethatthesubstanceboughtorseizedduringthebuybust
operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit. In this
regard,paragraph1,Section21,ArticleIIofR.A.No.9165(the
chainofcustodyrule)providesforsafeguardsfortheprotectionof
theidentityandintegrityofdangerousdrugsseized.
Same;Same;ChainofCustody;Theprosecutionsfailureto
submitinevidencethephysicalinventoryandphotographofthe
seizeddrugsasrequiredunderArticle21ofRepublicAct(RA)No.
9165, will not render the accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized from him inadmissible.This Court has, in many cases,
heldthatwhilethechainofcustodyshouldideallybeperfect,in
reality it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken
chain. The most important factor is the preservation of the
integrityandtheeviden
207
VOL.751,FEBRUARY18,2015
Peoplevs.Rosauro
tiary value of the seized items as they will be used to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, the
prosecutionsfailuretosubmitinevidencethephysicalinventory
andphotographoftheseizeddrugsasrequiredunderArticle21
ofR.A.No.9165,willnotrendertheaccusedsarrestillegalorthe
itemsseizedfromhiminadmissible.Thechainofcustodyisnot
established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical
inventoryandphotographingoftheseizeddrugsinthepresence
of the enumerated persons. The Implementing Rules and
RegulationsofR.A.No.9165onthehandlinganddispositionof
seized dangerous drugs states: xxxProvided, further, that
noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
andcustodyoversaiditems.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforaccusedappellant.
PEREZ,J.:
For the consideration of the Court is an appeal of the
Decision1dated 19 June 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.G.R. CRH.C. No. 00552MIN, which affirmed the
Judgment2dated24November2006oftheRegionalTrialCourt
(RTC), Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No.
2004856, finding accusedappellant Eric RosauroyBongcawil
(accusedappellant)guiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofillegalsale
207 ofshabuunderSec.5,ArticleIIofRepublicActNo.9165(R.A.
No.9165)ortheComprehensiveDangerousDrugsActof
_______________
1Rollo, pp. 317; penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean
PaulB.Inting,withAssociateJusticesEdgardoA.Camelloand
JhosepY.Lopez,concurring.
2CARollo,pp.7275;pennedbyJudgeNoliT.Catli.
208
208 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Rosauro
2002, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonmentandorderinghimtopayafineofP500,000.00.
InanAmendedInformationdated21February2005, 3accused
appellantwaschargedwithviolationofSec.5,Art.IIofR.A.No.
9165,towit:
Thatonthe3rddayofJuly,2004atabout5:30oclockinthe
afternoon, more or less, atPurok3,BarangayPoblacion,
Municipality of Villanueva, Province of Misamis Oriental,
Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
HonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,notbeingauthorized
by law to possess and to sell any dangerous drugs, knowingly,
willfullyandfeloniously,didthenandthere,sellandconveytoa
thirdperson,whoactedasadecoyinabuybustoperation,one(1)
sachetofshabu,containing0.04grams(sic)ofshabu,whichwhen
examined gave POSITIVE result to test for the presence of
MethamphetamineHydrochloride(Shabu),adangerousdrug.4
Uponrearraignment,accusedappellantpleadednotguiltyto
the crime charged.5Thereafter, pretrial and trial on the merits
ensued.
_______________
3Records,p.1;TheOriginalInformationdated21September
2004reads:
Thatonthe3rddayofJuly,2004atabout5:30oclockinthe
afternoon, more or less, atPurok3,BarangayPoblacion,
Municipality of Villanueva, Province of Misamis Oriental,
Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
HonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,notbeingauthorized
by law to possess and to sell any dangerous drugs, knowingly,
willfullyandfeloniouslydidthenandtheresellandconveytoa
thirdpersonone(1)sachetofShabu,containing0.08grams(sic)
ofshabu,whichwhenexaminedgavePOSITIVEresulttothetest
forthepresenceofMethamphetamineHydrochloride(Shabu),a
dangerousdrug.
4Rollo,p.6;CADecision.
5CARollo,p.72;RTCJudgment.
209
VOL.751,FEBRUARY18,2015
Peoplevs.Rosauro
Basedontherecords,theprosecutionsversionofthefactsis
asfollows:
OnOctober13,2002,onthebasisofunconfirmedreportsthat
accusedappellantEricRosauro(Rosauroforbrevity)wasselling
anddistributingdrugs,theProvincialDrugEnforcementUnitof
Misamis Oriental conducted a testbuy operation in the
MunicipalityofVillanueva,MisamisOrientalusingaconfidential
agent. The confidential agent boughtshabufrom Rosauro
atPurok2,BarangayKatipunan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental.
ThesubstanceboughtfromRosaurowasexaminedbythePNP
crime laboratory and yielded a positive result for
MethamphetamineHydrochloride(commonlyknownasshabu).
On July 3, 2004, the policeauthorities received information
that again drugs were being distributed
atPurok3,BarangayPoblacion, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental.
Thus,at5:30oclockintheafternoon,theProvincialAntiIllegal
DrugsSpecial Operation Task Unit (PAIDSOTU) elements led
by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot and PO3 Juancho Dizon positioned
themselvesinthehouseoftheirconfidentialagent.
There,thePAIDSOTUelementssawRosauronegotiatewith
the confidential agent. In exchange for the one (1) sachet
ofshabugiven by Rosauro to the confidential agent, the latter
gavehimamarked100pesobillwithserialnumberYZ712579.
After the transaction, Larot and Dizon came out of their
hiding place and arrested Rosauro. Thereafter, the confidential
agenthandedthesachettoLarot,whotapedit,markeditwith
themarkingExhibitA,andplaceditinsidehispocket.Healso
tookpicturesofRosauroandthedrugs.Inthepolicestation,he
preparedaCertificateofInventoryandaRequestforLaboratory
Examination.BoththedrugsandRosaurowerethenturnedover
209 totheCrimelaboratory.
On the basis of the request made by Larot, Police Chief
InspectorMa.LeocyMagabo,theForensicChemi
210
210 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Rosauro
 calOfficerofPNPCrimeLaboratoryconductedalaboratory
examinationonthecontentsofthesachet,onaccusedappellant,
and the marked money. The examination of the seized item
yielded positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu); while the accusedappellant and the marked money
testedpositiveforthepresenceofultravioletfluorescentpowder. 6
Forhispart,accusedappellantclaimsthathewasmerelya
victimofinstigation:
AccusedappellantRosauro,ontheotherhand,tellsadifferent
tale.HetestifiedthatonJuly3,2004,thepoliceassetwenttohis
housefour(4)timesandconvincedhimtodoanerrandforhim.
Rosaurorefusedtobuyshabuashedidnotknowwheretobuy
one.Itwastheconfidentialinformantwhotoldhimtobuythe
prohibited drug from a certain Kael and to deliver it to the
formershouse.Itwasalsotheinformantwhogavethemoneyto
Rosaurotobuytheshabu.ButRosaurowasnotabletomeetor
buydirectlyfromKaelbecauseitwasayoungmanwhogotand
handedtohimtheshabuontheroad.WhenRosaurowenttothe
houseoftheconfidentialinformantasinstructed,hewasarrested
by SPO4 Larot and Dizon. The sachet ofshabuwas not even
recoveredfromhimbutfromtheconfidentialinformant.7
Findingtheevidenceoftheprosecutionsufficienttoestablish
theguiltofaccusedappellant,theRTCrenderedajudgmentof
conviction,viz.:
INTHELIGHTOFTHEFOREGOING,thisCourthereby
renders Judgment finding accused ERIC
ROSAUROyBONGCAWIL, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
thecrimechargedintheinformationforsellinganddeliveringa
sachet ofshabuto the poseurbuyer a Violation of Section 5,
ArticleIIofR.A.9165andimposes
_______________
6Rollo,p.35;CADecision.
7Id.,atp.5.
211
VOL.751,FEBRUARY18,2015 211
Peoplevs.Rosauro
a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand(Php500,000.00)Pesosandtopaythecost.
The accused ERIC B. ROSAURO who has undergone
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time
duringwhichhehasundergonepreventiveimprisonmentifthe
detentionprisoneragreesvoluntarilyinwritingtoabidebythe
samedisciplinaryruleimposeduponconvictedprisoners,except
thosedisqualifiedbylaw.
Thesachetofshabu,Exh.Aisconfiscatedandforfeitedin
favorofthegovernmenttobedestroyedinaccordancewithlaw. 8
Accusedappellant appealed before the CA, assigning a lone
error:
I
THE COURTA QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT
PROVENBEYONDREASONABLEDOUBT.9
After a review of the records, the CA affirmed the RTC
Judgment.Theappellatecourtruledthatwhattranspiredinthe
caseatbarwasanentrapmentandnotaninstigation; 10thatall
theelementsofillegalsaleofregulatedorprohibiteddrugswere
dulyproven;11thatthenonpresentationoftheconfidentialagent
incourtisnotfatal;12thattheinconsistenciesinthetestimonyof
thelonewitnessoftheprosecutiondonotaffecttheresultofthe
case;13andthattheapprehending
_______________
8CARollo,pp.7475;RTCJudgment.
9Id.,atp.49;BrieffortheAccusedAppellant.
10Rollo,p.8;CADecision.
11Id.,atpp.1112.
12Id.,atp.12.
13Id.,atp.13.
212
212 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Rosauro
teamwasabletopreservetheintegrityofthesubjectdrugand
thattheprosecutionwasabletopresenttherequiredunbroken
chaininthecustodyofthesubjectdrug.14Thus,theCAheld:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment dated November 24, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City in
CriminalCaseNo.2004856isherebyAFFIRMED.15
AccusedappellantisnowbeforetheCourtseekingareviewof
hisconviction.
Afterathoroughreviewoftherecords,however,wedismiss
theappeal.
Itisapropostoreiterateherethatwherethereisnoshowing
thatthetrialcourtoverlookedormisinterpretedsomematerial
factsorthatitgravelyabuseditsdiscretion,theCourtwillnot
disturbthetrialcourtsassessmentofthefactsandthecredibility
ofthewitnessessincetheRTCwasinabetterpositiontoassess
andweightheevidencepresentedduringtrial.Settledtooisthe
rule that the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining
thoseofthetrialcourtarebindingonthisCourt,unlessthereisa
clearshowingthatsuchfindingsaretaintedwitharbitrariness,
capriciousnessorpalpableerror.16
The RTC and the CA both found the arrest of accused
appellanttobetheresultofalegitimateentrapmentprocedure,
and we find nothing in the records as to warrant a contrary
finding.InPeoplev.Bartolome,17wehadtheoccasiontodiscuss
thelegitimacyofadecoysolicitation,towit:
_______________
14Id.,atp.15.
15Id.,atp.17.
16Peoplev.Vasquez,G.R.No.200304,15January2014,714
SCRA78,101.
17G.R. No. 191726, 6 February 2013, 690 SCRA 159, 172,
citingPeoplev.Sta.Maria,545Phil.520,528529;516SCRA621,
628(2007).
213
VOL.751,FEBRUARY18,2015 213
Peoplevs.Rosauro
Itisnodefensetotheperpetratorofacrimethatfacilitiesfor
its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the
criminal act was done at the decoy solicitation of persons
seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the actwere present and apparently assisting its
commission.Especiallyisthistrueinthatclassofcaseswhere
theofficeisonehabituallycommitted,andthesolicitationmerely
furnishesevidenceofacourseofconduct.
As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the
informant utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of a
courseofconduct.Thepolicereceivedanintelligencereportthat
appellanthasbeenhabituallydealinginillegaldrugs.Theyduly
actedonitbyutilizinganinformanttoeffectadrugtransaction
withappellant.Therewasnoshowingthattheinformantinduced
theappellanttosellillegaldrugstohim.
Similarly,thepresentationofaninformantaswitnessisnot
regarded as indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a
drugdealingaccused.Asarule,theinformantisnotpresentedin
court for security reasons, in view of the need to protect the
informantfromtheretaliationoftheculpritarrestedthroughhis
efforts.Thereby,theconfidentialityoftheinformantsidentityis
protected in deference to his invaluable services to law
enforcement. Only when the testimony of the informant is
consideredabsolutelyessentialinobtainingtheconvictionofthe
culpritshouldtheneedtoprotecthissecuritybedisregarded. 18In
thepresentcase,asthebuybustoperationwasdulywitnessedby
the Provincial AntiIllegal DrugsSpecial Operation Task Unit
(PAIDSOTU)elementsledbySPO4LorenzoLarot(SPO4Larot)
andPO3JuanchoDizon,theirtestimoniescantaketheplaceof
thatoftheconfidentialinformant.
As to whether accusedappellants guilt was established
beyondreasonabledoubt,weruleintheaffirmative.
_______________
18Id.,atp.175.
214
214 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Rosauro
In a catena of cases, this Court laid down the essential
elements to be duly established for a successful prosecution of
offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited
drugs,likeshabu,underSection5,ArticleIIofR.A.No.9165,to
wit:(1)theidentityofthebuyerandtheseller,theobjectofthe
sale,andtheconsideration;and(2)thedeliveryofthethingsold
andpaymenttherefor.Briefly,thedeliveryoftheillicitdrugto
the poseurbuyer and the receipt of the marked money by the
sellersuccessfullyconsummatethebuybusttransaction.Whatis
material, therefore, is the proof that the transaction or sale
transpired,coupledwiththepresentationincourtofthecorpus
delicti.19
Verily, all the elements for a conviction of illegal sale of
dangerous or prohibited drugs were proven by the prosecution:
the identity of accusedappellant as the seller, and that of the
confidentialinformantasposeurbuyerwereestablished,aswell
astheexchangeofthesachetofshabuandthemarkedmoney.It
wasalsoascertainedthattheseizeditemwaspositiveforshabu,
adangerousdrug,andthatthesameitemwasproperlyidentified
in open court by SPO4 Larot. Moreover, the P100.00bill with
serialnumberYZ712579,orthesubjectmarkedmoney,aswellas
thelivingbodyoftheaccusedappellantrevealedapositiveresult
forultravioletfluorescentpowder.
Accusedappellantaversthattheprosecutionwasnotableto
prove thecorpus delicti, and that the statutory safeguards
providedforinSec.21ofR.A.No.9165werenotfollowed.
Indeed,asweheldinPeoplev.Torres,20equallyimportantin
everyprosecutionforillegalsaleofdangerousorprohibiteddrugs
isthepresentationofevidenceoftheseizeddrugasthecorpus
delicti.Theidentityoftheprohibiteddrugmustbeprovedwith
moralcertainty.Itmustalsobeestablishedwith
_______________
19Peoplev.Torres,G.R.No.191730,5June2013,697SCRA
452,462463.
 20Id.,atp.464.
215
VOL.751,FEBRUARY18,2015
Peoplevs.Rosauro
the same degree of certitude that the substance bought or
seizedduringthebuybustoperationisthesameitemofferedin
courtasexhibit.Inthisregard,paragraph1,Section21,ArticleII
of R.A. No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule) provides for
safeguards for the protection of the identity and integrity of
dangerousdrugsseized,towit:
SEC.21.Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, PlantSources of
Dangerous
Drugs,ControlledPrecursorsandEssentialChemicals,Instrumen
ts/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.The PDEA
shalltakechargeandhavecustodyofalldangerousdrugs,plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlledprecursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratoryequipmentso confiscated, seized and/orsurrendered,
forproperdispositioninthefollowingmanner:
(1)Theapprehendingteamhavinginitialcustodyandcontrol
of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physicallyinventoryandphotographthesameinthepresenceof
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscatedand/orseized,orhis/herrepresentativeorcounsel,a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
signthecopiesoftheinventoryandbegivenacopythereof.
However,thisCourthas,inmanycases,heldthatwhilethe
chainofcustodyshouldideallybeperfect,inrealityitisalmost
always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The most
important factor is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to
215 determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, the
prosecutionsfailuretosubmitinevidencethephysicalinventory
andphotographoftheseizeddrugsasrequiredunder
216
216 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Rosauro
Article 21 of R.A. No. 9165, will not render the accuseds
arrestillegalortheitemsseizedfromhiminadmissible.21
Thechainofcustodyisnotestablishedsolelybycompliance
withtheprescribedphysicalinventoryandphotographingofthe
seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons. The
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 on the
handlinganddispositionofseizeddangerousdrugsstates:
xxxProvided, further, that noncompliance with these
requirementsunderjustifiablegrounds,aslongastheintegrity
andevidentiaryvalueoftheseizeditemsareproperlypreserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. 22(Italics,
emphasis,underscoringomitted)
In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the
confidentialinformantgavetheseizeditemtoSPO4Larotwho
placed tape on the sachet and marked it Exhibit A. Upon
reachingthepolicestation,SPO4LarotexecutedtheCertificate
ofInventory,aswellastherequestforlaboratoryexamination.
The request, the specimen, as well as the marked money and
accusedappellant were then brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratoryforexamination.TheywerereceivedbySPO2Ricardo
Maisog,theReceivingClerkofthePNPCrimeLaboratoryOffice,
whothenforwardedthemtoPoliceInspectorMa.LeocyJabonillo
Magabo, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Informantsareusuallynotpresentedincourtbecauseofthe
Laboratory.23Moreover, the seized item was duly identified by needtohidetheiridentityandpreservetheirinvaluableservice
SPO4Larotinopencourtasthesameitemseizedfromaccused tothepolice.(Id.)
appellant. o0o
Accusedappellantsguilthavingbeenestablished,welikewise _______________
affirmthepenaltyimposedbytheRTCandtheCA.
_______________ 24Supranote19atp.469.
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
21Peoplev.Loks,G.R.No.203433,27November2013,711 reserved.
SCRA187,196197.
22Supranote19atpp.465466.
23Rollo,p.15;CADecision.
217
VOL.751,FEBRUARY18,2015 217
Peoplevs.Rosauro
Underthelaw,theoffenseofillegalsaleofshabucarrieswith
itthepenaltyoflifeimprisonmenttodeathandafineranging
fromFiveHundredThousandPesos(P500,000.00)toTenMillion
Pesos(P10,000,000.00),regardlessofthequantityandpurityof
thesubstance.24Thus,theRTCandCAwerewithinboundswhen
theyimposedthepenaltyoflifeimprisonmentandafineofFive
HundredThousandPesos(P500,000.00).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal
isDISMISSED.
SOORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), LeonardoDe Castro,
BersaminandPerlasBernabe,JJ.,concur.
Appealdismissed.
Notes.Thepresentationofaninformantisnotarequisite
for the prosecution of drug cases. (Quinicot vs. People, 590
SCRA458[2009])

G.R.No.203984.June18,2014.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff
appellee,vs.MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, accused
appellant.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrantless
Searches and Seizures; The purpose of allowing a warrantless
search and seizureincident to a lawful arrest is to protect the
arrestingofficerfrombeingharmedbythepersonarrested,who
mightbearmedwithaconcealedweapon,andtopreventthelatter
fromdestroyingevidencewithinreach.Thepurposeofallowing
awarrantlesssearchandseizureincidenttoalawfularrestisto
protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person
arrested,whomightbearmedwithaconcealedweapon,andto
preventthelatterfromdestroyingevidencewithinreach.Itis
therefore a reasonable exercise of the States police power to
protect(1)lawenforcersfromtheinjurythatmaybeinflictedon
thembyapersontheyhavelawfullyarrested;and(2)evidence
frombeingdestroyedbythearrestee.Itseekstoensurethesafety
ofthearrestingofficersandtheintegrityoftheevidenceunder
thecontrolandwithinthereachofthearrestee.
Same; Same; Same; Plainview Doctrine; The Plain View
Doctrineisactuallytheexceptiontotheinadmissibilityofevidence
obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest
outside the suspects person and premises under his immediate
control.ThePlainViewDoctrineisactuallytheexceptiontothe
inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspects person and
premises under his immediate control. This is so because
[o]bjectsintheplainviewofanofficerwhohastherighttobein
thepositiontohavethatviewaresubjecttoseizureandmaybe
presentedasevidence.Thedoctrineisusuallyappliedwherea
policeofficer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object xxx. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification
whetherit be a warrant for anotherobject, hotpursuit,search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for
beingpresentunconnectedwithasearchdirectedagainsttheac
_______________
*FIRSTDIVISION.
21cusedandpermitsthewarrantlessseizure.ThePlain
ViewDoctrinethusfindsnoapplicabilityinCalantiaossituation
because the police officers purposely searched him upon his
arrest.Thepoliceofficersdidnotinadvertentlycomeacrossthe
blackbag,whichwasinCalantiaospossession;theydeliberately
opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiaos lawful
arrest.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody
Rule; Marking; The failure to strictly comply with Section 21,
Article II ofRepublicAct(R.A.)No. 9165, suchas immediately
markingseizeddrugs,willnotautomaticallyimpairtheintegrity
ofchainofcustodybecausewhatisofutmostimportanceisthe
preservationoftheintegrityandtheevidentiaryvalueoftheseized
items,asthesewouldbeutilizedintheinthedeterminationofthe
guiltorinnocenceoftheaccused.ThisCourthasheldthatthe
failuretostrictlycomplywithSection21,ArticleIIofRepublic
ActNo.9165,suchasimmediatelymarkingseizeddrugs,willnot
automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody because
whatisofutmostimportanceisthepreservationoftheintegrity
andtheevidentiaryvalueoftheseizeditems,asthesewouldbe
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.Section21anditsIRRdonotevenmentionmarking.
Whattheyrequire are(1) physicalinventory,and(2)takingof
photographs.AsthisCourtheldinPeoplev.Ocfemia,706SCRA
312 (2013): What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its
implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of
markingoftheseizeditemsinwarrantlessseizurestoensure
thattheevidenceseizeduponapprehensionisthesameevidence
subjectedtoinventoryandphotographywhentheseactivitiesare
undertakenatthepolicestationratherthanattheplaceofarrest.
Consistency with the chain of custody rule requires that the
markingoftheseizeditemstotrulyensurethattheyarethe
same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones
offeredinevidenceshouldbedone(1)inthepresenceofthe
apprehendedviolator(2)immediatelyuponconfiscation.
Same;Same;Same;Unlessitcanbeshownthattherewas
badfaith,illwill,ortamperingoftheevidence,thepresumption
thattheintegrityoftheevidencehasbeenpreservedwillremain.
Unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or
tamperingoftheevidence,thepresumptionthattheintegrityof
the evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of
showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the
policeofficershandledtheseized
22drugswithregularity,andthattheyproperlydischarged
their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao failed to
dischargesuchburden.
Same; Same; Marking; Denial; FrameUp; The defenses of
denial and frameup have always been frowned upon by the
SupremeCourt(SC).Histheory,fromtheverybeginning,was
thathedidnotdoit,andthathewasbeingframedforhaving
offendedthepoliceofficers.Simplyput,hisdefensetacticwasone
of denial and frameup. However, those defenses have always
beenfrowneduponbytheCourt,towit:Thedefensesofdenial
and frameup have been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and
standarddefenseployinprosecutionsforviolationofDangerous
DrugsAct.Inordertoprosper,thedefensesofdenialandframe
upmustbeprovedwithstrongandconvincingevidence.Inthe
casesbeforeus,appellantfailedtopresentsufficientevidencein
supportofhisclaims.Asidefromhisselfservingassertions,no
plausibleproofwaspresentedtobolsterhisallegations.Hence,as
Calantiaofailedtoshowclearandconvincingevidencethatthe
apprehending officers were stirred by illicit motive or failed to
properlyperformtheirduties,theirtestimoniesdeservefullfaith
andcredit.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforaccusedappellant.
LEONARDODECASTRO,J.:
ThisisanappealfromtheJanuary17,2012Decision 1ofthe
Court of Appeals in C.A.G.R. CRH.C. No. 04069, affirmingin
tototheJuly23,2009Decision2oftheRegionalTrial
_______________
1Rollo, pp. 218; penned by Associate Justice Amelita G.
TolentinowithAssociateJusticesRamonR.GarciaandSamuel
H.Gaerlan,concurring.
2CARollo,pp.2229;pennedbyJudgeVictorianoB.Cabanos
anddocketedasCriminalCaseNo.69566.
23Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 127, finding accused
appellant Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta (Calantiao) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of
Republic ActNo. 9165or the ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs
Actof2002.
 OnNovember13,2003,CalantiaowaschargedbeforetheRTC
ofviolationofSection11,ArticleIIofRepublicActNo.9165inan (police officers) and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez
Information,3thepertinentportionofwhichreads:
Thatonoraboutthe11thdayofNovember,2003inCaloocan
City,MetroManila,Philippinesandwithinthejurisdictionofthis
Honorable Court, the above named accused, without any
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2)
bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops with a total weight of
997.9grams,knowingthesametobeadangerousdrug.
The facts, as synthesized by the RTC and adopted by the
CourtofAppeals,areasfollows:
EVIDENCEOFTHEPROSECUTION
OnNovember13,2003[,]ataround5:30xxxintheafternoon,
whilePO1NELSONMARIANOandPO3EDUARDORAMIREZ
wereonduty,acertainEDWINLOJERAarrivedattheiroffice
andaskedforpoliceassistanceregardingashootingincident.Per
reportofthelatter,itappearsthatwhiledrivingatowingtruck
andtraversingalongEDSA,Balintawak,QuezonCity,hehada
trafficdispute(gitgitan)withawhitetaxicabpromptinghimto
follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th Avenue Street
cornerC3Road,CaloocanCity.Thereat,thepassengersofsaid
taxicab,oneofthemwasaccusedCalantiao,alightedandfired
theirguns.Surprised,Lojeracouldnotdoanythingbutcontinued
his driving until he reached a police station nearby where he
reportedtheincident.
3Records,p.A.
24
The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON
MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ. PO1 Mariano
testified that they immediately responded to said complaint by
proceedingto5thAvenuecorner8thStreet,CaloocanCitywhere
they found the white taxi. While approaching said vehicle, two
armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them
chasedthembuttheyweresubdued.PO1Marianorecoveredfrom
Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried
marijuanafruitingtopsandamagazineofsuper38stainlesswith
ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiaos
companion[a].38revolver.
Thesuspectsandtheconfiscateditemswerethenturnedover
to SPO3 PABLO TEMENA, police investigator atBagong
BarrioPolice Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano
markedthebricksofmarijuanacontainedinablackbagwithhis
initials,NM.Thereafter,saidspecimenwereforwardedtothe
PNPCrime Laboratoryforchemical analysis. The resultofthe
examination conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA
revealedthatthesamewaspositiveformarijuana,adangerous
drug.
TheforegoingtestimonyofPO1MARIANOwascorroborated
by PO3 RAMIREZ who testified that he personally saw those
bricksofmarijuanaconfiscatedfromtheaccused.Heconfirmed
that he was with PO1 Mariano when they apprehended said
accusedandhiscompanionandtestifiedthatwhilePO1Mariano
recoveredfromtheaccusedablackbagcontainingmarijuana,on
hispart,heconfiscatedfromaccusedscompaniona.38revolver.
MR.CRISENDOAMANSEC,thedriverofthetaxiwherethe
suspectsboardedwasalsopresentedinopencourtandtestifiedas
towhatheknowsabouttheincident.Heconfirmedthatonthat
date,two(2)personsboardedonhistaxianduponreachingC3
Road,theyalightedandfiredthree(3)shotsandranaway.
25
Aside from the oral testimonies of the witnesses, the
prosecution also offered the following documentary evidence to
boosttheirchargeagainsttheaccused:
 Exh. A Request for Laboratory Examination dated
November12,2003
Exh.BPhysicalSciencesReportNo.D142303dated
November12,2003
Exh. C1 Picture of First brick of marijuana fruiting
tops
Exh.C2PictureofSecondbrickofmarijuanafruiting
tops
Exh.DReferralSlipdatedNovember12,2003
Exh. E Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
November 12, 2003 of PO3 Eduardo Ramirez and PO1
NelsonMariano
Exh.E1Theirrespectivesignatures
Exh. F Sinumpaang Salaysay of Crisendo Amansec
(ErroneouslymarkedasExh.E)
EVIDENCEOFTHEDEFENSE
Theaccusedofferedadifferentversionofthestory.According
to his testimony, this instant case originated from a traffic
mishapwherethetaxiheandhiscompanionRommelReyeswere
ridingalmost collidedwith anothercar. Reyesthenopened the
windowandmadeafuckyousignagainstthepersonsonboard
of that car. That prompted the latter to chase them and when
theywerecaughtinatrafficjam,PO1NelsonMariano,oneofthe
personsonboardofthatothercaralightedandkickedtheirtaxi.
CalantiaoandReyesalightedandPO1Marianoslappedthelatter
anduttered,Putanginamobakitmoakopinakyuhindimoba
akokilala?Saidpoliceofficerpokedhisgunagain[st]Reyesand
when Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao and
Reyes were then handcuffed and were brought to the police
station.Thereat,theyweresubjectedtobodyfrisking
26andtheirwalletsandmoneyweretaken.PO1Marianothen
preparedsomedocumentsandinformedthemthattheywillbe
chargedfordrugs.Anewspapercontainingmarijuanawasshown
to them and said police officer told them that it would be
sufficient evidence against them. They were detained and
subjectedtomedicalexaminationbeforetheyweresubmittedfor
inquestattheprosecutorsoffice.4
RulingoftheRTC
On July 23, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision giving
credencetotheprosecutionscase.Thedispositiveportionofthe
Decisionreads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring accused MEDARIO CALANTIAO y
DIMALANTA,GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBTof
the offense of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165, for
illegally possessing 997.9 grams of marijuana fruiting tops.
Henceforth,thisCourtherebysentenceshimtosufferthepenalty
oflifeimprisonmentandafineofFiveHundredThousandPesos
(Php500,000.00).5
In convicting Calantiao, the RTC held that the illegal drug
seizedwasadmissibleinevidenceasitwasdiscoveredduringa
body search after Calantiao was caughtin flagrante delictoof
possessingagunandfiringatthepoliceofficers.Moreover,the
RTC found all the elements of the offense to have been duly
establishedbytheprosecution.6
Aggrieved,Calantiaoappealed7hisconvictiontotheCourtof
Appeals,assigningthefollowingerrors:
_______________
4CARollo,pp.2324.
5Id.,atp.29.
 6Id.,atp.28.
7Records,p.326.
27
I proven,10theCourtofAppeals,onJanuary17,2012,promulgated
THE COURTA QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT
THATTHEALLEGEDLYSEIZEDITEMSAREINADMISSIBLE
INEVIDENCE.
II
THECOURTAQUOGRAVELYERREDINCONVICTINGTHE
ACCUSEDAPPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS PATENT NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED
DANGEROUSDRUGS.
III
THECOURTAQUOGRAVELYERREDINCONVICTINGTHE
ACCUSEDAPPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS
FAILURETOPROVETHEPROPERCHAINOFCUSTODYOF
THESEIZEDDANGEROUSDRUGS.8
RulingoftheCourtofAppeals
TheCourtofAppealsfoundnoreasontooverturnCalantiaos Marijuanavalid
conviction.Itfoundthattherewassufficientreasontojustifya
warrantless arrest, as the police officers were acting on a
legitimate complaint and had a reasonable suspicion that the
persons identified at the scene were the perpetrators of the
offense.Likewise,theCourtofAppealsheldthatthesearchand _______________
subsequentseizureofthemarijuanainquestionwaslawfuland
valid,beingincidentaltoalawfularrest.9
_______________
8CARollo,p.46.
9Rollo,pp.710.
28Finding that all the elements of the charge of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs to be present and duly
itsDecision,affirmingintototheRTCsruling.
Undaunted,CalantiaoisnowbeforethisCourtprayingforan
acquittal, adding the following arguments in support of his
position:
First,theplainviewdoctrineisnotanexceptiontoasearch
incidenttoavalidwarrantlessarrest.
xxxx
Second, Calantiao did not waive the inadmissibility of the
seizeditems.
xxxx
Finally,theseizeditemscustodialchainisbroken.11
In essence, Calantiao is questioning the admissibility of
themarijuanafound in his possession, as evidenceagainsthim
onthegroundsofeitheritwasdiscoveredviaanillegalsearch,or
becauseitscustodialchainwasbroken.
RulingofthisCourt
ThisCourtfindsnomeritinCalantiaosarguments.
Search and Seizure of
ThisCourtcannotsubscribetoCalantiaoscontentionthatthe
marijuana in his possession cannot be admitted as evidence
against him because it was illegally discovered and seized, not
havingbeenwithintheapprehendingofficersplainview.12
10Id.,atp.13.
11Id.,atpp.3739.
12CARollo,pp.5052.
 29Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are
governedbySection13,Rule126oftheRevisedRulesofCriminal
Procedure,towit:
Section13.Search incident to lawful arrest.A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commissionofanoffensewithoutasearchwarrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure
incidenttoalawfularrestistoprotectthearrestingofficerfrom
beingharmedbythepersonarrested,whomightbearmedwitha
concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying
evidencewithinreach.13Itisthereforeareasonableexerciseof
the States police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the
injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have
lawfullyarrested;and(2)evidencefrombeingdestroyedbythe
arrestee.Itseekstoensurethesafetyofthearrestingofficersand
the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the
reachofthearrestee.
InValerosov.CourtofAppeals,14thisCourthadtheoccasion
toreiteratethepermissiblereachofavalidwarrantlesssearch
andseizureincidenttoalawfularrest,viz.:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weaponthatthelattermightuseinordertoresistarrestoreffect
his escape. Otherwise, the officers safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
entirelyreasonableforthearrestingofficertosearchforandseize
any evidence on the arrestees person in order to prevent its
concealmentordestruction.
_______________
13Valerosov.CourtofAppeals,614Phil.236,252;598SCRA
41,58(2009).
14Id.,atp.251;pp.5556.
30
Moreover,inlawfularrests,itbecomesboththedutyandthe
rightoftheapprehendingofficerstoconductawarrantlesssearch
notonlyonthepersonofthesuspect,butalsointhepermissible
area within the latters reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest
allowstheseizureofevidenceordangerousweaponseitheronthe
person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate
control. The phrase within the area of his immediate control
meanstheareafromwithinwhichhemightgainpossessionofa
weaponordestructibleevidence.Agunonatableorinadrawer
in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the
arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested.(Citationsomitted)
InValeroso, however, the Court held that the evidence
searched and seized from him could not be used against him
becausetheywerediscoveredinaroom,differentfromwherehe
wasbeingdetained,andwasinalockedcabinet.Thus,thearea
searched could not be considered as one within his immediate
controlthat hecouldtakeany weaponor destroy any evidence
againsthim.15
Inthecaseatbar,themarijuanawasfoundinablackbagin
Calantiaospossessionandwithinhisimmediatecontrol.Hecould
have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to
destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing
themarijuanawas in Calantiaos possession, it was within the
permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly
conductawarrantlesssearch.
Calantiaos argument that themarijuanacannot be used as
evidenceagainsthimbecauseitsdiscoverywasinviolationofthe
PlainViewDoctrine,ismisplaced.
 The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the
inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search
incidenttoalawfularrestoutsidethesuspectspersonand
_______________
15Id.,atp.252;p.57.
31premises under his immediate control. This is so because
[o]bjectsintheplainviewofanofficerwhohastherighttobein
thepositiontohavethatviewaresubjecttoseizureandmaybe
presentedasevidence.16Thedoctrineisusuallyappliedwherea
policeofficer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object xxx. [It] serves to supplement the prior justification
whetherit be a warrant for anotherobject, hotpursuit,search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for
being present unconnected with a search directed against the
accusedandpermitsthewarrantlessseizure.17
The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in
Calantiaos situation because the police officers purposely
searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not
inadvertentlycomeacrosstheblackbag,whichwasinCalantiaos
possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search
incidenttoCalantiaoslawfularrest.
Inventory and Chain
CustodyofEvidence
Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were
validly effected, themarijuanais still inadmissible as evidence
against him for failure of the apprehending officers to comply
withtherulesonchainofcustody,astheitemwasmarkedatthe
policestation.18
_______________
16Peoplev.Leangsiri,322Phil.226,248;252SCRA213,230
(1996).
17Valerosov.CourtofAppeals,supranote13atp.253;p.58,
citingPeoplev.Cubcubin,Jr.,413Phil.249,271272;360SCRA
690,709(2001);Peoplev.Leangsiri,supraatpp.249250;p.231.
18CARollo,p.53.
32ThepertinentprovisionsofRepublicActNo.9165provide
asfollows:
Section21.CustodyandDispositionofConfiscated,Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment.ThePDEAshalltakechargeandhavecustodyofall
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated,seizedand/orsurrendered, forproperdispositionin
thefollowingmanner:
(1)The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation,physicallyinventoryandphotographthesameinthe
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
of
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel,arepresentativefromthemediaandtheDepartmentof
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
requiredtosignthecopiesoftheinventoryandbegivenacopy
thereof[.]
ItsImplementingRulesandRegulationsstate:
SECTION21.Custody and Disposition of Confiscated,
Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment.ThePDEAshalltakechargeandhavecustodyofall
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated,seizedand/orsurrendered, forproperdispositionin
thefollowingmanner:33
(a)Theapprehendingofficer/teamhavinginitialcustodyand
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation,physicallyinventoryandphotographthesameinthe
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel,arepresentativefromthemediaandtheDepartmentof
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
requiredtosignthecopiesoftheinventoryandbegivenacopy
thereof;Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served;oratthenearestpolicestationoratthenearestofficeof
theapprehendingofficer/team,whicheverispracticable,incaseof
warrantlessseizures;Provided,further,thatnoncompliance
withtheserequirementsunderjustifiablegrounds,aslong
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items[.](Emphasis
supplied)
This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply
with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, such as
immediatelymarkingseizeddrugs,willnotautomaticallyimpair
the integrity of chain of custody because what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiaryvalueoftheseizeditems,asthesewouldbeutilizedin
thedeterminationoftheguiltorinnocenceoftheaccused. 19
Section21anditsIRRdonotevenmentionmarking.What
they require are (1) physical inventory, and (2) taking of
photographs.AsthisCourtheldinPeoplev.Ocfemia:20
_______________
19Peoplev.Ocfemia,G.R.No. 185383,September25,2013,
706SCRA312.
20Id.
34
WhatSection21ofR.A.No.9165anditsimplementingruledo
not expressly specify is the matter of marking of the seized
itemsinwarrantlessseizurestoensurethattheevidenceseized
upon apprehensionisthesame evidence subjected toinventory
and photography when these activities are undertaken at the
policestationratherthanattheplaceofarrest.Consistencywith
the chain of custody rule requires that the marking of the
seizeditemstotrulyensurethattheyarethesameitemsthat
enterthechainandareeventuallytheonesofferedinevidence
shouldbedone(1)inthepresenceoftheapprehendedviolator(2)
immediatelyuponconfiscation.
Theprosecutionwasabletoestablishthechainofcustodyof
theseizedmarijuanafromthetimethepoliceofficersconfiscated
it,tothetimeitwasturnedovertotheinvestigatingofficer,upto
the time it was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination.21ThisCourthasnoreasontooverruletheRTCand
theCourtofAppeals,whichbothfoundthechainofcustodyofthe
seized drugs to have not been broken so as to render
themarijuanaseizedfromCalantiaoinadmissibleinevidence.
Furthermore,unlessitcanbeshownthattherewasbadfaith,
illwill,ortamperingoftheevidence,thepresumptionthatthe
integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The
burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption
thatthepoliceofficershandledtheseizeddrugswithregularity,
and that they properly dischargedtheirduties isonCalantiao.
Unfortunately,Calantiaofailedtodischargesuchburden.22
Itisworthytonotethattheseargumentswereonlyraisedby
Calantiaoonhisappeal.Hehimselfadmitsthis.23His
_______________
21Rollo,p.14.
22Peoplev. Amansec,G.R. No. 186131, December14, 2011,
662SCRA574,594595.
23Rollo,p.40
35theory,fromtheverybeginning,wasthathedidnotdoit,and
thathewasbeingframedforhavingoffendedthepoliceofficers.
Simply put, hisdefense tactic was one of denial and frameup.
However,thosedefenseshavealwaysbeenfrowneduponbythe
Court,towit:
The defenses of denial and frameup have been invariably
viewedbythisCourtwithdisfavorforitcaneasilybeconcocted
andisacommonandstandarddefenseployinprosecutionsfor
violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the
defensesofdenialandframeupmustbeprovedwithstrongand
convincing evidence. In the cases before us, appellant failed to
presentsufficientevidenceinsupportofhisclaims.Asidefrom
his selfserving assertions, no plausible proof was presented to
bolsterhisallegations.24
Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing
evidence that the apprehending officers were stirred by illicit
motiveorfailedtoproperlyperformtheirduties,theirtestimonies
deservefullfaithandcredit.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
herebyAFFIRMStheJanuary17,2012DecisionoftheCourtof
AppealsinC.A.G.R.CRH.C.No.04069.
SOORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and
Reyes,JJ.,concur.
Judgmentaffirmed.
_______________
24Peoplev.Lazaro,Jr.,G.R.No.186418,October16,2009,
604SCRA250,269.
25Peoplev.Valencia,439Phil.561,568;390SCRA696,702
(2002).
36
Notes.As an incident to the lawful arrest of the accused
aftertheconsummationofthebuybustoperation,thearresting
officers had the authority to search the person of the accused.
(Peoplevs.Mantalaba,654SCRA188[2011])
The plain view doctrine applies when the following
requisitesconcur:(a)thelawenforcementofficerinsearchofthe
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the
discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediatelyapparenttotheofficerthattheitemheobservesmay
beevidenceofacrime,contrabandorotherwisesubjecttoseizure.
(Miclat,Jr.vs.People,656SCRA539[2011])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R.No.199689.March12,2014.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff
appellee,vs.HERMANOS CONSTANTINO,
JR.yBINAYUG,a.k.a.JOJIT,accusedappellant.
 Criminal Law; Denials; Denial is an inherently weak
defense,consistentlyviewedwithdisfavorbythecourts,beinga
selfserving negative evidence.Admittedly, denial is an
inherentlyweakdefense,consistentlyviewedwithdisfavorbythe
courts,beingaselfservingnegativeevidence.Inview,however,
of the constitutional presumption that an accused is innocent
untilthecontraryisprovenbeyondreasonabledoubt,theburden
lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption by
presenting the required quantum of evidence. In so doing, the
prosecutionmustrestonitsownmeritsandmustnotrelyonthe
weaknessofthedefense.
Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Shabu; In
prosecutionsforillegalsaleofshabu,whatismaterialistheproof
thatthetransactionorsaleactuallytookplace,coupledwiththe
presentation in court of thecorpus delictias evidence.In a
prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following
elementsmustbeproven:(1)theidentityofthebuyerandthe
seller,theobject,andtheconsideration;and(2)thedeliveryofthe
thing sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, [in]
prosecutionsforillegalsaleofshabu,whatismaterialistheproof
thatthetransactionorsaleactuallytookplace,coupledwiththe
presentationincourtofthecorpusdelictiasevidence.Andinthe
prosecution of these offenses, the primary consideration is to
ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs and
other related articles have been preserved from the time they
were confiscated from the accused until their presentation as
evidenceincourt.
Same;Same;Evidence;ChainofCustodyRule;Wordsand
Phrases; Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized
movementsandcustodyofseizeddrugsorcontrolledchemicalsor
plantsourcesofdangerousdrugsorlaboratoryequipmentofeach
_______________
*FIRSTDIVISION.
178stage,fromthetimeofseizure/confiscationtoreceiptin
theforensiclaboratorytosafekeepingtopresentationincourtfor
destruction.Section1(b)ofDangerousDrugsBoardRegulation
No.1,seriesof2002,defineschainofcustodyasfollows:Chain
ofCustodymeansthedulyrecordedauthorizedmovementsand
custodyofseizeddrugsorcontrolledchemicalsorplantsourcesof
dangerousdrugsorlaboratoryequipmentofeachstage,fromthe
timeofseizure/confiscationtoreceiptintheforensiclaboratoryto
safekeepingtopresentationincourtfordestruction.Suchrecord
of movements and custody of seized item shall include the
identityandsignatureofthepersonwhoheldtemporarycustody
of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of
custodyweremadeinthecourseofsafekeepinganduseincourt
asevidence,andthefinaldisposition.
Same;Same;Same;Same;LinksThatMustbeEstablished
intheChainofCustodyinaBuyBustSituation.Thefollowing
linksmustbeestablishedinthechainofcustodyinabuybust
situation:first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer;second, the turn over of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer totheinvestigatingofficer;third, the turn
overbytheinvestigatingofficeroftheillegaldrugtotheforensic
chemistforlaboratoryexamination;andfourth,theturnoverand
submissionofthemarkedillegaldrugsseizedfromtheforensic
chemisttothecourt.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Marking;Crucialinprovingthe
chainofcustodyisthemarkingoftheseizeddangerousdrugsor
other related items immediately after they are seized from the
accused,forthemarkinguponseizureisthestartingpointinthe
custodiallinkthatsucceedinghandlersoftheevidencewilluseas
reference point.The Court already emphasized inPeople v.
Zakaria,686 SCRA 390 (2012), the importance of marking the
seized item right after seizure: Crucial in proving the chain of
custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or other
relateditemsimmediatelyaftertheyareseizedfromtheaccused,
forthemarkinguponseizureisthestartingpointinthecustodial
linkthatsucceedinghandlersoftheevidencewilluseasreference
point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to
separatethemarkedevidencefromthecorpusofallothersimilar
or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused
until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating
switching,plantingorcontaminationofevi
179dence.Afailuretomarkatthetimeoftakingofinitial
custodyimperilstheintegrityofthechainofcustodythatthelaw
requires.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Thefailureoftheprosecutionto
establishtheevidenceschainofcustodyisfataltoitscaseasthe C.Aquino.
Court can no longer consider or even safely assume that the
integrityandevidentiaryvalueoftheconfiscateddangerousdrug
were properly preserved.The failure of the prosecution to
establishtheevidenceschainofcustodyisfataltoitscaseasthe
Court can no longer consider or even safely assume that the
integrityandevidentiaryvalueoftheconfiscateddangerousdrug
wereproperlypreserved.Inlightoftheforegoing,Constantinois
acquitted of the crime charged, not because the Court accords
credencetohisdefenseofframeup,butbecausetheprosecution
failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond
reasonabledoubt.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforaccusedappellant.
LEONARDODECASTRO,J.:
ThisappealchallengestheDecision[1]datedJuly29,2011of
theCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CRH.C.No.03353,affirmingthe
Decision[2]dated April 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),Branch5ofTuguegaraoCity,Cagayan,inCriminalCase
No. 10516, which found accusedappellant Hermanos
Constantino, Jr.yBinayug,a.k.a.Jojit (Constantino), guilty of
thecrimeofillegalsaleofmethamphetaminehydrochloride,more
popularlyknownasshabu,underArticle
______________
[1]Rollo,pp. 216; penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R.
Rosario with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and
DantonQ.Bueser,concurring.
[2]Records,pp.143147;pennedbyPresidingJudgeJezarene
180II,Section5ofRepublicActNo.9165,otherwiseknownas
theComprehensiveDangerousDrugsActof2002.
TheInformation[3]filedbeforetheRTCchargedConstantino,
asfollows:
ThatonJanuary20,2005,intheCityofTuguegarao,Province
ofCagayanandwithinthejurisdictionoftheHonorableCourt,
theabovenamedaccused,withoutauthorityoflawandwithout
permittosell,transport,deliveranddistributedangerousdrugs,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
transport,distributeanddelivertwo(2)heatsealedtransparent
plastic sachets containing 0.14 gram of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloridecommonlyknownasshabu,adangerousdrugto
amemberofthePNP,TuguegaraoCitywhoactedasaposeur
buyer;thatafterreceivingthetwo(2)plasticsachets,theposeur
buyersimultaneouslyhandedtotheaccusedthemarkedmoney
consisting of one (1) piece of FIVE HUNDRED PESO BILL
(P500.00)withSerialNo.QP278070andfive(5)piecesofONE
HUNDREDPESOBILLwithSerialNos.SM989053,PS724429,
XM484584, BB048002, and EK6900025 or a total of P1,000.00
and this led to the apprehension of the accused and the
confiscation of the dangerous drug together with the buybust
moneybythesaidapprehendinglawenforcersoftheTuguegarao
CityPoliceStationwhoformedthebuybustteamincoordination
withthePDEA.
When arraigned on July 8, 2005, Constantino pleaded not
guiltytothecrimecharged.[4]Thereafter,pretrialandtrialon
themeritsensued.
Evidencefortheprosecutionpresentedthefollowingversionof
events:
_______________
[3]Id.,atp.1.
[4]Id.,atp.36.
181
OnJanuary20,2005,ataround2:00intheafternoon,Police
Superintendent (P/Supt.) Mariano Rodriguez (Rodriquez), the
Chief of Police of Tuguegarao City, received a report from a
confidentialinformant(CI)thatacertainJojitwassellingillegal
drugsinthesaidcity.P/Supt.Rodriguezimmediatelyformeda
buybust group composed of Senior Police Officer (SPO)2 Noel
Taguiam(Taguiam), SPO2AlexanderTamang(Tamang), SPO1
Arthur Blaquera (Blaquera), Police Officer (PO)3 Edwin
Hernandez(Hernandez),andPO3RolandoDomingo(Domingo).
PO3Domingowasdesignatedastheposeurbuyer.Thebuybust
money,consistingofoneP500.00billandfiveP100.00bills,were
dusted with fluorescent powder and their respective serial
numberswererecordedinthepoliceblotter.[5]
Around 8:00 in the evening of the same day, the team
proceededtoReynovillaSt.,CaritanCentro,TuguegaraoCity,the
place where, according to the CI, Jojit was sellingshabu. PO3
Domingopositionedhimselfbesideastreetlightwhiletherestof
theteamhidbehind anearby concretefence. After waitingfor
about45minutes,Constantinoarrivedonboardatricycle.PO3
DomingorecognizedConstantinoastheJojitdescribedbytheCI.
PO3DomingoapproachedConstantinoandaskedhimifhewas
Jojit.WhenConstantinorepliedintheaffirmative,PO3Domingo
next asked, Mayroon ka bangstuff? (Do you have stuff?) In
response, Constantino inquired of PO3 Domingo how much he
wantedto buy.PO3 Domingosaidhe wanted tobuy P1,000.00
worthofshabu,simultaneouslyhandingoverthebuybustmoney
toConstantino,who,inturn,handedtwoplasticsachetstoPO3
Domingo. Thereupon, PO3 Domingo turned his cap backwards,
theprearrangedsignalfortheconsummatedsale.Uponseeing
thesignal,theothermembersofthebuybustteamapproached
the scene at once and arrested Constantino, from whom SPO2
Taguiamrecoveredthebuybustmoney.[6]
_______________
[5]TSN,July25,2006,pp.89.
[6]Id.,atpp.1116.
182Thereafter,Constantinowasbroughttothepolicestation
wheretherecovereddrugsandmoney were turnedovertothe
investigator, SPO2 Tamang.[7]The recovered drugs were then
marked with the initials A1 and A2. The incident was
recordedinthepoliceblotterwithaninventoryoftherecovered
drugsandmoney.[8]
Laterthatevening,ataroundtenoclock,P/Supt.Rodriguez
andSPO2 Tamangsubmittedto the PhilippineNational Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory Services, Camp Marcelo Adduru,
Tuguegarao City, a request for laboratory examination of two
plasticsachetswithwhitecrystallinesubstancemarkedasA1
and A2 to determine the presence of dangerous drugs;[9]as
wellasbothhandsofConstantino,onepieceP500.00bill,andfive
piecesP100.00bills,todeterminethepresenceoftheultraviolet
powder.[10]Per Chemistry Report No. D082005[11]and
Physical Identification Report No. PI042005,[12]prepared by
Police Senior Inspector (P/SInsp.) Mayra Matote Madria,
[13]Forensic Chemist, the contents of the two plastic sachets
tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride; while the
otherspecimenstestedpositiveforthepresenceofbrightyellow
ultravioletfluorescentpowder.
Constantinodeniedtheaccusationagainsthimandasserted
thathewasmerelyframedup.
According to Constantino, at around 8:00 in the evening on
January20,2005,hewasenjoyingajoyridewithhisfriend,Jeff
Abarriao,onthelattersmotorcycle,withinthevicinityofCaritan
Centro.After30minutes,Constantinodecidedtogo
_______________
[7]Id.,atp.17.
[8]Id.,atpp.2122.
[9]Records,p.54;ExhibitF.
[10]Id.,atp.55;ExhibitF1.
[11]Id.,atp.56;ExhibitD.
[12]Id.,atp.53;ExhibitC.
[13]BythetimeP/SInsp.MadriatestifiedbeforetheRTCon
October 7, 2005, she already got married and was using her
marriednameMayraMatoteMadriaTulauan.
183home. While walking along Reyno or Reynovilla St., two
vehiclessuddenlystopped,oneinfrontandtheotherbehindhim.
Fivemen,allincivilianclothes,alightedfromthetwovehicles.
TwoofthemenheldConstantinoshands,whileanotherpokeda
gunathim,askinghimwherehecamefromandorderinghimto
bringouttheshabu.Constantinoansweredthathedidnotknow
what the men were talking about. The men then forced
Constantinointooneofthevehicles.Insidethevehicle,oneofthe
menfriskedandsearchedConstantino,andtoldhimthathewas
being arrested for sellingshabu. The men, who were now
apparentlypoliceofficers,broughtConstantinototheTuguegarao
CityPoliceStation.Atthepolicestation,thepoliceofficerstook
Constantinoscellphoneandwallet.Alsoatthepolicestation,one
ofthearrestingpoliceofficersbroughtouttwopiecesofplastic
sachetsandmoneyandturneditovertooneofhiscompanions.
At around 9:30 in the evening, the police officers brought
ConstantinotothePNPCrimeLaboratory,butnothinghappened
becauseheheardthatthepersonwhowassupposedtoconduct
the examination was not around, so, Constantino was brought
backtothepolicestation.[14]
Thefollowingday,January21,2005,thepoliceofficersagain
brought Constantino to the PNP Crime Laboratory. Along the
way,oneofthepoliceescortsforcedConstantinotoholdacertain
amount of money. Constantino tried to resist but he could not
really do anything because he was handcuffed. After his
examination,Constantinowasdetainedandwastoldthathewas
suspectedofsellingshabu.
TheRTCpromulgateditsDecisiononApril15,2008,finding
Constantino guilty as charged. The trial court rejected the
argumentsofthedefense,thus:
1.The Prosecution failed to give a detailed account of the
arrangementwiththeaccusedforthepurchaseoftheshabu.
_______________
[14]TSN,September3,2007,pp.511.
184
The Courts response: The testimony of PO3 Domingo was
detailedenough,corroboratedbyotherwitnesses.Itisthedefense
thathasfailedtoshow inwhat crucialdetailtheprosecutions
accountiswanting.
2.The police officers categorically admitted that they did not
personallyknowtheaccuseduntiltheywereattheallegedplace
oftransaction.
TheCourtsresponse:Substantivelawdoesnotrequirethis;the
rulesofevidencedonot.DidtheyknowhewasJojit?Yes,from
thedescriptiongiventheinformant.Domingoaskedwhetherhe
wasJojit.HeansweredYes.
3.Thearrestingofficersfailedtocomplywiththerequirements
of Article II, Section 21 of R.A. 9165 that requires that an
inventorybetakenandthatphotographsbetakenoftheitems
seized.
The Courts comment: The Police Blotter Entry No. 0270
enumerates the items seized. This, the Court holds to be
substantialcompliance.Evenassuming,withoutadmitting,that
notalltherequirementsmaynothavebeencompliedwith,these
omissions do not operate to exclude the evidence nor to cause
suppression thereof. They are directory, not mandatory
provisions.
4.Thechainofcustodywasnotestablishedwithcertainty.
TheCourtscomment:Thechainisnotdifficulttotrace,and
hasbeenestablishedbyevidence,thus:
a.Exhibit B: The police blotter
recording that on 20 January 2005 at
2100hours,mentioningthetwosachets
ofshabuwhichaccordingtotheblotter
theaccusedadmittedhehandedoverto
Domingo; Domingo had testified that
the markings A1 NBT and A2 NBT
were placed on the sachets by
InvestigatorAlexanderTamang;
b.ExhibitF:DatedJanuary20,2005,arequestto
thePNPCrimeLabServices
185for the examination of two plastic sachet (sic)
with white crystalline substance marked A1 and
A2;
c.ExhibitD:ChemistryReportNo.D
082005 completed 21 January 2005
reporting a qualitative examination of
thecontentsoftwoheatsealedsachets
marked as A1 NBT and A2 NBT and
identifying the substance as
MethamphetamineHydrochloride.
5.TherewasnopriorcoordinationwithPDEA.
The Courts response: None was needed. Exhibit H clearly
evidences that SPO1 Blaquera was authorized to conduct anti
drug operations. Domingo also answered the question about
coordinationwithPDEAwhenhetestified:Duringthattime3
representativesoftheIntelligenceOperativesweredeputizedin
thePDEAinthepersonsofNoelTaguiam,ArthurBlaqueraand
theChiefofPolice.
Hermanos testified in his behalf and his testimony can be
reducedtothefollowingstory:
1.Hewentonajoyridethatnightwith
hisfriendaboardamotorcycle;
2.Tiring, he alighted and started to walk along
ReynoVillaStreet;
3.He was accosted by police officers who, at the
time,hedidnotknowtobepoliceofficers;
4.Theytookhimtothepolicestationandproduced
thesachets;
 5.Next day, while on the way to the Crime Lab,
theyforcedhimtoholdmarkedbills,althoughhe
wascuffed.
Alltold,itisastorythatismeanttoendeavortoexplainthe
circumstancesaroundtheaccusedsarrestandapprehension.For
onething,itisselfserving;for
186another,wearenottoldanyreasonwhythepoliceofficers
shouldhavewantedtoapprehendhimasupposedlyguiltless
man; third, the Court never heard the testimony of his friend
withwhomhewassupposedtohavehadajoyridethatnight.In
sum, his story does not convince this Court.[15](Citations
omitted.)
TheRTCimposedthefollowingsentenceuponConstantino:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonabledoubtofViolationofSec.5,Art.IIofR.A.9165and
sentences him to suffer the penalty ofLIFE
IMPRISONMENTandafineofP500,000.00.[16]
Maintaininghisinnocence,ConstantinoappealedtotheCourt
ofAppeals,arguingthat:
1.The trial court gravely erred in giving full credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses despite the patent
irregularitiesintheconductofthebuybustoperation.
2.Thetrialcourtgravelyerredinconvictingaccusedappellant
despitetheprosecutionsfailuretoestablishthatchainofcustody
of the drug specimens allegedly confiscated from the accused
appellant.
3.The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused
appellant despite the prosecutions failure to establish the
identityoftheprohibiteddrugsconstitutingthecorpusdelictiof
theoffense.
In its Decision dated July 29, 2011, the Court of Appeals
affirmedin totothe judgment of conviction of the RTC against
Constantino.TheappellatecourtheldthatConstantinosdefense
offrameupwasnotworthyofcredenceashisversion
_______________
[15]Records,pp.145147.
[16]Id.,atp.147.
187oftheincidentwasnotatallcorroborated.Constantinowas
caughtin flagrante delictosellingshabuto PO3 Domingo, who
acted as the poseurbuyer,therefore, he was legally arrested
withoutawarrant.Theappellatecourtalsofoundthatthechain
of custody of theshabuhad been preserved from the time said
drugs were confiscated from Constantino to the time the same
drugs were delivered to the crime laboratory and thereafter
retrievedandpresentedasevidencebeforethetrialcourt.Lastly,
the appellate court stressed that between the positive and
categorical declarations of the prosecution witnesses, on one
hand,andtheunsubstantialdenialornegativestatementsofthe
appellant,ontheotherhand,theformergenerallyprevails;and
thatnegativeaverments,unsubstantiatedbyclearandconvincing
evidence,deservenoweightinlaw,especiallyvisvisthetime
testedpresumptionofregularityofperformanceofofficialdutyon
thepartoftheapprehendingofficers.
Intheend,theCourtofAppealsdecreed:
WHEREFORE,the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Tuguegarao City, Branch 5, dated 15 April 2008, in Criminal
CaseNo.10516,isAFFIRMED.[17]
Consequently, Constantino comes before this Court seeking
thereversalofhisconvictionbythetrialcourtandtheCourtof
Appeals.
 In his Supplemental Brief, Constantino contests his
conviction, averring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecutionwitnesses,particularly,onthecircumstancesofthe
marking of the two plastic sachets containingshabuallegedly
confiscated from him. Different people claim to have made the
marking NBT on the two plastic sachets and gave various
explanationsastowhattheinitialsNBTstandfor.Inshort,
_______________
[17]Rollo,p.15.
188Constantinoarguesthattheprosecutionfailedtoestablisha
cruciallinkinthechainofcustodyoftheshabuinthiscase.
Theappealisimpressedwithmerit.
Admittedly,denialisaninherentlyweakdefense,consistently
viewedwithdisfavorbythecourts,beingaselfservingnegative
evidence.Inview,however,oftheconstitutionalpresumptionthat
an accused is innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonabledoubt,theburdenliesontheprosecutiontoovercome
such presumption by presenting the required quantum of
evidence.Insodoing,theprosecutionmustrestonitsownmerits
andmustnotrelyontheweaknessofthedefense.[18]
Inaprosecutionforthesaleofadangerousdrug,thefollowing
elementsmustbeproven:(1)theidentityofthebuyerandthe
seller,theobject,andtheconsideration;and(2)thedeliveryofthe
thing sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, [in]
prosecutionsforillegalsaleofshabu,whatismaterialistheproof
thatthetransactionorsaleactuallytookplace,coupledwiththe
presentationincourtofthecorpusdelictiasevidence.[19]Andin
theprosecutionoftheseoffenses,theprimaryconsiderationisto
ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs and
other related articles have been preserved from the time they
were confiscated from the accused until their presentation as
evidenceincourt.[20]
ArticleII,Section21(1)ofRepublicActNo.9165laysdown
the procedure to be followed in the seizure and custody of
dangerousdrugs:
_______________
[18]People v. Magpayo, G.R. No. 187069, October 20, 2010,
634SCRA441,447.
[19]Peoplev.DelRosario,G.R.No.188107,December5,2012,
687SCRA318,326327.
[20]Peoplev.Secreto,G.R.No.198115,February27,2013,692
SCRA298,307.
189
Section21.CustodyandDispositionofConfiscated,Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment.ThePDEAshalltakechargeandhavecustodyofall
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated,seizedand/orsurrendered, forproperdispositionin
thefollowingmanner:
(1)The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation,physicallyinventoryandphotographthesameinthe
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel,arepresentativefromthemediaandtheDepartmentof
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
requiredtosignthecopiesoftheinventoryandbegivenacopy
thereof[.]
 Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 describes in more
detailhowtheforegoingprocedureistobeapplied:
SECTION21.Custody and Disposition of Confiscated,
Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment.ThePDEAshalltakechargeandhavecustodyofall
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated,seizedand/orsurrendered, forproperdispositionin
thefollowingmanner:
(a)Theapprehendingofficer/teamhavinginitialcustodyand
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation,physicallyinventoryandphotographthesameinthe
presenceoftheaccusedortheper
190son/sfromwhomsuchitemswereconfiscatedand/orseized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventoryandbegivenacopythereof;Provided,thatthephysical
inventoryandphotographshallbeconductedattheplacewhere
thesearchwarrantisserved;oratthenearestpolicestationorat
thenearestofficeoftheapprehendingofficer/team,whicheveris
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;Provided,
further,that noncompliance with these requirements under
justifiablegrounds,aslongastheintegrityandtheevidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehendingofficer/team,shallnotrendervoidandinvalidsuch
seizuresofandcustodyoversaiditems[.]
Whilepoliceofficersareenjoinedtostrictlycomplywiththe
procedure prescribed by law, the IRR also explicitly excuses
noncomplianceunderjustifiablegrounds,butonlyiftheintegrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items have been properly
preserved by the apprehending officers. The integrity and
evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved for as
longasthechainofcustodyofthesamearedulyestablished.
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1,
seriesof2002,[21]defineschainofcustodyasfollows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized
movementsandcustodyofseizeddrugsorcontrolledchemicalsor
plantsourcesofdangerousdrugsorlaboratoryequipmentofeach
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction.Suchrecordofmovementsandcustodyofseizeditem
shallin
_______________
[21]Guidelines of the Custody and Disposition of Seized
DangerousDrugs,ControlledPrecursorsandEssentialChemicals
andLaboratoryEquipment.
191clude the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when
suchtransferofcustodyweremadeinthecourseofsafekeeping
anduseincourtasevidence,andthefinaldisposition.
InMalillinv.People,[22]theCourtdiscussedhowthechainof
custodyofseizeditemsisestablished:
Asamethodofauthenticatingevidence,thechainofcustody
rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
questioniswhattheproponentclaimsittobe.Itwouldinclude
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
itemwaspickeduptothetimeitisofferedintoevidence,insuch
awaythateverypersonwhotouchedtheexhibitwoulddescribe
how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happenedtoitwhileinthewitnesspossession,theconditionin
whichitwasreceivedandtheconditioninwhichitwasdelivered
tothenextlinkinthechain.Thesewitnesseswouldthendescribe
theprecautionstakentoensurethattherehadbeennochangein
theconditionoftheitemandnoopportunityforsomeonenotin
thechaintohavepossessionofthesame.(Citationsomitted.)
Thus,thefollowinglinksmustbeestablishedinthechainof
custodyinabuybustsituation:first,theseizureandmarking,if
practicable,oftheillegaldrugrecoveredfromtheaccusedbythe
apprehending officer;second, the turn over of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer;third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
andfourth,theturnoverandsubmissionofthe
_______________
[22]576Phil.576,587;553SCRA619,632633(2008).
192markedillegaldrugsseizedfromtheforensicchemisttothe
court.[23]
Afteracarefulscrutinyofthetestimoniesoftheprosecution
witnesses, the Court finds glaring inconsistencies affecting the
integrityoftheshabupurportedlyconfiscatedfromConstantino.
TheinconsistenttestimoniesofPO3 Domingo, PO3 Hernandez,
andP/SInsp.Tulauanastowho,when,andwherethetwoplastic
sachetsofshabuweremarkedleadtheCourttoquestionwhether
thetwoplasticsachetsofshabuidentifiedincourtwerethevery
sameonesconfiscatedfromConstantino.Thedoubtfulmarkings
alreadybrokethechainofcustodyoftheseizedshabuatavery
earlystage.
To recall, the first crucial link in the chain of custody is
seizure and marking of the illegal drug. In this case, PO3
Domingo, as poseurbuyer, received two plastic sachets
ofshabufromConstantinoinexchangeforP1,000.However,PO3
Domingo himself did not put any markings on the two plastic
sachetsofshabu.Instead,uponarrivalofthebuybustteamwith
Constantinoatthepolicestation,PO3Domingoturnedoverthe
two plastic sachets ofshabuto theinvestigator, SPO2 Tamang,
who was also a member of the buybust team. PO3 Domingo
testifiedthatitwasSPO2TamangwhoputthemarkingNBT
on thesaidsachetsofshabu.Beloware theexcerptsfromPO3
Domingostestimony:
QIf that plastic sachets which was sold to you by
HermanosConstantinoisshowntoyouwillyoubeable
toidentifythesame?
AYes,maam.
QHowwereyouabletoidentifytheplasticsachets?
AThereisaninitials(sic),maam.
QWhatinitialsareyoureferringto?
AA1initialNBTandA2initialNBT.
_______________
[23]People v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 197550, September 25,
2013,706SCRA337.
193
QWhoplacedthoseinitialsintheplasticsachets?
ATheInvestigator,maam.
QAndwhoistheinvestigator?
AAlexanderTamang,maam.
QWheredidheplacethoseinitials?
AIn the police station after the apprehension,maam.
[24](Emphasissupplied.)
 However, PO3 Hernandez, another member of the buybust xxxx
team,categoricallypointedtoSPO2Taguiam,alsoamemberof
AItwasNoelB.Taguiam,sir.
thebuybustteam,astheonewhoputthemarkingNBTonthe
The witness is pointing to the marking NBT partly
plasticsachetsupontheteamsreturntothepolicestation,thus:
hidden.
PROS.NICOLAS:
QDuring the buy bust operation you stated that the COURT:
accused handed to theposeur buyer inthe person of QWhoisNoelB.Taguiam?
PO3 Rolando Domingo two plastic sachets containing AAmemberofthebuybustteamalso,sir.
asyouclaimedmethamphetaminehydrochloride,have PROS.NICOLAS:
youseentheseplasticsachetsatthattimewhenthey
handedtoPO3RolandoDomingo? QYou stated this NBT was placed by one Noel B.
AYes,sir. Taguiam,whydoyouknowthathewastheonewho
QIfthesetwoplasticsachetswillbeshowntoyouagain placedthis?
today will you be able to tell that these two plastic ABecauseIwaspresentduringthattimewhenheplaced
sachets were the same plastic sachets that were hisinitial,sir.
handedbytheaccusedtoPO3RolandoDomingo? QDoyouknowwhenthisNoelB.Taguiamplacedthose
AYes,sir. initialsonthosetwoplasticsachets?
QIamshowingtoyouthesetwoplasticsachetskindly AAfterweconductedthebuybustoperation,sir.
tellusifthesearetheplasticsachetsthatwerehanded QHowsoonNoelB.Taguiamplacedthoseinitialsafter
toPO3RolandoDomingo? theconductofthebuybustoperation?
AThesearetheones,sir. AAfterafewhours,sir.
QWhydoyousaythatthesearethetwoplasticsachets QWheredidheplacethoseinitials?
handedbytheaccused? AInouroffice,sir.[25](Emphasissupplied.)
_______________ To complicate things even further, P/SInsp Tulauan,[26]the
[24]TSN,July25,2006,pp.2021. ForensicChemist,alsodeclaredbeforethetrialcourtthatthe
194 _______________
ABecauseIwasthereandIsawtheaccusedhandedthe [25]TSN,April2,2007,pp.1314.
twoplasticsachetstoPO3RolandoDomingo,sir. [26]Seenote13.
QWhydoyouknowthatthesearethesameplasticsachets? 195marking NBT on the two plastic sachets ofshabuwere
AThesearetheones,sir. made by SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray (Tamaray), the duty officer
QMr. Witness, there are markings on these two plastic who received the specimens at the crime laboratory. P/SInsp.
sachets,doyouknowwhosemarkingsarethese? Tulauantestified:

PROS.ISRAEL:
QWhenyoureceivedthesetwospecimensMadamWitness,
willyoupleasetellusthephysicalappearanceofthese
itemswhenyoureceivedthesame?
ATheywereheatsealedandwithmarkingsA1andA
2,yourHonor.
QAnd will you please point to us these markings
A1andA2whenyoureceivedtheseitemsMadam
Witness?
AThisisthemarkingsA1andA2,Maam.
INTERPRETER:
ThewitnessispointingtothemarkingsA1andA2
withtheuseofablackpentelpen.
PROS.ISRAEL:
QThereisanothermarkinginthisplasticsachetMadam
Witness marked as NBT, what is this marking all
about?
AThat is the marking ofSPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray,
Maam.
QIsheauthorizedtomakethenecessarymarkingwhich
wasrequestedtobeexaminedMadamWitness?
AYes, Maam because he is the one who received the
specimenfromtheonewhodeliverit,Maam.
QInthissecondplasticsachetMadamWitnesswhichyou
identifiedearlier,thatthereisamarkingA1,there
is another marking NBT, what is this marking all
aboutMadamWitness?
A That is the marking ofSPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray,
Maam.[27](Emphasessupplied.)
_______________
[27]TSN,October7,2005,pp.2021.
196
On crossexamination, P/SInsp. Tulauan confirmed her
previousdeclarationthatSPO3Tamarayhadclaimedmakingthe
markingonthesachetsofshabu:
Atty.Aquino
Madam Witness, with respect to that marking made
whichareA1andA2,theyarenotyourmarkings,
isitnot?
AYes,sir.
QAndwithrespectalsotothatNBTmarkedandplaced
inthatexhibit whichyouhave earlieridentified,you
did not see this duty officer placed his markings
thereon,isitnot?
AYessirbutIaskedhimwhoplacedthatmarkingandhe
saidthathewastheonewhoplacedtheinitialNBT,
sir.[28]
The Court already emphasized inPeople v. Zakaria[29]the
importanceofmarkingtheseizeditemrightafterseizure:
Crucialinprovingthechainofcustodyisthemarkingofthe
seizeddangerousdrugsorotherrelateditemsimmediatelyafter
theyareseizedfromtheaccused,forthemarkinguponseizureis
thestartingpointinthecustodiallinkthatsucceedinghandlers
oftheevidencewilluseasreferencepoint.Moreover,thevalueof
markingoftheevidenceistoseparatethemarkedevidencefrom
thecorpusofallothersimilarorrelatedevidencefromthetimeof
seizurefromtheaccuseduntildispositionattheendofcriminal
proceedings,obviatingswitching,plantingorcontaminationof
evidence.Afailuretomarkatthetimeoftakingofinitialcustody
imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law
requires.(Citationomitted.)
_______________
[28]Id.,atpp.2526.
[29]G.R.No.181042,November26,2012,686SCRA390,403.
197 Herein,theprosecutioniscompletelysilentastowhy
PO3 Domingo, the poseurbuyer, despite having immediate
custody of the two plastic sachets ofshabupurchased from
Constantino,failedtoimmediatelymarktheseizeddrugsbefore
turning over the custody of the same to another police officer.
Thislapseinprocedureopenedthedoorforconfusionanddoubt
astotheidentityofthedrugsactuallyseizedfromConstantino
duringthebuybustandtheonespresentedbeforethetrialcourt,
especially considering that three different people, during the
interval,supposedlyreceivedandmarkedthesame.Toclarifythe
matter, the prosecution could have presented as witness either
SPO2TamangorSPO2Taguiamtodirectlyvalidatethemarking
in court, but unfortunately, the prosecution chose to dispense
with the testimonies of both officers. This omission diminished
the importance of the markings as the reference point for the
subsequent handling of the evidence. As a consequence, an
objective person could now justifiably suspect
theshabuultimatelypresentedasevidenceincourttobeplanted
orcontaminated.[30]
Thefailureoftheprosecutiontoestablishtheevidenceschain
ofcustodyisfataltoitscaseastheCourtcannolongerconsider
orevensafelyassumethattheintegrityandevidentiaryvalueof
theconfiscateddangerousdrugwereproperlypreserved.[31]
Inlightoftheforegoing,Constantinoisacquittedofthecrime
charged,notbecausetheCourtaccordscredencetohisdefenseof
frameup, but because the prosecution failed to discharge its
burdenofprovinghisguiltbeyondreasonabledoubt.
WHEREFORE,theappealisGRANTED.TheDecisiondated
July29,2011oftheCourtofAppealsinC.A.G.R.CRH.C.No.
03353,affirmingtheDecisiondatedApril15,2008of
_______________
Notes.While a perfect chain of custody is almost always
impossibletoachieve,anunbrokenchainbecomesindispensable
and essential in the prosecution of drug cases owing to
susceptibility to alteration, tampering, contamination and
evensubstitution and exchangehence, every link must be
accountedfor.(Peoplevs.Gatlabayan,653SCRA803[2011])
Thepresumption ofregularity inthe performanceofofficial
dutyobtainsonlywherenothingintherecordsissuggestiveof
the fact that the law enforcers involved deviated from the
standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law
otherwise, where the official act in question is irregular on its
face,anadversepresumptionarisesasamatterofcourse.(People
vs.Lorena,639SCRA139[2011])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R.No.212171.September7,2016.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff
appellee,vs.MERCURY DELA CRUZaliasDEDAY, accused
appellant.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of
DangerousDrugs; Thedeliveryoftheillicitdrugtotheposeur
buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
successfully consummate the buybust transaction.We have
consistentlyheldthatinordertosecureaconvictionforillegal
sale of dangerousdrugs, itis necessary that theprosecutionis
abletoestablishthefollowingessentialelements:(1)theidentity
of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its
payment. Whatis material is theproofthat the transactionor
saleactuallytookplace,coupledwiththepresentationincourtof
thecorpusdelictiasevidence.Thedeliveryoftheillicitdrugto
the poseurbuyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked
moneysuccessfullyconsummatethebuybusttransaction.Here,
all the aforesaid elements necessary for accusedappellants
prosecution have been sufficiently complied with, indubitably
establishing that she has indeed committed the crime. PO1
Reales testified in detail how he was introduced by the
confidential informant to accusedappellant. The confidential
informant,thereafter,manifestedtotheaccusedappellanttheir
intention to buy worth P200.00. Upon giving the accused
appellantthe2markedP100.00bills,she,inreturn,handedto
PO1 Reales a small plastic containing white crystalline
substance. The plastic sachet later on tested positive for the
presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. The testimony
givenbyPO1RealeswascorroboratedbySPO1Batobalonosand
PO1Bullidoinallmaterialdetails.Itisthereforeclearbeyond
any shadow of doubt that the buybust operation had been
substantiallycompletedandconsummated.Thefactthataccused
appellantwasabletoevadethearrestimmediatelyafterthesale
andthatshewasarrestedonlyafter,byvirtueofawarrantof
arrest, did not change the fact that the crime she committed
earlierhadbeenconsummated.
_______________
*THIRDDIVISION.
382
382 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.DelaCruz
RemedialLaw;Evidence;PresumptionofRegularity;Inthe
absenceofanyintentorillmotiveonthepartofthepoliceofficers
tofalsely impute commission of a crime against the accused
appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
officialdutyisentitledtogreatrespectanddeservestoprevailover
the bare, uncorroborated denial and selfserving claim of the
accusedofframeup.Weagreewiththelowercourtsthatinthe
absenceofanyintentorillmotiveonthepartofthepoliceofficers
to falsely impute commission of a crime against the accused
appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
officialdutyisentitledtogreatrespectanddeservestoprevail
overthebare,uncorroborateddenialandselfservingclaimofthe
accused of frameup. Also, we reject the appellants contention
that the police officers failed to comply with the provisions of
Section21,paragraph1ofR.A.No.9165,whichprovidesforthe
procedureinthecustodyanddispositionofseizeddrugs.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody
Rule;Tobeadmissibleinevidence,theprosecutionmustbeableto
present through records or testimony, the whereabouts of the
dangerousdrugsfromthetimethesewereseizedfromtheaccused
bythearrestingofficers;turnedovertotheinvestigatingofficer;
forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their
composition; andupto the timethese areoffered inevidence.
Althoughideallytheprosecutionshouldofferaperfectchainof
custodyinthehandlingofevidence,substantialcompliancewith
the legal requirements on the handling of the seized item is
sufficient.This Court has consistently ruled that even if the
arrestingofficersfailedtostrictlycomplywiththerequirements
underSection21ofR.A.No.9165,suchprocedurallapseisnot
fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in
evidence.Whatisofutmostimportanceisthepreservationofthe
integrityandevidentiaryvalueoftheseizeditems,asthesame
wouldbeutilizedinthedeterminationoftheguiltorinnocenceof
the accused.In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the
prosecutionmustbeabletopresentthroughrecordsortestimony,
thewhereaboutsofthedangerousdrugsfromthetimethesewere
seizedfromtheaccusedbythearrestingofficers;turnedoverto
the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for
determinationoftheircomposition;anduptothetimetheseare
offeredinevidence.Foraslongasthechainofcustodyremains
unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural
requirementsprovidedforinSec.21ofR.A.
383
VOL.802,SEPTEMBER7,2016
Peoplevs.DelaCruz
No. 9165 were not faithfully observed, the guilt of the
accusedwillnotbeaffected.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity;
Accusedappellantbearstheburdenofshowingthattheevidence
was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public
officers and the presumption that public officers properly
discharged their duties.The integrity of the evidence is
presumedtohavebeenpreservedunlessthereisashowingofbad
faith,illwill,orproofthattheevidencehasbeentamperedwith.
Accusedappellantbearstheburdenofshowingthattheevidence
was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the
presumption ofregularity inthe handling of exhibits by public
officers and the presumption that public officers properly
dischargedtheir duties.Accusedappellant in thiscase failed to
presentanyplausiblereasontoimputeillmotiveonthepartof
thearrestingofficers.Thus,thetestimoniesoftheapprehending
officersdeservefullfaithandcredit.Infact,accusedappellantdid
notevenquestionthecredibilityoftheprosecutionwitnesses.She
simplyanchoredherdefenseondenialandalibi.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforaccusedappellant.
PEREZ,J.:
We resolve the appeal, filed by accusedappellant Mercury
DelaCruzaliasDeday,fromthe27September2013Decision 1of
383 theCourtofAppeals(CA)inC.A.G.R.CRH.C.No.01103.
_______________
1Rollo, pp. 421; penned by Associate Justice Carmelita
SalandananManahan, with Associate Justices Ramon Paul L.
HernandoandMa.LuisaC.QuijanoPadilla,concurring.

384
384 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.DelaCruz
In a Decision dated 27 November 2008, the Regional Trial
2 2Records, pp. 6774; docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU
Court(RTC),Branch58,CebuCity,foundtheaccusedappellant
guilty of illegal sale ofshabuunder Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 91653and sentenced him to suffer the
penaltylifeimprisonmentandtopayafineofP500,000.00.
The RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of Senior
PoliceOfficer(SPO)2AlejandroBatobalanos,PoliceOfficer(PO)
1 Angsgar Babyboy A. Reales, and PO1 Leopoldo Bullido who
conductedthebuybustoperationagainsttheaccusedappellant,
and rejected the selfserving defenses of denial andalibiof
accusedappellant and her livein partner. The RTC noted that
the categorical affirmation of accusedappellant and her livein
partnerthatthearrestingofficersdidnotdemandanythingfrom
theminexchangefortheaccusedappellantslibertycreatedthe
presumption that the arresting officers were performing their
officialfunctionsregularly.4
Onintermediateappellatereview,theCAaffirmedintotothe
RTCsruling.TheCAagreedwiththeRTCingivingweighttothe
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, and held that the
arresting officers complied with the proper procedure in the
custodyanddispositionoftheseizeddrugs.
OurRuling
We dismiss the appeal and affirm the accusedappellants
guilt.
WefindnoreasontoreversetheRTCsfindings,asaffirmed
bytheCA.Inthesamemannerasthelowercourts,wegivefull
credittothepositive,spontaneousandstraightfor
_______________
80787.
3OtherwiseknownastheComprehensiveDangerousDrugs
Actof2002.
4Records,pp.7374.
385
VOL.802,SEPTEMBER7,2016 385
Peoplevs.DelaCruz
ward testimonies of the police officers pointing to accused
appellantasthesellerandpossessoroftheconfiscatedshabu.
Wehaveconsistentlyheldthatinordertosecureaconviction
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the
prosecutionisabletoestablishthefollowingessentialelements:
(1)theidentityofthebuyerandtheseller,theobjectofthesale
anditsconsideration;and(2)thedeliveryofthethingsoldandits
payment. Whatis material is theproofthat the transactionor
saleactuallytookplace,coupledwiththepresentationincourtof
thecorpusdelictiasevidence.Thedeliveryoftheillicitdrugto
the poseurbuyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked
moneysuccessfullyconsummatethebuybusttransaction. 5Here,
all the aforesaid elements necessary for accusedappellants
prosecution have been sufficiently complied with, indubitably
establishing that she has indeed committed the crime. PO1
Reales testified in detail how he was introduced by the
confidential informant to accusedappellant. The confidential
informant,thereafter,manifestedtotheaccusedappellanttheir
intention to buy worth P200.00. Upon giving the accused
appellantthe2markedP100.00bills,she,inreturn,handedto
PO1 Reales a small plastic containing white crystalline
substance. The plastic sachet later on tested positive for the
presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. The testimony
givenbyPO1RealeswascorroboratedbySPO1Batobalonosand
PO1Bullidoinallmaterialdetails.Itisthereforeclearbeyond
any shadow of doubt that the buybust operation had been
substantiallycompletedandconsummated.Thefactthataccused
appellantwasabletoevadethearrestimmediatelyafterthesale
andthatshewasarrestedonlyafter,byvirtueofawarrantof
arrest, did not change the fact that the crime she committed
earlierhadbeenconsummated.
_______________
5Peoplev.DelosSantos,645Phil.587,601;631SCRA350,
363(2010),citingPeoplev.Guiara,616Phil.290,302;600SCRA
310,322323(2009),furthercitingPeoplev.Gonzales,430Phil.
504,513;380SCRA689,697(2002).
386
386 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.DelaCruz
We agree with the lower courts that in the absence of any
intent or ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely
imputecommissionofacrimeagainsttheaccusedappellant,the
presumptionofregularity intheperformance of official duty is
entitled to great respect anddeserves to prevail over the bare,
uncorroborated denial and selfserving claim of the accused of
frameup.6
Also, we reject the appellants contention that the police
officers failed to comply with the provisions of Section 21,
paragraph1ofR.A.No.9165, 7whichprovidesfortheprocedure
inthecustodyanddispositionofseizeddrugs.
Afteracarefulperusaloftherecords,weagreewiththeCA
that the prosecution had established the unbroken chain of
custodyovertheseizeddrugs.Thiswasestablishedthroughthe
testimoniesoftheprosecutionwitnesses,towit:Ataround7:15
oclock in the evening of November 10, 2006, PO3 Batobalonos,
PO1 Reales, PO1 Bullido and their civilian asset proceeded to
Sitio Cogon, A. Lopez St., Barangay Labangon. When the team
went inside the interior portion of Sitio Cogon, PO1 Reales
together with the civilian asset approached the house of Dela
Cruz,whilePO3BatobalonosandPO1Bullidowerestrategically
hiddenmoreorlessten(10)metersaway.
_______________
6Peoplev.Dumlao,584Phil.732,740;562SCRA762,769
(2008).
7Section21.Custody and Disposition of Confiscated,
Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment.xxx
(1)Theapprehendingteamhavinginitialcustodyandcontrolof
the drugs shall immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physicallyinventoryandphotographthesameinthepresenceof
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscatedand/orseized,orhis/herrepresentativeorcounsel,a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
signthecopiesoftheinventoryandbegivenacopythereof[.]
387
VOL.802,SEPTEMBER7,2016
Peoplevs.DelaCruz
ThecivilianassetcalledDelaCruzandtoldherthattheywillbuy
shabuworthP200.00.Thereafter,DelaCruzhandedPO1Realesa
small plastic containing white crystalline substance and in
exchangehehandedtotheformertheP200.00bills.Upongetting
holdofthemoney,PO3BatobalonosandPO1Bullido,whosaw
theconsummationofthetransactionrushedto the scene. When
PO3BatobalonosgotholdofDelaCruz,thelattershoutedforhelp
andresistedarrest.DelaCruzwasabletorunandsotheteam
chased her, however, her neighbor Arthur Tabasa Ortega
(Ortega)blockedtheirway.Theteamintroducedthemselvesas
policemenbutOrtegadidnotlisten,soPO3Batobalonosfireda
warningshotasthepeoplelikewisestartedtogatheraroundthem.
Meanwhile, DelaCruzwasable toevade arrest. Theteam then
arrestedOrtegaforobstructionofjustice.
Ontheirwaytothepolicestationaboardtheirpatrolcar,PO1
RealeshandedtoPO3Batobalonosthesmallplasticcontaining
whitecrystallinesubstancewhichhepurchasedfromDelaCruz.
Thereafter, upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Batobalonos
markedtheseizeditemwithDDM11/10/06.
Afterwards, a Request for Laboratory Examination of the
seizeditemwaspreparedbyPO3Batobalonos.TheRequestand
theseizeditemweredeliveredtotheRegionalCrimeLaboratory
Office7,CampSoteroCabahug,GorordoAvenue,CebuCityby
PO1Realesataround1:10oclockinthemorningofNovember11,
2006.
Thereafter Forensic Chemist PCI Salinas issued Chemistry
387 ReportNo.D17712006,8withthefindingthatthespecimengave
positive result for the presence of Methamphetamine
hydrochloride.9
_______________
8Rollo,pp.89.(Emphasissupplied)
9Records, p. 9; as evidenced by Chemistry Report No. D
17712006.
388
388 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.DelaCruz
The confiscated dangerous drug which also constitutes
thecorpus delictiof the crime was validly considered by the
courtsinarrivingatthedecisiondespitethefactthattheforensic
chemist who examined it did not testify in court. The relevant
portionoftheRTCdecisionreads:
ThepresentationofthetestimonyofForensicchemistPSI
MUTCHIT G. SALINASwas dispensed with, the defense
havingADMITTED: the existence of the Letter Request dated
November10,2006fromthePNPStation10;theexistenceofone
(1) small plastic pack containing white crystalline substance
whichisthesubjectforexamination,howeverDENIEDastothe
ownershipofsaidevidence;theexistenceanddueexecutionofthe
ChemistryReportNo.D17712006executedbywitnessMutchit
G.Salinas;thattheintendedwitnessisandexpertwitnesswho
examined the specimen found to contain the presence of
Methylamphetamine hydrochloride locally known asshabu, a
dangerousdrug.10
Anent accusedappellants contention that the drugs were
markednotattheplacewhereshewasapprehendedbutatthe
policestationandthattherewasnophysicalinventorymadeon
the seized item nor was it photographed, we find the same
untenable. Thealleged non compliance with Section21 of R.A.
No. 9165 was not fatal to the prosecutions case because the
apprehending team properly preserved the integrity and
evidentiaryvalueoftheseizeddrugs.11
Relevanttotheinstantcaseistheproceduretobefollowedin
thecustodyandhandlingoftheseizeddangerousdrugsas
_______________
10Id.,atp.67.
11InPeoplev. Sanchez(590 Phil. 214, 234; 569 SCRA194,
211212 [2008]), we held that noncompliance with the strict
directiveofSection21ofR.A.No.9165isnotnecessarilyfatalto
theprosecutionscase;[buttheselapses]mustberecognizedand
explainedintermsoftheirjustifiablegroundsandtheintegrity
andevidentiary valueof theevidenceseized must beshownto
havebeenpreserved.
389
VOL.802,SEPTEMBER7,2016
Peoplevs.DelaCruz
outlined in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules
andRegulationsofR.A.No.9165,whichstates:
(a)Theapprehendingofficer/teamhavinginitialcustodyand
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation,physicallyinventoryandphotographthesameinthe
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel,arepresentativefromthemediaandtheDepartmentof
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
requiredtosignthecopiesoftheinventoryandbegivenacopy
thereof:Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served;oratthenearestpolicestationoratthenearestofficeof
theapprehendingofficer/team,whicheverispracticable,incaseof
warrantlessseizures;Provided,further,thatnoncompliancewith
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items[.]
The last part of the aforequoted issuance provided the
exception to the strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Although ideally the prosecution
shouldofferaperfectchainofcustodyinthehandlingofevidence,
substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the
handling of the seized item is sufficient. 12This Court has
consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to
strictlycomply withthe requirementsunderSection 21ofR.A.
389 No.9165,suchprocedurallapseisnotfatalandwillnotrender
theitemsseizedinadmissibleinevidence.13Whatisof
_______________
12Peoplev.Cortez,611Phil.360,381;593SCRA743,764
(2009).
 13Peoplev.Almodiel,694Phil.449,467;680SCRA306,323
(2012);Peoplev.Campos,643Phil.668,673;629SCRA462,468
390
390 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.DelaCruz
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.14In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the
prosecutionmustbeabletopresentthroughrecordsortestimony,
thewhereaboutsofthedangerousdrugsfromthetimethesewere
seizedfromtheaccusedbythearrestingofficers;turnedoverto
the investigating officer; forwarded to the laboratory for
determinationoftheircomposition;anduptothetimetheseare
offeredinevidence.Foraslongasthechainofcustodyremains
unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural
requirementsprovidedforinSec.21ofR.A.No.9165werenot
faithfullyobserved,theguiltoftheaccusedwillnotbeaffected. 15
In the instant case, the failure to strictly comply with the
requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was satisfactorily
explained by the apprehending officers. They testified that a
commotioneruptedwhenaccusedappellantresistedandshouted
forhelpwhileshewasbeingarrested.Thecommotioneventually
gaveaccusedappellanttheopportunitytorunandeludearrest.
The arresting officers further alleged that the people who
gatheredaroundthemwerealreadyaggressivepromptingthem
to decide to immediately proceed to the police station for their
safety.16Infact,thearrestingofficersevenhadtofireawarning
shotandarrestArthurTabasaOrtega,
_______________
(2010),citingPeoplev.Concepcion,578Phil.957,971;556SCRA
421,436437(2008).
14Peoplev.Magundayao,683Phil.295,321;667SCRA310,
326(2012);Peoplev.Le,636Phil.586,598;622SCRA571,580
(2010), citingPeople v. De Leon, 624 Phil. 786, 801; 611 SCRA
118,133(2010),furthercitingPeoplev.Naquita,582Phil.422,
442;560SCRA430,448(2008);Peoplev.Concepcion,id.
15People v. Manlangit, 654 Phil. 427, 440441; 639 SCRA
455,469470(2011),citingPeoplev.Rosialda,643Phil.712,726;
629 SCRA 507, 522 (2010), further citingPeople v. Rivera, 590
Phil.894,912913;569SCRA879,899(2008).
16TSN,16September2008,p.6;TSN,21October2008,p.6.
391
VOL.802,SEPTEMBER7,2016 391
Peoplevs.DelaCruz
thepersonwhointervenedinthearrestofaccusedappellant,in
orderforthemtopacifythepeoplearoundthem.
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been
preservedunlessthereisashowingofbadfaith,illwill,orproof
that the evidence has been tampered with. Accusedappellant
bearstheburdenofshowingthattheevidencewastamperedor
meddledwithinordertoovercomethepresumptionofregularity
inthehandlingofexhibitsbypublicofficersandthepresumption
that public officers properly discharged their duties.17Accused
appellant in this casefailed to present any plausible reason to
imputeillmotiveonthepartofthearrestingofficers.Thus,the
testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve full faith and
credit.18In fact, accusedappellant did not even question the
credibilityoftheprosecutionwitnesses.Shesimplyanchoredher
defenseondenialandalibi.
Weaffirmthepenaltiesimposedastheyarewellwithinthe
ranges provided by law. Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
prescribes a penalty of life imprisonment to death 19and a fine
rangingfromP500,000.00toP10,000,000.00forthesaleofany
dangerousdrug,regardlessofthequantityorpurityinvolved.
WHEREFORE,thedecisiondated27September2013ofthe
Court of Appeals in C.A.G.R. CRH.C. No. 01103 is
herebyAFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.
Velasco,Jr.(Chairperson),PeraltaandLeonen,**JJ.,concur.
_______________
17Peoplev.Miranda,560Phil.795,810;534SCRA552,568
569(2007).
18SeePeoplev.Macabalang,538Phil.136,155;508SCRA
282,300(2006).
19Theimpositionofthedeathpenaltyhasbeenproscribed
withtheeffectivityofR.A.No.9346,otherwiseknownasAnAct
ProhibitingtheimpositionofDeathPenaltyinthePhilippines.
**Designated additional member per Raffledated 8 August
2016.
392
392 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.DelaCruz
Reyes,J.,OnWellnessLeave.
Judgmentaffirmed.
Notes.The lack of conclusive identification of the illegal
drugs allegedly seized from petitioner due to the failure of the
police to mark, inventory and photograph the seized plastic
sacheteffectivelynegatedthepresumptionofregularity.(People
vs.Sabdula,722SCRA90[2014])
The Prosecution cannot avoid confronting the issue of the
broken chain of custody by embellishing its case with the
presumption of regularity. (People vs. Angngao,752 SCRA531
[2015])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R.No.181045.July2,2014.*
SPOUSES EDUARDO and LYDIA SILOS, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINENATIONALBANK,respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is not the
function of the Supreme Court (SC) to reexamine or
reevaluate evidence adduced by the parties in the
proceedings below. The rule admits of certain well
recognized exceptions.Before anything else, it must be
saidthatitisnotthefunctionoftheCourttoreexamineor
reevaluate evidence adduced by the parties in the
proceedings below. The rule admits of certain well
recognizedexceptions,though,aswhenthelowercourts
findingsarenotsupportedbytheevidenceonrecordor
arebasedonamisapprehensionoffacts,orwhencertain
relevantandundisputedfactsweremanifestlyoverlooked
that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.Thiscasefallswithinsuchexceptions.
BanksandBanking;InterestRates;Inanumberofdecided
cases,theSupremeCourt(SC)struckdownprovisionsincredit
documents issued by Philippine National Bank (PNB) to, or
required of, its borrowers which allow the bank to increase or
decreaseinterestrateswithinthelimitsallowedbylawatany
timedependingonwhateverpolicyitmayadoptinthefuture.A
not factors which influence the fixing of interest rates to be
imposedonhim.Clearly,respondentsmethodoffixinginterest
ratesbasedon onesided, indeterminate,and subjectivecriteria
suchasprofitability,costofmoney,bankcosts,etc.isarbitrary
for there is no fixed standard or margin above or below these
considerations.
Same;Same;Anymodificationinthecontract,suchasthe
interestrates,mustbemadewiththeconsentofthecontracting
parties.Any modification in the contract, such as the interest
rates,mustbemadewiththeconsentofthecontractingparties.
The minds of all the parties must meet as to the proposed
modification,especiallywhenitaffectsanimportantaspectofthe
agreement.Inthecaseofloanagreements,therateofinterestis
aprincipalcondition,ifnotthemostimportantcomponent.Thus,
any modification thereof must be mutually agreed upon;
otherwise,ithasnobindingeffect.
Same; Same; Truth in Lending Act (R.A. No. 3765); The
Truth in Lending Act, or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3765, was
enactedtoprotectcitizensfromalackofawarenessofthetrue
costofcreditto
619
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 619
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
theuserbyusingafulldisclosureofsuchcostwithaviewof
preventing the uninformed use of credit to the detriment of the
national economy.Accordingly, petitioners are correct in
arguing that estoppel should not apply to them, for [e]stoppel
cannotbepredicatedonanillegalact.Asbetweenthepartiestoa
contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is
prohibitedbylaworisagainstpublicpolicy.Itappearsthatby
its acts, respondent violated the Truth in Lending Act, or
Republic Act No. 3765, which was enacted to protect xxx
citizensfromalackofawarenessofthetruecostofcredittothe
user by using a full disclosure of such cost with a view of
preventingtheuninformeduseofcredittothedetrimentofthe
nationaleconomy.Thelawgivesadetailedenumerationofthe
specificinformationrequiredtobedisclosed,amongwhicharethe
interest and other charges incident to the extension of credit.
Section 4thereof provides thata disclosure statement must be
furnishedpriortotheconsummationofthetransaction.
Same;Same;Same;Byrequiringthepetitionerstosignthe
credit documents and the promissory notes in blank, and then
unilaterally filling them up later on, respondent violated the
Truth in Lending Act, and was remiss in its disclosure
obligations.By requiring the petitioners to sign the credit
documents and the promissory notes in blank, and then
unilaterally filling them up later on, respondent violated the
Truth in Lending Act, and was remiss in its disclosure
obligations.
Same;Same;Same;Loanandcreditarrangementsmaybe
madeenticingby,orsweetenedwith,offersoflowinitialinterest
rates,butactuallyaccompaniedbyprovisionswritteninfineprint
thatallowlenderstolateronincreaseordecreaseinterestrates
unilaterally,withouttheconsentoftheborrower,anddepending
oncomplexandsubjectivefactors.Loanandcreditarrangements
maybemadeenticingby,orsweetenedwith,offersoflowinitial
interestrates,butactuallyaccompaniedbyprovisionswrittenin
fine print that allow lenders to later on increase or decrease
interestratesunilaterally,withouttheconsentoftheborrower,
anddependingoncomplexandsubjectivefactors.Becausethey
have been lured into these contracts by initially low interest
rates,borrowersgetcaughtandstuckinthewebofsubsequent
steepratesandpenalties,surchargesandthelike.Beingordinary
individualsorentities,theynaturallydreadlegalcomplications
andcannotaffordcourtlitiga
620
6 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
20
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
tion;theysuccumbtowhateverchargesthelendersimpose.
Attheveryleast,borrowersshouldbechargedrightly;butthen
againthisisnotpossibleinaonesidedcreditsystemwherethe
temptation to abuse is strong and the willingness to rectify is
madeweakbytheeternaldesireforprofit.
Same; Same; Starting July 1, 2013, the prevailing rate of
interestshallbe6%perannumpursuanttotheSupremeCourts
(SCs)rulinginNacarv.GalleryFrames,703SCRA439(2013)
and Bangko Sentral ng PilipinasMonetary Board Circular No.
799.With regard to interest, the Court finds that since the
escalationclauseisannulled,theprincipalamountoftheloanis
subject to the original or stipulated rate of interest, and upon
maturity,theamountdueshallbesubjecttolegalinterestatthe
rate of 12% per annum. This is the uniform ruling adopted in
previouscases,includingthosecitedhere.Theinterestspaidby
petitioners should be applied first to the payment of the
stipulatedorlegalandunpaidinterest,asthecasemaybe,and
later,tothecapitalorprincipal.Respondentshouldthenrefund
theexcessamountofinterestthatithasillegallyimposedupon
petitioners;[t]heamounttoberefundedreferstothatpaidby
petitioners when they had no obligation to do so. Thus, the
parties original agreement stipulated the payment of 19.5%
interest;however,thisratewasintendedtoapplyonlytothefirst
promissory note which expired onNovember 21, 1989 and was
paid by petitioners; it was not intended to apply to the whole
durationoftheloan.Subsequenthigherinterestrateshavebeen
declared illegal; but because only the rates are found to be
improper,theobligationtopayinterestsubsists,thesametobe
fixed at the legal rate of 12% per annum. However, the 12%
interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013. Starting July 1,
2013, the prevailing rate of interest shall be 6% per annum
pursuanttoourrulinginNacarv.GalleryFrames,703SCRA439
(2013)andBangkoSentralngPilipinasMonetaryBoardCircular
No.799.
RemedialLaw;CivilProcedure;Appeals;Itisanelementary
principleinthesubjectofappealsthatanappelleewhodoesnot
himself appeal cannot obtain from the appellate court any
affirmativereliefotherthanthosegrantedinthedecisionofthe
courtbelow.Withregardtoattorneysfees,itwasplainerrorfor
theCAtohavepassedupontheissuesinceitwasnotraisedby
the petitioners in their appeal; it was the respondent that
improperlybroughtitupin
621
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 621
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
 its appellees brief, when it should have interposed an
appeal,sincethetrialcourtsDecisiononthisissueisadverseto
it.Itisanelementaryprincipleinthesubjectofappealsthatan
appellee who does not himself appeal cannot obtain from the
appellatecourtanyaffirmativereliefotherthanthosegrantedin
thedecisionofthecourtbelow.xxx[A]nappellee,whoisatthe
sametimenotanappellant,mayonappealbepermittedtomake
counter assignments of error in ordinary actions, when the
purposeismerelytodefendhimselfagainstanappealinwhich
errorsareallegedtohavebeencommittedbythetrialcourtboth
intheappreciationoffactsandintheinterpretationofthelaw,in
order to sustain the judgment in his favor but not when his
purpose is to seek modification or reversal of the judgment, in
which case it is necessary for him to have excepted to and
appealedfromthejudgment.Sincepetitionersdidnotraisethe
issue of reduction of attorneys fees, the CA possessed no
authoritytopassuponitattheinstanceofrespondent.Theruling
ofthetrialcourtinthisrespectshouldremainundisturbed.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
StephenC.Arceoforpetitioners.
LynaB.BrotarloPascoforrespondent.
DELCASTILLO,J.:
In loan agreements, it cannot be denied that the rate of
interest is a principal condition, if not the most important
component. Thus, any modification thereof must be mutually
agreed upon; otherwise, ithas no binding effect. Moreover, the
Courtcannotconsiderastipulationgrantingapartytheoptionto
prepay the loan if said party is not agreeable to the arbitrary
interest rates imposed. Premium may not be placed upon a
stipulation in a contract which grants one party the right to
choosewhethertocontinuewithorwithdrawfromtheagreement
ifitdiscoversthatwhattheotherpartyhasbeendoingallalong
isimproperorillegal.622
622 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
ThisPetitionforReviewonCertiorari 1questionstheMay8,
2007Decision2oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inC.A.G.R.CVNo.
79650,whichaffirmedwithmodificationstheFebruary28,2003
Decision3andtheJune4,2003Order4oftheRegionalTrialCourt
(RTC),Branch6ofKalibo,AklaninCivilCaseNo.5975.
FactualAntecedents
SpousesEduardoandLydia Silos(petitioners) have beenin
businessforabouttwodecadesofoperatingadepartmentstore
and buying and selling of readytowear apparel. Respondent
Philippine National Bank (PNB) is a banking corporation
organizedandexistingunderPhilippinelaws.
To secure a oneyear revolving credit line of P150,000.00
obtained from PNB, petitioners constituted in August 1987
aRealEstateMortgage5overa370squaremeterlotinKalibo,
AklancoveredbyTransferCertificateofTitleNo.(TCT)T14250.
InJuly1988,thecreditlinewasincreasedtoP1.8millionandthe
mortgagewascorrespondinglyincreasedtoP1.8million. 6Andin
July 1989, aSupplementto the Existing Real Estate
Mortgage7wasexecutedtocoverthesamecreditline,whichwas
increasedtoP2.5million,andadditionalsecuritywasgiveninthe
form of a 134square meter lot covered by TCT T16208. In
addition,petitionersissuedeight
_______________
1Rollo,pp.945.
2Id.,atpp.4764;pennedbyAssociateJusticeFranciscoP.
AcostaandconcurredinbyExecutiveJusticeArsenioJ.Magpale
andAssociateJusticeAgustinS.Dizon.
 3Records,pp.361367;pennedbyJudgeNiovadyM.Marin.
4Rollo,pp.7273.
5Records,p.94.
6SeeWhereasClauseofSupplementtoExistingRealEstate
Mortgage,id.,atp.10.
7Id.,atpp.1011.
623
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 623
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
PromissoryNotes8andsignedaCreditAgreement.9ThisJuly
1989CreditAgreementcontainedastipulationoninterestwhich
providesasfollows:
1.03.Interest.(a)TheLoanshallbesubjecttointerest
attherateof19.5%perannum.Interestshallbepayablein
advanceeveryonehundredtwentydaysattherateprevailingat
thetimeoftherenewal.
(b)TheBorroweragreesthattheBankmaymodifythe
interest rate in the Loan depending on whatever policy
the Bank may adopt in the future, including without
limitation,theshiftingfromthefloatinginterestratesystemto
thefixedinterestratesystem,orviceversa.WheretheBankhas
imposedontheLoaninterestatarateperannum,whichisequal
totheBanksspreadoverthecurrentfloatinginterestrate,the
BorrowerherebyagreesthattheBankmay,withoutneed
ofnoticetotheBorrower,increaseordecreaseitsspread
overthe floatinginterest rateat anytimedependingon
whatever policy it may adopt in the future.10(Emphases
supplied)
TheeightPromissoryNotes,ontheotherhand,containeda
stipulationgrantingPNBtherighttoincreaseorreduceinterest
rates within the limits allowed by law or by the Monetary
Board.11TheRealEstateMortgageagreementprovidedthesame
righttoincreaseorreduceinterestratesatanytimedepending
onwhateverpolicyPNBmayadoptinthefuture.12
Petitioners religiously paid interest on the notes at the
followingrates:
1.1stPromissoryNotedatedJuly24,198919.5%;
_______________
8Rollo,p.148.
9Records,pp.4754.
10Id.,atp.47.
11Id.,atp.192.
12Id.,atp.74,dorsalportion.
624
624 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
2.2ndPromissoryNotedatedNovember22,198923%;
3.3rdPromissoryNotedatedMarch21,199022%;
4.4thPromissoryNotedatedJuly19,199024%;
5.5thPromissoryNotedatedDecember17,199028%;
6.6thPromissoryNotedatedFebruary14,199132%;
7.7thPromissoryNotedatedMarch1,199130%;and
8.8thPromissoryNotedatedJuly11,199124%.13
In August 1991, anAmendment to Credit
Agreement14was executed by the parties, with the following
stipulationregardinginterest:
1.03.Interest on Line Availments. (a)The Borrowers
agreetopayinterest on eachAvailmentfrom date of each
Availment up to but not including the date of full payment
thereofattherateperannumwhichisdetermined bythe
Banktobeprimerateplusapplicablespreadineffectasof
thedateofeachAvailment.15(Emphasessupplied)

Under this Amendment to Credit Agreement, petitioners
issued in favor of PNB the following 18 Promissory Notes,
whichpetitionerssettledexceptthelast(thenotecoveringthe
principal)atthefollowinginterestrates:
1.9thPromissoryNotedatedNovember8,199126%;
2.10thPromissoryNotedatedMarch19,199225%;
3.11thPromissoryNotedatedJuly11,199223%;
4.12thPromissoryNotedatedNovember10,199221%;
5.13thPromissoryNotedatedMarch15,199321%;
6.14thPromissoryNotedatedJuly12,199317.5%;
7.15thPromissoryNotedatedNovember17,199321%;
_______________
13Id.,atpp.192199.
14Id.,atpp.5558.
15Id.,atp.56.
625
VOL.728,JULY2,2014
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
8.16thPromissoryNotedatedMarch28,199421%;
9.17thPromissoryNotedatedJuly13,199421%;
10.18thPromissoryNotedatedNovember16,199416%;
11.19thPromissoryNotedatedApril10,199521%;
12.20thPromissoryNotedatedJuly19,199518.5%;
13.21stPromissory Note dated December 18, 1995
18.75%;
14.22ndPromissoryNotedatedApril22,199618.5%;
15.23rdPromissoryNotedatedJuly22,199618.5%;
16.24thPromissoryNotedatedNovember25,199618%;
17.25thPromissoryNotedatedMay30,199717.5%;and
18.26thPromissoryNote(PN9707237)datedJuly30,1997
25%.16
The 9thup to the 17thpromissory notes provide for the
paymentofinterestattheratetheBankmayatanytimewithout
notice,raisewithinthelimitsallowedbylawxxx.17Ontheother
hand, the 18thup to the 26thpromissory notes including PN
9707237, which is the 26thpromissory note carried the
followingprovision:
xxxForthispurpose,I/Weagreethattherateofinterest
herein stipulated may be increased or decreased forthe
subsequent Interest Periods, with prior notice to the
Borrower in the event of changes in interest rate
prescribedbylawortheMonetaryBoardofthe Central
Bank of thePhilippines, orin the Banks overall cost of
funds. I/We hereby agree that in the event I/we are not
agreeabletotheinterestratefixedforanyInterestPeriod,
I/we shall have the option to prepay the loan or credit
facilitywithoutpenaltywithinten(10)
625 _______________
16Id.,atpp.174191.
17Id.,atp.191.
626
626 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
calendar days from the Interest Setting
Date.18(Emphasissupplied)
Respondent regularly renewed the line from 1990 up to
1997, and petitioners made good on the promissory notes,
religiouslypayingtheinterestswithoutobjectionorfail.Butin
1997,petitionersfalteredwhentheinterestratessoareddueto
the Asian financial crisis. Petitioners sole outstanding
promissorynoteforP2.5millionPN9707237executedinJuly
1997 anddue 120 days lateror on October 28, 1997 became
past due, and despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to
makegoodonthenote.
Incidentally,PN9707237providedforthepenaltyequivalent
to24%perannumincaseofdefault,asfollows:
Withoutneedfornoticeordemand,failuretopaythisnoteor
anyinstallmentthereon,whendue,shallconstitutedefaultand
in such cases or in case of garnishment, receivership or
bankruptcyorsuitofanykindfiledagainstme/usbytheBank,
theoutstandingprincipalofthisnote,attheoptionoftheBank
and without prior notice of demand, shall immediately become
dueandpayableandshallbesubjecttoapenaltychargeof
twentyfour percent (24%)per annumbased on the
defaultedprincipalamount.xxx19(Emphasissupplied)
PNBpreparedaStatementofAccount 20asofOctober12,
1998,detailingtheamountdueanddemandablefrompetitioners
inthetotalamountofP3,620,541.60,brokendownasfollows:
PrincipalP2,500,000.00 T14250andT16208becameunnecessaryandwrongful.Asfor
Interest538,874.94 theimposedpenaltyofP581,666.66,petitionersallegedthatsince
_______________
18Id.,atp.174.
19Id.
20Id.,atp.12.
627
VOL.728,JULY2,2014
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
Penalties581,666.66 _______________
TotalP3,620,541.60
Despite demand, petitioners failed to pay the foregoing
amount.Thus,PNBforeclosedonthemortgage,andonJanuary
14,1999,TCTsT14250andT16208weresoldtoitatauctionfor
theamountofP4,324,172.96.21Thesheriffscertificateofsalewas
registeredonMarch11,1999.
Morethanayearlater,oronMarch24,2000,petitionersfiled
Civil CaseNo. 5975, seeking annulmentof theforeclosure sale
andanaccountingofthePNBcredit.Petitionerstheorizedthat
afterthefirstpromissorynotewheretheyagreedtopay19.5%
interest,thesucceedingstipulationsforthepaymentofinterestin
their loan agreements with PNB which allegedly left to the
latterthesolewilltodeterminetheinterestratebecamenull
andvoid.Petitionersaddedthatbecausetheinterestrateswere
fixed by respondent without their prior consent or agreement,
theseratesarevoid,andasaresult,petitionersshouldonlybe
made liable for interestatthelegalrateof 12%.Theyclaimed
furtherthattheyoverpaidinterestsonthecredit,andconcluded
thatduetothisoverpaymentofsteepinterestcharges,theirdebt
shouldnowbedeemedpaid,andtheforeclosureandsaleofTCTs
the Real Estate Mortgage and the Supplement thereto did not
includepenaltiesaspartofthesecuredamount,thesameshould
beexcludedfromtheforeclosureamountorbidprice,evenifsuch
penalties are provided for in the final Promissory Note, or PN
9707237.22
In addition, petitioners sought to be reimbursed an alleged
627
overpaymentofP848,285.00madeduringtheperiodAugust21,
1991toMarch5,1998,resultingfromrespondentsimpo
21Id.,atp.13.
22Id.,atpp.6870.
628
628 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
sition of the alleged illegal and steep interest rates. They also 25Id.,atp.165.
prayedtobeawardedP200,000.00bywayofattorneysfees. 23 26Id.,atp.149.
InitsAnswer,24PNBdeniedthatitunilaterallyimposedorfixed 629
interestrates;thatpetitionersagreedthatwithoutpriornotice,
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 629
PNB may modify interest rates depending on future policy
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
adopted by it; and that the imposition of penalties was agreed
allPromissoryNotessheandEduardoissuedwerealwaysleftin
upon in the Credit Agreement. It added that the imposition of
blank when they executed them, with respondents mere
penalties is supported by the allinclusive clause in the Real
assurancethatitwouldbetheonetoenterorindicatethereonthe
Estate Mortgage agreement which provides that the mortgage
prevailinginterestrateatthetimeofavailment;andthatthey
shall stand as security for any and all other obligations of
agreedtosuch arrangement. Shefurthertestified thatthetwo
whatever kind and nature owing to respondent, which thus
RealEstateMortgageagreementsshesigneddidnotstipulatethe
includes penalties imposed upon default or nonpayment of the
payment of penalties; that she and Eduardo consulted with a
principalandinterestonduedate.
lawyer,andweretoldthatPNBsactionswereimproper,andso
On pretrial, the parties mutually agreed to the following
on March 20, 2000, they wrote to the latter seeking a
materialfacts,amongothers:
recomputationoftheiroutstandingobligation;andwhenPNBdid
a)Thatsince1991upto1998,petitionershadpaidPNBthe
notoblige,theyinstitutedCivilCaseNo.5975.27
totalamountofP3,484,287.00;25and
On crossexamination, Lydia testified that she has been in
b)ThatPNBsent,andpetitionersreceived,aMarch10,2000
business for 20 years; that she also borrowed from other
demandletter.26
individualsandanotherbank;thatitwasonlywithbanksthat
Duringtrial,petitionerLydiaSilos(Lydia)testifiedthatthe
shewasaskedtosignloandocumentswithnoindicatedinterest
Credit Agreement, the Amendment to Credit Agreement, Real
rate; that she did not bother to read the terms of the loan
EstateMortgageandtheSupplementtheretowereallprepared
documentswhichshesigned;andthatshereceivedseveralPNB
byrespondentPNBandwerepresentedtoherandherhusband
statementsofaccountdetailingtheiroutstandingobligations,but
Eduardoonlyforsignature;thatshewastoldbyPNBthatthe
shedidnotcomplain;thatsheassumedinsteadthatwhatwas
latter alone would determine the interest rate; that as to the
writtenthereiniscorrect.28
AmendmenttoCreditAgreement,shewastoldthatPNBwould
For his part, PNB Kalibo Branch Manager Diosdado Aspa, Jr.
fill up the interest rate portion thereof; that at the time the
(Aspa), the sole witness for respondent, stated on cross
partiesexecutedthesaidCreditAgreement,shewasnotinformed
examinationthatasapractice, the determination ofthe prime
about the applicable spread that PNB would impose on her
ratesofinterestwastheresponsibilitysolelyofPNBsTreasury
account;thattheinterestrateportionof
Department which is based in Manila; that these prime rates
_______________
were simply communicated to all PNB branches for
23Id.,atp.71.
implementation; that there are a multitude of considerations
24Id.,atpp.3743.
which determine the interest rate, such as the cost of money,
foreigncurrencyvalues,PNBsspread,bankadministrativecosts,
profitability, and the practice in the banking industry; that in
everyrepricingofeachloanavailment,theborrowerhastheright
toquestiontherates,butthatthiswas
_______________
27Rollo,pp.5152.
28Id.,atp.52.
630
630 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
notdonebythepetitioners;andthatanythingthatisnotfoundin
the Promissory Note may be supplemented by the Credit
Agreement.29
RulingoftheRegionalTrialCourt
On February 28, 2003, the trial court rendered judgment
dismissingCivilCaseNo.5975.30Itruledthat:
1.While the Credit Agreement allows PNB to unilaterally
increase its spread over the floating interest rate at any time
depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future, it
likewiseallowsforthedecreaseatanytimeofthesame.Thus,
such stipulation authorizing both the increase and decrease of
interest rates as may be applicable is valid, 31as was held in
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v.
CourtofAppeals;32
_______________
29Id.,atpp.5253.
30Records,pp.361367;pennedbyJudgeNiovadyM.Marin.
31Id.,atpp.365366.
32408 Phil. 803, 811812; 356 SCRA 671, 679 (2001). The
Courtthereinheld:
While it may be acceptable, for practical reasons given the
fluctuating economic conditions, for banks to stipulate that
interest rates on a loan not be fixed and instead be made
dependent upon prevailing market conditions, there should
always be a reference rate upon which to peg such variable
interestrates.Anexampleofsuchavalidvariableinterestrate
wasfoundinPolotan,Sr.v.CourtofAppeals.Inthatcase,the
contractualprovisionstatingthatifthereoccursanychangein
theprevailing marketrates, thenew interest rate shallbe the
guiding rate in computing the interest due on the outstanding
obligationwithoutneedofservingnoticetotheCardholderother
thantherequiredpostingonthemonthlystatementservedtothe
Cardholderwasconsideredvalid.Theaforequotedprovisionwas
upheldnotwithstandingthatitmaypartakeofthenatureofan
escalation clause,becauseat the same timeit provides for
the decrease in the interest rate in case the prevailing
marketratesdictateitsreduction.Inotherwords,unlikethe
stipulationsubjectoftheinstantcase,theinterestrate
631
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 631
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
2.Banks are allowed to stipulate that interest rates on
loans need not be fixed and instead be made dependent on
prevailingratesuponwhichtopegsuchvariableinterestrates; 33
3.ThePromissoryNote,astheprincipalcontractevidencing
petitionersloan,prevailsovertheCreditAgreementandtheReal
Estate Mortgage. As such, the rate of interest, penalties and
attorneys fees stipulated in the Promissory Note prevail over
those mentioned in the Credit Agreement and the Real Estate
Mortgageagreements;34
4.Roughly, PNBs computation of the total amount of
petitionersobligationiscorrect;35
 5.Becausetheloanwasadmittedlydueanddemandable,the
foreclosurewasregularlymade;36
6.By the admission of petitioners during pretrial, all
payments made toPNB wereproperlyapplied totheprincipal,
interestandpenalties.37
ThedispositiveportionofthetrialcourtsDecisionreads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
renderedinfavoroftherespondentandagainstthepetitionersby
DISMISSINGthelatterspetition.
Costsagainstthepetitioners.
_______________
involvedinthePolotan caseis designedto bebased on the
prevailing market rate. On the other hand, a stipulation
ostensiblysignifyinganagreementtoanyincreaseordecreasein
theinterestrate,withoutmore,cannotbeacceptedbythisCourt
asvalidforitleavessolelytothecreditorthedeterminationof
what interest rate to charge against an outstanding loan.
(Emphasissupplied)
33Records,p.365.
34Id.,atp.366.
35Id.
36Id.
37Id.,atp.367.
632
632 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
SOORDERED. 38
Petitioners moved for reconsideration. In an Order39dated
June4,2003,thetrialcourtgrantedonlyamodificationinthe
award of attorneys fees, reducing the same from 10% to 1%.
Thus, PNB was ordered to refund to petitioner the excess in
attorneysfeesintheamountofP356,589.90,viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered upholding the
validityoftheinterestratechargedbytherespondentaswellas
the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and the Certificate of
Sale.However,respondentisdirectedtorefundtothepetitioner
the amount of P356,589.90 representing the excess interest
chargedagainstthelatter.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.40
RulingoftheCourtofAppeals
PetitionersappealedtotheCA,whichissuedthequestioned
Decisionwiththefollowingdecretalportion:
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,theinstantappealis
PARTLYGRANTED.ThemodifiedDecisionoftheRegionalTrial
CourtperOrderdatedJune4,2003isherebyAFFIRMEDwith
MODIFICATIONS,towit:
1.[T]hattheinterestratetobeappliedaftertheexpiration
ofthefirst30dayinterestperiodforPNNo.9707237shouldbe
12%perannum;
2.[T]hattheattorneysfeesof10%isvalidandbinding;and
_______________
38Id.
39Rollo,pp.7273.
40Id.,atp.73.
633
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 633
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
3.[T]hat[PNB]isherebyorderedtoreimburse[petitioners]
theexcessinthebidpriceofP377,505.99whichisthedifference
betweenthetotalamountdue[PNB]andtheamountofitsbid
price.
SOORDERED.41
Ontheotherhand,respondentdidnotappealtheJune4,
2003 Order of the trial court which reduced its award of
attorneysfees.Itsimplyraisedtheissueinitsappelleesbriefin
theCA,andincludedaprayerforthereversalofsaidOrder.
Ineffect, theCAlimitedpetitionersappealtothefollowing
issues:
1)Whetherxxxtheinterestratesonpetitionersoutstanding
obligationwereunilaterallyandarbitrarilyimposedbyPNB;
2)Whetherxxxthepenaltychargesweresecuredbythereal
estatemortgage;and
3)Whether xxx the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale are
valid.42
TheCAnotedthat,basedonreceiptspresentedbypetitioners
duringtrial,thelatterdutifullypaidatotalofP3,027,324.60in
interestfortheperiodAugust7,1991toAugust6,1997,overand
abovetheP2.5millionprincipalobligation.Andthisisexclusive
ofpaymentsforinsurancepremiums,documentarystamptaxes,
andpenalty.Allthewhile,petitionersdidnotcomplainnorobject
totheimpositionofinterest;theyinfactpaidthesamereligiously
andwithoutfailforsevenyears.Theappellatecourtruledthat
petitionersarethusestoppedfromquestioningthesame.
TheCAneverthelessnotedthatfortheperiodJuly30,1997to
August14,1997,PNBwronglyappliedaninterest
_______________
41Id.,atpp.6364.
42Id.,atp.55.
634
634 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
rate of 25.72% instead of the agreed 25%; thus it overcharged
petitioners,andthelatterpaid,anexcessofP736.56ininterest.
Ontheissueofpenalties,theCAruledthattheexpresstenor
of the Real Estate Mortgage agreements contemplated the
inclusion of the PN 9707237 stipulated 24% penalty in the
amounttobesecuredbythemortgagedproperty,thus
Forandinconsiderationofcertainloans,overdraftsandother
creditaccommodationsobtainedfromtheMORTGAGEEandto
secure the payment of the same andthose others that the
MORTGAGEEmayextendtotheMORTGAGOR,including
interestandexpenses,andotherobligationsowingbythe
MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE, whether direct or
indirect, principal or secondary, as appearing in the
accounts, books and records of the MORTGAGEE, the
MORTGAGOR does hereby transfer and convey by way of
mortgageuntotheMORTGAGEExxx.43(Emphasissupplied)
The CA believes that the 24% penalty is covered by the
phrase and other obligations owing by the mortgagor to the
mortgageeandshouldthusbeaddedtotheamountsecuredby
the mortgages.44The CA then proceeded to declare valid the
foreclosureandsaleofpropertiescoveredbyTCTsT14250andT
16208,whichcameasanecessaryresultofpetitionersfailureto
paytheoutstandingobligationupondemand. 45TheCAsawfitto
increasethetrialcourtsawardof1%to10%,findingthelatter
rate to be reasonable and citing the Real Estate Mortgage
agreementwhichauthorizedthecollectionofthehigherrate.46
_______________
43Records,p.74.
44Rollo,p.61.
45Id.,atpp.6162.
46Id.,atp.62.
635
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 635
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
 Finally, the CA ruled that petitioners are entitled to
P377,505.09surplus,whichisthedifferencebetweenPNBsbid
priceofP4,324,172.96andpetitionerstotalcomputedobligation
as of January 14, 1999, or the date of the auction sale, in the
amountofP3,946,667.87.47
Hence,thepresentPetition.
Issues
ThefollowingissuesareraisedinthisPetition:
I II
A.THE COURT OF APPEALS AS WELL AS THE LOWER
COURTERREDINNOTNULLIFYINGTHEINTERESTRATE
PROVISIONINTHECREDITAGREEMENTDATEDJULY24,
1989 XXX AND IN THE AMENDMENT TO CREDIT
AGREEMENTDATEDAUGUST21,1991XXXWHICHLEFT
TO THE SOLE UNILATERAL DETERMINATION OF THE
RESPONDENT PNB THE ORIGINAL FIXING OF INTEREST
RATE AND ITS INCREASE, WHICH AGREEMENT IS
CONTRARYTOLAW,ART.1308OFTHE[NEWCIVILCODE],
AS ENUNCIATED IN PONCIANO ALMEIDA V. COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. [NO.] 113412, APRIL 17, 1996, AND
CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY AND PUBLIC INTEREST,
ANDINAPPLYINGTHEPRINCIPLEOFESTOPPELARISING
FROM THE ALLEGED DELAYED COMPLAINT OF
PETITIONER[S],AND[THEIR]PAYMENTOFTHEINTEREST
CHARGED.
B.CONSEQUENTLY,THECOURTOFAPPEALSANDTHE
LOWERCOURTERREDINNOTDECLARINGTHATPNBIS
NOT AT ALL ENTITLED TO ANY INTEREST EXCEPT THE
LEGAL RATE FROM DATE OF DEMAND, AND IN NOT
APPLYINGTHEEXCESSOVERTHELEGAL
_______________
47Id.,atp.63.
636
636 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
RATE OF THE ADMITTED PAYMENTS MADE BY
PETITIONER[S]FROM19911998INTHEADMITTEDTOTAL
AMOUNT OF P3,484,287.00, TO PAYMENT OF THE
PRINCIPALOFP2,500,000.[00]LEAVINGANOVERPAYMENT
OF P984,287.00 REFUNDABLE BY RESPONDENT TO
PETITIONER[S]WITHINTERESTOF12%PERANNUM.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LOWER COURT
ERREDINHOLDINGTHATPENALTIESAREINCLUDEDIN
THE SECURED AMOUNT, SUBJECT TO FORECLOSURE,
WHENNOPENALTIESAREMENTIONED[NOR]PROVIDED
FOR IN THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE AS A SECURED
AMOUNTANDTHEREFORETHEAMOUNTOFPENALTIES
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM [THE]
FORECLOSUREAMOUNT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE
RULING OF THE LOWER COURT, WHICH REDUCED THE
ATTORNEYSFEESOF10%OFTHETOTALINDEBTEDNESS
CHARGED IN THE XXX EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
TOONLY1%,AND[AWARDING]10%ATTORNEYSFEES.48
PetitionersArguments
PetitionersinsistthattheinterestrateprovisionintheCredit
AgreementandtheAmendmenttoCreditAgreementshouldbe
declarednullandvoid,fortheyrelegatedtoPNBthesolepower
tofixinterestratesbasedonarbitrarycriteriaorfactorssuchas
bankpolicy,profitability,costofmoney,foreigncurrencyvalues,
andbankadministrativecosts;spacesforinterestratesinthetwo
CreditAgreementsand
_______________
 48Id.,atpp.2324.
637
VOL.728,JULY2,2014
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
thepromissorynoteswereleftblankforPNBtounilaterallyfill,
and their consent or agreement to the interest rates imposed
thereafterwasnotobtained;theinterestrate,whichconsistsof
the prime rate plus the bank spread, is determined not by
agreementofthepartiesbutbyPNBsTreasuryDepartmentin
Manila. Petitioners conclude that by this method of fixing the
interestrates,theprincipleofmutualityofcontractsisviolated,
and public policy as well as Circular 905 49of the then Central
Bank had been breached. Petitioners question the CAs
applicationoftheprincipleofestoppel, saying that noestoppel
can proceed from an illegal act. Though they failed to timely
questiontheimpositionoftheallegedillegalinterestratesand
continuedtopaytheloanonthebasisoftheserates,theycannot
bedeemedtohaveacquiesced,andhencecouldrecoverwhatthey
erroneouslypaid.50
Petitionersarguethatiftheinterestrateswerenullified,then
theirobligationtoPNBisdeemedextinguishedasofJuly1997;
moreover,itwouldappearthattheyevenmadeanoverpayment
tothebankintheamountofP984,287.00.
Next,petitionerssuggestthatsincetheRealEstateMortgage
agreements did not include nor specify, as part of the secured
amount, the penalty of 24% authorized in PN 9707237, such
amount of P581,666.66 could not be made answerable by or
collected from the mortgages covering TCTs T14250 and T
16208. Claiming support fromPhilippine Bank of
Communications[PBCom]v.CourtofAppeals,51petitionersinsist
thatthephraseandotherobligationsowingbythe
_______________
49Whichremovedtheceilingoninterestratesforsecuredand
unsecuredloans,regardlessofmaturity(Section1),butrequired
637 that the rate of interest on a floating rate loan during each
interestperiodshallbestatedonthebasisofareferencerateplus
amarginasmaybeagreeduponbytheparties(Section7).
50Rollo, p. 167, citing United Coconut Planters Bank v.
SpousesBeluso,557Phil.326;530SCRA567(2007).
51323Phil.297;253SCRA241(1996).
638
638 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
mortgagortothemortgagee52inthemortgageagreementscannot
embracetheP581,666.66penalty,because,asheldinthePBCom
case, [a] penalty charge does not belong to the species of
obligationsenumeratedinthemortgage,hence,thesaidcontract
cannot be understood to secure the penalty;53while the
mortgages are the accessory contracts, what items are secured
may only be determined from the provisions of the mortgage
contracts,andnotfromtheCreditAgreementorthepromissory
notes.
Finally, petitioners submit that the trial courts award of 1%
attorneysfeesshouldbemaintained,giventhatinforeclosures,a
lawyersworkconsistsmerelyinthepreparationandfilingofthe
petition,andinvolvesminimalstudy. 54Toallowtheimpositionof
a staggering P396,211.00 for such work would be contrary to
equity. Petitioners state that the purpose of attorneys fees in
cases of this nature is not to give respondent a larger
compensation for the loan than the law already allows, but to
protectitagainstanyfuturelossordamagebybeingcompelledto
retain counsel x x x to institute judicial proceedings for the
collectionofitscredit.55Andbecausetheinstantcaseinvolvesa
simpleextrajudicialforeclosure,attorneysfeesmaybeequitably
tempered.
RespondentsArguments
For its part, respondent disputes petitioners claim that
interestrateswereunilaterallyfixedbyit,takingreliefintheCA
pronouncement that petitioners are deemed estopped by their
failuretoquestiontheimposedratesandtheircontin
_______________
52Records,p.74.
53Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of
Appeals,supranote51atp.313;p.254.
54CitingMambulaoLumberCo.v.PhilippineNationalBank,
130Phil.366,380381;22SCRA359,372(1968).
55CitingNew Sampaguita Builders Construction, Inc. v.
PhilippineNationalBank,479Phil.483,510;435SCRA565,592
(2004).
639
VOL.728,JULY2,2014
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
uedpaymentthereofwithoutopposition.Itaddsthatbecausethe
Credit Agreement and promissory notes contained both an
escalationclauseandadeescalationclause,itmaynotbesaid
that the bank violated the principle of mutuality. Besides, the
increaseordecreaseininterestrateshavebeenmutuallyagreed
uponbytheparties,asshownbypetitionerscontinuouspayment
without protest. Respondent adds that the alleged unilateral
impositionofinterestratesisnotapropersubjectforreviewby
theCourtbecausetheissuewasneverraisedinthelowercourt.
Asforpetitionersclaimthatinterestratesimposedbyitare
nullandvoidforthereasonsthat1)theCreditAgreementsand
thepromissorynotesweresignedinblank;2)interestrateswere
atshortperiods;3)nointerestratescouldbechargedwhereno
agreementoninterestrateswasmadeinwriting;4)PNBfixed
interestratesonthebasisofarbitrarypoliciesandstandardsleft
to its choosing; and 5) interest rates based on prime rate plus
applicable spread are indeterminate and arbitrary PNB
counters:
a.ThatCreditAgreementsandpromissorynotesweresigned
bypetitioner[s]inblankRespondentclaimsthatthisissuewas
never raisedinthe lower court. Besides, documentaryevidence
prevailsovertestimonialevidence;LydiaSilostestimonyinthis
regardisselfserving,unsupportedanduncorroborated,andfor
beingtheloneevidenceonthisissue.Thefactremainsthatthese
documents are in proper form, presumed regular, and endure,
against arbitrary claims by Silos who is an experienced
businesspersonthatshesignedquestionableloandocuments
whoseprovisionsforinterestrateswereleftblank,andyetshe
continued topay the interests without protest for a number of
years.56
_______________
639 56Rollo,pp.100,102.
640
640 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
b.ThatinterestrateswereatshortperiodsRespondent
argues that the law which governs and prohibits changes in
interestratesmademorethanonceeverytwelvemonthshasbeen
removed57withtheissuanceofPresidentialDecreeNo.858.58
c.Thatnointerestratescouldbechargedwherenoagreement
oninterestrateswasmadeinwritinginviolationofArticle1956
oftheCivilCode, whichprovidesthatnointerestshall be due
unlessithasbeenexpresslystipulatedinwritingRespondent
insists that the stipulated 25%per annumas embodied in PN
9707237shouldbeimposedduringtheinterim,ortheperiodafter
theloanbecamedueandwhileitremainsunpaid,andnotthe
legalinterestof12%asclaimedbypetitioners. 59
 d.That PNB fixed interest rates on the basis of arbitrary
policies and standards left to its choosing According to
respondent, interest rates were fixed taking into consideration
increases or decreases as provided by law or by the Monetary
Board,thebanksoverallcostsoffunds,anduponagreementof
theparties.60
e.That interest rates based on prime rate plus applicable
spread are indeterminate and arbitrary On this score,
respondent submits there are various factors that influence
interestrates,frompoliticaleventstoeconomicdevelopments,
_______________
57Id.,atp.103.
58Amending Further Act Numbered Two Thousand Six
Hundred FiftyFive, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the
UsuryLaw.
59Rollo,pp.103104.
60Id.,atpp.104105.
641
VOL.728,JULY2,2014
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
etc.; the cost of money, profitability and foreign currency
transactionsmaynotbediscounted.61
On the issue of penalties, respondent reiterates the trial
courtsfindingthatduringpretrial,petitionersadmittedthatthe
Statementof AccountasofOctober12, 1998 whichdetailed
and included penalty charges as part of the total outstanding
obligationowingtothebankwascorrect.Respondentjustifies
the impositionand collectionofa penaltyas anormalbanking
practice, and the standard rate per annum for all commercial
banks,atthetime,was24%.Respondentaddsthatthepurposeof
the penalty or a penal clause for that matter is to ensure the
performanceoftheobligationandsubstitutefordamagesandthe
payment of interest in the event of noncompliance. 62And the
promissorynotebeingtheprincipalagreementasopposedto
themortgage,whichisamereaccessoryshouldprevail.This
beingthecase,itsinclusionaspartofthesecuredamountinthe
mortgageagreementsisvalidandnecessary.
Regarding the foreclosure of the mortgages, respondent
accusespetitionersofpreemptingconsolidationofitsownership
overTCTsT14250andT16208;thatpetitionersfiledCivilCase
No. 5975 ostensibly to question the foreclosure and sale of
propertiescoveredbyTCTsT14250andT16208inadesperate
move to retain ownership over these properties, because they
failedtotimelyredeemthem.
RespondentdirectstheattentionoftheCourttoitspetitionin
G.R.No.181046,63wheretheproprietyoftheCAsrulingonthe
followingissuesissquarelyraised:
_______________
61Id.,atpp.106107.
62CitingArticle1226oftheCivilCodeandParas,CivilCode
of the Philippines Annotated (Commentaries) Vol. IV, p. 298,
641
1989,12thedition.
63Philippine National Bank, petitioner, versusSpouses
EduardoandLydiaSilos,respondents.
642
642 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
1.Thattheinterestratetobeappliedaftertheexpirationof
thefirst30dayinterestperiodforPN9707237shouldbe12%per
annum;and
2.That PNB should reimburse petitioners the excess in the
bidpriceofP377,505.99whichisthedifferencebetweenthetotal
amountduetoPNBandtheamountofitsbidprice.
OurRuling
 TheCourtgrantsthePetition.
Beforeanythingelse,itmustbesaidthatitisnotthefunction
oftheCourttoreexamineorreevaluateevidenceadducedbythe
partiesintheproceedingsbelow.Theruleadmitsofcertainwell
recognizedexceptions,though,aswhenthelowercourtsfindings
arenotsupported by the evidence on recordorarebasedon a
misapprehension of facts, or when certain relevant and
undisputed facts were manifestly overlooked that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. This case falls
withinsuchexceptions.
The Court notes that on March 5, 2008, a Resolution was
issuedbytheCourtsFirstDivisiondenyingrespondentspetition
in G.R. No. 181046, due to late filing, failure to attach the
requiredaffidavitofserviceofthepetitiononthetrialcourtand
the petitioners, and submission of a defective verification and
certificationofnonforumshopping.OnJune25,2008,theCourt
issued another Resolution denying with finality respondents
motionforreconsiderationoftheMarch5,2008Resolution.And
on August 15, 2008, entry of judgment was made. This thus
settlestheissues,asabovestated,coveringa)theinterestrate
or12%perannumthatappliesuponexpirationofthefirst30
daysinterestperiodprovidedunderPN9707237,andb)theCAs
decreethatPNBshouldreimbursepetitionertheexcessinthebid
priceofP377,505.09.
It appears that respondents practice, more than once
proscribedbytheCourt,hasbeencarriedoveroncemoretothe
643
VOL.728,JULY2,2014
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
petitioners.Inanumberofdecidedcases,theCourtstruckdown
provisionsincreditdocumentsissuedbyPNBto,orrequiredof,
its borrowers which allow the bank to increase or decrease
interest rates within the limits allowed by law at any time
dependingonwhateverpolicyitmayadoptinthefuture.Thus,
inPhilippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals,64such
stipulationandsimilaronesweredeclaredinviolationofArticle
130865of the Civil Code. In a second case,Philippine National
Bankv.CourtofAppeals,66theverysamestipulationsfoundin
the credit agreement and the promissory notes prepared and
issued by the respondent were again invalidated. The Court
thereinsaid:
TheCreditAgreementprovidedinteralia,that
(a)TheBANKreservestherighttoincreasetheinterest
rate within the limits allowed by law at any time
depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the
future;Provided, that the interest rate on this
accommodation shall be correspondingly decreased in the
eventthattheapplicablemaximuminterestisreducedbylaw
orbytheMonetaryBoard.Ineithercase,theadjustmentin
the interest rate agreed upon shall take effect on the
effectivity date of the increase or decrease in the maximum
interestrate.
ThePromissory Note, in turn,authorized the PNB to
raise the rate of interest, at any time without notice,
beyond the stipulated rate of 12% but only within the
limitsallowedbylaw.
TheRealEstateMortgagecontractlikewiseprovidedthat
_______________
643
64273Phil.789,796797,799;196SCRA536,543(1991).
65Art. 1308.The contract must bind both contracting
parties;itsvalidityorcompliancecannotbelefttothewillofone
ofthem.
66G.R.No.107569,November8,1994,238SCRA20.
 644
644 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
(k)INCREASE OF INTEREST RATE:The rate of interest
chargedontheobligationsecuredbythismortgageaswellas
theinterestontheamountwhichmayhavebeenadvancedby
the MORTGAGEE, in accordance with the provision
hereof,shallbesubjectduringthelifeofthiscontractto
suchanincreasewithintherateallowedbylaw,asthe
BoardofDirectorsoftheMORTGAGEEmayprescribe
foritsdebtors.
xxxx
Inmakingtheunilateralincreasesininterestrates,petitioner
bank relied on the escalation clause contained in their credit
agreementwhichprovides,asfollows:
TheBankreservestherighttoincreasetheinterestratewithin
thelimitsallowedbylawatanytimedependingonwhatever
policyitmayadoptinthefutureandprovided,that,the
interestrateonthisaccommodationshallbecorrespondingly
decreasedintheeventthattheapplicablemaximuminterest
rateis reducedbylaw orbytheMonetary Board. Ineither
case, the adjustment in the interest rate agreed upon shall
takeeffectontheeffectivitydateoftheincreaseordecreasein
maximuminterestrate.
ThisclauseisauthorizedbySection2ofPresidentialDecree
(P.D.)No.1684whichfurtheramendedActNo.2655(TheUsury
Law),asamended,thus:
Section2.The same Act is hereby amended by adding a new
sectionafterSection7,toreadasfollows:
Sec.7a.Parties to an agreement pertaining to a loan or
forbearanceofmoney,goodsorcreditsmaystipulatethattherate
ofinterestagreeduponmaybein645
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 645
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
creasedintheeventthattheapplicablemaximumrateofinterest
is increased by law or by the Monetary Board;Provided, That
suchstipulationshallbevalidonlyifthereisalsoastipulationin
the agreement that the rate of interest agreed upon shall be
reducedintheeventthattheapplicablemaximumrateofinterest
is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board;Provided,further,
Thattheadjustmentintherateofinterestagreeduponshalltake
effectonoraftertheeffectivityoftheincreaseordecreaseinthe
maximumrateofinterest.
Section1ofP.D.No.1684alsoempoweredtheCentralBanks
MonetaryBoardtoprescribethemaximumratesofinterestfor
loansandcertainforbearances.Pursuanttosuchauthority,the
Monetary Board issued Central Bank (C.B.) Circular No. 905,
Seriesof1982,Section5ofwhichprovides:
Sec.5.Section 1303 of the Manual of Regulations (for Banks
and Other Financial Intermediaries) is hereby amended to
readasfollows:
Sec.1303.Interest and Other Charges.The rate of interest,
includingcommissions,premiums,feesandothercharges,on
any loan, or forbearance of any money, goods or credits,
regardless of maturity and whether secured or unsecured,
shall not be subject to any ceiling prescribed under or
pursuanttotheUsuryLaw,asamended.
P.D.No.1684andC.B.CircularNo.905nomorethanallow
contractingpartiestostipulatefreelyregardinganysubsequent
adjustment in the interest rate that shall accrue on a loan or
forbearanceofmoney,goodsor
646
646 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
credits.Infine,theycanagreetoadjust,upwardordownward,
the interest previously stipulated.However, contrary to the
stubborn insistence of petitioner bank, the said lawand
circular did not authorize either party to unilaterally
raisetheinterestratewithouttheothersconsent.
It is basic that there can be no contract in the true
sense in the absence of the element of agreement, or of
mutualassentoftheparties.Ifthisassentiswantingon
the part of the one who contracts, his act has no more
efficacy than if it had been done under duress or by a
personofunsoundmind.
Similarly,contract changes must be made with the
consent of the contracting parties. The minds of all the
parties must meet as to the proposed modification,
especially when it affects an important aspect of the
agreement. In the case of loan contracts, it cannot be
gainsaid that the rate of interest is always a vital
component,for itcan makeor breaka capitalventure.Thus,
anychangemustbemutuallyagreedupon,otherwise,itisbereft
ofanybindingeffect.
We cannot countenance petitioner banks posturing
thattheescalationclauseatbenchgivesitunbridledright
to unilaterally upwardly adjust the interest on private
respondentsloan.Thatwouldcompletelytakeawayfrom
private respondents the right to assent to an important
modification in their agreement, and would negate the
element of mutuality in contracts. InPhilippine National
Bankv.CourtofAppeals,etal.,196SCRA536,544545(1991)we
held
xxxTheunilateralactionofthePNBinincreasingthe
interestrateontheprivaterespondentsloanviolatedthe
mutualityofcontractsordainedinArticle1308oftheCivil
Code:
647
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 647
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
Art.1308.Thecontractmustbindbothcontractingparties;
itsvalidityorcompliancecannotbelefttothewillofoneofthem.
Inorderthatobligationsarisingfromcontractsmayhavethe
force of law between the parties, there must be mutuality
betweenthepartiesbasedontheiressentialequality.Acontract
containing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent
exclusivelyupontheuncontrolledwill ofone ofthe contracting
parties, is void . . . . Hence, even assuming that the . . . loan
agreementbetweenthePNBandtheprivaterespondentgavethe
PNBalicense(althoughinfacttherewasnone)toincreasethe
interest rate at will during the term of the loan, that license
wouldhavebeennullandvoidforbeingviolativeoftheprinciple
of mutuality essential in contracts. It would have invested the
loan agreement with the character of a contract of adhesion,
where the parties do not bargain on equal footing, the weaker
partys(thedebtor)participationbeingreducedtothealternative
totakeitorleaveit....Suchacontractisaveritabletrapfor
theweakerpartywhomthecourtsofjusticemustprotectagainst
abuseandimposition.67(Emphasessupplied)
Then again, in a third case,Spouses Almeda v. Court of
Appeals,68theCourtinvalidatedtheverysameprovisionsinthe
respondentspreparedCreditAgreement,declaringthus:
The binding effect of any agreement between parties to a
contract is premised on two settled principles: (1) that any
obligationarisingfromcontracthastheforce
_______________
67Id.,atpp.2226.
 68326Phil.309;256SCRA292(1996).
648
648 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
oflawbetweentheparties;and(2)thattheremustbemutuality
between the parties based on their essential equality. Any
contractwhichappearstobeheavilyweighedinfavorofoneof
thepartiessoastoleadtoanunconscionableresultisvoid.Any
stipulation regarding thevalidity or compliance of the contract
whichisleftsolelytothewillofoneoftheparties,islikewise,
invalid.
It is plainly obvious, therefore, from the undisputed
factsofthecasethatrespondentbankunilaterallyaltered
thetermsofitscontractwithpetitionersbyincreasingthe
interestratesontheloanwithoutthepriorassentofthe
latter. In fact, the manner of agreement is itself explicitly
stipulatedbytheCivilCodewhenitprovides,inArticle1956that
Nointerestshallbedueunlessithasbeenexpresslystipulated
in writing.What has been stipulated in writing from a
perusalofinterestrateprovisionofthecreditagreement
signedbetweenthepartiesisthatpetitionerswerebound
merelytopay21%interest,subjecttoapossibleescalation
ordeescalation,when1)thecircumstanceswarrantsuch
escalationordeescalation;2)withinthelimitsallowedby
law;and3)uponagreement.
Indeed, the interest rate which appears to have been
agreeduponbythepartiestothecontractinthiscasewas
the 21% rate stipulated in the interest provision. Any
doubt about this is in fact readily resolved by a careful
readingofthecreditagreementbecausethesameplainly
usesthephraseinterestrateagreedupon,inreference
totheoriginal21%interestrate.xxx
xxxx
Petitioners never agreed in writing to pay the increased
interestratesdemandedbyrespondentbankincontraventionto
thetenoroftheircreditagreement.Thatanincreaseininterest
rates from 18% to as much as 68% is excessive and
unconscionable is indisputable.Between 1981 and 1984,
petitioners had paid an amount equivalent to virtually
halfoftheentire
649
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 649
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
principal (P7,735,004.66) which was applied to interest
alone. By the time the spouses tendered the amount of
P40,142,518.00 in settlement of their obligations;
respondentbankwasdemandingP58,377,487.00overand
above those amounts already previously paid by the
spouses.
Escalation clauses are not basically wrong or legally
objectionablesolongastheyarenotsolelypotestativebutbased
onreasonableandvalidgrounds.Here,asclearlydemonstrated
above, not only [are] the increases of the interest rates on the
basis of the escalation clause patently unreasonable and
unconscionable, but also there are no valid and reasonable
standardsuponwhichtheincreasesareanchored.
xxxx
Inthefaceoftheunequivocalinterestrateprovisionsinthe
creditagreementandinthelawrequiringthepartiestoagreeto
changes in the interest rate in writing, we hold that the
unilateralandprogressiveincreasesimposedbyrespondentPNB
were null and void. Their effect was to increase the total
obligation on an eighteen million peso loan to an amount way
over three times that which was originally granted to the
borrowers. That these increases, occasioned by crafty
manipulations in the interest rates is unconscionable and
neutralizes the salutary policies of extending loans to spur
businesscannotbedisputed.69(Emphasessupplied)
Still,inafourthcase,PhilippineNationalBankv.Courtof
Appeals,70theabovedoctrinewasreiterated:
Thepromissorynotecontainedthefollowingstipulation:
For value received, I/we, [private respondents] jointly and
severally promise to pay to the ORDER of the PHILIPPINE
NATIONALBANK,atitsofficeinSan
_______________
69Id.,atpp.316317,322,325;pp.299308.
70328Phil.54;258SCRA549(1996).
650
650 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
JoseCity,Philippines,thesumofFIFTEENTHOUSANDONLY
(P15,000.00), Philippine Currency, togetherwith interest
thereon at the rate of 12%per annumuntil paid, which
interest rate the Bank may at any time without notice,
raisewithinthelimitsallowedbylaw,andI/wealsoagreeto
pay jointly and severally ____%per annumpenalty charge, by
wayofliquidateddamagesshouldthisnotebeunpaidorisnot
renewedonduedated.
Paymentofthisnoteshallbeasfollows:
*THREEHUNDREDSIXTYFIVEDAYS*AFTERDATE
On the reverse side of the note the following condition was
stamped:
AllshorttermloanstobegrantedstartingJanuary1,1978
shall be made subject to the condition that any and/or all
extensionshereofthatwillleaveanyportionoftheamountstill
unpaidafter730daysshallautomaticallyconverttheoutstanding
balanceintoamediumorlongtermobligationasthecasemaybe
andgive the Bank the right to charge the interest rates
prescribedunderitspoliciesfromthedatethe accountwas
originallygranted.
To secure payment of the loan the parties executed a real
estatemortgagecontractwhichprovided:
(k)INCREASEOFINTERESTRATE:
Therateofinterestchargedontheobligationsecuredby
thismortgageaswellastheinterestontheamountwhichmay
havebeenadvancedbytheMORTGAGEE,inaccordancewiththe
provision hereof,shall be subject during the life of this
contract to such an increase within the rate allowed by
law, as the Board of Directors of the MORTGAGEE may
prescribeforitsdebtors.
xxxx
Tobeginwith,PNBsargumentrestsonamisapprehensionofthe
import of the appellate courts ruling. The Court of Appeals
nullifiedtheinterestrateincreases651
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 651
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
not because the promissory note did not comply with P.D. No.
1684byprovidingforadeescalation,butbecausetheabsenceof
such provision made the clause so onesided as to make it
unreasonable.
Thatrulingiscorrect.ItisinlinewithourdecisioninBanco
FilipinoSavings&MortgageBankv.NavarrothatalthoughP.D.
No.1684isnottoberetroactivelyappliedtoloansgrantedbefore
itseffectivity,theremustneverthelessbeadeescalationclauseto
mitigate the onesidedness of the escalation clause. Indeed
becauseofconcernfortheunequalstatusofborrowersvisvis
thebanks,ourcasesafterBancoFilipinohavefashionedtherule
thatanyincreaseintherateofinterestmadepursuantto
an escalation clause must be the result of agreement
betweentheparties.
ThusinPhilippineNationalBankv.CourtofAppeals,
two promissory notes authorized PNB to increase the
stipulatedinterestperannumwithinthelimitsallowed
bylawat anytimedependingonwhateverpolicy [PNB]
mayadoptinthefuture;Provided,thattheinterestrate
on this note shall be correspondingly decreased in the
event that the applicable maximum interest rate is
reducedbylaworbytheMonetaryBoard.Therealestate
mortgagelikewiseprovided:
Therateofinterestchargedontheobligationsecured
by this mortgage as well as the interest on the amount
whichmayhavebeenadvancedbytheMORTGAGEE,in
accordance with the provisions hereof, shall be subject
duringthelifeofthiscontracttosuchanincreasewithin
therateallowedbylaw,astheBoardofDirectorsofthe
MORTGAGEEmayprescribeforitsdebtors.
Pursuant to these clauses, PNB successively increased the
interest from 18% to 32%, then to 41% and then to 48%.This
Court declared the increases unilaterally imposed by
[PNB] to be in violation of the principle of mutualityas
embodied in Art. 1308 of the Civil Code, which provides that
[t]hecontractmustbindbothcontractingparties;itsvalidityor
compliancecannotbelefttothewillofoneofthem.AstheCourt
explained:
In order that obligations arising from contracts may
havetheforceoflawbetweentheparties,theremustbe
mutuality between the parties based on their essential
equality. A contract containing a condition which makes its
fulfillment dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of
oneofthecontractingparties,isvoid(Garciavs.RitaLegarda,
Inc.,21SCRA555).Hence,evenassumingthattheP1.8million
loan agreement between the PNB and the private respondent
gave the PNB a license (although in fact there was none) to
increasetheinterestrateatwillduringthetermoftheloan,that
licensewouldhavebeennullandvoidforbeingviolativeofthe
principle of mutuality essential in contracts. It would have
investedtheloanagreementwiththecharacterofacontractof
adhesion,wherethepartiesdonotbargainonequalfooting,the
weaker partys (the debtor) participation being reduced to the
alternativetotakeitorleaveit(Quavs.LawUnion&Rock
InsuranceCo.,95Phil.85).Suchacontractisaveritabletrapfor
theweakerpartywhomthecourtsofjusticemustprotectagainst
abuseandimposition.
AsimilarrulingwasmadeinPhilippineNationalBank
v. Court of Appeals. The credit agreement in that case
provided:
The BANK reserves the right to increase the interest
rate within the limits allowed by law at any time
dependingonwhateverpolicyitmayadoptinthefuture:
Provided,thattheinterestrateonthisaccommodationshallbe
correspondingly decreased in the event that the applicable
maximuminterestisreducedbylaworbytheMonetaryBoard...
.
Asinthefirstcase,PNBsuccessivelyincreasedthestipulated
interestsothatwhatwasoriginally12%perannumbecame,after
onlytwoyears,42%.Indeclaringtheincreasesinvalid,weheld:
653
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 653
 Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
Wecannotcountenance petitionerbanksposturing thatthe
escalationclauseatbenchgivesitunbridledrighttounilaterally
upwardlyadjusttheinterestonprivaterespondentsloan.That
wouldcompletelytakeawayfromprivaterespondentstherightto
assent to an important modification in their agreement, and
wouldnegatetheelementofmutualityincontracts.
Onlyrecentlyweinvalidatedanotherroundofinterest
increasesdecreedbyPNBpursuanttoasimilaragreement
ithadwithotherborrowers:
[W]hiletheUsuryLawceilingoninterestrateswasliftedby
C.B.Circular905,nothinginthesaidcircularcouldpossibly
be read as granting respondent bank carte blanche
authority to raise interest rates to levels which would
eitherenslaveitsborrowersorleadtoahemorrhagingof
theirassets.
InthiscasenoattemptwasmadebyPNBtosecurethe
conformity of private respondents to the successive
increasesintheinterestrate.Privaterespondentsassent
to the increases cannot be implied from their lack of
responsetotheletterssentbyPNB,informingthemofthe
increases. For as stated in one case, no one receiving a
proposal to change a contract is obliged to answer the
proposal.71(Emphasissupplied)
We made the same pronouncement in a fifth case,New
Sampaguita Builders Construction, Inc. v. Philippine National
Bank,72thus
Courts have the authority to strike down or to modify
provisions in promissory notes that grant the lenders
unrestrainedpowertoincreaseinterestrates,penaltiesandother
charges at the latters sole discretion and without giving prior
notice to and securing the consent of the borrowers. This
unilateralauthorityisanathematothe
_______________
71Id.,atpp.5657,6063;pp.550557.
72Supranote55.
654
654 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
mutuality of contracts and enable lenders to take undue
advantage of borrowers. Although the Usury Law has been
effectively repealed, courts may still reduce iniquitous or
unconscionable rates charged for the use of
money.Furthermore, excessive interests, penalties and
otherchargesnotrevealedindisclosurestatementsissued
by banks, even if stipulated in the promissory notes,
cannot be given effect under the Truth in Lending
Act.73(Emphasissupplied)
Yetagain,inasixthdisposition,PhilippineNationalBank
v. Spouses Rocamora,74the above pronouncements were
reiteratedtodebunkPNBsrepeatedrelianceonitsinvalidated
contractstipulations:
We repeated this rule in the 1994 case ofPNB v. CA and
JaymeFernandezandthe1996caseofPNBv.CAandSpouses
Basco.Takingnoheedoftheserulings,theescalationclause
PNB used in the present case to justify the increased interest
rates is no different from the escalation clause assailed in the
1996PNBcase;inboth,theinterestrateswereincreasedfrom
theagreed12%perannumrateto42%.xxx
xxxx
Onthestrengthofthisruling,PNBsargumentthat
the spouses Rocamoras failure to contest the increased
interest rates that were purportedly reflected in the
statementsofaccountandthedemandletterssentbythe
bankamountedtotheirimpliedacceptanceoftheincrease
shouldlikewisefail.
Evidently, PNBs failure to secure the spouses Rocamoras
consenttotheincreasedinterestratespromptedthelowercourts
todeclareexcessiveandillegaltheinterestratesimposed.Togo
aroundthislowercourtfinding,PNBallegesthattheP206,297.47
deficiency
_______________
73Id.,atp.486;p.571.
74616Phil.369;600SCRA395(2009).
655
VOL.728,JULY2,2014
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
claim was computed using only the original 12%per
annuminterestrate.Wefindthisunlikely.Ourexaminationof
PNBs own ledgers, included in the records of the case, clearly
indicatesthatPNBimposedinterestrateshigherthantheagreed
12%per annumrate. This confirmatory finding, albeit based
solelyonledgersfoundintherecords,reinforcestheapplication
inthiscaseoftherulethatfindingsoftheRTC,whenaffirmedby
theCA,arebindinguponthisCourt.75(Emphasessupplied)
Verily, all these cases, including the present one, involve
identical or similar provisions found in respondents credit
agreements and promissory notes. Thus, the July 1989 Credit
Agreementexecutedbypetitionersandrespondentcontainedthe
followingstipulationoninterest:
1.03.Interest.(a)TheLoanshallbesubjecttointerestatthe
rateof19.5%[perannum].Interestshallbepayableinadvance
everyonehundredtwentydaysattherateprevailingatthetime
oftherenewal.
(b)The Borrower agrees thatthe Bank may modify the
interest rate in the Loan depending on whatever policy
the Bank may adopt in the future, including without
limitation,theshiftingfromthefloatinginterestratesystemto
thefixedinterestratesystem,orviceversa.WheretheBankhas
imposedontheLoaninterestatarateperannumwhichisequal
totheBanksspreadoverthecurrentfloatinginterestrate,the
BorrowerherebyagreesthattheBankmay,withoutneed
ofnoticetotheBorrower,increaseordecreaseitsspread
overthe floatinginterest rateat anytimedependingon
whatever policy it may adopt in the future.76(Emphases
supplied)
while the eight promissory notes issued pursuant thereto
655 grantedPNBtherighttoincreaseorreduceinterestrates
_______________
75Id.,atpp.382383;409410.
76Records,p.74.
656
656 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
withinthelimitsallowedbylawortheMonetaryBoard77and
theRealEstateMortgageagreementincludedthesamerightto
increase or reduce interest rates at any time depending on
whateverpolicyPNBmayadoptinthefuture.78
On the basis of the Credit Agreement, petitioners issued
promissory notes which they signed in blank, and respondent
lateronenteredtheircorrespondinginterestrates,asfollows:
1stPromissoryNotedatedJuly24,198919.5%;
2ndPromissoryNotedatedNovember22,198923%;
3rdPromissoryNotedatedMarch21,199022%;
4thPromissoryNotedatedJuly19,199024%;
5thPromissoryNotedatedDecember17,199028%;
 6thPromissoryNotedatedFebruary14,199132%;
7thPromissoryNotedatedMarch1,199130%;and
8thPromissoryNotedatedJuly11,199124%.79
On the other hand, the August 1991 Amendment to Credit
Agreementcontainsthefollowingstipulationregardinginterest:
1.03.Interest on Line Availments. (a)The Borrowers
agreetopayinterest on eachAvailmentfrom date of each
Availment up to but not including the date of full payment
thereofattherateperannumwhichisdetermined bythe
Banktobeprimerateplusapplicablespreadineffectasof
thedateofeachAvailment.80(Emphasessupplied)
andunderthisAmendmenttoCreditAgreement,petitioners
againexecutedandsignedthefollowingpromissorynotesin
_______________
77Id.,atp.192.
78Id.,atp.74,dorsalportion.
79Id.,atpp.192199.
80Id.,atp.56.
657
VOL.728,JULY2,2014
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
blank, for the respondent to later on enter the corresponding
interestrates,whichitdid,asfollows:
9thPromissoryNotedatedNovember8,199126%;
10thPromissoryNotedatedMarch19,199225%;
11thPromissoryNotedatedJuly11,199223%;
12thPromissoryNotedatedNovember10,199221%;
13thPromissoryNotedatedMarch15,199321%;
14thPromissoryNotedatedJuly12,199317.5%;
15thPromissoryNotedatedNovember17,199321%;
16thPromissoryNotedatedMarch28,199421%;
17thPromissoryNotedatedJuly13,199421%;
18thPromissoryNotedatedNovember16,199416%;
19thPromissoryNotedatedApril10,199521%;
20thPromissoryNotedatedJuly19,199518.5%;
21stPromissoryNotedatedDecember18,199518.75%;
22ndPromissoryNotedatedApril22,199618.5%;
23rdPromissoryNotedatedJuly22,199618.5%;
24thPromissoryNotedatedNovember25,199618%;
25thPromissoryNotedatedMay30,199717.5%;and
26thPromissoryNote(PN9707237)datedJuly30,1997
25%.81
The 9thup to the 17thpromissory notes provide for the
payment of interest at the rate the Bank may at any time
withoutnotice,raisewithinthelimitsallowedbylawxxx. 82On
theotherhand,the18thuptothe26thpromissorynoteswhich
includesPN9707237carriedthefollowingprovision:
xxxForthispurpose,I/Weagreethattherateofinterest
herein stipulated may be increased or decreased forthe
subsequentInterestPeriods,with
_______________
657 81Id.,atpp.174191.
82Id.,atp.191.
657
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 657
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
prior notice to the Borrower in the event of changes in
interestrateprescribedbylawortheMonetaryBoardof
the Central Bank of the Philippines, or in the Banks
overallcostoffunds.I/Weherebyagreethatintheevent
I/we are not agreeable to the interest rate fixed for any
InterestPeriod,I/weshallhavetheoptiontoprepaythe
loan or credit facility without penalty within ten (10)
calendar days from the Interest Setting Date.83(Emphasis
supplied)
Thesestipulationsmustbeoncemoreinvalidated,aswasdone
inpreviouscases.Thecommondenominatorinthesecasesisthe
lackofagreementofthepartiestotheimposedinterestrates.For
thiscase,thislackofconsentbythepetitionershasbeenmade
obviousbythefactthattheysignedthepromissorynotesinblank
fortherespondenttofill.WefindcrediblethetestimonyofLydia
in this respect. Respondent failed to discredit her; in fact, its
witnessPNBKaliboBranchManagerAspaadmittedthatinterest
rates were fixed solely by its Treasury Department in Manila,
whichwerethensimplycommunicatedtoallPNBbranchesfor
implementation. If this were the case, then this would explain
whypetitionershadtosignthepromissorynotesinblank,since
theimposableinterestrateshaveyettobedeterminedandfixed
byrespondentsTreasuryDepartmentinManila.
Moreover,inAspasenumerationofthefactorsthatdetermine
the interest rates PNB fixes such as cost of money, foreign
currency values, bank administrative costs, profitability, and
considerationswhichaffectthebankingindustryitcanbeseen
thatconsiderationswhichaffectPNBsborrowersareignored.A
borrowerscurrentfinancialstate,hisfeedbackoropinions,the
nature and purpose of his borrowings, the effect of foreign
currency values or fluctuations on his business or
borrowing,etc.thesearenotfactorswhichinflu
_______________
83Id.,atp.174.
659
VOL.728,JULY2,2014
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
encethefixingofinterestratestobeimposedonhim.Clearly,
respondentsmethodoffixinginterestratesbasedononesided,
indeterminate,andsubjectivecriteriasuchasprofitability,costof
money,bankcosts,etc.isarbitraryforthereisnofixedstandard
ormarginaboveorbelowtheseconsiderations.
Thestipulationinthepromissorynotessubjectingtheinterest
ratetoreviewdoesnotrendertheimpositionbyUCPBofinterest
ratesontheobligationsofthespousesBelusovalid.Accordingto
saidstipulation:
Theinterestrateshallbesubjecttoreviewandmaybeincreased
or decreased by the LENDERconsidering among others
the prevailing financial and monetary conditions; or
therateofinterestandchargeswhichotherbanksor
financial institutions charge or offer to charge for
similar accommodations; and/or the resulting
profitabilitytotheLENDERafterdueconsiderationofall
dealingswiththeBORROWER.
It should bepointed out that theauthorityto review
theinterestratewasgiven[to]UCPBaloneasthelender.
Moreover, UCPB may apply the considerations enumerated in
this provision as it wishes. As worded in the above provision,
UCPB may give as much weight as it desires to each of the
following considerations: (1) the prevailing financial and
monetary condition; (2) the rate of interest and charges which
otherbanksorfinancialinstitutionschargeoroffertochargefor
similaraccommodations;and/or(3)theresultingprofitabilityto
theLENDER(UCPB)afterdueconsiderationofalldealingswith
theBORROWER(thespousesBeluso).Again,asinthecaseof
theinterestrateprovision,thereisnofixedmarginabove
orbelowtheseconsiderations.
659
Inviewoftheforegoing,theSeparabilityClausecannotsave
eitherofthetwooptionsofUCPBastothe
660
660 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
interest to be imposed, as both options violate the principle of
mutualityofcontracts.84(Emphasessupplied)
To repeatwhathasbeen saidin theabovecitedcases, any
modificationinthecontract,suchastheinterestrates,mustbe
madewiththeconsentofthecontractingparties.Themindsofall
thepartiesmustmeetastotheproposedmodification,especially
whenitaffectsanimportantaspectoftheagreement.Inthecase
ofloanagreements,therateofinterestisaprincipalcondition,if
not the most important component. Thus, any modification
thereof must be mutually agreed upon; otherwise, it has no
bindingeffect.
What is even more glaring in the present case is that, the
stipulationsinquestionnolongerprovidethatthepartiesshall
agreeupontheinterestratetobefixed;instead,theyareworded
insuchawaythattheborrowershallagreetowhateverinterest
rate respondent fixes. In credit agreements covered by the
abovecitedcases,itisprovidedthat:
The Bank reserves the right to increase the interest rate
within the limits allowed by law at any time depending on
whatever policy it may adopt in the future:Provided, that, the
interest rate on this accommodation shall be correspondingly
decreasedintheeventthattheapplicablemaximuminterestrate
isreducedbylaworbytheMonetaryBoard.Ineithercase,the
adjustmentintheinterestrateagreeduponshalltakeeffect
ontheeffectivity dateoftheincreaseordecreasein maximum
interestrate.85(Emphasissupplied)
Whereas,inthepresentcreditagreementsunderscrutiny,it
isstatedthat:
_______________
84United Coconut Planters Bank v. Spouses
Beluso,supranote50atpp.342343;p.584.
85SeePhilippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals,supra
note66atp.22.
661
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 661
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
INTHEJULY1989CREDITAGREEMENT
(b)The Borrower agreesthat the Bank may modify the
interestrateontheLoandependingonwhateverpolicytheBank
mayadoptinthefuture,includingwithoutlimitation,theshifting
fromthefloatinginterestratesystemtothefixedinterestrate
system,orviceversa.WheretheBankhasimposedontheLoan
interestatarateperannum,whichisequaltotheBanksspread
over the current floating interest rate,the Borrower hereby
agreesthat the Bank may,without need of notice to the
Borrower, increase or decrease its spread over the floating
interest rate atany time depending on whatever policy it may
adoptinthefuture.86(Emphasessupplied)
IN THE AUGUST 1991 AMENDMENT TO CREDIT
AGREEMENT
1.03.Interest on Line Availments. (a)The Borrowers
agreeto pay interest on each Availment from date of each
Availmentuptobutnotincludingthedateoffullpaymentthereof
at the rateper annumwhich is determined by the Bank to be
primerateplusapplicablespreadineffectasofthedateofeach
Availment.87(Emphasissupplied)
 Plainly, with the present credit agreement, the element of
consentoragreementbytheborrowerisnowcompletelylacking,
which makes respondents unlawful act all the more
reprehensible.
Accordingly, petitioners are correct in arguing that estoppel
shouldnotapplytothem,for[e]stoppelcannotbepredicatedon
an illegal act. As between the parties to a contract, validity
cannotbegiventoitbyestoppelifitisprohibitedby
_______________
86Records,p.47.
87Id.,atp.56.
662
662 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
law or is against public policy.88It appears that by its acts,
respondentviolatedtheTruthinLendingAct,orRepublicActNo.
3765,whichwasenactedtoprotectxxxcitizensfromalackof
awareness ofthe true cost ofcredittothe userby using afull
disclosureofsuchcostwithaviewofpreventingtheuninformed
useofcredittothedetrimentofthenationaleconomy. 89Thelaw
givesadetailedenumerationofthespecificinformationrequired
tobedisclosed,amongwhicharetheinterestandothercharges
incident to the extension of credit.90Section 4 thereof provides
that a disclosure statement must be furnished prior to the
consummationofthetransaction,thus:
SEC.4.Anycreditorshallfurnishtoeachpersontowhom
creditisextended,priortotheconsummationofthetransaction,a
clearstatementinwritingsettingforth,totheextentapplicable
andinaccordancewithrulesandregulationsprescribedbythe
Board,thefollowinginformation:
(1)thecashpriceordeliveredpriceofthepropertyorservice
tobeacquired;
(2)the amounts, if any, to be credited as down payment
and/ortradein;
(3)the difference between the amounts set forth under
clauses(1)and(2);
(4)thecharges,individuallyitemized,whicharepaidortobe
paidbysuchpersoninconnectionwiththetransactionbutwhich
arenotincidenttotheextensionofcredit;
(5)thetotalamounttobefinanced;
_______________
88United Coconut Planters Bank v. Spouses
Beluso,supranote50atp.343;p.585.
89Section2thereof.
90HeirsofZoiloEspirituv.SpousesLandrito,549Phil.180,
190191;520SCRA383,391392(2007).
663
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 663
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
(6)the finance charge expressed in terms of pesos and
centavos;and
(7)thepercentagethatthefinancebearstothetotalamount
to be financed expressed as a simple annual rate on the
outstandingunpaidbalanceoftheobligation.
UnderSection4(6),financechargerepresentstheamounttobe
paid by the debtor incident to the extension of credit such as
interest or discounts, collection fees, credit investigation fees,
attorneys fees, and other service charges. The total finance
charge represents the difference between (1) the aggregate
consideration(downpaymentplusinstallments)onthepartofthe
debtor, and (2) the sum of the cash price and nonfinance
charges.91
 Byrequiringthepetitionerstosignthecreditdocumentsand
thepromissorynotesinblank,andthenunilaterallyfillingthem
uplateron,respondentviolatedtheTruthinLendingAct,and
wasremissinitsdisclosureobligations.Inonecase,whichthe
Courtfindsapplicablehere,itwasheld:
UCPBfurtherarguesthatsincethespousesBelusowere
duly given copies of the subject promissory notes after
theirexecution,thentheyweredulynotifiedoftheterms
thereof, in substantial compliance with the Truth in
LendingAct.
Oncemore,wedisagree.Section4oftheTruthinLendingAct
clearlyprovidesthatthedisclosurestatementmustbefurnished
priortotheconsummationofthetransaction:
SEC.4.Any creditor shall furnish to each person to whom
credit is extended, prior to the consummation of the
transaction,aclearstatementinwritingsettingforth,tothe
extentapplicableandinaccordancewithrulesandregulations
prescribedbytheBoard,thefollowinginformation:
_______________
91CentralBankCircularNo.158.
664
664 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
(1)thecashpriceordeliveredpriceofthepropertyorserviceto
beacquired;
(2)theamounts,ifany,tobecreditedasdownpaymentand/or
tradein;
(3)thedifferencebetweentheamountssetforthunderclauses
(1)and(2);
(4)thecharges,individuallyitemized,whicharepaidortobe
paid by such person in connection with the transaction but
whicharenotincidenttotheextensionofcredit;
(5)thetotalamounttobefinanced;
(6)thefinancechargeexpressedintermsofpesosandcentavos;
and
(7)thepercentagethatthefinancebearstothetotalamountto
be financed expressed as a simple annual rate on the
outstandingunpaidbalanceoftheobligation.
The rationale of this provision is to protect users of
credit fromalackofawareness ofthetruecostthereof,
proceeding from the experience that banks are able to
concealsuchtruecostbyhiddencharges,uncertaintyof
interest rates, deduction of interests from the loaned
amount, and the like. The law thereby seeks to protect
debtors by permitting them to fully appreciate the true
costoftheirloan,toenablethemtogivefullconsenttothe
contract, and to properly evaluate their options in
arriving at business decisions. Upholding UCPBs claim of
substantialcompliancewoulddefeatthesepurposesoftheTruth
in Lending Act.The belated discovery of the true cost of
creditwilltoooftennotbeabletoreversetheilleffectsof
analreadyconsummatedbusinessdecision.
Inaddition,thepromissorynotes,thecopiesofwhich
werepresentedtothespousesBelusoafterexecution,are
not sufficient notification from UCPB. As earlier
discussed, the interest rate provision therein does not
sufficientlyindicatewithparticularitytheinterestrateto
be applied to the loan covered by said promissory
notes.92(Emphasessupplied)
However, the oneyear period within which an action for
violation of the Truth in Lending Act may be filed evidently
prescribed long ago, or sometime in 2001, one year after
petitioners received the March 2000 demand letter which
containedtheillegalcharges.
Thefactthatpetitionerslaterreceivedseveralstatementsof
account detailing its outstanding obligations does not cure
respondentsbreach.Torepeat,thebelateddiscoveryofthetrue
cost of credit does not reverse the ill effects of an already
consummatedbusinessdecision.93Neithermaythestatementsbe
considered proposals sent to secure the petitioners conformity;
theyweresentaftertheimpositionandapplicationoftheinterest
rate, and not before. And even if it were to be presumed that
these are proposals or offers, there was no acceptance by
petitioners. No one receiving a proposal to modify a loan
contract, especially regarding interest, is obliged to answer the
proposal.94
Loanandcreditarrangements may bemadeenticing by, or
sweetenedwith,offersoflowinitialinterestrates,butactually
accompaniedbyprovisionswritteninfineprintthatallowlenders
to later on increase or decrease interest rates unilaterally,
withouttheconsentoftheborrower,anddependingoncomplex
andsubjectivefactors.Becausetheyhavebeenluredintothese
contractsbyinitiallylowinterestrates,borrowersgetcaughtand
stuck in the web of subsequent steep rates and penalties,
surchargesandthelike. Beingordinary individuals orentities,
theynaturallydreadlegalcomplica
_______________
92United Coconut Planters Bank v. Spouses Beluso, supra
note50atpp.356358;p.600.
93Id.,atp.358;id.
94Supranote55atp.500;p.583.
666
666 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
tionsandcannotaffordcourtlitigation;theysuccumbtowhatever
chargesthelendersimpose.Attheveryleast,borrowersshould
bechargedrightly;butthenagainthisisnotpossibleinaone
sidedcreditsystemwherethetemptationtoabuseisstrongand
thewillingnesstorectifyismadeweakbytheeternaldesirefor
profit.
Given the above supposition, the Court cannot subscribe to
respondentsargumentthatineveryrepricingofpetitionersloan
availment,theyaregiventherighttoquestiontheinterestrates
imposed.Theimportofrespondentslineofreasoningcannotbe
otherthanthatifoneoutofeveryhundredborrowersquestions
respondents practice of unilaterally fixing interest rates, then
onlytheloanarrangementwiththatlonecomplainingborrower
will enjoy the benefit of review or renegotiation; as to the 99
others, the questionable practice will continue unchecked, and
respondent will continue to reap the profits from such
unscrupulouspractice.TheCourtcannomorecondoneaviewso
perverse. This is exactly what the Court meant in the
immediatelyprecedingcitedcasewhenitsaidthatthebelated
discoveryofthetruecostofcreditdoesnotreversetheilleffects
of an already consummated business decision;95as to the 99
borrowerswhodidnotorcouldnotcomplain,theillegalactshall
have become afait accompli to their detriment, they
havealreadysufferedtheoppressiverates.
Besides,thatpetitionersare giventherightto questionthe
interestratesimposedis,underthecircumstances,irrelevant;we
have a situation where the petitioners do not stand on equal
footingwiththerespondent.Itisdoubtfulthatanyborrowerwho
finds himself in petitioners position would dare question
respondents power to arbitrarily modify interest rates at any
time. In the second place, on what basis could any borrower
questionsuchpower,whenthecriteriaorstan
_______________
 95Id.
667
VOL.728,JULY2,2014
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
dardswhicharereallyonesided,arbitraryandsubjective
fortheexerciseofsuchpowerarepreciselylostonhim?
Forthesamereasons,theCourtcannotvalidlyconsiderthat,
as stipulated in the 18thup to the 26thpromissory notes,
petitioners are granted the option to prepay the loan or credit
facilitywithoutpenaltywithin10calendardaysfromtheInterest
SettingDateiftheyarenotagreeabletotheinterestratefixed.It
has been shown that the promissory notes are executed and
signedinblank,meaningthatbythetimepetitionerslearnofthe
interestrate,theyarealreadyboundtopayitbecausetheyhave
already presigned the note where the rate is subsequently
entered.Besides,premiummaynotbeplaceduponastipulation
inacontractwhichgrantsonepartytherighttochoosewhether
tocontinuewithorwithdrawfromtheagreementifitdiscovers
thatwhattheotherpartyhasbeendoingallalongisimproperor
illegal.
Thus said, respondents arguments relative to the credit
documents that documentary evidence prevails over
testimonial evidence; that the credit documents are in proper
form,presumedregular,andendure,againstarbitraryclaimsby
petitioners, experienced business persons that they are, they
signedquestionableloandocumentswhoseprovisionsforinterest
rateswereleftblank,andyettheycontinuedtopaytheinterests
withoutprotestforanumberofyearsdeservenoconsideration.
With regard to interest, the Court finds that since the
escalationclauseisannulled,theprincipalamountoftheloanis
subject to the original or stipulated rate of interest, and upon
maturity,theamountdueshallbesubjecttolegalinterestatthe
rate of 12%per annum. This is the uniform ruling adopted in
previouscases,includingthosecitedhere. 96Theinterestspaidby
667 petitioners should be applied first to the payment of the
stipulatedorlegalandunpaidinterest,asthecasemay
_______________
96SeealsoEquitablePCIBankv.NgSheungNgor,565Phil.
520,539;541SCRA223,241242(2007).
668
668 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
be,andlater,tothecapitalorprincipal. 97Respondentshouldthen
refundtheexcessamountofinterestthatithasillegallyimposed
uponpetitioners;[t]heamounttoberefundedreferstothatpaid
bypetitionerswhentheyhadnoobligationtodoso. 98Thus,the
parties original agreement stipulated the payment of 19.5%
interest;however,thisratewasintendedtoapplyonlytothefirst
promissory note which expired onNovember 21, 1989 and was
paid by petitioners; it was not intended to apply to the whole
durationoftheloan.Subsequenthigherinterestrateshavebeen
declared illegal; but because only the rates are found to be
improper,theobligationtopayinterestsubsists,thesametobe
fixed at the legal rate of 12%per annum. However, the 12%
interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013. Starting July 1,
2013, the prevailing rate of interest shall be 6%per
annumpursuant to our ruling inNacar v. Gallery
Frames99andBangko Sentral ng PilipinasMonetary Board
CircularNo.799.
Nowtotheissueofpenalty.PN9707237providesthatfailureto
pay it or any installment thereon, when due, shall constitute
default, and a penalty charge of 24% per annum based on the
defaulted principal amount shall be imposed. Petitioners claim
thatthispenaltyshouldbeexcludedfromtheforeclosureamount
or bid price because the Real Estate Mortgage and the
Supplementtheretodidnotspecificallyincludeitaspartofthe
securedamount.Respondentjustifiesitsinclusioninthesecured
amount,sayingthatthepurposeofthepenaltyorapenalclause
istoensuretheperformanceoftheobligationandsubstitutefor
damagesandthepayment
_______________
97Hodgesv.Salas,63Phil.567,574(1936),citingAguilarv.
Rubiato and Gonzalez Vila, 40 Phil. 570 (1920);Go Chioco v.
Martinez,45Phil.256,279282(1923);GuiJong&Co.v.Rivera
andAvellar,45Phil.778,784(1924);Sajov.Gustilo,48Phil.451,
462(1925).
98SeePhilippineSavingsBankv.Castillo,G.R.No.193178,
May30,2011,649SCRA527,538.
99G.R.No.189871,August13,2013,703SCRA439.
669
VOL.728,JULY2,2014
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
ofinterestintheeventofnoncompliance. 100Respondentaddsthat
the imposition and collection of a penalty is a normal banking
practice, and the standard rateper annumfor all commercial
banks,atthetime,was24%.Itsinclusionaspartofthesecured
amountinthemortgageagreementsisthusvalidandnecessary.
TheCourtsustainspetitionersviewthatthepenaltymaynotbe
includedaspartofthesecuredamount.Havingfoundthecredit
agreementsandpromissorynotestobetainted,wemustaccord
thesametreatmenttothemortgages.Afterall,[a]mortgageand
anotesecuredbyitaredeemedpartsofonetransactionandare
construedtogether.101Beingsotaintedandhavingtheattributes
ofacontractof adhesionasthe principal credit documents, we
must construe the mortgage contracts strictly, and against the
partywhodraftedit.Anexaminationofthemortgageagreements
revealsthatnowhereisitstatedthatpenaltiesaretobeincluded
in the secured amount. Construing this silence strictly against
therespondent,theCourtcanonlyconcludethatthepartiesdid
notintendtoincludethepenaltyallowedunderPN9707237as
partofthesecuredamount.Givenitsresources,respondentcould
have if it truly wanted to conveniently prepared and
executedanamendedmortgageagreementwiththepetitioners,
therebyincludingpenaltiesintheamounttobesecuredbythe
encumberedproperties.Yetitdidnot.
Withregardtoattorneysfees,itwasplainerrorfortheCAto
have passed upon the issue since it was not raised by the
petitionersintheirappeal;itwastherespondentthatimproperly
brought it up in its appellees brief, when it should have
interposedanappeal,sincethetrialcourtsDecisiononthisissue
isadversetoit.Itisanelementaryprincipleinthe
_______________
100CitingArticle1226oftheCivilCodeandParas,CivilCode
669 of the Philippines Annotated (Commentaries) Vol. IV, p. 298,
1989,12thedition.
101PhilippineBank ofCommunications,supranote 51atp.
314;p.255.
670
670 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
subjectofappealsthatanappelleewhodoesnothimselfappeal
cannotobtainfromtheappellatecourtanyaffirmativereliefother
thanthosegrantedinthedecisionofthecourtbelow.
xxx[A]nappellee,whoisatthesametimenotanappellant,
mayonappealbepermittedtomakecounterassignmentsoferror
inordinaryactions,whenthepurposeismerelytodefendhimself
against an appeal in which errors are alleged to have been
committedbythetrialcourtbothintheappreciationoffactsand
intheinterpretationofthelaw,inordertosustainthejudgment
inhisfavorbutnotwhenhispurposeistoseekmodificationor
reversalofthejudgment,inwhichcaseitisnecessaryforhimto
haveexceptedtoandappealedfromthejudgment.102
Since petitioners did not raise the issue of reduction of
attorneysfees,theCApossessednoauthoritytopassuponitat
theinstanceofrespondent.Therulingofthetrialcourtinthis
respectshouldremainundisturbed.
For the fixing of the proper amounts due and owing to the
partiestotherespondentascreditorandtothepetitionerswho
are entitled to a refund as a consequence of overpayment
consideringthattheypaidmorebywayofinterestchargesthan
the 12%per annum103herein allowed the case should be
remanded to the lower court for proper accounting and
computation,applyingthefollowingprocedure:
1.The 1stPromissory Note with the 19.5% interest rate is
deemedproperandpaid;
2.All subsequent promissory notes (from the 2nd to the
26thpromissorynotes)shallcarryaninterestrateofonly12%per
annum.104Thus,interestpaymentmade
_______________
102Saenzv.Mitchell,60Phil.69,80(1934).
103Or6%perannum,whenapplicable.
104Id.
671
VOL.728,JULY2,2014
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
inexcessof12%onthe2ndpromissorynoteshallimmediatelybe
applied to the principal, and the principal shall be accordingly
reduced. The reduced principal shall then be subjected to the
12%105interestonthe3rdpromissorynote,andtheexcessover
12%interestpaymentonthe3rdpromissorynoteshallagainbe
appliedtotheprincipal,whichshallagainbereducedaccordingly.
Thereducedprincipalshallthenbesubjectedtothe12%interest
on the 4th promissory note, and the excess over 12% interest
paymentonthe4thpromissorynoteshallagainbeappliedtothe
principal, which shall again be reduced accordingly. And so on
andsoforth;
3.After the above procedure is carried out, the trial
courtshallbeabletoconcludeifpetitionersa)stillhave
an OUTSTANDING BALANCE/OBLIGATION or b) MADE
PAYMENTS OVER AND ABOVE THEIR TOTAL
OBLIGATION(principalandinterest);
4.Suchoutstandingbalance/obligation,iftherebeany,
shall then be subjected to a12% per annum interestfrom
October28,1997untilJanuary14,1999,whichisthedateofthe
auctionsale;
5.Such outstanding balance/obligation shall alsobe charged
a24%perannumpenaltyfromAugust14,1997untilJanuary
14, 1999. But from this total penalty, the petitioners previous
payment of penalties in the amount of P202,000.00 made on
January27,1998106shallbeDEDUCTED;
6.Tothisoutstandingbalance(3.),theinterest(4.),penalties
(5.), and the final and executory award of1% attorneys
feesshallbeADDED;
_______________
105Id.
671 106Rollo,p.63.
7.Thesumtotaloftheoutstandingbalance(3.),interest(4.)
and 1% attorneys fees (6.) shall be DEDUCTED from the bid
priceofP4,324,172.96.Thepenalties(5.)arenotincludedbecause
theyarenotincludedinthesecuredamount;
 8.Thedifferencein(7.)[P4,324,172.96LESSsumtotalofthe
outstandingbalance(3.),interest(4.),and1%attorneysfees(6.)]
shallbeDELIVEREDTOTHEPETITIONERS;
9.Respondent may then proceed to consolidate its title to
TCTsT14250andT16208;
10.ON THE OTHER HAND, if after performing the
procedure in (2.), it turns out that petitioners made
anOVERPAYMENT, the interest (4.), penalties (5.), and the
awardof1%attorneysfees(6.)shall be DEDUCTEDfromthe
overpayment. There is no outstanding balance/obligation
preciselybecausepetitionershavepaidbeyondtheamountofthe
principalandinterest;
11.Iftheoverpaymentexceedsthesumtotaloftheinterest
(4.),penalties(5.),andawardof1%attorneysfees(6.),theexcess
shallbeRETURNEDtothepetitioners,withlegalinterest,under
theprincipleofsolutioindebiti;107
12.Likewise,iftheoverpaymentexceedsthetotalamountof
interest(4.)andawardof1%attorneysfees(6.),thetrialcourt
shall INVALIDATE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
ANDSALE;
13.HOWEVER,ifthetotalamountofinterest(4.)andaward
of1%attorneysfees(6.)exceedpetitioners
_______________
107Also, under the Civil Code, Art. 1413, interest paid in
excessoftheinterestallowedbytheusurylawsmayberecovered
bythedebtor,withinterestthereonfromthedateofthepayment.
673
VOL.728,JULY2,2014
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
overpayment,thentheexcessshallbeDEDUCTEDfromthebid
priceofP4,324,172.96;
14.Thedifferencein(13.)[P4,324,172.96LESSsumtotalof
theinterest(4.)and1%attorneysfees(6.)]shallbeDELIVERED
TOTHEPETITIONERS;
15.Respondent may then proceed to consolidate its title to
TCTs T14250 and T16208. The outstanding penalties, if any,
shallbecollectedbyothermeans.
Fromtheabove,itwillbeseenthatif,afterproperaccounting,
itturnsoutthatthepetitionersmadepaymentsexceedingwhat
they actually owe by way of principal, interest, and attorneys
fees, then the mortgaged properties need not answer for any
outstandingsecuredamount,becausethereisnotany;quitethe
contrary, respondent must refund the excess to petitioners. In
suchcase,theextrajudicialforeclosureandsaleoftheproperties
shallbedeclarednullandvoidforobviouslackofbasis,thecase
beingoneofsolutioindebitiinstead.If,ontheotherhand,itturns
outthatpetitionersoverpaymentsininterestsdonotexceedtheir
total obligation, then the respondent may consolidate its
ownership over the properties, since the period for redemption
has expired. Itsonly obligation will be to return the difference
between its bid price (P4,324,172.96) and petitioners total
obligationoutstandingexceptpenaltiesafterapplyingthe
lattersoverpayments.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
isGRANTED.TheMay8,2007DecisionoftheCourtofAppeals
in C.A.G.R. CV No. 79650 isANNULLEDandSET ASIDE.
Judgmentisherebyrenderedasfollows:
1.Theinterestratesimposedandindicatedinthe2 nduptothe
673 26 Promissory Notes are DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and
th
suchnotesshallinsteadbesubjecttointerestattherateoftwelve
percent(12%)perannumuptoJune30,2013,andstartingJuly
1,2013,sixpercent(6%)perannumuntilfullsatisfaction;
674
674 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
2.The penalty charge imposed in Promissory Note No.
9707237shallbeEXCLUDEDfromtheamountssecuredbythe
realestatemortgages;
3.Thetrialcourtsawardofonepercent(1%)attorneysfees
isREINSTATED;
4.The case is orderedREMANDEDto the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan for the computation of
overpayments made by petitioners spouses Eduardo and Lydia
Silos to respondent Philippine National Bank, taking into
consideration the foregoing dispositions, and applying the
procedurehereinabovesetforth;
5.Thereafter, the trial court isORDEREDto make a
determinationas to the validity of theextrajudicial foreclosure
andsale,declaringthesamenullandvoidincaseofoverpayment
and ordering the release and return of Transfer Certificates of
TitleNos.T14250andTCTT16208topetitioners,orordering
thedeliverytothepetitionersofthedifferencebetweenthebid
priceandthetotalremainingobligationofpetitioners,ifany;
6.Inthemeantime,therespondentPhilippineNationalBank
isENJOINEDfromconsolidatingtitletoTransferCertificatesof
Title Nos. T14250 and T16208 until all the steps in the
procedureabovesetforthhavebeentakenandapplied;
7.The reimbursement of the excess in the bid price of
P377,505.99, which respondent Philippine National Bank is
ordered to reimburse petitioners, should beHELD IN
ABEYANCEuntil the true amount owing to or owed by the
partiesasagainsteachotherisdetermined;
8.Consideringthatthiscasehasbeenpendingforsuchalong
time and that further proceedings, albeit uncomplicated, are
required,thetrialcourtisORDEREDtoproceedwithdispatch.
675
VOL.728,JULY2,2014 675
Silosvs.PhilippineNationalBank
SOORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), LeonardoDe
**
Castro, PerezandPerlasBernabe,JJ.,concur.
Petitiongranted,judgmentannulledandsetaside.
Notes.Sincethestipulationontheinterestrateisvoid,itis
asiftherewasnoexpresscontractthereon.(Macalinaovs.Bank
ofthePhilippineIslands,600SCRA67[2009])
Thepaymentofinterestinloansorforbearanceofmoneyis
allowed only if: (1) there was an express stipulation for the
payment of interest; and (2) the agreement for thepayment of
interest was reduced in writing. (Prisma Construction &
DevelopmentCorporationvs.Menchavez,614SCRA590[2010])
o0o
G.R. No. 201001.November 10, 2014.*
MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP., petitioner, vs.
MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP., respondent.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Best Evidence Rule;
Documentary Evidence; The Best Evidence Rule, a
basic postulate requiring the production of the original
document whenever its contents are the subject of
inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.The Best Evidence Rule, a basic
postulate requiring the production of the original
document whenever its contents are the subject of
inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court which provides: Section 3. Original VELASCO, JR.,J.:
document must be produced; exceptions.When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no For consideration of the Court is a Petition for Review
evidence shall be admissible other than the original on Certiorari dated April 20, 20121 filed by MCMP
document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When
Construction Corp. under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot beThe petition seeks the reversal of the Decision dated
October 14, 20112 and Resolution dated March 9, 20123
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror; (b) When the original is in the custody or under
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
the control of the party against whom the evidence is91860 entitled Monark Equipment Corporation v. MCMP
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after Construction Corporation. The CA Decision affirmed the
reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of Decision dated November 20, 20074 and Order dated
numerous accounts or other documents which cannot April 28, 20085 issued by the Regional Trial Court,
be examined in court without great loss of time and the
Branch 96 in Quezon City (RTC) in Civil Case No.Q-02-
fact sought to be established from them is only the 47092 entitled Monark Equipment Corporation v. MCMP
Construction Corporation.
general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is
a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
The facts of the case are as follows:
recorded in a public office. MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision andequipment from Monark Equipment Corporation
resolution of the Court of Appeals. (Monark) for various periods in 2000, the lease covered
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court. by a Rental Equipment Contract (Contract). Thus,
Henry Ll. Yusingco, Jr. for petitioner. Monark delivered five (5) pieces of heavy equipment to
Pestelero Law Office for respondent. the project site of MCMP in Tanay, Rizal and Llavac,
_______________ Quezon, the delivery evidenced by invoices as well as
* THIRD DIVISION. Documents Acknowledgment Receipt Nos. 04667 and
433 5706, received and signed by representatives of MCMP,
namely, Jorge Samonte on December 5, 2000 and Rose
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014
Takahashi on January 29, 2001, respectively. Notably,
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
the invoices state:
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 8-25.
RESOLUTION 2 Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C.
Lantion, concurred in by Associate Justices Japar B.
Dimaampao (Chairperson, 17th Division) and Ramon A.
Cruz; id., at pp. 50-63.
3 Id., at pp. 65-69.
4 Penned by Judge Afable E. Cajigal; id., at pp. 26-
40.
5 Id., at pp. 41-48.
434
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
Credit sales are payable within 30 days from the date
of invoice. Customer agrees to pay interest at 24% p.a.
on all amounts. In addition, customer agrees to pay a
collection fee of 1% compounded monthly and 2% per
month penalty charge for late payment on amounts
overdue. Customer agrees to pay a sum equal to 25% of
any amount due as attorneys fees in case of suit, and
expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of
Quezon City, Makati, Pasig or Manila, Metro Manila, for
any legal action arising from, this transactions.
Despite the lapse of the thirty (30)-day period indicated
in the invoices, MCMP failed to pay the rental fees.
Upon demands made upon MCMP to pay the amount
due, partial payments were made in the amount of
Php100,000.00 on April 15, 2001 and Php100,000.00 on
August 15, 2001. Further demands went unheeded. As
of April 30, 2002, MCMP owed Monark the amount of
Php1,282,481.83, broken down as follows:
Thus, on June 18, 2002, Monark filed a suit for a Sum of
Money with the RTC docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-
47092.7 In its Answer filed on July 5, 2002, 8 MCMP
alleged in defense that the complaint was premature as
Monark has refused to give a detailed breakdown of its
claims. MCMP further averred that it had an agreement
with Monark that it would not be charged for the whole
time that the leased equipment
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 28-29.
7 Id., at p. 51.
8 Id., at p. 9.
435
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
was in its possession but rather only for the actual time
that the equipment was used although still on the
project site. MCMP, however, admitted that this
agreement was not contained in the Contract.
During trial, Monark presented as one of its witnesses,
Reynaldo Peregrino (Peregrino), its Senior Account
Manager. Peregrino testified that there were two (2)
original copies of the Contract, one retained by Monark,
while the other was given to MCMP. He further testified
that Monarks copy had been lost and that diligent
efforts to recover the copy proved futile. Instead,
Peregrino presented a photocopy of the Contract which
he personally had on file. MCMP objected to the
presentation of secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the Contract arguing that there were no
diligent efforts to search for the original copy. Notably,
MCMP did not present its copy of the Contract
notwithstanding the directive of the trial court to
produce the same.9
On November 20, 2007, the RTC issued its Decision
finding for Monark as plaintiff, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and
legal premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff, and ordering the defendant to pay the
former:
1. Php1,282,481.83 as balance for the rental fees of the
subject heavy equipments (sic) as of April 30, 2002,
inclusive of the interests thereof;
2. Twenty-Five percent (25%) of the total amount to be
recovered as payment for the attorneys fees; and
3. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 57-58.
436
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
From this Decision of the RTC, MCMP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated January 31, 2008 while Monark
interposed a Motion for Clarification and/or Partial
Reconsideration.10 On April 28, 2008, the RTC issued an
Order, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court finds
no reversible error in the assailed decision henceforth,
the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. On the other hand, the
plaintiffs Motion for Clarification and/or Partial
Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED for being
meritorious. Therefore, in the dispositive portion of the
assailed decision dated 20 November 2007, the
following should be included:
The payment of interests, charges and fees due after
April 30, 2002 and up to the time when all the
obligations of the defendant to the plaintiff shall have
been fully paid, computed in accordance with the
stipulations entered into between the parties under
Exhibits A to G, and uniformly stated in the following
wise:
Credit sales are payable within 30 days from the date of
invoice. Customer agrees to pay interest at 24% p.a. on
all amounts. In addition, customer agrees to pay a
collection fee of 1% compounded monthly and 2% per
month penalty charge for late payment on amounts
overdue. Customer agrees to pay a sum equal to 25% of
any amount due as attorneys fees in case of suit, and
expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of
Quezon City, Makati, Pasig or Manila,
_______________
10 Dated January 29, 2008; id., at p. 55.
437
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
Metro Manila, for any legal action arising from, this
transactions.
SO ORDERED.
Unsatisfied, MCMP appealed the RTCs Decision and
Order to the Court of Appeals (CA). Eventually, the
appellate court, by a Decision dated October 14, 2011,
affirmed in toto the Decision and Order of the RTC.
MCMPs motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision
was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March 9,
2012.
Hence, the instant petition.
MCMP challenges the ruling of the CA arguing that the
appellate court should have disallowed the
presentation of secondary evidence to prove the
existence of the Contract, following the Best Evidence
Rule. MCMP specifically argues that based on the
testimony of Peregrino, Monark did not diligently
search for the original copy of the Contract as
evidenced by the fact that: 1) the actual custodian of
the document was not presented; 2) the alleged loss
was not even reported to management or the police;
and 3) Monark only searched for the original copy of the
document for the purposes of the instant case.
Petitioners contention is erroneous.
The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the
production of the original document whenever its
contents are the subject of inquiry, is contained in
Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Section3.Original document must be produced;
exceptions.When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
438
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or
other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
(Emphasis supplied)
Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide
the relevant rules on the presentation of secondary
evidence to prove the contents of a lost document:
Section5.When original document is unavailable.
When the original document has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof
of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove
its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Section 6.When original document is in adverse
partys custody or control.If the document is in the
custody or under the control of adverse party, he must
have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such
notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he
fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may
be presented as in the case of its loss.
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman ,11
the Court set down the requirements before a party
may present secondary evidence to prove the contents
of the original document whenever the original copy
has been lost:
_______________
11 G.R. No. 165487, July 13, 2011, 653 SCRA 765,
777.
439
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original, the
offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or
due execution of the original; (2) the loss and
destruction of the original or the reason for its non-
production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror,
the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of
the original can be attributed. The correct order of
proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and
contents.
In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the
above requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC
gave credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the
original Contract in the possession of Monark has been
lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the
same but to no avail. Such testimony has remained
uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly held by this
Court, findings of facts and assessment of credibility
of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court.12
Hence, the Court will respect the evaluation of the trial
court on the credibility of Peregrino.
MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by
Monark is not the contract that they entered into. Yet, it
has failed to present a copy of the Contract even
despite the request of the trial court for it to produce
its copy of the Contract.13 Normal business practice
dictates that MCMP should have asked for and retained
a copy of their agreement. Thus, MCMPs failure to
present the same and even explain its failure, not only
justifies the presentation by Monark of secondary
evidence in accordance with Section 6 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, but it also gives rise to the
disputable presumption adverse to MCMP under Section
3(e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
_______________
12 G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 182.
13 Rollo, pp. 57-58.
440
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
Next, MCMP claims that the pieces of equipment were
not actually delivered to it by Monark. It bears pointing 67, 76-78, citing Imperial v. Jaucian, G.R. No. 149004,
out, however, that the witnesses of MCMP itself, Jorge
Samonte, a Budget Supervisor of MCMP, and Engr.
Horacio A. Martinez, Sr., General Manager of MCMP,
both acknowledged the delivery of the equipment to the
project sites.14 Clearly, the contention of MCMP is false.
Evidently, the instant petition must be dismissed.
Nevertheless, the Court takes notice that the trial court
imposed upon MCMP a 24% per annum interest on the
rental fees as well as a collection fee of 1% per month
compounded monthly and a 2% per month penalty
charge. In all then, the effective interest rate foisted
upon MCMP is 60% per annum. On top of this, MCMP
was assessed for attorneys fees at the rate of 25% of
the total amount due. These are exorbitant and
unconscionable rates and, following jurisprudence,
must be equitably reduced.
In Macalinao v. Bank of the Philippine Islands ,15 the
Court reduced the interest imposed by the bank of 36%
for being excessive and unconscionable:
x x x Nevertheless, it should be noted that this is not
the first time that this Court has considered the
interest rate of 36% per annum as excessive and
unconscionable. We held in Chua v. Timan:
The stipulated interest rates of 7% and 5% per month
imposed on respondents loans must be equitably
reduced to 1% per month or 12% per annum. We need
not unsettle the principle we had affirmed in a plethora
of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3% per
_______________
14 Id., at p. 15.
15 G.R. No. 175490, September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA
April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 517, Tongoy v. Court of
Appeals, No. L-45645, June 28, 1983, 123 SCRA 99.
441
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
month and higher are excessive, iniquitous,
unconscionable and exorbitant. Such stipulations are
void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law.
While C.B. Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on
January 1, 1983, effectively removed the ceiling on
interest rates for both secured and unsecured loans,
regardless of maturity, nothing in the said circular
could possibly be read as granting carte blanche
authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels
which would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a
hemorrhaging of their assets. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as
if there was no express contract thereon. Hence, courts
may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity
demand.
The same is true with respect to the penalty charge.
Notably, under the Terms and Conditions Governing the
Issuance and Use of the BPI Credit Card, it was also
stated therein that respondent BPI shall impose an
additional penalty charge of 3% per month. Pertinently,
Article 1229 of the Civil Code states:
Art.1229.The judge shall equitably reduce the
penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there
has been no performance, the penalty may also be
reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable.
In exercising this power to determine what is iniquitous
and unconscionable, courts must consider the
circumstances of each case since what may be
iniquitous and unconscionable in one may be totally
just and equitable in another.
442
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
In the more recent case of Pentacapital Investment
Corporation v. Mahinay,16 the Court reduced the interest
and penalties imposed in a contract as follows:
Aside from the payment of the principal obligation of
P1,936,800.00, the parties agreed that respondent pay
interest at the rate of 25% from February 17, 1997 until
fully paid. Such rate, however, is excessive and thus,
void. Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it
is as if there was no express contract thereon. To be
sure, courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and
equity demand. In this case, 12% interest is reasonable.
The promissory notes likewise required the payment of
a penalty charge of 3% per month or 36% per annum.
We find such rates unconscionable. This Court has
recognized a penalty clause as an accessory obligation
which the parties attach to a principal obligation for
the purpose of ensuring the performance thereof by
imposing on the debtor a special prestation (generally
consisting of the payment of a sum of money) in case
the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or
inadequately fulfilled. However, a penalty charge of 3%
per month is unconscionable; hence, we reduce it to 1%
per month or 12% per annum, pursuant to Article 1229
of the Civil Code which states:
Art.1229.The judge shall equitably reduce the
penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there
has been no performance, the penalty may also be
reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable.
Lastly, respondent promised to pay 25% of his
outstanding obligations as attorneys fees in case of
nonpayment thereof. Attorneys fees here are in the
nature of liquidated damages. As long as said
stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public
order, it is strictly bind-
_______________
16 G.R. No. 171736,July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 284, 305-
306.
443
VOL. 739, NOVEMBER 10, 2014
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
ing upon respondent. Nonetheless, courts are
empowered to reduce such rate if the same is
iniquitous or unconscionable pursuant to the above
quoted provision. This sentiment is echoed in Article
2227 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art.2227.Liquidated damages, whether intended as
an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if
they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
Hence, we reduce the stipulated attorneys fees from
25% to 10%.
Following the above principles previously laid down by
the Court, the interest and penalty charges imposed
upon MCMP must also be considered as iniquitous,
unconscionable and, therefore, void. As such, the rates
may validly be reduced. Thus, the interest rate of 24%
per annum is hereby reduced to 12% per annum.
Moreover, the interest shall start to accrue thirty (30)
days after receipt of the second set of invoices on
January 21, 2001, or March 1, 2001 in accordance with
the provisions in the invoices themselves.
Additionally, the penalty and collection charge of 3%
per month, or 36% per annum, is also reduced to 6%
per annum. And the amount of attorneys fees is
reduced from 25% of the total amount due to 5%.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit with the
MODIFICATION that the dispositive portion of the RTCs
Decision dated November 20, 2007, as amended in an
Order dated April 28, 2008, should read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and legal
premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, and ordering the defendant to pay the former:
1. Php765,380.33 representing the unpaid rental fees;
444
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
MCMP Construction Corp. vs. Monark Equipment Corp.
2. Interest of 12% per annum on the unpaid rental fees
to be computed from March 1, 200117 until payment;
3. Penalty and collection charge of 6% per annum on
the unpaid rental fees to be computed from March 1,
2001;
4. Attorneys Fees of five percent (5%) of the total
amount to be recovered; and
5. The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
Villarama, Jr., Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe** and
Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Petition denied with modification.
Notes.Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d)
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except when the original is a public
record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office. (Dimaguila vs. Monteiro, 714 SCRA
565 [2014])
When the subject of inquiry is the content of a
document, submission of a certified true copy is
justified only in clearly delineated instances. ( Republic
vs. Sandiganbayan, 722 SCRA 211 [2014])
o0o
_______________
17 Thirty (30) days from the date when the second
set of invoices were received by MCMP.
* * Acting member per Special Order No. 1866 dated
November 4, 2014. G.R.No.189404.December11,2013.*
WILGEN LOON, JERRY ARCILLA, ALBERT PEREYE,
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights ARNOLD PEREYE, EDGARDO OBOSE, ARNEL MALARAS,
reserved. PATROCINO TOETIN, EVELYN LEONARDO, ELMER
GLOCENDA,RUFOCUNAMAY,ROLANDOSAJOL,ROLANDO
ABUCAYON, JENNIFER NATIVIDAD, MARITESS TORION,
ARMANDO LONZAGA, RIZAL GELLIDO, EVIRDE HAQUE,
[1]MYRNA VINAS, RODELITO AYALA, WINELITO OJEL,
RENATO RODREGO, NENA ABINA, EMALYN OLIVEROS,
LOUIEILAGAN,JOELENTIG,ARNELARANETA,BENJAMIN
COSE, WELITO LOON and WILLIAM ALIPAO,
petitioners,vs.POWER MASTER, INC., TRIC GENERAL
SERVICES, and SPOUSES HOMER and CARINA ALUMISIN,
respondents.
LaborLaw;Appeals;Bond;Paragraph2,Article223ofthe
Labor Code provides that [i]n case of a judgment involving a
monetaryaward,anappealbytheemployermaybeperfectedonly
uponthepostingofacashorsuretybondissuedbyareputable
bonding companyduly accredited by the Commissionin the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.Paragraph 2, Article 223 of the Labor Code
provides that [i]n case of a judgment involving a monetary
award,anappealbytheemployermaybeperfectedonlyuponthe
postingofacashorsuretybondissuedbyareputablebonding
companydulyaccredited by theCommissionin the amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed
from.Contrarytotherespondentsclaim,theissueoftheappeal
bondsvaliditymayberaisedforthefirsttimeonappealsinceits
proper filing is a jurisdictional requirement. The requirement
thattheappealbondshouldbeissuedbyanaccreditedbonding
company is mandatory and jurisdictional. The rationale of
requiring an appeal bond is to discourage the employers from
usinganappealtodelayorevadetheemployeesjustandlawful
claims.Itisin
_______________
*SECONDDIVISION.
[1]EvirdlyHaqueintheCourtofAppealsdecision;Rollo,p.
55.
441tendedtoassuretheworkersthattheywillreceivethe
money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the
employersappeal.
Same;Same;ProceduralRulesandTechnicalities;Inlabor
cases,strictadherencetothetechnicalrulesofprocedureisnot
required. Time and again, we have allowed evidence to be
submitted for the first time onappeal with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in the interest of substantial
justice.Inlaborcases,strictadherencetothetechnicalrulesof
procedure is not required. Time and again, we have allowed
evidence to be submitted for the first time on appeal with the
NLRC in the interest of substantial justice. Thus, we have
consistentlysupportedtherulethatlaborofficialsshoulduseall
reasonablemeanstoascertainthefactsineachcasespeedilyand
objectively,withoutregardtotechnicalitiesoflaworprocedure,in
the interest of due process.However, this liberal policy should
stillbesubjecttorulesofreasonandfairplay.Theliberalityof
procedural rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a
party should adequately explain any delay in the
submissionofevidence;and(2)apartyshouldsufficiently
prove the allegations sought to be proven. The reason for
these requirements is that the liberal application of the rules
before quasijudicial agencies cannot be used to perpetuate
injusticeandhamperthejustresolutionofthecase.Neitheris
theruleonliberalconstructionalicensetodisregardtherulesof
procedure.
Same; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Administrative
Proceedings;While we generally admit in evidence and give
probative value to photocopied documents in administrative
proceedings,allegationsofforgeryandfabricationshouldprompt
theadversepartytopresenttheoriginaldocumentsforinspection.
Whytherespondentsphotocopiedandcomputerizedcopiesof
documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest
opportunity is a serious question that lends credence to the
petitionersclaimthattherespondentsfabricatedtheevidencefor
purposes of appeal.While we generally admit in evidence
and give probative value to photocopied documents in
administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and
fabricationshouldprompttheadversepartytopresentthe
originaldocumentsforinspection.Itwasincumbentuponthe
respondentstopresenttheoriginals,especiallyinthiscasewhere
thepetitionershadsubmittedtheirspecimensignatures.Instead,
therespondentseffectivelydeprivedthepetitionersofthe
442opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged
spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is
thusleftwithnooptionbuttorulethattherespondentsfailureto
present the originals raises the presumption that evidence
willfullysuppressedwouldbeadverseifproduced.
Same; Burden of Proof; Termination of Employment;In
terminationcases,theburdenofprovingjustandvalidcausefor
dismissing an employee from his employment rests upon the
employer.Interminationcases,theburdenofprovingjustand
validcausefordismissinganemployeefromhisemploymentrests
upon the employer. The employers failure to discharge this
burden results in the finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
Thisisexactlywhathappenedinthepresentcase.
Same; Same; Payment; As in illegal dismissal cases, the
general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove
paymentratherthanontheplaintifftoprovenonpaymentofthese
moneyclaims.Asinillegaldismissalcases,thegeneralruleis
thattheburdenrestsonthedefendanttoprovepaymentrather
thanontheplaintifftoprovenonpaymentofthesemoneyclaims.
Therationaleforthisruleisthatthepertinentpersonnelfiles,
payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents
which will show that differentials, service incentive leave and
other claims of workers have been paid are not in the
possessionoftheworkerbutareinthecustodyandcontrolofthe
employer.
Same; Same; Overtime Pay; Premium Pay; The burden of
provingentitlementtoovertimepayandpremiumpayforholidays
andrestdaysrestsontheemployeebecausethesearenotincurred
in the normal course of business.The CA was correct in its
finding that the petitioners failed to provide sufficient factual
basisfortheawardofovertime,andpremiumpaysforholidays
andrestdays.Theburdenofprovingentitlementtoovertimepay
and premium pay for holidays and rest days rests on the
employeebecausethesearenotincurredinthenormalcourseof
business.Inthepresentcase,thepetitionersfailedtoadduceany
evidencethatwouldshowthattheyactuallyrenderedservicein
excessoftheregulareightworkinghoursaday,andthattheyin
factworkedonholidaysandrestdays.443
Same;AttorneysFees;Anemployeeisentitledtoanawardof
attorneysfeesequivalenttotenpercent(10%)oftheamountofthe
wagesinactionsforunlawfulwithholdingofwages.Theaward
of attorneys fees is also warranted underthe circumstances of
thiscase.Anemployeeisentitledtoanawardofattorneysfees
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the amount of the wages in
actionsforunlawfulwithholdingofwages.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
NenitaC.Mahinayforpetitioners.
BRION,J.:
We resolve the petition for review oncertiorari,[2]filed by
petitioners Wilgen Loon, Jerry Arcilla, Albert Pereye, Arnold
Pereye,EdgardoObose,ArnelMalaras,PatrocinoToetin,Evelyn
Leonardo, Elmer Glocenda, Rufo Cunamay, Rolando Sajol,
Rolando Abucayon, Jennifer Natividad, Maritess Torion,
Armando Lonzaga, Rizal Gellido, Evirde Haque, Myrna Vinas,
Rodelito Ayala, Winelito Ojel, Renato Rodrego, Nena Abina,
Emalyn Oliveros, Louie Ilagan, Joel Entig, Arnel Araneta,
Benjamin Cose, Welito Loon, William Alipao (collectively,
thepetitioners),tochallengetheJune5,2009decision[3]andthe
August28,2009resolution[4]oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCA
G.R.SPNo.95182.
_______________
[2]Rollo, pp. 1854; datedOctober 23, 2009 andfiledunder
Rule45oftheRulesofCourt.
[3]Id., at pp. 5565; penned by Associate Justice Sixto C.
Marella,Jr.,andconcurredinbyAssociateJusticesRebeccade
GuiaSalvadorandJaparB.Dimaampao.
[4]Id.,atpp.6667.
444
TheFactualAntecedents
RespondentsPowerMaster,Inc.andTriCGeneralServices
employedandassignedthepetitionersasjanitorsandleadsmen
in various Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company(PLDT)officesinMetroManilaarea.Subsequently,the
petitioners filed a complaint for money claims against Power
Master, Inc., TriC General Services and their officers, the
spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin
(collectively,therespondents). The petitioners alleged in their
complaint that they were not paid minimum wages, overtime,
holiday,premium,serviceincentiveleave,andthirteenthmonth
pays.Theyfurtheraverredthattherespondentsmadethemsign
blankpayrollsheets.OnJune11,2001,thepetitionersamended
their complaintand includedillegaldismissal astheircauseof
action. They claimed that the respondents relieved them from
serviceinretaliationforthefilingoftheiroriginalcomplaint.
Notably, the respondents did not participate in the
proceedingsbeforetheLaborArbiterexceptonApril19,2001
andMay21,2001whenMr.RomuloPacia,Jr.appearedon
the respondents behalf.[5]The respondents counsel also
appearedinapreliminarymandatoryconferenceonJuly
5, 2001.[6]However, the respondents neither filed any position
papernorprofferedpiecesofevidenceintheirdefensedespitetheir
knowledgeofthependencyofthecase.
TheLaborArbitersRuling
In a decision[7]dated March 15, 2002, Labor
Arbiter(LA)Elias H. Salinas partially ruled in favor of the
petitioners.TheLAawardedthepetitionerssalarydifferential,
service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays.In
awarding
_______________
[5]Id.,atp.407.
[6]Id.,atp.321.
[7]Id.,atpp.405413.
445theseclaims,the LAstatedthatthe burdenofprovingthe
paymentofthesemoneyclaimsrestswiththeemployer.TheLA
also awardedattorneys feesin favor of the petitioners,
pursuanttoArticle111oftheLaborCode.[8]
However, the LA denied the petitioners claims
forbackwages, overtime, holiday, and premium pays.The
LA observed that the petitioners failed to show that they
rendered overtime work and worked on holidays and rest days
without compensation. The LA further concluded that the
petitioners cannot be declared to have been dismissed from
employmentbecausetheydidnotshowanynoticeoftermination
of employment. They were also not barred from entering the
respondentspremises.
TheProceedingsbeforetheNLRC
BothpartiesappealedtheLAsrulingwiththeNationalLabor
RelationsCommission.ThepetitionersdisputedtheLAsdenialof
theirclaimforbackwages,overtime,holidayandpremiumpays.
Meanwhile, the respondents questioned the LAs ruling on the
ground that the LA did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons.
Therespondentsinsistedthattheywerenotpersonallyserved
withsummonsandotherprocesses.Theyalsoclaimedthatthey
paidthepetitionersminimumwages,serviceincentiveleaveand
thirteenthmonthpays.Asproofs,theyattachedphotocopied
andcomputerizedcopiesofpayroll
_______________
[8]Article111oftheLaborCodeprovides:
1.Incasesofunlawfulwithholdingofwages,theculpable
party may be assessed attorneys fees equivalent to ten
percentoftheamountofwagesrecovered.
2.Itshallbeunlawfulforanypersontodemandoraccept,
inanyjudicialoradministrativeproceedingsfortherecovery
of wages, attorneys fees which exceed ten percent of the
amountofwagesrecovered.
446sheetstotheirmemorandumonappeal.[9]Theyfurther
maintained that the petitioners were validly dismissed. They
arguedthatthepetitionersrepeateddefiancetotheirtransferto
different workplaces and their violations of the company rules
and regulations constituted serious misconduct and willful
disobedience.[10]
On January 3, 2003, the respondents filed an unverified
supplemental appeal.They attached photocopied and
computerizedcopiesoflistofemployeeswithautomated
teller machine (ATM)cards to the supplemental
appeal.Thislistalsoshowedtheamountsallegedlydepositedin
the employees ATM cards.[11]They also attached
documentaryevidenceshowingthatthepetitionerswere
dismissedforcauseandhadbeenaccordeddueprocess.
On January 22, 2003, the petitioners filed anUrgent
Manifestation and Motion[12]where they asked for the
deletionofthesupplementalappealfromtherecordsbecauseit
allegedly suffered from infirmities.First, the supplemental
appealwasnotverified.Second,itwasbelatedlyfiledsixmonths
from the filing of the respondents notice of appeal with
memorandum on appeal. The petitioners pointed out that they
only agreed to the respondents filing of a responsive pleading
until December 18, 2002.[13]Third, the attached documentary
evidenceonthesupplementalappealborethepetitionersforged
signatures.
_______________
[9]Id., at pp. 781879; the payroll sheets cover the periods
fromNovember1,1998toDecember30,1998;fromNovember1,
1999 to December 30, 1999; and from November 1, 2000 to
February28,2001.
[10]Id.,atpp.548780.
[11]Id.,atpp.880985;thepayrollsheetscovertheperiods
fromNovember1,2000toDecember30,2000,andfromJanuary
1,2001toFebruary15,2001.
[12]Id.,atpp.359382.
[13]Id.,atp.360.
447
 They reiterated these allegations in anUrgent Motion to
ResolveManifestationandMotion(ToExpungefromthe
RecordsRespondentsSupplementalAppeal,Replyand/or
Rejoinder)dated January 31, 2003.[14]Subsequently, the
petitioners filed anUrgent Manifestation with Reiterating
Motion to StrikeOff the Record Supplemental
Appeal/Reply, Quitclaims and Spurious Documents
Attached to Respondents Appealdated August 7, 2003.
[15]Thepetitionersarguedinthislastmotionthatthepayrolls
should not be given probative value because they were the
respondents fabrications. They reiterated that the genuine
payrolls bore their signatures, unlike the respondents
photocopies of the payrolls. They also maintained that their
signatures in the respondents documents (which showed their
receiptofthirteenthmonthpay)hadbeenforged.
TheNLRCRuling
InaresolutiondatedNovember27,2003,theNLRCpartially
ruled in favor of the respondents.[16]The NLRC affirmed the
LAs awards ofholiday pay and attorneys fees. It also
maintainedthattheLAacquiredjurisdictionoverthepersonsof
therespondentsthroughtheirvoluntaryappearance.
However,itallowedtherespondentstosubmitpiecesof
evidenceforthefirsttimeonappealonthegroundthat
they had been deprived of due process.It found that the
respondents did not actually receive the LAs processes. It also
admittedtherespondentsunverifiedsupplementalappealonthe
groundthattechnicalitiesmaybedisregardedtoservethegreater
interestofsubstantialdue
_______________
[14]Id.,atpp.384389.
[15]CARollo,pp.249254.
[16]Rollo, pp. 148180. Penned by Commissioner Tito F.
Genilo,andconcurredinbyPresidingCommissionerLourdesC.
JavierandCommissionerErnestoC.Verceles.
448process.Furthermore,theRulesofCourtdonotrequirethe
verificationofasupplementalpleading.
The NLRC also vacated the LAs awards ofsalary
differential,thirteenthmonthandserviceincentiveleave
pays. In so ruling, it gave weight to the pieces of evidence
attached to the memorandum on appeal and the supplemental
appeal. It maintained that the absence of the petitioners
signatures in the payrolls was not an indispensable factor for
their authenticity. It pointed out that the payment of money
claimswasfurtherevidencedbythelistofemployeeswithATM
cards. It also found that the petitioners signatures were not
forged.Ittookjudicialnoticethatmanypeopleuseatleasttwoor
moredifferentsignatures.
The NLRC further ruled that the petitioners werelawfully
dismissed on grounds of serious misconduct and willful
disobedience.Itfoundthatthepetitionersfailedtocomplywith
various memoranda directing them to transfer to other
workplaces and to attend training seminars for the intended
reorganizationandreshuffling.
TheNLRCdeniedthepetitionersmotionforreconsideration
inaresolutiondatedApril28,2006.[17]Aggrieved,thepetitioners
filedapetitionforcertiorariunderRule65oftheRulesofCourt
beforetheCA.[18]
TheCARuling
The CA affirmed the NLRCs ruling. The CA held that the
petitionerswereaffordedsubstantiveandproceduraldueprocess.
Accordingly, the petitioners deliberately did not explain their
side. Instead, they continuously resisted theirtransfer to other
PLDTofficesandviolatedcompanyrulesandregulations.Italso Thiscasepresentstousthefollowingissues:
upheldtheNLRCsfindingsonthepetitionersmonetaryclaims. 1)WhethertheCAerredwhenitdidnotfindthattheNLRC
_______________ committedgraveabuseofdiscretioningivingduecourse
[17]Id.,atpp.181189. totherespondentsappeal;
[18]Id.,atpp.128144. a)Whethertherespondentsperfectedtheirappealbefore
449 theNLRC;and
TheCAdeniedthepetitionersmotionforreconsiderationina _______________
resolution dated August 28, 2009, prompting the petitioners to [19]Supranote2.
filethepresentpetition.[19]
[20]Ibid.
ThePetition [21]Rollo,pp.475502,506512.
450
InthepetitionbeforethisCourt,thepetitionersarguethatthe b)WhethertheNLRCproperlyallowedtherespondents
CA committed a reversible error when it did not find that the supplementalappeal
NLRCcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretion.Theyreiteratetheir
2)Whether the respondents were estopped from submitting
argumentsbeforethelowertribunalsandtheCAinsupportof
piecesofevidenceforthefirsttimeonappeal;
thisconclusion.Theyalsopointoutthattherespondentsposteda
bondfromasuretythatwasnotaccreditedbythisCourtandby 3)Whetherthepetitionerswereillegallydismissedandare
theNLRC.Ineffect,therespondentsfailedtoperfecttheirappeal thusentitledtobackwages;
beforetheNLRC.TheyfurtherinsistthattheNLRCshouldnot 4)Whether the petitioners are entitled to salary differential,
haveadmittedtherespondentsunverifiedsupplementalappeal. overtime,holiday,premium,serviceincentiveleave,and
[20] thirteenthmonthpays;and
5)Whetherthepetitionersareentitledtoattorneysfees.
TheRespondentsPosition
TheCourtsRuling
IntheirComments,therespondentsstressthatthepetitioners
onlyraisedtheissueofthevalidityoftheappealbondforthefirst The respondents perfected their
time onappeal. They also reiterate their arguments before the appeal with the NLRC because the
NLRCandtheCA.Theyadditionallysubmitthatthepetitioners revocation of the bonding companys
argumentshavebeenfullypasseduponandfoundunmeritorious authority has a prospective
bytheNLRCandtheCA.[21] application
TheIssues
 Paragraph2,Article223oftheLaborCodeprovidesthat[i]n
caseofajudgmentinvolvingamonetaryaward,anappealbythe
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding companyduly
accreditedbytheCommissionintheamountequivalenttothe
monetaryawardinthejudgmentappealedfrom.
Contrary to the respondents claim, the issue of the appeal
bondsvaliditymayberaisedforthefirsttimeonappealsinceits
properfilingisajurisdictionalrequirement.[22]Therequirement
thattheappealbondshouldbeissuedbyanaccreditedbonding
company is mandatory and jurisdictional. The rationale of
requiring an appeal bond is to discourage the employers from
usinganappealtodelayorevadetheemploy
_______________
[22]Oca v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 696, 702; 378 SCRA
642,647(2002).
451ees just and lawful claims. It is intended to assure the
workersthattheywillreceivethemoneyjudgmentintheirfavor
uponthedismissaloftheemployersappeal.[23]
Inthepresentcase,therespondentsfiledasuretybondissued
by Security Pacific Assurance Corporation(Security Pacific)on
June 28, 2002. At that time, Security Pacific was still an
accredited bonding company. However, the NLRC revoked its
accreditation on February 16, 2003.[24]Nonetheless, this
subsequentrevocationshouldnotprejudicetherespondentswho
relied on its then subsisting accreditation in good faith. InDel
Rosario v. Philippine Journalists, Inc.,[25]we ruled that a
bonding companys revocation of authority is prospective in
application.
However,therespondentsshouldpostanewbondissuedby
anaccreditedbondingcompanyincompliancewithparagraph4,
Section6,Rule6oftheNLRCRulesofProcedure.Thisprovision
statesthat[a]cashorsuretybondshallbevalidandeffective
from the date of deposit or posting,until the case is finally
decided,resolvedorterminatedortheawardsatisfied.
The CA correctly ruled that the
NLRCproperlygaveduecoursetothe
respondentssupplementalappeal
TheCAalsocorrectlyruledthattheNLRCproperlygavedue
coursetotherespondentssupplementalappeal.Neitherthelaws
northerulesrequiretheverificationofthesupple
_______________
[23]Catubay v. National Labor Relations Commission, 386
Phil. 648, 657; 330 SCRA 440, 447 (2000); andBorja Estate v.
SpousesBallad,498Phil.694,706;459SCRA657,668(2005).
[24]PerCertificationdatedAugust22,2013ofMr.JamesD.V.
Navarrete,OCAAssistantChiefofOffice,LegalOffice.
[25]G.R.No.181516,August19,2009,596SCRA515,522
523.
452mentalappeal.[26]Furthermore,verificationisaformal,not
a jurisdictional, requirement. It is mainly intended for the
assurancethatthemattersallegedinthepleadingaretrueand
correct and not of mere speculation.[27]Also, a supplemental
appealismerelyanaddendumtotheverifiedmemorandumon
appeal that was earlier filed in the present case; hence, the
requirementforverificationhassubstantiallybeencompliedwith.
Therespondentsalsotimelyfiledtheirsupplementalappeal
on January 3, 2003. The records of the case show that the
petitioners themselves agreed that the pleading shall be filed
untilDecember18,2002.TheNLRCfurtherextendedthefilingof
the supplemental pleading until January 3, 2003 upon the
respondentsmotionforextension.
 Apartymayonlyadduceevidence
for the first time on appeal if he
adequately explains his delay in the
submission of evidence and he
sufficiently proves the allegations
soughttobeproven
In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of
procedure is not required. Time and again, we have allowed
evidence to be submitted for the first time on appeal with the
NLRC in the interest of substantial justice.[28]Thus, we have
consistentlysupportedtherulethatlaborofficialsshoulduse
_______________
[26]NLRCRulesofProcedure,Rule1,Section3,inrelation
toRulesofCourt,Rule7,Section4.
[27]Roy Pasos v. Philippine National Construction
Corporation,G.R. No. 192394, July 3, 2013; 700 SCRA 608;
andMillennium Erectors Corporation v. Magallanes,G.R. No.
184362, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 708, 713714,
citingPacquing v. CocaCola Philippines,Inc.,G.R. No. 157966,
January31,2008,543SCRA344,356357.
[28]Casimirov.SternRealEstateInc.,519Phil.438,454455;
484SCRA463,479(2006);andIranvs.NLRC,352Phil.264265,
273274;289SCRA433,442(1998).
453all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedilyandobjectively,withoutregardtotechnicalitiesoflawor
procedure,intheinterestofdueprocess.[29]
However,thisliberalpolicyshouldstillbesubjecttorulesof
reason and fairplay.The liberality of procedural rules is
qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should
adequately explain any delay in the submission of
evidence; and (2) a party should sufficiently prove the
allegations sought to be proven.[30]The reason for these
requirements is that the liberal application of the rules before
quasijudicialagenciescannotbeusedtoperpetuateinjusticeand
hamper the just resolution of the case. Neither is the rule on
liberalconstructionalicensetodisregardtherulesofprocedure.
[31]
Guidedbytheseprinciples,theCAgrosslyerredinrulingthat
theNLRCdidnotcommitgraveabuseofdiscretioninarbitrarily
admitting and giving weight to the respondents pieces of
evidenceforthefirsttimeonappeal.
A.The respondents failed to
adequatelyexplaintheirdelay
inthesubmissionofevidence
We cannot accept the respondents cavalier attitude in
blatantly disregarding the NLRC Rules of Procedure. The CA
gravelyerredwhenitoverlookedthattheNLRCblindlyadmitted
andarbitrarilygaveprobativevaluetotherespondentsevidence
despite their failure to adequately explain their delay in the
submission of evidence. Notably, the respondents delay was
anchoredontheirassertionthatthey
_______________
[29]Iranv.NLRC,supra,atp.274;p.442.
[30]Tanjuanv.Phil.PostalSavingsBank,Inc.,457Phil.993,
10041005;411SCRA168,176(2003).
[31]Favilav.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,367Phil.
584,593;308SCRA303,313(1999).
454wereobliviousoftheproceedingsbeforetheLA.However,the
respondents did not dispute the LAs finding that Mr. Romulo
Pacia,Jr.appearedontheirbehalfonApril19,2001andMay21,
2001.[32]The respondents also failed to contest the petitioners
assertionthattherespondentscounselappearedinapreliminary
mandatoryconferenceonJuly5,2001.[33]
Indeed,theNLRCcapriciouslyandwhimsicallyadmittedand
gaveweighttotherespondentsevidencedespiteitsfindingthat
they voluntarily appeared in the compulsory arbitration
proceedings. The NLRC blatantly disregarded the fact that the
respondents voluntarily opted not to participate, to adduce
evidenceintheirdefenseandtofileapositionpaperdespitetheir
knowledgeofthependencyoftheproceedingsbeforetheLA.The
respondentswerealsogrosslynegligentinnotinformingtheLA
of the specific building unit where the respondents were
conducting their business and their counsels address despite
theirknowledgeoftheirnonreceiptoftheprocesses.[34]
B.The respondents failed to
sufficiently prove the
allegationssoughttobeproven
Furthermore,therespondentsfailedtosufficientlyprovethe
allegations sought to be proven. Why the respondents
photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence
were not presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious
question that lends credence to the petitioners claim that the
respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of
appeal.While we generally admit in evidence and give
probative value to photocopied documents in
administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and
fabricationshouldprompttheadversepartytopresentthe
original
_______________
[32]Supranote5.
[33]Supranote6.
[34]NLRCRulesofProcedure,Rule3,Sections4and6(e).
455documents for inspection.[35]It was incumbent upon the
respondentstopresenttheoriginals,especiallyinthiscasewhere
thepetitionershadsubmittedtheirspecimensignatures.Instead,
the respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the
opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged spurious
evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is thus left
withnooptionbuttorulethattherespondentsfailuretopresent
the originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully
suppressedwouldbeadverseifproduced.[36]
It was also gross error for the CA to affirm the NLRCs
propositionthat[i]tisofcommonknowledgethattherearemany
peoplewhouseatleasttwoormoredifferentsignatures.[37]The
NLRCcannottakejudicialnoticethatmanypeopleuseatleast
two signatures, especially in this case where the petitioners
themselves disown the signatures in the respondents assailed
documentary evidence.[38]TheNLRCs position is unwarranted
andispatentlyunsupportedbythelawandjurisprudence.
Viewedintheselights,thescalesofjusticemusttiltinfavorof
theemployees.Thisconclusionisconsistentwiththerulethatthe
employers cause can only succeed on the strength of its own
evidenceandnotontheweaknessoftheemployeesevidence.[39]
The petitioners are entitled to
backwages
Basedontheaboveconsiderations,wereversetheNLRCand
theCAsfindingthatthepetitionerswereterminatedfor
_______________
[35]Nicariov.NLRC,356Phil.936,941;295SCRA619,625
(1998).
[36]RulesofCourt,Rule131,Section3(e).
[37]Rollo,p.164.
[38]RulesofCourt,Rule129,Section2.
 [39]The CocaCola Export Corporation v. Gacayan,G.R. No.
149433, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 377, 400401, citations
omitted.
456just cause and were afforded procedural due process. In
terminationcases,theburdenofprovingjustandvalidcausefor
dismissing an employee from his employment rests upon the
employer.Theemployersfailuretodischargethisburdenresults
inthefindingthatthedismissalisunjustified.[40]Thisisexactly
whathappenedinthepresentcase.
The petitioners are entitled to
salary differential, service
incentive,holiday, and thirteenth
monthpays
We also reverse the NLRC and the CAs finding that the
petitioners are not entitled to salary differential, service
incentive, holiday, and thirteenth month pays. As in illegal
dismissalcases,thegeneralruleisthattheburdenrestsonthe
defendanttoprovepaymentratherthanontheplaintifftoprove
nonpaymentofthesemoneyclaims.[41]Therationaleforthisrule
is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records,
remittancesandothersimilardocumentswhichwillshowthat
differentials,serviceincentiveleaveandotherclaimsofworkers
havebeenpaidarenotinthepossessionoftheworkerbutare
inthecustodyandcontroloftheemployer.[42]
Thepetitionersare notentitledto
overtimeandpremiumpays
However,theCAwascorrectinitsfindingthatthepetitioners
failedtoprovidesufficientfactualbasisfortheawardofovertime,
andpremiumpaysforholidaysandrestdays.
_______________
[40]Eastern Overseas Employment Center, Inc. v. Bea,512
Phil.749,759;476SCRA384,394(2005).
[41]Pigcaulanv.SecurityandCreditInvestigation,Inc.,G.R.
No.173648,January16,2012,663SCRA1,1415;andBuilding
Care Corp. v. NLRC,335 Phil. 1131, 1139; 268 SCRA666, 672
(1997).
[42]Villarv.NLRC,387Phil.706,716;331SCRA686,695
(2000).
457The burden of proving entitlement to overtime pay and
premium pay for holidaysand rest days restson the employee
becausethesearenotincurredinthenormalcourseofbusiness.
[43]In the present case, the petitioners failed to adduce any
evidencethatwouldshowthattheyactuallyrenderedservicein
excessoftheregulareightworkinghoursaday,andthattheyin
factworkedonholidaysandrestdays.
Thepetitionersare entitled
toattorneysfees
The award of attorneys fees is also warranted under the
circumstancesofthiscase.Anemployeeisentitledtoanawardof
attorneysfeesequivalenttotenpercent(10%)oftheamountof
thewagesinactionsforunlawfulwithholdingofwages.[44]
Asafinalnote,weobservethatRodelitoAyala,WinelitoOjel,
RenatoRodregoandWelitoLoonarealsonamedaspetitionersin
this case. However, we deny their petition for the reason that
theywerenotpartoftheproceedingsbeforetheCA.Theirfailure
totimelyseekredressbeforetheCAprecludesthisCourtfrom
awardingthemmonetaryclaims.
All told, we find that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in admitting and giving probative value to the
respondentsevidenceonappeal,whicherrorstheCAreplicated upon the employer. (Marc II Marketing, Inc. vs. Joson, 662
whenitupheldtheNLRCrulings. SCRA35[2011])
WHEREFORE,based on these premises, An employer has the right to require the performance of
weREVERSEandSETASIDEthedecisiondatedJune5,2009, overtime service in any of the situations contemplated under
andtheresolutiondatedAugust28,2009oftheCourtofAppeals Article89oftheLaborCodeandanemployeesnoncomplianceis
inCAG.R.SPNo.95182.ThiscaseisREMANDEDtotheLabor willful disobedience. (Realda vs. New Age Graphics, Inc., 671
Arbiter for the sole purpose of computing petitioners (Wilgen
SCRA410[2012])
Loon,JerryArcilla,AlbertPereye,ArnoldPereye,
o0o
_______________
_______________
[43]Lagaticv.NLRC,349Phil.172,185186;285SCRA251, **DesignatedasActingMemberinlieuofAssociateJustice
262(1998). JoseP.PerezperSpecialOrderNo.1627datedDecember6,2013.
[44]LaborCode,Article111.
458Edgardo Obose, Arnel Malaras, Patrocino Toetin, Evelyn Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
Leonardo, Elmer Glocenda, Rufo Cunamay, Rolando Sajol, reserved.
Rolando Abucayon, Jennifer Natividad, Maritess Torion,
Armando Lonzaga, Rizal Gellido, Evirdly Haque, Myrna Vinas,
Nena Abina, Emalyn Oliveros, Louie Ilagan, Joel Entig, Arnel
Araneta, Benjamin Cose and William Alipao) full backwages
(computedfromthedateoftheirrespectivedismissalsuptothe
finality of this decision) and their salary differential, service
incentive leave, holiday, thirteenth month pays, and attorneys
feesequivalenttotenpercent(10%)ofthewithheldwages.The
respondents are further directed to immediately post a
satisfactory bond conditioned on the satisfaction of the awards
affirmedinthisDecision.
SOORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perlas

BernabeandLeonen,**JJ.,concur.
Judgmentandresolutionreversedandsetaside. G.R.No.201011.January27,2014.*
Notes.Interminationcases,theburdenofprovingjustand THERESITA,JUAN,ASUNCION,PATROCINIA,RICARDOand
validcausefordismissinganemployeefromhisemploymentrests GLORIA, all surnamed DIMAGUILA, petitioners,vs.JOSE and
SONIAA.MONTEIRO,respondents.
 RemedialLaw;Evidence;Admissions;Section4ofRule129
oftheRulesofCourtprovidesthatanadmissionmadebyaparty
inthecourseoftheproceedingsinthesamecasedoesnotrequire
proof,andmaybecontradictedonlybyshowingthatitwasmade
throughpalpablemistake.Section4ofRule129oftheRulesof
Courtprovidesthatanadmissionmadebyapartyinthecourseof
theproceedingsinthesamecasedoesnotrequireproof,andmay
be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpablemistake.Thepetitionersarguethatsuchadmissionwas
thepalpablemistakeoftheirformercounselinhisrushtofilethe
answer,acopyofwhichwasnotprovidedtothem.
Same;Same;Same;Article1431oftheCivilCodeprovides
thatthroughestoppel,anadmissionisrenderedconclusiveupon
the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
againstthepersonrelyingthereon.Article1431oftheCivilCode
provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered
conclusiveuponthepersonmakingit,andcannotbedeniedor
disprovedasagainstthepersonrelyingthereon.Therespondent
spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners admission and so
amendedtheiroriginalcomplaintforpartitiontooneforrecovery
ofpossessionofaportionofthe
______________
*THIRDDIVISION.
566subjectproperty.Thus,thepetitionersarenowestopped
fromdenyingorattemptingtoprovethattherewasnopartition
oftheproperty.Consideringthatanadmissiondoesnotrequire
proof,theadmissionofthepetitionerswouldactuallybesufficient
toprovethepartitionevenwithoutthedocumentspresentedby
therespondentspouses.Ifanything,theadditionalevidencethey
presentedonlyservedtocorroboratethepetitionersadmission.
Same; Same; Best Evidence Rule; Anent the best evidence
rule,Section3(d)ofRule130oftheRulesofCourtprovidesthat
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself,exceptwhentheoriginalisapublicrecordinthecustodyof
apublicofficerorisrecordedinapublicoffice.Anentthebest
evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document,noevidenceshallbeadmissibleotherthantheoriginal
documentitself,exceptwhentheoriginalisapublicrecordinthe
custodyofapublicofficerorisrecordedinapublicoffice.Section
7ofthesameRuleprovidesthatwhentheoriginalofadocument
isinthecustodyofapublicofficerorisrecordedinapublicoffice,
itscontentsmaybeprovedbyacertifiedcopyissuedbythepublic
officerincustodythereof.Section24ofRule132providesthatthe
recordofpublicdocumentsmaybeevidencedbyacopyattested
bytheofficerhavingthelegalcustodyortherecord.
Same;Same;HearsayEvidenceRule;Theruleprovidesthat
entriesinofficialrecordsmadeintheperformanceofthedutyofa
publicofficerofthePhilippines,orbyapersonintheperformance
ofadutyspeciallyenjoinedbylaw,areprimafacieevidenceofthe
factsthereinstated.Astothehearsayrule,Section44ofRule
130oftheRulesofCourtsimilarlyprovidesthatentriesinofficial
records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that
entriesinofficialrecordsmadeintheperformanceofthedutyofa
publicofficerofthePhilippines,orbyapersonintheperformance
ofadutyspeciallyenjoinedbylaw,areprimafacieevidenceofthe
facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the
inconvenienceanddifficultyofrequiringtheofficialsattendance
as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the
courseofhisduty.Thedocumentstrustworthinessconsistsinthe
presumptionofregularityofperformanceofofficialduty.
567
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Riguera&RigueraLawOfficeforpetitioners.
EdgardoM.Salandananforrespondents.
MENDOZA,J.:
ThisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45ofthe
Rules ofCourtassailing theAugust 15,2011 Decision1andthe
March5,2012Resolution2oftheCourtofAppeals(CA),inCA
G.R. CV No. 92707, which affirmed the August 23, 2007
Decision3of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Santa Cruz,
Laguna(RTC),inCivilCaseNo.SC3108.
TheFacts
On July 5, 1993, the respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia
Monteiro(Spouses Monteiro), along with Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa,
and Clarita Nobleza, filed their Complaint for Partition and
Damages before the RTC, against the petitioners, Theresita,
Juan,Asuncion,Patrocinia,Ricardo,andGloriaDimaguila(The
Dimaguilas),togetherwithRosalina,Jonathan,Eve,Sol,Venus,
Enrique, Nina, Princess Arieta, and Evangelina Borlaza. The
complaintallegedthatallthepartieswerecoownersandprayed
for the partition of a residential house and lot located at Gat.
TayawSt.,Liliw,Laguna,withanareaof489squaremeters,and
coveredbyTaxDeclarationNo.1453.SpousesMonteiroanchored
theirclaimonadeedofsale
_______________
1Rollo, pp. 2943; penned by Associate Justice Hakim S.
Abdulwahid, with Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and
AssociateJusticeRodilV.Zalameda,concurring.
2Id.,atpp.4445.
3Id.,atpp.144157.
568executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro
Dimaguila(Pedro).
In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants
counteredthattherewasnocoownershiptospeakofinthefirst
place. They alleged that the subject property, then owned by
Maria Ignacio Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally
betweenhertwosons,PerfectoandVitalianoDimaguila,through
aDeedofExtrajudicialPartition,withitssouthernhalfportion
assignedtoPerfectoandthenorthernhalfportiontoVitaliano.
They claimed that they were the heirs of Vitaliano and that
Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with the property asthey
werenotheirsofeitherPerfectoorVitaliano.
Duringthecourseoftheproceedings,severalincidentswere
initiated,namely:(a)MotiontoDismissforlackoflegalcapacity
to sue of Spouses Monteiro and for lack of cause of action; (b)
MotionforReconsiderationoftheOrderofdenialthereof,which
was denied; (c) Motion for Production and Inspection of
Documents;(d)MotionforReconsiderationoftheOrdergranting
the same, which was denied; (e) Motion to Defer Pretrial; (f)
NoticeofConsignationbythepetitionersintheexerciseoftheir
alleged right of redemption of the share being claimed by the
SpousesMonteiroinlightofthedeedofsaletheyproducedand
claimedtohavebeenexecutedbytheheirsofPedrointheirfavor;
(g)MotiontoRemoveSoniaMonteiro(Sonia)asplaintiff,which
was denied; (h) Motion for Reconsideration thereof, which was
also denied; (i) Motion for Clarification and/or Extended
Resolution; and (j) Motion to Suspend Proceedings due to a
pendingPetitionforCertioraribeforetheCAassailingseveralof
theRTCorders.Theproceedingsresumedafterthepromulgation
by the CA of its April 5, 2000 Resolution in CAG.R. No. SP
52833,whichupheldtheassailedRTCorders.
On January 2, 2001, upon resumption of the proceedings,
SpousesMonteirofiledtheirMotionforLeavetoAmend
569and/or Admit Amended Complaint.4The RTC granted their
motion.Theamendedcomplaintabandonedtheoriginalclaimfor
partition and instead sought the recovery of possession of a
portionofthesubjectpropertyoccupiedbytheDimaguilasand
otherdefendants,specifically,theportionsoldtothecouplebythe
heirs of Pedro. Furthermore, only Spouses Monteiro were
retainedasplaintiffsandtheDimaguilasasdefendants.
Inamendingtheircomplaint,SpousesMontieroadoptedthe
Dimaguilasadmissionintheiroriginalanswerthatthesubject
property had already been partitioned between Perfecto and
Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated
October 5, 1945, and that during their lifetime, the brothers
agreedthatPerfectowouldbecometheownerofthesouthernhalf
portionandVitalianoofthenorthernhalfportion,whichdivision
wasobservedandrespectedbythemaswellastheirheirsand
successorsininterest.
SpousesMonteirofurtheraverredthatPerfectowassurvived
byEsperanza,LeandroandPedro,whohaddividedthesouthern
halfportionequallyamongstthemselves,withtheirrespective1/3
sharesmeasuring81.13squaremeterseach;thatPedrosshare
pertainstothe1/3ofthesouthernhalfimmediatelyadjacentto
the northernhalf adjudicated to the Dimaguilas as heirs of
Vitaliano;thatonSeptember29,1992,Pedrossharewassoldby
hisheirstothemthroughaBilihanngLahatNamingKarapatan
(Bilihan)with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and
LeandroappearinginanAffidavitofConformityandWaiver;and
that when they attempted to take possession of the share of
Pedro, they discovered that the subject portion was being
occupiedbytheDimaguilas.
In their Answer5to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas
admittedthatthesubjectpropertywasinheritedby,and
_______________
4Records,Vol.II,pp.289308.
5Id.,atpp.315328.
570divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied
theadmissionintheiroriginalanswerthatithadbeenactually
dividedintosouthernandnorthernportions.Instead,theyargued
thattheExtrajudicialPartitionmentionedonlythedivisionofthe
subjectpropertyintotwoandshareandsharealike.Ineffect,
they argued the existence of a coownership, contrary to their
original position. The Dimaguilas further argued that
theBilihandidnotspecifythemetesandboundsoftheproperty
sold,inviolationofArticle1458oftheCivilCode.Evenassuming
that such had been specified, they averred that the sale of a
definiteportionofapropertyownedincommonwasvoidsincea
coownercouldonlysellhisundividedshareintheproperty.
Duringthetrial,SpousesMonteiropresentedPedritoAdrieta,
brotherofSoniaMonteiro(Sonia),whotestifiedthatPerfectowas
hisgrandfatherandthatatthetimeofPerfectosdeath,hehad
twoproperties, oneofwhichwasthe subjectproperty inLiliw,
Laguna, which went to his children, Esperanza, Leonardo and
Pedro. Pedro was survived by his children Pedrito, Theresita,
Francisco, and Luis, who, in turn, sold their rights over the
subjectpropertytoSonia.
Sonia testified that she was approached by Pedros son,
Francisco, and was asked if she was interested in purchasing
Pedros1/3shareofthesouthernportionoftheBahaynaBato,
andthatheshowedheradeedofextrajudicialpartitionexecuted
by and between Perfecto and Vitaliano, as well as the tax
declarationofthepropertytoprovethatthepropertyhadalready
beenpartitionedbetweenthetwobrothers.
EngineerBaltazarF.Mesinatestifiedthathewasthegeodetic
engineer hired by Spouses Monteiro to survey the property in
Liliw,andrecountedthathecheckedtheboundaryofthesubject
property,subdividedthelotintotwoandcameupwithasurvey
plan.
Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the Office of the
Municipal Assessor, presented a certified true copy of the
cadastralmapofLiliwandalistofclaimants/owners.
571
Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources(DENR), testified that as
part of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the records of
surveyedland,includingcadastralmapsfromtheregion.
OneoftheDimaguilas,Asuncion,wasthesolewitnessforthe
defendants.Shetestifiedthattheirfirstcounselmadeamistake
whenheallegedintheiroriginalanswerthatthepropertyhad
already been partitioned into northern and southern portions
betweenthetwobrothers,astheoriginalanswerhadbeenrushed
and they were never given a copy of it. She claimed that the
mistakewasonlypointedouttoherbytheirnewcounselafter
theirformercounselwithdrewduetocancer.Shefurthertestified
thattherewasnointentiontopartitionthebahaynabatowhich
stoodonthesubjectproperty,inordertopreserveitshistorical
andsentimentalvalue.
RulingoftheRTC
In its August 23, 2007 Decision, the RTC ruled in favor of
SpousesMonteiroandorderedtheDimaguilastoturnoverthe
possessionofthesubject1/3portionofthesouthernhalfofthe
property,towit:
WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffsandagainstthedefendants:
a.Orderingthedefendantsandallpersonsclaimingrightsunder
themtopeacefullyvacateandturnoverpossessionof1/3ofthe
southernportionofthepropertycoveredbyTaxDeclaration
No.1453,specificallydescribedasAofLot877inthesketch
planmarkedasExhibitI,within60daysfromthefinalityof
thisDecision,failingwhichletawritofpossessionissue;
b.Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and
solidarily,the
572amountofP500permonthintheformofrentforthe
use of the property from July 1993 until the property is
vacated;
c.Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and
solidarily,attorneysfeesofP30,000andlitigationexpenseof
P20,000.
SOORDERED.6
The RTC found that although the extrajudicial partition
merely divided the property into two share and share alike,
evidencealiundewas appreciated to show that there was an
actual division of the property into south and north between
PerfectoandVitaliano,andthatsuchpartitionwasobservedand
honored by their heirs. These pieces of evidence were the
cadastral map of Liliw7and a corresponding list of claimants,
whichshowedthatthesubjectpropertyhadlongbeenregistered
as Lot 876 (northernhalf), claimed by Buenaventura
Dimaguila(Buenaventura), an heir of Vitaliano, and Lot 877
(southernhalf),claimedbyPerfecto.
TheRTCheldthatthemannerofpartitionwasadmittedby
the Dimaguilasthemselves intheir originalanswer. It gaveno
credence to the claim of Asuncion that such admission was an
error of their former counsel andthat she was unaware of the
contentsof their original answer. It noted that the Dimaguilas
hadstronglymaintainedtheirtheoryofpartitionfrom1992when
thecomplaintwasfirstfiled,andonlychangedtheirdefensein
2001 when Spouses Monteirofiled their amended complaint. It
keenly observed that it was precisely their admission which
propelledSpousesMonteirotoamendtheircomplaintfromoneof
partitiontorecoveryofpossession.Thus,theRTCconcludedthat
therewasindeedapartitionofthesubjectpropertyintosouthern
halfandnorth
_______________
6Rollo,pp.156157.
7Records,Vol.I,ExhibitA,pp.2425.
573ernhalfportionsbetweenPerfectoandVitalianoandthatthe
Dimaguilaswereestoppedfromdenyingthesame.
AstotheauthenticityoftheBilihan,wherethe1/3shareof
PedrowassoldtoSpousesMonteiro,theRTCfoundthedocument
toberegularandauthenticabsentanypieceofevidencetothe
contrary. It stated that the proper persons to contest the sale
werenottheDimaguilas,whoweretheheirsofVitaliano,butthe
heirsofPerfecto.Itnotedthattherecordsshowedthattheheirs
ofEsperanzaandLeandro(Pedrossiblings),hadsignifiedtheir
conformitytothepartitionandtothesaleofPedros1/3portion.
RulingoftheCA
InitsassailedAugust15,2011Decision,theCAaffirmedthe
rulingoftheRTC.
The CA found that Spouses Monteiro had established their
casebyapreponderanceofevidencethrutheirpresentationofthe
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition,8the cadastral map and the
municipalassessorsrecords.9Itnoted,moreimportantly,thatthe
Dimaguilas themselves corroborated the claim of partition in
theiroriginalanswer.Itlikewiseruledthatthepetitionerswere
estopped from denying their admission of partition after the
respondentspouseshadreliedontheirjudicialadmission.
TheDimaguilasalsoinsistedontheirargument,whichwas
raisedbeforetheRTC,butnotaddressed,thattheBilihanshould
not have been admitted as evidence for lack of a documentary
stamp tax, in accordance with Section 201 of the National
Internal Revenue Code(NIRC). CitingGabucan v. Manta10and
DelRosariov.Hamoy,11theCA,however,ruled
_______________
8Records,Vol.III,ExhibitJ,p.519.
9Records,Vol.I,ExhibitA,pp.2425.
10184Phil.588;95SCRA752(1980).
11235Phil.719;151SCRA719(1987).
574that if a document which did not bear the required
documentarystampwaspresentedinevidence,thecourtshould
requiretheproponenttoaffixtherequisitestamp.TheCAnoted
thattheRTChadfailedtodirectSpousesMonteirotoaffixthe
stamp and merely reminded the presiding judge to be more
vigilantonsimilarsituationsinthefuture.Nonetheless,itheld
thatthepetitionersdidnotpossessthenecessarypersonalityto
assailthesalebetweenSpousesMonteiroandtheheirsofPedro
becauseitpertainedtothesouthernhalfofthepropertytowhich
theyhadnoclaim.
TheCAlikewisefoundsufficientbasisfortheawardofrentals
as compensatory damages since Spouses Monteiro were
wrongfully deprived of possession of the 1/3 portion of the
southernhalfofthesubjectproperty.Italsoupheldtheawardof
attorneys fees andlitigation expenses by the RTC, considering
that Spouses Monteiro were compelled to litigate and incur
expensestoprotecttheirrightsandinterest.
InitsassailedMarch5,2012Resolution,theCAdeniedthe
petitionersmotionforreconsiderationforlackofmerit.
Hence,thispetition.
 AssignmentofErrors
I THECOURTOFAPPEALSGRAVELYERREDWHEN
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THERE WAS AN ACTUAL
PARTITIONOFTHEPROPERTYCOVEREDBYTAX
DECLARATIONNO.1453.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE 1/3 PORTION OF THE
SOUTHERNHALFOFTHEPROPERTYWASSOLD
TOTHERESPONDENTS.
575
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE EXHIBIT C, THE
BILIHANNGLAHATNAMINGKARAPATAN.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE
ENTITLEDTORECOVERPOSSESSIONOFTHE1/3
PORTION OF THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE
PROPERTY.
V duringthetrialashearsayandaviolationofthebestevidence
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR
RENTALS FOR THE USE OF THE PROPERTY
FROMJULY1993UNTILVACATED.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR
ATTORNEYSFEESANDLITIGATIONEXPENSES.
VII
IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE PETITIONERS
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND TO GRANT THE
COUNTERCLAIMSINTERPOSEDTHEREIN.12
TheDimaguilasarguethattheiroriginalallegationregarding
thepartitionofthesubjectpropertyintonorthernandsouthern
portionswasamistakeoftheirformer counsel,and itwasnot
theirintentiontopartitionthepropertybecausetodosowould
damagethehousethereon.Evenassumingan
_______________
12Rollo,pp.1314.
576admissionwasmade,thepetitionersaverthatsuchwasmade
onlybysome,butnotall,ofthecoowners;andthatpartitioncan
only be made by all coowners, and allowing the admission is
tantamount to effecting partition by only some coowners.
SpousesMonteirothemselves,intheiroriginalcomplaint,made
an admission that they were coowners of the property and
asserted that there was no partition. The
evidencealiundeconsidered by the RTC, consisting of the
cadastralmapandthelistofclaimants,weretimelyobjectedto
rule.
The petitioners reiterate that theBilihanshould not have
beenadmittedintoevidencebecauseitlackedthedocumentary
stamptaxrequiredbySection201oftheNIRC,providingthatno
documentshallbeadmittedinevidenceuntiltherequisitestamps
have been affixed thereto. They argue that the ruling of
petitioners lack of personality to assail the deed of sale is
different from the issue of the deed of sales admissibility as
evidence. They conclude that considering that no documentary
stamp was ever affixed on the deed of sale, such should never
havebeenadmittedintoevidenceandconsequently,shouldnot
havebeenrelieduponbythelowercourtstoprovethesaleof1/3
ofthesouthernportion;andthatconsideringthattheBilihanis
inadmissibleasevidence,therespondentspouseshavenobasis
fortheirclaimtothesubject1/3portionofthesouthernhalfof
the property. Thus, they insist that the lower courts erred in
awarding to Spouses Monteiro the possession of the subject
property,therentals,attorneysfeesandlitigationexpenses,and
in failing to rule on their counterclaim for demolition of
improvementsandpaymentofdamages.
Theassignmentoferrorsboilsdowntotwomainissues:
1.Whethertherewasapartitionofthesubjectproperty;and
577
2.Whether the 1/3 portion of the southernhalf of the subject
propertywassoldtotherespondentspouses.
RulingoftheCourt
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the petitioners
assignment of errors calls for the Court to again evaluate the
evidence to determine whether there was a partition of the
property and whether the 1/3 portion of the southern half was
soldtotherespondentspouses.Theseclearlyentailquestionsof
factwhicharebeyondtheCourtsambitofreviewunderRule45
oftheRulesofCourt,especiallyconsideringthatthefindingsof
factoftheRTCwereaffirmedbytheCA. 13Onthisgroundalone,
thepresentpetitionmustbedenied.Nonetheless,theCourtshall
delveintothesefactualissuestofinallyputthiscasetorest.
PartitionoftheSubjectProperty
SpousesMonteiro,asplaintiffsintheoriginalcase,hadthe
burden of proof to establish their case by a preponderance of
evidence,whichistheweight,credit,andvalueoftheaggregate
evidence on either side, synonymous with the term greater
weight of the evidence. Preponderance of evidence is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
thatwhichisofferedinoppositionthereto.14
To prove their claim of partition, the respondent spouses
presentedthefollowing:(1)theDeedofExtrajudicialPartition,
dated October 5, 1945, executed by and between the brothers
PerfectoandVitaliano;(2)thecadastralmapofLiliw
_______________
13Heirs of Vda. Dela Cruz v. Heirs of Fajardo,G.R. No.
184966,May30,2011,649SCRA463,470.
14BankofthePhilippineIslandsv.SpousesRoyeca,581Phil.
188,194;559SCRA207,215(2008).
578Cadm484,15datedAugust6,1976,showingthatthesubject
propertyhadbeendividedintosouthernandnorthernportions,
registered as Lot Nos. 876 and 877; and (3) the Municipal
Assessorsrecords16showingthatthesaidlotswererespectively
claimedbyBuenaventuraandPerfecto.
ItisundisputedthattheDeedofExtrajudicialPartitionstated
thatPerfectoandVitalianoagreedtodividebetweentheminto
twoandshareandsharealikethesubjectproperty,includingthe
house situated thereon. It appears, however, that the property
wasactuallypartitionedintodefiniteportions,namely,southern
andnorthernhalves,asreflectedinthecadastralmapofLiliw,
which were respectively claimed by an heir of Vitaliano and
Perfectohimself.It,thus,appearsthatthesubjectpropertyhad
alreadybeenpartitionedintodefiniteportionsmorethan20years
priortotheoriginalcomplaintforpartitionfiledin1993,andthat
suchdivisionhadbeenobservedbythebrothersheirs.Asearlier
pointedout,thepetitionersthemselvesadmittedtothisveryfact
intheiroriginalanswer,towit:
(b)OnSeptember5,1945thebrothersPERFECTOand
VITALIANO DIMAGUILA executed a deed of
EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION of the aforedescribed
property dividing the same into two (2) equal parts as
indicatedintheaforesaiddeedasfollows,towit:
xxx
(c)Asaresultoftheforegoingpartitionandasknownby
allthepartiesinthiscasefromthebeginningorassoonas
they reached the age of discernment PERFECTO
DIMAGUILAbecamethesoleandexclusiveownerofthe
southern half of the aforedescribed property and
VITALIANODIMAGUILAbecamethe
_______________
15Records,Vol.III,ExhibitJ,p.519.
16Records,Vol.III,ExhibitL,p.556.
579soleownerofthenorthernhalfofthesameproperty;
thehousethat wasbuilt thereonandstill existing upto
thistimewaslikewiseequallydividedbetweenthetwo(2)
DIMAGUILAbrothersinaccordancewiththeextrajudicial
partitionofhalfequalshares;
xxx
2.Inotherwords,theshareofVITALIANODIMAGUILA
in the above described property has already been long
segregatedandhadpassedontohisheirsasisverywell
knownbyallthepartiesinthiscase;17
xxx
(EmphasesintheOriginal)
Section418ofRule129oftheRulesofCourtprovidesthatan
admissionmadebyapartyinthecourseoftheproceedingsinthe
samecasedoesnotrequireproof,andmaybecontradictedonlyby
showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The
petitionersarguethatsuchadmissionwasthepalpablemistake
oftheirformercounselinhisrushtofiletheanswer,acopyof
whichwasnotprovidedtothem.PetitionerAsunciontestified:
QSo,whywasthatallegations(sic)madeintheAnswer?
AMaybe,(sic)inhisrushtofiletheAnswer,Atty.Paredesfiled
thesamewithoutgivingusacopy19
_______________
17Records,Vol.I,pp.1112.
18Section4.Judicialadmissions.Anadmission,verbalor
written,madebythepartyinthecourseoftheproceedingsinthe
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradictedonlybyshowingthatitwasmadethroughpalpable
mistakeorthatnosuchadmissionwasmade.
19TSN,December1,2005,p.15.
580
This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely selfserving
claim unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof.20Furthermore, the Court notes that this position was
adoptedbythepetitionersonlyalmosteight(8)yearsaftertheir
originalanswerwasfiled,inresponsetotheamendedcomplaint
of the respondent spouses. In their original answer to the
complaint for partition, their claim that there was already a
partitionintonorthernhalfandsouthernhalfportions,wasthe
very essence of their defense. It was precisely this admission
whichmovedtherespondentspousestoamendtheircomplaint.
The petitioners cannot now insist that the very foundation of
theiroriginaldefensewasapalpablemistake.
Article143121oftheCivilCodeprovidesthatthroughestoppel,
anadmissionisrenderedconclusiveuponthepersonmakingit,
andcannotbedeniedordisprovedasagainstthepersonrelying
thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the
petitioners admission and so amended their original complaint
forpartitiontooneforrecoveryofpossessionofaportionofthe
subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from
denyingorattemptingtoprovethattherewasnopartitionofthe
property.
Considering that an admission does not require proof, the
admissionofthepetitionerswouldactuallybesufficienttoprove
the partition even without the documents presented by the
respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they
presentedonlyservedtocorroboratethepetitionersadmission.
The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the
cadastralmapandthelistofclaimantspresentedbythere
_______________
20Rosaroso v. Soria,G.R. No. 194846, June 19, 2013, 699
SCRA232.
21Art. 1431.Through estoppel an admission or
representationisrenderedconclusiveuponthepersonmakingit,
andcannotbedeniedordisprovedasagainstthepersonrelying
thereon.
581spondentspouses,onthegroundthattheyviolatedtherule
onhearsayandthebestevidencerule.
Anentthebestevidencerule,Section3(d)ofRule130ofthe
RulesofCourtprovidesthatwhenthesubjectofinquiryisthe
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
thantheoriginaldocumentitself,exceptwhentheoriginalisa
publicrecordinthecustodyofapublicofficerorisrecordedina
publicoffice.22Section7ofthesameRuleprovidesthatwhenthe
originalofadocumentisinthecustodyofapublicofficeroris
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.23Section24ofRule132providesthattherecordofpublic
documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer
havingthelegalcustodyortherecord.24
_______________
22Section3.Original document must be produced;
exceptions.When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document,noevidenceshallbeadmissibleotherthantheoriginal
documentitself,exceptinthefollowingcases:
xxx
(d)Whentheoriginalisapublicrecordinthecustody
ofapublicofficerorisrecordedinapublicoffice.
23Section7.Evidenceadmissiblewhenoriginaldocumentis
apublicrecord.Whentheoriginalofdocumentisinthecustody
ofpublicofficerorisrecordedinapublicoffice,itscontentsmay
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custodythereof.
24Section24.Proofofofficialrecord.Therecordofpublic
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publicationthereoforbyacopyattestedbytheofficerhavingthe
legalcustodyoftherecord,orbyhisdeputy,andaccompanied,if
therecordisnotkeptinthePhilippines,withacertificatethat
suchofficerhasthecustody.Iftheofficeinwhichtherecordis
kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretaryoftheembassyorlegation,consulgeneral,consul,vice
consul,orconsularagentorbyanyofficerintheforeignserviceof
the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
recordiskept,andauthenticatedbythesealofhisoffice.
582
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the
corresponding list of claimants ofthe area covered by the map
werepresentedbytwopublicofficers.ThefirstwasCrisostomo
Arves,ClerkIIIoftheMunicipalAssessorsOffice,arepositoryof
such documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR
employee,who,asarecordofficer,certifiesandsafekeepsrecords
ofsurveyedlandinvolvingcadastralmaps.Thecadastralmaps
andthelistofclaimants,ascertifiedtruecopiesoforiginalpublic
records,fallundertheexceptiontothebestevidencerule.
Astothehearsayrule,Section44ofRule130oftheRulesof
Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an
exceptiontotherule.25Theruleprovidesthatentriesinofficial
recordsmadeintheperformanceofthedutyofapublicofficerof
the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, areprima facieevidence of the facts
therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the
inconvenienceanddifficultyofrequiringtheofficialsattendance
as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the
courseofhisduty.Thedocumentstrustworthinessconsistsinthe
presumptionofregularityofperformanceofofficialduty.26
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The
DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and
managetheconductofcadastralsurveys. 27Itis,therefore,clear
that thecadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants
qualifyasentriesinofficialrecordsastheywerepreparedbythe
DENR,asmandatedbylaw.Assuch,they
_______________
25Section44.Entriesinofficialrecords.Entriesinofficial
recordsmadeintheperformanceofhisdutybyapublicofficerof
the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
thereinstated.
26Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law: Vol. V, (Quezon City,
Philippines,RexPrintingCompany,Inc.,2004),p.740.
27DENRAdmin.Order200123.
583are exceptions to the hearsay rule and areprima
facieevidenceofthefactsstatedtherein.
Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the
partition,theypresentednoevidencetocontradicttheevidenceof
therespondentspouses.Thus,evenwithouttheadmissionofthe
petitioners,therespondentspousesprovedbyapreponderanceof
evidence that there had indeed been a partition of the subject
property.
Saleof1/3PortionoftheSouthernhalf
Toprovethat1/3ofthesouthernhalfportionofthesubject
propertywassoldtothem,SpousesMonteiropresentedadeedof
sale entitledBilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan,28dated
September29,1992,whereinPedrossharewassoldbyhisheirs
to them, with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and
Leandro in an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver. 29The
petitionersarguethattheBilihanshouldnothavebeenadmitted
into evidence because it lacked the documentary stamp tax
requiredbySection201oftheNIRC.
On August 29, 1994, the petitioners filed a motion for the
productionand/orinspectionofdocuments,30prayingthatSpouses
Monteirobeorderedtoproducethedeedofsale,whichtheycited
asthesourceoftheirrightsascoowners.OnNovember20,1995,
Spouses Monteiro submitted their compliance,31furnishing the
RTCandthepetitionerswithacopy 32oftheBilihan.OnJanuary
3,1996,thepetitionersfiledanoticeofconsignation, 33manifesting
thattheyhadattemptedtoexercisetheirrightofredemptionas
coownersofthe1/3portionofthesouthernhalfoftheproperty
underArticle
_______________
28Records,Vol.III,ExhibitC,p.514.
29Records,Vol.I,pp.303305.
30Id.,atpp.7576.
31Id.,atp.111.
 32Id.,atp.112.
33Id.,atpp.113115.
584162334oftheCivilCodebysendingandtenderingpaymentof
redemptiontoSpousesMonteiro,whichwas,however,returned.
By filing the notice of consignation and tendering their
paymentfortheredemptionofthe1/3portionofthesouthernhalf
oftheproperty,thepetitioners,ineffect,admittedtheexistence,
dueexecutionandvalidityoftheBilihan.Consequently,theyare
now estopped from questioning its admissiblity in evidence for
relying on such for their right of redemption. Additionally, the
Court notes that the copy35of theBilihanwhich was originally
submitted by Spouses Monteiro with its compliance filed on
November20,1995,doesinfactbearadocumentarystamptax.It
couldonlymeanthatthedocumentarystamptaxonthesalewas
properlypaid.TheBilihanwas,therefore,properlyadmittedinto
evidenceandconsideredbytheRTC.
In any case, as correctly held by the lower courts, the
petitioners,asheirsofVitaliano,whoinheritedthenorthernhalf
portion of the subject property, do not possess the necessary
personalitytoassailthesaleofthesouthernhalfportionbetween
Spouses Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro. They are not real
partiesininterest who stand to be benefited or injured by the
saleofthe1/3portionofthesouthernhalfoverwhichtheyhave
absolutelynoright.Ascorrectlyruledbythecourtsbelow,only
fellowcoownershavethepersonalitytoassailthesale,namely,
theheirsofPedrossiblings,EsperanzaandLeandro.Theyhave,
however,expresslyac
_______________
34Art. 1623.Therightoflegalpreemptionorredemption
shallnotbeexercisedexceptwithinthirtydaysfromthenoticein
writingbytheprospectivevendor,orbythevendor,asthecase
maybe.ThedeedofsaleshallnotberecordedintheRegistryof
Property,unlessaccompaniedbyanaffidavitofthevendorthat
hehasgivenwrittennoticethereoftoallpossibleredemptioners.
The right of redemption of coowners excludes that of
adjoiningowners.
35Records,Vol.I,p.112.
585quiescedtothesaleandwaivedtheirrighttothepropertyin
the affidavit presented by Spouses Monteiro. 36As such, the
petitionershavenorighttotheircounterclaimsofdemolitionof
improvementsandpaymentofdamages.
WithSpousesMonteirohavingsufficientlyprovedtheirclaim
overthesubject1/3portionofthesouthernhalfoftheproperty
through theBilihan, the lower courts did not err in awarding
possession, rentals, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses to
them.
TheCourt,however,findsthattheawardofrentalsshouldbe
reckonedfromJanuary2,2001,thedatetheSpousesMonteiro
filed their Amended Complaint seeking recovery of the subject
portion. Interest at the rate of6% per annumshall also be
imposed on the total amount of rent due from finality of this
Decisionuntilfullypaid.37
WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED. The August 15,
2011DecisionandtheMarch5,2012ResolutionoftheCourtof
Appeals, in CAG.R. CV No. 92707 areAFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION,inthat:
a. TheawardofrentattherateofP500.00permonthshall
be reckoned from January 2, 2001 until the property is
vacated;and
b.Interestattherateof6%perannumshallbeimposedon
thetotalamountofrentduefromfinalityofthisDecision
untilfullypaid.
SOORDERED.
 Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad and Leonen,
JJ.,concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed with
modification.
_______________
36Id.,atpp.303304.
37Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13,
2013,703SCRA439.
586
Notes.Acts of facts admitted do not require proof and
cannotbecontradictedunlessitisshownthattheadmissionwas
madethroughpalpablemistakeorthatnosuchadmissionwas
made.(Vidarvs.People,611SCRA216[2010])
Judicialadmissionsmadebypartiesinthepleadings,orinthe
course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are
conclusive and so does not require further evidence to prove
them.(Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs.
Pingol,630SCRA413[2013])
o0o

Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights

reserved.

G.R.No.201011.January27,2014.*
THERESITA,JUAN,ASUNCION,PATROCINIA,RICARDOand
GLORIA, all surnamed DIMAGUILA, petitioners,vs.JOSE and
SONIAA.MONTEIRO,respondents.
 RemedialLaw;Evidence;Admissions;Section4ofRule129
oftheRulesofCourtprovidesthatanadmissionmadebyaparty
inthecourseoftheproceedingsinthesamecasedoesnotrequire
proof,andmaybecontradictedonlybyshowingthatitwasmade
throughpalpablemistake.Section4ofRule129oftheRulesof
Courtprovidesthatanadmissionmadebyapartyinthecourseof
theproceedingsinthesamecasedoesnotrequireproof,andmay
be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpablemistake.Thepetitionersarguethatsuchadmissionwas
thepalpablemistakeoftheirformercounselinhisrushtofilethe
answer,acopyofwhichwasnotprovidedtothem.
Same;Same;Same;Article1431oftheCivilCodeprovides
thatthroughestoppel,anadmissionisrenderedconclusiveupon
the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
againstthepersonrelyingthereon.Article1431oftheCivilCode
provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered
conclusiveuponthepersonmakingit,andcannotbedeniedor
disprovedasagainstthepersonrelyingthereon.Therespondent
spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners admission and so
amendedtheiroriginalcomplaintforpartitiontooneforrecovery
ofpossessionofaportionofthe
______________
*THIRDDIVISION.
566subjectproperty.Thus,thepetitionersarenowestopped
fromdenyingorattemptingtoprovethattherewasnopartition
oftheproperty.Consideringthatanadmissiondoesnotrequire
proof,theadmissionofthepetitionerswouldactuallybesufficient
toprovethepartitionevenwithoutthedocumentspresentedby
therespondentspouses.Ifanything,theadditionalevidencethey
presentedonlyservedtocorroboratethepetitionersadmission.
Same; Same; Best Evidence Rule; Anent the best evidence
rule,Section3(d)ofRule130oftheRulesofCourtprovidesthat
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself,exceptwhentheoriginalisapublicrecordinthecustodyof
apublicofficerorisrecordedinapublicoffice.Anentthebest
evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document,noevidenceshallbeadmissibleotherthantheoriginal
documentitself,exceptwhentheoriginalisapublicrecordinthe
custodyofapublicofficerorisrecordedinapublicoffice.Section
7ofthesameRuleprovidesthatwhentheoriginalofadocument
isinthecustodyofapublicofficerorisrecordedinapublicoffice,
itscontentsmaybeprovedbyacertifiedcopyissuedbythepublic
officerincustodythereof.Section24ofRule132providesthatthe
recordofpublicdocumentsmaybeevidencedbyacopyattested
bytheofficerhavingthelegalcustodyortherecord.
Same;Same;HearsayEvidenceRule;Theruleprovidesthat
entriesinofficialrecordsmadeintheperformanceofthedutyofa
publicofficerofthePhilippines,orbyapersonintheperformance
ofadutyspeciallyenjoinedbylaw,areprimafacieevidenceofthe
factsthereinstated.Astothehearsayrule,Section44ofRule
130oftheRulesofCourtsimilarlyprovidesthatentriesinofficial
records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that
entriesinofficialrecordsmadeintheperformanceofthedutyofa
publicofficerofthePhilippines,orbyapersonintheperformance
ofadutyspeciallyenjoinedbylaw,areprimafacieevidenceofthe
facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the
inconvenienceanddifficultyofrequiringtheofficialsattendance
as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the
courseofhisduty.Thedocumentstrustworthinessconsistsinthe
presumptionofregularityofperformanceofofficialduty.
567
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Riguera&RigueraLawOfficeforpetitioners.
EdgardoM.Salandananforrespondents.
MENDOZA,J.:
ThisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45ofthe
Rules ofCourtassailing theAugust 15,2011 Decision1andthe
March5,2012Resolution2oftheCourtofAppeals(CA),inCA
G.R. CV No. 92707, which affirmed the August 23, 2007
Decision3of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Santa Cruz,
Laguna(RTC),inCivilCaseNo.SC3108.
TheFacts
On July 5, 1993, the respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia
Monteiro(Spouses Monteiro), along with Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa,
and Clarita Nobleza, filed their Complaint for Partition and
Damages before the RTC, against the petitioners, Theresita,
Juan,Asuncion,Patrocinia,Ricardo,andGloriaDimaguila(The
Dimaguilas),togetherwithRosalina,Jonathan,Eve,Sol,Venus,
Enrique, Nina, Princess Arieta, and Evangelina Borlaza. The
complaintallegedthatallthepartieswerecoownersandprayed
for the partition of a residential house and lot located at Gat.
TayawSt.,Liliw,Laguna,withanareaof489squaremeters,and
coveredbyTaxDeclarationNo.1453.SpousesMonteiroanchored
theirclaimonadeedofsale
_______________
1Rollo, pp. 2943; penned by Associate Justice Hakim S.
Abdulwahid, with Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and
AssociateJusticeRodilV.Zalameda,concurring.
2Id.,atpp.4445.
3Id.,atpp.144157.
568executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro
Dimaguila(Pedro).
In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants
counteredthattherewasnocoownershiptospeakofinthefirst
place. They alleged that the subject property, then owned by
Maria Ignacio Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally
betweenhertwosons,PerfectoandVitalianoDimaguila,through
aDeedofExtrajudicialPartition,withitssouthernhalfportion
assignedtoPerfectoandthenorthernhalfportiontoVitaliano.
They claimed that they were the heirs of Vitaliano and that
Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with the property asthey
werenotheirsofeitherPerfectoorVitaliano.
Duringthecourseoftheproceedings,severalincidentswere
initiated,namely:(a)MotiontoDismissforlackoflegalcapacity
to sue of Spouses Monteiro and for lack of cause of action; (b)
MotionforReconsiderationoftheOrderofdenialthereof,which
was denied; (c) Motion for Production and Inspection of
Documents;(d)MotionforReconsiderationoftheOrdergranting
the same, which was denied; (e) Motion to Defer Pretrial; (f)
NoticeofConsignationbythepetitionersintheexerciseoftheir
alleged right of redemption of the share being claimed by the
SpousesMonteiroinlightofthedeedofsaletheyproducedand
claimedtohavebeenexecutedbytheheirsofPedrointheirfavor;
(g)MotiontoRemoveSoniaMonteiro(Sonia)asplaintiff,which
was denied; (h) Motion for Reconsideration thereof, which was
also denied; (i) Motion for Clarification and/or Extended
Resolution; and (j) Motion to Suspend Proceedings due to a
pendingPetitionforCertioraribeforetheCAassailingseveralof
theRTCorders.Theproceedingsresumedafterthepromulgation
by the CA of its April 5, 2000 Resolution in CAG.R. No. SP
52833,whichupheldtheassailedRTCorders.
On January 2, 2001, upon resumption of the proceedings,
SpousesMonteirofiledtheirMotionforLeavetoAmend
569and/or Admit Amended Complaint.4The RTC granted their
motion.Theamendedcomplaintabandonedtheoriginalclaimfor
partition and instead sought the recovery of possession of a
portionofthesubjectpropertyoccupiedbytheDimaguilasand
otherdefendants,specifically,theportionsoldtothecouplebythe
heirs of Pedro. Furthermore, only Spouses Monteiro were
retainedasplaintiffsandtheDimaguilasasdefendants.
Inamendingtheircomplaint,SpousesMontieroadoptedthe
Dimaguilasadmissionintheiroriginalanswerthatthesubject
property had already been partitioned between Perfecto and
Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated
October 5, 1945, and that during their lifetime, the brothers
agreedthatPerfectowouldbecometheownerofthesouthernhalf
portionandVitalianoofthenorthernhalfportion,whichdivision
wasobservedandrespectedbythemaswellastheirheirsand
successorsininterest.
SpousesMonteirofurtheraverredthatPerfectowassurvived
byEsperanza,LeandroandPedro,whohaddividedthesouthern
halfportionequallyamongstthemselves,withtheirrespective1/3
sharesmeasuring81.13squaremeterseach;thatPedrosshare
pertainstothe1/3ofthesouthernhalfimmediatelyadjacentto
the northernhalf adjudicated to the Dimaguilas as heirs of
Vitaliano;thatonSeptember29,1992,Pedrossharewassoldby
hisheirstothemthroughaBilihanngLahatNamingKarapatan
(Bilihan)with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and
LeandroappearinginanAffidavitofConformityandWaiver;and
that when they attempted to take possession of the share of
Pedro, they discovered that the subject portion was being
occupiedbytheDimaguilas.
In their Answer5to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas
admittedthatthesubjectpropertywasinheritedby,and
_______________
4Records,Vol.II,pp.289308.
5Id.,atpp.315328.
570divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied
theadmissionintheiroriginalanswerthatithadbeenactually
dividedintosouthernandnorthernportions.Instead,theyargued
thattheExtrajudicialPartitionmentionedonlythedivisionofthe
subjectpropertyintotwoandshareandsharealike.Ineffect,
they argued the existence of a coownership, contrary to their
original position. The Dimaguilas further argued that
theBilihandidnotspecifythemetesandboundsoftheproperty
sold,inviolationofArticle1458oftheCivilCode.Evenassuming
that such had been specified, they averred that the sale of a
definiteportionofapropertyownedincommonwasvoidsincea
coownercouldonlysellhisundividedshareintheproperty.
Duringthetrial,SpousesMonteiropresentedPedritoAdrieta,
brotherofSoniaMonteiro(Sonia),whotestifiedthatPerfectowas
hisgrandfatherandthatatthetimeofPerfectosdeath,hehad
twoproperties, oneofwhichwasthe subjectproperty inLiliw,
Laguna, which went to his children, Esperanza, Leonardo and
Pedro. Pedro was survived by his children Pedrito, Theresita,
Francisco, and Luis, who, in turn, sold their rights over the
subjectpropertytoSonia.
Sonia testified that she was approached by Pedros son,
Francisco, and was asked if she was interested in purchasing
Pedros1/3shareofthesouthernportionoftheBahaynaBato,
andthatheshowedheradeedofextrajudicialpartitionexecuted
by and between Perfecto and Vitaliano, as well as the tax
declarationofthepropertytoprovethatthepropertyhadalready
beenpartitionedbetweenthetwobrothers.
EngineerBaltazarF.Mesinatestifiedthathewasthegeodetic
engineer hired by Spouses Monteiro to survey the property in
Liliw,andrecountedthathecheckedtheboundaryofthesubject
property,subdividedthelotintotwoandcameupwithasurvey
plan.
Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the Office of the
Municipal Assessor, presented a certified true copy of the
cadastralmapofLiliwandalistofclaimants/owners.
571
Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources(DENR), testified that as
part of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the records of
surveyedland,includingcadastralmapsfromtheregion.
OneoftheDimaguilas,Asuncion,wasthesolewitnessforthe
defendants.Shetestifiedthattheirfirstcounselmadeamistake
whenheallegedintheiroriginalanswerthatthepropertyhad
already been partitioned into northern and southern portions
betweenthetwobrothers,astheoriginalanswerhadbeenrushed
and they were never given a copy of it. She claimed that the
mistakewasonlypointedouttoherbytheirnewcounselafter
theirformercounselwithdrewduetocancer.Shefurthertestified
thattherewasnointentiontopartitionthebahaynabatowhich
stoodonthesubjectproperty,inordertopreserveitshistorical
andsentimentalvalue.
RulingoftheRTC
In its August 23, 2007 Decision, the RTC ruled in favor of
SpousesMonteiroandorderedtheDimaguilastoturnoverthe
possessionofthesubject1/3portionofthesouthernhalfofthe
property,towit:
WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffsandagainstthedefendants:
a.Orderingthedefendantsandallpersonsclaimingrightsunder
themtopeacefullyvacateandturnoverpossessionof1/3ofthe
southernportionofthepropertycoveredbyTaxDeclaration
No.1453,specificallydescribedasAofLot877inthesketch
planmarkedasExhibitI,within60daysfromthefinalityof
thisDecision,failingwhichletawritofpossessionissue;
b.Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and
solidarily,the
572amountofP500permonthintheformofrentforthe
use of the property from July 1993 until the property is
vacated;
c.Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and
solidarily,attorneysfeesofP30,000andlitigationexpenseof
P20,000.
SOORDERED.6
The RTC found that although the extrajudicial partition
merely divided the property into two share and share alike,
evidencealiundewas appreciated to show that there was an
actual division of the property into south and north between
PerfectoandVitaliano,andthatsuchpartitionwasobservedand
honored by their heirs. These pieces of evidence were the
cadastral map of Liliw7and a corresponding list of claimants,
whichshowedthatthesubjectpropertyhadlongbeenregistered
as Lot 876 (northernhalf), claimed by Buenaventura
Dimaguila(Buenaventura), an heir of Vitaliano, and Lot 877
(southernhalf),claimedbyPerfecto.
TheRTCheldthatthemannerofpartitionwasadmittedby
the Dimaguilasthemselves intheir originalanswer. It gaveno
credence to the claim of Asuncion that such admission was an
error of their former counsel andthat she was unaware of the
contentsof their original answer. It noted that the Dimaguilas
hadstronglymaintainedtheirtheoryofpartitionfrom1992when
thecomplaintwasfirstfiled,andonlychangedtheirdefensein
2001 when Spouses Monteirofiled their amended complaint. It
keenly observed that it was precisely their admission which
propelledSpousesMonteirotoamendtheircomplaintfromoneof
partitiontorecoveryofpossession.Thus,theRTCconcludedthat
therewasindeedapartitionofthesubjectpropertyintosouthern
halfandnorth
_______________
6Rollo,pp.156157.
7Records,Vol.I,ExhibitA,pp.2425.
573ernhalfportionsbetweenPerfectoandVitalianoandthatthe
Dimaguilaswereestoppedfromdenyingthesame.
AstotheauthenticityoftheBilihan,wherethe1/3shareof
PedrowassoldtoSpousesMonteiro,theRTCfoundthedocument
toberegularandauthenticabsentanypieceofevidencetothe
contrary. It stated that the proper persons to contest the sale
werenottheDimaguilas,whoweretheheirsofVitaliano,butthe
heirsofPerfecto.Itnotedthattherecordsshowedthattheheirs
ofEsperanzaandLeandro(Pedrossiblings),hadsignifiedtheir
conformitytothepartitionandtothesaleofPedros1/3portion.
RulingoftheCA
InitsassailedAugust15,2011Decision,theCAaffirmedthe
rulingoftheRTC.
The CA found that Spouses Monteiro had established their
casebyapreponderanceofevidencethrutheirpresentationofthe
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition,8the cadastral map and the
municipalassessorsrecords.9Itnoted,moreimportantly,thatthe
Dimaguilas themselves corroborated the claim of partition in
theiroriginalanswer.Itlikewiseruledthatthepetitionerswere
estopped from denying their admission of partition after the
respondentspouseshadreliedontheirjudicialadmission.
TheDimaguilasalsoinsistedontheirargument,whichwas
raisedbeforetheRTC,butnotaddressed,thattheBilihanshould
not have been admitted as evidence for lack of a documentary
stamp tax, in accordance with Section 201 of the National
Internal Revenue Code(NIRC). CitingGabucan v. Manta10and
DelRosariov.Hamoy,11theCA,however,ruled
_______________
8Records,Vol.III,ExhibitJ,p.519.
9Records,Vol.I,ExhibitA,pp.2425.
10184Phil.588;95SCRA752(1980).
11235Phil.719;151SCRA719(1987).
574that if a document which did not bear the required
documentarystampwaspresentedinevidence,thecourtshould
requiretheproponenttoaffixtherequisitestamp.TheCAnoted
thattheRTChadfailedtodirectSpousesMonteirotoaffixthe
stamp and merely reminded the presiding judge to be more
vigilantonsimilarsituationsinthefuture.Nonetheless,itheld
thatthepetitionersdidnotpossessthenecessarypersonalityto
assailthesalebetweenSpousesMonteiroandtheheirsofPedro
becauseitpertainedtothesouthernhalfofthepropertytowhich
theyhadnoclaim.
TheCAlikewisefoundsufficientbasisfortheawardofrentals
as compensatory damages since Spouses Monteiro were
wrongfully deprived of possession of the 1/3 portion of the
southernhalfofthesubjectproperty.Italsoupheldtheawardof
attorneys fees andlitigation expenses by the RTC, considering
that Spouses Monteiro were compelled to litigate and incur
expensestoprotecttheirrightsandinterest.
InitsassailedMarch5,2012Resolution,theCAdeniedthe
petitionersmotionforreconsiderationforlackofmerit.
Hence,thispetition.
 AssignmentofErrors
I THECOURTOFAPPEALSGRAVELYERREDWHEN
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THERE WAS AN ACTUAL
PARTITIONOFTHEPROPERTYCOVEREDBYTAX
DECLARATIONNO.1453.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE 1/3 PORTION OF THE
SOUTHERNHALFOFTHEPROPERTYWASSOLD
TOTHERESPONDENTS.
575
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE EXHIBIT C, THE
BILIHANNGLAHATNAMINGKARAPATAN.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE
ENTITLEDTORECOVERPOSSESSIONOFTHE1/3
PORTION OF THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE
PROPERTY.
V duringthetrialashearsayandaviolationofthebestevidence
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR
RENTALS FOR THE USE OF THE PROPERTY
FROMJULY1993UNTILVACATED.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR
ATTORNEYSFEESANDLITIGATIONEXPENSES.
VII
IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE PETITIONERS
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND TO GRANT THE
COUNTERCLAIMSINTERPOSEDTHEREIN.12
TheDimaguilasarguethattheiroriginalallegationregarding
thepartitionofthesubjectpropertyintonorthernandsouthern
portionswasamistakeoftheirformer counsel,and itwasnot
theirintentiontopartitionthepropertybecausetodosowould
damagethehousethereon.Evenassumingan
_______________
12Rollo,pp.1314.
576admissionwasmade,thepetitionersaverthatsuchwasmade
onlybysome,butnotall,ofthecoowners;andthatpartitioncan
only be made by all coowners, and allowing the admission is
tantamount to effecting partition by only some coowners.
SpousesMonteirothemselves,intheiroriginalcomplaint,made
an admission that they were coowners of the property and
asserted that there was no partition. The
evidencealiundeconsidered by the RTC, consisting of the
cadastralmapandthelistofclaimants,weretimelyobjectedto
rule.
The petitioners reiterate that theBilihanshould not have
beenadmittedintoevidencebecauseitlackedthedocumentary
stamptaxrequiredbySection201oftheNIRC,providingthatno
documentshallbeadmittedinevidenceuntiltherequisitestamps
have been affixed thereto. They argue that the ruling of
petitioners lack of personality to assail the deed of sale is
different from the issue of the deed of sales admissibility as
evidence. They conclude that considering that no documentary
stamp was ever affixed on the deed of sale, such should never
havebeenadmittedintoevidenceandconsequently,shouldnot
havebeenrelieduponbythelowercourtstoprovethesaleof1/3
ofthesouthernportion;andthatconsideringthattheBilihanis
inadmissibleasevidence,therespondentspouseshavenobasis
fortheirclaimtothesubject1/3portionofthesouthernhalfof
the property. Thus, they insist that the lower courts erred in
awarding to Spouses Monteiro the possession of the subject
property,therentals,attorneysfeesandlitigationexpenses,and
in failing to rule on their counterclaim for demolition of
improvementsandpaymentofdamages.
Theassignmentoferrorsboilsdowntotwomainissues:
1.Whethertherewasapartitionofthesubjectproperty;and
577
2.Whether the 1/3 portion of the southernhalf of the subject
propertywassoldtotherespondentspouses.
RulingoftheCourt
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the petitioners
assignment of errors calls for the Court to again evaluate the
evidence to determine whether there was a partition of the
property and whether the 1/3 portion of the southern half was
soldtotherespondentspouses.Theseclearlyentailquestionsof
factwhicharebeyondtheCourtsambitofreviewunderRule45
oftheRulesofCourt,especiallyconsideringthatthefindingsof
factoftheRTCwereaffirmedbytheCA. 13Onthisgroundalone,
thepresentpetitionmustbedenied.Nonetheless,theCourtshall
delveintothesefactualissuestofinallyputthiscasetorest.
PartitionoftheSubjectProperty
SpousesMonteiro,asplaintiffsintheoriginalcase,hadthe
burden of proof to establish their case by a preponderance of
evidence,whichistheweight,credit,andvalueoftheaggregate
evidence on either side, synonymous with the term greater
weight of the evidence. Preponderance of evidence is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
thatwhichisofferedinoppositionthereto.14
To prove their claim of partition, the respondent spouses
presentedthefollowing:(1)theDeedofExtrajudicialPartition,
dated October 5, 1945, executed by and between the brothers
PerfectoandVitaliano;(2)thecadastralmapofLiliw
_______________
13Heirs of Vda. Dela Cruz v. Heirs of Fajardo,G.R. No.
184966,May30,2011,649SCRA463,470.
14BankofthePhilippineIslandsv.SpousesRoyeca,581Phil.
188,194;559SCRA207,215(2008).
578Cadm484,15datedAugust6,1976,showingthatthesubject
propertyhadbeendividedintosouthernandnorthernportions,
registered as Lot Nos. 876 and 877; and (3) the Municipal
Assessorsrecords16showingthatthesaidlotswererespectively
claimedbyBuenaventuraandPerfecto.
ItisundisputedthattheDeedofExtrajudicialPartitionstated
thatPerfectoandVitalianoagreedtodividebetweentheminto
twoandshareandsharealikethesubjectproperty,includingthe
house situated thereon. It appears, however, that the property
wasactuallypartitionedintodefiniteportions,namely,southern
andnorthernhalves,asreflectedinthecadastralmapofLiliw,
which were respectively claimed by an heir of Vitaliano and
Perfectohimself.It,thus,appearsthatthesubjectpropertyhad
alreadybeenpartitionedintodefiniteportionsmorethan20years
priortotheoriginalcomplaintforpartitionfiledin1993,andthat
suchdivisionhadbeenobservedbythebrothersheirs.Asearlier
pointedout,thepetitionersthemselvesadmittedtothisveryfact
intheiroriginalanswer,towit:
(b)OnSeptember5,1945thebrothersPERFECTOand
VITALIANO DIMAGUILA executed a deed of
EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION of the aforedescribed
property dividing the same into two (2) equal parts as
indicatedintheaforesaiddeedasfollows,towit:
xxx
(c)Asaresultoftheforegoingpartitionandasknownby
allthepartiesinthiscasefromthebeginningorassoonas
they reached the age of discernment PERFECTO
DIMAGUILAbecamethesoleandexclusiveownerofthe
southern half of the aforedescribed property and
VITALIANODIMAGUILAbecamethe
_______________
15Records,Vol.III,ExhibitJ,p.519.
16Records,Vol.III,ExhibitL,p.556.
579soleownerofthenorthernhalfofthesameproperty;
thehousethat wasbuilt thereonandstill existing upto
thistimewaslikewiseequallydividedbetweenthetwo(2)
DIMAGUILAbrothersinaccordancewiththeextrajudicial
partitionofhalfequalshares;
xxx
2.Inotherwords,theshareofVITALIANODIMAGUILA
in the above described property has already been long
segregatedandhadpassedontohisheirsasisverywell
knownbyallthepartiesinthiscase;17
xxx
(EmphasesintheOriginal)
Section418ofRule129oftheRulesofCourtprovidesthatan
admissionmadebyapartyinthecourseoftheproceedingsinthe
samecasedoesnotrequireproof,andmaybecontradictedonlyby
showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The
petitionersarguethatsuchadmissionwasthepalpablemistake
oftheirformercounselinhisrushtofiletheanswer,acopyof
whichwasnotprovidedtothem.PetitionerAsunciontestified:
QSo,whywasthatallegations(sic)madeintheAnswer?
AMaybe,(sic)inhisrushtofiletheAnswer,Atty.Paredesfiled
thesamewithoutgivingusacopy19
_______________
17Records,Vol.I,pp.1112.
18Section4.Judicialadmissions.Anadmission,verbalor
written,madebythepartyinthecourseoftheproceedingsinthe
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradictedonlybyshowingthatitwasmadethroughpalpable
mistakeorthatnosuchadmissionwasmade.
19TSN,December1,2005,p.15.
580
This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely selfserving
claim unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof.20Furthermore, the Court notes that this position was
adoptedbythepetitionersonlyalmosteight(8)yearsaftertheir
originalanswerwasfiled,inresponsetotheamendedcomplaint
of the respondent spouses. In their original answer to the
complaint for partition, their claim that there was already a
partitionintonorthernhalfandsouthernhalfportions,wasthe
very essence of their defense. It was precisely this admission
whichmovedtherespondentspousestoamendtheircomplaint.
The petitioners cannot now insist that the very foundation of
theiroriginaldefensewasapalpablemistake.
Article143121oftheCivilCodeprovidesthatthroughestoppel,
anadmissionisrenderedconclusiveuponthepersonmakingit,
andcannotbedeniedordisprovedasagainstthepersonrelying
thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the
petitioners admission and so amended their original complaint
forpartitiontooneforrecoveryofpossessionofaportionofthe
subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from
denyingorattemptingtoprovethattherewasnopartitionofthe
property.
Considering that an admission does not require proof, the
admissionofthepetitionerswouldactuallybesufficienttoprove
the partition even without the documents presented by the
respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they
presentedonlyservedtocorroboratethepetitionersadmission.
The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the
cadastralmapandthelistofclaimantspresentedbythere
_______________
20Rosaroso v. Soria,G.R. No. 194846, June 19, 2013, 699
SCRA232.
21Art. 1431.Through estoppel an admission or
representationisrenderedconclusiveuponthepersonmakingit,
andcannotbedeniedordisprovedasagainstthepersonrelying
thereon.
581spondentspouses,onthegroundthattheyviolatedtherule
onhearsayandthebestevidencerule.
Anentthebestevidencerule,Section3(d)ofRule130ofthe
RulesofCourtprovidesthatwhenthesubjectofinquiryisthe
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
thantheoriginaldocumentitself,exceptwhentheoriginalisa
publicrecordinthecustodyofapublicofficerorisrecordedina
publicoffice.22Section7ofthesameRuleprovidesthatwhenthe
originalofadocumentisinthecustodyofapublicofficeroris
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.23Section24ofRule132providesthattherecordofpublic
documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer
havingthelegalcustodyortherecord.24
_______________
22Section3.Original document must be produced;
exceptions.When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document,noevidenceshallbeadmissibleotherthantheoriginal
documentitself,exceptinthefollowingcases:
xxx
(d)Whentheoriginalisapublicrecordinthecustody
ofapublicofficerorisrecordedinapublicoffice.
23Section7.Evidenceadmissiblewhenoriginaldocumentis
apublicrecord.Whentheoriginalofdocumentisinthecustody
ofpublicofficerorisrecordedinapublicoffice,itscontentsmay
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custodythereof.
24Section24.Proofofofficialrecord.Therecordofpublic
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publicationthereoforbyacopyattestedbytheofficerhavingthe
legalcustodyoftherecord,orbyhisdeputy,andaccompanied,if
therecordisnotkeptinthePhilippines,withacertificatethat
suchofficerhasthecustody.Iftheofficeinwhichtherecordis
kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretaryoftheembassyorlegation,consulgeneral,consul,vice
consul,orconsularagentorbyanyofficerintheforeignserviceof
the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
recordiskept,andauthenticatedbythesealofhisoffice.
582
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the
corresponding list of claimants ofthe area covered by the map
werepresentedbytwopublicofficers.ThefirstwasCrisostomo
Arves,ClerkIIIoftheMunicipalAssessorsOffice,arepositoryof
such documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR
employee,who,asarecordofficer,certifiesandsafekeepsrecords
ofsurveyedlandinvolvingcadastralmaps.Thecadastralmaps
andthelistofclaimants,ascertifiedtruecopiesoforiginalpublic
records,fallundertheexceptiontothebestevidencerule.
Astothehearsayrule,Section44ofRule130oftheRulesof
Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an
exceptiontotherule.25Theruleprovidesthatentriesinofficial
recordsmadeintheperformanceofthedutyofapublicofficerof
the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, areprima facieevidence of the facts
therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the
inconvenienceanddifficultyofrequiringtheofficialsattendance
as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the
courseofhisduty.Thedocumentstrustworthinessconsistsinthe
presumptionofregularityofperformanceofofficialduty.26
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The
DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and
managetheconductofcadastralsurveys. 27Itis,therefore,clear
that thecadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants
qualifyasentriesinofficialrecordsastheywerepreparedbythe
DENR,asmandatedbylaw.Assuch,they
_______________
25Section44.Entriesinofficialrecords.Entriesinofficial
recordsmadeintheperformanceofhisdutybyapublicofficerof
the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
thereinstated.
26Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law: Vol. V, (Quezon City,
Philippines,RexPrintingCompany,Inc.,2004),p.740.
27DENRAdmin.Order200123.
583are exceptions to the hearsay rule and areprima
facieevidenceofthefactsstatedtherein.
Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the
partition,theypresentednoevidencetocontradicttheevidenceof
therespondentspouses.Thus,evenwithouttheadmissionofthe
petitioners,therespondentspousesprovedbyapreponderanceof
evidence that there had indeed been a partition of the subject
property.
Saleof1/3PortionoftheSouthernhalf
Toprovethat1/3ofthesouthernhalfportionofthesubject
propertywassoldtothem,SpousesMonteiropresentedadeedof
sale entitledBilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan,28dated
September29,1992,whereinPedrossharewassoldbyhisheirs
to them, with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and
Leandro in an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver. 29The
petitionersarguethattheBilihanshouldnothavebeenadmitted
into evidence because it lacked the documentary stamp tax
requiredbySection201oftheNIRC.
On August 29, 1994, the petitioners filed a motion for the
productionand/orinspectionofdocuments,30prayingthatSpouses
Monteirobeorderedtoproducethedeedofsale,whichtheycited
asthesourceoftheirrightsascoowners.OnNovember20,1995,
Spouses Monteiro submitted their compliance,31furnishing the
RTCandthepetitionerswithacopy 32oftheBilihan.OnJanuary
3,1996,thepetitionersfiledanoticeofconsignation, 33manifesting
thattheyhadattemptedtoexercisetheirrightofredemptionas
coownersofthe1/3portionofthesouthernhalfoftheproperty
underArticle
_______________
28Records,Vol.III,ExhibitC,p.514.
29Records,Vol.I,pp.303305.
30Id.,atpp.7576.
31Id.,atp.111.
 32Id.,atp.112.
33Id.,atpp.113115.
584162334oftheCivilCodebysendingandtenderingpaymentof
redemptiontoSpousesMonteiro,whichwas,however,returned.
By filing the notice of consignation and tendering their
paymentfortheredemptionofthe1/3portionofthesouthernhalf
oftheproperty,thepetitioners,ineffect,admittedtheexistence,
dueexecutionandvalidityoftheBilihan.Consequently,theyare
now estopped from questioning its admissiblity in evidence for
relying on such for their right of redemption. Additionally, the
Court notes that the copy35of theBilihanwhich was originally
submitted by Spouses Monteiro with its compliance filed on
November20,1995,doesinfactbearadocumentarystamptax.It
couldonlymeanthatthedocumentarystamptaxonthesalewas
properlypaid.TheBilihanwas,therefore,properlyadmittedinto
evidenceandconsideredbytheRTC.
In any case, as correctly held by the lower courts, the
petitioners,asheirsofVitaliano,whoinheritedthenorthernhalf
portion of the subject property, do not possess the necessary
personalitytoassailthesaleofthesouthernhalfportionbetween
Spouses Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro. They are not real
partiesininterest who stand to be benefited or injured by the
saleofthe1/3portionofthesouthernhalfoverwhichtheyhave
absolutelynoright.Ascorrectlyruledbythecourtsbelow,only
fellowcoownershavethepersonalitytoassailthesale,namely,
theheirsofPedrossiblings,EsperanzaandLeandro.Theyhave,
however,expresslyac
_______________
34Art. 1623.Therightoflegalpreemptionorredemption
shallnotbeexercisedexceptwithinthirtydaysfromthenoticein
writingbytheprospectivevendor,orbythevendor,asthecase
maybe.ThedeedofsaleshallnotberecordedintheRegistryof
Property,unlessaccompaniedbyanaffidavitofthevendorthat
hehasgivenwrittennoticethereoftoallpossibleredemptioners.
The right of redemption of coowners excludes that of
adjoiningowners.
35Records,Vol.I,p.112.
585quiescedtothesaleandwaivedtheirrighttothepropertyin
the affidavit presented by Spouses Monteiro. 36As such, the
petitionershavenorighttotheircounterclaimsofdemolitionof
improvementsandpaymentofdamages.
WithSpousesMonteirohavingsufficientlyprovedtheirclaim
overthesubject1/3portionofthesouthernhalfoftheproperty
through theBilihan, the lower courts did not err in awarding
possession, rentals, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses to
them.
TheCourt,however,findsthattheawardofrentalsshouldbe
reckonedfromJanuary2,2001,thedatetheSpousesMonteiro
filed their Amended Complaint seeking recovery of the subject
portion. Interest at the rate of6% per annumshall also be
imposed on the total amount of rent due from finality of this
Decisionuntilfullypaid.37
WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED. The August 15,
2011DecisionandtheMarch5,2012ResolutionoftheCourtof
Appeals, in CAG.R. CV No. 92707 areAFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION,inthat:
a. TheawardofrentattherateofP500.00permonthshall
be reckoned from January 2, 2001 until the property is
vacated;and
b.Interestattherateof6%perannumshallbeimposedon
thetotalamountofrentduefromfinalityofthisDecision
untilfullypaid.
SOORDERED.
 Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad and Leonen,
JJ.,concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed with
modification.
_______________
36Id.,atpp.303304.
37Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13,
2013,703SCRA439.
586
Notes.Acts of facts admitted do not require proof and
cannotbecontradictedunlessitisshownthattheadmissionwas
madethroughpalpablemistakeorthatnosuchadmissionwas
made.(Vidarvs.People,611SCRA216[2010])
Judicialadmissionsmadebypartiesinthepleadings,orinthe
course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are
conclusive and so does not require further evidence to prove
them.(Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs.
Pingol,630SCRA413[2013])
o0o

Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights

reserved.

G.R. No. 181892.September 8, 2015.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by

Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, and MANILA INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs. HON. JESUS M.
MUPAS, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Republic vs. Mupas
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 117, Pasay City, and PHILIPPINE
INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.,
respondents. G.R. No. 209731.September 8, 2015.*

G.R. No. 209917.September 8, 2015.* PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.
petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, as
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by represented by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita,
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, DEPARTMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, and COMMUNICATIONS, MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, AUTHORITY, TAKENAKA CORPORATION, and
petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR ASAHIKOSAN CORPORATION, respondents.
TERMINALS COMPANY, INC., TAKENAKA CORPORATION Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Expropriation
and ASAHIKOSAN CORPORATION, respondents. Proceedings; Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides
that the clerk of court shall serve copies of the
G.R. No. 209696.September 8, 2015.* commissioners final report on all interested parties
upon the filing of the report. Each party shall have ten
TAKENAKA CORPORATION and ASAHIKOSAN (10) days within which to file their objections to the
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE reports findings.Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
PHILIPPINES, represented by Executive Secretary provides that the clerk of court shall serve copies of
Eduardo Ermita, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION the commissioners final report on all interested parties
AND COMMUNICATIONS, MANILA INTERNATIONAL upon the filing of the report. Each party shall have ten
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, and PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL days within which to file their objections to the reports
AIR TERMINALS COMPANY, INC., respondents. findings. Upon the expiration of the ten-day period or
_______________ after all the parties have filed their objections and after
* EN BANC. hearing, the trial court may: (a) accept the report and
render judgment in accordance therewith; (b) for cause
shown, recommit the report to the commissioners for
385 further report of facts; (c) set aside the report and
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015 appoint new commissioners; (d) partially accept the
report; and (e) make such order or render such
judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation;
and to the defendant, the just compensation for the
property so taken.
Eminent Domain; Due Process; The procedural
due process requirements in an eminent domain case
are satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to domain is a fundamental state power that is
present their evidence before the commissioners
whose findings (together with the pleadings, evidence
of the parties, and the entire record of the case) are
reviewed and considered by the expropriation court.
The essence of procedural due process is the right to
be heard. The procedural due process requirements in
an eminent domain case are satisfied if the parties are
given the opportunity to present their evidence before
the commissioners whose findings (together with the
pleadings, evidence of the parties,
386
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
Republic vs. Mupas
and the entire record of the case) are reviewed and
considered by the expropriation court. It is the parties the individuals fundamental rights.
total failure to present evidence on just compensation
that renders the trial courts ruling void. The
opportunity to present evidence during the trial
remains to be the vital requirement in the observance
of due process.
Same; Words and Phrases; Eminent domain is a
fundamental state power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is the power of a sovereign state to
appropriate private property within its territorial
sovereignty to promote public welfare.Eminent
inseparable from sovereignty. It is the power of a
sovereign state to appropriate private property within
its territorial sovereignty to promote public welfare.
The exercise of this power is based on the States
primary duty to serve the common need and advance
the general welfare. It is an inherent power and is not
conferred by the Constitution. It is inalienable and no
legislative act or agreement can serve to abrogate the
power of eminent domain when public necessity and
convenience require its exercise. The decision to
exercise the power of eminent domain rests with the
legislature which has the exclusive power to prescribe
how and by whom the power of eminent domain is to be
exercised. Thus, the Executive Department cannot
condemn properties for its own use without direct
authority from the Congress. The exercise of eminent
domain necessarily derogates against private rights
which must yield to demand of the public good and the
common welfare. However, it does not confer on the
State the authority to wantonly disregard and violate
Same; Expropriation Proceedings; Just
Compensation; Words and Phrases; Just compensation
is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The word just is used to qualify the
meaning of the word compensation and to convey the
idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to
be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. On
the other hand, the word compensation means a full
indemnity or remuneration for the loss or damage
sustained by the owner of property taken or injured for
public use. Simply stated, just compensation
387
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
means that the former owner must be returned to the
monetary equivalent of the position that the owner had
when the taking occurred. To achieve this monetary
equivalent, we use the standard value of fair market
value of the property at the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation or at the time of the taking
of property, whichever is earlier.
Same; Same; Same; Fair Market Value; Words and
Phrases; Jurisprudence broadly defines fair market
value as the sum of money that a person desirous but
not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given
and received for a property.Jurisprudence broadly
defines fair market value as the sum of money that a
person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
price to be given and received for a property. Fair
market value is not limited to the assessed value of the
property or to the schedule of market values
determined by the provincial or city appraisal
committee. However, these values may serve as factors
to be considered in the judicial valuation of the
property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In cases where the fair
market value of the property is difficult to ascertain,
the court may use other just and equitable market
methods of valuation in order to estimate the fair
market value of a property. In cases where the fair
market value of the property is difficult to ascertain,
the court may use other just and equitable market
methods of valuation in order to estimate the fair
market value of a property.
Same; Same; Same; Replacement Cost; Words and
Phrases; Replacement cost is a different standard of
valuation from the fair market value; Replacement cost
is the amount necessary to replace the
improvements/structures, based on the current market
prices for materials, equipment, labor, contractors
profit and overhead, and all other attendant costs
associated with the acquisition and installation in
place of the affected improvements /structures.
Replacement cost is a different standard of valuation
from the fair market value. As we previously stated, fair
market value is the price at which a property may be
sold by a seller who is not compelled to sell and bought
by a buyer who is not compelled to buy. In contrast,

388
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
Republic vs. Mupas
replacement cost is the amount necessary to
replace the improvements/structures, based on the
current market prices for materials, equipment, labor,
contractors profit and overhead, and all other
attendant costs associated with the acquisition and
installation in place of the affected Phrases; Reproduction cost is the estimated current
improvements/structures. We use the replacement
cost method to determine just compensation if the
expropriated property has no market-based evidence of
its value.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The replacement cost
method is a cost approach in appraising real estate for building.Reproduction cost is the estimated current
purposes of expropriation. This approach is premised
on the principle of substitution which means that all
things being equal, a rational, informed purchaser
would pay no more for a property than the cost of
building an acceptable substitute with like utility.
The replacement cost method is a cost approach in
appraising real estate for purposes of expropriation.
This approach is premised on the principle of
substitution which means that all things being equal, a
rational, informed purchaser would pay no more for a
property than the cost of building an acceptable
substitute with like utility. The cost approach
considers the principles of substitution, supply and
demand, contribution and externalities. The value of
the land and the value of improvements are determined
separately according to their highest and best use.
Buyers assess the value of a piece of property not only
based on the existing condition of the property, but also
in terms of the cost to alter or improve the property to
make it functional specifically for the purposes of the
buyers use. This may include building new structures,
renovating existing structures, or changing the
components of an existing structure to maximize its
utility.
Same; Same; Same; Reproduction Cost; Words and
cost to construct an exact replica of the subject
building, using the same materials, construction
standards, design, layout, and quality of workmanship;
and incorporating all the deficiencies,
superadequacies, and obsolescence of the subject
cost to construct an exact replica of the subject
building, using the same materials, construction
standards, design, layout, and quality of workmanship;
and incorporating all the deficiencies,
superadequacies, and obsolescence of the subject
building. It is the cost of
389
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
 Republic vs. Mupas
duplicating the subject property at current prices
or the current cost of reproducing a new replica of the
property being appraised using the same, or closely
similar, materials. In the United States, the recognized
and used method in eminent domain cases in
appraising specialized properties is the reproduction
cost less depreciation approach.
Same; Same; Same; Replacement Cost New;
Words and Phrases; Replacement cost new is the
estimated cost to construct a building with utility
equivalent to the appraised building using modern
materials and current standards, design, and layout or
the current cost of a similar new property having the
nearest equivalent utility as the property being
valued.Replacement cost new is the estimated cost
to construct a building with utility equivalent to the
appraised building using modern materials and current
standards, design, and layout or the current cost of a
similar new property having the nearest equivalent
utility as the property being valued. It is the cost of
acquiring a modern, functional equivalent of the subject
property and views the building as if reconstructed
with modern methods, design and materials that would
most closely replace the use of the appraised building
but provide the same utility. Replacement cost does
not consider the most common forms of functional
obsolescence.
Same; Same; Same; Depreciated Replacement
Cost Approach; Words and Phrases; Depreciated
replacement cost approach is the method of valuation
which provides the current cost of replacing an asset
with its modern equivalent asset less deductions for all
physical deterioration and all relevant forms of
obsolescence and optimisation.Depreciated
replacement cost approach is the method of valuation
which provides the current cost of replacing an asset
with its modern equivalent asset less deductions for all
physical deterioration and all relevant forms of
obsolescence and optimisation. Depreciated
replacement cost is a method of appraising assets that
are usually not exposed to the open market. A general
formula of this method is as follows: Cost of
constructing the building(s) (including fees) Plus: Cost
of the land (including fees) = Total Costs Less:
Allowance for age and depreciation = Depreciated
Replacement Cost Under this method, the appraiser
assesses the current
390
39 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0
Republic vs. Mupas
gross replacement of the assets, usually comprised of
the land and the building. If the asset is an
improvement, the appraiser assesses the cost of its
replacement with a modern equivalent and deducts
depreciation to reflect the differences between the
hypothetical modern equivalent and the actual asset.
The appraiser has to establish the size and
specification that the hypothetical buyer ideally
requires at the date of valuation in order to provide the
same level of productive output or an equivalent
service.
Same; Same; Same; Construction Cost; Attendant
Cost; Words and Phrases; Construction costs are the
costs that are normally and directly incurred in the
purchase and installation of an asset, or group of
assets, into functional use. On the other hand,
attendant costs are the costs that are normally
required to purchase and install a property but that are
not usually included in the vendor invoice.
Construction costs are the costs that are normally and
directly incurred in the purchase and installation of an
asset, or group of assets, into functional use. On the
other hand, attendant costs are the costs that are
normally required to purchase and install a property but
that are not usually included in the vendor invoice.
Under Section 10 of the RA 8974 IRR, construction cost
is the current market price of materials, equipment,
labor, the contractors profit and overhead, while the
attendant cost is the cost associated with the
acquisition and installation in place of the affected
improvement.
Same; Same; Same; Physical Obsolescence;
Words and Phrases; Physical obsolescence refers to
the wear and tear over the years, which might be
combined with a lack of maintenance.Physical
obsolescence refers to the wear and tear over the
years, which might be combined with a lack of
maintenance. Physical depreciation is curable if
capital investment can bring the building to a state in
which the degree of obsolescence is mitigated (e.g.,
standards of finishes and services). It is incurable if
no amount of capital investment can rectify the
[depreciation] (for example, building structural
flexibility). Curable physical depreciation is measured
by the cost to cure or retrofitting which could extend
the life of the building. Incurable depreciation or
deterioration is estimated by a variety of age-life or
economic-age calculation methods.
391
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
Same; Same; Same; Functional Obsolescence;
Words and Phrases; Functional obsolescence reflects
the advances in technology which allow for a more
efficient delivery of services and goods from a building
of different designs and specifications.Functional
obsolescence reflects the advances in technology
which allow for a more efficient delivery of services
and goods from a building of different designs and
specifications. Functional obsolescence arises where
the design or specification of the asset no longer
fulfills the function for which it was originally
designed.
Same; Same; Same; Economic Obsolescence;
Words and Phrases; Economic obsolescence results
from the impact of changing external macro- and micro-
economic conditions on the property and should not
include internal factors which affect the profitability of
the occupying business, the writing down of such
factors to reflect the profitability of the business being
a matter for the occupier.Economic obsolescence
results from the impact of changing external macro-
and micro-economic conditions on the property and
should not include internal factors which affect the
profitability of the occupying business, the writing
down of such factors to reflect the profitability of the
business being a matter for the occupier. Within
economic obsolescence, the prospect of extending the
life of the building by capital investment should be
considered, as well as the fact that lack of
maintenance can accelerate the rate of depreciation.
Same; Same; Same; Just compensation must not
extend beyond the property owners loss or injury.
Just compensation must not extend beyond the
property owners loss or injury. This is the only way for
the compensation paid to be truly just, not only to the
individual whose property is taken, but also to the
public who will shoulder the cost of expropriation. Even
as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his
property without due process, so too would its
overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the
public.
Same; Same; Same; The determination of just
compensation in eminent domain cases is essentially
and exclusively a judicial function.The determination
of just compensation in eminent domain cases is
essentially and exclusively a judicial function. Fixing
the formula with definitiveness and particularity in just
392
39 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
Republic vs. Mupas
compensation is not the function of the executive nor
of the legislative branches, much less of the parties in
this case. Any valuation for just compensation laid
down in the statutes may not replace the courts own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how this amount should be arrived at. Legislative
enactments, as well as executive issuances, providing
the method of computing just compensation are treated
as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount of just
compensation.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Court of
Appeals; Under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals (CA), the CA may receive
evidence.Under Section 3, Rule 6 of the Internal Rules
of the CA, the CA may receive evidence in the following
cases: (a) In actions falling within its original
jurisdiction, such as (1) certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, (2) annulment of judgment or final order, (3)
quo warranto, (4) habeas corpus, (5) amparo, (6)
habeas data, (7) anti-money laundering, and (8)
application for judicial authorization under the Human
Security Act of 2007; (b) In appeals in civil cases
where the Court grants a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule
53 of the Rules of Court; (c) In appeals in criminal
cases where the Court grants a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Sec. 12, Rule
124 of the rules of Court; and (d) In appeals involving
claims for damages arising from provisional remedies.
Same; Evidence; Equiponderance of Evidence
Rule; Under the equiponderance of evidence rule, when
the scale of justice shall stand on equipoise and
nothing in the evidence inclines a conclusion to one (1)
side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.
Under the equiponderance of evidence rule, when the
scale of justice shall stand on equipoise and nothing in
the evidence inclines a conclusion to one side or the
other, the court will find for the defendant. If the facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the
allegations of the plaintiff and the other consistent with
the defense of the defendant, the evidence does not
fulfill the requirement of preponderance of evidence.
When the evidence of the parties is in equipoise, or
when there is a doubt as to where the preponderance
of evidence lies, the party with the burden
393
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
of proof fails. The reason for this rule is that the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and
not on the weakness of the defendants claim. Thus,
even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger
than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance
of evidence on his side when this evidence is
insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.
Same; Same; Documentary Evidence; Best
Evidence Rule; Under the best evidence rule, when the
subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself. In proving the terms of a
written document, the original of the document must
be produced in court.Under the best evidence rule,
when the subject of inquiry relates to the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself. In proving the terms of a
written document, the original of the document must
be produced in court. The best evidence rule ensures
that the exact contents of a document are brought
before the court. In deeds, wills, and contracts, a slight
variation in words may mean a great difference in the
rights and obligations of the parties. A substantial
hazard of inaccuracy exists in the human process of
making a copy by handwriting or typewriting. Moreover,
with respect to oral testimony purporting to give the
terms of a document from memory, a special risk of
error is present, greater than in the case of attempts at
describing other situations generally. The best
evidence rule likewise acts as an insurance against
fraud. If a party is in the possession of the best
evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does away with the item-
inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally
by-item court identification and authentication of
arises that the better evidence is withheld for voluminous exhibits which would only be burdensome
fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and tedious for the parties and the court.
and defeat. The rule likewise protects against Same; Same; Same; Best Evidence Rule;
misleading inferences resulting from the intentional orWhenever a party seeks an exemption under the best
unintentional introduction of selected portions of a evidence rule pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 130 of the
larger set of writings. Rules of Court, he asks permission from the trial court
Same; Same; Same; Voluminous Exhibits; Section to produce a summary of numerous documents, whose
3(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does away with theoriginals are available to the adverse party for
item-by-item court identification and authentication ofinspection.Whenever a party seeks an exemption
voluminous exhibits which would only be burdensome under the best evidence rule pursuant to Section 3(c),
and tedious for the parties and the court.We agree Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, he asks permission from
with PIATCO that it need not submit numerous and the trial court to produce a summary of numerous
voluminous invoices, official receipts, and other documents, whose originals are available to the
relevant documents before adverse party for inspection. He does not ask
permission from the trial court to present in evidence
the numerous non-original documents . Otherwise, the
394 very purpose of Section 3(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court would be defeated. In that case, every exhibit of
39 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
non-original documents would be identified,
4
authenticated, and cross-examined, leading to a
Republic vs. Mupas
tedious and protracted litigation. Thus, if a party
desires to present photocopies of the original
documents, he must first establish that the
the trial court to prove the attendant costs that it presentation of photocopies is justified under Section
incurred in the construction of the NAIA-IPT III. The 3(a), (b), and/or (d), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court . He
trial court may admit a summary of voluminous original must establish the presence of all the elements under
documents, in lieu of original documents, if the party these provisions.
has shown that the underlying writings are numerous Same; Same; Same; Same; Lost or Destroyed
and that an in-court examination of these documents Documents; Elements that Must be Proved Before
would be inconvenient. In other words, Section 3(c), Secondary Evidence of Lost or Destroyed Documents
are Admitted.In the case of lost or destroyed
documents, the offeror of non-original documents must
first prove the following elements before secondary
evidence is admitted before the court: (a) the existence
or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and
destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-
395
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on
the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the
original can be attributed. To conclude otherwise is to
allow the party to circumvent the best evidence rule
and the requirements under Section 3(a), (b), and (d),
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court by merely invoking
Section 3(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Just Compensation; Just compensation must be
duly proven by preponderance of evidence or greater
weight of credible evidence.The mean percentage
range is highly speculative and devoid of any factual
basis. As a court of law, we should only measure just
compensation using relevant and actual evidence as
basis in fixing the value of the condemned property.
Just compensation must be duly proven by
preponderance of evidence or greater weight of
credible evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
Damages; Temperate Damages; Temperate or
moderate damages, which are more than nominal but
less than compensatory damages, may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of
the case, be proved with certainty.In a case for
damages, we allow the party to receive temperate
damages in the absence of competent proof on the
amount of actual damages. Temperate or moderate
damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty.
Same; A complaint for damages seeks to
vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may
be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or
exemplary.An eminent domain case is different from a
complaint for damages. A complaint for damages is
based on tort and emanates from the transgression of a
right. A complaint for damages seeks to vindicate a
legal wrong through damages, which may be actual,
moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.
When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable
with Article 19 of the Civil Code and other provisions on
human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise
results in the
396
39 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
 Republic vs. Mupas
damage of another, a legal wrong is committed and the
wrongdoer is held responsible.
Eminent Domain; Expropriation Proceedings; Just
Compensation; Under Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, the property sought to be expropriated shall be
appraised as of the date of taking of the property or the
filing of the complaint for expropriation, whichever is
earlier.Under Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
the property sought to be expropriated shall be
appraised as of the date of taking of the property or the
filing of the complaint for expropriation, whichever is
earlier, thus: Section 4. Order of expropriation.If the
objections to and the defenses against the right of the
plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or
when no party appears to defend as required by this
Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be expropriated, for the public use
or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of
the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first. A final order
sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be
appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal,
however, shall not prevent the court from determining
the just compensation to be paid. After the rendition of
such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to
dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such
terms as the court deems just and equitable.
Same; Same; Same; Interest Rates; Just
compensation would not be just if the State does not
pay the property owner interest on the just
compensation from the date of the taking of the
property.Section 9, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution
provides that [n]o private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation. The 1987
Constitution thus commands the condemnor to pay the
property owner the full and fair equivalent of the
property from the date of taking. This provision likewise
presupposes that the condemnor incurs delay if it does
not pay the property owner the full amount of just
compensation on the date of taking. The reason is that
just compensation would not be just if the State does
not pay the property owner interest on the just
compensation from the date
397
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
of the taking of the property. Without prompt payment,
the property owner suffers the immediate deprivation
of both his land and its fruits or income . The owners
loss, of course, is not only his property but also its
income-generating potential.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Taking; When the
taking of the property precedes the filing of the
complaint for expropriation, the Supreme Court (SC)
orders the condemnor to pay the full amount of just
compensation from the date of taking whose interest
shall likewise commence on the same date. When the
taking of the property precedes the filing of the
complaint for expropriation, the Court orders the
condemnor to pay the full amount of just compensation
from the date of taking whose interest shall likewise
commence on the same date. The Court does not rule
that the interest on just compensation shall commence
the date when the amount of just compensation
becomes certain, e.g., from the promulgation of the
Courts decision or the finality of the eminent domain
case.
Interest Rates; Loans; On June 21, 2013, the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued Circular No.
799, pursuant to Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No.
796 dated May 16, 2013, reducing the legal interest on
loans and forbearance of money from twelve percent
(12%) to six percent (6%) per annum. BSP Circular No.
799 took effect on July 1, 2013. On June 21, 2013, the
BSP issued Circular No. 799, pursuant to MB Resolution
No. 796 dated May 16, 2013, reducing the legal interest
on loans and forbearance of money from 12% to 6% per
annum. BSP Circular No. 799 took effect on July 1,
2013.
Eminent Domain; Expropriation Proceedings;
Based on the clear terms of Section 12, Rule 67, it is
the plaintiff in this case, the Government not the
property owner or third party intervenors, i.e., Takenaka
and Asahikosan, who shall shoulder the costs of the
expropriation before the court of origin. Based on the
clear terms of Section 12, Rule 67, it is the plaintiff in
this case, the Government not the property owner or
third party intervenors, i.e., Takenaka and Asahikosan,
who shall shoulder the costs of the expropriation
before the court of origin. Since the expenses of the
BOC form part of the costs of the suit as these are
expenses necessary in prosecuting or defending an
action or a distinct proceeding within an action the
398
39 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
Republic vs. Mupas
Government solely bears the expenses of the BOC. The
property owner shall only bear the costs of the appeal
if he loses in his appeal.
Same; Same; Parties; Under Sections 8 and 14 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 8974 Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR), in relation with Section 9, Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court, all persons who claim to have lawful
interest in the property to be condemned should be
included as defendants in the complaint for
expropriation.The defendants in an expropriation
case are not limited to the owners of the property
condemned. They include all other persons owning,
occupying, or claiming to own the property. Under
Sections 8 and 14 of RA 8974 IRR, in relation with
Section 9, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, all persons
who claim to have lawful interest in the property to be
condemned should be included as defendants in the
complaint for expropriation.
Same; Same; Same; Just Compensation; All
persons who have lawful interest in the property
sought to be expropriated should be impleaded in the
complaint for purposes of determining who shall be
entitled to just compensation. All persons who have
lawful interest in the property sought to be
expropriated should be impleaded in the complaint for
purposes of determining who shall be entitled to just
compensation. If a known owner is not joined as
defendant, he may intervene in the proceeding. If the
owner is joined but not served with process and the
proceeding is already closed before he came to know of
the condemnation, he may maintain an independent
suit for damages. Consequently, Takenaka and
Asahikosan are correct in invoking Section 9, Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court for purposes of determining who
shall be entitled to just compensation in this case. This
rule is likewise their proper basis of intervention in the
RTCs March 12, 2007 order in Civil Case No. 04-0876.
Same; Same; Just Compensation; From the
express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No.
8974, just compensation shall only be paid to the
property owner.From the express provision of Section
4 of RA 8974, just compensation shall only be paid to
the property owner. We implead persons with lawful
interests in the property in order to determine the
person who shall receive just compensation.
399
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
Note that the last paragraph, Section 4 of RA 8974
states: When the decision of the court becomes final
and executory, the implementing agency shall pay the
owner the difference between the amount already paid
and the just compensation as determined by the court.
This provision thus envisions a situation where the
court determines with finality, for purposes of payment
of just compensation, the conflicting claims of the
defendants and intervenors.
Same; Same; The expropriation courts
determination of the lawful property owner is merely
provisional; The Courts disposition with respect to the
ownership of the property is not conclusive, and it
remains open to challenge through proper actions. We
clarify that the expropriation courts determination of
the lawful property owner is merely provisional. By
filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor merely
serves notice that it is taking title to and possession of
the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to
or interest in the property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for
the taking. The Courts disposition with respect to the
ownership of the property is not conclusive, and it
remains open to challenge through proper actions. The
courts resolution of the title to the land at the time of
taking has no legal consequences beyond the eminent
domain proceedings. The courts decision cannot be
pleaded as a defense of res judicata or collateral conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in
estoppel in any action to determine title to the all later suits on points and matters determined in the
property. former suit.
Same; Finality of Judgments; To avoid future Same; Expropriation Proceedings; Just
litigation, the Supreme Court (SC) emphasizes that a Compensation; Taking; To clarify and to avoid confusion
final disposition in the eminent domain case with in the implementation of our judgment, the full payment
respect to the order to pay a particular person shall be of just compensation is not a prerequisite for the
final and executory upon the lapse of relevant periods Governments effective taking of the property; When
under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. To avoid future the taking of the property precedes the payment of just
litigation, we emphasize that a final disposition in the compensation, the Government shall indemnify the
eminent domain case with respect to the order to pay a property owner by way of interest. To clarify and to
particular person shall be final and executory upon the avoid confusion in the implementation of our judgment,
lapse of relevant periods under Rule 39 of the Rules of the full payment of just compensation is not a
Court. The recourse of the person claiming ownership prerequisite for the Governments effective taking of
over the expropriated property in any subsequent case the property. As discussed above, RA 8974 allows the
is against the adjudged property owner in the Government to enter the property and implement
expropriation case. The principle of res judicata appliesnational infrastructure projects upon the issuance of
in this particular matter because the issues on the the writ of possession. When the taking of the property
amount of just compensation precedes the payment of just compensation, the
Government shall indemnify the property owner by way
of interest.
400 Same; Same; Taking; Words and Phrases; Taking
under the power of eminent domain means entering
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
upon private property for more than a momentary
0
period, and under the warrant or color of legal
Republic vs. Mupas
authority, devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in
such a way as substantially to oust the owner and
and the person to be paid just compensation are deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
the central issues in the second phase of expropriation. Taking under the power of eminent domain means
Based on this principle, a final judgment or decree on entering upon private property for more than a
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is momentary period, and under the warrant or color of
legal authority, devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in
such a way as substantially to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. Taking
of property takes place when: (1) the owner is actually
deprived or dispossessed of his property; (2) there is a
practical destruction or a material impairment of the
value of his property; (3) the owner is deprived of the
ordinary use of the property, or (4) when he is deprived
of the jurisdiction, supervision and control of his
property.
401
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
Same; Same; Just Compensation; Writs of
Possession; Under Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No.
8974, the Government is only entitled to a writ of
possession upon initial payment of just compensation
to the defendant, and upon presentment to the court of
a certificate of availability of funds.Under Section 4 of
RA 8974, the Government is only entitled to a writ of
possession upon initial payment of just compensation
to the defendant, and upon presentment to the court of
a certificate of availability of funds. A writ of
possession does not transfer title to the Government; it
is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment
to recover the possession of land. It commands the
sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to the
person entitled under the judgment. Section 4 of RA
8974 further states that the writ of possession is an
order to take possession of the property and to start
the implementation of the project.
Same; Same; The Government is provisionally
authorized to take the property for public purpose or
public use whenever the court issues a writ of
possession in favor of the Government. The
Government is provisionally authorized to take the
property for public purpose or public use whenever the
court issues a writ of possession in favor of the
Government. It may take possession of the property or
effectively deprive the property owner of the ordinary
use of the property. If the court, however, later on
determines that the State has no right of expropriation,
then the State shall immediately restore the defendant
of the possession of the property and pay the property
owner damages that he sustained.
Same; Same; The States taking of the property is
not based on trust or contract, but is founded on its
inherent power to appropriate private property for
public use.The States taking of the property is not
based on trust or contract, but is founded on its
inherent power to appropriate private property for
public use. It is also for this reason to compensate
the property owner for the deprivation of his right to
enjoy the ordinary use of his property until the naked
title to the property passed to the State that the
State pays interest from the time of the taking of the
property until full payment of just compensation.
 conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal
402 claims between the parties that is susceptible or ripe
for judicial resolution.An actual case or controversy
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an
2
assertion of opposite legal claims between the parties
Republic vs. Mupas
that is susceptible or ripe for judicial resolution. A
justiciable controversy must not be moot and academic
or have no practical use or value. In other words, there
Expropriation Proceedings; Commissioners must be a definite and concrete dispute touching on
Report; Under Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the legal relations of the parties who have adverse
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) may accept or reject, legal interests. Otherwise, the Court would simply
whether in whole or in part, the Bureau of Customs render an advisory opinion on what the law would be on
(BOCs) report which is merely advisory and a hypothetical state of facts. The disposition of the
recommendatory in character.These developments case would not have any practical use or value as there
render the appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an is no actual substantial relief to which the applicant
independent appraiser of the NAIA-IPT III ineffective. would be entitled to and which would be negated by the
An appraiser is a person selected or appointed by dismissal or denial of the petition.
competent authority to ascertain and state the true
value of goods or real estate. The purpose of appointing LEONEN,J., Concurring Opinion:
DG Jones and Partners as an independent appraiser
was to assist the BOC in appraising the NAIA-IPT III. In Eminent Domain; Expropriation Proceedings; View
fact, the BOC requested the RTC to engage the that the improvements built by Philippine International
services of an independent appraiser because the BOC Air Terminals Co.,
had no technical expertise to conduct the valuation of
the NAIA-IPT III. In turn, the BOC was to recommend to
the RTC the replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT III. Under 403
Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may
accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the BOCs VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
report which is merely advisory and recommendatory in Republic vs. Mupas
character.
Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; An
actual case or controversy exists when there is a Inc. through its subcontractors may have been
private, but it was the product of a procurement
contract that would later be declared as illegal and
void ab initio. Thus, view that it is not the kind of
private property protected under Article III, Section 9
of the Constitution. It is not the kind of property that
should be the subject of expropriation.I entertain
serious doubts about the propriety of the remedy
pursued by the government to comply with the Decision
of this court in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc., 420 SCRA 575 (2004). The
improvements built by Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. through its subcontractors may have
been private, but it was the product of a procurement
contract that would later be declared as illegal and void
ab initio. Thus, in my view, it is not the kind of private
property protected under Article III, Section 9 of the
Constitution. It is not the kind of property that should
be the subject of expropriation. Otherwise, the essence
of the illegality of the contract will be nullified.
Same; Same; Just Compensation; View that
instead of the fair market value of the property at the
time of the taking, the government would have had to
pay the value of the property based on its utility at
present.Nonetheless, the rules on valuation will be
different should government be made to pay the owner
so that there is no unjust enrichment. Instead of the
fair market value of the property at the time of the
taking, the government would have had to pay the value
of the property based on its utility at present.
Same; Same; Same; View that while just
compensation must be the value of the property at the
time of the taking, the actual amount to be paid should
take into consideration the present value of the
property.I reiterate the view that while just
compensation must be the value of the property at the
time of the taking, the actual amount to be paid should
take into consideration the present value of the
property. I had occasion to point this out in my
Separate Opinions in Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tecson , 700
SCRA 243 (2013), and Heirs of Spouses Tria v. Land
Bank of the Philippines, 700 SCRA 188 (2013).
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals; and SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Enrique W. Galang for Takenaka Corporation and
Asahikosan Corporation.
Quasha, Ancheta, Pea & Nolasco for Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).
Mario V. Andres and Katharina C. Cases-De Vera for
Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide
(Fraport) Stockholder of PIATCO.
BRION,J.:
Before the Court are the consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated
August 22, 2013, and the Resolution dated October 29,
2013, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
98029; and the petition for certiorari assailing the May
3, 2007; May 18, 2008; and January 7, 2008 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117,
in Civil Case No. 04-0876.1
_______________
 1 In G.R. No. 209917, the Government filed a petition
for review on certiorari seeking to partially reverse the
CAs August 22, 2013 Amended Decision and October
29, 2013 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 98029. In G.R.
No. 209696, Takenaka and Asahikosan filed a petition
for review on certiorari seeking to partially reverse the
same CA rulings. In G.R. No. 209731, PIATCO filed a
petition for review on certiorari filed seeking to reverse
the same CA rulings.
405
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
In G.R. No. 181892, the Government filed a petition for
certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order assailing the January 7, 2008 order of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117 in
Civil Case No. 04-0876.
In C.A.-G.R. CV No. 98029, the CA ordered petitioners
Republic of the Philippines, Department of
Transportation and Communications, and Manila
International Airport Authority ( Government for brevity)
to pay the Philippine International Airport Terminals
Co., Inc. (PIATCO) the amount of $371,426,688.24 with
interest at 6% per annum as just compensation for the
expropriation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport-
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA-IPT III).2
In Civil Case No. 04-0876, the RTC appointed DG Jones
and Partners as an independent appraiser of the NAIA-
IPT III, and ordered the Government to submit a
Certificate of Availability of Funds to cover DG Jones
and Partners appraisal fee of $1,900,000.00.
For ease of presentation, the Courts discussion shall
be under the following structure:
I. The Factual Antecedents
A. The NAIA-IPT IIII Contract and PIATCO
1. The NAIA-IPT III Contract
2. PIATCO
3. PIATCO and the Services of Takenaka and
Asahikosan
B. The Agan v. PIATCO Case, G.R. No. 155001
1. The Case and the Decision dated May 5, 2003
2. The Motion for Reconsideration and the Resolution
dated January 21, 2004
C. The Expropriation Case, Civil Case No. 04-0876
_______________
2 Rollo, pp. 10-40; penned by Associate Justice
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., and concurred in by
Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and
Samuel J. Gaerlan.
406
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
Republic vs. Mupas
D. The Republic v. Gingoyon Case, G.R. No. 166429
1. The Case and the Decision dated December 19, 2005
2. The Motion for Reconsideration and the Resolution
dated February 1, 2006
E. Proceedings in Civil Case No. 04-0876 after the
Finality of the Gingoyon Case
1. The Appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an
Independent Appraiser
2. The BOCs Expenses
F. The Parties and the BOCs Appraisal of the NAIA-IPT
III
1. The Governments Appraisal
2. PIATCOs Appraisal
3. Takenaka and Asahikosans Appraisal
4. The BOCs Appraisal
II. The RTCs Rulings in Civil Case No. 04-0876
A. The Main Decision
B. The RTCs Interlocutory Order on the Validity of the
Escrow Account
1. The Government and the Creation of an Escrow
Account for the Payment of Just Compensation
2. The Omnibus Order dated October 11, 2011
III. The CAs Rulings
A. C.A.-G.R. CV No. 98029
B. C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 123221
IV. The Action to Enforce the London Awards, Civil Case
No. 06-171
V. The Parties Positions
A. The Governments Position
B. PIATCOs Position
C. Takenaka and Asahikosans Position
VI. The Issues
VII. The Courts Rulings
A. G.R. Nos. 209917, 209696, and 209731
1. The parties were afforded procedural due process
despite their nonreceipt of the BOC Final Report prior
to the promulgation of the May 23, 2011 Decision in
Civil Case No. 04-0876.
2. Framework: Eminent domain is an inherent power of
the State
2.a. The power of eminent domain is a fundamental
state power that is inseparable from sovereignty
2.b. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from the owner by the condemnor
2.b.1. Fair market value is the general standard of value
in determining just compensation
2.b.2. Replacement cost is a different standard of value
from fair market value
2.b.3. Replacement cost is only one of the standards
that the Court should consider in appraising the NAIA-
IPT III

407 408

VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015 40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Mupas 8
 Republic vs. Mupas
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
2.b.4. The use of depreciated replacement cost method
is consistent with the principle that the property owner
7. Interests, Fruits, and Income
should be compensated for his actual loss
7.a. Computation of Interests
3. Construction cost of the NAIA-IPT III
7.b. PIATCO is not entitled to the fruits and income of
3.a. The base valuation of the NAIA-IPT III
the NAIA-IPT III
3.b. Structural defects on the NAIA-IPT III
8. The BOCs Expenses
3.b.1. The Court cannot consider the additional
8.a. Takenaka and Asahikosan should not share in the
evidence submitted by Takenaka and Asahikosan
BOCs expenses
before the Court of Appeals
9. PIATCO as the Proper Recipient of Just
3.b.2. Equiponderance of evidence on the alleged
Compensation
structural defects of the NAIA-IPT III favors PIATCO,
9.a. Takenaka and Asahikosans intervention in the
Takenaka, and Asahikosan
case as unpaid subcontractors is proper
3.c. The unnecessary areas
9.b. The property owner is entitled to just
4. Attendant cost of the NAIA-IPT III
compensation
4.a. PIATCOs attendant cost
9.c. A final disposition in the eminent domain case with
4.b. The BOC and the RTCs attendant cost
respect to the order of payment to a particular person
4.c. The Governments attendant cost
shall be final and executory
5. Deductions to the Replacement Cost of the NAIA-IPT
9.d. The determination of whether the NAIA-IPT III shall
III
be burdened by liens and mortgages even after the full
5.a. Depreciation should be deducted from the
payment of just compensation is premature
replacement cost
10. The exercise of eminent domain from the
5.b. Rectification for contract compliance should not be
perspective of taking.
deducted from the replacement cost
10.a. The Government may take the property for public
6. Adjustments to the Replacement Cost
purpose or public use upon the issuance and effectivity
6.a. The replacement cost should be adjusted to
of the writ of possession
December 2004 values
B.G.R. No. 181892
1. The issue on the appointment of an independent
409 appraiser is already moot and academic

410
41 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0
Republic vs. Mupas
I.The Factual Antecedents
A.The NAIA-IPT III Contract and PIATCO
1.The NAIA-IPT III Contract
On October 5, 1994, Asias Emerging Dragon Corp.
(AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government through the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the
Manila International Airport Authority ( MIAA) for the
construction and development of the NAIA-IPT III under
a build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) arrangement. The
DOTC and the MIAA invited the public to submit
competitive and comparative proposals to AEDCs
unsolicited proposal in accordance with the BOT Law3
and its implementing rules.4
2.PIATCO
On September 20, 1996, Paircargo Consortium
composed of Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co.,
Inc. (Paircargo), Philippine Air and Grounds Services,
Inc. (PAGS), and Security Bank Corporation ( Security
Bank) submitted its competitive proposal to the
Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC).5
Both AEDC and Paircargo Consortium offered to
build the NAIA-IPT III for at least $350 million at no
cost to the Government and to pay the Government: 5%
share in gross revenues for the first five years of
operation, 7.5% share in gross revenues for the next ten
years of operation, and 10% share in gross revenues for
the last ten years of operation. However,
_______________
3 Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7718.
4 Agan v. PIATCO, 450 Phil. 789; 402 SCRA 612
(2003).
5 Id., at pp. 792-793; p. 635.
411
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the Government a
total of P17.75 billion as guaranteed payment for 27
years while AEDC offered to pay the Government a total
of P135 million for the same period.6
After finding that Paircargo Consortium submitted a bid
superior to the AEDCs unsolicited proposal and after
the AEDCs failure to match the competitive bid, the
DOTC awarded, through a notice of award, the NAIA-IPT
III project to the Paircargo Consortium (that later
organized itself as PIATCO).7 3. PIATCO and the Services of Takenaka and
On July 12, 1997, the Government executed a Asahikosan
Concession Agreement with PIATCO for the
On March 31, 2000, PIATCO engaged the services of
construction, development, and operation of the NAIA-
IPT III under a build-operate-transfer scheme. On Takenaka, a local branch of a foreign corporation duly
November 26, 1998, the Amended and Restated organized under the laws of Japan and doing business
Concession Agreement (ARCA) superseded the 1997 in the Philippines, for the construction of the NAIA-IPT
Concession Agreement. The Government and PIATCO III under an Onshore Construction Contract.10
likewise entered into a series of supplemental On the same date, PIATCO, through an Offshore
agreements, namely: the First Supplement signed on Procurement Contract,11 likewise contracted the
August 27, 1999; the Second Supplement signed on services of Asahi-
September 4, 2000; and the Third Supplement signed on
_______________
June 22, 2001.8 10 This agreement was further supplemented by the
Under the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and following contracts:
the Supplemental Agreement (for brevity, PIATCO (a) First Supplement to the Agreement Re: the Ninoy
contracts), the Government authorized PIATCO to build,
Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III
operate, and maintain the NAIA-IPT III during the Onshore Construction Contract dated January 26, 2001;
concession period of twenty-five (25) years.9 (b) Second Supplement Agreement Relating to the
_______________ Onshore Construction Contract Re: the Ninoy Aquino
6 Id., at p. 794; p. 636. International Airport Passenger Terminal III Onshore
7 Id., at pp. 794-795; p. 637. Construction Contract dated February 21, 2001;
8 Id., at pp. 795-796; p. 638. (c) Agreement between Takenaka and Asahikosan
9 Id., at p. 795; p. 637. and Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide
Relating to the Deeds of Guaranteed Re: Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III dated
412 February 21, 2001;
(d) Third Supplemental Agreement relating to the
41 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Onshore Construction Contract dated April 11, 2002;
2
and
Republic vs. Mupas
(e) Fourth Supplemental Agreement relating to the
Onshore Construction Contract dated September 11,
2002.
 See CA Rollo, Volume XXXII-Q, pp. 10-155, 183-201
and 381-398.
11 The Offshore Procurement Contract was
supplemented by the following agreements:
(a) First Supplement to the Agreement Re: the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III
Offshore Procurement Contract dated January 26,
2001;
(b) Second Supplement Agreement relating to the
Offshore Procurement Contract Re: Ninoy Aquino
International
413
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
kosan, a foreign corporation duly organized under the
laws of Japan, for the design, manufacture, purchase,
test and delivery of the Plant12 in the NAIA-IPT III.
In May 2002, PIATCO defaulted on its obligation to pay
Takenaka and Asahikosan pursuant to their respective
contracts. To settle the problem, Takenaka and
Asahikosan agreed to defer PIATCOs payments until
June 2003, conditioned on their receipt of adequate
security from PIATCO as stipulated in the Fourth
Supplemental Agreement (relating to the Onshore
Construction Contract)13 and the Fourth Supplement
Agreement (relating to the Offshore Procurement
Contract), respectively.14
_______________
Airport Passenger Terminal III dated February 21, 2001;
and
(c) Agreement between Takenaka and Asahikosan and
Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide
Relating to the Deeds of Guaranteed Re: Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III dated
February 21, 2001;
(d) Third Supplement Agreement Relating to the
Offshore Procurement Contract Re: Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III dated April
11, 2002;
(e) Fourth Supplement Agreement relating to the
Offshore Procurement Contract dated September 11,
2002.
Id., at pp. 183-201 and 238-398.
12Id.
13 Id., at pp. 214-237.
14 Id., at pp. 381-398.
414
41 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
Republic vs. Mupas
On November 29, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo declared in her speech that the Government
would not honor the PIATCO contracts. On the same
day, Takenaka and Asahikosan notified PIATCO that
they were suspending the construction of the NAIA-IPT
III for PIATCOs failure to provide adequate security.15
B.The Agan v. PIATCO Case, G.R. No. 155001
1. The Case and the Decision dated May 5, 2003
On September 17, 2002, petitioners Demosthenes
Agan, et al., asked the Court to nullify the PIATCO
contracts, and to prohibit the DOTC and the MIAA from
implementing these contracts for being contrary to law.
The case, entitled Agan v. PIATCO, was docketed as
G.R. No. 155001.16
On May 5, 2003, the Court nullified the PIATCO
contracts after finding that Paircargo Consortium (that
later incorporated into PIATCO) was not a duly
prequalified bidder for failure to meet the minimum
equity requirements for the NAIA-IPT III project, as
required under the BOT Law and the Bid Documents.
The Court also ruled that Security Bank (member of the
Paircargo Consortium) invested its entire net worth in a
single undertaking or enterprise in gross violation of
Section 21-B of the General Banking Act (which limits a
commercial banks equity investment, whether allied or
non-allied, to fifteen percent (15%) of its net worth). 17
The
_______________
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 209696), Volume II, p. 415.
16 Supra note 4 at p. 797; p. 639.
17 The Court ruled in Agan that the maximum
amount that Security Bank could validly invest in the
Paircargo Consortium is only P528,525,656.55,
representing 15% of its entire net worth. We concluded
that the total net worth of the Paircargo Consortium
after considering the maximum amounts that may be
validly invested by
415
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
Court further found that the PIATCO contracts
contained provisions that substantially departed from
the draft Concession Agreement. These substantial
modification of the PIATCO contracts violated the
public policy for being repugnant to the principle that
all bidders must be on equal footing during the public
bidding.18
2. The Motion for Reconsideration and the Resolution
dated January 21, 2004
We denied PIATCO, et al.s motion for reconsideration in
our January 21, 2004 resolution. 19 Significantly, we
stated in the resolution that the Government should
first pay PIATCO as a prerequisite before taking
over the NAIA-IPT III, to wit:
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that
the structures comprising the NAIA-IPT III facility are
almost complete and that funds have been spent by
PIATCO in their construction. For the Government to
take over the said facility, it has to compensate
respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures.
The compensation must be just and in accordance with
law and equity for the Government cannot unjustly
enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its
investors.20 (Underlines and emphases ours)
_______________
each of its members is P558,384,871.55 or only
6.08% of the project cost. This amount is substantially
less than the prescribed minimum equity investment
required for the project in the amount of
P2,755,095,000.00 or 30% of the project cost.
18 Supra note 4 at pp. 744-841; p. 664.
19 Agan v. PIATCO, 465 Phil. 545, 586; 420 SCRA
575, 607 (2004).
20 Id., at p. 582; p. 603.
416
41 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
Republic vs. Mupas
C.The Expropriation Case, Civil Case No. 04-087621
On December 21, 2004, the Government filed a
complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III before (G.R. No. 209731), Volume I, pp. 384-385.
the RTC of Pasay, Branch 117. The Government
informed the RTC that it had deposited with the Land
Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) the amount of
P3,002,125,000.00, representing the NAIA-IPT IIIs
assessed value.22
On the same day, the RTC issued a writ of
possession in favor of the Government. Citing City of
Manila v. Serrano,23 the RTC held that that it had the
ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession upon: (1)
the filing of the complaint for expropriation sufficient in
form and substance, and (2) the Governments deposit
of the amount equivalent to the propertys assessed
value, pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.24
On January 4, 2005, the RTC modified its
December 21, 2004 order and directed: (1) the Land
Bank to immediately release to PIATCO the amount of
US$62,343,175.7725 that would be deducted from the
just compensation; (2) the Gov-
_______________
21 The case is entitled Republic of the Philippines,
represented by Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,
the Department of Transportation and Communications,
and the Manila International Airport Authority,
plaintiffs, -versus- Philippine Air Terminals Co., Inc.,
defendant. See G.R. No. 209731, Volume I, pp. 363-383.
22 Republic v. Gingoyon, 514 Phil. 678; 478 SCRA
474 (2005). See also RTC Rollo, Volume II, pp. 1050-1066
and Rollo (G.R. No. 209731), Volume I, pp. 363-374.
23 411 Phil. 754, 765; 359 SCRA 231, 238 (2001).
24 Republic v. Gingoyon, supra at pp. 678-679; p.
595. See also RTC Rollo, Volume II, p. 1072 and Rollo
25 The MIAA held guaranty deposits in the sum of
$62,343,175.77 with Land Bank for purposes of
expropriating the NAIA-IPT III. See Rollo (G.R. No.
209731), Volume I, pp. 380-382.
417
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
ernment to submit to the RTC a Certificate of
Availability of Funds for the payment of just
compensation; and (3) the Government to maintain and
preserve the NAIA-IPT III pending the expropriation
proceedings and the full payment of just compensation.
The RTC likewise prohibited the Government from
performing acts of ownership over the NAIA-IPT III such
as awarding concessions or leasing any part of the
NAIA-IPT III to other parties.26
The Government sought reconsideration of the January
4, 2005 Order, arguing that Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, and not RA 8974, applied to the case since the
NAIA-IPT III was not a national government
infrastructure project.27
RA 8974 is otherwise known as An Act to Facilitate the
Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for
National Government Infrastructure Projects and for
Other Purposes.
The Government argued that under Section 2, Rule 67
of the Rules of Court, it shall have the right to a writ of
possession upon deposit with the authorized
government depositary of an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation,
which amount shall be held by the depositary subject to
the orders of the court. In contrast, Section 4 of RA
8974, as a rule, requires the Government to immediately
pay the property owner the amount equivalent to 100%
of the value of the property based on the BIRs relevant
zonal valuation and the value of the improvements/and
or structures, upon the filing of the complaint and after
due notice to the defendant.
_______________
26 Supra note 22 at pp. 679-680; pp. 509-510. See
also RTC Rollo, Volume II, pp. 818-821 and Rollo (G.R.
No. 209731), Volume I, pp. 390-396.
27 Id., at pp. 680-681; p. 568. See also RTC Rollo,
Volume II, pp. 823-829.
418
41 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
Republic vs. Mupas
On January 7, 2005, the RTC appointed three
Commissioners28 to determine just compensation
without consulting the Government and PIATCO.29 Due
to these successive adverse rulings, the Government
sought to inhibit Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon, the RTCs
presiding judge, from hearing the case.30 (The judge
was ambushed and killed on December 31, 2005)31
On January 10, 2005, the RTC denied the Governments
urgent motion for reconsideration and motion for
inhibition.32
On December 14, 2005, Asahikosan filed a motion for
leave to intervene in Civil Case No. 04-0876 (the
expropriation case).33 On the other hand, Takenaka filed
a Manifestation dated December 15, 2005, 34 with the
attached Manifestation and Motion dated December 14,
2005.35 Takenaka alleged that the Government
impleaded it as an additional defendant in an amended
complaint for expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III,
_______________
28 The RTC appointed Dr. Fiorello R. Estuar, Atty.
Sofronio B. Ursal, and Capt. Angelo I. Panganiban. Dr.
Estuar and Atty. Ursal were succeeded by Engr. Adam
Abinales and Atty. Alfonso V. Tan, Jr., respectively.
29 Supra note 22 at pp. 680-681; p. 540. See also
RTC Rollo, Volume II, pp. 942-943 and Rollo (G.R. No.
181892), pp. 306-307.
30 Rollo (G.R. No. 209731), Volume I, pp. 397-398;
RTC Rollo, Volume II, pp. 944-950.
31 On January 20, 2006, Judge Jesus M. Mupas of
RTC-Pasay, Branch 119 was designated by the Supreme
Court to replace Judge Henrick Gingoyon in the
expropriation case. See RTC Rollo, Volume XXVI-A,
unpaged.
32 Supra note 22 at p. 681; p. 568. See also RTC
Rollo, Volume II, pp. 958-965 and Rollo (G.R. No.
209731), Volume I, pp. 399-406.
33 Rollo (G.R. No. 209696), Volume I, pp. 266-286;
RTC Rollo, Volume IV, pp. 4244-4247.
34 Id., at pp. 229-231; id., at pp. 4224-4226.
35 RTC Rollo, Volume IV, pp. 4248-4264.
419
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
but was not served summons. Takenaka thus
manifested its voluntary appearance before the RTC.36
Takenaka and Asahikosan informed the RTC that they
had previously filed two collection cases against
PIATCO, docketed as Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-
269, before the High Court of Justice, Queens Bench
Division, Technology and Construction Court in London,
England, (London Court) on August 9, 2004.
In both instances, the London Court ruled in their favor.
The dispositive part of the judgment award in Claim No.
HT-04-248 provides:
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Judgment be entered for the First Claimant 37 in the
sum of 6,602,971.00 United States dollars, together
with interest in the sum of 116,825,365.34 Philippine
pesos up to and including 18 February 2005.
2. Judgment be entered for the Second Claimant 38 in
the sum of 8,224,236.00 United States dollars, together
with interest in the sum of 2,947,564.87 United States
dollars up to and including 18 February 2005, being a
total of 11,171,800.87 United States dollars.
3. Save for the costs of and caused by the amendment
of the particulars of claim, which will be the subject of
a separate Order, the Defendant do pay the First
Claimants and the Second Claimants costs in the
action, to be subject to detailed assessment if not
agreed.
_______________
36 Rollo (G.R. No. 209696), Volume I, pp. 229-231;
id., at pp. 4224-4226.
37 The First Claimant refers to Takenaka
Corporation.
38 The Second Claimant refers to Asahikosan
Corporation.
420
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0
Republic vs. Mupas
DATED this 18th day of February 2005.39
On the other hand, the dispositive part of the judgment
award in Claim No. HT-05-269 states:
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Judgment be entered for the First Claimant in the
sum of 21,688,012.18 United States dollars, together
with interest in the sum of 6,052,805.83 United States
dollars.
2. Judgment be entered for the Second Claimant in the
sum of 30,319,284.36 United States dollars, together
with interest in the sum of 5,442,628.26 United States 2007 Order, the RTC treated Takenakas Manifestation
dollars.
3. The defendant to pay the Claimants costs in the motion to intervene and allowed Takenaka and
action, to be subject to detailed assessment if not
agreed.
DATED this 2 (sic) day of December 2005.40
Takenaka and Asahikosan asked the RTC to: (a) hold in
abeyance the release of just compensation to PIATCO
until the London awards are recognized and enforced in
the Philippines; and (b) order that the just
compensation be deposited with the RTC for the
benefit of PIATCOs creditors.4
During the hearing of the motions, the Government
clarified that it neither filed an amended complaint for
expropriation nor impleaded Takenaka as a necessary
party in the case.42
_______________
39 Rollo (G.R. No. 209696), Volume I, p. 245; RTC
Rollo, Volume IV, p. 4239.
40 Id., at p. 227; id., at p. 4241.
41 Id., at pp. 242-243 and 284.
42 Id., at pp. 332-333.
421
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
The RTC initially denied Takenaka and Asahikosans
respective motions43 in the August 8, 2006 Order, but
subsequently reconsidered its ruling.44 In a March 12,
with the attached Manifestation and Motion as a
Asahikosan to intervene in the case as PIATCOs
creditors.45
Pending the RTCs resolution of Takenaka and
Asahikosans motions for leave to intervene in the
expropriation case, the Government went directly to
the Court seeking Judge Gingoyons inhibition from the
case; the nullification of the order of release of the sum
of $62.3 million to PIATCO; and the nullification as well
of the appointment of the commissioners.
D.The Republic v. Gingoyon Case, G.R. No. 166429
1. The Case and the Decision dated December 19,
2005
On January 12, 2005, the Government, et al., filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court assailing the
validity of the January 4, 7, and 10, 2005 orders of the
RTC in the ex-
_______________
In a decision dated September 6, 2010, the RTC
recognized the validity of the London awards in Claim
Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269 and declared these
awards as enforceable in the Philippine jurisdiction.
The RTC thus ordered PIATCO to pay Takenaka and
Asahikosan the sum of $85.7 million.
PIATCO appealed the case to the CA which affirmed the
RTC rulings in a decision dated March 13, 2012. The CA
likewise denied PIATCOs motion for reconsideration in
a resolution dated May 31, 2012.
43 RTC Rollo, Volume X, pp. 7548-7573.
44 Rollo (G.R. No. 209731), Volume II, p. 1788.
45 Rollo (G.R. No. 209696), Volume I, pp. 332-333.
422
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
Republic vs. Mupas
propriation case.46 The case, entitled Republic v.
Gingoyon, was docketed as G.R. No. 166429.
The Government argued that the RTC should not have
ordered the release of $62.3 Million since the NAIA-IPT
IIIs assessed value was only P3 billion. Moreover, the
RTCs prohibition against the Government to perform
acts of ownership on the NAIA-IPT III was contrary to
the essence of a writ of possession. It 47 asserted that
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governed the
expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III since it was not a
national government infrastructure project.
The Government likewise contended that the
commissioners appointment was void. It claimed that
it had been deprived of due process since it was not
given the opportunity to contest the appointment of the
commissioners. The Government likewise sought Judge
Gingoyons inhibition from the case due to his alleged
manifest partiality to PIATCO.48
The Court partly granted the petition and rendered the
following rulings:
First, under the 2004 Resolution in Agan: (a) PIATCO
must receive payment of just compensation determined
in accordance with law and equity; and (b) the
Government is barred from taking over the NAIA-IPT III
until just compensation is paid.
Second, RA 8974 applies in the expropriation case
insofar as the law: (a) requires the Government to
immediately pay PIATCO at least the proffered value of
the NAIA-IPT III; and (b) provides valuation standards in
determining the amount of just compensation.
_______________
46 Supra note 22 at p. 681; p. 510.
47 For simplicity and ease of reading, the Court
shall use it, instead of they.
48 RTC Rollo, Volume II, pp. 971-1036.
423
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
RA 8974 is the governing law in cases where the
national government expropriates property for the
purpose of commencing national government
infrastructure projects such as the construction of the
NAIA-IPT III. However, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
applies in determining the assessed value and the
mode of deposit of just compensation if the national
government initiates the expropriation complaint for
purposes other than national infrastructure projects.
Under both Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and RA 8974,
the Government initiates the expropriation by filing an
expropriation complaint. However, the rules on the
mode of deposit differ because Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court merely requires the Government to deposit the
assessed value of the property sought to be
expropriated with an authorized government depositary
before the issuance of a writ of possession.
In contrast, RA 8974 commands the Government to
make a direct payment to the property owner prior to
the issuance of a writ of possession. Under RA 8974,
the payment shall be based on: (a) the BIRs zonal
valuation in case of land; and (b) the value of the
improvements or structures under the replacement
cost method. If the completion of a government
infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and
importance and if there is no existing valuation of the
property, the implementing agency shall immediately
pay the proffered value of the property.49
_______________
49 Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC.2.Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value
with authorized government depository.Upon the
filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and
after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall
have the right to take or enter upon the possession of
the real property involved if he deposits with the
authorized government depositary an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for
purposes of taxation to be held by such
424

42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
Republic vs. Mupas
We thus observed that Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court is contrary to our January 21, 2004 Resolution
which required the Government to make prior payment
of just com-
_______________
bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit
shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court
authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a
government bank of the Republic of the Philippines
payable on demand to the authorized government
depositary.
In contrast, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974 states:
SEC.4.Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings.
Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for
the right-of-way, site or location for any national
government infrastructure project through
expropriation, the appropriate proceedings before the
proper court under the following guidelines:
a)Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due
notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property the amount
equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent
(100%) of the value of the property based on the
current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the
improvements and/or structures as determined under
Section 7 hereof;
xxxx
c)In case the completion of a government
infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and
importance, and there is no existing valuation of the
area concerned, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered
value taking into consideration the standards
prescribed in Section 5 hereof.
Upon completion with the guidelines above mentioned,
the court shall immediately issue to the implementing
agency an order to take possession of the property and
start the implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the
implementing agency shall present to the court a
certificate of availability of funds from the proper
official concerned.
425
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
pensation to PIATCO before it could take over the NAIA-
IPT III.
The Court at the same time qualified the applicability
of RA 8974 to the expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III. We
held that the Congress may legislate on the valuation
standards of just compensation and the manner of its
payment since these are substantive matters. We made
clear, however, that the Congress cannot legislate on
the procedural aspects of expropriation since this
power lies with the Court. In fact, Section 14 of RA 8974
IRR provides that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court shall
apply to all matters regarding defenses and objections
to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and
conflicting claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the
parties, and such other incidents affecting the
complaint.
Third, we held in abeyance the implementation of the
writ of possession until the Government directly pays
to PIATCO the proffered value of P3 billion. The zonal
valuation method under Section 4 of RA 8974 shall not
apply since the Government owns the land on which
the NAIA-IPT III stands. Consequently, PIATCO should
only be paid the value of the improvements and/or
structures using the replacement cost method. 50
Pending the determination of just compensation, the
Government shall pay the sum of P3 billion as the
provisional amount of just compensation because there
was no expedited means by which the Government
could immediately take possession of the NAIA-IPT III.
We also stated that the replacement cost method is
only one of the factors to be considered in determining
just compensation. Equity should likewise be
considered in determining just compensation.
_______________
50 RA 8974 IRR, Section 7.
426
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
Republic vs. Mupas
Fourth, we authorized the Government to perform acts
essential to the operation of the NAIA-IPT III as an
international airport terminal once the writ of
possession becomes effective. This authority covers
the repair, reconditioning, and improvement of the
complex; maintenance of the existing facilities and
equipment; installation of new facilities and equipment;
provision of services and facilities pertaining to the
facilitation of air traffic and transport; and other
services that are integral to a modern-day international
airport. This is consistent with Section 4 of RA 8974
which provides that the court shall immediately issue
to the implementing agency an order to take
possession of the property and start the
implementation of the project upon fulfillment of
certain conditions.
This ruling qualified the Courts statement in its
January 21, 2004 Resolution that [f]or the Government
to take over the said facility, it has to compensate
respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures.
Nonetheless, we clarified that the title to the NAIA-IPT
III shall pass to the Government only upon full payment
of the just compensation since the proffered value is
merely a provisional determination of just
compensation.
Fifth, we ordered the RTC to complete its determination
of just compensation within sixty (60) days from finality
of our decision since it was no longer possible for the
RTC to determine just compensation within sixty (60)
days from the filing of the complaint under Section 4 of
RA 8974.
Sixth, the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
appointing the commissioners. Neither Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court nor RA 8974 requires the RTC to consult
the parties in the expropriation case prior to the
appointment of commissioners. We also stated that
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court shall apply insofar as it is
consistent with RA 8974, the IRR, and the Courts
rulings in Agan.
427
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
Considering that the expropriation proceedings were
effectively suspended seven days after the
appointment of the commissioners, the parties may file
their objections with the RTC within five days from
finality of the decision in accordance with Section 5,
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Seventh, there was no ground to order Judge
Gingoyons inhibition since the Government failed to
show his alleged partiality.51
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED in PART with
respect to the orders dated 4 January 2005 and 10
January 2005 of the lower court. Said orders are
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) The implementation of the Writ of Possession dated
21 December 2005 is HELD IN ABEYANCE, pending
payment by petitioners to PIATCO of the amount of
Three Billion Two Million One Hundred Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P3,002,125,000.00), representing the
proffered value of the NAIA-IPT III facilities;
2) Petitioners, upon the effectivity of the Writ of
Possession, are authorized [to] start the
implementation of the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport-International Passenger Terminal III project by
performing the acts that are essential to the operation
of the said International Airport Passenger Terminal
project;
3) RTC Branch 117 is hereby directed, within sixty (60)
days from finality of this Decision, to determine the just
compensation to be paid to PIATCO by the Government.
_______________
51 Supra note 22 at pp. 657-719; pp. 548-549.
428
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
Republic vs. Mupas
The Order dated 7 January 2005 is AFFIRMED in all
respects subject to the qualification that the parties
are given ten (10) days from finality of this Decision to
file, if they so choose, objections to the appointment of
the commissioners decreed therein.
The Temporary Restraining Order dated 14 January
2005 is hereby LIFTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.52
53 Republic v. Gingoyon, 517 Phil. 7, 8; 481 SCRA
457, 463 (2006). See also RTC Rollo, Volume V, pp. 4446-
4487.
54 Id., at pp. 7-8; p. 464; id., at pp. 4547-4579 and
4665-4732.

2. The Motion for Reconsideration and the Resolution

dated February 1, 2006 429

VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015

On January 2, 2006, the Government, et al., filed a
Republic vs. Mupas
motion for partial reconsideration of the Courts
December 19, 2005 Decision.53 Asahikosan,
Takenaka, and Rep. Salacnib F. Baterina also filed a
motion for leave to intervene and asked the Courts peals55 as basis for their intervention. In that case, the
Court took the extraordinary step of allowing the
reconsideration of its December 19, 2005
Decision.54 motion for intervention even after the challenged order
of the trial court had already become final. On the other
The Government raised the question of who between
PIATCO, on the one hand, and Takenaka and hand, Rep. Baterina invoked his prerogative as
legislator and taxpayer to curtail the payment of just
Asahikosan, on the other was the NAIA-IPT IIIs
builder. The Government informed the Court that compensation without any appropriation in PIATCOs
favor.
Takenaka and Asahikosan, as the unpaid
contractors in the NAIA-IPT III project, claimed The Court denied the motions and held that the alleged
liens over the NAIA-IPT III have not been judicially
significant liens on the NAIA-IPT III. The
Government opined that it would end up established. Takenaka and Asahikosan were not parties
to Gingoyon and did not present their claims before the
expropriating the NAIA-IPT III with liens and claims
in excess of its actual value if the proffered value Court. The Court did not make any declaration
regarding Takenaka and Asahikosans rights to any form
would be directly released to PIATCO.
As PIATCOs unpaid creditors, Takenaka and of compensation for the construction of the NAIA-IPT
III.
Asahikosan intervened in the case. They relied on
Mago v. Court of Ap- Moreover, the Court did not recognize the London
awards in favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan. Under
_______________
52 Id., at pp. 718-719; pp. 549-550. Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a foreign
judgment would not bind Philippine courts unless the
judgment is recognized and enforced in this
jurisdiction. Philippine courts may annul a foreign
judgment for lack of jurisdiction, lack of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, clear mistake of law or fact, or In G.R. No. 169914, AEDC filed a petition for mandamus
when the foreign judgment is contrary to public policy.
Even assuming that PIATCO is indeed liable to other
parties, the creditors have other judicial avenues to
ventilate and prove their claims against PIATCO.
The Court also categorically stated that PIATCO, as
builder of the NAIA-IPT III, must first receive just
compensation in accordance with law and equity
before the Government may take over the NAIA-IPT III.
The Court likewise denied the motions for intervention
for serious procedural errors. Under Section 2, Rule 19
of the
_______________
55 363 Phil. 225, 338; 303 SCRA 600, 613 (1999).
430
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0
Republic vs. Mupas
Rules of Court, the motion to intervene should be filed
before the courts rendition of judgment, and not after
the resolution of the case. Moreover, Takenaka and
Asahikosan failed to establish their legal interest in the to the recognition of the proponent as the original
case since their claims against PIATCO have not been
conclusively established in this jurisdiction.56
_______________
56 Another related case is Asias Emerging Dragon
Corp. v. DOTC, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169914 & 174166.
and prohibition before the Court: (a) seeking to compel
the Government to execute in its favor an approved
Draft Concession Agreement for the operation of the
NAIA-IPT III; and (b) seeking to prohibit the DOTC and
the MIAA from awarding the NAIA-IPT III project to or
negotiating into any concession contract with third
parties. The case, entitled AEDC v. DOTC, was docketed
as G.R. No. 169914.
AEDC contended that it had the exclusive, clear, and
vested statutory right to the award of the NAIA-IPT III
project on the ground that it remained the unchallenged
original proponent of the NAIA-IPT III project as a result
of the Courts nullification of PIATCO contracts.
The Court denied the petition.
We noted that AEDC belatedly filed the petition
twenty months after the Courts promulgation of Agan
in violation of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, the petition was barred by res judicata.
The RTC already dismissed Civil Case No. 66213 upon
the execution of a compromise agreement by AEDC, on
one hand, and the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC, on
the other hand.
Under Section 10.6 of the RA 6957 IRR, the
Governments acceptance of the unsolicited proposal
is limited to its commitment to pursue the project and
proponent. Thus, the Governments commitment is
limited to the pursuit of the project; it does not award
the project to the original proponent. The acceptance
of the unsolicited proposal only prevents the
Government from entertaining other similar proposals
until the solicitation of comparative proposals.
431
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
_______________
Upon the submission of comparative proposals, the
original proponent has the right to match the lowest or
most advantageous proposal within thirty working days
from notice thereof. If the original proponent is able to
match the lowest or most advantageous proposal
submitted, then the original proponent has the right to
the award of the project. The right to be awarded the
project, however, is contingent upon the original
proponents actual exercise of his right to match the
lowest or most advantageous proposal. In other words,
if the original proposal failed to match the most
advantageous comparative proposal, then the original
proponent has no right to be awarded the project.
AEDC failed to match PIATCOs more advantageous
proposal. Consequently, AEDC had no enforceable right
to be awarded the NAIA-IPT III project. Moreover, the
nullification of the award to PIATCO neither revived the
proposal nor reopened the bidding.
The Court also stated that AEDCs original proposal
was to undertake the building, operation, and transfer
to the Government of the NAIA-IPT III. This proposal
was no longer feasible since the NAIA-IPT III was
already substantially built. Furthermore, AEDC was not
financially qualified to undertake the NAIA-IPT III
project since it then had a paid-in capital of only
P150,000,000.00 at the time of the submission of the
bids.
In G.R. No. 174166, Congressman Baterina, et al., filed a
petition for certiorari opposing the expropriation
proceedings on the ground that the NAIA-IPT III is a
public property. They posited that PIATCO should not be
paid just compensation and was only entitled to
recovery on quantum meruit as the builder of the NAIA-
IPT III.
The Court denied the petition. We held that PIATCO was
entitled to just and equitable consideration for its
construction of the NAIA-IPT III. Furthermore, the
propriety of the expropriation proceedings was already
recognized and upheld by the Court in Agan and
Gingoyon.
In a resolution dated April 7, 2009, the Court denied
AEDC, et al.s motion for reconsideration. The Court
stated that the project would be awarded to the original
proponent if there was no other competitive bid
submitted for the BOT project. However, if other
proponents
432
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2
Republic vs. Mupas
E.Proceedings in Civil Case No. 04-0876after the
Finality of the Gingoyon Case
1. The Appointment of DG Jones and Partners as an
Independent Appraiser
On April 11, 2006, the RTC ordered the BOC to
resume its duties. In compliance, the BOC submitted its
Inception Report and Inception Framework to the RTC.
On April 24, 2007, the parties and the BOC conferred to
set the ground rules and procedure in determining the
just compensation due to the NAIA-IPT III.
On April 26, 2006, the Government asked the RTC to
stop the payment of P3 billion proffered value in view of
an alleged supervening event the collapse of the
ceiling of the arrival lobby section of the north side of
the NAIA-IPT III on March 27, 2006. The Government
claimed that the collapse created a 100-square foot
hole in the ceiling and caused heavy asbestos pipes to
fall on the floor of the NAIA-IPT III. The Government
likewise informed the Court that the MIAA requested
the Association of Structural Engineers of the
Philippines (ASEP) to investigate the cause of the
collapse.57 In its Final Report dated June 2006, the
ASEP identified the following factors that contributed
to the collapse:
a. Incomplete design coordination as shown by the
absence of detailed shop drawings during the
construction, an absence described as unusual for a
BOT project of this size.
_______________
submitted competitive bids, then the original proponent
must be able to match the most advantageous or
lowest bid to enjoy his preferential right to the award of
the project.
57 Rollo (G.R. No. 181892), pp. 68-69.
433
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
b. Wrong choice of ceiling and wall components and
fixing materials, e.g., use of rivets instead of clips,
screws or wire; use of furring channels instead of
stronger C channels; use of wall angles thinner than
required; and
c. Poor workmanship, e.g., uneven distribution and
improper attachment of rivets, lack of ceiling supports
in the presence of mechanical fixtures.58
The ASEP concluded that the likely cause of the
collapse was the syncretic effect of all these factors
working over time since the construction of the
ceiling.59
Upon the BOCs request,60 on May 5, 2006, the RTC
ordered the engagement of the services of an
internationally accepted independent appraiser who this order, the Government tendered to PIATCO a P3
shall conduct the valuation of the NAIA-IPT III.61 billion check on September 11, 2006. On the same day,
On May 23, 2006, the Government manifested that it the RTC reinstated the writ of possession in favor of
engaged the services of: (a) TCGI Engineer to the Government.63
determine the structural integrity of NAIA-IPT III; (b)
Thereafter, the Government and PIATCO submitted their
Ove Arup & Partners Massachusetts, Inc. (Ove Arup) to list of nominees for the appointment of an independent
conduct a design and technical review of the NAIA-IPT appraiser.64 On May 3, 2007, the RTC appointed DG
III and to conduct a peer review of TCGI Engineers Jones and Partners as independent appraiser.65
methodology and test results; and (c) Gleeds On May 18, 2007, the RTC directed the Government to
International to determine the value of the NAIA-IPT submit a Certificate of Availability of Funds to cover DG
III.62 Jones and Partners $1.9 Million appraisal fee.66
On June 20, 2006, the RTC ordered Land Bank to _______________
immediately release the amount of P3 billion to PIATCO. 63 Rollo (G.R. No 209696), Volume I, p. 331.
The RTC ruled that the collapse of a portion of the 64 Rollo (G.R. No. 181892), p. 174. After the conduct
NAIA-IPT III was of a Pre-Final Evaluation of Prequalification of
_______________ Consultant, the BOC shortlisted DG Jones and Partners
58 Id., at pp. 74-80. as well as Sallmans Far East Ltd. HK. ( Sallmans) as
59 Id., at pp. 68-69. independent appraisers.
60 Id., at pp. 16 and 61. 65 Prior to the appointment, Judge Mupas
61 Id., at p. 16. interviewed the representatives of DG Jones and
62 Id., at p. 150; RTC Rollo, Volume VIII, p. 5591.
Partners, and Sallmans. The RTC concluded that DG
Jones and Partners was more qualified than Sallmans
as independent appraiser since the former submitted a
434 lower appraisal fee of US$1,900,000.00 ($1.9 Million).
Moreover, DG Jones and Partners has a wide
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
experience and track record in the appraisal of airport
4
facilities. See Prior to the appointment, Judge Mupas
Republic vs. Mupas
interviewed the representatives of DG Jones and
Partners, and Sallmans. The RTC concluded that DG
Jones and Partners was more qualified than Sallmans
not a supervening event that would hinder the payment as independent appraiser since the former submitted a
of the proffered value to PIATCO. In compliance with lower appraisal fee of US$1,900,000.00 ($1.9 Million).
Moreover, DG Jones and Partners has a wide
experience and track record in the appraisal of airport
facilities.
See Rollo (G.R. No. 181892), pp. 64-66.
66 The appraisal fee is itemized as follows:
435
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas
The Government sought the reconsideration of the May
3 and 18, 2007 orders. The Government complained that
the appointment of an appraiser apart from those hired
by the Government would result in the unnecessary
depletion of its funds since it would be compelled to
pay two appraisers.67
In response, PIATCO argued that the RTC has the
inherent power to appoint an independent appraiser
pursuant to Section 5(g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC has
_______________
See Rollo (G.R. No. 181892), pp. 60 and 358.
67 The Government further argued that there were
no laws or rules that empowered the RTC and the BOC
to appoint an independent appraiser. The Government
opined that the RTC should exclusively choose among
its nominees pursuant to Section 7 of RA 8974 as well
as Sections 10 and 11 of RA 8974 IRR. Furthermore, the
appointment of an independent appraiser would only
result in the duplication of tasks since the BOC and the
independent appraiser essentially perform the same
function. The BOC would serve no purpose since the
appraisal of the NAIA-IPT III would be derived from the
findings of DG Jones and Partners.
It opined that the DG Jones and Partners appraisal
fee was unjust and exorbitant. The Government also
pointed out that PIATCO manifested its willingness to
share one-half of the expenses in the valuation of the
NAIA-IPT III during the valuation hearings. The
Government further raised doubts on DG Jones and
Partners qualifications since the RTC allegedly
appointed the firm without disclosing DG Jones and
Partners qualifications and proposals.
Id., at pp. 170-182.
436
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
Republic vs. Mupas
wide discretion on how it shall carry its mandate under to the engagement of the services of an appraiser. The
RA 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.68
In an order dated January 7, 2008, the RTC sustained
the appointment of DG Jones and Partners. The RTC
ruled that its power to appoint the members of the BOC Gensler.
under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court includes
the power to appoint an independent appraiser.69
_______________
68 PIATCO contended that the Government was
estopped from assailing the appointment of DG Jones
and Partners. The Government participated in the
appointment process by nominating other firms as an
independent appraiser. Furthermore, it would be
iniquitous for the Government to solely appraise the
replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT III. PIATCO asserted
that the Government should solely bear the cost of the
appraisal. The Government should have anticipated the
appointment of an independent appraiser when it filed
a complaint for expropriation. Id., at pp. 183-190.
69 The RTC stated that it would be grossly unfair to
choose exclusively among the Governments nominees;
otherwise, the independence of the appraiser would be
questionable. The Government pointed out that the
government tax assessors valuation of expropriated
property was not even conclusive on trial courts. In
fact, the BOC itself requested the appointment of an
independent appraiser since it had no technical
expertise to ascertain the just compensation due to
PIATCO.
The RTC also held that the Government was
estopped from objecting to the appointment of an
independent appraiser since it did not previously object
Government even nominated several firms for the
purpose of appointing an independent appraiser,
particularly, Gleeds International, Ove Arup, and
The RTC likewise imposed on the Government the
sole responsibility of paying the appraisal fee of DG
Jones and Partners. Under Section 12, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, the commissioners fees shall be taxed
as part of the costs of the proceedings. The plaintiff
shall pay all costs, except those of rival claimants
litigating their claims. If the property owner appeals
from the expropriation courts
437
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
Republic vs. Mupas

The Government directly challenged before the Court
the May 3, May 18, and January 7, 2008 orders in a
petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 181892.70
On January 9, 2008, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order against the implementation of the
May 3 and 18, 2007 Orders as well as the January 7,
2008 Order.71
_______________
judgment, he shall pay for the costs of the appeal.
According to the RTC, PIATCO should not shoulder the
appraisal fee since it is constitutionally entitled to just
compensation.
The RTC also affirmed DG Jones and Partners
independence. The RTC impartially chose this firm upon
a thorough review of its qualifications and upon the
BOCs recommendation. The Government would
likewise not directly communicate with and pay the
appraisal fee to DG Jones and Partners. The
Government shall deposit the appraisal fee with the
RTC who shall in turn pay DG Jones and Partners.
The dispositive portion of the RTC order provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Orders dated May 3, 2007 and May 18, 2007 are
affirmed without modification. Consequently,
Plaintiffs Omnibus Motion dated June 15, 2007
is denied. This expropriation having been
initiated in December 2004, the certificate of
availability of funds from Plaintiffs for the
necessary full compensation to PIATCO, the
costs and the expenses entailed in this
expropriation is clearly justified and should be
submitted to this Court within 15 days from
plaintiffs receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Id., at pp. 60-63.
70 Id., at pp. 2-54.
71 Id., at pp. 231-232.
438
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
Republic vs. Mupas
2. The BOCs Expenses
On June 15, 2006, the BOC filed a request for the
release of a mobilization fund of P1,600,000.00 to
support the discharge of its functions.72 The RTC
approved the request and directed the Government and
PIATCO to equally share the BOCs expenses.73 The
Government and PIATCO complied with this order and
tendered the sum of P1,600,000.00 to the BOC.74
On November 24, 2009, the BOC requested
additional funds in the amount of P5,250,000.00. 75 On
December 7, 2010, the RTC directed the Government
and PIATCO to equally defray the BOCs expenses. 76 The
Government contested this order and insisted that
Takenaka and Asahikosan should likewise shoulder the F.The Parties and the BOCs Appraisalof the NAIA-
BOCs expenses as intervenors in the case.77 IPT III
In an order dated March 11, 2011, the RTC ordered
Takenaka and Asahikosan to share in the BOCs After the Court issued the January 9, 2008
expenses. The RTC thus ordered each party to pay temporary restraining order, the parties and the BOC
P1,750,000.00. PIATCO complied with this order and conducted a preliminary conference on April 22, 2010,
paid the amount of P1,750,000.00 to the BOC.78 to adopt an alternative course of action to avoid further
Takenaka and Asahikosan sought the partial delay in the determination of just compensation.80
reconsideration of this order. They argued that they The Government manifested that it was ready to
should not be made to pay the BOCs expenses since present its own valuation of the NAIA-IPT III and other
their prayer to defer the release of a portion of the just supporting evidence. PIATCO, Takenaka, and
compensation pending the conclusion of the Asahikosan did not object to this manifestation.81
enforcement proceedings was addressed to the RTC[,] On August 5, 2010, the RTC ordered the parties to
and not to the BOC.79 submit their appraisal reports of NAIA-IPT III with
_______________ supporting documents and affidavits.82 The Government
72 Id., at p. 144. appraised the NAIA-IPT III at $149,448,037.00 while
73 Id., at p. 145. PIATCO concluded that its replacement cost was
74 Id., at p. 146; RTC Rollo, Volume XVII, pp. 11175- $905,867,549.47. On the other hand, Takenaka and
11181. Asahikosan claimed that the NAIA-IPT IIIs construction
75 Rollo (G.R. No. 209696), Volume II, p. 576. cost amounted to $360,969,790.82.
76 Id., Volume I, pp. 80-81.
77 Id., at p. 81 1. The Governments Appraisal
78 Id. Based on the Gleeds Report dated November 15,
79 Id. 2010, the Government computed the valuation of the
NAIA-IPT III as follows: 83
December 2002 CCV December 200
439 Base valuation $USD @3Q01 $300,206,693 $300,206,693
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015 Deterioration $USD @2Q09 $0 $1,738,318
Depreciation $USD 3Q01 $0 $35,076,295
Republic vs. Mupas
_______________
80 Id., Volume II, p. 576.
81 Id.
 82 Id., at p. 577. designated time and specific location, adding
83 Rollo (G.R. No. 209917), Volume II, pp. 1861-1899. the cost of works in, on, and around the
structure, and then accounting for inferior and
nonperforming works, and rectification of those
440 works.84
Gleeds arrived at the CCV by considering the rates
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
and prices for the third quarter of 2001, which
0
represented the midpoint of the construction
Republic vs. Mupas
period from June 2000 (the commencement of
construction) to December 2002 (the suspension
of construction). It claimed that calculating the
cost of construction based on its midpoint was a
Total Base CCVs $USD $300,206,693 recognized standard practice in the construction
Rectification for Contract Compliance $USD industry. The base CCV excluded the following
@2Q09 items:
Not compliant with bid documents -$30,670,894 _______________
Inferior quality -$7,702,640 84 Gleeds Report dated November 15, 2010, p.8.
Additional areas to be built (63,490 m2) -$75,570,510
Total Contract Compliance -$113,944,044
Deductions $USD ___________ 441
Total CCVs $USD $186,262,649
VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015
$300,206,693.00 as base current cost valuation Republic vs. Mupas
(CCV). Based on the Gleeds report, the
construction cost of the NAIA-IPT III as of
December 2002 was $300,206,693.00, consisting 1. Failed structural elements of the Terminal, as
of the cost of constructing the terminal building, identified in the Arup Seismic Evaluation Report and
aprons, car park, elevated roadways, and other Gravity Loading and Element Capacity Assessment;
related items. 2. The inferior quality of material used and works,
Gleeds appraised the NAIA-IPT III by multiplying the including floor tiling, plasterboard wall finishes and
structures dimensions (i.e., quantities) by a ceilings, internal and external metal paneling;
price (i.e., rate) for constructing the works at a 3. Constructed areas that are unnecessary to the
functioning of an international airport terminal and
therefore of no benefit to the Republic. These areas _______________
identified in the Arup Site Observation Report include
areas where the requirements stated in the Bid
Documents have been grossly overprovided. They also
include the multilevel retail mall that, with its own
internal circulation, is functionally separate from the
Terminal and accessible only through the multi-storey
car park (20,465 m2), and excess retail concession
space (1,727 m2);
4. The cost of seismic and gravity load structural
retrofits for the failed elements in the terminal
buildings and multi-storey car park structures, as those
retrofits are described in Arups Drawings listed in
Appendix B Drawing List 2 and other rectification
works required to bring the terminal to compliance with
applicable building and airport codes (as indicated in
the Appendices of Arups Site Observation Report);
5. The cost of completing the items listed in the JAC
project status summary report of 28 February 2003; 85
and
_______________
85 Outstanding Project Works and Tests on
Completion Status:

442

44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2
Republic vs. Mupas
 443

VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015

Republic vs. Mupas

_______________
 444

44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

4
Republic vs. Mupas

_______________
 445

VOL. 769, SEPTEMBER 8, 2015

Republic vs. Mupas

6. The cost of seismic and gravity load structural

retrofits for the failed elements in the elevated roadway
structures as those retrofits were described in Arups
Drawings listed in Appendix B Drawing List 3, Arup
Review on TCGI Report of Civil Design Review and
Evaluation Elevated Roadway, dated March 2009,
and other rectification works required to bring the
elevated roadways to compliance with applicable
building and airport codes (as indicated in the
Appendices of Arups Site Observation Report).86

$263,392,081 as total base CCV as of December

2004. The Government asserted that the NAIA-
IPT III suffered from depreciation and
deterioration in the sum of US$36,814,612.00
from December 2002 until December 2004. The
base value CCV at the time of expropriation
should be US$263,392,081.00 after deducting
depreciation and deterioration.
$113,944,044 as total contract compliance
deductions. The Government further deducted
items which
_______________
 b. Moving walkways underprovision
c. Sun shading to external glazing
d. Lack of 400hz PC air to loading bridges
e. Completion of testing, commissioning, and operation
of the facility
f. Provision of as-built documentation
The Government likewise deducted the replacement
cost of inferior quality items and additional areas that
the Government had to build to finish the NAIA-IPT III
project.87

2.PIATCOs Appraisal

PIATCO claimed that the total replacement value of

the NAIA-IPT III as of December 31, 2010 amounted to
$905,867,550.00.
Actual Costs @ Inflation Base V
2002 Rate @ 2004
See CA Rollo, Volume 32-D, pp. 117-118. I.Materials, Equipment and
86 Rollo (G.R. No. 209696), pp. 585-586. Labor Engineering & 360,969,791 1.0971 396,01
Procurement
II.Attendant Costs
446
Engineering and Architecture 19,372,539 1.0971 21,253
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Quality Assurance 6,923,720 1.0971 7,596,0
6 Construction Supervision 4,302,227 1.0971 4,719,9
Republic vs. Mupas Construction Insurance 4,329,272 1.0971 4,749,6
Site Development 8,358,169 1.0971 9,169,7

were noncompliant with bid documents, including,

among others:
a. FIDS monitors not flat screen

[G.R. No. 107372. January 23, 1997] RAFAEL S.
ORTAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR
INOCENTES, AND ASUNCION LLANES
INOCENTES, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N FRANCISCO, J.:
On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner
two (2) parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a consideration
of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. The first deed of
absolute sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 258628
provides in part:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTY FIVE
THOUSAND (P35,000.00) PESOS, receipt of which in full is
hereby acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and
conveyed, as we hereby sell, transfer and convey, that
subdivided portion of the property covered by TCT No.
258628 known as Lot No. 684-G-1-B-2 in favor of RAFAEL S.
ORTANEZ, of legal age, Filipino. whose marriage is under a
regime of complete separation of property, and a resident of
942 Aurora Blvd., Quezon City, his heirs or assigns."[1]
while the second deed of absolute sale covering TCT No. 243273
provides:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS receipt of which in full is
hereby acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and
conveyed, as we hereby sell, transfer and convey, that
consolidated-subdivided portion of the property covered by
TCT No. 243273 known as Lot No. 5 in favor of RAFAEL S.
ORTANEZ, of legal age, Filipino, whose marriage is under a
regime of complete separation of property, and a resident of
942 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City his heirs or assigns.[2]
Private respondents received the payments for the above-
mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. On April 9,
1990 the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles.
[3]
Private respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title
of the first lot is in the possession of another person, [4] and
petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain
conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific
performance before the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim
private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral
conditions[5] which were never reflected in the deeds of sale:[6]
"3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains
with the defendants (private respondents) until plaintiff
(petitioner) shows proof that all the following requirements
have been met:
(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way
amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan
for the segregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property
and that of defendants' lot to segregate his right of way;
(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other
expenses that may be incurred by reason of sale. x x x."
During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former
judge, orally testified that the sale was subject to the above
conditions,[7] although such conditions were not incorporated in the
deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground
that the introduction of said oral conditions was barred by the parol
evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and
eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a quo. Hence,
this petition.
We are tasked to resolve the issue on the admissibility of parol
evidence to establish the alleged oral conditions-precedent to a
contract of sale, when the deeds of sale are silent on such
conditions.
The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First,
private respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming
from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case,
depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as
written or documentary evidence.[8] Spoken words could be
notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a
uniform language.[9] Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule
130[10] of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were
reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the
terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted
other than the contents thereof. [11] Considering that the written deeds
of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in
said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the
parties.[12] Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an
inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it
is the law between the parties.[13]
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely
on the case of Land Settlement Development, Co. vs. Garcia
Plantation[14] where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a
contract may be established by parol evidence. However, the
material facts of that case are different from this case. In the former,
the contract sought to be enforced [15] expressly stated that it is
subject to an agreement containing the conditions-precedent which
were proven through parol evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in
this case, made no reference to any pre- conditions or other
agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as absolute in its own
terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would
vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument,
[16]
hence, contrary to the rule that:
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the
terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to
show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or
different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties.[17]
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a
contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or
mistake." [18] No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that
their parol evidence is admissible under the exceptions provided by
the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to
express the true intent of the parties. Such exception obtains only in One last thing, assuming arguendo that the parol evidence is
the following instance: admissible, it should nonetheless be disbelieved as no other
evidence appears from the record to sustain the existence of the
"[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in alleged conditions. Not even the other seller, Asuncion Inocentes,
terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be was presented to testify on such conditions.
understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the
case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the records of this case REMANDED to the trial court for proper
contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of disposition in accordance with this ruling.
the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they
entered into the contract may be received to enable the SO ORDERED.
court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument." [19]
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms
thereof.
Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents contention
that they "put in issue by the pleadings" the failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Record
shows[20] that private respondents did not expressly plead that the
deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the
intention[21] of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private
respondents). Such issue must be "squarely presented." [22] Private
respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to four (4)
conditions which they tried to prove during trial by parol evidence.
[23]
Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not plead any of
the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. [24] Their case is
covered by the general rule that the contents of the writing are the
only repository of the terms of the agreement. Considering that
private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer (and former judge)
he was "supposed to be steeped in legal knowledge and practices"
and was "expected to know the consequences" [25] of his signing a
deed of absolute sale. Had he given an iota's attention to scrutinize
the deeds, he would have incorporated important stipulations that the
transfer of title to said lots were conditional.[26]

G.R.No.126006.January29,2004.*
LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. and ELIAS Q. TAN,
petitioners,vs.COURTOFAPPEALS(SeventeenthDivision)and
ALLIEDBANKINGCORP.,respondents.
Evidence;Parol Evidence Rule;No other evidence to be
received other than the contents of the written agreement.The
parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject
petitioner Tans claim regarding the purported unwritten
agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the
payment of the obligation Section 9, Rule 130 of the of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that [w]hen the terms of an
agreementhavebeenreducedtowriting,itistobeconsideredas
containingallthetermsagreeduponandtherecanbe,between
thepartiesandtheirsuccessorsininterest,noevidenceofsuch
termsotherthanthecontentsofthewrittenagreement.
_______________
SECONDDIVISION.
*
329
VOL.421,JANUARY29,2004 329
LapulapuFoundation,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals
Same;Same;Parol evidence cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditionswhicharenotmentionedatallinwriting.Evidenceof
a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not
admissibletovary,contradictordefeattheoperationofavalid
contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditionswhicharenotmentionedatallinwriting,unlessthere
hasbeenfraudormistake.Nosuchallegationhadbeenmadeby
thepetitionersinthiscase.
Corporation Law;Corporate Officers;Powers;If a
corporationknowinglypermitsoneofitsofficerstoactwithinthe
scopeofanapparentauthority,itholdshimouttothepublicas
possessingthepower todo thoseacts.Itisafamiliardoctrine
thatifacorporationknowinglypermitsoneofitsofficers,orany
otheragent,toactwithinthescopeofanapparentauthority,it
holdshimouttothepublicaspossessingthepowertodothose
acts;andthus,thecorporationwill,asagainstanyonewhohasin
good faith dealt with it through such agent, be estopped from
denyingtheagentsauthority.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
RomeoD.Tagraforpetitioners.
 EduardoF.Roselloforprivaterespondents. P/NNo. DateofP/N Maturity DateAmountasof
1/23/79
CALLEJO,SR.,J.: BDNo.716 Dec.12,1977 Apr.11,1978 P122,322.21
BDNo.839 Jan.5,1978 May5,1978 P120,455.542
BeforetheCourtisthepetitionforreviewoncertiorarifiledby As of January 23, 1979, the entire obligation amounted to
the Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. and Elias Q. Tan seeking to P493,566.61 and despite demands made on them by the
reverse and set aside the Decision1dated June 26, 1996 of the respondent Bank, the petitioners failed to pay the same. The
Court of Appeals (CA) inCAG.R. CV No. 37162ordering the respondentBankwasconstrainedtofilewiththeRegionalTrial
petitioners, jointly and solidarily, to pay the respondent Allied CourtofCebuCity,Branch15,acomplaintseekingpaymentby
Banking Corporation the amount of P493,566.61 plus interests thepetitioners,jointlyandsolidarily,ofthesumofP493,566.61
andothercharges.Likewise,soughttobereversedandsetaside representingtheirloanobligation,exclusiveofinterests,penalty
istheappellatecourtsResolutiondatedAugust19,1996denying charges,attorneysfeesandcosts.
thepetitionersmotionforreconsideration. In its answer to the complaint, the petitioner Foundation
Thecasestemmedfromthefollowingfacts: deniedincurringindebtednessfromtherespondentBankalleging
that theloans were obtained by petitioner Tan in his personal
_______________ capacity,forhisownuseandbenefitandonthestrengthofthe
personal information he furnished the respondent Bank. The
1
PennedbyAssociateJusticeDelilahVidallonMagtoliswith
petitioner Foundation maintained that it never authorized
Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos and Artemio G.
petitioner Tan to cosign in his capacity as its President any
Tuqueroconcurring.
promissorynoteandthattherespondentBankfullyknew that
330
the loans contracted were made in petitioner Tan's personal
330 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED capacityandforhisownuseandthatthepetitionerFoundation
LapulapuFoundation,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals never benefited, directly or indirectly therefrom. The petitioner
Sometimein1977,petitionerEliasQ.Tan,thenPresidentofthe FoundationtheninterposedacrossclaimagainstpetitionerTan
copetitionerLapulapuFoundation,Inc.,obtainedfourloansfrom allegingthathe,havingexceededhisauthority,shouldbesolely
the respondent Allied Banking Corporation covered by four liableforsaidloans,andacounterclaimagainsttherespondent
promissorynotesintheamountsofP100,000each.Thedetailsof Bankfordamagesandattorneysfees.
thepromissorynotesareasfollows: Forhispart,petitionerTanadmittedthathecontractedthe
P/NNo. DateofP/N Maturity DateAmountasof loans from the respondent Bank in his personal capacity. The
1/23/79 parties,however,agreedthattheloansweretobepaidfromthe
BDNo.504 Nov.7,1977 Feb.5,1978 P123,377.76 pro
BDNo.621 Nov.28,1977 Mar.28,1978 P123,411.10
_______________
 2
Rollo,p.24.
s interestat14%perannum,computedfromJanuary24,
331
VOL.421,JANUARY29,2004
LapulapuFoundation,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals
ceedsofpetitionerTanssharesofcommonstocksintheLapulapu
IndustriesCorporation,arealestatefirm.Theloanswerecovered
bypromissorynoteswhichwereautomaticallyrenewable(rolled
over)everyyearatanamountincludingunpaidinterests,until
suchtimeaspetitionerTanwasabletopaythesamefromthe
proceedsofhisaforesaidshares.
AccordingtopetitionerTan,therespondentBanksemployee
required him to affix twosignatures on every promissory note,
assuring him that the loan documents would be filled out in
accordancewiththeiragreement.However,afterhesignedand
deliveredtheloandocumentstotherespondentBank,thesewere
filledoutinamannernotinaccordwiththeiragreement,such
that the petitioner Foundation was included as party thereto.
Further,priortoitsfilingofthecomplaint,therespondentBank
madenodemandonhim.
After due trial, the courta quorendered judgment the
dispositiveportionofwhichreads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing evidences [sic],
arguments and considerations, this court hereby finds the
preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiff and hereby
rendersjudgmentasfollows:
1. 1.RequiringthedefendantsEliasQ.TanandLapulapu
Foundation, Inc. [the petitioners herein] to pay jointly
andsolidarilytotheplaintiffAlliedBankingCorporation
[the respondent herein] the amount of P493,566.61 as
principal obligation for the four promissory notes,
includingall otherchargesincluded inthesame,with
1979, until the same are fully paid, plus 2% service
331 chargesand1%monthlypenaltycharges.
2. 2.RequiringthedefendantsEliasQ.TanandLapulapu
Foundation,Inc.,topayjointlyandsolidarily,attorneys
feesintheequivalentamountof25%ofthetotalamount
due from the defendants on the promissory notes,
includingallcharges;
3. 3.RequiringthedefendantsEliasQ.TanandLapulapu
Foundation,Inc.,topayjointlyandsolidarilylitigation
expensesofP1,000.00pluscostsofthesuit.3
Onappeal,theCAaffirmedwithmodificationthejudgmentofthe
courtaquobydeletingtheawardofattorneysfeesinfavorofthe
respondentBankforbeingwithoutbasis.
_______________
3
Id.,atp.25.
332
332 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
LapulapuFoundation,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals
The appellate court disbelieved petitioner Tans claim that the
loanswerehispersonalloansasthepromissorynotesevidencing
themshowedupontheirfacesthatthesewereobligationsofthe
petitionerFoundation,ascontractedbypetitionerTanhimselfin
hisofficialandpersonalcharacter.Applyingtheparolevidence
rule, the CA likewise rejected petitioner Tans assertion that
there was an unwritten agreement between him and the
respondentBankthathewouldpaytheloansfromtheproceeds
ofhissharesofstocksintheLapulapuIndustriesCorp.
Further, the CA found that demand had been made by the
respondent Bank on the petitioners prior to the filing of the
complainta quo.It noted that the two letters of demand dated
January3,19794andJanuary30,19795askingsettlementofthe
obligationweresentbytherespondentBank.Thesewerereceived
by the petitioners as shown by the registry return
cards6presentedduringtrialinthecourtaquo.
Finally,likethecourtaquo,theCAappliedthedoctrineof
piercing the veil of corporate entity in holding the petitioners
jointlyandsolidarilyliable.Theevidenceshowedthatpetitioner
Tan hadrepresented himself as the President of the petitioner
Foundation, opened savings and current accounts in its behalf,
andsignedtheloandocumentsforandinbehalfofthelatter.The
CA,likewise,foundthatthepetitionerFoundationhadallowed
petitionerTantoactasthoughhehadtheauthoritytocontract
theloansinitsbehalf.Ontheotherhand,petitionerTancould
notescapeliabilityashehadusedthepetitionerFoundationfor
hisbenefit.
Aggrieved, the petitioners now come to the Court alleging
that:
1. I.THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDINGTHATTHELOANSSUBJECTMATTEROF
THEINSTANTPETITIONAREALREADYDUEAND
DEMANDABLE DESPITE ABSENCE OF PRIOR
DEMAND.
2. II.THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPLYINGTHEPAROLEVIDENCERULEANDTHE
DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE VEIL OF
CORPORATEENTITYASBASISFORADJUDGING
_______________
4
ExhibitR.
5
ExhibitS.
6
ExhibitsR2andS1.
333
VOL.421,JANUARY29,2004 333
LapulapuFoundation,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals
1. JOINTANDSOLIDARYLIABILITYONTHEPARTOF
PETITIONERS ELIAS Q. TAN AND LAPULAPU
FOUNDATION,INC.7
Thepetitionersassailtheappellatecourtsfindingthattheloans
had become due and demandable in view of the two demand
letters sent to them by the respondent Bank. The petitioners
insist that there was nopriordemand asthey vigorously deny
receiving those letters. According to petitioner Tan, the
signaturesontheregistryreturncardswerenothis.
The petitioners denial of receipt of the demand letters was
rightfullygivenscantconsiderationbytheCAasitheld:
ExhibitsRandSaretwolettersofdemand,respectivelydated
January3,1979andJanuary30,1979,askingsettlementofthe
obligationscoveredbythepromissorynotes.Thefirstletterwas
writtenbyBenTioPengSeng,VicePresidentofthebank,and
addressedtoLapulapuFoundation,Inc.,attentionofMr.EliasQ.
Tan,President,whilethesecondwasafinaldemandwrittenby
theappelleescounsel,addressedtobothdefendantsappellants,
andgivingthemfive(5)daysfromreceiptwithinwhichtosettle
orjudicialactionwouldbeinstitutedagainstthem.Bothletters
weredulyreceivedbythedefendants,asshownbytheregistry
return cards, marked as Exhibits R2 and S1, respectively.
TheallegationofTanthathedoesnotknowwhosignedthesaid
registryreturnreceiptsmeritsscantconsideration,forthereisno
showing that the addresses thereon were wrong. Hence, the
disputable presumptionthat a letter duly directed and mailed
wasreceivedintheregularcourseofmail(perpar.V,Section3,
Rule131oftheRevisedRulesonEvidence)stillholds.8
There is no dispute that the promissory notes had already
matured.However,thepetitionersinsistthattheloanshadnot
become due and demandable as they deny receipt of the
respondentBanksdemandletters.Whenpresentedtheregistry
returncardsduringthetrial,petitionerTanclaimedthathedid
notrecognizethesignaturesthereon.Thepetitionersallegation
anddenialareselfserving.Theycannotprevailovertheregistry
return cardswhichconstitute documentary evidenceandwhich
enjoythepresumptionthat,absentclearandconvincingevidence
tothecontrary,thesewereregularlyissuedbythepostalofficials
inthe
_______________
7
Rollo,p.14.
8
Id.,atp.30.
334
334 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
LapulapuFoundation,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals
performance of their official duty and that they acted in good
faith.9Further,astheCAcorrectlyopined,mailsarepresumedto
havebeenproperlydeliveredandreceivedbytheaddresseein
the regular course of the mail.10As the CA noted, there is no
showing that the addresses on the registry return cards were
wrong.Itisthepetitionersburdentoovercomethepresumptions
bysufficientevidence,andotherthantheirbarefaceddenial,the
petitionersfailedtosupporttheirclaimthattheydidnotreceive
the demand letters; therefore, no prior demand was made on
thembytherespondentBank.
Having established that the loans had become due and
demandable,theCourtshallnowresolvetheissueofwhetherthe
CA correctly held the petitioners jointly and solidarily liable
therefor.
In disclaiming any liability for the loans, the petitioner
Foundation maintains that these were contracted by petitioner
Taninhispersonalcapacityandthatitdidnotbenefittherefrom.
On the other hand, while admitting that the loans were his
personal obligation, petitioner Tan avers that he had an
unwrittenagreementwiththerespondentBankthattheseloans
would be renewed on a yeartoyear basis and paid from the
proceedsofhissharesofstockintheLapulapuIndustriesCorp.
Thesecontentionsareuntenable.
The Court particularly finds as incredulous petitioner Tans
allegationthathewasmadetosignblankloandocumentsand
thatthephraseINMYOFFICIAL/PERSONALCAPACITYwas
superimposed by the respondent Banks employee despite
petitionerTansprotestation.TheCourtishardpressedtobelieve
thatabusinessmanofpetitionerTansstaturecouldhavebeen
socarelessastosignblankloandocuments.
Incontrast,asfoundbytheCA,thepromissorynotes 11clearly
showed upon their faces that they are the obligation of the
petitioner Foundation, as contracted by petitioner Tan in his
official and personal capacity.12Moreover, the application for
creditaccommodation,13thesignaturecardsofthetwoaccountsin
thename
_______________
 9
GoldLineTransit,Inc.v.Ramos,363SCRA262(2001).
10
Section3(V),Rule131oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.
11
ExhibitsHtoL.
12
Rollo,p.26.
13
ExhibitD.
335
VOL.421,JANUARY29,2004
LapulapuFoundation,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals
of petitioner Foundation,14as well as New Current Account
Record,15allaccompanyingthepromissorynotes,weresignedby
petitioner Tan for and in the name of the petitioner
Foundation.16These documentary evidence unequivocally and
categorically establish that the loans were solidarily contracted
bythepetitionerFoundationandpetitionerTan.
Asacorollary,theparolevidencerulelikewiseconstrainsthis
Court to reject petitioner Tans claim regarding the purported
unwrittenagreementbetweenhimandtherespondentBankon
thepaymentoftheobligationSection9,Rule130oftheofthe
Revised Rules of Court provides that [w]hen the terms of an
agreementhavebeenreducedtowriting,itistobeconsideredas
containingallthetermsagreeduponandtherecanbe,between
thepartiesandtheirsuccessorsininterest,noevidenceofsuch
termsotherthanthecontentsofthewrittenagreement.17
In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the
petitioners and the respondent Bank. These promissory notes
containedmaturitydatesasfollows:February5,1978,March28,
1978,April11,1978andMay5,1978,respectively.Thatthese
_______________
14
ExhibitsAandB.
15
ExhibitC.
16
Ibid.
17
Theprovisionreadsinfull:
Sec. 9.Evidence of written agreements.When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containingallthetermsagreeduponandtherecanbe,between
thepartiesandtheirsuccessorsininterest,noevidenceofsuch
termsotherthanthecontentsofthewrittenagreement.
335 However,apartymaypresentevidencetomodify,explainor
addtothetermsofthewrittenagreementifheputsinissuein
hispleadings:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the
writtenagreement;
(b)Thefailureofthewrittenagreementtoexpressthetrue
intentandagreementofthepartiesthereto;
(c)Thevalidityofthewrittenagreement;or
(d)Theexistenceofothertermsagreedtobythepartiesor
their successorsininterest after the execution of the written
agreement.
Thetermagreementincludeswills.
336
336 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
LapulapuFoundation,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals
notes were to be paid on these dates is clear and explicit.
Nowherewasitstatedthereinthattheywouldberenewedona
yeartoyear basis or rolledover annually until paid from the
proceeds of petitioner Tans shares in the Lapulapu Industries
Corp.Accordingly,thispurportedunwrittenagreementcouldnot
be made to vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the
promissorynotes.
Evidenceofapriororcontemporaneousverbalagreementis
generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the
operationofavalidcontract.18Whileparolevidenceisadmissible
toexplainthemeaningofwrittencontracts,itcannotservethe
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in
writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.19No such
allegationhadbeenmadebythepetitionersinthiscase.
Finally, the appellate court did not err in holding the
petitionersjointlyandsolidarilyliableasitappliedthedoctrineof
piercing the veil of corporate entity. The petitioner Foundation
assertsthatithasapersonalityseparateanddistinctfromthatof
itsPresident,petitionerTan,andthatitcannotbeheldsolidarily
liablefortheloansofthelatter.
TheCourtagreeswiththeCAthatthepetitionerscannothide
behindthecorporateveilunderthefollowingcircumstances:
TheevidenceshowsthatTanhasbeenrepresentinghimselfas
thePresidentofLapulapuFoundation,Inc.Heopenedasavings
accountandacurrentaccountinthenamesofthecorporation,
andsignedtheapplicationformaswellasthenecessaryspecimen
signaturecards(ExhibitsA,BandC)twice,forhimselfand
for the foundation. Hesubmitted a notarized Secretarys
Certificate (Exhibit G) from the corporation, attesting that he
hasbeenauthorized,interalia,tosignforandinbehalfofthe
LapulapuFoundationanyandallchecks,draftsorotherorders
with respect to the bank; to transact business with the Bank,
negotiate loans, agreements, obligations, promissory notes and
other commercial documents; and to initially obtain a loan for
P100,000.00 from any bank(Exhibits G1 and G2). Under
thesecircumstances, thedefendantcorporation isliable forthe
transactionsenteredintobyTanonitsbehalf.20
_______________
18
MCEngineeringv.CourtofAppeals,380SCRA116(2002).
19
Ibid.
20
Rollo,p.31(Italicsours.)
337
VOL.421,JANUARY29,2004 337
LapulapuFoundation,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals
Per its Secretarys Certificate, the petitioner Foundation had
given its President, petitioner Tan, ostensible and apparent
authority tointer aliadeal with the respondent Bank.
Accordingly, the petitioner Foundation is estopped from
questioning petitioner Tans authority to obtain the subject
loansfromtherespondentBank.Itisafamiliardoctrinethatifa
corporation knowingly permits one of its officers, or any other
agent,toactwithinthescopeofanapparentauthority,itholds
himouttothepublicaspossessingthepowertodothoseacts;
andthus,thecorporationwill,asagainstanyonewhohasingood
faithdealtwithitthroughsuchagent,beestoppedfromdenying
theagentsauthority.21
In fine, there is no cogent reason to deviate from the CAs
rulingthatthepetitionersarejointlyandsolidarilyliableforthe
loanscontractedwiththerespondentBank.
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thepetitionisDENIED
and the Decision dated June 26, 1996 and Resolution dated
August19,1996oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.37162
areAFFIRMEDintoto.
SOORDERED.
Puno(Chairman),Quisumbing,AustriaMartinezandTi
nga,JJ.,concur.
Petitiondenied,judgmentandresolutionaffirmedintoto.
Note.Thesocalledparoleevidenceruleforbidsanyaddition
to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by
testimonyofotherevidencepurportingtoshowthat,atorbefore
theexecutionofthepartieswrittenagreement,otherordifferent
termswereagreeduponbytheparties,varyingthepurportofthe
written contract. (Manufacturers Building, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals,354SCRA521[2001])

o0o

_______________

G.R.No.169985.June15,2011.*
MODESTO LEOVERAS, petitioner,vs.CASIMERO VALDEZ,
respondent.
Property;LandTitles;Ownership;Reconveyance;Anaction
forreconveyanceisalegalandequitableremedygrantedtothe
rightful landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously
registeredinthenameofanother,tocompeltheregisteredowner
to transfer or reconvey the land to him.An action for
reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the
rightful landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously
registeredinthenameofanother,tocompeltheregisteredowner
totransferorreconveythelandtohim.Theplaintiffinthisaction
mustallegeandprovehisownershipofthelandindisputeand
thedefendantserroneous,fraudulentorwrongfulregistrationof
theproperty.
_______________
**PerSpecialOrderNo.1003datedJune8,2011.
***Additional member per Special Order No. 1000 dated
June8,2011.
*THIRDDIVISION.
62
6 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
2 theabsoluteandexclusiveowneroftheshareallottedtohim.
Leoverasvs.Valdez
Evidence;ParolEvidenceRule;Toavoidtheoperationofthe
parolevidencerule,theRulesofCourtallowsapartytopresent
evidence modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the
writtenagreementifheputsinissueinhispleadingthefailureof
thewrittenagreementtoexpressthetrueintentandagreementof
theparties.Toavoidtheoperationoftheparolevidencerule,the
Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence modifying,
explainingoraddingtothetermsofthewrittenagreementifhe
putsinissueinhispleading,asinthiscase,thefailureofthe ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.63
writtenagreementtoexpressthetrueintentandagreementof
theparties.Thefailureofthewrittenagreementtoexpressthe
trueintentionofthepartiesiseitherbyreasonofmistake,fraud,
inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not
preventameetingofthemindsoftheparties.
Property;Partition;Partitionisthedivisionbetweentwoor
morepersonsofrealorpersonalproperty,ownedincommon,by
settingaparttheirrespectiveinterestssothattheymayenjoyand
possess these in severalty, resulting in the partial or total
extinguishment of coownership.The Civil Code of the
Philippines defines partition as the separation, division and
assignmentofathingheldincommonamongthosetowhomit
maybelong.Partitionisthedivisionbetweentwoormorepersons
ofrealorpersonalproperty,ownedincommon,bysettingapart
their respective interests so that they may enjoy and possess
theseinseveralty,resultinginthepartialortotalextinguishment
ofcoownership.
Same; Same; One of the legal effects of partition is to
terminatethecoownership andtomakethe previouscoowners
Contrary to the petitioners claim that his actual possession
determines the extent of his ownership, it is the
partiesAgreementthatdefines theextentoftheir ownershipin
thesubjectproperty.Oneofthelegaleffectsofpartition,whether
byagreementamongthecoownersorbyjudicialproceeding,isto
terminate the coownership and, consequently, to make the
previouscoownerstheabsoluteandexclusiveowneroftheshare
allottedtohim.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
VOL.652,JUNE15,2011 63
Leoverasvs.Valdez
AoananLawOfficeforpetitioner.
SheilaCresenciaElasinforrespondent.
BRION,J.:
BeforetheCourtisapetitionforreviewoncertiorari1assailing
the March 31, 2005 decision2and the October 6, 2005
resolution3oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCAG.R.CVNo.68549.
The CA decision reversed the June 23, 2000 decision 4of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan,dismissingrespondentCasimeroValdezscomplaint
for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages against
petitionerModestoLeoveras.
FactualAntecedents
MariaSta.MariaandDomingaMananganweretheregistered
ownersthreefourths () and onefourth ()proindiviso,
respectivelyofaparceloflandlocatedinPoblacion,Manaoag,
Pangasinan, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
24695,withanareaof28,171squaremeters.5
In September 1932, Sta. Maria sold her threefourths ()
share to Benigna Llamas.6The sale was duly annotated at the
backofOCTNo.24695.WhenBenignadiedin1944, 7shewilled
her threefourths () share equally to her sisters Alejandra
LlamasandJosefaLlamas.8Thus,Alejandraand
_______________
1UnderRule45oftheRulesofCourt.
2Rollo,pp. 1221; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E.
Veloso, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Roberto A.
BarriosandAmelitaG.Tolentino.
3Id.,atp.10.
4Id.,atpp.2225;pennedbyJudgeModestoC.Juanson.
5AnnexQ.
6AnnexQ2.
7AnnexJ.
8AnnexK,par.5,andAnnexC,par.3.
64
64 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Leoverasvs.Valdez
Josefa each owned onehalf () of Benignas threefourths ()
share.
OnJune 14,1969,Alejandrasheirs sold theirpredecessors
onehalf()share(roughlyequivalentto10,564squaremeters)to
therespondent,asevidencedbyaDeedofAbsoluteSale.9
AlsoonJune14,1969,Josefasoldherownonehalf()share
(subject property) to the respondent and the petitioner, as
evidencedbyanotherDeedofAbsoluteSale. 10Onevendate,the
respondentandthepetitionerexecutedanAgreement,11allotting
theirportionsofthesubjectproperty.
WITNESSETH
Thatwe[petitionerandrespondent]aretheabsoluteowners
of [the subject property] which is particularly described as
follows:
xxx
Thatourownershipoverthesaidportionmentionedaboveis
evidencedbyaDeedofAbsoluteSalexxx
That in said deed of sale mentioned in the immediate
preceding paragraph, our respective share consist of 5,282.13
[onehalfof10,564squaremeters]squaremetereach.
That we hereby agreed and covenanted that our respective
shareshallbeasfollows:
Modesto Leoveras3,020 square meters residential portion
on the northern part near the
Municipal road of Poblacion Pugaro,
Manaoag,Pangasinan;
_______________
 9 Annex A. The deed was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on June 20, 1977,
underEntryNo.456592.
10Annex C. The deed was registered in the Office of the _______________
Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on June 20, 1977,
underEntryNo.456594;Records,pp.23.
11AnnexD.
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VOL.652,JUNE15,2011
Leoverasvs.Valdez
Casimero Valdez7,544.2712square meters of the
parceloflanddescribedabove.13 13Supranote11;AnnexO.
OnJune8,1977,thepetitionerandtherespondentexecuted
an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the subject property. 14The
partiestookpossessionoftheirrespectiveportionsofthesubject
propertyanddeclareditintheirnamefortaxationpurposes.15
In 1996, the respondent asked the Register of Deeds of
Lingayen, Pangasinan on the requirements for the transfer of
titleovertheportionallottedtohimonthesubjectproperty.To
his surprise, the respondent learned that the petitioner had
already obtained in his name two transfer certificates of title
(TCTs):one,TCTNo.195812coveringanareaof3,020square
meters; andtwo, TCT No. 195813covering an area of 1,004
squaremeters(oratotalof4,024squaremeters).
TheRegisterofDeedsinformedtherespondentthattheycould
not find the record of OCT No. 24695; instead, the Register of
Deedsfurnishedtherespondentwiththefollowing16(collectively,
petitionersdocuments):
1.Two(2)deedsofabsolutesaledatedJune14,1969,
bothexecutedbySta.Maria,purportedlyconveying
anunspecifiedportionofOCTNo.24695asfollows:
a.11,568squaremeterstotherespondentand
petitioner17
12Theareaofthesubjectpropertyis10,564squaremeters.
The Agreement itself states thatpriorto the allotment of the
parties respective portions, the parties own aproindivisoone
65 halfshare,thatis,5,282squaremetersofthesubjectland.The
RTCfoundthatundertheAgreement,therespondentisentitled
to7,544sq.m.
14TheAffidavitofAdverseClaimwasannotatedattheback
ofOCTNo.24695asEntryNo.456593,AnnexN.
15Rollo,pp.2324.
16Records,pp.45.
17AnnexF.
66
66 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Leoverasvs.Valdez
b.8, 689 square meters to one Virgilia Li
Meneses18
2.Deed of Absolute Sale(Benigna Deed) also dated
June14,1969executedbyBenigna19whichreads:
I,BenignaLlamas,Fernandezxxxdosellxxxbywayof
ABSOLUTE SALE unto the said Casimero
Valdez,Modesto Leoverasand Virgilia Meneses their
heirsandassigns,7,544sq.m.;4,024sq.m.and8,689sq.
m. more or lessrespectivelyof a parcel of land which is
particularlydescribedasfollows:
A parcel of land xxx covered by [OCT No.] 24695.
(Emphasesadded)
 3.SubdivisionPlanofPSU21864ofOCTNo.24695 20
4.AffidavitofConfirmationofSubdivision21datedMay
3,1994(Affidavit),whichreads:
That we, Virgilia Li Meneses, xxx Dominga Manangan;
ModestoLeoveras;andCasimeroValdezxxx
xxxarecoownersofacertainparceloflandwithanareaof
28, 171 sq. m. more or less in subdivision plan Psu21864 xxx
coveredby[OCTNo.]24695situatedatPoblacion(nowPugaro),
Manaoag,Pangasinan;
xxx we agree xxx to subdivide and hereby confirmed the
subdivisioninthefollowingmannerxxx:
Lot2withanareaof3,020sq.m.xxxtoModestoLeo
verasxxx;
Lot3withanareaof1,004sq.m.xxxtoModestoLeo
verasxxx;
Lot4withanareaof7,544sq.m.xxxtoCasimeroValdezxxx;
Lot5withanareaof8,689sq.m.xxxtoVirgiliaMeneses;
Lot6withanareaof7,043sq.m.xxxtoDomingaManangan
(Emphasissupplied.)
_______________
18AnnexH.
19AnnexG.
20AnnexS.
21AnnexI.
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Leoverasvs.Valdez
On June 21, 1996, the respondent filed a complaint for
Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against the
petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the 1,004square meter
portion (disputed property) covered by TCT No. 195813, on the
ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 square
metersidentifiedinthepartiesAgreement.
The respondent sought the nullification of the petitioners
titlesbycontestingtheauthenticityofthepetitionersdocuments.
Particularly, the respondent assailed the Benigna Deed by
presenting Benignas death certificate. The respondent argued
thatBenignacouldnothaveexecutedadeed,whichpurportsto
convey 4,024 square meters to the petitioner, in 1969 because
Benignaalreadydiedin1944.Therespondentaddedthatneither
couldSta. Maria havesold tothepartiesher threefourths()
sharein1969becauseshehadalreadysoldhersharetoBenigna
in 1932.22The respondent denied his purported signature
appearingintheAffidavit,23andprayedfor:
a)xxxthecancellationofthe[petitionersdocuments];
b)thecancellation of TCT No. 195813 in the name of
Modesto Leoveras and that it be reconveyedto the
[respondent];
c)thecancellation and nullification of [TCT No.
195812]coveringanareaof3,020squaremetersxxx;
d)[theissuanceof]titlexxxinthenameof[respondent]over
an area of 17,104 square meters of OCT
24695;24(Underscoringsupplied)
Inhisdefense,thepetitionerclaimedthatthepartiesalready
had(i)delineatedtheirrespectiveportionsofthesubjectproperty
even before they acquired it in 1969 and (ii) agreed that upon
acquisition,eachwouldowntheportionas
67
_______________
22TSN,September9,1996,p.13.
23TSN,September4,1996,p.6.
24Records,pp.78.
68
68 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Leoverasvs.Valdez
delineated;thattheareaheactuallypossessedandsubsequently
acquired has a total area of 4,024 square meters, which he
subdividedintotwoportionsandcausedtobecoveredbythetwo
TCTs in question. The petitioner claimed that in signing the
Agreement, he was led to believe, based on the parties rough
estimation, that the area he actually possessed is only 3,020
square meters contrary to the parties real intentioni.e., the
extent of their ownership would be based on their actual
possession.25
Thepetitionerfurtherclaimedthattherespondentvoluntarily
participated in executing the Affidavit, which corrected the
mistake in the previously executed Agreement 26and confirmed
the petitioners ownership over the disputed property. The
petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and for a
declaration that he is the lawful owner of the parcels of land
coveredbyhistitles.
RtcRuling
TheRTC dismissed thecomplaint. The courtruled thatthe
respondentfailedtopreponderantlyprovethattheBenignaDeed
and the Affidavit are fabricated and, consequently, no ground
existstonullifythepetitionerstitles.Thecourtobservedthatthe
respondentdidnotevencomparehisgenuinesignaturewiththe
signaturesappearinginthesedocuments.
CARuling
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by ruling against the
authenticityoftheBenignaDeedandtheAffidavit.TheCAgave
weight to Benignas death certificate which shows the
impossibilityofBenignasexecutionofthedeedin1969.TheCA
alsonotedthediscrepancybetweentherespondentssignatures
asappearingintheAffidavit,ononehand,andthe
_______________
25Id.,atpp.7273.
26Id.,atpp.7475.
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VOL.652,JUNE15,2011 69
Leoverasvs.Valdez
documents on record, on the other. 27The CA added that the
respondents failure to compare his genuine signature from his
purportedsignaturesappearinginthepetitionersdocumentsis
notfatal,sinceSection22,Rule132oftheRulesofCourtallows
thecourttomakeitsowncomparison.Inlightofitsobservations,
theCAruled:
As the totality of the evidence presented sufficiently sustains
[therespondents]claimthatthetitlesissuedto[thepetitioner]
werebasedonforgedandspuriousdocuments, itbehoovesthis
Courttoannulthesecertificatesoftitle.
WHEREFORE,theassailedDecisiondatedJune23,2000is
SETASIDE.DeclaringTCTNo.195812andTCTNo.195813as
NULL and VOID,[thepetitioner] is hereby directed to
reconvey the subjectparcelsof land to
[therespondent].28(Emphasisadded.)
UnwillingtoaccepttheCAsreversaloftheRTCruling,the
petitionerfiledthepresentappealbycertiorari,claimingthatthe
CA committed gross misappreciation of the facts 29by going
beyondwhattherespondentsoughtinhiscomplaint.
 ThePetition
ThepetitionerclaimsthattheCAshouldnothaveorderedthe
reconveyance of both parcels of land covered by the TCTs in
questionsincetherespondentonlyseeksthereconveyanceofthe
disputed propertyi.e., the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
195813.
_______________
27Thesedocumentsare:theAgreement,executedin1994,the
respondentsAffidavitofAdverseClaimovertheportionsoldto
him by the heirs of Alejandra, executed in 1977, and the
Verification and Certification against NonForum Shopping
attachedtotheComplaint.
28Rollo,pp.4950.
29Id.,atp.30.
70
70 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Leoverasvs.Valdez
Thepetitionerassertsthatafterthesubjectsale,theparties
physically partitioned the subject property and possessed their
respectiveportions,therebysettingthelimitsoftheirownership.
ThepetitioneradmitsthattheBenignaDeedisfabricated
buthastenstoaddthatitwasonlydesigned(i)toaffirmthetrue
intent and agreement of the parties on the extent of their
ownership,asshownbytheiractualphysicalpossession,and(ii)
asaconvenienttooltofacilitatethetransferoftitletohisname.
TheRespondentsComment
The respondent claims that since the petitioner himself
admitted using a spurious document in obtaining his titles (as
allegedinthecomplaintandasfoundbytheCA),thentheCA
correctlycancelledthelatterstitles.30
The petitioner forged the respondents signature in the
Affidavit to make it appear that he agreed to the division
indicated in the document. The respondent defended the CAs
reconveyanceofbothparcelsofland,coveredbythepetitioners
titles,totherespondentbyarguingthatifthedistributioninthe
Affidavitisfollowed,theoriginalintendmentofthepartieson
their shares of the subject property would be grievously
impaired31
TheIssues
Thetwobasicissues32forourresolutionare:
1.WhethertheCAerredinnullifyingthepetitionerstitles.
_______________
30Id.,atpp.122123.
31Id.,atp.124.
32Id.,atp.122;therespondentsComment.
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VOL.652,JUNE15,2011 71
Leoverasvs.Valdez
2.WhethertheCAerredinorderingthereconveyanceofthe
parceloflandcoveredbythepetitionerstitles.
TheRuling
Wepartiallygrantthepetition.
 An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy
grantedtotherightfullandowner,whoselandwaswrongfullyor
erroneously registered in the name of another, to compel the
registered ownerto transfer orreconvey the landtohim. 33The
plaintiffinthisactionmustallegeandprovehisownershipofthe
land in dispute and the defendants erroneous, fraudulent or
wrongfulregistrationoftheproperty.
Werulethattherespondentadequatelyprovedhisownership
ofthedisputedpropertybyvirtueofthe(i)DeedofAbsoluteSale
executedbyJosefainfavoroftheparties;(ii)thepartiesAffidavit
ofAdverseClaim;and(iii)thepartiesAgreement,whichcover
thesubjectproperty.
The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the
authenticity of these documents,34particularly the Agreement.
However,heclaimsthatsincetheAgreementdoesnotreflectthe
true intention of the parties, the Affidavit was subsequently
executedinordertoreflectthepartiestrueintention.
Thepetitionersargumentcallstoforetheapplicationofthe
parolevidencerule,35i.e.,whenthetermsofanagreement
_______________
33Esconde v. Barlongay, No. L67583, July 31, 1987, 152
SCRA603.
34InPermanentSavingsandLoanBankv.Velarde(G.R.No.
140608,September23,2004,439SCRA1),theCourtruledthat
theallegationthat thewrittenagreementdoesnot express the
true intentionof theparties does notcarry with it the specific
denial of the genuineness and due execution of the written
instrument.
35Section9,Rule130oftheRulesofCourtreads:
SEC.9.Evidence of written agreements.When
thetermsofanagreementhavebeenreducedtowriting,it
is
72
72 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Leoverasvs.Valdez
are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to
containallthetermsagreeduponandnoevidenceoftheseterms
can be admitted other than what is contained in the written
agreement.36Whateverisnotfoundinthewritingisunderstood
tohavebeenwaivedandabandoned.37
Toavoidtheoperationoftheparolevidencerule,theRulesof
Courtallowsapartytopresentevidencemodifying,explainingor
addingtothetermsofthewrittenagreementifheputsinissuein
hispleading,asinthiscase,thefailureofthewrittenagreement
to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The
failureofthewrittenagreementtoexpressthetrueintentionof
the parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable
conductoraccident,whichneverthelessdidnotpreventameeting
ofthemindsoftheparties.38
_______________
consideredascontainingallthetermsagreeduponandtherecan
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
However,apartymaypresentevidencetomodify,explainor
addtothetermsofthewrittenagreementifheputsinissuein
hispleading:
(a)Anintrinsicambiguity,mistakeorimperfectionin
thewrittenagreement;
 (b)Thefailureofthewrittenagreementtoexpressthe
trueintentandagreementofthepartiesthereto;
(c)Thevalidityofthewrittenagreement;or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the
partiesortheirsuccessorsininterestaftertheexecutionof
thewrittenagreement.
Thetermagreementincludeswills.
36Ortaezv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.107372,January23,
1997,266SCRA561.
37HeirsofCarmenCruzZamorav.MultiwoodInternational,
Inc.,G.R.No.146428,January19,2009,576SCRA137.
38Article1359oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippinesreads:
When,therehavingbeenameetingofthemindsoftheparties
toacontract,theirtrueintentionisnotexpressedin
73
VOL.652,JUNE15,2011
Leoverasvs.Valdez
At the trial, the petitioner attempted to prove, by parol
evidence,theallegedtrueintentionofthepartiesbypresenting
the Affidavit, which allegedly corrected the mistake in the
previously executed Agreement and confirmedhis ownership of
theparcelsoflandcoveredbyhistitles.Itwasthepetitioners
staunchassertionthattherespondentcoexecutedthisAffidavit
supposedlytoreflectthepartiestrueintention.
In the present petition, however, the petitioner made a
damaging admission that theBenigna Deedisfabricated,
therebycompletelybolsteringtherespondentscauseofactionfor
reconveyance of the disputed property on the ground of
fraudulentregistrationoftitle.SincetheAffidavitmerelyreflects
whatisembodiedintheBenignaDeed,thepetitionersadmission,
coupledwiththerespondentsdenialofhispurportedsignaturein
the Affidavit, placed in serious doubt the reliability of this
document,supposedlythebedrockofthepetitionersdefense.
Curiously, if the parties truly intended to include in the
petitionerssharethedisputedproperty,thepetitionerobviously
neednotgoatlengthoffabricatingadeedofsaletosupporthis
applicationforthetransferoftitleofhisrightfulportionofthe
subjectproperty.Notably,thereisnothingintheAffidavit(that
supposedlycorrectedthemistakeintheearlierAgreement)that
supports the petitioners claim that the partition ofthe subject
propertyisbasedonthepartiesactualpossession.
Note that the RTC dismissed the complaint based on the
respondentsallegedfailuretoprovethespuriousnessofthe
_______________
the instrument purporting to embody the agreement, by
73 reasonofmistake,fraud,inequitableconductoraccident,oneof
thepartiesmayaskforthereformationoftheinstrumenttothe
endthatsuchtrueintentionmaybeexpressed.
If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident has
prevented a meeting of the minds of the parties, the proper
remedyisnotreformationoftheinstrumentbutannulmentofthe
contract.
74
74 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Leoverasvs.Valdez
documentssubmittedbythepetitionertotheRegisterofDeeds.
However, by admitting the presentation of a false deed in
securing his title, the petitioner rendered moot the issue of
authenticityoftheBenignaDeedandrelievedtherespondentof
the burden of proving its falsity as a ground to nullify the
petitionerstitles.
 Byfraudulentlycausingthetransferoftheregistrationoftitle
overthedisputedpropertyinhisname,thepetitionerholdsthe
title to this disputed property in trust for the benefit of the
respondentasthetrueowner; 39registrationdoesnotvesttitlebut
merelyconfirmsorrecordstitlealreadyexistingandvested.The
Torrenssystemofregistrationcannotbeusedtoprotectausurper
from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud, or to permit one to enrich oneself at the
expense of others.40Hence, the CA correctly ordered the
reconveyance ofthe disputed property, covered by TCT No.
195813,totherespondent.
The parties Agreement effectively
partitionedthesubjectproperty
Thepetitioneralsoreliesonhisallegedactualpossessionof
thedisputedpropertytosupporthisclaimofownership.Notably,
both parties make conflicting assertions of possession of the
disputedproperty.41Thepetitionertestifiedonhispossessionas
follows:
_______________
39Article1456oftheCivilCodereads:
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
personobtainingitis,byforceoflaw,consideredatrustee
ofanimpliedtrustforthebenefitofthepersonfromwhom
thepropertycomes.
40Lopezv.Lopez,G.R.No.161925,November25,2009,605
SCRA358.
41Therespondenttestifiedthathehasbeeninpossessionof
thelandinlitigationsince1969.(TSN,September9,1996,p.2.)
Ontheotherhand,thepetitionertestifiedthathehasbeenin
possessionofthe4,020squaremeters.(TSN,June19,1997,pp.
34.)
75
VOL.652,JUNE15,2011 75
Leoverasvs.Valdez
Q:Howmanysquaremetersdidyougetfromthelandandhow
manysquaremeterswastheshareof[respondent]?
A:4[0]20 square meters and my brotherinlaw 6,000 plus
squaremeters.
xxx
Q:Wasthereaboundarybetweenthe4,020squaremetersand
the rest of the property which (sic) designated by your
brotherinlaw?
A:Thereissir,andtheboundaryisthefence.
Q:Whendidyouputupthatfencewhichistheboundary?
A:Afterthedeedofsalewasmade.
Q:And that boundary fence which you put according to you
sincetheexecutionoftheDeedofAbsoluteSalein1969up
tothepresentdoesitstillexist?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:Sincethetimeyoupurchasedthepropertyaccordingtoyou
youalreadydividedtheproperty,isthatcorrect?
A:Yes,sir.
Q:And that as of today who is in possession of that 4,020
squaremeters?
A:I,sir.42
Thepetitionerandtherespondentwereoriginallycoownersof
thesubjectpropertywhentheyjointlyboughtitfromthesame
vendor in 1969. However, the parties immediately terminated
thisstateofindivisionbyexecutinganAgreement,whichisinthe
natureofapartitionagreement.
The Civil Code of the Philippines defines partition as the
separation,divisionandassignmentofathingheldincommon
among those to whom it may belong.43Partition is the division
betweentwoormorepersonsofrealorpersonalproperty,owned
incommon,bysettingaparttheirrespectiveinterestssothatthey
mayenjoyandpossesstheseinsever
_______________
42TSN,June19,1997,pp.34.
43Article1079.
76
76 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Leoverasvs.Valdez
alty,44resulting in the partial or total extinguishment of co
ownership.45
Inthepresentcase,thepartiesagreedtodividethesubject
property by giving the petitioner the 3,020 square meters
residential portion on the northern part near the Municipal
road.46Thereisnodisputethatthis3,020squaremeterportion
isthesameparceloflandidentifiedasLotNo.2(whichisnotthe
subject of the respondents actionfor reconveyance) in the
Affidavit and the Subdivision Plan presented by the petitioner
beforetheRegisterofDeeds.ThefactthattheAgreementlacks
technicaldescriptionofthepartiesrespectiveportionsorthatthe
subjectpropertywasthenstillembracedbyasinglecertificateof
title could not legally prevent a partition, where the different
portionsallottedtoeachweredeterminedandbecameseparately
identifiable,asinthiscase.47
Whatisstrikinglysignificantisthateventhepetitionersown
testimonymerely attemptedtoconfirmhis actualpossession of
thedisputedproperty,without,however,supportinghisclaim
contrarytothewrittenAgreementthatthepartiesownershipof
thesubjectpropertywouldbecoextensivewiththeirpossession.
Thisisthecoreofthepetitionersdefense.Atanyrate,justas
nonpossession does not negate ownership, neither does
possessionautomaticallyproveown
_______________
44Arturo M. Tolentino, 2Commentaries and Jurisprudence
ontheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,p.210.
45Article494oftheCivilCodereads:
Nocoownershallbeobligedtoremaininthecoownership.
Eachcoownermaydemandatanytimethepartitionofthething
ownedincommon,insofarashisshareisconcerned.
46Supranote11;AnnexO.
47DelaCruzv.Cruz,No.L27759,April17,1970,32SCRA
307.
77
VOL.652,JUNE15,2011 77
Leoverasvs.Valdez
ership,48especially in the face of an unambiguous document
executedbythepartiesthemselves.
Contrary tothepetitionersclaimthathisactualpossession
determines the extent of his ownership, it is the
partiesAgreementthatdefines theextentoftheir ownershipin
thesubjectproperty.Oneofthelegaleffectsofpartition,whether
byagreementamongthecoownersorbyjudicialproceeding,isto
terminate the coownership and, consequently, to make the
previouscoownerstheabsoluteandexclusiveowneroftheshare
allottedtohim.49
Parenthetically,therespondentdeclaredfortaxationpurposes
theportionheclaimsinDecember1987. 50Thetotalarea(7,544
squaremeters)ofthepropertiesdeclaredisequivalenttothearea
allotted to the respondent under the Agreement. On the other
hand,thepetitionerdeclaredthe1,004squaremeterportiononly
inSeptember1994,underTaxDeclarationNo.9393, 51despitehis
claimofexclusiveandadversepossessionsince1969.
Nullification of the petitioners title over
the3,020squaremeterportion
Whilethepetitioneradmittedusingaspuriousdocumentin
securing his titles, nonetheless, he questions the CAs
nullificationofTCTNo.195812onthegroundthat,perthere
_______________
48Medina v. Greenfield Development Corporation, G.R. No.
140228,November19,2004,443SCRA150.
49EduardoP.Caguioa,2CommentsandCasesonCivilLaw,
1966ed.,p.151,citingArticle1091oftheCivilCodewhichreads:
Apartitionlegallymadeconfersuponeachheirtheexclusive
ownershipofthepropertyadjudicatedtohim.
50IntherespondentsTaxDeclarationNo.3131(Markedas
Annex E), he declared the following with their corresponding
area: Residential750 [square meters]; Unirrig. Rice land
4,794.27[squaremeters];PastureLand2000[squaremeters].
51Records,Annex6.
78
78 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Leoverasvs.Valdez
spondentsownadmissionandthepartiesAgreement,heisthe
rightfulownerofthelandcoveredbythistitle.
Wedisagree.
Thepetitioners argument confuses registration oftitle with
ownership.52While the petitioners ownership over the land
covered by TCT No. 195812 is undisputed, his ownership only
gavehimtherighttoapplyforthepropertransferoftitletothe
propertyinhisname.Obviously,thepetitioner,evenasarightful
owner,mustcomplywiththestatutoryprovisionsonthetransfer
ofregisteredtitletolands.53Section53of
_______________
52Ownershipofapieceoflandisonething,andregistration
under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite
another(Grandev.CourtofAppeals,No.L17652,June30,1962,
5SCRA524).
53Section51ofPresidentialDecreeNo.(P.D.)1529reads:
Conveyanceandotherdealingsbyregisteredowner.An
owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease,
chargeorotherwisedealwiththesameinaccordancewith
existinglaws.Hemayusesuchformsofdeeds,mortgages,
leasesorothervoluntaryinstrumentsasaresufficientin
law.xxx
Section53ofP.D.1529reads:
Presentation of owners duplicate upon entry of new
certificate. No voluntary instrument shall be registered
by the Register of Deeds, unless the owners duplicate
certificate is presented with such instrument, except in
casesexpresslyprovidedforinthisDecreeoruponorderof
thecourt,forcauseshown.
xxx
Section57ofP.D.1529reads:
Procedure in registration of conveyances. An owner
desiring to conveyhisregisteredlandinfee simple shall
execute and register a deed of conveyance in a form
sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds shall thereafter
makeoutintheregistrationbookanewcertificateoftitle
to the grantee and shall prepare and deliver to him an
owners duplicate certificate. The Register of Deeds shall
 noteupontheoriginalandduplicatecertificatethedateof
transfer,thevolumeandpageofthe
79
VOL.652,JUNE15,2011
Leoverasvs.Valdez
Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that the subsequent
registrationoftitleprocuredbythepresentationofaforgeddeed
or other instrument is null and void. Thus, the subsequent
issuanceofTCTNo.195812gavethepetitionernobetterright
thanthetaintedregistrationwhichwasthebasisfortheissuance
ofthesametitle.TheCourtsimplycannotallowthepetitioners
attempt to get around the proper procedure for registering the
transferoftitleinhisnamebyusingspuriousdocuments.
Reconveyance is the remedy of the
rightfulowneronly
WhiletheCAcorrectlynullifiedthepetitionerscertificatesof
title, the CA erred in ordering the reconveyance of
theentiresubject property in the respondents favor. The
respondenthimselfadmittedthatthe3,020squaremeterportion
coveredbyTCTNo.195812isthepetitionersjustshareinthe
subject property.54Thus, although the petitioner obtained TCT
No.195812usingthesamespuriousdocuments,thelandcovered
bythistitleshouldnotbereconveyedinfavoroftherespondent
since he isnot the rightful ownerof the property covered by
thistitle.55
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
MODIFIED. Accordingly, the petitioner is directed to
RECONVEYtotherespondenttheparceloflandcoveredbyTCT
No.195813.Costsagainstpetitioner.
SOORDERED.
CarpioMorales (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama,
Jr.andSereno,JJ.,concur.
Petitionpartiallygranted,judgmentandresolutionmodified.
79
Note.Theregimeofcoownershipexistswhenownershipof
anundividedthingorrightbelongstodifferentpersons.Bythe
nature of a coownership, a coowner cannot point to a specific
portionofthepropertyownedincommonashisownbecausehis
sharethereinremainsintangible.(Dailisanvs.CourtofAppeals,
560SCRA351[2008])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R.No.171601.April8,2015.*
SPOUSES BONIFACIO and LUCIA PARAS,
petitioners,vs.KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,respondent.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Parol Evidence Rule; Rule 130,
Section9oftheRevisedRulesonEvidenceprovidesfortheParol
EvidenceRule,theruleonadmissibilityofdocumentaryevidence
whenthetermsofanagreementhavebeenreducedintowriting;
Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the
formalitiesobserved,forbidsanyadditionto,orcontradictionof,
thetermsofawrittenagreementbytestimonyorotherevidence
purportingtoshowthatdifferenttermswereagreeduponbythe
parties, varyingthepurportofthewrittencontract.Rule130,
Section9oftheRevisedRulesonEvidenceprovidesfortheParol
EvidenceRule,theruleonadmissibilityofdocumentaryevidence
whenthetermsofanagreementhavebeenreducedintowriting:
Section9.Evidenceofwrittenagreements.Whenthetermsofan
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containingallthetermsagreeduponandtherecanbe,between
thepartiesandtheirsuccessorsininterest,noevidenceofsuch
termsotherthanthecontentsofthewrittenagreement.However,
a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
termsofwrittenagreementifheputsinissueinhispleading:(a)
An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;(b)Thefailureofthewrittenagreementtoexpressthe
trueintentandagreementofthepartiesthereto;(c)Thevalidity
of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms
agreedtobythepartiesortheirsuccessorsininterestafterthe
execution of the written agreement. The term agreement
includeswills.Perthisrule,reductiontowrittenform,regardless
of the formalities observed, forbids any addition to, or
contradictionof,thetermsofawrittenagreementbytestimonyor
other evidence purporting to show that different terms were
agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written
contract.
_______________
*SECONDDIVISION.
242
242 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
Same;Same;Same;Two(2)thingsmustbeestablishedfor
parolevidencetobeadmitted:first,thattheexistenceofanyof
thefour(4)exceptionshasbeenputinissueinapartyspleading
orhasnotbeenobjectedtobytheadverseparty;andsecond,that
theparolevidencesoughttobepresentedservestoformthebasis
oftheconclusionproposedbythepresentingparty.Providedthat
a party puts in issue in its pleading any of the four (4) items
enumeratedinthesecondparagraphofRule130,Section9,a
partymaypresentevidencetomodify,explainoraddtotheterms
oftheagreement[.]Raisinganyoftheseitemsasanissueina
pleadingsuchthatitfallsundertheexceptionisnotlimitedto
thepartyinitiatinganaction.InPhilippineNationalRailwaysv.
CourtofFirstInstanceofAlbay,83SCRA569(1978),thiscourt
notedthatifthedefendantsetuptheaffirmativedefensethat
thecontractmentionedinthecomplaintdoesnotexpressthetrue
agreement of the parties, then parol evidence is admissible to
provethetrueagreementoftheparties[.]Moreover,aswithall
possibleobjectionstotheadmissionofevidence,apartysfailure
totimelyobjectisdeemedawaiver,andparolevidencemaythen
beentertained.Apartfrompleadingtheseexceptions,itisequally
imperativethattheparolevidencesoughttobeintroducedpoints
totheconclusionproposedbythepartypresentingit.Thatis,it
mustberelevant,tendingtoinducebeliefin[the]existenceof
theflaw,trueintent,orsubsequentextraneoustermsaverredby
the party seeking to introduce parol evidence. In sum, two (2)
thingsmustbeestablishedforparolevidencetobeadmitted:first,
thattheexistenceofanyofthefour(4)exceptionshasbeenputin
issue in a partys pleading or has not been objected to by the
adverseparty;andsecond,thattheparolevidencesoughttobe
presentedservestoformthebasisoftheconclusionproposedby
thepresentingparty.
 Same;Same;Ourevidentiaryrulesimpelustoproceedfrom
the position (unless convincingly shown otherwise) that
individuals act as rational human beings, i.e., [t]hat a person
takesordinarycareofhisconcerns.Ourevidentiaryrulesimpel
us to proceed from the position (unless convincingly shown
otherwise) that individuals act as rational human beings,i.e.,
[t]hatapersontakesordinarycareofhisconcerns[.]Thisbasic
evidentiary stance, taken with the supporting evidence
petitioners Spouses Paras adduced, respondent Kimwas
awarenessoftheconditionsunderwhichpetitionerLuciaParas
wasbound,andtheAgreementsowntextspecifyingexclusive
243
VOL.755,APRIL8,2015
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
allotment for respondent Kimwa, supports petitioners
Spouses Paras position that respondent Kimwa was obliged to
haul40,000cubicmetersofaggregatesonorbeforeMay15,1995.
As it admittedly hauled only 10,000 cubic meters, respondent
Kimwaisliableforbreachofcontractinrespectoftheremaining
30,000cubicmeters.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
EscasinasPartner&Companyforpetitioners.
P.B.Flores&Associatesforrespondent.
LEONEN,J.:
ThisresolvesthePetitionforReviewonCertiorari1underRule
45ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedureprayingthattheassailed
Decision2dated July 4, 2005 and Resolution3dated February 9,
2006oftheCourtofAppealsSpecial20thDivisioninC.A.G.R.
CVNo.74682bereversedandsetaside,andthattheDecision 4of
Branch55oftheRegionalTrialCourt,MandaueCitydatedMay
16,2001inCivilCaseNo.MAN2412bereinstated.5
The trial courts May 16, 2001 Decision ruled in favor of
petitionersSpousesBonifacioandLuciaParas(plaintiffsbefore
theRegionalTrialCourt)intheiractionforbreachofcontract
_______________
1Rollo,pp.1128.
2Id., at pp. 3239. The Decision was penned by Associate
JusticeIsaiasP.Dicdican(Chair)andconcurredinbyAssociate
JusticesSesinandoE.VillonandEnricoA.Lanzanas.
243
3Id.,atpp.4748.TheResolutionwaspennedbyAssociate
JusticeIsaiasP.Dicdican(Chair)andconcurredinbyAssociate
JusticesPampioA.AbarintosandEnricoA.Lanzanas.
4Id.,atpp.6670.
5Id.,atp.26.
244
244 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
with damages against respondent Kimwa Construction and
DevelopmentCorporation(Kimwa).6
TheassailedDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsreversedandset
aside the trial courts May 16, 2001 Decision and dismissed
Spouses Paras Complaint.7The Court of Appeals assailed
ResolutiondeniedSpousesParasMotionforReconsideration.8
LuciaParas(Lucia)wasaconcessionaireofasandandgravel
permit at Kabulihan, Toledo City[.] 9Kimwa is a construction
firm that sells concrete aggregates to contractors and haulers
in...Cebu.10
 On December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa entered into a KIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
contract denominated Agreement for Supply of Aggregates CORP.,acorporationdulyorganizedandexistingunderthelaws
(Agreement) where 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were ofthePhilippineswithofficeaddressatSubangdaku,Mandaue
allotted11byLuciaassuppliertoKimwa. 12Kimwawastopick City,hereinafterrepresentedbyitsPresidentMRS.CORAZONY.
up the allotted aggregates at Lucias permitted area in Toledo LUA, of legal age, Filipino and a resident of Subangdaku,
City13atP240.00pertruckload.14 MandaueCity[,]hereinafterreferredtoastheCONTRACTOR;
TheentiretyofthisAgreementreads: WITNESSETH:
AGREEMENTFORSUPPLYOFAGGREGATES ThattheSUPPLIERis[sic]SpecialPermitteeof(Rechanelling

Block#VIofSapangDacoRiveralongBarangayIlihan)located
KNOWALLMENBYTHESEPRESENTS:
atToledoCityunderthetermsandconditions:
ThisAgreementmadeandenteredintobyandbetween:
1. That the aggregates is [sic] to be picked up by the
LUCIAPARAS,oflegalage,Filipino,marriedandresidentof
Poblacion,ToledoCity,ProvinceofCebu,hereinafterreferredto CONTRACTORattheSUPPLIER[sic]permittedareaattherate
astheSUPPLIER: ofTWOHUNDREDFORTY(P240.00)PESOSpertruckload;
_______________ 2.That the volume allotted by the SUPPLIER to the
CONTRACTORislimitedto40,000cu.m.;
6Id.,atp.70. 3.ThatthesaidAggregatesis[sic]fortheexclusiveuseofthe
7Id.,atp.38. Contractor;
8Id.,atp.48. 4. That the terms of paymentis Fifteen(15) days after the
9Id.,atp.32. receiptofbilling;
10Id. 5.Thatthereis[sic]nomodification,amendment,assignment
11Id.,atp.36. ortransferofthisAgreement afteracceptance shallbe binding
upontheSUPPLIERunlessagreedtoinwritingbyandbetween
12Id.,atp.33.
theCONTRACTORandSUPPLIER.
13Id.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed our
14Id.,atp.66. signaturesthis6thdayofDecember,1994atMandaueCity,Cebu,
Philippines.
246
245 246 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
VOL.755,APRIL8,2015 245
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation LUCIAPARAS(sgd.)CORAZONY.LUA(sgd.)
and SupplierContractor15
 (Emphasissupplied) 23Id.
24Id.
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic 247
meters of aggregates. Sometime after this, however, Kimwa
VOL.755,APRIL8,2015 247
stoppedhaulingaggregates.16
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the Agreement,
SpousesParasaddedthatwithinafewdays,Kimwawasable
Lucia,joinedbyherhusband,Bonifacio,filedtheComplaint 17for
toextractandhaul10,000cubicmetersofaggregates.However,
breach of contract with damages that is now subject of this
after extracting and hauling this quantity, Kimwa allegedly
Petition.
transferredtotheconcessionareaofacertainMrs.Remediosdela
IntheirComplaint,SpousesParasallegedthatsometimein
Torre in violation of their Agreement. They then addressed
December1994,LuciawasapproachedbyKimwaexpressingits
demand letters to Kimwa. As these went unheeded, Spouses
interesttopurchasegravelandsandfromher.18Kimwaallegedly
ParasfiledtheirComplaint.25
asked that it be assured19of 40,000 cubic meters worth of
In its Answer,26Kimwa alleged that it never committed to
aggregates.20Luciacounteredthatherconcessionareawasdueto
obtain40,000cubic meters ofaggregatesfromLucia.It argued
be rechanneled on May 15, 1995, when her Special Permit
thatthecontroversialquantityof40,000cubicmetersrepresented
expires.21Thus,sheemphasizedthatshewouldbewillingtoenter
only an upper limit or the maximum quantity that it could
into a contract with Kimwa provided the forty thousand cubic
haul.27Itlikewiseclaimedthatitneithermadeanycommitment
meter[s] w[ould] be withdrawn orcompletelyextracted and
tohaul40,000cubicmetersofaggregatesbeforeMay15,1995nor
hauledbefore15May1995[.] 22KimwathenassuredLuciathatit
representedthatthehaulingofthisquantitycouldbecompleted
wouldtakeonlytwotothreemonthsforittocompletelyhaulthe
in two to three months.28It denied that the hauling of 10,000
40,000 cubic meters of aggregates. 23Convinced of Kimwas
cubicmetersofaggregateswascompletedinamatterofdaysand
assurances,LuciaandKimwaenteredintotheAgreement.24
counteredthatittookweekstodoso.Italsodeniedtransferring
_______________
totheconcessionareaofacertainMrs.RemediosdelaTorre.29
Kimwa asserted thatthe Agreement articulatedthe parties
15RTCRecords,p.97.
trueintentthat40,000cubicmeterswasamaximumlimitand
16Rollo,p.33. thatMay15,1995wasneversetasadeadline.InvokingtheParol
17Id.,atpp.5659. EvidenceRule,itinsistedthatSpousesParaswerebarredfrom
18Id.,atp.56. introducing evidence which would show that the parties had
19Id. agreeddifferently.30
20Id.,atpp.5657. On May 16, 2001, the Regional Trial Court rendered the
DecisioninfavorofSpousesParas.Thetrialcourtnotedthatthe
21Id.,atp.57.
22Id.
Agreementstipulatedthattheallottedaggregatesweresetaside Hence,thisPetitionwasfiled.
exclusivelyforKimwa.Itreasonedthatitwascon The issue for resolution is whether respondent Kimwa
_______________ ConstructionandDevelopmentCorporationisliabletopetitioners
SpousesParasfor(admittedly)failingtohaul30,000cubicmeters
25Id. ofaggregatesfrompetitionerLuciaParaspermittedareabyMay
26Id.,atpp.6063. 15,1995.
To resolve this, it is necessary to determine whether
27Id.,atp.60.
petitionersSpousesParaswereabletoestablishthatrespondent
28Id.,atpp.6061.
Kimwa was obliged to haul a total of 40,000 cubic meters of
29Id.,atpp.6162. aggregatesonorbeforeMay15,1995.
30Id.,atpp.6263. _______________
248
248 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED 31Id.,atp.70.
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation 32Id.,atp.96.
trarytohumanexperienceforKimwatohaveenteredintoan 33Id.,atp.70.
AgreementwithLuciawithoutverifyingthelattersauthorityas 34Id.,atpp.3637.
aconcessionaire.31ConsideringthattheSpecialPermit32granted
35Id.,atp.48.
to Lucia (petitioners Exhibit A before the trial court) clearly
249
indicatedthatherauthoritywasgoodforonlysix(6)monthsfrom
November14,1994,thetrialcourtnotedthatKimwamusthave VOL.755,APRIL8,2015 249
beenawarethatthe40,000cubicmetersofaggregatesallottedto Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
itmustnecessarilybehauledbyMay15,1995.Asitfailedtodo WereversetheDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsandreinstate
so,itwasliabletoSpousesParasforthetotalsumofP720,000.00, thatoftheRegionalTrialCourt.RespondentKimwaisliablefor
thevalueofthe30,000cubicmetersofaggregatesthatKimwadid failingtohaultheremainderofthequantitywhichitwasobliged
nothaul,inadditiontoattorneysfeesandcostsofsuit.33 toacquirefrompetitionerLuciaParas.
Onappeal,theCourtofAppealsreversedtheRegionalTrial
CourtsDecision.Itfaultedthetrialcourtforbasingitsfindings I
onevidencepresentedwhichweresupposedlyinviolationofthe
ParolEvidenceRule.ItnotedthattheAgreementwasclearthat Rule130,Section9oftheRevisedRulesonEvidenceprovides
Kimwawasunder noobligation tohaul 40,000 cubicmetersof for the Parol Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of
aggregatesbyMay15,1995.34 documentaryevidencewhenthetermsofanagreementhavebeen
In a subsequent Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied reducedintowriting:
reconsiderationtoSpousesParas.35
 Section9.Evidenceofwrittenagreements.Whentheterms
ofanagreementhavebeenreducedtowriting,itisconsideredas
containingallthetermsagreeduponandtherecanbe,between
thepartiesandtheirsuccessorsininterest,noevidenceofsuch
termsotherthanthecontentsofthewrittenagreement.
However,apartymaypresentevidencetomodify,explainor
addtothetermsofwrittenagreementifheputsinissueinhis
pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the
writtenagreement;
(b)Thefailureofthewrittenagreementtoexpressthetrue
intentandagreementofthepartiesthereto;
(c)Thevalidityofthewrittenagreement;or
(d)Theexistenceofothertermsagreedtobythepartiesor
their successorsininterest after the execution of the written
agreement.
Thetermagreementincludeswills.
Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the
formalitiesobserved,36forbidsanyadditionto,orcontradict
_______________
36SeeInciong,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,327Phil.364,371;256
SCRA578,585(1996)[PerJ.Romero,SecondDivision].
250
250 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
tionof,thetermsofawrittenagreementbytestimonyorother
evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed
uponbytheparties,varyingthepurportofthewrittencontract. 37
Thisruleisanimatedbyaperceivedwisdomindeferringto
thecontractingpartiesarticulatedintent.Inchoosingtoreduce
their agreementintowriting,theyare deemed tohave done so
meticulouslyandcarefully,employingspecificfrequently,even
technicallanguageasareappropriatetotheircontext.Froman
evidentiarystandpoint,thisisalsobecauseoraltestimony...
comingfromapartywhohasaninterestintheoutcomeofthe
case,dependingexclusivelyonhumanmemory,isnotasreliable
as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be
notoriouslyunreliableunlikeawrittencontractwhichspeaksofa
uniformlanguage.38AsillustratedinAbellav.CourtofAppeals:39
Without any doubt, oral testimony as to a certain fact,
depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is not as
reliableaswrittenordocumentaryevidence.Iwouldsoonertrust
the smallest slip of paper for truth, said Judge Limpkin of
Georgia, than the strongest and most retentive memory ever
bestowed on mortal man. This is especially true in this case
wheresuchoraltestimonyisgivenby...apartytothecasewho
hasaninterestinitsoutcome,andby...awitnesswhoclaimed
tohavereceivedacommissionfromthepetitioner. 40
_______________
38Ortaezv.CourtofAppeals,334Phil.514,518;266SCRA
561,565(1997)[PerJ.Francisco,ThirdDivision].
39327 Phil. 270; 257 SCRA 482 (1996) [PerJ.Francisco,
ThirdDivision].
37SeaoilPetroleumCorporationv.AutocorpGroup,590Phil.
410, 418; 569 SCRA 387, 395 (2008) [PerJ.Nachura, Third
Division], citingEdrada v. Ramos, 505 Phil. 672, 677678; 468
SCRA597,604(2005)[PerJ.Tinga,SecondDivision].
40Id.,atp.276;p.487,citingDeLeonv.CourtofAppeals,
205 SCRA 612, 622623 (1992) [PerJ.Cruz, First Division]
andMillerv.Cotten,5Ga.341,349.
 251
VOL.755,APRIL8,2015
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
This,however,ismerelyageneralrule.Providedthataparty
putsinissueinitspleadinganyofthefour(4)itemsenumerated
in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9, a party may
present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
agreement[.]41Raising any of these items as an issue in a
pleadingsuchthatitfallsundertheexceptionisnotlimitedto
thepartyinitiatinganaction.InPhilippineNationalRailwaysv.
Court of First Instance of Albay,42this court noted that if the
defendant set up the affirmative defense that the contract
mentionedinthecomplaintdoesnotexpressthetrueagreement
oftheparties,thenparolevidenceisadmissibletoprovethetrue
agreement of the parties[.]43Moreover, as with all possible
objectionstotheadmissionofevidence,apartysfailuretotimely
object is deemed a waiver, and parol evidence may then be
entertained.
Apartfrompleadingtheseexceptions,itisequallyimperative
that the parol evidence sought to be introduced points to the
conclusionproposedbythepartypresentingit.Thatis,itmustbe
relevant,tendingtoinducebeliefin[the]existence44
_______________
41ACI Philippines, Inc. v. Coquia, 580 Phil. 275, 284; 558
SCRA300,310(2008)[PerJ.Tinga,SecondDivision].
42173 Phil. 5; 83 SCRA 569 (1978) [PerJ.Aquino, Second
Division].
43Id.,at p. 11; p. 576, citingEnriquezv. Ramos, 116 Phil.
525,531;6SCRA219,220221(1962)[PerJ.BautistaAngelo,En
Banc],PhilippineSugarE.D.Co.v.Philippines,62L.Ed.1177,
247U.S.385,HeirsofDelaRamav.TalisaySilayMillingCo.,54
251 Phil. 580, 588 (1930) [PerJ.Romualdez,En Banc], andLand
Settlement and Development Corporation v. Garcia Plantation
Co., Inc., 117 Phil. 761, 765; 7 SCRA 750, 752 (1963)
[PerJ.Paredes,EnBanc].
44Rev.RulesonEvid.,Rule128,Secs.3and4provide:
Section3.Admissibilityofevidence.Evidenceisadmissible
whenitisrelevanttotheissueandisnotexcludedbythelawof
theserules.
Section4.Relevancy; collateral matters.Evidence must
havesucharelationtothefactinissueastoinducebeliefinits
existence or nonexistence. Evidence on collateral matters shall
notbeallowed,
252
252 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms
averredbythepartyseekingtointroduceparolevidence.
Insum,two(2)thingsmustbeestablishedforparolevidence
to be admitted:first, that the existence of any of the four (4)
exceptionshasbeenputinissueinapartyspleadingorhasnot
beenobjectedtobytheadverseparty;andsecond,thattheparol
evidencesoughttobepresentedservestoformthebasisofthe
conclusionproposedbythepresentingparty.
II
Here,theCourtofAppealsfoundfaultintheRegionalTrial
Courtforbasingitsfindingsonthebasisofevidencepresentedin
violation of the parol evidence rule. 45It proceeded to fault
petitionersSpousesParasforshowingnoproof...of[respondent
Kimwas]obligation.46Then,itstatedthat[t]hestipulationsin
the agreement between the parties leave no room for
interpretation.47
TheCourtofAppealsisinseriouserror.
At the onset, two (2) flaws in the the Court of Appeals
reasoningmustbeemphasized.First,itisinconsistenttosay,on
one hand, that the trial court erred on the basis of evidence
presented48(albeitsupposedlyinviolationoftheParolEvidence
Rule),and,ontheother,thatpetitionersSpousesParasshowed
no proof.49Second,without even accounting fortheexceptions
provided by Rule 130, Section 9, the Court of Appeals
immediately concluded that whatever evidence petitioners
SpousesParaspresentedwasinviolationoftheParolEvidence
Rule.
_______________
exceptwhenittendsinanyreasonabledegreetoestablishthe
probabilityorimprobabilityofthefactinissue.
45Rollo,p.36.
46Id.,atp.37.
47Id.
48Id.,atp.36.
49Id.,atp.37.
253
VOL.755,APRIL8,2015 253
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
Contrary to the Court of Appeals conclusion, petitioners
SpousesParaspleadedintheComplainttheyfiledbeforethetrial
courtamistakeorimperfectionintheAgreement,aswellasthe
Agreements failure to express the true intent of the parties.
Further,respondentKimwa,throughitsAnswer,alsoresponded
to petitioners Spouses Paras pleading of these issues. This is,
thus,anexceptionalcaseallowingadmissionofparolevidence.
Paragraphs6to10ofpetitionersComplaintread:
6.Sensingthatthebuyerscontractorsandhaulersalikecould
easily consumed [sic] the deposits defendant proposed to the
plaintiffwifethatitbeassuredofafortythousand(40,000)cubic
meter[sic];
7. Plaintiff countered that the area is scheduled to be
rechanneled on 15 May 1995 and by that time she will be
prohibitedtoselltheaggregates;
8.Shefurthertoldthedefendantthatshewouldbewillingto
enterintoacontractprovidedthefortythousandcubicmeter[sic]
willbewithdrawnorcompletelyextractedandhauledbefore15
May1995,thescheduledrechanneling;
9.Defendantassuredherthatitwilltakethemonlytwoto
threemonthstohaulcompletelythedesiredvolumeasdefendant
hasallthetrucksneeded;
10. Convinced of the assurances, plaintiffwife and the
defendantenteredintoacontractforthesupplyoftheaggregates
sometimeon6December1994orthereabouts,atacostofTwo
HundredForty(P240.00)Pesospertruckload[.]50
ItistruethatpetitionersSpousesParasComplaintdoesnot
specifically state words and phrases such as mistake,
imperfection, or failure to express the true intent of the
parties.Nevertheless,itisevidentthatthecruxofpetition
_______________
50Id.,atpp.5657.
254
254 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
 ers Spouses Paras Complaint is their assertion that the
Agreement entered into . . . on 6 December 1994 or
thereabouts51was founded on the parties supposed
understandingthatthequantityofaggregatesallottedinfavorof
respondent Kimwa must be hauled by May 15, 1995, lest such
haulingberenderedimpossiblebytherechannelingofpetitioner
LuciaParaspermittedarea.Thisassertionistheveryfoundation
ofpetitionershavingcometocourtforrelief.
Proof of how petitioners Spouses Paras successfully pleaded
and put this in issue in their Complaint is how respondent
Kimwa felt it necessary to respond to it or address it in its
Answer.Paragraphs2to5ofrespondentKimwasAnswerread:
2.Theallegationinparagraphsixofthecomplaintisadmitted
subject to the qualification that when defendantoffered tobuy
aggregatesfromtheconcessionoftheplaintiffs,itsimplyasked
theplaintiffconcessionaireifshecouldsellasufficientsupplyof
aggregates to be used in defendants construction business and
plaintiffconcessionaireagreedtoselltothedefendantaggregates
fromherconcessionuptoalimitof40,000cubicmetersatthe
priceofP240.00percubicmeter.
3. The allegations in paragraphs seven and eight of the
complaintarevehementlydeniedbythedefendant.Thecontract
which was entered into by the plaintiffs and the defendant
provides only that the former supply the latter the volume of
40,000.00 cubic meters of aggregates. There is no truth to the
allegationthattheplaintiffwifeenteredintothecontractunder
theconditionthattheaggregatesmustbequarriedandhauledby
defendantcompletelybeforeMay15,1995,otherwisethiswould
havebeenunequivocallystipulatedinthecontract.
_______________
51Id.,atp.57.
255
VOL.755,APRIL8,2015 255
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
4.Theallegationinparagraphnineofthecomplaintishereby
denied.Thedefendantnevermadeanyassurancetotheplaintiff
wife that it will take only two to three months to haul the
aforesaidvolumeofaggregates.Likewise,thecontractissilenton
thisaspectforinfactthereisnodefinitetimeframeagreedupon
by the parties within which defendant is to quarry and haul
aggregatesfromtheconcessionoftheplaintiffs.
5. The allegation in paragraph ten of the complaint is
admitted insofar as the execution of the contract is concerned.
However,thecontractwasexecuted,notbyreasonofthealleged
assurancesofthedefendanttotheplaintiffs,asclaimedbythe
latter,butbecauseoftheintentandwillingnessoftheplaintiffs
tosupplyandsellaggregatestoit.Itwasupontheinstanceofthe
plaintiffthatthedefendantsignthesubjectcontracttoexpressin
writing their agreement that the latter would haul aggregates
from plaintiffs concession up to such point in time that the
maximum limit of 40,000 cubic meters would be quarried and
hauled without a definite deadline being set. Moreover, the
contractdoesnotobligatethedefendanttoconsumetheallotted
volumeof40,000cubicmeters.52
Considering how the Agreements mistake, imperfection, or
supposed failure to express the parties true intent was
successfullyputinissueinpetitionersSpousesParasComplaint
(andevenrespondedtobyrespondentKimwainitsAnswer),this
casefallsundertheexceptionsprovidedbyRule130,Section9of
theRevisedRulesonEvidence.Accordingly,thetestimonialand
documentary parol evidence sought to be introduced by
petitionersSpousesParas,whichattesttothesesupposedflaws
andwhattheyavertohavebeenthepartiestrueintent,maybe
admittedandconsidered.
_______________
52Id.,atpp.6061.
256
256 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
III
Ofcourse,thisadmissionandavailabilityforconsiderationis
noguaranteeofhowexactlytheparolevidenceadducedshallbe
appreciated by a court. That is, they do not guarantee the
probative value, ifany, that shall be attached tothem. In any
case, wefindthatpetitionershave established thatrespondent
Kimwawasobligedtohaul40,000cubicmetersofaggregateson
orbeforeMay15,1995.Consideringitsadmissionthatitdidnot
haul 30,000 cubic meters of aggregates, respondent Kimwa is
liabletopetitioners.
The PreTrial Order issued by the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. MAN2412 attests to respondent Kimwas
admissionthat:
6) Prior to or during the execution of the contract[,] the
Plaintiffs furnished the Defendant all the documents and
requisitepapersinconnectionwiththecontract,oneofwhichwas
a copy of the Plaintiffs [sic] special permit indicating that the
Plaintiffs [sic] authority was only good for (6) months from
November14,1994.53
ThisSpecialPermitwas,inturn,introducedbypetitionersin
evidence as their Exhibit A,54with its date of issuance and
effectivity being specifically identified as their Exhibit A
1.55RelevantportionsofthisSpecialPermitread:
ToAllWhomItMayConcern:
PERMISSIONisherebygrantedto:
NameAddress
LUCIAPARASPoblacion,ToledoCity
_______________
53Id.,atp.64.
54RTCRecords,pp.93and96.
55Id.,atp.93.
257
VOL.755,APRIL8,2015 257
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
toundertaketherechannellingofBlockNo.VIofSapangDaco
River alongBarangayIlihan, Toledo City, subject to following
termsandconditions:
1.That the volume to be extracted from the area is
approximately40,000cubicmeters;
....
Thispermit whichisvalidforsix(6) monthsfromthe date
hereofisrevocableanytimeuponviolationofanyoftheforegoing
conditionsorintheinterestofpublicpeaceandorder.
CebuCapitol,CebuCity,November14,1994.56
Having been admittedly furnished a copy of this Special
Permit,respondentKimwawaswell awarethata totalof only
about 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates may be extracted by
petitioner Lucia from the permitted area, and that petitioner
Lucia Paras operations cannot extend beyond May 15, 1995,
whentheSpecialPermitexpires.
The Special Permits condition that a total of only about
40,000cubicmetersofaggregatesmaybeextractedbypetitioner
Lucia Paras from the permitted area lends credence to the
positionthattheaggregatesallottedtorespondentKimwawas
in consideration of its corresponding commitment to haul all
40,000 cubic meters. This is so, especially in light of the
AgreementsownstatementthatthesaidAggregatesisforthe
exclusive use of [respondent Kimwa.]57By allotting the entire
40,000 cubic meters, petitioner Lucia Paras bound her entire
businesstorespondentKimwa.Rationalhumanbehaviordictates
thatshemusthavedoneso withthe corresponding assurances
fromit.Itwouldhavebeenirrational,ifnotridiculous,ofherto
obligeherselftomakethisallotment
_______________
56Id.,atp.96.
57Id.,atp.97.
258
258 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
withoutrespondentKimwasconcomitantundertakingthatit
wouldobtaintheentireamountallotted.
Likewise,theconditionthattheSpecialPermitshallbevalid
foronlysix(6)monthsfromNovember14,1994lendscredenceto
petitioners Spouses Paras assertion that, in entering into the
AgreementwithrespondentKimwa,petitionerLuciaParasdidso
because of respondent Kimwas promise that hauling can be
completed by May 15, 1995. Bound as she was by the Special
Permit,petitionerLuciaParasneededtomakeiteminentlyclear
to any party she was transacting with that she could supply
aggregatesonlyuptoMay15,1995and thatthe otherpartys
hauling must be completed by May 15, 1995. She was merely
actingwithduediligence,forotherwise,anycontractshewould
enterintowouldbenegated; anycommitmentshewouldmake
beyondMay15,1995wouldmakeherguiltyofmisrepresentation,
andanyprospectiveincomeforherwouldberenderedillusory.
Ourevidentiaryrules impelustoproceedfromthe position
(unless convincingly shown otherwise) that individuals act as
rationalhumanbeings,i.e.,[t]hatapersontakesordinarycareof
his concerns[.]58This basic evidentiary stance, taken with the
supporting evidence petitioners Spouses Paras adduced,
respondent Kimwas awareness of the conditions under which
petitionerLuciaParaswasbound,andtheAgreementsowntext
specifying exclusive allotment for respondent Kimwa, supports
petitionersSpousesParaspositionthatrespondentKimwawas
obliged to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before
May15,1995.Asitadmittedlyhauledonly10,000cubicmeters,
respondentKimwaisliableforbreachofcontractinrespectofthe
remaining30,000cubicmeters.
WHEREFORE,the Petition isGRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated July 4, 2005 and Resolution dated February 9,
2006oftheCourtofAppealsSpecial20thDivisioninC.A.G.R.CV
No.74682areREVERSEDandSETASIDE.TheDeci
_______________
58Rev.RulesonEvid.,Rule131,Sec.3(d).
259
VOL.755,APRIL8,2015 259
Parasvs.KimwaConstructionandDevelopmentCorporation
sionofBranch55oftheRegionalTrialCourt,MandaueCity
dated May 16, 2001 in Civil Case No. MAN2412
isREINSTATED.
Alegalinterestof6%perannumshalllikewisebeimposedon
thetotaljudgmentawardfromthefinalityofthisDecisionuntil
fullsatisfaction.
SOORDERED.
 Carpio(Chairperson),Brion,DelCastilloandMendoza,JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set
aside.
Notes.Toavoidtheoperationoftheparolevidencerule,the
Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence modifying,
explainingoraddingtothetermsofthewrittenagreementifhe
putsinissueinhispleadingthefailureofthewrittenagreement
toexpressthetrueintentandagreementoftheparties.(Leoveras
vs.Valdez,652SCRA61[2011])
Unsubstantiated testimony, offered as proof of verbal
agreements which tend to vary the terms of the written
agreement,isinadmissibleundertherule.(Sarazavs.Francisco,
711SCRA95[2013])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.

G.R.No.205590.September2,2015.*

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,vs.LIGAYA M.
PASIMIO,respondent.
 Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Court of Appeals;
Section9ofBatasPambansa(BP)Blg.129,otherwiseknownas
theJudiciaryReorganizationActof1980,categoricallystatesthat
theCourtofAppeals(CA)has,interalia,thepowertotrycases,
receive
_______________
*THIRDDIVISION.
71
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
evidenceandperformanyandallactsnecessarytoresolve
factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction.Before proceeding to the main issue of
this case, there is a need to clarify the assailed decisions
perplexingbutflawedpronouncementthat theCA, notbeinga
trier of facts, is without competence to review the factual
determinationoftheRTC.Section9ofBatasPambansaBlg.(BP)
129,otherwiseknownastheJudiciaryReorganizationActof1980,
categoricallystatesthattheCAhas,interalia,thepowertotry
cases,receiveevidenceandperformanyandallactsnecessaryto
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original
andappellatejurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The parties in Rule 41 appeal
proceedingsmayraisequestionsoffactormixedquestionsoffact
and law.The CAs regrettable cavalier treatment of PNBs
appealisinconsistentwithRule41oftheRulesofCourtandwith
the usual course of judicial proceedings. Be reminded that the
partiesinRule41appealproceedingsmayraisequestionsoffact
ormixedquestionsoffactandlaw.Thus,ininsistingthatitisnot
atrieroffactsandimplyingthatithadnochoicebuttoadoptthe
RTCs factual findings, the CA shirked from its function as an
appellatecourttoindependentlyevaluatethemeritsofthiscase.
To accept the CAs aberrant stance is to trivialize its review
function,but,perhapsworse,renderuselessoneofthereasonsfor
itsinstitution.
Same; Evidence; Preponderance of Evidence; Words and
Phrases;Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of
71 evidence or greater weight of credible evidence.It is settled
thattheburdenofprooflieswiththepartywhoassertsaright
and the quantum of evidence required by law in civil cases is
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the
weight,credit,andvalueoftheaggregateevidenceoneitherside
and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
greater weight of evidence or greater weight of credible
evidence.
Same;Same;Justassettledistherulethattheplaintiffin
civilcasesmustrelyonstrengthofhisorherownevidenceand
notupontheweaknessofthatofthedefendant.Justassettledis
therulethattheplaintiffincivilcasesmustrelyonstrengthof
hisorher
72
72 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of the
defendant.Inthecaseatbench,thismeansthatonPasimiorests
the burden of proof and theonusto produce the required
quantumofevidencetosupporthercause/sofaction.
Same; Same; Clear and Convincing Evidence; The
employment of fraud, duress, or undue influence is a serious
charge, and to be sustained it must be supported by clear and
convincing proof; it cannot be presumed.The employment of
fraud,duress,orundueinfluenceisaseriouscharge,andtobe
sustaineditmustbesupportedbyclearandconvincingproof;it
cannot be presumed.There is no allegation or evidence that
Gregorio and Miranda influenced Pasimio by employing means
shecouldnotwellresist,andwhichcontrolledhervolitionand
inducedhertosigntheloandocumentsandtheApril10,2003
Affidavit, which otherwise she would not have executed. Also,
there was no evidence showing that Gregorio and Mirandas
influence interfered with Pasimios exercise of independent
discretionnecessarytodeterminetheadvantageordisadvantage
ofsigningthesedocuments.
Same;Same;DisputablePresumptions;Rule131,Sec.3of
the Rules of Court specifies that a disputable presumption is
satisfactoryifuncontradictedandnotovercomebyotherevidence.
ItisgermanetoobserveatthisjuncturethatPNBhas,inits
favor, certain presumptions which Pasimio failed to overturn.
Rule131,Sec.3oftheRulesofCourtspecifiesthatadisputable
presumptionissatisfactoryifuncontradictedandnotovercomeby
otherevidence.
Mercantile Law; Promissory Notes; A promissory note
represents a solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal
commitment to repay it on the date and under the conditions
agreeduponbytheborrowerandthelender.Inupholdingthe
RTCs finding respecting Pasimios never having received any
loanproceeds,theCAdoubtlessdisregardedtheruleholdingthat
a promissory note is the best evidence of the transaction
embodiedtherein;also,toprovetheexistenceoftheloan,thereis
noneedtosubmitaseparatereceipttoprovethattheborrower
receivedtheloanproceeds.Indeed,apromissorynoterepresents
asolemnacknowledgmentofadebtandaformalcommitmentto
repayitonthedateandundertheconditionsagreeduponbythe
borrowerandthelender.Ashasbeenheld,apersonwhosigns
suchaninstrumentisboundtohonoritasale
73
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015 73
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
gitimate obligation duly assumed by him through the
signature he affixes thereto as a token of his good faith. If he
renegesonhispromisewithoutcause,heforfeitsthesympathy
and assistance of this Court and deserves instead its sharp
repudiation.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Notarized Documents; Settled is
therulethatadefectivenotarizationwillstripthedocumentofits
publiccharacterandreduceittoaprivateinstrument, andthe
evidentiary standard of its validity shall be based on
preponderanceofevidence.TheabsenceofPasimioscommunity
tax certificate number in: said loan documents neither vitiates
the transaction nor invalidates the document. If at all, such
absencerendersthenotarizationoftheloandocumentsdefective.
Underthenotarialrulesatthattime,i.e.,Sec.163(a)ofRepublic
ActNo.7160,otherwiseknownastheLocalGovernmentCodeof
1991,where an individual subject to the community tax
acknowledgesanydocumentbeforeanotarypublic,itshallbethe
duty of the administering officer to require such individual to
exhibitthecommunitytaxcertificate.Thedefectivenotarization
oftheloan documentsonlymeansthatthese documentswould
not be carrying the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution; that they should be treated as a
privatedocumenttobeexaminedinappropriatecasesunderthe
parameters of Sec. 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which
providesthatbeforeanyprivatedocumentofferedasauthenticis
receivedinevidence,itsdueexecutionandauthenticitymustbe
provedeither:(a)byanyonewhosawthedocumentexecutedor
written;or(b)byevidenceofthegenuinenessofthesignatureor
handwriting of the maker xxx. Settled is the rule that a
defective notarization will strip the document of its public
character and reduce it to a private instrument, and the
evidentiary standard of its validity shall be based on
preponderanceofevidence.
Same;Same;ResInterAliosActa;Actsanddeclarationsof
persons strangers to a suit should, as a rule, be irrelevant as
evidence.It was wrong for the CA to make the foregoing
conclusionsmerelybecauseanotherbankclient,VirginiaPollard
(Pollard),testifiedtobeingavictimofirregularbanktransactions
of PNB Sucat. Even if Pollard were telling the truth, her
testimonyshouldnothavebeenconsideredproofthatwhatshe
underwent is what actually transpired between Pasimio and
PNB.Res inter alios acta.Acts and declarations of persons
strangerstoasuitshould,asarule,beir
74
74 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
relevant as evidence. Pollards transaction with PNB is
entirelydifferentandtotallyunrelatedtoPasimiosdealingswith
thebank.
Same; Same; Parol Evidence; That when the terms of an
agreementhavebeenreducedtowriting,itistobeconsideredas
containingallsuchterms,and,therefore,therecanbe,betweenthe
partiesandtheirsuccessorsininterest,noevidenceofthetermsof
theagreementotherthanthecontentsofthewriting.Itiswellto
consider this rule: that when the terms of an agreement have
beenreducedtowriting,itistobeconsideredascontainingall
suchterms,and,therefore,therecanbe,betweenthepartiesand
their successorsininterest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreementotherthanthecontentsofthewriting.Underthisrule,
parol evidence or oral evidence cannot be given to contradict,
change or vary a written document, except if a party presents
evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of a written
agreement and puts in issue in his pleadings: (a) an intrinsic
ambiguity,mistake,orimperfectioninthewrittenagreement;(b)
the failureof thewrittenagreement to express thetrue intent
and agreement of the parties; (c) the validity of the written
agreement;and(d)theexistenceofothertermsagreedtobythe
parties or their successorsininterestafter theexecutionof the
writtenagreement.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Antonio M. Elicano and Salvador J. Ortega, Jr.for
petitioner.
Rondain&Mendiolaforrespondent.
VELASCO,JR.,J.:
 In this petition for review under Rule 45, the Philippine
NationalBank(PNB)assailsandseekstosetasidetheJanu
75
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
ary23,2013Decision1oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inC.A.G.R.
CVNo.94079dismissingpetitionersappealfromthedecisionof
theRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofParaaqueCity,Branch196,
whichruledforrespondentLigayaPasimio(Pasimio)inanaction
forasumofmoneyshecommencedthereatagainstthebank.
TheFacts
From the petition, the comment thereon, their respective
annexes, and other pleadings filed by the parties, the Court
gathersthefollowingrelevantfacts:
On May 19, 2005, Pasimio filed suit against PNB for the
recovery of a sum of money and damages before the RTC of
Paraaque City. In her complaint,2docketed as Civil Case No.
CV050195andeventuallyraffledtoBranch196ofthecourt,she
allegedhavingapesoanddollartimedepositaccountswithPNB
in the total amount of P4,322,057.57 and US$5,170.80,
respectively;thatbothinvestmentplacementshavematured;and
when she sought to withdraw her deposit money with accrued
interests,PNBrefusedtooblige.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, 3with annexes, PNB
admitted the fact of deposit placement for the amount
aforestated.ButitclaimedthatPasimioiswithoutrighttoinsist
ontheirwithdrawal,thedepositedamounthavingalreadybeen
usedinpaymentofheroutstandingloanobligationstothebank.
PNBnarratedhowthesetoffofsortcameabout:Pasimioandher
husbandtookoutthreeloansagainstdepositholdout 4fromthe
PNBSucatbranch,asfollows:aThreeMillion
_______________
1Rollo,pp.824.PennedbyAssociateJusticeAgnesReyes
75 Carpio and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosalinda
AsuncionVicenteandPriscillaJ.BaltazarPadilla.
2Id.,atpp.7680.
3Id.,atpp.8195.
4AloanagainstdepositholdoutisaPNBproductwhere
theloanissecuredbythePNBdepositoftheborrower.
76
76 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
One Hundred Thousand Peso (P3,100,000) loan on March 21,
2001;aOneMillionSevenHundredThousandPeso(P1,700,000)
loanonApril2,2001;andaThirtyOneThousandOneHundred
USDollar(US$31,100)loanonDecember7,2001.
PNB further alleged the following: (1) each loan
accommodationwassecuredbyadepositaccountofPasimio;(2)
theproceedsofthefirstandsecondloanswerereleasedtoand
receivedbythePasimiospousesintheformofPNBManagers
Checks(MCs)whiletheproceedsofthethirdloanwerereleased
andreceivedincash;(3)theloanproceedswereacknowledgedby
Pasimioincorrespondingnotarizedpromissorynotes(PNs)and
Disclosure Statements of Loan/Credit Transaction; (4) Pasimio
thenrelenttheproceedsofthethirdloantoacertainPaoloSun;
(5) contrary to Pasimios allegations on maturing deposit
instruments, she in fact renewed/rolled over her placements
severaltimes;and(6)Pasimiohadfailedtopayheroutstanding
loan obligations forcing the bank to apply her deposits to the
unpaid loans pursuant to the legal compensation arrangement
embodiedintheholdoutprovisounderClause5ofthePN.5
To this answer, Pasimio filed her reply and answer to
counterclaimallegingfactsshewouldalsolaterventuretoprove.
Duringthetrialfollowingthejoinderofissues,Pasimiodenied
obtaining any loan from PNB, let alone receiving the
corresponding loan proceeds. While conceding signing certain
documents which turned out to be the Peso Loans Against
Peso/FX Deposit Loan Applications, the Promissory Notes and
Holdout on Savings Deposit/Peso/FX Time Deposit and
AssignmentofDepositSubstituteandtheDisclosureStatements
ofLoan/CreditTransaction(LoanDocuments),sheprofessednot
_______________
5Clause 5 of the PNs reads: By virtue of the Hold
out/assignment, the BANK has the right to offset the amount
assigned/heldoutagainstthisnotewithoutanyneedofnoticeto
ordemandontheCLIENT/Sinanyofthefollowingevents(i)any
default or premature acceleration of due date of the Loan or
OtherObligationxxx.
77
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
understandingwhattheyreallymeant. Sheagreedto affixher
signatureontheseloandocumentsinblankorinanincomplete
state,sheadded,onlybecausethePNBSucatbranchmanager,
Teresita Gregorio (Gregorio), and Customer Relations Officer,
GloriaMiranda(Miranda),ledhertobelievethatwhatshewas
signingwererelatedtonewhighyieldingPNBproducts.
PasimiowouldalsodenyrelendingtheloanproceedstoPaolo
Sun. She asserted in this regard that Gregorio repaired to her
residence with a duly accomplished affidavit detailing the
relendingeventandurgedhertosignthesameifshewishedto
recoverherplacements.
In all, Pasimio depicted herself as victim of a nefarious
lendingscam, orchestrated by GregorioandMiranda whoPNB
had ordered dismissed following the exposure of their
involvement in anomalous loan transactions with unsuspecting
PNBdepositors.
Pasimiosubmittedthefollowingasevidence:
1. Passbook for PNB Mint Placement No. 61281001164164
(sameasPNBMintPlacementNo.6128100115590)to
provethatsheinvestedP3,100,000withPNBSucatunder
PNBMintPlacementNo.6128100115590;
2. Passbook for PNB Mint Placement No. 61281001164688
(sameasPNBMintPlacementNo.6128100115632)to
provethatsheinvestedP1,700,000withPNBSucatunder
PNBMintPlacementNo.6128100115632;
3.CertificateofTimeDepositfor$CTDNo.6628100116575
to prove that she invested US$5,160.84 with PNBSucat
under Certificate of Time Deposit $CTD No.
6628100116575;
4. Letter dated April 22, 2004 addressed to the PNB Sucat
77 branchmanagertoprovethatshemadeademandforthe
releaseofherinvestments;
5.LettersdatedJuly21,2004fromPNBsInternalAuditorto
PasimiotoprovethatPNBconfirmedherdepositsand
investmentwithPNBSucatbutthatshe
78
78 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
 PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
corrected entries pertaining to their amounts and denied
havingadepositholdoutonanyofherinvestments;
6. Engagement letter dated February 2, 2005 from the law
firmRondain&Mendiola;
7. An unsigned affidavit to prove that Gregorio had
preparedanaffidavittomakeitappearthatPasimioand
other depositors entered into loan agreements with a
certainPaoloSun,tocoverher(Gregorios)illegalschemes
and that Gregorio went to thehomes of thesedepositors
beggingthemtosigntheaffidavitasshewasalreadybeing
auditedbyPNBsmainoffice;6and
8.AMemorandumonIrregularLendingOperationonLoansv.
DepositHoldOut(SucatBranch)datedFebruary18,2003
detailing the allegedmodus operandiof Gregorio and
Miranda and stating that the latter were dismissed for
theirinvolvementinshadyloanpractices.7
Ontheotherhand,PNBofferedthefollowingforpurposesas
stated:
1.PesoLoansAgainstPeso/FXDepositLoanApplicationForm
datedMarch21,2001toprovethatPasimioappliedfora
PNBloanandvoluntarilyexecutedaloanapplicationform
datedMarch21,2001fortheamountofP3,100,000secured
byherownPNBMintAccountNo.612810011393asloan
collateral;
2.PNandHoldoutonPeso/FXSavingsDeposit/Peso/FXTime
DepositandAssignmentofDepositSubstitutedatedMarch
21, 2001 to prove that Pasimios P3,100,000 loan was
supported with a PN which she and her husband
voluntarilysignedandexecutedon
_______________
6Records,pp.349352.
7Id.,atpp.564568.
79
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015 79
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
March 21, 2001 and that she renewed the said loan on
differentdates;
3. Disclosure Statement of Loan/Credit Transaction dated
March 21, 2001 to prove that Pasimios loan for
P3,100,000 was also supported with a Disclosure
Statement, a copy of which she acknowledged to have
received prior to the consummation of the credit
transaction,whereshevoluntarilyagreedtothetermsand
conditionsofherloanbysigningthesaidstatement;
4.MCNo.0000166650datedMarch21,2001forP3,049,188.94
toprovethatPasimioencashedthischeckandreceived
theproceedsofherP3,100,000loan,netofbankcharges;
5. Peso Loans Against Peso/FX Deposit Loan
Application/ApprovalFormdatedApril2,2001toprove
thatPasimioappliedforanotherloanonApril2,2001in
theamountofP1,700,000andthatthesamewassecured
byPasimiosownPNBMintAccountNo.6128100113429.
As in the first loan, Pasimio also voluntarily affixed her
signatureonthedocument;
6.PNandHoldoutonPeso/FXSavingsDeposit/Peso/FXTime
DepositandAssignmentofDepositSubstitutedatedApril
2,2001toprovethatPasimiossecondloanofP1,700,000
is supported by a PN which she voluntarily signed and
 executedonApril2,2001togetherwithherhusbandand
thatsherenewedthesaidloanondifferentdates;
7. Disclosure Statement of Loan/Credit Transaction dated
April2,2001toprovethatPasimiosloanforP1,700,000
wasalsosupportedwithaDisclosureStatement,acopyof
which she acknowledged to have received prior to the
consummation of the credit transaction, where she
voluntarilyagreedtothetermsandconditionsofherloan
bysigningthesaidstatement;
80
80 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
8.MCNo.0000166682datedApril2,2001intheamountof
P1,672,797.50toprovethatPasimioencashedthischeck
and received the proceeds of her P1,700,000 loan, net of
bankcharges;
9. Peso Loans Against Peso/FX Deposit Loan
Application/Approval Form dated December 7, 200 to
provethatPasimioappliedforaUS$31,100loanwhichher
ownPNBFXCTDNo.6628100115637(US$20,393.78)and
CTD No. 6628100115716 (US$10,766.25) secured as
collateral. As in the first two loans, Pasimio also
voluntarilyaffixedhersignatureonthedocument;
10. PN and HoldOut on Peso/FX Savings Deposit/Peso/FX
TimeDepositandAssignmentofDepositSubstitutedated
December 7, 2001 to prove that Pasimios US$31,100
loanissupportedbyaPNnotewhichsheandherhusband
voluntarilysignedandexecutedonDecember7,2001and
thatsherenewedthesaidloanondifferentdates;
11. Disclosure Statement of Loan/Credit Transaction dated
December 7, 2001 to prove that Pasimios loan for
US$31,100 was also supported with a Disclosure
Statement, a copy of which she acknowledged to have
received prior to the consummation of the credit
transaction,whereshevoluntarilyagreedtothetermsand
conditionsofherloanbysigningthesaidstatement;
12. Miscellaneous Ticket dated December 7, 2001 in the
amountofUS$30,981.28toprovethatPasimioreceived
theproceedsofherUS$31,100loan,netofbankcharges;
13.BillsPaymentFormdatedJuly26,2004toprovethat
her failure to settle her peso/dollar loan obligations was
subsequentlysettledbyoffsettingtheavailablebalanceof
herdepositaccountsthatwereusedascollateralsagainst
theseloans,inaccordancewiththePNssheexecuted;
81
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015 81
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
14. Demand letter addressed to Pasimio dated July 5, 2004
signedbyNoelR.Millaresonbehalfofthebanktoprove
thatPNBdemandedpaymentofherloansintheaggregate
amount of P4,623,458.03 and US$5,277.34 which had
alreadybecomedueandpayable;
15. Pasimios Affidavit dated April 10, 2003 to prove
Pasimios execution of an affidavit lending US$31,100 to
PaoloSun;
16.PasimiosletterdatedFebruary25,2003toprovethat
thePasimioseffectedachangeintheirPNBMintAccount
Nos.depositedatPNBSucatfromtheoldaccountnumber
6128100113393tothenewaccountnumber6128100116464
(pertainingtothedepositofP3,100,000);andfromtheold
account number 6128100113429 to the new account
 number 6128100116488 (pertaining to the deposit of
P1,700,000);
17. PNB Mint Savings Account Passbook with Serial No.
046783 to prove that the deposit covered by this
passbook in the amount of P3,100,000 was used as
collateral for Pasimios P3,100,000 loan. As proof of this
fact, the passbook is stamped with the notation HOLD
OUTtoindicateawithdrawalrestrictiononthisaccount;
18.PNBMintSavingsAccountPassbookwithSerialNumber
046781 to prove that the deposit covered by this,
passbook in the amount of P1,700,000 was used as
collateral for Pasimios P1,700,000 loan. As proof of this
fact,thepassbookisstampedwiththenotationHOLD
OUTtoindicateawithdrawalrestrictiononthisaccount;
19.PortionofPNBMintPassbookstampedHoldOutto
provethatthesavingsaccountcoveredbythispassbookis
underaholdoutrestriction;
20. Pasimios Certificate of Time Deposit Ledger for PNBig
SavingsAccountNo.22254768387toprovethat
82
82 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
PasimioopenedanaccountwithPNBSucatonMarch21,
2001 under Account No. 22254768387 which was
constitutedascollateraloftheP3,100,000loan;
21.PNBigSavingsAccountfromOctober29,2003uptoMay
3,2004toprovethatPasimioopenedanaccountwith
PNBSucat under Account No. 2815254913 which
constitutedascollateralfortheP1,700,000loan;
22.TheCertificateofDepositLedgerfromJune4,2001toJuly
25, 2004 to prove that the amounts covered by this
deposit document were used as collateral for Pasimios
dollarloanofUS$31,100;
23.CTDdatedJune4,2001intheamountofUS$34,030.18
to prove that Pasimio was issued a Certificate of Time
Deposit for the amount of US$34,030.18 with an annual
interestrateof4.5%;
24.CTDdatedJuly27,2001intheamountofUS$20,187.10
to prove that Pasimio was issued a Certificate of Time
Deposit for the amount of US$20,187.10 with an annual
interestrateof4.125%;
25. CTD dated December 23, 2003 in the amount of
US$5,136.03 to prove that Pasimio had an existing
dollartimedepositwithPNBwhichsheusedascollateral
forthedollarholdoutloanthatshetookout.Thedollar
certificateisstampedwithanotationthatreadsHOLD
OUT;
26.StatementofAccount(SOA)toprovethatPNBSucat
issued aSOAfor Pasimios DollarHoldOut Loan, which
showedanoutstandingbalanceofUS$5,100.ThisSOAwas
usedasbasisfortheoffsettingofPasimiospastdueloan
obligationwithherPNBMintAccountascollateral;and
27.StatementofAccount(SOA)toprovethatPNBSucat
issued aSOAfor Pasimios DollarHoldOut Loan, which
showedanoutstandingbalanceofP4,321,781.06.
ThisSOAwasusedasbasisfortheoffsettingofPasimios
past due loan obligation with her PNB Mint Account as
collateral.8
RTCsDecision

OnOctober30,2009,theRTCrenderedjudgment 9infavorof
Pasimio,asplaintiff,disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the
Complaint dated May 16, 2005 with merit, and Defendant,
PhilippineNationalBankisorderedtopayplaintiff,LIGAYAM.
P[A]SIMIO[,] the amount of xxx (P3,100,000.00), xxx
(P1,222,000.00) and xxx (US$5,170), respectively, representing
her peso/dollar time deposit placements with said bank, with
legal interest on said amounts, and the amount of xxx
(P180,000.00)representingattorneysfees,andcosts.
SOORDERED.10
The disposition is predicated on the postulate that Pasimio
hadprovenbyconvincingevidencethatshedidnotobtainany
loanaccommodationfromPNB.Asacorollary,thetrialcourtheld
thattherewasnoevidence snowing thereleaseby PNBofthe
loanproceedstoPasimio.Pushingthepoint,theRTCstatedthat
the transaction documents were highly questionable for the
reasonsstatedinsomedetailinitsdecisiontobereproducedby
theCAinitsassaileddecision.
Therefrom,PNBappealedtotheCA,therecoursedocketedas
C.A.G.R.CVNo.94079.
_______________
8Id.,atpp.446452.
9Rollo,pp.104120.PennedbyJudgeBrigidoArtemonM.
LunaII.
10Id.,atp.120.
84
84 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
CAsDecision
In its assailed Decision dated January 23, 2013, the CA
affirmedthattheRTC,towit:
WHEREFORE,theinstantappealisDENIED.TheDecision
dated 30 October 2009 rendered by the [RTC], Branch 196,
ParaaqueCityinCivilCaseNo.050195isherebyAFFIRMED. 11
EvenasitfoundanddeclaredPNBsbankpersonnelgrossly
negligent and their transactions with Pasimio highly
unacceptable,12the appellate court held that no loan proceeds
were ever released to Pasimio, thus sustaining the RTC
appreciation of the evidence thus presented on the matter by
Pasimio.13TheCAwrote:
Hence,WeareonewiththeRTCwhenitruledthattherewas
no release of proceeds of bank loans to plaintiffappellee
[Pasimio],viz.:
No release of proceeds of purported bank loans to plaintiff.
Theevidenceathanddoesnotshowthatanyamountoftheloans,
iftherewereany,wereeverreleasedby[PNB]toplaintiff.
The[PNB]presentedamiscellaneousticketdatedDecember
7, 2001 for the discounted amount of xxx (US$30,981.28)
attendingthereleaseofsuchfundsoverthepurportedthirdloan
intheamountofxxx(US$31,100.00)extendedtoplaintiffandas
affectingherFXdollartimedeposits.Thisdocumentremainsto
be a simple ticket advice and [would] not amount to fact of
paymentofloanproceedsintheabsenceofanycogentandbetter
evidence
_______________
 11Id.,atp.23.
12Id.,atpp.1617.
13Id.,atp.15.
85
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
whichisavailabletothebank.Thereisnostatementofaccount
oracorrespondingcheckdocumentpresentedtocomplimentsuch
ticket advice to clearly show an amount was debited from the
account of the bank to ably pay off the amount of the loan
proceeds.Themiscellaneousticketstandingbyitselfisno[t]an
adequateproofoffactofpaymentofaloanxxx.
The [PNB] presented a document for Manager Check No.
166650 dated March 21, 2001 at a discounted amount of xxx
(P3,049,188.94)toprovethepossiblereleaseofproceedsofafirst
loan allegedly secured by plaintiff for the amount of xxx
(P3,100,000.00).Lookingoverthedorsalportionofthecheck,itis
highlyunnatural andirregularthattheverycheckinquestion
doesnothaveamachineprintedvalidationofthetransactionto
reflectthedebitentryoftheaccountfromwhichthereleaseof
funds might have been secured. With exception to the stamp
markingandafewsignaturesatthebackofthecheck,itbecomes
highly inconceivable for a bank teller to forget a machine
validation of a check, not unless the checks was not properly
clearedbutwasonlyreceivedbytheteller.Thecheckstanding
outasevidencedocsnotprofferthattheamountindicatedtherein
was properly released for the purpose, to only draw a farce
conclusionthatitwasproperlytransactedandfundswasindeed
releasedtoplaintiff.
The [PNB] presented a document for Manager Check No.
166682 dated April 2, 2001 in the discounted amount of xxx
(P1,679,797.50) to prove the alleged release of proceeds of a
second loan allegedly secured by plaintiff for the amount xxx
85
(P1,700,000.00).Lookingoverthedorsalportionofthecheck,the
machine validation entry by the teller reads of entry005 502
28102AP01PCOUT1,672,797.50
86
86 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
AN14021226incomparisonwiththefrontportionofthevery
check does not tally with the check no. 166682 neither the
checkingaccountfromwhichtheamountisdrawnatreference
number 002810222222 which makes it an invalid validation
entryandwillnotprovethefactthatdebitedamountsweremade
from the bank account number 002810222222 [to cover the
releasetoplaintiffofproceeds]ofthesecondloan.Therebeingno
explanationbytheverybankemployeespresentedbythebankon
thediscrepancyofthetellervalidationentrieswiththechecking
accountusedtopossiblepayoffthereleaseofloanproceeds,there
can be no indication that the loan was properly paid for to
plaintiff.
 Simply stated, there is really no loan ever released by
defendantbankinfavorofplaintifftoengagetheoperativeright
toholdoutonthedepositsofthelatter.14
On arelated matter, theCA found, ashighly irregular,the
PNBpersonnelsactofsecuringPasimiossignatureandconsent
tohavetheproceedsoftheUS$31,100loanrelenttoPaoloSun.
Itexpounded:
Second,itcanbegleanedfromthefactsofthecasethat[PNB]
wasabletoobtainthesignatureandassentofplaintiffappellee
inrelendingtheloanproceedstoacertainPaoloSun,inamanner
notinaccordancewiththeordinarycourseofbusinessofbanks.
Accordingtoplaintiffappellee,BankManagerGregoriowentto
herhouseforhertosignadocument,tellingherthatitwasthe
onlywayforplaintiffappelleetogethermoneybackbyrelending
hermoneydepositswith[PNB]toacertainPaoloSunwhomshe
doesnotknow.Plaintiffappelleealsocontendsthatshewasnot
awarethatthedocumentshesignedwasnotarized.
87
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
Forthatalone,theactionperformedbythebankmanagerin
the transactions is definitely exposed to a high incident of
negligence. It bears stressing that banks must exercise the
highestdegreeofdiligenceandbydoingthetransactionsoutside
thebankwithoutanyproperexplanationoftheconsequencesof
the document to be signed by plaintiffappellee asclient of the
bankisreprehensiblexxx.Thebankpersonnelmisrepresented
the true nature of the transaction which deprived plaintiff
appelleetoevaluatetheconsequencesofthetransactionofferedto
herbythebankpersonnelof[PNB].15
And agreeing with the RTC on what it viewed as the
questionable nature of the transactions PNB entered into with
Pasimio, as purportedly evidenced by a combination of related
circumstancesreflectingdocumentarytampering,theCAquoted
withapprovaltheensuingexcerptsfromtheRTCsdecision:
Thetransactiondocumentsarehighlyquestionable.Theloan
applicationformdatedMarch21,2001overthepurportedfirst
peso loan in the amount of xxx (P3,100,000.00) which was
verifiedwithanotarypubliconApril30,2001didnotutilize
anyresidencecertificateofplaintiffxxxwhichalsomissed
out for a residence certificate number in the promissory note
dated March 21, 2001,the same former document carried
boldertypewrittenentriesforthenamesofdepositorsbut
faintentriesfortheamountandthesecuritydepositaccount
whichonlyshowsthatsuchentriesweremadeondifferentdates
usingdifferenttypesetscompoundedbythecolumnsideforthe
verified balance of deposit and the recommendation of interest
wereleftunfilled.Whichcircumstancesbringinaquestion
87 onthevalidityandveracityoftheloandocumentswhenin
facttheentriesandthemissingitemsthereto[do]notspeakwell
ofafullyaccomplishedandperfectedloandocumentbetweenthe
parties.Sadtosay,thiscourt
88
88 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
cannotevenbelieve[PNBs]witness,EdnaPalomaresinstating
thatshecheckedtheentries[in]theloanapprovalformbelore
she placed her signature considering there are valuable and 16Id.,atpp.1920.
important entries that are left unfulfilled by a bank officer as
herself to even downgrade her line of credibility on the true
circumstancestotheexecutionofsuchdocument. 89
The same circumstances attend the loan documents that VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015 89
allegedly covered the second loan in the amount of xxx
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
(P1,700,000.00) and the third loan in the amount of xxx
pectedofofficialsandemployeesofthebankisfargreaterthan
(US$31,100.00), and this court need not discuss further to
those of ordinary officers and employees in the other business
emphasize the line of anomalous circumstances attending the
firms.
executionandexistenceofsuchdocuments.16(emphasisadded)
Unquestionably, [PNB] xxx had the direct obligation to

supervise very closely the employees handling its depositors
The CA explained that even if both parties may have been
accounts,andshouldalwaysbemindfulofthefiduciarynatureof
negligentintheconductoftheirrespectiveaffairs,PNBcannot
itsrelationshipwiththedepositors.Suchrelationshiprequiredit
evadeliabilityforitsshortcomings.Asstressedbytheappellate
and its employees to record accuratelyeverysingle transaction,
court, the banking industry is impressed with public interest.
and as promptly as possible, considering that the depositors
Accordingly,allbanksandtheirpersonnelareburdenedwitha
accounts should always reflect the amounts of money the
highlevelofresponsibilityandexpectedtobemorecarefulthan
depositorscoulddisposeofastheysawfitxxx.Ifitfellshortof
ordinary persons. The CA held that since PNB was grossly
that obligation, it should bear the responsibility for the
negligent,itshouldbeartheconsequences:
consequencestothedepositorxxx.
Third,althoughitmaybearguedthatbothpartiesseemedto
Inthiscase,[PNBs]personnelwereinviolationoftheirduties
havebeennegligentintheirownaffairs,[PNB]cannotputallthe
andresponsibilitiesasitsemployees.Theyhavecommittedgross
blametocoveritsnegligenceonplaintiffappellee.Thedegreeof
negligenceindealingwiththeirbanktransactionswhichconnotes
care is more paramount and expected with that of banks than
wantofcareintheperformanceofonesduties.[PNBs]failure
thatofanordinaryperson.
to observe basic procedure constituted serial negligence. The
Asthebankingindustryisimpressedwithpublicinterest,all
repealed failure to carefully observe theduties of its personnel
bankpersonnelareburdenedwithahighlevelofresponsibility
clearlyshowedutterwantofcare.Asgatheredfromtherecordsof
insofarascareanddiligenceinthecustodyandmanagementof
thecase,itwasshownthatthisisnotanisolatedtransactionas
funds are concerned. Banks handle transactions involving
otherclientsofthebankhavebeenlikewisevictimized.Witness
millionsofpesosandpropertiesxxx.Indeed,bytheverynature
VirginiaPollardhasstatedinhertestimonybeforetheRTCthat
of their work, the degree of responsibility, care and
atonepoint,shetoo,wasavictimofirregularbanktransactions
trustworthinessex
of the same branch of [PNB] as offered by its bank personnel.
_______________
Thus, it was [PNBs] action that defies the ordinary banking
transactions and between an ordinary person like plaintiff
appellee and a bank like [PNB], [PNB] carries more burden,
whichunfortunately,itfailedtoovercome.
Verily,fromtheforegoinginstances,(PNB]wasindeedgrossly
negligent in its transactions with plaintiffappellee. Even
assumingthatplaintiffappelleewasconcoctingherversionofthe
facts, We still find irregularities and inconsistencies that have
attributedtotheun
90
90 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
justifiedrefusaltoreturntheinvestmentplacementandtothe
commissionofnegligence.17
Finally, the CA would state the observation, citingCitytrust
Banking Corporation v. Cruz18andTypoco v. Commission on
Elections,19that the errors PNB sought reviewed relate to the
RTCsfactualfindingswhentheappellatecourtisnotatrierof
facts,necessarilyimplyingthatitisimproperfortheCAunder
thepremisestodowhatPNBseeks.TheCAexplainedthatthe
stateddoctrineregardingthefactualfindingsoftheRTCapplies
withinforceintheinstantcase.20
Issue
WhetherornottheCAerredinaffirmingtheRTCDecision
grantingPasimioscomplaintforasumofmoney.
TheCourtsRuling
The findings of Fact of the CA are subject to welldefined
exceptions,21amongwhicharewhensuchfindingsarenot
_______________
17Id.,atpp.2022.
18G.R.No.157049,August11,2010,628SCRA22.
19G.R.No.186359,March5,2010,614SCRA391.
20Rollo,p.23.
21Development Rank of the Philippines v. Traders Royal
Bank,G.R.No.171982,18August2010,628SCRA404,413414.
ThejurisdictionoftheCourtincasesbroughtbeforeitfromthe
appellatecourtislimitedtoreviewingerrorsoflawandfindings
offactoftheCAareconclusiveupontheCourtsinceitisnotthe
Courtsfunctiontoanalyzeandweightheevidencealloveragain.
Nevertheless, in several cases, the Court enumerated the
exceptionstotherulethatfactualfindingsoftheCAarebinding
on the Court: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when
thereisgraveabuseofdiscretion;(4)whenthejudgmentisbased
onamisapprehensionoffacts;(5)whenthefindingsoffactare
conflicting;(6)wheninmakingitsfindingstheCourt
91
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015 91
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
supported by substantial evidence, grounded on surmises or
conjecturesorarepatentlyarbitrary,bindingandconclusiveand
this Court will not review them on appeal. This case squarely
fallsundertheexceptionsofthegeneralrule.
Thepetitionisimpressedwithmerit.

TheCAhasthepower
toresolvefactualissues
Before proceeding to the main issue of this case, there is a
need to clarify the assailed decisions perplexing but flawed
pronouncementthattheCA,notbeingatrieroffacts,iswithout
competence to review the factual determination of the RTC.
Section9ofBatasPambansaBlg.(BP)129,otherwiseknownas
theJudiciaryReorganizationActof1980,categoricallystatesthat
the CA has,inter alia, the power to try cases, receive evidence
andperformanyandallactsnecessarytoresolvefactualissues
raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction,thus:
Sec.9.Jurisdiction.TheCourtofAppealsshallexercise:
xxxx
TheCourtofAppealsshallhavethepowertotrycasesand
conducthearings,receiveevidenceandperform
_______________
ofAppealswentbeyondtheissuesofthecase,oritsfindingsare
contrarytotheadmissionsofboththeappellantandtheappellee;
(7)whenthefindingsarecontrarytothatofthetrialcourt;(8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidenceonwhichtheyarebased;(9)whenthefactssetforthin
thepetitionaswellasinthepetitionersmainandreplybriefsare
notdisputedbytherespondent;(10)whenthefindingsoffactare
premisedonthesupposedabsenceofevidenceandcontradicted
by the evidence on record; or (11) when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which,ifproperlyconsidered,wouldjustifyadifferentconclusion.
92
92 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
anyandallactsnecessarytoresolvefactualissuesraisedincases
fallingwithinitsoriginalandappellatejurisdiction,includingthe
power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must becontinuous
andmustbecompletedwithinthree(3)monthsunlessextended
bytheChiefJustice.
To be sure, the cases22the CA cited to support its adverted
pronouncement are inapposite. In context, the issue involved
inCitytrustandTypocorelates to the nature and extent of this
Courts, and not the CAs, power to review factual findings of
lowercourtsandadministrativeagenciesinpetitionsforreview
and in originalcertiorariand prohibition cases.
Clearly,CitytrustandTypocohave been misread and
consequentlymisapplied.
Itisalsoworthytonotethattheappellatecourtsrelianceon
the factual findings of the trial court is hinged on the latters
firsthandopportunitytohearthewitnessesandtoobservetheir
demeanorduringthetrial.However,whensuchfindingsarenot
anchored on their credibility and their testimonies, but on the
assessment of documents that are available to appellate
magistrates and subject to their scrutiny, reliance on the trial
courtsfactualfindingsfindsnoapplication.23
The CAs regrettable cavalier treatment of PNBs appeal is
inconsistent with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and with the
usualcourseofjudicialproceedings.Beremindedthattheparties
in Rule 41 appeal proceedings may raise questions of fact or
mixedquestionsoffactandlaw.24Thus,ininsisting
_______________
22Citytrust Banking Corporation v. Cruz,supranote
18;Typocov.CommissiononElections,supranote19.
23Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and
RelationsoftheUnitedPresbyterianChurchintheUSA,G.R.No.
140472,June10,2002,383SCRA326,334.
24Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v.
CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.115104,October12,1998,297SCRA
602.
93
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
thatitisnotatrieroffactsandimplyingthatithadnochoicebut
to adopt the RTCs factual findings, the CA shirked from its
function as an appellate court to independently evaluate the
merits of this case. To accept the CAs aberrant stance is to
trivializeitsreviewfunction,but,perhapsworse,renderuseless
oneofthereasonsforitsinstitution.
Pasimiofailedtoproveherclaim
bypreponderanceofevidence
Itissettledthattheburdenofprooflieswiththepartywho
assertsarightandthequantumofevidencerequiredbylawin
civil cases is preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of
evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term greater weight of evidence or
greaterweightofcredibleevidence. 25Section1,Rule133ofthe
RulesofCourtprovides:
Section1.Preponderance of evidence, how determined.In
civilcases,thepartyhavingtheburdenofproofmustestablish
his caseby a preponderanceofevidence.Indeterminingwhere
thepreponderanceofevidenceorsuperiorweightofevidenceon
theissuesinvolvedlies,thecourtmayconsiderallthefactsand
circumstances of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
factstowhichtheyaretestifying,thenatureofthefactstowhich
theytestify,theprobabilityorimprobabilityoftheirtestimony,
their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibilitysofarasthesamemaylegitimatelyappearuponthe
trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses,
93 though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater
number.
_______________
25Ogawa v. Menigishi,G.R. No. 193089, July 9, 2012, 676
SCRA14,22.
94
94 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
Justassettledistherulethattheplaintiffincivilcasesmust
rely on strength of his or her own evidence and not upon the
weakness of that of the defendant. In the case at bench, this
meansthatonPasimioreststheburdenofproofandtheonusto
producetherequiredquantumofevidencetosupporthercause/s
ofaction.26
 With the view we take of the case, Pasimio has failed to
dischargethisburden.
TherecanbenoquibblingthatPasimiohad,duringthetime
material,openedandmaintaineddepositaccountswithPNB.For
thispurpose,shesubmittedtwopassbooksandonecertificateof
timedeposittoestablishherpesoanddollarplacementswiththe
bank.However,PNBalsosucceededinsubstantiatingitsdefense
forrefusingtoreleasePasimiosfundsbypresentingdocuments
showing that her accounts were, pursuant to holdout
arrangement,madecollateralsfortheloanssheobtainedfromthe
bank and were eventually used to pay her outstanding loan
obligations.Unfortunately,PasimiofailedtotrumpPNBsdefense
aftertheburdenofevidenceshiftedbacktoher.
Torecall,PNB,tobolsteritscase,presentedthesedocuments:
loanapplicationforms,PNsanddisclosurestatementstoprove
thatPasimioobtainedthedisputedbankloans;managerschecks
and a miscellaneous ticket to establish the release of the loan
proceedstoPasimio;passbooksandacertificateoftimedeposit
with the stamp HOLDOUT to indicate restrictions on the
withthrawalofPasimiosdeposit;abillspaymentformtoprove
that Pasimios deposits were made to pay for her outstanding
obligations in accordance with the provisions of Pasimios
promissorynotes;andasignedandnotarizedaffidavitrecounting
thatshelenttheproceedsofherdollarloantoPaoloSun.
_______________
26VitarichCorporationv.Losin,G.R.No.181560,November
15,2010,634SCRA671,680.
95
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
On the witness stand, PNBs witness Edna Palomares, the
banksPerProOfficer,categoricallytestifiedhavingpreparedand
processedallofPasimiosloandocuments,andwitnessedPasimio
and her husband signing the same. 27Palomares also testified
aboutPasimiosreceiptoftheproceedsofthesubjectloansand
identifiedthesignaturesappearingonthedorsalportionofthe
PNBmanagerschecksandmiscellaneousticketcoveringtheloan
processedasgenuinesignaturesofPasimio.28
Pasimio,ontheotherhand,deniedapplyingforanyloanwith
PNBandreceivinganyloanproceedsorauthorizingthebankto
useherdepositascollateral.Whileadmittingtosigningcertain
papers,sheprofessedunawarenessthatwhatshesignedwerein
factloandocumentsasnobodycameforwardtoexplainwhatthey
were,addingthatshewasconvincedtosignthemonlybecause
shewasmadetobelievebybankofficersthatthedocumentswere
relatedtoanewPNBhighyieldinginvestmentproduct.
Unfortunately,thecourtsaquochosetodisregardallofPNBs
documentaryevidenceandruledinfavorofPasimio.Thistousis
ablatantmistakeonthepartoftheRTCandtheCAbecauseall
thatPasimioput forwardagainstPNBsevidence, for themost
partdocumentary,wereunsubstantiateddenialsandbare,self
serving assertions. To borrow fromPecson v. Commission on
Elections,29citingAlmeidav.CourtofAppeals,30theuseofwrong
orirrelevantconsiderations,relianceonclearlyerroneousfactual
findingsorgivingtoomuchweighttoonefactorindecidingan
issue is sufficient to tainta decisionmakers action with grave
abuseofdiscretion.
As between Pasimios barefaced denials and Palomares
positiveassertions,thetrialcourtoughttohaveaccorded
_______________
95 27TSN,September9,2008,pp.1131.
 28TSN,March27,2007,pp.14,3031,1922and2325;TSN, A:Thatsright.
May22,2007,pp.3132,3940,and4344. Q:Whyisthisso,MadamWitness?
29G.R.No.182865,December24,2008,575SCRA634,649. A:BecauseItrustedthebank,Itrustedtheemployeesofthe
30G.R.No.159124,January17,2005,448SCRA681. bank having been a depositor for the past two (2)
decades.
_______________
96
96 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED 31Manalo v. RoldanConfesor, G.R. No. 102358, November
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio 19,1992,215SCRA808,821.
greater weight to Palomares testimony, especially considering 32TSN,March27,2007,pp.67,1819,2223;TSN,May22,
that Pasimio never put in issue the due execution and 2007,pp.28,30,38,and42.
authenticity of the loan documents. As between a positive and 33Id.,atpp.14,3031,1922and2325;id.,atpp.3132,39
categoricaltestimonywhichhasatruth,ononehand,andabare 40and4344.
denial,ontheother,theformerisgenerallyheldtoprevail. 31
It cannot be stressed enough that Pasimio unequivocally
admitted that the signatures appearing in the Loan 97
Application/ApprovalFormsdatedMarch21,2001,April2,2001 VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015 97
andDecember7,2001,32inallthreePromissoryNotes, 33andthe PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
DisclosureStatementdatedDecember7,2001werehersandher Q:Butyouknow,MadamWitness,theconsequencesofyour
husbands.Shealsowasawareoftheconsequencesofheractof actsinsigningproformadocuments?
signing.Hertestimoniesonthematterarequotedhereunder:
A:Well,Itrustedthosepeople.So...
Q: But you know the consequences of signing blank
Atty.Banzuela:
documents?
Q:Thankyou.MadamWitness,youtestifiedthatyousigned
A:Yes.34
thesedocumentswhichareblankinitsdetails,whatdo

youmeanbyblankindetails.
Pasimiohadtaggedasforgerieshersignaturesappearingin
A:Nothing.Blankasinitsaproformaformbutblank. theDisclosureStatementsofMarch21,2001andApril2,2001.
Q: Madam Witness, but you read what these documents She, however, never presented any competent proof to
were? successfully support hercontention. While testimoniesofhand
A:No,Ididnotread. writingexpertsarenotamusttoproveforgeries,Pasimiodidnot
Q:YouentrustedtoPNBthathugeamountofUS$31,100, submitanyevidencefortheRTCtoconsiderandreadilyconclude
P1,700,000 and US$3,100 without going through the thatthesignaturesintheseDisclosureStatementswereforged.
documentsthatyouweresigningwithPNB?
 Likewise, Pasimio also denied, having appeared before a
notarypublictosubscribeandsweartotheloandocuments,but
neversubstantiatedthisallegation.Itissettledthatanotarial
document, guaranteed by public attestation in accordance with
thelaw,mustbesustainedinfullforceandeffect,absentstrong,
complete,andconclusiveproofofitsfalsityornullityonaccount
ofsomeflawordefectprovidedbylaw.35
The RTC and the CA, for unexplained reason, ignored
PasimiosadmissionsinherApril10,2003Affidavitinwhichshe
stated that she relent the proceeds of the US$31,100 loan to
PaoloSun.Aportionofthisaffidavitreads:
2.I agreed to lend the amount of Dollars: ThirtyOne
ThousandOneHundredOnly($31,100.00)toPAOLOSUN,
payable on an agreed maturity date and at an agreed
interestrateoutofaLoanAgainstDepositHoldoutthatI
willsecurefromPNBusingmytimedepositsascollateral.
_______________
34TSN,May22,2007,pp.4849.
35Sierrav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.90270,July24,1992,
211SCRA785,793;citingChilianchinv.Coquinco,84Phil.714
(1949).
98
98 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
3.PAOLOSUNandIagreedthatshouldIlendhimthe
proceedsofmyLoanAgainstDepositHoldoutfromPNB,
he would pay all the bank charges and interest on such
PNBloan,whichheagreedtodosobyauthorizingPNBto
debithisdepositaccountforsuchamountequivalenttothe
charges/interestdueonmyloan.
4.PNBapprovedmyloanapplication,andso,afterIhave
lent the loan proceeds to PAOLO SUN, the latter has
dutifullyandpromptlypaidallbankchargesandinterest
undertheaforesaidarrangement.36
Again, Pasimio did not deny the due execution of this
affidavit.Rather,shelamelyinsistedshewasonlyforcedtosign
thisaffidavituponGregoriosrepresentationsthatthiswasthe
onlywaythatshewouldrecoverherinvestments.Pasimiodenied
knowingPaoloSunandhavingloanarrangementswithhim.She
would stick to her story that she signed the document under
duress,needing,asshedidatthattime,moneytosupportadying
spouse.GregorioalsoallegedlydivulgedthatsheneededPasimio
tosigntheAffidavitasshe(Gregorio)wasalreadybeingaudited
andinvestigatedbythePNBMainoffice.
As between Pasimios empty assertions about the above
affidavitanditscontentsandthecategoricalstatementsinthe
notarized affidavit detailing her arrangement with PNB and
PaoloSun,thechoiceastowhichismorecredibleshouldbeclear
andsimple. Infact, Pasimiooughtto havebeenestopped from
denyingthecontentsofthataffidavit.
Verily, Pasimios version of the case taxes credulity. By her
owntestimonialaccount,sheisaholderofaBSCommercedegree
and used to work as a personnel director of an advertising
agency.37It is, therefore, not believable that a person of her
educationalattainmentandstature,whoappearedtobeofgood
physicalandmentalhealth,wouldsimplyhandover
_______________
36Rollo,p.214.
37TSN,March27,2007,pp.45.

99
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
millionsof pesos, nomeanamountby ordinarystandards,to a
bank and then blindly sign documents involving her money
without exercising a modicum of care by verifying, or at least
takingacursorylookatwhatthesedocumentsmean.Andyet,
thecourtsaquochosetoclosetheireyestotheseabsurdities.
Lestitbeoverlooked,PasimioshusbandRenealsoaffixedhis
signature on the subject promissory notes and loan application
formstosignifyhisconsenttohiswifesfinancialdealings.There
is no allegation, let alone proof, that Rene did not likewise
understandwhathewassigningandgivinghisconsentto.These
loan documents have, on their face, the words Peso Loans
Against Peso/FX Deposit Loan Application/Approval Form,
Promissory Note and Holdout on Peso/FX Savings
Deposit/Peso/FX Time Deposit and Assignment of Deposit
Substitute, and Disclosure Statements of Loan/Credit
Transaction printed in big letters. Thus, it is reasonable to
assume that, atfirst glance, Pasimioand husbandRene would
havebeenputonnoticeofwhatthesedocumentswere.Whatthey
signedwereproformabankdocuments,printedinfullbutwith
blanks to be filled up with specific terms thereof such as loan
amount,interestrate,andsecurity,amongothers.Theywerenot,
infine,emptywhitesheetsofpaper.ItmaybethatPasimiowas
indeedmadetosigntheblankspacesoftheloandocuments.Be
thatasitmay,itiswellnighimpossiblethatshehadabsolutely
noideawhattheyactuallywere,shehavingtestifiedbeingaPNB
depositor for some twenty years. Indeed, the Court is hard
pressedtobelievethatshehasnotencounteredthesedocuments
before,justasitisalsohardtoimaginethatherhusbanddidnot
noticethetitlesofthesedocumentsandhadnocluewhatthey
were.
99 Pasimio would parlay the idea that she signed certain loan
documentsandtheApril10,2003affidavitunderduressorundue
influence. Like her other unsubstantiated assertions, her
allegationsofimproperinfluence,duressorfraudprac
100
100 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
tisedonherbybankofficersdeservescantconsideration.Undue
influenceisdescribedundertheCivilCode,thus:
Art.1337.There is undue influence when a person
takes improper advantage of his power over the will of
another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of
choice.Thefollowingcircumstancesshallbeconsidered:the
confidential,family,spiritualandotherrelationsbetween
theparties,orthefactthatthepersonallegedtohavebeen
undulyinfluencedwassufferingfrommenialweakness,or
wasignorantorinfinancialdistress.
Asregardsfraud,theCivilCodesays:
Art.1338.There is fraud when, through insidious
wordsormachinationsofoneofthecontractingparties,the
other is induced to enter into a contract which without
them,hewouldnothaveagreedto.
Art.1344.In order that fraud may make a contract
voidable, it should be serious and should not have been
employedbybothcontractingparties.
 The employment of fraud, duress, or undue influence is a
seriouscharge,andtobesustaineditmustbesupportedbyclear
and convincing proof; it cannot be presumed. 38There is no
allegation or evidence that Gregorio and Miranda influenced
Pasimiobyemployingmeansshecouldnotwellresist,andwhich
controlledhervolitionandinducedhertosigntheloandocuments
andtheApril10,2003Affidavit,whichotherwiseshewouldnot
haveexecuted.Also,therewasnoevidenceshowingthatGregorio
and Mirandas influence interfered with Pasimios exercise of
independentdiscretionnecessarytodeterminetheadvantageor
disadvantageofsigningthesedocuments.
_______________
38Sierrav.CourtofAppeals,supranote35.
101
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
Then,too,PasimiofailedtoprovethatGregorioandMiranda
defraudedher.Takingintoconsiderationthepersonalconditions
ofPasimio,thereisnoclearandconvincingevidenceestablishing
seriousfraudordeceit,insidiouswordsormachinationsonthe
partofPNBoritsofficers,sufficienttoimpressorleadherinto
error.39
ItisgermanetoobserveatthisjuncturethatPNBhas,inits
favor, certain presumptions which Pasimio failed to overturn.
Rule131,Sec.3oftheRulesofCourtspecifiesthatadisputable
presumptionissatisfactoryifuncontradictedandnotovercomeby
otherevidence.Corollarythereto,paragraphs(r)and(s)thereof
read:
SEC.3.Disputable presumptions.The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
becontradictedandovercomebyotherevidence:
xxxx
(r)Thattherewassufficientconsiderationforacontract;
(s)That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed
forasufficientconsideration.
andSec.24oftheNegotiableInstrumentsLawreads:
SEC.24.Presumption of consideration.Every
negotiableinstrumentisdeemedprimafacietohavebeen
issued for a valuable consideration; and every person
whosesignatureappearsthereontohavebecomeaparty
theretoforvalue.
Pasimio also failed to overcome the presumptions that a
persontakesordinarycareofhisconcerns,40thatprivate
101 _______________
39Id.
40RulesofCourt,Rule131,Sec.3,par.(d).
102
102 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
transactionshavebeenfairandregular, 41andthattheordinary
courseofbusinesshasbeenfollowed.42
Certainly, the trial court erred in saying that Pasimio had
provedbyconvincingevidencethatshehadnotsecuredanyloan
accommodations from the defendant bank xxx and, thus, is
entitledforthereturnofsaiddepositxxxandthat[t]hefactum
probansto sustain parties cause has been successfully hurdled
and undertaken by plaintiff, in contradistinction to defendants
mere denial of a transport obligation, the latter failing to
overcomethequantumofevidencepresentedbyplaintifftotilt
thescaleofjusticeinfavorofplaintiffherein. 43Intruth,other
than her selfserving statements, Pasimio had nothing else to
show against PNBs evidence. The greater weight of credible
evidenceastowhetherPasimiosecuredfromPNBloanscovered
bypromissorynoteswithholdoutprovisionsisdecidedlyinfavor
ofpetitionerbank.
Tobesure,theRTCdidnotexplainitsreasonsforcomingup
with these conclusions and did not even bother to discuss its
evaluation of the merits of Pasimios evidence. The Court also
notes that the trial court never even declared that, indeed,
Pasimio and her husband were fooled into signing the loan
documents and made to believe that the loan documents were
relatedtoahighyieldingPNBproduct.
Hence,itmaybesaidthatthetrialcourtviolatedinasense
the constitutional caveat enjoining courts from rendering a
decision without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
factsandthelawonwhichitisbased.TheRTChadfailedto commitment to repay it on the date and under the conditions
dischargeitsdutytoinformpartiestolitigationonhowthecase
wasdecided,withanexplanationofthefactualandlegalreasons
thatledtotheconclusionsofthecourt.
_______________
41Id.,Rule131,Sec.3,par.(p).
42Id.,Rule131,Sec.3,par.(q).
43Rollo,pp.119120.
103
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015 103
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
ThedismissalofPNBspeti
tionisbasedonmerespecu
lationsandsurmises
In denying Pasimios appeal, the CA adopted verbatim the
trialcourtsfindingsthattherewasnoevidenceprovingPasimios
receipt of the loan proceeds and that the loan documents were
highlyquestionable.Theappellatecourtalsoreasonedthatsince
PNBwasgrosslynegligentintransactingwithPasimio,thebank
shouldsuffertheconsequences.
In upholding the RTCs finding respecting Pasimios never
havingreceivedanyloanproceeds,theCAdoubtlessdisregarded
theruleholdingthatapromissorynoteisthebestevidenceofthe
transactionembodiedtherein;also,toprovetheexistenceofthe
loan,thereisnoneedtosubmitaseparatereceipttoprovethat
the borrower receivedthe loan proceeds. 44Indeed, a promissory
noterepresentsasolemnacknowledgmentofadebtandaformal
agreeduponbytheborrowerandthelender.Ashasbeenheld,a
personwhosignssuchaninstrumentisboundtohonoritasa
legitimateobligationdulyassumedbyhimthroughthesignature
heaffixestheretoasatokenofhisgoodfaith.Ifherenegesonhis
promisewithoutcause,heforfeitsthesympathyandassistanceof
thisCourtanddeservesinsteaditssharprepudiation.45
TheCourthasalsodeclaredthatameredenialofthereceipt
oftheloan,whichisstatedinaclearandunequivocalmannerin
a public instrument, is not sufficient to assail its validity. To
overthrowtherecitalsofsuchinstrument,convincingandmore
thanmerelypreponderantevidenceisnecessary.Acontraryrule
wouldthrowwideopendoorsto
_______________
44Ycongv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.153758,February22,
2006,483SCRA72,78.
45Sierrav.CourtofAppeals,supranote35atp.795.
104
104 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
fraud.46Following this doctrine, Pasimios notarized promissory
notes bearing her signature and that of her husband must be
upheld,absent,ashere,strong,complete,andconclusiveproofof
theirnullity.
Thepromissorynotes,bearingPasimiossignature,speakfor
themselves. To repeat, Pasimio has not questioned the
genuineness and due execution of the notes. By signing the
promissory notes, she is deemed to acknowledge receipt of the
correspondingloanproceeds.Withal,shecannotplausiblysetup
thedefensethatshedidnotapplyforanyloan,andreceivethe
valueofthenotesoranyconsiderationthereforinordertoescape
herliabilitiesunderthesepromissorynotes.47
But the foregoing is not all. PNB presented evidence that
strengthened its allegation on the existence of the loan. Here,
each promissory note was supported by a corresponding loan
application form and disclosure statement, all of which carried
Pasimiossignatures.Isolatedfromeachother,thesedocuments
might not prove the existence of the loan, but when taken
together,collectively,theyshowthatPasimiotookthenecessary
stepstocontractloansfromPNBandwasawareoftheirterms
andconditions.
Further, thisCourtdoesnot agree thatthe loandocuments
were highly questionable. The trial court arrived at this
conclusionuponobservingthattheMarch21,2001,April2,2001,
and December 7, 2001 loan application forms and promissory
notes did not bear Pasimios community tax certificate number
andbecauseitappearedthattheblanksforthespecifictermsof
theseloandocumentswerefilledupondifferentdatesconsidering
that some typewritten entries appeared to be bolder or darker
thantheothers.
Thesereasonsarespeciousastheyareflimsy.
_______________
46Id.,atp.793.
47SeeCov.AdmiralUnitedSavingsBank,G.R.No.154740,
April16,2008,551SCRA472.
105
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015 105
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
First,theauthenticityoftheseloandocumentsshouldnotbe
affectedmerelybecausetheirblankspacesappearedtohavebeen
filledup,ifthatbethecase,ondifferentdates,usingdifferent
typewriters.AsPNBaptlyputsit,thereisnothingsuspiciousor
inherentlywrongabout bank formsbeingfilled up ondifferent
dates since these are usually
pretyped,withtheblanksthereontobefilledupsubsequently,
dependingonthespecifictermsofthetransactionwithaclient,
andthereafterpresentedtothelatterforsigning.
 Second, the absence of Pasimios community tax certificate
numberin:saidloandocumentsneithervitiatesthetransaction
norinvalidatesthedocument.Ifatall,suchabsencerendersthe
notarizationoftheloandocumentsdefective.Underthenotarial
rules at that time,i.e., Sec. 163(a) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwiseknownastheLocalGovernmentCodeof1991,wherean
individual subject to the community tax acknowledges any
document before a notary public, it shall be the duty of the
administering officer to require such individual to exhibit the
communitytaxcertificate.Thedefectivenotarizationoftheloan
documents only means that these documents would not be
carryingtheevidentiaryweightconferreduponitwithrespectto
its due execution; that they should be treated as a private
document to be examined in appropriate cases under the
parameters of Sec. 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which
providesthatbeforeanyprivatedocumentofferedasauthenticis
receivedinevidence,itsdueexecutionandauthenticitymustbe
provedeither:(a)byanyonewhosawthedocumentexecutedor
written;or(b)byevidenceofthegenuinenessofthesignatureor
handwriting of the maker xxx. Settled is the rule that a
defective notarization will strip the document of its public
character and reduce it to a private instrument, and the
evidentiary standard of its validity shall be based on
preponderanceofevidence.48
_______________
48Heirs of Victorino Sarili v. Lagrosa,G.R. No. 193517,
January15,2014,713SCRA726,736737.
106
106 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
It must be stressed that the adverted defective notarization
shouldnothavebeenmadeanissueatallinthefirstplace,for
Pasimioalreadyadmittedexecutingthedocumentsinquestion,or
to put it in anotherway, shedid notdeny that the signatures
appearing thereon were hers and her husbands. Thus, the
requirementsofSec.20,Rule132oftheRulesofCourthavebeen
sufficientlymetandalldoubtsastotheirauthenticityanddue
executionshouldhavebeenputtorest.
More importantly, the records do not show that Pasimio
allegedtheregoingdefectsandpresentedanyproofforthetrial
courttoconsiderandruleon.
Furthermore, the Court does not find sufficient evidence to
supporttheCAsfindingthatPNBisguiltyofgrossnegligence
and,thus,mustsuffertheconsequencesofitstransactionswith
Pasimio. In this regard, the CA explained that PNB foiled to
exercisethehighestdegreeofdiligencerequiredofbanksbecause
allegedly, Gregorio was able to obtain Pasimios signature and
assent to relend the dollar loan proceeds to Paolo Sun in
amannernotinaccordancewiththeordinarycourseofbusiness
of banks.Also, the appellate court found PNB reprehensible
fordoing transactions outside the bank without any proper
explanation of the consequences of the document to be signed
by[Pasimio] and because thebank personnelmisrepresented the
truenatureofthetransaction.49
There is no sufficient evidence to support the foregoing. It
must be stressed that these were solely drawn from Pasimios
testimony that Gregorio went to her house for her to sign the
April10,2003Affidavitandthatthelattertoldherthattheonly
way she could get her money back was to relend her money
depositstoPaoloSun.OtherthanPasimiosstory,theCAhadno
otherevidencetobolsterthesefindings.
_______________
49Rollo,p.19.
107
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
Further, the CAs conclusions that PNBs personnel werein
violationoftheirdutiesandresponsibilitiesasitsemployees;that
theycommitted gross negligence in dealing with their bank
transactions;andthatthebankrepeatedlyfailedtoobservebasic
proceduresthus,wasguiltyofserialnegligence,arenotsupported
bysufficientevidence.
It was wrong for the CA to make the foregoing conclusions
merely because another bank client, Virginia Pollard (Pollard),
testifiedtobeingavictimofirregularbanktransactionsofPNB
Sucat. Even if Pollard were telling the truth, her testimony
shouldnothavebeenconsideredproofthatwhatsheunderwent
iswhatactuallytranspiredbetweenPasimioandPNB.Resinter
alios acta.Acts and declarations of persons strangers to a suit
should,asarule,beirrelevantasevidence.Pollardstransaction
withPNBisentirelydifferentandtotallyunrelatedtoPasimios
dealingswiththebank.
WhatmaybetrueinthecaseofPollardmaynotholdtruefor
Pasimio.Itwasquiteerroneousfortheappellatecourttodeclare
PNBgrosslynegligentinitstransactionswithPasimiowhenthe
only evidence it had discussed on the matter was Pollards
testimony.ItmaybetruethatthePNBwasgrosslynegligentin
dealingwithPollard,butthisdoesnotautomaticallymeanthat
PNBwasgrosslynegligenttowardPasimioaswell.Hence,theCA
hadnobasisinsayingthat[e]venassumingthat[Pasimio]was
concoctingherversionofthefacts,[it]stillfind[s]irregularities
andinconsistenciesthathaveattributedtotheunjustifiedrefusal
to return the investment placement and to the commission of
negligence.
Much is attempted to be made by theMemorandum on
107 IrregularLendingOperationonLoansv.DepositHoldOut(Sucat
Branch)dated February 18, 2003. The memorandum does not
pertain to Pasimio or her accounts and transactions with the
bank, albeit it discusses Garcia and Mirandas sham dealings
with other bank clients. Hence, the memorandum is really not
determinativeofthecriticalquestionofwhetheror
108
108 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
notPasimiosoughtandeventuallysecuredloanaccommodations
fromPNB.
Here,theRTCandtheCAfocusedonfindingtrivialflawsand
weaknessesinPNBsevidenceandtotallydisregardedthebanks
mosttellingproof,foremostofwhicharethenotarizednotes.Had
the courtsa quolooked at and considered the totality of the
banksevidence,thenitwouldhaverealizedhowpreposterousthe
storythatPasimiospunwas,astoryfeaturing,atbottom,awell
educated, accomplished woman signing several pieces of bank
documentsinvolvingmillionsofpesos,withoutknowing,nayeven
reading,whatsheissigning.
Finally,itiswelltoconsiderthisrule:thatwhenthetermsof
anagreementhavebeenreducedtowriting,itistobeconsidered
as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be,
betweenthepartiesandtheirsuccessorsininterest,noevidence
of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the
writing.50
Under this rule, parol evidence or oral evidence cannot be
giventocontradict,changeorvaryawrittendocument,exceptifa
partypresentsevidencetomodify,explain,oraddtothetermsof
a written agreement and puts in issue in his pleadings: (a) an
intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written
agreement;(b)thefailureofthewrittenagreementtoexpressthe
trueintentandagreementoftheparties;(c)thevalidityofthe
writtenagreement;and(d)theexistenceofothertermsagreedto
bythepartiesortheirsuccessorsininterestaftertheexecutionof
thewrittenagreement.51
Suchevidence,however,mustbeclearandconvincingandof
suchsufficientcredibilityastooverturnthewrittenagree
_______________
50NortonResourcesandDevelopmentCorporationv.AllAsia
Bank Corporation,G.R. No. 162523, November 25, 2009, 605
SCRA370,380.
51RulesofCourt,Rule130,Sec.9.
109
VOL.769,SEPTEMBER2,2015 109
PhilippineNationalBankvs.Pasimio
ment.52SincenoevidenceofsuchnatureisbeforetheCourt,the
documentsembodyingtheloanagreementofthepartiesshouldbe
upheld.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
isGRANTED.The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 23, 2013 in C.A.G.R. CV No. 94079
isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. Respondent Ligaya M.
Pasimios complaint in Civil Case No. CV050195 before the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 196
isDISMISSEDforlackofmerit.
Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Peralta,Villarama,Jr.,Perez**andJardeleza,JJ.,concur.
Petitiongranted,judgmentreversedandsetaside.
Notes.UndertheParolEvidenceRule,whenthetermsofan
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, as
betweenthepartiesandtheirsuccessorsininterest,noevidence
ofsuchtermsotherthanthecontentsofthewrittenagreement.
(DuvazCorporationvs.ExportandIndustryBank,523SCRA405
[2007])
Adisputablepresumptionissatisfactoryifuncontradictedand
not overcome by other evidence. (Siain Enterprises, Inc. vs.
CupertinoRealtyCorp.,590SCRA435[2009])
o0o
_______________
52Sierrav.CourtofAppeals,supranote35atp.790.
** Designated acting member per Special Order No. 2084
datedJune29,2015.
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
692 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
 HeirsofLourdesSaezSabanpanvs.Comorposa
G.R.No.152807.August12,2003.*
HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN: BERNARDO S.
SABANPAN, RENE S. SABANPAN, DANILO S. SABANPAN
andTHELMAS.CHU;HEIRSOFADOLFOSAEZ:MA.LUISA
SAEZ TAPIZ, MA. VICTORIA SAEZ LAPITAN, MA. BELEN
SAEZandEMMANUELSAEZ;andHEIRSOFCRISTINASAEZ
GUTIERREZ: ROY SAEZ GUTIERREZ and LUIS SAEZ, JR.,
petitioners,vs.ALBERTO C. COMORPOSA, HERDIN C.
COMORPOSA, OFELIA C. ARIEGO,1REMEDIOS
COMORPOSA, VIRGILIO A. LARIEGO,2BELINDA M.
COMORPOSAandISABELITAH.COMORPOSA,respondents.
Public Land Act;Jurisdiction;Homestead Patent;Courts
have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling
within the powers of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB).
UnderthePublicLandAct,themanagementandthedisposition
ofpubliclandisundertheprimarycontrolofthedirectoroflands
(now the director of the Lands Management Bureau or LMB),
subjecttoreviewbytheDENRsecretary.Asarule,then,courts
have no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters properly falling
withinthepowersoftheLMB.ThepowersgiventotheLMBand onsummaryprocedurecasesinwhichnofullblowntrialisheld.
the DENR to alienate and dispose of public land does not,
however, divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory
actions instituted by occupants or applicants to protect their
respectivepossessionsandoccupations.Thepowertodetermine
whohasactualphysicalpossessionoroccupationofpublicland
andwhohasthebetterrightofpossessionoveritremainswith
thecourts.ButoncetheDENRhasdecided,particularlythrough
thegrantofahomesteadpatentandtheissuanceofacertificate
oftitle,itsdecisiononthesepointswillnormallyprevail.
Evidence;Documentary Evidence;Facsimiles;Pleadings
filedviafaxmachinesarenotconsideredoriginalsandareatbest
exactcopies.Pleadingsfiledviafaxmachinesarenotconsidered
originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not
admissibleinevidence,asthereisnowayofdeterminingwhether
theyaregenuineorauthentic.
Same;Offer of Evidence;Exception;Neither the rules of
procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of
evidence that has not been formally offered during the trial.
Neithertherulesofprocedurenorjurisprudencewouldsanction
theadmissionofevidencethathasnotbeen
_______________
*
THIRDDIVISION.
1
AlsospelledAriegainthepleadings.
2
AlsospelledLariegainthepleadings.
693
VOL.408,AUGUST12,2003 693
HeirsofLourdesSaezSabanpanvs.Comorposa
formallyofferedduringthetrial.Butthisevidentiaryruleis
applicableonlytoordinarytrials,nottocasescoveredbytherule
Same;Admissibility;Probative Value;Distinction;The
admissibilityofevidenceshouldnotbeconfusedwithitsprobative
value.Theadmissibilityofevidenceshouldnotbeconfusedwith
its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of
whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all,
while probative value refers to the question of whether the
admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of
evidencemaybeadmissible,butitsevidentiaryweightdepends
onjudicialevaluationwithintheguidelinesprovidedbytherules
ofevidence.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
CariagaLawOfficesforpetitioners.
WilliamG.Carpenteroforrespondents.
PANGANIBAN,J.:
The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its
probativevalue.Justbecauseapieceofevidenceisadmitteddoes
notipsofactomeanthatitconclusivelyprovesthefactindispute.
TheCase
BeforeusisaPetitionforReview 3underRule45oftheRulesof
Court,seekingtosetasidetheAugust7,2001Decisionandthe
February27,2002ResolutionoftheCourtofAppeals4(CA)inCA
GRSPNo.60645.ThedispositiveportionoftheassailedDecision
readsasfollows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby
AFFIRMStheDecisiondated22June2000renderedbyBranch
18 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur,
REVERSINGandSETTING
_______________
3
Rollo,pp.1137.
4
Eighth Division. Written by Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona
and concurred in by Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria (Division
chairman)andEloyR.Bello,Jr.(member).
694
694 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
HeirsofLourdesSaezSabanpanvs.Comorposa
ASIDEthe Decision ofthe Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz,
DavaodelSu[r].5
The assailed Resolution6denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
TheFacts
The CA summarized the factual antecedents of the case as
follows:
A[C]omplaintforunlawfuldetainerwithdamageswasfiledby
[petitioners]against[respondents]beforetheSantaCruz,Davao
delSurMunicipalTrialCourt.
The[C]omplaintallegedthatMarcosSaezwasthelawfuland
actualpossessorofLotNo.845,Land275locatedatDarong,Sta.
Cruz,DavaodelSurwithanareaof1.2hectares.In1960,hedied
leavingallhisheirs,hischildrenandgrandchildren.
In1965,FranciscoComorposawhowasworkinginthelandof
Oboza was terminated from his job. The termination of his
employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being a
close family friend of [Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa
approached the late Marcos Saezs son, [Adolfo] Saez, the
husbandofGloriaLeanoSaez,abouthisproblem.Outofpityand
for humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed Francisco
ComorposatooccupythelandofMarcosSaez.Hence,hisnipahut
wascarriedbyhisneighborsandtransferredtoaportionofthe
landsubjectmatterofthiscase.Suchtransferwaswitnessedby
several people, among them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza.
FranciscoComorposaoccupiedaportionofMarcosSaezproperty
withoutpayinganyrental.
Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was
succeededinhispossessionbytherespondentswholikewisedid
not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through
petitionerstolerance.
On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the
respondents to vacate the premises but the latter refused to
vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the legitimate
claimantsandtheactualandlawfulpossessor[s]ofthepremises.
A[C]omplaintwasfiledwiththebarangayofficeofSta.Cruz[,]
Davao del Sur, but the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement.Thus,thecorrespondingCertificatetoFileActionwas
issuedbythesaidbarangayandanactionforunlawfuldetainer
wasfiledbypetitionersagainstrespondents.
_______________
5
AssailedDecision,p.6;Rollo,p.49.
6
Rollo,p.52.
695
VOL.408,AUGUST12,2003
HeirsofLourdesSaezSabanpanvs.Comorposa
Respondents,intheirAnswer,deniedthematerialallegationsof
the[C]omplaintandallegedthattheyenteredandoccupiedthe
premisesintheirownrightastrue,validandlawfulclaimants,
possessorsandownersofthesaidlotwaybackin1960andupto
the present time; that they have acquired just and valid
ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or
extraordinaryprescription,andthattheRegionalDirectorofthe
DENR,RegionXIhasalreadyupheldtheirpossessionoverthe
land in question when it ruled that they [were] the rightful
claimants and possessors and [were], therefore, entitled to the
issuanceofatitle.
The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur
renderedjudgmentinfavorofpetitionersbuttheRegionalTrial
CourtofDigos,DavaodelSur,onappeal,reversedandsetaside
thesaiddecision.xxx7
RulingoftheCourtofAppeals
Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA upheld the
rightofrespondentsasclaimantsandpossessors.Theappellate
courtheldthatalthoughnotyetfinaltheOrderissuedbythe
regionalexecutivedirectoroftheDepartmentofEnvironmentand
Natural Resources (DENR) remained in full force and effect,
unless declared null and void. The CA added that the
CertificationissuedbytheDENRscommunityenvironmentand
natural resources (CENR) officer was proof that when the
cadastralsurveywasconducted,thelandwasstillalienableand
wasnotyetallocatedtoanyperson.
According to the CA, respondents had the better right to
possess alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
becausetheyhavesufficientlyproventheiractual,physical,open,
notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession
thereof since 1960. The appellate court deemed as selfserving,
695 andthereforeincredible,theAffidavitsexecutedbyGloriaLeano
Saez,NoelObozaandPaulinaParan.
Hence,thisPetition.8
_______________
7
AssailedDecision,pp.23;Rollo,pp.4546.
8
ThiscasewasdeemedsubmittedfordecisiononJanuary15,
2003, upon the Courts receipt of respondents Memorandum,
signed by Atty. William G. Carpentero. Petitioners
Memorandum, filed on January 10, 2003, was signed by Atty.
OswaldoA.Macadangdang.
696
696 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
HeirsofLourdesSaezSabanpanvs.Comorposa
TheIssue
IntheirMemorandum,petitionersraisethefollowingissuesfor
theCourtsconsideration:
I
DidtheCourtofAppealsgravelyabuseitsdiscretionand[err]in
sustainingtherulingoftheRegionalTrialCourtgivingcredence
totheOrderdated2April1998issuedbytheregionalexecutive
director?
II
DidtheCourtofAppealsgravelyabuseitsdiscretionanderr
insustainingtheRegionalTrialCourtsrulinggivingweightto
theCENROfficersCertification,whichonlybearsthefacsimileof
theallegedsignatureofacertainJoseF.Tagordaand,[worse],it
isanewmatterraisedforthefirsttimeonappeal?
III
DidtheCourtofAppealsgravelyabuseitsdiscretionanderr
in holding that the land subject matter of this case has been
acquiredbymeansofadversepossessionandprescription?
IV
DidtheCourtofAppealsgravelyabuseitsdiscretion,anderr
in declaring that, neither is there error on the part of the
Regional Trial Court, when it did not give importance to the
affidavitsbyGloriaLeanoSaez,Noel[Oboza],andPaulinaParan
forallegedlybeingselfserving?9
Tofacilitatethediscussion,thefourthandthethirdissuesshall
bediscussedinreversesequence.
TheCourtsRuling
ThePetitionhasnomerit.
_______________
Petitioners Memorandum, p. 8; Rollo, p. 283. Original in
9
uppercase.
697
VOL.408,AUGUST12,2003 697
HeirsofLourdesSaezSabanpanvs.Comorposa
First Issue:
TheDENROrderofApril2,1998
PetitionersclaimthattherelianceoftheCAupon theApril2,
1998 Order issued by the regional director of the DENR was
erroneous.ThereasonwasthattheOrder,whichhadupheldthe
claimofrespondents,wassupposedlynotyetfinalandexecutory.
AnotherOrderdatedAugust23,1999, 10issuedlaterbytheDENR
regionaldirector,allegedlyheldinabeyancetheeffectivityofthe
earlierone.
Under the Public Land Act,11the management and the
disposition of public land is under the primary control of the
director of lands12(now the director of the Lands Management
BureauorLMB),13subjecttoreviewbytheDENRsecretary. 14As
arule,then,courtshavenojurisdictiontointrudeuponmatters
properlyfallingwithinthepowersoftheLMB.
ThepowersgiventotheLMBandtheDENRtoalienateand
disposeofpubliclanddoesnot,however,divestregularcourtsof
jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or
applicants to protect their respective possessions and
occupations.15The power to determine who has actual physical
possessionor occupationofpubliclandandwho hasthebetter
rightofpossessionoveritremainswiththecourts. 16Butoncethe
DENRhasdecided,particularlythroughthegrantofahomestead
patentand
_______________
10
AnnexI;Rollo,pp.9192.
 11
CommonwealthAct141asamended. new matter being raised by respondents for the first time on
12
4ofCA141asamended. appeal.
13
The LMB absorbed the functions of the Bureau of Lands, Wearenotpersuaded.
which was abolished by Executive Order No. 131, except those InGarvida,theCourtheld:
linefunctionsthatweretransmittedtotheregionalfieldoffices. A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the
14
3ofCA141asamended. transmissionandreproductionofprintedandgraphicmatterby
15
Omandamv.CourtofAppeals,349SCRA483,January18, scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
2001;Solisv.IntermediateAppellateCourt,198SCRA267,June representingtheshadeortoneofeachareabyaspecifiedamount
19,1991;Rallonv.Ruiz,Jr.,138Phil.347;28SCRA331,May26, ofelectriccurrent.xxx19
1969;Molina v. Bacud,126 Phil. 166;19 SCRA 956, April 27, Pleadingsfiledviafaxmachinesarenotconsideredoriginals
andareatbestexactcopies.Assuch,theyarenotadmissible
1967;Bohayang v. Maceren,96 Phil. 390, December 29,
inevidence,asthereisnowayofdeterminingwhethertheyare
1954;Pitarguev.Sorilla,92Phil.5,September17,1952. genuineorauthentic.20
16
Solisv.IntermediateAppellateCourt,supra,citingNational The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for
Development Company v. Hervilla,151 SCRA 520, June 30, bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR Officer Jose F.
1987;Espejov.Malate,205Phil.216;120SCRA269,January27, Tagorda.Thefacsimilereferredtoisnotthesameasthatwhich
1983. is alluded to inGarvida.The one mentioned here refers to a
698 facsimilesignature,whichisdefinedasasignatureproducedby
698 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED mechanical
HeirsofLourdesSaezSabanpanvs.Comorposa
theissuanceofacertificateoftitle,itsdecisiononthesepoints _______________
willnormallyprevail.17
Therefore, while theissue as to who among the parties are
17
Omandamv.CourtofAppeals,supra.
entitledtoapieceofpubliclandremainspendingwiththeDENR,
18
338Phil.484;271SCRA767,April18,1997.
thequestionofrecoveryofpossessionofthedisputedpropertyisa
19
Id., p. 496, per Puno,J., citing WebstersThird New
matterthatmaybeaddressedtothecourts. InternationalDictionary(1976),p.813.
Second Issue: 20
Ibid.
CENROfficersCertification 699
PetitionerscontendthattheCENRCertificationdatedJuly22, VOL.408,AUGUST12,2003 699
1997 is a sham document, because the signature of the CENR HeirsofLourdesSaezSabanpanvs.Comorposa
officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they meansbutrecognizedasvalidinbanking,financial,andbusiness
citeGarvidav.Sales,Jr.18andarguethattheCertificationisa transactions.21
 Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the
Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has
acknowledgedanduseditasreferenceinhisOrderdatedApril2,
1998:
x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a CERTIFICATION
dated22July1997,certifiedamongothers,that:xxxperrecords
availableinhisOffice,xxxthecontrovertedlotxxxwasnot Court,176SCRA394,August11,1989.
allocatedtoanypersonxxx.22
If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the
regionaldirectorwouldnothaveuseditasreferenceinhisOrder.
Instead,hewouldhaveeitherverifieditordirectedtheCENR
officertotaketheappropriateaction,asthelatterwasunderthe
formersdirectcontrolandsupervision.
PetitionersclaimthattheCertificationwasraisedforthefirst
timeonappealisincorrect.Asearlyasthepretrialconferenceat
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had
alreadybeenmarkedasevidenceforrespondentsasstatedinthe
Pretrial Order.23The Certification was not formally offered,
however, because respondents had not been able to file their
positionpaper.
Neither the rules of procedure24nor jurisprudence25would
sanction the admission of evidence that has not been formally
offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable
only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on
summaryprocedurecasesinwhichnofullblowntrialisheld. 26
_______________
21
Facsimile signature,Websters Third New International
Dictionary(1976),p.813.
22
Rollo,p.104.
23
Id.,p.121.
24
34,Rule132oftheRulesofCourt.
25
Peoplev.Carino,165SCRA664,September26,1988;Veran
v.CourtofAppeals,157SCRA438,January29,1988.
26
RepublicofthePhilippinesv.CourtofAppeals,277SCRA
633, August 18, 1997;De los Reyes v. Intermediate Appellate
700
700 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
HeirsofLourdesSaezSabanpanvs.Comorposa
Third Issue:
AffidavitofPetitionersWitnesses
PetitionersassertthattheCAerredindisregardingtheAffidavits
oftheirwitnesses,insistingthattheRuleonSummaryProcedure
authorizestheuseofaffidavits.Theyalsoclaimthatthefailureof
respondents to file their position paper and counteraffidavits
beforetheMTCamountstoanadmissionbysilence.
Theadmissibilityofevidenceshouldnotbeconfusedwithits
probativevalue.Admissibilityreferstothequestionofwhether
certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while
probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted
evidence proves an issue.27Thus, a particular item of evidence
maybeadmissible,butitsevidentiaryweightdependsonjudicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence.28
Whileinsummaryproceedingsaffidavitsareadmissibleasthe
witnessesrespectivetestimonies,thefailureoftheadverseparty
toreplydoesnotipsofactorenderthefacts,setforththerein,duly
proven.Petitionersstillbeartheburdenofprovingtheircauseof
action,becausetheyaretheonesassertinganaffirmativerelief. 29
Fourth
DefenseofPrescription
Petitioners claim that the courta quoerred in upholding the
defenseofprescriptionprofferedbyrespondents.Itistheformers
contention that since the latters possession of the land was
merely being tolerated, there was no basis for the claim of
prescription.Wedisagree.
For the Court to uphold the contention of petitioners, they
have first to prove that the possession of respondents was by
mere tolerance. The only pieces of evidence submitted by the
formertosupporttheirclaimwereatechnicaldescriptionanda
vicinitymapdrawninaccordancewiththesurveydatedMay22,
1936.30BothofthesewerediscreditedbytheCENRCertification,
whichindicatedthatthecontestedlothadnotyetbeenallocated
toanypersonwhenthesurveywasconducted. 31Thetestimonyof
petitioners witnesses alone cannot prevail over respondents
continued and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot for a
considerablelengthoftime.
Furthermore,thisisanissueoffactthatcannot,asarule,be
raisedinapetitionforreviewunderRule45.32
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
DecisionAFFIRMED.Costsagainstpetitioners.
SOORDERED.
Puno(Chairman),SandovalGutierrez,CoronaandCarpi
oMorales,JJ.,concur.
Petitiondenied,assaileddecisionaffirmed.
Note.The burden of proof in land registration cases is
incumbentontheapplicantwhomustshowthatheisthereal
and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for.
(Turquesavs.Valera,322SCRA573[2000])
o0o
Issue: G.R.No.193531.December6,2011.*
ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES, petitioner,vs.PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION, represented by
ATTY.CARLOSR.BAUTISTA,JR.,respondent.
Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Motion for
Reconsideration;Amotionforreconsiderationmayeitherbefiled
bymailorpersonaldelivery;Movanthas15daysfromreceiptof
thedecisionwithinwhichtofileamotionforreconsiderationor
anappealtherefrom.Amotionforreconsiderationmayeitherbe
filed by mail or personal delivery. When a motion for
reconsiderationwassentbymail,thesameshallbedeemedfiled
onthedateshownbythepostmarkontheenvelopewhichshall
beattachedtotherecordsofthecase.Ontheotherhand,incase
of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date
stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant has 15
daysfromreceiptofthedecisionwithinwhichtofileamotionfor
reconsiderationoranappealtherefrom.
Same;Same;Same;Themodeusedbypetitionerinfilinghis
reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.Even
assumingarguendothat petitioner indeed submitted a letter
reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile
transmission,suchletterreconsiderationdidnottolltheperiodto
appeal.Themodeusedbypetitionerinfilinghisreconsideration
isnotsanctionedbytheUniformRulesonAdministrativeCases
intheCivilService.Aswestated
_______________
*ENBANC.
622
6 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
22
 Torresvs.PhilippinesAmusementandGamingCorporation
earlier,themotionforreconsiderationmaybefiledonlyin
twoways,eitherbymailorpersonaldelivery.
PleadingsandPractice;Evidence;ElectronicCommerceAct;
Afacsimileisnotagenuineandauthenticpleading;Itis,atbest,
anexactcopypreservingallthemarksofanoriginal.InGarvida
v. Sales, Jr., 271 SCRA 767 (1997), we found inadmissible in
evidencethefilingofpleadingsthroughfaxmachinesandruled
that: xxxxxx A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic
pleading.Itis,atbest,anexactcopypreservingallthemarksof
anoriginal.Withouttheoriginal,thereisnowayofdetermining
on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and
authenticandwasoriginallysignedbythepartyandhiscounsel.
Itmay,infact,beashampleading.
Same; Same; Same; A facsimile transmission is not
considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic
Commerce Act; The terms electronic data message and
electronicdocumentasdefinedundertheElectronicCommerce
Actof2000,donotincludeafacsimiletransmission.Afacsimile
transmissionisnotconsideredasanelectronicevidenceunderthe
ElectronicCommerceAct.InMCCIndustrialSalesCorporation
v.SsangyongCorporation,536SCRA408(2007),Wedetermined
thequestionofwhethertheoriginalfacsimiletransmissionsare
electronic data messagesor electronicdocuments withinthe
context of the Electronic Commerce Act, and We said: We,
therefore,concludethatthetermselectronicdatamessageand
electronicdocument,asdefinedundertheElectronicCommerce
Actof2000,donotincludeafacsimiletransmission.Accordingly,a
facsimile transmission cannot be considered aselectronic
evidence.Itisnotthefunctionalequivalentofanoriginalunder
the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible aselectronic
evidence.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
JacksonVisdaYabutforpetitioner.
Roderick R. Consolacion, Arnold Ferdinand C.
SalvosaandMarianitoV.Sagsagatforprivaterespondent.
623
VOL.661,DECEMBER6,2011 623
Torresvs.PhilippinesAmusementandGamingCorporation
PERALTA,J.:
PetitionerElleryMarchG.Torresseekstoannulandsetaside
theDecision1datedApril22,2010oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)in
CAG.R. SP No. 110302, which dismissed his petition seeking
reversal of the Resolutions dated June 23, 2008 2and July 28,
20093oftheCivilServiceCommission(CSC).Alsoassailedisthe
CAResolution4datedJuly30,2010denyingpetitionersmotionfor
reconsideration.
PetitionerwasaSlotMachineOperationsSupervisor(SMOS)
of respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR). On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of
paddingoftheCreditMeterReadings(CMR)oftheslotmachines
at PAGCORHyatt Manila, then Casino FilipinoHyatt (CF
Hyatt), which involved the slot machine and internal security
personnel of respondent PAGCOR, and in connivance with slot
machine customers, respondent PAGCORs Corporate
InvestigationUnit(CIU)allegedlyconductedaninvestigationto
verifytheveracityofsuchreport.TheCIUdiscoveredthescheme
ofCMRpaddingwhichwascommittedbyaddingzeroafterthe
firstdigitoftheactualCMRofaslotmachineoraddingadigit
beforethefirstdigitoftheactualCMR,e.g.,aslotmachinewith
anactualCMRofP5,000.00willbeissuedaCMRreceiptwiththe
amountofeitherP50,000.00orP35,000.00.5BasedontheCIUs
investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot machine jackpot
slipsissuedbyCFHyattforthemonthsofFebruaryandMarch
2007,theCIUidentifiedthemembersofthesyndicatewhowere
responsible for such CMR padding, which included herein
petitioner.6
_______________
1Penned by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with
Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Stephen C. Cruz,
concurring;Rollo,pp.3344.
2Penned by Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez
Mendoza;id.,atpp.6273.
3Id.,atpp.7583.
4Penned by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with
Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Stephen C. Cruz,
concurring;id.,atpp.129131.
5CARollo,p.84.
6Id.,atpp.8586.
624
624 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Torresvs.PhilippinesAmusementandGamingCorporation
On May 4, 2007, the CIU served petitioner with a
Memorandum of Charges7for dishonesty, serious misconduct,
fraud and violation of office rules and regulations which were
considered grave offenses where the penalty imposable is
dismissal.Thesummarydescriptionofthechargesstated:
Sometime between November 2006 and March 2007, you
facilitated and actively participated in the fraudulent scheme
withrespecttoirregularmanipulationofCreditMeterReading
(CMR) which, in turn, led to the misappropriation of money
earmarked for the slot machine jackpot at CF Hyatt Manila.
Theseanomaloustransactionswereconsummatedthroughyour
directparticipationandactivecooperationofyourcoemployees
and customers. With malice afterthought, you embezzled and
stole monies from PAGCOR, thereby resulting in substantial
lossestotheproprietaryinterestofPAGCOR.8
Onthesameday,anotherMemorandumofCharges 9signedby
Rogelio Y. Bangsil, Jr., Senior Branch Manager, CF Hyatt
Manila,wasissuedtopetitionerinforminghimofthechargeof
dishonesty(paddingofanomalousSMjackpotreceipts).Petitioner
wasthenrequiredtoexplaininwritingwithinseventytwo(72)
hours from receipt thereof why he should not besanctioned or
dismissed. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension
effectiveimmediatelyuntilfurtherorders.
On May 7, 2007, petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter
explanation/refutation10of the charges against him. He denied
anyinvolvementorparticipationinanyfraudulentmanipulation
oftheCMRorpaddingoftheslotmachinereceipts,andheasked
foraformalinvestigationoftheaccusationsagainsthim.
OnAugust4,2007,petitionerreceivedaletter 11datedAugust
2, 2007 from Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head of
PAGCORs
_______________
7Rollo,p.91.
8Id.
9Id.,atp.92.
10Id.,atpp.9394.
11Id.,atp.95.
625
VOL.661,DECEMBER6,2011 625
Torresvs.PhilippinesAmusementandGamingCorporation
HumanResourceandDevelopmentDepartment,dismissinghim
fromtheservice.Theletterreadsinpart,towit:
 PleasebeinformedthattheBoardofDirectors,initsmeeting _______________
on July 31, 2007, approved the recommendation of the 12Id.
AdjudicationCommitteetodismissyoufromtheserviceeffective 13Id.,atpp.8490.
uponapprovalduetothefollowingoffense: 626
Dishonesty,grossmisconduct,seriousviolationsofofficerules
626 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
andregulations,conductprejudicialtothebestinterestsofthe
Torresvs.PhilippinesAmusementandGamingCorporation
companyandlossoftrustandconfidence,committedasfollows:
and manner provided by the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Foractivelyanddirectlyparticipatinginaschemetodefraudthe
CasesintheCivilServiceLaw.
companyinconspiracywithcoemployeesandSMcustomersby
OnJune23,2008,theCSC,treatingpetitionerscomplaintas
padding slot machine Credit Meter Reading (CMR) receipts in
anappealfromthePAGCORsdecisiondismissingpetitionerfrom
favorofcoconspiratorcustomerswhohadsaid(sic)CMRreceipts
the service, issued Resolution No. 081204 denying petitioners
paid at the tellers booth on numerous occasions which caused
appeal.Thedispositiveportionofwhichreadsasfollows:
substantiallossestotheproprietaryinterestsofPAGCOR.12
WHEREFORE,theinstantappealofElleryMarchG.Torres
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a
isherebyDENIED.Accordingly,thedecisioncontainedinaletter
Complaint13againstPAGCORanditsChairmanEfraimGenuino
dated August 2, 2007 of Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head,
for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of backwages and other
Human Resource and Development Department (HRDD),
benefits.Thecomplaintallegedamongothers:(1)thathedenied
PAGCOR, finding him guilty of Dishonesty, Gross Misconduct,
all the charges against him; (2) that he did ask for a formal
Serious Violation of Office Rules and Regulations, Conduct
investigationoftheaccusationsagainsthimandforPAGCORto
PrejudicialtotheBestInterestoftheServiceandLossofTrust
produce evidence and proofs to substantiate the charges, but
andConfidenceandimposinguponhimthepenaltyofdismissal
respondentPAGCORdidnotcallforanyformaladministrative
fromtheservice,isherebyAFFIRMED.Thepenaltyofdismissal
hearing; (3) that he tried to persuade respondent PAGCOR to
carrieswithittheaccessorypenaltiesofforfeitureofretirement
reviewandreverseitsdecisioninaletterofreconsiderationdated
benefits,cancellationofeligibility,perpetualdisqualificationfrom
August13,2007addressedtotheChairman,themembersofthe
reemployment in the government service, and bar from taking
BoardofDirectorsandtheMeritSystemsProtectionBoard;and
futureCivilServiceExamination.14
(4) that no resolution was issued on his letter reconsideration,
Insoruling,theCSCfoundthattheissueforresolutionwas
thus, the filing of the complaint. Petitioner claimed that as a
whether petitioners appeal had already prescribed which the
result of his unlawful, unjustified and illegal
formeransweredinthepositive.TheCSCdidnotgivecreditto
termination/dismissal,hewascompelledtohiretheservicesofa
petitioners claim that he sent a facsimile transmission of his
counselinordertoprotecthisrights.
letter reconsideration within the period prescribed by the
Respondent PAGCOR filed its Comment wherein it alleged,
UniformRules onAdministrativeCasesintheCivilService.It
amongothers,thatpetitionerfailedtoperfectanappealwithin
found PAGCORs denial of having received petitioners letter
theperiod
morecredibleasitwassupportedbycertificationsissuedbyits
employees. It found that a verification of one of the telephone
numberswherepetitionerallegedlysenthisletterreconsideration
disclosed that such number did not belong to the PAGCORs
OfficeoftheBoardofDirectors;andthatpetitionershouldhave
mentioned about theallegedfacsimile transmission at the first
instance when he filed his complaint and not only when
respondent PAGCOR raised the issue of prescription in its
Comment.
PetitionersmotionforareconsiderationwasdeniedinCSC
ResolutionNo.091105datedJuly28,2009.
_______________
14Id.,atp.73.
627
VOL.661,DECEMBER6,2011
Torresvs.PhilippinesAmusementandGamingCorporation
PetitionerfiledwiththeCAapetitionforreviewunderRule
43oftheRulesofCourtseekingtosetasidethetwinresolutions
issuedbytheCSC.
On April 22, 2010, the CA issued its assailed decision
dismissingthepetitionforlackofmerit.
Indismissingthepetition,theCAfoundthatpetitionerfailed
to adduce clear and convincing evidence that he had filed a
motion for reconsideration. It found insufficient to merit
consideration petitioners claim that he had sent through a
facsimiletransmissionaletter/reconsiderationdatedAugust13,
2007addressedtoPAGCORsChairman,membersoftheBoardof
Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board; that
assumingarguendothataletterreconsiderationwasindeedsent
throughafacsimiletransmission,suchfacsimiletransmissionis
inadmissible as electronic evidence under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000; and that a review of the CSC assailed
resolutionrevealedthatthetelephonenumberswherepetitioner
claimedtobetherecipientofthefaxeddocumentsentwasnot
that of PAGCORs Office of Board of Directors. The CA found
baseless and conjectural petitioners claim that PAGCOR can
easily deny having receivedtheletter by giving orderstotheir
employeestoexecuteanaffidavitofdenialunderpainandthreat
ofadministrativesanctionorterminationfromservice.
The CA then concluded that PAGCORs decision which was
containedinaletterdatedAugust4,2007dismissingpetitioner
fromtheservicehadalreadyattainedfinalitysincetherewasno
motionforreconsiderationfiledbypetitionerinthemannerand
withintheperiodprovidedforundertheRevisedUniformRules
ontheAdministrativeCasesintheCivilService.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a
627 ResolutiondatedJuly30,2010.
Hence, this petition where petitioner states the errors
committedbytheCAinthiswise:
Thefirstissuethatshouldberesolvedis:
1.Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it
affirmedthedismissalofpetitionerbasedmerelyontechnicality
withoutconsideringthe
628
628 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Torresvs.PhilippinesAmusementandGamingCorporation
allegations on summary and arbitrary dismissal based on
fabricatedandunfoundedaccusations.
Nexttoberaisedweretheissuespropoundedinpetitioners
Memorandumdated29January2010butwerenottackledupon
bytheCourtofAppeals,thus:
A.Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in
rulingthat therewas novalidletter/motionforreconsideration
submittedtoreconsiderpetitionersdismissalfromtheservice;
 B.Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in
giving more weight to PAGCORs denial of having received
petitionersletterofreconsideration;
C.WhetherornottheCivilServiceCommissionerredinnot
acting/resolving theExParteMotion to IssueSubpoenaDuces
Tecum;
D. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in
rulingthatpetitionersfailuretosendhisletterreconsideration
throughmailorbypersonalserviceassetforthintheRulesof
Court,heforfeitedhisrighttoappeal;and
E.Whether or not the Civil Service Commission erred in
favoring PAGCORs dismissal of petitioner from employment
basedonhearsay,imaginaryandnonexistentevidence. 15
The threshold issue for resolution is whether the CA erred
whenitaffirmedtheCSCsdismissaloftheappealforbeingfiled
beyondthereglementaryperiod.
Petitionercontendsthathefiledhisletterreconsiderationof
hisdismissal16onAugust13,2007,whichwaswithinthe15day
period for filing the same; and that he did so by means of a
facsimiletransmissionsenttothePAGCORsOfficeoftheBoard
of Directors. He claims that the sending of documents thru
electronicdatamessage,whichincludesfacsimile,issanctioned
under Republic Act No. 8792, the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000. Petitioner further contends that since his letter
reconsiderationwasnotacteduponbyPAGCOR,hethenfiledhis
complaintbeforetheCSC.
_______________
15Id.,atpp.1011.
16Id.,atpp.96100.
629
VOL.661,DECEMBER6,2011
Torresvs.PhilippinesAmusementandGamingCorporation
Wearenotpersuaded.
Sections37,38,39,and43oftheRevisedUniformRuleson
AdministrativeCasesintheCivilService,whichareapplicableto
thiscase,respectivelyprovide,towit:
Section37.Finality of Decisions.A decision rendered by
headsofagencieswherebyapenaltyofsuspensionfornotmore
thanthirtydaysorafineinanamountnotexceedingthirty(30)
dayssalaryisimposed,shallbefinalandexecutory.However,if
thepenaltyimposedissuspensionexceedingthirtydays,orfine
in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, the same shall be
finalandexecutoryafterthelapseofthereglementaryperiodfor
filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal and no such
pleadinghasbeenfiled.
Section38.Filingofmotionforreconsideration.Theparty
adversely affected by the decision may file a motion for
reconsiderationwiththediscipliningauthoritywhorenderedthe
samewithinfifteendaysfromreceiptthereof.
Section39.When deemed filed.A motion for
reconsideration sent by mail shall be deemed filed on the date
shownbythepostmarkontheenvelopewhichshallbeattached
totherecordsofthecaseandincaseofpersonaldelivery,thedate
stampedthereonbytheproperoffice.
Section43.Filing of Appeals.Decisions of heads of
departments,agencies,provinces,cities,municipalitiesandother
instrumentalitiesimposingapenaltyexceedingthirty(30)days
suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days
salary,maybeappealedtotheCommissionProperwithinaperiod
offifteen(15)daysfromreceiptthereof.
Clearly, a motion for reconsideration may either be filed by
mailorpersonaldelivery.Whenamotionforreconsiderationwas
629 sentbymail,thesameshallbedeemedfiledonthedateshownby
the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the
records of the case. On the other hand, in case of personal
delivery,themotionisdeemedfiledonthedatestampedthereon
bytheproperoffice.Andthemovanthas15daysfromreceiptof
thedecisionwithinwhichtofileamotionforreconsiderationor
anappealtherefrom.
Petitionerreceivedacopyoftheletter/noticeofdismissalon
August4,2007;thus,themotionforreconsiderationshouldhave
beensubmittedeitherbymailorbypersonaldeliveryonorbefore
August 19, 2007. However, recordsdo not show that petitioner
hadfiledhis
630
630 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Torresvs.PhilippinesAmusementandGamingCorporation
motionforreconsideration.Infact,theCSCfoundthatthenon
receiptofpetitioners letterreconsiderationwasdulysupported
bycertificationsissuedbyPAGCORemployees.
Even assumingarguendothat petitioner indeed submitted a
letter reconsideration which he claims was sent through a
facsimiletransmission,suchletterreconsiderationdidnottollthe
period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his
reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on
AdministrativeCasesintheCivilService.Aswestatedearlier,
the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways,
eitherbymailorpersonaldelivery.
InGarvidav.Sales,Jr.,17wefoundinadmissibleinevidence
thefilingofpleadingsthroughfaxmachinesandruledthat:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the
transmissionandreproductionofprintedandgraphicmatterby
scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
representingtheshadeortoneofeachareabyaspecifiedamount
of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over
regulartelephonelinesorviamicrowaverelayandisusedbythe
receivertoreproduceanimageoftheelementalareaintheproper
positionandthecorrectshade.Thereceiverisequippedwitha
stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper
referredtoasafacsimile.
xxxAfacsimileisnotagenuineandauthenticpleading.Itis,at
best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original.
Withouttheoriginal,thereisnowayofdeterminingonitsface
whetherthefacsimilepleadingisgenuineandauthenticandwas
originallysignedbythepartyandhiscounsel.Itmay,infact,bea
shampleading.xxx18
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an
electronicevidenceundertheElectronicCommerceAct.InMCC
Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation,19We
determined the question of whether the original facsimile
transmissions are electronic data messages or electronic
documentswithinthecontextoftheElectronicCommerceAct,
andWesaid:
_______________
17G.R.No.124893,April18,1997,271SCRA767.
18Id.,atp.779.(Citationsomitted.)
19G.R.No.170633,October17,2007,536SCRA408.
631
VOL.661,DECEMBER6,2011 631
Torresvs.PhilippinesAmusementandGamingCorporation
We, therefore, conclude thatthe terms electronic data
message and electronic document, as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not includeafacsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be
considered aselectronic evidence. It is not the functional
equivalentofanoriginalundertheBestEvidenceRuleandisnot
admissibleaselectronicevidence.(Italicsours.)20
 We,therefore,foundnoreversibleerrorcommittedbytheCA
when it affirmed the CSC in dismissing petitioners appeal.
PetitionerfiledwiththeCSCacomplaintagainstPAGCORand
itsChairmanforillegaldismissal,nonpaymentofbackwagesand
other benefits on September 14, 2007. The CSC treated the
complaint as an appeal from the PAGCORs dismissal of
petitioner.UnderSection43whichweearlierquoted,petitioner
had 15 days from receipt of the letter of dismissal to file his
appeal.However,atthetimepetitionerfiledhiscomplaintwith
the CSC, which was considered as petitioners appeal, 41 days
had already elapsed from the time he received his letter of
dismissalonAugust4,2007;hence,theCSCcorrectlyfoundthat
it has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since petitioners
dismissal had already attained finality. Petitioners dismissal
fromtheservicebecamefinalandexecutoryafterhefailedtofile
his motion for reconsideration or appeal in the manner and
withintheperiodprovidedforundertheRevisedUniformRules
onAdministrativeCasesintheCivilService.
InPea v. Government Service and Insurance System,21We
said:
Noteworthyisthattherighttoappealisneitheranatural
right nor a part of due process, except where it is granted by
statuteinwhichcaseitshouldbeexercisedinthemannerandin
accordancewiththeprovisionsoflaw.Inotherwords,appealisa
rightofstatutoryandnotofconstitutionalorigin.Theperfection
ofanappealinthemannerandwithintheperiodprescribedby
lawisnotonlymandatorybutalsojurisdictionalandthefailure
ofapartytoconformtotherulesregardingappealwillrenderthe
judgmentfinalandexecutoryand,hence,unappealable,foritis
more important that a case be settled than it be settled right.
Furthermore,itisaxiomaticthatfinal
_______________
20Id.,atp.455.
21G.R.No.159520,September19,2006,502SCRA383.
632
632 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Torresvs.PhilippinesAmusementandGamingCorporation
andexecutoryjudgmentscannolongerbeattackedbyanyofthe
partiesorbemodified,directlyorindirectly,evenbythehighest
courtoftheland.Justasthelosingpartyhastherighttofilean
appealwithintheprescribedperiod,soalsothewinningpartyhas
thecorrelativerighttoenjoythefinalityoftheresolutionofthe
case.22
WHEREFORE,the petitionisDENIED. The Decision dated
April 22, 2010 and the Resolution dated July 30, 2010 of the
CourtofAppealsareherebyAFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.
Corona (C.J.), Carpio, LeonardoDe Castro, Brion,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza,
Sereno,ReyesandPerlasBernabe,JJ.,concur.
Velasco,Jr.,J.,OnOfficialLeave.
Petitiondenied,judgmentandresolutionaffirmed.
Note.RepublicAct(R.A.)No.8792,otherwiseknownasthe
ElectronicCommerceActof2000,doesnotmaketheinterneta
mediumfor publishing laws, rulesandregulations. (Garcillano
vs. The House of Representatives Committees on Public
Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and
Security, Information and Communications Technology, and
SuffrageandElectoralReforms,575SCRA170[2008]).
o0o
_______________
22Id.,atpp.396397.(Italicssupplied.)
 Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R.No.182835.April20,2010.*
RUSTAN ANGyPASCUA, petitioner,vs. THE HONORABLE
COURTOFAPPEALSandIRISHSAGUD,respondents.
Criminal Law; Violence against Women; Republic Act No.
9262; Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against
womenincludesanactoractsofapersonagainstawomanwith
whomhehasorhadasexualordatingrelationshipthatinclude
any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to a woman.Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262
providesthatviolenceagainstwomenincludesanactoractsofa
personagainstawomanwithwhomhehasorhadasexualor
dating relationship. Thus:SEC.3.Definition of Terms.As
used in this Act, (a) Violence against women and their
childrenreferstoanyactoraseriesofactscommittedby
anypersonagainstawomanwhoishiswife,formerwife,
oragainstawomanwithwhomthepersonhasorhada
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
commonchild,oragainstherchildwhetherlegitimateor
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
includingthreatsofsuch acts,battery,assault,coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x
xSection 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence
against womenandthese includeany formofharassmentthat
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a
woman.Thus:SEC.5.ActsofViolenceAgainstWomenand
TheirChildren.Thecrimeofviolenceagainstwomenand
theirchildreniscommittedthroughanyofthefollowing
acts: x x x x h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or
reckless conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distresstothewomanorherchild.Thisshallinclude,but
notbelimitedto,thefollowingacts:xxxx5.Engagingin
anyformofharassmentorviolence.
Same; Same; Same; Elements of the Crime of Violence
againstWomen.Theelementsof thecrime ofviolence against
women through harassment are: 1. The offender has or had a
sexualor
_______________
*SECONDDIVISION.
583
VOL.618,APRIL20,2010 583
Angvs.CourtofAppeals
dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The
offender,byhimselforthroughanother,commitsanactorseries
ofactsofharassmentagainstthewoman;and3.Theharassment
alarmsorcausessubstantialemotionalorpsychologicaldistress
toher.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Dating
Relationship, Defined; A dating relationship includes a
situation where the parties are romantically involved over time
andonacontinuingbasisduringthecourseoftherelationship.
Section 3(e) provides that a dating relationship includes a
situationwherethepartiesareromanticallyinvolvedovertime
andonacontinuingbasisduringthecourseoftherelationship.
Thus:(e) Dating relationship refers to a situation
whereinthepartiesliveashusbandandwifewithoutthe
benefitofmarriageorareromanticallyinvolvedovertime
and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary
socialization between two individuals in a business or
socialcontextisnotadatingrelationship.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Sexual Relations, Defined;
Sexualrelationsreferstoasinglesexualactwhichmayormay
notresultinthebearingofacommonchild.R.A.9262provides
inSection3thatviolenceagainstwomenxxxreferstoanyact
oraseriesofactscommittedbyanypersonagainstawomanxxx
with whom the person has or had
asexualordatingrelationship. Clearly, the law itself
distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship.
Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines dating relationship while
Section 3(f) defines sexual relations. The latter refers to a
singlesexualactwhichmayormaynotresultinthebearingofa
commonchild.Thedatingrelationshipthatthelawcontemplates
can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking
placebetweenthoseinvolved.
Same;Same;Same;Section3(a)ofR.A.9262punishesany
actorseriesofactsthatconstitutesviolenceagainstwomenthis
means that a single act of harassment, which translates into
violence, would be enough.Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes
any act or series of acts that constitutes violence against
women. This means that a single act of harassment, which
translatesintoviolence,wouldbeenough.Theobjectofthelawis
toprotectwomen and children. Punishingonly violence thatis
repeatedlycommittedwouldlicenseisolatedones.594
5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
94
Angvs.CourtofAppeals
Evidence; Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01701SC);
The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions,
quasijudicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
Rustan claimsthatthe obscenepicturesenttoIrish througha
textmessageconstitutesanelectronicdocument.Thus,itshould
beauthenticatedbymeansofanelectronicsignature,asprovided
underSection1,Rule5oftheRulesonElectronicEvidence(A.M.
01701SC). But,firstly,Rustan is raisingthisobjection tothe
admissibilityoftheobscenepicture,ExhibitA,forthefirsttime
beforethisCourt.Theobjectionistoolatesinceheshouldhave
objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the
time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
alreadywaivedsuchgroundforobjection.Besides,theruleshe
citesdonotapplytothepresentcriminalaction.TheRuleson
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasijudicial
proceedings,andadministrativeproceedings.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
 Padilla, Padolina, Padilla, Ignacio & Associates Law
Officesforpetitioner.
TheSolicitorGeneralforrespondent.
ABAD,J.:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of
violenceagainstwomenwhenaformerboyfriendsenttothegirl
thepictureofanakedwoman,nother,butwithherfaceonit.
TheIndictment
ThepublicprosecutorchargedpetitioneraccusedRustanAng
(Rustan)beforetheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofBaler,Aurora,
of violation of the AntiViolence Against Women and Their
ChildrenActorRepublicAct(R.A.)9262inaninformationthat
reads:595
VOL.618,APRIL20,2010
Angvs.CourtofAppeals
ThatonoraboutJune5,2005,intheMunicipalityof
MariaAurora,ProvinceofAurora,Philippinesandwithin
thejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,thesaidaccused
willfully,unlawfullyandfeloniously,inapurposefuland
reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging
Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic
picturetooneIrishSagud,whowashisformergirlfriend,
whereby the face of the latter was attached to a
completely naked body of another woman making it to
appearthatitwassaidIrishSagudwhoisdepictedinthe
said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing
substantialemotionalanguish,psychologicaldistressand
humiliationtothesaidIrishSagud.1
TheFactsandtheCase
TheevidencefortheprosecutionshowsthatcomplainantIrish
Sagud(Irish)andaccusedRustanwereclassmatesatWesleyan
University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they
becameonandoffsweetheartstowardstheendof2004.When
IrishlearnedafterwardsthatRustanhadtakenaliveinpartner
(nowhiswife),whomhehadgottenpregnant,Irishbrokeupwith
him.
BeforeRustangotmarried,however,hegotintouchwithIrish
andtriedtoconvincehertoelopewithhim,sayingthathedidnot
lovethewomanhewasabouttomarry.Irishrejectedtheproposal
andtoldRustantotakeonhisresponsibilitytotheotherwoman
andtheirchild.IrishchangedhercellphonenumberbutRustan
somehowmanagedtogetholdofitandsenthertextmessages.
Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages,
namely,09204769301and09218084768.Irishrepliedtohistext
messagesbutitwastoaskhimtoleaveheralone.
595 IntheearlymorningofJune5,2005,Irishreceivedthrough
multimediamessageservice(MMS)apictureofanakedwoman
withspreadlegsandwithIrishsfacesuperim
_______________
1DocketedasCriminalCase3493.
596
596 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Angvs.CourtofAppeals
posedonthefigure(ExhibitA). 2Thesenderscellphonenumber,
stated in the message, was 09218084768, one of the numbers
thatRustanused.Irishsurmisedthathecopiedthepictureofher
face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003
(ExhibitB).3
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text
messagesfromRustan.Heboastedthatitwouldbeeasyforhim
tocreatesimilarlyscandalouspicturesofher.Andhethreatened
to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the
messageshesenttoIrish,writtenintextmessagingshorthand,
read:Madalilangikalatyun,mychatrumangtarlacraytpwede
ringsendsalahatngchatter.4
IrishsoughtthehelpofthevicemayorofMariaAurorawho
referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish
contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in
sendingthepictureandhistextmessages.IrishaskedRustanto
meetherattheLorentessResortinBrgy.Ramada,MariaAurora,
andhedid.Hecameinamotorcycle.Afterparkingit,hewalked
towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and
arrestedhim.They searched himandseizedhisSonyEricsson
P900cellphoneandseveralSIMcards.WhileRustanwasbeing
questionedatthepolicestation,heshoutedatIrish:Malandika
kasi!
JosephGonzales,aninstructorattheAuroraStateCollegeof
Technology,testifiedasanexpertininformationtechnologyand
computergraphics.Hesaidthatitwasverymuchpossibleforone
toliftthefaceofawomanfromapictureandsuperimposeiton
thebodyofanotherwomaninanotherpicture.Picturescanbe
manipulatedandenhancedbycomputertomakeitappearthat
thefaceandthebodybelongedtojustoneperson.
_______________
2Records,p.69.
3Id.,atp.70.
4ExhibitDandsubmarkings,id.,atpp.7276.
597
VOL.618,APRIL20,2010
Angvs.CourtofAppeals
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A)
hadtwodistinctirregularities:thefacewasnotproportionateto
the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the
picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the
pictureofIrishinExhibitB.Finally,Gonzalesexplainedhow
thiscouldbedone,transferringapicturefromacomputertoa
cellphoneliketheSonyEricssonP900seizedfromRustan.
Forhispart,RustanadmittedhavingcourtedIrish.Hebegan
visitingherinTarlacinOctober2003andtheirrelationlasted
untilDecemberofthatyear.Heclaimedthataftertheirrelation
ended,Irishwantedreconciliation.TheymetinDecember2004
but,afterhetoldherthathisgirlfriendatthattime(laterhis
wife)wasalreadypregnant,Irishwalkedoutonhim.
Sometimelater,RustangotatextmessagefromIrish,asking
himtomeetheratLorentessResortassheneededhishelpin
selling her cellphone. When he arrived atthe place, two police
officersapproachedhim,seizedhiscellphoneandthecontentsof
hispockets,andbroughthimtothepolicestation.
RustanfurtherclaimsthathealsowenttoLorentessbecause
Irishaskedhimtohelpheridentifyapranksterwhowassending
hermalicioustextmessages.Rustangotthesendersnumberand,
pretendingtobeIrish,contactedtheperson.Rustanclaimsthat
he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he
forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said,
whytheobscenemessagesappearedtohaveoriginatedfromhis
cellphone number. Rustanclaims that it was Irish herself who
senttheobscenepicture(ExhibitA)tohim.Hepresentedsix
picturesofawomanwhomheidentifiedasIrish(Exhibits2to
7).5
MichelleAng(Michelle),Rustanswife,testifiedthatshewas
sureIrishsentthesixpictures.Michelleclaimsthatshereceived
597 thepicturesandhidthememorycard(Exhibit8)
_______________
 5Id.,atpp.156159.
598
598 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Angvs.CourtofAppeals
thatcontainedthembecauseshewasjealousandangry.Shedid
notwanttoseeanythingofIrish.But,whilethewomaninthe
picturesposedinsexyclothing,innonedidsheappearnakedas
inExhibitA.Further,thefaceofthewomaninExhibits2,4,
5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the
woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the
womaninthepicturewasfullydressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irishs testimony completely
credible,giveninanhonestandspontaneousmanner.TheRTC
observed that she wept while recounting her experience,
prompting the court to comment: Her tears were tangible
expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she
sufferedinthehandsofherformersweetheart.Thecryingofthe
victimduringhertestimonyisevidenceofthecredibilityofher
charges with the verity borne out of human nature and
experience.6Thus,initsDecisiondatedAugust1,2001,theRTC
foundRustanguiltyoftheviolationofSection5(h)ofR.A.9262.
OnRustansappealtotheCourtofAppeals(CA), 7thelatter
renderedadecisiondatedJanuary31,2008,8affirmingtheRTC
decision.TheCAdeniedRustansmotionforreconsiderationina
resolutiondatedApril25,2008.Thus,Rustanfiledthepresentfor
reviewoncertiorari.
TheIssuesPresented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused
RustansentIrishbycellphonemessagethepicturewithherface
pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish,
psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of
Section5(h)ofR.A.9262.
_______________
6Rollo,p.38.
7DocketedasCAG.R.CR30567.
8 PennedbythenAssociateJusticeMarianoC.DelCastillo
(now a member of this Court), and concurred in by Associate
JusticesArcangelitaRomillaLontokandRomeoF.Barza.
599
VOL.618,APRIL20,2010 599
Angvs.CourtofAppeals
Thesubordinateissuesare:
1.Whether or not a dating relationship existed between
RustanandIrishasthistermisdefinedinR.A.9262;
2.Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the
sending of the nude picture in this case, already constitutes a
violationofSection5(h)ofR.A.9262;
3.WhetherornottheevidenceusedtoconvictRustanwas
obtainedfromhiminviolationofhisconstitutionalrights;and
4.WhetherornottheRTCproperlyadmittedinevidencethe
obscenepicturepresentedinthecase.
TheCourtsRulings
Section3(a)ofR.A.9262providesthatviolenceagainstwomen
includesanactoractsofapersonagainstawomanwithwhomhe
hasorhadasexualordatingrelationship.Thus:
SEC.3.DefinitionofTerms.AsusedinthisAct,
(a)Violence against women and their children
refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
personagainstawomanwhoishiswife,formerwife,or
against a womanwith whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
commonchild,oragainstherchildwhetherlegitimateor
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
includingthreatsofsuch acts,battery,assault,coercion,
harassmentorarbitrarydeprivationofliberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence
against womenandthese includeany formofharassmentthat
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a
woman.Thus:600
600 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Angvs.CourtofAppeals
SEC.5.Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children.Thecrimeofviolenceagainstwomenandtheir
childreniscommittedthroughanyofthefollowingacts:
xxxx
h.Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotionalorpsychologicaldistressto
the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be
limitedto,thefollowingacts:
xxxx
5.Engaginginanyformofharassmentorviolence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the
elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassmentare:
1.The offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationshipwiththeoffendedwoman;
2.The offender, by himself or through another,
commitsanactorseriesofactsofharassmentagainstthe
woman;and
3.The harassment alarms or causes substantial
emotionalorpsychologicaldistresstoher.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution
neededtoprovethataccusedRustanhadadatingrelationship
with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a dating relationship
includesasituationwherethepartiesareromanticallyinvolved
over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship.Thus:
(e)Datingrelationshipreferstoasituationwherein
thepartiesliveashusbandandwifewithoutthebenefitof
marriageorareromanticallyinvolvedovertimeandona
continuingbasisduringthecourseoftherelationship.A
casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between
two individuals in a business or social context is not a
datingrelationship.(Underscoringsupplied.)
601
VOL.618,APRIL20,2010 601
Angvs.CourtofAppeals
Here, Rustan claims that, being romantically involved,
implies that theoffenderandthe offended womanhaveor had
sexual relations. According to him, romance implies a sexual
act. He cites Websters ComprehensiveDictionary Encyclopedia
Edition whichprovidesacolloquial orinformalmeaning to the
wordromanceusedasaverb,i.e.,tomakelove;tomakelove
toasinHeromancedher.
Butitseemsclearthatthelawdidnotuseinitsprovisionsthe
colloquialverbromancethatimpliesasexualact.Itdidnotsay
that the offender must have romanced the offended woman.
Rather, it used the noun romance to describe a couples
relationship,i.e.,aloveaffair.9
R.A.9262providesinSection3thatviolenceagainstwomen
xxxreferstoanyactoraseriesofactscommittedbyanyperson
against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had
asexualordatingrelationship. Clearly, the law itself
distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship.
Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines dating relationship while
Section 3(f) defines sexual relations. The latter refers to a
singlesexualactwhichmayormaynotresultinthebearingofa
commonchild.Thedatingrelationshipthatthelawcontemplates
can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking
placebetweenthoseinvolved.
RustanalsoclaimsthatsincetherelationshipbetweenIrish
and him was of the onandoff variety (awaybati), their
romancecannotberegardedashavingdevelopedovertimeand
on a continuing basis. But the two of them were romantically
involved,asRustanhimselfadmits,fromOctobertoDecemberof
2003.Thatwouldbetimeenoughfornurturingarelationshipof
mutualtrustandlove.
Anawaybatiorafightandkissthingbetweentwoloversis
acommonoccurrence.Theirtakingplacedoesnotmeanthatthe
romanticrelationbetweenthetwoshouldbedeemed
_______________
9WebstersNewWorldCollegeDictionary,ThirdEdition,p.
1164.
602
602 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Angvs.CourtofAppeals
brokenupduringperiodsofmisunderstanding.Explainingwhat
awaybatimeant,Irishexplainedthatattimes,whenshecould
notreplytoRustansmessages,hewouldgetangryather.That
was all. Indeed, she characterized their threemonth romantic
relationascontinuous.10
Two.Rustanarguesthattheoneactofsendinganoffensive
pictureshouldnotbeconsideredaformofharassment.Heclaims
that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very
dangerousprecedent.ButSection3(a)ofR.A.9262punishesany
act or series of acts that constitutes violence against women.
Thismeansthatasingleactofharassment,whichtranslatesinto
violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect
womenandchildren.Punishingonlyviolencethatisrepeatedly
committedwouldlicenseisolatedones.
Rustanallegesthattodayswomen,likeIrish,aresousedto
obscenecommunicationsthathergettingonecouldnotpossibly
haveproducedalarminherorcausedhersubstantialemotional
orpsychologicaldistress.Heclaimshavingpreviouslyexchanged
obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already
desensitizedbythem.
But,firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his
wife givetheir testimonies was not impressed with their claim
that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself
(Exhibits 27). Itis doubtfulifthewomaninthepicturewas
Irishsinceherfacedidnotclearlyshowonthem.
Michelle,Rustanswife,claimedthatshedeletedseveralother
pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her
testimonydid notmakesense. Shesaid thatshedidnotknow
thatExhibits2to7hadremainedsavedaftershedeletedthe
pictures.Later,however,shesaidthatshedidnothavetimeto
delete them.11And, if she thought that she had deleted all the
picturesfromthememorycard,thenshehad
_______________
10TSN,April11,2006,pp.2224.
11TSN,July19,2006,pp.1012.
603
VOL.618,APRIL20,2010 603
Angvs.CourtofAppeals
noreasonatalltokeepandhidesuchmemorycard.Therewould
havebeennothingtohide.Finally,ifsheknewthatsomepictures
remainedinthecard,therewasnoreasonforhertokeepitfor
severalyears,giventhatasshesaidshewastoojealoustowant
toseeanythingconnectedtoIrish.Thus,theRTCwascorrectin
notgivingcredencetohertestimony.
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish
experiencedbasedonRustanslowregardfortheallegedmoral
sensibilitiesoftodaysyouth.Whatisobsceneandinjurioustoan
offendedwomancanofcourseonlybedeterminedbasedonthe
circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the
picture,herlegsspreadopenandbearingIrishsheadandface,
was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and
offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the
pornographytrade,wouldbescandalizedandpainedifshesees
herselfinsuchapicture.Whatmakesitfurtherterrifyingisthat,
asIrishtestified,Rustansentthepicturewithathreattopostit
in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a
nightmare.
Three.Rustanarguesthat,sincehewasarrestedandcertain
itemswereseized from himwithoutany warrant, theevidence
presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the
factisthattheprosecutiondidnotpresentinevidenceeitherthe
cellphoneortheSIMcardsthatthepoliceofficersseizedfromhim
atthetimeofhisarrest.Theprosecutiondidnotneedsuchitems
to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a
photographdepictingtheSonyEricssonP900cellphonethatwas
used, which cellphoneRustanadmittedowning during the pre
trialconference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him
consisted in Irishs testimony that she received the obscene
pictureandmalicioustextmessagesthatthesenderscellphone
numbersbelongedtoRustanwithwhomshehadbeenpreviously
incommunication.Indeed,toprovethatthecellphonenumbers
belongedtoRustan,Irish andthe police usedsuchnumbersto
summonhimtocometoLorentessResortandhe
604
604 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Angvs.CourtofAppeals
did. Consequently,theprosecutiondidnothavetopresentthe
12
confiscatedcellphoneandSIM cards to provethatRustansent
thosemessages.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text
messages to Irish.13His defense was that he himself received
thosemessagesfromanunidentifiedpersonwhowasharassing
Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his
cellphone.ButRustanneverpresentedthecellphonenumberof
the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to
authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such
versionandneitherwillthisCourt.Besides,itwasmostunlikely
forIrishtopinthethingsonRustanifhehadmerelytriedtohelp
heridentifythesender.
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish
throughatextmessageconstitutesanelectronicdocument.Thus,
itshouldbeauthenticatedbymeansofanelectronicsignature,as
provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence(A.M.01701SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the
admissibilityoftheobscenepicture,ExhibitA,forthefirsttime
beforethisCourt.Theobjectionistoolatesinceheshouldhave
objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the
time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
alreadywaivedsuchgroundforobjection.14
Besides,theruleshecitesdonotapplytothepresentcriminal
action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil
actions, quasijudicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings.15
_______________
12TSN,April11,2006,p.28.
13TSN,June27,2006,pp.2324.
14Peoplev.Mendoza,G.R.No.180501, December24, 2008,
575SCRA616,625626.
15A.M.No.01701SC,Rule1,Section2.
605
VOL.618,APRIL20,2010 605
Angvs.CourtofAppeals
Inconclusion,thisCourtfindsthattheprosecutionhasproved
eachandeveryelementofthecrimechargedbeyondreasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE,theCourtDENIESthepetitionandAFFIRMS
thedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CR30567dated
January31,2008anditsresolutiondatedApril25,2008.
SOORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,**BrionandPerez,
JJ.,concur.
Petitiondenied,judgmentandresolutionaffirmed.
Notes.A facsimile transmission cannot be considered as
electronic evidenceit is not the functional equivalent of an
originalundertheBestEvidenceRuleandisnotadmissibleas
electronic evidence. (MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs.
SsangyongCorporation,536SCRA408[2007])
Since a facsimile transmission is not an electronic data
messageoranelectronicdocument,andcannotbeconsidered
as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a
photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence.
(MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation,
536SCRA408[2008])
Section3ofR.A.No.9262defines[v]iolenceagainstwomen
andtheirchildrenasanyactoraseriesofactscommittedby
any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or
againstawomanwithwhomthepersonhasorhadasexualor
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
withoutthefamilyabode,whichresultinorislikelytoresultin
physical,sexual,psychologicalharmorsuffering,oreco
_______________
** Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate
JusticeMarianoC.DelCastillo,perraffledatedSeptember14,
2009.
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R.No.204894.March10,2014.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,vs. NOEL
ENOJASyHINGPIT, ARNOLDGOMEZyFABREGAS,
FERNANDO SANTOSyDELANTAR and ROGER
JALANDONIyARI,appellants.
 Criminal Law; Aggravating Circumstances; Aid of Armed
Men;UseofUnlicensedFirearms;Inaidofarmedmen,themen
act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in the
commissionofthecrimeunderthesamepurposeastheprincipal
accused,otherwisetheyaretoberegardedascoprincipalsorco
conspirators.Theuseofunlicensedfirearm,ontheotherhand,is
a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the
circumstancesmentionedinArticle248oftheRevisedPenalCode
asqualifyingahomicidetomurder.Inaidofarmedmen,the
men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in the
commissionofthecrimeunderthesamepurposeastheprincipal
accused,otherwisetheyaretoberegardedascoprincipalsorco
conspirators.Theuseofunlicensedfirearm,ontheotherhand,is
a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the
circumstancesmentionedinArticle248oftheRevisedPenalCode
asqualifyingahomicidetomurder.Consequently,theaccusedin
thiscasemaybeheldliableonlyforhomicide,aggravatedbythe
use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the
information.
RemedialLaw;Evidence;TextMessages;Textmessagesare
tobeprovedbythetestimonyofapersonwhowasapartytothe
sameorhaspersonalknowledgeofthem.Astotheadmissibility
ofthetextmessages,theRTCadmittedtheminconformitywith
the Courts earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic
Evidencetocriminalactions.Textmessagesaretobeprovedby
thetestimonyofapersonwhowasapartytothesameorhas
personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the
accusedEnojas,exchangedtextmessageswiththeotheraccused
in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient ofthose
messagessentfromandtothemobile
_______________
*THIRDDVISION.
314phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on
them.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforappellants.
ABAD,J.:
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Pias
charged appellants Noel EnojasyHingpit (Enojas), Arnold
GomezyFabregas(Gomez),FernandoSantosyDelantar(Santos),
and Roger JalandoniyAri (Jalandoni) with murder before the
LasPiasRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)inCriminalCase060854.
[1]
PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (PO2 Gregorio) testified that at
around 10:30 in the evening of August 29, 2006, he and PO2
Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the
vicinityofToyotaAlabangandSMSouthmallwhentheyspotted
ataxithatwassuspiciouslyparkedinfrontoftheAguilaAuto
Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang
Zapote Roads. The officers approached the taxi and asked the
driver,lateridentifiedasaccusedEnojas,forhisdocuments.The
latter complied but, having entertained doubts regarding the
veracityofdocumentsshownthem,theyaskedhimtocomewith
them to the police station in their mobile car for further
questioning.[2]
AccusedEnojasvoluntarilywentwiththepoliceofficersand
lefthistaxibehind.Onreachingthe711conveniencestoreonthe
ZapoteAlabangRoad,however,theystoppedandPO2Pangilinan
wentdowntorelievehimselfthere.Ashe
_______________
[1]Records,p.1.
[2]TSN,February8,2007,pp.47.
315approached the stores door, however, he came upon two
suspectedrobbersandshotitoutwiththem.PO2Pangilinanshot
onesuspectdeadandhittheotherwhostillmanagedtoescape.
ButsomeonefiredatPO2Pangilinancausinghisdeath.
Onhearingtheshots,PO2Gregoriocamearoundandfiredat
anarmedmanwhomhesawrunningtowardsPilarVillage.He
sawanotherman,whocamefromtheJollibeeoutlet,runtowards
AlabangZapoteRoadwhilefiringhisgunatPO2Gregorio.The
latter returned fire but the men were able to take a taxi and
escape.PO2Gregorioradioedforhelpandforanambulance.On
returningtohismobilecar,herealizedthataccusedEnojas,the
taxidrivertheyhadwiththemhadfled.
P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation
DivisionoftheLasPiasPolice,testifiedthatheandPO2Teoson
Rosarito(PO2Rosarito)immediatelyrespondedtoPO2Gregorios
urgentcall.SuspectingthataccusedEnojas,thetaxidriverwho
fled, was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched the
abandonedtaxiandfoundamobilephonethatEnojasapparently
left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3
Cambi)tomonitoritsincomingmessages.[3]
The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2
Pangilinan had killed was someone named Reynaldo Mendoza
whowasarmedwitha.38caliberrevolver.Thepolicefoundspent
9 mm and M16 rifle shells at the crime scene. Followup
operationsatnearbyprovincesresultedinfindingthedeadbody
ofoneofthesuspects,AlexAngeles,attheMetroSouthMedical
CenteralongMolino,Bacoor,Cavite.[4]
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored
the messages in accused Enojas mobile phone and, posing as
Enojas,communicatedwiththeotheraccused.Thepolice
_______________
[3]TSN,May3,2007,pp.1014.
[4]CARollo,p.28.
316thenconductedanentrapmentoperationthatresultedinthe
arrestofaccusedSantosandJalandoni.Subsequently,thepolice
were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The
prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text
messagesbetweenEnojasandsomeofhiscoaccused.[5]
Thevictimsfather,RicardoPangilinan,testifiedthathisson
wasatthetimeofhisdeath28yearsold,unmarried,andwas
receiving police pay ofP8,000.00 toP10,000.00 per month.
Ricardo spentP99,999 for burial expense,P16,000.00 for the
intermentservices,andP50,000.00forpurchaseofthecemetery
lot.[6]
Manifestinginopencourtthattheydidnotwanttoadduce
anyevidenceortestifyinthecase,[7]theaccusedoptedtoinstead
file a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008 for their defense.
They pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since
theywereallillegallyarrestedandsincetheevidenceofthetext
messageswereinadmissible,nothavingbeenproperlyidentified.
On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment,[8]finding all
theaccusedguiltyofmurderqualifiedbyevidentpremeditation
anduseofarmedmenwiththespecialaggravatingcircumstance
ofuseofunlicensedfirearms.Itthussentencedthemtosufferthe
penaltyofreclusionperpetua,withoutthepossibilityofparoleand
to indemnify the heirs of PO2 Pangilinan withP165,999.00 as
actual damages,P50,000.00 as moral damages,P25,000.00 as
exemplarydamages,andP2,080,000.00ascompensationforloss
ofearningcapacity.
 UponreviewinCAG.R.CRH.C.03377,onJune14,2012the
Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmedin
tototheconvictionoftheaccused.[9]TheCA,however,found
_______________
[5]Records,pp.431438.
[6]TSN,December14,2006,pp.47.
[7]Rollo,p.6.
[8]Id.,atpp.2734.
[9]Id.,atpp.217.
317the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution
failedtoprovethattheseveralaccusedplannedthecrimebefore
committingit.TheaccusedappealedfromtheCAtothisCourt.
[10]
Thedefensepointsoutthattheprosecutionfailedtopresent
direct evidence that the accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or
Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead.[11]This
may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by
circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1)thereismorethanonecircumstance;2)thefactsfromwhich
theinferencesarederivedareproven;and3)thecombinationof
allthecircumstancesissuchastoproduceaconvictionbeyond
reasonabledoubt.[12]
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the
prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the
convictionofalltheaccused.Thus:
1.PO2GregoriopositivelyidentifiedaccusedEnojasas
thedriverofthetaxicabsuspiciouslyparkedinfrontofthe
AguilaAutoGlassshop.Theofficerswerebringinghimwith
them to the police station because of the questionable
documentsheshoweduponquery.Subsequentinspectionof
the taxicab yielded Enojas mobile phone that contained
messages which led to the entrapment and capture of the
otheraccusedwhowerealsotaxicabdrivers.
2.Enojas fled during the commotion rather than
remaininthecabtogotothepolicestationwherehewas
abouttobetakenforquestioning,tendingtoshow
_______________
[10]Id.,atp.18.
[11]Bacolodv. People, G.R. No. 206236, July 15, 2013, 701
SCRA229.
[12]Peoplev.Garcia,577Phil.483,500;554SCRA616,633
(2008).
318thathehadsomethingtohide.Hecertainlydidnotgo
tothepoliceafterwardstoclearupthematterandclaim
histaxi.
3.PO2GregoriopositivelyidentifiedaccusedGomezas
oneofthemenhesawrunningawayfromthesceneofthe
shooting.
4.ThetextmessagesidentifiedKuaJustinasoneof
those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the
messagesalsoreferredtoKuaJustinastheonewhowas
hitinsuchshootoutandlaterdiedinahospitalinBacoor,
Cavite.Thesemessageslinkedtheotheraccused.
5.During the followup operations, the police
investigators succeeded in entrapping accused Santos,
Jalandoni,Enojas,andGomez,whowereallnamedinthe
textmessages.
6.Thetextmessagessenttothephonerecoveredfrom
thetaxidrivenbyEnojasclearlymadereferencestothe711
 shootout and to the wounding of Kua Justin, one of the
gunmen,andhissubsequentdeath.
7.Thecontextofthemessagesshowedthattheaccused
were members of an organized group of taxicab drivers
engagedinillegalactivities.
8.Uponthearrestoftheaccused,theywerefoundin
possession of mobile phones with call numbers that
correspondedtothesendersofthemessagesreceivedonthe
mobilephonethataccusedEnojasleftinhistaxicab.[13]
TheCourtmust,however,disagreewiththeCAsrulingthat
theaggravatingcircumstancesofa)aidofarmedmenandb)use
ofunlicensedfirearmsqualifiedthekillingofPO2Pangilinanto
murder.Inaidofarmedmen,themenactasaccomplicesonly.
Theymustnotbeactinginthecommissionofthecrimeunderthe
samepurposeastheprincipalaccused,
_______________
[13]CARollo,pp.3233.
319otherwise they are to be regarded as coprincipals or co
conspirators.Theuseofunlicensedfirearm,ontheotherhand,is
a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the
circumstancesmentionedinArticle248oftheRevisedPenalCode
asqualifyingahomicidetomurder.[14]Consequently,theaccused
inthiscasemaybeheldliableonlyforhomicide,aggravatedby
the use of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the
information.
Astotheadmissibilityofthetextmessages,theRTCadmitted
theminconformitywiththeCourtsearlierResolutionapplying
the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.[15]Text
messagesaretobeprovedbythetestimonyofapersonwhowasa
partytothesameorhaspersonalknowledgeofthem.[16]Here,
PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text
messageswiththeotheraccusedinordertoidentifyandentrap
them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the
mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on
them.
Theaccusedlamentthattheywerearrestedwithoutavalid
warrantofarrest.But,assumingthatthiswasso,itcannotbea
groundforacquittingthemofthecrimechargedbutforrejecting
anyevidencethatmayhavebeentakenfrom
_______________
[14]SeePeoplev.Candado,174Phil.12,2728;84SCRA508,
524(1978).
[15]A.M. No. 01701SC, Re: Expansion of the Coverage of
theRulesonElectronicEvidence,September24,2002.
Rule 1, Sec.2.Cases covered.These Rules shall apply to
thecriminalandcivilactionsandproceeding,aswellasquasi
judicialandadministrativecases.
[16]Id.,Rule11,Section2:
Section2.Ephemeral electronic communications.
Ephemeralelectronic communications shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge thereof. In theabsence or unavailability of
suchwitnesses,othercompetentevidencemaybeadmitted.
320them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an
unlawfularrest,apointthatisnotinissuehere.Atanyrate,a
crimehadbeencommittedthekillingofPO2Pangilinanand
theinvestigatingpoliceofficershadpersonalknowledgeoffacts
indicatingthatthepersonstheyweretoarresthadcommittedit.
[17]Thetextmessagestoandfromthemobilephoneleftatthe
scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the
participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police
caughttheminanentrapmentusingthisknowledge.
Theawardofdamagesbythecourtsbelowhastobemodified
toconformtocurrentjurisprudence.[18]
WHEREFORE, the CourtMODIFIESthe Court of Appeals
DecisionofJune14,2012inCAG.R.CRHC03377.TheCourt
insteadFINDSaccusedappellantsNoelEnojasyHingpit,Arnold
GomezyFabregas, Fernando SantosyDelantar, and Roger
JalandoniyAriGUILTYofthelessercrimeofHOMICIDEwith
the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
CourtSENTENCESeachofthemto12yearsofprisionmayor,as
minimum, to 20 years ofreclusion temporal,as maximum. The
Court alsoMODIFIESthe award of exemplary damages by
increasingittoP30,000.00,withanadditionalP50,000.00forcivil
indemnity.
SOORDERED.
G.R.No.200148.June4,2014.*
RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG, petitioner,vs. TERESITA D.
RIVERA,respondent.
Criminal Law; Prescription of Crimes; Motion to
Quash;Section9,Rule117oftheRulesofCourt,whichinessence
partiallyprovidesthatthedefenseofextinctionofcriminalaction
or liability, e.g., prescription, is not deemed waived even if the
accused had not raised the same in a motion to quash.
WhilePeople v. Castro,95 Phil. 462 (1954),is an old
jurisprudence, it still finds application in the case at bench in
viewofSection9,Rule117oftheRulesofCourt,whichinessence
partiallyprovidesthatthedefenseofextinctionofcriminalaction
or liability,e.g., prescription, is not deemed waived even if the
accusedhadnotraisedthesameinamotiontoquash.InRiveras
case, the issue of prescription is raised in her comment to the
instant petition before this Court. Syhunliong does not
specificallyrefuteRiverasaverment,thus,itisdeemedadmitted.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Privileged Communication;The
rule on privileged communication means that a communication
made in good faith on any subject matter in which the
communicatorhasaninterest,orconcerningwhichhehasaduty,
is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty.
The rule on privileged communication means that a
communicationmadeingoodfaithonanysubjectmatterinwhich
thecommunicatorhasaninterest,orconcerningwhichhehasa
duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding
duty.Inordertoprovethatastatementfallswithinthepurview
ofaqualifiedprivilegedcommunicationunderArticle354,No.1,
thefollowingrequisitesmustconcur:(1)thepersonwhomadethe
communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which
interestmayeitherbehisownoroftheonetowhomitismade;
(2)thecommunicationisaddressedto an officeror a board, or
superior,havingsomeinterestordutyinthematter,andwhohas
thepowertofurnishtheprotectionsought;and(3)thestatements
inthecommunicationaremadeingoodfaithandwithoutmalice.
_______________
*FIRSTDIVISION.
 163
Same; Same; Same; Text Messages; Riveras text message
falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication
sinceshewasspeakinginresponsetoduty[toprotectherown
interest] and not out of an intent to injure the reputation of
Syhunliong.The Court thus finds no error in the CAs
declarationthatRiverastextmessagefallswithintheambitofa
qualified privileged communication since she was speaking in
responsetoduty[toprotectherowninterest]andnotoutofan
intenttoinjurethereputationofSyhunliong.Besides,[t]here
was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond [that] of
conveyingittothepartyconcemed.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheresolutionoftheCourt.
Cruz,Neria&CarpioLawOfficesforpetitioner.
RicardoM.Perezforrespondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES,J.:
For review is the instant Petition1 filed by Ramon A.
Syhunliong (Syhunliong) seeking the reversal of the
Decision2rendered on July 11, 2011 and Resolution3issued on
January6,2012bytheCourtofAppeals(CA)inC.A.G.R.S.P.
No. 110335. The CA set aside the Orders dated December 4,
20084and June 18, 20095of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
QuezonCity,Branch84,whichdeniedtheMotiontoDis
_______________
1Rollo,pp.827.
2Penned by Associate Justice MarioL.Guaria III, with
AssociateJusticesJaparB.DimaampaoandManuelM.Barrios,
concurring;id.,atpp.2938.
3Id.,atpp.4041.
4IssuedbyPresidingJudgeLuisitoG.Cortez;id.,atpp.56
59.
5Id.,atpp.6063.
164miss/Quash on Jurisdictional Challenge6(Motion to Quash)
filed by the herein respondent, Teresita D. Rivera (Rivera), in
CriminalCaseNo.Q07147802,anactionforlibel.
Antecedents
Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private
complainant and defendant in Criminal Case No. Q07
147802.Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and
DevelopmentCorporation (BANFF)andlikewise ownsinterests
inconstruction,restaurantandhospitalbusinesses.Ontheother
hand,RiverausedtobetheAccountingManagerofBANFF.She
was hired in September of 2002 with a monthly salary of
Php30,000.00.
About three years after, Rivera, citing personal and family
matters,tenderedherresignationtobeeffectiveonFebruary3,
2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF
untilMarchofthesameyeartocompletetheturnoverofpapers
under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas), who
succeededher.
SometimeinAprilof2006,RiveracalledLumapastorequest
for the payment of her remaining salaries, benefits and
incentives.LumapasinformedRiverathatherbenefitswouldbe
paid,butthecheckrepresentinghersalarieswasstillunsigned,
andherincentiveswereputonholdbySyhunliong.7
On April 6, 2006, at around 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent the
followingtextmessagetooneofBANFFsofficialcellularphones
heldbyLumapas:
I am expecting that[.][G]rabe talagasufferingsko dyan
hanggangpagkuhanglastpayko.Idontdeservethis[because]I
didmyjobwhenI[was]stillthere.God
_______________
6Id.,atpp.4654.
7Id.,atpp.2930.
165
bless ras[.]8[S]ana yung pagsimba niya, alam niyareal
meaning.9(Italicsours)
Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another message,
whichreads:
Kailanganreleaseniya lahat [nang] makukuha ko
diyanincludingincentiveuptothelastdatenanandyanakopara
dinakamiabotsalabor.10(Italicsours)
Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the
National Labor Relations Commission a complaint against
Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13 thto 16thmonth and
incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund in the total sum of
Php698,150.48.11
On April16,2007,12pendingthe resolution ofthe aforecited
laborcase,SyhunlionginstitutedagainstRiveraacomplaintfor
libel, the origin of the instant petition. The information, dated
June21,2007,chargedRiverawiththefollowing:
Thatonoraboutthe6thdayofApril,2006,inQuezonCity,
Philippines,thesaidaccused,withmaliciousintentofimpeaching
the honor, virtue, character and reputation of one RAMON A.
SYHUNGLIONG[sic]and
_______________
8TheinitialsofSyhunliong.
9Rollo,p.30.
10Id.
11Id.,atpp.4647.
12Per Syhunliongs narration in the instant petition, the
complaintwasfiledonAugust18,2007(id.,atp.14).However,
theinformationforlibelfiledwiththeRTCagainstRiverawas
datedJune21,2007(id.,atp.44).Thesaidinformationcouldnot
have been filed earlier than Syhunliongs complaint. The CA
decision and the orders of the RTC do not indicate when
Syhunliong filed the complaint. However, in Riveras Petition
forCertiorarifiled before the CA, it was indicated that
SyhunliongscomplaintwasinstitutedonApril16,2007(id.,atp.
68).
166
with evident intent of exposing the complainant to public
dishonor, discredit, contempt and ridicule, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously publish in the
form of text messages and/or caused to be publish[ed] the
followingdefamatorystatementsthroughthecompanyscellular
phone,towit:
xxxx
that with the said text message, the said accused meant and
intendedtoconveyasinfactshedidmeanandconvey,malicious
and offensive insinuations and imputations that tends [sic] to
destroythegoodnameandreputationofRamonSyhunliong,with
no good or justifiable motive but solely for the purpose of
maligningandbesmirchingthegoodname,honor,characterand
reputationofthesaidcomplainantandtoexposeit,asinfact[he]
was exposed to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, to the
damageandprejudiceofsaidoffendedparty.
CONTRARYTOLAW.13
Rivera filed a Motion to Quash 14the aforequoted
information.She argued that the text message, which was the
subjectofthelibelcomplaint,merelyreflectedtheunduestress
she hadsuffereddue tothedelay in thereleaseofher unpaid
salaries, benefits and incentives.Further, the facts charged in
the information did not constitute the crime of libel as the
elementsofmaliceandthemakingofdefamatoryimputationfor
public consumption were wanting.Her text message was not
promptedbyillwillorspite,butwasmerelysentaspartofher libelousmaterial[ortext]mustbeviewedasawhole.Inorderto
dutytodefendherowninterests.
DuringthearraignmentonOctober11,2007,Riveraentereda
pleaofnotguilty.15
_______________
13Id.,atp.44.
14Id.,atpp.4654.
15Id.,atp.55.
167
TheOrdersoftheRTC
On December 4, 2008, the RTC issued an Order 16denying
RiverasMotiontoQuashonthesegrounds:
[T]he grounds raised by [Rivera] in the motion to quash [are]
evidentiaryinnature[,]whichcanonlybethreshedoutinafull
blownhearingtodetermineifsaid[t]extmessagefallssquarely
within the parameters of Privileged Communication or the
elementsofArticle353oftheRevisedPenalCode[are]notfully
establishedbytheProsecutionsevidence.
The Rule on Criminal Procedure in the prosecution of any
felonyoroffenserequiresonlytheexistenceofprobablecausein
ordertoindictanaccusedofthecrimecharged.xxx[P]robable
cause was established seasonably during the preliminary
investigation. [Rivera] should have participated during
thepreliminaryinvestigationorfiledaMotion for re
investigation[if]shewasnotaccordedsuchrightandraisedthese
grounds,beforesheenter[ed]herpleaduringarraignment.
TheSupremeCourtruledthat[i]tshouldbenotedthatthe
ascertainthemeaningof[the]publishedarticle[ortextmessage],
thewholeofthearticlemustbeconsidered,eachphrasemustbe
construedinthelightoftheentirepublication.
TheSupremeCourtheldthatwriting[ortexting]toaperson
other than the person defamed is sufficient to constitute
publication,forthepersontowhomtheletter[textmessage]is
addressedisathirdpersoninrelationtoitswriterandtheperson
defamedtherein.Inthiscase,thewifeofthecomplainant[,]who
receivedtheunsealedletter[,]isheldathirdpersontowhomthe
publicationismade.[]17(Citationsomitted)
_______________
16Id.,atpp.5659.
17Id.,atpp.5859.
168
The RTC thereafter issued an Order18on June 18, 2009
denying Riveras motion for reconsideration to the
foregoing.CitingLuChuSingandLuTianChiongv.LuTiong
Gui,19the RTC explained that the privileged character of a
communication merely does away with the presumption of
malice.However,theplaintiffisnotprecludedfromprovingthe
existenceofsuchmalice.TheRTConceagainconcurredwiththe
Public Prosecutors finding that there was probable cause to
indictRiveraforhavingascribedtoSyhunliongthepossessionof
aviceordefect,orforhavingcommittedanact,tendingtocause
dishonorordiscredittothelattersname.
Rivera challenged the orders issued by the RTC through a
PetitionforCertiorari20filedbeforetheCA.QuotingArticle354of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), she emphasized that every
defamatoryimputationispresumedtobemalicious,evenifitbe
true,ifnogoodintentionandjustifiablemotiveformakingitis
shown,exceptinaprivatecommunicationmadebyanyperson
to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social
duty.21CitingBrillantev.CourtofAppeals,22Riveraenumerated
the requisites,compliance withwhich would makea statement
fall within the purview of a qualified privileged
communication,viz.:(1)thepersonwhomadethecommunication
hadalegal,moral,orsocialdutytomakethecommunication,or
atleast,hadaninteresttoprotect,whichinterestmayeitherbe
hisownoroftheone[for]whomitismade;(2)thecommunication
is addressed toan officer or a board, or superior, having some
interestordutyinthematter,andwhohasthepowertofurnish
the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the
communication are made in good faith and without
malice.23Riveralikewise
_______________
18Id.,atpp.6063.
1976Phil.669(1946).
20Rollo,pp.6484.
21Id.,atp.79.
22483Phil.568;440SCRA541(2004).
23Rollo,p.80.
169stressedthatunderSections3(a)24and9,25Rule11726ofthe
RulesofCourt,anaccusedmaymovetoquashtheinformation
even after arraignment if the facts charged therein do not
constituteanoffense.Shethusconcludedthatthetextmessage
shesenttoLumapaswasinthenatureofaqualifiedprivileged
communication,it being merely an expression ofherlegitimate
grievancesoverthedelayinthereleaseofherunpaidsalariesand
otherentitlements.RiveratextedLumapasbecausethelatterwas
in the best position to help expedite the release of the checks.
Riverahadnointenttoinjureanyonesreputation.Lastly,Rivera
labeled as erroneous the RTCs declaration regarding the
necessity of a full blown trial since facts sufficient for the
resolution of the case were allegedly already extant in the
records.
TheCAsRuling
On July 11, 2011, the CA rendered the herein assailed
Decision27directingthedismissaloftheinformationforlibelfiled
againstRivera.TheCAfavorablyconsideredherargumentthat
when the facts in an informationfail to chargeanoffense, the
saidgroundcanbeinvokedbytheaccusedina
_______________
24Sec.3.Grounds.The accused may move to quash the
complaintorinformationonanyofthefollowinggrounds:
(a)Thatthefactschargeddonotconstituteanoffense;
xxxx
25Sec.9.Failuretomoveorquashortoallegeanyground
therefor.The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a
motiontoquashbeforehepleadstothecomplaintorinformation,
eitherbecausehedidnotfileamotiontoquashorfailedtoallege
the same in the said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the grounds provided for in
paragraphs(a) [thefactschargeddonotconstitute an offense],
(b),(g)[thecriminalactionorliabilityhasbeenextinguished]and
(i)ofSection3ofthisRule.
26MotiontoQuash.
27Rollo,pp.2938.
170motion to quash filed even after arraignment. The CA
likewiseexplainedthat:
Thefocalissuetothepartiesinthepresentcaseiswhether
thefactschargedintheinformation[,]aswellastheundeniable
factsappearingontherecord[,]showthatanoffenseoflibelhas
beencommitted.Ourcriminallawconvincinglyprovideuswitha
definitionoflibelItisapublicandmaliciousimputationofa
crime, or of a vice or defect ... or any act, omission, condition,
statusorcircumstancetendingtocausethedishonor,discreditor
contemptof...aperson.xxx.
The first procedural requisite in the determination of the
existenceoflibeliswhetherthereisadefamatoryimputation.The
historyofthelawonlibelaboundsinexamplesofutterancesor
statements thatare notnecessarilyconsideredlibelousbecause
theyarea[sic]mereexpression[s]ofan[sic]opinion[s]ofa[sic]
person[s]inconnectionwitha[sic]plea[s]orgrievance[s].Libelis
inherentlyalimitationonthelibertyofspeechandpressfreedom,
andmustbeconstruedinamannerthatdoesnottrenchupon
constitutionallyprotectedfreedoms.
xxxTherecanbelibelonlyifthewordsusedarecalculatedto
inducethehearerorreadertosupposeandunderstandthemas
impeaching the honesty, virtue or reputation of another. The
questionisnotwhatthewriterorspeakermeantbyhiswordsbut
whattheyconveytothosewhoheardorreadthem.
xxxx
Wecanbreakupthetextmessageof[Rivera]to[Lumapas]
intothreeparts.Theutteranceismercifullyshortsothatitcould
notbedifficulttoinferthewholesenseandunderstandingofthe
messagefromthestandpointofLumapastowhomthemessage
wasconveyed. Incontext,[Rivera]wasseeking payment ofher
wage claims consequent to her resignation and receiving
[BANFFs] response through Lumapas. [Rivera] retorted with
threethingsinhermessagetoLumapas(1)thatshesuffereda
lotincollectingherlastpayfrom[BANFF]

171
Grabetalagasufferingskodyanhanggangpagkuhanglastpay
ko.[;](2)thatshedoesnotdeservetosufferthisway[becauseshe]
did [her] job when [she was] still there[;] and (3) turning to
[Syhunliong]himself[she]saidGodblessras[.][S]anayung
pagsimbaniya,alamniyarealmeaning.
Iflibelistobeunderstoodasanimputationofacrime,viceor
defecttoanother,therecanbenolibelinthefirsttwoofthethree
statements which announced only the sufferings, albeit
undeserved[,]of[Rivera].Thepropositiongetstobediceyinthe
third statement because now she makes a distinct reference to
[Syhunliong][,][b]utistheimputationdefamatory?Wehesitateto
reach this conclusion, and all doubts in criminal law, we are
basically taught, must be resolved in favor of the accused. To
articulatethelegalwisdom,[Rivera]hastherighttoexpressan
opinioninamatterinwhichshehasanundeniableinterest.
[Rivera said] in the last part of the text that [Syhunliong]
shouldunderstandtherealmeaningofthemasswhenhegoesto
attendit.Itisinthistailendofthemessagethat[Syhunliong]is
mentioned.Butwhatisconveyedbythewords[]sanaalamniya
real meaning?[] Does it impute a crime, vice or defect in
[Syhunliong], either directly or by way ofinnuendo? But
theinnuendocanonlybeexplanatoryofalibelousimputationand
cannotalterthesenseofthewordsclaimedtobelibelous.Ifthe
publicationisnotactionableperse,aninnuendocannotmakeit
so,andifthepublicationisactionableperse,theinnuendowould
notevenbenecessary.
Weholdthatthetextmessageisnotactionablelibel.Itdoes
not serve to cast a shadow on [Syhunliongs] character and
integrity[,] there being no direct and personal imputation of a
venalitytohim.Atbest,thestatementthat[Syhunliong]should
understandthemeaningofthemasssuggeststhat[Syhunliong]
shouldbemorecompassionateandcaringtotheemployee.Butis
being the converse ofcompassionateandcaringsuggestive of a
viceordefectinthepersonalludedto?Wedonotthink
172
so. Otherwise, even courts should be exposed to contempt and
ridicule for reaching at times decisions in favor of capital and
against labor. x x x To follow the intent of the message as
ordinarilyconveyedbythewordsandthecontextinwhichthey
aresaid,itcanonlysuggesttheintentionof[Rivera]todescribe
[Syhunliong] as strict and selfish. But[,] there are legitimate
reasonswhy a person who acts intheinterestoftheemployer
mayappearstrictandselfishtotheotherside.Onemayhaveto
be so to protect the interest of his company and, indeed, the
outcome of the labor case vindicates the stand of [Syhunliong]
againstgiving[Rivera]theclaimsshesoughtafter.
Aresponsibleofficerwhosedecisionsmayaffectthefortunes
of others and who is faced with criticism such as in this case
shouldnotbesoonionskinnedastoreactthroughthecriminal
law.Instead,heshouldusemethodsofdiscussionandpersuasion
to dispel the misgivings over his decisions. He should, in
particular,explainthroughthesamesourcethattoldhimofthe
commentwhy[BANFF]cannotsatisfyall[ofRiveras]claims.
xxxThemattercontainedinthetextmessageisprivileged
communication under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code
which [negates] the existence of malice in a private
communicationmadebyanypersontoanotherintheperformance
ofanylegal,[moral]orsocialduty.xxxItwasLumapaswhotold
herofthestandof[Syhunliong]onthematterofherwageclaims,
andherreactionthroughthetextmessagemaybedeemedapart
ofherdutytoseekredressofhergrievancesthroughthesame
source.Shewasspeakinginresponsetodutyandnotoutofan
intent to injure the reputation of the person who claims to be
defamed. There was no unnecessary publicity of the message
beyond the necessity of conveying it to the party
concerned.28(Citationsomittedanditalicssupplied)
_______________
28Id.,atpp.3337.
173
TheCAdeniedSyhunliongsmotionforreconsiderationtothe
abovethroughthehereinassailedResolution 29datedJanuary6,
2012.
IssuesandArgumentsoftheParties
Undaunted,SyhunliongnowpresentstothisCourttheissues
ofwhetherornot:(a)thetrialcourtsdenialofamotiontoquash
informationmaybevalidlyassailedthroughaspecialcivilaction
forcertiorari; (b) Rivera may validly question the denial of her
motiontoquashbeforetheCAaftervoluntarilyallowingherself
to be arraigned even during the pendency of such motion to
quash;(c)theCAmayvalidlyreviewoncertiorariwhatwas,at
best,anerrorofjudgmentmadebytheRTC;(d)theCAcorrectly
ruledthatthefactschargedintheinformationdonotconstitute
theoffenseoflibel;and(e)theCAcommittedreversibleerrorin
orderingtheoutrightdismissalofCriminalCaseNo.Q07147802
ontheputativegroundthattheallegedlylibeloustextmessages
wereprivilegedcommunication.30
Insupportofthepetition,SyhunliongcitesSoriano,etal.v.
People, et al.31where the Court declared that in assailing the
denialofamotiontoquashaninformation,theaccusedshould
not fileaspecialcivilactionforcertiorari.Instead,theaccused
should enter a plea, go to trialsansprejudice to present the
specialdefensesheorshehadinvokedinthemotiontoquash,
andifanadversedecisionisrendered,fileanappealtherefrom.
Syhunliong further avers that Rivera was arraigned on
October11,2007.Section1,Rule117oftheRulesofCourtclearly
providesthattheaccusedmayonlybeallowedtofileamotionto
quashatanytimebeforeenteringaplea.In
_______________
29Id.,atpp.4041.
30Id.,atpp.1617.
31609Phil.31;591SCRA244(2009).
174Riveras case, she had already voluntarily entered a plea;
hence, it was tantamount to an effective abandonment of her
motiontoquash.
It is also Syhunliongs argument that the CA improperly
arrogateduntoitselfthepowertoreviewthePublicProsecutor
and RTCs uniform finding of the existence of probable
cause.EvenifitweretobeassumedthattheRTCerredinits
disposition,itwasamistakeofjudgmentandnotofjurisdiction.
SyhunliongalsorefutestheCAsfindingthatthefactscharged
intheinformationdidnotconstitutethecrimeoflibel.Thetext
message was apparently an indictment of his personality and
charactersinceitportrayedhimasahypocrite.
Lastly, Syhunliong invokesPeople v. Judge Gomez32which
enunciatedthedoctrinethatinalibelcase,theprivilegednature
ofacommunicationisnotagroundforamotiontoquash,butis
merelyamatterofdefensetobeprovenduringthetrial.
In Riveras Comment,33she reiterates the arguments in the
MotiontoQuashfiledwiththeRTC.Additionally,shecontends
that the RTC no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Syhunliongscomplaint.ThetextmessagewassentonApril6,
2006. Per Syhunliongs narration in the instant petition, his
complaint was filed on August 18, 2007, 34beyond the one year
prescriptiveperiodforinstitutingactionsforlibelprovidedforin
Articles9035and9136oftheRPC.
_______________
32187Phil.110;98SCRA181(1980).
33Rollo,pp.86105.
34Id.,atp.14.
35Art.90.Prescriptionofcrime.xxx
xxxx
Thecrimeoflibelorothersimilaroffensesshallprescribein
oneyear.
175
Further,thegroundthatthefactschargedintheinformation
didnotconstituteanoffensecanberaisedevenafterarraignment
andisbroad enoughtocover withinitsambitlackofprobable
cause.This,thecourtcanreassessintheexerciseofitsinherent
powerofjudicialreview.
Riveraalsolamentsthatshewasdeprivedofdueprocessand
of the opportunity to submit countervailing evidence during
preliminaryinvestigation.
OurRuling
Thereisnomeritintheinstantpetition.
Prescriptionhadsetin.
Syhunliong raised five issues before this Court, but the
Courtsresolutionofthesamewouldbeasuperfluityinthelight
ofRiverasunrefutedavermentthatprescriptionhadsetinbefore
thecomplaintforlibelwasinstituted.
InRomualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,37the Court, partially
quotingPeople v. Moran,38stressed the reason behind and the
characterofprescriptionofpenaloffenses,towit:
Here the State is the grantor,
surrendering by act of grace its rights to
prosecute,anddeclaringtheoffensetobeno
longerthesubjectofprosecution.Thestatute
isnotastatuteofprocess,tobescantilyand
grudgingly applied, but an amnesty,
declaringthataftera
_______________
 36Art.91.Computation of prescription of offenses.The
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities,ortheiragents,andshallbeinterruptedbythefiling
ofthecomplaintorinformation,andshallcommencetorunagain
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convictedoracquitted,orareunjustifiablystoppedforanyreason
notimputabletohim.
37529Phil.90;497SCRA89(2006).
3844Phil.387(1923).
176
certain time oblivion shall be cast over
the offence; xxx that from henceforth[,] he
may cease to preserve the proofs of his
innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are
blotted out. Hence[,] it is that statutes of
limitation are to be liberally construed in
favorofthedefendant,notonlybecausesuch
liberalityofconstructionbelongstoallactsof
amnesty and grace, but because the very
existenceofthestatute,isarecognitionand
notificationbythelegislatureofthefactthat
time,whileitgraduallywearsoutproofsof
innocence, has assigned to it fixed and
positiveperiodsinwhichitdestroysproofsof
guilt.Independentlyoftheseviews,itmust
be remembered that delay in instituting
prosecutions is not only productive of
expense to the State, but of peril to public
justice in the attenuation and distortion,
even by mere natural lapse of memory, of
testimony. It is the policy of the law that
prosecutions should be prompt, and that
statutes,enforcingsuchpromptitudeshould
be vigorously maintained. They are not
merelyactsofgrace,butchecksimposedby
the State upon itself, to exact vigilant
activityfromitssubalterns,andtosecurefor
criminaltrialsthebestevidencethatcanbe
obtained.
Indeed,thereisnoreasonwhyweshoulddenypetitionerthe
benefits accruing from the liberal construction of prescriptive
laws on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates from
theliberalityoftheState.xxxAnydoubtonthismattermustbe
resolved in favor of the grantee thereof, the
accused.39(Italicssupplied)
Inthecaseatbar,itisextantintherecordsthatSyhunliong
filedhiscomplaintagainstRiveramorethanoneyearafterthe
allegedlylibelousmessagewassenttoLuma
_______________
39Supranote37atpp.112113;pp.111112.
177pas.WhetherthedateofthefilingofthecomplaintisApril
16,2007orAugust18,2007, 40itwouldnotalterthefactthatits
institutionwasmadebeyondtheprescriptiveperiodprovidedfor
inArticle90oftheRPC.TheCourtfindsnopersuasivereason
whyRiverashouldbedeprivedofthebenefitsaccruingfromthe
prescriptionofthecrimeascribedtoher.
Peoplev.Castro,41ontheotherhand,isinstructiveanentthe
effectincriminalproceedingsofthefailureofanaccusedtoraise
prescription as a ground in a motion to quash an
information,viz.:
Doesthefailureoftheaccusedtomovetoquashbeforepleading
constituteawaivertoraisethequestionofprescriptionatalater
stageofthecase?
A case in point isPeople vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 387.
xxx [T]he court ruled that the crime had already prescribed
holdingthatthisdefensecannot[b]edeemedwaivedevenifthe
casehadbeendecidedbythelowercourtandwaspendingappeal
intheSupremeCourt.Thephilosophybehindthisrulingwasaptly
statedasfollows:Althoughthegeneralruleisthatthedefenseof
prescriptionisnotavailableunlessexpresslysetupinthelower
court, as in that case it is presumed to have been waived and
cannotbetakenadvantageofthereafter,yetthisruleisnotalways
of absolute application in criminal cases, such as that in which
prescriptionofthecrimeisexpresslyprovidedbylaw,fortheState
nothavingthentherighttoprosecute,orcontinueprosecuting,nor
topunish,orcontinuepunishing,theoffense,ortocontinueholding
thedefendantsubjecttoitsactionthroughtheimpositionofthe
penalty, the court must so declare. And elaborating on this
proposition,theCourtwentontostateasfollows:
Asprescriptionofthecrimeisthelossby
the State of the right to prosecute and
punish the same, it is absolutely
indisputablethatfromthemomenttheState
haslostor
_______________
40Supranote12.
4195Phil.462(1954).
178
waivedsuchright,thedefendantmay,atany
stageoftheproceeding,demandandaskthat
the same be finally dismissed and he be
acquitted from the complaint, and such
petition is proper and effective even if the
court taking cognizance of the case has
already rendered judgment and said
judgmentismerelyinsuspense,pendingthe
resolutionofamotion fora reconsideration
andnewtrial,andthisisthemoresosince
insuchacasethereisnotyetanyfinaland
irrevocablejudgment.
Therulingaboveadvertedtosquarelyappliestothepresent
case.Here,theruleprovidesthatthepleaofprescriptionshould
besetupbeforearraignment,orbeforetheaccusedpleadstothe
charge,asotherwisethedefensewouldbedeemedwaived;but,as
was well said in the Moran case, this rule is not of absolute
application, especially when it conflicts with a substantive
provisionsofthelaw,suchasthatwhichreferstoprescriptionof
crimes. Since, under the Constitution, the Supreme Court has
onlythepowertopromulgaterulesconcerningpleadings,practice
and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law, and
cannotcoversubstantiverights(Section13,ArticleVIII,ofthe
Constitution),theruleweareconsideringcannotbeinterpreted
or given such scope or extent that would come into conflict or
defeatanexpressprovisionofoursubstantivelaw.Oneofsuch Prescription of the crime is already
provisionsisarticle89oftheRevisedPenalCodewhichprovides a compelling reason for this Court to
that the prescription of crime has the effect of totally order the dismissal of the libel in
extinguishing the criminal liability. And so we hold that formation, but the Court still
therulinglaiddownintheMorancasestillholdsgoodevenifit stresses that the text message which
were laid down before the adoption of the present Rules of Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within
Court.42(Italicssupplied)
the purview of a qualified privileged

communication.
WhileCastroisanoldjurisprudence,itstillfindsapplication
inthecaseatbenchinviewofSection9,Rule117oftheRulesof
Court, which in essence partially provides that the defense of
extinctionofcriminalactionorliability,e.g.,pre The rule on privileged communication means that a
communicationmadeingoodfaithonanysubjectmatterinwhich
_______________ thecommunicatorhasaninterest,orconcerningwhichhehasa
duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding
42Id.,atpp.464466. duty.43
Inordertoprovethatastatementfallswithinthepurviewof
aqualifiedprivilegedcommunicationunderArticle354,No.1,the
179scription,isnotdeemedwaivedeveniftheaccusedhadnot following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the
raisedthesameinamotiontoquash.InRiverascase,theissue communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
ofprescriptionisraisedinhercommenttotheinstantpetition communication,oratleast,hadaninteresttopro
beforethisCourt.SyhunliongdoesnotspecificallyrefuteRiveras
averment,thus,itisdeemedadmitted. _______________
Insum,eveniftheCourtweretosustainSyhunliongsstance
that Rivera availed of the wrong remedy when she resorted to 43Noviciov.Aggabao,463Phil.510,517;418SCRA138,144
filing a petition forcertioraribefore the CA to assail the RTC (2003).
ordersdenyingthemotiontoquash,theresultwouldonlyprove
circuitous.Evenifthetrialproceedsandanadversedecisionis
renderedagainstRivera, she can appeal the same, but theCA 180tect,whichinterestmayeitherbehisownoroftheoneto
andthisCourtwouldstillbecompelledtoorderthedismissalof whomitismade;(2)thecommunicationisaddressedtoanofficer
theinformationonaccountofprescriptionofthecrime. or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the
matter,andwhohasthepowertofurnishtheprotectionsought;
and(3)thestatementsinthecommunicationaremadeingood
faithandwithoutmalice.44
Inthecaseatbar,itwasLumapaswhoinformedRiveraof
either the delay or denial of the latters claims for payment of
salaries,benefitsandincentivesbySyhunliong.Riveraexpressed
throughthesubjecttextmessagehergrievancestoLumapas.At
thattime,Lumapaswasthebestperson,whocouldhelpexpedite
thereleaseofRiverasclaims.
Prescindingfromtheabove,theCourtthusfindsnoerrorin
theCAsdeclarationthatRiverastextmessagefallswithinthe
ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she was
speakinginresponsetoduty[toprotectherowninterest]andnot
outofanintenttoinjurethereputation 45ofSyhunliong.Besides,
[t]here was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond
[that]ofconveyingittothepartyconcemed.46
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,the petition
isDENIED.The Decision rendered on July 11, 2011 and
ResolutionissuedonJanuary6,2012bytheCourtofAppealsin
C.A.G.R. S.P.No.110335 ordering theRegional Trial Court of
QuezonCity,Branch84,todismisstheinformationforlibelfiled
by Ramon A. Syhunliong against Teresita D. Rivera
areAFFIRMED.
G.R.No.198240.July3,2013.*
LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS,** petitioner,vs.THE HEIRS OF
THE LATE DR. ANDRES NAVARRO, JR., namely NONITA
NAVARRO, FRANCISCA NAVARRO MALAPITAN, SOLEDAD
NAVARRO BROCHLER, NONITA BARRUN NAVARRO, JR.,
IMELDA NAVARRO, ANDRES NAVARRO III, MILAGROS
NAVARRO YAP, PILAR NAVARRO, TERESA NAVARRO
TABITA,andLOURDESBARRUNREJUSO,respondents.
RemedialLaw;Certiorari;GraveAbuseofDiscretion;Words
andPhrases;Graveabuseofdiscretiondefiesexactdefinition,but
itgenerallyreferstocapriciousorwhimsicalexerciseofjudgment
asisequivalenttolackofjurisdiction.Graveabuseofdiscretion
defies exact definition, but it generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.Theabuseofdiscretionmustbepatentandgrossas
toamounttoanevasionofapositivedutyoravirtualrefusalto
performadutyenjoinedbylaw,ortoactatallincontemplationof
law,aswherethepowerisexercisedinanarbitraryanddespotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility. Grave abuse of
discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the
Constitution or grossly disregards the law or existing
jurisprudence.
Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Specific rules of witness
disqualificationareprovidedunderSections21to24,Rule130of
theRulesonEvidence.Section21disqualifiesawitnessbyreason
of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a
witnessbyreasonofmarriage.Section23disqualifiesawitnessby
reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24
disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged
communication.InArmedForcesofthePhilippinesRetirement
and Separation Benefits System v. Republic of the Philippines,
694SCRA118(2013),wesaidthatawitnessmustonly
_______________
*FIRSTDIVISION.
**Rollo,pp.14,42.WhileLydiaNavarroGragedaisnamed
as copetitioner in the title of the petition, only Luisa Navarro
Marcoshasverifiedit.
659
VOL.700,JULY3,2013 659
 Marcosvs.HeirsoftheLateDr.AndresNavarro,Jr.
possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualificationsprovidedintheRulesofCourt.Section20,Rule
130oftheRulesonEvidenceprovides:SEC.20.Witnesses;their
qualifications.Except as provided in the next succeeding
section,allpersonswhocanperceive,andperceiving,canmake
knowntheirperceptiontoothers,maybewitnesses.Religiousor
politicalbelief,interestintheoutcomeofthecase,orconvictionof
acrimeunlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,shallnotbeaground
fordisqualification.Specificrulesofwitnessdisqualificationare
provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130 of theRules on
Evidence.Section21disqualifiesawitnessbyreasonofmental
incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by
reasonofmarriage.Section23disqualifiesawitnessbyreasonof
deathorinsanityoftheadverseparty.Section24disqualifiesa
witnessbyreasonofprivilegedcommunication.
Same;Same;Same;ExpertWitnesses;Section49,Rule130
of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert
witness may be received in evidence.Section 49, Rule 130 of
theRules of Evidenceis clear that the opinion of an expert
witnessmaybereceivedinevidence,towit:SEC.49.Opinionof
expertwitness.Theopinionofawitnessonamatterrequiring
specialknowledge,skill,experienceortrainingwhichheisshown
topossess,maybereceivedinevidence.Forinstance,inTamani
v. Salvador, 647 SCRA 132 (2011), we were inclined to believe
that Tamanis signature was forged after considering the
testimonyofthePNPdocumentexaminerthatthecaseinvolved
simulated or copied forgery, such that the similarities will be
superficial.Wesaidthatthevalueoftheopinionofahandwriting
expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a
writingisgenuineorfalse,butupontheassistancehemayafford
in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of
writingwhichwouldordinarilyescapenoticeordetectionfroman
unpracticedobserver.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Handwriting Experts;
Jurisprudence is replete with instances wherein this Court
dispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to prove
forgeries.Jurisprudenceisalsorepletewithinstanceswherein
thisCourtdispensed with the testimony of expert witnesses to
prove forgeries. However, we have also recognized that
handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses
consideringthetechnicalnatureoftheprocedureinexam
660
6 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
60
Marcosvs.HeirsoftheLateDr.AndresNavarro,Jr.
ining forged documents. More important, analysis of the
questionedsignatureinthedeedofdonationexecutedbythelate
AndresNavarro,Sr.incrucialtotheresolutionofthecase.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
SiguionReyna,Montecillo&Ongsiakoforpetitioner.
RubenA.SongcoandRicardoButalidforrespondents.
VILLARAMA,JR.,J.:
PetitionerLuisaNavarroMarcosappealstheDecision 1dated
February 28, 2011 and Resolution2dated July 29, 2011 of the
CourtofAppeals(CA)inCAG.R.SPNo.92460.
Theantecedentfactsfollow:
SpousesAndresNavarro,Sr.andConcepcionMedinaNavarro
died in 1958 and 1993, respectively. They left behind several
parcels of land including a 108.3997hectare lot (subject lot)
locatedinCayabon,Milagros,Masbate.3
hespousesweresurvivedbytheirdaughtersLuisaNavarro
Marcos,hereinpetitioner,andLydiaNavarroGrageda,andthe
heirsoftheironlysonAndresNavarro,Jr.TheheirsofAndres,
Jr.aretherespondentsherein.4
Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents
areclaimingexclusiveownershipofthesubjectlot.Respondents
basedtheirclaimontheAffidavitofTransferofReal
_______________
1Id.,atpp.4752.PennedbyAssociateJusticeMarioV.Lopez
withtheconcurrenceofAssociateJusticesMagdangalM.DeLeon
andFranchitoN.Diamante.
2Id.,atpp.5457.
3Id.,atp.48.
4Id.
661
VOL.700,JULY3,2013
Marcosvs.HeirsoftheLateDr.AndresNavarro,Jr.
Property dated May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr. donated the
subjectlottoAndres,Jr.5
Believingthattheaffidavitisaforgery,thesisters,through
Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting
examinationoftheaffidavit.The PNP handwritingexpertPO2
Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.s signature on the
affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr.
werenotwrittenbyoneandthesameperson.6
Thus,thesisterssuedtherespondentsforannulmentofthe
deed of donation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Masbate,wherethecasewasdocketedasCivilCaseNo.5215. 7
After the pretrial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2
Alvarezasawitness.TheyarguedthattheRTCdidnotauthorize
the handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added that
presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their
constitutionalrighttodueprocesssincenonoticewasgivento
thembeforetheexaminationwasconducted.8Thus,PO2Alvarezs
reportisaworthlesspieceofpaperandhertestimonywouldbe
uselessandirrelevant.9
In its Order10dated August 19, 2004, the RTC granted
respondentsmotionanddisqualifiedPO2Alvarezasawitness.
TheRTCruledthatPO2Alvarezssupposedtestimonywouldbe
hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged
handwritingofAndres,Sr.Also,thereisnoneedforPO2Alvarez
tobepresented,ifsheistobepresentedasanexpertwitness,
becausehertestimonyisnotyetneeded.
_______________
5Id.
6Id.
7Id.
661 8Id.,atpp.4849.
9Id.,atp.211.
10CARollo,pp.2425.
662
662 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Marcosvs.HeirsoftheLateDr.AndresNavarro,Jr.
ThesisterssoughtreconsiderationoftheorderbuttheRTC
deniedtheirmotioninanOrder11datedOctober11,2005.
Aggrieved,thesistersfiledapetitionforcertioraribeforethe
CA, which however, dismissed their petition in the assailed
Decision dated February 28, 2011 on the ground that the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2
Alvarezsdisqualificationasawitness.
Later,theCAlikewisedeniedtheirmotionforreconsideration
in its Resolution dated July 29, 2011. The CA refused to take
judicial notice of the decision of another CA Division which
reinstatedCivilCaseNo.5215.TheCAheldthataCAJustice
cannottakejudicialnoticeofdecisionsormatterspendingbefore
anotherDivisionoftheappellatecourtwhereheorsheisnota
member. The CA also held that the sisters were negligent for
belatedlyinformingitthatCivilCaseNo.5215wasreinstated.
Hence,thisappeal.
PetitionerarguesthattheCAerredinrefusingtoreconsider
theassaileddecisioninlightofthereinstatementofCivilCase
No.5215.PetitioneraddsthattheCAerredinnotrulingthatthe
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying PO2
Alvarez as a witness.12They stress that PO2 Alvarez will be
presentedasanexpertwitnesstorenderanopiniononwhether
the disputed handwriting was indeed made by Andres, Sr. or
whetheritisaforgery.13
Intheircomment,14respondentscounterthattheCAproperly
disqualifiedPO2Alvarez.TheyalsoagreedwiththeCAthather
disqualification was mooted by the dismissal of Civil Case No.
5215.
Wefindinfavorofpetitioner.
_______________
11Id.,atp.26.
12Rollo,p.29.
13Id.,atp.35.
14Id.,atpp.530532.
663
VOL.700,JULY3,2013
Marcosvs.HeirsoftheLateDr.AndresNavarro,Jr.
TheCArulingthatthedismissalofCivilCaseNo.5215has
mootedtheissueofPO2Alvarezsdisqualificationasawitness
cannolongerbejustified.Hence,wereversetheCAruling.While
we agree with the CA in considering the RTCs Orders 15which
dismissedCivilCaseNo.5215,weareunabletoagreewithits
refusal to take judicial notice of the Decision 16of another CA
Division which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. Subsequent
proceedingswereevenheldinthereinstatedCivilCaseNo.5215
perOrders17issuedbytheRTCwhichwerealreadysubmittedto
theCA.ThatCivilCaseNo.5215wasreinstatedisafactthat
cannotbeignored.
WealsoagreewithpetitionerthattheRTCcommittedgrave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness.
Graveabuseofdiscretiondefiesexactdefinition,butitgenerally
refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalenttolackofjurisdiction.Theabuseofdiscretionmustbe
patentandgrossastoamounttoanevasionofapositivedutyor
avirtualrefusaltoperformadutyenjoinedbylaw,ortoactatall
incontemplationoflaw,aswherethepowerisexercisedinan
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.18Graveabuseofdiscretionariseswhenalowercourtor
tribunalviolatestheConstitutionorgrosslydisregardsthelawor
existingjurisprudence.19
InArmedForcesofthePhilippinesRetirementandSeparation
Benefits System v. Republic of the Philippines,20we said that a
witnessmustonlypossessallthequalificationsand
_______________
15CARollo,pp.262,267268.
16Id.,atpp.297306.
17Id.,atpp.307308.
663 18Deutsche Bank AG v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 193065,
February27,2012,667SCRA82,100.
19RepublicofthePhilippinesv.Hon.RamonS.Caguioa,et
al.,G.R. No. 174385, February 20, 2013, p. 10, 691 SCRA 306,
322.
20G.R.No.188956,March20,2013,p.5;694SCRA118,125.
664
664 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Marcosvs.HeirsoftheLateDr.AndresNavarro,Jr.
none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court.
Section20,Rule130oftheRulesonEvidence
provides:
SEC.20.Witnesses; their qualifications.Except as
provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who
can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perceptiontoothers,maybewitnesses.
Religiousorpoliticalbelief,interestintheoutcomeof
thecase,orconvictionofacrimeunlessotherwiseprovided
bylaw,shallnotbeagroundfordisqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under
Sections21to24,Rule130oftheRulesonEvidence.Section21
disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of
marriage.Section23disqualifiesawitnessbyreasonofdeathor
insanityoftheadverseparty.Section24disqualifiesawitnessby
reasonofprivilegedcommunication.
InCaviliv.JudgeFlorendo,21wehaveheldthatthe specific
enumeration ofdisqualifiedwitnesses excludesthe operationof
causesofdisabilityotherthanthosementionedintheRules.The
Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not
embodiedtherein.Wesaid:
The generosity with which the Rule allows people to
testify is apparent. Interest in the outcome of a case,
convictionofacrimeunlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,and
religiousbeliefarenotgroundsfordisqualification.
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific
disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies those who are
mentally incapacitatedand children whose tenderage or
immaturity renders them incapable of being witnesses.
Section20providesfordisqualificationbasedonconflictsof
interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for
disqualification based on privileged communications.
Section15ofRule132maynotbearuleondisqualification
_______________
21238Phil.597,602603;154SCRA610,615616(1987).
665
VOL.700,JULY3,2013 665
Marcosvs.HeirsoftheLateDr.AndresNavarro,Jr.
ofwitnessesbutitstatesthegroundswhenawitnessmay
beimpeachedbythepartyagainstwhomhewascalled.
ThereisnoprovisionoftheRulesdisqualifyingparties
declaredindefaultfromtakingthewitnessstandfornon
disqualifiedparties.Thelawdoesnotprovidedefaultasan
exception.The specific enumeration of disqualified
witnesses excludes the operation of causes of
disabilityotherthanthosementionedintheRules.It
is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the
construction of statutes that an express exception,
exemption,orsavingclauseexcludesotherexceptions.xxx
Asageneralrule,wherethereareexpressexceptionsthese
comprisetheonlylimitationsontheoperationofastatute
and no other exception will be implied. xxxThe Rules
should not be interpreted to include an exception
not embodied therein.(Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted.)
AsahandwritingexpertofthePNP,PO2Alvarezcansurely
perceiveandmakeknownherperceptiontoothers.Wehaveno
doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be
disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the
disqualificationsspecifiedundertheRules.Respondentsmotion
todisqualifyhershouldhavebeendeniedbytheRTCforitwas
notbasedonanyofthesegroundsfordisqualification.TheRTC
rather confused the qualification of the witness with the
credibilityandweightofhertestimony.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of theRules
of Evidenceis
clear thatthe opinion of an expert witness may be received in
evidence,towit:
SEC.49.Opinionofexpertwitness.Theopinionofa
witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experienceortrainingwhichheisshowntopossess,may
bereceivedinevidence.
Forinstance,inTamaniv.Salvador,22wewereinclinedtobelieve
that Tamanis signature was forged after considering the
testimonyofthePNPdocumentexaminerthatthecaseinvolved
simulated or copied forgery, such that the similarities will be
superficial.Wesaidthatthevalueoftheopinionofahandwriting
expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a
writingisgenuineorfalse,butupontheassistancehemayafford
in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of
writingwhichwouldordinarilyescapenoticeordetectionfroman
unpracticedobserver.
Thus,wedisagreewiththeRTCthatPO2Alvarezstestimony
would be hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of theRules on
Evidence,PO2Alvarezisallowedtorenderanexpertopinion,as
the PNP document examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the
RTCalreadyruledattheoutsetthatPO2Alvarezstestimonyis
hearsayevenbeforehertestimonyisofferedandsheiscalledto
thewitnessstand.Underthecircumstances,theCAshouldhave
issuedacorrectivewritofcertiorariandannulledtheRTCruling.
True, the use of the word may in Section 49, Rule 130 of
theRules on Evidencesignifies that the use of opinion of an
expertwitnessispermissiveandnotmandatoryonthepartofthe
courts.23Jurisprudenceisalsorepletewithinstanceswhereinthis
Courtdispensedwiththetestimonyofexpertwitnessestoprove
forgeries.24However, we have also recognized that handwriting
experts are often offered as expert witnesses considering the
technical nature of the procedure in examining forged
documents.25More important, analysis of the questioned
signature in the deed of donation executed by the late Andres
Navarro,Sr.incrucialtotheresolutionofthecase.
Insum,theRTCshouldnothavedisqualifiedPO2Alvarezas
awitness.Shehasthequalificationsofwitnessandpossessnone
of the disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the
opinion of an expert witness to be received as evidence.
InTamani,weusedtheopinionofanexpertwitness.Thevalueof
PO2 Alvarezs expert opinion cannot be determined if PO2
Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting
examinationsheconducted.
WHEREFORE,weGRANTthepetition.WeSETASIDEthe
(1)DecisiondatedFebruary28,2011andResolutiondatedJuly
29,2011oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.92460,and(2)
Orders dated August 19, 2004 and October 11, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 5215.
WeDENYrespondents motion to disqualify PO2 Mary Grace
Alvarezasawitness.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
VOL.427,APRIL2,2004 15
Peoplevs.Golimlim
G.R.No.145225.April2,2004.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,vs.SALVADOR
GOLIMLIM@BADONG,appellants.
Witnesses;Mental Retardates;That a person is a mental
retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her
testimony bereft of truth.The trial judges assessment of the
credibility of witnesses testimonies is, as has repeatedly been
held by this Court, accorded great respect on appeal in the
absenceofgraveabuseofdiscretiononitspart,ithavinghadthe
advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial
evidenceincludingthedemeanorofthewitnesses.Inthepresent
case,nocogentreasoncanbeappreciatedtowarrantadeparture
fromthefindingsofthetrialcourtwithrespecttotheassessment
ofEvelynstestimony.ThatEvelynisamentalretardatedoesnot
disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of
truth.
Same;Same;Itisnowuniversallyacceptedthatintellectual
weakness,nomatterwhatformitassumes,isnotavalidobjection
tothecompetencyofawitnesssolongasthelattercanstillgivea available whoknows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our
fairlyintelligentandreasonablenarrativeofthemattertestified
to.InPeople v.Trelles, where the trial court relied heavily on
the therein mentally retarded private complainants testimony
irregardless of her monosyllabic responses and vacillations
between lucidity and ambiguity, this Court held: A mental
retardate or a feebleminded person is not,per se,disqualified
frombeingawitness,hermentalconditionnotbeingavitiationof
her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual
weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid
objectiontothecompetencyofawitnesssolongasthelattercan
still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the
mattertestifiedto.
Same;Same;To be sure, modern rules on evidence have
downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a
witnesstheremedyofex
_______________
THIRDDIVISION.
*
16
1 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
6
Peoplevs.Golimlim
cludingsuchawitnesswhomaybetheonlypersonavailable
whoknowsthefacts,seemineptandprimitive.Itcannotthenbe
gainsaidthatamentalretardatecanbeawitness,dependingon
hisorherabilitytorelatewhatheorsheknows.Ifhisorher
testimonyiscoherent,thesameisadmissibleincourt.Tobesure,
modernrulesonevidencehavedowngradedmentalincapacityas
agroundtodisqualifyawitness.AsobservedbyMcCormick,the
remedyofexcludingsuchawitnesswhomaybetheonlyperson
rulesfollowthemoderntrendofevidence.Thus,inalonglineof
cases,thisCourthasupheldtheconvictionoftheaccusedbased
mainly on statements given in court by the victim who was a
mentalretardate.
Criminal Law;Rape;Mental Retardates;Statutory
Rape;Sexualintercoursewithawomanwhoisamentalretardate
constitutes statutoryrapewhich does notrequireproof that the
accusedusedforceorintimidationinhavingcarnalknowledgeof
the victim for conviction; A quantum of force which may not
suffice when the victim is a normal person may be more than
enough when employed against an imbecile.It is settled that
sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate
constitutesstatutoryrapewhichdoesnotrequireproofthatthe
accusedusedforceorintimidationinhavingcarnalknowledgeof
thevictimforconviction.ThefactofEvelynsmentalretardation
was not, however, alleged in the Information and, therefore,
cannot be the basis for conviction. Such notwithstanding, that
forceandintimidationattendedthecommissionofthecrime,the
modeofcommissionallegedintheInformation,wasadequately
proven. It bears stating herein that the mental faculties of a
retardate being different from those of a normal person, the
degreeofforceneededtooverwhelmhimorherisless.Hence,a
quantum of force which may not suffice when the victim is a
normalperson,maybemorethanenoughwhenemployedagainst
animbecile.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtofSorsogon,
Sorsogon,Br.65.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforappellants.
CARPIOMORALES,J.:
OnappealistheDecision1ofJune9,2000oftheRegionalTrial
Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 65 in Criminal Case No.
241,
_______________
1
Rolloatpp.3145.
17
VOL.427,APRIL2,2004
Peoplevs.Golimlim
findingappellantSalvadorGolimlimaliasBadongguiltybeyond
reasonable doubt of rape, imposing on him the penalty
ofreclusionperpetua,andholdinghimcivillyliableintheamount
ofP50,000.00asindemnity,andP50,000.00asmoraldamages.
TheInformationdatedApril16,1997filedagainstappellant
readsasfollows:
ThatsometimeinthemonthofAugust,1996,atBarangayBical,
Municipality of Bulan, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and
withinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourttheabovenamed
accused,armedwithabladedweapon,bymeansofviolenceand
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Evelyn Canchela
against her will and without her consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
Contrarytolaw.2
Upon arraignment on December 15, 1997, 3appellant, duly
assistedbycounsel,pleadednotguiltytotheoffensecharged.
Thefactsestablishedbytheprosecutionareasfollows:
PrivatecomplainantEvelynG.Canchela(Evelyn),isamental
retardate.Whenhermother,AmparoHachero,leftforSingapore
on May 2, 1996 to work as a domestic helper, she entrusted
Evelyn to the care and custody of her (Amparos) sister Jovita
GubanandherhusbandSalvadorGolimlim,hereinappellant,at
BarangayBical,Bulan,Sorsogon.4
SometimeinAugust1996,Jovitalefttheconjugalresidenceto
meet a certain Rosing,5leaving Evelyn with appellant. Taking
advantage of the situation, appellant instructed private
complainanttosleep,6andsoonaftershehadlaiddown,hekissed
herandtookoffherclothes.7Ashepokedatheranobjectwhich
toEvelynfeltlikeaknife, 8heproceededtoinserthispenisinto
17 hervagina.9Hislustsatisfied,appellantfellasleep.
_______________
2
Id.,atp.10.
3
Recordsatp.29.
4
TSN,August12,1998atp.12.
5
TSN,October14,1998atp.6.
6
TSN,January27,1999atp.9.
 7
Id.,atp.6. FINDINGS: LMP [last menstrual period]: Aug. 96 ?
8
Id.,atp.8. Abd [abdomen]: 7 months AOG [age of gestation]
FHT [fetal heart tone]: 148/min
9
Id.,atpp.10and13.
Presentation: Cephalic
18
Hymen:oldlacerationat3,5,7,&11oclockposition14
18 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
On the same day, the sisters went back to the Investigation
Peoplevs.Golimlim SectionoftheBulanMunicipalPoliceStationbeforewhichthey
WhenJovitaarrived,Evelyntoldheraboutwhatappellantdidto executedtheirswornstatements.15
her.Jovita,however,didnotbelieveherandinfactshescolded
her.10 _______________
Sometime in December of the same year, Lorna Hachero,
Evelynshalfsister,receivedaletterfromtheirmotherAmparo 10
Id.,atp.10.
instructinghertofetchEvelynfromSorsogonandallowherto 11
TSN,June2,1998atp.7.
stay in Novaliches, Quezon City where she (Lorna) resided. 12
Id.,atp.8.
Dutifully, Lorna immediately repaired to appellants home in 13
TSN,August12,1998atp.3.
Bical,andbroughtEvelynwithhertoManila. 14
ExhibitE,Recordsatp.16.
A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna 15
ExhibitB,Recordsatp.12.
suspectedthathersisterwaspregnantasshenoticedhergrowing
19
belly. She thereupon brought her to a doctor at the Pascual
VOL.427,APRIL2,2004 19
GeneralHospitalatBaeza,Novaliches,QuezonCityforcheckup
andultrasoundexamination. Peoplevs.Golimlim
Lornas suspicions were confirmed as the examinations OnFebruary27,1997,Evelyn,assistedbyLorna,filedacriminal
revealedthatEvelynwasindeedpregnant.11Shethusaskedher complaintforrape16againstappellantbeforetheMunicipalTrial
sister how she became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that CourtofBulan,Sorsogon,docketedasCriminalCaseNo.6272.
appellanthadsexualintercoursewithherwhileholdingaknife.12 InthemeantimeoronMay7,1997,Evelyngavebirthtoa
InFebruaryof1997,thesistersleftforBulan,Sorsogonfor girl,JoanaCanchela,atGuruyan,Juban,Sorsogon.17
thepurposeoffilingacriminalcomplaintagainstappellant.The Appellant, on being confronted with the accusation, simply
police in Bulan, however, advised them to first have Evelyn saidthatitisnottrue[b]ecausehermindisnotnormal, 18she
examined.Obliging,thetworepairedonFebruary24,1997tothe havingmentionedmanyothernamesofmenwhoha[d]sexual
Municipal Health Office of Bulan, Sorsogon where Evelyn was intercoursewithher.19
examined by Dr. Estrella Payoyo.13The Medicolegal Report Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by the present
appealed Decision, convicted appellant as charged. The
revealedthefollowingfindings,quotedverbatim:
dispositiveportionofthedecisionreads:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,accusedSalvadorGolimlim Peoplevs.Golimlim
havingbeenfoundguiltyofthecrimeofRAPE(Art.335R.P.C.as AppellantarguesthatEvelynstestimonyisnotcategoricalandis
amended by RA 7659) beyond reasonable doubt is hereby repletewithcontradictions,thusengenderinggravedoubtsasto
sentencedtosufferthepenaltyofRECLUSIONPERPETUA,and hiscriminalculpability.
toindemnifytheoffendedpartyEvelynCanchelaintheamount IngivingcredencetoEvelynstestimonyandfindingagainst
of P50,000.00 as indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral appellant, the trial court made the following observations,
damage[s],andtopaythecosts. quotedverbatim:
SOORDERED.20
Hence,thepresentappeal,appellantassigningtothetrialcourt 1. 1)Despiteherweakanddullmentalstatethevictimwas
thefollowingerrors: consistentinherclaimthatherPapayBadong(accused
Salvador Golimlim) had carnal knowledge of her and
1. I.THE COURTA QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING wastheauthorofherpregnancy,andnobodyelse(See:
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE ForcomparisonherSwornStatementonp.3/Record;her
CONTRADICTORYANDIMPLAUSIBLETESTIMONY narration in the Psychiatric Report on pp. 47 &
OF EVELYN CANCHELA, A MENTAL RETARDATE, 48/Record;theTSNsofhertestimonyinopencourt);
[AND]
2. 2)She remains consistent that her Papay Badong raped
2. II.THECOURTAQUOGRAVELYERREDINFINDING heronlyonce;
THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT
FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN 3. 3)That the contradictory statements she made in open
BEYONDREASONABLEDOUBT.21 court relative to the details of how she was raped,
althoughwould seem derogatory toher credibility and
_______________ reliability as a witness under normal conditions, were
amplyexplainedbythepsychiatristwhoexaminedher
16
Recordsatp.7. andsupportedbyherfindings(See:ExhibitsFtoF
17
ExhibitD,Recordsatp.127. 2);
18
TSN,September20,1999atp.4.
19
Ibid. 4. 4)Despiteherclaimthatseveralpersonslaidontopofher
20
Rolloatp.45. (which is still subject to question considering that the
21
Id.,atp.80. victimcouldnotelaborateonitsmeaning),thelucidfact
20 remainsthatsheneverpointedtoanybodyelseasthe
20 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED authorofherpregnancy,butherPapayBadong.Which
 only shows that the trauma that was created in her
mind by the incident has remained printed in her
memory despite her weak mental state. Furthermore,
grantingforthesakeofargumentthatothermenalso
laidontopofher,thisdoesnotdeviatefromthefactthat
herPapayBadong(theaccused)hadsexualintercourse
withher.22
The trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses
testimonies is, as has repeatedly been held by this Court,
accordedgreatrespectonappealintheabsenceofgraveabuseof
discretion on its part, it having had the advantage of actually
examining both real and testimonial evidence including the
demeanorofthewitnesses.23
Inthe present case, no cogent reason can beappreciated to
warrant a departure from the findings of the trial court with
respecttotheassessmentofEvelynstestimony.
_______________
Id.,atpp.3839.
22
People v. De Guzman,372 SCRA 95, 101 (2001),People v.
23
Balisnomo,265SCRA98,104(1996)(citationsomitted).
21
VOL.427,APRIL2,2004
Peoplevs.Golimlim
ThatEvelynisamentalretardatedoesnotdisqualifyherasa
witnessnorrenderhertestimonybereftoftruth.
Sections20and21ofRule130oftheRevisedRulesofCourt
provide:
SEC.20.Witnesses;theirqualifications.Exceptasprovidedin
the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving,canmakeknowntheirperceptiontoothers,maybe
witnesses.
xxx
SEC. 21.Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or
immaturity.Thefollowingpersonscannotbewitnesses:
1. (a)Those whose mental condition, at the time of their
production for examination, is such that they are
incapableofintelligentlymakingknowntheirperception
toothers;
2. (b)Childrenwhosementalmaturityissuchastorender
themincapableofperceivingthefactsrespectingwhich
theyareexaminedandofrelatingthemtruthfully.
InPeoplev.Trelles,24wherethetrialcourtreliedheavilyonthe
therein mentally retarded private complainants testimony
irregardless of her monosyllabic responses and vacillations
betweenlucidityandambiguity,thisCourtheld:
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not,per
se,disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not
beingavitiationofhercredibility.Itisnowuniversallyaccepted
thatintellectualweakness, no matter whatformitassumes, is
notavalidobjectiontothecompetencyofawitnesssolongasthe
21
lattercanstillgiveafairlyintelligentandreasonablenarrativeof
themattertestifiedto.25
It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a
witness,dependingonhisorherabilitytorelatewhatheorshe
knows.26If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is
admissibleincourt.27
Tobesure,modernrulesonevidencehavedowngradedmental
incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness. As observed by
McCormick,theremedyofexcludingsuchawitnesswhomaybe statusexaminationforthree(3)timesandItriedtoseetheconsistencyin
theonlypersonavailablewho thenarrationbutverypoor(sic)ingivingdetails.
xxx
_______________
Q: Mayweknowwhatsherelatedtoyou?
24
340SCRA652(2000). A: SherelatedtomethatshewasrapedbyheruncleTatayBadong.Whatshe
25
Id.,atp.658(citationsomitted). mentionedwasthat,andIquote:hinilaangpantyko,pinasokangpisotat
26
Peoplev.DelosSantos,364SCRA142,156(2001). bayagniyasapipiko.Shewouldlaughinappropriatelyaftertellingmethat
27
People v. Lubong,332 SCRA 672, 690 (2000) (citation particularincident.Ialsotriedtoaskherregardingthedates,thetimeofthe
omitted). incident,butshecouldnotreally....Itriedtoelicitthoseimportantthings,
22 butthepatienthadahardtimerememberingthosedates.
22 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
_______________
Peoplevs.Golimlim
knowsthefacts,seemsineptandprimitive.Ourrulesfollowthe
People v. Espanola,271 SCRA 689, 709 (1997) (citations
28
moderntrendofevidence.28
omitted).
Thus, in a long line of cases,29this Court has upheld the
conviction of the accused based mainly on statements given in
29
People v. Agravante,338 SCRA 13(2000),People
courtbythevictimwhowasamentalretardate. v.Padilla,301 SCRA 265(1999),People v. Malapo,294 SCRA
Fromameticulousscrutinyoftherecordsofthiscase,thereis 579(1998),People v.Balisnomo,265 SCRA 98(1996),People
noreasontodoubtEvelynscredibility.Tobesure,hertestimony v.Gerones,193SCRA263(1991).
is not without discrepancies, given of course her 30
TSN,December21,1998atp.10.
feeblemindedness. 23
By the account of Dr. Chona CuyosBelmonte, Medical VOL. 23
SpecialistIIatthePsychiatricDepartmentoftheBicolMedical 427,
Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn was suffering
APRIL2,
from moderate mental retardation with an IQ of 46, 30she is
2004
capableofperceivingandrelatingeventswhichhappenedtoher.
Thusthedoctortestified: Peoplevs.Golimlim
Q: Sodoyoutrytoimpressthatalthoughsheanswersingeneraltermsitdoes Q: Butconsideringthatyouhaveevaluatedhermentally,gaveherI.Q.
notnecessarilymeanthatshemightbeinventinganswersonlythatshe test,inyourhonestopinion,doyoubelievethatthisnarrationbythe
couldnotgotothespecificdetailsbecauseofdullness? patienttoyouabouttherapeisreliable?
A: IdontthinkshewasinventingheranswerbecauseIconductedmental A: Yes,sir.
Q: Whydoyouconsiderthatreliable?
A: Beinga(sic)moderatelyretarded,Ihavenoticedthespontaneityof
heranswersduringthetimeofthetesting.Shewasnoteven
hesitatingwhenshetoldmeshewasrapedonceathomebyher
TatayBadong;andshewaslaughingwhenshetoldmeabouthowit
wasdoneon(sic)her.So,althoughshemaybeinappropriatebut
(sic)shewasspontaneous,shewasconsistent.
Q: Now,Iwouldliketorelatetoyouanincidentthathappenedinthis
Courtforyoutogiveusyourexpertopinion.Itriedtopresentthe
victiminthiscasetotestify.Whileshetestifiedthatshewasraped
byheruncleBadong,whenaskedaboutthedetails,thereof,she
wouldnotmake(sic)thedetail.Sheonlyansweredwala(no).Iask
thisquestionbecausesomehowthisseemsrelatedtoyourprevious
evaluationthatwhileshegaveananswer,shegavenodetail.Now,I
wasthinkingbecauseIamamanandIwastheoneaskingandthe
Judgeisamanalso.Andwhilethemotherwouldsaythatshewould
relatetoherandsherelatedtoyou,canyouexplaintouswhywhen
shewaspresentedincourtthatoccurrence,thateventhappened?
A: Therearealotofpossibleanswerstothatquestion;one,isthe
courtsatmosphereitself.Thismayhavebroughtalittleanxietyon
thepartofthepatientandthisinhibitsherfromrelatingsomeofthe
detailsrelativetotheincidentinquestion.WhenIconductedmy
interviewwiththepatient,therewereonlytwo(2)ofusintheroom.
Inormallydonotaskthisquestionduringthefirstsessionwiththe
patientbecausetheseareemotionallyleadingquestions,andIdonot
expectthepatienttobeverytrusting.So,Iusuallyaskthistypeof
questionsduringthelaterpartofmyexaminationtomakeherrelax
duringmyevaluation.Sointhisway,shewillbemorecooperative
withme.Idontthinkthatthiskindofatmospherewithinthe
courtroomwithsomepeoplearound,thiscouldhaveinhibitedthe
patientfromansweringquestions.
xxx
Q: Whatifthevictimisbeingcoachedorledbysomeoneelse,willshe
beabletoanswerthequestions?
A: Yes,shemaybeabletoanswerthequestions,butyouwouldnotice
theinconsistencyoftheanswersbecausewhatwenormallydoisthat
wepresentthequestionsindifferentways,andweexpectthesame
answer.Thisishowwetrytoevaluatethe
24
24 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Golimlim
patient.Iftheperson,especiallyaretarded,isbeingcoachedbysomebody,
theanswerswillnolongerbeconsistent.
Q: Youalsomentionedawhileagothattheanswersgivenbythepatient,taken
allinall,wereconsistent?
A: Yes,sir.31(Italicssupplied)
AsnotedintheabovequotedtestimonyofDr.Belmonte,Evelyn
couldgivespontaneousandconsistentanswerstothesamebut
differently framed questions under conditions which do not
inhibitherfromanswering.Itcouldhavebeeninthislightthat
Evelynwasabletorelateincourt,uponexaminationbyafemale
governmentprosecutorandtheexclusionofthepublicfromthe
proceedings, on Dr. Belmontes suggestion,32how, as quoted
below,shewasrapedandthatitwasappellantwhodidit:
Q: LornaHacherotestifiedbeforethisCourtthatyougavebirthtoababygirl
namedJohanna,isthistrue?
A: (Thewitnessnods,yes.)
xxx
Q: WhoisthefatherofJohanna?
A: PapayBadong
Q: WhoisthisPapayBadongthatyouarereferringto? A: Iwasscoldedbythewife,MamayBita.
A: ThehusbandofMamayBita. Q: Iamreferringtothatverymomentwhenyouwereundressed.
Q: Ishehereincourt? ImmediatelyafteryourPapayBadongundressedyou,whatdidyou
A: Heishere. do?
Q: Pleaselookaroundandpointhimtous. xxx
A: (Thewitnesspointingtothelonemansittinginthefirstrowofthegallery A: Helaidontopofme.
wearingaregularprisonorangetshirtwhogavehisnameasSalvador Q: Whatwasyourpositionwhenhelaidontopofyou?
Golimlimwhenasked.) A: Iwaslyingdown.
Q: WhywereyouabletosaythatitisPapayBadongwhoisthefatherofyour Q: Thenafterhewentontopofyou,whatdidhedothere?
childJohanna? A: Hemade(sic)sexualintercoursewithme.
A: BecausethenIwasleftatMamayBitashouse,althoughIamnotthere Q: Whenyousaidhehada(sic)sexualintercoursewithyou,whatdid
now. hedoexactly?
Q: AndthathousewhereyouwereleftisalsothehouseofyourPapay A: Hekissedme.
Badong? Q: Where?
A: Yesmaam. A: Onthecheeks(witnessmotioningindicatinghercheeks).
Q: Whatelsedidhedo?PleasedescribebeforethisHonorableCourt
_______________ thesexualintercoursewhichyouarereferringtowhichtheaccused
didtoyou.
Id.,atpp.921.
31
A: Initoyandhesleptafterthat.
Id.,atpp.1314.
32
(toCourt)
25
Nevertheless,maywerequestthatthelocaltermforsexual
VOL.427, 25
intercourse,thewordInitoywhichwasusedbythewitnessbeput
APRIL2,
ontherecord,andwerequestjudicialnoticeofthefact
2004
thatinitoyisthelocaltermforsexualintercourse.
Peoplevs.Golimlim
xxx
Q: WhatdidSalvadorGolimlimoryourPapayBadongdotoyou
Q: WhatdidyoufeelwhenyourPapayBadonghadsexualintercourse
thatswhyyouwereabletosaythatheisthefatherofyourchild?
withyou?
A: Iwasundressedbyhim.
A: Ifeltaknife;itwaslikeaknife.
xxx
Q: Wheredidyoufeelthatknife?
Q: Whatdidyoudoafteryouwereundressed?
A: Iforgot.
 Q: WhydidyouallowyourPapayBadongtohavesexualintercourse thecrimewascommittedin1996),thetrialcourtdidnotspecify
withyou? under which mode the crime was committed. Under the said
A: Iwillnotconsenttoit. article,rapeiscommittedthus:
xxx ART.335.Whenandhowrapeiscommitted.Rapeiscommitted
26 by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
26 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED followingcircumstances.

Peoplevs.Golimlim
1. 1.Byusingforceorintimidation;
Q: Didyoulikewhathedidtoyou?
A: Idonotwantit. 2. 2.When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
Q: Butwhydidithappen? unconscious;and
A: Iwasforcedto.
xxx _______________
Q: DidyoufeelanythingwhenheinsertedintoyourvaginawhenyourPapay
Badonglaidontopofyou?
33
TSN,January27,1999atpp.413.
A: Hissexualorgan/penis.
34
People v. De Guzman,372 SCRA 95, 111 (2001) (citations
Q: HowdidyouknowthatitwasthepenisofyourPapayBadongthatwas omitted),People v. Glabo,371 SCRA 567, 573 (2001) (citations
enteredintoyourvagina? omitted),People v. Lalingjaman,364 SCRA 535, 546 (2001)
A: Itwasputontopofme. (citationsomitted),Peoplev.Agravante,338SCRA13,20(2000).
Q: Diditenteryourvagina? 27
A: Yes,YourHonor. VOL.427,APRIL2,2004 27
xxx Peoplevs.Golimlim
Q: MadamWitness,isittruethatyourPapayBadonginsertedhispenisinto
yourvaginaorsexualorganduringthattimethathewasontopofyou? 1. 3.When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
A: (Thewitnessnods,yes.)33(Italicssupplied)
Appellantsbaredenialisnotonlyaninherentlyweakdefense.It
isnotsupportedbyclearandconvincingevidence.Itcannotthus Thecrimeofrapeshallbepunishedbyreclusionperpetua.
prevailoverthepositivedeclarationofEvelynwhoconvincingly Wheneverthecrimeof rape iscommittedwiththeuse of a
identifiedhimasherrapist.34 deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
InconvictingappellantunderArticle335oftheRevisedPenal bereclusionperpetuaordeath.
Code,asamendedbyRepublicAct7659(thelawinforcewhen xxx
It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a
mental retardate constitutes statutory rape which does not
require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in
havingcarnalknowledgeofthevictimforconviction. 35Thefactof
Evelyns mental retardation was not, however, alleged in the
Information and, therefore, cannot be the basis for conviction.
Suchnotwithstanding,thatforceandintimidationattendedthe
commissionofthecrime,themodeofcommissionallegedinthe
Information,wasadequatelyproven.Itbearsstatinghereinthat
thementalfacultiesofaretardatebeingdifferentfromthoseofa
normalperson,thedegreeofforceneededtooverwhelmhimor
herisless.Hence,aquantumofforcewhichmaynotsufficewhen
thevictimisanormalperson,maybemorethanenoughwhen
employedagainstanimbecile.36
Still under the abovequoted provision of Art. 335 of the
RevisedPenalCode,whenthecrimeofrapeiscommittedwith
the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall bereclusion
perpetuatodeath.Inthecaseatbar,however,althoughthereis
adequateevidenceshowingthatappellantindeedusedforceand
intimidation, that is not the case with respect to the use of a
deadlyweapon.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
CourtofSorsogon,Sorsogon,Branch65inCriminalCaseNo.241
finding appellant, Salvador Golimlim alias Badong, GUILTY
beyondreasonabledoubtofrape,whichthisCourtfindstohave
been committed under paragraph 1, Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, and holding him civilly liable therefor, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Costsagainstappellant.
72 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Alvarezvs.Ramirez
G.R.No.143439.October14,2005.*
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, petitioner,vs.SUSAN RAMIREZ,
respondent.
Remedial Law;Evidence;Witnesses;Words and
Phrases;MaritalDisqualification;Duringtheirmarriage,neither
the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other
withouttheconsentoftheaffectedspouse,exceptinacivilcaseby
oneagainsttheother,orinacriminalcaseforacrimecommitted
by one against the other or the latters direct descendants or
ascendants.Section22,Rule130oftheRevisedRulesofCourt
provides: Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage.
During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may
testifyfororagainsttheotherwithouttheconsentoftheaffected
spouse, exceptin a civil case by one against the other, orina
criminalcaseforacrimecommittedbyoneagainsttheotheror
thelattersdirectdescendantsorascendants.Thereasonsgiven
fortheruleare:1.Thereisidentityofinterestsbetweenhusband
andwife;2.Ifoneweretotestifyfororagainsttheother,thereis
consequentdangerofperjury;3.Thepolicyofthelawistoguard
thesecurityandconfidencesofprivatelife,evenattheriskofan
occasionalfailureofjustice,andtopreventdomesticdisunionand
unhappiness;and4.Wherethereiswantofdomestictranquility
there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimonyoftheother.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
 MarvinH.Mesiaforpetitioner.
PonceEnrile,Reyes&Manalastasforrespondent.
_______________
THIRDDIVISION.
*
73
VOL.473,OCTOBER14,2005
Alvarezvs.Ramirez
SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari 1assailing the
Decision2oftheCourtofAppealsdatedMay31,2000inCAG.R.
SP No. 56154, entitled SUSAN RAMIREZ, petitioner, versus,
HON. BENJAMIN M. AQUINO, JR., as JUDGE RTC,
MALABON,MM,BR.72,andMAXIMOALVAREZ,respondents.
SusanRamirez,hereinrespondent,isthecomplainingwitness
in Criminal Case No. 19933MN for arson 3pending before the
RegionalTrialCourt, Branch72,MalabonCity.Theaccusedis
Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of
EsperanzaG.Alvarez,sisterofrespondent.
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza
Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness against
petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no
objection.
Esperanzatestifiedasfollows:
ATTY.ALCANTARA:
WearecallingMrs.EsperanzaAlvarez,thewifeoftheaccused,YourHonor.
COURT:
Swearinthewitness.
xxx
ATTY.MESIAH:(sic)
YourHonor,weareofferingthetestimonyofthiswitnessforthepurposeof
provingthattheaccusedMaximoAlvarezcommittedalltheelementsofthe
crimebeingchargedparticularlythataccusedMaximoAlvarezpour
_______________
73 1
UnderRule45,Section1ofthe1997RevisedRulesofCivil
Procedure,asamended.
2
PennedbyJusticePortiaAlioHormachuelosandconcurred
inbyJusticeMa.AliciaAustriaMartinez(nowamemberofthis
Court)andJusticeElviJohnS.Asuncion.
3
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 19933MN and captioned
PeopleofthePhilippinesvs.MaximoAlvarez.
74
74 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Alvarezvs.Ramirez
onMay29,1998gasolineinthehouselocatedatBlk.5,Lot9,Phase1C,
Dagatdagatan,Navotas,MetroManila,thehouseownedbyhissisterin
lawSusanRamirez;thataccusedMaximoAlvarezafterpouringthe
gasolineonthedoorofthehouseofSusanRamirezignitedandsetitonfire;
thattheaccusedatthetimehesuccessfullysetthehouseonfire(sic)of
SusanRamirezknewthatitwasoccupiedbySusanRamirez,themembers
ofthefamilyaswellasEsperanzaAlvarez,theestrangedwifeofthe
accused;thatasaconsequenceoftheaccusedinsuccessfullysettingthe
firetothehouseofSusanRamirez,thedoorofsaidhousewasburnedand
togetherwithseveralarticlesofthehouse,includingshoes,chairsand
others.
COURT:
Youmayproceed.
 xxx pursuanttoRule130oftheRevisedRulesofCourtonmarital
DIRECTEXAMINATION disqualification.
ATTY.ALCANTARA: Respondent filed an opposition6to the motion. Pending
resolutionofthemotion,thetrialcourtdirectedtheprosecution
xxx
toproceedwiththepresentationoftheotherwitnesses.
Q: Whenyouwereabletofindthesource,incidentallywhatwasthesourceof
OnSeptember2,1999,thetrialcourtissuedthequestioned
thatscent? Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying
A: WhenIstandbythewindow,sir,Isawamanpouringthegasolineinthe and deleting her testimony from the records. 7The prosecution
houseofmysister(andwitnesspointingtothepersonoftheaccusedinside filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other
thecourtroom). assailedOrderdatedOctober19,1999.8
Q: Fortherecord,Mrs.Witness,canyoustatethenameofthatperson,ifyou This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining
know? witnessinCriminalCaseNo.19933MN,tofilewiththeCourtof
Appealsapetitionforcertiorari 9withapplicationforpreliminary
A: Heismyhusband,sir,MaximoAlvarez.
injunctionandtemporaryrestrainingorder.10
Q: IfthatMaximoAlvarezyouwereabletosee,canyouidentifyhim?
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision
A: Yes,sir. nullifyingandsettingasidetheassailedOrdersissuedbythetrial
Q: IfyoucanseehiminsidetheCourtroom,canyoupleasepointhim? court.
A: Witnesspointingtoapersonandwhenaskedtostandandaskedhisname, Hence,thispetitionforreviewoncertiorari.
hegavehisnameasMaximoAlvarez.4 TheissueforourresolutioniswhetherEsperanzaAlvarezcan
testifyagainstherhusbandinCriminalCaseNo.19933MN.
_______________
_______________
4
TranscriptofStenographicNotes(TSN),June21,1999atpp.
37. 5
Rolloatpp.4447.
75 6
Id.,atpp.4858.
VOL.473,OCTOBER14,2005 75 7
Id.,atpp.8587.
Alvarezvs.Ramirez 8
Id.,atp.88.
InthecourseofEsperanzasdirecttestimonyagainstpetitioner, 9
UnderRule65,Section1ofthe1997RevisedRulesonCivil
the latter showed uncontrolled emotions, prompting the trial Procedure,asamended.
judgetosuspendtheproceedings. 10
Rolloatpp.101134.
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a 76
motion5to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him 76 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
 Alvarezvs.Ramirez
Section22,Rule130oftheRevisedRulesofCourtprovides:
Sec. 22.Disqualification by reason of marriage.During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
exceptinacivilcasebyoneagainsttheother,orinacriminal
caseforacrimecommittedbyoneagainsttheotherorthelatters
directdescendantsorascendants.
Thereasonsgivenfortheruleare:
1. 1.Thereisidentityofinterestsbetweenhusbandandwife;
2. 2.Ifoneweretotestifyfororagainsttheother,thereis
consequentdangerofperjury;
3. 3.The policy of the law is to guard the security and
confidences of private life, even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic
disunionandunhappiness;and
4. 4.Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is
danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimonyoftheother.11
Butlikeallothergeneralrules,themaritaldisqualificationrule
hasitsownexceptions,bothincivilactionsbetweenthespouses
andincriminalcasesforoffensescommittedbyoneagainstthe
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound
reasonswhich,intheexceptedcases,outweighthoseinsupportof
thegeneralrule.Forinstance, wherethemaritalanddomestic
relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preservednorpeaceandtranquilitywhichmaybedisturbed,the
reasonbaseduponsuchharmonyandtranquilityfails.Insucha
case,identityofin
_______________
Peoplevs.Francisco,No.L568,July16,1947,78Phil.694,
11
andCargillvs.State,220,Pac.,64,65;25Okl.Cr.,314;35A.L.R.,
133.
77
VOL.473,OCTOBER14,2005 77
Alvarezvs.Ramirez
terestsdisappearsandtheconsequentdangerofperjurybasedon
that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the
security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at
protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their
absence,merelyleaveavoidintheunhappyhome.12
InOrdoovs.Daquigan,13thisCourtheld:
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this
jurisdiction,isthatlaiddowninCargilvs.State,35ALR133,220
Pac.64,25Okl.314,whereinthecourtsaid:
Therulethattheinjurymustamounttoaphysicalwrongupon
thepersonistoonarrow;andtherulethatanyoffenseremotely
or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the
exceptionistoobroad.Thebetterruleisthat,whenanoffense
directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal
relation,itcomeswithintheexceptiontothestatutethatoneshall
not be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecutionforacrimecommittee(by)oneagainsttheother.
Obviously,theoffenseofarsonattributedtopetitioner,directly
impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife
Esperanza.Hisact,asembodiedintheInformationforarsonfiled
againsthim,eradicatesallthemajoraspectsofmaritallifesuch
as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the
conjugalrelationshipsurvivesandflourishes.
AscorrectlyobservedbytheCourtofAppeals:
Theactofprivaterespondentinsettingfiretothehouseofhis
sisterinlawSusanRamirez,knowingfullywellthathiswifewas
there,andinfactwiththeallegedintentofinjuringthelatter,is
an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital
relationwhichthedisqualificationprimarilyseekstoprotect.The
criminalactcomplainedofhadtheeffectofdirectlyandvitally
impairingthe
_______________
Peoplevs.Francisco,Id.
12
No.L39012,January31,1975,62SCRA270.
13
78
78 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Alvarezvs.Ramirez
conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and
domestic relations between her and the accusedhusband have
become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or
tranquilitytobepreserved.TheSupremeCourthasheldthatin
such a case, identity is nonexistent. In such a situation, the
security and confidences of private life which the law aims to
protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence,
merely leave a void in the unhappy home. (People v.
Castaeda,271SCRA504[1997]).Thus,thereisnolongerany
reasontoapplytheMaritalDisqualificationRule.
Itshouldbestressedthatasshownbytherecords,priortothe
commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner
andhiswifewasalreadystrained.Infact,theywereseparatedde
factoalmostsixmonthsbeforetheincident.Indeed,theevidence
andfactspresentedrevealthatthepreservationofthemarriage
between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the
Stateaimstoprotect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being
interestedinlayingthetruthbeforethecourtssothattheguilty
may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the
righttoofferthedirecttestimonyofEsperanza,evenagainstthe
objection of the accused, because (as stated by this Court
inFrancisco14), it was the latter himself who gave rise to its
necessity.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.Thetrialcourt,RTC,Branch72,MalabonCity,is
orderedtoallowEsperanzaAlvareztotestifyagainstpetitioner,
her husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933MN. Costs against
petitioner.
SOORDERED.
Panganiban(Chairman),Corona,CarpioMoralesandGa
rcia,JJ.,concur.
Judgmentaffirmed.
_______________
14
Supra.
562 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Castaeda,Jr.
No.L46306.February27,1979.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.HON.
MARIANOC.CASTAEDA,JR.,asJudgeoftheCourtofFirst
Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, and BENJAMIN F.
MANALOTO,respondents.
 Criminal Procedure;Wife may testify against husband for voidintheunhappyhome.Thus,thereisnoreasontoapplythe
crimeoffalsificationofadeedofsaleofconjugalhouseandlot maritaldisqualificationrule.
wherewifewasmadetoappearashavinggivenfarconsenttothe
ORIGINALACTIONintheSupremeCourt.Certiorariand
sale.Withmorereasonmusttheexceptionapplytotheinstant injunction.
casewherethevictimofthecrimeandthepersonwhostandsto
bedirectlyprejudic ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Fiscal Regidor Y. AglipayandSpecial Counsel Vicente
_______________
Macalinoforpetitioner.
SECONDDIVISION.
* MoisesSevillaOcampoforprivatepetitioner.
563 CiceroJ.Punzalanforrespondent.
VOL.88,FEBRUARY27,1979 563
Peoplevs.Castaeda,Jr. SANTOS,J.:
ed by the falsification is not a third person but the wife
herself.Anditisundeniablethatthecriminalactcomplainedof Onthebasisofthecomplaint 1ofhiswife,VictoriaM.Manaloto,
had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal hereinprivaterespondentBenjaminManalotowaschargedbefore
relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in theCourtofFirstInstanceofPampanga,presidedbyrespondent
personallylodginghercomplaintwiththeofficeoftheProvincial Judge, Hon, Mariano C. Castaeda, Jr., with the crime of
Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the Falsification of Public Document committed, according to the
instantpetition,whichseekstosetasidetheorderdisqualifying Information,asfollows:
herfromtestifyingagainstherhusband.Takencollectively,the Thatonoraboutthe19thdayofMay,1975,intheMunicipalityof
actuations of the witnesswife underscore the fact that the SanFernando,provinceofPampanga,Philippines,andwithinthe
martial and domestic relations between her and the accused jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused
husbandhavebecomesostrainedthatthereisnomoreharmony BEN
to be preserved nor peace and tranguility which may be
disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in _______________
previous decisions, identity of interests disappears and the 1
SeeAnnexesA,B,andB1ofthePetition(Rollo,pp,11
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is
15).
nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
564
confidencesofprivatelifewhichthelawaimsatprotectingwillbe
nothingbutidealswhich,throughtheirabsence,merelyleavea 564 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Castaeda,Jr.
JAMIN F. MANALOTO, with deliberate intent to commit
falsification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously counterfeit, imitate and forge the signature of his
spouseVictoriaM.Manalotoinadeedofsaleexecutedbysaid
accusedwhereinhesoldahouseandlotbelongingtotheconjugal
partnershipofsaidspouseinfavorofPoncianoLacsamanaunder
Doc. No. 1957, Page No. 72, Book No. LVII, Series of 1975,
notarized by Notary Public Abraham Pa. Gorospe, thereby
makingitappearthathisspouseVictoriaM.Manalotogaveher
marital consent tosaid salewhen in fact and in truth she did
not.2
At the trial, theprosecution called the complainantwifeto the
witness stand but the defense moved to disqualify her as a
witness,invokingSec.20,Rule130oftheRevisedRulesofCourt
whichprovides:
SEC.20.Disqualificationbyreasonofinterestorrelationship.
Thefollowingpersonscannottestifyastomattersinwhichthey
areinterested,directlyorindirectly,ashereinenumerated:
xxxxxxxxxx 1977,4anditsMemoranduminsupportofthePetitiononAugust
(b) A husband can not be examined for or against his wife
without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband
without his consent, except in a civil case by one against the
other,orinacriminalcaseforacrimecommittedbyoneagainst
theother.
Theprosecutionopposedsaidmotiontodisqualifyontheground
that the case falls under the exception to the rule, contending
thatitisacriminalcaseforacrimecommittedbyoneagainst
the other. Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge
granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from
testifyingfororagainstherhusband,inanorderdatedMarch31,
1977.Amotionforreconsiderationwasfiledbutwasdeniedby
respondentJudgeinanorderdatedMay19,1977.
Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by the office of the
Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines,
seekingtosetasidetheaforesaidordersoftherespondentJudge
andprayingthatapreliminaryinjunctionoratem
_______________
2
AnnexCofthePetition(Rollo,pp.1617).
565
VOL.88,FEBRUARY27,1979 565
Peoplevs.Castaeda,Jr.
poraryrestrainingorder beissuedbythisCourtenjoiningsaid
judgefromfurtherproceedingwiththetrialofaforesaidCriminal
CaseNo.1011.
On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved(a) to issue a
temporary restraining order, and (b) to require the Solicitor
Generaltoappearascounselforthepetitioner. 3TheOfficeofthe
Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance on June 27,
30, 1977.5The respondents filed their Memorandum on
September 5, 1977.6Whereupon, the case was considered
submittedfordecision.7
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents
emergesthesoleissuesdeterminativeoftheinstantpetition,to
wit:WhetherornotthecriminalcaseforFalsificationofPublic
Document filed against herein private respondent Benjamin F.
Manalotowhoallegedlyforgedthesignatureofhiswife,Victoria
M.Manaloto,inadeadofsale,therebymakingitappearthatthe
latter gave her marital consent to the sale of a house and lot
belongingtotheirconjugalpartnershipwheninfactandintruth
she did notmay be considered as a criminal case for a crime
committed by a husband against his wife, and, therefore, an
exceptiontotheruleonmaritaldisqualification.
 Wesustainpetitionersstandthatthecaseisanexceptionto
themaritaldisqualificationrule,asacriminalcaseforacrime
committedbytheaccusedhusbandagainstthewitnesswife.
1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of
FalsificationofPublicDocumentistheforgerybytheaccusedof
hiswifessignatureinadeedofsale,therebymakingitappear
thereinthatsaidwife consented tothesale of ahouseandlot
belongingtotheirconjugalpartnershipwheninfactandintruth
shedidnot.Itmustbenotedthathadthesaleofthesaidhouse
andlot,andthesigningofthewilesnamebyherhus
_______________
3
Rollo,p.39.
4
Ibid.,p.44.
5
Ibid.,p.76.
6
Ibid.,p.87.
7
Ibid.,p.99.
566
566 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Castaeda,Jr.
bandinthedeedofsale,beenmadewiththeconsentofthewife,
nocrimecouldhavebeenchargedagainstsaidhusband.Clearly,
therefore,itisthehusbandsbreachofhiswifesconfidencewhich
gave rise tothe offense charged. And it is this same breach of
trustwhichpromptedthewifetomakethenecessarycomplaint
withtheOfficeoftheProvincialFiscalwhich,accordingly,filed
the aforesaid criminal ease with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga.Torule,therefore,thatsuchcriminalcaseisnotone
for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is to
advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual
antecendentsoftheinstantcase.
2.Thisisnotthefirsttimethattheissueofwhetheraspecific
offense may be classified as a crime committed by one spouse
againsttheotherispresentedtothisCourtforresolution.Thus,
in the case ofOrdoo v. Daquigan,8this Court, through Mr.
JusticeRamonC.Aquino,setupthecriteriontobefollowedin
resolvingtheissue,statingthat:
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this
jurisdiction,isthatlaiddowninCargillvs.State,35ALR,133.
220,Pac.64,26Okl.314,whereinthecourtsaid:
Therulethattheinjurymustamounttoaphysicalwrongupon
thepersonistoonarrow;andtherulethatanyoffenseremotely
or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the
exception is too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN
OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND
VITALLYIMPAIRS,THECONJUGALRELATION,ITCOMES
WITHINTHEEXCEPTION,tothestatutethatoneshallnotbea
witnessagainsttheotherexceptinacriminalprosecutionfora
crimecommitted(by)oneagainsttheother.
Applying the foregoing criterion in mid case ofOrdoo v.
Daquigan, this Court held that the rape committed by the
husbandofthewitnesswifeagainsttheirdaughterwasacrime
committedbythehusbandagainsthiswife.Althoughthevictim
ofthecrimecommittedbytheaccusedinthatcasewasnot
_______________
8
G.R.No.L39012,January31,1975,62SCRA270,at273.
567
VOL.88,FEBRUARY27,1979 567
Peoplevs.Castaeda,Jr.
hiswifebuttheirdaughter,thisCourt,nevertheless,appliedthe
exception for the reason that said criminal act positively
undermine(d)theconnubialrelationship.9
Withmorereasonmusttheexceptionapplytotheinstantcase
wherethevictimofthecrimeandthepersonwhostandstobe
directlyprejudicedbythefalsificationisnotathirdpersonbut
the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the criminal act
complainedofhadtheeffectofdirectlyandvitallyimpairingthe
conjugalrelation.Thisisapparentnotonlyintheactofthewife
in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the
ProvincialFiscal,butalsoinherinsistentefforts 10inconnection
with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order
disqualifying her from testifying against her husband. Taken
collectively,theactuationsofthewitnesswifeunderscorethefact
that the martial and domestic relations between her and the
accusedhusbandhavebecomesostrainedthatthereisnomore
harmonytobepreservednorpeaceandtranquillitywhichmaybe
disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in
previous decisions, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is
nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidencesofprivatelifewhichthelawaimsatprotectingwillbe
nothingbutidealswhich,throughtheirabsence,merelyleavea
voidintheunhappyhome.11Thus,thereisnoreasontoapplythe
martialdisqualificationrule.
3.Finally,overridingconsiderationsofpublicpolicydemand
thatthewifeshouldnotbedisqualifiedfromtestifying
_______________
Id.,p.274.
9
Victoria Manaloto, through her counsel, assisted the
10
Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga in filing theinstant petition for
certiorari(rollo,pp.910).Furthermore,shefiledonAug.22,1977
amemoranduminsupportofthepetition(rollo,pp.6874),and,
onDec.28,1977,apleadingentitledChronologicallyEffected
Observations and Circumstances in Support of or to Butress
MemorandumforPrivatePetitionerVictoriaM.Manaloto,dated
August 18, 1977 informing this Court that the trouble in her
maritalrelationwithherhusband,thehereinprivaterespondent,
isbeyondrepair.(rollo,pp.105108).
11
Peoplevs.Francisco,78Phil.694,704(citedinOrdoovs.
Daquigan,supra.).
568
568 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Castaeda,Jr.
againstherhusbandintheinstantcase.For,asaptlyobservedby
the Solicitor General, (t)o espouse the contrary view would
spawnthedangerousprecedentofahusbandcommittingasmany
falsificationsagainsthiswifeashecouldconjure,seekingshelter
intheantimaritalprivilegeasalicensetoinjureandprejudice
herinsecretallwithunabashedandcompleteimpunity.
INVIEWOFALLTHEFOREGOING,theorderofthelower
courtdatedMarch31,1977,disqualifyingVictoriaManalotofrom
testifying for or against her husband, Benjamin Manaloto, in
CriminalCaseNo.1011,aswellastheorderdatedMay19,1977,
denyingthemotionforreconsiderationareherebySETASIDE.
ThetemporaryrestrainingorderissuedbythisCourtishereby
liftedandtherespondentJudgeisherebyorderedtoproceedwith
thetrialofthecase,allowingVictoriaManalotototestifyagainst
herhusband.
SOORDERED.
Fernando(Chairman),Barredo,Antonio,AquinoandCon
cepcionJr.,JJ.,concur.
Ordersetaside.
 Note.Thehusbandssaleofconjugallotwithoutthewifes
consentisnotvalid.(Villocinovs.Doyon,18SCRA1094;Reyesvs.
DeLeon,20SCRA369).
Thewifemayaskthecourttorenouncetheadministrativeof
conjugalpropertiesfromthehusbandforherprotection.(Ysasi
vs.Fernandez,23SCRA1079).
A debt contracted by the wife is a debt of the conjugal
partnership where the husband was negligent in allowing the
wifetoincurdebts.(Garciavs.Cruz,25SCRA224).
Anillegaldetainerjudgmentagainstthehusbandaloneovera
pieceoflandparaphernalincharactercannotbindnoraffectthe
wifespossessionthereof.(Platavs.Yatco,12SCRA718).
o0o
569
234 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Razonvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
G.R.No.74306.March16,1992.*
ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner,vs.INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his
capacityasAdministratoroftheEstateoftheDeceasedJUANT.
CHUIDIAN,respondents.
G.R.No.74315.March16,1992.*
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,vs.INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATECOURT,ENRIQUERAZON,andE.RAZON,INC.,
respondents.
Evidence;Dead mans statute.In the instant case, the
testimonyexcludedbytheappellatecourtisthatofthedefendant
(petitionerherein)totheeffectthatthelateJuanChuidian,(the
fatherofprivaterespondentVicenteChuidian,theadministrator
oftheestateofJuanChuidian)andthedefendantagreedinthe
lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E.
Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the
deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never
happened.Thecasewasfiledbytheadministratoroftheestateof
thelateJuanChuidiantorecoversharesofstockinE.Razon,Inc.
allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear,
therefore,thatthetestimonyofthepetitionerisnotwithinthe
prohibition of the rule. The case was not filedagainstthe
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon
claimsagainsttheestate.Furthermore,therecordsshowthatthe
private respondent never objected to the testimony of the
petitionerasregardsthetruenatureofhistransactionwiththe
late elder Chuidian. The petitioners testimony was subject to
crossexamination by the private respondents counsel. Hence,
grantingthatthepetitionerstestimonyiswithintheprohibition
of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private
respondentisdeemedtohavewaivedtherule.
CorporationLaw;Transferofstockcertificates.Thelawis
clearthatinorderforatransferofstockcertificatetobeeffective,
the certificate must be properlyindorsedand that title to such
certificateofstockisvestedinthetransfereebythedeliveryof
theduly indorsedcertificate of stock. (Section 35, Corporation
Code)Sincethecertificateofstockcoveringthequestioned1,500
sharesofstockregisteredinthe
_______________
THIRDDIVISION.
*
235
VOL.207,MARCH16,1992 235
Razonvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
 nameofthelateJuanChuidianwasneverindorsedtothe
petitioner,theinevitableconclusionisthatthequestionedshares
ofstockbelongtoChuidian.Thepetitionersasseverationthathe
didnotrequireanindorsementofthecertificateofstockinview
ofhisintimatefriendshipwiththelateJuanChuidiancannot
overcomethefailuretofollowtheprocedurerequiredbylawor
theproperconductofbusinessevenamongfriends.Toreiterate,
indorsement of the certificate of stock is a mandatory
requirement of law for an effective transfer of a certificate of
stock.
PETITIONStoreviewthedecisionandresolutionofthethen
IntermediateAppellateCourt.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
RafaelT.DurianforEnriqueRazon.
ManuelR.SingsonforVicenteB.Chuidian.
GUTIERREZ,JR.,J.:
The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on the
ownershipof1,500sharesofstockinE.Razon,Inc.coveredby
StockCertificateNo.003issuedonApril23,1966andregistered
under the name of Juan T. Chuidian in the books of the
corporation. The then Court of First Instance of Manila, now
RegionalTrialCourtofManila,declaredthatEnriqueRazon,the
petitioner inG.R. No. 74306is the owner of the said shares of
stock. The then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, however, reversed the trial courts decision and ruled
thatJuanT.Chuidian,thedeceasedfatherofpetitionerVicente
B.ChuidianinG.R.No.74315istheownerofthesharesofstock.
Bothpartiesfiledseparatemotionsforreconsideration.Enrique
Razonwantedtheappellatecourtsdecisionreversedandthetrial
courts decision affirmedwhileVicente Chuidianasked thatall
cashandstockdividendsandallthepreemptiverightsaccruing
to the 1,500 shares of stock be ordered delivered to him. The
appellatecourtdeniedbothmotions.Hence,thesepetitions.
Therelevantantecedentfactsareasfollows:
In his complaint filed on June 29, 1971, and amended on
November16,1971,VicenteB.Chuidianprayedthatdefendants
EnriqueB.Razon,E.Razon,Inc.,GeronimoVelasco,Franciscode
Borja,JoseFrancisco,AlfredoB.deLeon,Jr.,GabrielLlamasand
LuisM.de
236
236 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Razonvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
Razonbeorderedtodelivercertificatesofstocksrepresentingthe
shareholdingsofthedeceasedJuanT.ChuidianintheE.Razon,
Inc.withaprayerforanordertorestrainthedefendantsfrom
disposing of the said shares of stock, for a writ of preliminary
attachment v. properties of defendants having possession of
sharesofstockandforreceivershipofthepropertiesofdefendant
corporationxxx.
xxxxxxxxx
In their answer filed on June 18, 1973, defendants alleged
thatallthesharesofstockinthenameofstockholdersofrecord
ofthecorporationwerefullypaidforbydefendant,Razon;that
saidsharesaresubjecttotheagreementbetweendefendantsand
incorporators;thatthesharesofstockwereactuallyownedand
remainedinthepossessionofRazon.Appelleesalsoallegedxxx
thatneitherthelateJuanT.Chuidiannortheappellanthadpaid
anyamountwhatsoeverforthe1,500sharesofstockinquestionx
xx.
xxxxxxxxx
The evidence of the plaintiff shows that he is the
administratoroftheintestateestateofJuanTelesforoChuidian
in Special Proceedings No. 71054, Court of First Instance of
Manila.
Sometime in 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon,
Inc.forthepurposeofbiddingforthearrastreservicesinSouth
Harbor, Manila. The incorporators consisted of Enrique Razon,
EnriqueValles,LuisaM.deRazon,JoseTuason,Jr.,VictorLim,
JoseF.CastroandSalvadorPerezdeTagle.
OnApril23,1966,stockcertificateNo.003for1,500sharesof
stockofdefendantcorporationwasissuedinthenameofJuanT.
Chuidian.
On the basis of the 1,500 shares of stock, the late Juan T.
Chuidianandafterhim,theplaintiffappellant,wereelectedas
directorsofE.Razon,Inc.Bothofthemactuallyservedandwere
paidcompensationasdirectorsofE.Razon,Inc.
From the time the certificate of stock was issued on April
1966 up to April 1971, Enrique Razon had not questioned the
ownershipbyJuanT.Chuidianofthesharesofstockinquestion
andhadnotbroughtanyactiontohavethecertificateofstock
overthesaidsharescancelled.
The certificate of stock was in the possession of defendant
Razonwhorefusedtodeliversaidsharestotheplaintiff,untilthe
same was surrendered by defendant Razon and deposited in a
safetyboxinPhilippineBankofCommerce.
Defendants allege that after organizing the E. Razon, Inc.,
Enrique Razon distributed shares of stock previously placed in
the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some
friendsincludingJuanT.Chuidian.
StockCertificateNo.003covering1,500sharesofstockupon
237
VOL.207,MARCH16,1992
Razonvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
instructionofthelateChuidianonApril23,1966waspersonally
deliveredbyChuidianonJuly1,1966totheCorporateSecretary
ofAttorneySilverioB.deLeonwhowashimselfanassociateof
the Chuidian Law Office (Exhs. C & 11). Since then, Enrique
Razonwasinpossessionofsaidstockcertificateevenduringthe
lifetime of the late Chuidian, from the time the late Chuidian
deliveredthesaidstockcertificatetodefendantRazonuntilthe
time(sic)ofdefendantRazon.Byagreementoftheparties(sic)
delivereditfordepositwiththebankunderthejointcustodyof
thepartiesasconfirmedbythetrialcourtinitsorderofAugust7,
1971.
Thus, the 1,500 shares of stock under Stock Certificate No.
003 were delivered by the late Chuidian to Enrique because it
wasthelatterwhopaidforallthesubscriptiononthesharesof
stock in the defendant corporation and the understanding was
that he (defendant Razon) wastheownerofthesaidsharesof
stockandwastohavepossessionthereofuntilsuchtimeashe
waspaidthereforbytheothernominalincorporators/stockholders
(TSN.,pp.4,8,10,2425,2526,2831,3132,60,6668,July22,
1980,Exhs.C,11,1314).(Rollo74306,pp.6668)
InG.R.No.74306,petitionerEnriqueRazonassailstheappellate
courtsdecision onitsallegedmisapplicationofthedeadmans
statuteruleunderSection20(a)Rule130oftheRulesofCourt.
Accordingtohim,thedeadmansstatuteruleisnotapplicable
totheinstantcase.Moreover,theprivaterespondent,asplaintiff
inthecasedidnotobjecttohisoraltestimonyregardingtheoral
agreementbetweenhimandthedeceasedJuanT.Chuidianthat
theownershipofthesharesofstockwasactuallyvestedinthe
petitionerunlessthedeceasedoptedtopaythesame;andthat
the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination
regardingsuchtestimony.
237 Section20(a)Rule130oftheRulesofCourt(Section23ofthe
RevisedRulesonEvidence)states:
SEC.20.Disqualificationbyreasonofinterestorrelationship
Thefollowingpersonscannottestifyastomattersinwhichthey
areinteresteddirectlyorindirectly,ashereinenumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted,against an executor or
administratoror other representative of a deceased person, or
against a person of unsound mind,upon a claim or demand
againsttheestateofsuchdeceasedpersonoragainstsuchperson
ofunsoundmind,cannottestifyastoanymatteroffactaccruing
beforethedeathofsuchdeceased
238
238 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Razonvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
personorbeforesuchpersonbecameofunsoundmind.(Italics
supplied)
xxxxxxxxx
ThepurposeoftherulehasbeenexplainedbythisCourtinthis
wise:
Thereasonfortheruleisthatifpersonshavingaclaimagainst
theestateofthedeceasedorhispropertieswereallowedtotestify
asto the supposedstatementsmadebyhim(deceased person),
manywouldbetemptedtofalselyimputestatementstodeceased
persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus
unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or
unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to
guardagainstthetemptationtogivefalsetestimonyinregardto
thetransaction inquestion onthepartof thesurviving party.
(Tongcov.Vianzon,50Phil.698;GoChiGun,etal.v.CoCho,et
al.,622[1955])
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in
that it is applicable to a caseagainstthe administrator or its
representativeofanestateuponaclaimagainsttheestateofthe
deceasedperson.(SeeTongcov.Vianzon,50Phil.698[1927])
Intheinstantcase,thetestimonyexcludedbytheappellate
courtisthatofthedefendant(petitionerherein)totheeffectthat
thelateJuanChuidian,(thefatherofprivaterespondentVicente
Chuidian,theadministratoroftheestateofJuanChuidian)and
thedefendantagreedinthelifetimeofJuanChuidianthatthe
1,500sharesofstockinE.Razon,Inc.areactuallyownedbythe
defendantunlessthedeceasedJuan Chuidianoptedto pay the
same which never happened. The case was filed by
theadministratorof the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to
recoversharesofstockinE.Razon,Inc.allegedlyownedbythe
lateJuanT.Chuidian.
Itisclear,therefore,thatthetestimonyofthepetitionerisnot
within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not
filedagainsttheadministratoroftheestate,norwasitfiledupon
claimsagainsttheestate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent
neverobjectedtothetestimonyofthepetitionerasregardsthe
truenatureofhistransactionwiththelateelderChuidian.The
petitionerstestimonywassubjecttocrossexaminationbythe
239
VOL.207,MARCH16,1992 239
Razonvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
private respondents counsel. Hence, granting that the
petitionerstestimonyiswithintheprohibitionofSection20(a),
Rule130oftheRulesofCourt,theprivaterespondentisdeemed
tohavewaivedtherule.WeruledinthecaseofCruzv.Courtof
Appeals(192SCRA209[1990]):
Itisalsosettledthatthecourtcannotdisregardevidencewhich
would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been
rendered admissibleby the failure of a party to object thereto.
Thus:
xxxTheacceptance ofanincompetent witnesstotestifyina
civilsuit,aswellastheallowanceofimproperquestionsthatmay
be put to him while on the stand is a matter resting in the
discretion of the litigant. He may assert his right by timely
objectionorhemaywaiveit,expresslyorbysilence.Inanycase
theoptionrestswithhim.Onceadmitted,thetestimonyisinthe
caseforwhatitisworthandthejudgehasnopowertodisregard
itforthesolereasonthatitcouldhavebeenexcluded,ifithad
beenobjectedto,nortostrikeitoutonitsownmotion(Emphasis
supplied).(Marellavs.Reyes,12Phil.1.)
The issue as to whether or not the petitioners testimony is
admissible having been settled, we now proceed to discuss the
fundamentalissueontheownershipofthe1,500sharesofstock
inE.Razon,Inc.
E. Razon, Inc. was organized in 1962 by petitioner Enrique
Razon for the purpose of participating in the bidding for the
arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators
were Enrique Razon, Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose
Tuazon,Jr.,VictorL.Lim,JoseF.CastroandSalvadorPerezde
Tagle.Thebusiness,however,didnotstartoperationsuntil1966.
Accordingtothepetitioner,someoftheincorporatorswithdrew
from the said corporation. The petitioner then distributed the
stockspreviouslyplacedinthenamesofthewithdrawingnominal
incorporators to some friends, among them the late Juan T.
Chuidiantowhomhegave1,500sharesofstock.Thesharesof
stockwereregisteredinthenameofChuidianonlyasnominal
stockholderandwiththeagreementthatthesaidsharesofstock
wereownedandheldbythepetitionerbutChuidianwasgiven
theoptiontobuythesame.Inviewofthisarrangement,Chuidian
in1966deliveredtothepetitionerthestockcertificatecovering
the1,500sharesofstockofE.Razon,
240
240 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Razonvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
Inc.Sincethen,thepetitionerhadinhispossessionthecertificate
of stock until the time, he delivered it for deposit with the
Philippine Bank of Commerce under the parties joint custody
pursuant to their agreement as embodied in the trial courts
order.
Thepetitionermaintainsthathisaforesaidoraltestimonyas
regards the true nature of his agreement with the late Juan
Chuidian on the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. is
sufficient to prove his ownership over the said 1,500 shares of
stock.
Thepetitionerscontentionisnotcorrect.
In the case ofEmbassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals(188
SCRA492[1990])weruled:
xxx For an effective transfer of shares of stock the mode and
manneroftransferasprescribedbylawmustbefollowed(Navea
v. Peers Marketing Corp.,74 SCRA 65). As provided under
Section3ofBatasPambansaBilang68,otherwiseknownasthe
Corporation Code of the Philippines, shares of stock may be
transferredbydeliverytothetransfereeofthecertificateproperly
indorsed.Titlemaybevestedinthetransfereebythedeliveryof
the duly indorsed certificate of stock (18 C.J.S. 928, cited
inRiverav.Florendo,144SCRA643).However,notransfershall
be valid, except as between the parties until the transfer is
properly recorded in the books of the corporation (Sec. 63,
CorporationCodeofthePhilippines;Section35oftheCorporation
Law)
Intheinstantcase,thereisnodisputethatthequestioned1,500
sharesofstockofE.Razon,Inc.areinthenameofthelateJuan
Chuidianinthebooksofthecorporation.Moreover,therecords
showthatduringhislifetimeChuidianwaselectedmemberofthe
BoardofDirectorsofthecorporationwhichclearlyshowsthathe
wasastockholderofthecorporation.(SeeSection30,Corporation
Code) From the point of view of the corporation, therefore,
Chuidianwastheownerofthe1,500sharesofstock.Insucha
case, the petitioner who claims ownership over the questioned
sharesofstockmustshowthatthesameweretransferredtohim
byprovingthatalltherequirementsfortheeffectivetransferof
sharesofstockinaccordancewith thecorporations by laws, if
any,werefollowed(SeeNavav.PeersMarketingCorporation,74
SCRA65[1976])
241
VOL.207,MARCH16,1992
Razonvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
orinaccordancewiththeprovisionsoflaw.
Thepetitionerfailedinbothinstances.Thepetitionerdidnot
presentanybylawswhichcouldshowthatthe1,500sharesof
stockwereeffectivelytransferredtohim.Intheabsenceofthe
corporations by laws or rules governing effective transfer of
sharesofstock,theprovisionsoftheCorporationLawaremade
applicabletotheinstantcase.
Thelawisclearthatinorderforatransferofstockcertificate
tobeeffective,thecertificatemustbeproperlyindorsedandthat
titletosuchcertificateofstockisvestedinthetransfereebythe
delivery of theduly indorsedcertificate of stock. (Section 35,
Corporation Code) Since the certificate of stock covering the
questioned1,500sharesofstockregisteredinthenameofthelate
Juan Chuidian was never indorsed to the petitioner, the
inevitableconclusionisthatthequestionedsharesofstockbelong
toChuidian.Thepetitionersasseverationthathedidnotrequire
anindorsementofthecertificateofstockinviewofhisintimate
friendship with the late Juan Chuidian can not overcome the
failure to follow the procedure required by law or the proper
conduct of business even among friends. To reiterate,
indorsement of the certificate of stock is a mandatory
requirement of law for an effective transfer of a certificate of
stock. Moreover, the preponderance of evidence supports the
appellate courts factual findings that the shares of stock were
giventoJuanT.Chuidianforvalue.JuanT.Chuidianwasthe
legalcounselwhohandledthelegalaffairsofthecorporation.We
givecredencetothetestimonyoftheprivaterespondentthatthe
sharesofstockweregiventoJuanT.Chuidianinpaymentofhis
legal services to the corporation. Petitioner Razon failed to
overcomethistestimony.
241 InG.R.No.74315,petitionerVicenteB.Chuidianinsiststhat
theappellatecourtsdecisiondeclaringhisdeceasedfatherJuan
T.Chuidianasownerofthe1,500sharesofstockofE.Razon,Inc.
should have included all cash and stock dividends and all the
preemptiverightsaccruingtothesaid1,500sharesofstock.
Thepetitionisimpressedwithmerit.
Thecashandstockdividendsandallthepreemptiverights
areallincidentsofstockownership.
Therightsofstockholdersaregenerallyenumeratedasfol
242
242 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Razonvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
lows:
xxxxxxxxx
x x x [F]irst, to have a certificate or other evidence of his
statusasstockholderissuedtohim;second,tovoteatmeetingsof
thecorporation; third, toreceivehisproportionateshare of the
profits of the corporation; and lastly, to participate
proportionately inthedistributionofthecorporateassets upon
the dissolution or winding up. (Purdys Beach on Private
Corporations,sec.554)(Pascualv.DelSazOrozco,19Phil.82, 243
87) Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
WHEREFORE,judgmentisrenderedasfollows: reserved.

1. a)InG.R. No. 74306, the petition is DISMISSED. The

questioned decision and resolution of the then
IntermediateAppellateCourt,nowtheCourtofAppeals,
areAFFIRMED.Costsagainstthepetitioner.

2. b)InG.R. No. 74315, the petition is GRANTED. The

questioned Resolution insofar as it denied the
petitioners motion to clarify the dispositive portion of
thedecisionofthethenIntermediateAppellate Court,
nowCourtofAppealsisREVERSEDandSETASIDE.
ThedecisionoftheappellatecourtisMODIFIEDinthat
allcashandstockdividendsaswellasallpreemptive
rights that have accrued and attached to the 1,500
shares in E. Razon, Inc., since 1966 are declared to
belongtotheestateofJuanT.Chuidian.

SOORDERED.
Bidin,Davide,Jr.andRomero,JJ.,concur.
Feliciano,J.,Onleave.
G.R.No.74306dismissed;decisionandresolutionaffirmed.
G.R.No.74315,granted.Resolutionanddecisionreversedand
setaside.
Note.Foraneffectivetransferofsharesofstock,themode
andmanneroftransferasprescribedbylawshouldbefollowed.
(EmbassyFarms,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals,188SCRA492.)
o0o
VOL.363,AUGUST15,2001 249
SungaChanvs.Chua
G.R.No.143340.August15,2001.*
LILIBETH SUNGACHAN and CECILIA SUNGA,
petitioners,vs.LAMBERTOT.CHUA,respondent.
Partnership;Contracts;Apartnershipmaybeconstitutedin
any form, except where immovable property or real rights are
contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall be
necessary.Apartnershipmaybeconstitutedinanyform,except
whereimmovablepropertyorrealrightsarecontributedthereto,
in which case a public instrument shall be necessary. Hence,
basedontheintentionoftheparties,asgatheredfromthefacts
and ascertained from their language and conduct, a verbal
contractofpartnershipmayarise.Theessentialpointsthatmust
be proven to show that a partnership was agreed upon are(1)
mutualcontributiontoacommonstock,and(2)ajointinterestin
theprofits.Understandablyso,inviewoftheabsenceofawritten
contract of partnership between respondent and Jacinto,
respondent resorted to the introduction of documentary and
testimonialevidencetoprovesaidpartnership.Thecrucialissue
tosettletheniswhetherornottheDeadMansStatute
_______________
*
THIRDDIVISION.
250
2 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
50
SungaChanvs.Chua
appliestothiscasesoastorenderinadmissiblerespondents
testimonyandthatofhiswitness,Josephine.
Same;Evidence;Dead Mans Statute;Requirements;The
Dead Mans Statute provides that if one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or
other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and
unexplained account of the transaction.The Dead Mans
Statuteprovidesthatifonepartytotheallegedtransactionis
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained
accountofthetransaction.Butbeforethisrulecanbesuccessfully
invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is
necessarythat:1.Thewitnessisapartyorassignorofapartyto
a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. 2. The
action is against an executor or administrator or other
representativeofadeceasedpersonorapersonofunsoundmind;
3.Thesubjectmatteroftheactionisaclaimordemandagainst
theestateofsuchdeceasedpersonoragainstpersonofunsound
mind;4.Histestimonyreferstoanymatteroffactwhichoccurred
beforethedeathofsuchdeceasedpersonorbeforesuchperson
becameofunsoundmind.
Same;Same;Same;Same;When it is the executor or
administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the
counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to
occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the
counterclaim.TworeasonsforestalltheapplicationoftheDead
MansStatutetothiscase.First,petitionersfiledacompulsory
counterclaimagainstrespondentintheiranswerbeforethetrial
court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners
themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the
DeadMansStatute.Wellentrenchedistherulethatwhenitis
theexecutororadministratororrepresentativesoftheestatethat
sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may
testifytooccurrencesbeforethedeathofthedeceasedtodefeat
the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim,
respondentisnotdisqualifiedfromtestifyingastomattersoffact
occurringbeforethedeathofthedeceased,saidactionnothaving
beenbroughtagainstbutbytheestateorrepresentativesofthe
deceased.
251
VOL.363,AUGUST15,2001 251
SungaChanvs.Chua
Same;Same;Words and Phrases;Assignor of a party
meansassignorofacauseofactionwhichhasarisen,andnotthe
assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has personality is retained until the complete winding up of its
arisen.ThetestimonyofJosephineisnotcoveredbytheDead business,culminatinginitstermination.
MansStatuteforthesimplereasonthatsheisnotapartyor
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
assignorofapartytoacaseorpersonsinwhosebehalfacaseis
Appeals.
prosecuted.Recordsshowthatrespondentofferedthetestimony
ofJosephinetoestablishtheexistenceofthepartnershipbetween
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
respondentandJacinto.PetitionersinsistencethatJosephineis
thealteregoofrespondentdoesnotmakeheranassignorbecause ManuelT.Chanforpetitioners.
thetermassignorofapartymeansassignorofacauseofaction PacatangLawOfficeforrespondent.
whichhasarisen,andnottheassignorofarightassignedbefore 252
anycauseofactionhasarisen.Plainlythen,Josephineismerely 252 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
awitnessofrespondent,thelatterbeingthepartyplaintiff. SungaChanvs.Chua
Same;Dissolution;The Civil Code expressly provides that
upon dissolution, the partnership continues and its legal GONZAGAREYES,J.:
personality is retained until the complete winding up of its
BeforeusisapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45of
business culminating in its termination.With regard to
theRulesofCourtoftheDecision 1oftheCourtofAppealsdated
petitionersinsistencethatlachesand/orprescriptionshouldhave
January 31, 2000 in the case entitled Lamberto T. Chua vs.
extinguished respondents claim, we agree with the trial court
LilibethSunga Chanand Cecilia Sungaand of the Resolution
andtheCourtofAppealsthattheactionforaccountingfiledby
dated May 23, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration of
respondentthree(3)yearsafterJacintosdeathwaswellwithin
herein petitioners Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia Sunga
theprescribedperiod.TheCivilCodeprovidesthatanactionto
(hereaftercollectivelyreferredtoaspetitioners).
enforceanoralcontractprescribesinsix(6)yearswhiletheright
Thepertinentfactsofthiscaseareasfollows:
todemandanaccountingforapartnersinterestasagainstthe
OnJune22,1992,LambertoT.Chua(hereafterrespondent)
personcontinuingthebusinessaccruesatthedateofdissolution,
filed a complaint against Lilibeth Sunga Chan (hereafter
intheabsenceofanycontraryagreement.Consideringthatthe
petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner
deathofapartnerresultsinthedissolutionofthepartnership,in
Cecilia),daughterandwife,respectivelyofthedeceasedJacinto
this case, it was after Jacintos death that respondent as the
L. Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for Winding Up of Partnership
survivingpartnerhadtherighttoanaccountofhisinterestas
Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and
againstpetitioners.ItbearsstressingthatwhileJacintosdeath
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment with the
dissolved the partnership, the dissolution did not immediately
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del
terminatethepartnership.TheCivilCodeexpresslyprovidesthat
Norte.
upon dissolution, the partnership continues and its legal
 Respondentallegedthatin 1977,he verballyenteredintoa
partnershipwithJacintointhedistributionofShellaneLiquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience,
respondentandJacintoallegedlyagreedtoregisterthebusiness
name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE
CENTER(hereafterShellite),underthenameofJacintoasasole
proprietorship.Respondentallegedlydeliveredhisinitialcapital
contribution of P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the latter in turn
produced P100,000.00 ashis counterpart contribution, with the
intentionthattheprofitswouldbeequallydividedbetweenthem.
The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by
Josephine Sy (hereafter Josephine), a sister of the wife of
respondent,ErlindaSy.Ascompensation,Jacintowouldreceivea
managers fee or remuneration of 10% of the gross profit and
Josephinewouldreceive10%ofthenetprofits,inadditiontoher
wagesandotherremunerationfromthebusiness.
_______________
Per Associate Justice Delilah VidallonMagtolis and
1
concurred in by Associate Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis and
MercedesGozoDadole,CourtofAppeals,FourteenthDivision.
253
VOL.363,AUGUST15,2001
SungaChanvs.Chua
Allegedly,fromthetimethatShelliteopenedforbusinessonJuly
8,1977,itsbusinessoperationwentquitewellandwasprofitable.
Respondentclaimedthathecouldattesttothesuccessoftheir
businessbecauseofthevolumeofordersanddeliveriesoffilled
Shellane cylinder tanks supplied by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation. While Jacinto furnished respondent with the
merchandiseinventories,balancesheetsandnetworthofShellite
from 1977 to 1989, respondent however suspected that the
amount indicated in these documents were understated and
undervalued by Jacinto and Josephine for their own selfish
reasonsandfortaxavoidance.
UponJacintosdeathinthelaterpartof1989,hissurviving
wife,petitionerCeciliaandparticularlyhisdaughter,petitioner
Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition
and management of Shellite without respondents consent.
Despite respondents repeated demands upon petitioners for
accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and restitution of
his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply.
PetitionerLilibethallegedlycontinuedtheoperationsofShellite,
convertingtoherownuseandadvantageitsproperties.
OnMarch31,1991,respondentclaimedthatafterpetitioner
Lilibeth ran out of alibis and reasons to evade respondents
demands,shedisbursedoutofthepartnershipfundstheamount
of P200,000.00 and partially paid the same to respondent.
Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed respondent that the
P200,000.00representedpartialpaymentofthelatterssharein
thepartnership,withapromisethattheformerwouldmakethe
complete inventory and winding up of the properties of the
business establishment. Despite such commitment, petitioners
allegedly failed to comply with their duty to account, and
continuedtobenefitfromtheassetsandincomeofShellitetothe
253 damageandprejudiceofrespondent.
OnDecember19,1992,petitionersfiledaMotiontoDismiss
on the ground that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC)inManila,nottheRegionalTrialCourtinZamboangadel
Nortehadjurisdictionovertheaction.Respondent opposedthe
motiontodismiss.
On January 12, 1993, the trial court finding the complaint
sufficientinformandsubstancedeniedthemotiontodismiss.
254
254 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
 SungaChanvs.Chua
On January 30, 1993, petitioners filed their Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaims, contending that they are not liable
for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests,
damages and attorneys fees, that respondent does not have a
cause of action against them, and that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC being the
agencythathasoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoverthecase.
Ascounterclaim,petitionersoughtattorneysfeesandexpensesof
litigation.
OnAugust2,1993,petitionerfiledasecondMotiontoDismiss
this time on the ground that the claim for winding up of
partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in
partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in
partnershipassets/propertiesshouldbedismissedandprosecuted
againsttheestateofdeceasedJacintoinaprobateorintestate
proceeding.
OnAugust16,1993,thetrialcourtdeniedthesecondmotion
todismissforlackofmerit.
On November 26, 1993, petitioners filed their Petition for
Certiorari,ProhibitionandMandamuswiththeCourtofAppeals
docketedasCAG.R.SPNo.32499questioningthedenialofthe
motiontodismiss.
OnNovember29,1993,petitionersfiledwiththetrialcourta
MotiontoSuspendPretrialConference.
OnDecember13,1993,thetrialcourtgrantedthemotionto
suspendpretrialconference.
On November 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the
petitionforlackofmerit.
On January 16, 1995, this Court denied the petition for
review,oncertiorarifiledbypetitioner,aspetitionersfailedto
show that a reversible error was committed by the appellate
court.2
On February 20, 1995, entry of judgment was made by the
ClerkofCourtandthecasewasremandedtothetrialcourton
April26,1995.
On September 25, 1995, the trial court terminated the pre
trialconferenceandsetthehearingofthecaseonJanuary17,
1996.
_________________
2
Rollo,p.185.
255
VOL.363,AUGUST15,2001 255
SungaChanvs.Chua
Respondent presented his evidence while petitioners were
consideredtohavewaivedtheirrighttopresentevidencefortheir
failure to attend the scheduled date for reception of evidence
despitenotice.
On October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision
ruling for respondent. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffandagainstthedefendants,asfollows:
1. (1)DIRECTING them to render an accounting in
acceptable form under accounting procedures and
standardsoftheproperties,assets,incomeandprofitsof
the Shellite Gas Appliance Center since the time of
death of Jacinto L. Sunga, from whom they continued
thebusinessoperationsincludingallbusinessesderived
from the Shellite Gas Appliance Center; submit an
inventory,andappraisalofalltheseproperties,assets,
income, profits, etc. to the Court and to plaintiff for
approvalordisapproval;
2. (2)ORDERING them to return and restitute to the
partnershipanyandallproperties,assets,incomeand
profitstheymisappliedandconvertedtotheirownuse
andadvantagethatlegallypertaintotheplaintiffand
accountforthepropertiesmentionedinpars.AandBon
pages45ofthispetitionasbasis;
3. (3)DIRECTINGthemtorestituteandpaytotheplaintiff
1/2sharesandinterestoftheplaintiffinthepartnership
of the listed properties, assets and good will (sic) in
schedulesA,BandC,onpages45ofthepetition;
4. (4)ORDERING them to pay the plaintiff earned but
unreceivedincomeandprofitsfromthepartnershipfrom
1988toMay30,1992,whentheplaintifflearnedofthe
closure of the store the sum of P35,000.00 per month,
withlegalrateofinterestuntilfullypaid;
5. (5)ORDERING them to wind up the affairs of the
partnership and terminate its business activities
pursuanttolaw,afterdeliveringtotheplaintiffallthe
1/2 interest, shares, participation and equity in the
partnership, orthe value thereof in money or moneys
worth,ifthepropertiesarenotphysicallydivisible;
6. (6)FINDINGthemespeciallyLilibethSungaChanguilty
ofbreachoftrustandinbadfaithandholdthemliable
to the plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as moral and
exemplarydamages;and,
7. (7)DIRECTING them to reimburse and pay the sum of
P25,000.00 as attorneys (sic) and P25,000.00 as
litigationexpenses.
256
256 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
SungaChanvs.Chua
NOspecialpronouncementsastoCOSTS.
SOORDERED.3
OnOctober28,1997,petitionersfiledaNoticeofAppealwiththe
trialcourt,appealingthecasetotheCourtofAppeals.
On January 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal.ThedispositiveportionoftheDecisionreads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed. The appealed
decisionisAFFIRMEDinallrespects.4
On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsiderationfiledbypetitioner.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner relies upon the
followinggrounds:
1. 1.The Court of Appeals erred in making a legal
conclusion that there existed a partnership between
respondent Lamberto T. Chua and the late Jacinto L.
Sunga upon the latters invitation and offer and that
uponhisdeaththepartnershipassetsandbusinesswere
takenoverbypetitioners.
2. 2.The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal
conclusionthatlachesand/orprescriptiondidnotapply
intheinstantcase.Petitionersquestionthecorrectness
ofthefindingofthetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppeals
that a partnership existed between respondent and
Jacintofrom1977untilJacintosdeath.Intheabsence
of any written document to show such partnership
betweenrespondentandJacinto,petitionersarguethat
these courts were proscribed from hearing the
testimoniesofrespondentand
 3. 3.The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal
conclusion that there was competent and credible
evidence to warrant the finding of a partnership, and
assumingarguendothatindeedtherewasapartnership,
thefindingofhighlyexaggeratedamountsorvaluesin
thepartnershipassetsandprofits.5
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed
betweenrespondentandJacintofrom1977untilJacintosdeath.
Intheansenceofanywrittendocumenttoshowsuchpartnership
between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argue that these
courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of
respondentand
________________
3
Records,pp.7576;Decision,pp.2526.
4
Rollo,p.46;Decision,p.11.
5
Rollo,pp.1314;Petition,pp.67.
257
VOL.363,AUGUST15,2001
SungaChanvs.Chua
his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three
yearsafterJacintosdeath.Tosupportthisargument,petitioners
invoke the Dead Mans Statute or Survivorship Rule under
Section23,Rule130oftheRulesofCourtthatprovides:
SEC. 23.Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of
adverse party.Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or
personsinwhosebehalfacaseisprosecuted,againstanexecutor
oradministratororotherrepresentativeofadeceasedperson,or
against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
againsttheestateofsuchdeceasedperson,oragainstsuchperson
ofunsoundmind,cannottestifyastoanymatteroffactoccurring
beforethedeathofsuchdeceasedpersonorbeforesuchperson
becameofunsoundmind.
PetitionersthusimplorethisCourttorulethatthetestimoniesof
respondent and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have been
admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person
(Jacinto),nowrepresentedbypetitioners.
Wearenotpersuaded.
Apartnershipmaybeconstitutedinanyform,exceptwhere
immovable property or real rights are contributed thereto, in
whichcaseapublicinstrumentshallbenecessary.6Hence,based
on the intentionof theparties, as gatheredfromthe facts and
ascertainedfromtheirlanguageandconduct,averbalcontractof
partnershipmayarise.7Theessentialpointsthatmustbeproven
to show that a partnership was agreed upon are (1) mutual
contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint interest in the
profits.8Understandablyso,inviewoftheabsenceofawritten
contract of partnership between respondent and Jacinto,
respondent resorted to the introduction of documentary and
testimonialevidencetoprovesaidpartnership.Thecrucialissue
257 tosettletheniswhetherornotthe
________________
6
JOSE C. VITUG,COMPENDIUM OF CIVIL LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE,REV.ED.(1993),p.712.
7
RAMON C. AQUINO AND CAROLINA C. GRIO
AQUINO,THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VOL. 3
(1990),p.295.
8
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO,COMMENTARIES AND
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,VOLUME5(1997),p.320.
 258
258 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
SungaChanvs.Chua
Dead Mans Statute applies to this case so as to render
inadmissible respondents testimony and that of his witness,
Josephine.
The Dead Mans Statute provides that if one party to the
alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death,
insanity,orothermentaldisabilities,thesurvivingpartyisnot
entitledtotheundueadvantageofgivinghisownuncontradicted
andunexplainedaccountofthetransaction. 9Butbeforethisrule
canbesuccessfullyinvokedtobartheintroductionoftestimonial
evidence,itisnecessarythat:
1. 1.Thewitnessisapartyorassignorofapartytoacase
orpersonsinwhosebehalfacaseisprosecuted.
2. 2.The action is against an executor or administrator or
otherrepresentativeofadeceasedpersonorapersonof
unsoundmind;
3. 3.Thesubjectmatteroftheactionisaclaimordemand
against the estate of such deceased person or against
personofunsoundmind;
4. 4.His testimony refers to any matter of fact which
occurred before the death of such deceased person or
beforesuchpersonbecameofunsoundmind.10
TworeasonsforestalltheapplicationoftheDeadMansStatute
tothiscase.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim 11against
respondentintheiranswerbeforethetrialcourt,andwiththe
filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively
removed this case from the ambit of the Dead Mans
Statute.12Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the
executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that
sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may
testifytooccurrencesbeforethedeathofthedeceasedtodefeat
the counterclaim.13Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim,
respondentisnotdisqualifiedfrom
________________
Tanvs.CourtofAppeals,295SCRA247(1998),p.258.
9
OSCAR M. HERRERA,REMEDIAL LAW, REVISED
10
RULESONEVIDENCE,VOL.V(1999),pp.308309.
11
Records,pp.4751.
12
SeeGonivs.CourtofAppeals,144SCRA222(1986).
13
HERRERA,supra,p.310.
259
VOL.363,AUGUST15,2001 259
SungaChanvs.Chua
testifyingastomattersoffactoccurringbeforethedeathofthe
deceased,saidactionnothavingbeenbroughtagainstbutbythe
estateorrepresentativesofthedeceased.14
Second,thetestimonyofJosephineisnotcoveredbytheDead
MansStatuteforthesimplereasonthatsheisnotapartyor
assignorofapartytoacaseorpersonsinwhosebehalfacaseis
prosecuted.Recordsshowthatrespondentofferedthetestimony
ofJosephinetoestablishtheexistenceofthepartnershipbetween
respondentandJacinto.PetitionersinsistencethatJosephineis
thealteregoofrespondentdoesnotmakeheranassignorbecause
thetermassignorofapartymeansassignorofacauseofaction
whichhasarisen,andnottheassignorofarightassignedbefore
any cause of action has arisen.15Plainly then, Josephine is
merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party
plaintiff.
We are not convinced by petitioners allegation that
Josephines testimony lacks probative value because she was
allegedlycoercedbyrespondent,herbrotherinlaw,totestifyin
his favor. Josephine merely declared in court that she was
requested by respondent to testify and that if she were not
requestedtodososhewouldnothavetestified.Wefailtoseehow
we can conclude from this candid admission that Josephines
testimony is involuntary when she did not in any way
categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of
respondent.Also,thefactthatJosephineisthesisterofthewife
ofrespondentdoesnotdiminishthevalueofhertestimonysince
relationshipperse,withoutmore,doesnotaffectthecredibilityof
witnesses.16
Petitioners reliance alone on the Dead Mans Statute to
defeatrespondentsclaimcannotprevailoverthefactualfindings
ofthetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealsthatapartnershipwas
establishedbetweenrespondentandJacinto.Basednotonlyon
thetestimonialevidence,butthedocumentaryevidenceaswell,
thetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealsconsideredtheevidence
for
__________________
14
Gonivs.CourtofAppeals,supra,p.233.
15
RICARDOJ.FRANCISCO,EVIDENCE,THIRDEDITION
(1996),p.135.
16
Peoplevs.Nang,289SCRA16(1998),p.32.
260
260 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
SungaChanvs.Chua
respondentassufficienttoprovetheformationofapartnership,
albeitaninformalone.
Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their
favorduringtrial.Bytheweightofjudicialprecedents,afactual
matterlikethefindingoftheexistenceofapartnershipbetween
respondentandJacintocannotbeinquiredintobythisCourton
review.17ThisCourtcannolongerbetaskedtogoovertheproofs
presentedbythepartiesandanalyze,assessandweighthemto
ascertainifthetrialcourtandtheappellatecourtwerecorrectin
accordingsuperiorcredittothisorthatpieceofevidenceofone
partyortheother.18Itmustbealsopointedoutthatpetitioners
failed to attend the presentation of evidence of respondent.
Petitioners cannot now turn to this Court to question the
admissibility and authenticity of the documentary evidence of
respondentwhenpetitionersfailedtoobjecttotheadmissibilityof
theevidenceatthetimethatsuchevidencewasoffered.19
With regard to petitioners insistence that laches and/or
prescription should have extinguished respondents claim, we
agreewiththetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealsthattheaction
foraccountingfiledbyrespondentthree(3)yearsafterJacintos
death was well within the prescribed period. The Civil Code
providesthatanactiontoenforceanoralcontractprescribesin
six (6) years20while the right to demand an accounting for a
partnersinterestasagainstthepersoncontinuingthebusiness
accruesatthedateofdissolution,intheabsenceofanycontrary
agreement.21Consider
________________
17
Alicbusanvs.CourtofAppeals,269SCRA336(1997),p.341
 18
Ibid.
19
SeeChuavs.CourtofAppeals,301SCRA356(1999).
20
Thefollowingactionsmustbecommencedwithinsixyears:
1. (1)Uponanoralcontract;and
2. (2)Uponaquasicontract.
Art.1842,CivilCode:
21
The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any
partner, or his legal representative as against the winding up
partnersorthesurvivingpartnersorthepersonorpartnership
continuingthebusiness,atthedateofdissolution,intheabsence
ofanyssagreementtothecontrary.
261
VOL.363,AUGUST15,2001
SungaChanvs.Chua
ingthatthedeathofapartnerresultsinthedissolutionofthe
partnership,22in this case, it was after Jacintos death that
respondentasthesurvivingpartnerhadtherighttoanaccountof
hisinterestasagainstpetitioners.Itbearsstressingthatwhile
Jacintosdeathdissolvedthepartnership,thedissolutiondidnot
immediately terminate the partnership. The Civil
Code23expresslyprovidesthatupondissolution,thepartnership
continuesanditslegalpersonalityisretaineduntilthecomplete
windingupofitsbusiness,culminatinginitstermination. 24
In a desperate bid to cast doubt on the validity of the oral
partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners
maintain that said partnership that had an initial capital of
P200,000.00shouldhavebeenregisteredwiththeSecuritiesand
Exchange Commission (SEC) since registration is mandated by
theCivilCode.True,Article1772oftheCivilCoderequiresthat
partnerships with a capital of P3,000.00 or more must register
with the SEC, however, this registration requirement is not
mandatory. Article 1768 of the Civil Code 25explicitly provides
that the partnership retains its juridical personality even if it
failstoregister.Thefailuretoregisterthecontractofpartnership
doesnotinvalidatethesameasamongthepartners,solongas
the contract has the essential requisites, because the main
purposeofregistrationistogivenoticetothirdparties,anditcan
beassumedthatthemembersthemselvesknewofthecontentsof
their contract.26In the case at bar, noncompliance with this
directoryprovisionofthelawwillnotinvalidatethepartnership
consideringthatthetotalityoftheevidence
__________________
22
Article1830,CivilCode
261 24
Syvs.CourtofAppeals,313SCRA328(1999),p.347.
23
Art.1828.Thedissolutionofapartnershipisthechangein
therelationofthepartnerscausedbyanypartnerceasingtobe
associatedinthecarryingonasdistinguishedfromthewinding
up of thebusiness.Art. 1829. On dissolutionthepartnershipis
notterminated,butcontinuesuntilthewindingupofpartnership
affairsiscompleted.
25
The partnership has a juridical personality separate and
distinctfromthatofeachofthepartners,evenincaseoffailureto
complywiththerequirementsofarticle1772,firstparagraph.
26
TOLENTINO,supra,p.325.
262
262 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
GoldLineTransit,Inc.vs.Ramos
provesthatrespondentandJacintoindeedforgedthepartnership
inquestion.
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DENIEDandtheappealeddecisionisAFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.
Melo(Chairman),Vitug,PanganibanandSandoval
Gutierrez,JJ.,concur.
Petitiondenied,judgmentaffirmed.
Notes.Dissolution of a partnership is the change in the
relation of the parties caused by any partner ceasing to be
associatedinthecarryingon,asmightbedistinguishedfromthe
windingup,ofitsbusinesses.(Syvs.CourtofAppeals,313SCRA
328[1999])
The partnership although dissolved, continues to exist until
itstermination,atwhichtimethewindingupofitsaffairsshould
have been completed and the net partnership assets are
partitioned and distributed to the partners. (Sy vs. Court of
Appeals,313SCRA328[1999])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
VOL.374,JANUARY25,2002 555
Bordalbavs.CourtofAppeals
G.R.No.112443.January25,2002.*
TERESITAP.BORDALBA,petitioner,vs.COURTOFAPPEALS,
HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME, namely, CANDIDA FLORES,
EMANNUEL JAYME, DINA JAYME DEJORAS, EVELIA
JAYME, and GESILA JAYME; AND HEIRS OF ASUNCION
JAYMEBACLAY, namely, ANGELO JAYMEBACLAY,
CARMEN JAYMEDACLAN and ELNORA JAYME BACLAY,
respondents.
Appeals;Evidence;Itisdoctrinalthatfindingsoffactsofthe
CourtofAppealsupholding thoseof the trial courtare binding
upontheSupremeCourt.Thecontentionsarewithoutmerit.It
is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
upholding those of the trial courtare binding upon this Court.
While there are exceptions to this rule, petitioner has not
convincedusthatthiscasefallsunderoneofthem.
LandRegistration;LandTitles;Itisasettledrulethatthe
LandRegistrationActprotectsonlyholdersoftitleingoodfaith,
anddoesnotpermititsprovisiontobeusedasashieldforthe
commission of fraud, or as a means to enrich oneself at the
expenseofothers.TheCourtseesnoreasontodeviatefromthe
findingsofthetrial courtthat petitionerresorted tofraudand
misrepresentationinobtainingafreepatentandtitleoverthelot
underscrutiny.TheCourtofAppealscorrectlypointedoutthat
misrepresentationtaintedpetitionersapplication,insofarasher
declarationthatthelandappliedforwasnotoccupiedorclaimed
by any other person. Her declaration is belied by the extra
judicialpartitionwhichsheacknowledged,hermothersaborted
attempt to have the lot registered, private respondents
predecessorsininterests opposition thereto, and by the
occupancyofaportionofthesaidlotbyNicanorJaymeandhis
familysince1945.ItisasettledrulethattheLandRegistration
Actprotectsonlyholdersoftitleingoodfaith,anddoesnotpermit
itsprovisiontobeusedasashieldforthecommissionoffraud,or
asameanstoenrichoneselfattheexpenseofothers.
Same;Same;Evidence;DeadMansStatute;Thedeadmans
statutedoesnotoperatetoclosethemouthofawitnessastoany
matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than
through personal dealings with the deceased person, or
communicationmadebythedeceasedtothewitness.Astothe
allegedviolationofthedeadmansstatute,sufficeittostatethat
saidrulefindsnoapplicationinthepresentcase.Thedead
_______________
*
FIRSTDIVISION.
556
5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
56
Bordalbavs.CourtofAppeals
mans statute does not operate to close the mouth of a
witnessastoanymatteroffactcomingtohisknowledgeinany
other way than through personal dealings with the deceased
person,orcommunicationmadebythedeceasedtothewitness.
Sincetheclaimofprivaterespondentsandthetestimonyoftheir
witnesses in the present case is based,inter alia, on the 1947
DeedofExtrajudicialPartitionandotherdocuments,andnoton
dealingsandcommunicationswiththedeceased,thequestioned
testimonieswereproperlyadmittedbythetrialcourt.
Succession;Inorderthatanheirmayasserthisrighttothe
propertyofadeceased,nopreviousjudicialdeclarationofheirship
isnecessary.Likewiseuntenableistheclaimofpetitionerthat
private respondents are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and
Asuncion JaymeBaclay. Other than their bare allegations to
disputetheirheirship,nohardevidencewaspresentedbythemto
substantiatetheirallegations.Besides,inorderthatanheirmay
asserthisrighttothepropertyofadeceased,nopreviousjudicial
declarationofheirshipisnecessary.
Evidence;Admissions Against Interest;Where one derives
titletopropertyfromanother,theact,declaration,oromissionof
thelatter,while holding the title,inrelationtotheproperty,is
evidence against the former.Anent the issue of identity, the
disparityintheboundariesofLotNo.1242(799C)visavisthe
boundariesofthelotreferredtointhe1947DeedofExtrajudicial
PartitioncanbeexplainedbythefactthatLotNo.1242(799C)is
onlyaportionoftheentireparceloflanddescribedintheDeed,a
1/3pro indivisoportion of which was adjudicated each to, first,
petitioners mother, second, to the predecessorsininterest of
privaterespondents,andthird,toanunidentifiedparty.Logically
therefore,theirboundarieswillnotbesimilar.Atanyrate,the
records show that the parcel of land adjudicated to the
predecessorsininterestofthepartieshereinwasthelotfoundon
thecornerofPlaridelandMabiniStreetsinLooc,MandaueCity.
As admittedfurtherbyboth parties, LotNo. 1242(799C)was
partofthelandallottedtotheirpredecessorsininterestinthe
1947 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. Moreover, petitioners
mother acknowledged in her application for registration of Lot
No.1242thattheDeedofExtrajudicialPartitionwasthesource
of her claim over the lot sought to be registered. She further
admitted that thelot now known asLot No. 1242 (799C) was
partoftheparceloflandinheritedbyherandhercoheirs,tothe
extent of 1/3 share each. Under Section 31, Rule 130, of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, where one derives title to property
fromanother,theact,declaration,oromissionofthelatter,while
holdingthetitle,inrelationtotheproperty,isevidenceagainst
theformer.
557
VOL.374,JANUARY25,2002
Bordalbavs.CourtofAppeals
Land Titles;When the record does not show that the land
subjectmatterofactionhasbeenexactlydetermined,theaction
cannotprosper,inasmuchastheplaintiffsownershiprightsinthe
landclaimeddonotappearsatisfactorilyandconclusivelyproven
at the trial; In the present case, while it is true that private
respondentswerenotabletoshowtheextentoftheirproindiviso
rightoveralot,theyhaveneverthelessestablishedtheirclaimover
thesame,thecaseshouldberemandedtothelowercourtforanew
trial.InBeo v. Courtof Appeals,the Court heldthatin order
that an action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is
indispensablethathewhobringstheactionmustfullyprovenot
onlyhisownershipbutalsotheidentityofthepropertyclaimed
bydescribingthelocation,areaandboundariesthereof.Sothat
whentherecorddoesnotshowthatthelandsubjectmatterofthe
action has been exactly determined, the action cannot prosper,
inasmuchastheplaintiffsownershiprightsinthelandclaimed
donotappearsatisfactorilyandconclusivelyprovenatthetrial.
Inthepresentcase,whileitistruethatprivaterespondentswere
notabletoshowtheextentoftheir1/3proindivisorightoverLot
No.1242(799C),theyhaveneverthelessestablishedtheirclaim
over the said lot. Hence, in line with our ruling in the case
ofLaluanv.Malpaya,theprudentrecoursewouldbetoremand
thecasetothelowercourtforanewtrial.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
V.L.Legaspiforpetitioner.
557
PedroAlbinoforRuralBankofMandaue.
Palma,Palma&Associatesforprivaterespondents.
YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:
ThisisapetitionforreviewunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt
seekingtosetasidetheOctober20,1992DecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals1inCAG.R.CVNo.27419,whichaffirmedwithmodifica
_______________
1
NinthDivision,composedofAssociateJusticesNathanielP.
DePano,Jr.(ponenteandchairman),JesusM.Elbinias(member)
andAngelinaS.Gutierrez(member).
558
558 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Bordalbavs.CourtofAppeals
tiontheDecision2oftheRegionalTrialCourtofMandaue,Branch
28,inCivilCaseNo.MAN386.
TheinstantcontroversystemmedfromLotNo.1242(LotNo.
799C)withanareaof1,853squaremetersandlocatedatBarrio
Looc, MandaueCity.The subject lot is partofaparcel ofland
situatedonthecornerofMabiniandPlaridelStreetsinMandaue
City,andoriginallyownedbythelatespousesCarmenoJayme
and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, an extrajudicial
partition,3written in the Spanish language was executed,
describingsaidparceloflandas
2.otraparceladeterrenourbanoenelbarriodeLook,Mandawe,
Cebu, que linda al N. con la Calle Mabini y propiodades de F.
Jayme;alE.lindaconpropiodadesdeFernandoAntigua;alS.
lindaconpropiodadesdeLucasyVictorianoJayme,yalO.linda
con la Calle Plaridel. La propiodad descrita esta avaluada, con
todassusmejoras,enlacantidaddeMILYCINCUENTAPESOS
........................................................P1,050.00. 4
anddisposing,interalia,thesameparceloflandasfollows:
1. 1)1/3infavorof(a)theirgrandchildNicanorJayme,the
deceased spouse of private respondent Candida Flores
andthefatherofprivaterespondentsEmmanuel,Dina,
Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their
grandchild Asuncion JaymeBaclay, whose heirs are
private respondents Agelio Baclay, Elnora Baclay and
CarmenJaymeDaclan;
2. 2)1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez,
motherofpetitionerTeresitaP.Bordalba;and
3. 3)1/3toanunidentifiedparty.
_______________
PennedbyJudgeMercedesGozoDadole.
2 Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion JaymeBaclay
CONVENIO DE REPARTICION Y DISTRIBUCION
3 filed their opposition6contending that said application included
EXTRAJUDICIALESDELOSBIENESDELOSESPOSOSDON
CARMENOJAYME,YDOAMARGARITAESPINADEJAYME
CELEBRADO EL... DE.......DE 1947, POR SUS HIJOS,
MARIANO JAYME, SEGUNDO JAYME, ANDRES JAYME,
GENEROSA JAYME, TEOFILA JAYME DE OUANO,
FELECITASJAYMEDELATONIOYELENAJAYME,VIUDA
DE PEREZ, CON LA CONCURRENCIA DE LOS DOS
SOBRINOS ASUNCION JAYME DE BACLAY Y NICANOR
JAYME, HIJOS DE LA FINADA ESPIRIDIONA JAYME...
(ExhibitA,Records,p.76).
4
ExhibitA2,Records,p.77.
559
VOL.374,JANUARY25,2002 559
Bordalbavs.CourtofAppeals
Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is
NicanorJaymeshouse,whichhisfamilyoccupiedsince1945.
Sometime in July 1964, Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez,
petitionersmother,filedwiththeRegionalTrialCourtofCebu,
BranchIV,anamendedapplicationfortheregistration 5ofthelot
describedwiththefollowingboundaries:
NFruelanaJayme&Road
SFelicitasdeLatonio
EAgustindeJayme
WPorfirioJayme,LotNo.1andVivencioAbellana
Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be
registered was originally a part of a land owned by her late
parents,thespousesCarmenoJaymeandMargaritaEspinade
Jayme; and that1/3 ofsaid land was adjudicated to her in an
extrajudicialpartition.Shefurtherstatedthataportionofthe
lotforwhichtitleisappliedforisoccupiedbyNicanorJaymewith
herpermission.
the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947 extrajudicial
partition.Thecasewas,however,dismissedforlackofinterestof 2. 2)Lot No. 1242B with an area of 420 square meters
the parties. Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of covered by TCT No. 22772 in the name of Teresita P.
Lands of Cebu City an application 7dated January 10, 1979, Bordalba, and which the latter mortgaged with the
seekingtheissuanceofaFreePatentoverthesamelotsubjectof RuralBankofMandaue;
theabortedapplicationofhermother,ElenaJayme,nowknown
asLotNo.1242(799C),describedasfollows: 3. 3)Lot No. 1242C with an area of 210 square meters
North: FroilanJaymeandRoad covered by TCT 22773 in the name of Teresita P.
East: AgustinJayme Bordalba;
South: AlfredoAlivioandSpousesHilarioGandecila
West: HilarioGandecilaPorferioJaymeandHeirsofVevencioAbellanosa8 4. 4)Lot No. 1242D with an area of 210 square meters
coveredbyTCT22774inthenameofTeresitaBordalba;
_______________
5. 5)Lot No. 1242E with an area of 216 square meters
5
ExhibitB,Records,pp.8183. covered by TCT 22775 in the name of Teresita P.
6
ExhibitC,Records,pp.8485. Bordalba;
7
ExhibitD,Records,p.86.
8
Exhibit3,Records,p.117. 6. 6)LotNo.1242Fwithanareaof216squaremetersand
560 covered by TCT No. 22776 in the name of Teresita P.
560 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED Bordalba.
Bordalbavs.CourtofAppeals
On April 16, 1980, petitioner was successfully granted Free Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the
PatentNo.(VIII)11421andOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.0 aforesaidFreePatentandOriginalCertificateofTitleoverLot
571 (FP) over said lot.9Thereafter, petitioner caused the No.1242,aswellastheconveyancesmadebypetitionerinvolving
subdivisionandtitlingofLotNo.1242(799C), into6lots, 10as thelotsubjectofthecontroversy,privaterespondentsfiledwith
wellasthedispositionoftwoparcelsthereof,thus: theRegionalTrialCourtofMandaueCity,Branch28,theinstant
complaintagainstpetitionerTeresita Bordalba,spousesGenaro
1. 1)Lot No. 1242A with an area of 581 square meters U.Cabahug,andRitaCapala,RuralBankofMandaueandthe
coveredbyTransferCertificateofTitleNo.22771(FP)in DirectoroftheBureauofLands.
the name of spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Inthesaidcomplaint,privaterespondentsprayedthatFree
Capala,towhompetitionersoldsaidlot; PatentNo.(VIII)11421andOCTNo.0571(FP),aswellasTCT
Nos.2277122776bedeclaredvoidandorderedcancelled.Private
respondentsalsoprayedthattheybeadjudgedownersofLotNo.
1242 (799C), and that spouses Genaro V. Cabahug and Rita
CapalaaswellastheRuralBankofMandauebedeclaredbuyers
and
_______________
ExhibitJ,Records,p.96.
9
ExhibitK,Records,p.100andExhibitsLQ,Records,
10
pp.101107.
561
VOL.374,JANUARY25,2002 561
Bordalbavs.CourtofAppeals
mortgageeinbadfaith,respectively.Inaddition,theyaskedthe
courtto awardthemactual,compensatory,and moraldamages
plusattorneysfeesintheamountofP20,000.00.
Petitioner,ontheotherhand,averredthatLotNo.1242(799
C)wasacquiredbyherthroughpurchasefromhermother, 11who
wasinpossessionofthelotintheconceptofanownersince1947.
Inheranswer,petitionertracedhermothersownershipofthelot
partlyfromthe1947deedofextrajudicialpartitionpresentedby
private respondents,12and claimed that Nicanor Jayme, and
Candida Flores occupied a portion of Lot No. 1242 (799C) by
mere tolerance of her mother. On crossexamination, petitioner
admitted that the properties of the late Carmeno Jayme and
Margarita Espina de Jayme were partitioned by their heirs in
1947,butclaimedthatshewasnotawareoftheexistenceofsaid
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. She, however, identified one of
the signatures in the said Deed to be the signature of her
mother.13
On May 28, 1990, the trial court, finding that fraud was
employedbypetitionerinobtainingFreePatentNo.(VIII)11421
andOCTNo.0571(FP),declaredsaidpatentandtitlevoidand
ordered its cancellation. However, it declared that spouses
GenaroU.CabahugandRitaCapalaaswellastheRuralBankof
Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith,
respectively;andconsequentlyupheldasvalidthesaleofLotNo.
1242AcoveredbyTransferCertificateofTitleNo.22771(FP)to
spousesGenaroU.CabahugandRitaCapala,andthemortgage
ofLotNo.1242BcoveredbyTCTNo.22772infavoroftheRural
BankofMandaue.Thedispositiveportionofthedecisionreads:
WHEREFORE,foregoingpremisesconsidered,Decisionishereby
renderedinfavoroftheplaintiffsby:
1. 1)declaringFreePatentNo.(VIII)11421aswellasthe
Original Certificate of Title No. 057 (FP) and all
subsequent certificates of title as a result of the
subdivisionofLotNo.1242exceptTCTNO.22771(FP)
asnullandvoidandorderingtheRegisterofDeedsof
MandaueCitytocancelthem;
_______________
11
Exhibit2,Records,p.115.
12
Records,p.32.
13
TSN,November14,1989,p.18.
562
562 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Bordalbavs.CourtofAppeals
1. 2)declaringspousesdefendants Genaro U.Cabahug and
RitaCapalaasbuyersingoodfaithandarethelegaland
rightfulownersofLotNo.1242AasdescribedinTCT
No.22771(FP);
2. 3)declaring the Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. as
mortgagee in good faith and the mortgage lien in its
 favor be carried over to and be annotated in the new
certificateoftitletobeissuedunderthenamesofthe
plaintiffs;
3. 4)declaringtheplaintiffsasthelegalandrightfulowners
ofLot1242andorderingtheissuanceofthecertificateof
titleintheirnames;
4. 5)dismissingtheclaimsofthedefendantspousesCabahug
andCapalaandthedefendantRuralBankofMandaue,
Inc.forlackofmerit;
5. 6)ordering the defendant Teresita Bordalba to pay
plaintiffsthefollowingamounts:
1. (a)P5,000.00asactualandlitigationexpenses;
2. (b)P20,000.00asattorneysfees,and,
1. 7)orderingdefendantBordalbatopaythecosts.
SOORDERED.14
Both petitioner Teresita Bordalba and private respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that since
private respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No.
1242(799C),petitionershouldbeorderedtoreconvey1/3ofLot
No.1242(799C)toprivaterespondents.Thedecretalportionof
therespondentcourtsdecisionstates:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is MODIFIED to order
thereconveyanceofonethirdofthesubjectlandinfavorofthe
plaintiffappelleesinlieuofthecancellationoftheCertificatesof
TitleissuedandtheirdeclarationastheownersofLotNo.1242in
itsentirety.TherestisAFFIRMEDintoto.
SOORDERED.15
Thus,petitionerfiledtheinstantpetition,assailingthedecisionof
the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that the testimonies
givenbythewitnessesforprivaterespondentswhichtouchedon
_______________
Records,pp.205206.
14
Rollo,p.33.
15
563
VOL.374,JANUARY25,2002 563
Bordalbavs.CourtofAppeals
matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not
havebeenadmittedbythetrialcourt,asthesameviolatedthe
dead mans statute. Likewise, petitioner questions the right of
privaterespondentstoinheritfromthelateNicanorJaymeand
Asuncion JaymeBaclay, as well as the identity between the
disputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of
ExtrajudicialPartition.
Thecontentionsarewithoutmerit.Itisdoctrinalthatfindings
offactsoftheCourtofAppealsupholdingthoseofthetrialcourt
arebindinguponthisCourt.Whilethereareexceptionstothis
rule,petitionerhasnotconvincedusthatthiscasefallsunderone
ofthem.16
TheCourtseesnoreasontodeviatefromthefindingsofthe
trialcourtthatpetitionerresortedtofraudandmisrepresentation
inobtainingafreepatentandtitleoverthelotunderscrutiny.
TheCourtofAppealscorrectlypointedoutthatmisrepresentation
tainted petitioners application, insofar as her declaration that
the land applied for was not occupied or claimed by any other
person. Her declaration is belied by the extrajudicial partition
whichsheacknowledged,hermothersabortedattempttohave
thelotregistered,privaterespondentspredecessorsininterests
oppositionthereto,andbytheoccupancyofaportionofthesaid
lotbyNicanorJaymeandhisfamilysince1945.
ItisasettledrulethattheLandRegistrationActprotectsonly
holdersoftitleingoodfaith,anddoesnotpermititsprovisionto
beusedasashieldforthecommissionoffraud,orasameansto
enrichoneselfattheexpenseofothers.17
Astotheallegedviolationofthedeadmansstatute, 18sufficeit
tostatethatsaidrulefindsnoapplicationinthepresentcase.
Thedeadmansstatutedoesnotoperatetoclosethemouthofa
witnessastoanymatteroffactcomingtohisknowledgeinany
otherway
_______________
16
Pua, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,345 SCRA 233, 243
(2000); citingLagandaon v. Court of Appeals,290 SCRA
330(1998).
17
Esquivias,etal.v.CourtofAppeals,etal.,272SCRA803,
816(1997];citingAngelesv.Samia,66Phil.444(1938).
18
RulesofCourt,Rule130,Section23.
564
564 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Bordalbavs.CourtofAppeals
than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or
communicationmadebythedeceasedtothewitness. 19
Sincetheclaimofprivaterespondentsandthetestimonyof
their witnesses in the present case is based,inter alia, on the
1947DeedofExtrajudicialPartitionandotherdocuments,and
not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the
questionedtestimonieswereproperlyadmittedbythetrialcourt.
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private
respondentsarenotlegalheirsofNicanorJaymeandAsuncion
JaymeBaclay.Otherthantheirbareallegationstodisputetheir
heirship,nohardevidencewaspresentedbythemtosubstantiate
their allegations.Besides,inorder that an heirmayasserthis
right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial
declarationofheirshipisnecessary.20
Anenttheissueofidentity,thedisparityintheboundariesof
LotNo.1242(799C)visavistheboundariesofthelotreferredto
inthe1947DeedofExtrajudicialPartitioncanbeexplainedby
thefactthatLotNo.1242(799C)isonlyaportionoftheentire
parceloflanddescribedintheDeed,a1/3proindivisoportionof
whichwasadjudicatedeachto,first,petitionersmother,second,
tothepredecessorsininterestofprivaterespondents,andthird,
toanunidentifiedparty.Logicallytherefore,theirboundarieswill
notbesimilar.Atanyrate,therecordsshowthattheparcelof
land adjudicated to the predecessorsininterest of the parties
herein was the lot found on the corner of Plaridel and Mabini
Streets in Looc, Mandaue City. As admitted further by both
parties,LotNo.1242(799C)waspartofthelandallottedtotheir
predecessorsininterest in the 1947 Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition. Moreover, petitioners mother acknowledged in her
application for registration of Lot No. 1242 that the Deed of
ExtrajudicialPartitionwasthesourceofherclaimoverthelot
sought to be registered. She further admitted that the lot now
known as Lot No. 1242 (799C) was part of the parcel of land
inheritedbyherandhercoheirs,to
_______________
19
VolumeV,Herrera,RemedialLaw,p.312(1999).
 HeirsofIgnacioConti,etal.v.CourtofAppeals,300SCRA
20
345, 353 (1998), citingMarabilles v. Quito,110 Phil. 64(1956)
andHernandezv.Padua,14Phil.194(1909).
565
VOL.374,JANUARY25,2002
Bordalbavs.CourtofAppeals
theextentof1/3shareeach.UnderSection31,Rule130,ofthe
Revised Rules on Evidence, where one derives title to property
fromanother,theact,declaration,oromissionofthelatter,while
holdingthetitle,inrelationtotheproperty,isevidenceagainst
theformer.
ConsideringthatLotNo.1242(799C)ispartoftheparcelof
land over whichprivate respondentspredecessorsininterestis
entitled to 1/3 proindiviso share, which was disregarded by
petitioner when she secured a Free Patent and Original
Certificate of Title in her name, to the exclusion of private
respondents predecessorsininterest, the trial court and the
CourtofAppeals,therefore,didnoterrinupholdingtherightof
privaterespondentsascoowners,andorderingthepetitionerto
reconvey1/3ofthelotinquestiontothem.
Notwithstandingtheforegoing,however,theCourtisunable
to determine what part of Lot No. 1242 (799C) is within the
boundaries of the parcel of land inherited in the 1947 Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition by the predecessorsininterest of the
parties herein. This is so because private respondents did not
showtheextentofthesaidlandmentionedinthe1947Deedof
ExtrajudicialPartitioninrelationtoLotNo.1242(799C).While
theypresentedtheboundariesoftheparceloflandadjudicatedin
theDeed,towit:
North: CalleMabiniypropiodadesdeF.Jayme
East: PropiodadesdeFernandoAntigua
South: PropiodadesdeLucasyVictorianoJayme
West: CallePlaridel
theydidnot,however,showwheretheseboundariesarefoundin
relationtotheboundariesofLotNo.1242(799C).Absentafixed
boundary of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed, which
they claim LotNo. 1242(799C)is apartof, theCourt cannot
565
determinetheextenttowhichthelotnowknownasLotNo.1242
(799C) is included. Admittedly, the north boundary of Lot No.
1242 (799C) (Property of Froilan Jaime and Mabini Street) is
similartothenorthboundaryofthelandmentionedintheDeed.
Withonlyonereferencepoint,however,thesouth,eastandwest
boundariesof
566
566 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Bordalbavs.CourtofAppeals
LotNo.1242(799C)cannotbeestablishedwithcertaintytobe
withintheparceloflanddescribedintheDeedofExtrajudicial
Partition.
InBeov.CourtofAppeals,21theCourtheldthatinorderthat
an action for recovery of possession may prosper, it is
indispensablethathewhobringstheactionmustfullyprovenot
onlyhisownershipbutalsotheidentityofthepropertyclaimed
bydescribingthelocation,areaandboundariesthereof.Sothat
whentherecorddoesnotshowthatthelandsubjectmatterofthe
action has been exactly determined, the action cannot prosper,
inasmuchastheplaintiffsownershiprightsinthelandclaimed
donotappearsatisfactorilyandconclusivelyprovenatthetrial.
Inthepresentcase,whileitistruethatprivaterespondents
were not able toshow theextent of their 1/3proindivisoright
over Lot No. 1242 (799C), they have nevertheless established
theirclaimoverthesaidlot.Hence,inlinewithourrulinginthe
case ofLaluan v. Malpaya,22the prudent recourse would be to
remandthecasetothelowercourtforanewtrial.
 WHEREFORE, in view of all theforegoing, the October 20,
1992DecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.27419,
and the May 28, 1990 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
MandaueCity,Branch28,inCivilCaseNo.MAN386,insofaras
itrelatestotherecognitionofthe1/3shareofprivaterespondents
overLotNo.1242(799C)isAFFIRMED.Thecaseisremandedto
thetrialcourtinordertodeterminewhatpartofLotNo.1242
(799C)isincludedintheparceloflandadjudicatedinthe1947
DeedofExtrajudicialPartitiontothepredecessorsininterestof
thepartiesherein.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.(C.J.,Chairman),Puno,KapunanandPardo,
JJ.,concur.
Judgmentaffirmed,caseremandedtotrialcourt.
againstinterestisentitledtoovercomebyevidencetheapparent
inconsistency,anditiscompetentforthepartyagainstwhomthe
pleading is offered to show that the statements were
inadvertentlymadeorweremadeunderamistakeoffact.(Bitong
vs.CourtofAppeals,292SCRA503[1998])
TheobjectandpurposeoftheDeadMansStatuteistoguard
against the temptation togive false testimony in regard of the
transactioninquestion on thepart of the survivingparty, and
furthertoputthetwopartiestoasuitupontermsofequalityin
regardtotheopportunitytogivingtestimony.(Tanvs.Courtof
Appeals,295SCRA247[1998])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R.No.179786.July24,2013.*
JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, petitioner,vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Evidence; PhysicianPatient Privileged
Communication Rule; The physicianpatient privileged
communicationruleessentiallymeansthataphysicianwhogets
informationwhileprofessionallyattendingapatientcannotina
civilcasebeexaminedwithoutthepatientsconsentastoanyfacts
which would blacken the latters reputation.The physician
patientprivilegedcommunicationrule essentiallymeans thata
physicianwhogetsinformationwhileprofessionallyattendinga
patientcannotinacivilcasebeexaminedwithoutthepatients
consent as to any facts which would blacken the latters
reputation.Thisruleisintendedtoencouragethepatienttoopen
uptothephysician,relatetohimthehistoryofhisailment,and
give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a
correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate
cure.Anyfearthataphysiciancouldbecompelledinthefutureto
cometocourtandnarrateallthathadtranspiredbetweenhim
andthepatientmightpromptthelattertoclamup,thusputting
hisownhealthatgreatrisk.
Same; Same; Objection to Evidence; Section 36, Rule 132,
statesthatobjectionstoevidencemustbemadeaftertheofferof
suchevi
_______________
*THIRDDIVISION.
77
VOL.702,JULY24,2013 77
Chanvs.Chan
 dence for admission in court.The case presents a
proceduralissue,giventhatthetimetoobjecttotheadmissionof
evidence,suchasthehospitalrecords,wouldbeatthetimethey
are offered. The offer could be made part of the physicians
testimonyorasindependentevidencethathehadmadeentriesin
thoserecordsthatconcernthepatientshealthproblems.Section
36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made
aftertheofferofsuchevidenceforadmissionincourt.Thus:SEC.
36.Objection.Objectiontoevidenceofferedorallymustbemade
immediately after the offer is made. Objection to a question
propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness
shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent. An offer of evidence in writing shall be
objectedtowithinthree(3)daysafternoticeoftheofferunlessa
differentperiodisallowedbythecourt.Inanycase,thegrounds
fortheobjectionsmustbespecified.Sincetheofferofevidenceis
madeatthetrial,Josielenesrequestforsubpoenaducestecumis
premature.Shewillhavetowaitfortrialtobeginbeforemaking
a request for the issuance of a subpoenaduces tecumcovering
Johnnyshospitalrecords.Itiswhenthoserecordsareproduced
forexaminationatthetrial,thatJohnnymayopttoobject,not
just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their
disclosure.Section24(c),Rule130oftheRulesofEvidencequoted
aboveisaboutnondisclosureofprivilegedmatters.
Same; Same; PhysicianPatient Privileged Communication
Rule; Toallow thedisclosureduring discovery procedureofthe
hospitalrecordstheresultsofteststhatthephysicianordered,
thediagnosisofthepatientsillness,andtheadviceortreatment
he gave him would be to allow access to evidence that is
inadmissiblewithoutthepatientsconsent.Therighttocompel
theproductionofdocumentshasalimitation:thedocumentstobe
disclosedarenotprivileged.Josieleneofcourseclaimsthatthe
hospitalrecordssubjectofthiscasearenotprivilegedsinceitis
thetestimonialevidenceofthephysicianthatmayberegarded
asprivileged.Section24(c)ofRule130statesthatthephysician
cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined regarding their professional conversation. The
privilege,saysJosielene,doesnotcoverthehospitalrecords,but
only the examination of the physician at the trial. To allow,
however,thedisclosureduringdiscoveryprocedureofthehospital
records the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosisofthepatientsillness,andtheadviceortreatmenthe
78
7 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
8
Chanvs.Chan
gave him would be to allow access to evidence that is
inadmissible without the patients consent. Physician
memorializes all these information in the patients records.
Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the
physiciantotestifyonprivilegedmattershegainedwhiledealing
withthepatient,withoutthelatterspriorconsent.
LEONEN,J.,ConcurringOpinion:
Remedial Law; Evidence; PhysicianPatient Privileged
CommunicationRule;Viewthatthehospitalrecordsofrespondent
Johnny Chan may not be produced in court without his/her
consent.IagreethatthehospitalrecordsofrespondentJohnny
Chan may not be produced in court without his/her consent.
Issuanceofasubpoenaducestecumforitsproductionwillviolate
thephysicianpatientprivilegeruleunderRule130,Sec.24(c)of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, this privilege is not
absolute. The request of petitioner for a copy of the medical
recordshasnotbeenproperlylaid.Insteadofarequestforthe
issuanceofasubpoenaducestecum,JosieleneLaraChanshould
avail of the mode of discovery under Rule 28 of Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 28 pertains to the physical or mental
examinationofpersons.Thismaybeorderedbythecourt,inits
discretion, upon motion and showing of good cause by the
requesting party, in cases when the mental and/or physical
conditionofapartyisincontroversy.Asidefromshowinggood
cause,therequestingpartyneedsonlytonotifythepartytobe
examined (and all other parties) and specify the time, place,
manner,conditions,andscopeoftheexamination,includingthe
nameofthephysicianwhowillconducttheexamination.
Same; Same; Same; View that the examined party may
obtain a copy of the examining physicians report concerning
his/her mental or physical examination.The examined party
mayobtainacopyoftheexaminingphysiciansreportconcerning
his/her mental or physical examination. The requesting party
shalldeliverthisreporttohim/her.Aftersuchdelivery,however,
the requesting party becomes entitled to any past or future
medicalreportinvolvingthesamementalorphysicalcondition.
Uponmotionandnotice,thecourtmayordertheexaminedparty
to deliver those medical reports to the requesting party if the
examinedpartyrefusestodoso.Moreover,iftheexaminedparty
requestsacopyoftheexaminingphysicians
79
VOL.702,JULY24,2013
Chanvs.Chan
report or if he/she takes the examining physicians
deposition, the request waives the examined partys privileges
whenthetestimonyofanypersonwhoexaminedorwillexamine
his/hermentalofphysicalstatusistakenintheactionorinany
actioninvolvingthesamecontroversy.
Same;Same;Same;Viewthatthephysicianpatientprivilege
doesnotcoverinformationdiscoveredunderRule28oftheRules
of Court.Discovery procedures provide a balance between the
needoftheplaintifforclaimanttofullyandfairlyestablishher
case and the policy to protect to a certain extent
communicationsmadebetweenapatientandhisdoctor.Hence,
the physicianpatient privilege does not cover information
discovered under Rule 28. This procedure is availed with the
intention of making the results public during trial. Along with
othermodesofdiscovery,thiswouldpreventthetrialfrombeing
carriedoninthedark.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Ubano,Sianghio,Lozada&Cabantacforpetitioner.
Fragante,Pooten,Ferrer,Fayre&Associatesforrespondent.
ABAD,J.:
Thiscaseisabouttheproprietyofissuingasubpoenaduces
tecumfor the production and submission in court of the
respondenthusbandshospitalrecordinacasefordeclarationof
nullityofmarriagewhereoneoftheissuesishismentalfitnessas
ahusband.
TheFactsandtheCase
79 On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan
(Josielene)filedbeforetheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofMakati
City,Branch144apetitionforthedeclarationofnul
80
80 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Chanvs.Chan
lity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the
dissolutionoftheirconjugalpartnershipofgains,andtheaward
ofcustodyoftheirchildrentoher.JosieleneclaimedthatJohnny 2Rollo,pp.6972.
failedtocareforandsupporthisfamilyandthatapsychiatrist 81
diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking VOL.702,JULY24,2013 81
andexcessiveuseofprohibiteddrugs.Indeed,shehadconvinced
Chanvs.Chan
him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and
beforetheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCAG.R.SP97913,imputing
rehabilitation.
graveabuseofdiscretiontotheRTC.
Johnnyresistedtheaction,claimingthatitwasJosielenewho
OnSeptember17,2007theCA3deniedJosielenespetition.It
failedinherwifelyduties.Tosavetheirmarriage,heagreedto
ruled that, if courts were to allow the production of medical
marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the
records, then patients would be left with no assurance that
hospital,twomenforciblyheldhimbybotharmswhileanother
whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their
gavehimaninjection.Themarriagerelationsgotworsewhenthe
physicianswouldbekeptconfidential.Theprohibitioncoversnot
policetemporarilydetainedJosieleneforanunrelatedcrimeand
only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent
releasedheronlyafterthecaseagainstherended.Bythen,their
hospitalrecords.TheCAaddedthat,althoughJohnnycanwaive
marriagerelationshipcouldnolongerberepaired.
the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached the
During the pretrial conference, Josielene premarked the
Philhealthformtohisanswerforthelimitedpurposeofshowing
Philhealth Claim Form1that Johnny attached tohis answer as
hisallegedforcibleconfinement.
proofthathewasforciblyconfinedattherehabilitationunitofa
QuestionPresented
hospital. The form carried a physicians handwritten note that
Thecentralquestionpresentedinthiscaseis:
Johnny suffered from methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court
Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006 Josielene filed
correctlydeniedtheissuanceofasubpoenaducestecumcovering
with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoenaduces
Johnnyshospitalrecordsonthegroundthatthesearecoveredby
tecumaddressed to Medical City, covering Johnnys medical theprivilegedcharacterofthephysicianpatientcommunication.
records when he was there confined. The request was TheRulingoftheCourt
accompaniedbyamotiontobeallowedtosubmitinevidence
Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoenaduces
therecordssoughtbysubpoenaducestecum.2
tecumcovering the hospital records of Johnnys confinement,
Johnnyopposedthemotion,arguingthatthemedicalrecords
which records she wanted to present in court as evidence in
were covered by physicianpatient privilege. On September 13,
supportofheractiontohavetheirmarriagedeclaredanullity.
2006 the RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielenes
RespondentJohnnyresistedherrequestforsubpoena,however,
motion.Italsodeniedhermotionforreconsideration,prompting
invoking the privileged character of those records. He cites
hertofileaspecialcivilactionofcertiorari
Section24(c),Rule130oftheRulesofEvidencewhichreads:
_______________
_______________
1AnnexB.
 3PennedbyAssociateJusticeJoseL.Sabio,Jr.andconcurred
inbyAssociateJusticesJoseC.Reyes,Jr.andMyrnaDimaranan
Vidal.
82
82 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Chanvs.Chan
SEC.24.Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication.Thefollowingpersonscannottestifyasto
matterslearnedinconfidenceinthefollowingcases:
xxxx
(c)Apersonauthorizedtopracticemedicine,surgery
orobstetricscannotinacivilcase,withouttheconsentof
the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment
given by him or any information which he may have
acquired in attending such patient in a professional
capacity,whichinformationwasnecessarytoenablehimto
act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
reputationofthepatient.
The physicianpatient privileged communication rule
essentially means that a physician who gets information while
professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be
examined without the patients consent as to any facts which
would blacken the latters reputation. This rule is intended to
encouragethepatienttoopenuptothephysician,relatetohim
the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body,
enablingthephysiciantomakeacorrectdiagnosisofthatailment
andprovidetheappropriatecure.Anyfearthataphysiciancould
becompelledinthefuturetocometocourtandnarrateallthat
had transpiredbetweenhim andthepatientmight promptthe
lattertoclamup,thusputtinghisownhealthatgreatrisk. 4
1.Thecasepresentsaproceduralissue,giventhatthetime
to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital
records,wouldbeatthetimetheyareoffered.Theoffercouldbe
made part of the physicians testimony or as independent
evidencethathehadmadeentriesinthoserecordsthatconcern
thepatientshealthproblems.
_______________
4Francisco,The Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines,
VolumeVII,PartI,1997ed.,p.282,citingWillofBruendi,102
Wis.47,78N.W.169andMcRaev.Erickson,1Cal.App.326.
83
VOL.702,JULY24,2013 83
Chanvs.Chan
Section36,Rule132,statesthatobjectionstoevidencemust
bemadeaftertheofferofsuchevidenceforadmissionincourt.
Thus:
SEC.36.Objection.Objection to evidence offered
orallymustbemadeimmediatelyaftertheofferismade.
Objectiontoaquestionpropoundedinthecourseofthe
oralexaminationofawitnessshallbemadeassoonasthe
groundsthereforshallbecomereasonablyapparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to
within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a
differentperiodisallowedbythecourt.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be
specified.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielenes
requestforsubpoenaducestecumispremature.Shewillhaveto
waitfortrialtobeginbeforemakingarequestfortheissuanceof
asubpoenaducestecumcoveringJohnnyshospitalrecords.Itis
whenthoserecordsareproducedforexaminationatthetrial,that
Johnnymayopttoobject,notjusttotheiradmissioninevidence,
but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Evidence quoted above is about nondisclosure of
privilegedmatters.
2.ItisofcoursepossibletotreatJosielenesmotionforthe
issuanceofasubpoenaducestecumcoveringthehospitalrecords
asamotionforproductionofdocuments,adiscoveryprocedure
availabletoalitigantpriortotrial.Section1,Rule27oftheRules
ofCivilProcedureprovides:
SEC.1.Motionforproductionorinspection; order.
Uponmotionofanypartyshowinggoodcausetherefor,the
courtinwhichanactionispendingmay(a)orderanyparty
to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing,byoronbehalfofthemovingparty,ofany
designateddocuments,papers,books,ac
84
84 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Chanvs.Chan
counts,letters,photographs,objectsortangiblethings,not
privileged,whichconstituteorcontainevidencematerial
toanymatterinvolvedintheactionandwhichareinhis
possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to
permitentryupondesignatedlandorotherpropertyinhis
possession or control for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or
any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The
ordershallspecifythetime,placeandmannerofmaking
theinspectionandtakingcopiesandphotographs,andmay
prescribesuchtermsandconditionsasarejust.(Emphasis
supplied)
Buttheaboverighttocompeltheproductionofdocumentshas
alimitation:thedocumentstobedisclosedarenotprivileged.
Josieleneofcourseclaimsthatthehospitalrecordssubjectof
thiscasearenotprivilegedsinceitisthetestimonialevidenceof
thephysicianthatmayberegardedasprivileged.Section24(c)of
Rule130statesthatthephysiciancannotinacivilcase,without
the consent of the patient, be examined regarding their
professionalconversation.Theprivilege,saysJosielene,doesnot
cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the
physicianatthetrial.
Toallow,however,thedisclosureduringdiscoveryprocedure
ofthehospitalrecordstheresultsofteststhatthephysician
ordered,thediagnosisofthepatientsillness,andtheadviceor
treatmenthegavehimwouldbetoallowaccesstoevidence
that is inadmissible without the patients consent. Physician
memorializes all these information in the patients records.
Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the
physiciantotestifyonprivilegedmattershegainedwhiledealing
withthepatient,withoutthelatterspriorconsent.
3.JosielenearguesthatsinceJohnnyadmittedinhisanswer
to the petition before the RTC that he had been confined in a
hospitalagainsthiswillandinfactattachedtohisan
85
VOL.702,JULY24,2013 85
Chanvs.Chan
swer a Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he
shouldbedeemedtohavewaivedtheprivilegedcharacterofits
records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Evidencethatprovides:
SEC.17.Whenpartoftransaction,writingorrecord
giveninevidence,theremainderadmissible.Whenpartof
anact,declaration,conversation,writingorrecordisgiven
in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject
maybeinquiredintobytheother, andwhenadetached
act,declaration,conversation,writingorrecordisgivenin
evidence,anyotheract,declaration,conversation,writing
 orrecordnecessarytoitsunderstandingmayalsobegiven
inevidence.
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it
cannotbesaidthatJohnnyhadalreadypresentedthePhilhealth
claimforminevidence,theactcontemplatedabovewhichwould
justifyJosieleneintorequestinganinquiryintothedetailsofhis
hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce
evidenceinthecasewhenhefiledhisanswer.Anyrequestfor
disclosureofhishospitalrecordswouldagainbepremature.
For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were
justified in denying Josielene her request for the production in
courtofJohnnyshospitalrecords.
ACCORDINGLY, the CourtDENIESthe petition
andAFFIRMStheDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.
SP97913datedSeptember17,2007.
SOORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), PeraltaandMendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Leonen,J.,SeeSeparateConcuringOpinion.
86
86 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Chanvs.Chan
CONCURRlNGOPINION
LEONEN,J.:
Iconcurbutaddthefollowingpoints:
IagreethatthehospitalrecordsofrespondentJohnnyChan
maynotbeproducedincourtwithouthis/herconsent.Issuanceof
a subpoenaduces tecumfor its production will violate the
physicianpatientprivilegeruleunderRule130,Sec.24(c) 1ofthe
RulesofCivilProcedure.
However, this privilege is not absolute. The request of
petitionerforacopyofthemedicalrecordshasnotbeenproperly
laid.
Instead of a request for the issuance of a subpoenaduces
tecum,JosieleneLaraChanshouldavailofthemodeofdiscovery
underRule28ofRulesofCivilProcedure.
Rule 28 pertains to the physical or mental examination of
persons.Thismaybeorderedbythecourt,initsdiscretion, 2upon
motion and showing of good cause3by the requesting party, in
caseswhenthementaland/orphysicalconditionofapartyisin
controversy.4Aside from showing good cause, the requesting
partyneedsonlytonotifythepartytobeexamined(andallother
parties)andspecifythetime,place,man
_______________
1RulesofCourt,Rule130,Sec.24(c)provides:
Apersonauthorizedtopracticesurgeryorobstetricscannotin
acivilcase,withouttheconsentofthepatient,beexaminedasto
anyadviceortreatmentgivenbyhimoranyinformationwhich
hemayhaveacquiredinattendingsuchpatientinaprofessional
capacity,whichinformationwasnecessarytoenablehimtoactin
that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the
patient.
2RulesofCourt,Rule28,Sec.1.
3RulesofCourt,Rule28,Sec.2.
4RulesofCourt,Rule28,Sec.1.
87
VOL.702,JULY24,2013 87
Chanvs.Chan
ner,conditions,andscopeoftheexamination,includingthename
ofthephysicianwhowillconducttheexamination.5
The examined party may obtain a copy of the examining
physicians report concerning his/her mental or physical
examination.6The requesting party shall deliver this report to Chanvs.Chan
him/her.7After such delivery, however, the requesting party Inviewoftheforegoing,IvotetoDENYthepetition.
becomesentitledtoanypastorfuturemedicalreportinvolving
thesamementalorphysicalcondition. 8Uponmotionandnotice, Petitiondenied,judgmentaffirmed.
thecourtmayordertheexaminedpartytodeliverthosemedical
Notes.Forlackofaspecificlawgearedtowardsthetypeof
reportstotherequestingpartyiftheexaminedpartyrefusestodo
negligencecommittedbymembersofthemedicalprofession,such
so.9
claim for damages is almost always anchored on the alleged
Moreover, if the examined party requests a copy of the
violationofArticle2176oftheCivilCode;Inmedicalnegligence
examining physicians report or if he/she takes the examining
cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a
physiciansdeposition,the requestwaives theexaminedpartys
physicianpatientrelationshipbetweenthedoctorandthevictim.
privilegeswhenthetestimonyofanypersonwhoexaminedorwill
(Lucasvs.Tuao,586SCRA173[2009])
examinehis/hermentalofphysicalstatusistakenintheactionor
inanyactioninvolvingthesamecontroversy.10 When a patient engages the services of a physician, a
Discoveryproceduresprovideabalancebetweentheneedof physicianpatientrelationshipisgenerated;Thus,intreatinghis
theplaintifforclaimanttofullyandfairlyestablishhercaseand patient, a physician is under a duty to exercise that degree of
the policy to protect to a certain extent communications care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general
made between a patient and his doctor. Hence, the physician neighborhoodandinthesamegenerallineofpracticeordinarily
patient privilege does not cover information discovered under possess and exercise in like cases. (Jarcia, Jr. vs. People, 666
Rule28.Thisprocedureisavailedwiththeintentionofmaking SCRA336[2012])
the results public during trial. Along with other modes of o0o
discovery,thiswouldpreventthetrialfrombeingcarriedonin Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
thedark.11 reserved.
_______________
5RulesofCourt,Rule28,Sec.2.
6RulesofCourt,Rule28,Sec.3.
7RulesofCourt,Rule28,Sec.3.
8RulesofCourt,Rule28,Sec.3.
9RulesofCourt,Rule28,Sec.3.
10RulesofCourt,Rule28,Sec.4.
11Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Tantoco and Santiago, G.R.
No.90478,November21,1991,204SCRA212.
89
VOL.702,JULY24,2013 89
 This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October
2001 by Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom ("Judge Lacurom"), Pairing
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, against
respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Jacoba ("respondents"). Complainant charged respondents with
violation of Rules 11.03,1 11.04,2 and 19.013 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff

Alejandro R. Veneracion ("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful
detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos ("Barrientos"). 4 The
Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor
of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court.
The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting
as pairing judge.
THIRD DIVISION
On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution")
reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion. 5 The
A.C. No. 5921 March 10, 2006 dispositive portion reads:

JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated
Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, December 22, 2000, as well as REVERSES the Decision of the court
Branch 30, Complainant, a quo dated July 22, 1997.
vs.
ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-
JACOBA, Respondents. Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to
CEASE and DESIST from ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico
Barrientos from the 1,000 square meter homelot covered by TCT No.
DECISION T-75274, and the smaller area of one hundred forty-seven square
meters, within the 1,000 sq.m. covered by TCT No. T-78613, and the
CARPIO, J.: house thereon standing covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-
01137, issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and
The Case Barrientos is ordered to pay Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house
covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137.
SO ORDERED.6
Veneracions counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with
Request for Inhibition)7 dated 30 July 2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"),
pertinent portions of which read:
II. PREFATORY STATEMENT
This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as
it is entirely DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is a Legal
MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform
ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE!
The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x
xxxx
III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in
Peremptorily and Suddenly Reversing the Findings of the Lower
Court Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding Judge:1awph!l.net
x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a
very questionable SHORT period of time, came this STUNNING and
SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis, the Hon.
Pairing Judge simply and peremptorily REVERSED two (2) decisions
in favor of the plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if not suspicious,
hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
xxxx
[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established
and presumes FACTS not part of the records of the case, all "loaded"
in favor of the alleged "TENANT." Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an
INSULT to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in the Judicial
Process. Need we say more?
xxxx
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding
That the Defendant is Entitled to a Homelot, and That the Residential
LOT in Question is That Homelot:
THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the
Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base this conclusion? x x x
This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!
xxxx
6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously
in Holding and Declaring that The [court] A QUO Erroneously Took
Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction over the
Subject-Matter:
Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows
that JURISDICTION is determined by the averments of the
COMPLAINT and not by the averments in the answer! This is backed
up by a Litany of Cases!
xxxx
7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge
Ridiculously ERRED in Ordering the Defendant To Pay P10,000.00
to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiffs HOUSE:
THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of
the Manifold GLARING ERRORS committed by the Hon. Pairing
Court Judge.
 xxxx
This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL
HOUSE to the defendant for the ridiculously LOW price
of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and
ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court Presiding
Judge. Like the proverbial MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution
should be slain on sight!8
The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit
himself "in order to give plaintiff a fighting chance" and (2) the
Resolution be reconsidered and set aside.9 Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Jacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on behalf of the
Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.
On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to
appear before his sala and explain why she should not be held in
contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and
humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.10 In her
Explanation, Comments and Answer,11 Velasco-Jacoba claimed that
"His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject
Motion; records will show that the undersigned counsel did not
actually or actively participate in this case."12 Velasco-Jacoba
disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor
and integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the
respect that is rightfully due all courts of justice." 13She rationalized as
follows:
x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some
sardonic, strident and hard-striking adjectives. And, if we are to pick
such stringent words at random and bunch them together, side-by-
side x x x then collectively and certainly they present a cacophonic
picture of total and utter disrespect. x x x
xxxx
We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a
staccato of incisive and hard-hitting remarks, machine-gun style as to
be called contumacious and contemptuous. They were just
articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment and disbelief at the
sudden reversal of their good fortune, not driven by any desire to just
cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing judge. They must believe
that big monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more
no less. x x x The matters involved were [neither] peripheral nor
marginalized, and they had to call a spade a spade. x x x 14
Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize
"for whatever mistake [they] may have committed in a moment of
unguarded discretion when [they] may have stepped on the line and
gone out of bounds." She also agreed to have the allegedly
contemptuous phrases stricken off the record.15
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty
of contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a
fine of P1,000.16
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September
2001 order. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an
afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said
"O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli." (Sign this as it
is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading
handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her
husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and
future."17 This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion
which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then
suspension from the practice of law.18
Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty
of contempt without conducting any hearing. She accused Judge
Lacurom of harboring "a personal vendetta," ordering her
imprisonment despite her status as "senior lady lawyer of the IBP
Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother
many times over."19At any rate, she argued, Judge Lacurom should
have inhibited himself from the case out of delicadeza because
"[Veneracion] had already filed against him criminal cases before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and before the
Ombudsman."20
The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the
Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm, Veneracion had executed an
affidavit on 23 August 2001 accusing Judge Lacurom of knowingly
rendering unjust judgment through inexcusable negligence and
ignorance21 and violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA 3019").22 The first charge
became the subject of a preliminary investigation23 by the City
Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City. On the second charge, Veneracion
set forth his allegations in a Complaint-Affidavit24 filed on 28 August
2001 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this
time directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in
contempt.25 Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion
for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30
July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacobas statements implicating
him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence. 26 Judge
Lacurom later rendered a decision27 finding Jacoba guilty of
contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.
On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint
against respondents before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at
the hearing set by IBP Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro ("IBP
Commissioner Navarro") despite sufficient notice.28
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of
10 October 2002, recommended the suspension of respondents from
the practice of law for six months.29 IBP Commissioner Navarro
found that "respondents were prone to us[ing] offensive and
derogatory remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy and
disrespect for authority."30 Although the remarks were not directed at
Judge Lacurom personally, they were aimed at "his position as a
judge, which is a smack on the judiciary system as a whole." 31
The IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") adopted IBP
Commissioner Navarros Report and Recommendation, except for
the length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three
months.32 On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board transmitted its
recommendation to this Court, together with the documents
pertaining to the case.
Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP
Board decision, thus:33
xxxx
3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the
present complaint of Judge Lacurom is sub judice; the
same issues involved in this case are raised before the
Honorable Court of Appeals presently pending in CA-
G.R. SP No. 66973 for Certiorari and Mandatory
Inhibition with TRO and Preliminary Injunction x x x;
4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom
before the Supreme Court involving the same issues we
raised in the aforementioned Certiorari case, which was
dismissed by the Supreme Court for being premature, in
view of the pending Certiorari case before the Court of
Appeals;
 5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court
of Appeals, the present complaint should likewise be
dismissed and/or suspended pending resolution of the
certiorari case by the Court of Appeals.34(Emphasis supplied)
The Courts Ruling
On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacobas contention that
the present complaint should be considered sub judice in view of the
petition for certiorari and mandatory inhibition with preliminary
injunction ("petition for certiorari")35 filed before the Court of Appeals.
The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-
Jacoba on 4 October 2001, seeks to nullify the following orders
issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No. 2836: (1) the Orders
dated 26 September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying
respondents respective motions for inhibition; and (2) the 13
September 2001 Order which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of
contempt. The petitioners allege that Judge Lacurom acted "with
grave abuse of discretion [amounting] to lack of jurisdiction, in
violation of express provisions of the law and applicable decisions of
the Supreme Court."36
Plainly, the issue before us is respondents liability under the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The outcome of this case has no bearing
on the resolution of the petition for certiorari, as there is neither
identity of issues nor causes of action.
Neither should the Courts dismissal of the administrative complaint
against Judge Lacurom for being premature impel us to dismiss this
complaint. Judge Lacuroms orders in Civil Case No. 2836 could not
be the subject of an administrative complaint against him while a
petition for certiorari assailing the same orders is pending with an
appellate court. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the
aggrieved parties and the same has not been resolved with finality.
Until there is a final declaration that the challenged order or judgment
is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether
the judge is administratively liable.37
The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of
this case. The corresponding implications of their actions also give
rise to different liabilities. We first examine the charge against
Velasco-Jacoba.
There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba
appears on the 30 July 2001 motion. Velasco-Jacobas responsibility
as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3.Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed by
the party or counsel representing him x x x.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading, that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it, and
that it is not interposed for delay.
x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule,
or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein x x x shall be
subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied)
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect
certified that she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it
was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied
the motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap
of paper to that of a court document.
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001
motion only because of her husbands request but she did not know
its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each
others pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the
spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, "[s]o implicit is [their] trust for
each other that this happens all the time. Through the years, [she]
already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is
signed by the other."38 By Velasco-Jacobas own admission,
therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an act of
falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground
for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other
ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion. 39
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does
not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility
of Velasco-Jacobas statement pointing to him as the author of the
motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer
with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wifes
account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion
by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which he
perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental." 40
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacobas version of the facts more
plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was
immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacobas defense which was
raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption
of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for
Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacobas
assertion that she had not "actually participate[d]" in the prosecution
of the case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836,
praying that Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for
certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against him. 41 This
petition for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the premise
that the motion was, in fact, Jacobas handiwork.42
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived
by failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any
conduct that may be construed as implied consent. 43 This waiver
applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July
2001 motion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 11.03.A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04.A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly
exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba to defend ably his clients
cause. We recall his use of the following words and
phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous
mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an
anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba
acknowledged that the words created "a cacophonic picture of total
and utter disrespect."44
Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that
every remark in the 30 July 2001 motion was warranted. We
disagree.
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court
and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.45 However, even
the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack
made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacuroms Resolution.
On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided
the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a
lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession.46 The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we
are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial
administration.47
In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely
enjoined to use dignified language but also to pursue the clients
cause through fair and honest means, thus:
Rule 19.01.A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its
resolution, Jacoba assisted his client in instituting two administrative
cases against Judge Lacurom. As we have earlier noted, Civil Case
No. 2836 was then pending before Judge Lacuroms sala. The
Courts attention is drawn to the fact that the timing of the filing of
these administrative cases could very well raise the suspicion that
the cases were intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.
In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a
repetition of similar acts would merit a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again
we are faced with the question of whether respondents have
conducted themselves with the courtesy and candor required of them
as members of the bar and officers of the court. We find respondents
to have fallen short of the mark.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice
of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this Decision. We
also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law
for two (2) months effective upon finality of this Decision.
We STERNLY WARN respondentsthat a repetition of the same or
similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal records as
attorneys; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative

cases before this Court. In Administrative Case No. 2594, we
suspended Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six months
because of "his failure to file an action for the recovery of possession
of property despite the lapse of two and a half years from receipt by
him of P550 which his client gave him as filing and sheriffs fees." 48 In
Administrative Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss
in his duties when he failed to file the appellants brief, resulting in
the dismissal of his clients appeal. We imposed the penalty of one
year suspension.49

As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for
appearing in barangay conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party,
knowing fully well the prohibition contained in Section 415 of the
Local Government Code.50

A.C.No.5439.January22,2007.*
CLARITA J. SAMALA, complainant,vs.ATTY. LUCIANO D.
VALENCIA,respondent.
Legal Ethics;Attorneys;Conflict of Interest;Test;A lawyer
maynotundertaketodischargeconflictingdutiesanymorethan
hemayrepresentantagonisticinterests,asternrulefoundedon
theprinciplesofpublicpolicyandgoodtaste;Oneofthetestsof
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relationwouldpreventthefulldischargeofthelawyersdutyof
undividedfidelityandloyaltytotheclientorinvitesuspicionof
unfaithfulnessordoubledealingintheperformanceofthatduty.
Rule15.03,Canon15ofthe
_______________
ENBANC.
*
2
2 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Samalavs.Valencia
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer
shallnotrepresentconflictinginterestsexceptbywrittenconsent
ofallconcernedgivenafterafulldisclosureofthefacts.Alawyer
maynot,withoutbeingguiltyofprofessionalmisconduct,actas
counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his
presentorformerclient.Hemaynotalsoundertaketodischarge
conflictingdutiesanymorethanhemayrepresentantagonistic
interests. Thissternruleisfoundedon theprinciples ofpublic
policyandgoodtaste.Itspringsfromtherelationofattorneyand
clientwhichisoneoftrustandconfidence.Lawyersareexpected
notonlytokeepinviolatetheclientsconfidence,butalsotoavoid
theappearanceoftreacheryanddoubledealingforonlythencan
litigantsbeencouragedtoentrusttheirsecretstotheirlawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.Oneofthetestsofinconsistencyofinterestsiswhether
theacceptanceofanewrelationwouldpreventthefulldischarge
ofthelawyersdutyofundividedfidelityandloyaltytotheclient
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or doubledealing in the
performanceofthatduty.
Same;Same;Same;The bare attorneyclient relationship
with a client precludes an attorney from accepting professional
employmentfromtheclientsadversaryeitherinthesamecaseor
inadifferentbutrelatedaction.Anattorneyowesloyaltytohis
clientnotonlyinthecaseinwhichhehasrepresentedhimbut
alsoaftertherelationofattorneyandclienthasterminated.The
bare attorneyclient relationship with a client precludes an
attorneyfromacceptingprofessionalemploymentfromtheclients
adversary either in the samecase or in a different but related
action. A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent
client against a former client when the subject matter of the
presentcontroversyisrelated,directlyorindirectly,tothesubject
matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the
formerclient.
Same;Same;Same;Knowledge acquired by a lawyer from
hisclientscaselearningtheweakpointsoftheactionaswellas
thestrongones,mustbeconsideredsacredandguardedwithcare.
RespondentisboundtocomplywithCanon21oftheCodeof
Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall
preservetheconfidencesandsecretsofhisclientevenafterthe
attorneyclient relation is terminated. The reason for the
prohibitionisfoundintherelationofattorneyandclient,whichis
oneoftrustandconfidence
3 SCRA 123 (2003), we held that a lawyer must bea disciple of
VOL.512,JANUARY22,2007
Samalavs.Valencia
ofthehighestdegree.Alawyerbecomesfamiliarwithallthe
factsconnectedwithhisclientscase.Helearnsfromhisclient
theweak points ofthe actionaswell asthestrong ones. Such
knowledgemustbeconsideredsacredandguardedwithcare.
Same;Same;Falsehood;It matters not that the trial court
wasnotmisled by alawyerssubmissionof acertificateoftitle
whichwasalreadycancelledandanewoneissuedinthenameof
someotherpersonwhatisdecisiveinthiscaseishisintentin
tryingtomisleadthecourt.Respondentcannotfeignignorance
ofthefactthatthetitlehesubmittedwasalreadycancelledin
lieuofanewtitleissuedinthenameofAlbain1995yet,asproof
ofthelattersownership.RespondentfailedtocomplywithCanon
10oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilitywhichprovidesthat
alawyershallnotdoanyfalsehood,norconsenttothedoingof
any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misleadbyanyartifice.Itmattersnotthatthetrialcourtwasnot
misled by respondents submission of TCT No. 273020 in the
nameofValdez,asshownbyitsdecisiondatedJanuary8,2002
dismissingthecomplaintforejectment.Whatisdecisiveinthis
case is respondents intent in trying to mislead the court by
presentingTCTNo.273020despitethefactthatsaidtitlewas
alreadycancelledandanewone,TCTNo.275500,wasalready
issuedinthenameofAlba.
Same;Same;Same;Alawyershouldbearinmindthatasan
officerofthecourthishighvocationistocorrectlyinformthecourt
uponthelawandthefactsofthecaseandtoaiditindoingjustice
and arriving at correct conclusion.InYoung v. Batuegas, 403
truth.HesworeuponhisadmissiontotheBarthathewilldono
falsehoodnorconsenttothedoingofanyincourtandheshall
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courtsastohisclients.Heshouldbearinmindthatasanofficer
ofthecourthishighvocationistocorrectlyinformthecourtupon
thelawandthefactsofthecaseandtoaiditindoingjusticeand
arrivingatcorrectconclusion.Thecourts,ontheotherhand,are
entitledtoexpectonlycompletehonestyfromlawyersappearing
andpleadingbeforethem.Whilealawyerhasthesolemndutyto
defendhisclients rightsandisexpected todisplay theutmost
zealindefenseofhisclientscause,hisconductmustneverbeat
theexpenseoftruth.Alawyeristheser
4
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Samalavs.Valencia
vantofthelawandbelongstoaprofessiontowhichsociety
hasentrustedtheadministrationoflawandthedispensationof
justice.Assuch,heshouldmakehimselfmoreanexemplarfor
otherstoemulate.
Same;Same;Administrative Complaints;The filing of an
administrativecaseagainstalawyerforprotectingtheinterestof
his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a
practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the
right of his client.Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 004439 and 01
036162bothentitledValenciav.Samalaforestafaandgrave
coercion, respectively, to protect his clients rights against
complainantwhofiledI.S.No.004306forestafaagainstLagmay,
and I.S. No. 004318 against Alvin Valencia for trespass to
dwelling.Wefindthechargetobewithoutsufficientbasis.The
act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the
interestofhisclient,ononehand,andhisowninterest,onthe
other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge
unlessitcanbeclearlyshownthatthesamewasbeingdoneto
abuse judicial processes to commit injustice. The filing of an
administrativecaseagainstrespondentforprotectingtheinterest
ofhisclientandhisownrightwouldbeputtingaburdenona
practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the
rightofhisclient.
Same;Same;Immorality;Words and Phrases;It may be
difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may
qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a
lawyer,immoralconducthasbeendefinedasthatconductwhich
is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be
difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may
qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a
lawyer,immoralconducthasbeendefinedasthatconductwhich
is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.Thus,inseveralcases,theCourtdidnothesitateto
disciplinealawyerforkeepingamistressindefianceofthemores
and sense of morality of the community. That respondent
subsequentlymarriedLagmayin1998afterthedeathofhiswife
andthatthisishisfirstinfractionasregardsimmoralityserveto
mitigatehisliability.
5
VOL.512,JANUARY22,2007 5
Samalavs.Valencia
ADMINISTRATIVECASEintheSupremeCourt.Disbarment.
ThefactsarestatedintheresolutionoftheCourt.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,J.:
Beforeusisacomplaint1datedMay2,2001filedbyClaritaJ.
Samala (complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia
(respondent)forDisbarmentonthefollowinggrounds:(a)serving
ontwoseparateoccasionsascounselforcontendingparties;(b)
knowinglymisleadingthecourtbysubmittingfalsedocumentary
evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for
nonpaymentofrentalfees;and(d)havingareputationofbeing
immoralbysiringillegitimatechildren.
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its
ResolutionofOctober24,2001,referredthecasetotheIntegrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.2
The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree
JesusB.Raval.Afteraseriesofhearings,thepartiesfiledtheir
respective memoranda3and the case was deemedsubmittedfor
resolution.
CommissionerWilfredoE.J.E.ReyespreparedtheReportand
Recommendation4datedJanuary12,2006.Hefoundrespondent
guiltyofviolatingCanons15and21oftheCodeofProfessional
Responsibilityandrecommendedthepenaltyofsuspensionforsix
months.
_______________
1
Rollo,pp.14.
2
Id.,atp.106.
3
Id.,atpp.118125;129134.
4
Id.,atpp.569579.
6 _______________
6 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Samalavs.Valencia
InaminuteResolution5passedonMay26,2006,theIBPBoardof
Governorsadoptedandapprovedthereportandrecommendation
ofCommissionerReyesbutincreasedthepenaltyofsuspension
fromsixmonthstooneyear.
WeadoptthereportoftheIBPBoardofGovernorsexceptas
totheissueonimmoralityandastotherecommendedpenalty.
Onservingascounselforcontendingparties.
Records show that inCivil Case No. 95105MK, filed in the
RegionalTrialCourt(RTC),Branch272,MarikinaCity,entitled
LeonoraM.Avillev.EdithaValdezfornonpaymentofrentals,
hereinrespondent,whilebeingthecounselfordefendantValdez,
also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia,
Bustamante and Bayuga6by filing an Explanation and
CompliancebeforetheRTC.7
InCivilCaseNo.986804filedintheMetropolitanTrialCourt
(MTC),Branch75,MarikinaCity,entitledEdithaS.Valdezand
Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband for
ejectment,respondentrepresentedValdezagainstBustamante
one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy.
Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City
docketedasSCACaseNo.99341MK.InhisdecisiondatedMay
2, 2000,8Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz9warned
respondenttorefrainfromrepeatingtheactofbeingcounselof
recordofbothpartiesinCivilCaseNo.95105MK.
ButinCivilCaseNo.2000657MK,filedintheRTC,Branch
273,MarikinaCity,entitledEdithaS.Valdezv.JosephJ.Alba,
Jr.andRegisterofDeedsofMarikinaCity,
5
Id.,atp.568.
6
Id.,atpp.411417.
7
Id.,atpp.57.
8
Id.,atpp.1113.
9
NowAssistantCourtAdministrator.
7
VOL.512,JANUARY22,2007 7
Samalavs.Valencia
respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for
Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba,
respondents former client inCivil Case No. 986804and SCA
CaseNo.99341MK.
Records further reveal that at thehearing of November 14,
2003,respondentadmittedthatinCivilCaseNo.95105MK,he
was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for
Bustamante and Bayuga10albeit he filed the Explanation and
Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants. 11Respondent also
admitted that he represented Valdez inCivil Case No. 98
6804andSCACaseNo.99341MKagainstBustamanteandher
husbandbutdeniedbeingthecounselforAlbaalthoughthecase
is entitled Valdezand Albav. Bustamante and her husband,
because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the
ownersoftheproperty 12anditwasonlyValdezwhosignedthe
complaintforejectment.13But,whileclaimingthatrespondentdid
notrepresentAlba,respondent,however,aversthathealready
severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged
respondentwithestafa.14Thus,thefilingofCivilCaseNo.2000
657MKagainstAlba.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
givenafterafulldisclosureofthefacts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct,actascounselforapersonwhoseinterestconflicts
with that of his present or former client. 15He may not also
undertaketodischargeconflictingdutiesanymorethanhe
_______________
Rollo,pp.397398;407410.
10
Id.,atpp.1113.
11
12
Id.,atp.439.
13
Id.,atp.441.
14
Id.,atp.434.
15
Frias v. Lozada,A.C. No. 6656, December 13, 2005,477
SCRA393,400.
8
8 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Samalavs.Valencia
mayrepresentantagonisticinterests.Thissternruleisfounded
ontheprinciplesofpublicpolicyandgoodtaste. 16Itspringsfrom
the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and
confidence.Lawyersareexpectednotonlytokeepinviolatethe
clientsconfidence,butalsotoavoidtheappearanceoftreachery
anddoubledealingforonlythencanlitigantsbeencouragedto
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importanceintheadministrationofjustice.17
Oneofthetestsofinconsistencyofinterestsiswhetherthe
acceptanceofanewrelationwouldpreventthefulldischargeof
thelawyersdutyofundividedfidelityandloyaltytotheclientor
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or doubledealing in the
performanceofthatduty.18
Thesternruleagainstrepresentationofconflictinginterestsis
foundedonprinciplesofpublicpolicyandgoodtaste.Itsprings
from the attorneys duty to represent his client with undivided
fidelityandtomaintaininviolatetheclientsconfidenceaswellas
fromtheinjunctionforbiddingtheexaminationofanattorneyas
toanyoftheprivilegedcommunicationsofhisclient.19
Anattorneyowesloyaltytohisclientnotonlyinthecasein
which he has represented him but also after the relation of
attorney and client has terminated.20The bare attorneyclient
relationshipwith aclientprecludes anattorney fromaccepting
professionalemploymentfromtheclientsadversaryei
_______________
16
Agpalo,LegalEthics,6thEdition,pp.219,225;citingcases.
17
Hiladov.David,84Phil.569,579(1949).
 18
Santos,Sr.v.Beltran,463Phil.372,383;418SCRA17,25 representinganewclientwhoseinterestisadversetohisformer
26(2003). client.Albamaynotbehisoriginalclientbutthefactthathefiled
19
Tiania v. Ocampo,A.C. No. 2285, August 12, 1991,200 a case entitled Valdezand Albav. Bustamante and her
SCRA472,479. husband,isaclearindicationthatrespondentisprotectingthe
20
LorenzanaFoodCorporationv.Daria,Adm.CaseNo.2736, interestsofbothValdezandAlbainthesaidcase.Respondent
May27,1991,197SCRA428,435;Butedv.Hernando,Adm.Case cannotjustclaimthatthelawyerclient
No.1359,October17,1991,203SCRA1,8.
9 _______________
VOL.512,JANUARY22,2007 9 21
Natanv.Capule,91Phil.640,648(1952).
Samalavs.Valencia 22
Nombrado v. Hernandez,135 Phil. 5, 9;26 SCRA 13, 17
ther in the same case or in a different but related action. 22A
21

(1968).
lawyerisforbiddenfromrepresentingasubsequentclientagainst
a former client when the subject matter of the present
23
Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra,A.C. No. 5128, March 31,
controversyisrelated,directlyorindirectly,tothesubjectmatter 2005,454SCRA167,177178.
of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former
24
Nombradov.Hernandez,supra.
client.23 25
Natanv.Capule,supraatp.648.
WeheldinNombradov.Hernandez24thattheterminationof 26
Ibid.,atp.648.
therelationofattorneyandclientprovidesnojustificationfora 10
lawyertorepresentaninterestadversetoorinconflictwiththat 10 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
oftheformerclient.Thereasonfortheruleisthattheclients Samalavs.Valencia
confidenceoncereposedcannotbedivestedbytheexpirationof relationshipbetweenhimandAlbahaslongbeenseveredwithout
the professional employment.25Consequently, a lawyer should observingSection26,Rule138oftheRulesofCourtwhereinthe
not,evenaftertheseveranceoftherelationwithhisclient,do writtenconsentofhisclientisrequired.
anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any
InGonzalesv.Cabucana,Jr.,27citingthecaseofQuiambaov.
matter in which he previously represented him nor should he
disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the Bamba,28weheldthat:
previousrelation.26 The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
Inthiscase,respondentsavermentthathisrelationshipwith applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present
Albahaslongbeenseveredbytheactofthelatterofnotturning clientsinthesameactionorinanunrelatedaction.Itisofno
over the proceeds collected inCivil Case No. 986804, in momentthatthelawyerwouldnotbecalledupontocontendfor
connivancewiththecomplainant,isunavailing.Terminationof oneclientthatwhichthelawyerhastoopposefortheotherclient,
the attorneyclient relationship precludes an attorney from or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
informationacquiredfromonetothedisadvantageoftheotheras
the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the
opposingpartiesinonecase,oneofwhomwouldlosethesuit,are
present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers
respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performanceofthedutyofundividedfidelitytobothclients. 29
Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall
preservetheconfidencesandsecretsofhisclientevenafterthe
attorneyclientrelationisterminated.
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of
attorneyandclient,whichisoneoftrustandconfidenceofthe
highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his clients case. He learns from his client the
weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such
knowledgemustbeconsideredsacredandguardedwithcare. 30
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondents
representationofValdezandAlbaagainstBustamanteandher
_______________
27
A.C.No.6836,January23,2006,479SCRA320.
28
A.C.No.6708,August25,2005,468SCRA1.
29
Id.,atp.11.
30
Maturan v. Gonzales,350 Phil. 882, 887;287 SCRA 443,
446447(1998);U.S.v.Laranja,21Phil.500,510(1912).
11
VOL.512,JANUARY22,2007
Samalavs.Valencia
husband,inonecase,andValdezagainstAlba,inanothercase,is
aclearcaseofconflictofinterestswhichmeritsacorresponding
sanctionfrom thisCourt. Respondent may havewithdrawnhis
representationinCivilCaseNo.95105MKuponbeingwarned
by the court,31but the same will not exculpate him from the
chargeofrepresentingconflictinginterestsinhisrepresentation
inCivilCaseNo.2000657MK.
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting
professional employments, to refrain from all appearances and
actsofimproprietyincludingcircumstancesindicatingconflictof
interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and
dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing
candor,fairnessandloyaltyinalltransactionswithhisclients. 32
On knowingly misleading the court by submitting
falsedocumentaryevidence.
Complainant alleges that inCivil Case No. 007137filed before
MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No.
273020asevidenceofValdezsownershipdespitethefactthata
newTCTNo.275500wasalreadyissuedinthenameofAlbaon
February2,1995.
RecordsrevealthatrespondentfiledCivilCaseNo.007137on
November27,2000andpresentedTCTNo.273020asevidenceof
Valdezsownershipofthesubjectproperty.33Duringthehearing
before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the
Answerwasfiledinthesaidcase,thatwasthetimethathecame
toknowthatthetitlewasalreadyinthenameofAlba;sothat
whenthecourtdismissedthecom
_______________
11
31
Rollo,pp.423427.
32
Gamillav.Mario,Jr.,447Phil.419,432;399SCRA308,
321(2003).
33
Rollo,pp.3032.
12
12 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Samalavs.Valencia
plaint, he did not do anything anymore.34Respondent further
avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were
revealed to him only when the case for rescission was filed in
2002.
Uponexaminationoftherecord,itwasnotedthatCivilCase
No. 2000657MKfor rescission of contract and cancellation of
TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000, 35before
RTC,Branch273,MarikinaCity,thusbelyingtheavermentof
respondentthathecametoknowofAlbastitleonlyin2002when
the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the
hearingbeforeCommissionerRavalthatCivilCaseNos.007137
and 2000657MKwere filed on the same date, although in
differentcourtsandatdifferenttimes.
Hence,respondentcannotfeignignoranceofthefactthatthe
title he submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a new title
issuedinthenameofAlbain1995yet,asproofofthelatters
ownership.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibilitywhichprovidesthatalawyershallnot
doanyfalsehood, norconsenttothedoingofanyincourt;nor
shallhemislead,orallowtheCourttobemisleadbyanyartifice.
Itmattersnotthatthetrialcourtwasnotmisledbyrespondents
submissionofTCTNo.273020inthenameofValdez,asshown
byitsdecisiondatedJanuary8,2002 36dismissingthecomplaint
forejectment.Whatisdecisiveinthiscaseisrespondentsintent
in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020
despitethefactthatsaidtitlewasalreadycancelledandanew
one,TCTNo.275500,wasalreadyissuedinthenameofAlba.
InYoung v. Batuegas,37we held that a lawyer must be a
discipleoftruth.HesworeuponhisadmissiontotheBarthat
_______________
34
Id.,atpp.459474.
35
Id.,atpp.1416;471473.
36
Id.,atpp.127128.
37
451Phil.155;403SCRA123(2003).
13
VOL.512,JANUARY22,2007 13
Samalavs.Valencia
hewilldonofalsehoodnorconsenttothedoingofanyincourt
andheshallconducthimselfasalawyeraccordingtothebestof
hisknowledgeanddiscretionwithallgoodfidelityaswelltothe
courts as to his clients.38He should bear in mind that as an
officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the
courtuponthelawandthefactsofthecaseandtoaiditindoing
justice and arriving at correct conclusion.39The courts, on the
other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyersappearingandpleadingbeforethem.Whilealawyerhas
thesolemndutytodefendhisclientsrightsandisexpectedto
display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his
conductmustneverbeattheexpenseoftruth.
Alawyeristheservantofthelawandbelongstoaprofession
towhichsocietyhasentrustedtheadministrationoflawandthe
dispensationofjustice.40Assuch,heshouldmakehimselfmore
anexemplarforotherstoemulate.41
Oninitiatingnumerouscasesinexchangefornonpayment
ofrentalfees.
Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases:
(a)CivilCaseNo.2000657MKattheRTC,Branch272;(b)Civil
CaseNo.007137attheMTC,Branch75;and(c)I.S.Nos.00
4439and01036162bothentitledValenciav.Samalaforestafa
and grave coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City
Prosecutor.Complainantclaimsthatthetwocriminalcaseswere The filing of an administrative case against respondent for
filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay protectingtheinterestofhisclientandhisownrightwouldbe
docketed as I.S. No. 004306 for estafa and I.S. No. 004318 putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to
against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to defendandprosecutetherightofhisclient.
dwelling. On having a reputation for being immoral by siring
illegitimatechildren.
_______________ Wefindrespondentliableforbeingimmoralbysiringillegitimate
children.
38
Id.,atp.161;p.126. Duringthehearing,respondentadmittedthathesiredthree
39
Ibid.,atp.161;pp.126127. childrenbyTeresitaLagmaywhoareallover20years
40
TingDumali v. Torres,A.C. No. 5161, April 14, 2004,427
SCRA108,117. _______________
41
Ibid.,atp.117.
14
42
Rollo,p.485.
14 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
43
Id.,atpp.144146.
Samalavs.Valencia
44
Id.,atp.100.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer
45
Id.,atpp.4143.
agreementwithrespondent.Aspaymentforhisservices,hewas 46
Id.,atpp.4445.
allowedtooccupythepropertyforfreeandutilizethesameashis 47
Son of respondent and one of the tenants in the subject
officepursuanttotheirretaineragreement.42 property.
Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00443943and 0103616244both 15
entitled Valencia v. Samala for estafa and grave coercion, VOL.512,JANUARY22,2007 15
respectively,toprotecthisclientsrightsagainstcomplainantwho Samalavs.Valencia
filedI.S.No.00430645forestafaagainstLagmay,andI.S.No.00 ofage,48whilehisfirstwifewasstillalive.Healsoadmittedthat
431846againstAlvinValencia47fortrespasstodwelling. hehaseightchildrenbyhisfirstwife,theyoungestofwhomis
Wefindthechargetobewithoutsufficientbasis.Theactof over20yearsofage,andafterhiswifediedin1997,hemarried
respondentoffilingtheaforecitedcasestoprotecttheinterestof Lagmayin1998.49RespondentfurtheradmittedthatLagmaywas
hisclient,ononehand,andhisowninterest,ontheother,cannot stayinginoneoftheapartmentsbeingclaimedbycomplainant.
bemadethebasisofanadministrativechargeunlessitcanbe However, he does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a
clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial relationship50and does not consider the latter as his second
processestocommitinjustice. family.51He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay
because he has twohouses, one in Muntinlupa and another in
Marikina.52
In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more
than enough to hold him liable on the charge of immorality.
During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He
evenjustifiedhistransgressionbysayingthathedoesnothave
anyrelationshipwithLagmayanddespitethefactthathesired
three children by the latter, he does not consider them as his
second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent
boasts in telling the commissioner that he has two housesin
Muntinlupa,wherehisfirstwifelived,andinMarikina,where
Lagmay lives.53It is of no moment that respondent eventually
marriedLagmayafterthedeath ofhisfirstwife.Thefact still
remainsthatrespondentdidnotliveuptotheexactingstandard
ofmoralityanddecorumrequiredofthelegalprofession.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,alawyershallnotengageinunlawful,dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the
degreeofmoraldelinquencythatmayqualifyanactasimmoral,
yet, forpurposesofdisciplining alawyer, immoral conduct has
beendefinedasthatconductwhichiswillful,
_______________
48
Rollo,pp.514515.
49
Id.,atpp.517519.
50
Id.,atp.521.
51
Id.,atp.524.
52
Id.,atpp.520524.
53
Id.,atpp.520521.
16
16 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Samalavs.Valencia
flagrant,orshameless,andwhichshowsamoralindifferenceto
theopinionofrespectablemembersofthecommunity. 54Thus,in
severalcases,theCourtdidnothesitatetodisciplinealawyerfor
keepingamistressindefianceofthemoresandsenseofmorality
of the community.55That respondent subsequently married
Lagmayin1998afterthedeathofhiswifeandthatthisishis
first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his
liability.
ACCORDINGLY,theCourtfindsrespondentAtty.LucianoD.
ValenciaGUILTYofmisconductandviolationofCanons21,10
and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years,
effectiveimmediatelyuponreceiptofhereinResolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the
land,theIntegratedBarofthePhilippinesaswellastheOfficeof
theBarConfidantfortheirinformationandguidance,andletit
beenteredinrespondentspersonalrecords.
SOORDERED.
Puno(C.J.),Quisumbing,YnaresSantiago,Sandoval
Gutierrez,Carpio,Corona,CarpioMorales,Callejo,
Sr.,Azcuna,Tinga,ChicoNazario,GarciaandVelasco, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Atty.LucianoD.Valenciasuspendedfrompracticeoflawfor
three(3)yearsformisconductandviolationofCanons21,10and
1ofCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.
_______________
Rau Sheng Mao v. Velasco,459 Phil. 440, 445;413 SCRA
54
108,112(2003).
 Mendozav.Mala,A.C.No.1129,July27,1992,211SCRA
55 isnoclaimthatmilitaryordiplomaticsecretswillbedisclosedby
839, 841;Vda. de Mijares v. Villaluz,A.C. No. 4431, June 19, theproductionofrecordspertainingtothepersonneloftheEIIB.
Indeed, EIIBs function is the gathering and evaluation of
1997,274 SCRA 1, 6;Paras v. Paras,397 Phil. 462, 475;343
intelligence reports andinformation regarding illegalactivities
SCRA 414, 426 (2000);Cambaliza v. CristalTenorio,A.C. No. affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to,
6290,July 14, 2004,434 SCRA288,294;Gov. Achas, MTJ04 economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting.
1564, March 11, 2005,453 SCRA 189, 201;Zaguirre v. Consequently,whileincaseswhichinvolvestatesecretsitmaybe
Castillo,A.C.No.4921,August3,2005,465SCRA520,530. sufficient todeterminefromthe circumstancesofthecasethat
17 thereisreasonabledangerthatcompulsionoftheevidencewill
VOL.512,JANUARY22, 17 expose military matters without compelling production, no
2007 similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other
considerations.
286 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS
Same;Neitheristhereanylaworregulationwhichconsiders
ANNOTATED
personnelrecordsoftheEIIBasclassifiedinformation.Norhas
Almontevs.Vasquez
ourattentionbeencalledtoanylaworregulationwhichconsiders
G.R.No.95367.May23,1995.* personnel records of the EIIB as classified information. To the
COMMISSIONERJOSET.ALMONTE,VILLAMORC.PEREZ, contrary,COACircularNo.88293,whichpetitionersinvoketo
NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA RIVERA, supporttheircontentionthatthereisadequatesafeguardagainst
petitioners,vs.HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and
misuse of public funds, provides that the onlyitem of
CONCERNEDCITIZENS,respondents.
expenditurewhichshouldbetreatedstrictlyconfidentialisthat
Ombudsman;At common law a governmental privilege which refers to the purchase of information and payment of
against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets rewards.
bearingonmilitary,diplomaticandsimilarmatters.Atcommon
law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized _______________
withrespecttostatesecretsbearingonmilitary,diplomaticand
similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of ENBANC.
*

suchparamountimportanceasinandofitselftranscendingthe 287
individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a VOL.244,MAY23,1995 287
consequencethereof,theplaintiffcannotenforcehislegalrights. Almontevs.Vasquez
Same;Inthecaseatbar,thereisnoclaimthatmilitaryor Same;Thestatutesandregulationsinvokedbypetitionersdo
diplomaticsecretswillbedisclosedbytheproductionofrecords notexempttheEIIBfromthedutytoaccountforitsfundstothe
pertainingtothepersonneloftheEIIB.Inthecaseatbar,there proper authorities.Theotherstatutes andregulationsinvoked
bypetitionersinsupportoftheircontentionthatthedocuments
sought in the subpoenaduces tecumof the Ombudsman are
classified merely indicate the confidential nature of the EIIBs
functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to
accountforitsfundstotheproperauthorities.Indeedbydenying
thatthereweresavingsmadefromcertainitemsintheagency
and alleging that the DBM had released to the EIIB only the
allocations needed for the 947 personnel retained after its
reorganization, petitioners in effect invited inquiry into the
veracity oftheirclaim. If,aspetitionersclaim, the subpoenaed
recordshavebeenexaminedbytheCOAandfoundbyittobe
regular in all respects, there is no reason why they cannot be
shown to another agency of the government which by
constitutional mandate is required to look into any complaint
concerningpublicoffice.
Same;TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesaredesignatedby
the Constitution protectorsofthepeople andas such theyare
required by it to act promptly on complaints in any form or
manneragainstpublicofficialsoremployeesoftheGovernment,
oranysubdivision, agencyor instrumentalitythereof,including
governmentowned or controlled corporation.On the other
hand,theOmbudsmanisinvestigatingacomplaintthatseveral
itemsintheEIIBwerefilledbyfictitiouspersonsandthatthe
allotmentsfortheseitemsin1988wereusedforillegalpurposes.
The plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his
investigation. He and his Deputies are designated by the
Constitution protectors of the people and as such they are
required by it to act promptly on complaintsin any form or
manneragainstpublicofficialsoremployeesoftheGovernment,
oranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,including
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporation.
Same;TheConstitutionexpresslyenjoinstheOmbudsmanto
actonanycomplaintfiledinanyformormannerconcerning
officialactsoromissions.PetitionerscontendthatunderArt.XI,
13(4)theOmbudsman can actonly inany appropriate case,
andsubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylawand
that because the complaint in this case is unsigned and
unverified, the case is not an appropriate one. This contention
lacksmerit.Asalreadystated,theConstitutionexpresslyenjoins
the Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed in any form or
mannerconcerningofficialactsoromissions.
288
2 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
88
Almontevs.Vasquez
Same;Testimony given at a factfinding investigation and
charges made in a pleading in a case in court constituted a
sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to commence investigation,
because a formal complaint was really not necessary.
Accordingly, inDiaz v. Sandiganbayanthe Court held that
testimonygivenatafactfindinginvestigationandchargesmade
inapleadinginacaseincourtconstitutedasufficientbasisfor
the Ombudsman to commence investigation, because a formal
complaintwasreallynotnecessary.
Same;Thephraseinanappropriatecasemeansanycase
concerningofficialactoromissionwhichisallegedtobeillegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient.Rather than referring to the
formofcomplaints,therefore,thephraseinanappropriatecase
inArt.XI,12meansanycaseconcerningofficialactoromission
which is alleged to be illegal, unjust, improper, orinefficient.
The phrase subject to such limitations as may beprovided by
lawreferstosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbyCongressor,
intheabsencethereof,tosuchlimitationsasmaybeimposedby
thecourts.Suchlimitationsmaywellincludearequirementthat
the investigation be conductedin camera, with the public
excluded,asexceptiontothegeneralnatureoftheproceedingsin
theOfficeoftheOmbudsman.Areconciliationistherebymade
betweenthedemandsofnationalsecurityandtherequirementof
accountabilityenshrinedintheConstitution.
Same;ThegeneralinvestigationintheOmbudsmansoffice
is precisely for the purpose of protecting those against whom a
complaint is filed against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution as much as securing the State from useless and
expensive trials.What has been said above disposes of
petitioners contention that the anonymous lettercomplaint
against them is nothing but a vexatious prosecution. It only
remains to say that the general investigation in the
Ombudsmans office is precisely for the purpose of protecting
thoseagainstwhomacomplaintisfiledagainsthasty,malicious,
andoppressiveprosecutionasmuchassecuringtheStatefrom
uselessandexpensivetrials.Theremayalsobebenefitresulting
from such limitedin camerainspection in terms of increased
public confidence that the privilege is not being abused and
increasedlikelihoodthatnoabuseisinfactoccurring.
KAPUNAN,J,DissentingOpinion:
Ombudsman;EIIBs functions are related to matters
affecting national security.Disclosure of the documents as
requiredbytheOmbudsmanwouldnecessarilydefeatthelegal
mandate of the EIIB as the intelligence arm of the executive
branchofgovernmentrelatingto
289
VOL.244,MAY23,1995 289
Almontevs.Vasquez
mattersaffectingtheeconomyofthenation.Assuch,EIIBs
functionsarerelatedtomattersaffectingnationalsecurity.Inthe
performance of its function in relation with the gathering of
intelligence information executive privilege could as well be
invokedbytheEIIB,especiallyinrelationtoitscovertoperations.
Same;Courtcannotinterferewithadetermination,properly
made,onaquestionaffectingeconomicsecuritylestitisprepared
to ride roughshod over certain prerogatives of our political
branches.Thedetermination,bytheexecutivebranch,through
itsappropriateagencies,ofaquestionasaffectingthenational
securityisapolicydecisionforwhichthisCourthasneitherthe
competencenorthemandatetoinfringeupon.Intheabsenceofa
clear showing a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Executive,actingthroughits(nationalsecurity)agencies,Iamof
the opinion that we cannot interfere with a determination,
properlymade,onaquestionaffectingeconomicsecuritylestwe
arepreparedtorideroughshodovercertainprerogativesofour
politicalbranches.
Same;The constitutional right allowing disclosure of
governmentaldocuments,i.e.,therighttoinformationonmatters
of public concern is not absolute.The constitutional right
allowingdisclosureofgovernmentaldocuments,i.e.,therightto
informationonmattersofpublicconcernisnotabsolute.While
access to official records may not be prohibited, it may be
regulated. Regulation includes appropriate authority to
determinewhatdocumentsareofpublicconcern,themannerof
access to information contained in such documents and to
withhold information under certain circumstances, particularly,
as in this case, those circumstances affecting the national
security.
PETITIONforcertiorari,prohibitionandmandamusinthe
SupremeCourt.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
ValmonteLawOfficesforpetitioners.
MENDOZA,J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to
annulthesubpoenaducestecumandordersissuedbyrespondent
Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa
Rivera,aschiefaccountantandrecordcustodian,respectively,of
theEconomicIntelligenceandInvestigationBureau(EIIB)to
290
290 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Almontevs.Vasquez
produceall documentsrelating toPersonal ServicesFundsfor
theyear1988andallevidence,suchasvouchers(salary)forthe
wholeplantillaofEIIBfor1988andtoenjoinhimfromenforcing
hisorders.
PetitionerJoseT.AlmontewasformerlyCommissionerofthe
EIIB,whileVillamorC.PerezisChiefoftheEIIBsBudgetand
Fiscal Management Division. The subpoenaduces tecumwas
issuedbytheOmbudsmaninconnectionwithhisinvestigationof
an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings
fromunfilledpositionsintheEIIBhadbeenillegallydisbursed.
Theletter,purportingtohavebeenwrittenbyanemployeeofthe
EIIBandaconcernedcitizen,wasaddressedtotheSecretaryof
Finance, with copies furnished several government offices,
includingtheOfficeoftheOmbudsman.
Theletterreadsinpertinentparts:
1. 1.ThesearethethingsthatIhavebeenobserving.During
the implementation of E.O. 127 on May 1, 1988, one
hundredninety(190)personnelweredismissed.Before
that implementation, we had a monthly savings of
P500,000.00 from unfilled plantilla position plus the
implementationofRA6683whereinseventy(70)regular
employeesavailedatotalamountofP1,400,000.00was
saved from the government monthly. The question is,
howdotheyusedordisbursedthissavings?TheEIIB
hasasyndicateheadedbytheChiefofBudgetDivision
whoismanipulatingfundsandalsothebrainoftheso
called ghost agents or the Emergency Intelligence
Agents(EIA).TheCommissionerofEIIBhasabiggest
shareonthis.Amonghisactivitiesare:
1. a)Supporting RAM wherein he is involved. He
gives big amount especially during the Dec. Failed
coup.
2. b)Paymentforthirtyfive(30)miniUZIs.
3. c)Payment for the purchased of Maxima 87 for
personalusedoftheCommissioner.
4. d)Anotherobservation was theagentsunderthe
DirectorofNCREIIBisthesoleoperatingunitwithin
MetroManilawhichwasapprovedbynolessthanthe
Commissioner due toanomalous activities of almost
allagentsassignedatthecentralofficedirectlyunder
theCommissioner.RetiredBrig.Gen.Almonteasone
oftheAntiGraftboardmemberoftheDepartmentof
Finance should not tolerate this. However, the
 Commissioner did not investigate his own men assorted high powered firearms. Agents plus one
instead,heplacedthemunderthe1530payroll. personnel from the legal proclaimed only five (5)
firearms and the remaining was pilfered by
291 them.Another observation is almost all EIIB agents
VOL.244,MAY23,1995 291 collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate
Almontevs.Vasquez monthly and brokers every week for them not to be
apprehended.Another observation is the commissioner
allocatesfundscomingfromtheintelligencefundstothe
1. e)Manymorewhicharepersonal.
mediatosustaintheirgoodimageofthebureau.

1. 2.Sir,myquestionisthis.Canyourgoodofficeinvestigate
In his comment1on the lettercomplaint, petitioner Almonte
EIIB intelligence funds particularly Personal Services
deniedthatasaresultoftheseparationofpersonnel,theEIIB
(01)Funds?IwonderwhytheDeptofBudget&Mgmt.
hadmadesomesavings.Heaverredthattheonlyfundsreleased
cannot compel EIIB to submit an actual filled up
to his agency by the Department of Budget and Management
position because almost half of it are vacant and still
(DBM)werethosecorrespondingto947plantillapositionswhich
they are releasing it. Are EIIB plantilla position
werefilled.Healsodeniedthattherewereghostagentsinthe
classified? It is included in the Personal Services
Itemization(PSI)andIbelieveitisnotclassifiedanda EIIB and claimed that disbursements for open (i.e., overt
rulingfromCivil ServiceCommissionthat EIIB isnot personnel)andclosed(i.e.,covertpersonnel)plantillasofthe
exemptedfromCivilService.Anotherinfo,whenwehad agencyhadbeenclearedbytheCommissiononAudit(COA);that
salarydifferentiallastOct88allmoneyforthewhole thecaseofthe30Uzishadalreadybeeninvestigatedby
plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions
weresavedandconvertedtoghostagentsofEIA. _______________

2. 3.Another thing that I have observed was the Chief

1
Rollo,pp.3637.
BudgetDivisionpossesseshighcaliberfirearmssuchas 292
a mini UZI, Armalite rifle and two (2) 45 cal. pistol 292 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
issuedtohimbytheAssistantCommissionerwhereinhe Almontevs.Vasquez
isnotanagentofEIIBandauthorizedassuchaccording Congress,whereitwasshownthatitwasnottheEIIBbutan
to memorandum order number 283 signed by the agentwhohadspentforthefirearmsandtheywereonlyloaned
PresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippineseffective9 totheEIIBpendingappropriationbyCongress;that,contraryto
Jan. 1990.Another observation was when EIIB agents thechargethataMaximacarhadbeenpurchasedforhisuse,he
apprehendedacertaincivilianwhopossessesnumerous wasusingagovernmentissuedcarfromtheNICA;thatitwashis
prerogativeasCommissionertogroundagentsintheEIIBmain
office so that they could be given reorientation and retraining;
that the allegation that the EIIB operatives pilfered smuggled
firearmswaswithoutfactualbasisbecausethefirearmswerethe
subject of seizure proceedings before the Collector of Customs,
PortofManila;thattheEIIBhadbeenuncompromisingtoward
employees found involved in anomalous activities; and that
intelligencefundshadnotbeenusedformediapropagandaandif
media people went to the EIIB it was because of newsworthy
stories.Petitioneraskedthatthecomplaintbedismissedandthe
caseconsideredclosed.
SimilarlypetitionerPerez,budgetchiefoftheEIIB,deniedin
hiscomment2datedApril3,1990thatsavingshadbeenrealized
fromtheimplementationofE.O.No.127,sincetheDBMprovided
allocationsforonlytheremaining947personnel.Hesaidthatthe
disbursementoffundsfortheplantillapositionsforovertand
covert personnel had been cleared by the COA and that the
highpoweredfirearmshadbeenissuedfortheprotectionofEIIB
personnel attending court hearings and the Finance Officer in
withdrawingfundsfromthebanks.
The Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsmans office,
Jose F. Sao, found the comments unsatisfactory, being
unverified and plying only on generalizations without meeting
specificallythepointsraisedbycomplainantasconstitutiveofthe
allegedanomalies.3He,therefore,askedforauthoritytoconduct
apreliminaryinvestigation.Anticipatingthegrantofhisrequest,
heissuedasubpoena4topetitionersAlmonteandPerez,requiring
themtosubmittheircounteraffidavitsandtheaffidavitsoftheir
witnesses,aswellasasubpoenaducestecum5tothe
_______________
2
Id.,p.38.
3
Id.,p.39.
4
Id.,p.41.
5
Id.,p.42.
293
VOL.244,MAY23,1995 293
Almontevs.Vasquez
ChiefoftheEIIBsAccountingDivisionorderinghimtobringall
documentsrelatingtoPersonalServicesFundsfortheyear1988
andallevidence,suchasvouchers(salary)forthewholeplantilla
ofEIIBfor1988.
PetitionersAlmonteandPerezmovedtoquashthesubpoena
and the subpoenaduces tecum. In his Order dated June 15,
1990,6respondentOmbudsmangrantedthemotiontoquashthe
subpoenainviewofthefactthattherewerenoaffidavitsfiled
against petitioners. But he denied their motion to quash the
subpoenaducestecum.Heruledthatpetitionerswerenotbeing
forced to produce evidence against themselves, since the
subpoenaduces tecumwas directed to the Chief Accountant,
petitionerNerioRogado.InadditiontheOmbudsmanorderedthe
ChiefoftheRecordsSectionoftheEIIB,petitionerElisaRivera,
to produce before the investigator all documents relating to
PersonnelServiceFunds,fortheyear1988,andalldocuments,
salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988,
withinten(10)daysfromreceipthereof.
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for a reconsideration,
arguingthatRogadoandRiverawereEIIBemployeesundertheir
supervisionandthattheOmbudsmanwasdoingindirectlywhat
he could not do directly,i.e., compelling them (petitioners
AlmonteandPerez)toproduceevidenceagainstthemselves.
Petitioners motion was denied in respondent Ombudsmans
orderdatedAugust6,1990.Hence,thispetitionwhichquestions
the orders of June 15, 1990 and August 6, 1990 of respondent
Ombudsman.
Toputthiscaseinperspectiveitshouldbestatedattheoutset
that itdoesnotconcern ademandbya citizenfor information
under the freedom of information guarantee of the
Constitution.7Rather it concerns the power of theOffice of the
Ombudsman to obtain evidence in connection with an
investigationconductedby
_______________
6
Id.,pp.5354.
7
Art.III,7provides:Therightofthepeopletoinformation
onmattersofpublicconcernshallberecognized.Accesstoofficial
records,andtodocuments,andpaperspertainingtoofficialacts,
transactions,ordecisions,aswellastogovernmentresearchdata
usedasbasisforpolicydevelopment,shallbeaffordedthecitizen,
subjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.
294
294 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Almontevs.Vasquez
itvisavistheclaimofprivilegeofanagencyoftheGovernment. necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements,
Thuspetitionersraisethefollowingissues.8
1. I.WHETHERORNOTACASEBROUGHTABOUTBY
AN UNSIGNED AND UNVERIFIED LETTER
COMPLAINTISANAPPROPRIATE CASEWITHIN
THECONCEPTOFTHECONSTITUTIONINWHICH
PUBLICRESPONDENTCANOBLIGEPETITIONERS
BYVIRTUEOFHISSUBPOENADUCESTECUMTO
PRODUCE TO HIM ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING
TO PERSONAL SERVICES FUNDS FOR THE YEAR
1988 AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH AS VOUCHERS
(SALARY) FOR THE WHOLE PLANTILLA OF EIIB
FOR1988.
2. II.WHETHERORNOTALLDOCUMENTSRELATING
TO PERSONAL SERVICES FUNDS FOR THE YEAR
1988 AND ALL EVIDENCE, SUCH AS VOUCHERS
(SALARY) FOR THE WHOLE PLANTILLA OF EIIB
FOR 1988 ARE CLASSIFIED AND, THEREFORE,
BEYOND THE REACHOF PUBLICRESPONDENTS
SUBPOENADUCESTECUM.
I.
Thereareseveralsubsidiaryissuesraisedbypetitioners,butthe
principalonesrevolveonthequestionwhetherpetitionerscanbe
orderedtoproducedocumentsrelatingtopersonalservicesand
salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such
documentsareclassified.Disclosureofthedocumentsinquestion
is resisted on theground that knowledge of EIIBs documents
relativetoitsPersonalServicesFundsanditsplantilla...will
targets,strategies,andtacticsandthewholeofitsbeingandthis
coulddestroytheEIIB.9
PetitionersdonotquestionthepoweroftheOmbudsmanto
issueasubpoenaducestecumnortherelevancyormaterialityof
the documents required to be produced, to the pending
investigationintheOmbudsmansoffice.Accordingly,thefocusof
discussionshouldbeontheGovernmentsclaimofprivilege.
________________
8
PetitionersMemorandum,p.6.
 9
PetitionersMemorandum,p.27. Thus, the Court for the first time gave executive privilege a
295 constitutionalstatusandanewname,althoughnotnecessarilya
VOL.244,MAY23,1995 295 newbirth.12
Almontevs.Vasquez Theconfidentialityofjudicialdeliberationsmentionedinthe
opinionoftheCourtreferredtothefactthatJusticesoftheU.S.
A. SupremeCourtandjudgesoflowerfederalcourtshavetradition

At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is _______________

recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military,
diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon
10
Anno.,Government Privilege Against Disclosure of Official
publicinterestofsuchparamountimportanceasinandofitself Information,95L.Ed.34and7,pp.42729,434.
transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even 11
418U.S.683,7089,41L.Ed.2d1039,10614(1973).
though,asaconsequencethereof,theplaintiffcannotenforcehis 12
Freund,The Supreme Court 1973 TermForeword: On
legalrights.10 PresidentialPrivilege,88HARV.L.REV.13,1835(1974).
Inaddition,inthelitigationovertheWatergatetapesubpoena 296
in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the right of the
296 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
President to the confidentiality of his conversations and
Almontevs.Vasquez
correspondence,whichitlikenedtotheclaimofconfidentialityof
ally treated their working papers and judicial notes as private
judicialdeliberations.SaidtheCourtinUnitedStatesv.Nixon:11
property.A1977proposalintheU.S.CongressthatJusticesand
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his
judgesoflowerfederalcourtsshouldbeencouragedtomakesuch
conversations and correspondence, like the claim of
arrangements as will assure the preservation and eventual
confidentialityofjudicialdeliberations,forexample,hasallthe
availability of their personal papers, especially the deposit of
valuestowhichweaccorddeferencefortheprivacyofallcitizens
theirpapersinthesamedepositorytheyselectfor[their]Public
and,addedtothosevalues,isthenecessityforprotectionofthe
Papers13was rebuffed by the Justices who, in a letter to the
public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Regulation and Government
opinionsinPresidentialdecisionmaking.APresidentandthose
Information of the U.S. Senate, referred to difficult concerns
whoassisthimmustbefreetoexplorealternativesintheprocess
respecting the appropriate separation that must be maintained
ofshapingpoliciesandmakingdecisionsandtodosoinaway
betweenthelegislativebranchandthisCourt.14
manywouldbeunwillingtoexpressexceptprivately.Theseare
There are, inaddition tosuch privileges, statutorilycreated
the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for
onessuchastheGovernmentsprivilegetowithholdtheidentity
Presidentialcommunications.Theprivilegeisfundamentaltothe
ofpersonswhofurnishinformationofviolationsoflaws.15
operation of the government and inextricably rooted in the
separationofpowersundertheConstitution....
 Withrespecttotheprivilegebasedonstatesecret,therule
wasstatedbytheU.S.SupremeCourtasfollows:
Judicialcontrolovertheevidenceinacasecannotbeabdicatedto
thecapriceofexecutiveofficers.Yetwewillnotgosofarastosay
thatthecourtmayautomaticallyrequireacompletedisclosureto
the judge before the claim of privilege will be accepted in any
case. It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the
circumstancesofthecase,thatthereisareasonabledangerthat
compulsionoftheevidencewillexposemilitarymatterswhich,in
the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When
thisisthecase,theoccasionfortheprivilegeisappropriate,and
thecourtshouldnotjeopardizethesecuritywhichtheprivilegeis
meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the
evidence,evenbythejudgealone,inchambers....Ineachcase,
theshowingofnecessitywhichismadewilldeterminehowfar
the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for
invokingtheprivilegeisappropriate.Wherethereisa
_______________
13
FinalReportoftheNationalStudyCommissiononRecords
and Documents of Federal Officials(March 31, 1977), quotedin
BLOCH & KRATTENMAKER, SUPREME COURT POLITICS:
THEINSTITUTIONANDITSPROCEDURES67787(1994).
14
LetterofChiefJusticeWilliamH.RehnquistdatedJune7,
1993toSen.JosephI.Lieberman,Chairman,Subcommitteeon
RegulationandGovernmentInformation,U.S.Senate,quotedin
BLOCH&KRATTENMAKER,id.,at6878.
15
COACircularNo.88293.
297
VOL.244,MAY23,1995 297
Almontevs.Vasquez
strongshowingofnecessity,theclaimofprivilegeshouldnotbe
lightlyaccepted,buteventhemostcompellingnecessitycannot
overcometheclaimofprivilegeifthecourtisultimatelysatisfied
thatmilitarysecretsareatstake.Afortiori,wherenecessityis
dubious, a formal claim of privilege, made under the
circumstancesofthiscase,willhavetoprevail.16
On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality does not
restontheneedtoprotectmilitary,diplomaticorothernational
security secrets but on a general public interest in the
confidentialityofhisconversations,courtshavedeclinedtofindin
theConstitutionanabsoluteprivilegeofthePresidentagainsta
subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of criminal
laws.17
________________
16
UnitedStatesv.Reynolds,345U.S.1,1011,97L.Ed.727,
73435 (1953). In this case the U.S. Supreme Court reverseda
lowercourtorderrequiringthegovernmenttoproducedocuments
relating to the crash of a military aircraft which had been
engagedinasecretmissiontotestelectronicequipment.Thefact
conceded by the respondents, that the aircraft was on a secret
military mission, justified nonproduction of the report of the
accident.Itwasapparentthereportcontainedstatesecretswhich
intheinterestofnationalsecuritycouldnotbedivulgedevenin
thechambersofthejudgeorincamera.Therewasareasonable
dangerthattheinvestigationreportwouldcontainreferencesto
thesecretelectronicequipmentwhichwastheprimaryconcernof
themission.
17
InUnitedStatesv.Nixon,418U.S.683,41L.Ed.2d1039
(1974),theCourt,whileacknowledgingthatthePresidentsneed
forcompletecandorandobjectivityfromadviserscallsforgreat
deference from the courts, nonetheless held that such
generalized claim of confidentiality could not prevail over the
specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
Accordingly the Court ordered the tapes of conversations of
President Nixon to be turned over to the trial judge forin
camerainspectiontodetermine whethertheywererelevantand
admissible apart from being privileged. Similarly inNixon v.
AdministratorofGeneralServices,433U.S.425,53L.Ed.2d867
(1977) it was held that the mere screening of tapes and other
recordsofPresidentNixonsconversationswithemployeesofthe
FederalGovernment,tobedonebyprofessionalarchivistsforthe
purpose of legitimate historical and governmental purpose,
constituted a very limited intrusion . . . into executive
confidentialitycomparabletothoseheldtojustifyin
298
298 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Almontevs.Vasquez
B.
Inthecaseatbar,thereisnoclaimthatmilitaryordiplomatic
secretswillbedisclosedbytheproductionofrecordspertainingto
thepersonneloftheEIIB.Indeed,EIIBsfunctionisthegathering
andevaluationofintelligencereportsandinformationregarding
illegalactivitiesaffectingthenationaleconomy,suchas,butnot
limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar
salting.18Consequently, while in cases which involve state
secretsitmaybesufficienttodeterminefromthecircumstances
ofthecasethatthereisreasonabledangerthatcompulsionofthe
evidence will expose military matters without compelling
production,19nosimilarexcusecanbemadeforaprivilegeresting
onotherconsiderations.
Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation
which considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified
information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88293, which
petitioners invoke to support their contention that there is
adequatesafeguardagainstmisuseofpublicfunds,providesthat
the onlyitem of expenditure which should be treated strictly
confidentialisthatwhichreferstothepurchaseofinformation
and payment of rewards. Thus, part V, No. 7 of the Circular
reads:
Theonlyitemofexpenditurewhichshouldbetreatedasstrictly
confidential because it falls under the category of classified
information is that relating to purchase of information and
payment of rewards. However, reasonable records should be
maintainedandkeptforinspectionoftheChairman,Commission
on Audit or his duly authorized representative. All other
expenditures are to be considered unclassified supported by
invoices,receiptsandotherdocuments,and,therefore,subjectto
reasonable inquiry by the Chairman or his duly authorized
representative.20
_______________
camerainspection.433U.S.at45152,53L.Ed.2d.at89697.
Accordingly the validity of the law, entitled Presidential
RecordingsandMaterialsPreservationAct,wasupheldagainst
theclaimthatthePresidentialprivilegeshieldstherecordsfrom
archivalscrutiny.
18
E.O.No.127.
19
UnitedStatesv.Reynolds,supra,note16.
20
QuotedinPetitionersMemorandum,p.27.
299
VOL.244,MAY23,1995 299
 Almontevs.Vasquez
Itshouldbenotedthattheregulationrequiresthatreasonable
recordsbekeptjustifyingtheconfidentialorprivilegedcharacter
of the information relating to informers. There are no such
reasonable records in this case to substitute for the records
claimedtobeconfidential.
Theotherstatutesandregulations21invokedbypetitionersin
support of their contention that the documents sought in the
subpoenaduces tecumof the Ombudsman are classified merely
indicatetheconfidentialnatureoftheEIIBsfunctions,butthey
donotexempttheEIIBfromthedutytoaccountforitsfundsto
theproperauthorities.Indeedbydenyingthatthereweresavings
madefromcertainitemsintheagencyandallegingthattheDBM
hadreleasedtotheEIIBonlytheallocationsneededforthe947
personnel retained after its reorganization, petitioners in effect
invitedinquiryintotheveracityoftheirclaim.If,aspetitioners
claim,thesubpoenaedrecordshavebeenexaminedbytheCOA
andfoundbyittoberegularinallrespects,thereisnoreason governmentwhichbyconstitutionalmandateisrequiredtolook
whytheycannotbeshowntoanotheragencyofthe
_______________
Petitioners cite in their Memorandum, at p. 19, the
21
following:
19.ReleaseofIntelligenceandConfidentialFunds.Intelligence
and confidential funds provided for in the budgets of
departments, bureaus, offices or other agencies of the national
government,including amounts from savingsauthorized by
Special Provisions to be used for intelligence and counter
intelligenceactivities,shallbereleasedonlyuponapprovalofthe
PresidentofthePhilippines.(RA6642GAAforCY1988)
Effectiveimmediately,allrequestsfortheallocationorrelease
of intelligence funds shall indicate in full detail the specific
purposesforwhichsaidfundsshallbespentandshallexplainthe
circumstancesgivingrisetothenecessityfortheexpenditureand
theparticularaimstobeaccomplished.(LetterofInstructionsNo.
1282datedJanuary12,1983).
Anydisbursementofintelligencefundsshouldnotbeallowed
inaudit,unlessitisinstrictcompliancewiththeprovisionsof
LettersofInstructionNo.XXXand1282.Anyofficeroremployee
who violates the provisions of the aforementioned Letter of
Instructionshallbedealtwithadministrativelywithoutprejudice
to any criminal action that may be warranted. (Memorandum
CircularNo.1290oftheOfficeofthePresidentdatedAugust19,
1985).
300
300 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Almontevs.Vasquez
intoanycomplaintconcerningpublicoffice.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman is investigating a
complaintthatseveralitemsintheEIIBwerefilledbyfictitious
personsandthattheallotmentsfortheseitemsin1988wereused
forillegalpurposes.Theplantillaandotherpersonnelrecordsare
relevanttohisinvestigation.HeandhisDeputiesaredesignated
bytheConstitutionprotectorsofthepeopleandassuchtheyare
required by it to act promptly on complaintsin any form or
manneragainstpublicofficialsoremployeesoftheGovernment,
oranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,including
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporation.22
His need for the documents thus outweighs the claim of
confidentiality of petitioners. What is more, while there might
havebeencompellingreasonsfortheclaimofprivilegein1988
whenitwasassertedbypetitioners,now,sevenyearslater,these
reasons may have been attenuated, if they have not in fact
ceased. Theagents whose identities couldnotthen berevealed
mayhaveceasedfromtheserviceoftheEIIB,whilethecovert
missionstowhich they mighthavebeen deployedmighteither
have been accomplished or abandoned. On the other hand, the
Ombudsmansdutytoinvestigatethecomplaintthattherewere
in1988unfilledpositionsintheEIIBforwhichcontinuedfunding
wasreceivedbyitsofficialsandputtoillegaluse,remains.
Aboveall, evenifthesubpoenaeddocuments aretreated as
presumptivelyprivileged,thisdecisionwouldonlyjustifyordering
theirinspectionincamerabutnottheirnonproduction.However,
asconcessiontothenatureofthefunctionsoftheEIIBandjustto
besurenoinformationofaconfidentialcharacterisdisclosed,the
examination of records in this case should be made in strict
confidencebytheOmbudsmanhimself.Referencemaybemadeto
the documentsinany decisionororder whichtheOmbudsman
mayrenderorissuebutonlytotheextentthatitwillnotreveal
covert activities of the agency. Above all, there must be a
scrupulousprotectionofthedocumentsdelivered.
With these safeguards outlined, it is believed that a
satisfactoryresolutionoftheconflictingclaimsofthepartiesis
achieved.
_______________
Art.XI,12.
22
301
VOL.244,MAY23,1995
Almontevs.Vasquez
Itisnotamisstostatethatevenmattersofnationalsecurityhave
been inquired into in appropriatein cameraproceedings by the
courts. InLansang v. Garcia23this Court held closed door
sessions, with only the immediate parties and their counsel
present,todetermineclaimsthatbecauseofsubversiontherewas
imminent dangertopublicsafetywarranting thesuspension of
the writ ofhabeas corpusin 1971. Again inMarcos v.
Manglapus24the Court met behind closed doors to receive
militarybriefingsonthethreatposedtonationalsecuritybythe
returntothecountryoftheformerPresidentandhisfamily.In
theUnitedStates,asimilarinquiryintothedangertonational
securityasaresultofthepublicationofclassifieddocumentson
theVietnamwarwasupheldbytheU.S.SupremeCourt.25Wesee
noreasonwhysimilarsafeguardscannotbemadetoenablean
agencyoftheGovernment,liketheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,to
carryoutitsconstitutionaldutytoprotectpublicinterests 26while
insuringthe
_______________
23
42SCRA448(1971).
24
117SCRA668(1989).
25
NewYorkTimesCo.v.UnitedStates[ThePentagonPapers
Case],403U.S.713,29L.Ed.2d822(1971).
26
Art.XI,13.TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallhavethe
followingpowers,functions,andduties:
1. (1)Investigateonitsown,oroncomplaintbyanyperson,
anyactoromissionofanypublicofficial,employee,office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
301 illegal,unjust,improper,orinefficient.
2. (2)Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any
public official or employee of the Government, or any
 subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well
as of any governmentowned or controlled corporation
withoriginalcharter,toperformandexpediteanyactor
dutyrequiredbylaw,ortostop,preventandcorrectany
abuseorimproprietyintheperformanceofduties.
3. (3)Directtheofficerconcernedtotakeappropriateaction
against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
4. (4)Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case,
and subjecttosuchlimitations as maybeprovidedby
law,to
302
302 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Almontevs.Vasquez
confidentialityofclassifieddocuments.
C.
PetitionerscontendthatunderArt.XI,13(4)theOmbudsman
can act only in any appropriate case, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law and that because the
complaintinthiscaseisunsignedandunverified,thecaseisnot
an appropriate one. This contention lacks merit. As already
stated,theConstitutionexpresslyenjoinstheOmbudsmantoact
onanycomplaintfiledinanyformormannerconcerningofficial
actsoromissions.Thus,Art.XI,12provides:
TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputies,asprotectorsofthepeople,
shall act promptly on complaintsfiled in any form or
manneragainstpublicofficialsoremployeesoftheGovernment,
oranysubdivision,agency,orinstrumentalitythereof,including
governmentowned or controlled corporations and shall
inappropriatecases,notifythecomplainantsoftheactiontaken
andtheresultthereof.(Emphasisadded)
Similarly, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Rep. Act No. 6770)
providesin26(2):
TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallreceivecomplaintsfromany
sourceinwhateverformconcerninganofficialactoromission.It
shall
_______________
furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactionsenteredintobyhisofficeinvolvingthedisbursement
oruseofpublicfundsorproperties,andreportanyirregularityto
theCommissiononAuditforappropriateaction.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and
informationnecessaryinthedischargeofitsresponsibilities,and
toexamine,ifnecessary,pertinentrecordsanddocuments.
....
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud, and corruption inthe Government and
makerecommendationsortheireliminationandtheobservance
ofhighstandardsofethicsandefficiency.Intheperformanceof
hisfunctionstheOmbudsmanisgivenunderRep.ActNo.6770,
15(8)thepowertoissuesubpoenaandsubpoenaducestecum.
303
VOL.244,MAY23,1995 303
Almontevs.Vasquez
actonthecomplaintimmediatelyandifitfindsthesameentirely
baseless,itshalldismissthesameandinformthecomplainantof
suchdismissalcitingthereasonstherefor.Ifitfindsareasonable
groundtoinvestigatefurther,itshallfirstfurnishtherespondent
publicofficeroremployeewithasummaryofthecomplaintand
requirehimtosubmitawrittenanswerwithinseventytwohours
fromreceiptthereof.Iftheanswerisfoundsatisfactory,itshall
dismissthecase.(Emphasisadded)
Accordingly, inDiaz v. Sandiganbayan27the Court held that
testimonygivenatafactfindinginvestigationandchargesmade
inapleadinginacaseincourtconstitutedasufficientbasisfor
the Ombudsman to commence investigation, because a formal
complaintwasreallynotnecessary.
Ratherthanreferringtotheformofcomplaints,therefore,the
phraseinanappropriatecaseinArt.XI,12meansanycase againsthasty,malicious,andoppressiveprosecutionasmuchas
concerningofficialactoromissionwhichisallegedtobeillegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.28The phrase subject to such
limitationsasmaybeprovidedbylawreferstosuchlimitations
asmaybeprovidedbyCongressor,intheabsencethereof,tosuch
limitations as may be imposed by the courts. Such limitations
may well include a requirement that the investigation be
conductedincamera,withthepublicexcluded,asexceptiontothe
general nature of the proceedings in the Office of the
Ombudsman.29A reconciliation is thereby made between the
demands of national security and the requirement of
accountability enshrined in the Constitution. 30What has been
saidabovedisposesofpetitionerscontentionthattheanonymous
lettercomplaint against them is nothing but a vexatious
prosecution.Itonlyremainstosaythatthegeneralinvestigation
intheOmbudsmansofficeispreciselyforthe
_______________
27
219SCRA675(1993).
28
Art.XI,13(1).
29
Art. XI, 13(6) requires the Office of the Ombudsman to
publicize matters covered by its investigation when
circumstancessowarrantandwithdueprudence.
30
Art.XI,1provides:Publicofficeisapublictrust.Public
officers and employees must atall times be accountable to the
people,servethemwithutmostresponsibility,integrity,loyalty,
and efficiency,actwithpatriotismandjusticeandlead modest
lives.
304
304 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Almontevs.Vasquez
purpose of protecting those against whom a complaint is filed
securingtheStatefromuselessandexpensivetrials.Theremay
alsobebenefitresultingfromsuchlimitedincamerainspectionin
terms of increased public confidence that the privilege is not
being abused and increased likelihood that no abuse is in fact
occurring.
II.
Noristhereviolationofpetitionersrighttotheequalprotection
ofthelaws.Petitionerscomplainthatinallforumandtribunals.
..theaggrievedparties...canonlyhalerespondentsviatheir
verifiedcomplaintsorswornstatementswiththeiridentitiesfully
disclosed, while in proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsmananonymousletterssufficetostartaninvestigation.
In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure
because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second
place,itisapparentthatinpermittingthefilingofcomplaintsin
anyformandinamanner,theframersoftheConstitutiontook
intoaccountthewellknownreticenceofthepeoplewhichkeep
them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this
Courthadoccasiontopointout,theOfficeoftheOmbudsmanis
differentfromtheotherinvestigatoryandprosecutoryagenciesof
thegovernmentbecausethosesubjecttoitsjurisdictionarepublic
officialswho,throughofficialpressureandinfluence,canquash,
delayordismissinvestigationsheldagainstthem.31Ontheother
handcomplainantsaremoreoftenthannotpoorandsimplefolk
whocannotaffordtohirelawyers.32
III.
Finally,itiscontendedthattheissuanceofthesubpoenaduces
tecumwouldviolatepetitionersrightagainstselfincrimination.
Itisenoughtostatethatthedocumentsrequiredtobe
_______________
31
Delosov.Domingo,191SCRA545,551(1990).
32
2 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION,
pp.369370.
305
VOL.244,MAY23,1995 305
Almontevs.Vasquez
producedinthiscasearepublicrecordsandthosetowhomthe
subpoenaduces tecumis directed are government officials in
whosepossessionorcustodythedocumentsare.Moreover,if,as
petitioners claim the disbursement by the EIIB of funds for
personalservicehasalreadybeenclearedbytheCOA,thereisno
reason why they should object to the examination of the
documentsbyrespondentOmbudsman.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDISMISSED,butitisdirected
that the inspection of subpoenaed documents be made
personallyin cameraby the Ombudsman, and with all the
safeguardsoutlinedinthisdecision.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa(C.J.),Feliciano,Padilla,Regalado,Davide,
Jr.,Romero,Bellosillo,Melo,Quiason,PunoandVitug, JJ.,
concur.
Kapunan,J.,Seedissentingopinion.
Francisco,J.,Onleave.
DISSENTINGOPINION
KAPUNAN,J.:
The wellwrittenponenciaof Mr. Justice Mendoza would
postulate that the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau(EIIB)documentsrelatingtothePersonalServicesFunds
fortheyear1988andalldocumentaryevidence,includingsalary
vouchersforthewholeplantillaoftheEIIBfor1988beproduced
before the Ombudsman over the objections of the EIIB
Commissioneronthegroundthatthedocumentscontainhighly
confidential matters, apart from the fact that the expenditures
hadbeenclearedinauditbytheCommissiononAudit(COA).The
reasons relied upon in theponenciaare a) that the EIIB
documentsatissuearenotclassifiedunderCOA(Commissionon
Audit) Circular No. 88293, Part V No. 7 which limits such
matters exclusively to expenditures relating to the purchase of
information and payments of rewards; and b) the documents
relating to disbursement and expenditures of the EIIB for
personal fundshad already been previously examinedby the
CommissiononAuditwhensuchoutlayhadbeenpasseduponin
306
306 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
 Almontevs.Vasquez
audit in the said Office, such that there is no confidentiality
privilegetoprotect.
Withduerespect,Ibegtodisagree.
DisclosureofthedocumentsasrequiredbytheOmbudsman
would necessarily defeat the legal mandate of the EIIB as the
intelligencearmoftheexecutivebranchofgovernmentrelatingto
matters affecting the economy of the nation. As such, EIIBs
functionsarerelatedtomattersaffectingnationalsecurity.Inthe
performance of its function in relation with the gathering of
intelligence information executive privilege could as well be
invokedbytheEIIB,especiallyinrelationtoitscovertoperations.
The determination, by the executive branch, through its
appropriate agencies, of a question as affecting the national
securityisapolicydecisionforwhichthisCourthasneitherthe
competencenorthemandatetoinfringeupon.Intheabsenceofa
clear showingofagrave abuse ofdiscretionon thepart ofthe
Executive,actingthroughits(nationalsecurity)agencies,Iamof
the opinion that we cannot interfere with a determination,
properlymade,onaquestionaffectingeconomicsecuritylestwe
arepreparedtorideroughshodovercertainprerogativesofour
political branches. In an area obviously affecting the national
security,disclosureofconfidentialinformationonthepromptings
of some dissatisfied employees would potentially disturb a
numberofcarefullylaidoutoperationsdependentonsecrecyand
I am not prepared to do this. The characterization of the
documentsasclassifiedinformationisnotashieldforwrongdoing
but a barrier against the burdensome requests for information
whichnecessarilyinterferewiththeproperperformanceoftheir
duties.Togivein,ateveryturn,tosuchrequestswouldbegreatly
disruptiveofgovernmentalfunctions.Moresointhiscase,since
expenditures of the EIIB for personal funds had already been
previouslyexaminedandpasseduponinauditbytheCommission
onAudit.Therehasbeennoallegationofanyirregularityinthe
COAsearlierexamination,andintheabsenceofsubstantiated
allegations,thepreviousdeterminationoughttobeaccordedour
respectunlesswewanttoencourageunnecessary andtiresome
foraysandinvestigationsintogovernmentactivitieswhichwould
notonlyendupnowherebutwhichwouldalsodisruptorderail
suchactivities.
307
VOL.244,MAY23,1995 307
Almontevs.Vasquez
The confidentiality privilege invoked by petitioners attaches in
theexerciseofthefunctionsoftheEIIB,aspresidentialimmunity
is bestowed by reason of the political functions of the Chief
Executive,asaseparateandcoequalbranchofgovernment.By
the same parity of reasoning, the disclosure of the EIIB
documents required to be examined by the Ombudsman even
incameraproceedingswillunderthepretextofascertainingthe
properdisbursementsoftheEIIBfundswillunnecessarilyimpair
the performance by the EIIB of its functions especially those
affectingnationalsecurity.
Theconstitutional rightallowingdisclosureofgovernmental
documents, i.e., the right to information on matters of public
concernisnotabsolute.Whileaccesstoofficialrecordsmaynotbe
prohibited,itmayberegulated. 1Regulationincludesappropriate
authoritytodeterminewhatdocumentsareofpublicconcern,the
mannerofaccesstoinformationcontainedinsuchdocumentsand
to withhold information under certain circumstances,
particularly, as in this case, those circumstances affecting the
nationalsecurity.2
Besides, as I emphasized earlier, the determination of the
legality of EIIBs disbursements of funds allocated to it are
properly within the competence of the Commission on Audit,
whichastheponenciaofJusticeMendozafinds,hasbeencleared
inaudit.TheCommissiononAudithadadopted,asinthepast,
measures to protect classified information pertaining to
examination of expenditures of intelligence agencies. In the
presentcase,disclosureofinformationtoanyotheragencywould
unnecessarily expose the covert operations of EIIB, as a
governmentagencychargedwithnationalsecurityfunctions.
I,therefore,votetogiveduecoursetothepetition.
Petitiondismissed.
Note.The constitutional provision on the right to public
recordsisselfexecutoryandsuppliestherulesbywhichthe
_______________
1
BERNAS,ITHECONSTITUTIONOFTHEREPUBLICOF
THEPHILIPPINES,265(1987).
2
Seeid.,at267.
308
308 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
FortuneInsuranceandSuretyCo.,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals
right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right
andmandatorythedutytoaffordaccesstosourcesofinformation.
(AquinoSarmientovs.Morato,203SCRA515[1991])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R.No.181508.October2,2013.*
OSCAR CONSTANTINO, MAXIMA CONSTANTINO and
CASIMIRA MATURINGAN, petitioners,vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO
CONSTANTINO, JR., represented by ASUNCION
LAQUINDANUM,respondents.
InPariDelictoDoctrine;Undertheinparidelictodoctrine,
the parties to a controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they
shall have no action against each other, and it shall leave the
parties where it finds them.Latin for in equal fault, in pari
delictoconnotesthattwoormorepeopleareatfaultorareguilty
ofacrime.Neithercourtsoflawnorequitywillinterposetogrant
relieftotheparties,whenanillegalagreementhasbeenmade,
and both parties stand inpari delicto. Under thein pari
delictodoctrine,thepartiestoacontroversyareequallyculpable
or guilty, they shall have no action against each other, and it
shallleavethepartieswhereitfindsthem.
_______________
*SECONDDIVISION.
581
VOL.706,OCTOBER2,2013 581
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
Thisdoctrinefindsexpressioninthemaximsexdolomalo
non oritur actio and in pari delicto potior est conditio
defendentis.
 Same; In pari delicto situations involve the parties in one
contractwhoarebothatfault,suchthatneithercanrecovernor
haveanyactionagainsteachother.Findingtheinapplicability
of the in pari delicto doctrine, We find occasion to stress that
Article1412oftheCivilCodethatbreatheslifetothedoctrine
speaksoftherightsandobligationsofthepartiestothecontract
with an illegal cause or object which does not constitute a
criminal offense. It applies to contracts which are void for
illegalityofsubjectmatterandnottocontractsrenderedvoidfor
beingsimulated,orthoseinwhichthepartiesdonotreallyintend
tobeboundthereby.Specifically,inparidelictosituationsinvolve
the parties in one contract who are both at fault, such that
neithercanrecovernorhaveanyactionagainsteachother.
RemedialLaw;CivilProcedure;Parties;Privies;Wordsand
Phrases;Bythetermpriviesismeantthosebetweenwhoman
actionisdeemedbindingalthoughtheyarenotliterallypartiesto
the saidaction.Bythetermpriviesis meantthosebetween
whomanactionisdeemedbindingalthoughtheyarenotliterally
parties to the said action. This Court, inCorrea v. Pascual, 99
Phil. 696 (1956) had occasion to explain that privity in estate
denotes the privity between assignor and assignee, donor and
donee, grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and
remainderman or reversioner and their respective assignees,
vendorbydeedofwarrantyandaremotevendeeorassignee.A
privyinestateisone,ithasbeensaid,whoderiveshistitletothe
propertyinquestionbypurchase;onewhotakesbyconveyance.In
fine, respondents, as successorsininterest, derive their right
fromandareinthesamepositionastheirpredecessorinwhose
shoestheynowstand.
Same; Evidence; Judicial Admissions; Judicial admissions
arelegallybindingonthepartymakingtheadmissions.Judicial
admissions are legally binding on the party making the
admissions. Pretrial admission in civil cases is one of the
instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under
Section7,Rule18oftheRulesofCourt,whichmandatesthatthe
contentsofthepretrialordershallcontrolthesubsequentcourse
oftheaction,thereby,definingandlimitingtheissuestobetried.
InBayas,etal.v.Sandi
582
5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
82
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
ganbayan, et al., 391 SCRA 415 (2002) this Court
emphasizedthat:Oncethestipulationsarereducedintowriting
andsignedbythepartiesandtheircounsels,theybecomebinding
on the parties who made them.They become judicial
admissionsofthefactorfactsstipulated.Evenifplacedata
disadvantageousposition,apartymaynotbeallowedtorescind
them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the
disadvantage.
Same; Same; Same; The general rule regarding
conclusivenessofjudicialadmissionuponthepartymakingitand
thedispensationofproofadmitsoftwoexceptions:1)whenitis
shownthattheadmission was made through palpablemistake,
and2)whenitisshownthatnosuchadmissionwasinfactmade.
Section4ofRule129oftheRulesofCourt,providesthat:An
admission,verbalorwritten,madebyapartyinthecourseofthe
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admissionmaybecontradictedonlybyshowingthatitwasmade
throughpalpablemistakeorthatnosuchadmissionwasmade.
AscontemplatedintheaforementionedprovisionoftheRulesof
Court, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial
admissionuponthepartymakingitandthedispensationofproof
admitsoftwoexceptions:1)whenitisshownthattheadmission
wasmadethroughpalpablemistake,and2)whenitisshownthat
nosuchadmissionwasinfactmade.Thelatterexceptionallows
onetocontradictanadmissionbydenyingthathemadesuchan
admission.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
JefferyC.Cruzforpetitioners.
BurgosandVillabertLawOfficeforrespondents.
PEREZ,J.:
BeforetheCourtisaPetitionforReviewonCertiorariunder
Rule45oftheRulesofCourtassailingthe31May2007583
VOL.706,OCTOBER2,2013
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
Decision oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.81329,
1
which reversed the 27 October 2003 Decision2of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 of Malolos City, Bulacan, in a
complaintforDeclarationofNullityofPagmamanasaLabasng
Hukuman, Tax Declaration Nos. 961002202653 & 1002655,
With Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction & Damages
docketedasCivilCaseNo.630M99.
TheFacts
Thisinvolvesacontroversyoveraparceloflandclaimedtobe
part of an estate which needed to beproportionally subdivided
amongheirs.
PedroConstantino,Sr.,(PedroSr.)ancestorsofthepetitioners
andrespondents,ownedseveralparcelsofland,oneofwhichisan
unregisteredparceloflanddeclaredfortaxationpurposesunder
TaxDeclaration208143consistingof240squaremeterssituated
at Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Pedro, Sr., upon his death,
was survived by his six (6) children, namely: 1) PEDRO
CONSTANTINO, JR. (Pedro, Jr.), the grandfather of the
respondents; 2) ANTONIA CONSTANTINO, who later died
without issue; 3) CLARA CONSTANTINO, who also later died
withoutissue;4)BRUNOCONSTANTINO,whowassurvivedby
his 6 children including petitioner Casimira Constantino
Maturingan;5)EDUARDOCONSTANTINO,whoissurvivedby
his daughter Maura; and 6) SANTIAGO CONSTANTINO, who
was survived by his five (5) children which includes petitioner
OscarConstantino.4
_______________
1PennedbyAssociateJusticeMoninaArevaloZenarosaand
concurred in by Associate Justices Portia AlioHormachuelos
andEdgardoF.Sundiam.CARollo,pp.4053.
2PennedbyJudgeVictoriaC.FernandezBernardo,records,
583 pp.190194.
3ExhibitF,id.,atp.10.
4Id.,atpp.34.
584
584 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
On 17 June 1999, respondents Asuncion Laquindanum
(Asuncion)andJosefinaCailipan(Josefina),greatgrandchildren
of Pedro Sr., in representation of Pedro, Jr. filed a
complaint5against petitioners Oscar Constantino, Maxima
Constantino and Casimira Maturingan, grandchildren of Pedro
Sr., for the nullification of a document denominated as
PagmamanasaLabasngHukumandated10August1992,6Tax
Declaration Nos. 9610022 (02653) 7and 9610022 (02655)8and
reinstatementofTaxDeclarationNo.208149inthenameofPedro
Sr.
Inthesaidcomplaint,respondentsallegedthatsometimein
October1998,petitionersassertedtheirclaimofownershipover
thewholeparcelofland(240sqm)ownedbythelatePedroSr.,to
theexclusionofrespondentswhoareoccupyingaportionthereof.
Upon verification, respondents learned that a Tax Declaration
No. 02010217033235 in the name of petitioner Oscar
ConstantinoandhiscousinMaximaConstantinowasunlawfully
issued,whichineffectcanceledTaxDeclarationNo.20814inthe
name of their ancestor Pedro Sr. The issuance of the new tax
declaration was allegedly due to the execution of a simulated,
fabricatedandfictitiousdocumentdenominatedasPagmamana
saLabasngHukuman,whereinthepetitionersmisrepresented
themselvesasthesoleandonlyheirsofPedroSr.Itwasfurther
allegedthatsubsequently,thesubjectlandwasdividedequally
betweenpetitionersOscarandMaximaresultingintheissuance
of Tax Declaration No. 96100220265310in the name of Oscar,
with an area of 120 sq m and the other half in the name of
MaximacoveredbyTaxDeclarationNo.961002202652. 11
_______________
5Id.,atpp.28.
6ExhibitE,id.,atp.11.
7ExhibitC,id.,atp.14.
8ExhibitD,id.,atp.16.
9ExhibitF,id.,atp.10.
10Id.,atp.98.
11Id.,atp.99.
585
VOL.706,OCTOBER2,2013
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
The share of Maxima was eventually conveyed to her sister,
petitionerCasimirainwhosenameanewTaxDeclarationNo.96
100220265512wasissued.
Thus,respondentssoughttoannulthePagmamanasaLabas
ngHukumanaswellastheTaxDeclarationsthatwereissuedon
thebasisofsuchdocument.
Thepetitioners,ontheotherhand,averredintheirAnswer
WithCounterclaim13thatPedroSr.,uponhisdeath,leftseveral
parcelsofland,namely:1)alotwithanareaof240sqmcovered
byTaxDeclarationNo.20814;2)alotwithanareaof192sqm
also situated at Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan, previously
coveredbyTaxDeclarationNo.9534;and3)anagriculturalland
withanareaofFour(4)hectares,moreorless.Thepetitioners
claimedthatthedocumentPagmamanasaLabasngHukuman
pertainingtothe240sqmlotwasperfectlyvalidandlegal,asit
wasaproductofmutualandvoluntaryagreementbetweenand
amongthedescendantsofthedeceasedPedroSr.
Further, petitioners alleged that the respondents have no
cause of action against them considering that the respondents
lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr., had already been
transferred to them as evidenced by the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver14dated 5 December 1968, executed by
Angelo Constantino, Maria Constantino (mother of respondent
Asuncion), Arcadio Constantino and Mercedes Constantino, all
heirsofPedroJr.Inthesaiddeed,respondentsadjudicatedunto
themselvestotheexclusionofotherheirs,theparceloflandwith
anareaof192sqmbymisrepresentingthattheyweretheonly
legitimateheirsofPedroSr.Thus,petitionersclaimedthatinthe
manner similar to the assailed Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman,theyas
585
_______________
12Id.,atp.101.
 13Id.,atpp.2428.
14Id.,atpp.3031.
586
586 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
sertedtheirrightsandownershipoverthesubject240sqmlot
withoutdamagetotherespondents.
In essence, petitioners position was that the Deed of
ExtrajudicialSettlementwithWaiverwhichledtotheissuanceof
TaxDeclarationNo.9534wasacquiescedinbytheotherheirsof
Pedro Sr., including thepetitioners, on the understanding that
the respondent heirs of Pedro Jr. would no longer share and
participateinthesettlementandpartitionoftheremaininglot
coveredbythePagmamanasaLabasngHukuman.
On 15 August 2000, pretrial conference15was conducted
whereinthepartiesenteredintostipulationsandadmissionsas
wellasidentificationoftheissuestobelitigated.
Thereupon, trial on the merits ensued.On 27 October 2003,
theRTCrenderedaDecision16infavoroftherespondentsfinding
that:
As a result of execution of Extrajudicial Settlement
withWaiverdatedDecember5,1968(Exh.2)executed
by theHeirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr., a son of Pedro
Constantino,Sr.andthesubsequentexecutionofanother
deeddenominatedasPagmamanasaLabasngHukuman
datedAugust10,1992(Exh.E)executedbytheheirsof
SantiagoandBrunoConstantino,alsoothersonsofPedro
Constantino, Sr., to the exclusion of the other heirs,
namely, those of ANTONIA, CLARA, and EDUARDO
CONSTANTINO, both plaintiffs and defendants acted
equallyatfault.Theyareinparidelicto,wherebythelaw
leavesthemastheyareanddeniesrecoverybyeitherone
of them. (See:Yu Bun Guan v. Ong, 367 SCRA 559).
Parties who are equally guilty cannot complain against
eachother.(Sarmientov.Salud,45SCRA213.)
_______________
15Id.,atpp.7071.
16Id.,atpp.190194.
587
VOL.706,OCTOBER2,2013 587
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
Supplementing the law on the matter, that is, the
provisionofArticle19oftheNewCivilCodewherebyevery
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performanceofhisduties,actwithjustice,giveeveryone
hisdue,andobservehonestyandgoodfaith,isthelegal
maximthathewhocomestocourttodemandequitymust
come with clean hands. (LBC Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,236SCRA602).
Although, plaintiffsheirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.,
including Asuncion Laquindanum and Josefina Cailipan,
are not parties or signatories to the Extrajudicial
SettlementwithWaiverdatedDecember5,1968,theyare
successorsininterest of Pedro Constantino, Jr. They are
considered privies to said deed, and are bound by said
extrajudicialsettlement.(See:Cabresosv.Tiro,166SCRA
400). In other words, they are PRIVIES IN ESTATE.
(Correav.Pascual,99Phil.696,703).
Consequently, plaintiffs are now estopped from
claimingotherwise.(See:PNBv.CA,94SCRA357).They
areestoppedtoshareintherealpropertysubjectmatterof
thiscase.Infine,theyarenotentitledtothereliefsprayed
 for.(CommunicationMaterials &Design,Inc.v. CA,260
SCRA673).
With respect to alleged damages claimed by plaintiffs
againstdefendantsintheirComplaintandcounterclaimfor
damagesbydefendantsagainstplaintiffsintheirAnswer,
bothclaimsareherebydismissedforlackofvalidfactual
andlegalfoundations
Disposition
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and
disquisition, the deed denominated as Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman of August 10, 1992 and Tax
Declaration No. 961002202653 in the name of Oscar
Constantino and Tax Declaration No. 961002202655 in
the name of Casimira C. Maturingan (from Maxima
ConstantinotoCasimiraC.Maturingan)stand.Plaintiffs
588
588 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
Complaintfornullificationthereofwithdamagesishereby
DISMISSED.17
Not convinced, the respondents appealed the aforequoted
decisiontotheCourtofAppeals(CA)raising,amongothers,the
erroneousapplicationbythetrialcourtofthedoctrineofinpari
delictoindeclaringthevalidityofthedocumentPagmamanasa
LabasngHukuman.
In its 31 May 2007 Decision,18the CA ruled in favor of the
respondentsheirsofPedro,Jr.,declaringthattheExtrajudicial
SettlementwithWaiverdated5December1968theyexecuted
coveringthe192sqmlotactuallybelongstoPedroJr.,hence,not
partoftheestateofPedroSr.TheCArationatedinthiswise:
The192squaremeterslotwhichwasadjudicatedinthe
ExtrajudicialSettlementwithWaiverdated5December
1968amongtheheirsofPedroJr.namelyAngelo,Maria,
ArcadioandMercedesisapropertybelongingtoPedroJr.
althoughthereisatypographicalerrorinthatthenameof
Pedro Jr. was inadvertently typed only asPedro
Constantino.Itisclearfromthereadingofthedocument
thatatypographicalerrorwascommittedbecausethefour
(4) children of Pedro Jr. by Felipa dela Cruz were
specificallyidentified.Further,duringthepresentationof
evidenceoftheplaintiffsappellants,itwasrebuttedthat
PedroSr.hadsix(6)legitimatechildrennamely:PedroJr.,
Antonia,Clara,Santiago,BrunoandEduardo19andPedro
Jr.hadfour(4).20
Thus,theCAwentontostatethattherespondents,heirsof
PedroJr.,didnotadjudicatethe192sqmlotuntothemselvesto
theexclusionofalltheotherheirsofPedroSr.
_______________
17Id.,atpp.193194.
18Rollo,pp.3245.
19TSN,23October2000,pp.47.
20Rollo,p.41.
589
VOL.706,OCTOBER2,2013 589
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
Rather,theadjudicationinthedocumententitledExtrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver dated 5 December 1968 pertains to a
different property and is valid absent any evidence to the
contrary.Hence,itiserroneousforthetrialcourttodeclarethe
partiesinparidelicto.
TheIssue
The petitioners now question the said ruling assigning as
error, among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the
existence of misrepresentation in both documents, thereby
ignoring the propriety of the application of thein pari
delictodoctrine.Likewiseassailedistheerroneousdisregardby
the CA of stipulations and admissions during the pretrial
conference on which the application of the doctrine ofin pari
delictowasbased.
OurRuling
Latinforinequalfault,inparidelictoconnotesthattwoor
morepeopleareatfaultorareguiltyofacrime.Neithercourtsof
lawnorequitywillinterposetograntrelieftotheparties,when
an illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand
inparidelicto.21Undertheparidelictodoctrine,thepartiestoa
controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have no
actionagainsteachother,anditshallleavethepartieswhereit
findsthem.Thisdoctrinefindsexpressioninthemaximsexdolo
malo non oritur actio and in pari delictopotior est conditio
defendentis.22
Whencircumstancesarepresentedfortheapplicationofsuch
doctrine,courtswilltakeahandsoffstanceininterpretingthe
contractfororagainstanyoftheparties.Thisisillus
_______________
21AlawDictionary,AdaptedtotheConstitutionandLawsof
theUnitedStates.ByJohnBouvier.Published1856.
22Ubarrav.Mapalad,A.M.No.MTJ91622,22March1993,
220SCRA224,235.
590
590 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
trated in the case ofPackaging Products Corporation v.
NLRC,23wherethisCourtpronouncedthat:
This Court cannot give positive relief to either
petitionerorrespondentbecauseweareaskedtointerpret
and enforce an illegal and immoral arrangement. (See
Articles1409,1411,and1412oftheCivilCode).Kickback
arrangementsinthepurchaseofrawmaterials,equipment,
supplies and other needs of offices, manufacturers, and
industrialistsaresowidespreadandpervasivethatnobody
seemstoknowhowtoeliminatethem.xxx.
Boththepetitionersandtheprivaterespondentarein
pari delicto. Neither one may expect positive relief from
courtsofjusticeintheinterpretationoftheircontract.The
courtswillleavethemastheywereatthetimethecase
wasfiled.24
Asadoctrineincivillaw,theruleonparidelictoisprincipally
governedbyArticles1411and1412oftheCivilCode,whichstate
that:
Article1411.When the nullity proceeds from the
illegalityofthecauseorobjectofthecontract,andtheact
constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari
delicto,theyshallhavenoactionagainsteachother,and
bothshallbeprosecuted.
xxxxxx
Article1412.If the act in which the unlawful or
forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal
offense,thefollowingrulesshallbeobserved:
xxxxxx
1.When the fault is on the part of both contracting
parties,neithermayrecoverwhathehasgivenbyvirtueof
_______________
23236Phil.225;152SCRA210(1987).
24Id.,atpp.234235;p.218.
591
VOL.706,OCTOBER2,2013 591
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
 the contract, or demand the performance of the others
undertaking;
xxxxxx.
The petition at bench does not speak of an illegal cause of
contract constituting a criminal offense under Article 1411.
NeithercanitbesaidthatArticle1412findsapplicationalthough
suchprovisionwhichispartofTitleII,BookIVoftheCivilCode
speaksofcontractsingeneral,aswellascontractswhicharenull
and voidab initiopursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code
suchasthesubjectcontracts,whichasclaimed,areviolativeof
themandatoryprovisionofthelawonlegitimes.
Wedonotdisputethathereinparties,throughtheDeedsthey
separatelyexecuteddeprivedeachotherofrightfulsharesinthe
twolotssubjectoftheseparatecontractsthatis,ifthetwo(2)
parcelsoflandsubjectmatterthereof,formpartoftheestateof
thelatePedroSr.
Itisassertedbythepetitionersthattheirexecutionin1992of
the contract denominated as Pagmamana sa Labas ng
HukumanwhichexcludedotherheirsofPedroSr.,waswithan
underlying agreement with the other heirs including Maria
Constantino, daughter of Pedro Jr. and grandmother of
respondents.25Theagreementwasfortheotherheirstorecognize
the 192 square meters lot subject matter of the Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver executed in 1968 as the share of the
heirsofPedroSr.intheestateofPedroSr.,Petitionersrespected
suchagreement,asinfact,MariaLaquindanumandthatofher
heirs,hereinrespondents,werenotdisturbedintheirpossession
orownershipoverthesaidparcelofland;thus,theheirsofPedro
Jr.weresaidtohaveacquiesced 26tothePagmamanasaLabas
ngHukumanand
_______________
25Answer with Counterclaim filed by defendants, herein
petitioners,records,pp.2428.
26Id.,atp.26.
592
592 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
theunderlyingagreementandthereforetheyhavenorecourseor
reason to question it taking cue from the doctrine ofin pari
delicto. This was the basis of the trial courts findings that
respondentsarenowestoppedfromclaimingotherwise.27
Wefindthatthetrialcourterroneouslyappliedthedoctrine.
This is not to say, however, that the CA was correct in
upholding the validity of the contract denominated as
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman. The CA decision being,
likewise,basedonparidelicto,isalsoincorrect.
Findingtheinapplicabilityoftheinparidelictodoctrine,We
find occasion tostress that Article 1412 of the Civil Code that
breatheslifetothedoctrinespeaksoftherightsandobligationsof
thepartiestothecontractwithanillegalcauseorobjectwhich
does not constitute a criminal offense. It applies to contracts
whicharevoidforillegalityofsubjectmatterandnottocontracts
renderedvoidforbeingsimulated, 28orthoseinwhichtheparties
do not really intend to be bound thereby. Specifically,in pari
delictosituationsinvolvethepartiesinonecontractwhoareboth
atfault,suchthatneithercanrecovernorhaveanyactionagainst
eachother.
Inthiscase,therearetwoDeedsofextrajudicialassignments
untothesignatoriesoftheportionsoftheestateofanancestor
commontothemandanothersetofsignatorieslikewiseassigning
untothemselvesportionsofthesameestate.TheseparateDeeds
cameintobeingoutofanidenticalintentionofthesignatoriesin
bothtoexcludetheircoheirsoftheirrightfulshareintheentire
estateofPedroSr.Itwas,inreality,anassignment ofspecific
portionsoftheestateofPedroSr.,withoutresortingtoalawful
partitionofestateasbothsetsofheirsintendedtoexcludethe
otherheirs.
_______________
27Page5oftheDecisiondated27October2003,id.,atp.194.
28LectureNotesonCivilCodebyProfessorRubenF.Balane,
p.352.
593
VOL.706,OCTOBER2,2013 593
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
Clearly,theprincipleofinparidelictocannotbeapplied.The
inapplicabilityisdictatednotonlybythefactthattwodeeds,not
one contract, are involved, but because of the more important
reasonthatsuchanapplicationwouldresultinthevalidationof
bothdeedsinsteadoftheirnullificationasnecessitatedbytheir
illegality.Itmustbeemphasizedthattheunderlyingagreement
resulting in the execution of the deeds is nothing but a void
agreement.Article1409oftheCivilCodeprovidesthat:
ART.1409.The following contracts are inexistent and
voidfromthebeginning:
(1)Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to
law;morals,goodcustoms,publicorderorpublicpolicy;
xxxxxxxxx
Corollarily, given the character and nature of the deeds as
beingvoidandinexistent,ithas,asaconsequence,ofnoforceand
effectfromthebeginning,asifithadneverbeenenteredintoand
whichcannotbevalidatedeitherbytimeorratification. 29
That said, we cannot give credence to the contention of
respondentsthatnofaultcanbeattributedtothemorthatthey
arefreefromtheeffectsofviolationofanylawsarisingfromthe
supposed unlawful agreement entered into between Maria
Laquindanum,theirpredecessorininterest,andtheotherheirs,
includingpetitionersherein,basedonthefactthattheyarenot
signatoriestosaidagreement,thus,thelackofanybindingeffect
tothem.Respondentsarguedandsetforthasanissueduringthe
trial that they were not signatories to any of the contract or
priviestosuchanarrangement.Itisnotdisputed,however,that
respondentsaresuccessorsin
_______________
29CivilCodeofthePhilippines,Vol.IV,Tolentino,1973Ed.,
p.592,alsocitedinTongoyv.CourtofAppeals,208Phil.95,113;
123SCRA99,119(1983).
594
594 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
interest of Maria Laquindanum, one of the signatories in the
ExtrajudicialSettlementwithWaiverwhowasalsoallegedlyin
agreementwiththepetitioners.
Onthisnote,Weagreewiththetrialcourtthatrespondents
are privies to Maria Laquindanum. By the term privies is
meantthosebetweenwhomanactionisdeemedbindingalthough
theyarenotliterallypartiestothesaidaction. 30ThisCourt,in
Correav.Pascual,31hadoccasiontoexplainthatprivityinestate
denotes the privity between assignor and assignee, donor and
donee, grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and
remainderman or reversioner and their respective assignees,
vendorbydeedofwarrantyandaremotevendeeorassignee.A
privyinestateisone,ithasbeensaid,whoderiveshistitletothe
propertyinquestionbypurchase;onewhotakesbyconveyance.In
fine, respondents, as successorsininterest, derive their right
fromandareinthesamepositionastheirpredecessorinwhose
shoestheynowstand.Assuchsuccessors,respondentssituation
is analogous to that of a transfereependente liteillustrated
inSantiago Land Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,32reiteratingFetalinov.Sanz33wherethisCourtheld:
Assuch,hestandsexactlyintheshoesofhispredecessorin
interest, the original defendant, and is bound by the
proceedings had in the case before the property was
transferred to him. He is a proper, but not an
indispensable,partyashewould,inanyevent,havebeen
boundbythejudgmentagainsthispredecessor. 34
_______________
30Cabresosv.JudgeTiro,248Phil.631,636637;166SCRA
400,405(1988).
3199Phil.696,703(1956)quoting50C.J.,407and33Words
andPhrases,800.
32334Phil.741,747;267SCRA79,87(1997).
3344Phil.691(1923).
34Id.,atp.694.
595
VOL.706,OCTOBER2,2013
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
Thus,anyconditionattachedtothepropertyoranyagreement
precipitating the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver which was binding upon Maria
Laquindanumisapplicabletorespondentswhomerelysucceeded
Maria.
This notwithstanding, it must however be shown that the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver, referred to a
propertyownedbyPedroSr.Thereissuchbasisfromthefactsof
thiscase.
The records show that apart from respondent Asuncion
Laquindanumssstatementthattheparceloflandsubjectmatter
oftheDeedofExtrajudicialSettlementwithWaiverisnotpartof
theestateofPedroSr.,theircommonancestor,nootherevidence
was offered to support it. The CA in giving credence to the
respondents claim, merely relied on the alleged typographical
error in the Deed. The basis for the CAs conclusion was the
inclusionofthewifeofPedroJr.andthatoftheirchildren,which
theCAconsideredasproofthatthepropertywasownedbyPedro
Jr.andnotpartoftheestateofPedroSr.Aspointedoutbythe
petitioners,thementionofthenamesofthechildrenofPedroJr.
intheExtrajudicialSettlementisnotproofthatthesubjectofthe
deedisthepropertyofPedroJr.Meanttoexcludealltheother
heirsofPedroSr.,onlythechildrenofPedroJr.appearedinthe
ExtrajudicialSettlementasheirs.
Weak as the reasoning is, the CA actually contradicted the
admissionsmadenolessbytherespondentsduringthepretrial
conference where they stipulated thatthe land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 9534 consisting of 192 sq. m belongs to Pedro
Sr.35
A portion of the admission and stipulations made by both
partiesduringthepretrialishereunderquoted,thus:
595 Respondentsadmissions:
_______________
35Records,pp.7071.
596
596 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
1.That the land covered by TaxDeclaration No. 9534
previously owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr. was
transferred to Maria Constantino under Tax
DeclarationNo.9535;(highlightingours)
1.TheexistenceofExtrajudicialSettlementwithWaiverper
Doc.No.319,PageNo.44,BookNo.11,Seriesof1968by
NotaryPublicRomericoFlores,Jr.
 Clearly, the above stipulation is an admission against
respondentsinterestofthefactofownershipbyPedro,Sr.ofthe
192 sq m lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534, which was
transferred to respondents mother, the daughter of Pedro, Jr.
Suchthat,inoneoftheissuessubmittedtoberesolvedbythe
trial court, this was included: Whether or not the Deed of
ExtrajudicialSettlementwithWaiverisenforceableagainstthe
plaintiffs, thus curing the legal infirmities, if any, of the
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman36 an issue earlier
mentioned.
Judicialadmissionsarelegallybindingonthepartymaking
the admissions. Pretrial admission in civil cases is one of the
instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under
Section7,Rule18oftheRulesofCourt,whichmandatesthatthe
contentsofthepretrialordershallcontrolthesubsequentcourse
oftheaction,thereby,definingandlimitingtheissuestobetried.
InBayas,etal.v.Sandiganbayan,etal.,37thisCourtemphasized
that:
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and
signed by the parties and their counsels, they become
binding on the parties who made them.They become
judicialadmissionsofthefactorfactsstipulated.38
_______________
36Id.,atp.71.
37440Phil.54;391SCRA415(2002).
38Id.,atp.69;p.426,citingSchreiberv.Rickert,50NE2d
879,13October1943.
597
VOL.706,OCTOBER2,2013
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
Evenifplacedatadisadvantageousposition,apartymay
notbeallowedtorescindthemunilaterally,itmustassume
theconsequencesofthedisadvantage.39(Highlightingours)
Moreover,inAlfelorv.Halasan,40thisCourtdeclaredthat:
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later
challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of
proof;productionofevidenceisdispensedwith.Ajudicial
admissionalsoremovesanadmittedfactfromthefieldof
controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the
pleadingscannotbecontrovertedbythepartymakingsuch
admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all
proofstothecontraryorinconsistenttherewithshouldbe
ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or
not.Theallegations,statementsoradmissionscontainedin
apleadingareconclusiveasagainstthepleader.Aparty
cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or
inconsistentwithwhatwaspleaded.41(Citationsomitted)
WeareawarethatthelastparagraphofSection7,Rule18of
the Rules of Court serves as a caveat for the rule of
conclusiveness of judicial admissions for, in the interest of
justice,issuesthatmayariseinthecourseoftheproceedingsbut
whichmaynothavebeentakenupinthepretrialcanstillbe
takenup.
Section7,Rule18oftheRulesofCourtreads:
Section7.Recordofpretrial.Theproceedingsinthe
pretrialshallberecorded.Upontheterminationthereof,
thecourtshallissueanorderwhichshallreciteindetail
thematterstakenupintheconference,theactiontaken
thereon,theamendmentsallowedtothe
597
_______________
39Id.
40520Phil.982;486SCRA451(2006).
 41Id.,atp.991;pp.459460.
598
598 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
pleadings,andtheagreementsoradmissionsmadebythe
parties as to any of the matters considered. Should the
actionproceedtotrial,theordershall,explicitlydefineand
limittheissuestobetried.Thecontentsoftheordershall
controlthesubsequentcourseoftheaction,unlessmodified
beforetrialtopreventinjustice.
In addition, Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,
providesthat:
Anadmission,verbalorwritten,madebyapartyinthe
courseoftheproceedingsinthesamecase,doesnotrequire
proof.Theadmissionmaybecontradictedonlybyshowing
thatitwasmadethroughpalpablemistakeorthatnosuch
admissionwasmade.
AscontemplatedintheaforementionedprovisionoftheRules
of Court, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial
admissionuponthepartymakingitandthedispensationofproof
admitsoftwoexceptions:1)whenitisshownthattheadmission
wasmadethroughpalpablemistake,and2)whenitisshownthat
nosuchadmissionwasinfactmade.Thelatterexceptionallows
onetocontradictanadmissionbydenyingthathemadesuchan
admission.42
However, respondents failed to refute the earlier
admission/stipulationbeforeandduringthetrial.Whiledenying
ownershipbyPedroSr.ofthe192sqmlot,respondentAsuncion
Laquindanum, when placed on the stand, offered a vague
explanationastohowsuchparceloflandwasacquiredbyPedro
Jr.Aportionofhertestimony43isheretoreproducedasfollows:
_______________
42FlorentinoAtillo,IIIv.CourtofAppeals,etal.,334Phil.
546,552;266SCRA596,602(1997).
43TSN,23November2000,p.6.
599
VOL.706,OCTOBER2,2013 599
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
ATTY.DOMINGO:
Q:Do you know if as part of the estate of the late Pedro
Constantino,Sr.isanotherparceloflandalsosituatedat
Sta.Maria,Hagonoy,Bulacanwithanareaof192square
meters?
A:It is not owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr., sir. It is our
property owned by Pedro Constantino, Jr. that was
inheritedbymymotherMariaConstantino.
Q:AnddoyouknowhowPedroConstantino,Jr.acquired
thatparcelofland,theonethatyoumentionedawhile
ago?
A:Kinagisnankonapoyonglupangyonpagkabatapa
nayoneamin.(Highlightingours)
The above assertion of denial is simply a selfserving
declarationunsupportedbyevidence.Thisrendersconclusivethe
stipulationsmadeduringthepretrialconference.Consequently,
respondentsareboundbytheinfirmitiesofthecontractonwhich
theybasedtheirrightoverthepropertysubjectmatterthereof.
Considering that the infirmities in the two deeds relate to
exclusionofheirs,acircumventionofanheirsrighttohisorher
legitime,itisapttoreiterateourrulinginNeriv.HeirsofHadji
YusopUy,44disposingthat:
Hence,intheexecutionoftheExtrajudicialSettlement
of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favour of
spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciation should have
participated.ConsideringthatEutropiaandVictoriawere
 admittedlyexcluded and that then minors Rosa and
Douglaswerenotproperlyrepresentedtherein,the
settlementwasnotvalidandbindinguponthemand
consequently,atotalnullity.(Highlightingours)
_______________
44G.R.No.194366,10October2012,683SCRA553,560.
600
600 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
Furtherhighlighting theeffectofexcluding theheirs in the
settlement of estate, the case ofSegura v. Segura,45elucidated
thus:
ItisclearthatSection1ofRule74doesnotapplytothe
partitioninquestionwhichwasnullandvoidasfarasthe
plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only partition.
The partition in the present case was invalid because it
excludedsixofthenineheirswhowereentitledtoequal
shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule no
extrajudicialsettlementshallbebindinguponanyperson
whohasnotparticipatedthereinorhadnonoticethereof.
Asthepartitionwasatotalnullityanddidnotaffectthe
excludedheirs,itwasnotcorrectforthetrialcourttohold
thattheirrightto challenge thepartition hadprescribed
aftertwoyearsfromitsexecutionxxx.
Inlightoftheforegoing,whilebothpartiesactedinviolation
of the law on legitimes, thepari delictorule, expressed in the
maxims Ex dolo malo non oritur actionand in pari delicto
potiorestconditiondefendentis,whichrefusesremedytoeither
party to an illegal agreement and leaves them where they
are,does not apply in this case. (Underline supplied)46As held
inDeLeonv.CA:47
In the ultimate analysis, therefore, both acted in
violationoflaws.However,theparidelictoruleexpressed
in the maximsEx dolo malo non oritur action and in
paridelictopotiorestconditiondefendentis,whichrefuses
remedytoeitherpartytoanillegalagreementandleaves
themwheretheyaredoesnotapplyinthiscase.
_______________
45Id.,atp.561citingSegurav.Segura,247APhil.449,456;
165SCRA368,373(1988).
46DeLeonv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.80965,6June1990,
186SCRA345,359.
47Id.
601
VOL.706,OCTOBER2,2013 601
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.
xxxxxxxxx
SincetheLetterAgreementwasrepudiatedbeforethe
purposehasbeenaccomplishedandtoadheretothepari
delicto rule in this case is to put a premium to the
circumventionofthelaws,positivereliefshouldbegranted
toMacaria.Justicewouldbeservedbyallowinghertobe
placed in the position in which she was before the
transactionwasenteredinto.
Accordingly, in order not to put a premium to the
circumventionofthelawsascontemplatedbythepartiesinthe
instantcase,wemustdeclarebothcontractsasvoid.Indeed,any
circumventionofthelawcannotbecountenanced.48
WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 81329 is herebyREVERSED.
ThePagmamana sa Labas ng Hukumanand Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver are hereby declared void without
prejudicetothepartitionoftheestateofPedroConstantinoSr.
withthefullparticipationofallthelattersheirs.
SOORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del CastilloandPerlas
Bernabe,JJ.,concur.
Judgmentreversed.
Notes.Partiestoavoidagreementcannotexpecttheaidof
the law; the courts leave them as they are, because they are
deemedinparidelictoorinequalfault.Thisrule,however,isnot
absolute.Article1142oftheCivilCodeprovidesanexception,and
permitsthereturnofthatwhichmayhavebeengivenundera
void contract. (QueenslandTokyo Commodities, Inc. vs. George,
630SCRA304[2010])
_______________
48Magsulinv.NationalOrganizationofWorkingMen,etal.,
451Phil.254,262;403SCRA199,205(2003).
602
602 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Constantinovs.HeirsofPedroConstantino,Jr.

Theinpari delictorule provides that when two parties are
equally at fault, the law leaves them as they are and denies
recoverybyeitheroneofthem.(LandBankofthePhilippinesvs.
Poblete,691SCRA613[2013]) 520 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
o0o
Peoplevs.Gaudia
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
G.R.No.146111.February23,2004.*
reserved.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,vs.ROLENDO
GAUDIA@LENDOYorDODO,appellant.
Criminal Law;Circumstantial Evidence;Requisites;The
rulingcaselawisthatforcircumstantialevidencetobesufficient
tosupportaconviction,allcircumstancesmustbeconsistentwith
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty,andatthesametimeinconsistentwiththehypothesisthat
heisinnocentandwitheveryotherrationalhypothesisexceptthat
ofguilt.UnderRule133,Section4oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,
conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided
threerequisitesconcur:(a)thereismorethanonecircumstance;
(b)thefacts fromwhichthe inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The ruling case
lawisthatforcircumstantialevidencetobesufficienttosupport
aconviction,allcircumstancesmustbe
_______________
ENBANC.
*
521
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004
Peoplevs.Gaudia
consistent with each other, consistent withthe hypothesis
thattheaccusedisguilty,andatthesametimeinconsistentwith
thehypothesisthatheisinnocentandwitheveryotherrational
hypothesisexceptthatofguilt.
Same;Witnesses;It is hoary jurisprudence that mere
relationshiptooneoftheparties,withoutashowingofanyother
impropermotive,isnotsufficientbasistoimpairthecredibilityof
thewitness.First,appellantsattempttodiscreditthetestimony
ofMikcannotsucceed.ItistruethatMikisarelativebyaffinity
ofAmaliaLoyola.Itishoaryjurisprudence,however,thatmere
relationshiptooneoftheparties,withoutashowingofanyother
impropermotive,isnotsufficientbasistoimpairthecredibilityof
thewitness.Inthecaseatbar,appellantcannotimputeanyill
motiveforMiktotestifyadverselyagainsthim.
Same;Rape;Child Witnesses;Words and Phrases;Studies
show that children, particularly very young children, make the
perfectvictimsofrape;Certainly,childrenhavemoreproblems
inproviding accountsof eventsbecausetheydonotunderstand
everything they experience; Moreover, children have a limited
vocabulary; It must also be considered that there is no actual
counterpart for the word rape in Visayan parlance.Next,
appellanttriedtocapitalizeonthefactthatRemelynnevermade
anystatementthathesexuallymolestedher.Thisisaspecious
argument. Remelyn had toldher mother, CrazyLendoy forced
me.Remelynwas31/2yearsoldatthetime.Atsuchaninfantile
age, shecould not beexpected to have acomprehension of the
concept of rape. Studies show that children, particularly very
youngchildren,maketheperfectvictims.Theynaturallyfollow
the authority of adults as the socialization process teaches
521 children that adults are to be respected. The childs age and
developmental level will govern how much she comprehends
abouttheabuseandthereforehowmuchitaffectsher.Ifthechild
istooyoungtounderstandwhathashappenedtoher,theeffects
will be minimized because she has no comprehension of the
consequences. Certainly, children have more problems in
providing accounts of events because they do not understand
everything they experience. They do not have enough life
experiencesfromwhich todraw uponinmaking senseof what
they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have a
limited vocabulary. The fact that Remelyn called appellant
Buangorcrazyshowsthathedidsomethingwhichsheknew
was not right or proper. By saying iya kong lugos, Remelyn
clearlyconveyedthatheforcedhertodosomethingbad.Withher
limitedcomprehension,thechildcouldnothaveaperfectwayof
relatingthatshehadbeensexuallyabused.Finally,itmustalso
be considered that there is no actual counterpart for the word
rapeinVisayanparlance.
522
5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
22
Peoplevs.Gaudia
Same;Same;Witnesses;Hearsay;OffersofCompromise;Res
Inter Alios Acta Principle;A witness can only testify on facts
which are based on his personal knowledge or perception;
Following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet, the actions of the accuseds parents in offering to
compromisecannotprejudicetheaccused,sincehewasnotaparty
tothesaidconversation,norwasitshownthathewasprivytothe
offerofcompromisemadebythemtothemotherofthevictim.
Similarly, appellants charge that the offers of compromise
allegedlymadebytheparentsoftheappellanttoAmalia,andby
theappellanthimselftoAmaliashusbandshouldnothavebeen
takenagainsthimbythetrialcourt,evenifsustained,willnot
exculpatehim.Tobesure,theofferofcompromiseallegedlymade
byappellanttoAmaliaLoyolashusbandishearsayevidence,and
ofnoprobativevalue.ItwasonlyAmaliawhotestifiedastothe
allegedoffer,andshewasnotapartytotheconversationwhich
allegedlytranspiredattheHagonoyMunicipalJail.Awitnesscan
onlytestifyonfactswhicharebasedonhispersonalknowledgeor
perception. The offer of compromise allegedly made by the
appellants parents to Amalia may have been the subject of
testimonyofAmalia.However,followingtheprincipleofresinter
aliosactaalterinocerenondebet,theactionsofhisparentscannot
prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the said
conversation,norwasitshownthathewasprivytotheofferof
compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They
cannot be considered as evidence against appellant but we
reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the
convictionoftheappellant.
Same;Same;Right to be Informed;Pleadings and
Practice;WheretheInformationmerelydescribedtherapevictim
asaminoranddidnotallegethatshewasbelowsevenyears
old,theaccusedwasthereforechargedwithsimplerapeonly.We
nowreviewthepenaltyofdeathimposeduponappellant.Inthe
caseatbar,theInformationstatesthatappellant,bymeansof
forceandintimidation. .. willfully, unlawfully andfeloniously
(had) carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, aminor, against
her will to her damage and prejudice. (emphasis ours) The
InformationdidnotallegethatRemelynwasbelowsevenyears
oldwhenshewasviolated.Appellantwasthereforechargedwith
simple rape, under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law).
Uponitspassage,R.A.No.7659introducedsevennewattendant
circumstances,whichwhenpresent,willtransformthecrimeto
qualifiedrape,punishablebydeath.Weagainstressthatthese
new attendant circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
information to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The
factsstatedinthebodyoftheinformationdeterminethecrimefor
whichtheaccusedstandschargedandforwhichhemustbetried.
Themainpurposeofrequiringalltheelementsofacrimetobe
set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense. It would be a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against him and,
consequently,a
523
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004 523
Peoplevs.Gaudia
 denialofdueprocess,ifheischargedwithsimplerapeand
beconvictedofitsqualifiedformpunishablewithdeath,although
theattendantcircumstancequalifyingtheoffenseandresulting
incapitalpunishmentwasnotallegedintheindictmentonwhich
hewasarraigned.
AUTOMATICREVIEWofadecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourt
ofDigos,DavaodelSur,Br.19.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforappellant.
PUNO,J.:
Therecanbenogreaterviolationofapersonsrighttofeelsafe
and secure than the crime of rape. When one commits such a
horribleactonanother,hedegradesnotonlythatpersonsbody;
moreimportantly,hedefilesthatpersonsmind.Whenthevictim
is a little child, the act and the perpetrator himself assume a
bestiality beyond the comprehension of normal human beings.
Yet,thelawmustapplyequallyuponsaintsandsinnersalike,
eventothemostsalaciousruffian.
BeforeusistheDecision1dated10July2000ofBranch19of
the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, finding
appellant Rolendo Gaudia2guilty of the crime of rape, meting
uponhimthepenaltyofdeath,andorderinghimtopaytoprivate
complainantRemelynLoyolatheamountsoffiftythousandpesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00)asexemplarydamages,andcostsofsuit.
TheInformationfiledagainsttheaccusedappellantreadsas
follows:
That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 oclock in the
evening,intheMunicipalityofHagonoy,ProvinceofDavaodel
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniouslyhavecarnalknowledgewithRemelynLoyola,aminor,
againstherwilltoherdamageandprejudice.
_______________
1
WrittenbyRTCJudgeHilarioI.Mapayo.
2
AlsoknownbythenameLendoyorDodo.
524
524 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Gaudia
TheprosecutionpresentedRemelynsmother,AmaliaLoyola,as
itsprimarywitness.Amaliatestifiedthaton24March1997,she
lefthertwochildrenRemelyn(31/2yearsold) 3andKimberly(1
year old)4at their house in Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur to
gather pigs food at Bulatukan. At the time, her husband was
working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in the
afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn.
Shewenttofetchwaterandproceededtoaneighbortoaskabout
the whereabouts of Remelyn. Nobody could provide her any
information. On her way home, she shouted and called out
Remelyns name. At about 6:00 p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn
calling out to her, Ma, I am here, from a grove ofipil
ipiltrees.5Amalia rushed toward the place, but was met by
Remelynatthemangotrees,somethirty(30)metersfromtheir
house.6She found Remelyn crying, naked,nagbakaang(walking
withherlegsspreadapart)andwithfreshanddriedbloodonher
body.Ipilipilleavesclungtoherforehead.Bloodwasoozingfrom
her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed Police officers came and brought Amalia, Remelyn and two
her. Upon closer inspection, she found a whitish mucuslike barangay officials (kagawads)tothe police precinctofHagonoy
substancecomingfromRemelynsprivateorgan.7 forinvestigation.Amaliasstatementwastaken.12
Thefollowingday,2March1997,AmaliabroughtRemelynto On25March1997,AmaliabroughtRemelyntotheHagonoy
thehouseofacertainTiyaCoring,aquackdoctor,fortreatment. Health Center in Davao del Sur. Dr. Patricio Hernane, the
Amongthepeoplepresentinthepremisesweretherelativesand municipal health officer,13conducted a genital examination of
parentsoftheappellant.8Thequackdoctorfoundbothdriedblood Remelyn,andmadethefollowingfindings:
and fresh blood oozing in Remelyns vagina, and told
Amalia,Hoy!Amalia,yourdaughterwasbeing(sic)raped.9At GENITALEXAMINATION:
about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed
Amaliathathehadseentheappellantpassbyherhouseandtake AbsenceofPubicHair(TannerStageI).Nocontusionsarenoted
Remelyn.10At this point, the parents of appellant told Amalia, ontheexternalgenitalia.Driedbloodare(sic)notedonthelabia
Mal,letustalkaboutthismatter,wewilljustsettlethis,weare minora. Fresh hymenal lacerations are noted at 12, 3, 6, 10
willingtopaytheamountofP15,000.00,forthecrimethatmy oclock(sic)arenotedwithfreshvaginallacerationnotedatthe
soncommitted.11 posterior commissure but not extending to the perineum. No
lacerationswerenotedattheanalopening.
_______________ Speculumexaminationisnotdonebecauseevenexposureof
thelabiaminoramakethechildcry.(sic)
3
TSN, 5 January 1998, p. 4. According to Amalia Loyola, CONCLUSION:Physicalvirginitylost.14
Remelynwasbornon9August1993. Thedoctoropinedthatthelacerationscouldhavebeencausedby
4
Id.,atp.5. theinsertionofaforeignobject,suchasthepenisofaman. 15On
5
Id.,atp.8. 26March1997,Amaliaexecutedheraffidavitcomplaint. 16Amalia
6
Id.,atp.7. statedthereinthatRemelynhadtoldherBuangLendoyiyakong
7
Id.,atpp.57. lugos.17(Meaning crazy lendoy he forced me in the Visayan
8
TSN,5January1998,p.19. dialect.)Amaliaconfirmedinhertestimonythattwoweeksafter
9
Id.,atp.8. the incident, Remelyn told her, Ma, Lendoy is crazy, she (sic)
10
TSN, 5 January 1998, pp. 1415, and TSN, 26 February broughtmetotheipilipiltrees.18
1998,pp.45. The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyns
11
Id.,atp.19. neighbor and a barangaykagawadin their area. Mik testified
525 thaton24March1997,atabout4:00p.m.,heandhiswifewere
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004 525 ontheirwayhomeafterregisteringattheCOMELECoffice.They
Peoplevs.Gaudia
were in a hurry as their child was running a fever. Mik saw NationalElections.WithhimwasTotongLoyola,thebrotherin
appellantcar law of Amalia Loyola. They finished at 5:00 p.m., left and
repairedtothehouseofCatalinaCabano,appellantsaunt,toask
_______________ forvinegarfortheirkinilaw(adishcomposedofrawfishsteeped
invinegar).TheyfoundDaylenCabano,thesmallgrandchildof
12
TSN,5January1998,p.8. Catalina, alone at her house. Daylen was crying, hence, they
13
TSN,8December1997,p.4. brought her with them as they proceeded to the place where
14
ExhibitsA2andA3fortheprosecution,alsoExhibit1
Catalina was collectingtuba(fermented coconut wine). It was
Cforthedefense,p.46oftheOriginalRecords.
appellant who carried Daylen.23They reached Catalinas place
15
TSN,8December1997,pp.78.
after5:00p.m.Thereafter,theywenttothehouseofappellant.
16
ExhibitBfortheprosecution,p.5oftheOriginalRecords.
DodoMalonandappellantsparentswereinthehouse.Ataround
17
Id. 9:00 p.m., Totong and Dodo Malon left, after partaking of
18
TSN,5January1998,p.9.
thekinilaw.Appellant stayed home. The following morning (25
526
March1997),appellantandDodoMilonwenttotherivertofish.
526 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED Atabout12:00noon,appellantrepairedtothehouseofhisaunt,
Peoplevs.Gaudia VictoriaGayod,inMahayahaytodrinktuba.Hewaslocatedby
rying a small girl in his arms. 19He identified the little girl as thepoliceandinvestigated.24HeclaimedthatitwasDaylenand
Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia Loyola. Appellant and notthevictimRemelynwhomhewascarrying.
Remelynwereontheirwaytowardtheipilipiltrees.20
The next morning, 25 March 1997, at about 7:00 a.m., a _______________
neighbor informed Mik that Remelyn had been raped. He
proceededtothehouseofthequackdoctorwhereAmaliabrought 19
ExhibitDfortheprosecution,p.6oftheOriginalRecords.
Remelynforexamination.AmaliaconfirmedtoMikthatRemelyn 20
TSN,26February1998,pp.45.
hadbeenraped.MiktoldAmaliathatappellantcommittedthe 21
Id.,atp.9.
crime.MiktheninformedBarangayOfficialRodrigoMalud 21and 22
Id.,atp.7.
the othertanodsof the incident. They were instructed tolocate 23
Id.,atpp.610.
the appellant. They passed to the police the information that 24
Id.,atp.10.
appellantwasinBarangayMahayahay.Thepolicemencameand
527
tookappellantforinvestigation.22
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004 527
Theappellant,ROLENDOGAUDIA,interposedthedefenseof
alibi.Heaverredthaton24March1997,atabout4:00p.m.,he Peoplevs.Gaudia
wenttotheBarangayCentertoregisterattheCOMELECforthe As corroborative witness, appellant presented Alex Totong
Loyola. Totong testified that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00
p.m.,theyregisteredasvotersinthebarangay.Afterregistering, (P50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos
theywenthometoappellantshouse,butagainlefttogetvinegar (P30,000.00)asexemplarydamages,andtopaythecostsofsuit.
from his aunt Catalina Cabano, for theirkinilaw.In Catalinas
house,theyfoundherdrunkhusband,her10yearolddaughter, _______________
and her 3year old grandchild Daylen. 25Catalinas daughter 25
TSN,16July1999,p.7.
directed them to the place where she was gatheringtuba.As
Daylen was crying, appellant carried her on their way to
26
Id.,atpp.47.
Catalina. It was then about 4:00 p.m. After Catalina finished
27
Id.,atpp.910.
gatheringtuba,thefourofthemappellant,Totong,Catalinaand
28
TSN,16July1999,pp.1113.
Daylen, left together and repaired to Catalinas house for the
29
Id.,atp.15.
vinegar. Appellant and Totong returned to appellants house 528
where they spent the night.26Totong woke up at 6:00 a.m. the 528 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
followingday,andleftappellantshouse.Totongcametoknowof Peoplevs.Gaudia
appellantsarrestthefollowingday.27 InhisBrief30totheCourt,appellantassignedthefollowingerrors
Catalina Cabano also corroborated appellants story. She inthejudgmentofthetrialcourt:
relatesthaton24March1997,shewasgatheringtuba,ataplace
around 2 kilometers from her house. She left Maritess, her I.
youngest child and Daylen, her grandchild, at her house. 28At
about 5:30 p.m., appellant and Totong arrived. Appellant was THETRIALCOURTERREDINCONVICTINGTHEACCUSED
carrying Daylen. They waited for Catalina to finish APPELLANT, ROLANDO (sic) GAUDIA DESPITE THE FACT
gatheringtubauntil6:00p.m.AppellantandTotongwenttothe THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
formershouse, had adrinking spree, and thenpartedways at REASONABLEDOUBT.
about6:30p.m.Thatnight,accordingtoCatalina,shetalkedto
TulonMikatthepremisesnearthehouse.Mikwaslookingfor II.
Remelyn. At that time, appellant was already at the house of
Catalinasyoungersister,whichislocatedacrosstheriver,about EVEN GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT
4kilometersaway.29 ACCUSEDAPPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient CHARGED,THETRIALCOURTSTILLERREDINIMPOSING
circumstantialevidencetoconvictappellantforthecrimeofrape THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE
withthequalifyingcircumstancethatthevictimwasbelowseven FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO STATE WITH
years of age. Appellant was sentenced to death and ordered to CERTAINTYTHEQUALIFYINGCIRCUMSTANCEOFAGEIN
indemnify the victim the sums of fifty thousand pesos THEINFORMATION.
Weconvictappellantforsimplerape,andnotforqualifiedrape.
Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court,
conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided
threerequisitesconcur:(a)thereismorethanonecircumstance;
(b)thefacts fromwhichthe inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The ruling case
lawisthatforcircumstantialevidencetobesufficienttosupport
a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each
other,consistentwiththehypothesisthattheaccusedisguilty,
andatthesametimeinconsistentwiththehypothesisthatheis
innocentandwitheveryotherrationalhypothesisexceptthatof
guilt.31
Thefirstcircumstantialevidenceagainsttheappellantisthe
testimonyofprosecutionwitnessTulonMikthatat4:00p.m.on
24 March 1997, he saw him carrying Remelyn toward the
direction of theipilipilgrove, some 130 meters from her
house.32AsaneighborandrelativeofRemelynsstepfather,Mik
hadsufficientfamiliaritywiththechildRemelyn.Thepossibility
thathecouldhavebeenmistakeninidentifyingthevictimisnil.
The second circumstantial evidence against the appellant is
AmaliastestimonythatRemelynemergednakedfromthesame
_______________
30
Rollo,pp.3745.
31
Peoplev.Gallarde,325SCRA835(2000).
32
TSN,26February1998,p.11.
529
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004
Peoplevs.Gaudia
ipilipilgrove, withipilipilleaves clinging to her forehead.
Remelynwascryingandwalkingwithherlegsspreadfarapart.
Remelyns private organ was bleeding and excreting a white
mucuslikesubstance.33
The third circumstantial evidence against appellant is
Remelynsstatementtohermotherthatitwasappellantwhohad
broughthertotheipilipilgrove34andforcedhertodosomething
againstherwill.35
There is no question that Remelyn was violated. After
examiningRemelyn,Dr.PatricioHernane,theMunicipalHealth
OfficerofHagonoy,foundhertohaveabrokenhymen,aswellas
freshvaginallacerations.
From these, theculpability of theappellant can be inferred
withmoralcertainty.Alltheaforementionedcircumstanceshave
been indubitably proven, both by the testimonial and
documentaryevidencepresentedbytheprosecution,andbythe
inabilityoftheappellanttodiscredittheirveracity.
The attempt of appellant to discredit the circumstantial
evidence against him is futile. Appellant contends,first, that
Tulon Miks testimony is weak, on the ground that Mik is a
relative of the husband of Amalia. 36He also questions the
credibility of Mik because of his failure to confront appellant
when he saw him carrying Remelyn. Neither did Mik inform
Amalia about what he saw when Amalia was looking for
Remelyn.AppellantinsiststhatitwasDaylenwhomhecarried
andnotRemelyn.Second,hestressesthefactthatRemelyndid
not make any categorical statement that he sexually molested
her.Third,hemaintainsthattheaccusationofflightagainsthim
529 is false.Fourth, he avers that the offer of compromise by his
parentsastenderedtoAmaliaLoyolashouldnotbetakenagainst
him,37while the offer of compromise he allegedly made to
Amaliashusband,asrelayedbyAmaliainhertestimony,should
beexcludedasevidenceforbeinghearsay.38Finally,he
_______________
33
TSN,5January1998.
34
ExhibitBfortheprosecution,p.5oftheOriginalRecords.
35
TSN,5January1998,p.9.
36
TSN,5January1998,p.6,asquotedinp.7ofAppellants
Brief,p.38,Rollo.
37
Sec.28,Rule130oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.
38
Sec.36,Rule130oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.
530
530 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Gaudia
submitsthatinconsistenciesinthetestimonyofAlexLoyolaand
Cabanoshouldnotbecountedagainsthimonthegroundthatany
finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecutions
evidence.
Werejectappellantsarguments.
First, appellants attempt to discredit the testimony of Mik
cannot succeed. It is true that Mik is a relative by affinity of
Amalia Loyola. It is hoary jurisprudence, however, that mere
relationshiptooneoftheparties,withoutashowingofanyother
impropermotive,isnotsufficientbasistoimpairthecredibilityof
thewitness.39Inthecaseatbar,appellantcannotimputeanyill
motiveforMiktotestifyadverselyagainsthim.
AppellantquestionsthefailureofMiktochallengehimwhy
he was carrying Remelyn. Also, he assails Mik for failing to
informAmaliaLoyolaofsuchasight.Mikhadanexplanationfor
theinadvertence.Hesaidhisownchildwasdownwithafever,
andheandhiswifewerehurryinghome. 40Forthissamereason,
he revealed the fact that he saw appellant carrying Remelyn
towardtheipilipilgroveonlywhenhelearnedofRemelynsfate.
But thereafter, he lost no time in reporting the matter to the
barangaychairman.41Asabarangaykagawad,healsoassistedin
the pursuit and arrest of appellant at Barangay
Mahayahay.42These subsequent actions strengthen Miks
credibility.
ThetrialcourtaccordedmorecredencetoMiksnarrationof
the events over the testimonies of Cabano and Loyola. It is a
cornerstoneofourjurisprudencethatthetrialjudgesevaluation
ofthetestimonyofawitnessanditsfactualfindingsareaccorded
not only the highest respect, but also finality, unless some
weightycircumstancehasbeenignoredormisunderstoodwhich
could alter the result ofthe judgmentrendered. Inthecaseat
bar,thereisnoirregularityintheassessmentofevidencebythe
lower court. It granted utmost credibility to Miks testimony.
Giventhedirectopportunitytoobservethewitnessonthestand,
thetrialjudgewasinavantagepositiontoassesshisdemeanor
anddetermineif
_______________
39
Peoplevs.Antonio,303SCRA414(1999).
40
TSN,26February1998,p.11.
41
Id.,atp.6.
42
Id.,atp.7.
531
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004 531
Peoplevs.Gaudia
he was telling the truth or not. 43The trial court found Miks
testimony more worthy of credence over those of Catalina and
Loyola.Wehavenoreasontoreverseitsfindings.
 Next, appellanttriedto capitalizeonthe factthatRemelyn
nevermadeanystatementthathesexuallymolestedher.Thisis
a specious argument. Remelyn had told her mother, Crazy
Lendoyforcedme.44Remelynwas31/2yearsoldatthetime.At
such an infantile age, she could not be expected to have a
comprehensionoftheconceptofrape.Studiesshowthatchildren,
particularlyveryyoungchildren,maketheperfectvictims.They
naturally follow the authority of adults as the socialization
process teaches children that adults are to be respected. The
childs age and developmental level will govern how much she
comprehendsabouttheabuseandthereforehowmuchitaffects
her.Ifthechildistooyoungtounderstandwhathashappenedto
her, the effects will be minimized because she has no
comprehension of the consequences. Certainly, children have
moreproblemsinprovidingaccountsofeventsbecausetheydo
not understand everything they experience. They do not have
enoughlifeexperiencesfromwhichtodrawuponinmakingsense
ofwhattheysee,hear,taste,smellandfeel.Moreover,theyhave
a limited vocabulary.45The fact that Remelyn called appellant
Buangorcrazyshowsthathedidsomethingwhichsheknew
was not right or proper. By saying iya kong lugos, Remelyn
clearlyconveyedthatheforcedhertodosomethingbad.Withher
limitedcomprehension,thechildcouldnothaveaperfectwayof
relatingthatshehadbeensexuallyabused.Finally,itmustalso
be considered that there is no actual counterpart for the word
rapeinVisayanparlance.
Appellantschargethatthetrialcourterredwhenitruledthat
hefledarrest,evenifcorrect,isnotpivotaltohisguilt.Thereare
enoughpiecesofcircumstantialevidencetoconvicthim.Neither
_______________
43
People vs. Manalo,G.R. Nos. 14498990, 31 January
2003,396 SCRA 573;People vs. Glabo,371 SCRA
567(2001);People vs. Navida,346 SCRA 821(2000);People vs.
Valla,323 SCRA 74(2000);People vs. Lopez,302 SCRA
669(1999).
44
ExhibitBfortheprosecution,p.5oftheOriginalRecords.
45
Goldstein,SethL.,TheSexualExploitationofChildren,A
Practical Guide to Assessment, Investigation and Intervention,
2ndEdition,CRCPressLLC:1999.
532
532 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Gaudia
will it affect the penalty or the award of damages rendered
againsthim.
Similarly, appellants charge that the offers of compromise
allegedlymadebytheparentsoftheappellanttoAmalia,andby
theappellanthimselftoAmaliashusbandshouldnothavebeen
takenagainsthimbythetrialcourt,evenifsustained,willnot
exculpatehim.Tobesure,theofferofcompromiseallegedlymade
byappellanttoAmaliaLoyolashusbandishearsayevidence,and
ofnoprobativevalue.ItwasonlyAmaliawhotestifiedastothe
allegedoffer,46andshewasnotapartytotheconversationwhich
allegedlytranspiredattheHagonoyMunicipalJail.Awitnesscan
onlytestifyonfactswhicharebasedonhispersonalknowledgeor
perception.47The offer of compromise allegedly made by the
appellants parents to Amalia may have been the subject of
testimony48of Amalia. However, following the principle ofres
interaliosactaalterinocerenondebet,49theactionsofhisparents
cannotprejudicetheappellant,sincehewasnotapartytothe
saidconversation,norwasitshownthathewasprivytotheoffer
ofcompromisemadebythemtothemotherofthevictim.They
cannot be considered as evidence against appellant but we
reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the
convictionoftheappellant.
Appellantsdefensehardlyimpresses.Itisinterestingtonote
thatappellantandhiswitnessesclaimthatitwasataround5:00
p.m. when appellant carried the child Daylen toward her
grandmother Catalina at the place where she was
gatheringtuba.Miktestifiedthatitwasaround4:00p.m.when
he saw appellant carrying Remelyn toward theipilipilgrove.
Giventhe130meterdistancebetweentheipilipilgroveandthe
housesofappellantandofAmaliaLoyola,appellantcouldhave
easily taken Remelyn from her house, raped her at theipil
ipilgrove,andleftherthere,allinamatterofafewminutes.
Sometime past 4:00 p.m., he could then have returned to his
house, and together with Alex Loyola, proceeded to the
COMELECofficetoregister,anddidallthesubsequentactshe
claimstohavedone.
_______________
46
Id.,atp.20.
47
Section36,Rule130,RevisedRulesofCourt.
48
TSN,25January1998,p.19.
49
AscodifiedinSection28,Rule130,RevisedRulesofCourt.
533
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004
Peoplevs.Gaudia
The Court also notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of
Catalina and Loyola. The discrepancies in the witnesses
narrationastothetimeofarrivalofappellantattheplacewhere
Catalinawasgatheringtuba,histimeofarrivalathisownhouse,
andthetimewhenLoyola andappellantactually parted ways,
arenotmeretrivialdetailswhichcouldbeforgottenbywitnesses
because of the passage of time. To make matters worse, the
appellants testimony was, at times, contradicted by his own
witnesses. Particularly telling was the conflict between
appellantsstatementthatTotonghadalreadylefthishouseon
the night of 24 March 1997 and Totong and Catalinas own
avermentsthatTotonghadstayedthenightatappellantshouse.
These contradictory testimonies only made more incredulous
appellantstale.
Wenowreviewthepenaltyofdeathimposeduponappellant.
In the case at bar, the Information states that appellant, by
means of force and intimidation . . . willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously (had) carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola,
aminor, against her will to her damage and
prejudice.50(emphasis ours)The Information did not allege that
Remelyn was below seven years old when she was violated.
Appellantwasthereforechargedwithsimplerape,underSection
335oftheRevisedPenalCode,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.
7659(theDeathPenaltyLaw).Uponitspassage,R.A.No.7659
introduced seven new attendant circumstances, which when
present,willtransformthecrimetoqualifiedrape,punishableby
death.Weagainstressthatthesenewattendantcircumstances
must be properly pleaded in the information to justify the
impositionofthedeathpenalty.Thefactsstatedinthebodyof
theinformationdeterminethecrimeforwhichtheaccusedstands
charged and for which he must be tried. 51The main purpose of
533 requiring all the elements of a crime to be set out in the
information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informedofthechargesagainsthimand,consequently,adenial
ofdueprocess,ifheischargedwithsimplerapeandbeconvicted
of its qualified form punishable with death, although the
attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in
capitalpunishmentwasnotallegedintheindictmentonwhichhe crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
wasarraigned.52 ofreclusion perpetua.He is ordered to pay to complainant
RemelynLoyolatheamountsofP50,000.00ascivilindemnityex
_______________
delicto,P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
50
OriginalRecords,p.2.Emphasisours. exemplarydamages.Costsagainsttheappellant.
51
Peoplevs.LimSan,17Phil.273(1910).
52
Peoplevs.DavidGarcia,281SCRA463(1997).
534
534 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Gaudia
Wenowreviewthedamagesawardedbythetrialcourt.Timeand
again,wehaveruledthatwhenthereisafindingthatrapehad
been committed, the award of civil indemnityex delictois
mandatory.53If the death penalty has been imposed, the
indemnityshouldbeP75,000.00;otherwisethevictimisentitled
to P50,000.00 for each count of rape. 54Thus, the appellant is
ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to
RemelynLoyola.55 VOL.470,SEPTEMBER20,2005 373
Weaffirmtheawardofmoraldamages.Thisisautomatically Doldolvs.People
awardedinrapecaseswithoutneedoffurtherproofotherthan G.R.No.164481.September20,2005.*
thecommissionofthecrime,asitisassumedthatarapevictim
CONRADO C. DOLDOL, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE
hassufferedmoralinjuriesentitlinghertosuchanaward.56
PHILIPPINESand THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALS,
We alsofindtheaward ofexemplary damages madebythe
respondents.
lower court in favor of complainant as proper because
Criminal Law;Malversation;Evidence;Admissions;Partial
complainanthasbeencorrectlygrantedmoraldamagesandthe
offense against her was committed with the aggravating restitution of the cash shortage is an implied admission of
circumstance57of age. However, the amount awarded must be misappropriation of the missing funds.Except for his bare
reducedtoP25,000.00inlinewithprevailingjurisprudence.58 testimony, the petitioner offered no competent and credible
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the Regional evidence to prove that the missing funds were actually cash
TrialCourt,Branch19,ofDigos,DavaodelSurinCriminalCase advancesofemployeesinthemunicipality.Thepetitionercould
No.213(97)isherebyMODIFIED.Appellantisfoundguiltyofthe haveofferedinevidencethedocumentsevidencingthenamesof
therecipientsandamountsofthecashadvances,butfailedtodo
so.Moreover,thepetitionerwrote
_______________
*
SECONDDIVISION.
374
3 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
74
Doldolvs.People
the Provincial Auditor and offered to refund the missing
funds as follows: P200,000.00 on September 15, 1995,
P200,000.00onorbeforeOctober31,1995,andP884,139.66on
November 30, 1995. He was able to pay only P200,000.00 on
September 15, 1995, and failed to remit the balance of his
shortage. Suchpartial restitution of the petitioners of the cash
shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of the
missingfunds.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
VillamorA.Toleteforpetitioner.
TheSolicitorGeneralforthePeople.
CALLEJO,SR.,J.:
Conformably to the Memorandum1dated April 6, 1995 of the
ProvincialAuditor,ateamofStateAuditorsledbyStateAuditor
EmilieS.Ritua,withStateAuditorsLydiaNaoeandBeverlyT.
Cruz as members, conducted an audit of the cash and cash
account of Conrado C. Doldol, the Municipal Treasurer of
Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. The audit covered the General Fund,
Special Education Fund and Trust Fundinhiscustody forthe
period of November 30, 1994 to June 8, 1995. Doldol and the
MunicipalAccountantwerepresentduringtheaudit.TheState
AuditorsdiscoveredthatDoldolhada shortage of P801,933.26.
TheyalsonotedthatonJune5,1995,hemadecashwithdrawals
from the municipalitysdeposit accountwiththeLand Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) amounting to P360,000.59. The
withdrawal,purportedlyforsalaries,wages,allowancesandmid
yearbonusesofmunicipalofficersandemployees,hadnotbeen
recordedintheGeneralFundCashbookasofJune8,1995.The
StateAuditorsalsonotedthatDoldolmadeadjustmentsinthe
said cashbook on June 8, 1995, increasing his P801,933.26
shortagetoP1,134,421.54.
_______________
1
ExhibitA.
375
VOL.470,SEPTEMBER20,2005 375
Doldolvs.People
InaLetter datedJuly5,1995,theStateAuditorsdemandedthe
2
immediaterefundofthesaidamount,andforDoldoltosubmit
within 72 hours a written explanation on the said shortage.
Doldol failed to respond and was, thereafter, relieved of his
duties.OnJuly20,1995,hewasdirectedtotransfertheaccount
toAssistantMunicipalTreasurerLoidaCancino.
TheStateAuditorsthenconductedanotherauditofthesaid
account,thistimecoveringtheperiodofJune8,1995toJuly19,
1995. They discovered that Doldol incurred an added cash
shortage of P149,905.92. In a Letter to Doldol dated July 27,
1995,theStateAuditorsdemandedtheimmediaterestitutionof
themissingfund,anddirectedhimtosubmitwithin72hoursa
writtenexplanationwhyheincurredsuchshortage.Again,Doldol
failedtorespond.TheStateAuditorssubmittedtheirReportto
the Provincial Auditor on their examinations showing his
shortages.OnAugust3,1995,theStateAuditorssubmittedtheir
Memorandum on the result of the audits to the Provincial
Auditor.
On the same day, Doldol wrote the Provincial Treasurer
requesting that a reaudit be conducted on his cash and cash
account,takingexceptiontothefindingsoftheStateAuditors.
Insteadofpursuinghisrequestforareaudit,Doldoloptedto
refundthemissingfunds. OnSeptember15, 1995, heremitted
P200,000.00totheActingMunicipalTreasurerforwhichhewas
issued Official Receipt No. 436756. Doldol promised to pay the
balance of his shortage, as follows: P200,000.00 on October 31,
1995,andP884,139.66onorbeforeNovember30,1995.However,
herenegedonhispromise.
OnFebruary6,1996,theProvincialAuditortransmittedthe
MemorandumandConsolidatedReportoftheStateAuditorsto
theOmbudsman,andrequestedthatDoldolbe
_______________
2
ExhibitE.
376
376 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Doldolvs.People
chargedformalversationofpublicfunds.Despitetheextensions
giventohim,Doldolfailedtofilehiscounteraffidavit.
Twoinformationsformalversationofpublicfundswerethen
filed against Doldol in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
CarlosCity.ThefirstInformation,docketedasCriminalCaseNo.
SCC2760,reads:
ThatonoraboutJune8,1995,orsometimepriororsubsequent
thereto, in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,CONRADOC.DOLDOL,a
publicofficer,beingthentheMunicipalTreasurer,Municipality
of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, and as such accountable for public
funds received and/or entrusted to him by reason of his office,
actinginrelationofhisofficeandtakingadvantageofthesame,
didthenandtherewilfully,unlawfullyandfeloniously,useand
benefittheamountofONEMILLIONONEHUNDREDTHIRTY
FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTYONE PESOS
and 54/100 (P1,134,421.54) from such public funds received by
himbyreasonofhisoffice,tothedamageofthegovernmentin
theamountaforestated.
CONTRARYTOLAW.3
The second Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SCC
2763,reads:
That sometime between June 8, 1995 and July 19, 1995 or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
HonorableCourt,CONRADOC.DOLDOL,apublicofficer,being
then the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality of Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan, and as such accountable for public funds received
and/orentrustedtohimbyreasonofhisoffice,actinginrelation
ofhisofficeandtakingadvantageofthesame,didthenandthere
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, misappropriate and
convert to his personal use and benefit the amount of ONE
HUNDREDFORTYNINETHOUSANDNINEHUNDREDFIVE
PESOSand92/100(P149,905.92)fromsuchpublicfundsreceived
byhimbyreasonofhisoffice,tothedamageofthegovernmentin
theamountaforestated.
_______________
 3
Rollo,pp.5455. imposed upon him which includes perpetual absolute
377 disqualification(Art.41,Rev.PenalCode)andtopaythecosts.
VOL.470,SEPTEMBER20,2005 377 SOORDERED.5
Doldolvs.People OnappealtotheCourtofAppeals(CA),Doldolalleged:
CONTRARYTOLAW.4
Doldol testified that the funds which the State Auditors found 1. 1.Thatthetrialcourterredinrejectingthedefensesput
missingwere,infact,cashadvancesavailedofbythemunicipal upbytheaccusedasfollows:
employees.Heinsistedthatnotasinglecentavowasusedforhis
personalbenefit.Heaverredthatthechargeslodgedagainsthim _______________
wereprematurebecausethesamewerebasedonanincomplete
audit. 4
Id.,atpp.5758.
InaJointDecision,thetrialcourtconvictedtheaccusedofthe 5
Rollo,pp.8788.
crimescharged.Thefalloofthedecisionreads: 378
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theaccusedConradoDoldol 378 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
ishereby foundguiltybeyondreasonabledoubt ofthe crimeof Doldolvs.People
MalversationofPublicFundsinCriminalCaseNo.SCC2760and
inCriminalCaseNo.SCC2763,asdefinedandpenalizedbyArt. 1. a.The evidence shows that the audits were not yet
217oftheRevisedPenalCode.Inbothcases,theamountinvolved completedwhenthelettersofdemandwereservedupon
is more than P22,000.00, as such the penalty to be imposed himtoproducetheallegedmissingfunds.
isreclusiontemporalinitsmaximumperiodtoreclusionperpetua.
Considering that the accused surrendered to the police in 2. b.He was not given the chance to further verify the
Urbiztondo,Pangasinan(SeeExh.4)andbeingentitledtothe recordsdespitehisrequesttothateffect.
provision of [the] Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentencedtosufferanindeterminatepenaltyof10years,1day 3. c.Thereisnoevidencethathetookthemoneyfromthe
ofprisionmayorasminimumto18years,8monthsofreclusion vaultorbroughtithome.
temporalas maximum in each of the two cases. Further, he is
orderedtopaytheamountofP1,134,421.54inCriminalCaseNo. d.Themissingfunds,ifany,werecashadvancesofcertain
SCC2760andanotheramountofP149,905.92inCriminalCase municipalemployees.
No. SCC2763 minus, of course, his advance payment of
P200,187.80. In addition, he should be made to suffer the 4. e.Hishavingborrowedmoneyfromthebanknegatesthe
accessory penalties corresponding to the principal penalty chargeofmisappropriationofpublicfunds.
 1. 2.That the trial court erred in convicting the accused
based on the testimonies of the auditors and the
documentaryevidenceadducedbythem.
2. 3.Thatthetrialcourterredinsentencingtheaccusedto
suffer the penalties imposed by the assailed joint
decision.6
OnFebruary11,2001,theCArenderedjudgmentaffirmingthe
appealed decision, and, likewise, denied Doldols motion for
reconsiderationthereof.
Doldol,nowthepetitioner,forthwithfiledthepresentpetition
forreviewoncertiorari,faultingtheCAasfollows:
1. 1.In affirming the joint decision of the Regional Trial
Court,Branch56,SanCarlosCity,PangasinaninCrim.
CaseNos.SCC2760andSCC2763;
2. 2.Inconvictingtheaccusedpetitioneronthebasisofan
erroneousandincompleteaudit;
3. 3.In not dismissing the cases against the accused
petitioner.7
The petitioner reiterates his arguments that the audit of his
accountabilities had not been completed because the State
Auditorshadyettoconductaverificationoftheirinitialfindings
basedonthecashbookandareconciliationofthebank
_______________
6
Id.,atp.64.
7
Rollo,p.15.
379
VOL.470,SEPTEMBER20,2005 379
Doldolvs.People
depositsofthemunicipality.ThepetitionerinsiststhattheState
Auditorsdidnotsubmitanybankreconciliationstatement.The
petitionerarguesthathewasnevergivenachancetoexplainand
pointoutthathedidnotincuranyshortageofpublicfunds,and
thatthechargesagainsthimshouldbedismissed.Tobolsterhis
claim, he cites the ruling of this Court inDumagat v.
Sandiganbayan8andSection560oftheManualofInstructionsto
Treasurers and Auditors and other Guidelines to bolster his
claim.
Thepetitionerassertsthattheprosecutionfailedtoprovethat
thepublicfundswereforhispersonaluse.Infact,thepetitioner
insists,theevidenceshowsthattheallegedmissingfundswere
unliquidated cashadvancesofemployees. Hence, thepetitioner
concludes,theprimafaciepresumptionunderthelastparagraph
ofArticle217oftheRevisedPenalCodedoesnotapply.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor
General(OSG)assertsthattheissuesraisedbythepetitionerare
factualand,underRule45oftheRulesofCourt,onlyquestionsof
lawmayberaised.TheOSGpositsthatthefindingsoffactsof
the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on this
Court, absent a showing that the trial court ignored,
misconstrued or misunderstood cogent facts and circumstances
which,ifconsidered,wouldchangetheoutcomeofthecase.The
OSG maintains that the prosecution adduced proof beyond
reasonabledoubtthatthepetitionermalversedthepublicfunds
subject of the two Informations. Moreover, the petitioners
contentionthatthechargesagainsthimwerepremature,because
theauditofhisaccountabilitieshadnotyetbeencompletedand
he was not given a chance to explain the whereabouts of the
subjectfundsbeforethesaidchargeswerefiled,isbeliedbythe
factthatheevenmadeapartialrestitutionofthepublicfunds.
The OSG notes that as found by the trial court, thepetitioner
evenfailedtospecifythe
_______________
8
G.R.No.96915,3July1992,211SCRA171.
380
380 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Doldolvs.People
namesoftheemployeeswhoweregrantedcashadvancesandthe
accountsofthesaidadvances.Itfurtheraversthattherulingof
thisCourtinDumagatv.Sandiganbayan9doesnotapplybecause:
Inhisvainattempttoexculpatehimselffromcriminalliability,
petitionerinvokesthedoctrineestablishedinDumagatvs.Sandi
ganbayan, et al., [211 SCRA 171, 177 (1992)], wherein this
Honorable Court acquitted the accused of the crime of
malversation of public funds, holding that [s]ince the audit
examinationleftmuchtobedesiredintermsofthoroughnessand
completenessastherewereaccountswhichwerenotconsidered,
thesamecannotbemadethebasisforholdingpetitionerliablefor
malversation.
It is submitted that the ruling inDumagat vs.
Sandiganbayan(supra)isnotapplicabletotheinstantcaseasthe
twocasesarebasedondifferentfactualcircumstances.
Inthefirstplace,inDumagatvs.Sandiganbayan(supra,atp.
178),therewasafindingthatthehaphazardexaminationofthe
cash accountability of petitioner was made by the auditor in
violation of the Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and
Auditors and that the missing funds would have been
discovered if only the auditor took into consideration the
contentsofthetwovaultsinSindanganandTampisilanandthe
factthathercollectioninDipologCityweredepositedwiththe
NFAcashier.Intheinstantcase,therewassufficientcompliance
withtheManualof Instructions toTreasurersandAuditorsas
thetwo(2)auditingteamshadcompletedtheirexaminationand,
thereafter, required herein petitioner to produce or explain the
shortagesoffundsinhiscustody.Notwithstandingthedemand
for him to explain the shortages, petitioner totally disregarded
thesameandfurtherfailedtoproduceupondemandthemissing
fundsamountingtoP1,134,421.54andP149,905.92.Therewas,
thus, nothing leftfor the team ofauditorsto dointheinstant
case. If at all, State Auditor Ritua requested for the return of
petitioners cashbook and passbooks merely to reconcile and
confirmthecorrectnessoftheirfindings.10
Thepetitionhasnomerit.
_______________
9
Ibid.
10
Rollo,pp.139140.
381
VOL.470,SEPTEMBER20,2005 381
Doldolvs.People
The evidence on record shows that the team of State Auditors
conducteditsfirstauditofcashandcashaccountsoftheGeneral
Fund,SpecialEducationFundandTrustFundinthecustodyof
the petitioner, and discovered that he had a shortage of
P1,134,421.54.11
InaLetter12datedJuly5,1995,theStateAuditorsdemanded
that the petitioner immediately produce the missing funds. He
was also required to submit within 72 hours a written
explanation why the shortage occurred. In the meantime, the
State Auditors conducted another audit of the cash and cash
accountsofthepetitioner during theperiodofJune 8, 1995 to
July 19, 1995, and he was found to have a shortage of
P149,905.92. The petitioner was informed of the results of the
auditinaLetterdatedJuly27,1995,wherehewasdirectedto
refund his shortage of P149,905.92 and to submit a written
explanation thereon within 72 hours.13However, the petitioner
failed to respond to such demand, and failed to object to the
findingsandconclusionsoftheStateAuditors.Itbearsstressing
thatthepetitionerwaspresentduringthesaidaudit.
Whileitistruethatthepetitionerrequestedforareauditon
August3,1995andobjectedtosomeofthefindingsoftheaudit
team,headdressedtheletterrequesttotheProvincialTreasurer,
andnotto the Provincial AuditorofPangasinan. Wenotethat
whiletheProvincialAuditorhadalreadysignedtheTransmittal
LetterdatedAugust3,1995ontheStateAuditorsReportand
requestforthepetitionersprosecutionformalversationofpublic
funds,itwasfiledonlyonFebruary6,1996.Inthemeantime,the
ProvincialAuditorneverreceivedanyletterfromthepetitioner
requestingforareauditofhisaccount.
_______________
11
ExhibitF.
12
ExhibitE.
13
Ibid.
382
382 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Doldolvs.People
Admittedly, State Auditor Ritua conducted an audit of the
General Fund, the Special Education Fund and Trust Fund
Passbook,andtheLBPandDBPPassbooksonJuly11,1995for
verificationandreconciliationpurposes.However,thepetitioner
was not barred from examining and receiving the same,
preparatory to the submission of his explanation to the State
Auditorsdemandletters.Indeed,thepetitionerwasevenableto
writetheProvincialTreasureronAugust3,1995,andrequested
his objection to such findings. The following findings and
ratiocinationoftheCA,assupportedbytheevidenceonrecord,
negatethesubmissionofthepetitioner:
. . . [T]he records at the depository banks confirmed the
correctness of the COAs findings that there were, indeed,
shortagesinthefundsunderappellantscontrol,thus,rendering
appellants request for a reaudit as a mere superfluous and
redundant procedure (TSN, Amando T. Sison; Emelie
Ritua,supra).
Appellants contention that he was not given the chance to
verify the records under audit despite a request to that effect
deserves scant consideration. The records show that appellant
wastwiceaffordedampleopportunitytoreplenishthefundsor
explainthereasonforitsdisappearance.Verily,thiscouldhave
been the perfect opportunity for the appellant to verify the
recordsandprovideanacceptablereasonbehindtheshortagesin
the municipal funds under his custody. Appellant, however, on
bothinstancesfailedtoreplytothedemandsgivenbytheCOA.
For having refused to face the music, so to speak, and
disregarded the demands sent by the COA, appellant has only
himselftoblameifhehaslostanyopportunitytofurtherverify
thefinancialrecordsofthemunicipality.14
The record of the Ombudsman shows that the petitioner was
requiredtosubmithiscounteraffidavit,butrequestedfortimeto
doso,onhisrepresentationthathisrequesttotheCommission
onAuditforareauditwasstillpending.Itturnedoutthatthe
petitionermadenosuchrequest.Moreover,thepetitionerfailed
to submit his counteraffidavit to the Ombudsman. Thus, the
petitionerssubmissionthatthe
_______________
Rollo,pp.3839.
14
383
VOL.470,SEPTEMBER20,2005
Doldolvs.People
auditofhisaccounthadnotbeencompletedbeforethereportof
theStateAuditorswasreferredtotheOmbudsmanisnotcorrect.
Except for his bare testimony, the petitioner offered no
competentandcredibleevidencetoprovethatthemissingfunds
were actually cash advances of employees in the municipality.
The petitioner could have offered in evidence the documents
evidencingthenamesoftherecipientsandamountsofthecash
advances,butfailedtodoso.Moreover,thepetitionerwrotethe
Provincial Auditor and offered to refund the missing funds as
follows: P200,000.00 onSeptember15, 1995, P200,000.00 onor
beforeOctober31,1995,andP884,139.66onNovember30,1995.
HewasabletopayonlyP200,000.00onSeptember15,1995,and
failed to remit the balance of his shortage. Such partial
restitutionofthepetitionersofthecashshortageisanimplied
admissionofmisappropriationofthemissingfunds.Therulingof
theCAonthismatteriscorrect:
AsWehavealreadystatedhereinabove,onSeptember15,1995,
not too long after the shortages in the municipal funds were
discovered,appellantmadeapartialpayment/settlementinthe
amountof200,187.80pesosasevidencedbyOfficialReceiptNo.
436756(Exhibit8,Record,VolumeIII,p.6).Withrespecttothe
balanceofthemissingfunds,appellantpromisedtopaythesame
ininstallmentbasis.Appellant,though,failedtocomplywithhis
undertaking(Record,VolumeI,p.457;TSN,AmandoT.Sison,
July 27, 1998, pp. 3233). Said payment is of no moment and
couldnothavelegallybroughtacquittalfortheappellant.Onthe
contrary, as guided by Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence,Weholdthatsaidpayment,particularlywhentakenin
conjunction with appellants commitment to gradually pay the
remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise
which must be treated as an implied admission of appellants
383 guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his
personaluse.15
_______________
Rollo,p.40.
15
384
384 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
ManlySportwearManufacturing,Inc.vs.DadodetteEnterprises
INLIGHTOFALLTHEFOREGOING,thepetitionisDENIED
forlackofmerit.TheDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.
CRNo.25845isAFFIRMED.Costsagainstthepetitioner.
SOORDERED.
Puno(Chairman),AustriaMartinez,TingaandChico
Nazario,JJ.,concur.
Petitiondenied,judgmentaffirmed.
Notes.The act of encashing a check intended for a
particular project and subsequently using the money for some
other purpose constitutes misappropriation. (Nizurtado vs.
Sandiganbayan,239SCRA33[1994])
Oneessentialelementofthecrimeofmalversationisthata
public officer must take public funds, money or property, and
misappropriateitforhisownprivateuseorbenefit.(Aquinovs.
Olivares,399SCRA475[2003])
o0o
 Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights therightsenumeratedintheconstitutionalprovisionexistonlyin
reserved. custodial interrogations, or incustody interrogation of accused
persons.It is wellsettled that the foregoing legal formalities
requiredbythefundamentallawofthelandapplyonlytoextra
judicialconfessionsoradmissionsobtainedduring

_______________

10
Gonzalesvs.CourtofAppeals,268SCRA322(1998).
*
THIRDDIVISION.
420
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
20
Ladianavs.People
custodialinvestigations. Indeed, the rights enumerated in
theconstitutionalprovisionexistonlyincustodialinterrogations,
orincustodyinterrogationofaccusedpersons.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Definition.Custodial
interrogationis the questioning initiated by law enforcement
officersafterapersonhasbeentakenintocustodyorotherwise
deprivedofhisfreedomofactioninanysignificantway.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Distinguished from Preliminary
Investigation; Definition.Apreliminary investigationis an
inquiryoraproceedingtodeterminewhetherthereissufficient
VOL.393,DECEMBER4,2002 419
groundtoengenderawellfoundedbeliefthatacrimehasbeen
Ladianavs.People committed,andthattherespondentisprobablyguiltythereofand
G.R.No.144293.December4,2002.* shouldbeheldfortrial.
JOSUE R. LADIANA, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE Same;Same;Same;Same;Same;The Court has
PHILIPPINES,respondent. unequivocally declared that a defendant on trial or under
Criminal Law;Homicide;Rights of the Accused;Custodial preliminaryinvestigationisnotundercustodialinterrogation.
Investigations;ExtraJudicialConfessionsorAdmissions;Indeed, Evidently,apersonundergoingpreliminaryinvestigationbefore
the public prosecutor cannot be considered as being under
custodial investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally
declared that a defendant on trial or under preliminary
investigationisnotundercustodialinterrogation.Itexplainedas
follows: His [accused] interrogation by the police, if any there
hadbeenwouldalreadyhavebeenendedatthetimeofthefiling
of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors office).
Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already
pending in court (or the public prosecutors office), there is no
occasiontospeakofhisrightwhileundercustodialinterrogation
laiddownbythesecondandsubsequentsentencesofSection20,
ArticleIVofthe1973Constitution[nowSection12,ArticleIIIof
the1987Constitution],fortheobviousreasonthatheisnolonger
undercustodialinterrogation.
Same;Same;Same;The accusedwhether in court or
undergoingpreliminaryinvestigationbeforethepublicprosecutor
unquestionablypossessrightsthatmustbesafeguarded.The
accusedwhether in court or undergoing preliminary
investigation before the public prosecutorunquestionably
possess rights that must be safeguarded. These include: 1) the
righttorefusetobemadewitnesses;2)therightnottohaveany
prejudice whatsoever imputed to them by such refusal; 3) the
righttotestifyontheirownbehalf,subjecttocrossexamination
bytheprosecution;and4)whiletestifying,therighttorefuseto
answer a specific question that tends to incriminate them for
somecrimeotherthanthatforwhichtheyarebeingprosecuted.
421
VOL.393,DECEMBER4,2002
Ladianavs.People
Same;Same;Evidence;Admissions Distinguished from
Confessions;Sections26and33ofRule130oftheRevisedRules
onEvidencedistinguishonefromtheother.Sections26and33
ofRule130oftheRevisedRulesonEvidencedistinguishonefrom
theotherasfollows:SEC.26.Admissionsofaparty.Theact,
declarationoromissionofapartyastoarelevantfactmaybe
given in evidence against him. SEC. 33.Confession.The
declarationofanaccusedacknowledginghisguiltoftheoffense
charged, or ofanyoffense necessarily includedtherein, maybe
given in evidence against him. In a confession, there is an
acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a
statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of
guiltorofthecriminalintenttocommittheoffensewithwhichone
ischarged.
Same;Same;Same;Admissions;Ingeneral,admissionsmay
berebuttedbyconfessingtheiruntruthorbyshowingtheywere
made by mistake.In general, admissions may be rebutted by
confessing their untruth or by showing they were made by
mistake. The party may also establish that the response that
formed the admission was made in a jocular, not a serious,
manner;orthattheadmissionwasmadeinignoranceofthetrue
state of facts. Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization
why such admissions had been made, thus, leaving them
unrebutted.Inaddition,admissionsmadeunderoath,asinthe
caseatbar,areevidenceofgreatweightagainstthedeclarant.
Theythrowonhimtheburdenofshowingamistake.
Same;Same;Justifying Circumstances;SelfDefense;It is
hornbookdoctrinethatselfdefensemustbeprovedwithcertainty
by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes
421 any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person
invoking it.It is hornbook doctrine that selfdefense must be
proved with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing
evidencethatexcludesanyvestigeofcriminalaggressiononthe
part of theperson invoking it. It cannot be entertained ifit is
uncorroboratedbyanyseparateandcompetentevidence,anditis
also doubtful. The question whether the accused acted in self
defenseisessentiallyaquestionoffactproperlyevaluatedbythe
lowercourt;inthiscase,theSandiganbayan.
Same;Same;Mitigating Circumstances;Voluntary
Surrender;Elements.For voluntary surrender to mitigate
criminal liability, the following elements must concur: 1) the
offender has not been actually arrested, 2) the offender
surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latters
agent, and 3) the surrender is voluntary. To be sufficient, the
surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly
indicatingtheintentoftheaccusedtosurrenderunconditionally,
eitherbecausethey
422
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
22
Ladianavs.People
acknowledgetheirguiltorwishtosavetheauthoritiesthe
trouble and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in
searchingforandcapturingthem.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheSandiganbayan.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
JoseA.AlmoandAngelR.PurisimaIIIforpetitioner.
TheSolicitorGeneralforthePeople.
PANGANIBAN,J.:
TheConstitutionbarstheadmissioninevidenceofanystatement
extractedbythepolicefromtheaccusedwithouttheassistanceof
competent and independent counsel during
acustodialinvestigation.However,acounteraffidavitvoluntarily
presented by the accused during thepreliminaryinvestigation,
evenifmadewithouttheassistanceofcounsel,maybeusedas
evidenceagainsttheaffiant.
TheCase
BeforeusisaPetitionforReviewunderRule45oftheRulesof
Court,assailingtheApril10,2000Decision1andAugust4,2000
Resolution2of theSandiganbayan(First Division) in Criminal
CaseNo.16988.ThedispositiveportionoftheassailedDecision
readsasfollows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
JOSUE R. LADIANA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide and, in the absence of any modifying
circumstance, sentencing the said accused to: (a) suffer an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of ten (10) years
ofprisionmayor,asminimum,toseventeen(17)yearsandfour
(4)monthsofreclusiontemporal,asmaximum[;](b)sufferallthe
_______________
1
AnnexAofthePetition;Rollo,pp.7185.PennedbyJustice
Gregory S. Ong with the concurrence of Justices Francis E.
Garchitorena(thenDivisionchairmanandpresidingjustice)and
CatalinoR.Castaeda,Jr.(member).
2
AnnexCofthePetition;id.,pp.93101.
423
VOL.393,DECEMBER4,2002 423
Ladianavs.People
appropriateaccessorypenaltiesconsequentthereto;(c)indemnify
theheirsofthevictim,FranciscoSanJuan,inthetotalamountof
FiftySixThousandFiveHundredPesos(P56,500.00);and(d)pay
thecosts.3
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Petitioner was originally charged with murder before
theSandiganbayanin an Information4dated August 5, 1991.
However,theantigraftcourtissuedanOrder 5datedOctober14,
1991, noting that besides the allegation that the crime was
allegedly committed by the accused while he was taking
advantage of his official position, nothing else is in the
Information to indicate this fact so that, as the Information
stands, nothing except a conclusion of fact exists to vest
jurisdiction[in]thisCourtovertheaccusedandoverthecrimefor
whichheischarged.
Further, the Order gave the government sufficient time to
amend the Information to show adequate facts to vest
theSandiganbayanwithjurisdictionoverthecase.Subsequently,
anAmendedInformation,6stillchargingpetitionerwithmurder,
was filed on April 1, 1992. The accusatory portion reads as
follows:
That on or about the 29th day of December 1989, in the
Municipality of Lumban, Laguna, Philippines, and within the
jurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,a
public officer, being then a member of the Integrated National
Police (INP now PNP) assigned at the Lumban Police Station,
Lumban,Laguna,actinginrelationtohisdutywhichisprimarily
to enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction, taking
advantageofhisofficialpositionconfrontedFranciscoSanJuan
why the latter was removing the steel pipes which were
previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of
vehicles along P. Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban,
Laguna,purposelytoinsurethesafetyofpersonspassingalong
the said street and when Francisco San Juan told the accused
thatthelatterhasnobusinessinstoppinghim,saidaccusedwho
wasarmedwithafirearm,withintenttokillandwithtreachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack
andsho[o]tFran
_______________
3
SandiganbayanDecision,p.13;id.,p.84.
4
Records,pp.12.
5
Id.,p.56.
6
Id.,pp.8889.ThiswassignedbySpecialProsecutionOfficer
FidelD.GalindezandapprovedbythenOmbudsmanConradoM.
Vasquez.
424
424 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ladianavs.People
ciscoSanJuanwiththefirearmhittingFranciscoSanJuanathis
headandneckinflictinguponhimfatalwoundstherebycausing
thedeathofFranciscoSanJuan.7
DuringhisarraignmentonMay8,1992,petitioner,assistedby
his counselde parte,8pled not guilty.9After due trial,
theSandiganbayanfoundhimguiltyofhomicide,notmurder.
TheFacts
In their Memoranda, both the prosecution and the defense
substantially relied upon theSandiganbayans narration of the
factsasfollows:
Theprosecutionpresentedfive(5)witnesses,namely:CaridadM.
San Juan, PO2 Leopoldo Cacalda, Dr. Rogelio M. Javan, SPO2
Percival A. Gabinete, and Maria T. Cortez. Their respective
testimonies,inessenceareasfollows,towit:
1. CARIDAD MARGALLO SAN JUAN (hereinafter,
Caridad) declared that she is the wife of Francisco San Juan
(hereinafter Francisco), the victim in the case atbar. Caridad
testifiedthatFranciscowastheBarangayCaptainofBarangay
Salac,Lumban,Laguna,untilhewasshotandkilledbyaccused
Ladiana, who happens to be also a distant relative of the
decedent.
Caridadrecountedthat,onDecember29, 1989, shewasin
herhousewhenanunidentifiedwomancameandtoldherthat
her husband was killed by accused Ladiana. She immediately
calleduphersisterinlawbeforerushingtoJacintoStreetwhere
thegruesomeincidentallegedlytranspired.Thereat,manypeople
were milling around, and Caridad saw the lifeless body of
Franciscolyinginthemiddleoftheroadandbeingexaminedby
[SPO2]PercivalA.Gabinete.
Caridadrecalledthatitwasaround11:00oclocka.m.when
she reached the place of the subject incident. At that point in
time,shewasnotevenallowedbythepolicetotouch,muchless
get near to, the cadaverof Francisco. Caridad, expectedly, was
cryingandoneofherauntsadvisedhertogohome.
_______________
7
AmendedInformation,p.1;id.,p.88.
8
Atty.BalagtasP.Ilagan.
9
SeeCertificateofArraignment;Records,p.100.
425
VOL.393,DECEMBER4,2002
Ladianavs.People
Caridadmaintainedthatshewasawarethatherhusbandwas
killed by accused Ladiana because this was what the woman
actuallytoldher.Moreover,accusedLadianahadgivenhimself
uptothepoliceauthorities.
Caridadwentontonarratethat,onDecember30,1989,she
wasatthepolicestation,whereshegaveherwrittenstatement
before police investigator PFC Virgilio Halili (hereinafter,
Halili).
Additionally,CaridadpresentedtheDeathCertificateofher
husband and testified that he was eventually buried at the
Lumban Cemetery. She declared that she had incurred about
TwentyThousandPesos(P20,000.00)forthefuneral,burialand
otherincidentalexpensesbyreasonofthedeathofFrancisco.
On crossexamination, Caridad testified that, on December
29, 1989, she was in her house and that she did not hear any
gunshot between 10:30 and 11:00 oclock a.m. Caridad also
admittedshedidnotwitnessthekillingofherhusband.
On questions propounded by the Court, Caridad narrated
thatherhusbandsufferedtwogunshotwoundsoneontheupper
righttempleandtheotherontheleftcheek.However,Caridad
statedthatshewastoldthatthewoundsweretheentryandthe
exitpoints.ShealsotoldtheCourtthatherhusbandwaswearing
short pants at the time of his death and that she found some
bruisesonhisknees.
Finally,Caridadrecalledthat,onthedateoftheincident,her
husbandwaswithhisclosefriend,acertainRodolfoCabrera,and
someotherpersons,andthattheywenttoJacintoStreettorepair
thesteelhumpswhichwereusedtoblockthestreetduringschool
daysfortheprotectionandsafetyoftheschoolchildren.
2.PO2LEOPOLDODERAMOSCACALDA,JR.(hereinafter,
CACALDA) declared that he is a policeman assigned at the
425 Lumban Police Station in Lumban, Laguna. He has been
designatedastheradiooperatorofthestationsince1989.
Cacalda recounted that, on December 29, 1989, at around
11:00 oclock a.m., somebody, whose name he could no longer
recall, reported to him about an existing trouble along Jacinto
Street in Barangay Salac. Cacalda responded by going to the
scene,wherehewasaccompaniedbyAlbertoMercado,amember
of the CAGFIL. Thereat, Cacalda saw the lifeless body of
Franciscolyingfaceupontheroad.Cacaldadidnotexaminethe
bodyofFrancisco.Helefttheplaceoftheincidentwhen[SPO2]
PercivalA.Gabineteandotherpolicemensubsequentlyarrived.
Cacalda had gathered from the people milling around the
bodyofFranciscothatitwasaccusedLadianawhoshotandkilled
Francisco.
426
426 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ladianavs.People
CacaldaimmediatelylefttolookforaccusedLadiana.However,
heeventuallysawaccusedLadianaalreadyinsidethejailofthe
police station and thereafter learned that said accused had
surrenderedtothepoliceauthority.
CacaldarecalledthathewaslateroninvestigatedbyHalili
becausehewastherespondingpolicemanwhowenttothescene
of the incident. Consequently, Cacalda executed a written
statementinrelationtothesubjectincident.
Oncrossexamination,Cacaldatestifiedthathewasaradio
operator and not an investigator of the police station. He also
testifiedthathedidnotwitnesstheincidentsubjectmatterofthe
caseatbar.
Cacaldawentontotestifythatthepeoplemillingaroundthe
placeoftheincidenttoldhimthataccusedLadianahadalready
left.Becauseofthisdevelopment,Cacaldaproceededtoaccused
Ladianaa house but was told that he had already gone to the
police station. Cacalda accordingly went to the police station
wherehesawaccusedLadianaalreadylockedinsidethejail.He
alsosawastabwoundonaccusedLadianasrightbicepbuthedid
notanymoreaskhimhowhesustainedthesaidinjury.
3.DR.ROGELIOJAVANyMAGRACIA(hereinafter,Javan)
declaredthatheisaphysicianandtheMunicipalHealthOfficer
ofLumban,Laguna.
Javan recounted that he was the one who performed the
necropsyonthecadaverofFranciscoandthathehadprepared
the corresponding reports and/or documents relating thereto.
Javan made a sketch representing the anterior and posterior
views of the body of Francisco, and labeled and placed red
markingsonthegunshotwoundsfoundonthesaidcadaver.The
markingGunshotwoundAisthepointofentry,whichisone(1)
centimeterindiameterandsituatedtwo(2)inchesbehindtheleft
ear. The marking Gunshot wound B is the point of exit of
GunshotwoundA,whichistwo(2)centimetersindiameterand
foundabovetherightcheekboneandone(1)inchbelowtheright
eye.Javanalsotestifiedthatthereisanothergunshotwoundand
thepointofentryandexitarelabeledasGunshotwoundCand
GunshotwoundD,respectively.GunshotwoundDisoneand
onehalf (11/2) centimeters in diameter and located at the left
cheek,threeandonehalf(31/2)centimetersbelowthelefteye,
whileGunshotwoundCisone(1)centimeterindiameterand
foundattherightlateralaspectoftheneck,atthelevelofthe
adamsapple.
AccordingtoJavan,theassailantmustbebehindthevictim
whenheinflictedGunshotwoundA.AsregardsGunshotwound
C,theassailantlikewisemustbebehindthevictim,atadistance
ofmorethantwentyfour(24)inchesaway.
427
VOL.393,DECEMBER4,2002 427
Ladianavs.People
Lastly,Javantestifiedthathewasnotabletoretrieveanybullet
during the examination. However, judging from the size of the
woundandthepointofentry,Javanopinedthatthefirearmused
wasprobablyacaliber38.
OnquestionspropoundedbytheCourt,Javantestifiedthat
Gunshot wound A could have been fired first because the
trajectoryisonthesamelevelsomuchsothattheassailantand
the victim could have been both standing. Javan inferred that
GunshotwoundCcouldhavebeeninflictedwhilethevictimwas
alreadyfallingdown.Javanthenstressedthatbothwoundsare
fatalinnature.
4. SPO2 PERCIVAL AMBROSIO GABINETE (hereinafter,
Gabinete)declaredthatheisapoliceofficerandaresidentofNo. 428
4055VillaJosefinaSubdivision,Sta.Cruz,Laguna.
ThetestimonyofGabinetewassubsequentlydispensedwith,
upontheadmissionofthedefensethathewaspartofthegroupof
policemenwhoproceededtotheplaceofthesubjectincidentand
that he found the body of Francisco lying along the road.
Additionally, the defense admitted the existence of the receipt
issuedbyFunerariadeMesadatedJanuary3,1990inthesumof
SixThousandFiveHundredPesos(P6,500.00).
5. MARIO TALAVERA CORTEZ (hereinafter, Cortez)
declaredthatheisaretiredAssistantProsecutorofLaguna.
PriortotheconductoftheexaminationinchiefonCortez,the
defense counsel made an admission as to the authorship,
authenticity,and voluntarinessoftheexecutionofthecounter
affidavitofaccusedLadiana,whichwassubscribedandswornto
beforeCortez.Insaidcounteraffidavit,accusedLadianaallegedly
admitted to making the fatal shots on Francisco. However,
accusedLadianaallegedlydidsoinselfdefenseasFranciscowas
then purportedly attacking accused Ladiana and had, in fact,
alreadyinflictedastabwoundonthearmofaccusedLadiana.
However, Cortez emphasized that he was not the one who
conductedthe preliminaryinvestigationof thecomplaint which
ledtothefilingofthesubjectcase.Additionally,Corteztestified
thathewouldnotbeabletoanymorerecognizethefaceofthe
affiant in the said counteraffidavit, but maintained that there
was a person who appeared and identified himself as Josue
Ladianabeforeheaffixedhissignatureonthecounteraffidavit.
After the presentation of Cortez, the prosecution filed its
formalofferofevidenceandresteditscase.
OnMay31,1995,thisCourtissuedaresolutionadmittingall
thedocumentaryevidencesubmittedbytheprosecution.
428
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ladianavs.People
OnAugust20,1996,accusedLadianafiledaMotionforLeaveof
Court to File Demurrer to Evidence dated August 16, 1995,
claiming that: (i) a review of the documentary and testimonial
evidenceadducedbytheprosecutionallegedlyfailedtoshowthat
the accused is guilty of the offense charged; (ii) at best, the
evidencesubmitted by the prosecution areallegedly hearsay in
character,consideringthatthesupposedeyewitnessintheperson
of Rodolfo Cabrera was never presented in court; and (iii) the
prosecutionwasallegedlymerelyabletoprovethefactofdeathof
the victim, but not the identity of the person who caused said
death.
OnAugust23,1996,thisCourtissuedanOrderofevendate
holding that the filing of a demurrer to evidence is no longer
appropriateconsideringthataccusedLadianareceivedacopyof
thisCourtsresolutiondatedMay31,1995ontheadmissionof
theprosecutionsdocumentaryexhibitsasearlyasMay25,1995.
On September 2, 1996, in view of his perception that the
evidencesubmittedbytheprosecutionisallegedlyinadequateto
sustaina conviction, accused Ladiana, through counsel, waived
hisrighttopresentcontrovertingevidence.Instead,heaskedfor
timetofileawrittenmemorandum.Thus,bothpartiesweregiven
timewithinwhichtodoso,afterwhichthecaseshallbedeemed
submittedforresolution.
Thereafter,thisCourtreceivedonOctober25,1996bymail
theMemorandumforthedefense.Asfortheprosecution,itopted
nottofileany.10(Citationsomitted)
RulingoftheSandiganbayan prosecutor who had administered the oath on the
TheSandiganbayanruledthattheprosecutionhadbeenableto Counteraffidavitfiledbypetitioneraccused.
establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The
courta quoheld that his CounterAffidavit,11in which he had 2. II.Whether or not the prosecution has presented proof
admittedtohavingfiredthefatalshotsthatcausedthevictims beyondreasonabledoubttoovercometheconstitutional
death,12maybeusedasevidenceagainsthim.Itunderscoredthe presumption of innocence of the accused and his right
admission made by the defense as to the authorship, the against selfincrimination on thebasis of the Counter
authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution of the affidavitwhoseexecutionwasadmittedbythecounselof
CounterAffidavit.13In short, it ruled that the document had thepetitioner,butnotbytheaccusedpersonally.
sufficientlyestablishedhisrespon
3. III.WhetherornottheCounteraffidavitoftheaccused
_______________ petitioner which was considered by
theSandiganbayanin its decision as similar to an
10
SandiganbayanDecision,pp.29;Rollo,pp.7380. extrajudicialconfessionmay[be]admittedagainsthim
11
ExhibitH,prosecutionsexhibitsfolder. asevidenc[e]ofguiltbeyondreasonabledoubtevenifhe
12
SandiganbayanDecision,p.10;Rollo,p.81. was not assi[s]ted then by counsel and while he was
undercustodialinvestigation.
13
Ibid.
429
VOL.393,DECEMBER4,2002 429 4. IV.WhetherornottheSandiganbayanisconstitutionally
and legally correct in issuing the Order of August 23,
Ladianavs.People
1996 denying the Motion for Leave of Court to File
sibilityforthedeathofthevictim.However,itfoundnoevidence
DemurrertoEvidencedatedAugust16,1995filedbythe
oftreachery;thus,itconvictedhimofhomicideonly.14
accused in accordance with Sec. 15 of Rule 120 of the
Hence,thisPetition.15
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure in relation to Rule
Issues
XXIoftheRevisedRulesofSandiganbayan.
InhisMemorandum,petitionerraisesthefollowingissuesforthis
Courtsconsideration:
_______________

1. I.Whether or not theSandiganbayanmay convict the

Ibid.
14
accusedpetitionerbeyondreasonabledoubtofthecrime
This casewasdeemed submitted for resolution onMay9,
15
ofhomicideevenintheabsenceofanyeyewitnesswho
2001,uponreceiptofpetitionersMemorandum,signedbyJoseA.
personally saw the sho[o]ting of the victim by the
Almo and Angel R. Purisima III. Respondents Memorandum,
accused, basing it only on the testimony of the
filed on April 18, 2001, was signed by Special Prosecutor remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
LeonardoP.Tamayo,DeputySpecialProsecutorRobertE.Kallos, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
ActingASABDirectorRodrigoV.Coquia,andSpecialProsecution servicesofcounsel,hemustbeprovidedwithone.Theserights
Officer Manuel T. Soriano, Jr. of the Office of the Special cannotbewaivedexceptinwritingandinthepresenceofcounsel.
Prosecutor(OSP). xxxxxxxxx
430 (3)Anyconfessionoradmissionobtainedinviolationofthisor
430 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED Section17hereofshallbeinadmissibleinevidenceagainsthim. 18
Ladianavs.People
_______________

1. V.Whether or not accused is entitled to the mitigating 16

Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 56; Rollo, pp. 169170;
circumstance of voluntary surrender which fact was originalinuppercase.
admittedbytheprosecutionasitevenusedthesameas 17
Exh.Hoftheprosecutionsevidence.
proofoftheguiltoftheaccused.16 18
Art.III,12,1987Constitution.
431
Inshort,petitionerraisesthefollowingquestionsinthisappeal: VOL.393,DECEMBER4,2002 431
(1) whether the CounterAffidavit he executed during the
Ladianavs.People
preliminaryinvestigationofthiscaseisadmissibleproofshowing
Itiswellsettledthattheforegoinglegalformalitiesrequiredby
hiscomplicityinthecrime,(2)whethertheSandiganbayanerred
the fundamental law of the land apply only to extrajudicial
indenyinghisMotionforLeavetoFileaDemurrertoEvidence,
confessions or admissions obtained
and(3)whetherheisentitledtothemitigatingcircumstanceof
duringcustodialinvestigations. Indeed, the rights enumerated
19
voluntarysurrender.
in the constitutional provision exist only in custodial
ThisCourtsRuling
interrogations,orincustodyinterrogationofaccusedpersons. 20
ThePetitionisnotmeritorious.
Custodial interrogationis the questioning initiated by law
First Issue:
enforcementofficersafterapersonhasbeentakenintocustodyor
AdmissibilityofCounterAffidavit
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
Undeniably, the resolution of this case hinges mainly on the way.21
admissibility of the CounterAffidavit17submitted by petitioner In the present case, petitioner admits that the questioned
duringthepreliminaryinvestigation.Hearguesthatnocounsel statementsweremadeduringthepreliminaryinvestigation,not
waspresentwhentheAffidavitwasexecuted.Insupportofhis duringthecustodialinvestigation.However,hearguesthatthe
argument,hecitestheConstitutionthus: righttocompetentandindependentcounselalsoappliesduring
SEC.12.(1)Anypersonunderinvestigationforthecommission preliminaryinvestigations.
ofanoffenseshallhavetherighttobeinformedofhisrightto
 We disagree. Apreliminary investigationis an inquiry or a
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engenderawellfoundedbeliefthatacrimehasbeencommitted,
andthattherespondentisprobablyguiltythereofandshouldbe
heldfortrial.22
Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation
beforethepublicprosecutorcannotbeconsideredasbeingunder
custodial investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally
declared that a defendant on trial or under preliminary
investigationis notundercustodial interrogation.23Itexplained
asfollows:
His[accused]interrogationbythepolice,ifanytherehadbeen
wouldalreadyhave been endedat thetime ofthe filing ofthe
criminalcaseincourt(orthepublicprosecutorsoffice).Hence,
withrespecttoadefendantinacriminalcasealreadypendingin
court (or the public prosecutors office), there is no occasion to
speakofhisrightwhileundercustodialinterrogationlaiddown
bythesecondandsubsequentsentencesof
_______________
19
People v. Salonga,G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001,359
SCRA310.
20
People vs. Ayson,175 SCRA 216, 230, July 7, 1989, per
Narvasa,J.(later,C.J.).
21
Peoplev.Marra,236SCRA565,September20,1994;People
v. Logronio,214 SCRA 519, October 13, 1992;People v. Ayson,
supra.
22
Rule112,1,2000RevisedRulesofCriminalProcedure.
23
Peoplev.Ayson,supra.
432
432 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ladianavs.People
Section20,ArticleIVofthe1973Constitution[nowSection12,
ArticleIIIofthe1987Constitution],fortheobviousreasonthat
heisnolongerundercustodialinterrogation.24
There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the
admissions made by petitioner in his CounterAffidavit are not
violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the
undisputedfactsthatitwasnotexactedbythepolicewhilehe
was under custody or interrogation. Hence, the constitutional
rightsofapersonundercustodialinvestigationasembodiedin
ArticleIII,Section12ofthe1987Constitution,arenotatissuein
thiscase.
However, the accusedwhether in court or undergoing
preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor
unquestionably possess rightsthat mustbesafeguarded. These
include:1)therighttorefusetobemadewitnesses;2)theright
nottohaveanyprejudicewhatsoeverimputedtothembysuch
refusal;3)therighttotestifyontheirownbehalf,subjecttocross
examinationbytheprosecution;and4)whiletestifying,theright
torefusetoansweraspecificquestionthattendstoincriminate
them for some crime other than that for which they are being
prosecuted.25
We do not, however, agree with the Sandiganbayans
characterization of petitioners CounterAffidavit as an
extrajudicialconfession.Itisonlyanadmission.Sections26and
33ofRule130oftheRevisedRulesonEvidencedistinguishone
fromtheotherasfollows:
SEC. 26.Admissions of a party.The act, declaration or
omissionofapartyastoarelevantfactmaybegiveninevidence
againsthim.
SEC. 33.Confession.The declaration of an accused
acknowledginghisguiltoftheoffensecharged,orofanyoffense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against
him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an
admission, there is merely a statement of fact not directly
involvinganacknowledgmentofguiltorofthecriminalintentto
committhe
_______________
Id.,p.232.
24
Id.,p.234.
25
433
VOL.393,DECEMBER4,2002
Ladianavs.People
offensewith which one is charged. 26Thus, in the case atbar, a
statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act
chargedagainsthimbutdenyingthatitwasdonewithcriminal
intentisanadmission,notaconfession.27
TheCounterAffidavitinquestioncontainsanadmissionthat
petitioneractuallyshotthevictimwhenthelatterwasattacking
him.Wequotethepertinentportion:
[K]ayaitongsiKapitanSanJuanaysumugodathinawakanako
sa may leeg ng aking suot na Tshirt upang ako ay muling
saksakin;sadahilanghindiakomakatakboomakaiwassakabila
ngakingpananalaghanggangmagpaputokakongpasumalasa
kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko alam na siya ay
tinamaan;28
Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the
victimwhich eventually led to the latters deathbut denies
havingdoneitwithanycriminalintent.Infact,heclaimshedid
it in selfdefense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a
confessionorasanadmission,itisadmissibleinevidenceagainst
him.
Further, we do not doubt the voluntariness of the Counter
Affidavit.Petitionerhimselfsubmittedittothepublicprosecutor
to justify his actions in relation to the charges hurled against
him.ItescapesthisCourthowhecancavalierlydenyadocument
thathehasvoluntarilysubmittedandoriginallyrelieduponin
hisdefense.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their
untruth or by showing they were made by mistake. The party
mayalsoestablishthattheresponsethatformedtheadmission
was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the
admissionwasmadeinignoranceofthetruestateoffacts. 29Yet,
433
petitionerneverofferedanyrationalizationwhysuchadmissions
had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In addition,
admissionsmadeun
_______________
26
Peoplev.Lorenzo,240SCRA624,January26,1995.
27
Francisco,The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines
Evidence,Vol.VII,PartI,1997ed.,p.303.
28
Petitioners CounterAffidavit, p. 2; Exhibit H,
prosecutionsexhibitsfolder.
29
Francisco,supra,p.319.
434
434 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ladianavs.People
der oath, as in the case at bar, are evidence of great weight
againstthedeclarant.Theythrowonhimtheburdenofshowinga
mistake.30
 Petitioner contends that nowhere in the transcripts of this
casecanitbefoundthathehasadmittedtotheauthorship,the
authenticity or the voluntariness of the CounterAffidavit. We
quoteverbatimtheproceedingsintheSandiganbayan:
PJGARCHITORENA
Well,hewillidentifythepersonwhotooktheoathbeforehim.Willyou
denythatitwasyourclientwhotooktheoathbeforetheFiscalatthe
preliminaryinvestigation?
ATTY.ILAGAN
Wewilladmitthat,yourHonor.
PJGARCHITORENA
Sointhatcasewewillhavenoquestionabouttheauthorship,authenticity
andthevoluntarinessoftheexecutionofthecounteraffidavitdatedJuly31,
1990?Companiero?
ATTYILAGAN
Admitted,yourHonor.31
Theadmissionsofpetitionermadethroughhiscounselcannotbe
anyclearer.Tobesure,theunbrokenstreamofjudicialdictais
that,intheconductoftheircase,clientsareboundbytheactions
of their counsels, save whenthe latters negligenceis so gross,
recklessandinexcusablethattheformeraredeprivedoftheirday
in court.32Also, clients, being bound by the actions of their
counsels,cannotcomplainthattheresultofthelitigationmight
havebeendifferent had theirlawyers proceeded differently. 33A
counsel
_______________
30
Ibid.
31
TSN,April18,1995,pp.45.
32
Ramos v. Dajoyag, Jr.,AC 5174, February 28, 2002,378
SCRA 229;Villanueva v. People,330 SCRA 695, April 12,
2000;Sublayv.NLRC,324SCRA188,January31,2000;Alarcon
v. CA,323 SCRA 716, January 28, 2000;Velasquez v. CA,309
SCRA539,June30,1999.
33
People v. Remudo,G.R. No. 127905, August 30, 2001,364
SCRA 61;Gold Line Transit, Inc. v. Ramos,G.R. No. 144813,
August15,2001,363SCRA262;Peoplev.Villanueva,339SCRA
482,August31,2000.
435
VOL.393,DECEMBER4,2002 435
Ladianavs.People
mayerrastothecompetencyofwitnesses,thesufficiencyandthe
relevanceofevidence,theproperdefense,theburdenofproof,the
introductionorthewithholdingofwitnessesorpiecesofevidence,
orthemannerofarguingthecase.ThisCourt,however,hasruled
severaltimesthatthosearenotevenpropergroundsforanew
trial,unlessthecounselsincompetenceissogrossthattheclients
arepreventedfromfairlypresentingtheircase.34
Havingadmittedthathehadfatallyshotthevictim,petitioner
hadthedutyofshowingthatthekillingwasjustified,andthat
the latter incurred no criminal liability therefor.35Petitioner
shouldhavereliedonthestrengthofhisownevidenceandnoton
theweaknessofthatfortheprosecution.Evenifhisevidencebe
weak,itcannotbedisbelievedaftertheaccusedhasadmittedthe
killing.36
Petitionerarguesthatitwastheprosecutionthatindirectly
raisedtheissueofselfdefense.Hence,hecouldnotbeboundby
it. This argument deserves scant consideration. As discussed
earlier, the declarations contained in his CounterAffidavit are
admissions that may be used as evidence against
him.37TheSandiganbayandidnotunfairlypresumethathehad
indeedraised thetheoryofselfdefense, becausethisargument
had already been laid out in his CounterAffidavit. No
presumptionwasnecessary,becausetheadmissionwasclearand
unequivocal.
Neither do we believe petitioners claim that the antigraft
courtmiserablyfailedtogiveequaleffectortreatmenttoallthe
allegations found therein (CounterAffidavit) choosing
deliberately and without reasonable basis the parts which are
incriminatingin
_______________
34
Abrajanov.CA,343SCRA68,October13,2000;Peoplev.
Salido,258SCRA291,July5,1996.
35
People v. Obzunar,265 SCRA 547, December 16,
1996;Peoplev.Doepante,263SCRA691,October30,1996.
36
Peoplev.Damitan,G.R.No.140544,December7,2001,371
SCRA 629;People v. Iglesia,G.R. No. 132354, September 13,
2001,365SCRA156;Peoplev.Nepomuceno,Jr.,298SCRA450,
November11,1998;Peoplev.Bautista,254SCRA621,March12,
1996.
37
26,Rule130,RulesofCourt.
436
436 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Ladianavs.People
character, and ignoring without sufficient legal basis the
exculpatoryassertionsoftheaccused.38
The unsubstantiated and uncorroborated statements of
petitioner in his CounterAffidavit are utterly insufficient to
discharge his burden of proving that the act of killing was
justified.Itishornbookdoctrinethatselfdefensemustbeproved
withcertaintybysufficient,satisfactoryandconvincingevidence
thatexcludesanyvestigeofcriminalaggressiononthepartofthe
person invoking it.39It cannot be entertained if it is
uncorroboratedbyanyseparateandcompetentevidence,anditis
alsodoubtful.40Thequestionwhethertheaccused actedinself
defenseisessentiallyaquestionoffactproperlyevaluatedbythe
lowercourt;inthiscase,theSandiganbayan.41
Byitself,theCounterAffidavitmiserablyfailstoestablishthe
requisitesofselfdefenseenumeratedinthelaw. 42Hadpetitioner
been more vigilant in protecting his rights, he could have
presentedclearandcogentevidencetoprovethoseelements.But,
asfound by the courta quo,henotonly failedtodischargethe
burdenofprovingtheexistenceofthejustifyingcircumstanceof
selfdefense; he did not evenbotherto present any evidence at
all.43So,wedonotseehowtheSandiganbayancouldhavebeen
selectiveinitstreatmentofhisCounterAffidavit.
Verily,iftheaccusedfailstodischargetheburdenofproving
the existence of selfdefense or of any other circumstance that
eliminates criminal liability, his conviction shall of necessity
follow,on
_______________
38
PetitionersMemorandum,p.9;Rollo,p.173.
39
People v. Suyum,G.R. No. 137518, March 6, 2002,378
SCRA 415;People v. Sanchez,308 SCRA 264, June 16,
1999;Peoplev.Balamban,264SCRA619,November21,1996.
40
Peoplev.Suyum,supra;Peoplev.Sarabia,317SCRA684,
October29,1999.
41
People v. Suyum, supra;People v. Dano,339 SCRA 515,
September1,2000;Peoplev.Sarabia,supra.
 Art.II,RevisedPenalCode.
42 44
Peoplev.Suyum,supra;Peoplev.Templa,G.R.No.121897,
SandiganbayanDecision,p.11,Rollo,p.82.
43
August16,2001,363SCRA291;Peoplev.Cawaling,293SCRA
437 267,July28,1998;Peoplev.Vallador,257SCRA515,June20,
VOL.393,DECEMBER4,2002 437 1996.
Ladianavs.People 45
Peoplev.Gemoya,342SCRA63,October4,2000.
thebasisofhisadmissionofthekilling. 44Upholdingthisprinciple 46
Exh.Boftheprosecutionsevidence.
does not in any way violate his right to be presumed innocent 47
Exh.Eoftheprosecutionsevidence.
untilprovenguilty.Whenheadmittedtohavingkilledthevictim, 48
Exh.Foftheprosecutionsevidence.
the burden of proving his innocence fell on him. It becamehis 49
Peoplev.Gemoya,supra.
duty to establish by clear and convincing evidence the lawful 50
PetitionersMemorandum,p.15;Rollo,p.179.
justificationforthekilling. 51
Bernardov.CA,278SCRA782,September5,1997.
Therefore, petitionercannolonger invokehisconstitutional
righttobepresumedinnocentofthecrimecharged. 45Asfarashe
52
Bernardo v. CA, supra;People v. Mercado,159 SCRA 453,
isconcerned,homicidehasalreadybeenestablished.Thefactof March30,1988.
deathanditscausewereestablishedbyhisadmissionscoupled 438
withtheotherprosecutionevidenceincludingtheCertificateof 438 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Death,46the Certificate of PostMortem Examination47and the Ladianavs.People
MedicoLegalFindings.48Theintenttokillislikewisepresumed Final Issue:
fromthefactofdeath.49 VoluntarySurrender
Second Issue: After vigorously arguing against his own CounterAffidavit,
DenialofMotionforLeavetoFileDemurrer petitioner,inasurprisingchangeoftenor,imploresthisCourtto
Petitioner then argues that theSandiganbayanerred in not consider his voluntary surrender to the police authorities as a
giving due course to his Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to mitigatingcircumstance.Hearguesthattwooftheprosecution
Evidence. He brands this denial as legally and constitutionally witnesses testified that he had surrendered to the police
wrong.50 authorities after the shooting incident. 53To buttress his
We disagree. Prior leave to file a demurrer to evidence is argument,he contendsthatthemain reasonforhis voluntary
discretionary upon the trial court.51And, unless there is grave surrender is that he sincerely believe[d] that he was legally
abuseamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictioninitsdenial,the justifiedindefendinghimselfasapolicemanwhenhefoughtthe
trialcourtsresolutionmaynotbedisturbed.52 victim after he was attacked by the latter. 54It goes without
saying that this statement only reaffirms the admissions
_______________ containedinhisCounterAffidavit,whichhesovehementlytried
todiscredit.
 For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the
following elements must concur: 1) the offender has not been
actuallyarrested,2)theoffendersurrendershimselftoaperson
in authority or to the latters agent, and 3) the surrender is
voluntary.55Tobesufficient,thesurrendermustbespontaneous
andmadeinamannerclearlyindicatingtheintentoftheaccused
to surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge
their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the
expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and
capturingthem.56
Theonlypiecesofevidenceinsupportofthepleaofvoluntary
surrender made by petitioner are statements made by two (2)
prosecution witnesses that they were allegedly told by other
peoplethathehadalreadygonetothepolicestation.Thereisno
showingthathewasnotactuallyarrested;orthatwhenhewent
to the police station, he surrendered himself to a person in
authority. Neither is there any finding that he has evinced a
desiretoowntoanycomplicityinthekilling.
Wehaveruledinthepastthattheaccusedwhohadgoneto
thepoliceheadquartersmerelytoreporttheshootingincidentdid
notevinceanydesiretoadmitresponsibilityforthekilling.Thus,
hecouldnotbedeemedtohavevoluntarilysurrendered. 57Inthe
absenceofsufficientandconvincingproofshowingtheexistence
of indispensable circumstances, wecannot appreciatevoluntary
surrendertomitigatepetitionerspenalty.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
DecisionandResolutionAFFIRMED.Costsagainstpetitioner.
SOORDERED.
SandovalGutierrez,CoronaandCarpioMorales,
JJ.,concur.
Puno(Chairman),J.,AbroadonOfficialBusiness.
Petitiondenied,judgmentandresolutionaffirmed.
374 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Ulit
G.R.Nos.131799801.February23,2004.*
THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,appellee,vs.FELICIANO
ULITyTAMPOY,appellant.
CriminalProcedure;Appeals;Theappealinacriminalcase
isareviewdenovoandthecourtisnotlimitedtotheassigned
errorsan appeal opens the whole case for review, and the
appellate tribunal may consider and correct errors though
unassignedandevenreversethedecisionofthetrialcourtonthe
grounds other than those the parties raised as errors.The
appellant does not contest his conviction for rape in Criminal
CasesNos.97385and97386,andthevalidityoftheproceedings
inthesaid
_______________
ENBANC.
*
375
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004 375
Peoplevs.Ulit
cases in the trial court. He pleads, however, that he be
sparedthedeathpenalty.Heassertsthathewassoremorseful
for the crimes he committed and that he pleaded guilty in
CriminalCasesNos.97385and97387;henolongerpresented
anyevidenceinCriminalCaseNo.97388sothattheproceedings
beforethecourtwouldbeshortenedandsimplified.Nevertheless,
theappealinacriminalcaseisareviewdenovoandthecourtis
not limited to the assigned errors. An appeal thus opens the
wholecase for review,and theappellatetribunalmayconsider
and correct errors though unassigned and even reverse the
decision of the trial court on the groundsother than those the
partiesraisedaserrors.
Same;GuiltyPleas;CapitalOffenses;Whentheaccusedina
capitaloffenseinformsthetrialcourtofhisdecisiontochangehis
pleaofnotguiltytoguilty,itbehoovesthetrialcourttoconduct
asearchinginquiryintothevoluntarinessandfullcomprehension
oftheconsequenceofhisplea.InCriminalCaseNo.97385,the
appellant was charged with qualified rape,i.e., the rape of his
niece,whowasaminor,punishablebydeathunderArticle335of
theRevisedPenalCode,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.7659.
Undoubtedly,theappellantwaschargedwithacapitaloffense.
When the appellant informed the trial court of his decision to
changehispleaofnotguiltytoguilty,itbehoovedthetrial
courttoconductasearchinginquiryintothevoluntarinessand
fullcomprehensionoftheconsequencesofhispleaasmandated
by Section 6, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. InPeople vs. Camay, this Court enumerated the
following duties of the trial court under the rule: 1. The court
mustconductasearchinginquiryintothevoluntarinessandfull
comprehension[bytheaccused]oftheconsequencesofhisplea;2.
The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and precise degree of his
culpability; and 3. The court must require the prosecution to
presentevidenceinhisbehalfandallowhimtodosoifhedesires.
Same;Same;Same;Improvidentpleasofguiltytoacapital
offense on the part of the accused must be averted since by
admittinghisguiltbeforethetrialcourt,theaccusedwouldforfeit
hislifeandlibertywithouthavingfullyunderstoodthemeaning,
significance and the dire consequences of his plea.Theraison
detrefortheruleisthatthecourtsmustproceedwithextreme
carewheretheimposablepenaltyisdeath,consideringthatthe
executionofsuchsentenceisirrevocable.Experiencehasshown
that even innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.
Improvidentpleasofguiltytoacapitaloffenseonthepartofthe
accusedmustbeavertedsincebyadmittinghisguiltbeforethe
trialcourt,theaccusedwouldforfeithislifeandlibertywithout
having fully understood the meaning, significance and the dire
consequencesofhisplea.
376
3 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
76
Peoplevs.Ulit
Same;Same;Same;Guidelines in Conducting Searching
Inquiry;Thefocusoftheinquirymustbeonthevoluntarinessof
hispleaofguiltysothatitcantrulybesaidthatitisbasedona
freeandinformedjudgment.Thereisnohardandfastruleasto
howthetrialjudgemayconductasearchinginquiry.Ithasbeen
held, however, that the focus of the inquiry must be on the
voluntarinessofthepleaandthefullorcompletecomprehension
bytheaccusedofhispleaofguiltysothatitcantrulybesaidthat
it is based on a free and informed judgment. InPeople vs.
Aranzado,we formulated the following guideline as to how the
trialcourtmayconductitssearchinginquiry:(1)Ascertainfrom
theaccusedhimself(a)howhewasbroughtintothecustodyof
thelaw;(b)whetherhehadtheassistanceofacompetentcounsel
duringthecustodialandpreliminaryinvestigations;and(c)under
what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations.Thesethecourtshalldoinordertoruleoutthe
possibilitythattheaccusedhasbeencoercedorplacedundera
stateofduresseitherbyactualthreatsofphysicalharmcoming
frommalevolentoravengingquarters.(2)Askthedefensecounsel
aseriesof questionsastowhetherhe hadconferredwith,and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and Peoplevs.Ulit
consequencesofapleaofguilty.(3)Elicitinformationaboutthe Criminal Law;Rape;Guiding Considerations in
personalityprofileoftheaccused,suchashisage,socioeconomic
DeterminingGuiltinRapeCases.Indeterminingtheguiltofthe
status, and educational background, which may serve as a
accused in rape cases, the Court is guided by the following
trustworthyindexofhiscapacitytogiveafreeandinformedplea
considerations:(a)thatanaccusationofrapecanbemadewith
ofguilty.(4)Informtheaccusedtheexactlengthofimprisonment
facility;itisdifficulttoprove,butmoredifficultfortheperson
ornatureofthepenaltyunderthelawandthecertaintythathe
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the
will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused
intrinsicnatureofthecrimewhichusuallyinvolvestwopersons,
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
advice orbecause ofpromises ofthe authoritiesorpartiesofa
extreme caution; and (c) that the evidence for the prosecution
lighterpenaltyshouldheadmitguiltorexpressremorse.Itisthe
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot beallowed to
dutyofthejudgetoseetoitthattheaccuseddoesnotlaborunder
drawstrengthfromtheweaknessoftheevidenceofthedefense.
these mistaken impressions. (5) Require the accused to fully
It, likewise, bears stressing that in all criminal prosecutions,
narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him or
withoutregard to thenature of the defense which the accused
makehimreenactthemannerinwhichheperpetratedthecrime,
may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the
orcausehimtosupplymissingdetailsorsignificance.
prosecutiontoestablishhisguiltbeyondreasonabledoubt.
Same;Same;Same;Evidence;Wherethetrialcourtreceives,
Same;Same;Due Process;Evidence;Hearsay
independentlyofthepleaofguilty,evidencetodeterminewhether
Evidence;WordsandPhrases;Byhearsayevidenceismeantthat
theaccusedcommittedthecrimeschargedandtheprecisedegree
kindofevidencewhichdoesnotderiveitsvaluesolelyfromthe
of his criminal culpability therefor, he may still be convicted if
credencetobeattributedtothewitnessherselfbutrestssolelyin
thereisampleproofonrecord,notcontingentonthepleaofguilty,
partontheveracityandcompetenceofsomepersonsfromwhom
on which to predicate conviction.As a rule, this Court has set
thewitnesshas receivedtheinformation; In criminalcases,the
aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses
becauseoftheimprovidencethereof,andwhensuchpleaisthe admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the
sole basis of the condemnatory judgment. However, where the constitutional provision guaranteeing the accused the right to
trialcourtreceives,independentlyofhispleaofguilty,evidence confrontandcrossexaminethewitnesstestifyingagainsthim.We
todeterminewhethertheaccusedcommittedthecrimescharged donotagreewiththerulingofthetrialcourtthatthecontentsof
andtheprecisedegreeofhiscriminalculpabilitytherefor,hemay theswornstatementofLucellearehearsay,simplybecauseshe
stillbeconvictedifthereisampleproofonrecord,notcontingent did not testify thereon and merely identified her signatures
onthepleaofguilty,onwhichtopredicateconviction. therein. By hearsay evidence is meant that kind of evidence
377 which does not derive its value solely from the credence to be
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004 377 attributedtothewitnessherselfbutrestssolelyinpartonthe
veracityandcompetenceofsomepersonsfromwhomthewitness
hasreceivedtheinformation.Itsignifiesallevidencewhichisnot
foundeduponthepersonalknowledgeofthewitnessfromwhom
it is elicited, and which, consequently, is not subject to cross
examination.Thebasisfortheexclusionappearstolieinthefact
thatsuchtestimonyisnotsubjecttothetestwhichcanordinarily
beappliedfortheascertainmentoftruthoftestimony,sincethe
declarantisnotpresentandavailableforcrossexamination.In
criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a
violation of the constitutional provision that the accused shall
enjoy the right to confront and crossexamine the witness
testifying against him.Generally,theaffidavits ofpersonswho
arenotpresentedtotestifyonthetruthofthecontentsthereof
arehearsayevidence.Suchaffidavitmustbeformallyofferedin
evidence and accepted by the court; otherwise, it shall not be
consideredbythecourtforthesimplereasonthatthecourtshall
considersuchevidenceformallyofferedandaccepted.
Custodial Investigations;Right to Counsel;Exclusionary
Rule;Thebarangaychairmanisnot deemed alaw enforcement
officerforpurposesofapplyingSection12(1)and(3)ofArticleIII
oftheConstitutionasuspects
378
3 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
78
Peoplevs.Ulit
uncounselled statement before the barangay chairman is
admissible.Althoughtheappellantwasnotassistedbycounsel
atthetimehegavehisstatementtothebarangaychairmanand
whenhesignedthesame,itisstilladmissibleinevidenceagainst
him because he was not under arrest nor under custodial
investigationwhenhegavehisstatement.Theexclusionaryrule
ispremisedonthepresumptionthatthedefendantisthrustinto
an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police
interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physicalandpsychological,isforcefullyapparent.Asintendedby
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers investigation
conductedbypoliceauthoritieswhichwillincludeinvestigations
conductedbythemunicipalpolice,thePCandtheNBIandsuch
otherpoliceagenciesinourgovernment.Thebarangaychairman
isnotdeemedalawenforcementofficerforpurposesofapplying
Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Under
these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that the
appellants statement before thebarangaychairman is
inadmissible.
Criminal Law;Qualified Rape;Guidelines in Appreciating
Age, Either as an Element of the Crime or as a Qualifying
Circumstance.Thesamecannot,however,besaidwithrespectto
theageofthevictim.InPeoplev.Pruna,theCourt,afternoting
thedivergentrulingsonproofofageofthevictiminrapecases,
set out certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an
elementofthecrimeorasqualifyingcircumstance:1.Thebest
evidencetoprovetheageoftheoffendedpartyisanoriginalor
certifiedtruecopyofthecertificateoflivebirthofsuchparty;2.
In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic
documentssuchasbaptismalcertificateandschoolrecordswhich
showthedateofbirthofthevictimwouldsufficetoproveage;3.
Ifthecertificateoflivebirthorauthenticdocumentisshownto
have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a
memberofthefamilyeitherbyaffinityorconsanguinitywhois
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the
exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section40,Rule130oftheRulesonEvidenceshallbesufficient
underthefollowingcircumstances:a.Ifthevictimisallegedtobe
below3yearsofageandwhatissoughttobeprovedisthatsheis
lessthan7yearsold;b.Ifthevictimisallegedtobebelow7years
ofageandwhatissoughttobeprovedisthatsheislessthan12
yearsold;c.Ifthevictimisallegedtobebelow12yearsofage
andwhatissoughttobeprovedisthatsheislessthan18years
old; 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives
concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will
sufficeprovidedthatitisexpresslyandclearlyadmittedbythe
accused;5.Itistheprosecutionthathastheburdenofproving
theageoftheoffendedparty.Thefailureoftheaccusedtoobject
to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
againsthim;6.Thetrialcourtshouldalwaysmakeacategorical
findingastotheageofthevictim.
379
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004
Peoplevs.Ulit
Same;Same;Same;Thefactthattherewasnoobjectionfrom
thedefenseregardingthevictimsagecannotbetakenagainstthe
accusedsinceitistheprosecutionthathastheburdenofproving
thesame.Inthepresentcase,nobirthcertificateoranysimilar
authentic document was presented and offered in evidence to
proveLucellesage.Whilethevictimtestifiedthatshewasborn
onFebruary19,1986,therefore11yearsoldwhentheappellant
twicerapedher,thesamewillnotsufficeastheappellantdidnot
expresslyandclearlyadmitthesameasrequiredbyPruna.The
corroborationofLucellesmotherastoherageisnotsufficient
either,as thereis noevidencethatthe said certificateof birth
waslostordestroyedorwasunavailablewithoutthefaultofthe
prosecution.Thefactthattherewasnoobjectionfromthedefense
regardingthevictimsagecannotbetakenagainsttheappellant
since it is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the
same.Moreover,thetrialcourtdidnotmakeacategoricalfinding
of the victims minority, another requirement mandated
byPruna.
Same;Same;AlternativeCircumstances;Relationship;While
it is true that the alternative circumstance of relationship is
always aggravating in crimes against chastity, it is only taken
into consideration under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code
when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant,
legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by
affinity in the same degree of the offenderthe relationship of
uncle and niece is not covered by any of the relationships
mentioned.In the determination of whether the death penalty
should be imposed on the appellant, the presence of an
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime is
379
crucial.Inthecasesatbar,althoughtherelationshipofuncleand
niecebetweentheappellantandthevictimhasbeendulyproven,
thealternativecircumstanceofrelationshipunderArticle15of
theRevisedPenalCodecannotbeappreciatedasanaggravating
circumstance against the appellant. While it is true that the
alternativecircumstanceofrelationshipisalwaysaggravatingin
crimesagainstchastity,regardlessofwhethertheoffenderisa
relativeofahigherorlowerdegreeoftheoffendedparty,itisonly
taken into consideration under Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant,
descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or
relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender. The
relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by any of the
relationshipsmentioned.
AUTOMATICREVIEWofadecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourt
ofMakatiCity,Br.62.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforappellant.
380
380 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Ulit
CALLEJO,SR.,J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision1dated
December 17,1997 ofthe Regional Trial Court ofMakatiCity,
Branch 62, in Criminal Cases Nos. 97385 to 97388 finding
appellantFelicianoUlityTampoyguiltybeyondreasonabledoubt
of two counts of qualified rape.2In the same decision, the
appellant was convictedof two countsof acts of lasciviousness.
Foreachcountofrape,thetrialcourtsentencedhimtosufferthe
supreme penalty of death, while for each count of acts of
lasciviousness, the appellant was sentenced to suffer
imprisonmentfromeight(8)years,eight(8)monthsandone(1)
dayofprisionmayorinitsmediumperiod,asminimum,tofifteen
(15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days ofreclusion
temporalinitsmediumperiod,asmaximum.Theappellantwas,
likewise, ordered to indemnify the victim Lucelle Serrano, the
amountofP50,000foreachcountofrapeandP20,000foreach
countofactsoflasciviousness.
TheIndictments
Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, four
Informations were filed against her uncle, the appellant. The
docket number and the accusatory portion of each Information
reads:
CriminalCaseNo.97385
ThatsometimeinthemonthofNovember1996,intheCityof
Makati,MetroManila,Philippines,aplacewithinthejurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, who is the
uncleofthecomplainantLUCELLESERRANOyULIT,hence,
herrelativebyconsanguinitywithinthethirdcivildegree,while
armedwithaknife,bymeansofforce,violenceandintimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y
ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, without her consent and
againstherwill,toherdamageandprejudice.
CONTRARYTOLAW.3
_______________
1
PennedbyJudgeRobertoC.Diokno.
2
CriminalCasesNos.97385and97386.
3
Records,p.2.
381
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004 381
Peoplevs.Ulit
CriminalCaseNo.97386
That sometime in the month of February 1997, in theCity of
Makati,MetroManila,Philippines,aplacewithinthejurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, who is the
uncle of complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, hence her
relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree, while
armedwithaknife,bymeansofforce,violenceandintimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y
ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, without her consent and
againstherwill,toherdamageandprejudice.
 CONTRARYTOLAW.4
CriminalCaseNo.97387
ThatsometimeinthemonthofDecember1996,intheCityof
Makati,MetroManila,Philippines,aplacewithinthejurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd
designbymeansofforce,violenceandintimidation,didthenand
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
lasciviousnessuponcomplainantLUCELLESERRANOyULIT,
aneleven(11)yearoldgirl,bythenandtherekissingherand
touchinghersexualorgan,withoutherconsentandagainsther
will,toherdamageandprejudice.
CONTRARYTOLAW.5
CriminalCaseNo.97388
Thatonoraboutthe2nddayofMarch1997,intheCityof
Makati,MetroManila,Philippines,aplacewithinthejurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd
designbymeansofforce,violenceandintimidation,didthenand
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
lasciviousnessuponcomplainantLUCELLESERRANOyULIT,
aneleven(11)yearoldgirl,bythenandtheredraggingherinside
a bathroom and repeatedly kissing her on her checks [sic],
without her consent and against her will, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARYTOLAW.6
Theappellant,assistedbycounsel,pleadednotguiltyduringthe
arraignment.Jointtrialofallthecasesensued.
_______________
4
Id.,atp.4.
5
Id.,atp.6.
6
Id.,atp.8.
382
382 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Ulit
Inthemeantime,Lucellewasundergoingpsychiatrictreatment
at the Philippine General Hospital. On May 5, 1997, the
prosecutionpresentedherasitsfirstwitness.
Ondirectexamination,Lucelletestifiedthatshewasbornon
February19,1986.7InNovember1996,heruncle,theappellant,
did something to her. When the prosecution asked her what
happened,Lucelledidnotanswer.Whenaskedifshewantedto
continuewithhertestimony,again,shedidnotrespond.Thetrial
wasresettoJune2and9,1997.WhentrialresumedonJune9,
1997, Lucelle was questioned by the prosecution on direct
examination,butstill,shegavenoanswer.Shecriedprofuselyin
open court. When asked by the court if she wanted to proceed
withthetrial,sheremainedsilent.Thetrialwasresetanewto
July9and14,1997.
In the meantime, the trial court ordered that Lucelle be
subjected to physical and psychological examinations at the
National Center for Mental Health (NCMH). Dr. Rochelflume
Samson examined Lucelle and submitted her Report dated
August29,1997withthefollowingremarksandrecommendation:
Based on clinical history, mental status examination and
psychological evaluation, this patient is suffering from Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder. This illness is characterized by
intensefearandfeelingofhelplessnesswheneversherecallsher
traumatic experience of being raped. It causes her intense
psychological distress whenever asked to talk about the rape
sceneorincident.Thus,sheavoidsrecollectionsofthetrauma.
 Atpresent,sheisstillmanifestingsymptomsdescribedabove.
She would be having difficulties testifying in court because of
this. She requires psychiatric treatment at the OutPatient
Section.8
During the trial on July 14, 1997, Lucelle refused to take the
witnessstand.ThetrialwasresettoJuly21,1997.
During the hearing on October 20, 1997, the prosecution
presentedLucelleanewtocontinuewithhertestimonyondirect
examination. She declared that the appellant raped her in
November1996andmanyothertimesthereafterinherresidence
atNo.7104SanMaximoStreet,MakatiCity.Insteadofasking
questionstoelicitthefactsandcircumstancesbeforeandduring
thecommis
_______________
7
AnnexA,Records,p.13.
8
Id.,atp.67.
383
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004
Peoplevs.Ulit
sion ofthe crimes,the prosecutoraskedLucelleto identifyher
signatureinherswornstatement9andtoaffirmthetruthofits
contents. She did so. The public prosecutor then marked the
swornstatementinevidenceasExhibitH,andthenmanifested
to the court that he had no more questions for the witness on
directexamination.
Onclarificatoryquestionsbythecourt,Lucelletestifiedthat
shewasbornonFebruary19,1986.Theappellantmountedher,
removedherpants,pokedaknifeatherandthreatenedher. 10
Oncrossexamination,Lucelletestifiedthattheappellantwas
her mothers older brother. In November 1996, she was not
enrolledinanyschool.Herfatherwasworkingataconstruction
firm, the appellant was employed at the Department of
Environment and Sanitation in Makati City, while her
grandmother,wholivedwithher,workedasamaidinBelAir
Subdivison.Hermotherworkedforoneofherfatherscousins.On
redirectexamination,theprosecutionelicitedfromLucellethat
theappellantrapedherinNovember1996at11:00p.m.inside
theroomofherauntMarinainhergrandmothershouseatNo.
7104 San Maximo Street, Olympia, Makati City, and that her
aunt,Marina,andherAteSharonwereinsidetheroom.When
askedwhereherauntandAteSharonwerewhenshewasbeing
rapedinherauntsroom,Lucelledidnotrespond.Whenasked
why she did not respond to the questions propounded to her
during the previous hearings and why she had been crying in
opencourt,Lucellerepliedthatshewasafraidofheruncle,the
appellant.
In her sworn statement,11Lucelle alleged that sometime in
November1996,shewassleepinginaroominthehouse.Itwas
about6oclockintheevening.Shewasawakenedwhenshefelt
someonekissingheronthecheek.Whensheopenedhereyes,she
383 saw her uncle, the appellant, armed with bladed weapon
(balisong).Hepokedtheweaponontheleftsideofherneck.He
warned her that if she told her parents, he would kill her. He
removed her panties, undressed himself and mounted her. He
then inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain in her
privatepartandcried.Theappellant,thereafter,lefttheroom.
AlsoduringthemonthofNo
_______________
9
ExhibitH,Records,p.80.
10
TSN,20October1997,pp.56.
11
ExhibitH.
384
384 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Ulit
vember1996,theappellantcontinuedkissingherwheneverher
parentswereoutofthehouse.
In December 1996, Lucelle was in the room when the
appellantenteredandkissedherandmashedherprivateparts.
Sometime in February 1997, the appellant again abused her
(sinalbahe) while she was in the same room. It was about 11
oclockintheevening.Heagainwarnedhernottodivulgetoher
parents what he did to her. At 9:00 p.m. on March 2, 1997,
Lucelleurinatedinthebathroomandwhenshewasabouttogo
out,theappellantentered,pushedherinsideandkissedheron
hercheeksseveraltimes.
Celso Serrano, Lucelles father, testified that sometime in
November 1996, at dawn, he was in bed and noticed that the
appellant was in the bedroom of his cousininlaw. Sometime
later,hewenttothebathroom.Hethenheardhiswifeaskthe
appellantwherehehadcomefromandthelatterrepliedthathe
justcamefromtheroofofthehouse.Onanotheroccasion,one
earlySundaymorning,henoticedbloodstainsonLucellesshort
pants.Whenshedeclaredthatshehadhermonthlyperiod, he
gave her P5.00 with which to buy sanitary napkins. Lucelle
refusedtoacceptthemoney.Hesuggestedthatshewashherself
butshejustnoddedherhead.Whenheaskedherwhysherefused
toacceptthemoney,Lucellerepliedthatshewasafraidtotell
himbecauseshemightbekilled.
Lourdes Serrano testified that she was Lucelles mother.
LucellewasbornonFebruary19,1986. 12Sheandherhusband
Celso Serrano and their daughter Lucelle resided with her
mother, Guadalupe Ulit, at No. 7104 San Maximo Street,
Olympia,MakatiCity.HersisterMarinaandtheappellant,her
brother,alsoresidedinthesamehouse.Thefamilyslepttogether
intheeveningsinthesalaofthehousewhileMarinasleptinher
bedroom.Attimes,MarinaallowedhernieceLucelletosleepin
herbedroom.At11:00p.m.onFebruary19,1997,Lourdesnoticed
thatLucellewasnotatherside.Theappellant,whousuallyalso
sleptinthesala,wasnotthereeitherLourdeswenttoMarinas
bedroomandsawLucelleinbed(papag),coveredwithablanket.
Beside her was the appellant who was wearing a pair of short
pantsandundershirt.WhentheappellantsawLourdes,heslid
downfromthebed,wentunderthepapag,andfurtivelyleftthe
room.WhenLourdesremovedthe
_______________
ExhibitA,Records,p.71(CertificateofBaptism).
12
385
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004 385
Peoplevs.Ulit
blanket,shesawLucellelyingsidewayswithherkneesuptoher
chin (nakabaluktot). Lucelle was trembling with fear. When
Lourdes asked Lucelle what happened, she did not respond.
Lourdeslefttheroomandwentbacktothesala.Shewantedto
talktothe appellantbut decidedagainstitwhenshesawhim
seatedinthesala,playingwithhisbalisong.
Lourdesfurthertestifiedthatat9:00p.m.onMarch2,1997,
sheandherhusbandwerehavingdinnerwhenshenoticedthat
Lucellewasnowheretobefound.Shelookedforherdaughterin
thehouse,butfailedtofindher.ShethenaskedhercousinNitaif
shehadseenLucelle.Nitarepliedinthenegative.WhenLourdes
asked Nita if Lucelle was inside thebathroom, Nita responded
thattheappellantwasusingit.Momentarily,Lourdessawthe
appellantemergefromthebathroom.Hewasinhisshortpants
andhisshirtwasonhisshoulder.Hewasperspiringprofusely.
LourdeswasflabbergastedwhenshesawLucellecomeoutofthe
bathroomaftertheappellant.Lucellewascryingandlookedpale.
When Lourdes asked Lucelle why she wascrying, she told her
motherthatshehadjusturinated.Theappellantlatertoldher
sisterLourdesthathedidnotdoanythingtoLucelle.
Believingthattheappellanthadbeenabusingtheirdaughter,
Celso and Lourdes brought Lucelle on March 5, 1997, to
Barangay Chairman Romeo Medina. On their way, Lucelle
adamantlyrefusedtotellherparentswhattheappellantdidto
her. However, when they reached the barangay headquarters,
Lucelletoldthebarangaychairmanthattheappellantsexually
abused her. Thereafter, Lourdes filed a complaint with the
barangaychairmanagainsttheappellantforsexuallymolesting
Lucelle.
Barangay TanodFernando DavidtestifiedthatonMarch6,
1997,thebarangaychairmanorderedhimandBarangayTanod
Antonio Echavez to invite and bring the appellant to the
barangayhall.Thebarangaychairmanaskedtheappellantifhe
rapedLucelleandthelatterrepliedthathedid.ASinumpaang
SalaysaywaspreparedintheOfficeoftheBarangayChairmanin
whichtheappellantadmittedthatherapedLucelleinFebruary
1997,andonMarch2,1997,despiteherresistance,andthathe
threatenedtokillherandherfamilyifshedivulgedtheincidents
toherpar
386
386 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Ulit
ents. Theappellantsignedhisstatementinthepresenceofthe
13
barangaychairmanandthebarangaytanods.
Fromthebarangayheadquarters,theappellantwasbrought
totheMakatiCityPoliceHeadquarterswhereCelso,Lourdesand
Lucelle filed a complaint against him for rape and acts of
laciviousness.SPO4LiliaHogaroftheWomensDeskUnittook
theswornstatementsofLourdesandLucelle. 14Sheconducteda
custodialinvestigationoftheappellantwhowaswithoutcounsel
duringwhichthelatteradmittedhavingrapedthevictim.SPO4
Hogaralsopreparedareportonherinvestigationofthevictims
complaint.15
On July 28, 1997, Dr. Armie M. SoretaUmil, NBI Medico
Legal Officer, testified that on March 12, 1997, she conducted
genital and vaginal examinations on Lucelle and submitted
LivingCaseReportNo.MG97355whichcontainedthefollowing
findings:
GENERALPHYSICALEXAMINATION:
Height:141cm.Weight:78lbs.
Normallydeveloped,fairlynourished,conscious,coherent,
cooperative,ambulatorysubject.
Breasts,developing,conical,firm.Areolae,lightbrown,2.6
cms. in diameter. Nipples, lightbrown, protruding, 0.8 cm. in
diameter.
Noextragenitalphysicalinjuriesnoted.
GENERALEXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora, gaping.
Labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette, lax. Vestibular mucosa,
pinkish.Hymen,tall,thick,intact,distensible.Hymenalorifice,
admitsatube2.5cms.indiameter.Vaginalwalls,lax.Rugosities,
shallow.
CONCLUSIONS
 1. 1.)Noevidentsignofextragenitalphysicalinjuriesnoted
onthebodyofthesubjectatthetimeofexamination.
2. 2.)Hymen,intactbutdistensible,anditsorificewide(2.5
cms.indiameter)astoallowcompletepenetrationbyan
averagesizedadultFilipinomaleorganinfullerection
withoutproducinganygenitalinjury.16
_______________
13
ExhibitF,Records,p.77.
14
ExhibitsBandE.
15
ExhibitG,Recordsp.78.
16
ExhibitC,Id.,atp.74.
387
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004
Peoplevs.Ulit
When the prosecution offered in evidence the
appellantsSinumpaany Salaysaybefore the barangay
chairman17aspartofthetestimonyofBarangayTanodFernando
David,theappellantobjectedtoitsadmissiononthegroundthat
theappellantwasnotassistedbycounselandthat,hewasforced
andcoercedintosigningthesame.Nevertheless,thetrialcourt
admitted the statement as part of Davids testimony. The
appellants counsel, likewise, objected to the admissibility of
Lucelles sworn statement on the ground that she was
incompetenttogivethesamebecauseofhermentalillness.The
trialcourtadmittedtheswornstatementofLucelleinevidenceas
partofhertestimony.
Aftertheprosecutionhadresteditscase,thetrialcourtreset
thehearingtoNovember5,1997fortheappellanttoadducehis
evidence. When the case was called for trial on that date, his
counselmanifestedtothecourtthattheappellantwaschanging
his plea in Criminal Cases Nos. 97385 and 97387 from not
guilty to guilty.He also manifested that he would no longer
adduceanyevidenceinhisdefenseinCriminalCasesNos.97386
and 97388 because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyondreasonabledoubtforthecrimeschargedtherein.Thetrial
courtsuspendedtheproceedingsandgavetheappellantfortyfive
minutes to confer with his counsel. When trial resumed, the
appellantreiteratedhisearliermanifestation.Whentoldbythe
courtthathecouldbesentencedtodeathfortherapecharges,the
appellant stood pat on his decision to plead guilty in Criminal
Cases Nos. 97385 and 97387, and to no longer present any
evidenceinhisdefenseintheothertwocases.Theappellantwas
rearraignedinCriminalCasesNos.97385and97387withthe
assistanceofthesamecounselandenteredhispleaofguiltyto
thecharges.
387
On December 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment
convictingtheappellantofallthecrimescharged.Thedecretal
portionofthedecisionreads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
renderedasfollows:
1. 1.InCriminalCaseNos.97385and97386,forrape,the
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the
guiltoftheaccused,FELICIANOULITYTAMPOY,as
principalinthetwocountsofstatutoryrapedefinedand
penalizedunderArticle335oftheRevisedPenalCode,
_______________
ExhibitF,Id.,atp.77.
17
388
388 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
 Peoplevs.Ulit
asamended.Heisherebydeclare[d]CONVICTEDineachof
the cases. Accordingly he is sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty[of]DEATHineachofthetwocases;andindemnifythe
victimLUCELLESERRANO,intheamountofP50,000asmoral
damagesforeachofthecases;
1. 2.InCriminalCaseNos.97387and97388,foractsof
lasciviousness, the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonabledoubttheguiltoftheaccused,FELICIANO
ULITYTAMPOY,asprincipalintwocountsofactsof
lasciviousnessdefinedunderArticle336oftheRevised
Penal Code and penalized under Section 5(b) of R.A.
7610.HeisherebydeclaredCONVICTEDineachofthe
twocases;and,accordingly,heissentencedtosufferin
each of the cases an indeterminate prison term from
eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
ofprisionmayorinitsmediumperiod,asminimum,to
fifteen(15)years,six(6)monthsandtwenty(20)days
ofreclusiontemporalinitsmediumperiod,asmaximum;
and,indemnifythevictim,LUCELLESERRANO,inthe
amount of P20,000 as moral damages for each of the
cases.
SOORDERED.18
The trial court declared that even prescinding from the
appellants plea of guilty, the prosecutor adduced proof beyond
reasonabledoubtoftheguiltoftheappellantforqualifiedrapein
CriminalCasesNos.97385and97386.Thetrialcourtruledthat
although Lucelle did not testify on the contents of her sworn
statement19the same were admissible in evidence as part of
theresgestae.
The appellant did not appeal from the decision in Criminal
Cases Nos. 97387 and 97388. In view of the trial courts
imposition of the death penalty on the appellant in Criminal
CasesNos.97385and97386,thesaidcaseswerebroughttothis
Courtonautomaticappeal.
Theappellantassailsthedecisionofthetrialcourtwiththe
loneassignmentoferror,towit:
THETRIALCOURTERREDINSENTENCINGTHEACCUSED
FELICIANO ULIT WITH A DEATH PENALTY DESPITE HIS
ADMISSIONOFGUILT.20
_______________
18
Records,pp.226227.
19
AnnexA,Id.,atp.13.
20
Rollo,p.65.
389
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004 389
Peoplevs.Ulit
TheappellantdoesnotcontesthisconvictionforrapeinCriminal
CasesNos.97385and97386,andthevalidityoftheproceedings
inthesaidcasesinthetrialcourt.Hepleads,however,thathebe
sparedthedeathpenalty.Heassertsthathewassoremorseful
for the crimes he committed and that he pleaded guilty in
CriminalCasesNos.97385and97387;henolongerpresented
anyevidenceinCriminalCaseNo.97388sothattheproceedings
beforethecourtwouldbeshortenedandsimplified.Nevertheless,
theappealinacriminalcaseisareviewdenovoandthecourtis
not limited to the assigned errors.21An appeal thus opens the
wholecase for review,and theappellatetribunalmayconsider
and correct errors though unassigned and even reverse the
decision of the trial court on the groundsother than those the
partiesraisedaserrors.22
Appellants Plea of Guilty in Criminal Case No. 97385 was
ImprudentlyMade.
In Criminal Case No. 97385, the appellant was charged with
qualified rape,i.e., the rape of his niece, who was a minor,
punishablebydeathunderArticle335oftheRevisedPenalCode,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Undoubtedly, the
appellantwaschargedwithacapitaloffense.Whentheappellant
informedthetrialcourtofhisdecisiontochangehispleaofnot
guilty to guilty, it behooved the trial court to conduct a
searchinginquiryintothevoluntarinessandfullcomprehension
oftheconsequencesofhispleaasmandatedbySection6,Rule
116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. InPeople vs.
Camay,23thisCourtenumeratedthefollowingdutiesofthetrial
courtundertherule:
1. 1.The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntarinessandfullcomprehension[bytheaccused]of
theconsequencesofhisplea;
2. 2.The court must require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and precise
degreeofhisculpability;and
_______________
21
People v. Espejon,377 SCRA 412(2002);People v.
Feliciano,365SCRA613(2001).
22
Peoplev.Lucero,355SCRA93(2001).
23
152SCRA401(1987).
390
390 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Ulit
1. 3.The court must require the prosecution to present
evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.24
Theraisondetrefortheruleisthatthecourtsmustproceedwith
extremecarewheretheimposablepenaltyisdeath,considering
thattheexecutionofsuchsentenceisirrevocable.Experiencehas
shownthateveninnocentpersonshaveattimespleadedguilty.
Improvidentpleasofguiltytoacapitaloffenseonthepartofthe
accusedmustbeavertedsincebyadmittinghisguiltbeforethe
trialcourt,theaccusedwouldforfeithislifeandlibertywithout
having fully understood the meaning, significance and the dire
consequencesofhisplea.25
Thereisnohardandfastruleastohowthetrialjudgemay
conductasearchinginquiry.Ithasbeenheld,however,thatthe
focusoftheinquirymustbeonthevoluntarinessofthepleaand
thefullorcompletecomprehensionbytheaccusedofhispleaof
guiltysothatitcantrulybesaidthatitisbasedonafreeand
informedjudgment.InPeoplevs.Aranzado,26weformulatedthe
following guideline as to how the trial court may conduct its
searchinginquiry:
1. (1)Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was
broughtintothecustodyofthelaw;(b)whetherhehad
the assistance of a competent counsel during the
custodialandpreliminaryinvestigations;and(c)under
what conditions he was detained and interrogated
during the investigations. These the court shall do in
order to rule out the possibility that the accused has
beencoercedorplacedunderastateofduresseitherby
 actualthreatsofphysicalharmcomingfrommalevolent ofthejudgetoseetoitthattheaccuseddoesnotlabor
oravengingquarters. underthesemistakenimpressions.

2. (2)Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to 2. (5)Requiretheaccusedtofullynarratetheincidentthat

whether he had conferred with, and completely spawnedthechargesagainsthimormakehimreenact
explainedto,theaccusedthemeaningandconsequences themannerinwhichheperpetratedthecrime,orcause
ofapleaofguilty. himtosupplymissingdetailsorsignificance.27

3. (3)Elicitinformationaboutthepersonalityprofileofthe InPeoplevs.Ostia,28weheldthatthetrialcourtisalsorequired
accused, such as his age, socioeconomic status, and toprobethoroughlyintothereasonsormotivations,aswellasthe
educational background, which may serve as a factsandcircumstancesforachangeofpleaoftheaccusedand
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and hiscomprehensionofhisplea;explaintohimtheelementsofthe
informedpleaofguilty. crimeforwhichheischargedaswellasthenatureandeffectof
anymodifyingcircumstancesattendanttothecommissionofthe
4. (4)Informtheaccusedtheexactlengthofimprisonmentor offense,inclusiveofmitigatingandaggravatingcircumstances,as
nature ofthe penaltyunder thelawand thecertainty wellasthequalifyingandspecialqualifyingcircumstances,and
thathewillservesuchsentence.Notinfrequentlyindeed informhimoftheimposablepenaltyandhiscivilliabilitiesfor
anaccusedpleadsguiltyinthehopeofa thecrimeforwhichhewouldpleadguiltyto.29
Inthiscase,thetrialcourtfailedtomakeasearchinginquiry
_______________ intotheappellantsvoluntarinessandfullcomprehensionofhis
pleaofguilty.Thisisevidentbythetranscriptofstenographic
24
Ibid. notestakenonNovembers1998:
25
Peoplev.Alborida,359SCRA495(2001). ATTY.MANALO
26
365SCRA649(2001). Your Honor, at todays reception of defense evidence,
391 accused informed this representation that he will no longer
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004 391 presentevidenceandinsteadwillingtochangehispleafromnot
guiltytothatofguilty.Thisaccusedsrepresentationistherefore
Peoplevs.Ulit
prayingthathebeallowedtochangehispleafromthatofnot
guiltytoguilty.
1. lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of
COURT
promisesoftheauthoritiesorpartiesofalighterpenalty
Youbetterconferwithyourclientandexplaintohimthe
shouldheadmitguiltorexpressremorse.Itistheduty
consequences of his intended change of plea from not guilty to
thatofguilty.
ATTY.MANALO Do you know that you are accused here for the crime of
Yes,YourHonor. rape,acapitaloffensewhichcarrieswithitacapitalpunishment?
ACCUSED
_______________ Yes,YourHonor.
COURT(toaccused)
27
Id.,atpp.661662. Despiteyourknowledgethatyouarechargedwithacapital
28
G.R.No.131804,February26,2003,398SCRA132. offensewhichcarrieswithitacapitalpenaltyyoustillinsiststhat
29
Id.,atpp.1415. youarepleadingguilty?
392 ACCUSED
392 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED Yes,YourHonor.
COURT(toaccused)
Peoplevs.Ulit
Wasthereanyonewhoforcedyoutochangeyourpleaofnot
COURT(totheaccused)
guiltytothatofguilty?
Isyourcounselsmanifestationtrue,thatyouwouldliketo
ACCUSED
changeyourpleafromnotguiltytothatofguiltyandthatyouare
None,YourHonor.
nolongerpresentingevidenceinCriminalCasesNos.97386and
COURT
97388?
(toaccused)
ACCUSED
Doyouknowthatbypleadingguiltyyouwillbesentenced
Yes,YourHonor.
inaccordancewith[what]thelawprovides?
COURT
393
(totheaccused)
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004 393
Youtalkwithyourlawyerandthinktwicebeforeasking
thecourttochangeyourpleaofnotguiltytothatofguilty.The Peoplevs.Ulit
Courtwillcallyourcaseagain.... ACCUSED
COURT Yes,YourHonor.
(totheaccused) COURT
Mr.Ulit,earlieryourcounselinformedthecourtthatyou (toaccused)
wouldliketochangeyourpleafromnotguiltytothatofguilty,in Doyouknowthatthepenaltyprovidedforbylawisdeath
Criminal Case No. 97385, forrape and Criminal CaseNo. 97 penaltybecausetheInformationstatesthatthevictimiseleven
387,forActsofLasciviousness,doyouaffirmthemanifestationof yearsoldandyournieceandthatyouusedadeadlyweaponin
yourcounsel? thecommissionoftherape?
ACCUSED ACCUSED
Yes,YourHonor. Yes,YourHonor.Iamwillingtopleadguilty.
COURT(toaccused) COURT
 Alright,arraigntheaccused.30
First.The trial court did not ask the appellant his reasons for
changinghisplea,fromnotguiltytothatofguilty,andthecogent
circumstancesthatledhimtodecidetodoso.
Second.It appears in the Informations filed by the Public
Prosecutor that the appellant opted not to avail himself of his
right to a regular preliminary investigation and refused to
execute a waiver under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
TherecordsalsoshowthattheappellantexecutedaSinumpaang
Salaysaywhiledetainedatthebarangayhallwhereheconfessed
tohavingrapedthevictiminFebruary1997andMarch2,1997.
However,thetrialcourtdidnotasktheappellantwhetherhewas
assisted by counsel when he was brought to the Office of the
Public Prosecutor for inquest investigation. Neither did the
courtaquoinquireaboutthecircumstancesandtheappellants
reasonsforrefusingtoexecutethesaidwaiver.
The records show that when the prosecution offered the
appellantsSinumpaang Salaysayin evidence to prove that he
confessedtohavingrapedthevictiminFebruary1997andMarch
2,1997,theappellantobjectedtheretoonthegroundthathewas
notassistedbycounselandthathewascoercedintosigningthe
same.
Third. The trial court also failed to ascertain from the
appellantwhetherhewasassistedbycounselwhenheexecuted
hisSinumpaang Salaysaywhile detained at the barangay hall;
and,ifhewasnotsoassistedbycounsel,whetherhehadwaived
his right thereto, before and when he signed hisSinumpaang
Salaysay.
_______________
30
TSN,5November1997,pp.24.
394
394 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Ulit
Fourth.Thetrial courtfailed toasktheappellantwhy hewas
pleadingguiltytoarapecommittedinNovember1996,whenin
hisSinumpaang Salaysay,31he confessed to having raped the
victimonlyinFebruary1997andMarch2,1997.Theappellant
didnotadmithavingrapedherinNovember1996asallegedin
theInformationinCriminalCaseNo.97385.Thetrialcourtdid
not even inquire from the appellant who prepared and typed
hisSinumpaang Salaysayand if the contents of his statement
wereexplainedtohimbeforehesignedthesame.
Fifth. The trial court did not explain the following to the
appellant,inplainandsimpletermssoastobeunderstoodby
him: (a) the elements of the crime of qualified rape; (b) the
circumstancesofrelationshipandtheminorityofthevictim;and
(c)thathispleaofguiltytoqualifiedrapewouldnotmitigatethe
penaltyforthecrimeinlightofArticle63oftheRevisedPenal
Code.
Sixth.Itwasnotexplainedtotheappellantthatifconvictedof
qualified rape, he would be civilly liable to the victim in the
amount of P50,000 as moral damages and P75,000 as civil
indemnityexdelicto.
Seventh. Neither did the trial court inquire from the
appellantscounselwhetherthemeaningandtheconsequencesof
a guilty plea were explained to the appellant in a language or
dialectknowntoandunderstoodbyhim.
Eighth.Thetrialcourtfailedtodelveintoandascertainfrom
theappellanthisage,educationalattainmentandsocioeconomic
status.
 Ninth.Thetrialcourtfailedtoasktheappellanttonarrate In determining the guilt of the accused in rape cases, the
thefactsandcircumstancessurroundingtheincidentofqualified Court is guided by the following considerations: (a) that an
rapeaschargedinCriminalCaseNo.97385. accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to
Tenth.Theappellantwasnot asked ifhedesired toadduce prove,butmoredifficultforthepersonaccused,thoughinnocent,
evidenceinCriminalCaseNo.97385inspiteofhispleaofguilty. todisprove;(b)thatinviewoftheintrinsicnatureofthecrime
Asarule,thisCourthassetasideconvictionsbasedonpleas which usually involves two persons, the testimony of the
ofguiltyincapitaloffensesbecauseoftheimprovidencethereof, complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c)
and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory thattheevidencefortheprosecutionmuststandorfallonitsown
judgment.32However, where the trial court receives, meritsandcannotbeallowedtodrawstrengthfromtheweakness
independentlyofhispleaofguilty,evidencetodeterminewhether oftheevidenceofthedefense.34It,likewise,bearsstressingthat
theaccusedcommitted inallcriminalprosecutions,withoutregardtothenatureofthe
defensewhichtheaccusedmayraise,theburdenofproofremains
_______________ at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond
reasonabledoubt.35
ExhibitF.
31
The Prosecution Adduced Proof
Peoplev.Derilo,271SCRA633(1997).
32
of the Appellants Guilt Beyond
395 Reasonable Doubt of the Crime
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004 395 of Rape in Criminal Case
Peoplevs.Ulit No.97385
the crimes charged and the precise degree of his criminal Wehavereviewedtheevidenceonrecordandweareconvinced
culpability therefor, he may still be convicted ifthere isample thattheprosecutionadducedproofbeyondreasonabledoubtthat
proofonrecord,notcontingentonthepleaofguilty,onwhichto the appellant raped the victim in November 1996. The victim
predicateconviction.33 declaredinherswornstatement,ondirectexaminationandher
Inthiscase,theprosecutionhadalreadyresteditscasewhen tes
theappellantdecidedtochangehisplea.Infact,thetrialcourt
granted the prosecutions motion that the evidence it had _______________
presentedbeconsideredproofofthedegreeofculpabilityofthe
appellant. It is, thus, incumbent upon this Court to determine Peoplev.Rodriguez,375SCRA224(2002).
33

whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution in Criminal Peoplev.Mariano,345SCRA1(2000);Peoplev.Tacipit,242

34

CaseNo.97385issufficienttoestablishbeyondreasonabledoubt SCRA241(1995).
theappellantsguiltforqualifiedrape. 35
Ibid.
396
396 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED ...
Peoplevs.Ulit COURT
timony on clarificatory questions made by the trial court, that Q NoongNobyembre1996,ayonsaiyoayginahasakangiyongTito.Saanka
indeed, the appellant raped her in November 1996. Quoted ginahasangTitomo?
hereunderisthetestimonyofLucelleondirectandonredirect A Sa7104SanMaximoSt.,po.
examination:
Fiscal _______________
Q So,mataposmongituroangtiyuhinmo,anoangginawaniyasaiyo?
A Ginahasaniyaako. TSN,20October1997,pp.34.
36

Q Ilangulitkangginahasa? Id.,atp.14.
37

A Maramipo. 397
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004 397
Q Kailankaginahasangtiyuhinmo?
A Novemberpo. Peoplevs.Ulit
Q 19? Q Doondinsabahaynaiyongtinitirhan?
A 1996,po. A Opo.38
In her Sworn Statement, Lucelle narrated in detail how the
39
Q Saankaginahasa?
appellantravishedher:
A 7104SanMaximoSt.,MakatiCity,po.36
06.T:KailankaunangsenalbahengiyongTITOELY?
...
S:Noon pong Nobyembre 1996 hindi ko na po matandaan ang
Fiscal
petsa,mgabandang6:00nggabiponangakoaynatutulogsa
Q Humigitkumulang,anongorasnggabinanggahasainkangTitoElymo
noongNobyembre1996? loob po ng kuwarto ay nagising na lang po ako nang
A Alasonseponggabi. maramdamankonamayhumahaliksaakingpisngi,atnang
Q Samakatuwid,hindinasiyanagtratrabaho,walanasiyasatrabaho? ako po ay magising ay nakita ko po si TITO ELY na may
A Walanapo. hawakna balisong na humigit kumulangposa10 pulgada
Q Saanglugarkaginahasa? ang haba na nakatutok sa aking kaliwang leeg habang
A Sa7104SanMaximoSt. humahalikposaakingpisngiatangsabiaykungakodawpo
Q Saloobbangbahay? aymagsusumbongsaakingmagulangaypapatayinponiya
A Opo. (TITOELY)ako.Pagkatapospoayhinubaranpoakongpanty
Q SaangpartengbahaykaginahasangTitomo? atnaghubadnarinposiTITOELYngkanyangshortpantsat
A Sakuwartopo.37 pumatong na po sa akin. Ipinasok po ni TITO ELY and
 kanyang (TITO ELY) ari sa aking PEPE at ako po ay enjoy the right to confront and crossexamine the witness
nasaktanatumiyaknalangpoakoatnangmakaraosposi testifyingagainsthim.43Generally,theaffidavitsofpersonswho
arenotpresentedtotestifyonthetruthofthecontentsthereof
TITOELYayumalisnalang....40
arehearsayevidence.44Suchaffidavitmustbeformallyofferedin
We do not agree with the ruling of the trial court that the
evidence and accepted by the court; otherwise, it shall not be
contentsoftheswornstatementofLucelle arehearsay, simply
consideredbythecourtforthesimplereasonthatthecourtshall
because she did not testify thereon and merely identified her
considersuchevidenceformallyofferedandaccepted.45
signatures therein. By hearsay evidence is meant that kind of
Inthiscase,Lucelletestifiedonandaffirmedthetruthofthe
evidencewhichdoesnotderiveitsvaluesolelyfromthecredence
contentsofherswornstatementwhichsheherselfhadgiven.As
tobeattributedtothewitnessherselfbutrestssolelyinparton
gleanedfromthesaidstatement,shenarratedhowandwhenthe
the veracity and competence of some persons from whom the
appellant raped and subjected her to lascivious acts. She was
witness has received the information. 41It signifies all evidence
crossexaminedbytheappellantscounselandansweredthetrial
whichisnotfoundeduponthepersonalknowledgeofthewitness
courtsclarificatoryquestions.Theprosecutionofferedhersworn
fromwhomitiselicited,andwhich,consequently,isnotsubject
statementas partofher testimonyand thecourtadmittedthe
tocrossexamination.42Thebasisfortheexclusionappearstoliein
same for thesaid purpose without objection on thepart of the
thefactthatsuchtestimonyisnotsubjecttothetestwhichcan
appellant.
ordinarilybeappliedfortheascertainmentoftruthoftestimony,
since the declarant is not present and available for cross The Prosecution Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt that the
examination.In AppellantRapedtheVictiminFebruary1997
ThetrialcourtconvictedtheappellantofrapeinCriminalCase
_______________ No. 97386 on the basis of Lucelles sworn statement, 46the
testimony of her mother, Lourdes Serrano, the appellants
38
Id.,atp.16. statement47executedintheBarangayChairmansOffice,andthe
39
ExhibitH. testimony of Dr. Armie SoretaUmil. We agree with the trial
40
Ibid. courtsfindingsandconclusion.
41
RulesonEvidence,HerreraRemedialLaw,VolumeV,1999 First. In Lucelles sworn statement,48she declared that the
ed.,pp.563564. appellantsubjectedhertosexualabuse.
42
Id.,atp.564. Second.LourdessawLucelleinbed(papag)inMarinasroom,
398 coveredwithablanketbesidetheappellantwhowaswearinga
398 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
_______________
Peoplevs.Ulit
criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a
violationoftheconstitutional provision whiletheaccusedshall
 43
Fernando,The Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines,
PartI,Vol.VIII,1997ed.,pp.515518.
44
Vallartav.CourtofAppeals,163SCRA587(1988);Peoplev.
Santos,139SCRA583(1985).
45
Section34,Rule132,RulesofCourt.
46
Supra.
47
Supra.
48
Supra.
399
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004
Peoplevs.Ulit
pairofshortpantsandundershirt.Hesliddownfromthepapag,
wentunderthebedandslippedoutside.WhenLourdesremoved
theblanket,shesawLucelletremblingwithfear,lyingsidewise,
herkneesnearherchin(nakabaluktot).
Third.Theappellantadmittedtothebarangaychairmanon
March5,1997,thatherapedLucelleinFebruary1997:
Na,noongisangarawngPEBRERO1997,saloobngkuwartong
akingkapatidnababae,pumasokakonanadatnangnakahigasi
LUCILLEULITsaisangpapagnaanyongnatutulog.Lumapit
akosakanyaatpinaghihipuansamaseselangpartengkanyang
katawan at nang siyay magising tinakot ko siyang huwag
sisigaw, habang siya ay aking hinuhubaran ng Short na
kasamapatiangkanyangpanty.Nagpupumiglassiyahabang
akoaynakadagansakanyananoondinayhinuhubadkoang
aking brief. Pinaghahalikan ko po siya habang siya ay
nagpupumiglas at umiiyak at noon din ay aking pinasok ang
akingarisakanyangari.Umiiyaksiyahabangangakingariay
labasmasoksakanyangari.Nangakoaymakaraosaytinakotko
siyanghuwagmagsusumbogsakanyangmgamagulang.49
Althoughtheappellantwasnotassistedbycounselatthetimehe
gavehisstatementtothebarangaychairmanandwhenhesigned
thesame,itisstilladmissibleinevidenceagainsthimbecausehe
wasnotunderarrestnorundercustodialinvestigationwhenhe
gavehisstatement.50
Theexclusionaryruleispremisedonthepresumptionthatthe
defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where the
399 potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is
forcefully apparent. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, this covers investigation conducted by police
authorities which will include investigations conducted by the
municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police
agencies in our government.51The barangay chairman52is not
deemedalawenforcementofficer
_______________
49
Supra.
50
Peoplevs.Diano,339SCRA515(2000).
51
Peoplevs.Andan,269SCRA95(1997).
52
R.A.7160(LocalGovernmentCodeof1991).
SECTION 389.Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and
Functions.
400
400 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Ulit
forpurposesofapplyingSection12(1)and(3)ofArticleIIIofthe
Constitution. Under these circumstances, it cannot be
successfully
_______________
(a) Thepunong barangay, as the chief executive of
thebarangaygovernment, shall exercise such powers and
performsuchdutiesandfunctions,asprovidedbythisCodeand
otherlaws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the
purposeofwhichisthegeneralwelfareofthebarangayandits
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, thepunong
barangayshall:
1. (1)Enforcealllawsandordinanceswhichareapplicable
withinthebarangay;
2. (2)Negotiate, enter into, and sign contracts for and in
behalf of the barangay, upon authorization of
thesangguniangbarangay;
3. (3)Maintain public order in thebarangayand, in
pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal mayor
and thesangguniangmembers in the performance of
theirdutiesandfunctions;
4. (4)Callandpresideoverthesessionsofthesangguniang
barangayand thebarangayassembly, and vote only to
breakatie;
5. (5)Upon approval by a majority of all the members of
thesangguniang barangay, appoint or replace
thebarangaytreasurer, thebarangaysecretary, and
otherappointedbarangayofficials;
6. (6)Organizeandleadanemergencygroupwheneverthe
samemaybenecessaryforthemaintenanceofpeaceand
order or on occasions of emergency or calamity within
thebarangay,
7. (7)In coordination with thebarangaydevelopment
council,preparetheannualexecutiveandsupplemental
budgetsofthebarangay;
8. (8)Approve vouchers relating to the disbursement
ofbarangayfunds;
9. (9)Enforce laws and regulations relating to pollution
controlandprotectionoftheenvironment;
10. (10)Administer the operation of thekatarungang
pambarangayinaccordancewiththenprovisionsofthis
Code;
11. (11)Exercise general supervision over the activities of
thesangguniangkabataan;
401
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004 401
Peoplevs.Ulit
claimed that the appellants statement before
thebarangaychairmanisinadmissible.
The Sufficiency of Evidence on Lucelles Relationship with the
Appellant,herMinority,andtheProprietyoftheImpositionofthe
DeathPenalty
Theappellantsconvictionfortwocountsofrapehavingbeenduly
establishedbytheprosecution,wenowcometothequestionof
thepenaltytobemeteduponhim.
Article335oftheRevisedPenalCode,asamendedbySection
11ofRepublicActNo.7659,whichwasthelawineffectatthe
timeofthecommissionofthesubjectrapes,providesinpart:
ART.335.\Whenandhowrapeiscommitted.Rapeiscommitted
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
followingcircumstances.
1. 1.Byusingforceorintimidation;
2. 2.When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;and
3. 3.When the woman is under twelve years of age or is
demented.
Thecrimeofrapeshallbepunishedbyreclusionperpetua.
_______________
1. (12)Ensure the delivery of basic services as mandated
underSection17ofthisCode;
2. (13)Conduct an annualpalarong barangaywhich shall
feature traditional sports and discipline included in
nationalandinternationalgames,incoordinationwith
theDepartmentofEducation,CultureandSports;
3. (14)Promotethegeneralwelfareofthebarangay;and
4. (15)Exercise such other powers and perform such other
duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance.
(c) In the performance of his peace and order functions,
thepunongbarangayshallbeentitledtopossessandcarrythe
necessaryfirearmwithinhisterritorialjurisdiction,subjectto
appropriaterulesandregulations.
402
402 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Ulit
Wheneverthecrimeofrapeiscommittedwiththeuseofadeadly
weaponorbytwoormorepersons,thepenaltyshallbereclusion
perpetuatodeath.
...
Thedeathpenaltyshallalsobeimposedifthecrimeofrapeis
committedwithanyofthefollowingattendantcircumstances:
1. 1.Whenthevictimisundereighteen(18)yearsofageand
the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian,relativebyconsanguinityoraffinitywithinthe
third civil degree, or the commonlaw spouse of the
parentofthevictim.
...
Thequalifyingcircumstancesofminorityandrelationshipmust
concur.Moreimportantly,theymustbebothallegedandproved,
inordertoqualifythecrimeofrapeandwarranttheimpositionof
the death penalty.53In addition to the requirement that the
qualifying and aggravating circumstance must be specifically
allegedintheinformation,itmustbeestablishedwithcertainty
thatthevictimwasbeloweighteen(18)yearsofageorthatshe
wasaminoratthetimeofthecommissionofthecrime.Itmust
bestressedthattheseverityofthedeathpenalty,especiallyits
irreversibleandfinalnatureoncecarriedout,makesthedecision
making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most
exactingrulesofprocedureandevidence.54
The relationship between the appellant and the victim has
beenadequatelyestablished.TheallegationsinbothInformations
that the appellant is the victims uncle, a relative by
consanguinitywithinthethirdcivildegreeisspecificenoughto
satisfythespecialqualifyingcircumstanceofrelationship.
InPeoplev.Ferolino,55wesaid
InthiscasetheallegationthatFERLYNisANTONIOsnieceis
notspecificenoughtosatisfythespecialqualifyingcircumstances
ofrelationship.Iftheoffenderismerelyarelationnotaparent,
ascendant,stepparent,orguardianorcommonlawspouseofthe
motherofthevictimitmustbeallegedintheinformationthathe
is a relative by consanguinity or affinity[as the case may
be]withinthethirdcivildegree.Thatrela
_______________
53
Peoplev.Emperador,390SCRA1(2002).
54
People v. Ilagan,G.R. No. 144595, August 6, 2003,408
SCRA442.
55
329SCRA719(2000).
403
VOL.423,FEBRUARY23,2004
Peoplevs.Ulit
tionship by consanguinity or affinity was not alleged in the
informationsinthesecases.Evenifitwas,itwasstillnecessary
tofurtherallegethatsuchrelationshipwaswithinthethirdcivil
degree.56
Theprosecutionsevidencehasalsoshownthattheappellantis
thevictimsuncle,beingtheolderbrotherofthevictimsmother,
afactthattheappellanthimselfadmitted.
Thesamecannot,however,besaidwithrespecttotheageof
the victim. InPeople v. Pruna,57the Court, after noting the
divergentrulingsonproofofageofthevictiminrapecases,set
outcertainguidelinesinappreciatingage,eitherasanelementof
thecrimeorasqualifyingcircumstance:
1. 1.Thebestevidencetoprovetheageoftheoffendedparty
isanoriginalorcertifiedtruecopyofthecertificateof
livebirthofsuchparty.
2. 2.In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
schoolrecordswhichshowthedateofbirthofthevictim
wouldsufficetoproveage.
3. 3.Ifthecertificateoflivebirthorauthenticdocumentis
shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable,thetestimony,ifclearandcredible,ofthe
victims mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or
dateofbirthoftheoffendedpartypursuanttoSection
40,Rule130oftheRulesonEvidenceshallbesufficient
underthefollowingcircumstances:
403
 1. a.Ifthevictimisallegedtobebelow3yearsofageand 1. 6.Thetrialcourtshouldalwaysmakeacategoricalfinding
whatissought tobe provedisthatshe islessthan7 astotheageofthevictim.58
yearsold;
Inthepresentcase,nobirthcertificateoranysimilarauthentic
2. b.Ifthevictimisallegedtobebelow7yearsofageand document was presented and offered in evidence to prove
whatissoughttobeprovedisthatsheislessthan12 Lucelles age. While the victim testified that she was born on
yearsold; February 19, 1986, therefore 11 years old when the appellant
twicerapedher,thesamewillnotsufficeastheappellantdidnot
3. c.Ifthevictimisallegedtobebelow12yearsofageand expresslyandclearlyadmitthesameasrequiredbyPruna.The
whatissoughttobeprovedisthatsheislessthan18 corroborationofLucellesmotherastoherageisnotsufficient
yearsold. either,as thereis noevidencethatthe said certificateof birth
waslostordestroyedorwasunavailablewithoutthefaultofthe
1. 4.In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic prosecution.Thefactthattherewasnoobjectionfromthedefense
document, or the testimony of the victims mother or regardingthevictimsagecannotbetakenagainsttheappellant
relativesconcerningthevictimsage,thecomplainants since it is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the
testimonywillsufficeprovidedthatitisexpresslyand same.Moreover,thetrialcourtdidnotmakeacategoricalfinding
clearlyadmittedbytheaccused. of the victims minority, another requirement mandated
byPruna.
2. 5.Itistheprosecutionthathastheburdenofprovingthe Anotherissuethatneedstobesettledisthethirdparagraph
ageoftheoffendedparty.Thefailureoftheaccusedto of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which
objecttothetestimonialevidenceregardingageshallnot providesthat,[w]heneverrape iscommittedwiththeuseof a
betakenagainsthim. deadlyweaponorbytwoormorepersons,theimposablepenalty
shallbereclusionperpetuatodeath.
_______________ TheevidenceonrecordshowsthattheappellantrapedLucelle
withtheuseofadeadlyweaponinbothrapeincidentsasalleged
56
Id.,atp.735(Emphasisours). inbothinformations,andunderArticle335oftheRevisedPenal
57
390SCRA577(2002). Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the imposable
404 penaltyforthecrimeisreclusionperpetuatodeath.
404 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED Inthedeterminationofwhetherthedeathpenaltyshouldbe
Peoplevs.Ulit imposed on the appellant, the presence of an aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the crime is crucial. In the
casesatbar,althoughtherelationshipofuncleandniecebetween
the appellant and the victim has been duly proven, the
alternativecircumstanceofrelationshipunderArticle15ofthe
Revised Penal Code cannot be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance against the appellant. While it is true that the
alternativecircumstanceofrelationshipisalwaysaggravatingin
crimesagainstchastity,regardlessofwhethertheoffenderisa
relativeofahigherorlowerdegreeoftheoffendedparty,itisonly
taken into consideration under Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant,
descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or
relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender. The
relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by any of the
relationshipsmentioned.59
Hence, for the prosecutions failure to prove the age of the
victimbyanymeanssetforthinPruna,andconsideringthatthe
relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by any of the
relationshipsmentionedinArticle15oftheRevisedPenalCode,
as amended, the appellant can only be convicted of rape in its
aggravated form, the imposable penalty for which isreclusion
perpetuatodeath.
There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the
commissionofthecrimes,theappellantshouldbesentencedto
sufferreclusion perpetuafor each count of rape, conformably to
Article69oftheRevisedPenalCode.
Thevictimisentitledtomoraldamageswithoutneedofproof
otherthanthefactoftherapeitselfbecauseitisassumedthat
the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an
award.60We find the trial courts award of P50,000 as moral
damagestothevictimineachrapetobeinorder.
However,thetrialcourterredinnotawardingcivilindemnity
tothevictimineachcase,thesamebeingmandatoryuponthe
findingofthefactofrape.61Thus,thisCourtawardsthevictim
thesumofP50,000ascivilindemnityforeachcountofrape.In
additiontothis,appellantisorderedtopaythevictimP25,000as
exemplarydamages,thequalifyingaggravatingcircumstanceof
useofadeadlyweaponhavingattendedthecommissionofthe
crime.62
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
MakatiCity,Branch62,inCriminalCasesNos.97385to97388
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant Feliciano
UlityTampoyisfoundGUILTYbeyondreasonabledoubtoftwo
countsofrapeinCriminalCasesNos.97385and97386,andin
each
case, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion
perpetuaandorderedtopaythevictim,LucelleSerrano,P50,000
as moral damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity; and P25,000 as
exemplarydamages.Costsdeoficio.
SOORDERED.
Davide,
Jr.(C.J.),Puno,Vitug,Panganiban,Quisumbing,Ynares
G.R.No.179448.June26,2013.*
CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondent.
Constitutional Law; Custodial Interrogation; Words and
Phrases;Custodialinterrogationmeansanyquestioninginitiated
bylawenforcementauthoritiesafterapersonistakenintocustody
orotherwisedeprivedofhisfreedomofactioninanysignificant
manner.The constitutional proscription against the
admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in
violationofSection12,ArticleIIIoftheConstitution,ascorrectly
observedbytheCAandtheOSG,isapplicableonlyincustodial
interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning
initiatedbylawenforcementauthoritiesafterapersonistaken
intocustodyorotherwisedeprivedofhisfreedomofactioninany
significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial
investigationisguaranteedcertainrightswhichattachuponthe
commencement thereof, viz.: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have
competentandindependentcounselpreferablyofhisownchoice,
and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above. In the
present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an
uncounselledwrittenstatementregardingananomalydiscovered
in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the
questioningwasnotinitiatedbyalawenforcementauthoritybut
merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2)
petitionerwasneitherarrestednorrestrainedofhislibertyinany
significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner
cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have
beendeprivedoftheconstitutionalprerogativeduringthetaking
ofhiswrittenstatement.
Same; Right to Counsel; In Remolona v. Civil Service
Commission, 414 Phil. 590 (2001), the Supreme Court declared
thattherighttocounselappliesonlytoadmissionsmadeina
criminalinvestigationbutnottothosemadeinanadministrative
investigation.InRemolona v. Civil Service Commission, 362
SCRA304(2001),wedeclaredthattherighttocounselapplies
only to admissionsmade in a criminal investigation but not to
thosemadeinanadministra
_______________
*SECONDDIVISION.
640
6 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
40
Tanenggeevs.People
tive investigation. Amplifying further on the matter, the
CourtmadeclearintherecentcaseofCarbonelv.CivilService
Commission, 630 SCRA 202 (2010): However, it must be
rememberedthattherighttocounselunderSection12oftheBill
of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial
investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2),
Section12oftheBillofRightsappliesonlytoadmissionsmadein
a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrativeinvestigation.Here,petitionerswrittenstatement
was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his
employerinconnectionwithananomaly/irregularityheallegedly
committed in the course of his employment. No error can
therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in
evidence andingivingdueconsiderationtopetitionerswritten
statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its
admissibility.
Same;Evidence;Confessions;Aconfession[oradmission]is
presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the
confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary.[I]t is
settled that a confession [or admission] is presumed voluntary
untilthecontraryisprovedandtheconfessantbearstheburden
of proving the contrary. Petitioner failed to overcome this
presumption.Onthecontrary,hiswrittenstatementwasfoundto
havebeenexecutedfreelyandconsciously.Thepertinentdetails
henarratedinhisstatementwereofsuchnatureandqualitythat
onlyaperpetratorofthecrimecouldfurnish.
Same; Same; ExtrajudicialConfessions;Itisasettledrule
thatwherethedefendantdidnotpresentevidenceofcompulsion,
wherehedidnotinstituteanycriminaloradministrativeaction
againsthissupposedintimidators,wherenophysicalevidenceof
violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be
considered as having been voluntarily executed.The fact that
petitionerdidnotraiseawhimperofprotestandfileanycharges,
criminaloradministrative,againsttheinvestigatorandthetwo
policemenpresentwhoallegedlyintimidatedhimandforcedhim
tosignnegatehisbareassertionsofcompulsionandintimidation.
It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not present
evidenceofcompulsion,wherehedidnotinstituteanycriminalor
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where
nophysicalevidenceofviolencewaspresented,hisextrajudicial
statement shall be considered as having been voluntarily
executed.Neitherwillpetitionersassertionthathe
641
VOL.699,JUNE26,2013
Tanenggeevs.People
didnotreadthecontentsofhisstatementbeforeaffixinghis
signaturethereonjusttogetitoverwithpropuptheinstant
Petition. To recall, petitioner has a masteral degree from a
reputableeducationalinstitutionandhadbeenabankmanager
for quite a number of years. He is thus expected to fully
understand and comprehend the significance of signing an
instrument. It is just unfortunate that he did not exercise due
diligence in the conduct of his own affairs. He can therefore
expectnoconsiderationforit.
CriminalLaw;Forgery;Forgeryispresentwhenanywriting
is counterfeited bythe signing of anothers name with intent to
defraud.Forgeryispresentwhenanywritingiscounterfeited
bythesigningofanothersnamewithintenttodefraud.Itcanbe
established by comparing the alleged false signature with the
authenticorgenuine one.Afindingofforgery doesnotdepend
entirely on the testimonies of government handwriting experts
whoseopinionsdonotmandatorilybindthecourts.Atrialjudge
is not precluded but is even authorized by law to conduct an
independentexaminationofthequestionedsignatureinorderto
arriveatareasonableconclusionastoitsauthenticity.
RemedialLaw;CriminalProcedure;Appeals;Aruleoflong
standinginthisjurisdictionisthatfindingsofatrialcourt,when
affirmedbytheCourtofAppeals,areaccordedgreatweightand
respect.Inthiscase,thefindingofforgeryonthesignatureof
RomeoTan(Tan)appearinginthepromissorynotesandcashiers
checkswasnotanchoredsolelyontheresultoftheexamination
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
DocumentExaminer.Thetrialcourtalsomadeanindependent
examinationofthequestionedsignaturesandafteranalyzingthe
same, reached the conclusion that the signatures of Tan
641
appearinginthepromissorynotesaredifferentfromhisgenuine
signatures appearing in his Deposit Account Information and
SpecimenSignatureCardsonfilewiththebank.Thus,wefindno
reason to disturb the above findings of the RTC which was
affirmedbytheCA.Aruleoflongstandinginthisjurisdictionis
that findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are
accordedgreatweightandrespect.Absentanyreasontodeviate
fromthesaidfindings,asinthiscase,thesameshouldbedeemed
conclusiveandbindingtothisCourt.642
6 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
42
Tanenggeevs.People
Same; Evidence; Witnesses; The prosecution has the
prerogative to choose the evidence or the witnesses it wishes to
present.The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the
evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present. It has the
discretion as to how it should present its case. Moreover, the
presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not
applywheretheevidencewasatthedisposalofboththedefense
and the prosecution. In the present case, if petitioner believes
thatTanistheprincipalwitnesswhocouldexculpatehimfrom
liabilitybyestablishingthatitwasTanandnothimwhosigned
thesubjectdocuments,themostprudentthingtodoistoutilize
him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the right to have
compulsory process to secure Tans attendance during the trial
pursuant to Article III, Section 14(2) of the Constitution. The
recordsshow,however,thatpetitionerdidnotinvokesuchright.
Inviewofthese,nosuppressionofevidencecanbeattributedto
theprosecution.
CriminalLaw;Denials;Denialswhichareunsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence are negative and selfserving
evidence.Theymeritnoweightinlawandcannotbegivengreater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who
testifiedonaffirmativematters.TheCourtisalsonotpersuaded
bythebareanduncorroboratedallegationofpetitionerthatthe
loanscoveredbythepromissory notesand thecashierschecks
werepersonallytransactedbyTanagainsthisapprovedletterof
credit,althoughheadmittedlyneversawTanaffixhissignature
thereto.Again,thisallegation,astheRTCaptlyobserved,isnot
supported by established evidence. It is settled that denials
whichareunsubstantiatedbyclearandconvincingevidenceare
negativeandselfservingevidence.[Theymerit]noweightinlaw
andcannotbegivengreaterevidentiaryvalueoverthetestimony
ofcrediblewitnesseswhotestifiedonaffirmativematters.The
chain of events in this case, from the preparation of the
promissory notes to the encashment of the cashiers checks, as
narratedbytheprosecutionwitnessesandbasedonpetitioners
own admission, established beyond reasonable doubt that he
committedtheunlawfulactsallegedintheInformations.
Same;FalsificationofCommercialDocuments;Falsification
ofdocumentsunderparagraph1,Article172inrelationtoArticle
171oftheRevisedPenalCodereferstofalsificationbyaprivate
individual or a public officer or employee, who did not take
advantageofisofficialposition,ofpublic,privateorcommercial
document.
643
VOL.699,JUNE26,2013 643
Tanenggeevs.People
Falsificationofdocumentsunderparagraph1,Article172in
relationtoArticle171oftheRevisedPenalCode(RPC)refersto
falsification by a private individual or a public officer or
employee,whodidnottakeadvantageofhisofficialposition,of
public, private or commercial document. The elements of
falsificationofdocumentsunderparagraph1,Article172ofthe
RPCare:(1)thattheoffenderisaprivateindividualorapublic
officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and, (3) that the
falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial
document.Alltheabovementionedelementswereestablishedin
thiscase.First,petitionerisaprivateindividual.Second,theacts
of falsification consisted in petitioners (1) counterfeiting or
imitatingthehandwritingorsignatureofTanandcausingitto
appearthatthesameistrueandgenuineinallrespects;and(2)
causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or
proceeding when he did not in fact so participate.Third, the
falsificationwascommittedinpromissorynotesandcheckswhich
are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in
general,documentsorinstrumentswhichareusedbymerchants
or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions. Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions
whileacheckisameansofpaymentusedinbusinessinlieuof
moneyforconvenienceinbusinesstransactions.Acashierscheck
necessarilyfacilitatesbanktransactionsforitallowstheperson
whosenameandsignatureappearthereontoencashthecheck
andwithdrawtheamountindicatedtherein.
Same; Complex Crimes; Words and Phrases; A complex
crimemayrefertoasingleactwhichconstitutestwoormoregrave
or lessgrave felonies ortoanoffenseasanecessarymeansfor
committing another.When the offender commits on a public,
official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 as a necessary means to commit
anothercrimelikeestafa,theftormalversation,thetwocrimes
formacomplexcrime.UnderArticle48oftheRPC,therearetwo
classesofacomplexcrime.Acomplexcrimemayrefertoasingle
actwhichconstitutestwoormoregraveorlessgravefeloniesor
to an offense as a necessary means for committing another.
InDomingo v. People, 603 SCRA 488 (2009), we held: The
falsificationofapublic,official,orcommercialdocumentmaybea
meansofcommittingestafa,becausebeforethefalsifieddocument
isactuallyutilizedtodefraudanother,the
644
6 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
44
Tanenggeevs.People
crime of falsification has already been consummated,
damageorintenttocausedamagenotbeinganelementofthe
crimeoffalsificationofpublic,officialorcommercialdocument.In
other words, the crime of falsification has already existed.
Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial
documenttodefraudanotherisestafa.Butthedamageiscaused
by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or
commercialdocumentisonlyanecessarymeanstocommitestafa.
Same; Estafa; Estafa is generally committed when (a) the
accuseddefraudedanotherbyabuseofconfidence,orbymeansof
deceit,and(b)theoffendedpartyorathirdpartysuffereddamage
orprejudicecapableofpecuniaryestimation.Estafaisgenerally
committedwhen(a)theaccuseddefraudedanotherbyabuseof
confidence,orbymeansofdeceit,and(b)theoffendedpartyora
third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation. [D]eceit is the false representation of a matter of
fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosedwhichdeceivesorisintendedtodeceiveanothersothat
heshallactuponittohislegalinjury.Theelementsofestafa
obtain in thiscase. By falsely representing that Tan requested
himtoprocesspurportedloansonthelattersbehalf,petitioner
counterfeited or imitated the signature of Tan in the cashiers
checks. Through these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing
money from the bank. Once in possession of the amount,
petitioner thereafter invested the same in Eurocan Future
Commodities.Clearly,petitioneremployeddeceitinordertotake
holdofthemoney,misappropriatedandconvertedittohisown
personaluseandbenefit,andtheseresultedtothedamageand
prejudiceofthebankintheamountofaboutP43million.
Same; Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial
Documents;Penalties;Thecrimeoffalsificationwasestablishedto
beanecessarymeanstocommitestafa.PursuanttoArticle48of
theRevisedPenalCode,thepenaltytobeimposedinsuchcase
shouldbethatcorrespondingtothemostseriouscrime,thesame
tobeappliedinitsmaximumperiod.Petitionerinthiscaseis
found liable for the commission of the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of commercial document. The crime of
falsificationwasestablishedtobeanecessarymeanstocommit
estafa.PursuanttoArticle48ofthe
645
VOL.699,JUNE26,2013
Tanenggeevs.People
Code,thepenaltytobeimposedinsuchcaseshouldbethat
correspondingtothemostseriouscrime,thesametobeappliedin
itsmaximumperiod.Theapplicablepenaltythereforeisforthe
crimeofestafa,beingthemoreseriousoffensethanfalsification.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Gabionza,DeSantos&Partnersforpetitioner.
Perez, Calima, Maynigo & Roque Law Officesfor private
complainantMetrobank.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforrespondent.
DELCASTILLO,J.:
AssailedinthisPetitionforReviewonCertiorari1underRule
45oftheRulesofCourtistheDecember12,2006Decision 2ofthe
CourtofAppeals(CA)inCAG.R.CRNo.23653affirmingwith
modification the June 25, 1999 Decision 3of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30, in Criminal Case Nos. 98
16380610findingCarlosL.Tanenggee(petitioner)guiltybeyond
reasonabledoubtoffivecountsofestafathroughfalsificationof
commercial documents. Likewise questioned is the CAs
September 6, 2007 Resolution4denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration5andSupplementalMotionforReconsideration.6
_______________
1Rollo,pp.18103.
2CARollo,pp.206230;pennedbyAssociateJusticeMonina
ArevaloZenarosaandconcurredinbyAssociateJusticesMartin
S.Villarama,Jr.andLucasP.Bersamin(nowmembersofthis
Court).
3Records of Criminal Case No. 98163806, pp. 396405;
645 pennedbyJudgeSenecioO.Ortile.
4CARollo,pp.277279.
5Id.,atpp.231243.
6Id.,atpp.247257.
646
646 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tanenggeevs.People
FactualAntecedents
On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations 7for estafa
throughfalsificationofcommercialdocumentswerefiledagainst
petitioner. The said Informations portray the same mode of
commissionofthecrimeasinCriminalCaseNo.98163806but
differwithrespecttothenumbersofthechecksandpromissory
notesinvolvedandthedatesandamountsthereof,viz.:
ThatonoraboutJuly24,1997,intheCityofManila,
Philippines, the said accused, being then a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud, thru falsification of commercial
document, the METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.
(METROBANK), represented by its Legal officer, Atty.
Ferdinand R. Aguirre, in the following manner: herein
accused, being then the Manager of the COMMERCIO
BRANCHOFMETROBANKlocatedattheNewDivisoria
MarketBldg.,Divisoria,Manila,andtakingadvantageof
hispositionassuch,preparedandfilleduporcausedtobe
prepared and filled up METROBANK Promissory Note
Form No.366857with letters and figures reading
BD#083/97 after the letters reading PN, with figures
reading07.24.97afterthewordDATE,withtheamount
 ofP16,000,000.00inwordsandinfigures,andwithother
words and figures now appearing thereon, typing or
causingtobetypedattherightbottomthereofthename
readingROMEOTAN,feigningandforgingorcausingto
befeignedandforgedontopofsaidnamethesignatureof
RomeoTan,affixinghisownsignatureattheleftbottom
thereofpurportedlytoshowthathewitnessedthealleged
signing of the said note by Romeo Tan, thereafter
preparingandfillinguporcausingtobe
_______________
7RecordsofCriminalCaseNo.98163806,pp.23;recordsof
CriminalCaseNo.98163807,pp.12;recordsofCriminalCase
No.98163808,pp.12;recordsofCriminalCaseNo.98163809,
pp.12;recordsofCriminalCaseNo.98163810,pp.12.
647
VOL.699,JUNE26,2013 647
Tanenggeevs.People
preparedandfilledupMETROBANKCASHIERSCHECK
NO.CC 0000001531, a commercial document, with date
reading July 24, 1997, with the name reading Romeo
Tan as payee, and with the sum ofP15,362,666.67in
wordsandinfigures,whichpurportstobetheproceedsof
the loan being obtained, thereafter affixing his own
signature thereon, and [directing] the unsuspecting bank
cashier to also affix his signature on the said check, as
authorized signatories, and finally affixing, feigning and
forging or causing to be affixed, feigned and forgedfour
(4)timesatthebackthereofthesignatureofsaidRomeo
Tan,therebymakingitappear,asitdidappearthatRomeo
Tan had participated in the [preparation], execution and
signingofthesaid PromissoryNoteandthe signingand
endorsement of the said METROBANK CASHIERS
CHECK and that he obtained a loan
ofP16,000,000.00fromMETROBANK,whenintruthand
infact,asthesaidaccusedwellknew,suchwasnotthe
caseinthatsaidRomeoTandidnotobtainsuchloanfrom
METROBANK, neither did he participate in the
preparation,executionandsigningofthesaidpromissory
noteandsigningandendorsementofsaidMETROBANK
CASHIERSCHECK,muchlessauthorizehereinaccused
to prepare, execute and affix his signature in the said
documents;thatoncethesaiddocumentswereforgedand
falsified in the manner aboveset forth, the said accused
released, obtained and received from the METROBANK
the sum ofP15,363,666.67purportedly representing the
proceeds of the said loan, which amount, once in his
possession, with intent to defraud, he misappropriated,
misapplied and converted to his own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said
METROBANK in the same sum ofP15,363,666.67,
Philippinecurrency.
CONTRARYTOLAW.8
_______________
8RecordsofCriminalCaseNo.98163806,pp.23.
648
648 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tanenggeevs.People
OnMay27,1998,theRTCenteredapleaofnotguiltyforthe
petitionerafterherefusedtoenteraplea. 9Thecaseswerethen
consolidatedandjointlytried.
TheproceedingsbeforetheRTCasaptlysummarizedbythe
CAareasfollows:
During the pretrial, except for the identity of the
accused,thejurisdictionofthecourt,andthataccusedwas
thebranchmanagerofMetrobankCommercioBranchfrom
July 1997 to December 1997, no other stipulations were
 enteredinto.ProsecutionmarkeditsexhibitsAtoLand
submarkings.
xxxx
The prosecution alleged that on different occasions,
appellant caused to be prepared promissory notes and
cashierschecksinthenameofRomeoTan,avaluedclient
of the bank since he has substantial deposits in his
account, inconnectionwiththepurportedloansobtained
bythelatterfromthebank.Appellantapprovedandsigned
the cashiers check as branch manager of Metrobank
CommercioBranch.Appellantaffixed,forgedorcausedto
besignedthesignatureofTanasendorserandpayeeofthe
proceedsofthechecksatthebackofthesametoshowthat
thelatterhadindeedendorsedthesameforpayment.He
handed the checks to the Loans clerk, Maria Dolores
Miranda, for encashment. Once said documents were
forgedandfalsified,appellantreleasedandobtainedfrom
Metrobank the proceeds of the alleged loan and
misappropriatedthesametohisuseandbenefit.Afterthe
discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was
conductedandanadministrativeinvestigationwasheldin
the Head Office of Metrobank, during which appellant
signedawrittenstatement(markedasExhibitN)inthe
formofquestionsandanswers.
Theprosecutionpresentedthefollowingwitnesses:
_______________
9Id.,atp.73.
649
VOL.699,JUNE26,2013
Tanenggeevs.People
Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs
[D]epartment of Metrobank[,] testified that he conducted
and interviewed the appellant in January 1998; that in
said interview, appellant admitted having committed the
allegations in the Informations, specifically forging the
promissory notes; that the proceeds of the loan were
securedorpersonallyreceivedbytheappellantalthoughit
should be the client of the bank who should receive the
same; and that all the answers of the appellant were
containedinatypewrittendocumentvoluntarilyexecuted,
thumbmarked,andsignedbyhim(ExhibitN).
Rosemarie Tan Apostol, assistant branch manager,
testifiedthatthesignaturesappearingonthepromissory
notes were not the signatures of Romeo Tan; that the
promissorynotesdidnotbearhersignaturealthoughitis
required,duetothefactthatRomeoTanisavaluedclient
and her manager accommodated valued clients; that she
signed the corresponding checks upon instruction of
appellant;andthataftersigningthechecks,appellanttook
thesame[which]remainedinhiscustody.
Eliodoro M. Constantino, NBI Supervisor and a
handwritingexpert,testifiedthatthesignaturesappearing
on the promissory notes and specimen signatures on the
signaturecardofRomeoTanwerenotwrittenbyoneand
thesameperson.
Maria Dolores Miranda, a Loans Clerk at Metrobank
CommercioBranch,testifiedthatseveralcashierschecks
were issued in favor of Romeo Tan; that appellant
instructed her to encash the same; and that it was
appellantwhoreceivedtheproceedsoftheloan.
Forhisdefense,appellantCarlosLoTanenggeetestified
649 that he is a holder of a Masters degree from the Asian
InstituteofManagement,andwastheBranchManagerof
Metrobank Commercio Branch from 1994 until he was
charged in 1998 [with] theabovenamed offense. He was
with Metrobank for nine (9) years starting as assistant
 manager of Metrobank Dasmarias Branch, Binondo,
Manila.Asmanager,heoversawthedaytoday
650
650 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tanenggeevs.People
operationsofthe[branch],solicitedaccountsandprocessed
loans,amongothers.
AppellantclaimedthathewasabletosolicitRomeoTan
asaclientdepositorwhenhewasthebranchmanagerof
MetrobankCommercio.Asavaluedclient,RomeoTanwas
granted a credit line for forty million pesos
([P]40,000,000.00)byMetrobank.Tanwasalsoallowedto
open a fictitious account for his personal use and was
assisted personally by appellant in his dealings with the
bank. In the middle of 1997, Tan allegedly opened a
fictitious account and used the name Jose Tan. Such
practiceforvaluedclientswasallowedbyandknowntothe
banktohidetheirfinancesduetorampantkidnappingsor
fromtheBureauofInternalRevenue(BIR)orfromtheir
spouses.
According to appellant, Tan availed of his standing
creditline(throughpromissorynotes)forfive(5)timeson
the following dates: 1) 24 July 1997 for sixteen million
pesos([P]16,000,000.00),2)27October1997forsixmillion
pesos ([P]6,000,000.00), 3) 12 November 1997 for three
million pesos ([P]3,000,000.00), 4) 21 November 1997 for
sixteen million pesos ([P]16,000,000,00), 5) 22 December
1997fortwomillionpesos([P]2,000,000.00).Onallthese
occasions except the loan on 24 July 1997 when Tan
personally went to the bank, Tan allegedly gave his
instructions regarding the loan through the telephone.
Uponreceivingtheinstructions,appellantwouldorderthe
Loansclerktopreparethepromissorynoteandsendthe
samethroughthebanksmessengertoTansoffice,which
was located across the [street]. The latter would then
return to the bank, through his own messenger, the
promissory notes already signed by him. Upon receipt of
thepromissorynote,appellantwouldorderthepreparation
of the corresponding cashiers check representing the
proceedsoftheparticularloan,sendthesamethroughthe
banksmessengertotheofficeofTan,andthelatterwould
return the same through his own messenger already
endorsed together with a deposit slip under Current
Account No. 2582501337 of Jose Tan. Only Cashiers
Checkdated21November1997forsix
651
VOL.699,JUNE26,2013 651
Tanenggeevs.People
teenmillionpesos([P]16,000,000.00)wasnotendorsedand
deposited for, allegedly, it was used to pay the loan
obtainedon24July1997.Appellantclaimedthatallthe
signaturesofTanappearingonthepromissorynotesand
the cashiers checks were the genuine signatures of Tan
althoughheneversawthelatteraffixthemthereon.
In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank
auditorsconductedanauditoftheCommercioBranchfor
more than a week. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998,
appellant was asked by Elvira OngChan, senior vice
presidentofMetrobank,toreporttotheHeadOfficeonthe
followingday.Whenappellantarrivedatthesaidoffice,he
was surprised that there were seven (7) other people
present: two (2) senior branch officers, two (2) bank
lawyers,two(2)policemen(oneinuniformandtheotherin
plainclothes),andarepresentativeoftheInternalAffairs
unitofthebank,ValentinoElevado.
 Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a
paper (Exhibit N) in connection with the audit
investigation;thatheinquiredwhathewasmadetosign
but was not offered any explanation; that he was
intimidatedtosignandwasthreatenedbythepolicethat
hewillbebroughttotheprecinctifhewillnotsign;thathe
wasnotabletoconsultalawyersincehewasnotapprised
ofthepurposeofthemeeting;[and]thatjusttogetitover
with he signed the paper which turned out to be a
confession. After the saidmeeting, appellant wenttosee
Tanathisofficebutwasunabletofindthelatter.Healso ofprision mayoras minimum to twenty (20) years
triedtophonehimbuttonoavail.10
RulingoftheRegionalTrialCourt
After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated
Decision11dated June 25, 1999 finding petitioner guilty of the
crimescharged,thedecretalportionofwhichstates:
_______________
10CARollo,pp.210215.
11RecordsofCriminalCaseNo.98163806,pp.396405.
652
652 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tanenggeevs.People
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Carlos Lo
Tanenggee,guiltybeyondreasonabledoubtoftheoffenseofestafa
thru falsification of commercial document[s] charged in each of
thefive(5)Informationsfiledandherebysentenceshimtosuffer
thefollowingpenalties:
1.In Criminal Case No. 98163806[,] to suffer the
indeterminatepenaltyofimprisonmentfromeight(8)years
ofprision mayoras minimum to twenty (20) years
ofreclusiontemporalasmaximumincludingtheaccessory
penaltiesprovidedbylaw.
2. In Criminal Case No. 98163807[,] to suffer the
indeterminatepenaltyofimprisonmentfromeight(8)years
ofprision mayoras minimum to twenty (20) years
ofreclusiontemporalasmaximumincludingtheaccessory
penaltiesprovidedbylaw,andtoindemnifyMetrobankthe
sum of P16 Million with interest [at] 18%per
annumcountedfrom27November1997untilfullypaid.
3.In Criminal Case No. 98163808[,] to suffer the
indeterminatepenaltyofimprisonmentfromeight(8)years
ofreclusiontemporalasmaximumincludingtheaccessory
penaltiesprovidedbylaw,andtoindemnifyMetrobankthe
sum of P6 Million with interest [at] 18%per
annumcountedfrom27October1997untilfullypaid.
4.In Criminal Case No. 98163809[,] to suffer the
indeterminatepenaltyofimprisonmentfromeight(8)years
ofprision mayoras minimum to twenty (20) years
ofreclusiontemporalasmaximumincludingtheaccessory
penaltiesprovidedbylaw,andtoindemnifyMetrobankthe
sum of P2 Million with interest [at] 18%per
annumcountedfrom22December1997untilfullypaid.
5.In Criminal Case No. 98163810[,] to suffer the
indeterminatepenaltyofimprisonmentfromeight(8)years
ofprision mayoras minimum to twenty (20) years
ofreclusiontemporalasmaximumincludingtheaccessory
penaltiesprovidedbylaw,andtoindemnifyMetrobankthe
sum of P3 Million with interest [at] 18%per
annum[counted] from 12 November 1997 until fully
paid.653
VOL.699,JUNE26,2013 653
 Tanenggeevs.People
Accused shall serve the said penalties imposed
successively.
AsmandatedinArticle70oftheRevisedPenalCode,
themaximumdurationofthesentenceimposedshallnot
bemorethanthreefoldthelengthoftimecorrespondingto
the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him and
such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty (40)
years.
SOORDERED.12
RulingoftheCourtofAppeals
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA
where the case was docketed as CAG.R. CR No. 23653. On
December12,2006,theCApromulgateditsDecision 13affirming
withmodificationtheRTCDecisionanddisposingoftheappeal
asfollows:
WHEREFORE,theappealisDENIEDforlackofmerit
andtheDecisiondated25June1999oftheRegionalTrial
Court(RTC)ofManila,Branch30convictingtheaccused
appellant Carlos Lo [Tanenggee] on five counts
ofestafathrough falsification of commercial documents is
herebyAFFIRMEDwithMODIFICATIONthat
Criminal Case No. 98163806, he is further ordered to
indemnify Metrobank the sum of [P]16 Million with
interest [at] 18%per annumcounted from 24 July 1997
untilfullypaid.
SOORDERED.14
OnDecember29,2006,15petitionermovedforreconsideration,
whichtheCAdeniedperitsSeptember6,2007Resolution.16
_______________
12Id.,atpp.404405.
13CARollo,pp.206230.
14Id.,atpp.229230.
15Id.,atp.231.
16Id.,atpp.277279.
654
654 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tanenggeevs.People
Hence, the present Petition for Review onCertiorariunder
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the basic issues of: (1)
whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs admission in
evidenceofthepetitionerswrittenstatementbasedonitsfinding
thathewasnotinpolicecustodyorundercustodialinterrogation
when the same was taken; and, (2) whether the essential
elementsofestafathroughfalsificationofcommercialdocuments
wereestablishedbytheprosecution.17
ThePartiesArguments
While he admits signing a written statement, 18petitioner
refutesthetruthofthecontentsthereofandallegesthathewas
only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He
assertsthatsaidwrittenstatementwastakeninviolationofhis
rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution,
particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and
in
right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same
shouldnothavebeenadmittedinevidenceagainsthim.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines,
throughtheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG),maintainsthat
petitionerswrittenstatementisadmissibleinevidencesincethe
constitutionalproscriptioninvokedbypetitionerdoesnotapplyto
inquiries made in the context of private employment but is
applicableonlyincasesofcustodialinterrogation.TheOSGthus
praysfortheaffirmanceoftheappealedCADecision.
OurRuling
WefindthePetitionwantinginmerit.
 _______________
17Rollo,p.671.
18ExhibitN,recordsofCriminalCaseNo.98163806,pp.
189194.
655
VOL.699,JUNE26,2013 655
Tanenggeevs.People
Petitionerswrittenstatementis
admissibleinevidence.
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of
admissionorconfessionofguiltobtainedinviolationofSection
12,ArticleIIIoftheConstitution,ascorrectlyobservedbytheCA
andtheOSG,isapplicableonlyincustodialinterrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by
lawenforcementauthoritiesafterapersonistakenintocustody
orotherwisedeprivedofhisfreedomofactioninanysignificant
manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is
guaranteedcertainrightswhichattachuponthecommencement
thereof,viz.: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and
independentcounselpreferablyofhisownchoice,and(3)tobe
informed of the two other rights above. 19In the present case,
while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled
writtenstatementregardingananomalydiscoveredinthebranch
hemanaged,thefollowingareclear:(1)thequestioningwasnot
initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an
internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was
neitherarrestednorrestrainedofhis liberty in any significant
mannerduringthequestioning.Clearly,petitionercannotbesaid
tobeundercustodialinvestigationandtohavebeendeprivedof
the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written
statement.
Moreover, inRemolona v. Civil Service Commission,20we
declared that the right to counsel applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrativeinvestigation.Amplifyingfurtheronthemat
_______________
19People v. Bandula, G.R. No. 89223, May 27, 1994, 232
SCRA566,574.
20414Phil.590,599;362SCRA304,311312(2001).
656
656 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tanenggeevs.People
ter,theCourtmadeclearintherecentcaseofCarbonelv.Civil
ServiceCommission:21
However, it must be remembered that the right to
counselunderSection12oftheBillofRightsismeantto
protectasuspectduringcustodialinvestigation.Thus,the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the
BillofRightsappliesonlytoadmissionsmadeinacriminal
investigationbutnot tothose made in an administrative
investigation.22
Here, petitioners written statement was given during an
administrativeinquiryconductedbyhisemployerinconnection
with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the
courseofhisemployment.Noerrorcanthereforebeattributedto
the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due
consideration to petitioners written statement as there is no
constitutionalimpedimenttoitsadmissibility.
Petitioners written statement was given
voluntarily,knowinglyandintelligently.
Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under
duress and intimidation, an already prepared typewritten
statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his
supposition is just an afterthought for there is nothing in the
recordsthatwouldsupporthisclaimofduressandintimidation.
Moreover, [i]t is settled that a confession [or admission] is
presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the
confessantbearstheburdenofprovingthecontrary. 23Petitioner
failedtoovercomethispresumption.Onthecontrary,hiswritten
statement was found to have been executed freely and
consciously.Thepertinentdetailshenarratedinhisstate
_______________
21G.R.No.187689,September7,2010,630SCRA202.
22Id.,atp.207.
23Peoplev.Rapeza,549Phil.378,404;520SCRA596,626
(2007).
657
VOL.699,JUNE26,2013
Tanenggeevs.People
mentwereofsuchnatureandqualitythatonlyaperpetratorof
thecrimecouldfurnish.Thedetailscontainedthereinattesttoits
voluntariness.AscorrectlypointedoutbytheCA:
Asthetrialcourtnoted,thewrittenstatement(Exhibit
N)ofappellantisrepletewithdetailswhichcouldonlybe
suppliedbyappellant.Thestatementreflectsspontaneity
andcoherencewhichcannotbeassociatedwithamindto
whichintimidationhasbeenapplied.Appellantsanswers
to questions 14 and 24 were even initialed by him to
indicate his conformity to the corrections made therein.
Theresponsetoeveryquestionwasfullyinformative,even
beyond the required answers, which only indicates the
mindtobefreefromextraneousrestraints.24
InPeople v. Muit,25it was held that [o]ne of theindiciaof
voluntariness in the execution of [petitioners] extrajudicial
[statement]isthat[it]containsmanydetailsandfactswhichthe
investigatingofficerscouldnothaveknownandcouldnothave
suppliedwithouttheknowledgeandinformationgivenby[him].
Also,thefactthatpetitionerdidnotraiseawhimperofprotest
and file any charges, criminal or administrative, against the
investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly
intimidatedhimandforcedhimtosignnegatehisbareassertions
ofcompulsionandintimidation.Itisasettledrulethatwherethe
defendantdidnotpresentevidenceofcompulsion,wherehedid
not institute any criminal or administrative action against his
supposedintimidators,wherenophysicalevidenceofviolencewas
presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as
havingbeenvoluntarilyexecuted.26
_______________
24CARollo,p.220.
657 25G.R.No.181043,October8,2008,568SCRA251,268.
26People v. Del Rosario, 411 Phil. 676, 690691; 359 SCRA
166,178(2001),citingPeoplev.Santalani,181Phil.481,490;93
SCRA
658
658 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tanenggeevs.People
Neither will petitioners assertion that he did not read the
contents of his statement before affixing his signature thereon
justtogetitoverwithpropuptheinstantPetition.Torecall,
petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational
institutionandhadbeenabankmanagerforquiteanumberof
years.Heisthusexpectedtofullyunderstandandcomprehend
thesignificanceofsigninganinstrument.Itisjustunfortunate
thathedidnotexerciseduediligenceintheconductofhisown
affairs.Hecanthereforeexpectnoconsiderationforit.
Forgerydulyestablished.
 Forgeryispresentwhenanywritingiscounterfeitedbythe
signing of anothers name with intent to defraud. 27It can be
established by comparing the alleged false signature with the
authenticorgenuine one.Afindingofforgery doesnotdepend
entirely on the testimonies of government handwriting experts
whoseopinionsdonotmandatorilybindthecourts.Atrialjudge
is not precluded but is even authorized by law 28to conduct an
independentexaminationofthequestionedsignatureinorderto
arriveatareasonableconclusionastoitsauthenticity.
Inthiscase,thefindingofforgeryonthesignatureofRomeo
Tan(Tan)appearinginthepromissorynotesandcashierschecks
was not anchored solely on the result of the examination
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
DocumentExaminer.Thetrialcourtalsomadeanindependent
examinationofthequestionedsignaturesandafteranalyzingthe
same,reachedtheconclusionthatthesigna
_______________
315,324325(1979),Peoplev.Balane,208Phil.537,556;123
SCRA 614, 635 (1983) andPeople v. Villanueva, 213 Phil. 440,
453454;128SCRA488,501(1984).
27Ocampov.LandBankofthePhilippines,G.R.No.164968,
July3,2009,591SCRA562,570.
28RulesofCourt,Rule132,Section22.
659
VOL.699,JUNE26,2013
Tanenggeevs.People
turesofTanappearinginthepromissorynotesaredifferentfrom
his genuine signatures appearing in his Deposit Account
InformationandSpecimenSignatureCardsonfilewiththebank.
Thus,wefindnoreasontodisturbtheabovefindingsoftheRTC
whichwas affirmedby theCA. Arule oflong standingin this
jurisdictionisthatfindingsofatrialcourt,whenaffirmedbythe
CA,areaccordedgreatweightandrespect.Absentanyreasonto
deviatefromthesaidfindings,asinthiscase,thesameshouldbe
deemedconclusiveandbindingtothisCourt.
No suppression of evidence on the part
oftheprosecution.
Petitionerclaimsthattheprosecutionshouldhavepresented
Tanincourt toshedlightonthematter. His nonpresentation
created the presumption that his testimony if given would be
adversetothecaseoftheprosecution.Petitionerthuscontends
thattheprosecutionsuppresseditsownevidence.
Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has
theprerogativetochoosetheevidenceorthewitnessesitwishes
topresent.Ithasthediscretionastohowitshouldpresentits
case.29Moreover, the presumption that suppressed evidence is
unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the
disposalofboththedefenseandtheprosecution. 30Inthepresent
case,ifpetitionerbelievesthatTanistheprincipalwitnesswho
couldexculpatehimfromliabilitybyestablishingthatitwasTan
andnothimwhosignedthesubjectdocuments,themostprudent
thingtodoistoutilizehimashiswitness.Anyway,petitionerhas
therighttohavecompul
_______________
29People v. Daco, G.R. No. 168166, October 10, 2008, 568
SCRA348,361.
659 30People v. Mazo, 419 Phil. 750, 768; 367 SCRA 462, 480
(2001), citingPeople v. Padiernos, 161 Phil. 623, 632633; 69
SCRA484,491(1976).
660
660 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tanenggeevs.People
soryprocesstosecureTansattendanceduringthetrialpursuant
to Article III, Section 14(2) 31of the Constitution. The records
show,however,thatpetitionerdidnotinvokesuchright.Inview
of these, no suppression of evidence can be attributed to the
prosecution.
Petitionersdenialisunavailing.
The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and
uncorroboratedallegationofpetitionerthattheloanscoveredby
the promissory notes and the cashiers checks were personally
transactedbyTanagainsthisapprovedletterofcredit,although
headmittedlyneversawTanaffixhissignaturethereto.Again,
thisallegation,asthe RTCaptlyobserved, isnotsupported by
established evidence. It is settled that denials which are
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative
and selfserving evidence. [They merit] no weight in law and
cannotbegivengreaterevidentiaryvalueoverthetestimonyof
credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 32The
chain of events in this case, from the preparation of the
promissory notes to the encashment of the cashiers checks, as
narratedbytheprosecutionwitnessesandbasedonpetitioners
ownadmission,establishedbeyond
_______________
31Section14.(1)xxx
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumedinnocentuntilthecontraryisproved,andshallenjoy
therighttobeheardbyhimselfandcounsel,tobeinformedofthe
natureandcauseoftheaccusationagainsthim,tohaveaspeedy,
impartial,andpublictrial,tomeetthewitnessesfacetoface,and
tohavecompulsoryprocesstosecuretheattendanceofwitnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failuretoappearisunjustifiable.
32Peoplev.Sison,G.R.No.172752,June18,2008,555SCRA
156,170.
661
VOL.699,JUNE26,2013 661
Tanenggeevs.People
reasonabledoubtthathecommittedtheunlawfulactsallegedin
theInformations.
Elements of falsification of commercial
documentsestablished.
Falsificationofdocumentsunderparagraph1,Article172in
relationtoArticle171oftheRevisedPenalCode(RPC)refersto
falsification by a private individual or a public officer or
employee,whodidnottakeadvantageofhisofficialposition,of
public, private or commercial document. The elements of
falsificationofdocumentsunderparagraph1,Article172ofthe
RPCare:(1)thattheoffenderisaprivateindividualorapublic
officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification
enumeratedinArticle171oftheRPC;33and,(3)that
_______________
33ART. 171.Falsification by public officer, employee; or
notary or ecclesiastical minister.The penalty ofprision
mayorandafinenottoexceed5,000pesosshallbeimposedupon
anypublicofficer,employee,ornotarywho,takingadvantageof
hisofficialposition,shallfalsifyadocumentbycommittinganyof
thefollowingacts:
1.Counterfeitingorimitatinganyhandwriting,signature,or
rubric;
2.Causingittoappearthatpersonshaveparticipatedinany
actorproceedingwhentheydidnotinfactsoparticipate;
3.Attributingtopersonswhohaveparticipatedinanactor
proceedingstatementsotherthanthoseinfactmadebythem;
4.Makinguntruthfulstatementsinanarrationoffacts;
5.Alteringtruedates;
 6.Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
documentwhichchangesitsmeaning;
7. Issuinginanauthenticatedformadocumentpurporting
tobeacopyofanoriginaldocumentwhennosuchoriginalexists,
or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different
from,thatofthegenuineoriginal;or
8.Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the
issuancethereofinaprotocol,registry,orofficialbook.
662
662 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tanenggeevs.People
thefalsificationwascommittedinapublic,officialorcommercial
document.
All the abovementioned elements were established in this
case.First,petitionerisaprivateindividual.Second,theactsof
falsification consisted in petitioners (1) counterfeiting or
imitatingthehandwritingorsignatureofTanandcausingitto
appearthatthesameistrueandgenuineinallrespects;and(2)
causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or
proceeding when he did not in fact so participate.Third, the
falsificationwascommittedinpromissorynotesandcheckswhich
are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in
general,documentsorinstrumentswhichareusedbymerchants
or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions.34Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions
whileacheckisameansofpaymentusedinbusinessinlieuof
moneyforconvenienceinbusinesstransactions.Acashierscheck
necessarilyfacilitatesbanktransactionsforitallowstheperson
whosenameandsignatureappearthereontoencashthecheck
andwithdrawtheamountindicatedtherein.35
Falsification as a necessary means
tocommitestafa.
Whentheoffendercommitsonapublic,officialorcommercial
document any of the acts of falsification enumerated inArticle
171asanecessarymeanstocommitanothercrimelikeestafa,
theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime.
UnderArticle48oftheRPC,therearetwoclassesofacomplex
crime.Acomplexcrimemayrefertoasingleact
_______________
xxxx
34Monteverdev.People,435 Phil.906,921;387SCRA196,
210(2002).
35Domingov.People,G.R.No.186101,October12,2009,603
SCRA488,505506.
663
VOL.699,JUNE26,2013 663
Tanenggeevs.People
whichconstitutestwoormoregraveorlessgravefeloniesortoan
offenseasanecessarymeansforcommittinganother.
InDomingov.People,36weheld:
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial
documentmaybeameansofcommittingestafa,because
beforethefalsifieddocumentisactuallyutilizedtodefraud
another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated,damageorintenttocausedamagenotbeing
anelementofthecrimeoffalsificationofpublic,officialor
commercial document. In other words, the crime of
falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that
falsifiedpublic,officialorcommercialdocumenttodefraud
another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document.Therefore,thefalsificationofthepublic,official
or commercial document is only a necessary means to
commitestafa.
 Estafais generally committed when (a) the accused
defraudedanotherbyabuseofconfidence,orbymeansofdeceit,
and (b)the offended partyor a thirdparty suffered damageor
prejudicecapableofpecuniaryestimation. 37[D]eceitisthefalse
representationofamatteroffact,whetherbywordsorconduct,
by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that
whichshouldhavebeendisclosedwhichdeceivesorisintendedto
deceiveanothersothatheshallactuponittohislegalinjury. 38
The elements ofestafaobtain in this case. By falsely
representingthatTanrequestedhimtoprocesspurportedloans
onthelattersbehalf,petitionercounterfeitedorimitatedthe
_______________
36Id.,atpp.506507.
37Eugeniov.People,G.R.No.168163,March26,2008,549
SCRA433,447.
38Josonv.People,G.R.No.178836,July23,2008,559SCRA
649,656citingPeoplev.Menil,Jr.,394Phil.433,452;340SCRA
125,142(2000).
664
664 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tanenggeevs.People
signatureofTaninthecashierschecks.Throughthese,petitioner
succeeded in withdrawing money from the bank. Once in
possessionoftheamount,petitionerthereafterinvestedthesame
in Eurocan Future Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed
deceitinordertotakeholdofthemoney,misappropriatedand
converted it to his own personal use and benefit, and these
resultedtothedamageandprejudiceofthebankintheamountof
aboutP43million.
Taken in its entirety, the proven facts show that petitioner
could not have withdrawn the money without falsifying the
questioned documents. The falsification was, therefore, a
necessarymeanstocommitestafa,andfalsificationwasalready
consummated evenbefore thefalsified documents were usedto
defraud the bank. The conviction of petitioner for the complex
crimeofEstafathroughFalsificationofCommercialDocumentby
thelowercourtswasthusproper.
TheProperImposablePenalty
Thepenaltyforfalsificationofacommercialdocumentunder
Article172oftheRPCisprisioncorreccionalinitsmediumand
maximumperiodsandafineofnotmorethanP5,000.00.
Thepenaltyin estafacases, ontheotherhand, as provided
under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the RPC isprision
correccionalin its maximum period toprision mayorin its
minimumperiod39iftheamountdefraudedisoverP12,000.00but
doesnotexceedP22,000.00.Iftheamountinvolvedexceedsthe
latter sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the
penaltyinitsmaximumperiodwithanincrementalpen
_______________
39Minimum: 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5
monthsand10days
Medium:5years,5monthsand11daysto6years,8months
and20days
Maximum:6years,8monthsand21daysto8years.
665
VOL.699,JUNE26,2013 665
Tanenggeevs.People
altyofoneyearimprisonmentforeveryP10,000.00butinnocase
shallthetotalpenaltyexceed20yearsofimprisonment.
Petitionerinthiscaseisfoundliableforthecommissionofthe
complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
document. The crime of falsification was established to be a
necessarymeanstocommitestafa.PursuanttoArticle48ofthe
Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case should be that
correspondingtothemostseriouscrime,thesametobeappliedin
itsmaximumperiod.Theapplicablepenaltythereforeisforthe
crimeofestafa,beingthemoreseriousoffensethanfalsification.
TheamountsinvolvedinthiscaserangefromP2millionto
P16 million. Said amounts being in excess of P22,000.00, the
penaltyimposableshouldbewithinthemaximumtermofsix(6)
years, eight (8) months and twentyone (21) days to eight (8)
years ofprision mayor, adding one (1) year for each additional
P10,000.00. Considering the amounts involved, the additional
penalty of one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 would
surely exceed the maximum limitation provided under Article
315,whichistwenty(20)years.Thus,theRTCcorrectlyimposed
themaximumtermoftwenty(20)yearsofreclusiontemporal.
Thereisneed,however,tomodifythepenaltiesimposedbythe
trial court as affirmed by the CA in each case respecting the
minimum term of imprisonment. The trial court imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years
ofprisionmayorasminimumwhichisbeyondthelawfulrange.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of
thepenaltyshouldbewithintherangeofthepenaltynextlower
to that prescribed by law for the offense. Since the penalty
prescribed for theestafacharge against petitioner isprision
correccionalmaximum toprision mayorminimum, the penalty
nextlowerwouldthenbeprisioncorreccionalinitsminimumand
mediumperiodswhichhasadurationofsix(6)monthsandone
(1)daytofour(4)yearsandtwo(2)months.Thus,theCourtsets
theminimumterm
666
666 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tanenggeevs.People
oftheindeterminatepenaltyatfour(4)yearsandtwo(2)months
ofprisioncorreccional.Petitioneristhereforesentencedineach
casetosuffertheindeterminatepenaltyoffour(4)yearsandtwo
(2) months ofprision correccionalas minimum to twenty (20)
yearsofreclusiontemporalasmaximum.
WHEREFORE, the Petition isDENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 23653
dated December 12, 2006 and September 6, 2007, respectively,
are herebyAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONthat the
minimumtermoftheindeterminatesentencetobeimposedupon
the petitioner should be four (4) years and two (2) months
ofprisioncorreccional.
SOORDERED.
Carpio(Chairperson),Brion,PerezandPerlasBernabe,JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed with
modification.
Notes.Where the prosecution has sufficiently established
thattherespectiveextrajudicialconfessionsoftheaccusedwere
obtainedinaccordancewiththeconstitutionalguarantees,these
confessions are admissible, and are evidence of a high order.
(Peoplevs.Reyes,581SCRA691[2009])
The roadside questioning of a motorist does not fall under
custodialinterrogation,norcanitbeconsideredaformalarrest.
(Luzvs.People,667SCRA421[2012])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.

G.R.No.190583.December7,2015.*
MARIA PAZ FRONTRERASyILAGAN, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE
OFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondent.
Criminal Law; Theft; Qualified Theft; Theft becomes
qualified if it is among others, committed with grave abuse of
confidence.Theftiscommittedbyanypersonwho,withintentto
gainbutwithoutviolenceagainst,orintimidationofpersonsnor
forceuponthings,shalltakepersonalpropertyofanotherwithout
the latters consent. Intent to gain oranimus lucrandiis an
internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the
offender of the thing subject of asportation. Theft becomes
qualified if it is among others, committed with grave abuse of
confidence.
Same; Same; Same; Elements of Qualified Theft.
Conviction for qualified theft committed with grave abuse of
confidenceentails
_______________
*THIRDDIVISION.
153
VOL.776,DECEMBER7,2015 153
Frontrerasvs.People
the presence of all the following elements: 1. Taking of
personalproperty;2.Thatthesaidpropertybelongstoanother;3.
Thatthesaidtakingbedonewithintenttogain;4.Thatitbe
done without the owners consent; 5. That it be accomplished
withouttheuseofviolenceorintimidationagainstpersons,norof
force upon things; 6. That it be done with grave abuse of
confidence.
Same; Same; Same; Intent to Gain; Intent to gain can be
deducedfromthepetitionerspossessionofthepawnticketswhich
weresurrendered,togetherwiththeredemptionpaymentbytheir
respective pledgors.Intent to gain can be deduced from the
petitionerspossessionoftheforegoingpawnticketswhichwere
surrendered, together with the redemption payment by their
respective pledgors. She submitted them during the spot audit
along with a confession letter stating that portions of the
P1,250,800.00 missing value of jewelry were actually already
redeemed,thus:Yungibapongitemaymgatubosnaatnakatago
langpoangpapel.NagsimulapoitonoongbuwanngHulyo.Dala
narinpongmatindingpangangailangansapera.Itolamangpo
angtangikongmailalahadatiyandinpoangkatotohanan.The
tenor of the foregoing declarationandthecircumstancesofthe
petitioneratthetimeshewroteandsignedit,allmilitateagainst
her bare allegation that she was threatened with an
administrativecaseunlesssheadmitshertransgression.
Same; Same; It is obvious that losing ones job in an
administrativecaseislesscumbersomethanriskingonesliberty
by confessing to a crime one did not really commit. It is thus
implausibleforonetobecajoledintoconfessingtoawrongdoing
atthemereprospectoflosinghis/herjob.Thelanguageofthe
confessionletterwasstraightforward,coherentandclear.Itbore
no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity and it was replete with details which could only be
knowntothepetitioner.Moreover,itisobviousthatlosingones
job in an administrative case is less cumbersome than risking
oneslibertybyconfessingtoacrimeonedidnotreallycommit.It
is thus implausible for one to be cajoled into confessing to a
wrongdoing at the mere prospect of losing his/her job. The
petitioners declarations to Talampas show that she fully
understoodtheconsequencesofherconfession.Shealsoexecuted
the letter even before Finolan came to the Old Balara branch,
thus,negatingherclaimthatthelatterthreatenedherwithan
administrativesanction.
154
154 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Frontrerasvs.People
RemedialLaw;Evidence;Confessions;Aconfession,whether
judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made,
constitutesevidenceofahighordersinceitissupportedbythe
strongpresumptionthat nosane person oroneofnormalmind
will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the
perpetratorofacrime,unlesspromptedbytruthandconscience.
Aconfession,whetherjudicialorextrajudicial,ifvoluntarilyand
freely made, constitutes evidence of a high order since it is
supportedbythestrongpresumptionthatnosanepersonorone
ofnormalmindwilldeliberatelyandknowinglyconfesshimselfto
be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and
conscience. Theadmissibilityandvalidityofaconfession,thus
hinges on its voluntariness, a condition vividly present in this
case.
Criminal Law; Qualified Theft; Penalties; Since the
petitionercommittedqualifiedtheft,thepenaltyshallbetwo(2)
degreeshigherorreclusiontemporalinitsmediumandmaximum
periods,whichshallbeimposedinitsmaximumperiodwhichhas
arangeofseventeen(17)years,four(4)monthsandone(1)dayto
twenty(20)years.Sincethepetitionercommittedqualifiedtheft,
thepenaltyshallbetwodegreeshigherorreclusiontemporalin
itsmediumandmaximumperiods,whichshallbeimposedinits
maximumperiodwhichhasarangeofseventeen(17)years,four
(4)monthsandone(1)daytotwenty(20)years.
Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Analogous to Voluntary
Surrender; Anent the appreciation of mitigating circumstances,
the Supreme Court (SC) agrees with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) that the petitioners extrajudicial confession through the
handwritten letter coupled with her act of surrendering the
redeemedpawnticketsandthereaftergoingtothepolicestation
canbetakenasananalogouscircumstanceofvoluntarysurrender
underArticle13,paragraph10inrelationtoparagraph7ofthe
RevisedPenalCode(RPC).Anenttheappreciationofmitigating
circumstances, the Court agrees with the RTC that the
petitioners extrajudicial confession through the handwritten
lettercoupledwithheractofsurrenderingtheredeemedpawn
ticketsandthereaftergoingtothepolicestationcanbetakenas
ananalogouscircumstanceofvoluntarysurrenderunderArticle
13,paragraph10inrelationtoparagraph7oftheRPC.
155
VOL.776,DECEMBER7,2015 155
Frontrerasvs.People
Same;Same;NoIntentiontoCommitSoGraveaWrong;The
petitioner misappropriated the redemption payments under her
custody and control because she was constrained by extreme
necessityformoney.Basedonthesameextrajudicialconfession,
thepetitionerisalsoentitledtothemitigatingcircumstanceofno
intentiontocommitsograveawrongunderparagraph3againin
relationtoparagraph10bothofArticle13.Basedonherletter,
the petitioner misappropriated the redemption payments under
hercustodyandcontrolbecauseshewasconstrainedbyextreme
necessityformoney.Thisisnottopromotemonetarycrisisasan
excusetocommitacrimeortoemboldenapersonentrustedwith
fundsorpropertiestofeloniouslyaccessthesame,butratherto
underscoretheutmostconsiderationintheCourtsexerciseofits
discretionalpowertoimposepenalties,thatisaguiltyperson
deserves the penalty given the attendant circumstances and
commensurate with the gravity of the offense committed. From
such standpoint, the Court finds it prudent that unless the
foregoinganalogousmitigatingcircumstancesareappreciatedin
herfavor,thepetitionerwillbepenalizedexcessively.
Same; Same; Penalties; When there are two (2) or more
mitigatingcircumstancesandnoaggravatingcircumstancesare
present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable,
according to the number and nature of such circumstances.A
reductionintheimposablepenaltybyonedegreeisthusinorder
pursuanttoArticle64(5)oftheRPCwhichstatesthatwhenthere
are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty
nextlowertothatprescribedbylaw,intheperiodthatitmay
deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such
circumstances.Assuch,thepenaltynextlowerindegreewhich
isprisinmayorinitsmediumperiodshouldbeimposed.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
ManuelR.Bustamanteforpetitioner.
156
156 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Frontrerasvs.People
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforrespondent.
REYES,J.:
BeforetheCourtisaPetitionforReview 1underRule45ofthe
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision2dated July 29, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.G.R. CR No. 30909, which affirmed with modification the
Decision3datedMay8,2006oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)of
Quezon City, Branch 104, in Criminal Case No. Q9984626,
convicting Maria Paz Frontreras4yIlagan (petitioner) of the
crimeofQualifiedTheftandsentencinghertosufferthepenalty
ofreclusionperpetua.
TheFacts
ThepetitionerwastheVaultCustodianofthe685OldBalara,
Tandang Sora, Quezon City branch (Old Balara branch) of
CebuanaLhuillierPawnshop(Cebuana).Shewastaskedtosafe
keepallthepawneditemsandjewelryinsidethebranchvault.
Likewise employed in the same branch were Teresita Salazar
(Salazar)andJeannelynCarpon(Carpon)whoservedasBranch
Manager and District Manager, respectively. Salazar was
responsiblefortheoveralloperationoftheOldBalarabranchand
wasalsotaskedtohandletheappraisalofpawneditemsandthe
recording of such transactions. Carpon, on the other hand,
supervised the overall operations of the branches within her
district ensuring that they are operating within the objectives,
procedures,andpoliciesofCebuana;shealso
_______________
1Rollo,pp.931.
2Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, with
AssociateJusticesMartinS.Villarama,Jr.(nowamemberofthis
Court)andJoseC.Reyes,Jr.,concurring;CARollo,pp.136155.
3Issued by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada; Records (Vol. II),
pp.492511.
4Fronterasinotherdocumentsofthecase.
157
VOL.776,DECEMBER7,2015
Frontrerasvs.People
monitoredthedistrictbankaccountandhandledtheappraisal
ofpawneditemsandtherecordingofcash.5
OnOctober27,1998,asurpriseauditwasconductedatthe
OldBalarabranchbyCebuanasinternalauditors,MilaEscartin
(Escartin)andCynthiaTalampas(Talampas).Theauditrevealed
that 156 pieces of jewelry, with an aggregate value of
P1,250,800.00 were missing. A cash shortage of P848.60 was
likewisediscovered.Whenthepetitionerwasaskedtoexplainthe
discrepancy, she told Escartin that she would reduce her
explanationintowriting.Thenextday,anauditreportwassent
toMarcelinoFinolan(Finolan),AreaManagerofCebuana.6
UponreceiptoftheauditreportonOctober28,1998,Finolan
immediately proceededtothe Old Balara branchto conductan
investigation.HecalledEscartinandthepetitionerforameeting
during which the petitioner handed over several pawn
tickets7whileEscartingavehimahandwrittenlettermadebythe
petitioner,8whichreads:
Oct.28,1998
SaKinauukulan:
Sir,nagconductpongauditkahaponOct.27,1998ditosaOld
BalaraIatnadiskubreponamaramingnawawalangitem.Sir
anglahatpongitoaymgasanlanamin.Anginvolvepoditoay
angappraiserTessSalazar,Dist.ManagerJeannelynUy
Carpon,atakopoVaultCustodianMa.PazFrontreras.Yong
ibapongitemaymgatubosnaatnakatagolangpoangpapel.
Nagsimula po ito noong buwan ng Hulyo. Dala na rin pong
matindingpangangailangansapera.Itolamangpo
_______________
157
 5CARollo,pp.137138.
6Id.,atp.138.
7TSN,December13,1999,pp.1013.
8FolderofExhibits,ExhibitB.
158
158 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Frontrerasvs.People
angtangikongmailalahadatiyandinpoangkatotohanan.
Sumasainyo,
[signed]
Ma.PazFronteras9
On May 10, 1999, an Information10for Qualified Theft was
filedbeforetheRTCagainstthepetitioner,Salazar,andCarpon.
TheaccusatoryportionoftheInformationreads:
That on or about the period comprised from June 6,
1998uptoOctober17,1998,inQuezonCity,Philippines,
the above named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutuallyhelpingoneanother,beingthenemployedasthe
BranchManager,DistrictManager andVault Custodian,
respectively of [CEBUANA] represented by [FINOLAN]
locatedatUnit1119B&C685TandangSora,OldBalara,
Quezon City and such have free access to the jewelries
pawned to [CEBUANA], with grave abuse of confidence
reposedonthembytheiremployer,withintenttogainand
withouttheknowledgeandconsentoftheownerthereof,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away the amount of P1,263,737.60,
Philippine Currency, representing the value of the
jewelries and redemption payments, belonging to said
[CEBUANA], to the damage and prejudice of the said
offendedpartyintheamountaforementioned.
CONTRARYTOLAW.11
Salazar and Carpon entered a Not Guilty plea upon
arraignmentonJuly13,1999.12Thepetitionerlikewisepleaded
NotGuiltyduringherarraignmentonAugust9,1999.13
_______________
9Id.
10Records(Vol.I),pp.12.
11Id.
12Id.,atp.172.
13Id.,atp.178.
159
VOL.776,DECEMBER7,2015 159
Frontrerasvs.People
Trial thereafter ensued. According to prosecution witness
Finolan,asidefromreceivingthepetitionershandwrittenletter
onOctober28,1998,thepetitioneralsogavehimoriginalpawn
tickets,thebackportionofwhichshowedthesignaturesoftheir
respective pledgors. These signatures mean that the pledgors
have already redeemed the jewelry covered by each ticket by
paying the amount for which they stand as a security. No
payments were, however, recorded nor turned over to the
pawnshop.ThepetitioneralsointimatedtohimthatCarpontook
someofsuchcashpaymentsbutfailedtoreturnthesame.14These
declarations were corroborated by the testimonies of the other
prosecutionwitnesses,Escartin15andTalampas.16
 All of the accused took the witness stand and proffered in
defense that the internal audit for June, July, August and
Septemberof1998showednoreportofanomalyorshortage;that
had there been any anomaly or shortage, it could have been
discoveredthrutheperiodicauditbeingconductedbyCebuana;
they were not holding cash and there was no complaint from
clientsregardingmissingpawneditems.17
Carpon denied liability for the missing jewelry and
redemption payments and averred that she had no official
capacity to hold cash for Cebuana and that the pawned items
were handled by the vault custodian. When Finolan asked her
aboutthemissingitems,shetoldhimtherewasnone.Shewas
broughttothepolicestationandthensubmittedforinquestbut
wasthereafterreleasedbasedoninsufficiencyofevidence.18
_______________
14TSN,October5,1999,pp.614,1617;TSN,December13,
1999,pp.46,1213,1617.
15TSN,June19,2000,pp.45,1314.
16TSN,November7,2001,pp.69,1213,1519,2324.
17Records(Vol.II),p.502.
18Id.,atpp.502505.
160
160 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Frontrerasvs.People
SalazarwasabsentonOctober27and28,1998becauseshe
wassick.Shewassurprisedwhenshewasinformedthatthere
are missing pawned items at the Old Balara branch because
Finolanconductsanaudittwiceamonth.19
ThepetitionerclaimedthatFinolanandtheauditorprodded
hertoadmitliabilityforthemissingpawneditemsotherwisean
administrative case will be filed against her. The prospect of
losing her job frightened her. The police car outside the Old
Balarabranchalsointimidatedher.Shewasbroughttothepolice
stationandwaseventuallysubjectedtoinquestproceedingsbut
was released for lack of evidence. She denied that there were
missingjewelriesfromtheOldBalarabranch.Shestressedthat
what was actually missing was cash, over which she had no
custodialduty.20
On rebuttal, Finolan clarified that the purpose of the
spot/surprise audit was to check for fake or overappraised
pawneditemsandnottocheckforinventoryanomalies. 21
TheRulingoftheRTC
InaDecision22datedMay8,2006,theRTCfoundsufficient
circumstantial evidence establishing that the petitioner
perpetrated the offense. The petitioner was entrusted with the
positionofvaultcustodiantaskedwiththeresponsibilityforall
pawned wares and to make sure that they were all intact and
safelykeptinthevault.Duringtheaudit,therewereopenitems
(unredeemedpawneditems)whichshecouldnotlocate.
She had in her possession pawn tickets pertaining to items
whichwerealreadyredeemed.Shesurrenderedthepawntickets
toFinolan,butwithoutthecorrespondingredemptionpayment.
Her position of vault custodian created a high degree of
confidence between her and the pawnshop which she gravely
abused.23Based on the appraisal value of the pieces of jewelry
coveredbythepawnticketssurrenderedbythepetitionerduring
auditbutwithoutthecorrespondingredemption
_______________
19Id.,atpp.505506.
20Id.,atpp.507508.
 21Id.,atp.508. _______________
22Id.,atpp.492511.
23Id.,atp.509.
24Id.,atpp.509511.
161 25Id.,atp.511.
VOL.776,DECEMBER7,2015 161 26Id.
Frontrerasvs.People 27Id.,atpp.512515.
payment, Cebuana suffered injury in the aggregate sum of 28Id.,atpp.525540.
P414,050.00.24
ThepetitionerscoaccusedSalazarandCarponwereacquitted
onthegroundofreasonabledoubt.25Accordingly,thedispositive 162
portionoftheRTCdecisionreadsasfollows: 162 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

Frontrerasvs.People
WHEREFORE, the Court finds [the petitioner] guilty
ithadearlierimposedtofour(4)years,two(2)monthsand
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
QUALIFIEDTHEFTdefinedandpenalizedinArticle310 one(1)dayofprisincorreccionalasminimumtoten(10)years
oftheRevisedPenalCode,sentencinghertherefortoan andone(1)dayofprisinmayorasmaximum,explainingthus:
indeterminatepenaltyoffourteen(14)yearsandeight(8)
months ofreclusion temporalas minimum to twenty (20) TheCourtishoweverinclinedtoreducethepenaltyby
considering the surrender of the pawn tickets as a
yearsofreclusiontemporalasmaximum,andorderingher
mitigatingcircumstanceanalogoustovoluntarysurrender
topayto[Cebuana]theamountofP414,050.00.
underArticle13,paragraph7,andthenecessitymentioned
On ground of reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby
inthehandwrittenexplanationasanalogoustoincomplete
renderedacquittingaccused[Salazar]and[Carpon]ofthe
justificationunderArticle11,paragraph4,xxxinrelation
offensechargedagainstthem.
toArticle13,paragraph1,oftheRevisedPenalCode.29
SOORDERED.26

Consequently, the previous RTC ruling was modified as
The petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing for her
follows:
acquittal for failure of the prosecution to establish her guilt

beyondreasonabledoubt.Shealsoquestionedthecorrectnessof
WHEREFORE,theCourtmaintainstheDecisiondated
thepenaltyimposedbytheRTC.27
May 8, 2006 finding [the petitioner] guilty beyond
In an Order28dated November 6, 2006, the RTC denied
reasonabledoubtasprincipalofthecrimeofQUALIFIED
reconsiderationonitsfindingofguiltbutitreducedthepenalty
 THEFTdefinedandpenalizedinArticle310oftheRevised
PenalCode,and,consideringthetwoanalogousmitigating
circumstances, modifies the penalty by sentencing her
therefortoanindeterminatepenaltyoffour(4)years,two
(2) months and one (1) day ofprisin correccionalas
minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day ofprisin
mayoras maximum, and ordering her to pay to
[CEBUANA]theamountofP414,050.00
SOORDERED.30
Undeterred, thepetitioner fileda MotionforAmendmentof
ModifiedPenalty31arguingthattheRTCerredintheapplication
oftheIndeterminateSentenceLaw.TheRTCdeniedthemotion
inanOrder32datedMarch8,2007.
_______________
29Id.,atp.539.
30Id.,atp.540.
31Id.,atpp.541543.
32Id.,atpp.547549.
163
VOL.776,DECEMBER7,2015
Frontrerasvs.People
TheRulingoftheCA
The petitioner appealed to the CA contending that the
inferences made by the RTC were based on unfounded facts,
since:(a)basedontheauditreportsforJune,July,Augustand
September of 1998, there were no anomalies occurring in
Cebuana;(b)noevidencewaspresentedtendingtoprovethatthe
petitionerhadtheexclusiverighttoenterthepawnshopsvault;
(c)nocomplaintfromclientsregardingthemissingpawneditems
waseverfiled.33
The CA rejected the petitioners arguments and upheld the
RTCsfindingsandconclusions.TheCAobservedthattheaudits
wereactuallynotauditreportspersebutratherreportsmadein
ordertodeterminetheprofitabilityofthepawnshop.Evenifthey
areconsideredasregularaudits,theirnaturewillnotpreclude
theexistenceoffraudbecausetheywereconductedonlyforthe
purpose of ascertaining fake items or if there was over
appraisal.34
Anentthepetitionersinsinuationthatanotherpersoncould
haveaccessedthevault,theCAheld:
[O]nly the Vault Custodian and the Area Manager,
Finolaninthiscase,knowsthecombinationofthevault.
Finolan, however, has no keys to the main door of the
branchandlikewisehasnokeystotheinnerdoor/gateof
the branch. Furthermore, nobody is allowed to enter the
vaultwithoutthepresenceoftheVaultCustodian.Thus,
thereissimplynowayforFinolanoranyotherpersonfor
thatmatter,tohavebeenabletoremoveitemsfromthe
vault.Consideringthecircumstancesandthesafeguards
employed,itisabsurdtoimputethecrimetoanyperson
163 otherthan[thepetitioner].
[Thepetitioner],ontheotherhand,asVaultCustodian,
hasdailyandunsupervisedaccesstothevault.Again,
_______________
33CARollo,pp.7677.
34Id.,atpp.145146.
 164 35Id.,atpp.146147.
164 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED 36Id.,atpp.147148.
Frontrerasvs.People 37Id.,atpp.152154.
she hasthe duty toensure the safekeeping of all the 38Id.,atpp.136155.
pawneditemsandjewelryinsidethebranchvault.Ifthere
39Id.,atpp.154155.
wasanyloss,sheshouldhaveimmediatelyreporteditto

hersuperiors.Thefactthatshefailedtodosoleadstoa

reasonable inference that she is the author of the
165
loss.35(Citationsomittedandunderscoringintheoriginal)
VOL.776,DECEMBER7,2015 165

TheCAfurtherheldthattheabsenceofanycomplaintfrom Frontrerasvs.People
Cebuanasclients does not necessarily mean that there was no Thepetitionermovedforreconsideration40buthermotionwas
loss.Inthepawnshopbusiness,itisnotuncommonforpeopleto deniedintheCAResolution 41datedDecember18,2009.Hence,
fail to redeem the valuables they pawned. The CA, thus, thepresentpetition42arguingthattheCA:
concludedthattheprosecutionwasabletoestablish:(1)thefact
ofloss;(2)thatthelosswasduetoanunlawfultaking;and(3) I.
that the unlawful taking was committed with grave abuse of COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN NOT FINDING
confidence.36 THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
TheCA,however,disagreedwiththeRTCthatthereturnby RENDERINGJUDGMENTUPONCONJECTURESAND
thepetitionerofthepawnticketscanbedeemedasthemitigating SURMISESVISVISTHE ABSENCE OF
circumstanceofvoluntarysurrender.TheCAexplainedthatthe CIRCUMSTANTIALEVIDENCE.
petitionerdidnotsurrenderherselftoapersoninauthorityand II.
thusmodifiedthepenaltyimposedonhertoreclusionperpetua.37 COMMITTEDANERROROFLAWBYCONCLUDING
Accordingly, the CA Decision38dated July 29, 2009 was THAT THE PETITIONER HAS TO SUFFER THE
disposedinthismanner: PENALTYOFRECLUSIONPERPETUA.43

WHEREFORE,theinstantappealisDISMISSEDforlackof TheRulingoftheCourt
merit and the assailed decision isAFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONinthatthe[petitioner]issentencedtosuffer TheCourtdeniesthepetition.
thepenaltyofreclusionperpetua. Theftiscommittedbyanypersonwho,withintenttogainbut
SOORDERED.39(Emphasisintheoriginal) without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force
uponthings,shalltakepersonalpropertyofanotherwithoutthe
_______________
lattersconsent.44Intenttogainoranimuslucrandiisaninternal
actthatispresumedfromtheunlawfultakingbytheoffenderof
thethingsubjectofasportation.45Theftbecomesqualifiedifitis
amongothers,committedwithgraveabuseofconfidence. 46
_______________
40Id.,atpp.156169.
41Id.,atpp.223227.
42Rollo,pp.931.
43Id.,atp.14.
44RevisedPenalCode,Article308,paragraph1.
45People v. Anabe, 644 Phil. 261, 282; 630 SCRA 10, 28
(2010).
46Id.;RevisedPenalCode,Article310.
166
166 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Frontrerasvs.People
Convictionforqualifiedtheftcommittedwithgraveabuseof
confidenceentailsthepresenceofallthefollowingelements:
1.Takingofpersonalproperty;
2.Thatthesaidpropertybelongstoanother;
3.Thatthesaidtakingbedonewithintenttogain;
4.Thatitbedonewithouttheownersconsent;
5.Thatitbeaccomplishedwithouttheuseofviolenceor
intimidationagainstpersons,norofforceuponthings;
6.Thatitbedonewithgraveabuseofconfidence. 47
Ontheotherhand,theelementsofcorpusdelictiintheftare:
(1)thatthepropertywaslostbytheowner;and(2)thatitwas
lostbyfelonioustaking.48
Theevidenceonrecordshowsthattheforegoingelementsare
present in this case. The prosecution has established beyond
reasonable doubt that the petitioner unlawfully deprived
Cebuana of cash/money when she took out pawned items and
releasedthemtoredeemingpledgorsinexchangeforredemption
paymentswhichshe,however,didnotturnovertothepawnshop,
andinsteadpocketedthemforherowngain.Shegravelyabused
theconfidenceconcurrentwithhersensitivepositionasavault
custodianwhensheexploitedherexclusiveandunlimitedaccess
to the vault to facilitate the unlawful taking. Her position
entailedahighdegreeofconfidencereposedbyCebuanaasshe
hadbeengranteddailyunsupervisedaccesstothevault. 49Also,
thepetitionerknew
_______________
47People v. Mirto, 675 Phil. 895, 906; 659 SCRA 796, 807
(2011).
48Ganv.People,550Phil.133,161162;521SCRA550,580
(2007).
49CARollo,p.147.
167
VOL.776,DECEMBER7,2015 167
Frontrerasvs.People
the combinations of the branchs vault 50and nobody was
allowedtoenterthevaultwithoutherpresence.51
The petitioner gravely abused such relation of trust and
confidence when she accessed and released the pawned items
under her custody, received the payments for their redemption submitted them during the spot audit along with a confession
butfailedtorecordsuchredemptionandremitthepaymentsto letterstatingthatportionsoftheP1,250,800.00missingvalueof
the cash collections of Cebuana. Without the authority and jewelrywereactuallyalreadyredeemed,thus:
consentofheremployer,sherepeatedlytookandappropriatedfor
herselftheredemptionpaymentspaidforthepawneditemswith Yungibapongitemaymgatubosnaatnakatagolang
theaggregateappraisedvalueofP414,050.00,52viz.: po ang papel. Nagsimula po ito noong buwan ng Hulyo.
Dalanarinpongmatindingpangangailangansapera.Ito
_______________
lamangpoangtangikongmailalahadatiyandinpoang
50TSN,February7,2000,pp.34. katotohanan.53

51Id.,atp.10.
Thetenoroftheforegoingdeclarationandthecircumstances
52FolderofExhibits,Exhibits"D""D61."
ofthepetitioneratthetimeshewroteandsignedit,allmilitate

against her bare allegation that she was threatened with an

administrativecaseunlesssheadmitshertransgression.
168
The petitioner wrote and signed the confession letter
168 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
spontaneously. When Escartin asked her if there are any
Frontrerasvs.People problemsintheOldBalarabranch,thepetitioneransweredthat
044867 4,000.00 042712 22,000.00 she will write down her explanation and will submit it to
044903 3,000.00 042576 13,000.00 Escartin.54The petitioner also told Talampas that if she will
044714 2,500.00 043394 10,000.00 escape,shewilljustbeafraidthatsomeonewillgoafterher
044938 2,300.00 043395 16,000.00 _______________
042988 2,500.00 042147 7,500.00
045029 2,300.00 041972 15,000.00 53Id.,atExhibitB.
043858 5,500.00 044060 12,000.00 54TSN,June19,2000,pp.1314.
043766 3,500.00 043027 7,000.00
043641 1,750.00 042987 2,500.00
045068 2,000.00 043035 5,200.00 169
VOL.776,DECEMBER7,2015 169
Frontrerasvs.People
Intenttogaincanbededucedfromthepetitionerspossession andthatshewilljustfacetheconsequences.55Talampasthen
oftheforegoingpawnticketswhichweresurrendered,together saw the petitioner make and sign the confession letter. 56When
withtheredemptionpaymentby theirrespectivepledgors. She
FinolanwenttotheOldBalarabranchforfurtherinvestigation,
Escartinhandedhertheconfessionletterfromthepetitioner. 57
The language of the confession letter was straightforward, 170
coherentandclear.Itborenosuspiciouscircumstancestendingto 170 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
castdoubtuponitsintegrityanditwasrepletewithdetailswhich Frontrerasvs.People
couldonlybeknowntothepetitioner.Moreover,itisobviousthat 1.OnOctober27,1998,EscartinandTalampasconducteda
losingonesjobinanadministrativecaseislesscumbersomethan spotauditattheOldBalarabranchofCebuana.59
riskingoneslibertybyconfessingtoacrimeonedidnotreally 2. Escartin counterchecked the computer list of all pawned
commit.Itisthusimplausibleforonetobecajoledintoconfessing
items not yet redeemedvisvisthe actual stocks in the vault
toawrongdoingatthemereprospectoflosinghis/herjob.The
anddiscoveredthatthereweremissingitems. 60
petitioners declarations to Talampas show that she fully
3.Escartinaskedthepetitionerifthereareanyproblemsin
understoodtheconsequencesofherconfession.Shealsoexecuted
the branch. The latter answered that she will just write down
the letter even before Finolan came to the Old Balara branch,
everything that happened and hand over her explanation to
thus,negatingherclaimthatthelatterthreatenedherwithan
Escartin.61
administrativesanction.
4. After receiving the audit report on October 28, 1998,
Aconfession,whetherjudicialorextrajudicial,ifvoluntarily
Finolan proceeded to the Old Balara branch and conducted an
andfreelymade,constitutesevidenceofahighordersinceitis
investigation.62
supportedbythestrongpresumptionthatnosanepersonorone
5.WhenTalampasreportedforworkonOctober28,1998,the
ofnormalmindwilldeliberatelyandknowinglyconfesshimselfto
petitioner told her that she thought about what happened and
be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and
thatsheisafraidthatsomeonewillbegoingafterherifshewill
conscience. The admissibility and validity of a confession, thus
runawayandsoshehastofacetheconsequences.63
hingesonitsvoluntariness,58aconditionvividlypresentinthis
6. Talampas thereafter saw the petitioner write and sign a
case.
confessionletter.64
Thepetitionersextrajudicialwrittenconfessioncoupledwith
7.TheletterwasgiventoFinolanwhenhewenttotheOld
the following circumstantial evidence all point to her as the
Balarabranchtoinvestigate.65
perpetratoroftheunlawfultaking:
8. In the letter, the petitioner admitted that some of the
_______________
missing pawned items were already redeemed. She also stated
thatshehadextremeneedformoney.66
55TSN,November7,2001,p.17.
_______________
56Id.,atpp.1819.
57TSN,October5,1999,pp.910. 59TSN,June19,2000,pp.56.
58Peoplev.Satorre,456Phil.98,107;408SCRA642,647 60Id.,atp.11.
(2003).
 61Id.,atpp.1314. pesos,butifthevalueofthethingstolenexceedsthe
62TSN,October5,1999,pp.89. latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum
63TSN,November7,2001,p.17. periodoftheoneprescribedinthis
64Id.,atpp.1819. _______________
65TSN,October5,1999,p.10.
66CARollo,p.224. 67TSN,October5,1999,p.17;TSN,November7,2001,p.24.
68TSN,December13,1999,pp.1213.
69Id.,atp.14.
171 70Id.,atp.15.
VOL.776,DECEMBER7,2015 171 71Art.310.Qualified theft.The crime of theft shall be
Frontrerasvs.People punishedbythepenaltiesnexthigherbytwodegreesthanthose
9.ThepetitionerthenhandedovertoFinolanoriginalpawn respectivelyspecifiedinthenextprecedingarticle,ifcommitted
tickets.67 byadomesticservant,orwithgraveabuseofconfidence,orifthe
10. Finolan observed that the pawn tickets were already property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or
redeemed or paid by their respective pledgors as evidenced by consistsofcoconutstakenfromthepremisesoftheplantationor
theirsignaturesofvalidation.68 fishtakenfromafishpondorfishery,orifpropertyistakenon
11.Therearenorecordsofredemptiontransactionsunderthe the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
saidpawntickets.69 anyothercalamity,vehicularaccidentorcivildisturbance.
12.Thepetitionerdidnotconveyanyredemptionpaymentto
Finolanortothepawnshop.70
172
Penalty 172 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Frontrerasvs.People
Under Article 31071of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the paragraph,andoneyearforeachadditionalten
penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher than that thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
specifiedinArticle309whichstates: may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
suchcases,andinconnectionwiththeaccessorypenalties
Art.309.Penalties.Anypersonguiltyof theftshall which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
bepunishedby: provisionsofthisCode,thepenaltyshallbetermedprisin
1.The penalty ofprisin mayorin its minimum
mayororreclusiontemporal,asthecasemaybe.
andmediumperiods,ifthevalueofthethingstolen xxxx(Emphasisoursanditalicsintheoriginal)
ismorethan12,000pesosbutdoesnotexceed22,000
 Considering that the value involved in the present case
exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty isprisin mayorin its
minimumandmediumperiods.
Anent the graduation of penalty for qualified theft and the
imposition of incremental penalty for the amount in excess of
P22,000.00, the ruling espoused inRingor v. People72is hereby
adopted.
Since the petitioner committed qualified theft, the penalty
shallbetwodegreeshigherorreclusiontemporalinitsmedium
andmaximumperiods,73whichshallbeimposedinitsmaximum
periodwhichhasarangeofseventeen(17)years,four(4)months
andone(1)daytotwenty(20)years.74
The incremental penalty shall then be determined by
deductingP22,000.00fromtheamountinvolvedorP414,050.00.
ThiswillyieldtheamountofP392,050.00whichwouldthenbe
divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than
P10,000.00.75Theendresultisthat39yearsshouldbeaddedto
the principal penalty. The total imposable penalty, however,
shouldnotexceed20yearsandassuch,themaximumimposable
penaltyinthiscaseis20yearsofreclusiontemporal.76
_______________
72Ringorv.People,G.R.No.198904,December11,2013,712
SCRA622.
73Id.,atp.634.
74RevisedPenalCode,Article76.
75SeePeople v. Ocden, 665 Phil. 268, 294; 650 SCRA 124,
151(2011).
76Ringorv.People,supraatp.634.
173
VOL.776,DECEMBER7,2015 173
Frontrerasvs.People
Anenttheappreciationofmitigatingcircumstances,theCourt
agreeswiththeRTCthatthepetitionersextrajudicialconfession
through the handwritten letter coupled with her act of
surrenderingtheredeemedpawnticketsandthereaftergoingto
thepolicestationcanbetakenasananalogouscircumstanceof
voluntarysurrenderunderArticle13,paragraph10 77inrelation
toparagraph778oftheRPC.
Basedonthesameextrajudicialconfession,thepetitioneris
also entitled to the mitigating circumstance of no intention to
commitsograveawrongunderparagraph379againinrelationto
paragraph 10 both of Article 13. Based on her letter, the
petitionermisappropriated theredemptionpayments underher
custody and control because she was constrained by extreme
necessityformoney.
Thisisnottopromotemonetarycrisisasanexcusetocommit
a crime or to embolden a person entrusted with funds or
properties to feloniously access the same, but rather to
underscoretheutmostconsiderationintheCourtsexerciseofits
discretionalpowertoimposepenalties,thatisaguiltyperson
deservesthepenaltygiventheattendantcircumstances
_______________
77Art.13.Mitigating circumstances.The following are
mitigatingcircumstances:xxxx
10.Andfinally,anyothercircumstancesofasimilarnature
andanalogoustothoseabovementioned.
78Art.13.Mitigating circumstances.The following are
mitigatingcircumstances:
xxxx
 7.Thattheoffenderhadvoluntarilysurrenderedhimselftoa
person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily
confessedhisguiltbeforethecourtpriortothepresentationofthe
evidencefortheprosecution.
79Art.13.Mitigating circumstances.The following are
mitigatingcircumstances:
xxxx
3.Thattheoffenderhadnointentiontocommitsogravea
wrongasthatcommitted.
174
174 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Frontrerasvs.People
and commensurate with the gravity of the offense
committed.80From such standpoint, the Court finds it prudent
thatunlesstheforegoinganalogousmitigatingcircumstancesare
appreciated in her favor, the petitioner will be penalized
excessively.
Areductionintheimposablepenaltybyonedegreeisthusin
orderpursuanttoArticle64(5)oftheRPCwhichstatesthatwhen
there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no
aggravatingcircumstancesarepresent,thecourtshallimposethe
penaltynextlowertothatprescribedbylaw,intheperiodthatit
maydeemapplicable,accordingtothenumberandnatureofsuch
circumstances.Assuch,thepenaltynextlowerindegreewhich
isprisinmayorinitsmediumperiodshouldbeimposed.
ApplyingtheIndeterminateSentenceLaw,theminimumterm
shallbetakenfromthepenaltynextloweroranywherewithin
thefullrangeofprisincorreccionalorsix(6)monthsandone(1)
daytosix(6)years,whiletheindeterminatemaximumpenalty
shallbefixedanywherewithintherangeofprisinmayorinits
mediumperiodoreight(8)yearsandone(1)daytoten(10)years.
The penalty imposed by the CA should thus be modified to
conformtotheforegoingfindings.
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theDecisiondatedJuly
29, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.G.R. CR No. 30909
isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONas to the imposed
penaltysuchthatthepetitioner,Ma.PazFrontrerasyIlagan,is
sentencedtosuffertheindeterminatepenaltyoffour(4)years,
two (2) months and one (1) day ofprisin
correccionalasminimumto ten (10) years ofprisin
mayorasmaximum.
SOORDERED.
_______________
80Perez v. People, 568 Phil. 491, 524; 544 SCRA 532, 568
(2008).
175
VOL.776,DECEMBER7,2015 175
Frontrerasvs.People
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Del
Castillo**andJardeleza,JJ.,concur.
Judgmentaffirmedwithmodification.
Notes.A confession [or admission] is presumed voluntary
untilthecontraryisprovedandtheconfessantbearstheburden
of proving the contrary. (Tanenggee vs. People,699 SCRA639
[2013])
Graveabuseofconfidence,asanelementofQualifiedTheft,
must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence,
guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the
offended party that might create a high degree of confidence
between them which the appellant abused. (People vs.
Cahilig,731SCRA414[2014])


o0o
_______________

**DesignatedadditionalmemberperRaffledatedJanuary5,
2015viceAssociateJusticeMartinS.Villarama,Jr.
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved. VOL.221,MAY11,1993 715
Peoplevs.Santos
G.R.Nos.10022526.May11,1993.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,vs.RAUL
SANTOS y NARCISO, MARIO MORALES y BACANI, PETER
DOEandRICHARDDOE,accused.RAULSANTOSyNARCISO,
accusedappellant.
Criminal Procedure;Right to Counsel;There exists no real
necessitytoaffordservicesofcounseltoasuspectofacrimeinthe
course of a police lineup provided that said suspect is not
subjectedtoanyinvestigationorinterrogationinordertoextract
admissionorconfessionwithouttheassistanceofcounsel.Since
appellant Santos then had no lawyer present nor was one
provided,hiscounselargues,Santossidentificationwastainted
and inadmissible. The argument is creative, but has no legal
basis. InGamboav.Cruz,theCourtsaidthatthere isnoreal
needtoaffordasuspecttheserviceofcounselatpolicelineup,a
declaration reiterated inPeople v. Loveria.The customary
practiceis,ofcourse,thatitisthewitnesswhoisinvestigatedor
interrogated in the course of a police lineup and who gives a
statement to the police, rather than the accused who is not
questionedatallatthatstage.TheCourtisawareofthecaveat
inGamboa.Butthereisnothingintherecordofthiscasewhich
showsthatinthecourseofthelineup,thepoliceinvestigators
sought to extract any admission or confession from appellant
Santos. The investigators did not in fact interrogate appellant
Santosduring thelineup and heremainedsilentafterhehad
beenidentifiedbyBautistaandBohol.
Evidence;Similar Acts as Evidence;An affidavit of a
prosecutionwitnessinacase,otherthantheinstantone,shallbe
admissible in evidence for the limited purpose of proving
knowledge,planorschemeemployedbytheaccusedandfailureto
seasonablyobjecttoitsadmissionisdeemedwaiverofthehearsay
character ofsaid evidence; Case at bar.Appellant Santos now
complains that the affidavit of Ronaldo Guerrero was hearsay
evidence, considering that the prosecution did not present
RonaldoGuerreroasawitnessduringthetrial.Weconsiderthat
thetrialcourtdidnotcommitreversibleerrorinadmittingthe
Guerreroaffidavitforthelimitedpurposeforprovingknowledge
or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that appellant knew
thattheparticularcorneroftwo(2)particularstreetsinMalabon
was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its passengers.
Appellantalsohad
_______________
*
THIRDDIVISION.
716
7 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
16
Peoplevs.Santos
waived the hearsay character of this evidence by failure
seasonablytoobjecttotheadmissionoftheaffidavit;itistoolate
in that day to raise the hearsay rule in the appellants
memorandumafterprosecutionanddefensehadpresentedtheir
respectivecasesandhadmadetheirrespectiveoffersofevidence.
Same;DefenseofAlibi;Defenseofalibicannotprevailover
the positive identification of the accused by credible witnesses,
especiallywherethewitnessisthevictimcomplainanthimself.
Inrespectoftheweightproperlygiventoadefenseofalibi,the
Courthas,timesbeyondnumbering,ruledthatsuchdefenseis
weakmostespeciallywhenestablishedexclusivelyormainlyby
theaccusedhimselfandhisrelativesandnotbyindependentand
crediblepersons,andthatsuchadefensewillnotprevailoverthe
positive identification made by credible witnesses, especially
wherethewitnessisthevictimcomplainanthimself.
APPEALfromthejudgmentoftheRegionalTrialCourtof
Malabon,Br.72.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
ValmonteLawOfficesforaccusedappellant.
FELICIANO,J.:
Raul N. Santos appeals from a judgment of the trial court
convictinghimofmurderandfrustratedmurder.
On26October1989,appellantSantoswaschargedwiththe
crimes of murder with the use of unlicensed firearms and
frustratedmurder,underthefollowinginformations:
InCrim.CaseNo.8517MN:1
Thatonoraboutthe26thdayofMay,1989inNavotas,Metro
ManilaandwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,the
abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating together and
mutuallyhelpingwithoneanother,withoutanyjustifiablecause,
with deliberate intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniouslyshootGLICERIOCUPCUPINy
_______________
1
Records,p.73.
717
VOL.221,MAY11,1993
Peoplevs.Santos
REYESwiththeuseofunlicensedfirearmsofunknowncaliber,
therebyinflictinguponthelatterseriousphysicalinjurieswhich
causedhisdeathattheTondoMedicalCenter,Manila.
ContrarytoLaw.
InCrim.CaseNo.8518MN:2
Thatonoraboutthe26thdayofMay,1989inNavotas,Metro
ManilaandwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,the
abovenamedaccused,conspiringtogetherandmutuallyhelping
withoneanother,withoutanyjustifiablecause,withdeliberate
intenttokill,treacheryandevidentpremeditationdid,thenand
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot ALBERTO
BAUTISTAYCAYETANO,withtheuseoffirearmsofunknown
caliber, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical
injuries, thus performing all the acts of execution which would
haveproducedthecrimeofMURDERasaconsequencebutwhich
neverthelessdidnotproduceitbyreasonofcausesindependentof
thewillofthehereinaccused,thatisduetothetimely,ableand
efficientmedicalattendancerenderedtothevictimattheTondo
MedicalCenter,Manila.
ContrarytoLaw.
Three(3)otherpersonswerechargedinthesameinformations.
Upon request of the City Prosecutor who had conducted a re
investigationofthecases,thetrialcourtorderedtheamendment
oftheinformationson4April1990soastoinsertthenameofone
MarioMorales,inlieuofJohnDoe,asacoaccused.Moralesfor
whomawarrantofarrestwasissued,is,however,stillatlarge.
Theidentitiesofthetwo(2)otheraccusedremainunknown.
Atarraignment,RaulSantosenteredapleaofnotguilty.A
jointtrialofthetwo(2)criminalcasesensued,culminatingina
717 judgmentofconviction.Thedispositiveportionofthisjudgment
readsasfollows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
renderedfindingaccusedRaul Santos guiltybeyond reasonable
doubtoftheoffenseschargedagainsthiminthesecases.Heis
accordinglysentencedtotwo(2)prisontermsasfollows:
1. 1)InCrim.CaseNo.8517MNforMurder,tolifeimprison
_______________
2
Id.at71.
718
718 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Santos
1. ment,thedeathpenaltywhichshouldhavebeenimposed
in this case having been abolished under the present
Constitution;
 2. 2)InCrim.CaseNo.8518MNforFrustratedMurder,toa
prison term ranging from SIX (6) YEARS ofprision
correccional, as minimumto TWELVE (12) YEARS
ofprisionmayorasmaximum.
Accused Santos is also ordered to proportionately pay the
heirsofGlicerioCupcupinthesumofP30,000.00forthelossof
the latters life and to pay said heirs, proportionately also,
P100,000.00bywayofindemnificationfortheexpensesincurred
inconnectionwithCupcupinsdeath.
Costsagainstaccusedinbothcases.
SOORDERED.3
Therelevantfactsasfoundbythetrialcourtarethefollowing:
Glicerio Cupcupin and Alberto Bautista were riding on a jeep
drivenbytheformeronMay26,1989.Ataround11:45oclockin
themorningofsaiddate,thejeepwasatastopatthecornerof
EstrellaandYangcoStreetsinNavotas,MetroManilaandwas
about to make a right turn when two (2) persons armed with
short guns approached the jeep and fired at Cupcupin and
Bautista.Cupcupinwashitseveraltimesindifferentpartsofhis
bodyandhediedasaresultofthemultiplegunshotwoundshe
sustained(Exh. V). Bautistasustainedgunshotwounds, one at
theleftthigh,oneinthelowerabdomen,oneatthebackofthe
rightfootandanotheratthebackofthebody.Bautistawasable
torunawayevenashewasbeingfiredupon.Hetookcoverina
store.Theonefiringthegunathimwasamanhelateridentified
tobeaccusedRaulSantos.Theotheronewhichhesawsimilarly
firinghisgunwasaimingatCupcupin.Heidentifiedthemanto
be one Mario Morales. He added that he saw Cupcupin hit by
gunshotsattheleftsideofthebodynearthewaistwhichmade
Cupcupin falloff the steering wheel. After running away,
Bautista couldnot rememberanymorewhatelsehappened.He
couldnotsayiftherewereotherpersonswhoshotathimand
Cupcupin. After hearing a shout that the ambushers were no
longeraround,helearnedthatawomanbystanderwashitand
was boarded on a jeep to be brought to the hospital. He was
boarded on said jeep too but later transferred to a tricycle
somewhere at Bayanbayanan. Bautista was brought to the
Martinez General Hospital and to the Mary Johnston Hospital
wherehewastreated.Bautistawasoperatedon(Exhs.B,B1,C,
D and E). Upon the apprehension of accused Santos, Bautista
wenttothepoliceheadquarterswherehe
_______________
3
Id.,p.191;underscoringintheoriginal.
719
VOL.221,MAY11,1993 719
Peoplevs.Santos
pickedoutfromalineupaccusedRaulSantos.Inanotherline
up, he also picked out accused Morales. Bautista also gave a
swornstatementnarratingtheshootingincident(Exh.F).
PoliceAideVictorinoBoholwasondutyanddirectingtraffic
atthecornerofPlazaRizalandEstrellaStreetswhenheheard
gunshots. When he looked around he saw two (2) persons who
wereholdingCal.45pistolsfiringatpersonsonboardastainless
steelownerjeep.Boholwasnotabletoapproachthemenfiring
theirgunsbecausehewasnotprovidedwithagun.Whathedid
was to run to headquarters to call for policemen and when he
returnedtothesceneoftheshootinghelearnedthatoneofthe
passengersofthejeepwaskilled.Helearnedalsothattheslain
manwasGlicerioCupcupinandthathiscompanionwasAlberto
BautistaaliasTiwa.Boholalsoaddedthatthereweretwo(2)
otherpersonswhowerealsofiringatthepassengersofthejeep
althoughhedidnotrecognizethesetwo(2)otherpersons.After
thearrestofaccusedSantos,Boholwascalledtothepolicestation
and through a oneway mirror he was able to identify accused
Santos as oneofthepersonswhoshotCupcupin andBautista.
Boholalsogaveaswornstatementtothepolice(Exh.A).
Oncrossexamination,Boholadmittedthatatthetimeofthe
shootinghewasattheJimBreadStoretalkingtosomeone.When
heheardgunshotshestoodupatonceandsawfour(4)menfiring
their guns at the same time at the jeep. He added that the
accused was arrested some months later in connection with
another shooting incident wherein Santos was suspected of
involvement.HeconfirmedthatBautistawasbeingshotatwhile
runningawayfromtheplace.
Cpl.SabinoPatoodoftheNavotasPolicedeclaredthathewas
investigatingashootingincidentwhichresultedinthedeathof
oneAbdulRosaswhereinthesuspectwasaccusedSantoswhen
hewastippedbypoliceintelligenceoperativesthatSantoswas
involved in the ambush of Cupcupin. This made him conduct
further investigation by calling for Bautista and Bohol. Patood
also interviewed Santos who admitted his participation in the
ambush to him. He did not take any written statement from
accused Santos because there was no counsel available at that
time and because Santos was not willing to give any written
statement.
Dr. Maximo Reyes of the NBI Medico Legal Division
performed an autopsy on the cadaver of victim Cupcupin and
foundoutthatthelattersustainednineteen(19)gunshotwounds
in different parts of his body. The cause of death was severe
hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds. Dr. Reyes
added that the assailants were probably at the left side of the
victimastheywereshootingatthelatterwiththevictimpossibly
seatedatthetimehewasshotandhit.
ThevictimswifeLuciaCupcupindeclaredthatP100,000.00
was
720
720 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Santos
spent in connection with the death of her husband who was
earning P5,000.00 a month as a businessman dealing in junk
materialsandmarble.4
The trial court found that the accused Raul Santos had been
identified positively by the surviving victim of the shooting
incidentAlberto Bautista, and by the Traffic Aide who had
witnessed the execution of the crimeVictorino Bohol. The
defense of alibi offered by the accused and supported by the
testimonies of a friend and a sister, was rejected as weak and
unavailing.Asnoted,ajudgmentofconvictionfollowed.
In his appeal, Raul Santos assigns the following as errors
committedbythetrialcourt:
1. ithe lower court erred in holding that accuseds
identification by prosecutions witnesses was positive
and,thereforeiterredwhenitrejectedaccusedsdefense
ofalibi.
2. iithelowercourterredinconsideringoneofthetwocases
(not the instant ones) filed against the accused in
holdingalsoforhisguilt.
3. iiithelowercourterredinconvictingtheaccused.5
Inrespectofthefirstassignederror,appellantSantoscontends
thatthetestimoniesoftheprincipalprosecutionwitnessesdonot
conform with the knowledge and common experience of
mankind. Appellant argues that the two (2) prosecution
witnesses, the victim Bautista and Police Aide Bohol, testified
thattheysawtheaccusedforthefirsttimeintheirliveswhenthe
crimewascommittedandyetidentifiedhimasoneofthegunmen
five(5)monthslaterinthePoliceHeadquartersinNavotas.The
ambuscadeandtheslayingofGlicerioCupcupinhappenedon26
May1989;appellantSantoswasidentifiedatthepolicestationon
25 October 1989. Appellant argues that this lapse of time was
unreasonable, which, when coupled with the brief, limited and
obstructed view which the prosecution witnesses had of the
gunmenatthetimeoftheshooting,castsseriousdoubtonthe
accuracyandreliabilityoftheidentificationbythewitnesses.
Appellantsargumentdoesnotpersuade.
_______________
Id.at19294.
4
5
Rollo,pp.6364;AppellantsBrief,pp.67.
721
VOL.221,MAY11,1993
Peoplevs.Santos
PoliceAideBohol wasonlyabouttwelve(12) armlengthsaway
from the ambush vehicle. The ambush slaying occurred under
conditions of high visibility: the victim Cupcupin was shot to
deathat11:45oclockinthemorning,ingoodweather,whenthe
sunwasalmostatitszenith.Oncrossexamination,Boholstated
thattherewerenopassingvehiclesthatblockedhisviewofthe
slayingofthevictimasthevehiclesstoppedsomedistanceaway
from the jeep when the shooting began. In addition, Bohol
testifiedthathesawoneofthegunmentakeawristwatchanda
gun from Cupcupins lifeless body. Clearly, Bohol had the
opportunity to observe the extraordinary and startling events
which unfolded on thecorner of two (2)busy streets almost at
high noon, events which may be expected to leave a strong
impression upon the minds of an eyewitness who, like Police
Aide Bohol, had a duty to maintain law and order. Alberto
Bautistawhohadbeenridingonajeepandwhoescapeddeath
(but not gunshot wounds) by reason of his quick reflexes, had
everyreasontorememberthefacesofthosewhomhesawfiring
atthejeepandathimself.Thishasbeenrecognizedanumberof
timesinourcaselaw.InPeoplev.Jacolo,etal.,6theCourtsaid:
[W]hileevidenceastotheidentityoftheaccusedastheperson
who committed the crime should be carefully analyzed, x x
xwheretheconditionsofvisibilityarefavorableandthewitness
doesnotappeartobebiasedagainstthemanonthedock,hisor
herassertionsastotheidentityofthemalefactorshouldnormally
beaccepted.Andthisismoresowherethewitnessisthevictimor
his nearrelative, as in this case, because these (people) usually
strivetorememberthefacesoftheassailants.7(Italicssupplied).
AppellantSantosalsocontendedthatPoliceAideBoholcouldnot
have had a clear view of the ambuscade and the shooting of
721 Cupcupin since he (Bohol) was situated on the left side of the
gunmen.AsobservedbytheSolicitorGeneral,however,thetrial
courthadpointedoutthatifhe[Bohol]wastothefrontrightof
_______________
6
G.R.No.94470,16December1992.
7
People v. Jacolo, et al.,G.R. No. 94470, December 16,
1992;People v. Alvarez,169 SCRA 731(1989);People v.
Bernat,120SCRA918(1983).
722
722 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Santos
thejeepthenhemust[havebeen]alittlebytheleftsideofthe
persons firing atthe jeep x x x. 8Bohols view, therefore, the
SolicitorGeneralcontinued,wasnotlimitedtotheleftsideofthe
assailants,especiallysincehewasabletoseethem[thegunmen]
move around the site of the ambush after they [had] stopped
firing,specificallywhenoneofthemstrippedvictimCupcupinof
his gun and jewelry and they all walked away from that
place.9ThetrialcourtobviouslyconcludedthatBoholhadample
opportunityactuallytoobservetheeventsonwhichhetestified,
andwefindnobasisforoverturningthisconclusionofthetrial
court.
In respect of the identification by Bautista, accused also
suggeststhatBautistahadnorealopportunitytoseeandimpress
upon his memory the faces of the assailants. In his testimony,
Bautistastatedthattwo(2)menarmedwithhandgunssuddenly
approachedthejeepinwhichheandCupcupinwereriding.He
agreed that his attention had been focused (defense counsels
own language) on vehicles passing along Estrella Street as
Cupcupinmaneuveredthejeeptoturnrightatthecornerandto
head towards Navotas. When the assailants started shooting,
Bautistajumpedfromthejeep,washitontheleftthighandother
parts ofthe body, but managed torun forcover fromrepeated
shotsorburstsofgunfire.Bautistatestifiedfurtherthathewas
shotbyappellantRaulSantoswhileMoralespumpedbulletsinto
Cupcupin;thatthegunmenfiredatCupcupinandBautistafrom
closerange,Moralesbeingamerehalfanarmlengthtotheleftof
CupcupinwhileappellantSantoswasabouttwo(2)armlengths
away from the ambushed jeep; and that Bautista saw his
companion,Cupcupin,slumponthesteeringwheelasthebullets
crashedintohim.Oncemore,thetrialcourtwasledbytheabove
circumstances to conclude that Bautista had adequate
opportunitytoseeappellantSantosandtoretainhisfaceinhis
memory.Wefindnobasisforrejectingthisfactualconclusionof
thetrialcourt.
AppellantSantosmakestwo(2)additionalarguments.Firstly,
hecomplainsthathewasnotaffordedhisrighttocounselinthe
_______________
8
TSN,7February1990,p.27.
9
AppelleesBrief,pp.56;TSN,10January1990,pp.1315.
723
VOL.221,MAY11,1993 723
Peoplevs.Santos
courseof thepolicelineup, atthepolicestationwhere hewas
identifiedbytheprosecutionwitnesses.Thisargument,ofcourse,
assumes that during the police lineup, accused was under
custodialinvestigation,astagewhich, pertheappellant,began
the instant the police suspected him of involvement in the
ambuscade.SinceappellantSantosthenhadnolawyerpresent
norwasoneprovided,hiscounselargues,Santossidentification
wastaintedandinadmissible.Theargumentiscreative,buthas
nolegalbasis.InGamboav.Cruz,10theCourtsaidthatthereis
norealneedtoaffordasuspecttheserviceofcounselatpolice
lineup,11a declaration reiterated inPeople v. Loveria.12The
customary practice is, of course, that it is the witness who is
investigatedorinterrogatedinthecourseofapolicelineupand
whogivesastatementtothepolice,ratherthantheaccusedwho
isnotquestionedatallatthatstage.TheCourtisawareofthe
caveatinGamboa.13Butthereisnothingintherecordofthiscase
which shows that in the course of the lineup, the police
investigatorssoughttoextractanyadmissionorconfessionfrom
appellant Santos. The investigators did not in fact interrogate
appellantSantosduringthelineupandheremainedsilentafter
hehadbeenidentifiedbyBautistaandBohol.
AppellantSantosssecondcontentionisthattherehadbeen
improper suggestiveness in the course of the police lineup
amounting to an uncounselled confession. In effect, defense
counsel claims that Bautista and Bohol were induced by the
police investigators to point to appellant Santos as one of the No,sir.Somebodyapproachedmeandsaid,iyanpo.Butbeforeanswering,
gunmen.Therecorddoesnotshowthatthepoliceinvestigators Imadeaverycarefullookattheperson.14
had coached Bautista. Appellant Santos counsel directed the We are not convinced, however, that the phraseiyan
attentionofthisCourttoaportionofBoholstestimonyduring
poconstituted an improper suggestion, certainly not in the
crossexamination,towit:
context of a situation where, as here, appellant Santos was
_______________ identified successively by Bautista and Bohol from a group of
persons. We consider that the phraseiyan pois too cryptic.
10
162SCRA643(1988). WhatthisCourtwarnedagainstinPeoplev.Acosta,15i.e.,against
11
162SCRAat651. an identification process that was pointedly suggestive, or
12
187SCRA47(1990). generated confidence when there was none, activated visual
13
...themomentthereisamoveorevenanurgeofsaid imagination,andalltold,subverted[apersons]reliabilityas[an]
investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain eyewitness[..],hasnotbeensuccessfullyshowninthecaseat
informationwhichmayappearinnocentorinnocuousatthetime, bar.
from said suspect, he should there and then be assisted by Appellant Santos next seeks to assail the credibility of
counsel,unlesshewaivestheright,butthewaivershallbemade Bautista and Bohol by citing supposed inconsistencies between
inwritingandinthepresenceofcounsel.(Gamboa,162SCRA statements made in their affidavits before trial and their
651). testimony given in the course of the trial. Appellants counsel
724 complains16that while witness Bohol could recall the gunmens
724 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED generalappearance,hecouldnotrememberthekindofshoesthat
appellantSantoswaswearingnorthecoloroftheirguns;thathe
Peoplevs.Santos
had stated in his sworn statement that he had picked out
Atty.Valmonte:
appellantSantosfromalineupconsistingofseven(7)persons,
Alright,thatsomebodywhotoldyoutogototheofficeofCapt.Puzonyou whilehetestifiedinopencourtthathehadidentifiedappellant
wereinformedthatontheothersideoftheofficeofCapt.Puzontherewas when thelatter was togetherwith onlyone (1)detaineeinthe
alreadythepersonwhomtheywouldliketoidentify? investi
VictorinoBohol:
Yes,sir. _______________
Atty.Valmonte: 14
TSN,14February1990,at27.
Andwastheresomebodywhoaskedyouwhoamongthoseinthe 15
SeePeoplev.Acosta,187SCRA39,45(1990).
investigationroomthepersonwhomyousaw? 16
AppellantsBrief,pp.1418;Rollo,pp.7173.
VictorinoBohol: 725
 VOL.221,MAY11,1993
Peoplevs.Santos
gationroomofthepolicestation;thatBoholhadinitiallystated
thatBautistawasdrivingthejeepbutondirectexamination,he
stated that it was Cupcupininstead who had been driving the
jeep;thatinhisswornstatement,Boholhadclaimedthathewas
directing traffic when he first heard gunshots, but on cross
examination,statedthatatthatpointhewasengagedintaking
hismerienda.
Closeexaminationoftherecordwill,however,showthatthe
supposedinconsistenciesadducedbyappellantSantosareeither
nonexistent or clearly minor and inconsequential in character.
ThefactthatwitnessBoholmightnothaverememberedthekind
ofshoesappellantSantoswaswearingonthatviolentoccasion
northecolorofthegunmensweapons,isclearlyinconsequential
ClosescrutinyoftheswornstatementofBohol(ExhibitA)does
notrevealanystatementthathe(Bohol)hadpickedoutappellant
Santos from a seven (7)person lineup nor does the transcript
show that witness Bohol had identified appellant Santos when
appellantwasalonewithonlyonedetaineeintheinvestigation
roomatthepolicestation,17Appellantscounseldidnotdocument
his averments. Moreover, as pointed out by the Solicitor
General,18whetherapolicelineupconsistedoftwo(2)orseven(7)
persons is actually immaterial since a police lineup is not
essentialtoaproperandpositiveidentification. 19Whetheritwas
BautistaorCupcupinwhohadbeendrivingthejeepandwhether
Bohol was directing traffic or enjoying hismeriendawhen the
firstgunshotsrangout,cannotberegardedascriticalinnature;
suchquestionsdonotdetractfromthebasicfactsthatBoholwas
inapositiontoseeanddidseetheambushandtheshootingof
CupcupinandBautistaandsawbothassailantsandthevictims.
The entrenched principle is that minor inconsistencies in the
725 testimonyofawitnesstendtostrengthenratherthantoweaken
the credibility of the witness as they erase any suspicion of
rehearsedtestimony.20
_______________
17
SeeTSN,10January1990,pp.2628.
18
AppelleesBrief,p.10.
19
People v. Salviero, 198 SCRA 357 (1991);People v.
Espiritu,191SCRA503(1990).
20
People v. Kalubiran,196 SCRA 447(1991);People v.
Lagota,194 SCRA 92(1991);People v. Martinada,194 SCRA
36(1991);People
726
726 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Santos
In his second assignment of error, appellant Santos in effect
questionsthetrialcourtforadmittingaswornstatementbyone
RonaldoGuerrero(ExhibitEE),awitnessinanothercriminal
case(CriminalCaseNo.8117)whereappellantSantoswasalso
chargedwiththemurderofoneDanielNuguerawhichhadtaken
placeintheverysamesitewhereBautistaandCupcupinwere
ambushed,i.e.,atthecornerofYangcoStreetandEstrellaStreet,
Malabon,MetroManila.Whentheprosecutionfirstpresentedthe
swornstatementofGuerreroinordertoshowcriminalpropensity
onthepartofappellantSantos,thedefenseobjectedtoadmission
ofsuchswornstatement;thetrialcourtsustainedtheobjection
andrejectedtheevidenceforthepurposeitwasinitiallyoffered.
However,thetrialcourtadmittedthesameasfallingwithinone
ormoreoftheexceptionssetoutinSection34,Rule130ofthe
RulesofCourt,whichreads:
Sec.34.SimilarActsasEvidence.Evidencethatonedidordid
notdoacertainthingatonetimeisnotadmissibletoprovethat
hedidordidnotdothesameorasimilarthingatanothertime;
butit may be received to provea specific intent
orknowledge,identity,plan,system,scheme,habit, custom or
usageandthelike.(Italicssupplied).
Appellant Santos now complains that the affidavit of Ronaldo
Guerrerowashearsayevidence,consideringthattheprosecution
didnotpresentRonaldoGuerreroasawitnessduringthetrial.
Weconsiderthatthetrialcourtdidnotcommitreversibleerrorin
admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the limited purpose for
provingknowledgeorplanorscheme,andmorespecifically,that
appellant knew that the particular corner of two (2) particular
streetsinMalabonwasagoodplacetoambushavehicleandits
passengers.Appellantalsohadwaivedthehearsaycharacterof
thisevidencebyfailureseasonablytoobjecttotheadmissionof
theaffidavit;itistoolateinthatdaytoraisethehearsayrulein
theappellantsmemorandumafterprosecutionanddefensehad
presented theirrespectivecasesand had made their respective
offers of evidence.21Finally, and in any case, as pointed out by
the
_______________
v.Calixto,193SCRA303(1991).
21
TSN,25July1990,pp.2425;TSN,1August1990,pp.13
18; Records, pp. 575580. SeePeople v. Nebreja,203 SCRA
45(1991);
727
VOL.221,MAY11,1993
Peoplevs.Santos
SolicitorGeneral,theexclusion ofthe Guerrero affidavitwould
notresultinanychangeintheresultreachedbythetrialcourt.
For that result is essentially and adequately based upon the
positiveidentificationofappellantSantosasoneofthegunmen
byBautistaandBohol.
Thatittookthepoliceauthoritiesfive(5)monthstolocateand
apprehendappellantSantoswho,itturnedout,residedcloseby
theverylocaleoftheambushslaying,didnotinanywayweaken
the evidence of the prosecution or detract from the conclusions
reachedbythetrialcourt.Thelengthofthatperiodoftimeshows
only that police procedures are not always as efficient as they
couldbeandthatwitnessesarefrequentlyreluctanttovolunteer
information to the police authorities in criminal cases, a point
notedsofrequentlyastohavebecomeamatterofjudicialnotice. 22
Finally,wecometothedefenseofalibiwhichappellantSantos
raisedbeforethetrialcourtandwhichwasrecountedbythetrial
courtinthefollowingmanner:
AccusedRaulSantos,afterdenyingtheaccusationsagainsthim,
insisted that he was on the date and time that Cupcupin and
BautistawereambushedsomewhereinIbaan,Batangastowhich
place he went on May 20, 1989, because his sister Teresita
received a subpoena in a case involving one Apolonio Nuguera
andwhichsubpoenawasgiventohimbyanothersisternamed
Isabel. Accused Santos claimed that he was surprised and
confused by said subpoena(Exh. 2)andhadto gotoBatangas
whilehissistersareverifyingthecomplaintagainsthim.Accused
Santosalsomaintainedthatfromthetimehelefttheplaceon
June12,1989,heremainedcontinuouslyinsaidplace.
xxxxxxxxx
The testimony of accused Santos regarding his stay in
BatangaswascorroboratedbyMelindaDavidinwhosehousehe
727
stayedandbyhissisterIsabelSantos.23
In respect of the weight properly given to a defense of alibi,
theCourthas,timesbeyondnumbering,ruledthatsuchdefense
isweakmostespeciallywhenestablishedexclusivelyormainlyby
theaccusedhimselfandhisrelativesandnotbyindependentand
crediblepersons,24and that such a defensewillnotprevail over
thepositiveidentificationmadebycrediblewitnesses, 25especially
wherethewitnessisthevictimcomplainanthimself.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, we hold that the
judgmentofconvictionrenderedbythetrialcourtmustbe,andit
ishereby,AFFIRMEDwiththefollowingmodifications:thecivil
indemnity payable to the heirs of Glicerio Cupcupin shall be
INCREASEDtoP50,000.00;thepenaltyoflifeimprisonmentin
Criminal Case No. 8517MN shall be CHANGED toreclusion
perpetua,which is the proper imposable penalty under the
RevisedPenalCode.Costsagainstappellant.
SOORDERED.
Bidin,Davide,Jr.,RomeroandMelo,JJ.,concur.
Judgmentaffirmedwithmodification.
Note.Hearsay evidencewhether objectedto ornot has no
probativevalue(Peoplevs.Nebreja,203SCRA45).
The suspects, under custodial investigation, have the
constitutionalrighttocounsel(Peoplevs.Cavite,203SCRA383).
o0o
VOL.353,MARCH1,2001
Peoplevs.Nardo
G.R.No.133888.March1,2001.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff
appellee,vs.ALFREDONARDOyROSALES,accusedappellant.
Criminal Law;Rape;Evidence;Courts look with disfavor
upon retractions, because they can easily be obtained from
witnesses through intimidation or for monetary
consideration;Retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier
declaration;Recantationsmadeaftertheconvictionoftheaccused
deserveonlyscantconsideration.Bethatasitmay,recantations
arefrowneduponbythecourts.Arecantationofatestimonyis
exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the probability that
such recantationmaylater onbeitselfrepudiated. Courtslook
with disfavor upon retractions, because they can easily be
obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary
consideration.Aretractiondoesnotnecessarilynegateanearlier
declaration.Especially,recantationsmadeaftertheconvictionof
theaccuseddeserveonlyscantconsideration.
Same;Same;Same;The pardon to justify the dismissal of
the complaint should be made prior to the institution of the
criminal action.Any recantation or affidavit of desistance, by
itself,evenwhenconstruedasapardoninthesocalledprivate
crimes,isnotagroundforthedismissalofthecriminalcaseonce
theactionhasbeeninstituted.Thepardontojustifythedismissal
ofthecomplaintshould bemadepriortotheinstitution ofthe
criminalaction.Parenthetically,thecrimeinthecaseatbarwas
committedin1996,i.e.,priortothepassageoftheR.A.8353,the
AntiRapeLawof1997,whichreclassifiedrapeasacrimeagainst
persons.
Same;Same;Same;An affidavit of recantation, being
339 usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the
testimonygiveninopencourt.Evenifitweresworn,Lorielyns
recantationcouldhardlysufficetooverturnthefindingofguiltby
thetrialcourtwhichwasbasedonherownclearandconvincing
testimony, given during a fullblown trial. An affidavit of
recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered
inferior to the testimony given in open court. It would be a
dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of
justicesimplybecausethewitnesswhogaveitlateronchanged
his/hermindforonereasonoranother.Sucharulewouldmakea
solemntrialamockery,andplacetheproceedingsatthemercyof
unscrupulouswitnesses.
_______________
*
ENBANC.
340
3 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
40
Peoplevs.Nardo
Same;Same;Same;As a rule, Court does not disturb the
findings by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses.As
stated,thetrialcourtarrivedatitsfindingofguiltafteracareful
assessmentoftheevidencepresented,foremostofwhichwasthe
testimonyofthevictiminopencourt,wherethetrialjudgewas
able to personally evaluate her manner of testifying, and from
therereachastudiedopinionastohercredibility.Asarule,we
donotdisturbthefindingsbythetrialcourtonthecredibilityof
witnesses,forthetrialcourtisinabetterpositiontopassupon
thesame.
Same;Same;Same;Itissettledthatapersonaccusedofrape
canbeconvictedsolelyonthetestimonyofthevictimifthetrial
courtfindssaidtestimonytobecredible,natural,convincing,and
consistentwithhumannatureandthecourseofthings.Wefind
nothingintherecordswhichwouldindicatethatthefindingsof
factofthetrialcourtarenotsupportedbytheevidenceorwere
arrived at in manifest or palpable error, such as to warrant a
departurefromtheforegoingrule.Thetrialcourtwascorrectin
lending credibility to the testimony of Lorielyn. The sole
testimony of Lorielyn was sufficient to establish the guilt of
accusedappellant.Itissettledthatapersonaccusedofrapecan
beconvictedsolelyonthetestimonyofthevictimifthetrialcourt
finds said testimony to be credible, natural, convincing, and
consistentwithhumannatureandthecourseofthings.
Same;Same;Same;Inconsistencies in the testimony of
prosecutionwitnesseswithrespecttominordetailsandcollateral
matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration,
their veracity, or the weight of their testimony.Minor
inconsistenciesdonotaffectthecredibilityofwitnesses,asthey
mayeventendtostrengthenratherthanweakentheircredibility.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with
respecttominordetailsandcollateralmattersdonotaffecteither
thesubstanceoftheirdeclaration,theirveracity,ortheweightof
theirtestimony.Suchminorflawsmayevenenhancetheworthof
atestimony,fortheyguardagainstmemorizedfalsities.Besides,
arapevictimcannotbeexpectedtorecallvividlyallthesordid
detailsoftheviolationcommittedagainsthervirtue.
Same;Same;Same;Alibi;Inordertoovercometheevidence
of the prosecution with the defense of alibi, accusedappellant
must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the
crimewascommittedbutalsothatitwasphysicallyimpossiblefor
him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed.Asagainstthepositiveandcategoricaltestimonyof
Lorielyn,accusedappellantcanonlyprofferthedefenseofalibi.
However,inordertoovercometheevidenceoftheprosecution
341
VOL.353,MARCH1,2001 341
Peoplevs.Nardo
withthedefenseofalibi,hemustestablishnotonlythathe
wassomewhereelsewhenthecrimewascommittedbutalsothat
itwasphysicallyimpossibleforhimtohavebeenatthesceneof
thecrimeatthetimeitwascommitted.Intheinstantcase,the
testimonies for the defense sought to establish that accused
appellantwas400to500meters,or15minutes,awayfromthe
scene of the crime. This hardly qualifies as proof that it was
physicallyimpossibleforhimtobeatthesceneofthecrimewhen
it was committed. Accusedappellants defense of alibi must,
therefore,necessarilyfail.
AUTOMATICREVIEWofthedecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourt
ofLegazpiCity,Albay,Br.3.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforaccusedappellant.
PERCURIAM:
This case is before this Court on automatic review from the
Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Albay, Branch III, which
imposed on accusedappellant the death penalty for rape in
CriminalCaseNo.7170.
The victim, Lorielyn R. Nardo, is the eldest daughter of
accusedappellant.ShewasbornonSeptember11,1981and,at
thetimeoftheincident,wasfourteen(14)yearsold.1
On February 24, 1996, around noon, Lorielyn was in their
houselocatedinBarangay3,Camalig,Albay,togetherwithher
father, accusedappellant Alfredo Nardo, two younger brothers,
LeonelandLouie,andmaternalgrandfather,VicenteRemot.At
1:30oclockintheafternoon,aftertheyhadlunch,Vicenteleftfor
work.Alfredotoldhissons,LeonelandLouie,togoout.Hethen
ordered Lorielyn to get his cigarettes in his bedroom. When
Lorielyn went inside the bedroom, her father followed her. He
embracedLorielynfrombehindandbeganmashingherbreasts.
Lorielyn pleaded,Papa, please stop it Have mercy.Her father
ignoredher.Instead,heundressedherandpushedhertothebed.
Lorielynstartedto
_______________
1
CertificateofBaptism,ExhibitD.
342
342 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Nardo
cry,whileAlfredotookoffhisclothes.Then,helayontopofher
andhadsexualintercoursewithher.Hekissedherfromtheneck
down.ShetriedtofreeherselfbutAlfredotookholdofaknife
from a nearby cabinet and pointed it at her right ear. He
threatenedtokilltheirwholefamilyifLorielyntoldanyonewhat
hedid.Whenhewasfinished,Alfredoleftthehouse.Duringall
this time, Lorielyns mother, Elizabeth Nardo, was washing
clothesaboutfivehousesaway.2
Elizabethreturnedhomeatabout3:00oclockp.m.Shesaw
Lorielyncryingwhilewashingthedishes.SheaskedLorielynwhy
shewascrying,butherdaughtersaidnothing.3
OnMarch19,1996,Lorielynwaswashingclotheswhenher
fatherapproachedherandwhispered,Wewillplaytonightnear
the river.Lorielyn understood this to mean that her father
wantedtohavesexualintercoursewithheragain.Shefinished
thelaundryandleftthehouse.Shetookapassengerjeepneyto
BarangayLibod,Camalig,Albayandproceededtothehouseof
heraunt,CarolNavera.Shestayedthereuntilherauntarrived
at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon. When it became late,
CaroltoldLorielyntogohome,butshedecidedtospendthenight
atherauntshousebecauseshewasafraidtoundergotheordeal
fromherfatheragain.4
The next day, Lorielyns brother, Leonel, was sent by her
father to fetch her, but she refused to go with him. Her aunt
askedheragainwhyshedidnotwanttogohome.Shemerely
saidshehadaproblem.Shesleptatherauntshouseagainthat
night.Thefollowingday,hermothercametofetchher.Lorielyn Camalig, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the
toldhermothershedidnotwanttogohome.Shesaid,Mama, jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
doyouwantmetobecomepregnantinthathouse?Hermother being the father of the herein victim, with lewd and unchaste
design,bymeansofviolence,forceandintimidation,armedwith
asked,Who will impregnate you there?Lorielyn replied,Your
aknife,didthenandtherewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniously
husband.HermotherretortedthatAlfredocouldnotdothatto
havecarnalknowledgewithher(sic)owndaughter,LORIELYN
her,thenleft.5
R.NARDO,a14yearoldgirl,againstherwillandconsent,toher
LorielynstayedatherauntshouseuntilMarch22,1996.On
damageandprejudice.
thatdate,CarolagainaskedLorielynwhatherproblemwas.Fi
ACTSCONTRARYTOLAW.9
AtthearraignmentonAugust8,1996,accusedappellantpleaded
_______________
notguilty.10
2
TSN,April2,1997,pp.59;p.28. TheprosecutionpresentedDr.MelvynOrbe,whotestifiedon
thefollowingfindingsasaresultofhisexaminationofthevictim,
3
Ibid.,p.11.
LorielynNardo:
4
Id.,pp.1416. PelvicExamination:
5
Id.,pp.1719.
343 whitishtoyellowishdischarge
VOL.353,MARCH1,2001 343
Peoplevs.Nardo irritationlateralaspectoftheposteriorvulvaat3oclock
nally,shetoldherauntthatherfatherrapedher.Immediately,
Carolwenttoreportthemattertothepolice.Shelaterreturned _______________
homewithtwopolicemen,andtogethertheybroughtLorielynto
theCamaligPoliceStation.Therapewasenteredinthepolice 6
Exh.C.
blotter.6The policemen then brought Lorielyn to the Municipal 7
Exh.A.
HealthOfficeofCamalig,Albay,whereshewasexaminedbyDr. 8
Exh.E.
Melvyn P. Orbe, the Municipal Health Officer. 7From there 9
Record,p.2.
Lorielynwas brought totheMunicipalTrialCourtof Camalig 10
Id.,p.47.
Albay to file a formal complaint for rape against her father, 344
AlfredoNardo.8 344 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
OnMay29,1996,anInformationforrapewasfiledagainst
Peoplevs.Nardo
AlfredoNardo,chargingasfollows:
Thatonoraboutthe24thdayofFebruary1996,atmoreorless
1:30 oclock in the afternoon, at Brgy. No. 3, Municipality of
 *healedlacerationhymenalinoriginposterioraspectof
thefourchet11
Dr.Orbestatedthatbasedonthesefindings,itispossiblethat
Lorielynhadsexualintercourse.12
CarolinaNavera,testifyingfortheprosecution,corroborated
LorielynsstatementthatthelatterwenttoherhouseonMarch
20,1996.Lorielyncriedandtoldherthatshedidnotwanttogo
homebecauseshehadaproblem.Elizabeth,Lorielynsmother,
cametofetchherbutsherefusedtogohome,sayingthatshewas
rapedbyherfather. Uponhearingthis,Elizabethleftandtold
CarolinanottoletLorielynleaveherhouse.AfterElizabethwas
gone,Carolinawenttothepolicestation.Shereturnedlaterwith
two policemen, who then brought Lorielyn to the police
headquarters.13
Ma. Francia Aguilar, the social welfare officer of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, also testified
thatintheeveningofMarch22,1996,sherespondedtoareport
of a rape incident. She met the victim, Lorielyn Nardo, at the
house of Cely Bantog, a social worker, at Camalig, Albay. She
interviewedLorielynandhermother,Elizabeth,forthepurpose
of preparing a Social Case Study Report. 14Thereafter, she
endorsed Lorielyn to the DSWD Center for Girls in Sorsogon,
Sorsogontoundergotherapeutics.15
SPO3 Jose Nuylan, a member of the Camalig police force,
testified that he investigated the rape incident and took the
statementofLorielynNardo.16
Elizabeth Nardo, the victims mother, was called to the
witnessstand.ShetestifiedthatsheandAlfredoarenotmarried,
buttheyhavebeenlivingtogether.Theyhavesevenchildren,the
eldestofwhomisLorielyn.ShestatedthatLorielynwasbornon
September 11, 1981 at Anei, Claveria, Misamis Oriental; that
LorielynsbirthcertificatewasburnedintheMunicipalBuilding
ofMisamisOrien
_______________
11
Exh.A.
12
TSN,November5,1996,p.8.
13
TSN,November6,1996,pp.510.
14
Exh.B
15
TSN,November6,1996,pp.1316.
16
TSN,December16,1996,p.6.
345
VOL.353,MARCH1,2001 345
Peoplevs.Nardo
tal.17However, Elizabeth presented and identified Lorielyns
baptismalcertificateshowingthatshewasbornonSeptember11,
1981.18
Thedefense,ontheotherhand,presentedlawyerSanterG.
Gonzales, the employer of accusedappellant. He testified that
accusedappellantworkedasahelperathisfarminQuirangay,
Camalig,Albay.OnFebruary24,1996,accusedappellantarrived
athisfarmbefore8:00oclockinthemorning.Hewasfollowedby
hisfatherinlaw,VicenteRemot,wholivedwithhiminthesame
house.Itstartedtorainhard,sotheydecidednottoworkthat
day.VicenteRemotwenthomeataround8:30or9:00oclockin
the morning. Accusedappellant stayed behind. After a while,
Paterno Ramas, a neighbor of Atty. Gonzales, arrived. They
started to drink. None of them left the farmhouse since Atty.
Gonzaleskeptbottlesofginandcigarettesinstock.Theywere
joined later in the afternoon by Didjo Mujar, another friend of
Atty. Gonzales. They drank about five bottles of gin and sang
while Atty. Gonzales played the guitar. The rain subsided at
around3:30oclockintheafternoon,sotheystoppeddrinking.At
4:00oclockintheafternoon,accusedappellantleft.19Thefarmis
locatedaround400to500metersawayfromBarangay3,where
accusedappellantandthevictimreside,andcanbereachedin15
minutes.20
Whenaskedtocommentonthevictim,LorielynNardo,Atty.
Gonzalesdescribedherasonecapableoftellingalie.Henarrated
thatonce,shewenttohisfarmtocollecttheamountofP50.00as
dailywageofhergrandfather,VicenteRemot,butshegaveonly
P35.00tohermother.ElizabeththuswenttoAtty.Gonzalesto
ask about the deficiency. They later learned from Lorielyns
youngersisterthatshespentthemissingP15.00onsnacks.21
VicenteRemot,accusedappellantsfatherinlaw,corroborated
Atty.Gonzalestestimonythathereportedforworkatthelatters
farminthemorningofFebruary24,1996,buthewasunableto
_______________
17
TSN,February11,1997,pp.34.
18
Exh.D.
19
TSN,June9,1997,pp.37,12;Exh.5.
20
Ibid.,p.8.
21
Id.,p.7.
346
346 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Nardo
work because of the rain, so he went home instead, leaving
accusedappellantinthefarm.At1:00oclockintheafternoonof
thatday,hewasathomewatchingtelevisionwithElizabethand
hisgrandchildren,includingLorielyn.HerefutedLorielynsclaim
that he left after lunch to work, saying that he stayed in the
housethewholeafternoonsinceitwasraining.22
ElizabethalsotestifiedthatonFebruary24,1996,shewasat
homewatchingtelevisionwithherfatherandchildren,namely,
Lorielyn,Lewcherd,Lailani,Leonel,LouieBoyandLeoBoy.All
her children were at home because it was a Saturday. She
claimed that Lorielyn filed the complaint for rape against her
father because he was very strict with her. She learned from
Lorielynsbestfriendthatshehadaproblemwithherboyfriend,
acertainErwinLoreno.Atonetime,Lorielynaskedpermissionto
attend a holy retreat, but Elizabeth found out from the school
thattherewasnosuchretreat.Lorielynliedonanotheroccasion,
whenshetoldMrs.BonifaciaPazNievathathergrandfather
wassicksoshecanborrowmoney.23
Mrs. Bonifacia Nieva testified that her daughter was a
classmateofLorielyn.Once,Lorielynvisitedhersayingthatshe
wassentbyElizabethtoborrowmoneybecausehergrandfather
was sick. Mrs. Nieva gave Lorielyn P200.00. Later, when she
went to see Elizabeth to collect payment, she found out that
Lorielynsgrandfatherdidnotgetsick.Lorielynadmittedtoher
thatsheliedaboutittobeabletoborrowmoney.24
TheprosecutionrecalledLorielyntothewitnessstandbyway
ofrebuttalevidence.SherefutedAtty.Gonzalesstatementthat
shedidnotturnoverinfullthesalaryofhergrandfatherinthe
amountofP50.00.Shedeniedthatsheliedtohermotherabouta
holyretreatheldbyherschool.AnenttheamountofP200.00she
borrowed from Mrs. Nieva, she asserted that it was her father
whoorderedhertodothat,andthatshegavethewholesumof
P200.00tohim.25
_______________
22
Id.,pp.1416.
23
TSN,July10,1997,pp.410.
24
TSN,August11,1997,pp.35.
25
TSN,October7,1997,pp.36.
347
 VOL.353,MARCH1,2001 347 NardotheamountofFiftyThousandPesos(P50,000.00)formoral
Peoplevs.Nardo damages.
On clarificatory questioning by the presiding judge, Lorielyn Forhumanitarianreasons,however,itisrecommendedthat
maintained that her grandfather, Vicente Remot, indeed came theDEATHpenaltybecommutedtoRECLUSIONPERPETUA.
homeinthemorningofFebruary24,1996,butheleftagaintogo
_______________
toAtty.Gonzalesfarmafterlunch.Thatafternoon,hermother
was at the public faucet located far away from their house
washingclothes.Thejudgewonderedaloudwhyshewasdoing
26
Ibid.,pp.913.
the laundry in the afternoon when this is usually done in the
27
TSN,November24,1997,pp.311.
morning.Lorielynrepliedthathermotherhadstarteddoingthe
28
Ibid.,pp.1316.
laundryinthemorningbutthatshewasnotabletofinishit,so 348
shereturnedintheafternoontocontinueherchore.Shedenied 348 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
havinganymalefriends,sayingallherfriendsaregirls.When Peoplevs.Nardo
askedoncemorebythejudge,Lorielynreiteratedthatherfather SOORDERED.29
hadsexualintercoursewithher.26 Accusedappellantraisesthefollowingassignmentoferrors:
Carolina Nieva and Elizabeth Nardo were presented as
surrebuttalwitnesses.TheytestifiedinsumthatLorielynhada I
boyfriend.27
Accusedappellant was presented as the last witness. He THETRIALCOURTERREDINGIVINGCREDENCETOTHE
deniedthatherapedhisdaughteronFebruary24,1997,saying TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIM LORIELYN AND
thathewasatthefarmofAtty.Gonzales.HescoldedLorielyn DISREGARDINGTHEEVIDENCEFORTHEDEFENSE.
whenhelearnedfromhersisterandbrotherthatshewasalways
goingaroundwithaboy.HealsostatedthatLorielyngotmadat II
himbecausehedidnotpermithertoleavethehousewhenever
shewantedto.28 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECITE
On March 3, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment as THEREASONSWHYITWASRECOMMENDINGEXECUTIVE
follows: CLEMENCYFORTHEACCUSED.30
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING Accusedappellant assails the trial courts finding that Atty.
CONSIDERATIONS, this court finds the accused ALFREDO Gonzaleswashisemployerandthereforewaslikelytotestifyin
NARDOYROSALESGUILTYBEYONDREASONABLEDOUBT hisfavor;andthathecouldnothavenoticedaccusedappellant
ofthecrimeofRAPEandsentenceshimtosufferthepenaltyof leavethefarmintheafternoonofFebruary24,1996becausehe
DEATH. The said accused in likewise ordered to pay Lorielyn had one drink too many. Accusedappellant contends that the
courtshouldnothavebeentooquicktocondemnhimwhenhis
witness was a lawyer. Furthermore, he argues that Lorielyns On May 4, 2000, counsel for accusedappellant filed a
conductaftertheallegedrape,specificallyfromFebruary25to Supplemental Reply Brief,33alleging that she received another
March19,1996,duringwhichshestayedinthehousewithher letterfromLorielynNardowhichstates:
fatherandcontinuedtodoherdailychores,createsadoubtonthe 04172000
veracityofthecharge. DearAtty.TeresitadeGuzman,
In the Reply Brief for accusedappellant, 31defense counsel Unanguna po sa lahat ay nagpapasalamat po ako sa pag
revealsthatLorielynwroteherthefollowingletter: responsemosaletter.AkongapopalasiLorielynNardonaanak
71399 ni Mr. Alfredo Nardo na nakapiit ngayon sa DORM ID ng
DearAtty.DeGuzman: Muntinlupa,akopoyungnagpadalanglihamsainyo.Attorney,
AkongapopalasiLorielynNardonaanakniAlfredoNardo lagikopongipinagdarasalnanawaymataposnaangpaghihirap
na nakabinbin pa sa ngayon sa Maximum Security Compound atpagdunisangakingamasaloobngpiitan,nawaymataposna
NBP ID Mimtinlupa City. Sumulat po ako sa inyo upang ang lahat ng problema upang manumbalik muli ang sigla ng
humingingtulongnagawinposanaanglahat,walapotalagang amingpamilya.Nagpapasalamatngarinpopalaakosaginagawa
kasalananangakingamaakonapo mongpagtulongsaamin,attorneynawapoaymakamitnyoang
tagumpay.
_______________ Hanggangnalamangpoangakingliham,umaasapoakosa
inyongpangunawaattagumpay.
29
Record,p.149. Nagpapasalamatatumaasa,
30
AppellantsBrief;Rollo,p.53. LorielynNardo34
31
Rollo,pp.117129. In compliance with the Courts Resolution dated November 14,
349 2000,35theOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralfileditscommentonthe
VOL.353,MARCH1,2001 349
Peoplevs.Nardo _______________
mismongnagakusaangnagsasabinawalangkatotohananang
lahatngmgasinabikonapinagsamantalahanniyaako.Nagawa
32
Ibid.,pp.118119.
kolangpoyondahilmasyadopokasisiyangmahigpitsaaming 33
Id.,pp.134136.
magkakapatid.Atty.tulunganninyosanaako,nalamankonga 34
Id.,p.137.
popalaanginyongaddressdahildumalawpoangmamakonoon 35
Id.,p.141.
sapapakoathiningikonamanpoparamasulatankopokayo. 350
Umaasapoakonglubosnaakoyinyongmatutulungan.
350 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Lubosnaumaasa
Peoplevs.Nardo
LORIELYNNARDO32
lettersofLorielynNardo,36contendingthatthereisnomentionof _______________
herfathersinnocenceinherletterdatedApril17,2000.Rather,
shemerelyexpressedthereinherdeepsympathyforherfathers 36
Id.,pp.154158.
situation in prison. The Solicitor General argues that a 37
Id.,pp.144148.
recantation is not sufficient to warrant the exoneration of 38
Id.,p.151.
accusedappellant after he has been proven guilty beyond
351
reasonable doubt based on Lorielyns candid, categorical and
VOL.353,MARCH1,2001 351
straightforwardtestimonybeforethetrialcourt.
Inthemeantime,counselforaccusedappellant,bywayofa Peoplevs.Nardo
Manifestation and Motion,37submitted two more letters from January17,2001
LorielynNardowhicharehereunderreproduced,viz.:
August10,2000 DearAtty.TeresitaDeGuzman,

DearAttorney, Ako po muli si Lorielyn Nardo na anak ni Alfredo Nardo na

Unanguna posa lahat ay ang taospuso kong pasasalamat, sa
dahilangpagpapaunlakniyosakahilingankongmaipasasakorte
angisanglihamngkatotohanan,atkahitwalapapoangisang
desisyonmtilasakorteaylubospoakongumaasaatnagtitiwala
sa inyong kakayahan. Attorney, kung alam niyo lang po ng
matanggap at mabasa ang isang letter na nagmula sayo ay
punungpuno po ng kaligayahan ang aking puso dahil kahit
papaanoaynabawasannaangpagaalinlangansaakingisipan.
Sangayonpoaypatuloynalangakongumaasanasanaisang
araw ay makita kong muling masaya ang aking pamilya.
Attorney, isang pabor po ang nais kong hilingin, na sana bago
magpaskoaymulikongmakasamaangakingama,atgustoko
pongmagingninyotosaakinsadaratingnapasko.
Hanggang dito na lamang po ang aking liham, at lubos po
akongnagtitiwalasainyongkakayahannamapapawalangsala
angakingama.
Trulyyours,
LorielynNardo38
nakabinbin sa NBP DormID Muntinlupa. Kahit hindi po
natupad ang hinihiling kong sanay makalaya ang aking ama
noongnakaraangDisyembreaypatuloykoparinponginaasahan
athinihilinganginyongtulongnasanapoaymakalayanaang
aking ama. Patuloy pong nangingibabaw ang aking konsensiya
dahil sa aking ginawa, umaasa po ako na sana ay lalo pang
mapadaliangpaglabasniyasaloobngkulungan,maniwalapo
kayowalasiyangkasalanan.Attorney,alamkoponaginagawa
niyo(po)anglahatkayatngayonpalangpoaynagpapasalamat
ako sa inyo at patuloy na umaasa ng inyong tulong at sanay
maunawaanniyoako.
Patuloynaumaasa,
LorielynNardo
(anak)39
Accusedappellantreliesontheseletterstoobtainareversalof
the trial courts judgment of his conviction. However, the said
letterswerenotsubscribedandsworntobyLorielyn.
Be that as it may, recantations are frowned upon by the
courts.Arecantationofatestimonyisexceedinglyunreliable,for
thereisalwaystheprobabilitythatsuchrecantationmaylateron
beitselfrepudiated.Courtslookwithdisfavoruponretractions,
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through
intimidationorformonetaryconsideration.Aretractiondoesnot
necessarily negate an earlier declaration. 40Especially,
recantationsmadeaftertheconvictionoftheaccuseddeserveonly
scantconsideration.41
Moreover,anyrecantationoraffidavitofdesistance,byitself,
even when construed as a pardon in the socalled private
crimes,isnotagroundforthedismissalofthecriminalcaseonce
theac
_______________
39
Id.,p.149.
40
Peoplev.Navarro,297SCRA331,348(1998).
41
Villanuevav.People,G.R.No.135098,April12,2000,330
SCRA695.
352
352 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Nardo
tionhasbeeninstituted.42Thepardontojustifythedismissalof
the complaint should be made prior to the institution of the
criminalaction.43Parenthetically,thecrimeinthecaseatbarwas
committedin1996,i.e.,priortothepassageoftheR.A.8353,the
AntiRapeLawof1997,whichreclassifiedrapeasacrimeagainst
persons.
Even if it were sworn, Lorielyns recantation could hardly
sufficetooverturnthefindingofguiltbythetrialcourtwhichwas
basedonherownclearandconvincingtestimony,givenduringa
fullblown trial. An affidavit of recantation, being usually
takenex parte, would be considered inferior to the testimony
giveninopencourt.Itwouldbeadangerousruletorejectthe
testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the
witnesswhogaveitlateronchangedhis/hermindforonereason
oranother.Sucharulewouldmakeasolemntrialamockery,and
placetheproceedingsatthemercyofunscrupulouswitnesses.44
Asstated,thetrialcourtarrivedatitsfindingofguiltaftera
carefulassessmentoftheevidencepresented,foremostofwhich
was the testimony of the victim in open court, where the trial
judgewasabletopersonallyevaluatehermanneroftestifying,
andfromtherereachastudiedopinionastohercredibility.Asa
rule, we do not disturb the findings by the trial court on the
credibilityofwitnesses,forthetrialcourtisinabetterpositionto
passuponthesame.45
Thetrialjudgeisinabetterpositiontodecidethequestionof
credibility,sincehepersonallyheardthewitnessesandobserved
theirdeportmentandmanneroftestifying.Hehadbeforehimthe
essential aids to determine whether a witness was telling the
truthorlying.Truthdoesnotalwaysstalkboldlyforthnaked;she
oftenhidesinnooksandcranniesvisibleonlytothemindseyeof
thejudgewhotriedthecase.Tohimappearsthefurtiveglance,
the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or
flippantorsneeringtone,theheat,thecalmness,the
_______________
Alontev.Savellano,Jr.,287SCRA245,266(1998).
42
Ibid.,citingPeoplev.Entes,103SCRA162(1981).
43
44
Peoplev.Agbayani,284SCRA315,342(1998).
45
People v. Diasanta,G.R. No. 128108, July 6, 2000,335
SCRA218.
353
VOL.353,MARCH1,2001 353
Peoplevs.Nardo
yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full
realizationofthesolemnityofanoath,thecarriageandmien. 46
We find nothing in the records which would indicate that the
findingsoffactofthetrialcourtarenotsupportedbytheevidence
or were arrived at in manifest or palpable error, such as to
warrantadeparturefromtheforegoingrule.Thetrialcourtwas
correctinlendingcredibilitytothetestimonyofLorielyn.Thesole
testimony of Lorielyn was sufficient to establish the guilt of
accusedappellant.Itissettledthatapersonaccusedofrapecan
beconvictedsolelyonthetestimonyofthevictimifthetrialcourt
finds said testimony to be credible, natural, convincing, and
consistentwithhumannatureandthecourseofthings.47
Indeed,adaughter,especiallyoneinherminority,wouldnot
accuseherownfatherofsuchanunspeakablecrimeasincestuous
rape had she really not been aggrieved. 48More importantly,
Lorielyn withstood all the rigors of the case, starting from the
initialpoliceinterrogation,themedicalexamination,theformal
charge, the public trial, to the crossexamination. She went
throughthecourthearings,whereshecamefacetofacewithher
father.Ifitwastruethatshemerelymadeupthecharge,she
shouldhavebeenbotheredbyherconscienceatthesightofher
fatherinprisongarbandupontherealizationofhissorrystate
whileindetention.Thefactthatshemaintainedherstoryduring
hertestimonyinchiefallthewayuptoherrebuttaltestimony
onlyservestosubstantiatetheveracityofherclaim.
Wellsettledistherulethatnowomanwouldconcoctastoryof
defloration,allowanexaminationofherprivatepartsandsubmit
herselftopublichumiliationandscrutinyviaanopentrial,ifher
sordidtalewasnottrueandhersolemotivationwasnottohave
_______________
46
People v. Mitra,G.R. No. 130669, March 27, 2000,328
SCRA774;citingPeoplev.Agbayani,284SCRA315(1998).
47
People v. Bacule,G.R. No. 127568, January 28, 2000,323
SCRA734,Peoplev.Reyes,315SCRA563,57172(1999).
48
Peoplev.Antonio,G.R.No.122473,June8,2000,333SCRA
201;People v. Magdato,G.R. Nos. 13412227, February 7,
2000,324SCRA785.
354
354 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Nardo
theculpritapprehendedandpunished. 49Ayounggirlsrevelation
thatshehasbeenraped,coupledwithhervoluntarysubmission
to medical examination and her willingness to undergo public
trialwhereshecouldbecompelledtogiveoutthedetailsofan
assaultonherdignityby,asinthiscase,herownfather,cannot
besoeasilydismissedasamereconcoction. 50Courtsusuallygive
credence to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual
assault, particularly if it constitutes incestuous rape because,
normally,nopersonwouldbewillingtoundergothehumiliation
ofapublictrialandtotestifyonthedetailsofherordealwereit
not to condemn an injustice. Needless to say, it is settled
jurisprudence that testimonies of childvictims are given full
weightandcredit,sincewhenawoman,moresoifsheisaminor,
says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and
immaturityaregenerallybadgesoftruthandsincerity.51
Duringthetrial,thedefenseendeavoredtoportrayLorielyn
as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were cited wherein Lorielyn
supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents
permissiontoleavethehouse.However,Rule130,Section34,of
theRulesofCourtprovidesthat:Evidencethatonedidordidnot
doacertainthingatonetimeisnotadmissibletoprovethathe
didnordidnotdothesameorasimilarthingatanothertime;but
it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity,plan,system,scheme,habit,customorusage,andthe
like. While lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the
falsehoodscommittedbyLorielyn,assumingthemforthemoment
tobetrue,arepettyandinconsequential.Theyarenotasserious
aschargingonesownfatherofthesordidcrimeofrape,withall
ofitsseriousrepercussions.
Accusedappellant argues that the trial court should have
givencredencetohiswitness,Atty.SanterG.Gonzales,because
heisa
_______________
49
People v. Tao,G.R. No. 133872, May 5, 2000,331 SCRA
449;People v. Amigable,G.R. No. 133857, March 31, 2000,329
SCRA 527;People v. Sampior,G.R. No. 117691, March 1,
2000,327SCRA31.
50
Peoplev.Antipona,274SCRA328,335(1997).
51
Peoplev.Lusa,288SCRA296,303(1998).
355
VOL.353,MARCH1,2001
Peoplevs.Nardo
member of the bar. Atty. Gonzales, however, took the witness
standnotasalawyerbutasanordinaryperson.Hetestifiedin
hiscapacityasaccusedappellantsemployer.Assuch,nospecial
privilegeshouldbeaccordedhimbythetrialcourtbyreasononly
ofhisbeingamemberofthebar.Hedidnotappearinthatcase
asanofficerofthecourtbutasamerewitness,andhenceshould
betreatedasone.
Likewise, accusedappellant insists that Lorielyns conduct
aftertherape,duringwhichshecontinuedtoperformhertasks
andlivedwithherfatherintheirhouse,negatesthecommission
ofrape.AccusedappellantspropositionisderivedfromLorielyns
perfunctory yesorno answers to the leading questions
propoundedtoheroncrossexamination.Ratherthansustainthis
argument, we rely instead on the observations of the Social
WelfareOfficer,whomwefindtobeanimpartialwitness,inthis
wise:
Per observation, Lorielyn is a shy and silent type person. She
talkedinaverysmallvoiceand duringthe interviewshe only
talkswhenbeingasked.Shealsoappearstobeverysadandhave
beenstaringblankly(sic)52.
Accusedappellantassignsaserrorthetrialcourtsfailuretogive
thereasonsforrecommendingthecommutationofhissentence
from death toreclusion perpetua. As correctly observed by the
SolicitorGeneral,thetrialcourtwasimpelledbyhumanitarian
reason.53Moreover,thecommutationofsentenceisaprerogative
oftheChiefExecutive.
AsagainstthepositiveandcategoricaltestimonyofLorielyn,
accusedappellantcanonlyprofferthedefenseofalibi.However,
in order to overcome the evidence of the prosecution with the
defense of alibi, he must establish not only that he was
somewhereelsewhenthecrimewascommittedbutalsothatit
355
wasphysicallyimpossibleforhimtohavebeenatthesceneofthe
crime at the time it was committed. 54In the instant case, the
testimoniesforthe
_______________
52
SocialCaseStudyReport,p.2;Exh.B(emphasisours).
53
BrieffortheAppellee,p.18;Rollo,p.109.
54
Peoplev. Dando,G.R. No. 120646, February 14, 2000,325
SCRA406;Peoplev.Paraiso,319SCRA422,433(1999).
356
356 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
 Peoplevs.Nardo
defensesoughttoestablishthataccusedappellantwas400to500
meters, or 15 minutes, away fromthescene ofthe crime. This
hardlyqualifiesasproofthatitwasphysicallyimpossibleforhim
tobeatthesceneofthecrimewhenitwascommitted.Accused order to be appreciated as qualifying circumstances, however,
appellantsdefenseofalibimust,therefore,necessarilyfail.
Carefullysiftingthroughtheentirebodyofevidencepresented
in this case, we find nothing which would destroy the moral
certaintyofaccusedappellantsguilt.Whiletheremaybesome
inconsistenciesinthetestimonyofLorielyn,thesetoourmindare
minorinconsistencieswhichservetostrengthenhercredibilityas
theyarebadgesoftruthratherthanindiciaoffalsehood. 55Minor
inconsistenciesdonotaffectthecredibilityofwitnesses,asthey
mayeventendtostrengthenratherthanweakentheircredibility.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with
respecttominordetailsandcollateralmattersdonotaffecteither
thesubstanceoftheirdeclaration,theirveracity,ortheweightof
theirtestimony.Suchminorflawsmayevenenhancetheworthof
atestimony,fortheyguardagainstmemorizedfalsities. 56Besides,
arapevictimcannotbeexpectedtorecallvividlyallthesordid
detailsoftheviolationcommittedagainsthervirtue.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
RepublicActNo.7659,provides:
Thedeathpenaltyshallalsobeimposedifthecrimeofrapeis
committedwithanyofthefollowingattendantcircumstances:
1. 1.whenthevictimisundereighteen(18)yearsofageand
the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian,relativebyconsanguinityoraffinitywithinthe
third civil degree, or the commonlawspouse of the
parentofthevictim,xxx.57
The concurrence of the two special qualifying circumstances,
namely the victims minority and the relationship between the
victim and the culprit, increases the penalty of rape to one (1)
degree,thusresultingintheimpositionofthedeathpenalty.In
thesemust
_______________
55
55People v. Dreu,G.R. No. 126282, June 20, 2000,334
SCRA62.
56
Peoplev.Flora,G.R.No.125909,June23,2000,334SCRA
262.
57
R.A.7659,Sec.11,seventhparagraph.
357
VOL.353,MARCH1,2001 357
Peoplevs.Nardo
be properly pleaded in the indictment. 58In addition, the
qualifyingcircumstancesshouldbedulyprovedduringthetrial. 59
These requirements are met in this case. The Information
sufficiently alleges that accusedappellant is the father of the
victim,andthatthelatterwasfourteen(14)yearsoldatthetime
of commission of the rape. These elements, furthermore, were
categorically affirmed by Elizabeth Nardo, the victims mother
and the most competent witness. She testified that accused
appellant is Lorielyns father, and that Lorielyn was born on
September11,1981,60thusplacingherageatthetimeoftherape
atfourteen(14)years.Moreover,theLorielynsbirthdateandher
relationshiptoaccusedappellantareshownbyherCertificateof
Baptism.61Thiswaspresentedbyhermother,Elizabeth,inlieuof
herCertificateofLiveBirth,whichwasdestroyedbyfire. 62The
baptismal certificate, coupled by her mothers testimony, is
sufficienttoestablishLorielynsage.63
 Wethereforeaffirmthetrialcourtsimpositionofthedeath awardedtothevictiminthecriminalproceeding,insuchamount
penalty. astheCourtdeemsjust,withouttheneedforpleadingorproofof
Four justices of the Court have continued to maintain the thebasisthereofashasheretoforebeenthepractice.Indeed,the
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 insofar as it conventionalrequirementofallegataelprobataincivilprocedure
prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless they submit to the and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in
rulingofthemajoritytotheeffectthatthislawisconstitutional criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect included
andthatthedeathpenaltycanbelawfullyimposedinthecaseat therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such
bar. allegationscanbemade.
WelikewiseaffirmtheawardofP50,000.00formoraldamages Corollarily,thefactthatcomplainanthassufferedthetrauma
which is consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. 64No proof is ofmental,physicalandpsychologicalsufferingswhichconstitute
required to substantiate the award of moral damages in rape thebasesformoraldamagesaretooobvioustostillrequirethe
cases.InPeoplevs.Prades,65weheld: recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself
even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a
_______________ gaugeofhercredibility.Whatexistsbynecessaryimplicationas
being ineludibly present in the case need not go through the
58
Peoplev.Mendez,G.R.No.132546,July5,2000,335SCRA superfluityofstillbeingprovedthroughatestimonialcharade.
147. In addition to moral damages, the amount of P75,000.00, is
59
People v. Alvero,G.R. Nos. 13453638, April 5, 2000,329 awardedtothevictimasindemnity.
SCRA 737;People v. Llamo,G.R. No. 132138, January 28, xxx.Indictmentsforrapecontinueunabatedandthelegislative
2000,323SCRA791. response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court
60
TSN,February11,1997,pp.34. believesthat,onlikeconsiderations,thejurisprudentialpathon
61
Exh.D. thecivilaspectshouldfollowthesamedirection.Hence,starting
62
TSN,February11,1997,p.4. with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or
63
Peoplev.Rebancos,172SCRA425,429(1989). effectivelyqualifiedbyanyofthecircumstancesunderwhichthe
64
People v. Mendiola,G.R. No. 134846, August 8, 2000,337 death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the
SCRA418;Peoplev.Castillo,G.R.No.130205,July5,2000,335 indemnityforthevictimshallbeintheincreasedamountofnot
SCRA100. lessthanP75,000.00.Thisisnotonlyareactiontotheapathetic
65
293SCRA411(1998). societalperceptionofthepenallawandthefinancialfluctuations
358 overtime,butalsoanexpressionofthedispleasureoftheCourt
358 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED overtheincidenceofheinouscrimesagainstchastity.66
Peoplevs.Nardo WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
xxx.TheCourthasalsoresolvedthatincrimesofrape,suchas Legaspi City, Albay, Branch III, convicting accusedappellant
that under consideration, moral damages may additionally be AlfredoNardoyRosalesofthecrimeofrape,sentencinghimto
death,andorderinghimtopaythevictim,LorielynNardomoral ROQUETAALEJAGA,FELIPEALEJAGA,JR.,MARIADULLA
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, is AFFIRMED with the ALEJAGA, FELIPE ALEJAGA III, ROQUETA ALEJAGA,
MODIFICA JENNIFER ALEJAGA, EVERETTE CAPUNDAN, AND
LYNETTE ALEJAGA; THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
_______________ andTHEREGISTEROFDEEDSOFROXASCITY,respondents.
LandTitles;FreePatent;Fraud;Thepartyallegingfraudor
Peoplev.Victor,292SCRA186,200201(1998).
66
mistakeinatransactionbearstheburdenofproof.Webeginour
359
resolutionofthisissuewiththewellsettledrulethattheparty
VOL.353,MARCH1,2001 359 alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the burden of
Belovs.PhilippineNationalBank proof. The circumstancesevidencing fraud are asvaried as the
TIONthataccusedappellantis,further,orderedtopaythevictim peoplewhoperpetrate itineach case.Itmay assumedifferent
civilindemnityintheamountofP75,000.00. shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many different
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, ways.Thus,thelawrequiresthatitbeestablishedbyclearand
amendingArticle83oftheRevisedPenalCode,uponfinalityof convincingevidence.
this decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the Same;Same;Same;Evidence;Doctrine on Independently
recordsofthiscase,beforwardedwithoutdelaytotheOfficeof
Relevant Statements Defined.The doctrine on independently
thePresidentforpossibleexerciseoftheclemencyorpardoning
relevantstatementsholdsthatconversationscommunicatedtoa
power.
witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that,
SOORDERED.
regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made.
Davide, Evidenceastothemakingofsuchstatementsisnotsecondary
Jr.(C.J.),Bellosillo,Melo,Puno,Vitug,Kapunan,Mendoza,Pang butprimary,forinitselfit(a)constitutesafactinissueor(b)is
aniban,Quisumbing,Pardo,Buena,GonzagaReyes,Ynares circumstantiallyrelevanttotheexistenceofsuchfact.
Santiago,DeLeon,Jr.andSandovalGutierrez,JJ.,concur. Same;Same;Same;Registration;TorrensTitle;Thedoctrine
Judgmentaffirmedwithmodification. thattheregistrationofapatentundertheTorrensSystemdoesnot
by itself vest titleit merely confirms the registrants already
VOL.393,DECEMBER3,2002 361 existing one.True, once a patent is registered and the
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr. correspondingcertificateoftitleissued,thelandcoveredbythem
G.R.No.146030.December3,2002.* ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the property.Further,theTorrensTitleissuedpursuanttothepatent
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter.
petitioner,vs.HEIRSOFFELIPEALEJAGA,SR.,representedby However, this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles
secured by fraud and misrepresentation. Wellsettled is the
doctrine that the registration of a patent under the Torrens
System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the
registrants already existing one. Verily, registration under the
TorrensSystemisnotamodeofacquiringownership.
_______________
*
THIRDDIVISION.
362
3 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
62
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
Same;Same;Same;Under Section 101 of Commonwealth
ActNo.141,theStateevenafterthelapseofoneyearmaystill PANGANIBAN,J.:
bringanactionforthereversiontothepublicdomainofland.
Under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the State
evenafterthelapseofoneyearmaystillbringanactionforthe
reversiontothepublicdomainoflandthathasbeenfraudulently
granted to private individuals. Further, this indefeasibility
cannotbeabartoaninvestigationbytheStateastohowthetitle
has been acquired, if the purpose of the investigation is to
determinewhetherfraudhasinfactbeencommittedinsecuring
thetitle.
Same;Same;Same;Encumbrance;Prohibition;The State
prohibitsthesaleorencumbranceofthehomestead(Section116)
withinfiveyearsafterthegrantofthepatent.AsearlyasPascua
v. Talens,we have explained the rationale for the prohibition
againsttheencumbranceofahomesteaditsleaseandmortgage
includedan encumbrance which, by analogy, applies to a free
patent.Weruledasfollows:Itiswellknownthatthehomestead
laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of
theStatetolanddestitutecitizensfortheirhomeandcultivation.
PursuanttosuchbenevolentintentiontheStateprohibitsthesale
orencumbranceofthehomestead(Section116)withinfiveyears
afterthegrantofthepatent.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforpetitioner.
BenjaminDesturaforprivaterespondents.
LegalDepartmentforprivaterespondentPNB.
We reiterate the familiar doctrine that a free patent obtained
throughfraudormisrepresentationisvoid.Furthermore,theone
yearprescriptiveperiodprovidedinthePublicLandActdoesnot
bartheStatefromaskingforthereversionofpropertyacquired
throughsuchmeans.
363
VOL.393,DECEMBER3,2002 363
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
StatementoftheCase
BeforeusisaPetitionforReviewonCertiorariunderRule45of
theRulesofCourt,assailingtheNovember15,2000Decision 1of
theCourtofAppeals(CA)inCAGRCVNo.44568.Thedecretal
portionofthechallengedDecisionreadsasfollows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED,
SETASIDEandRECALLED.2
TheFacts
ThefactualantecedentsofthecasearesummarizedbytheCA
thus:
OnDecember28,1978, [Respondent]Felipe Alejaga,Sr.xxx
filed with the District Land Office, Roxas City, Free Patent
ApplicationNo.(VI2)8442coveringaparceloflandidentifiedas
Lot1,Mli06000020D,withanareaof.3899hectares,moreor
less located at Dumolog, Roxas City (Exh. A; Exh 9). It
appears that on December 27, 1978, when the application was
executedunderoath,EfrenL.Recio,LandInspector,submitteda
report of his investigation and verification of the land to the
DistrictLandOffice,BureauofLands,CityofRoxas.OnMarch
14, 1979, the District Land Officer of Roxas City approved the
applicationandtheissuanceof[a]FreePatenttotheapplicant.
OnMarch16,1979,thepatentwasalsoorderedtobeissuedand
thepatentwasforwardedtodefendantRegisterofDeeds,Cityof
Roxas, for registration and issuance of the corresponding
CertificateofTitle.Thereafter,OriginalCertificateofTitleNo.P
15 Free Patent No. (VI2) 3358 was issued to [respondent] by
defendantRegisterofDeeds.
On April 4, 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, through
counsel in a lettercomplaint requested the Director of Lands,
Manila,foraninvestigationoftheDistrictLandOfficer,Roxas
City, and the Regional Office, Region VI, Iloilo City, for
irregularitiesintheissuanceof thetitleofa foreshorelandin
favor of [respondent]. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special
Investigator,LegalDivision,LandManagementBureau(formerly
BureauofLands)submittedhisReportdatedApril17,1989.The
Chief,
_______________
1
Rollo,pp.2838.PennedbyJusticeMarianoM.Umaliand
concurredinbyJusticesRubenT.Reyes(Divisionchairman)and
RebeccadeGuiaSalvador(member).
2
Assailed CA Decision, p. 12; rollo, p. 38. Emphasis in the
original.
364
364 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
LegalDivision,LandManagementBureau,Manila,recommended
to the Director of Lands appropriate civil proceeding for the
cancellation of Free Patent Title No. (VI2) 3358 and the
correspondingOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.P15inthenameof
[respondent].
In the meantime, [respondent] obtained a NACIDA loan
under the Cottage Industry Guarantee and Loan Fund by the
defendant Philippine National Bank (hereinafter referred to as
PNB) executed in Cebu City in the amount of P100,000.00 on
August18,1981.Theloanwassecuredbyarealestatemortgage
infavorofdefendantPNB.Thepromissorynoteofappellantwas
annotatedatthebackofthetitle.
On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor
General instituted an action for Annulment/Cancellation of
PatentandTitleandReversionagainst[respondent],thePNBof
Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City
coveringFreePatentApplication(VI2)8442oftheparcelofland
withanareaof.3899hectaresmoreorlesslocatedatDumolog,
RoxasCity.
On November 17, 1990, whilethe case is pending hearing,
[respondent] died. He was substituted by his wife Roqueta
Alejaga and his children, namely: Everette Alejaga, Lynnette
Alejaga, Felipe Alejaga, Jr., Maria Dulla Alejaga, Roqueta
Alejaga,JenniferAlejagaandFelipeAlejagaIII.
xxxxxxxxx
 After hearing, the [trial] court in its dispositive portion
decreedasfollows:
WHEREFORE,judgmentisrendereddeclaringthattheapproval
of Free Patent Application No. 3358 and issuance of Original
CertificateofTitleNo.P15inthenameofFelipeAlejagaisby
meansoffraudhence,nullandvoidabinitioandthecourtorders:
1. a)thecancellationoftheapprovaloftheapplicationNo.
(VI2)8442coveringLotNo.1,Mli06000020Dwithan
areaof.3899hectares,moreorless,locatedatDumulog,
RoxasCity;
2. b)thecancellationofOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.P15,
Free Patent No. (VI2) 3358 in the name of Felipe
Alejaga;
3. c)thelandcoveredtherebyasabovedescribedisreverted
tothemassofthepublicdomain;
4. d)the defendants, Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr. or
defendant, Philippine National Bank, Roxas City
Branch,tosurrendertheownersduplicatecopyofabove
described Original Certificate of Title No. P15 to the
Register of Deeds (now Registries of Land Titles and
Deeds),RoxasCity;
365
VOL.393,DECEMBER3,2002
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
duplicatecopyofsaidtitlesurrenderedbyabovestated
defendants;
2. f)defendants, Philippine National Bank, crossclaim is
dismissed.
CostsagainstthedefendantsHeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.3
RulingoftheCourtofAppeals
InreversingtheRTC,theCAruledthatpetitionerfailedtoprove
itsallegationthatrespondentshadobtainedthefreepatentand
theCertificateofTitlethroughfraudandmisrepresentation. 4The
appellate court likewise held that, assuming there was
misrepresentationorfraudasclaimedbypetitioner,theactionfor
reversionshouldhavebeenbroughtwithinone(1)yearfromthe
registrationofthepatentwiththeRegistryofDeeds.5
Further,theCAbrushedasideashearsayIsaganiCartagenas
testimonythatLandInspectorEfrenL.Reciohadnotconducted
aninvestigationonthefreepatentapplicationofFelipeAlejaga,
Sr.6TheCAaddedthatpetitionerhadfailedtosupportitsclaim
that the lot covered by respondents free patent and title was
foreshoreland.7
Hence,thisPetition.8
_______________
3
Id.,pp.15.
4
Id.,p.6;Rollo,p.32.
365 5
Id.,p.12;id.,p.38.
Id.,p.7;id.,p.33.
6

7
Id.,p.11;id.,p.37.
1. e)thedefendant,RegisterofDeeds,RoxasCity,tocancel 8
The case was deemed submitted for decision on April 15,
Original Certificate of Title No. P15 and the owners 2002, upon the Courts receipt of Respondent Alejagas
MemorandumsignedbyAtty.BenjaminB.Distura.Respondent
PNBsMemorandum,filedonJuly20,2001,wassignedbyAtty.
Edwin M. Alaestante. Petitioners Manifestation, adopting its
Petition as its Memorandum was filed on July 20, 2001 and
signedbyAssistantSolicitorGeneralFernandaLampasPeralta
andSolicitorBrigidoArtemonM.LunaII.
366
366 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts
consideration:
I case.
TheHonorableCourtofAppealserredinnotfindingthatthecase
isalreadyfinalandexecutoryasagainstrespondentPNB.
II
TheCourtofAppealserredinnotconsideringthatpetitioner
hasproventheallegationstotheComplaint.
III
TheHonorableCourtofAppealserredindeclaringthatthe
actionforreversionisunavailing.9
Simply stated, the issues can be summed up into two: (1) the
efficacyofthegrantofthefreepatentand(2)theindefeasibility
oftheCertificateofTitleissuedinconsequencethereof.
ThisCourtsRuling
ThePetitionismeritorious.
First Issue:
EfficacyoftheGrant
Petitioner argues that it has proven fraud in the issuance of
RespondentAlejagasfreepatentandCertificateofTitle. 10Italso
aversthatRespondentPNBhasfailedtofileatimelyNoticeof
Appeal.
On the other hand, the Alejagas contend that they have
acquiredavestedrightovertheparceloflandcoveredbyOCT
No.P
_______________
Petition for Review, p. 10; Rollo, p. 15. Original in upper
9
10
Id.,p.13;id.,p.18.
367
VOL.393,DECEMBER3,2002 367
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
15 by virtue of their proven open, actual, exclusive and
undisputedpossessionofthelandformorethan30years.11
Attheoutset,wemustimmediatelyclarifythattherecords
show receipt by Respondent PNB of a copy of the Decision on
October 27, not on October 3, 1993 as alleged by
petitioner.12Further, the bank filed its Notice of Appeal on
November9,1993,withinthe15dayreglementaryperiod.
Inaddition,wemustpointoutthattheessentialissueraised
inthisPetitionthepresenceoffraudisfactual.Asageneral
rule,thisCourtdoesnotreviewfactualmatters. 13However,the
instant case falls under one of the exceptions, because the
findingsoftheCAconflictwiththoseoftheRTCandwiththe
evidenceonrecord.14
 Webeginourresolutionofthisissuewiththewellsettledrule Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
thatthepartyallegingfraudormistakeinatransactionbears tionerhadresortedtomisrepresentationorfraud,signsofwhich
theburdenofproof.15Thecircumstancesevidencingfraudareas were20ignoredbytheCourtofAppeals.21
varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. 16It may First,the issuance of the free patent was not made in
assume different shapes and forms; it may be committedin as
accordancewiththeprocedurelaiddownbyCommonwealthAct
many different ways.17Thus, the law requires that it be
No.141,otherwiseknownasthePublicLandAct. 22UnderSection
establishedbyclearandconvincingevidence.18
91thereof,aninvestigationshouldbeconductedforthepurpose
Inthecasebeforeus,wefindthatpetitionerhasadduceda
of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the
preponderance of evidence before the trial court, showing
applicationaretrue.23
manifestfraudinprocuringthepatent. 19ThisCourtagreeswith
Further, after thefiling oftheapplication,thelaw requires
the RTC that in obtaining a free patent over the lot under
sufficientnoticetothemunicipalityandthebarriowheretheland
scrutiny,peti
is
_______________
_______________
11
RespondentAlejagasMemorandum,p.29;Rollo,p.321. 20
Bordalbav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.112443,January25,
12
Seerecords,p.349.
2002,374SCRA555.
13
Tandov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.127984,December14, 21
Alonsov.CebuCountryClub,Inc.,G.R.No.130876,January
2001,372SCRA321.
31,2002,375SCRA390.
14
Lercana v. Jalandoni,G.R. No. 132286, February 1, 22
Anacttoamendandcompilethelawsrelativetolandofthe
2002,375SCRA604. publicdomain,effectiveDecember1,1936.
15
Mangahas v. Court of Appeals,304 SCRA 375, March 10, 23
Section91ofthePublicLandActprovides:
1999;citingCayabyabv.IntermediateAppellateCourt,232SCRA SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall be
1,April28,1994. considered as essential conditions and parts of any concession,
16
Siguanv.Lim,318SCRA725,November19,1999. title,orpermitissuedonthebasisofsuchapplication,andany
17
Destura v. Court of Appeals,325 SCRA 341, February 10, falsestatementthereinoromissionoffactsaltering,changing,or
modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such
2000.
statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or
18
Cuizonv.CourtofAppeals,260SCRA645,August22,1996.
changeofthematerialfactssetforthintheapplicationshallipso
19
Mangahasv.CourtofAppeals,supra.
factoproducethecancellationof theconcession,title,orpermit
368
granted.ItshallbethedutyoftheDirectorofLands,fromtimeto
368 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
time and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the
necessaryinvestigationsforthepurposeofascertainingwhether
thematerialfactssetoutintheapplicationaretrue,orwhether
theycontinuetoexistandaremaintainedandpreservedingood
faith,andforthepurposesofsuchinvestigation,theDirectorof
Lands is hereby empowered to issuesubpoenasandsubpoenas
ducestecumand,ifnecessary,toobtaincompulsoryprocessfrom
thecourts.Ineveryinvestigationmadeinaccordancewiththis
section, the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or
fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be
presumedifthegranteeorpossessorofthelandshallrefuseor
fail to obey asubpoenaorsubpoena duces tecumlawfully issued
bytheDirectorofLandsorhisauthorizeddelegatesoragents,or
shallrefuseorfailtogivedirectandspecificanswerstopertinent
questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order of
cancellationmayissuewithoutfurtherproceedings.
369
VOL.393,DECEMBER3,2002
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
located, in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to
presenttheirclaims.24Notethatthisnoticeandtheverification
andinvestigationoftheparceloflandaretobeconductedafteran
application for free patent has been filed with the Bureau of
Lands.
Inthiscase,however,FelipeAlejaga,Sr.sApplicationforFree
Patent25wasdatedandfiledonDecember28,1978.Ontheother
hand,theInvestigation&VerificationReport 26preparedbyLand
InspectorEfrenL.ReciooftheDistrictLandOfficeoftheBureau
of Lands of Roxas City was dated December 27, 1978. In that
Report, he stated that he had conducted the necessary
investigationand verification in the presence of the applicant.
Evenifweacceptthisstatementasgospeltruth,theviolationof
the rule cannot be condoned because, obviously, the required
noticetoadverseclaimantswasnotserved.
Evidently,thefilingoftheapplicationandtheverificationand
investigationallegedly conducted byRecio wereprecipitate and
beyondthepaleofthePublicLandAct.27Ascorrectlypointedout
bythetrialcourt,investigationandverificationshouldhavebeen
doneonlyafterthefilingoftheapplication.Hence,itwouldhave
beenhighlyanomalousforReciotoconducthisowninvestigation
and verification on December 27, 1998, a day before Felipe
Alejaga,Sr.filedtheApplicationforFreePatent 28Itmustalsobe
noted that while the Alejagas insist that an investigation was
conducted,they
_______________
24
Section46ofthePublicLandActprovides:
SEC. 46. If, after the filing of the application and the
369
investigation, the Director of Lands shall be satisfied with the
truth of the allegations contained in the application and the
applicant comes within the provisions of this chapter, he shall
causeapatenttoissuetotheapplicantorhislegalsuccessorfor
thetractsooccupiedandcultivated,provideditsareadoesnot
exceedtwentyfourhectares:Provided,Thatnoapplicationshall
befinallyacteduponuntilnoticethereofhasbeenpublishedin
the municipality and barrio in which the land is located and
adverse claimants have had an opportunity to present their
claims.
25
ExhibitA;exhibitsfolder,p.1.
26
ExhibitB;id.,p.2.
27
Espinov.Salubre,352SCRA668,February26,2001.
28
RTCDecision,p.6;Rollo,p.76.
370
370 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
do not dispute the fact that it preceded the filing of the
application.29
Second,theclaimoftheAlejagasthatanactualinvestigation
was conducted is not sustained by the Verification &
Investigation Report itself, which bears no signature.30Their
relianceonthepresumptionofregularityintheperformanceof
officialduty31isthusmisplaced.SinceReciossignaturedoesnot
appear on the December 27, 1978 Report, there can be no
presumptionthataninvestigationandverificationoftheparcelof
land was actually conducted. Strangely, respondents do not
proffer any explanation why the Verification & Investigation
ReportwasnotsignedbyRecio.Evenmoreimportantandaswill
later on be explained, this alleged presumption of regularity
assumingiteverexistedisovercomebytheevidencepresented
bypetitioner.
Third,thereportofSpecialInvestigatorIsaganiP.Cartagena
has not been successfully rebutted. In that report, Recio
supposedly admitted that he had not actually conducted an
investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land.
Cartagenas statement on Recios alleged admission may be
consideredasindependentlyrelevant.Awitnessmaytestifyas
tothestateof mindof anotherpersonthe lattersknowledge,
belief,orgoodorbadfaithandtheformersstatementsmaythen
be regarded as independently relevant without violating the
hearsayrule.32
Thus,becauseCartagenatookthewitnessstandandopened
himself to crossexamination, the Investigation Report 33he had
submittedtothedirectoroftheBureauofLandsconstitutespart
of
_______________
29
Roblesv.CourtofAppeals,328SCRA97,March14,2000.
30
SeeExhibitB;exhibitsfolder,p.2.
31
RevisedRulesofCourt,Rule131,Sec.3(m)provides:
(m)Thatofficialdutyhasbeenregularlyperformed.Whenthe
lawimposescertaindutiesandobligations,itwillbepresumed
thatsuchdutiesandobligationshavebeenperformedunlessitis
expressly made to appear to the contrary. All things are
presumedtohavebeenrightlyanddulyperformeduntilthereis
prooftothecontrary.
32
Francisco,BasicEvidence,2nded.,(1999),pp.214215.
33
ExhibitG;exhibitsfolder,pp.810.
371
VOL.393,DECEMBER3,2002 371
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
histestimony.Thoseportionsofthereportthatconsistedofhis
personal knowledge, perceptions and conclusions are not
hearsay.34Ontheotherhand,thepartreferringtothestatement
madebyReciomaybeconsideredasindependentlyrelevant.35
Thedoctrineonindependentlyrelevantstatementsholdsthat
conversationscommunicatedtoawitnessbyathirdpersonmay
beadmittedasproofthat,regardlessoftheirtruthorfalsity,they
were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such
statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a)
constitutesafactinissue 36or(b)iscircumstantiallyrelevantto
theexistenceofsuchfact.37
Since Cartagenas testimonywasbased onthereportof the
investigation he had conducted, his testimony was not hearsay
andwas,hence,properlyadmittedbythetrialcourt.38
Basedontheforegoingbadgesoffraud,wesustainpetitioners
contentionthatthefreepatentgrantedtoFelipeAlejaga,Sr.is
_______________
34
Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,273 SCRA 607, June 17,
1997.
35
CountryBankersInsuranceCorporationv.LiangaBayand
Community MultiPurpose Cooperative, Inc.,G.R. No. 136914,
January25,2002,374SCRA653.
36
Francisco,The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines
PartI(1997),p.518;citing31C.J.S.988.
37
Therearefivekindsofindependentlyrelevantstatements
thatarecircumstantialevidenceofthefactsinissue:
1.Statementsofapersonshowinghisstateofmind;thatis,his
mentalcondition,knowledge,belief,intention,illwillandother
emotions
2.Statementsthatmayidentifythedate,placeandcondition
asillnessandthelike
3. Statements of a person from which an inference may be
drawn as to the state of mind of another person; i.e., the
knowledge,belief,goodorbadfaithnoticedofthelatter
4.Statementsthatmayidentifythedate,placeandpersonin
question
5.Statementsshowingthelackofcredibilityofawitness
38
Bordalbav.CourtofAppeals,supra.
372
372 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
void.39Suchfraudisagroundforimpugningthevalidityofthe
Certificate of Title.40The invalidity of the patent is sufficient
basisfornullifyingtheCertificateofTitleissuedinconsequence
thereof,sincethelatterismerelyevidenceoftheformer. 41Verily,
we must uphold petitioners claim that the issuance of the
Alejagaspatentandtitlewastaintedwithfraud.42
Second Issue:
IndefeasibilityofTitle
PetitionercontendsthattheStatehasanimprescriptiblerightto
causethereversionofapieceofpropertybelongingtothepublic
domain.43Ontheotherhand,theAlejagasclaimthat,pursuantto
Section32ofPD152944otherwiseknownasthePropertyRegis
_______________
39
Roblesv.CourtofAppeals,328SCRA97,March14,2000.
40
Menesesv.CourtofAppeals,246SCRA162,July14,1995.
41
Daezv.CourtofAppeals,325SCRA856,February17,2000.
42
Barrerav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.123935,December14,
2001,372SCRA312.
43
PetitionforReview,p.18;Rollo,p.23.
44
Section32ofP.D.No.1529provides:
SEC.32.Reviewofdecreeofregistration;Innocentpurchaserfor
value.Thedecreeofregistrationshallnotbereopenedorrevised
byreasonofabsence,minority,orotherdisabilityofanyperson
adverselyaffectedthereby,norbyanyproceedinginanycourtfor
reversingjudgment,subject,however,totherightofanyperson,
includingthegovernmentandthebranchesthereof,deprivedof
land of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmationoftitleobtainedbyactualfraud,tofileintheproper
CourtofFirstInstanceapetitionforreopeningandreviewofthe
decreeofregistrationnotlaterthanoneyearfromandafterthe
date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case
shallsuchpetitionbeentertainedbythecourtwhereaninnocent
purchaserforvaluehasacquiredthelandoraninteresttherein,
whoserightsmaybeprejudiced.Wheneverthephraseinnocent
purchaserofvalueoranequivalentphraseoccursinthisDecree,
itshallbedeemedtoincludeaninnocentlessee,mortgagee,or
otherencumbrancerforvalue.
Upontheexpirationofsaidperiodofoneyear,thedecreeof
registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of
registrationinany
373
VOL.393,DECEMBER3,2002
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
tration Decreethe oneyear period for reversion has already
lapsed.45Thus, the States Complaint for reversion should be
dismissed.
Weagreewithpetitioner.
True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding
certificateoftitleissued,thelandcoveredbythemceasestobe
partofthepublicdomainandbecomesprivateproperty.Further,
the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes
indefeasibleayearaftertheissuanceofthelatter. 46However,this
indefeasibilityofatitledoesnotattachtotitlessecuredbyfraud
and misrepresentation.47Wellsettled is the doctrine that the
registration of a patent under the Torrens System does not by
itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrants already
existingone.Verily,registrationundertheTorrensSystemisnot
amodeofacquiringownership.48
Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No.
141,49theStateevenafterthelapseofoneyearmaystillbring
anactionforthereversiontothepublicdomainoflandthathas
beenfraudulentlygrantedtoprivateindividuals. 50Further,this
indefeasibilitycannotbeabartoaninvestigationbytheStateas
to how the title has been acquired, if the purpose of the
investigation is to determine whether fraud has in fact been
committedinsecuringthetitle.51
_______________
casemaypursuehisremedybyactionfordamagesagainstthe
applicantoranyotherpersonsresponsibleforthefraud.
45
RespondentAlejagasMemorandum,p.43;Rollo,p.336.
46
Baguiov.Republic,301SCRA450,January21,1999.
47
Ibid.
373 48
J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Macalindong,6 SCRA 938,
December29,1962.
49
Thissectionprovides:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of
lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the SolicitorGeneral or the officer acting in his
stead,inthepropercourts,inthenameoftheCommonwealthof
thePhilippines.
50
Republic v. Court of Appeals,255 SCRA 335, March 29,
1996.
51
Republicv.CourtofAppeals,111SCRA721,April10,1989.
374
374 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
Inthe casebeforeus, theindefeasibility ofacertificate oftitle
cannotbeinvokedbytheAlejagas,whoseforebearobtainedthe
titlebymeansoffraud.52Publicpolicydemandsthatthosewho
have done so should not be allowed to benefit from their
misdeed.53Thus,prescriptionandlacheswillnotbaractionsfiled
bytheStatetorecoveritsownpropertyacquiredthroughfraud
byprivateindividuals.54Thisissettledlaw.55
ProhibitionAgainstAlienationorEncumbrance
Assumingarguendothat the Alejagas title was validly issued,
thereisanotherbasisforthecancellationofthegrantandthe
reversion of the land to the public domain. Section 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 14156proscribes the encumbrance of a
parcelof
_______________
52
Republicv.RegisterofDeedsofQuezon,244SCRA537,May
31,1995.
53
Republicv.CourtofAppeals,supra,p.343.
54
Republic v. Heirs of Agustin L. Angeles,G.R. No. 141296,
October7,2002,390SCRA502.
55
Baguio v. Republic, supra;Republic v. Court of Appeals,
supraat note 51;Republic v. Court of Appeals,183 SCRA 620,
March 23, 1990;Republic v. Mina,114 SCRA 945, June 29,
1982;Director of Lands v. Abanilla,124 SCRA 358, August 31,
1983.
56
Thissectionprovides:
SEC. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its
branches,units,orinstitutions,landsacquiredunderfreepatent
orhomesteadprovisionsshallnotbe subject toencumbrance or
alienationfromthedateoftheapprovaloftheapplicationandfor
a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the
patentorgrant,norshalltheybecomeliabletothesatisfactionof
anydebtcontractedpriortotheexpirationofsaidperiod,butthe
improvementsorcropsonthelandmaybemortgagedorpledged
toqualifiedpersons,associations,orcorporations.
Noalienation,transfer,orconveyanceofanyhomesteadafter
fiveyearsandbeforetwentyfiveyearsafterissuanceoftitleshall
bevalidwithouttheapprovaloftheSecretaryofAgricultureand
Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on
constitutional
375
VOL.393,DECEMBER3,2002 375
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
landacquiredunderafreepatentorhomesteadwithinfiveyears
from its grant.57The prohibition against any alienation or
encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the
approvalofeveryapplication.58
Further,corporationsareexpresslyforbiddenbylawtohave
anyrightortitleto,orinterestin,landsthataregrantedunder
freeorhomesteadpatents; orany improvements thereon. They
areforbiddenfromenjoyingsuchright,titleorinterest,ifthey
havenotsecuredtheconsentofthegranteeandtheapprovalof
the secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources;andifsuchlandsaretobedevotedtopurposesother
thaneducation,charity,oreasementofway.59
_______________
and legal grounds. (As amended by Com. Act No. 456,
approvedJune8,1939.)
57
Republicv.CourtofAppeals,281SCRA639,November14,
1997.
Republicv.Ruiz,23SCRA348,April29,1968.
58
59
The following are the pertinent provisions of the Public
LandAct,asamendedbyCom.ActNo.615,approvedonMay5,
1941:
SEC. 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and
solely for educational, religious, or charitable purposes or for a
right of way, no corporation, association, or partnership may
acquire or have any right, title, interest, or property right
whatsoevertoanylandgrantedunderthefreepatent,homestead,
or individual sale provisions of this Act or to any permanent creditinvestigatedtheloanapplicantFelipeAlejagaandyouhave
improvementonsuchland. personallyexaminedthis?
SEC.122.Nolandoriginallyacquiredinanymannerunder A Yes,yourHonor.
the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on
COURT DoyouconcludethatthisOriginalCertificateofTitleisa[free]
suchland,shallbeencumbered,alienated,ortransferred,except
patent?
topersons, corporations, associations, or partnershipswho may
acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to A Yes,yourHonor.
corporationsorganizedinthePhilippinesauthorizedthereforby COURT Andthis[free]patentwasgrantedonMarch19,1979.
theircharters. A Yes,yourhonor.
Except in cases of hereditary succession, no land or any COURT Andassuch[free]patentitcannotbealienatedexcept[to]the
portion thereof originally acquired under the free patent, governmentorwithinfiveyearsfromitsissuance?
homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act, or any A Yes,yourhonor.
permanent improvement on such land, shall be transferred or
COURT Whydidyourecommendtheloan?
assignedtoanyindividual,norshallsuchlandoranypermanent
A Becauseitisjustamortgage.64
improvementthereonbeleasedtosuchindividual,whenthearea
Thus,themortgageexecutedbyRespondentFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
ofsaidland,addedtothatofhisown,shallexceedonehundred
andfortyfourhectares.Any fallssquarelywithinthetermencumbranceproscribedbySection
376
_______________
376 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr. transfer,assignment,orleasemadeinviolationhereofshall
Inthe caseatbar,FreePatentNo. (VI2)3358 60wasapproved benullandvoid.
andissuedonMarch14,1979.CorrespondingOriginalCertificate 60
ExhibitC;exhibitsfolder,p.3.
ofTitleNo.P1561wasissuedonthesamedate.OnAugust18, 61
ExhibitE;id.,p.5.
1981,ortwo(2)yearsafterthegrantofthefreepatent,Felipe 62
SeePromissoryNote;Records,p.24.
Alejaga, Sr. obtained from Respondent PNB a loan 62in the
amountofP100,000.Despitethestatementonthetitlecertificate
63
SeeCreditAgreement;id.,p.25.
itself that the land granted under the free patent shall be
64
TSN,July24,1991,p.9.
inalienable for five (5) years from the grant, a real estate 377
mortgage was nonetheless constituted on the parcel of land VOL.393,DECEMBER3,2002 377
coveredbyOCTNo.P15.63Inhistestimony,GabrielD.Aranas, Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
Jr.,thenCashierIIIofrespondentbank,evenadmittedthatthe 118 of the Public Land Act. 65A mortgage constitutes a legal
PNBwasawareofsuchrestriction. limitation on the estate, and the foreclosure of the mortgage
COURT YoutestifiedMr.Aranasthatyouinspectedthetitlealsowhenyou wouldnecessarilyresultintheauctionoftheproperty.66
 As early asPascua v. Talens,67we have explained the
rationale for the prohibition against the encumbrance of a
homesteadits lease and mortgage includedan encumbrance
which,byanalogy,appliestoafreepatent.Weruledasfollows:
It is wellknown that the homestead laws were designed to
distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land
destitutecitizensfortheirhomeandcultivation.Pursuanttosuch
benevolentintentiontheStateprohibitsthesaleorencumbrance
ofthehomestead(Section116)withinfiveyearsafterthegrantof
thepatent.
Further, an encumbrance ona parcel of land acquired through
free patent constitutes sufficient ground for the nullification of
suchgrant,asprovidedunderCommonwealthActNo.141,which
wequote:
SEC. 124. Anyacquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or
other contract made or executed in violation of any of the
provisionsofsectionsonehundredandeighteen,onehundredand
twenty,onehundredandtwentyone,onehundredandtwenty
two, and one hundred and twentythree of this Actshall be
unlawfulandnullandvoidfromitsexecutionandshallproduce
the effect of annulling and canceling the grant, title, patent, or
permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or
presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its
improvementstotheState.
Mortgage over a parcel of land acquired through a free patent
grantnullifiestheawardandconstitutesacauseforthereversion
ofthepropertytothestate,asweheldinRepublicv.Courtof
Appeals:68
_______________
65
Siyv.TanGunGa,119Phil.676;10SCRA398,February
29,1964.
66
PrudentialBankv.Panis,153SCRA390,August31,1987.
67
80Phil.792,April30,1948,perBengzon,J.(laterC.J.).
68
281SCRA639,November14,1997.
378
378 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.HeirsofFelipeAlejaga,Sr.
Theforegoinglegalprovisionsclearlyproscribetheencumbrance
of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead
within five years from the grant of such patent. Furthermore,
suchencumbranceresultsinthecancellationofthegrantandthe
reversionofthelandtothepublicdomain.69
To comply with the condition for the grant of the free patent,
withinfiveyearsfromitsissuance,FelipeAlejaga,Sr.shouldnot
haveencumberedtheparcellandgrantedtohim.Themortgage
he made over the land violated that condition.70Hence, the
propertymustnecessarilyreverttothepublicdomain,pursuant
toSection124ofthePublicLandAct.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision SET ASIDE. The Decision of the RTC of Roxas City
(Branch15)datedOctober27,1993isREINSTATED.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
SandovalGutierrez,CoronaandCarpioMorales,
JJ.,concur.
Puno(Chairman),J.,AbroadonOfficialBusiness.
Petition granted, judgment set aside. That of the trial court
reinstanted.
Note.Wherepubliclandisacquiredbyanapplicantthrough
fraud and misrepresentation, the State may institute reversion
proceedings even after the lapse of one year. (Republic vs. De
Guzman,326SCRA574[2000])

o0o

_______________

69
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 648, per
Panganiban,J.
Republic of the Philippines
70
RepublicofthePhilippinesv.Garcia,etal.,105Phil.826, Supreme Court
May27,1959. BaguioCity
379
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights FIRST DIVISION
reserved.
ANNA LERIMA PATULA, G.R. No. 164457
Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA,C.J.,Chairperson,
-versus- LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR.,JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, April 11, 2012
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In the trial of everycriminal case, a judge must rigidlytest the
States evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidenceadheres to the
basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the
crime charged upon such evidence. Nothing less is demanded of the judge;
otherwise, the guarantee of due process of law is nullified.The accused need
notadduceanythingto rebut evidence that is discredited for failing the
test.Acquittal should then follow.
Antecedents
Petitioner was charged withestafaunder an informationfiled in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in DumagueteCitythat averred:
That on or about and during the period from March 16 to
20, 1997 and for sometime prior thereto, in the City of
Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a
saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.,
Dumaguete City, having collected and received the total
sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said
company under the express obligation to account for the
proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said
company, but far from complying with her obligation and
after a reasonable period of time despite repeated
demands therefore, and with intent to defraud the said
company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail to deliver the said collection to the said
company but instead, did, then and there willfully
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said company
in the aforesaid amount of P131,286.97.
Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
[1]
Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged in the
information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of factswas had, and petitioner did
not avail herself of plea bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecutions first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that
he was the branch manager of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.
(Footluckers) in Dumaguete City since October 8, 1994; that petitioner was
an employee of Footluckers, starting as a saleslady in 1996 until she became
a sales representative; that as a sales representative she was authorized to
take orders from wholesale customers coming from different towns (like
Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia, Lumbangan and Mabinay in Negros
Oriental, and Siquijor), and to collect payments from them; that she could
issue and sign official receipts of Footluckers for the payments, which she
would then remit; that she would then submit the receipts for the payments
for tallying and reconciliation; that at first her volume of sales was quite
high, but later on dropped, leading him to confront her; that she responded
that business was slow; that he summoned the accounting clerk to verify;
that the accounting clerk discovered erasures on some collection receipts;
that he decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor Karen
Guivencan; that he learned from a customer of petitioners that the
customers outstanding balance had already been fully paid although that
balance appeared unpaid in Footluckers records; and that one night later on,
petitioner and her parents went to his house to deny having misappropriated
any money of Footluckers and to plead for him not to push through with a
case against her, promising to settle her account on a monthly basis; and that
she did not settle after that, but stopped reporting to work.[2]
On March 7, 2002, Gos cross examination, re-direct examination
and re-crossexamination were completed.
The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan,
whomFootluckers employed as its store auditor since November 16,
1995 until her resignation on March 31, 2001. She declared that Go had
requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had told him that they
had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected
outstandingbalances for them; that she first conducted her audit by going to
the customers in places from Mabinay to Zamboanguitain Negros Oriental,
and then in Siquijor; thatshe discovered in the course of her audit that the
amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of
around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate
copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that upon
completing her audit, she submittedto Go a written report denominated as
List of Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/
Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997
marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had
misappropriated the total amount ofP131,286.92.[3]
During Guivencans stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the
ledgers of petitioners various customers allegedly with discrepancies as
Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive. Each of the ledgers had a
first column that contained the dates of the entries, a second that identified
the invoices by the number, a third that statedthe debit, a fourth that noted
the credit (or the amounts paid), and a fifth that summed the balances (debit
minus credit).Only 49 of theledgerswere formally offered and admitted by
the RTC because the 50thledger could no longer be found.
In the course of Guivencansdirect-examination,petitioners counsel
interposed a continuing objection on the ground that the figuresentered in
Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the
persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court.
[4]
With that, petitioners counsel did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan,
apparently regarding her testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby
tended to prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.
TheProsecution thenformally offered its documentary exhibits,
including Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives (like the originals and
duplicates of the receipts supposedly executed and issued by petitioner),
 shall be effective only until the promulgation of this
inclusive, the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the
judgment.
accounts served by petitioner, and Guivencans so-called Summary (Final
SO ORDERED.[8]
Report) of Discrepancies.[5]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, butthe RTC denied

After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to
the motion on May 7, 2004.[9]
file a demurrer to evidence although it had manifested the intention to do so,
and instead rested itscase.The Prosecution and Defense submitted their
Issues
respective memoranda, and submitted the case for decision.[6]

Insisting that the RTCs judgment grossly violated [her]

On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner
Constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of
had opted not to present evidence for her defense the Prosecutions evidence
the accusation against her because, while the charge against her is estafa
remained unrefuted and uncontroverted,[7]rendered its decision finding
under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the evidence presented
petitioner guilty of estafa, to wit:
against her and upon which her conviction was based, was falsification, an
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and offense not alleged or included in the Information under which she was
circumstances, the Court finds ANNA LERIMA
arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and that said judgment likewise blatantly
PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Art. 315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal Code ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules on admission of evidence in
and accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an
that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all private
INDETERMINATE PENALTY of imprisonment of 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 18 years documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not proved in
and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum with all
the accessory penalties provided by law and to indemnify accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
private complainant the amount of P131,286.92 with petitioner has directly appealed to the Court via petition for review
interest at 12% per annum until fully paid and to pay the
costs. on certiorari, positing the following issues, to wit:

Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules 1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY
of Criminal Procedure, the cash bail put up by the accused ACCUSED FOR THAT MATTER , CHARGED
OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE CAN BE CONVICTED
UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION
WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION.
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSEDS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HER WAS VIOLATED
WHEN SHE WAS CONVICTED UPON OR BY
EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION CONSIDERING
THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST HER
IS ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER
ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE, EXHIBITS B
TO YY-YY-2, ALL PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, THE DUE
EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF WHICH
WERE NOT PROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC.
20, RULE 132 OF THE SAID REVISED RULES ON
EVIDENCE ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT SAID
EXHIBITS TEND TO PROVE FALSIFICATION BY
THE ACCUSED, A CRIME NEITHER CHARGED NOR
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF
KAREN GUIVENCAN DESPITE THE OBJECTION
THAT SAID TESTIMONY WHICH TRIED TO PROVE
THAT THE ACCUSED FALSIFIED EXHIBITS B TO
YY-YY-2INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE ACCUSEDS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF
THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION
AGAINST HER, FOR BEING IRRELEVANT AND
IMMATERIAL SINCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B)
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF
THE PROSECUTION REMAINS UNREFUTED AND
UNCONTROVERTED DESPITE ACCUSEDS
OBJECTION THAT SAID EVIDENCE IS
IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT TO THE CRIME
CHARGED.
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES NOT
CROSS-EXAMINING KAREN GUIVENCAN FOR
THE REASON THAT HER TESTIMONY IS
IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT AS IT TENDED TO
PROVE AN OFFENSE NOT CHARGED IN
INFORMATION RESULTED IN THE ADMISSION OF
SAID TESTIMONY AS BEING UNREFUTED AND
UNCONTROVERTED, AND WHETHER OR NOT THE
DEFENSES OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED WAIVED IF THE DEFENSE CROSS-
EXAMINED SAID WITNESS.
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN RULING THAT EXHIBIT A, WHICH IS
THE LIST OF CUSTOMERS COVERED BY
SALESWOMAN LERIMA PATULA WITH
DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS NOT HEARSAY AND
SELF-SERVING.[10]
The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:
1. Whether or not the failure of the information
for estafa to allege the falsification of the duplicate
receipts issued by petitioner to her customersviolated
 petitioners right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation;
2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting
evidence of the falsification of the duplicate
receiptsdespite the information not alleging the
falsification;
3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B
to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) were
admissible as evidence of petitioners guilt
for estafaas charged despite their not being duly
authenticated;and
4. Whether or not Guivencanstestimony onthe ledgers
and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive) to prove petitioners misappropriation or
conversion wasinadmissible for being hearsay.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
Failure of information to allege falsification
did not violate petitioners right to be informed
of thenatureand cause of the accusation
Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her
Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
when: (a) it held that the information did not have to allege her falsification
of the duplicate receipts, and (b) when it convicted her of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Codeby relying on the
evidence on falsification.
The contentionof petitioner cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights guaranteessome rightsto every person accused of
a crime, among them the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, viz:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect
when the information was filed in the RTC, contained the following
provisions on the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the
accusation in the information, to wit:
 Section 8.Designation of the offense. Whenever
possible, a complaint or information should state the
designation given to the offense by the statute, besides the
statement of the acts or omissions constituting the same,
and if there is no such designation, reference should be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing
it. (7)
Section 9.Cause of accusation. The acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense must
be stated in ordinary and concise language without
repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute
defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. (8)
The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and
cause of the accusation in the informationshould never be taken for granted
by the State. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not
clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an
offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be
violative of the Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation.[11] Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime,
even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily included in
the information filed against him.
The crime of estafacharged against petitioner was defined and
penalized by Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code, viz:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who
shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period,
if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty
shall be termed prision mayoror reclusion temporal, as
the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud
is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period if
such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000
pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if
such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in
the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any
of the following means:
xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence,
namely:
 xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the
prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or
on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of
or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by
denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.
xxx
The elements of the offense charged were as follows:
(a) That the offender received money, goods or other
personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return,
the same;
(b) That the offender misappropriated or converted such
money, goods or other personal property, or denied
his part in its receipt;
(c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was
to the prejudice of another; and
(d) That the offended party made a demand on the
offender for the delivery or return of such money,
goods or other personal property.[12]
According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner
misappropriated or converted the sums paid by her customers, and later
falsified the duplicates of the receipts before turning such duplicates to her
employer to show that the customers had paid less than the amounts actually
reflected on the original receipts. Obviously, she committed the falsification
in order to conceal her misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the
falsificationwas not an offense separate and distinct from the estafacharged
against her, the Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts of falsification
as its means of establishing her misappropriation or conversion as an
essential ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the information. In that
manner, her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her was not infringed or denied to her.
We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein
completely pleaded the estafa defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Codewithin the context of the substantive
lawand the rules. Verily, there was no necessity for the information to allege
the acts of falsification by petitioner because falsification was not an
element of the estafacharged.
Not surprisingly,the RTC correctly dealt in its decision with
petitioners concern thuswise:
 In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the]
accused that [the] prosecutions evidence utterly fails to
prove the crime charged. According to the defense, the
essence of Karen Guivencans testimony is that the
accused falsified the receipts issued to the customers
served by her by changing or altering the amounts in the
duplicates of the receipts and therefore, her testimony is
immaterial and irrelevant as the charge is
misappropriation under Art. 315, paragraph (1b) of the
Revised Penal Code and there is no allegation whatsoever
of any falsification or alteration of amounts in the
[i]nformation under which the accused was arraigned and
pleaded NOT GUILTY. Accused, thus, maintains that the
testimony of Karen Guivencan should therefore not be
considered at all as it tended to prove an offense not
charged or included in the [i]nformation and would
violate [the] accuseds constitutional and statutory right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against her. The Court is not in accord with such posture
of the accused.
It would seem that the accused is of the idea that
because the crime charged in the [i]nformation is
merely [e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru [f]alsification of
documents, the prosecution could not prove
falsification. Such argumentation is not correct. Since
the information charges accused only of
misappropriation pursuant to Art. 315, par. (1b) of the
Revised [P]enal Code, the Court holds that there is no
necessity of alleging the falsification in the Information
as it is not an element of the crime charged.
Distinction should be made as to when the
crimes of Estafa and Falsification will constitute as one
complex crime and when they are considered as two
separate offenses. The complex crime of Estafa
Through Falsification of Documents is committed
when one has to falsify certain documents to be able to
obtain money or goods from another person. In other
words, the falsification is a necessary means of
committing estafa. However, if the falsification is
committed to conceal the misappropriation, two
separate offenses of estafa and falsification are
committed. In the instant case, when accused collected
payments from the customers, said collection which
was in her possession was at her disposal. The falsified
or erroneous entries which she made on the duplicate
copies of the receipts were contrived to conceal some
amount of her collection which she did not remit to the
company xxx.[13]
II
Testimonial and documentary evidence,being hearsay,
did not prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the
burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In
discharging this burden, the Prosecutions duty is to prove each and every
element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt
for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. [14] The
Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the
commission of the offense. [15]In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely
on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the
weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the
Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. [16]Conversely, as
[17]
to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be
acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption
of innocence in his favor.In other words, the weakness of the defense put up
by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the
Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the
commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the
malefactor responsible for it.
Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged in the
information?
To establish the elements of estafaearlier mentioned, the
Prosecution presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various
documentsconsisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to
each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the
accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of
the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation
[18]
sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. The ledgers and receipts were
marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive.
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various
duties of petitioner as Footluckers sales representative. On her part,
Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually
received by petitioner from the customersor remitted by petitioner to
Footluckers.This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive,and that Guivencan based
her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by
petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers corresponding to each
customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries
effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and
test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners
misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner.
The denial of that opportunity rendered theentire proof of misappropriation
or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes
of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable
and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made
toSection 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness
can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise
provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a
substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes
the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft ofpersonal knowledge of the
disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony
derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently
testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source
of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard
another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the
witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in
court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of
such testimony thendepends not upon theveracity of the witness but upon the
veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness without
oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing
in court as a witness andcannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged
to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties,
to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any
ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she
was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.
[19]
Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that
there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. [20] The testimony
may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is
offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, it is hearsay just the same.[21]
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human
utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of
the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can
be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the
test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered,
not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the
truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in
a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say
that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove
that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused
uttered those words.[22] This kind of utterance ishearsay in character but is
not legal hearsay.[23]The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the
statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the
truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
[24]
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not
the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded
from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the
opposing party to cross-examine the originaldeclarant claiming to have a
direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence.[25]If hearsay is allowed,

the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. [26]It is then
to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness,
being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as
evidence to establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguardinga partys
right to cross-examine her adversarys witness,the Rules of Court offers two
solutions. The firstsolution is to require that allthe witnesses in a judicial
trial or hearing be examined only in courtunder oath or affirmation. Section
1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution,viz:
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. -
The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or
hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or
affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak,
or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the
answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a)
The secondsolution is to require that all witnesses besubject to the cross-
examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Courtensuresthis solutionthusly:
as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom
to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from
interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important
facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept
relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the
1987 Constitution,which guarantees that: In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face xxx ,
the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies
to non-criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based
upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability
of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn
affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the
opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness
of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the
out-of-court statement depends.[27]

Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and

extent. Upon the termination of the direct examination,
the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party
 Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencans testimony as
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary
well as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely public except last wills and testaments, and
rejected as proof of petitioners misappropriation or conversion. (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of
private documents required by law to be entered therein.
III
Lack of their proper authentication rendered All other writings are private.
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
inadmissible as judicial evidence
The nature of documents as either public or private determines
how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public
document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has
Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as
been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a
evidence Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, despite their
competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it
being private documents that were not duly authenticated as required by
is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court.In contrast, a private document is any other
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdistinguishes between a
writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the
public document and a private document for the purpose of their
intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
presentation in evidence, viz:
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or
Section 19. Classes of documents. For the sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by
purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents
law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by
are either public or private.
law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The
Public documents are:
requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four
(a) The written official acts, or records of the instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, context of Section 21,[28] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the
or of a foreign country;
genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been
specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; [29](c) when The Prosecutionattempted to have Go authenticate the signature of
thegenuineness and authenticity of the document petitioner in various receipts, to wit:

ATTY. ABIERA:
have been admitted;[30] or (d) when the document is not being offered as Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not
genuine.[31] tally with the original receipts, do you have
copies of these receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but its not now in
my possession.
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this
were private documents because private individuals executed or generated Honorable Court, can you assure this
them for private or business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the (Next Page)
exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be presented
ATTY ABIERA (continuing):
and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution Honorable Court that you will be able to present those
dutifully seeing to their authentication in the manner provided in Section20 receipts?
A. Yes.
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,viz: Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the
accused in this case, Anna Lerima Patula?
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before A. Yes.
any private document offered as authentic is received in Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be accused in this case?
proved either: A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the
receipts also.
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which
or written; or we would present this,or offer the same as
soon as the original receipts can be
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the presented, but for purposes only of your
signature or handwriting of the maker. testimony, Im going to point to you a
certain signature over this receipt number
Any other private document need only be identified FLDT96 20441, a receipt from Cirila
as that which it is claimed to be. Askin, kindly go over the signature and
 tell the Honorable Court whether you are
familiar with the signature? (Next Page)
A. Yes, that is her signature.
INTERPRETER: COURT:
Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh. A-1. What is the
collector. number of that receipt?

(Next Page)

ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the
signature rather, of the accused in this ATTY. ABIERA:
case appears? Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement
A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts. that: received from Cirila Askin.[32]
ATTY. ABIERA: xxx
In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be
presenting the original receipts Your
Honor, because its quite voluminous, so we As the excerpts indicate, Gos attempt at authentication of the signature of
will just forego with the testimony of the
witness but we will just present the petitioner on the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a
same using the testimony of another document that was marked as Exhibit A, while the purported signature of
witness, for purposes of identifying the
signature of the accused. We will request petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1) immediately fizzled out after
that this signature which has been identified the Prosecution admitted that the document was a meremachinecopy, not the
to by the witness in this case be marked,
Your Honor, with the reservation to present original. Thereafter, as if to soften its failed attempt, the Prosecution
the original copy and present the same to
expressly promised to produce at a later date the originalsof the receipt with
offer as our exhibits but for the meantime,
this is only for the purposes of recording, serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts. But that promise was
Your Honor, which we request the same, the
receipt which has just been identified awhile not even true, because almost in the same breath the Prosecution offered to
ago be marked as our Exhibit A You Honor. authenticate the signature of petitioner on the receiptsthrougha different
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit A. witness (though then still unnamed). As matters turned out in the end, the
ATTY. ABIERA: effort to have Go authenticate both themachinecopy of the receiptwith serial
And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit
A-1. number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of petitioner on that receipt
was wasteful because the machine copy was inexplicablyforgotten and was had not seen petitioner affix her signature on the receipts, as the following
no longer evenincluded in the Prosecutions Offer of Documentary excerpts from her testimony bear out:
Evidence.
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the
It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number confirmation sheet, will you go over these
Miss witness?
FLDT96 No. 20441was subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by
Guivencan. However,the Prosecution did not establishthat the signature the customer. The other receipt is the one
showing her payment prior to the last
appearing on Exhibit B was the same signature that Go had earliersought to payment.
identify to be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy COURT:
Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts?
(Exhibit A). This is borne out by the fact that the Prosecution abandoned A. From the customer.
Q. And who issued those receipts?
Exhibit A as the marking nomenclature for the machine copyof the receipt
A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 for all intents and purposes of ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be
this case, and used the same nomenclature to referinstead toan entirely marked as Exhibit B-3, receipt number
differentdocument entitled List of Customers covered by ANA LERIMA 20441.
PATULA w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March 16-20, (Next Page)
1997.
COURT:
Mark it.
In her case, Guivencans identification of petitioners signature on ATTY. ZERNA:
The signature of the collector be marked as
two receipts based alone on the fact that the signatures contained the legible Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of
the collector, are your familiar with that
family name of Patula was ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw
signature? (shown to witness)
infecting the documentary evidence against petitioner. Apparently, A. Yes.
Q. Whose signature is that?
Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioners signature on the receipts A. Miss Patula.
either because she lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she Q. How do you know?
A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula.
 Q. Are you familiar with her signature?
her lack of independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries, as the
A. Yes.
ATTY. ZERNA: following excerpts of her testimony show:
We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Exhibit B-3-a Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records
COURT: showed that this Cecilia Askin has an
Mark it. account of P10,791.75?
ATTY. ZERNA: ATTY. DIEZ:
The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit B-4 The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis,
and the signature as Exhibit B-4-a. office record.
COURT: COURT:
Mark it.[33] Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
xxx A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just
copied that and showed it to the customers
ATTY. ZERNA: for confirmation.
Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number
26603 issued to one Divina Cadilig. Will ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
you please identify this receipt if this is the Q. What about the receipts?
receipt of your office? COURT:
A.Yes. Make a follow-up question and what was the result when
Q.There is a signature over the portion for the you copied that amount in the ledger and
collector. Whose signature is this? you had it confirmed by the customers, what
A.Ms. Patula. was the result when you had it confirmed by
Q.How do you know that this is her signature? the customers?
A.Because we can read the Patula.[34] WITNESS:
A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still
a balance of P10,971.75.
We also have similar impressions of lack of proper authentication as to the ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. Do you have a-whats the basis of saying that the
ledgers the Prosecution presented to prove the discrepancies between the
balance of this customer is still P10,971.75
amountspetitioner hadallegedly received from the customers and the
(Next Page)
amounts she had actually remitted to Footluckers. Guivencanexclusively
relied on the entries of the unauthenticated ledgersto support her audit ATTY. ZERNA (continuing):
[i]n your office?
report on petitioners supposed misappropriation or conversion, revealing COURT:
That was already answered paero, the office has a ledger.
Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you?
A. No, Maam.[35]
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of
Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002)
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the
original and the duplicate, will you please
enlighten the Honorable Court on that
discrepancy which you said?
A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully
paid. Her ledger shows a zero balance she
has fully paid while in the original
(Next page)
WITNESS (continuing):
[r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven
hundred Ninety-one Pesos and Seventy-
five Centavos (10,791.75).
COURT:
Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is
indicated there?
A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was
already forwarded to the Manila Office.
Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger
showing that it has already a zero balance?
A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in
the original receipt she has still a balance.
xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
The confirmation sheet ---
COURT:
The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as
the receipt in your earlier testimony? Is that
what you referred to as the receipts, the
original receipts?
A. This is what I copied from the ledger.
Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said
showed that that particular customer still has
a balance of Ten Thousand something?
A. The receipt is no longer here.
Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already
entered in the ledger?
A. Yes.[36]
In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecutions evidence, it
should come as no surprise that petitioners counsel interposed timely
objections. Yet, the RTC mysteriously overruled the objections and
allowedthe Prosecutionto present the unauthenticated ledgers, as follows:
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of
Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)
ATTY. ZERNA:
CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION
Q Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us
several ledgers. Where is it now?
A It is here.
Q Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina
Cadilig, how much is her account in your
office?
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to
answer the question, let me interpose our
objection on the ground that this ledger
has not been duly identified to by the
person who made the same. This witness
will be testifying on hearsay matters
because the supposed ledger was not
identified to by the person who made the
same.
COURT:
Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I
think they were already duly identified by
this witness. As a matter of fact, it was she
who brought them to court
(Next Page)
COURT (cont.):
because these were the ledgers on file in their office.
ATTY. DIEZ
That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made
the entries is not this witness, Your Honor.
How do we know that the entries there is
(sic) correct on the receipts submitted to
their office.
COURT:
Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support
that. Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A Its the office clerk in-charge.
COURT:
The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk.
ATTY. ZERNA:
She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and
she is the auditor of Footluckers.
COURT:
flawed presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to the
I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified
where those entries were taken. So, you
answer the query of counsel.
xxx
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a
continuing objection to the questions
profounded(sic) on those ledgers on the
ground that, as I have said, it is hearsay.
COURT:
Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted.
Q (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one
who prepared the entries on those ledgers,
is she still connected with Footluckers?
A She is no longer connected now, Your Honor,
COURT:
Alright proceed.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ZERNA:
Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of
business. So, exempt from the hearsay
rule.
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.[37]
The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft treatment of the Prosecutions

instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well as withSection 22 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court,which contains instructions on how to prove the
genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as follows:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting
proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved by
any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he has seen the person write, or has seen
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness
has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphases
supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves
seen the execution or signing of the documents,the Prosecution surely did
not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives conformably with
the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. That was
the onlyfair and just result, as the Court held in Malayan Insurance Co.,
Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation:[38]
On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance
Co., Inc., contends that Jeanne Kings testimony was
hearsay because she had no personal knowledge of the
execution of the documents supporting respondents
cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice,
packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine
Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that even though King was
personally assigned to handle and monitor the importation
of Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, herein
respondent, this cannot be equated with personal
knowledge of the facts which gave rise to respondents
cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even though
she personally prepared the summary of weight of steel
billets received by respondent, she did not have personal
knowledge of the weight of steel billets actually shipped
and delivered.
At the outset, we must stress that respondents cause
of action is founded on breach of insurance contract
covering cargo consisting of imported steel billets. To
hold petitioner liable, respondent has to prove, first, its
importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets
valued at P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel
billets delivered to and received by the importer, namely
the respondent. Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned
to handle respondents importations, including their
insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the
volume of steel billets being imported, and therefore
competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay,
as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.However, she is not qualified to testify
on the shortage in the delivery of the imported steel
billets. She did not have personal knowledge of the
actual steel billets received. Even though she prepared
the summary of the received steel billets, she based the
summary only on the receipts prepared by other
persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was
hearsay. It has no probative value even if not objected
to at the trial.
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King
failed to properly authenticate respondents documentary
evidence. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of
Court, before a private document is admitted in
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person
who executed it, the person before whom its execution
was acknowledged, any person who was present and
saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the
parties to the instruments had previously confessed
execution thereof. In this case, respondent admits that
King was none of the aforementioned persons. She
merely made the summary of the weight of steel billets
based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and the
SGS report. Thus, the summary of steel billets actually
received had no proven real basis, and Kings
testimony on this point could not be taken at face
value.
xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are
either public or private. Private documents are those that
do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Section 20of the same law,
in turn, provides that before any private document is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity
must be proved either by anyone who saw the document
executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the maker. Here,
respondents documentary exhibits are private
documents. They are not among those enumerated in
Section 19, thus, their due execution and authenticity
need to be proved before they can be admitted
in evidence.With the exception concerning the
summary of the weight of the steel billets imported,
respondent presented no supporting evidence
concerning their authenticity. Consequently, they
cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured cargo
and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets.
In sum, we find no sufficient competent evidence to
prove petitioners liability.
That the Prosecutions evidence was left uncontested because
petitioner decided not to subject Guivencan to cross-examination, and did
not tender her contrary evidencewas inconsequential. Although the trial
court had overruled the seasonable objections to Guivencans testimony
bypetitioners counsel due to the hearsay character, it could not be denied
thathearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, had no probative value.
[39]
Verily, the flaws of the Prosecutions evidence were fundamental and
substantive, not merely technical and procedural, and were defects that the
adverse partys waiver of her cross-examination or failure to rebutcould not
set right or cure. Nor did the trial courts overruling of petitioners objections
imbue the flawed evidence with any virtue and value.
Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the
application of the hearsay rule by also terselystating that the ledgers were
prepared in the regular course of business. [40]Seemingly, the RTC applied
Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 43. Entries in the course of business.
Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein
stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or in
 the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular
admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged
course of business or duty.
upon such evidence. The failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the
guarantee of due of process of law in favor of the accused, who had no
This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping
obligation to prove her innocence. Heracquittal should follow.
mannerof justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to
the need to show the concurrence of the several requisites before entries in IV
No reliable evidence on damage
the course of business could be excepted from the hearsay rule. The
requisites are as follows:
Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt unreliable, the
(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or
Court declares that the disposition by the RTC ordering petitioner to
unable to testify;
indemnify Footluckers in the amount of P131,286.92 with interest of
(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer; 12% per annum until fully paid was not yet shown to be factually founded.
Yet, she cannot now be absolved of civil liability on that basis. Heracquittal
(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated
in the entries; has to bedeclared as without prejudice to the filing of a civil action against
her for the recovery of any amount that she may still owe to Footluckers.
(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or
in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral, or religious;
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE ANDREVERSESthe
(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular decision convicting ANNA LERIMA PATULAof estafa as charged,
course of business or duty.[41]
and ACQUITS her for failure of the Prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, without prejudice to a civil action brought against her for

The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to

the recoveryof any amount still owing in favor of Footluckers Chain of
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the
Stores, Inc.
trial of every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the States evidence of
guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to the basic rules of
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
 SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO

C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

G.R.No.198022.April7,2014.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,vs.SONNY
GATARINyCABALLERO@JAYR and EDUARDO
QUISAYAS,accused,
EDUARDOQUISAYAS,accusedappellant.
Criminal Law; Robbery with Homicide; Elements of.To
sustaina conviction forrobbery with homicide, theprosecution
must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal
propertybelongingtoanother;(2)withintenttogain;(3)withthe
useofviolenceorintimidationagainstaperson;and(4)onthe
occasionor by reasonoftherobbery,thecrimeofhomicide, as
usedinthegenericsense,wascommitted.
 Same;CorpusDelicti;WordsandPhrases;Corpusdelictihas
been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its
primarysense, refers to thefactthatacrime hasactuallybeen
committed.The prosecution did not convincingly establish
thecorpusdelictiofthecrimeofrobbery.Corpusdelictihasbeen
definedasthebodyorsubstanceofthecrimeand,initsprimary
sense,referstothefactthatacrimehasactuallybeencommitted.
Asappliedtoaparticularoffense,itmeanstheactualcommission
by someone of the particular crime charged. In this case, the
elementoftaking,aswellastheexistenceofthemoneyallegedto
have been lost and stolen by appellant, was not adequately
established.Wefindnosufficientevidence
_______________
*THIRDDIVISION.
17to show either the amount of money stolen, or if any
amount was in fact stolen from Januario. Even if we consider
Januarios dying declaration, the same pertains only to the
stabbingincidentandnottotheallegedrobbery.
Same;RobberywithHomicide;Assumingthatrobberywas
indeedcommitted, theprosecutionmustestablishwithcertitude
thatthekillingwasamereincidenttotherobbery,thelatterbeing
the perpetrators main purpose and objective.Assuming that
robbery was indeed committed, the prosecution must establish
withcertitudethatthekillingwasamereincidenttotherobbery,
thelatterbeingtheperpetratorsmainpurposeandobjective.Itis
not enough to suppose that the purpose of the author of the
homicide was to rob; a mere presumption of such fact is not
sufficient.Stated in a different manner, a conviction requires
certitudethattherobberyisthemainpurpose,andobjectiveof
themalefactorandthekillingismerelyincidentaltotherobbery.
Theintenttorobmustprecedethetakingofhumanlifebutthe
killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. What is
crucialforaconvictionforthecrimeofrobberywithhomicideis
fortheprosecutiontofirmlyestablishtheoffendersintenttotake
personalpropertybeforethekilling,regardlessofthetimewhen
thehomicideisactuallycarriedout.Inthiscase,therewasno
showing of the appellants intention, determined by their acts
prior to, contemporaneous with, and subsequent to the
commissionofthecrime,tocommitrobbery.Noshredofevidence
is on record that could support the conclusion that appellants
primary motive was to rob Januario and that he was able to
accomplish it. Mere speculation and probabilities cannot
substitute for proof required in establishing the guilt of an
accusedbeyondreasonabledoubt.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Dying
Declaration;RequisitesfortheAdmissibilityofDyingDeclaration
as an Exception to the Hearsay Evidence Rule.A dying
declaration,althoughgenerallyinadmissibleas evidencedueto
its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the
followingrequisitesconcur,namely:(a)thedeclarationconcerns
thecauseandthesurroundingcircumstancesofthedeclarants
death;(b)itismadewhendeathappearstobeimminentandthe
declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the
declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she
survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in
whichthesubjectofinquiryinvolvesthedeclarantsdeath.
18
Same;Same;Same;Same;Theruleisthat,inordertomake
a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and
imminentdeathmustbeenteredbythedeclarant.Inthecaseat
bar,itappearsthatnotalltherequisitesofadyingdeclaration
arepresent.Fromtherecords,noquestionsrelativetothesecond
requisitewaspropoundedtoJanuario.Itdoesnotappearthatthe
declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death
whenhemadethestatements.Theruleisthat,inordertomake
a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and
imminentdeathmustbeenteredbythedeclarant.Itisthebelief
inimpendingdeathandnottherapidsuccessionofdeathinpoint
of fact thatrendersa dying declaration admissible. The test is
whetherthedeclaranthasabandonedallhopesofsurvivaland
looked on death as certainly impending. Thus, the utterances
madebyJanuariocouldnotbeconsideredasadyingdeclaration.
Same; Same; Same; Res Gestae; Words and Phrases;Res
gestaerefers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that
growoutofthemainfactandservetoillustrateitscharacterand
aresospontaneousandcontemporaneouswiththemainfactasto
exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.Even if
Januarios utterances could not be appreciated as a dying
declaration, his statements may still be appreciated as part of
theres gestae.Res gestaerefers tothe circumstances, facts, and
declarationsthatgrowoutofthemainfactandservetoillustrate
itscharacterandaresospontaneousandcontemporaneouswith
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of
theres gestaeis, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation,issointerwovenorconnectedwiththeprincipalfact
oreventthatitcharacterizesastoberegardedasapartofthe
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any
premeditationorpurposetomanufacturetestimony.
Criminal Law; Aggravating Circumstances; Abuse of
Superior Strength; Abuse of superior strength is considered
whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which the latter
selected or took advantage of in the commission of the crime.
From the evidence presented, we find that as alleged in the
information,abuseofsuperiorstrengthattendedthecommission
ofthecrime,andthus,qualifiestheoffensetomurder.Abuseof
superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor,
assessingasuperiorityofstrengthnotori
19ously advantageous for the aggressor which the latter
selectedortookadvantageofinthecommissionofthecrime.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforaccusedappellant.
PERALTA,J.:
Assailed in this appeal is the Court of
Appeals(CA)Decision1datedFebruary23,2011inC.A.G.R.CR
H.C. No. 03593 affirming the Regional Trial
Court(RTC)2Decision3datedJune20,2008inCriminalCaseNo.
13838 convicting appellant Eduardo Quisayas ofRobbery with
Homicidecommitted against the victim Januario
CastilloyMasangcay(Januario).
Thefactsofthecasefollow:
Appellant and accused Sonny GatarinyCaballero were
charged in an Information4withRobbery with
Homicidecommittedasfollows:
Thatonoraboutthe3rddayofNovember,2004,atabout8:00
oclock(sic)intheevening,atBarangayPoblacion,Municipality
of Mabini, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
armed with a bladed weapon, conspiring and confederating
together, acting in common accord and mutually helping each
other,withintenttogain,withouttheknowledgeandconsentof
the owner thereof and with violence against or intimidation of
person,didthenandtherewill
_______________
1PennedbyAssociateJusticeStephenC.Cruz,withAssociate
Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Rodil V. Zalameda,
concurring;Rollo,pp.214.
2Branch3,PallocanWest,BatangasCity.
3PennedbyJudgeRubenA.Galvez,CARollo,pp.511.
4Records,pp.23.
20fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob, and carry away
cashmoneyamountingtoTwentyThousandPesos(P20,000.00),
PhilippineCurrency,belongingtoJanuarioCastilloyMasangcay
aliasKaManing,tothedamageandprejudiceofthelatterin
the aforementioned amount and that on the occasion and by
reasonofsaidrobbery,thesaidaccusedwithintenttokilland
takingadvantageoftheirsuperiorstrength,didthenandthere
willfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslyattack,assaultandstabwith
the said weapon Januario CastilloyMasangcay alias
KaManing,therebyinflictinguponthelatterthestabwounds
to[the]anteriorchestandrightshoulderandrightaxilla,which
directlycausedhisdeath.
Contrarytolaw.5
Appellant was arrested, while his coaccused remained at
large. When arraigned, he pleaded Not Guilty. Trial on the
meritsthereafterensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following
witnesses:(1) MariaCastillo,thevictimswife;(2)HowelUmali
(Umali),whoallegedlysawhowtheaccusedmauledthevictim;
(3) SPO3 Gregorio G. Mendoza (SPO3 Mendoza) of the Mabini
Police Station, who saw the victim lying on the floor and the
accusedrunningawayfromthecrimescene,andtestifiedonthe
dying declaration of Januario; (4) Dr. Catalino Ike A. Rasa Jr.
(Dr.Rasa),whoattendedtothevictimwhenhewasbroughtto
thehospital;and(5)PO1RogelioDizonCoronel(PO1Coronel),
whosawtheaccusedrunningfastnearthecrimesceneandwho,
likewise,testifiedonJanuariosantemortemstatement.
From the testimonies of the abovenamed witnesses, the
prosecutionestablishedthefollowingfacts:
OnNovember3,2004,at8oclockintheevening,Umaliwas
riding a bicycle on his way home when he saw Januario being
mauled by two persons opposite Doms Studio in Poblacion,
Mabini,Batangas.Uponseeingtheincident,hestayedinfrontof
thechurchuntilsuchtimethattheaccusedran
_______________
5Id.
21away and were chased by policemen who alighted from the
policepatrolvehicle.6
Onthesamenight,SPO3MendozaandPO1Coronelwereon
board their patrol vehicle performing their routine patrol duty
whentheymettwomen,lateridentifiedastheaccused,whowere
runningatafastspeed.Whenaskedwhytheywererunning,the
accuseddidnotanswerpromptingthepolicementochasethem.
Thepolicemen,however,wereunsuccessfulincatchingthemand
whenitbecameevidentthattheycouldnolongerfindthem,they
continuedpatrollingthearea.TheretheysawJanuariolyingon
thestreetinfrontofDomsstudio.Ashewasseverelyinjured,the
policemen immediately boarded Januario to the patrol vehicle
andbroughthimtotheZigzagHospital.Whileinsidethevehicle,
SPO3MendozaaskedJanuariowhohurthim.Heansweredthat
itwasJayRandhisunclewhostabbedhim.Theuncleturned
outtobetheappellantherein,whileJayRishiscoaccusedwho
remainsatlarge.7
AttheZigzagHospital,JanuariowasattendedtobyDr.Rasa
whofoundhimincriticalcondition.Threefatalwoundscausedby
abladedweaponwerefoundinJanuariosbodywhicheventually
causedhisdeath.8
MariaCastillo, forher part,testifiedonhowshelearnedof
what happened to her husband, the victim herein, the amount
allegedlystolenfromherhusband,aswellasontheexpensesand
loss incurred by reason of Januarios death. She, further,
quantifiedthesorrowandanxietythefamilysufferedbyreasonof
suchdeath.9
Inhisdefense,appellantdeniedtheaccusationagainsthim.
HeclaimedthatheisfromtheProvinceofSamarbuthasbeen
residinginCupang,MuntinlupaCitysince1987.He
_______________
6TSN,February20,2006,pp.57.
7Rollo,p.5.
8Id.
9CARollo,p.6.
22deniedknowing,muchmoreresidingin,Mabini,Batangas,as
heonlyheardabouttheprovincefromhisemployerwhohappens
to be a resident therein. He claimed that he did not know
Januarioandthathewas,infact,workinginMuntinlupaCityon
thedateandtimethecrimewasallegedlycommitted.10
TheprosecutionsrebuttalwitnessMr.BienvenidoCaponpon,
however,beliedappellantsclaimandinsistedthatappellantwas
rentingahouseinMabini,Batangasandthathewasseenthere
untilthedaythecrimewascommitted.11
OnJune20,2008,theRTCrenderedaDecisionagainstthe
appellant,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:
WHEREFORE,thePeoplehavingproventheguiltofaccused
EduardoQuisayasbeyondreasonabledoubt,heisherebydeclared
GUILTY of the offense as charged. Accordingly, he is hereby
sentencedtoaprisontermofReclusionPerpetua.
Further,heisherebyorderedtopayhereinoffendedpartyof
thefollowing:
(a)civilindemnityintheamountofPhp50,000.00;
(b)actual damages in the amount of Php20,000.00, plus
Php35,310.00(funeralandhospitalexpenses);and
(c)moraldamagesintheamountofPhp100,000.00.
SOORDERED.12
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Maria
CastillonotonlyastothefactoftakingmoneyfromJanuariobut
alsotheamounttaken.13Thefactofdeathwas,likewise,found
bythecourttohavebeenadequatelyprovenbythetestimonyof
Dr.Rasa.14Thoughtherewasnoevidencewhethertheunlawful
takingprecededthekillingofJanuario,
_______________
10TSN,November27,2007,pp.113.
11TSN,January31,2008,pp.114.
12Records,pp.187188.
13Id.,atpp.185186.
14Id.,atp.186.
23thecourtheldthattherewasdirectandintimateconnection
betweenthetwoacts.15
Astotheidentityoftheperpetrators,thecourtconsideredthe
victims response to SPO3 Mendozas question as to who
committedthecrimeagainsthimaspartoftheresgestae,which
isanexceptiontothehearsayrule.16Astoappellantsdefenseof
alibi, the court gave more weight to the prosecutions rebuttal
evidencethatindeedtheformerwasanactualresidentofMabini,
Batangas.17
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Contrary,
however,totheRTCsconclusion,theappellatecourtconsidered
Januarios statement to SPO3 Mendoza, that the accused were
theoneswhostabbedhimandtookhiswallet,notonlyaspart
ofresgestaebutalsoasadyingdeclaration.18
Hence,theappealbeforetheCourt.
We find appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt not of
robberywithhomicidebutofmurder.
Thetrialcourtsfactualfindings,includingitsassessmentof
the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their
testimonies,andtheconclusionsdrawnfromthefactualfindings
are accorded great respect and even conclusive effect. We,
nevertheless, fully scrutinize the records, since the penalty
ofreclusionperpetuathattheCAimposedonappellantdemands
nolessthanthiskindofcarefulanddeliberateconsideration.19
To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the
prosecutionmustprovethefollowingelements:(1)thetakingof
personalpropertybelongingtoanother;(2)withintenttogain;(3)
withtheuseofviolenceorintimidationagainsta
_______________
15Id.
16Id.
17Id.,atp.187.
18Rollo,p.8.
19Peoplev.Algarme,G.R.No.175978,February12,2009,578
SCRA601,613.
24person;and(4)ontheoccasionorbyreasonoftherobbery,the
crimeofhomicide,asusedinthegenericsense,wascommitted.20
First,inordertosustainaconvictionforthecrimeofrobbery
withhomicide,itisnecessarythattherobberyitselfbeprovenas
conclusively as any other essential element of the crime.21In
orderforthecrimeofrobberywithhomicidetoexist,itmustbe
establishedthatarobberyhasactuallytakenplaceandthat,asa
consequence or on the occasion of robbery, a homicide be
committed.22
For there to be robbery, there must be taking of personal
propertybelongingtoanother,withintenttogain,bymeansof
violenceagainstorintimidationofanypersonorbyusingforce
upon on things.23Both the RTC and the CA concluded that
robbery was committed based on the testimonies of Maria
Castillo,SPO3Mendoza,andPO1Coronel.Acloserlookatthe
testimoniesofthesewitnesses,however,failedtoconvinceusthat
indeedrobberytookplace.
MariaCastillostestimonywasofferedbytheprosecutionto
prove that her husband, the victim herein, was a victim of
robberywithhomicideandthatheisabusinessman,andthatshe
suffereddamagesbyreasonofsuchdeath.Thepertinentportion
ofherdirecttestimonyisquotedbelowforacloserscrutiny:
ATTY.MASANGYA:
QThevictiminthiscaseJanuarioCastillo,howareyou
relatedtohim?
_______________
20Id.,atp.621;Peoplev.Latam,G.R.No.192789,March
23,2011,646SCRA406,410;Peoplev.Baron,G.R.No.
185209,June28,2010,621SCRA646,656.
21People v. Orias, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010, 622
SCRA417,430.
22Peoplev.Abundo,402Phil.616,635636;349SCRA577,
594(2001),citingPeoplev.Pacala,58SCRA370,377
 378;(1974);Peoplev.Arondain,418Phil.354,367;366 Wewillobject.Thatwillbemisleading.
SCRA98,104(2001). COURT:
23Peoplev.Obedo,451Phil.529,538;403SCRA431,438 Ifsheisaware.
(2003). ATTY.EBORA:
25 Wesubmit.
WITNESS: COURT:
AMyhusband,sir. Youaskherifsheisawarewhotheperpetratorsare.
QOn November 3, 2004, do you remember of any 26
unusualincidentthathasoccurred? ATTY.MASANGYA:
AYes,sir. QMadam Witness, were you informed who are the
QAndwhatisthatevent? perpetratorsofthecrimeonyourhusband?
AAtaround8:30oclockintheeveningofNovember3, WITNESS:
2004 while I was at home, policemen arrived and ANot yet, sir. It was not told to me by the policemen
informedmethatmyhusbandwaswounded,sir. becausethepolicemenwereinahurry.
ATTY.MASANGYA:
QDidthesepoliceofficersinformyouthelocation(sic)of
QAfterthepolicemenwenttoyourhouse,wasthere[any]
whereyourhusbandwaslocated?
personwhoinformedyouwhoweretheperpetratorsof
AAccordingtothepolicemen,myhusbandwasatZigzag
thecrime?
Hospital,sir.
AYes,sir.Myniece.
QDidyougotoZigzagHospital,MadamWitness?
QAndwhoisthatnieceofyours,MadamWitness?
AYes,sir.
AJosephineBorbon,sir.
QWhat happened, Madam Witness, whenyou arrived
QDid Miss Borbon tell you about the identity of the
atthehospital?
perpetratorsofthecrime,MadamWitness?
AIwasinformedbythenursetherethatmyhusband
AYes,sir.
wasalreadydead.
QAndwhoarethepersonsdidMissBorbonmention?
ATTY.MASANGYA:
AMy former helper Sonny Gatarin and his uncle
QWere you informed of the cause of the death of your
EduardoQuisayas,sir.
husband?
QYouweretoldthatyourhusbandwasrobbed,howmuch
WITNESS:
wastakenfromyourhusband,MadamWitness?
AAccording to them my husband was wounded, many
AP20,000.00.
woundsandhewasrobbed,sir.
QAndcanyoutell,MadamWitness,whyisyourhusband
QMadam Witness, were you able to know who are the
carrying that amount of money at the time of his
personsresponsibleforthedeathofyourhusband?
death?
ATTY.EBORA:
AYes,sir. AWe felt deep sorrow together with my three (3)
WITNESS: children,sir.(Witnessiscrying)
AThoseweretheearningsforthatdayforhedelivered xxxx24
merchandiseandgroceries,sir.
ATTY.MASANGYA: From the above testimony, it can be inferred that Maria
QDo you know, Madam Witness, if your husband is Castilloobviouslywasnotatthesceneofthecrimeonthatfateful
engagedinanybusiness? nightasshewasonlyinformedthattheincidenttookplaceand
AYes,sir. that Januario was broughtto the Zigzag Hospital. It, likewise,
QAnd what is your proof in saying your husband is appearsthatshehadnopersonalknowledgethatJanuariowas
engagedinbusiness? robbed. While she claimed that P20,000.00 was illegally taken
AOur business was we delivered bottled goods and from him, no evidence was presented to show that Januario
groceries,sir. indeedhadthatamountatthattimeandthatthesamewasinhis
27 possession.AsMariaCastilloclaimedthatthesaidamountwas
QThebusinesswhereinyourhusbandisengagedhasan allegedlyreceivedfromtheirclients
existinglicensewiththeappropriatelocalgovernment? _______________
AYes,sir. 24TSN,November24,2005,pp.38.
QIf a copy will be shown to you, will you be able to 28intheirgrocerybusiness,saidfactcouldhavebeenprovenby
identifythesame? receiptsortestimoniesofsaidclients.Theprosecutionsfailureto
AYes,sir. present such evidence creates doubt as to the existence of the
QIamshowingtoyou[a]certifiedcopyof[the]Mayors money.
permitpreviouslymarkedasExhibitH? Thetrialandappellatecourtslikewisereliedonthetestimony
AThisisit,sir. ofSPO3MendozaandPO1CoronelonthestatementofJanuario
QIf you know, Madam Witness, how much is your afterthecommissionofthecrime.Whilebothpolicementestified
husbandearninginhissarisariorgrocerybusiness? as to thedying declaration ofJanuariopertainingtothecause
WITNESS: and circumstances surrounding his death, only PO1 Coronel
AYes,sir. testified during his direct examination that when asked who
ATTY.MASANGYA: stabbedhim,JanuariorepliedthatitwasJayArandhisuncle
QHowmuchisheearningatthetime? who stabbed him and took his wallet.25In response to the
AHeearnsP40,000.00. Presiding Judges clarificatory question, however, PO1 Coronel
QInamonthoryear? admitted that when he asked Januario who stabbed him, he
AP40,000.00amonth,sir. repliedthatitwasJayArandhisuncle.Afterwhich,nofurther
QHow do you feel or confront the situation that your question was asked.26On the other hand, nowhere in SPO3
husbandisalreadydead?
Mendozas testimony did he talk about the alleged taking of ANone,yourHonor.
wallet.Thepertinentportionsoftheirtestimoniesread: xxxx28
DirectTestimonyofSPO3Mendoza:
DirectExaminationofPO1Coronel: xxxx
xxxx QAnd when you saw Januario Castillo lying on the
QWhat did you do next after boarding him inside your street,whatdidyoudo?
vehicle? AWeliftedhimandboardedhiminourvehiclethenwe
AWebroughthimattheZigzagHospitalandweasked broughthimtothehospital.
himwhostabbedhim. QWhileyouweretravelling,wereyouabletotalktothe
QWhatwashisreplyMr.Witness? victimJanuarioCastillo?
AHetoldusthatJayarandhisunclestabbedhimand AYes,sir.
tookhiswallet. QWhatwasyourconversationallabout?
xxxx27 AI askedKaManing Castillo as to who stabbed him
_______________ andheansweredJayRandhisuncle.
25TSN,July10,2007,p.8. xxxx29
26Id.,atp.20. _______________
27Id.,atp.8.
29PO1CoronelsAnswers tothequestionspropoundedby 28Id.,atp.20.
thePresidingJudge: 29TSN,May30,2006,pp.67.
THECOURT: 30
Alright,theCourtwillask. It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the evidence
QWhendidyoutalkwiththevictim? presentedtoprovetherobberyaspectofthespecialcomplexcrime
AWhenwewereinsidethepatrolcar,yourHonor. of robbery with homicide, does not show that robbery actually
QWhatexactlydidyouaskfromthevictim? took place. The prosecution did not convincingly establish
AIaskedhimwhostabbedhim,yourHonor. thecorpusdelictiofthecrimeofrobbery.Corpusdelictihasbeen
QDidyoutellthevictimhiscondition? definedasthebodyorsubstanceofthecrimeand,initsprimary
ANo,yourHonor. sense,referstothefactthatacrimehasactuallybeencommitted.
QYoujustaskedthevictimwhostabbedhim? Asappliedtoaparticularoffense,itmeanstheactualcommission
AYes,yourHonor. by someone of the particular crime charged.30In this case, the
QWhatwastheanswerofthevictim? elementoftaking,aswellastheexistenceofthemoneyallegedto
AThat he was stabbed by Jayar and his uncle, your have been lost and stolen by appellant, was not adequately
Honor. established.31Wefindnosufficientevidencetoshoweitherthe
QAndnootherquestiondidyouaskhim? amountofmoneystolen,orifanyamountwasinfactstolenfrom
Januario.EvenifweconsiderJanuariosdyingdeclaration,the
samepertainsonlytothestabbingincidentandnottothealleged
robbery.
Moreover,assumingthatrobberywasindeedcommitted,the
prosecutionmustestablishwithcertitudethatthekillingwasa
mereincidenttothe robbery, thelatterbeing the perpetrators
mainpurposeandobjective.Itisnotenoughtosupposethatthe
purpose of the author of the homicide was to rob; a mere
presumptionofsuchfactisnotsufficient.32Statedinadifferent
manner, aconvictionrequires certitude that the robbery isthe
mainpurpose,andobjectiveofthemalefactorandthekillingis
merelyincidentaltotherobbery.Theintenttorobmustprecede
thetakingofhumanlifebutthekillingmayoccurbefore,during
or after the robbery.33What is crucial for a conviction for the
crimeof robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to firmly
establish the offenders intent to take personal property before
thekilling,regardlessofthetimewhenthehomicideisactually
carriedout.34Inthiscase,
_______________
30Peoplev.Obedo,supranote23atpp.538539;pp.438439.
31Id.,atp.539;p.439.
32Peoplev.Algarme,supranote19atp.625.
33Id.,atp.621;Peoplev.Latam,supranote20atp.410.
34Peoplev.Canlas,423Phil.665,684;372SCRA401,417
(2001).
31therewasnoshowingoftheappellantsintention,determined
bytheiractspriorto,contemporaneouswith,andsubsequentto
the commission of the crime, to commit robbery.35No shred of
evidence is on record that could support the conclusion that
appellantsprimarymotivewastorobJanuarioandthathewas
abletoaccomplishit.36Merespeculationandprobabilitiescannot
substitute for proof required in establishing the guilt of an
accusedbeyondreasonabledoubt.37
Wheretheevidencedoesnotconclusivelyprovetherobbery,
the killing of Januario would be classified either as a simple
homicideormurder,dependingupontheabsenceorpresenceof
anyqualifyingcircumstance,andnotthecrimeofrobberywith
homicide.38
Toestablishthefactthatappellantandhiscoaccusedkilled
thevictimbystabbinghimwithabladedweapon,theprosecution
presentedUmaliasaneyewitnesstothemaulingincident.Itwas
thissamewitnesswhoidentifiedtheperpetrators.Thetrialand
appellatecourtsalsoreliedonthestatementofJanuarioastothe
circumstancesofhisdeath,testifiedtobyPO1CoronelandSPO3
Mendozaasdyingdeclarationandaspartofresgestae.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as
evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be
admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the
declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding
circumstancesofthedeclarantsdeath;(b)itismadewhendeath
appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousnessofimpendingdeath;(c)thedeclarantwouldhave
beencompetenttotestifyhadheorshesurvived;and(d)the
_______________
35SeePeoplev.Algarme,supranote19atpp.625626.
36Peoplev.Canlas,supranote34.
37Id.,atpp.684685;p.418.
38Peoplev.Orias,supranote21.
32dyingdeclarationisofferedinacaseinwhichthesubjectof
inquiryinvolvesthedeclarantsdeath.39
Inthecaseatbar,itappearsthatnotalltherequisitesofa
dying declaration are present. From the records, no questions
relativetothesecondrequisitewaspropoundedtoJanuario.It
doesnotappearthatthedeclarantwasundertheconsciousnessof
hisimpendingdeathwhenhemadethestatements.Theruleis
that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed
beliefininevitableandimminentdeathmustbeenteredbythe
declarant.Itisthebeliefinimpendingdeathandnottherapid
succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying
declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has
abandonedallhopesofsurvivalandlookedondeathascertainly
impending.40Thus,theutterancesmadebyJanuariocouldnotbe
consideredasadyingdeclaration.
However, even if Januarios utterances could not be
appreciatedas adyingdeclaration, hisstatementsmay stillbe
appreciated as part of theres gestae.Res gestaerefers to the
circumstances,facts,anddeclarationsthatgrowoutofthemain
factandservetoillustrateitscharacterandaresospontaneous
andcontemporaneouswiththemainfactastoexcludetheideaof
deliberationandfabrication.Thetestofadmissibilityofevidence
as a part of theres gestaeis, therefore, whether the act,
declaration,or exclamation,issointerwoven orconnectedwith
theprincipalfactoreventthatitcharacterizesastoberegarded
as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly
negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.41
_______________
39Peoplev.Rarugal,G.R.No.188603,January16,2013,688
SCRA646,654;Peoplev.Maglian,G.R.No.189834,March30,
2011,646SCRA770,778.
40Belbis,Jr.v.People,G.R.No.181052,November14,2012,
685SCRA518,530531.
41Peoplev.Salafranca,G.R.No.173476,February22,2012,
666SCRA501,514.
33
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of
theresgestaeconcurherein.WhenJanuariogavetheidentityof
theassailantstoSPO3Mendoza,hewasreferringtoastartling
occurrencewhichisthestabbingbyappellantandhiscoaccused.
Atthattime,Januarioandthewitnesswereinthevehiclethat
wouldbringhimtothehospital,andthus,hadnotimetocontrive
hisidentificationoftheassailant.Hisutteranceaboutappellant
andhiscoaccusedhavingstabbedhim,inanswertothequestion
ofSPO3Mendoza,wasmadeinspontaneityandonlyinreaction
tothestartlingoccurrence.Definitely,thestatementisrelevant
because it identified the accused as the authors of the crime.
Verily, the killing of Januario, perpetrated by appellant, is
adequatelyprovenbytheprosecution.
Fromtheevidencepresented,wefindthatasallegedinthe
information,abuseofsuperiorstrengthattendedthecommission
ofthecrime,andthus,qualifiestheoffensetomurder.Abuseof
superior strength is considered whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor,
assessingasuperiorityofstrengthnotoriouslyadvantageousfor
theaggressorwhichthelatterselectedortookadvantageofinthe
commissionofthecrime.42
ItisclearfromtherecordsofthecasethatJanuariowasthen
fiftyfour(54)yearsold.Appellant,ontheotherhand,wasthen
forty(40)yearsold.Appellantcommittedthecrimewithhisco
accused, his nephew. Clearly, assailants are younger than the
victim.ThesetwoaccusedwereseenbyUmaliasthepersonswho
mauledJanuario.Moreover,assailantswerearmedwithabladed
weapon,whileJanuariowasunarmed.Thissamebladedweapon
wasusedinrepeatedlystabbingJanuario,whonolongershowed
anyactofdefense.Dr.Rasa,themedicaldoctorwhoattendedto
Januariowhenhewasbroughttothehospital,alsotestifiedasto
thenatureandextentoftheinjurysustainedbyJanuario.He
_______________
 42Peoplev.Calpito,462Phil.172,179;416SCRA491,495
(2003).
34clearly stated that Januario sustained three fatal injuries
which caused his death. The pertinent portion of Dr. Rasas
testimonyreads:
ATTY.MASANGYA:
QHow many injuries were sustained by the victim, Mr.
Witness?
AThree.
QInwhatpartsofthebodywasthevictiminjured?
AThevictimsustainedthreeinjuries:oneontheleftside
of the parasternal border the heart (sic) and it
penetrated,andthenthesecondonewasontheright
sideofthechestneartheshoulderandthethirdone
wasunderthearmpitalsotothechest.
ATTY.MASANGYA:
QWhich of those injuries caused the death of the
victim?
AAll of them are fatal, because the one over the heart
penetrated the heart and the aorta. The one in the
anterior chest near the right shoulder hit the blood
vesselsofthearmpitandthewoundunderthearmpit
apparentlyhitthelungs.
xxxx43
ThissamephysicianissuedtheMedicalCertificateexplaining
thelocationofthestabwoundsaswellasthecauseofdeathof
Januario,towit:
LocationofStabWounds:
1. Stab wound penetrating 2ndintercostal space left para
sternal border, 6 deeppenetrating the heart chambers and
aorta.
2.Stab wound over the right anterior deltoid muscle,
penetrating3intotherightaxillaspace;injuringtheaxilla
bloodvessels.
3. Stabwoundovertherightaxilla,penetratingtotheright
chestcavity.
_______________
43TSN,May24,2007,pp.56.
35
CAUSESOFDEATH
ImmediateCause:HypovolemicShock
Antecedent Cause:Multiple stab wounds to the anterior
chest, right axilla, and right axilla penetrating the chest
cavity.
xxxx44
Fromthetestimonyoftheeyewitnessandcorroboratedbythe
medicalcertificateofDr.Rasa,itcanbeinferredthatindeedthe
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended
the commission of the crime.To be sure, with two assailants
younger than the victim, armed with a bladed weapon and
inflictingmultiplemortalwoundsonthevictim,thereisdefinitely
abuse of superior strength deliberately taken advantage of by
appellantandhiscoaccusedinordertoconsummatetheoffense.
Now on the penalty.Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART.248.Murder.Anypersonwho,notfallingwithinthe
provisions of article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished byreclusion perpetuato death if
committedwithanyofthefollowingattendantcircumstances:
1.With treachery,taking advantage of superior
strength,with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons toinsure or afford ofMURDERandissentencedtosufferthepenaltyofreclusion
impunity. perpetua.
xxxx45 We, likewise,ORDERappellantTO PAYthe heirs of the

There being neither mitigating nor aggravating victim Januario CastilloyMasangcay the following: (1)
P35,300.00 actual damages; (2) P50,000.00 civil indemnity; (3)
circumstances,appellantshallbemetedthepenaltyofreclusion
P50,000.00 moral damages; (4) P30,000.00 exemplary damages;
perpetua. plus(5)sixpercent(6%)interestonalldamagesawardedfrom
Finally,theawardofdamages.Inmurder,thegrantofcivil thedateofthefinalityofthisdecisionuntilfullpayment.
indemnitywhichhasbeenfixedbyjurisprudenceat _______________
_______________
46Peoplev.Gutierrez,G.R.No.188602,February4,2010,611
44Records,p.144.
SCRA633,646647.
45Emphasissupplied.
47Peoplev.Camat,G.R.No.188612,July30,2012,677SCRA
36P50,000.00requiresnoproofotherthanthefactofdeathasa
result of the crime and proof of the accuseds responsibility 640, 672;People v. Concillado, G.R. No. 181204, November 28,
therefor.Moraldamages,ontheotherhand,whichinthiscaseis 2011, 661 SCRA363, 384;Peoplev. Rebucan, G.R.No. 182551,
alsoP50,000.00areawardedinviewoftheviolentdeathofthe July27,2011,654SCRA726,760.
victim.46Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of 37SOORDERED.
P30,000.00shouldlikewisebegiven,consideringthattheoffense Velasco,Jr.(Chairperson),Abad,MendozaandLeonen,JJ.,
wasattendedbyanaggravatingcircumstancewhetherordinary, concur.
orqualifyingasinthiscase.AsdulyprovenbyMariaCastillo, Judgmentmodified,EduardoQuisayasguiltyofmurder.
actualdamagesrepresentingthehospitalandfuneralexpenses,
asevidencedbyreceiptsintheamountofP35,300.00,beawarded.
Finally,inadditionandinconformitywithcurrentpolicy,wealso
G.R. No. 214453.June 17, 2015.*
imposeonallthemonetaryawardsfordamagesaninterestatthe
legalrateofsixpercent(6%)fromdateoffinalityofthisdecision
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
untilfullpayment.47
BERNABE P. PALANAS alias ABE, accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,weMODIFYtheCourt
Criminal Law; Murder; Murder is defined and
of Appeals Decision dated February 23, 2011 in C.A.G.R. CR
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
H.C. No. 03593, affirming the Regional Trial Court Decision
(RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659 .
dated June 20, 2008 in Criminal Case No. 13838, convicting
Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of
appellantEduardoQuisayasofRobberywithHomicide.Wefind
the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7659, as
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
follows: Art. 248. Murder.Any person who, not falling
within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances: 1. With
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with
the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery;
There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against a person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.Treachery is a well-
established concept in criminal law. There is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against a
person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might
make. There are two (2) conditions therefore that must
be met for treachery to be appreciated: ( a) the
employment of means of execution that gives the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (b) the means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted.
Same; Same; Same; The essence of treachery is
that the attack comes without warning in a swift,
deliberate, and unexpected manner, granting the victim
no chance to resist or escape .The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without warning in a
swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, granting the
victim no chance to
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
319
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015
People vs. Palanas
resist or escape. The attack must be sudden and
unexpected rendering the victim unable and
unprepared to put up a defense. With the foregoing in
mind, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and
the CA that Palanas killed SPO2 Borre, and that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the
same. The records show that SPO2 Borre was outside
carrying his grandson when two (2) assailants shot him.
During the attack, SPO2 Borre had no opportunity to
raise any meaningful defense against his assailants;
and consequently, he suffered multiple gunshot wounds
on his head and trunk, causing his death.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Dying Declaration;
Hearsay Evidence Rule; Conditions for a dying
declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay
evidence rule.For a dying declaration to constitute an
exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4)
conditions must concur: (a) the declaration must
concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of
the declarants death; (b) that at the time the
declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his
impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a
witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal
case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the credence since no person aware of his impending death
declarant is the victim. On the other hand, a statement
would make a careless and false accusation. Verily,
to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus,
because the declaration was made in extremity, when
constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay the party is at the point of death and when every
evidence, requires the concurrence of the following motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced
requisites: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth,
startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made the law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
as creating an obligation equal to that which is
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in imposed by an oath administered in court.
question and its immediately attending circumstances. Same; Same; Res Gestae; The test of admissibility
Same; Same; Same; Same; Because the of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore,
declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
the point of death and when every motive of falsehoodintimately interwoven or connected with the principal
is silenced and the mind is induced by the most fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as
powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it
deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
creating an obligation equal to that which is imposedmanufacture testimony.In the same vein, SPO2
by an oath administered in court .In the case at bar,
Borres statements may likewise be deemed to form
SPO2 Borres statements constitute a part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the
dying
declaration, given that they pertained to the cause and
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of
circumstances of his death and taking into
the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and
consideration the number and severity of his wounds, it
are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the
may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
under a fixed belief that his own death was already fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a
imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act,
the highest order and is entitled to utmost declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven
320 or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates
0
any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
People vs. Palanas
testimony. In this case, SPO2 Borres statements refer
to a startling occurrence, i.e., him being shot by
Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the
hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the
identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance
was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is
relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the
authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2
Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by
the prosecution.
Criminal Law; Alibi; It is axiomatic that alibi is an
inherently weak defense, and may only be considered if
the following circumstances are shown: (a) he was
somewhere else when the crime occurred; and (b) it
would be physically impossible for him to be at the
locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime .On the
other hand, the Court does not find credence in
Palanas defense of alibi. It is axiomatic that alibi is an
inherently weak defense, and may only be considered if
the following circumstances are shown: ( a) he was
somewhere else when the crime occurred; and ( b) it
would be physi-
321
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015
People vs. Palanas
cally impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at
the time of the alleged crime. In this case, the RTC
correctly observed that aside from the admission that
travel from Paraaque City to Pasig City only takes
about one (1) hour, the incident occurred on a Sunday
when traffic is not usually heavy. Moreover, Palanas
had access to a motorcycle that allowed him to travel
faster on the date and time of the incident. Under the
circumstances, there is the possibility that Palanas
could have been present at the locus criminis at the
time of the shooting. Accordingly, his defense of alibi
must fall.
Same; Penalties; Section 3 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9346 provides that [p]ersons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(ISL), as amended.Anent the proper penalty to be
imposed upon Palanas, Section 3 of RA No. 9346
provides that [p]ersons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
as amended. Pursuant thereto, Palanas should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant.
PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal 1 filed by
accused-appellant Bernabe P. Palanas alias Abe
(Palanas) assailing the Decision 2 dated January 16,
2014 of the Court of Appeals
_______________
1 See Notice of Appeal dated January 30, 2014;
Rollo, pp. 19-21.
2 Id., at pp. 2-18. Penned by Associate Justice Elihu
A. Ybaez, with Associate Justices Japar B.
Dimaampao and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang, concurring.
322
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
People vs. Palanas
(CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04925, which affirmed the
Decision3 dated October 20, 2010, of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC) in Criminal Case
No. 133352-H finding Palanas guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
The Facts
An Information4 was filed before the RTC charging
Palanas of the murder of SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio
(SPO2 Borre), viz.:
On or about March 26, 2006, in Pasig City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
[Palanas], acting in conspiracy with one male person
who is at-large, whose true identity and whereabout[s]
are still unknown acted as coprincipal in the killing of
one SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio, committed as follows:
said male person, armed with a gun, with intent to kill
and with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shot one
SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio on his head and different
parts of his body which directly caused his death, and
thereafter, took the firearm of the said victim, boarded
a motorcycle driven by the accused who thereafter,
drove the motorcycle away from the scene of the crime.
Contrary to Law.5
The prosecution presents the following version of the
facts:
At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2
Borre took his five (5)-month-old grandson outside his
residence at Block 14, Kenneth Street corner Eusebio
Avenue, Pasig City. PO3 Leopoldo Zapanta (PO3
Zapanta), who slept at SPO2 Borres residence, was
watching television when four
_______________
3 CA Rollo, pp. 27-41. Penned by Pairing Judge
Nicanor A. Manalo, Jr.
4 Id., at pp. 11-12.
5 Id.
323
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015
People vs. Palanas
(4) successive gunshots rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked
through the open door of SPO2 Borres house and saw
two (2) men armed with .38 caliber revolvers standing a
meter away from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver
the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre, but he could not identify
the other shooter. Thereafter, the two (2) assailants fled
on a motorcycle.6
PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borres stepson
Ramil Ranola (Ramil), brought SPO2 Borre to the Pasig
City General Hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2
Borre told Ramil and PO3 Zapanta that it was Abe,
Aspog, or Abe Palanas referring to his neighbor,
Palanas who shot him. This statement was repeated
to his wife, Resurreccion Borre (Resurreccion), who
followed him at the hospital. At around 11 oclock in the
morning of even date, SPO2 Borre died due to gunshot
wounds on his head and trunk.7
For his part, Palanas interposed the defense of denial
and alibi. He claimed that on March 25, 2006 he was in
Paraaque City attending to the needs of his sick
father. The next day, he went to a baptism in Tondo,
Manila and stayed there from morning until 9 oclock in
the evening, after which he returned to his father in
Paraaque City. He maintained that he was not aware
of the death of SPO2 Borre until he was informed by a
neighbor that Resurreccion was accusing him of killing
her husband. He also denied any knowledge why
Resurreccion would blame him for SPO2 Borres death. 8
The RTCs Ruling
In a Decision9 dated October 20, 2010, the RTC
convicted Palanas of the crime of Murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordered him to pay the heirs of SPO2
Borre the amounts of: (a) P50,000.00 as civil
_______________
6 Rollo, p. 3.
7 Id., at pp. 3-4.
8 CA Rollo, pp. 31-32.
9 Id., at pp. 27-41.
324
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
People vs. Palanas
indemnity; (b) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; ( c)
P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (d) P2,464,865.0710
as actual damages.11
The RTC found that the prosecution had established
beyond reasonable doubt that Palanas and his
companion were the ones who killed SPO2 Borre
through the positive identification of the eyewitnesses
to the incident. Moreover, SPO2 Borres statements that
Palanas shot him constituted an ante mortem
statement and formed part of the res gestae, and, thus,
admissible as evidence against Palanas. It further
opined that treachery attended SPO2 Borres killing as
he had no inkling that the attack would take place, and
that he was in no position to mount any feasible
defense.12 The RTC, however, did not appreciate evident
premeditation because of the absence of the following
elements: (a) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that
the accused clung to his determination; and ( c) a
sufficient lapse of time between determination and
execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.13
On the other hand, the RTC gave no credence to
Palanas defense of alibi. It observed that it was not
physically impossible for Palanas to be at the locus
criminis as his own witness even stated that the
distance between Pasig City and Paraaque City could
be traversed in less than one (1) hour.14
_______________
10 Id., at p. 41. The RTC provided a breakdown of
the amount awarded as actual damages:
11 Id.
12 Id., at pp. 36-39.
13 Id., at p. 36.
14 Id., at pp. 38-39.
325
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015
People vs. Palanas
Dissatisfied, Palanas appealed his conviction to the
CA.15
The CAs Ruling
In a Decision16 dated January 16, 2014, the CA affirmed
the RTCs ruling with modification increasing the
amounts awarded to the heirs of SPO2 Borre to
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
The CA found all the elements of the crime of Murder to
be present, giving probative weight to the dying
declaration of SPO2 Borre that it was Palanas who shot
him. It also found the presence of treachery as SPO2
Borre was in no position to defend himself when he was
successively shot.17
Aggrieved, Palanas filed the instant appeal.18
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not
Palanas conviction for the crime of Murder should be
upheld.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7659, 19
as follows:
_______________
15 See Notice of Appeal dated February 18, 2011;
id., at p. 42.
16 Rollo, pp. 2-18.
17 Id., at pp. 11-16.
18 See Notice of Appeal dated January 30, 2014; id.,
at pp. 19-21.
19 Entitled An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on
Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the
Revised Penal Laws, as Amended, Other Special Penal
Laws, and for Other Purposes (approved on December
13, 1993).
326
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
6
People vs. Palanas
Art.248.Murder.Any person who, not falling within
the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be treachery attended
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1.With treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons
to insure or afford impunity.
xxxx
Treachery is a well-established concept in criminal law.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against a person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.20 There are two (2)
conditions therefore that must be met for treachery to
be appreciated: (a) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and ( b) the
means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted.21
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes
without warning in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected
manner, granting the victim no chance to resist or
escape. The attack must be sudden and unexpected
rendering the victim unable and unprepared to put up a
defense.22
With the foregoing in mind, the Court agrees with the
findings of the RTC and the CA that Palanas killed SPO2
Borre, and that the qualifying circumstance of
_______________
20 Item 16, Article 14 of the RPC.
21 See People v. Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, June 9,
2014, 725 SCRA 597, citing People v. Lacaden, 620 Phil.
807, 824; 605 SCRA 784, 800 (2009).
22 See People v. Warriner, G.R. No. 208678, June 16,
2014, 726 SCRA 469.
327
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015
People vs. Palanas
the same. The records show that SPO2 Borre was
outside carrying his grandson when two (2) assailants
shot him. During the attack, SPO2 Borre had no
opportunity to raise any meaningful defense against his
assailants; and consequently, he suffered multiple
gunshot wounds on his head and trunk, causing his
death.23
The CA is also correct in admitting SPO2 Borres
statements on his way to the hospital as evidence, both
as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.
For a dying declaration24 to constitute an exception to
the hearsay evidence rule,25 four (4) conditions must
concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; ( b)
that at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant is conscious of his impending death; ( c) the
declarant was competent as a witness; and ( d) the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide,
Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim. 26
On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form
part of the res gestae,27 and thus, constitute another
exception to the
_______________
23 Rollo, pp. 3-5.
24 Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section37.Dying declaration.The declaration of
a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein
his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
25 Evidence is hearsay when its probative force
depends in whole or in part on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce. (See Espineli v. People,
G.R. No. 179535, June 9, 2014, 725 SCRA 365) See also
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
26 People v. Salafranca, G.R. No. 173476, February
22, 2012, 666 SCRA 501, 512.
27 Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section42.Part of res gestae.Statements made
by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to
328
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
People vs. Palanas
rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of
the following requisites: (a) the principal act, the res
gestae, is a startling occurrence; ( b) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.28
In the case at bar, SPO2 Borres statements constitute
a dying declaration, given that they pertained to the
cause and circumstances of his death and taking into
consideration the number and severity of his wounds, it
may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same
under a fixed belief that his own death was already
imminent.29 This declaration is considered evidence of
the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence
since no person aware of his impending death would
make a careless and false accusation. 30 Verily, because
the declaration was made in extremity, when the party
is at the point of death and when every motive of
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the
most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the
law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as
creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed
by an oath administered in court.31
In the same vein, SPO2 Borres statements may
likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae. Res
gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the
_______________
the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as
part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.
28 People v. Villarico, Sr., 662 Phil. 399, 418; 647
SCRA 43, 58-59 (2011).
29 People v. Cerilla, 564 Phil. 230, 240; 539 SCRA
251, 262 (2007).
30 Id., citing People v. Cortezano, 425 Phil. 696, 715;
375 SCRA 95, 112 (2002).
31 Id., at p. 241, citing United States v. Gil, 13 Phil.
530, 549 (1909); People v. Saliling, 161 Phil. 559, 572-
573; 69 SCRA 427, 438 (1976).
329
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015
People vs. Palanas
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are
so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main
fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a
part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act,
declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven
or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates
any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
32
testimony. In this case, SPO2 Borres statements
refer to a startling occurrence, i.e., him being shot by
Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the
hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the
identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance
was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. Definitely, such statement is
relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the
authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2
Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by
the prosecution.33
On the other hand, the Court does not find credence in
Palanass defense of alibi. It is axiomatic that alibi is an
inherently weak defense,34 and may only be considered
if the following circumstances are shown: (a) he was
somewhere else when the crime occurred; and ( b) it
would be physically impossible for him to be at the
locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.35 In this
case, the RTC correctly observed that aside from the
admission that travel from Paraaque City to Pasig City
only takes about one (1) hour, the incident
_______________
32 See People v. Gatarin, G.R. No. 198022, April 7,
2014, 721 SCRA 16, citing People v. Salafranca, G.R. No.
173476, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 501, 514.
33 Id.
34 People v. Amistoso, G.R. No. 201447, January 9,
2013, 688 SCRA 376, 394, citing People v. Abulon, 557
Phil. 428, 447; 530 SCRA 675, 696 (2007).
 35 People v. Agcanas, G.R. No. 174476, October 11,
2011, 658 SCRA 842, 847.
330
33 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0
People vs. Palanas
occurred on a Sunday when traffic is not usually heavy.
Moreover, Palanas had access to a motorcycle that
allowed him to travel faster on the date and time of the
incident.36 Under the circumstances, there is the
possibility that Palanas could have been present at the
locus criminis at the time of the shooting. Accordingly,
his defense of alibi must fall.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed upon Palanas,
Section 3 of RA 934637 provides that [p]ersons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known
as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Pursuant thereto, Palanas should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole.38
Finally, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence, the
Court increases the amounts of damages awarded to
the heirs of SPO2 Borre, as follows: ( a) P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; and
39
(c) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of finality of judgment until the same are fully
paid.40
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision
dated January 16, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04925 finding accused-appellant
Bernabe P. Palanas alias Abe, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and
punished under Article 248 of the
_______________
36 CA Rollo, pp. 38-39.
37 Entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines (approved on June 24,
2006).
38 See People v. Arguta, G.R. No. 213216, April 22,
2015, 756 SCRA 376. See also People v. Gani, G.R. No.
195523, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 530, 540.
39 People v. Serenas, 636 Phil. 495, 512-513; 622
SCRA 485, 502 (2010).
40 See People v. Balute, G.R. No. 212932, January
21, 2015, 748 SCRA 172.
331
VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015
People vs. Palanas
Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION, in that he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole, and ordered to pay the heirs of SPO2 Ramon
Borre y Orio the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
as exemplary damages, and P2,464,865.07 as actual
damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment
until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin and Perez, JJ., concur.
Appeal denied, judgment affirmed with
modification.
Notes.The statement of the victim an hour before
his death and right after the hacking incident bore all
the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the
res gestae either of which was an exception to the
hearsay rule. (People vs. Salafranca, 666 SCRA 501
[2013])
The rule is that, in order to make a dying
declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and
imminent death must be entered by the declarant.
(People vs. Quisayas, 721 SCRA 16 [2014])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
VOL.274,JUNE19,1997
Peoplevs.Bernal
G.R.No.113685.June19,1997.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff
appellee,vs.THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE and PETER
DOE,accusedappellants.
Criminal Law;Kidnapping;Evidence;In kidnapping, what
isimportantistodetermineandprovethefactofseizure,andthe
subsequent disappearance of the victim will not exonerate an
accused from prosecution therefor.TheCourt notes that up to
thisday,neitherthevictimnorhisbodyhasbeenfound.This,
however,doesnotprecludetheCourtfromrulingonthemeritsof
thecase.Inkidnapping,whatisimportantistodetermineand
provethefactofseizure,andthesubsequentdisappearanceofthe
victim willnot exonerate an accusedfromprosecution therefor.
Otherwise,kidnapperscaneasilyavoidpunishmentbythesimple
expedientofdisposingoftheirvictimsbodies.
Same;Same;Same;Forthechargeofkidnappingtoprosper,
the deprivation of the victims liberty, which is the essential
elementof the offense, must beduly proved.For the charge of
kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victims liberty,
whichistheessential
_______________
*
SECONDDIVISION.
198
1 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
98
Peoplevs.Bernal
elementoftheoffense,mustbedulyproved.Inthecaseat
bar,Bernalindisputablyactedinconspiracywiththetwoother
197
unknown individuals as shown by their concerted acts
evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose.
Proofofconspiracyisperhapsmostfrequentlymadebyevidence
of a chain of circumstances only. The circumstances present in
thiscasesufficientlyindicatetheparticipationofBernalinthe
disappearanceofOpenda,Jr.
 Same;Same;Same;Motive;Motive is generally irrelevant,
unlessitisutilizedinestablishingtheidentityoftheperpetrator.
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in
establishingtheidentityoftheperpetrator.Coupledwithenough
circumstantialevidenceorfactsfromwhichitmaybereasonably
inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be
sufficient to support a conviction. Openda, Jr.s revelation to
Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernals wife is
admissibleinevidence,pursuanttoSection38,Rule130ofthe
RevisedRulesonEvidence.
Same;Same;Same;Declaration Against Interest;Requisites
before a statement may be admissible.A statement may be
admissiblewhenitcomplieswiththefollowingrequisites,towit:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it
relatestoafactagainsttheinterestofthedeclarant;(3)thatat
thetimehemadesaiddeclarationthedeclarantwasawarethat
thesamewascontrarytohisaforesaidinterest;and(4)thatthe
declaranthadnomotivetofalsifyandbelievedsuchdeclaration
tobetrue.
Same;Same;Same;Appeals;Findingsoffactofatrialcourt
carrygreatweightandareentitledtorespectonappeal,absent
anystrongandcogentreasontothecontrary,sinceitisinabetter
position to decide the question of credibility of witnesses.The
courta quocommitted no error in finding the testimonies of
Enriquez,RacasaandSagarinosufficienttoconvictBernal.The
courtsaidthatSagarinosforthrightanswerstothequestionsof
the prosecutor and defense counsel clearly establish the
participationofBernalintheabductionorkidnappingofOpenda,
Jr. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the
mouthofacrediblewitness,butmustbecredibleinitself.This
Courtonceagainfindsoccasiontoreiteratetheestablishedrule
thatthefindingsoffactofatrialcourtcarrygreatweightandare
entitledtorespectonappeal,absentanystrongandcogentreason
to the contrary, since it is in a better position to decide the
questionofcredibilityofwitnesses.
199
VOL.274,JUNE19,1997 199
Peoplevs.Bernal
APPEALfromadecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtofDavao
City,Br.10.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
JohnnyP.LanderoforaccusedTheodoreBernal.
ROMERO,J.:
Accusedappellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other
persons whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown,
werechargedwiththecrimeofkidnappinginCriminalCaseNo.
2665898oftheRegionalTrialCourtofDavaoCity,Branch10,
under an information1dated July 13, 1992, which reads as
follows:
That on or about August 5, 1991, in the City of Davao,
Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,
theabovementionedaccused,armedwithhandguns,conspiring,
confederatingandcooperatingtogetherandhelpingoneanother,
andbymeansofforce,violence,intimidationandthreat,wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously grabbed and kidnapped one
BienvenidoOpenda,Jr.,whilethelatterwasdrinkingliquorwith
hisfriendsatBoltonIsla,thisCityandwasbrought,handcuffed
andcarriedawayusingaPUthenfledtogetherwithBienvenido
Openda,Jr.,therebydeprivingthesaidBienvenidoOpenda,Jr.of
hislibertyagainsthiswill.
 CONTRARYTOLAW.
A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his
arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution presented four
witnesses.2Ontheotherhand,TheodoreBernaltestifiedforhis
defense.
_______________
1
Rollo,p.5.
2
Namely, Salito Enriquez, a tailor and resident of Kasilac,
Bucana, Davao City; Roberto Racasa, a mason and resident of
Kasilac, Bucana, Davao City; Adonis Sagarino, a student and
resident of Boston Isla; and Teresita Openda, the mother of
BienvenidoOpenda,Jr.
200
200 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Bernal
Thematerialfactsandeventsasfoundbythecourtaquoare:
It appears that on August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the
morning,whileRobertoRacasaandOpenda,Jr.wereengagedin
adrinkingspree,theyinvitedBernal,whowaspassingby,tojoin
them.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men,
apparently because hewasgoing to fetchhischild. Thereafter,
twomenarrived,approachedOpenda,Jr.,andaskedthelatterif
hewasPayat.3Whenhesaidyes,oneofthemsuddenlypulled
outahandgunwhiletheotherhandcuffedhimandtoldhimnot
to run because they were policemen and because he had an
atrasoorascoretosettlewiththem.Theythenhastilytookhim
away.RacasaimmediatelywenttothehouseofOpenda,Jr.and
informedthelattersmotheroftheabduction.
Thetheoryoftheprosecution,asculledfromthetestimonyof
acertainSalitoEnriquez,tendstoestablishthatOpenda,Jr.had
anillicitaffairwithBernalswifeNatyandthiswasthemotive
behind the formers kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still
missing.
Ontheotherhand,thedefenseassertsthatOpenda,Jr.wasa
drugpusherarrestedbythepoliceonAugust5,1991,andhence,
wasneverkidnapped.4
On December 10, 1993, the courta quorendered
judgment5findingBernalguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthe
crime of kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of
BienvenidoOpenda, Jr. underArticle267oftheRevised Penal
Code and hereby sentences him toreclusion perpetuaand to
indemnify his mother Teresita Openda in the amount of
P50,000.00forhermentalanguishandmoralsuffering.6
_______________
3
TSN,May10,1993,p.9.
4
Rollo,p.9.
5
PennedbyJudgeAugustoV.Breva.
6
Rollo,p.24.
201
VOL.274,JUNE19,1997 201
Peoplevs.Bernal
Bernalassailsthelowercourtforgivingweightandcredenceto
theprosecutionwitnessesallegedlyillusorytestimoniesandfor
convictinghimwhenhisguiltwasnotprovedbeyondreasonable
doubt.
Wefindnocompellingreasontooverturnthedecisionofthe
lowercourt.
TheCourtnotesthatuptothisday,neitherthevictimnorhis
bodyhasbeenfound.This,however,doesnotprecludetheCourt
from ruling on the merits of the case. In kidnapping, what is
importantistodetermineandprovethefactofseizure,andthe
subsequent disappearance of the victim will not exonerate an
accused from prosecution therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can
easilyavoidpunishmentbythesimpleexpedientofdisposingof
theirvictimsbodies.
Article267oftheRevisedPenalCodeprovidesthus:
ART.267.Kidnappingandseriousillegaldetention.
Anyprivateindividualwhoshallkidnapordetainanother,or
inanyothermannerdeprivehimofhisliberty,shallsufferthe
penaltyofreclusionperpetuatodeath:
1. 1.If thekidnapping or detentionshall havelastedmore
thanfivedays.
2. 2.If it shall have been committed simulating public
authority.
3. 3.Ifanyseriousphysicalinjuriesshallhavebeeninflicted
uponthepersonkidnappedordetained,orifthreatsto
killhimshallhavebeenmade.
4. 4.Ifthepersonkidnappedordetainedshallbeaminor,
femaleorapublicofficer.
Thepenaltyshallbedeathwherethekidnappingordetention
was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
abovementionedwerepresentinthecommissionoftheoffense.
Forthechargeofkidnappingtoprosper,thedeprivationofthe
victims liberty, which is the essential element of the offense,
mustbedulyproved.Inthecaseatbar,Bernalindisputablyacted
inconspiracywiththetwootherunknownindividualsasshown
bytheirconcertedactsevidentiaryofa
202
202 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Bernal
unityofthoughtandcommunityofpurpose.7Proofofconspiracy
is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances only.8The circumstances present in this case
sufficiently indicate the participation of Bernal in the
disappearanceofOpenda,Jr.
Theprosecutionhasprofferedsufficientevidencetoshowthat,
indeed, Bernal, together with his two companions, abducted
Openda, Jr. on August 5, 1991. A certain Adonis Sagarino, a
childhoodfriendandneighborofthevictim,testifiedthathesaw
Bernal at the billiard hall at about 11:00 a.m. with his two
companions and overheard him dispatching one of them to
TarsingsStoretocheckifacertainpersonwasstillthere.This
personlaterturnedouttobeOpenda,Jr.Headdedthatafterthe
latters presence was confirmed, thethree menleft the billiard
hall.Minuteslater,Openda,Jr.,already handcuffed,passedby
thebilliardhallwithBernalscompanions.
Equally important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa, a
residentofBucana,DavaoCitywhoknewbothBernalandthe
victim,theformerbeinghisneighborandcompadre.Henarrated
thatheandthevictimweredrinkingatTarsingsStoreonthat
fatefuldaywhenBernalpassedbyandhadadrinkwiththem.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two
mencametothestoreandaskedforPayat.WhenOpenda,Jr.
confirmed that he was indeed Payat, he was handcuffed and
takenawaybytheunidentifiedmen.Likewise,acertainSalito
Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that
sometimeinJanuary1991,Openda,Jr.confidedtohimthathe
and Bernals wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty
evengaveOpenda,Jr.moneywhichtheyusedtopayforamotel
room.HeadvisedNatynottodoitagainbecauseshe(was)a
marriedwoman.9
_______________
7
Peoplev.Puno,219SCRA85(1993).
8
Peoplev.Minanday,242SCRA620(1995).
9
TSN,May10,1993,p.5.
203
VOL.274,JUNE19,1997
Peoplevs.Bernal
Undoubtedly,hiswifesinfidelitywasamplereasonforBernalto
contemplaterevenge.
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in
establishingtheidentityoftheperpetrator.Coupledwithenough
circumstantialevidenceorfactsfromwhichitmaybereasonably
inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be
sufficient to support a conviction.10Openda, Jr.s revelation to
Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernals wife is
admissibleinevidence,pursuanttoSection38,Rule130ofthe
RevisedRulesonEvidence,viz.:
Sec.38.Declarationagainstinterest.Thedeclarationmadebya
persondeceased,orunabletotestify,againsttheinterestofthe
declarant,ifthefactassertedinthedeclarationwasatthetimeit
was made so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declarationunlesshebelievedittobetrue,maybereceivedin
evidenceagainsthimselforhissuccessorsininterestandagainst
thirdpersons.
With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest
fromthepresentprovision,itissafetoassumethatdeclaration
against interest has been expanded to include all kinds of
interest,thatis,pecuniary,proprietary,moralorevenpenal.11
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the
following requisites, to wit: (1) that the declarant is dead or
unabletotestify;(2)thatitrelatestoafactagainsttheinterestof
thedeclarant;(3)thatatthetimehemadesaiddeclarationthe
declarantwasawarethatthesamewascontrarytohisaforesaid
interest;and(4)thatthedeclaranthadnomotivetofalsifyand
believedsuchdeclarationtobetrue.12
203 Openda,Jr.,havingbeenmissingsincehisabduction,cannot
becalledupontotestify.HisconfessiontoEnriquez,definitelya
declarationagainsthisowninterestsincehisaffair
_______________
10
Peoplev.Evangelista,256SCRA611(1996).
11
FranciscoonEvidence,1993edition,p.275.
12
Regalado,RemedialLawCompendium,7thRevisedEd.,p.
609.
204
204 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Bernal
withNatyBernalwasacrime,isadmissibleinevidence 13because
nosanepersonwillbepresumedtotellafalsehoodtohisown
detriment.14
In his brief, Bernal highlights supposed inconsistencies in
Sagarinos testimony. Heallegesthat thelatter couldnot have
seentheactualhandcuffingbecauseTarsingsStorecouldnotbe
seenfromthebilliardhall.Sagarinostestimonyshowsthatafter
Bernalandtwoothersleftthebilliardhall,thelattercameback
withOpenda,Jr.,alreadyhandcuffed.
Q Thethreeofthemtogether?
A Yes,sir. IfonehadadirectviewofTarsingsStorefromthebilliardhall,
Q Andwhataboutyou,wheredidyoustay? Bernal would not have requested his companion to check if
A Ijuststayedinthebilliardhall. Openda, Jr. were still there drinking with Racasa. Another
discrepancypointedoutbyBernalarosefromthetestimoniesof
Q Whileyoustay(sic)inthebilliardhall,afterawhile,whatdidyousee
RacasaandSagarino.Racasa,oncrossexamination,stated:
next?
Q AfterTheodoreBernalleftyouhaveseenhimalsoreturned(sic)withhis
A Thetwocameback.
child,isthatcorrect?
Q Whowerethesetwowhomyousaidwho(sic)cameback?
A Yes,sir,becauseIwasstillinthestore.17
A ThecompanionsofBernal.
Ontheotherhand,Sagarinoaverredthat:
Q Andwhatdidthesetwomendo?
Q WhenTheodoreBernallefttheplace,howlong(sic)wereyouabletosee
A TheyapprehendedJunjunOpenda.15
himagain?
From this proceeding, Bernal wrongly inferred that Sagarino
A Quiteatime,sir,becausewhentheyleft,histwocompanionscameback
actually saw Openda, Jr. arrested. The lower court correctly
rejectedthisargumentbyholdingthat: andproceededtoTarcingStoreandarrestedJunJunOpenda.Whenthese
ButSagarinohasnotsaidthathesawtheactualhandcuffingof twomenbroughtoutJunjunOpenda,fifteenminuteslater,Bernalcame.
Openda,Jr.attheTarsingorTarcingstore.Onthecontrary,he Q DoyouknowwherethisBernalfrom?(sic)
says that he had not known who the person was that Bernal A Hewascomingfromoutside.
referredtowhenherequestedoneofthistwocompanionstogo Q Hehaswithhimhisson?
seeifthatpersonwasstillthereatthestore,andthathecameto A Hewaswithnobody,sir.
knowthathewasOpenda,Jr.onlyafterhesawOpenda,Jr.pass Q Areyousureofthat?
bythebilliardhallalreadyhandcuffed,withthetwounidentified
A Yes,sir.
companions of Bernal with him, on their way out to the main
Q Hewasalone?
road.16
A Yes,sir.18
_______________ The testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino are not absolutely
inconsistentwitheachotherastobeirreconcilable.Considering
13
Rollo,p.11. the proximity of the store from the billiard hall, there is a
14
Peoplev.ToledoandHolgado,51Phil.825. possibilitythatwhenRacasasawBernalwithhissonatthestore,
15
TSN,July28,1993,pp.78. the latter could have already brought home his son before
16
TSN,October13,1993,pp.35. proceeding alone to the billiard hall where he was seen by
205 Sagarino.19
VOL.274,JUNE19,1997 205
_______________
Peoplevs.Bernal
 17
TSN,May10,1993,p.13.
18
TSN,July28,1993,pp.2122.
19
Rollo,p.90.
206
206 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Bernal
BernalwouldliketheCourttodismissSagarinostestimonyby
imputingrevengeashismotivefortestifying.Heallegesthaton
July 29, 1991, or six days before the alleged kidnapping, five
policemen arrived at Kasilak, Bucana on board a patrol car
asking for Openda, Jr., Sagarino, Joseph Mendoza, Dansoy
MadeloandDagoyBalagan.Herepliedthattheywereresidents
oftheplaceandstayingatthebilliardhallandmahjonghouse.
Thepolicemendepartedandwenttotheplaceshementioned.
Q Minuteslaterdoyouknowwhathappened?
A Theycameback.
Q Whatdidyoudoaftertheycameback?
A Iaskedthesepoliceofficersiftheyfoundthese(sic)personstheywere
looking(for)?
Q Whatwastheiranswer?
A Theyansweredinthenegative.
Q Sincetheanswerisinthenegative,whatdidyoudo?
A Iaskedthepoliceofficerswhytheywerelookingforthesepersons.(?)
Q Whatwastheanswerofthepolicemen?
A Thepoliceofficersaidthatthosepeoplewerewantedbythembecause
accordingly(sic)theyweremarijuanapushers.20
Bernals position is that no abduction or kidnapping ever took
placebutthatanarrestwasmadebypursuingpolicemen.This
contentionisquiteimprobable,ifnothighlypreposterous.
The trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of
Sagarino,itbeingfreefromanyillmotiveagainstBernal.Ifthe
latters allegations were true, then Sagarino should have been
arrestedbythepoliceatthetimehegavehistestimonyincourt.
Nosucharrestwas,however,made.
Thecourtaquocommittednoerrorinfindingthetestimonies
of Enriquez, Racasa and Sagarino sufficient to convict Bernal.
ThecourtsaidthatSagarinosforthrightanswersto
_______________
TSN,October13,1993,p.4.
20
207
VOL.274,JUNE19,1997 207
Peoplevs.Bernal
the questions of the prosecutor and defense counsel clearly
establish the participation of Bernal in the abduction or
kidnappingofOpenda,Jr.Evidence,tobebelieved,mustnotonly
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be
credible in itself.21This Court once again finds occasion to
reiteratetheestablishedrulethatthefindingsoffactofatrial
courtcarry great weight and are entitled to respect onappeal,
absentanystrongandcogentreasontothecontrary,sinceitisin
a better position to decide the question of credibility of
witnesses.22
Wenotethatafteralapseofaconsiderablelengthoftime,the
victimhasyettoresurface.Consideringthecircumstances,itis
safetoassumethatOpenda,Jr.isalreadydead.
Finally,theSolicitorGeneral,pursuanttotheIndeterminate
Sentence Law, recommended to this Court the penalty of
seventeen (17) years ofreclusion temporal, as minimum,
toreclusionperpetua,asmaximum.Themaximumpenaltymust
be determined in accordance with rules and provisions of the
Revised Penal Code. With respect to the minimum penalty,
however,itisleftentirelywithinthediscretionofthecourttofix Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
itanywherewithintherangeofthepenaltynextlowerwithout reserved.
reference to the periods into which it may be
subdivided.23Consistent with this ruling, this Court
imposesreclusion temporal, in its maximum period, as the
minimumpenalty,toreclusionperpetua,asmaximum.
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,theinstantappealis
DISMISSEDandtheappealeddecisiondatedNovember18,1993,
isAFFIRMEDintoto.
CostsagainstaccusedappellantTheodoreBernal.

_______________

21
Peoplev.Ulpindo,256SCRA201(1996).
22
People v. Catoltol, Sr.,G.R. No. 122359, November 28,
1996;People v. Balisnomo,G.R. No. 118990, November 28,
1996;Peoplev.Vallena,244SCRA685(1995).
23
Peoplev.Ducosin,59Phil.109.
208
208 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Sahagun
SOORDERED.
Regalado(Chairman),Puno,MendozaandTorres, Jr.,
JJ.,concur.
Appealdismissed,judgmentaffirmedintoto.
Note.For kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable
proofthattheactualintentofthemalefactorwastodeprivethe
offended party of her liberty. (People vs. Godoy,250 SCRA 582 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
676[1995]) Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
G.R.No.121027.July31,1997.*
o0o
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER,
petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA
DOMINGO,respondents.
Filiation;Parent and Child;Presumptions;There is no
presumptionofthelawmorefirmlyestablishedandfoundedon
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.It
seemsthatboththecourtaquoandrespondentappellatecourt
have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized
presumptiononlegitimacy.Thereisnopresumptionofthelaw
more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and
moreconvincingreasonthanthepresumptionthatchildrenborn
inwedlockarelegitimate.Andwellsettledistherulethatthe
issueoflegitimacycannotbeattackedcollaterally.
Same;Same;Same;Actions;Actions for Reconveyance;The
issueoflegitimacycannotbeproperlycontrovertedinanactionfor
reconveyance.Theissue,therefore,astowhetherpetitionersare
the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be
properlycontrovertedinthepresentactionforreconveyance.This
is aside, of course, from the further consideration that private
respondentisnottheproperpartytoimpugnthelegitimacyof
herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to
operateinfavorofpetitionersunlessanduntilitisrebutted.
Same;Same;Same;Burden of Proof;The burden of proof
rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular
party.Even
______________
SECONDDIVISION.
* evidence and support a finding or decision. Perforce, a
583
VOL.276,JULY31,1997 583
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this
case,theburdenofproofrestsnotonhereinpetitionerswhohave
the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private
respondent who is disputing the same. This fact alone should
have been sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise
appropriatecautionbeforeacting,asitdid,onthedemurrerto
evidence. It would have delimited the issues for resolution, as
wellasthetimeandeffortnecessitatedthereby.
Same;Same;Same;Evidence;In order to destroy the
presumption of legitimacy, the party against whom it operates
mustadducesubstantialandcredibleevidencetothecontrary.
Ordinarily,whenafactispresumed,itimpliesthatthepartyin
whose favor the presumption exists does not have to introduce
evidencetoestablishthatfact,andinanylitigationwherethat
factisputinissue,thepartydenyingitmustbeartheburdenof
proof to overthrow the presumption. The presumption of
legitimacyissostrongthatitisclearthatitseffectistoshiftthe
burdenofpersuasiontothepartyclaimingillegitimacy.Andin
order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it
operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the
contrary.
Same;Same;Same;Same;A presumption is prima facie
proofofthefactpresumed,andunlessthefactthusestablished
primafaciebythelegalpresumptionofitstruthisdisproved,it
must stand as proved.Where there is an entire lack of
competent evidence to the contrary, and unless or until it is
rebutted,ithasbeenheldthatapresumptionmaystandinlieuof
presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted. This is
basedonthetheorythatapresumptionisprimafacieproofofthe
factpresumed,andunlessthefactthusestablishedprimafacieby
thelegalpresumptionofitstruthisdisproved,itmuststandas
proved.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Pleadings and Practice;When a
partyoptsnottopresentcountervailingevidencetoovercomethe
presumption,bymerelyfilingademurrertoevidenceinstead,he
or she in effect impliedly admits the truth of such fact.
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present
countervailingevidencetoovercomethepresumption,bymerely
filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly
admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or
disregardedtheevidentialrule
584
5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
84
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
that presumptions like judicial notice and admissions,
relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he
allegedandsuchfactsaretherebyconsideredasdulyproved.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Hearsay Rule;Declarations
About Pedigree;Conditions for the admission of declarations
about pedigree.The primary proof to be considered in
ascertainingtherelationshipbetweenthepartiesconcernedisthe
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946,
categoricallydeclaredthattheformerisTeodorasniece.Sucha
statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is
admissible,asanexceptiontothehearsayrule,underSection39,
Rule130oftheRulesofCourt,subjecttothefollowingconditions:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the
declarantberelatedtothepersonwhosepedigreeisthesubjectof
inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other
thanthedeclaration;and(4)thatthedeclarationwasmadeante
litemmotam,thatis,notonlybeforethecommencementofthe
suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before
anycontroversyhasarisenthereon.
Same;Evidence;Hearsay Rule;Declarations About
Pedigree;Where the party claiming seeks recovery against a
relative common to both claimant and declarantnot from the
declaranthimselforthedeclarantsestatetherelationshipofthe
declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the
declarationitself,butthisrequirementdoesnotapplywhereitis
soughttoreachtheestateofthedeclaranthimselfandnotmerely
to establish a right through his declarations to the property of
someothermemberofthefamily.Thegeneralrule,therefore,is
thatwherethepartyclaimingseeksrecoveryagainstarelative
common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the
declaranthimselforthedeclarantsestate,therelationshipofthe
declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the
declarationitself.Theremustbesomeindependentproofofthis
fact.Asanexception,therequirementthattherebeotherproof
thanthedeclarationsofthedeclarantastotherelationship,does
notapplywhereitissoughttoreachtheestateofthedeclarant
himself and not merely to establish a right through his
declarationstothepropertyofsomeothermemberofthefamily.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Whereapartyclaimsarighttoa
partoftheestateofthedeclarant,thedeclarationofthelatterthat
the
585
VOL.276,JULY31,1997 585
 Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
former is her niece is admissible and constitutes sufficient
proofofsuchrelationship,notwithstandingthefactthattherewas
nootherpreliminaryevidencethereof,thereasonbeingthatsuch
declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of
receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice.We are
sufficientlyconvinced,andsohold,thatthepresentcaseisone
instancewherethegeneralrequirementonevidencealiundemay
berelaxed.Petitionersareclaimingarighttopartoftheestateof
the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by
TeodoraDezollerGuerrerothatpetitionerCorazonisherniece,is
admissible and constitutes sufficientproof of such relationship,
notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary
evidence thereof, the reason being that such declaration is
renderedcompetentbyvirtueofthenecessityofreceivingsuch
evidencetoavoidafailureofjustice.Moreimportantly,thereisin
thepresentcaseanabsolutefailurebyallandsundrytorefute
thatdeclarationmadebythedecedent.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Where the subject of the
declarationisthedeclarantsownrelationshiptoanotherperson,
itseemsabsurdtorequire,asafoundationfortheadmissionof
the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is
offered to establish.From the foregoing disquisitions, it may
thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedents
declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that
petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero. As held in one case, where the subject of the
declarationisthedeclarantsownrelationshiptoanotherperson,
itseemsabsurdtorequire,asafoundationfortheadmissionof
the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is
offeredtoestablish.Thepreliminaryproofwouldrenderthemain
evidenceunnecessary.
Same;Same;Same;PleadingsandPractice;Itiselementary
that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the
objectionshallbetreatedaswaived.Applyingthegeneralrulein
thepresentcasewouldnonethelessproducethesameresult.For
whilethedocumentaryevidencesubmittedbypetitionersdonot
strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are
howeveroftheconsideredopinionthatthesamemaybeadmitted
byreasonofprivaterespondentsfailuretointerposeanytimely
objectiontheretoatthetimetheywerebeingofferedinevidence.
Itiselementarythatanobjectionshallbemadeatthetimewhen
anallegedinadmissible
586
5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
86
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection
shallbetreatedaswaived,sincetherighttoobjectismerelya
privilegewhichthepartymaywaive.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Even if certain documents are
inadmissibleforbeinghearsay,butonaccountofapartysfailure
to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as
sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.The situation is
aggravated by the fact thatcounsel for private respondent
unreservedly crossexamined petitioners, as the lone witness, on
thedocumentaryevidencethatwereoffered.Atnotimewasthe
issueofthesupposedinadmissibilitythereof,orthepossiblebasis
for objection thereto, ever raised. Instead, private respondents
counselelicitedanswersfromthewitnessonthecircumstances
and regularity of her obtention of said documents: The
observationslatermadebyprivaterespondentinhercommentto
petitionersofferofexhibits,althoughthegroundsthereforwere
already apparent at the time these documents were being
adduced in evidence during the testimony of Corazon Dezoller
Tisonbutwhichobjectionswerenottimelyraisedtherein,mayno
longer serve to rectify the legal consequences which resulted
therefrom.Hence,evenassumingexgratiaargumentithatthese
documentsareinadmissibleforbeinghearsay,butonaccountof
herein private respondents failure to object thereto, the same
maybeadmittedandconsideredassufficienttoprovethefacts
thereinasserted.
Succession;Whereadecedentissurvivedbythespouseand
nephewsandnieces,theformershallbeentitledtoonehalfofthe
inheritanceandthenephewsandniecestotheotherhalf.Upon
thedeathofTeodora DezollerGuerrero, onehalf ofthe subject
property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse,
Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership.
Applyingtheaforequotedstatutoryprovisions,theremaininghalf
shall be equally divided between the widower and herein
petitionerswhoareentitledtojointlyinheritintheirownright.
Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total
undivided threefourths (3/4) share in the entire property to
herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private
respondent are deemed coowners of the property covered by
TransferCertificateofTitleNo.374012intheproportionofan
undividedonefourth(1/4)andthreefourths(3/4)sharethereof,
respectively.
587
VOL.276,JULY31,1997
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
Actions;PleadingsandPractice;DemurrertoEvidence;Ifa
demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of
dismissalisreversed,themovantshallbedeemedtohavewaived
the right to present evidence.All told, on the basis of the
foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiffs evidence
should have been, as it is hereby, denied. Nonetheless, private
respondent may no longer be allowed to present evidence by
reasonofthemandateunderSection1ofrevisedRule3ofthe
RulesofCourtwhichprovidesthatifthemotionisgrantedbut
onappealtheorderofdismissalisreversedheshallbedeemedto
havewaivedtherighttopresentevidence.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
BenjaminP.Quitorianoforpetitioners.
RamosoLawOfficeforprivaterespondent.
REGALADO,J.:
The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the
judgmentrenderedbyrespondentCourtofAppealsonJune30,
19951whichaffirmedtheOrderofDecember3,1992issuedbythe
RegionalTrialCourtofQuezonCity,Branch98,grantingherein
private respondents Demurrer to Plaintiffs Evidence filed in
CivilCaseNo.Q881054pendingtherein.
The present appellate review involves an action for
reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein private
587 respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch98,docketedastheaforesaidCivilCaseNo.Q881054,
overaparceloflandwithahouseandapartmentthereonlocated
at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was
originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora
DezollerGuerrero.ItappearsthatpetitionersCorazonTisonand
ReneDezollerarethenieceandnephew,
______________
1
PennedbyAssociateJusticeGloriaC.Paras,withAssociate
JusticesQuirinoAbadSantos,Jr.andDelilahVidallonMagtolis,
concurring;AnnexK,Petition,Rollo,74.
588
588 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is
the sister of petitioners father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora
DezollerGuerrerodiedonMarch5,1983withoutanyascendant
or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin
Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners father,
Hermogenes,diedonOctober3,1973,hencetheyseektoinherit
fromTeodoraDezollerGuerrerobyrightofrepresentation.The
recordsrevealthatuponthedeathofTeodoraDezollerGuerrero,
hersurvivingspouse,Martin,executedonSeptember15,1986an
Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement2adjudicatinguntohimself,
allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by
TransferCertificateofTitleNo.66886,asaconsequenceofwhich
TransferCertificateofTitleNo.358074wasissuedinthenameof
MartinGuerrero.OnJanuary2,1988,MartinGuerrerosoldthe
lottohereinprivaterespondentTeodoraDomingoandthereafter,
TransferCertificateofTitleNo.374012wasissuedinthelatters
name.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently,
hereinpetitionersfiledanactionforreconveyanceonNovember
2,1988,claimingthattheyareentitledtoinheritonehalfofthe
propertyinquestionbyrightofrepresentation.
At the pretrial conference, the following issues were
presentedbybothpartiesforresolution:
1. (1)whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are
thenephewandnieceofthelateTeodoraDezoller;
2. (2)whetherornottheplaintiffsareentitledtoinheritby
right of representation from the estate of the late
TeodoraDezoller;
3. (3)whetherornotdefendant(hereinprivaterespondent)
mustreconveythereservedparticipationoftheplaintiffs
totheestateofthelateTeodoraDezollerunderSection
4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court which was duly
annotatedonthetitleofthedefendant;
4. (4)whetherornottheplaintiffsareentitledtodamages,
moralandexemplary,plusattorneysfeesforthewillful
and
______________
2
AnnexB,id.;ibid.,41.
589
VOL.276,JULY31,1997 589
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
malicious refusal of defendant to reconvey the participation of
plaintiffsintheestateofTeodoraDezoller,despitedemandsand
knowingfullywellthatplaintiffsarethenieceandnephewofsaid
deceased;and
 (5)whetherornotthesubjectpropertynowinlitigationcanbe
consideredasconjugalpropertyofthespousesMartinGuerrero
andTeodoraDezollerGuerrero.3
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was
presented as the lone witness, with the following documentary
evidenceofferedtoprovepetitionersfiliationtotheirfatherand
their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of
Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed
records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller;
deathcertificatesofHermogenesDezollerandTeodoraDezoller
Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of
CorazonandReneDezoller;jointaffidavitsofPabloVerzosaand
MelitonSitjarattestingtotheparents,dateandplaceofbirthof
CorazonandReneDezoller;jointaffidavitofJulianaCariagaand
Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between
Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage
certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero. 4Petitioners
thereafterrestedtheircaseandsubmittedawrittenofferofthese
exhibits to which a Comment5was filed by herein private
respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to
PlaintiffsEvidenceonthegroundthatpetitionersfailedtoprove
theirlegitimatefiliationwiththedeceasedTeodoraGuerreroin
accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code. It is further
averredthatthetestimonyofpetitionerCorazonDezollerTison
regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is
selfserving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls
shortofthequantumofproofrequiredunderArticle172ofthe
FamilyCodetoestablishfiliation.Also,thecertificationissuedby
theOfficeoftheLocalCivil
______________
3
OriginalRecord,207208.
4
Ibid.,224229.
5
Ibid.,233234.
590
590 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
RegistrarofHimamaylan, NegrosOccidental is merely proofof
theallegeddestructionoftherecordsreferredtotherein,andthe
joint affidavit executed by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar
certifying to the date, place of birth and parentage of herein
petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants
wereneverpresentedforcrossexamination.6
OnDecember3,1992,thetrialcourtissuedanordergranting
the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for
reconveyance.7
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals
declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein
petitioners,suchasthebaptismalcertificates,familypicture,and
jointaffidavitsareallinadmissibleandinsufficienttoproveand
establishfiliation.Hence,thisappeal.
Wefindforpetitioners.
The bone of contention in private respondents demurrer to
evidenceiswhetherornothereinpetitionersfailedtomeetthe
quantumofproofrequiredbyArticle172oftheFamilyCodeto
establish legitimacy and filiation. There are two points for
consideration before us:firstis the issue on petitioners
legitimacy, andsecondis the question regarding their filiation
withTeodoraDezollerGuerrero.
I.Itisnotdebatablethatthedocumentaryevidenceadduced
bypetitioners,takenseparatelyandindependentlyofeachother,
arenotpersesufficientproofoflegitimacynorevenofpedigree.It
is important to note, however, that the rulings of both lower
courts in the case are basically premised on the erroneous
assumptionthat,inthefirstplace,theissueoflegitimacymaybe
validly controverted in an action for reconveyance, and, in the
second place, that herein petitioners have theonus probandito
provetheirlegitimacyand,corollarily,theirfiliation.Wedisagree
onbothcounts.Itseemsthatboththecourtaquoandrespondent
appellatecourthaveregrettablyoverlookedtheuniversallyrecog
______________
6
Ibid.,259267.
7
Ibid.,275.
591
VOL.276,JULY31,1997
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
nizedpresumptiononlegitimacy.Thereisnopresumptionofthe
lawmorefirmlyestablishedandfoundedonsoundermoralityand
moreconvincingreasonthanthepresumptionthatchildrenborn
inwedlockarelegitimate.8Andwellsettledistherulethatthe
issueoflegitimacycannotbeattackedcollaterally.
Therationalefortheseruleshasbeenexplainedinthiswise:
ThepresumptionoflegitimacyintheFamilyCodexxxactually
fixesacivilstatusforthechildborninwedlock,andthatcivil
statuscannotbeattackedcollaterally.Thelegitimacyofthechild
canbeimpugnedonlyinadirectactionbroughtforthatpurpose,
bytheproperparties,andwithintheperiodlimitedbylaw.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defenseorasacollateralissueinanotheractionforadifferent
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: The contest of the
legitimacyofachildbythehusbandorhisheirsmustbemadeby
propercomplaintbeforethecompetentcourt;anycontestmadein
anyotherwayisvoid.ThisprincipleappliesunderourFamily
Code.Articles170and171ofthecodeconfirmthisview,because
theyrefertotheactiontoimpugnthelegitimacy.Thisaction
canbebroughtonlybythehusbandorhisheirsandwithinthe
periodsfixedinthepresentarticles.
UpontheexpirationoftheperiodsprovidedinArticle170,the
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be
brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore,
becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious
intentionofthelaw is toprevent the status of achildborn in
wedlockfrombeinginastateofuncertaintyforalongtime.It
also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the
paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the
591
matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the
periodoftheconceptionofthechild,maystillbeeasilyavailable.
xxx
______________
8
Jones,CommentariesonEvidence,Vol.1,2nded.,118119.
592
592 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
Onlythehusbandcancontestthelegitimacyofachildborntohis
wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridiculewhichtheinfidelityofhiswifeproduces;andheshould
decidewhethertoconcealthatinfidelityorexposeit,inviewof
themoralandeconomicinterestinvolved.Itisonlyinexceptional
cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, noneeven his heirscan impugn
legitimacy;thatwouldamounttoaninsulttohismemory. 9
Theissue,therefore,astowhetherpetitionersarethelegitimate
childrenofHermogenesDezollercannotbeproperlycontroverted
inthepresentactionforreconveyance.Thisisaside,ofcourse,
fromthefurtherconsiderationthatprivaterespondentisnotthe
properpartytoimpugnthelegitimacyofhereinpetitioners.The
presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of
petitionersunlessanduntilitisrebutted.
Evenassumingthattheissueisallowedtoberesolvedinthis
case,theburdenofproofrestsnotonhereinpetitionerswhohave
the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private
respondent who is disputing the same. This fact alone should
have been sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise
appropriatecautionbeforeacting,asitdid,onthedemurrerto
evidence. It would have delimited the issues for resolution, as
wellasthetimeandeffortnecessitatedthereby.
Ordinarily,whenafactispresumed,itimpliesthattheparty
inwhosefavorthepresumptionexistsdoesnothavetointroduce
evidencetoestablishthatfact,andinanylitigationwherethat
factisputinissue,thepartydenyingitmustbeartheburdenof
proof to overthrow the presumption.10The presumption of
legitimacyissostrongthatitisclearthatitseffectistoshiftthe
burdenofpersuasiontothepartyclaimingillegitimacy. 11Andin
ordertodestroythepresumption,
______________
Tolentino, A., Civil Code of thePhilippines, Commentaries
9
andJurisprudence,Vol.1,1990ed.,535537.
10
Op.cit.,535.
11
JonesonEvidence,Vol.1,5thed.,178.
593
VOL.276,JULY31,1997
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
thepartyagainstwhomitoperatesmustadducesubstantialand
credibleevidencetothecontrary.12
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the
contrary,13andunlessoruntilitisrebutted,ithasbeenheldthat
a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a
findingordecision.14Perforce,apresumptionmustbefollowedif
it is uncontroverted. This is based on the theory that a
presumptionisprimafacieproofofthefactpresumed,andunless
thefactthusestablishedprimafaciebythelegalpresumptionof
itstruthisdisproved,itmuststandasproved. 15
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present
countervailingevidencetoovercomethepresumption,bymerely
filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly
admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or
disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial
notice and admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting
evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are thereby
consideredasdulyproved.
II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding
petitioners relationship withTeodora DezollerGuerrero, whose
estateisthesubjectofthepresentcontroversy,requiresamore
intensiveandextensiveexamination.
Petitionersevidence,asearlierexplained,consistsmainlyof
the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death
andmarriagecertificates,thevariouscertificationsfromthecivil
registrar,afamilypicture,andseveraljointaffidavitsexecutedby
third persons all of which she identified and explained in the
courseandaspartofhertestimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the
relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of
CorazonDezollerTisontotheeffectthatTeodoraDezoller
593
______________
 12
95ALR883.
13
31ACJS,Evidence,Sec.114,195.
14
Ibid.,Sec.119,216.
15
Brawsellvs.Tindall,294SW2d685.
594
594 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically
declaredthattheformerisTeodorasniece.16Suchastatementis
consideredadeclarationaboutpedigreewhichisadmissible,as
anexceptiontothehearsayrule,underSection39,Rule130of
theRulesofCourt,subjecttothefollowingconditions:(1)thatthe
declarantisdeadorunabletotestify;(2)thatthedeclarantbe
relatedtothepersonwhosepedigreeisthesubjectofinquiry;(3)
that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and (4) that the declaration was madeante litem
motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit
involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversyhasarisenthereon.
Thereisnodisputewithrespecttothefirst,secondandfourth
elements.Whatremainsforanalysisisthethirdelement,thatis,
whether or not the other documents offered in evidence
sufficientlycorroboratethedeclarationmadebyTeodoraDezoller
Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner
Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present
evidenceotherthansuchdeclaration.
Americanjurisprudencehasitthatadistinctionmustbemade
astowhentherelationshipofthedeclarantmaybeprovedbythe
verydeclarationitself,orbyotherdeclarationsofsaiddeclarant,
andwhenitmustbesupportedbyevidencealiunde.Theruleis
statedthus:
Onesituationtobenotedisthatwhereoneseekstosetupa
claimthrough,butnotfrom,thedeclarantandtoestablishthe
admissibility of a declaration regarding claimants pedigree, he
may not do so by declarants own statements as to declarants
relationship to the particular family. The reason is that
declarantsdeclarationofhisownrelationshipisofaselfserving
nature. Accordingly there must be precedent proof from other
sources that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a
member of the particular family; otherwise the requirement to
admissibilitythatdeclarantsrelationshiptothecommonfamily
mustappear is notmet.But whentheparty claimingseeksto
establishrelationshipinordertoclaim
______________
TSN,February14,1992,58.
16
595
VOL.276,JULY31,1997 595
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
directlyfromthedeclarantorthedeclarantsestate,thesituation
andthepolicyofthelawapplicablearequitedifferent.Insuch
casethedeclarationofthedecedent,whoseestateisincontroversy,
thathewasrelatedtotheonewhoclaimshisestate,isadmissible
withoutotherproofofthefactofrelationship.Whilethenatureof
thedeclarationisthendisserving,thatisnottherealgroundfor
its admission. Such declarations do not derive their evidential
valuefromthatconsideration,althoughitisauseful,ifnotan
artificial,aidindeterminingtheclasstowhichthedeclarations
belong.Thedistinctionwehavenotedissufficientlyapparent;in
theonecasethedeclarationsareselfserving,intheotherthey
arecompetentfromreasonsofnecessity.17(Italicsours.)
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming
seeksrecoveryagainstarelativecommontobothclaimantand
declarant,butnotfromthedeclaranthimselforthedeclarants
estate,therelationshipofthedeclaranttothecommonrelative
maynotbeprovedbythedeclarationitself.Theremustbesome
independentproofofthisfact.18Asanexception,therequirement
thattherebeotherproofthanthedeclarationsofthedeclarantas
totherelationship,doesnotapplywhereitissoughttoreachthe
estateofthedeclaranthimselfandnotmerelytoestablisharight
throughhisdeclarationstothepropertyofsomeothermemberof
thefamily.19
We aresufficientlyconvinced, andsohold, thatthepresent
case is one instance where the general requirement on
evidencealiundemayberelaxed.Petitionersareclaimingaright
to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner
Corazonisherniece,isadmissibleandconstitutessufficientproof
ofsuchrelationship,notwithstandingthefactthattherewasno
other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being that such
declarationisrenderedcompetentby
______________
17
Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, Vol. 3, 2nd ed., 2094
2095.
18
Op.cit.,2096.
19
Op.cit.,2098.
596
596 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
virtueofthenecessityofreceivingsuchevidencetoavoidafailure
of justice.20More importantly, there is in the present case an
absolutefailurebyallandsundrytorefutethatdeclarationmade
bythedecedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely
concluded, on the sole basis of the decedents declaration and
without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the
nieceandnephewofTeodoraDezollerGuerrero.Asheldinone
case,21wherethesubjectofthedeclarationisthedeclarantsown
relationshiptoanotherperson,itseemsabsurdtorequire,asa
foundationfortheadmissionofthedeclaration,proofofthevery
factwhichthedeclarationisofferedtoestablish.Thepreliminary
proofwouldrenderthemainevidenceunnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would
nonethelessproducethesameresult.Forwhilethedocumentary
evidencesubmittedbypetitionersdonotstrictlyconformtothe
rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered
opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private
respondentsfailuretointerposeanytimelyobjectiontheretoat
thetimetheywerebeingofferedinevidence. 22Itiselementary
that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissibledocumentisofferedinevi
______________
20
InreClarksEstate,110P.828.
21
HartmansEstate,107P.105,citedinMoran,Commentson
theRulesofCourt,Vol.5,1980ed.,322.
22
Onofferofevidence,theRulesofCourtpertinentlyprovide:
Sec. 35.When to make offer.x x x Documentary and object
evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a partys
testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless
allowedbytheCourttobedonebywriting.
Sec.36.Objection.Objectiontoevidenceofferedorallymust
be made immediately after the offer is made. Objection to a
questionpropoundedinthecourseoftheoralexaminationofa
witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall
becomereasonablyapparent.
597
VOL.276,JULY31,1997
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
dence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated as
23
waived,24sincetherighttoobjectismerelyaprivilegewhichthe
partymaywaive.25
As explained inAbrenica vs. Gonda, et al.,26it has been
repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or
objectionagainsttheadmissionofanyevidencemustbemadeat
thepropertime,otherwiseitwillbedeemedtohavebeenwaived.
The proper time is when from the question addressed to the
witness,orfromtheanswerthereto,orfromthepresentationof
the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be
inferred.
Thus,afailuretoexcepttotheevidencebecauseitdoesnot
conformwiththestatuteisawaiveroftheprovisionsofthelaw.
Thatobjectiontoaquestionputtoawitnessmustbemadeatthe
time the question is asked. An objection to the admission of
evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken after the
testimonyhasbeengiven,istoolate.27Thus,forinstance,failure
toobjecttoparolevidencegivenonthestand,wherethepartyis
inapositiontoobject,isawaiverofanyobjectionsthereto. 28
Thesituationisaggravatedbythefactthatcounselforprivate
respondent unreservedly crossexamined petitioners, as the lone
witness,onthedocumentaryevidencethatwereoffered.Atnotime
was the issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the
possiblebasisforobjectionthereto,everraised.Instead,private
respondents counsel elicited answers from the witness on the
circumstancesandregularityofherobtentionofsaiddocuments:
Theobservationslatermadeby
______________
597
23
Martin,RulesofCourt,Vol.5,3rded.,611.
24
People vs. De la Cruz,G.R. No. 108180, February 8,
1994,229SCRA754.
25
Moran,CommentsontheRulesofCourt,Vol.6,1980ed.,
125.
26
34Phil.745(1916).
27
Conluvs.Araneta,etal.,15Phil.387(1910).
28
SeeTalosig vs. Vda. De Nieba, et al.,G.R. No. L29557,
February29,1972,43SCRA472.
598
598 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
private respondent in her comment to petitioners offer of
exhibits,althoughthegroundsthereforwerealreadyapparentat
thetimethesedocumentswerebeingadducedinevidenceduring
the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison but which objections
werenottimelyraisedtherein,maynolongerservetorectifythe
legal consequences which resulted therefrom. Hence, even
assumingex gratia argumentithat these documents are
inadmissibleforbeinghearsay,butonaccountofhereinprivate
respondentsfailuretoobjectthereto,thesamemaybeadmitted
andconsideredassufficienttoprovethefactsthereinasserted. 29
Accordingly,theCertificateofMarriage(ExhibitS)whereinit
is indicated that the parents of Teodora Dezoller are Isabelo
DezollerandCeciliaCalpo,aswellastheCertificatesofBaptism
of Teodora Dezoller30(Exhibit H) and Hermogenes Dezoller
(Exhibit J) which both reflect the names of their parents as
Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that Hermogenes
Dezoller is the brother of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and the
DeathCertificateofHermogenesDezoller(ExhibitK)theentries
whereinweremadebypetitionerCorazonDezollerTisonashis
daughter,togetherwiththeJointAffidavitsofPabloVerzosaand
MelitonSitjar(ExhibitsNandP),toprovethathereinpetitioners
arethechildrenofHermogenesDezollerthesecanbedeemedto
have sufficiently established the relationship between the
declarantandhereinpetitioners.Thisisinconsonancewiththe
rulethataprimafacieshowingissufficientandthatonlyslight
proofoftherelationshipisrequired. 31Finally,itmaynotbeamiss
toconsiderasinthenatureofcircumstantialevidencethefact
thatboththedeclarantandtheclaimants,whoarethesubjectof
thedeclaration,bearthesurnameDezoller.32
______________
29
Op.cit.,128.
30
Thisparochialrecordisanofficialdocument,havingbeen
madepriortothepassageofG.O.No.68andActNo.190(U.S.vs.
Evangelista,29Phil.215[1915],andcasesthereincited).
31
Fulkerson,etal.vs.Holmes,etal.,117U.S.389.
32
Francisco,RulesofCourt,Vol.7,1973ed.,494.
599
VOL.276,JULY31,1997 599
Tisonvs.CourtofAppeals
III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the
mannerbywhichtheestateofthedecedentshallbedividedin
thiscase,towit:
Art.975.Whenchildrenofoneormorebrothersorsistersofthe
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation,iftheysurvivewiththeirunclesoraunts.Butif
theyalonesurvive,theyshallinheritinequalportions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and
ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall
inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of
brothersand sisters, nephewsand nieces, shouldtherebe any,
underArticle1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survivewiththewidoworwidower,thelattershallbeentitledto
onehalfoftheinheritanceandthebrothersandsistersortheir
childrentotheotherhalf.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, onehalf of the
subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving
spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal
partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the
remaininghalfshallbeequallydividedbetweenthewidowerand
hereinpetitionerswhoareentitledtojointlyinheritintheirown
right.Hence,MartinGuerrerocouldonlyvalidlyalienatehistotal
undivided threefourths (3/4) share in the entire property to
herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private
respondent are deemed coowners of the property covered by
TransferCertificateofTitleNo.374012intheproportionofan
undividedonefourth(1/4)andthreefourths(3/4)sharethereof,
respectively.
All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the
demurrertoplaintiffsevidenceshouldhavebeen,asitishereby,
denied.Nonetheless,privaterespondentmaynolongerbeallowed
topresentevidencebyreasonofthemandateunderSection1of
revisedRule3oftheRulesofCourtwhichprovidesthatifthe
motionisgrantedbutonappealtheorderofdismissalisreversed
he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.33WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are
declaredcoownersofthesubjectpropertywithanundividedone
fourth(1/4)andthreefourths(3/4)sharetherein,respectively.
SOORDERED.
Romero,PunoandMendoza,JJ.,concur.
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 495
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
G.R.No.124853.February24,1998.*
FRANCISCOL.JISON,petitioner,vs.COURTOFAPPEALSand
MONINAJISON,respondents.
Courts;Appeals;Whileitisageneralrulethatfactualissues
arenotwithintheprovinceoftheSupremeCourt,suchruledoes
notapplywherethereareconflictingfindingsoffactsofthetrial
courtandtheCourtofAppeals.Inissueiswhetherornotpublic
respondentCourtofAppealscommittedreversibleerror,which,
inthisinstance,necessitatesaninquiryintothefacts.Whileasa
general rule, factual issues are not within the province of this
Court,nevertheless,inlightoftheconflictingfindingsoffactsof
thetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppeals,thiscasefallsunderan
exceptiontothisrule.
ParentandChild;PaternityandFiliation;FamilyCode;The
FamilyCodehasretroactiveeffectunlesstherebeimpairmentof
vested rights.Beforeaddressing themeritsof thecontroversy,
wefirstdisposeofpreliminarymattersrelatingtotheapplicable
law and the guiding principles in paternity suits. As to the
former, plainly, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive
OrderNo.209)governsthepresentcontroversy.Ascorrectlycited
by the Court of Appeals,Uyguangcoserved as a judicial
confirmation of Article 256 of the Family Code regarding its
retroactiveeffectunlessthere
_______________
*
FIRSTDIVISION.
496
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
96
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
be impairment of vested rights, which does not hold true
here,itappearingthatneithertheputativeparentnorthechild
has passed away and the former having actually resisted the
lattersclaimbelow.
Same;Same;IllegitimateChildren;Evidence;Forthesuccess
of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second
paragraphofArt. 172oftheFamilyCode, ahighstandardof
proof is requiredspecifically, to prove open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposedfathertoconsiderthechildashis,bycontinuousand
clearmanifestationsofparentalaffectionandcare,whichcannot
be attributed to pure charity.For the success of an action to
establishillegitimatefiliationunderthesecondparagraph,which
MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the evidence
mentionedinthefirst paragraph, a highstandard of proof is
required.Specifically,toproveopenandcontinuouspossessionof
thestatusofanillegitimatechild,theremustbeevidenceofthe
manifestationofthepermanentintentionofthesupposedfather
to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear
manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributedtopurecharity.Suchacts mustbeofsuchanature
thattheyrevealnotonlytheconvictionofpaternity,butalsothe
apparentdesiretohaveandtreatthechildassuchinallrelations
in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously. By
continuousismeantuninterruptedandconsistent,butdoesnot
requireanyparticularlengthoftime.
Same;Same;Evidence;RationalefortheHighStandardof
Proof Requirement in Filiation Proceedings.The foregoing
standardofproofrequiredtoestablishonesfiliationisfounded
on theprinciple thatanorderforrecognitionandsupportmay
createanunwholesomeatmosphereormaybeanirritantinthe
family or lives of the parties, so that it mustbe issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence.
Same;Same;Same;Words and Phrases;Quantum of
Evidence;The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to
evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that
which is offered in opposition to itat bottom, it means
probabilityoftruth.Theforegoingdiscussion,however,mustbe
situated within the general rules on evidence, in light of the
burdenofproofincivilcases,i.e.,prepon
497
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
derance of evidence, and the shifting of the burden of
evidenceinsuchcases.Simplyput,hewhoallegestheaffirmative
oftheissuehastheburdenofproof,andupontheplaintiffina
civilcase,theburdenofproofneverparts.However,inthecourse
oftrialinacivilcase,onceplaintiffmakesoutaprimafaciecase
inhisfavor,thedutyortheburdenofevidenceshiftstodefendant
to controvert plaintiffsprima faciecase, otherwise, a verdict
mustbereturnedinfavorofplaintiff.Moreover,incivilcases,the
partyhavingtheburdenofproofmustproduceapreponderance
ofevidencethereon,withplaintiffhavingtorelyonthestrength
ofhisownevidenceandnotupontheweaknessofthedefendants.
The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence
which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is
offeredinoppositiontoit;atbottom,itmeansprobabilityoftruth.
Same;Same;Same;Unlawful intercourse will not be
presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for such
indulgence;Akintothecrimeofrapewhere,inmostinstances,the
onlywitnessestothefelonyaretheparticipantsinthesexualact
themselves,indecidingpaternitysuits,theissueofwhethersexual
intercourseactuallyoccurredinevitablyredoundstothevictims
or mothers word, as against the accuseds or putative fathers
protestations.FRANCISCOs arguments in support of his first
assigned error deserve scant consideration. While it has been
observedthatunlawfulintercoursewillnotbepresumedmerely
fromproof ofanopportunityforsuch indulgence,this does not
favor FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most
instances,theonlywitnessestothefelonyaretheparticipantsin
thesexualactthemselves,indecidingpaternitysuits,theissueof
whethersexualintercourseactuallyoccurredinevitablyredounds
497 to the victims or mothers word, as against the accuseds or
putative fathers protestations. In the instant case, MONINAs
mothercouldnolongertestifyastothefactofintercourse,asshe
had,unfortunately,passedawaylongbeforetheinstitutionofthe
complaintforrecognition.ButthisdidnotmeanthatMONINA
couldnolongerproveherfiliation.Thefactofherbirthandher
parentage may be established by evidence other than the
testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is
whetherMONINAsevidenceiscoherent,logicalandnatural.
Same;Same;Same;Birth Certificates;Baptismal
Certificates;Acertificateoflivebirthpurportedlyidentifyingthe
putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue of
paternity,whenthereisno
 498
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
98
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparationofsaidcertificates,andtheLocalCivilRegistraris
devoidofauthoritytorecordthepaternityofanillegitimatechild
upontheinformationofathirdperson;Lackofparticipationby
theputativefatherinthepreparationofthebaptismalcertificates
andschoolrecordsrenderssuchdocumentsincompetenttoprove
paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the
administration of the sacrament of baptism on the date so
specified.MONINAsrelianceonthecertificationissuedbythe
Local Civil Registrar concerning her birth (Exhs. E and F) is
clearly misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidenceastotheissueofpaternity,whenthereisnoshowing
that theputative father had a handin the preparation of said
certificates,andtheLocalCivilRegistrarisdevoidofauthorityto
recordthepaternityofanillegitimatechildupontheinformation
of a third person. Simply put, if the alleged father did not
interveneinthebirthcertificate,e.g.,supplyingtheinformation
himself,theinscriptionofhisnamebythemotherordoctoror
registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar
without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary
acknowledgment on the latters part. In like manner,
FRANCISCOs lack of participation in the preparation of the
baptismalcertificates(Exhs.CandD)andschoolrecords(Exhs.Z
andAA)rendersthesedocumentsincompetenttoprovepaternity,
theformerbeingcompetentmerelytoprovetheadministrationof
the sacrament of baptism on the date so specified. However,
despite the inadmissibility of the school recordsper seto prove
paternity,theymaybeadmittedaspartofMONINAstestimony
to corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO spent for her
education.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Same;Wherethebirthcertificate
andthebaptismalcertificateareperseinadmissibleinevidence
as proof of filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantialevidencetoprovethesame.Welikewisedisagree
withtherulingoftheCourtofAppealsthatthecertificatesissued
bytheLocalCivilRegistrarandthebaptismalcertificatesmaybe
taken as circumstantial evidence to prove MONINAs filiation.
Since they areper seinadmissible in evidence as proof of such
filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial
evidencetoprovethesame.
Same;Same;Same;Evidence of Pedigree;Words and
Phrases;Family Possessions, Explained;Statutory
Construction;Ejusdem
499
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 499
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
Generis;Theenumerationcontainedinthesecondportionof
Rule 130,Section40,inlightof the ruleof ejusdemgeneris, is
limited to objects which are commonly known as family
possessions,orthosearticleswhichrepresent,ineffect,afamilys
jointstatementofitsbeliefastothepedigreeofaperson.Wehold
thatthescopeoftheenumerationcontainedinthesecondportion
ofthisprovision,inlightoftheruleofejusdemgeneris,islimited
toobjectswhicharecommonlyknownasfamilypossessions,or
thosearticleswhichrepresent,ineffect,afamilysjointstatement
of its belief as to the pedigree of a person. These have been
described as objects openly exhibited and well known to the
family,orthosewhich,ifpreservedinafamily,mayberegarded
as giving a family tradition. Other examples of these objects
which are regarded as reflective of a familys reputation or
tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones,
monumentsorcoffinplates.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Same;Common Reputation,
Explained;Itisthegeneralrepute,thecommonreputationinthe
family,andnotthecommonreputationincommunity,thatisa
materialelementofevidencegoingtoestablishpedigree.Plainly
then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting
familypossessionsasdiscussedabove,maynotbeadmittedon
thebasisofRule130,Section40.Neithermaytheseexhibitsbe
admittedonthebasisofRule130,Section41regardingcommon
reputation, it having been observed that: [T]he weight of
authorityappearstobeinfavorofthetheorythatitisthegeneral
repute,thecommonreputationinthefamily,andnotthecommon
reputationincommunity,thatisamaterialelementofevidence
goingtoestablishpedigree.xxx[Thus]mattersofpedigreemay
beprovedbyreputationinthefamily,andnotbyreputationin
the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in
questionismarriagewhichmaybeprovedbycommonreputation
inthecommunity.
Same;Same;Same;Notarial Law;Quantum
Evidence;Thestandardtocontradictanotarialdocumentisclear
andconvincingevidence, i.e.,morethanmerelypreponderant.
Indeed, if MONINA were truly not FRANCISCOs illegitimate
daughter,itwouldhavebeenunnecessaryforhimtohavegoneto
suchgreatlengthsinorderthatMONINAdenounceherfiliation.
For as clearly established before the trial court and properly
appreciatedbytheCourtofAppeals,MONINAhadresignedfrom
Miller&Cruzfive(5)monthspriortotheexecutionofthesworn
statementinquestion,hence
500
5 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
00
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
negatingFRANCISCOstheoryoftheneedtoquashrumors
circulating within Miller & Cruz regarding the identity of
MONINAs father. Hence, coupled with the assessment of the
credibility of the testimonial evidence of the parties discussed
above, it is evident that the standard to contradict a notarial
document,i.e., clear and convincing evidence and more than
merelypreponderant,hasbeenmetbyMONINA.
Same;Same;Same;Denials;Perjurers usually confine
themselves to theincidentsimmediatelyrelated to theprincipal
fact about which they testify, and when asked about collateral
factsbywhichtheirtruthfulnesscouldbetested,theiranswersnot
infrequently take the stereotyped form of such expressions as I
dont know or I dont remember.Two (2) glaring points in
FRANCISCOs defense beg to be addressed: First, that his
testimony was comprised of mere denials, rife with bare,
unsubstantiatedresponsessuchasThatisnottrue,Idonot
believethat,or None thatI know. In declining then to lend
of credence to FRANCISCOs testimony, we resort to a guiding
principle in adjudging the credibility of a witness and the
truthfulnessofhisstatements,laiddownasearlyas1921:The
experience of courts and the general observation of humanity
teachusthatthenaturallimitationsofourinventivefacultiesare
suchthatifawitnessundertakestofabricateanddeliverincourt
a false narrative containing numerous details, he is almost
certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements
whichcanbereadilyrefuted,ortoexposeinhisdemeanorthe
falsity of his message. For this reason it will be found that
perjurersusuallyconfinethemselvestotheincidentsimmediately
relatedtotheprincipalfactaboutwhichtheytestify,andwhen
askedaboutcollateralfactsbywhichtheirtruthfulnesscouldbe
tested,theiranswersnotinfrequentlytakethestereotypedform
ofsuchexpressionsasIdontknoworIdontremember.
Laches;Elements;Doctrine of Stale Demands.The last
assigned errorconcerninglacheslikewise failsto convince. The
essentialelementsoflachesare: (1) conduct on the part ofthe
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in
assertingthecomplainantsrights,thecomplainanthavinghad
knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as having been
affordedanopportunitytoinstituteasuit;(3)lackofknowledge
ornoticeonthepartofthedefendantthatthecomplaintwould
asserttherightinwhichhebaseshis
501
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
suit;and(4)injuryorprejudicetothedefendantintheevent
relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held
barred.Thelastelementistheoriginofthedoctrinethatstale
demandsapplyonlywherebyreasonofthelapseoftimeitwould
beinequitabletoallowapartytoenforcehislegalrights.
Same;Lachesisbasedupongroundsofpublicpolicywhich
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims,andisprincipallyaquestionoftheinequityorunfairness
of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.As
FRANCISCO set up laches as an affirmative defense, it was
incumbent upon him to prove the existence of its elements.
However, he only succeeded in showing MONINAs delay in
asserting her claim, but miserably failed to prove the last
element.Inanyevent,itmustbestressedthatlachesisbased
upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society,thediscouragementofstaleclaims,andisprincipallya
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claimtobeenforcedorasserted.Thereisnoabsoluteruleasto
whatconstituteslaches;eachcaseistobedeterminedaccording
to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is
addressedtothesounddiscretionofthecourt,andsinceitisan
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to
perpetuate fraud and injustice. Since the instant case involves
paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, MONINA filed her
actionwellwithintheperiodgrantedherbyapositiveprovision
of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would
clearlybeinequitableandunjust.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
501 Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Salonga,Hernandez&Mendozaforpetitioner.
ApelesL.Padillaforprivaterespondent.
DAVIDE,JR.,J.:
ThisisapetitionforreviewunderRule45oftheRulesofCourtof
the27April1995decisionoftheCourtofAppeals
502
502 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
(CA) inCAG.R. CV No. 328601which reversed the decision of
Branch24oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofIloiloCityinCivil
Case No. 16373.2The latter dismissed the complaint of private
respondentMoninaJison(hereafterMONINA)forrecognitionas
an illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco Jison (hereafter
FRANCISCO).
InissueiswhetherornotpublicrespondentCourtofAppeals
committedreversibleerror,which,inthisinstance,necessitates
aninquiryintothefacts.Whileasageneralrule,factualissues
arenotwithintheprovinceofthisCourt,nevertheless,inlightof
theconflictingfindingsoffactsofthetrialcourtandtheCourtof
Appeals,thiscasefallsunderanexceptiontothisrule.3
In her complaint4filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985,
MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a
certainLiliaLopezJisonsince1940.Attheendof1945orthe
startof1946,however,FRANCISCOimpregnatedEsperanzaF.
Amolar(whowasthenemployedasthenannyofFRANCISCOs
daughter,Lourdes).Asaresult,MONINAwasbornon6August
1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the
continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of
FRANCISCObyhisactsandthatofhisfamily.MONINAfurther
alleged that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her
education, such that she obtained a Masters degree, became a
certifiedpublicaccountant(CPA)andeventually,aCentralBank
examiner.InviewofFRANCISCOsrefusaltoexpresslyrecognize
her,MONINAprayedforajudicialdeclarationofherillegitimate
statusandthatFRANCISCOsupportandtreatherassuch.
_______________
1
Rollo, 6580, per Jacinto, G.A.,J., withPurisima, F.P. and
Montoya,S.A.,JJ.,concurring.
2
Rollo,8491,perJudgeNorbertoE.Devera,Jr.
3
SeeGeagonia v. Court of Appeals,241 SCRA 152, 160
[1995];ConsolidatedBankandTrustCorporation(Solidbank)v.
CA,246 SCRA 193, 198 [1995]; andSuntay v. Court of
Appeals,251SCRA430,446[1995].
4
OriginalRecord(OR),vol.1,13.
503
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 503
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
Inhisanswer, FRANCISCOallegedthathecouldnothavehad
5
sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period
specifiedinthecomplaintasshehadceasedtobeinhisemployas
earlyas1944,anddidnotknowofherwhereaboutssincethen;
further,heneverrecognizedMONINA,expresslyorimpliedly,as
his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special defenses,
FRANCISCOcontendedthatMONINAhadnorightorcauseof
actionagainsthimandthatheractionwasbarredbyestoppel,
laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the
complaintandanawardofdamagesduetothemaliciousfilingof
thecomplaint.
AfterMONINAfiledherreply,6pretrialwasconductedwhere
thepartiesstipulatedonthefollowingissues:
1. 1.Did Francisco Jison have any sexual relation[s] with
EsperanzaAm[o]larabouttheendof1945orthestartof
1946?
2. 2.IsMoninaJisontherecognizedillegitimatedaughterof
FranciscoJisonbythelattersownactsandthoseofhis
family?
3. 3.IsMoninaJisonbarredfrominstitutingorprosecuting
the present action by estoppel, laches and/or
prescription?
 4. 4.Damages.7
Attrialonthemerits,MONINApresentedatotalofeleven(11)
witnesses, namely: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela
Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez,
Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador
ZavarizandLopeAmolar.
RubenCastellanes,Sr.,a63yearoldresidentofIloiloCity,
testifiedthathehadworkedforFRANCISCOforatotalofsix(6)
yearsatNellyGarden,FRANCISCOsIloiloresidence.Towards
theendoftheJapaneseoccupation,FRANCISCOs
_______________
5
Id.,1013.
6
Id.,1416.
7
OR,vol.1,39.
504
504 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
wife suffered a miscarriage or abortion, thereby depriving
FRANCISCO of consortium; thereafter, FRANCISCOs wife
managedanightclubonthegroundfloorofNellyGardenwhich
operateddailyfrom6:00p.m.till3:00a.m.ofthefollowingday,
therebyallowingFRANCISCOfreeaccesstoMONINAsmother,
EsperanzaAmolar,whowasnicknamedPansay.
Adela Casabuena, a 61year old farmer, testified that she
served as theyaya(nanny) of Lourdes from July 1946 up to
February 1947. AlthoughPansayhad left Nelly Garden two (2)
weeks before Adela started working for the
Jisons,Pansayreturned sometime in September 1946, or about
onemonthaftershegavebirthtoMONINA,toaskFRANCISCO
for support. As a result,Pansayand Lilia Jison, FRANCISCOs
wife, quarreled in the living room, and in the course
thereof,PansayclaimedthatFRANCISCOwasthefatherofher
baby.Towhich,Liliareplied:Ididnottellyoutomakethatbaby
soitisyourfault.Duringthequarrelwhichlastedfrom10:30till
11:00 a.m., FRANCISCO was supposedly inside the house
listening.
Arsenio Duatin, a 77year old retired laborer, testified that
from1947until1977,heworkedasFRANCISCOshouseboyat
the latters house on 12th Street, Capitol Subdivision, Bacolod
City. Arsenio met MONINA in 1967, when Felipe Lagarto, the
bookkeeper at Nelly Garden, informed Arsenio that MONINA,
FRANCISCOs daughter, would arrive at Bacolod City with a
letterofintroductionfromLagarto.
Initially, Arsenio identified seven (7) blackandwhite
photographs(Exhs.X5toX11)ofMONINA, 8andashepaidfor
thetelephonebills,helikewiseidentifiedsix(6)telephonecards
(Exhs.GtoL).ArseniothendeclaredthatwhenMON
_______________
8
ExhibitX5showedMONINAstandingatthemainentrance
ofFRANCISCOshouse;ExhibitX9showedMONINAsbedroom
in FRANCISCOs house; and Exhibit X11 showed MONINA
standing on the lawn of FRANCISCOs house. These exhibits
were offered to prove that MONINA had free use of
FRANCISCOshouseinBacolodCityandphonethereat.
505
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 505
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
INA arrived in Bacolod City, she introduced herself to him as
FRANCISCOsdaughter.ShestayedatFRANCISCOshouse,but
when the latter and his wife would come over, Arsenio would
concealthepresenceofMONINAbecauseMrs.Jisondidnotlike
to see her face. Once, Arsenio hid MONINA in the house of
FRANCISCOs sister, Mrs. Luisa Jison Alano, in Silay City;
another time, at the residence of FRANCISCOs cousin, Mrs.
ConchaLopezCuaycong.Finally,Arseniodeclaredthatthelast
timehesawMONINAwaswhensheleftforManila,afterhaving
finishedherschoolingatLaSalleCollegeinBacolodCity.
On redirect and upon questions by the court, Arsenio
disclosedthatitwasFRANCISCOwhoinstructedthatMONINA
behiddenwheneverFRANCISCOandhiswifewerearound;that
although FRANCISCO and MONINA saw each other at the
Bacolod house only once, they called each other through long
distance,andthatMONINAaddressedFRANCISCOasDaddy
during their lone meeting at the Bacolod house and were
affectionate to each other. Arsenio likewise declared that
MONINAstayedatFRANCISCOsBacolodhousetwice:firstfora
month,thenforaboutaweekthesecondtime.Onbothoccasions,
however,FRANCISCOandhiswifewereabroad.Finally,Arsenio
recalled that FRANCISCO likewise bade Arsenio to treat
MONINAlikehis(FRANCISCOs)otherdaughters.
Thetestimony ofZafiroLedesma, a74yearold banker and
formermayorofIloiloCity,initiallytouchedonhowheandhis
wife were related to FRANCISCO, FRANCISCOs wife and
MONINA. Zafiro first identified Exhibit R, a diagram of the
familytreesoftheJisonandLopezfamilies,whichshowedthat
former VicePresident Fernando Lopez was the first cousin of
FRANCISCOswife,thentoldthecourtthatthefamilyofVice
President Lopez treated MONINA very well because she is
consideredarelativexxxbyreputation,byactualperception.
Zafiro likewise identified Exhibits X13 to X18, photographs
takenatthe14April1985birthdaycelebrationofMrs.Fernando
Lopez,whichshowedMONINAwith
506
506 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
theformerVicePresidentandothermembersoftheLopezfamily.
Zafiro further testifiedthat whileMONINA lived with Mrs.
Cuaycong,thelatterpaidforsomeofMONINAsschoolneedsand
even asked MONINA to work in a hospital owned by Mrs.
Cuaycong;andthatanotherfirstcousinofFRANCISCOswife,a
certain RemediosLopez Franco, likewisehelpedMONINA with
her studies and problems, and even attended MONINAs
graduation in 1978 when she obtained a masteral degree in
Business Administration, as evidenced by another photograph
(Exh. X12). Moreover, upon Remedios recommendation,
MONINA was employed as a secretary at Merchant Financing
Company,whichwasmanagedbyacertainDantheaLopez,the
wife of another first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife, and among
whose directors were Zafiro himself, his wife and Dantheas
husband.Inclosing,ZafiroidentifiedMONINAsSocialSecurity
Record(Exh.W),whichwassignedbyDantheaasemployerand
whereMONINAdesignatedRemediosasthebeneficiary.
Danthea Lopez, a 58year old housekeeper, declared that
FRANCISCO was the first cousin of her husband, Eusebio D.
Lopez;andthatshecametoknowMONINAinthelatterpartof
1965 when Remedios Franco recommended MONINA for
employmentatMerchantFinancingCo.,whichDantheamanaged
atthattime.RemediosintroducedMONINAtoDantheaasbeing
reputedly the daughter of Mr. Frank Jison; and on several
occasions thereafter, Remedios made Danthea and the latters
husbandunderstandthatMONINAwasreputedlythedaughter
of [FRANCISCO]. While MONINA worked at Merchant
Financing, Danthea knew that MONINA lived with Remedios;
however,inthelatterpartof1966,asRemediosleftforManila
and MONINA was still studying at San Agustin University,
Danthea and her husband invited MONINA to live with them.
DuringMONINAs6monthstaywiththem,shewasnotcharged
forboardandlodgingandwastreatedasarelative,notamere
employee, all owing to what Remedios had said regarding
MONINAsfiliation.AsDantheaunderstood,MONINAresigned
from
507
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 507
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
MerchantFinancingasshewascalledbyMrs.Cuaycong,afirst
cousinofDantheashusbandwholivedinBacolodCity.
Romeo Bilbao, a 43year old seaman, testified that he had
workedforFRANCISCOfrom1969upto1980atNellyGardenin
various capacities: as a procurement officer, hacienda overseer
and, later, as hacienda administrator. Sometime in May, 1971,
Romeo saw and heard MONINA ask her Daddy (meaning
FRANCISCO) for the money he promised to give her, but
FRANCISCOansweredthathedidnothavethemoneytogive,
thentoldMONINAtogoseeMr.JoseCruzinBacolodCity.Then
inthemiddleofSeptemberthatyear,FRANCISCOtoldRomeoto
pickupMr.CruzattheIloilopierandbringhimtotheofficeof
Atty. Benjamin Tirol. At said office, Atty. Tirol, Mr. Cruz and
MONINAenteredaroomwhileRomeowaitedoutside.Whenthey
cameout,Atty.TirolhadpapersforMONINAtosign,butshe
refused. Atty. Tirol said that a check would be released to
MONINAifshesignedthepapers,soMONINAacceded,although
Atty.TirolintendednottogiveMONINAacopyofthedocument
shesigned.Thereafter,Mr.CruzgaveMONINAacheck(Exh.Q),
thenMONINAgrabbedacopyofthedocumentshesignedand
ranoutside.RomeothenbroughtMr.CruztoNellyGarden.Asto
his motive for testifying, Romeo stated that he wanted to help
MONINAberecognizedasFRANCISCOSdaughter.
RudyTingson,a45yearoldantiquedealer,testifiedthatin
19631964,hewasemployedbyFRANCISCOswifeattheBaguio
MilitaryInstituteinBaguioCity;thenin1965,Rudyworkedat
FRANCISCOs office at Nelly Garden recording hacienda
expenses,typingvouchersandofficepapers,and,attimes,acting
as paymaster for the haciendas. From the nature of his work,
Rudy knew the persons receiving money from FRANCISCOs
office, andclearlyrememberedthatin1965,aspartofhisjob,
Rudy gave MONINA her allowance from FRANCISCO four (4)
times, upon instructions of a certain Mr. Lagarto to give
MONINA P15.00 a month. Rudy likewise recalled that hefirst
metMONINAin1965,andthatshewouldgotoNellyGarden
wheneverFRANCISCOswife
508
508 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
was not around. On some of these occasions, MONINA would
speak with and address FRANCISCO as Daddy, without
objection from FRANCISCO. In fact, in 1965, Rudy saw
FRANCISCOgiveMONINAmoneythrice.Rudyfurtherdeclared
that in April 1965, FRANCISCOs office paid P250.00 to
FunerariaBernalforthefuneralexpensesofMONINAsmother.
Finally,astoRudysmotivesfortestifying,hetoldthecourtthat
hesimplywantedtohelpbringoutthetruthandnothingbutthe
truth, and that MONINAs filiation was common knowledge
amongthepeopleintheofficeatNellyGarden.
On redirect, Rudy declared that the moneys given by
FRANCISCOsofficetoMONINAwerenotreflectedinthebooks
oftheoffice, butwerekeptinaseparatebook,asMr.Lagarto
explainedthatFRANCISCOswifeandchildrenshouldnotknow
[of]this.Rudyfurtherrevealedthatastothegardenmeetings
between FRANCISCO and MONINA, Rudy saw MONINA kiss
FRANCISCOonthecheekbothuponarrivingandbeforeleaving,
andFRANCISCOsreactionuponseeingherwastosmileandsay
in the Visayan dialect: Kamusta ka iha? (How are you,
daughter?);andthatMONINAwasfreetogoinsidethehouseas
the household staff knew of her filiation, and that, sometimes,
MONINAwouldjointhemforlunch.
Alfredo Baylosis, a 62year old retired accountant, testified
thatheworkedforFRANCISCOatCentralSantosLopezinIloilo
from1951upto1961,thenatNellyGardenfrom1961until1972.
AlfredofirstservedFRANCISCOasabookkeeper,thenwhenMr.
Lagarto died in 1967 or 1969, Alfredo replaced Mr. Lagarto as
officemanager.
AlfredoknewMONINAsince1961assheusedtogotoNelly
Garden to claim her P15.00 monthly allowance given upon
FRANCISCOs standing order. Alfredo further declared that
MONINAsfiliationwasprettywellknownintheoffice;thathe
hadseenMONINAandFRANCISCOgofromthemainbuilding
to the office, with FRANCISCOs arm on MONINAs shoulder;
andthattheofficepaidfortheburialexpensesofPansay,butthis
wasnotrecordedinthebooksin
509
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
ordertohideitfromFRANCISCOswife.Alfredoalsodisclosed
thatthedisbursementsforMONINAsallowancestartedin1961
and were recorded in a separate cash book. In 1967, the
allowances ceased when MONINA stopped schooling and was
employedinBacolodCitywithMiller,Cruz&Co.,whichserved
asFRANCISCOsaccountantauditor.Once,whenAlfredowentto
theofficesofMiller,Cruz&Co.toseethemanager,Mr.Atienza,
and arrange for the preparation of FRANCISCOs income tax
return,AlfredochanceduponMONINA.WhenAlfredoaskedher
how she came to work there, she answered that her Daddy,
FRANCISCO,recommendedher,afactconfirmedbyMr.Atienza.
Alfredo then claimed that Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller,
Cruz&Co.,wasthemosttrustedmanofFRANCISCO.
DominadorSavariz,a55yearoldcaretaker,testifiedthathe
worked as FRANCISCOs houseboy at Nelly Garden from
November1953upto1965.OnemorninginApril1954,MONINA
and her motherPansaywent to Nelly Garden and spoke with
FRANCISCOforaboutanhour,duringwhichtime,Dominador
wasvacuumingthecarpetaboutsix(6)toseven(7)metersaway.
Due to the noise of the vacuum cleaner, FRANCISCO and
MONINAspokeinloudvoices,thusDominadoroverheardtheir
conversation. As FRANCISCO askedPansaywhy they
came,Pansayansweredthattheycametoaskforthesustenance
of his child MONINA. FRANCISCO then touched MONINAs
head and asked: How are you Hija?, to which MONINA
answered: Good morning, Daddy. After FRANCISCO
toldPansayandMONINAtowait,hepulledsomethingfromhis
walletandsaidtoPansay:Iamgivingthisforthechild.
InMay1954,DominadorsawMONINAatMr.Lagartosoffice
where Dominador was to get the days expenses, while
MONINAwasclaimingherallowancefromMr.Diasnes.Thenext
509
month,DominadorsawMONINAatNellyGardenandheardin
theofficethatMONINAwastheretogetherallowancefromher
Daddy. In December 1960, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly
Garden, in the room of Don Vicente (father of FRANCISCOs
wife),wheresheaskedforaChristmasgift
510
510 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
and she was calling Don Vicente,Lolo(grandfather). At that
time,FRANCISCOandhiswifewerenotaround.Thensometime
in1961,whenDominadorwenttoMr.Lagartosofficetogetthe
marketing expenses, Dominador saw MONINA once more
claimingherallowance.
 Dominadorfurthertestified thatinFebruary 1966, after he
hadstopped working for FRANCISCO, DominadorwasatMrs.
Francosresidenceassherecommendedhimforemploymentwith
hersister,Mrs.ConchaCuaycong.There,hesawMONINA,who
was then about 15 years old, together with Mrs. Francos
daughterandson.Mrs.FrancopointedatMONINAandasked
DominadorifheknewwhoMONINAwas.Dominadoranswered
that MONINA was FRANCISCOs daughter withPansay, and
thenMrs.FrancoremarkedthatMONINAwasstayingwithher
(Mrs.Franco)andthatshewassendingMONINAtoschoolatthe
UniversityofSanAgustin.
LopeAmolar,a50yearoldresidentofDingle,Iloilo,andthe
youngerbrotherofEsperanzaAmolar(Pansay),testifiedthathe
workedforFRANCISCOasahouseboyfromMarchtoNovember
1945 at Nelly Garden. Thereafter, FRANCISCO sent Lope to
work at Elena Apartments in Manila. By November
1945,PansaywasalsoworkingatElenaApartments,whereshe
revealedtoLopethatFRANCISCOimpregnatedher.Lopethen
confrontedFRANCISCO,whotoldLopedontgethurtanddont
cause any trouble, because I am willing to support yourInday
Pansayand my child. Three (3) days after this confrontation,
Lope asked for and received permission from FRANCISCO to
resignbecausehe(Lope)washurt.
On21October1986,MONINAherselftookthewitnessstand.
Atthattime,shewas40yearsoldandaCentralBankExaminer.
SheaffirmedthatasevidencedbycertificationsfromtheOfficeof
the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and baptismal
certificates(Exhs.CandD),shewasbornon6August1946in
Barangay Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to Esperanza Amolar (who
passedawayon20April1965)and
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VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
FRANCISCO.9MONINA first studied at Sagrado where she
stayedasaboarder.WhileatSagradofrom1952until1955(upto
Grade4),herfather,FRANCISCO,paidforhertuitionfeesand
other school expenses. She either received the money from
FRANCISCO or from Mr. Lagarto, or saw FRANCISCO give
moneytohermother,orMr.LagartowouldpaySagradodirectly.
After Sagrado, MONINA studied in different schools, 10but
FRANCISCOcontinuouslyansweredforherschooling.
Forhercollegeeducation,MONINAenrolledattheUniversity
ofIloilo,butshelaterdroppedduetoanaccidentwhichrequired
aweekshospitalization.AlthoughFRANCISCOpaidforpartof
the hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered most of
them. In 1963, she enrolled at the University of San Agustin,
where she stayed with Mrs. Franco who paid for MONINAs
tuition fees. However, expenses for books, school supplies,
uniformsandthelikewereshoulderedbyFRANCISCO.Atthe
startofeachsemester,MONINAwouldshowFRANCISCOthat
shewasenrolled,thenhewouldaskhertocanvassprices,then
giveherthemoneysheneeded.Afterfinishingtwo(2)semesters
atUniversityofSanAgustin,asevidencedbyhertranscriptof
records (Exh. Z showing that FRANCISCO was listed as
Parent/Guardian [Exh. Z1]), she transferred to De Paul
College,justinfrontofMrs.Francoshouse,andstudiedthere
forayear.Thereafter,MONINAenrolledatWesternInstituteof
Technology (WIT), where she obtained a bachelors degree in
CommerceinApril1967.Duringhersenioryear,shestayedwith
Eusebio and Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said
couple.ShepassedtheCPAboardexamsin1974,andtookupan
M.B.A.atDeLaSalleUniversityasevidencedbyhertran
_______________
511
 9
SpelledEsperanzaAmadorandFrankHesononExhibits
EandF,andFranqueJisononExhibitD.
10
Iloilo Central Elementary for Grade 5; Rizal Elementary
SchoolforGrade6;NegrosOccidentalProvincialHighSchoolup
toherjunioryearinhighschool;andIloiloProvincialHighSchool
forhersenioryearinhighschool.
512
512 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
script (Exh. AA), wherein FRANCISCO was likewise listed as
Guardian(Exhs.AA1andAA2).
MONINAenumeratedthedifferentmembersofthehousehold
staff at Nelly Garden, to wit: Luz, the household cook; the
houseboys Silvestre and Doming; the housemaid Natang;
theyayaoftheadoptedtriplets, Deling;theyayaofLoloVicente,
Adelina;andothers.MONINAlikewiseenumeratedthemembers
of the office staff (Messrs. Baylosis, Lagarto, Tingson, Diasnes,
Jalandoni,Supertisioso,Doroy,andothers),andidentifiedthem
fromaphotographmarkedasExhibitX2.Shethencorroborated
the prior testimony regarding her employment at Merchant
FinancingCo.,andherhavinglivedatHotelKahirupandatMrs.
Cuaycongs residence in Bacolod City, while working at the
hospitalownedbyMrs.Cuaycong.
MONINA further testified that in March 1968, she went to
ManilaandmetFRANCISCOatElenaApartmentsatthecorner
ofRomeroandSalasStreets,Ermita.ShetoldFRANCISCOthat
shewasgoingforavacationinBaguioCitywithMrs.Francos
mother,withwhomshestayeduptoJune1968.Uponherreturn
fromBaguioCity,MONINAtoldFRANCISCOthatshewantedto
work,sothelatterarrangedforheremploymentatMiller&Cruz
inBacolodCity.MONINAwenttoBacolodCity,wasinterviewed
byMr.JoseCruz,apartneratMiller&Cruz,whotoldhershe
would start working first week of September,sansexamination.
She resigned from Miller & Cruz in 1971 and lived with Mrs.
CuaycongatherForbesParkresidenceinMakati.MONINAwent
toseeFRANCISCO,toldhimthatsheresignedandaskedhimfor
moneytogotoSpain,butFRANCISCOrefusedasshecouldnot
speak Spanish and would not be able find a job. The two
quarreledandFRANCISCOorderedahelpertosendMONINA
outofthehouse.Intheprocess,MONINAbrokemanyglassesat
thepantryandcutherhand,afterwhich,FRANCISCOhugged
her,gavehermedicine,calmedherdown,askedhertoreturnto
BacolodCityandpromisedthathewouldgiveherthemoney.
MONINAreturnedtoBacolodCitybyplane,usingaFilipinas
OrientAirwaysplaneticket(Exh.M)whichFRANCISCO
513
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 513
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
gave.ShecalledMr.Cruz,thenAtty.Tirol,asinstructedbyMr.
Cruz.ThesecallswereevidencedbyPLDTlongdistancetollcards
(Exhs. GtoL), with annotations attheback reading: charged
andpaidunderthenameofFrankL.Jisonandweresignedby
ArsenioDuatin(Exhs.G1toL1).PLDTissuedacertificationas
to the veracity of the contents of the toll cards (Exh. BB).
Likewise introduced in evidence was a letter of introduction
prepared by Mr. Cruz addressed to Atty. Tirol, on MONINAs
behalf(Exh.N).
MONINAalsodeclaredthatAtty.Tirolthentoldherthatshe
wouldhavetogotoIloiloandsignacertainaffidavit,beforeMr.
CruzwouldturnoverthemoneypromisedbyFRANCISCO.She
wenttoAtty.TirolsofficeinIloilo,butaftergoingoverthedraft
oftheaffidavit,refusedtosignitasitstatedthatshewasnot
FRANCISCOsdaughter.Sheexplainedthatallshehadagreed
with FRANCISCO was that he would pay for her fare to go
abroad,andthatsinceshewasalittlegirl,sheknewabouther
illegitimacy.Shestartedcrying,beggedAtty.Tiroltochangethe
affidavit,towhichAtty.Tirolrespondedthathewasalsoafather
anddidnotwantthistohappentohischildrenastheycouldnot
be blamed for being brought into the world. She then wrote a
letter(Exh.O)toFRANCISCOandsentittothelattersForbes
Parkresidence(BauhiniaPlace)byJRScourierservice(Exhs.O
5 toO7). MONINA subsequently met FRANCISCO inBacolod
Citywheretheydiscussedtheaffidavitwhichsherefusedtosign.
FRANCISCOtoldherthattheaffidavitwasforhiswife,thatin
casesheheardaboutMONINAgoingabroad,theaffidavitwould
keepherpeace.
MONINAthennarratedthatthefirsttimeshewenttoAtty.
Tirols office, she was accompanied by one Atty. Fernando
Divinagracia,whoadvisedherthattheaffidavit(Exh.P) 11would
boomerang against FRANCISCO as it is contrary to law.
MONINA returned to Bacolod City, then met with Atty. Tirol
once more to reiterate her plea, but Atty. Tirol did not relent.
Thus,onthemorningof20or21September1971,
_______________
AlsomarkedasExhibit2forFRANCISCO.
11
514
514 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
shesignedtheaffidavitasshewasjoblessandneededthemoney
tosupportherselfandfinishherstudies.Inexchangeforsigning
the document, MONINA received a Bank of Asia check for
P15,000.00(Exh.Q),whichwaslessthantheP25,000.00which
FRANCISCO allegedly promisedto give. As Atty. Tirol seemed
hesitant to give her a copy of the affidavit after notarizing it,
MONINAmerelygrabbedacopyandimmediatelyleft.
MONINAthenpreparedtotravelabroad,forwhichpurpose,
sheprocuredlettersofintroduction(Exhs.SandT)fromacousin,
Mike Alano (son of FRANCISCOs elder sister Luisa); and an
uncle, EmilioJison(FRANCISCOselder brother), addressedto
anothercousin,BethJison(Emiliosdaughter),forBethtoassist
MONINA.ExhibitScontainedastatement(Exh.S1)expressly
recognizing that MONINA was FRANCISCOs daughter.
Ultimately though, MONINA decided not to go abroad, opting
insteadtospendtheproceedsoftheP15,000.00checkforherCPA
review, board exam and graduate studies. After finishing her
graduatestudies,sheagainplannedtotravelabroad,forwhich
reason, she obtained a letter of introduction from former Vice
President Fernando Lopez addressed to then United States
ConsulVernonMcAnnich(Exh.V).
As to other acts tending to show her filiation, MONINA
relatedthatononeoccasion,asFRANCISCOswifewasgoingto
arriveatthelattersBacolodCityresidence,FRANCISCOcalled
ArsenioDuatinandinstructedArseniotohideMONINA.Thus,
MONINA stayed with Mrs. Luisa Jison forthe duration of the
stayofFRANCISCOswife.MONINAalsoclaimedthatsheknew
Vice President Fernando Lopez and his wife, Mariquit, even
before starting to go to school. Thus, MONINA asked for a
recommendation letter (Exh. U) from Mrs. Mariquit Lopez for
possible employment with Mrs. Rosario Lopez Cooper, another
secondcousinofFRANCISCO.InExhibitU,Mrs.Lopezexpressly
recognized MONINA as FRANCISCOs daughter. As additional
proofofhercloserelationshipwiththefamilyofVicePresident
Lopez,MONINA
515
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 515
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
identifiedphotographstakenatabirthdaycelebrationon14April
1985.
 MONINAfinallyclaimedthatsheknewthethree(3)children
ofFRANCISCObywife,namely,Lourdes,Francisco,Jr.(Junior)
and Elena, but MONINA had met only Lourdes and Junior.
MONINAstestimonydealtlengthilyonherdealingswithJunior
andthetwo(2)occasionswhenshemetwithLourdes.Thelast
timeMONINAsawFRANCISCOwasinMarch1979,whenshe
soughthisblessingstogetmarried.
In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken
beforethenJudgeRomeoCallejooftheRegionalTrialCourtof
Manila, Branch 48. As additional witnesses, FRANCISCO
presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iigo Supertisioso,
LourdesLedesma,JoseCruzandDoloresArgenal.
FRANCISCOdeclaredthatPansaysemploymentceasedasof
October, 1944, and that while employed by him,Pansaywould
sleep with the other female helpers on the first floor of his
residence,whilehe,hiswifeanddaughtersleptinaroomonthe
secondfloor.Atthattime,hishouseholdstaffwascomposedof
three (3) female workers and two (2) male workers.
AfterPansayleftinOctober1944,shenevercommunicatedwith
himagain,neitherdidheknowofherwhereabouts.FRANCISCO
staunchly denied having had sexual relations withPansayand
disavowed any knowledge about MONINAs birth. In the same
vein,hedeniedhavingpaidforMONINAstuitionfees,inperson
orotherwise,andassertedthatheneverknewthatMr.Lagarto
paidforthesefees.Moreover,FRANCISCOcouldnotbelievethat
Lagartowouldpayforthesefeesdespiteabsenceofinstructions
orapprovalfromFRANCISCO.Helikewisecategoricallydenied
thathetoldanyone,beitDantheaLopez,ZafiroLedesma,Concha
CuaycongorRemediosFranco,thatMONINAwashisdaughter.
FRANCISCO also disclosed that upon his return from the
UnitedStatesin1971,hefiredAlfredoBaylosisupondiscovering
that Alfredo had taken advantage of his position during the
formersabsence.FRANCISCOlikewisefiredRudyTingsonand
RomeoBilbao,butdidnotgivethereasonstherefor.
516
516 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
Finally, FRANCISCO denied knowledge of MONINAs long
distancecallsfromhisBacolodresidence;nevertheless,whenhe
subsequentlydiscoveredthis,hefiredcertainpeopleinhisoffice
fortheirfailuretoreportthisanomaly.Asregardsthecaretaker
of his Bacolod residence, FRANCISCO explained that since
MONINA lived at Mrs. Cuaycongs residence, the caretaker
thought that he could allow people who lived at the Cuaycong
residencetousethefacilitiesathis(FRANCISCOs)house.
Nonito Jalandoni, bookkeeper and paymaster at Nellys
Gardenfrom1963 upto1974, thenfrom 1980 upto1986, the
assistant overseer of Hacienda Lopez, testified that he did not
knowMONINA;thathelearnedofheronlyinJune1988,when
hewasinformedbyFRANCISCOthatMONINAhadsuedhim;
andthatheneversawMONINAatNellysGarden,neitherdidhe
know of any instructions for anyone at Nellys Garden to give
moneytoMONINA.
TeodoroZulla,FRANCISCOsbookkeeperandpaymasterfrom
1951 up to 1986, testified that FRANCISCO dismissed Alfredo
Baylosis due to certain unspecified discrepancies; and that he
neversawMONINAreceivefundsfromeitherMr.LagartoorMr.
Baylosis.Uponquestionsfromthetrialcourt,however,Teodoro
admittedthathepreparedvouchersforonlyoneofFRANCISCOs
haciendas, and not vouchers pertaining to the latters personal
expenses.
IigoSupertisiosotestifiedthatheworkedforFRANCISCOat
Nellys Garden from 1964 up to 1984 as a field inspector,
paymaster, cashier and, eventually, officerincharge (OIC). He
confirmed Alfredo Baylosis dismissal due to these unspecified
irregularities, then denied that FRANCISCO ever ordered that
MONINA be given her allowance. Likewise, Iigo never heard
FRANCISCO mention that MONINA was his (FRANCISCOs)
daughter.
LourdesLedesma,FRANCISCOsdaughter,testifiedthatshe
saw (but did not know) MONINA at the Our Lady of Mercy
Hospital,ontheoccasionofthebirthofLourdesfirstson,Mark.
Overlunchoneday,LourdesauntcasuallyintroducedLourdes
andMONINAtoeachother,buttheywere
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VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
referredtoonlybytheirfirstnames.Thensometimein1983or
1984, MONINA allegedly went to Lourdes house in Sta. Clara
Subdivisionrequestingforaletterofintroductionorreferralas
MONINAwasthenjobhunting.However,Lourdesdidnotcomply
withtherequest.
Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., testified that
MONINA worked at Miller & Cruz from 1968 up to 1971,
however, he did not personally interview her before she was
accepted for employment. Moreover, MONINA underwent the
usualscreeningprocedurebeforebeinghired.Joserecalledthat
one of the accountants, a certain Mr. Atienza, reported that
MONINAclaimedtobeFRANCISCOsdaughter.Josethentold
Mr.AtienzatospeakwithMONINAandseeifhe(Mr.Atienza)
couldstopherfromspreadingthisrumor.Mr.Atienzareported
thathespokewithMONINA,whotoldhimthatsheplannedto
leave for the United States and needed P20,000.00 for that
purpose,andinexchange,shewouldsignadocumentdisclaiming
filiationwithFRANCISCO.Thus,JoseinstructedMr.Atienzato
request that MONINA meet with Jose, and at that meeting,
MONINA confirmed Mr. Atienzas report. Jose then informed
Atty.Tirol,FRANCISCOspersonallawyer,aboutthematter.
Atty.TiroltoldJosetosendMONINAandherlawyertohis
(Atty. Tirols) office in Iloilo. Jose then wrote out a letter of
introductionforMONINAaddressedtoAtty.Tirol.Joserelayed
Atty. Tirols message to MONINA through Mr. Atienza, then
later, Atty. Tirol told Jose to go to Iloilo with a check for
P15,000.00. Jose complied, and at Atty. Tirols office, Jose saw
MONINA,Atty.Tirolandhissecretaryreadingsomedocuments.
MONINA then expressed her willingness to sign the
document,sansrevisions. Jose alleged that he drew the
P15,000.00 from his personal funds, subject to reimbursement
517 fromandduetoanunderstandingwithFRANCISCO.
Dolores Argenal, a househelper at Nelly Garden from May
1944 up to May 1946, testified that she knew thatPansaywas
Lourdesnanny;thatLourdessleptinherparentsroom;thatshe
hadnotseenFRANCISCOgivespecialtreatmenttoPansay;that
therewasnounusualrelationshipbetween
518
518 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
FRANCISCO andPansay, and if there was any, Dolores would
have easily detected it since she slept in the same room
asPansay. Dolores further declared that whenever
FRANCISCOswifewasoutoftown,PansaywouldbringLourdes
downstairsatnighttime,andthatPansaywouldnotsleepinthe
room where FRANCISCO slept. Finally, Dolores declared
thatPansaystopped working for FRANCISCO and his wife in
October,1944.
Thereceptionofevidencehavingbeenconcluded,theparties
filedtheirrespectivememoranda.
It need be recalled that Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr.
presidedovertrialupto21October1986,therebyhearingonly
the testimonies of MONINAs witnesses and about half of
MONINAstestimonyondirectexamination.JudgeNorbertoE.
Devera,Jr.heardtherestofMONINAstestimonyandthoseof
FRANCISCOswitnesses.
Initsdecisionof12November1990 12thetrialcourt,through
Judge Devera, dismissed the complaint with costs against
MONINA.Intheopeningparagraphthereof,itobserved:
This is a complaint for recognition of an illegitimate child
institutedbyplaintiffMoninaJisonagainstdefendantFrancisco
Jison.Thiscomplaintwas filedonMarch13, 1985 atthetime
when plaintiff, reckoned from her death of birth, was already
thirtynine years old. Noteworthy also is the fact that it was
instituted twenty years after the death of plaintiffs mother,
Esperanza Amolar. For the years between plaintiffs birth and
Esperanzasdeath,noactionofanykindwasinstitutedagainst
defendanteitherbyplaintiff,hermotherEsperanzaorthelatters
parents. Neither had plaintiff brought such an action against
defendant immediately upon her mothers death on April 20,
1965,consideringthatshewasthenalreadynineteenyearsold
or,withinareasonabletimethereafter.Twentyyearsmorehadto
supervenebeforethiscomplaintwaseventuallyinstituted.
The trial court then proceeded to discuss the four issues
stipulatedatpretrial,without,however,summarizingthe
_______________
Supranote2.
12
519
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
testimonies of the witnesses norreferring to thetestimonies of
thewitnessesotherthanthosementionedinthediscussionofthe
issues.
Thetrialcourtresolvedthefirstissueinthenegative,holding
thatitwasimprobableforwitnessLopeAmolartohavenoticed
thatPansaywas pregnant upon seeing her at the Elena
ApartmentsinNovember1945,sincePansaywasthenonlyinher
first month of pregnancy; that there was no positive assertion
that copulation did indeed take place between Francisco and
Esperanza;andthatMONINAsattempttoshowopportunityon
thepartofFRANCISCOfailedtoconsiderthattherewasalso
theopportunityforcopulationbetweenEsperanzaandoneofthe
several domestic helpers admittedly also residing at Nellys
Garden at that time. The RTC also ruled that the probative
valueofthebirthandbaptismalcertificatesofMONINApaledin
light of jurisprudence, especially whenthe misspellings therein
wereconsidered.
The trial court likewise resolved the second issue in the
negative,findingthatMONINAsevidencethereonmayeitherbe
one of three categories, namely: hearsay evidence, incredulous
evidence,orselfservingevidence.Tothefirstcategorybelonged
thetestimoniesofAdelaCasabuenaandAlfredoBaylosis,whose
knowledgeofMONINAsfiliationwasbased,astotheformer,on
utterances of defendants wife Lilia and Esperanza allegedly
duringtheheatoftheirquarrel,whileastothelatter,Alfredos
conclusion was based from the rumors going [around] that
plaintiffisdefendantsdaughter,fromhispersonalobservationof
plaintiffs facial appearance which he compared with that of
defendantsandfromthewaythetwo(plaintiffanddefendant)
actedandtreatedeachotherononeoccasionthathehadthen
opportunity to closely observe them together. To the second
519 categorybelongedthatofDominadorSavariz,as:
At each precise time that Esperanza allegedly visited Nellys
Gardenandallegedlyonthoseoccasionswhendefendantswife,
LiliawasinManila,thiswitnesswasthereandallegedlyheard
piecesofconversationbetweendefendantandEsperanzarelated
tothepaternityofthelatterschild.xxx
520
520 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
TheRTCthenplacedMONINAstestimonyregardingtheactsof
recognition accorded her by FRANCISCOs relatives under the
thirdcategory,sincethelatterwereneverpresentedaswitnesses,
for which reason the trial court excluded the letters from
FRANCISCOsrelatives(Exhs.StoV).
Astothethirdissue,thetrialcourtheldthatMONINAwas
notbarredbyprescriptionforitwasoftheperception...that
thebenefitsofArticle268accordedtolegitimatechildrenmaybe
availedoforextendedtoillegitimatechildreninthesamemanner
astheFamilyCodehassoprovided;orbylaches,whichis[a] MADE,INADEQUATEANDINCREDIBLE.
creationofequityappliedonlytobringequitableresults,and...
addressed to the sound discretion of the court [and] the
circumstances[here]wouldshowthatwhetherplaintifffiledthis
case immediately upon the death of her mother Esperanza in
1965ortwentyyearsthereafterin1985,xxxthereseemstobe
noinequitableresulttodefendantasrelatedtothesituationof
plaintiff.
The RTC ruled, however, that MONINA was barred by
estoppelbydeedbecauseoftheaffidavit(Exh.P/Exh.2)which
she signed when she was already twentyfive years, a
professionaland...undertheableguidanceofcounsel.
Finally, the RTC denied FRANCISCOs claim for damages,
findingthatMONINAdidnotfilethecomplaintwithmalice,she
havingbeenpropelledbyanhonestbelief,foundedonprobable
cause.
MONINAseasonablyappealedtotheCourtofAppeals(CA
G.R. CV No. 32860) and sought reversal of the trial courts
decisiononthegroundsthat:
I
THETRIALCOURTWASERRONEOUSLYPREDISPOSEDTO
ADJUDGE THIS CASE AGAINST APPELLANT DUE TO ITS
MISPERCEPTION THAT APPELLANTS DELAY IN FILING
HERCOMPLAINTWASFATALTOHERCASE.
521
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 521
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE
TESTIMONIES OF APPELLANTS WITNESSES AS TAILOR
III
THETRIALCOURTERREDINITSREJECTIONOFTHE
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CERTIFIED COPIES OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY APPELLANT AS PART OF
HEREVIDENCE.
IV
THETRIALCOURTERREDINITSREQUIREMENTTHAT
A WITNESS TO THE ACTUAL ACT OF COPULATION
BETWEEN THE APPELLEE AND APPELLANTS MOTHER
SHOULDHAVEPOSITIVELYTESTIFIEDTOSAIDEFFECT.
V
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE judicialadmission,afamilybiblewhereinthenameofthechildis
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE DULY IDENTIFIED NOTES AND entered, common reputation respecting pedigree, admission by
LETTER OF THE RELATIVES OF THE APPELLEE AS silence,testimoniesofwitnessesxxx. 17TotheCourtofAppeals,
HEARSAY. thebottomlineissuewaswhetherornotMONINAestablished
her filiation as FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter by
VI preponderanceofevidence,astowhichissuesaidcourtfound:
[N]otjustpreponderantbutoverwhelmingevidenceonrecordto
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT prove that [MONINA] is the illegitimate daughter of
APPELLANTS AFFIDAVIT (EXH. P) SERVED AS A BAR [FRANCISCO]andthatshehadcontinuouslyenjoyedsuchstatus
AGAINST HER CLAIM FOR RECOGNITION INSTEAD OF bydirectactsof[FRANCISCO]and/orhisrelatives.
REINFORCINGSAIDCLAIM.13 Insoruling,theCourtofAppealsobservedthatthetestimoniesof
Expectedly, FRANCISCO refuted these alleged errors in his Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena and Dominador Savariz were
AppelleesBrief.14 alreadysufficienttoestablishMONINAsfiliation:
Initsdecisionof27April1995, 15theCourtofAppealsinitially Asadvertedtoearlier,thetrialcourtdiscreditedLopeAmolars
declaredthatasnovestedoracquiredrightswereaffected,the testimony by saying that Lope could not have detected
instantcasewasgovernedbyArticle175,inrela EsperanzaspregnantstateinNovember,1945sinceatthatpoint
in time [sic] she was still in the initial stage of pregnancy.
_______________ Apparently, the trial court paid more emphasis on the date
mentionedbyLopeAmolarthanonthetenorandimportofhis
13
OR,vol.2,AnnexC,BriefforPlaintiffAppellant,12.
testimony.AsxxxLopexxxwasaskedaboutanincidentthat
14
OR,vol.2,192etseq. transpiredmorethan41yearsback,[u]nderthecircumstances,it
15
Supranote1. isunreasonabletoexpectthatLopecouldstillbedeadrighton
522 thespecificmonthin1945that[he]metandconfrontedhissister.
522 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED Atanyrate,whatisimportantis
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
tion to Articles 172 and 173, of the Family Code. 16While the _______________
Court of Appeals rejected the certifications issued by the Local
CivilRegistrarofDingle,Iloilo(Exhs.EandF)asFRANCISCO CitingUyguangcov.CourtofAppeals,178SCRA684[1989].
16

didnotsignthem,saidcourtfocuseditsdiscussionontheother Citing ALICIA SEMPIODIY,HANDBOOK ON THE

17

FAMILYCODE246(1988ed.)(hereafterSEMPIODIY).
means by which illegitimate filiation could be proved,i.e., the
523
open and continuouspossession of the status of an illegitimate
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 523
childor,byanyothermeansallowedbytheRulesofCourtand
special laws, such as the baptismal certificate of the child, a Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
notthemonththattheymetbuttheessenceofhistestimonythat
his sister pointed to their employer [FRANCISCO] as the one
responsibleforherpregnancy, andthatuponbeing confronted,
[FRANCISCO] assured him of support for Esperanza and their
child.Itwouldappearthenthatinanattempttofindfaultwith
Lopestestimony,thetrialcourthasfallenoblivioustothefact
thateven[FRANCISCO],inhisdeposition,didnotdenythathe
wasconfrontedbyLopeaboutwhathehaddonetoEsperanza,
during which he unequivocally acknowledged paternity by
assuringLopeofsupportforbothEsperanzaandtheirchild.
TheCourtofAppealsfurthernotedthatCasabuenaandSavariz
testified on something that they personally observed or
witnessed,whichmattersFRANCISCOdidnotdenyorrefute.
Finally,saidcourtaptlyheld:
Takingintoaccountalltheforegoinguncontrovertedtestimonies
xxxletalonesuchcircumstantialevidenceas[MONINAs]Birth
Certificates x x x and Baptismal Certificates which invariably
bear the name of [FRANCISCO] as her father, We cannot go
alongwiththetrialcourtstheorythat[MONINAs]illegitimate
filiationhasnotbeensatisfactorilyestablished.
xxx
Significantly, [MONINAs] testimony finds ample
corroboration from [FRANCISCOs] former employees, Arsenio
Duatin,RudyTingsonandAlfredoBaylosis.xxx
xxx
Carefullyevaluatingappellantsevidenceonherenjoymentof
the status of an illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO]visa
vis[FRANCISCOs]controversionthereof,Wefindmoreweightin
the former. The positive testimonies of [MONINA] and [her]
witnessesxxxallbearingon[FRANCISCOs]actsand/orconduct
indubitably showing that he had continuously acknowledged
[MONINA] as his illegitimate daughter have not been
succeessfully[sic]refuted.Infact,[FRANCISCO]himself,inhis
deposition,onlycasuallydismissed[MONINAs]exhaustiveand
detailedtestimonyasuntrue,andwithrespecttothosegivenby
[MONINAs] witnesses, he merely explained that he had fired
[them]fromtheiremployment.Needlesstostate,[FRANCISCOs]
vague denial is grossly inadequate to overcome the probative
weightof[MONINAs]testimonialevidence.
524
524 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
Eventheaffidavit (Exh 2)which[FRANCISCO]hadfoistedon
thetrialcourtxxxdoesnotholdswayinthefaceof[MONINAs]
logicalexplanationthatsheatfirstdidagreetosigntheaffidavit
which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she promptly
complainedto[FRANCISCO]who,howeverexplainedtoherthat
the affidavit wasonlyfor theconsumptionof hisspousexxx.
Further,thetestimonyofJoseCruzconcerningtheeventsthat
ledtotheexecutionoftheaffidavitxxxcouldnothavebeentrue,
foraspointedoutby[MONINA],shesignedtheaffidavitxxx
almostfivemonthsaftershehadresignedfromtheMiller,Cruz
&Co.xxx
Atanyrate,if[MONINA]werenothisillegitimatedaughter,
itwouldhavebeenuncalledfor,ifnotabsurd,for[FRANCISCO]
orhislawyertohavesecured[MONINAs]swornstatementxxx
Onthecontrary,inasking[MONINA]tosignthesaidaffidavitat
thecostofP15,000,[FRANCISCO]clearlybetrayedhisintention
toconcealorsuppresshispaternityof[MONINA].xxx
Infine,Weholdthat[MONINAs]filiationas[FRANCISCOs]
illegitimate daughter has been conclusively established by the
uncontroverted testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena
and Dominador Savariz to the effect that appellee himself had
admittedhispaternityoftheappellee,andalsobythetestimonies
of appellant; Arsenio Duatin, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingsonand
Alfredo Baylosis unerringly demonstrating that by his own
conductorovertactslikesendingappellanttoschool,payingfor
hertuitionfees,schooluniforms,books,boardandlodgingatthe
Colegio del Sagrado Corazon de Jesus, defraying appellants
hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly
allowance,payingforthefuneralexpensesofappellantsmother,
acknowledging appellants paternal greetings and calling
appellanthisHija or child, instructing hisofficepersonnel to
giveappellantsmonthlyallowance,recommendingappellantfor
employmentattheMiller,Cruz&Co.,allowingappellanttouse
hishouseinBacolodandpayingforherlongdistancetelephone
calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in
ManilaandalsoathisForbesresidence,allowingappellanttouse
hissurnameinherscholasticandotherrecords(ExhsZ,AA,AA
1 to AA5, W & W5), appellee had continuously recognized
appellantashisillegitimatedaughter.Addedtothesearetheacts
of [FRANCISCO's] relatives acknowledging or treating
[MONINA] as [FRANCISCOs] daughter (Exh U) or as their
relative (Exhs T & V). On this point, witness Zafiro Ledesma,
formerMayorofIloiloCity,whosespousebelongstotheLopez
clanjustlike[FRANCISCO],testifiedthat[MONINA]hasbeen
consideredbythe
525
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
Lopezesasarelative.Heidentifiedpicturesoftheappelleeinthe
company of the Lopezes (Exhs X16 & X17). Another witness,
Danthea H. Lopez, whose husband Eusebio Lopez is appellees
first cousin, testified that appellant was introduced to her by
appellees cousin, Remedios Lopez Franco, as the daughter of
appelleeFranciscoJison,forwhichreason,shetookherinas[a]
secretaryintheMerchantsFinancingCorporationofwhichshe
wasthemanager,andfurtherallowedhertostaywithherfamily
freeofboardandlodging.Stillonthisaspect,DominadorSavariz
declaredthatsometimeinFebruary,1966appelleesrelative,Ms.
RemediosLopezFrancopointedtoappellantasthedaughterof
appelleeFranciscoJison.
Finally, the Certifications of the Local Civil Registrar of
Dingle (Exhs E and F) as well as [MONINAs] Baptismal
Certificates (Exhs C & D) which the trial court admitted in
evidence as part of [MONINAs] testimony, may serve as
circumstantial evidence to further reinforce [MONINAs] claim
thatsheis[FRANCISCOs]illegitimatedaughterbyEsperanza
Amolar.
Trueitisthatatrialjudgesassessmentofthecredibilityof
witnessesisaccordedgreatrespectonappeal.Buttheruleadmits
ofcertainexceptions.Onesuchexceptioniswherethejudgewho
renderedthejudgmentwasnottheonewhoheardthewitnesses
testify.[citationsomitted]Theotheriswherethetrialcourthad
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which, if properly
considered,mightaffecttheresultofthecase.[citationsomitted]
Inthe present case, both exceptions obtain. All of [MONINAs]
witnessesxxxwhosetestimonieswerenotgivencredencedidnot
testifybeforethejudgewhorenderedthedisputedjudgment.xx
x
525 TheCourtofAppealsthendecreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial
court is SET ASIDE and another one is hereby entered for
appellant Monina Jison, declaring her as the illegitimate
daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, and entitled to all rights
andprivilegesgrantedbylaw.
Costsagainstappellee.
SOORDERED.
526
526 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
HismotionforreconsiderationhavingbeendeniedbytheCourtof
Appeals in its resolution of 29 March 1996,18FRANCISCO filed
theinstantpetition.Heurgesustoreversethejudgmentofthe
Court of Appeals, alleging that said court committed errors of
law:
I.
...INREVERSINGTHEDECISIONOFTHETRIALCOURT
AND DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS THE
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF PETITIONER, CONSIDERING
[THE] IMPOSSIBILITY OF SEXUAL CONTACT BETWEEN
THE PETITIONER AND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
MOTHERATTHETIMECONCEPTIONWASSUPPOSEDTO
HAVEOCCURRED.
II.
. . . IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING
CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
TESTIMONIALEVIDENCEOFPATERNITYANDFILIATION
ISNOTCLEARANDCONVINCING.
III.
. . . IN GIVING CREDENCE TO DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
AS EVIDENCE OF FILIATION CONSIDERING THAT THE
SAMEAREHEARSAY,SELFSERVINGANDCANNOTBIND
THE PETITIONER UNDER THE BASIC RULES OF
EVIDENCE.
IV.
. . . IN INTERPRETING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
SWORNSTATEMENT(EXH.P/EXH.2)INAMANNERNOT
IN CONSONANCE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE
HONORABLESUPREMECOURT.
V.
. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE LONG AND
UNEXPLAINED DELAY IN THE FILING OF THE PRESENT
PATERNITYSUITASEQUIVALENTTOLACHES.
_______________
OR,vol.2,192etseq.
18
527
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 527
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
Asregardsthefirsterror,FRANCISCOinsiststhattakinginto
account thesecond paragraph of MONINAscomplaint wherein
she claimed that he andPansayhad sexual relations by about
theendof1945orthestartof1946,itwasphysicallyimpossible
forhimandPansaytohavehadsexualcontactwhichresultedin
MONINAsbirth,consideringthat:
Thenormalperiodofhumanpregnancyisnine(9)months.Ifas
claimedbyprivaterespondentinhercomplaintthathermother
wasimpregnatedbyFRANCISCOattheendof1945orthestart
of1946,shewouldhavebeenbornsometimeinlateSeptember
orearlyOctoberandnotAugust6,1946xxx.Theinstantcase
findsfactualandlegalparallelsinConstantinovs.Mendez,19thus:
xxx
FRANCISCOfurtherclaimsthathistestimonythatPansaywas
no longer employed by him at the time in question was
unrebutted,moreover,othermenhadaccesstoPansayduringthe
timeoforevenafterheremploymentbyhim.
Astotheseconderror,FRANCISCOsubmitsthatMONINAs
testimonialevidenceisshaky,contradictoryandunreliable,and
proceedstoattackthecredibilityofherwitnessesbyclaiming,in
themain,that:(a)LopeAmolarcouldnothavedetectedPansays
pregnancy in November 1945 when they met since she would
have been only one (1) month pregnant then; (b) Dominador
Savariz did not in fact witness the meeting between
FRANCISCO,PansayandMONINA; (c)Zafiro Ledesmahadan
ulteriormotiveintestifyingforMONINAasheownedabankin
Iloilo which was then under Central Bank supervision and
MONINA was the Bank Examiner assigned to Iloilo; and (d)
Danthea Lopez was not related to him by blood and whatever
favorabletreatmentMONINAreceivedfromDantheawasdueto
theformersemploymentatMerchantsFinancingCompanyand
additionalservicesrenderedatKahirupHotel;besides,Danthea
admittedthatshehadnopersonalknowledgeastotheissueof
paternityand
_______________
19
209SCRA18,23[1992].
528
528 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
filiationofthecontendingparties,henceSections39and40 20of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court did not come into play.
FRANCISCO likewise reechoes the view of the trial court as
regardsthetestimoniesofAdelaCasabuenaandAlfredoBaylosis.
FRANCISCOfurtherassertsthatMONINAstestimonythat
he answered for her schooling was selfserving and
uncorroborated by any receipt or other documentary evidence;
and assuming he did, such should be interpreted as a
manifestationofkindnessshowntowardsthefamilyofaformer
householdhelper.
AnentthetreatmentgivenbyhisrelativestoMONINAashis
daughter, FRANCISCO points to the fact thatPansaywas the
formerlaundrywomanofMrs.Franco;MONINAresidedwiththe
familiesofEusebioLopezandConchaCuaycongbecauseshewas
in their employ at Kahirup Hotel and Our Lady of Mercy
Hospital, respectively; MONINA failed to present Mrs. Franco,
EusebioLopezandMrs.Cuaycong;andMONINAsemployment
attheaccountingfirmofMiller,Cruz&Co.wasattributableto
hereducationalattainment,therebeingabsolutelynoevidenceto
provethatFRANCISCOeverfacilitatedheremploymentthereat.
Hence,inlightofBaluyotv.Baluyot,21thequantumofevidenceto
prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence, not merely a
preponderancethereof,wasnotmet.
Withrespecttothethirdassignederror,FRANCISCOargues
that the Court of Appeals reliance on the certifications of the
LocalCivilRegistrar(Exhs.EandF)andBaptismalCertificates
(Exhs. CandD)ascircumstantialevidenceismisplaced. First,
their genuineness could not be ascertained asthe persons who
issuedthemdidnottestify.Second,inlightofReyesv.Courtof
Appeals,22thecontentsofthebaptismalcertificateswerehearsay,
asthedatawasbasedonly
_______________
20
Actordeclarationaboutpedigreeandfamilyreputationor
traditionregardingpedigree,respectively.
21
186SCRA506[1990].
22
135SCRA439[1985].
529
 VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
onwhatwastoldtothepriestwhosolemnizedthebaptism,who
likewisewasnotpresentedasawitness.Additionally,thename
ofthefatherappearingthereinwasFranqueJison,whichwas
not FRANCISCOs name. Third, in both Exhibits Eand F, the
namesofthechilds parentswerelisted asFrankHeson and
Esperanza Amador (not Amolar). FRANCISCO further points
out that in Exhibit F, the status of the child is listed as
legitimate, while the fathers occupation as laborer. Most
importantly, there was no showing that FRANCISCO signed
ExhibitsEandForthathewastheonewhoreportedthechilds
birthtotheOfficeoftheLocalCivilRegistrar.AstoMONINAs
educational records, FRANCISCO invokesBaas v.
Baas23which recognized that school records are prepared by
schoolauthorities,notbyputativeparents,thusincompetentto
prove paternity. And, as to the photographs presented by
MONINA,FRANCISCOcitesColoradov.CourtofAppeals,24and
furtherassertsthatMONINAdidnotpresentanyofthepersons
withwhomsheisseeninthepicturestotestifythereon;besides
thesepersonswere,atbest,meresecondcousinsofFRANCISCO.
Helikewiseassailsthevariousnotesandletterswrittenbyhis
relatives(Exhs.StoV)astheywerenotidentifiedbytheauthors.
Finally, he stresses that MONINA did not testify as to the
telephone cards (Exhs. G to L) nor did these reveal the
circumstancessurroundingthecallsshemadefromhisresidence.
Anentthefourthassignederror,FRANCISCOcontendsthat
theCourtofAppealsinterpretationofMONINAsaffidavitof21
September 1971 ran counter toDequito v. Llamas,25and
overlookedthatatthetimeofexecution,MONINAwasmorethan
25yearsoldandassistedbycounsel.
529 Astothelastassignederror,FRANCISCObewailstheCourt
ofAppealsfailuretoconsiderthelongandunexplaineddelayin
thefilingofthecase.
_______________
23
134SCRA260[1985].
24
135SCRA47[1985].
25
66SCRA504[1975].
530
530 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
In her comment, MONINA forcefully refuted FRANCISCOs
arguments,leadingFRANCISCOtofilehisreplythereto.
On20November1996,wegaveduecoursetothispetitionand
requiredthepartiestosubmittheirrespectivememoranda,which
theysubsequentlydid.
Apainstakingreviewoftheevidenceandargumentsfailsto
supportpetitioner.
Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we first
disposeofpreliminarymattersrelatingtotheapplicablelawand
theguidingprinciplesinpaternitysuits.Astotheformer,plainly,
the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209)
governsthepresentcontroversy.AscorrectlycitedbytheCourtof
Appeals,Uyguangco26servedasajudicialconfirmationofArticle
256 of the Family Code27regarding its retroactive effect unless
therebeimpairmentofvestedrights,whichdoesnotholdtrue
here,itappearingthatneithertheputativeparentnorthechild
has passed away and the former having actually resisted the
lattersclaimbelow.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation,
suchasMONINAs,maybeestablishedinthesamewayandon
the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172
thereofprovidesthevariousformsofevidencebywhichlegitimate ThisArticlereproduces,withamendments,Articles265,266and
filiationisestablished,thus: 267oftheCivilCode.
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by Forthesuccessofanactiontoestablishillegitimatefiliation
anyofthefollowing: underthesecondparagraph,whichMONINAreliesupongiven
that she has none of the evidence mentioned in the first
1. (1)Therecordofbirthappearinginthecivilregisterora paragraph,ahighstandardofproof 28isrequired.Specifically,to
finaljudgment;or prove open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimatechild,theremustbeevidenceofthemanifestationof
2. (2)An admission of legitimate filiation in a public thepermanentintentionofthesupposedfathertoconsiderthe
documentoraprivatehandwritteninstrumentsignedby childashis,bycontinuousandclearmanifestationsofparental
theparentconcerned. affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity.
Suchactsmustbeofsuchanaturethattheyrevealnotonlythe
_______________ convictionofpaternity,butalsotheapparentdesiretohaveand
treatthechildassuchinallrelationsinsocietyandinlife,not
Supranote16.
26 accidentally,butcontinuously.29
Thisarticleprovides:
27 By continuous is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not doesnotrequireanyparticularlengthoftime.30
prejudiceorimpairvestedoracquiredrightsinaccordancewith The foregoing standard of proof required to establish ones
theCivilCodeorotherlaws. filiationisfoundedontheprinciplethatanorderforrecognition
531 andsupportmaycreateanunwholesomeatmosphereormaybe
anirritantinthefamilyorlivesoftheparties,sothatitmustbe
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 531
issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
convincingevidence.31
Intheabsenceoftheforegoingevidence,thelegitimatefiliation
shallbeprovedby: _______________

1. (1)Theopenandcontinuouspossessionofthestatusofa 28
SeeBaluyutv.Baluyut,supranote21,at513.
legitimatechild;or 29
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, 1CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES:COMMENTARIESANDJURISPRUDENCE602
2. (2)Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and 605(1985);seeMendozav.CourtofAppeals,201SCRA675,683
speciallaws. [1991].
30
SEMPIODIY,at245246.
31
Constantinov.Mendez,209SCRA18,2324[1992].
 532
532 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
Theforegoingdiscussion,however,mustbesituatedwithinthe
generalrulesonevidence,inlightoftheburdenofproofincivil
cases,i.e., preponderance of evidence, and the shifting of the
burdenofevidenceinsuchcases.Simplyput,hewhoallegesthe
affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the
plaintiffinacivilcase,theburdenofproofneverparts.However,
in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out
aprimafaciecaseinhisfavor,thedutyortheburdenofevidence
shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffsprima faciecase,
otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff.
Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
mustproduceapreponderanceofevidencethereon,withplaintiff
havingtorelyonthestrengthofhisownevidenceandnotupon
theweaknessofthedefendants.Theconceptofpreponderanceof
evidencereferstoevidencewhichisofgreaterweight,ormore
convincing,thatwhichisofferedinoppositiontoit;atbottom,it
meansprobabilityoftruth.32
Withtheseinmind,wenowproceedtoresolvethemeritsof
theinstantcontroversy.
FRANCISCOs arguments in support of his first assigned
errordeservescantconsideration.Whileithasbeenobservedthat
unlawfulintercoursewillnotbepresumedmerelyfromproofof
an opportunity for such indulgence,33this does not favor
FRANCISCO.Akintothecrimeofrapewhere,inmostinstances,
theonlywitnessestothefelonyaretheparticipantsinthesexual
actthemselves,indecidingpaternitysuits,theissueofwhether
sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the
victims or mothers word, as against the accuseds or putative
fathersprotestations.In
_______________
32
See7 VICENTE J. FRANCISCO,THE REVISED RULES
OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES, EVIDENCE(PART II,
RULES 131134), at 24, 542543 [1973] (citations omitted)
(hereafterFRANCISCO).
33
10C.J.S.,Bastards81and10AM.JUR.2DBastards105,
citingWalker v. State, 74 NE 614 [1905], 86 NE 502 (1908)
andStatev.Breeden,82NE1020[1908].
533
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 533
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
theinstantcase,MONINAsmothercouldnolongertestifyasto
thefactofintercourse, asshehad, unfortunately, passedaway
longbeforetheinstitutionofthecomplaintforrecognition.But
this did not mean that MONINA could no longer prove her
filiation. The fact of her birth and her parentage may be
establishedbyevidenceotherthanthetestimonyofhermother.
TheparamountquestiontheniswhetherMONINAsevidenceis
coherent,logicalandnatural.34
ThecomplaintstatedthatFRANCISCOhadcarnalknowledge
ofPansayby about the end of 1945. Weagreewith MONINA
that thiswasbroad enoughtocover thefourthquarterofsaid
year,henceherbirthon6August1946couldstillbeattributedto
sexualrelationsbetweenFRANCISCOandMONINAsmother.In
anyevent,sinceitwasestablishedthathermotherwasstillin
theemployofFRANCISCOatthetimeMONINAwasconceived
asdeterminedbythedateofherbirth,sexualcontactbetween
FRANCISCOandMONINAsmotherwasnotatallimpossible,
especially in light of the overwhelming evidence, as hereafter
shown,thatFRANCISCOfatheredMONINA,hasrecognizedher
ashisdaughterandthatMONINAhasbeenenjoyingtheopen
and continuous possession of the status as FRANCISCOs
illegitimatedaughter.
Wereadilyconcludethatthetestimonialevidenceofferedby
MONINA, wovenbyhernarration ofcircumstancesand events
thatoccurredthroughtheyears,concerningherrelationshipwith
FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses,
overwhelminglyestablishedthefollowingfacts:
1. 1)FRANCISCO is MONINAs father and she was
conceived at the time when her mother was in the
employoftheformer;
2. 2)FRANCISCOrecognizedMONINAashischildthrough
hisovertactsandconductwhichtheCourtofAppeals
tookpainstoenumerate,thus:
_______________
SeeIlano v. Court of Appeals,230 SCRA 242, 256257
34
[1994].
534
534 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
[L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees,
school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del
SagradodeJesus,defrayingappellantshospitalizationexpenses,
providingherwith[a]monthlyallowance,payingforthefuneral
expenses of appellants mother, acknowledging appellants
paternal greetings and calling appellant his Hija or child,
instructing his office personnel to give appellants monthly
allowance,recommendingappellantforemploymentattheMiller,
Cruz&Co.,allowingappellanttousehishouseinBacolodand
paying for her long distance telephone calls, having appellant
spendher vacation in hisapartmentinManilaandalsoathis
Forbesresidence,allowingappellanttousehissurnameinher
scholasticandotherrecords(Exhs.Z,AA,AA1toAA5,W&W
5)...
1. 3)Such recognition has been consistently shown and
manifested throughout the years
publicly,35spontaneously, continuously and in an
uninterruptedmanner.36
Accordingly,inlightofthetotalityoftheevidenceonrecord,the
secondassignederrormustfail.
There is some merit, however, in the third assigned error
againsttheprobativevalueofsomeofMONINAsdocumentary
evidence.
MONINAs reliance on the certification issued by the Local
Civil Registrar concerning her birth (Exhs. E and F) is clearly
misplaced.Itissettledthatacertificateoflivebirthpurportedly
identifyingtheputativefatherisnotcompetentevidenceastothe
issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative
fatherhadahandinthepreparationofsaidcertificates,andthe
LocalCivilRegistrarisdevoidofauthoritytorecordthepaternity
of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third
person.37Simplyput,iftheallegedfatherdid
_______________
35
SeeBaluyot v. Baluyot,supranote 21;Alberto v. Court of
Appeals,232SCRA745,757[1994].
36
SeeOngv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.95386,29May1997,
at11.
 SeeFernandezv.CourtofAppeals,230SCRA130,136137
37
[1994],citingRocesv.LocalCivilRegistrar,102Phil.1050(1958).
535
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 535
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
not intervene in the birth certificate,e.g., supplying the
informationhimself,theinscriptionofhisnamebythemotheror
doctor or registrarisnull andvoid; themerecertificatebythe
registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of
voluntaryacknowledgmentonthelatterspart. 38Inlikemanner,
FRANCISCOs lack of participation in the preparation of the
baptismalcertificates(Exhs.CandD)andschoolrecords(Exhs.Z
andAA)rendersthesedocumentsincompetenttoprovepaternity,
theformerbeingcompetentmerelytoprovetheadministrationof
the sacrament of baptism on the date so specified. 39However,
despite the inadmissibility of the school recordsper seto prove
paternity,theymaybeadmittedaspartofMONINAstestimony
to corroborate her claim that FRANCISCO spent for her
education.
WelikewisedisagreewiththerulingoftheCourtofAppeals
thatthecertificatesissuedbytheLocalCivilRegistrarandthe
baptismalcertificatesmaybetakenascircumstantialevidenceto
proveMONINAsfiliation.Since they areperseinadmissiblein
evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted
indirectlyascircumstantialevidencetoprovethesame.
As to Exhibits S, T, U and V, the various notes and asevidenceofpedigree.(italicssupplied)
letterswrittenbyFRANCISCOsrelatives,namelyMikeAlano,
EmilioJison,MariquitLopezandFernandoLopez,respectively,
allegedly attesting to MONINAs filiation, while their due
execution and authenticity are not in issue,40as MONINA
witnessedtheauthorssigningthedocuments,nevertheless,under
Rule130,Section39,thecontentsofthesedocumentsmaynotbe
admitted, there being no showing that the declarantsauthors
were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship
betweenthedeclarantsandMONINA
_______________
38
SeeBercilesv.GSIS,128SCRA53,7778[1984](citations
omitted).
39
SeeFernandezv.CA,supranote37;andReyesv.Courtof
Appeals,supranote22,at450.
40
Rule132,Section20(a),RulesofCourt.
536
536 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
shownbyevidenceotherthanthedocumentsinquestion.41Asto
theadmissibilityofthesedocumentsunderRule130,Section40,
however,thisrequiresfurtherelaboration.
Rule130,Section40,provides:
Section 40.Family reputation ortradition regarding pedigree.
Thereputationortraditionexistinginafamilyprevioustothe
controversy,inrespecttothepedigreeofanyoneofitsmembers,
may be received in evidenceif the witness testifying thereonbe
also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity.Entriesinfamilybiblesorotherfamilybooksorcharts,
engravingsonrings,familyportraitandthelike,maybereceived
Itisevidentthatthisprovisionmaybedividedintotwo(2)parts:
theportioncontainingthefirstunderscoredclausewhichpertains
totestimonialevidence,underwhichthedocumentsinquestion
may not be admitted as the authors thereof did not take the
witnessstand;andthesectioncontainingthesecondunderscored
phrase.WhatmustthenbeascertainediswhetherExhibitsSto
V,asprivatedocuments,fallwithinthescopeoftheclauseand
thelikeasqualifiedbytheprecedingphrase[e]ntriesinfamily
biblesorotherfamilybooksorcharts,engravingsonrights[and]
familyportraits.
Weholdthatthescopeoftheenumerationcontainedinthe
second portion of thisprovision, inlightof therule ofejusdem
generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as
familypossessions,orthosearticleswhichrepresent,ineffect,a
familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a
person.42Thesehavebeendescribedasobjectsopenlyexhibited
andwellknowntothefamily,43orthosewhich,if
_______________
41
SeeMendozav.CourtofAppeals,supranote29,at685for
requisites of admissibility of an act or declaration regarding
pedigree.
42
SeeFRANCISCO,at498.
43
5MANUELV.MORAN,COMMENTSONTHERULESOF
COURT329[1980](hereafterMORAN).
537
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family
tradition.44Otherexamplesoftheseobjectswhichareregarded
as reflective of a familys reputation or tradition regarding
pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones, 45monuments or coffin
plates.46
Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not
constitutingfamilypossessionsasdiscussedabove,maynotbe
admittedonthebasisofRule130,Section40.Neithermaythese
exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41
regardingcommonreputation,47ithavingbeenobservedthat:
[T]heweightofauthorityappearstobeinfavorofthetheorythat
itisthegeneralrepute,thecommonreputationinthefamily,and
not the common reputation in community, that is a material
element of evidence going to establish pedigree. x x x [Thus]
mattersofpedigreemaybeprovedbyreputationinthefamily,
and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except
wherethepedigreeinquestionismarriagewhichmaybeproved
bycommonreputationinthecommunity.48
Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits S to V,
inclusive, may, in like manner as MONINAs school records,
properlybeadmittedaspartofhertestimonytostrengthenher
claimthat,indeed,relativesofFRANCISCOrecognizedherashis
daughter.
_______________
44
5 RUPERTO G. MARTIN,RULES OF COURT IN THE
PHILIPPINES WITH NOTES AND COMMENTS 325(3rd ed.
1974)(hereafterMARTIN).
537
45
Id.
46
MORAN,supranote43.
47
Theprovisionreads:
Section41.Commonreputation.Commonreputationexisting
previoustothecontroversy,respectingfactsofpublicorgeneral
interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or
moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and
inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of
commonreputation.
48
MORAN,supranote43,at328and336.
538
538 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
We now direct our attention to MONINAs 21 September 1971
affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2), subject of the fourth assigned error,
wheresheatteststhatFRANCISCOisnotherfather.MONINA
contendsthatshesigneditunderduress,i.e.,shewasjobless,had
nosavingsandneededthemoneytosupportherselfandfinish
herstudies.Moreover, shesignedExhibitPupontheadviceof
Atty. Divinagracia that filiation could not be waived and that
FRANCISCOsploywouldboomeranguponhim.Ontheother
hand,FRANCISCOassertsthatfullcredenceshouldbeafforded
ExhibitPasMONINAwasalready25yearsoldatthetimeofits
executionandwasadvisedbycounsel;further,beinganotarized
document, its genuineness and due execution could not be
questioned.HereliesonthetestimonyofJoseCruz,apartnerat
the accounting firm of Miller & Cruz, who declared that he
intervened in the matter as MONINA was spreading rumors
about her filiation within the firm, which might have had
deleterious effects upon the relationship between the firm and
FRANCISCO.
On this issue, we find for MONINA and agree with the
followingobservationsoftheCourtofAppeals:
Eventheaffidavit (Exh 2)which[FRANCISCO]hadfoistedon
thetrialcourtxxxdoesnotholdswayinthefaceof[MONINAs] addressed: First, that his testimony was comprised of mere
logical explanation that she at first did not agree to sign the
affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In fact, she
promptlycomplainedto[FRANCISCO]who,howeverexplainedto
herthattheaffidavitwasonlyfortheconsumptionofhisspousex
xx.
Atanyrate,if[MONINA]werenothisillegitimatedaughter,
itwouldhavebeenuncalledfor,ifnotabsurd,for[FRANCISCO]
orhislawyertohavesecured[MONINAs]swornstatementxxx
Onthecontrary,inasking[MONINA]tosignthesaidaffidavitat
thecostofP15,000,[FRANCISCO]clearlybetrayedhisintention
toconcealorsuppresshispaternityof[MONINA].xxx
Indeed, if MONINA were truly not FRANCISCOs illegitimate
daughter,itwouldhavebeenunnecessaryforhimtohavegoneto
suchgreatlengthsinorderthatMONINAdenounceherfiliation.
Forasclearlyestablishedbeforethetrial
539
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 539
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
courtandproperlyappreciatedbytheCourtofAppeals,MONINA
had resigned from Miller & Cruz five (5) months prior to the
execution of the sworn statement in question, hence negating
FRANCISCOs theory of the need to quash rumors circulating
withinMiller&CruzregardingtheidentityofMONINAsfather.
Hence, coupled with the assessment of the credibility of the
testimonialevidenceofthepartiesdiscussedabove,itisevident
thatthestandardtocontradictanotarialdocument,i.e.,clearand
convincing evidence and more than merely preponderant, 49has
beenmetbyMONINA.
Plainly then, the burden of evidence fully shifted to
FRANCISCO.
Two (2) glaring points in FRANCISCOs defense beg to be
denials,rifewithbare,unsubstantiatedresponsessuchasThat
is not true, I do not believethat,or None thatI know. In
decliningthentolendcredencetoFRANCISCOstestimony,we
resort to a guiding principle in adjudging the credibility of a
witnessandthetruthfulnessofhisstatements,laiddownasearly
as1921:
Theexperienceofcourtsandthegeneralobservationofhumanity
teachusthatthenaturallimitationsofourinventivefacultiesare
suchthatifawitnessundertakestofabricateanddeliverincourt
a false narrative containing numerous details, he is almost
certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements
whichcanbereadilyrefuted,ortoexposeinhisdemeanorthe
falsityofhismessage.
Forthisreasonitwillbefoundthatperjurersusuallyconfine
themselvestotheincidentsimmediatelyrelatedtotheprincipal
fact about which they testify, and when asked about collateral
factsbywhichtheirtruthfulnesscouldbetested,theiranswers
notinfre
_______________
49
SeeYturralde v. Azurin,28 SCRA 407, 417 [1969],
citingMendezona v. Philippine Sugar Estates Development
Co.,41 Phil. 475, 493 [1921], in turn, citingCamacho v.
Municipality of Baliuag,28 Phil. 466[1914] andCentenera v.
Garcia Palicio,29 Phil. 470[1915]; andSalame v. Court of
Appeals,239SCRA356,359[1994].
540
540 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
quentlytakethestereotypedformofsuchexpressionsasIdont
knoworIdontremember.xxx50
Second,thereasonsforthedismissalsofTingson,Baylosisand
Savariz were unspecified or likewise unsubstantiated, hence
FRANCISCOsattempttoproveillmotiveontheirparttofalsely
testifyinMONINAsfavormaynotsucceed.Asmaybegleaned,
the only detail which FRANCISCO could furnish as to the
circumstances surrounding the dismissals of his former
employees was that Baylosis allegedly took advantage of his
positionwhileFRANCISCOwasintheUnitedStates.Butaside
from this bare claim, FRANCISCOs account is barren, hence
unable to provide the basis for a finding of bias against
FRANCISCOonthepartofhisformeremployees.
As to FRANCISCOs other witnesses, nothing substantial
couldbeobtainedeither.NonitoJalandoniavowedthatheonly
came to know of MONINA in June 1988; 51that during his
employmentatNellyGardenfrom1963upto1974,hedidnot
recalleverhavingseenMONINAthere,neitherdidheknowof
any instructions from FRANCISCO nor Mr. Lagarto
(FRANCISCOs office manager before passing away) regarding
the disbursement of MONINAs allowance. 52Teodoro Nulla
corroborated Jalandonis testimony regarding not having seen
MONINA at Nelly Garden and MONINAs allowance; declared
that Alfredo Baylosis was dismissed due to discrepancies
discovered after an audit, without any further elaboration,
however; but admitted that he never prepared the vouchers
pertaining to FRANCISCOs personal expenses, merely those
intended for one of FRANCISCOs haciendas.53Then, Iigo
Superticiosoconfirmedthataccordingtothereportofacertain
Mr.Atienza,BaylosiswasdismissedbyMr.
_______________
50
UnitedStatesv.Burns,41Phil.418,428429[1921];People
v.NemesioV.Ganan,Jr.,HarleyS.Fabicon,G.R.No.119722,2
December1996,at25.
51
TSN,15November1988,1011.
52
TSN,15November1988,1417.
53
TSN,16January1989,8;2425.
541
VOL.286,FEBRUARY24,1998 541
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
Jison for irregularities, while Superticioso was informed by
FRANCISCOthatTingsonwasdismissedforlossofconfidence.
SuperticiosolikewisedeniedthatMONINAreceivedmoneyfrom
FRANCISCOs office, neither was there a standing order from
FRANCISCOtoreleasefundstoher.54
Itisatonceobviousthatthetestimoniesofthesewitnessesfor
FRANCISCO are likewise insufficient to overcome MONINAs
evidence. The former merely consist of denials as regards the
latters having gone to Nelly Garden or having received her
allowancefromFRANCISCOsoffice,which,beingintheformof
negativetestimony,necessarilystandinfirmasagainstpositive
testimony;55bareassertionsasregardsthedismissalofBaylosis;
ignorance of FRANCISCOs personal expenses incapable of
evincing that FRANCISCO did not provide MONINA with an
allowance; or hearsay evidence as regards the cause for the
dismissals of Baylosis and Tingson. But what then serves as
thecoupdegrceisthatdespiteSuperticiososclaimthathedid
not know MONINA,56when confronted with Exhibit H, a
telephonetollticketindicatingthaton18May1971,MONINA
called a certain Eing at FRANCISCOs office, Superticioso
admittedthathisnicknamewasIingandthattherewasno
otherpersonnamedIinginFRANCISCOsoffice.57
All told, MONINAs evidence hurdled the high standard of
proof required for the success of an action to establish ones
illegitimatefiliationwhenrelyingupontheprovisionsregarding
openandcontinuouspossessionoranyothermeansallowedby
theRulesofCourtandspeciallaws;moreover,MONINAproved
herfiliationbymorethanmerepreponderanceofevidence.
The last assigned error concerning laches likewise fails to
convince.Theessentialelementsoflachesare:(1)conducton
_______________
54
TSN,17April1989,6,8,1012,29.
55
People v. Antonio,233 SCRA 283, 299 [1994];Batiquin v.
CourtofAppeals,258SCRA334,343[1996].
56
TSN,17April1989,13.
57
TSN,17April1989,2931.
542
542 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Jisonvs.CourtofAppeals
thepartofthedefendant,orofoneunderwhomheclaims,giving
risetothesituationofwhichthecomplaintseeksaremedy;(2)
delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as
havingbeenaffordedanopportunitytoinstituteasuit;(3)lackof
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complaintwouldasserttherightinwhichhebaseshissuit;and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accordedtothecomplainant,orthesuitisnotheldbarred. 58The
lastelementistheoriginofthedoctrinethatstaledemandsapply
onlywherebyreasonofthelapseoftimeitwouldbeinequitable
toallowapartytoenforcehislegalrights.59
As FRANCISCO set up laches as an affirmative defense, it
wasincumbentuponhimtoprovetheexistenceofitselements.
However, he only succeeded in showing MONINAs delay in
asserting her claim, but miserably failed to prove the last
element.Inanyevent,itmustbestressedthatlachesisbased
upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society,thediscouragementofstaleclaims,andisprincipallya
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claimtobeenforcedorasserted.Thereisnoabsoluteruleasto
whatconstituteslaches;eachcaseistobedeterminedaccording
to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is
addressedtothesounddiscretionofthecourt,andsinceitisan
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to
perpetuatefraud andinjustice. 60Sincetheinstant case involves
paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, MONINA filed her
actionwellwithintheperiodgrantedherbyapositiveprovision
of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would
clearlybeinequitableandunjust.
WHEREFORE,INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOING,thepetition
ishereby DENIED andthechallengeddecisionof theCourtof
Appealsof27April1995inCAG.R.CVNo.32860isAFFIRMED.
Costsagainstpetitioner.
SOORDERED.
Bellosillo,Vitug,PanganibanandQuisumbing,
JJ.,concur.
Petitiondenied;Challengeddecisionaffirmed.
Notes.ThephrasevestedoracquiredrightsunderArticle
256isnotdefinedbytheFamilyCode,leavingittothecourtsto
determinewhatitmeansaseachparticularissueissubmittedto
them.(Aruego,Jr.vs.CourtofAppeals,254SCRA711[1996])
IntheabsenceoftitlesindicatedinArt.265oftheCivilCode,
thefiliationofchildrenmaybeprovenbycontinuouspossessionof
thestatusofalegitimatechildandbyanyothermeansallowed
by the Rules of Court or special laws. (Balogbog vs. Court of
Appeals,269SCRA259[1997])
G.R.No.196735.May5,2014.*
PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,vs.DANILO
FELICIANO,JR.,JULIUSVICTORMEDALLA,CHRISTOPHER
SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL
BELTRANALVIR,accusedappellants.
RemedialLaw;CriminalProcedure;ProsecutionofOffenses;
ProbableCause;DueProcess;Uponafindingofprobablecause,
aninformationisfiledbytheprosecutoragainsttheaccused,in
compliancewiththedueprocessofthelaw.Itisenshrinedinour
Bill of Rights that [n]o person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without dueprocess oflaw.This includes the
rightoftheaccusedtobepresumedinnocentuntilprovenguilty
andtobeinformedofthenatureandaccusationagainsthim.
Uponafindingof
_______________
*THIRDDIVISION.
149
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 149
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor
against the accused, in compliance with the due process of the
law.Rule110,Section1,paragraph1oftheRulesofCriminal
Procedureprovidesthat:Acomplaintorinformationissufficient
ifitstatesthenameoftheaccused;thedesignationoftheoffense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximatedateofthecommissionoftheoffense;andtheplace
wheretheoffensewascommitted.
CriminalLaw;AggravatingCircumstances;Failuretostate
anaggravatingcircumstance,evenifdulyprovenattrial,willnot
be appreciated as such.Itshould be remembered that every
aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information.Failuretostateanaggravatingcircumstance,evenif
duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such.Itwas,
therefore,incumbentontheprosecutiontostatetheaggravating
circumstanceofwearingmasksand/orotherformsofdisguisein
theinformationinorderforalltheevidence,introducedtothat
effect,tobeadmissiblebythetrialcourt.
 Same; Same; Disguise; In criminal cases, disguise is an RemedialLaw; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Asa general
aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the rule,thefindingsoffactbythetrialcourt,whenaffirmedbythe
accusedtoremainanonymousandunidentifiableashecarriesout appellatecourt,aregivengreatweightandcredenceonreview.
his crimes.In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating As a general rule, the findingsof fact by the trial court, when
circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the accused to affirmed by the appellate court, are given great weight and
remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his credenceonreview.TherationaleforthiswasexplainedinPeople
crimes. The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial v.DanielQuijada,259SCRA191(1996),asfollows:Settledisthe
evidencethattendstoprovethattheaccusedweremaskedbut rulethatthefactualfindingsofthetrialcourt,especiallyonthe
themasksfelloffdoesnotpreventthemfromincludingdisguise credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect.
as an aggravating circumstance.What is important in alleging For,thetrialcourthastheadvantageofobservingthewitnesses
disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was throughthedifferentindicatorsoftruthfulnessorfalsehood,such
aconcealmentofidentitybytheaccused.Theinclusionofdisguise astheangryflushofaninsistedassertionorthesuddenpallorof
intheinformationwas,therefore,enoughtosufficientlyapprise adiscoveredlieorthetremulousmutterofareluctantansweror
theaccusedthatinthecommissionoftheoffensetheywerebeing the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the
chargedwith,theytriedtoconcealtheiridentity. blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the
Same; Conspiracy; Conspiracypresupposesthat theact of flippantorsneeringtone,theheat,thecalmness,theyawn,the
oneistheactofall.Theinformationchargesconspiracyamong sigh,thecandororlackofit,thescantorfullrealizationofthe
theaccused.Conspiracypresupposesthattheactofoneistheact solemnityofanoath,thecarriageandmien.Thereare,ofcourse,
of all.This would mean all the accused had been one intheir recognized exceptions to this rule. InPeoplev.Leticia
plantoconcealtheiridentityeveniftherewasevidencelateron Labarias,217SCRA 483 (1993), thiscourtstated that:Itisthe
toprovethatsomeofthemmightnothavedoneso.Inanycase, policy of this Court to sustain the factual findings of the trial
theaccused courtonthereasonableassumptionthatitisinabetterposition
150 toassesstheevidencebeforeit,particularlythetestimoniesofthe
1 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED witnesses,whorevealmuchofthemselvesbytheirdeportmenton
50 thestand.Theexceptionthatmakestheruleiswheresuch
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr. findings areclearly arbitrary or erroneousas when they
were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated aretainted with bias or hostilityor areso lacking in
murder, and attempted murder. All that is needed for the basisas to suggest that they were reached without the
informationtobesufficientisthattheelementsofthecrimehave carefulstudyandperceptivenessthatshouldcharacterize
beenallegedandthattherearesufficientdetailsastothetime, ajudicialdecision.
place,andpersonsinvolvedintheoffense.
 Same;Evidence;Witnesses;Itwouldbeinlinewithhuman
experience that a victim or an eyewitness of a crime would
endeavortofindwaystoidentifytheassailantsothatintheevent
that he or she survives, the criminal could be apprehended.
Itwould be in line with human experience that a victim or an
eyewitnessofacrimewouldendeavortofindwaystoidentifythe
assailantsothatinthe
151
VOL.724,MAY5,2014
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
eventthat he or she survives, the criminal could be
apprehended.Ithasalsobeenpreviouslyheldthat:Itisthemost
naturalreactionforvictimsofcriminalviolencetostrivetosee
thelooksandfacesoftheirassailantsandobservethemannerin
which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the
assailant and body movements thereof, creates a lasting
impressionwhichcannotbeeasilyerasedfromtheirmemory.
Same;Same;Same;Asageneralrule,awitnesscantestify
only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
whicharederivedfromhisownperception.As a generalrule,
[a]witnesscantestifyonlytothefactsheknowsofhispersonal
knowledge;thatis,whichare derivedfromhis ownperception,
xxx.All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are
inadmissibleasevidence.TheRulesof Court,however,provide
severalexceptionstothegeneralrule,andoneofwhichiswhen
the evidence is part ofres gestae,thus: Section 42.Part of res
gestae.Statementsmadebyapersonwhileastartingoccurrence
istakingplaceorimmediatelypriororsubsequenttheretowith
respecttothecircumstancesthereof,maybegiveninevidenceas
partofresgestae.So,also,statementsaccompanyinganequivocal
actmaterialtotheissue,andgivingitalegalsignificance,maybe
receivedaspartoftheresgestae.
Same;Same;ResGestae;Consideringthatthestatementsof
the bystanders were made immediately after the startling
occurrence,theyare,infact,admissibleasevidencegiveninres
gestae.There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group
peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a startling
occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders
151 weremadeimmediatelyafterthestartlingoccurrence,theyare,
infact,admissibleasevidencegiveninresgestae.
Criminal Law; Alibi; It is settled that the defense of alibi
cannotprevailoverthepositiveidentificationofthevictim.Itis
settledthatthedefenseofalibicannotprevailoverthepositive
identificationofthevictim.InPeoplev.BenjaminPeteluna,689
SCRA 190 (2013), this court is stated that: xxx In this
case,thevictims wereableto positively identify their attackers
whiletheaccusedappellantsmerelyofferedalibisanddenialsas
theirdefense.Thecredibilityofthevictimswasupheldbyboth
thetrialcourtandthe
152
1 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
52
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
appellatecourtwhilegivinglittlecredencetotheaccused
appellantsalibis. There is, thus, no reason to disturb their
findings.
Same;AggravatingCircumstances;Treachery;Theswiftness
and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the
victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery,
therefore, was present in this case.The victims, who were
unarmed,werealsoattackedwithleadpipesandbaseballbats.
Theonlywaytheycouldparrytheblowswaswiththeirarms.In
asituationwheretheywereunarmedandoutnumbered,itwould
beimpossibleforthemtofightbackagainsttheattackers.The
attackalsohappenedinlessthanaminute,whichwouldpreclude
any possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until
aftertheincident.Theswiftnessandthesuddennessoftheattack
gavenoopportunityforthevictimstoretaliateoreventodefend
themselves.Treachery,therefore,waspresentinthiscase.
Same;Conspiracy;Conspiracy,onceproven,hastheeffectof
attachingliabilitytoalloftheaccused,regardlessoftheirdegree
of participation.Itshould be remembered that the trial court
found that there was conspiracy among the accused
appellantsand the appellate court sustained this
finding.Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching
liability to all ofthe accused, regardless of their degree of
participation,thus:Onceanexpressorimpliedconspiracyis
proved,alloftheconspiratorsareliableascoprincipals
regardlessoftheextentandcharacteroftheirrespective
active participation in the commission of the crime or
crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
becauseincontemplationoflawtheactofoneistheactof
all.Theforegoing ruleisanchoredon the soundprinciplethat
whentwoormorepersonsunitetoaccomplishacriminalobject,
whetherthrough thephysical volitionofone,orall, proceeding
severallyorcollectively,eachindividualwhoseevilwillactively
contributestothewrongdoingisinlawresponsibleforthewhole,
thesameasthoughperformedbyhimselfalone.Althoughitis
axiomaticthatnooneisliableforactsotherthanhisown,when
twoormorepersonsagreeorconspiretocommitacrime,eachis
responsibleforalltheactsoftheothers,doneinfurtheranceof
theagreementorconspiracy.Theimpositionofcollectiveliability
upontheconspiratorsisclearlyexplainedinonecasewherethis
Court held that ... it is impossible to graduate the separate
liabilityofeach(conspirator)with
153
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 153
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
out taking into consideration the close and inseparable
relationofeachofthemwiththecriminalact,forthecommission
ofwhichtheyallactedbycommonagreement...Thecrimemust
therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which
existedbetweenthe...accused,beregardedastheactoftheband
or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible.Verily, the moment it is established that the
malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commissionofthefelonyproved,collectiveliabilityofthe
accusedconspiratorsattachesbyreasonoftheconspiracy,
andthecourtshallnotspeculatenoreveninvestigateas
to the actual degree of participation of each of the
perpetratorspresentatthesceneofthecrime.xxx.
ABAD,J.,DissentingOpinion:
Remedial Law; Evidence; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt;
View that in every criminal action, the prosecution has to
establishtheidentityoftheoffender,likethecrimeitself,byproof
beyond reasonable doubt.In every criminal action, the
prosecutionhastoestablishtheidentityoftheoffender,likethe
crime itself, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, its first
duty is to prove the identity of the offender for, even if the
commissionoftheoffensecanbeestablished,noconvictioncan
takeplacewithoutproofofhisidentitybeyondreasonabledoubt.
CriminalLaw;Alibi;Viewthattrue,alibiisaweakdefense
inthefaceofpositivetestimoniesofprosecutionwitnessesthatthe
accused committed the crime.True,alibiis a weak defense in
thefaceofpositivetestimoniesofprosecutionwitnessesthatthe
accused committed the crime. But such testimonies must be
credible and must come from credible witnesses. Several
circumstancesmilitateagainstthemaulingvictimstestimonies
thattheywereabletoidentifytheirattackers.
RemedialLaw;Evidence;Viewthatthecircumstancesofthe
separateidentifications,takingplaceinsplitseconds,defybelief.
Justwhatarethechancesthatfouroutoffivewitnesseswho
werefleeingand,indeed,runningfortheirliveswouldjustlook
back,riskstumblingandcrashingdown,toputinevidencethe
identitiesofsomeofthosewhomtheRTCandtheCAconvicted?
Verylittle.Itappearsaconvenientexcuseforprovidingevidence
wherenone
154
1 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
54
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
existed. The circumstances of the separate identifications,
takingplaceinsplitseconds,defybelief.Whatbafflesmeisthe
factthatthetrialcourtacquittedSJMoranowhomSRFortesand
GastonidentifiedwhilelookingbackontherunbutconvictedSJ
Zingapan,Soliva,andMedallawhowerealsotargetsoflookback
testimonies.
Same; Same; Res Gestae; View that the statement of the
bystanders,madewhilesomeofthewoundedwerebleedingthere
andtheexcitementlingered,maybegiveninevidenceaspartof
the res gestae.The statement of the bystanders, made while
some of the wounded were bleeding there and the excitement
lingered, may be given in evidence as part of theres gestae.
Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence provides:
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae.Statements made by a person
whileastartlingoccurrenceistakingplaceorimmediatelyprior
orsubsequenttheretowithrespecttothecircumstancesthereof,
maybegiveninevidenceaspartoftheresgestae.xxxThese
statementsarespontaneousreactionsinspiredbytheexcitement
ofthemoment.Itmaybeassumedthat,unliketardywitnesses,
thebystanderswhomadethestatementshadnoopportunityto
deliberate or fabricate. The words they uttered are part of the
commotiontheydescribed.Theresgestaecontradictstheattempt
ofprosecutionwitnessestoshowthatanumberoftheattackers
woremasksorthatidentificationwaspossiblebecausethemasks
ofsomefelloff.
ConstitutionalLaw;RighttoRemainSilent;Viewthatthe
righttosilenceisgiventopersonsundersuspicionforcommitting
somecrimes,nottothevictimswhosedutyistopromptlyassist
thepoliceinvestigatorsinpinpointingcriminalresponsibilities.
The right to silence is given to persons under suspicion for
committing some crimes, not to the victims whose duty is to
promptly assist the police investigators in pinpointing criminal
responsibilities.Noevidencehasbeenpresentedtoshowthatthe
UPpoliceforcewaspartialtotheopposingfraternity.Iamthus
unabletoblametheaccusedforbelievingthattheonlypossible
reason in this case for withholding informationfromthe police
fromdayonewasthatthevictimsandtheircounselhadyetto
puttheiractstogether.
CriminalLaw;AggravatingCircumstances;Treachery;View
thatwhiletheattackbymaskedmenisdoublycondemnable,not
only for the treachery involved but also for the cowardice and
deception
155
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 155
 Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
thatcamewithit,theSupremeCourtcannothastilysendto
prison those charged with these crimes without proof beyond
reasonabledoubtthattheycommittedthem.Whiletheattackby
maskedmen is doublycondemnable,notonlyforthetreachery
involvedbutalsoforthecowardiceanddeceptionthatcamewith
it, the Court cannot hastily send to prison those charged with
these crimes without proof beyond reasonable doubt that they
committed them. The Constitution ordains this. In a case like
this, where the identities and participations of the several
accused involved are difficult to prove, the ideal solution is to
convincetheleastguiltyofthem,theonewhoshowedthemost
reluctance and delivered the lightest blows, to turn state
witness.Iamunabletosayifeffortsinthisdirectionweretaken
bytheNBIortheprosecutorstoensurethattheyhadagoodcase.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
DeCastro & Cagampang Law Officesforaccusedappellant
ChristopherSoliva.
Villareal, Rosacia, Dino & Patag Law Officesfor appellant
Alvir.
EstelitoP.MendozaforappellantZingapan.
LEONEN,J.:
Itisinthehallowedgroundsofauniversitywherestudents,
faculty,andresearchpersonnelshouldfeelsafest.Afterall,thisis
whereideasthatcouldprobablysolvethesordidrealitiesinthis
worldarepeacefullynurturedanddebated.Universitiesproduce
hope.Theyincubateallouryouthfuldreams.
Yet,thereareelementswithinthisacademicmilieuthattrade
misplaced concepts of perverse brotherhood for these hopes.
Fraternityrumblesexistbecauseofpastimpunity.
156
156 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
Thishasresultedinasenselessdeathwhosejusticeisnowthe
subject matter of this case.Itis rare that these cases are
prosecuted.Itisevenmoreextraordinarythattherearecredible
witnesses who present themselves courageously before an able
andexperiencedtrialcourtjudge.
Thiscultureofimpunitymuststop.Thereisnospaceinthis
society for hooliganism disguised as fraternity rumbles. The
perpetrators must stand and suffer the legal consequences of
theiractions.Theymustdosoforthereisanindividualwhonow
lies dead, robbed of his dreams and the dreams of his family.
Excruciatinggriefforthemwillneverbeenough.
ItisundisputedthatonDecember8,1994,ataround12:30to
1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of theSigma
RhoFraternitywereeatinglunchattheBeachHouseCanteen,
near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines,
Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men
carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained
injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis
Venturina,diedfromhisinjuries.
Aninformation[1]formurder,docketedasCriminalCaseNo.
Q9561133, was filed against several members of theScintilla
JurisFraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius
VictorL.Medalla, WarrenL.Zingapan, Robert Michael Beltran
Alvir,ChristopherL.Soliva,ReynaldoG.Ablanida,CarloJolette
Fajardo, George Morano, Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle
Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero, and Rodolfo Pealosa, Jr. with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219. The
informationreads:
That on or about the 8thday of December 1994, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused, wearing masks
and/orotherformsofdisguise,conspiring,confederatingwith
otherpersonswhosetrue
_______________
[1]Originalrecords,Vol.I,p.3.
157
VOL.724,MAY5,2014
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been
ascertained, and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill, qualified with treachery, and with evident premeditation,
takingadvantageofsuperiorstrength,armedwithbaseballbats,
leadpipes,andcutters,didthenandtherewillfully,unlawfully
andfeloniouslyattack,assaultandemploypersonalviolenceupon
thepersonofDENNISF.VENTURINA,bythenandtherehitting
himontheheadandclubbinghimondifferentpartsofhisbody
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries which
werethedirectandimmediatecauseofhisdeath,tothedamage
and prejudice of the heirs of said DENNIS F. VENTURINA.
(Emphasissupplied)
Separate informations were also filed against them for the
attempted murder ofSigmaRhoFraternity members Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr.,[2]Cristobal Gaston, Jr.,[3]and Leandro
Lachica,[4]and the frustrated murder ofSigma RhoFraternity
membersMervinNatalicio[5]andArnelFortes.[6]Only11ofthe
accusedstoodtrialsinceoneoftheaccused,BenedictGuerrero,
remainedatlarge.
Atrialonthemeritsensued.
Thefacts,accordingtotheprosecution,areasfollows:
Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, Dennis Venturina, Mervin
Natalicio, Cristobal Gaston, Jr., Felix Tumaneng,[7]and Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr. are all members of theSigma RhoFraternity.
OnDecember8,1994, at around12:30 to 1:00 p.m., theywere
havinglunchatBeachHouseCanteen,locatedatthebackofthe
MainLibraryoftheUniversityofthePhilippines,
_______________
[2]DocketedasQ9561134.
157 [3]DocketedasQ9561135.
[4]DocketedasQ9561136.
[5]DocketedasQ9561137.
[6]DocketedasQ9561138.
[7]Felix Tumaneng was not presented as a witness by the
prosecution.
158
158 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
Diliman, Quezon City.[8]Suddenly,Dennis Venturina
shouted,Brods,brods![9]
According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon ofSigma
RhoFraternity,helookedaroundwhenVenturinashouted,and
he saw about ten (10) men charging toward them.[10]Themen
werearmedwithbaseballbatsandleadpipes,andtheirheads
were covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts.[11]Within a
fewseconds,five(5)ofthemenstartedattackinghim,hittinghim
withtheirleadpipes.[12]Duringtheattack,herecognizedoneof
theattackersasRobertMichaelBeltranAlvirbecausehismask
felloff.[13]
Lachica tried to parry the blows of his attackers, suffering
scratchesandcontusions.[14]Hewas,however,abletoruntothe
nearby College of Education.[15]Just before reaching it, he
looked back and saw Warren Zingapan and Julius
VictorL.Medalla holding lead pipes and standing where the
commotionwas.[16]Bothofthemdidnothavetheirmaskson.
[17]HewasfamiliarwithAlvir,Zingapan,andMedallabecause
he often saw them in the College of Social Sciences and
Philosophy (CSSP) andZingapanused tobe hisfriend.[18]The
attacklastedaboutthirty(30)tofortyfive(45)seconds.[19]
According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon
ofSigmaRho,helookedtohisleftwhenVenturinashouted.[20]
_______________
[8]TSN,June5,1995,pp.911.
[9]TSN,July3,1995,p.7. menwithbaseballbatsandleadpipes.Someofthemworepieces
[10]TSN,June5,1995,p.25.
[11]Id.,atpp.1112.
[12]Id.,atp.12.
[13]Id.
[14]Id.,atp.13.
[15]Id.,atpp.1314.
[16]Id.,atpp.4546.
[17]Id.,atpp.1314.
[18]Id.
[19]Id.,atp.33.
[20]TSN,July3,1995,p.7.
159Hesawabout fifteen(15)totwenty(20)men, mostof who
werewearingmasks,runningtowardthem.[21]Hewasstunned,
and he started running.[22]He stumbled over the protruding
rootsofatree.[23]Hegotup,buttheattackerscameafterhim
andbeathimupwithleadpipesandbaseballbatsuntilhefell
down.[24]Whilehewasparryingtheblows,herecognizedtwo(2)
oftheattackersasWarrenZingapanandChristopherL.Soliva
since they were not wearing any masks.[25]After about thirty
(30)seconds,theystoppedhittinghim.[26]Hewaslyingonhis
backandwhenhelookedup,hesawanothergroupoffour(4)to
five (5) men coming toward him, led by Benedict Guerrero.
[27]This group also beat him up.[28]He did not move until
anothergroupofmaskedmenbeathimupforaboutfive(5)to
eight (8) seconds.[29]When the attacks ceased, he was found
lyingontheground.[30]Severalbystandersbroughthimtothe
U.P. Infirmary where he stayed for more than a week for the
treatmentofhiswoundsandfractures.[31]
AccordingtoCesarMangrobang,Jr.,memberofSigmaRho,
healsolookedbackwhenVenturinashoutedandsawagroupof
ofclotharoundtheirheads.[32]Heranwhentheyattacked,but
two (2) men, whose faces were covered with pieces of cloth,
blockedhiswayandhithimwithleadpipes.[33]Whilerunning
andparryingtheblows,herecognizedthemas
_______________
[21]Id.
[22]Id.,atp.10.
[23]Id.
[24]Id.,atpp.1213.
[25]Id.,atpp.1416.
[26]Id.,atp.16.
[27]Id.,atpp.1617.
[28]Id.,atp.17.
[29]Id.,atp.19.
[30]Id.,atpp.1920.
[31]Id.
[32]TSN,September28,1995,pp.1415.
[33]Id.,atp.16.
160
160 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
GilbertMerleMagpantayandCarloJoletteFajardobecause
theirmasksfelloff.[34]Hesuccessfullyevadedhisattackersand
rantotheMainLibrary.[35]Hethendecidedthatheneededto
helphisfraternitybrothersandturnedbacktowardBeachHouse.
[36]There, he saw Venturina lying on the ground.[37]Danilo
Feliciano,Jr.wasbeatingVenturinaupwithaleadpipewhile
RaymundE.NaragwasaimingtohitVenturina.[38]Whenthey
sawhim,theywenttowardhisdirection.[39]Theywereaboutto
hit him when somebody shouted that policemen were coming.
FelicianoandNaragthenranaway.[40]
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. then saw Arnel Fortes. Fortes
accompaniedhimtohiscarsotheycouldbringVenturinatothe
U.P.Infirmary.[41]Whentheybroughtthecarover,otherpeople,
presumably bystanders, were already loading Venturina into
another vehicle.[42]They followed that vehicle to the U.P.
Infirmary where they saw Natalicio.[43]He stayed at the
infirmaryuntilthefollowingmorning.[44]
AccordingtoCristobalGaston,Jr.,memberofSigmaRho,he
immediately stood up when he heard someone
shout,Brods![45]Hesawagroupofmenchargingtowardthem
carrying lead pipes and baseball bats.[46]Most of them had
piecesofclothcoveringtheirfaces.[47]Hewasabouttorunwhen
two(2)
_______________
[34]Id.,atpp.1718.
[35]Id.,atpp.2021.
[36]Id.,atpp.2122.
[37]Id.,atp.23.
[38]Id.,atpp.2326.
[39]Id.,atp.28.
[40]Id.,atpp.2829.
[41]Id.,atp.33.
[42]Id.,atp.34.
[43]Id.,atp.35.
[44]Id.,atp.36.
[45]TSN,October11,1995,p.15.
[46]Id.
[47]Id.,atpp.1617.
161
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 161
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
of the attackers approached him.[48]One struck him with a
heavypipewhiletheotherstabbedhimwithabladedinstrument.
[49]Hewasabletoparrymostoftheblowsfromtheleadpipe,
but he sustained stab wounds on the chest and on his left
forearm.[50]Hewasabletorunaway.[51]Whenhesensedthatno
onewaschasinghim,helookedbacktoBeachHouseCanteenand
sawDaniloFeliciano,Jr.,WarrenZingapan,andGeorgeMorano.
[52]Hedecidedtogobacktothecanteentohelphisfraternity
brothers.[53]Whenhearrived,hedidnotseeanyofhisfraternity
brothersbutonlysawtheoneswhoattackedthem.[54]Heended
up going to their hangout instead to meet with his other
fraternity brothers.[55]They then proceeded to the College of
Lawwheretherestofthefraternitywasalreadydiscussingthe
incident.[56]
AccordingtoArnelFortes,memberofSigmaRho,healsoran
when he saw the group of attackers coming toward them.
[57]When he looked back, he saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr. hitting
Venturina.[58]He was also able to see Warren Zingapan and
GeorgeMoranoatthescene.[59]
 LeandroLachica,inthemeantime,uponreachingtheCollege U.P. where theSigma RhoFraternity members held a meeting.
ofEducation,boardedajeepneytotheCollegeofLawtowaitfor [65]
theirotherfraternitybrothers.[60]Oneofhisfraternitybrothers, On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers ofSigma
PeterCorvera,toldhimthathereceivedinforma Rhoadvised the victims to lodge their complaints with the
_______________ NationalBureauofInvestigation.[66]Theircounsel,Atty.Frank
[48]Id.,atpp.1718. Chavez,toldtheU.P.Policethatthevictimswouldbegivingtheir
[49]Id.,atpp.1920. statements before the National Bureau of Investigation,
[50]Id.,atp.24. promisingtogivetheU.P.Policecopiesoftheirstatements.Inthe
[51]Id.,atp.31. meantime,VenturinawastransferredfromtheU.P.Infirmaryto
St.LukesHospitalonDecember8,1994.HediedonDecember
[52]Id.,atpp.3132.
10,1994.[67]
[53]Id.,atp.33. On December 11, 1994, an autopsy was conducted on the
[54]Id.,atpp.3435. cadaverofDennisVenturina.[68]Dr.RolandoVictoria,amedico
[55]Id.,atp.40. legalofficeroftheNationalBureauofInvestigation,foundthat
[56]Id.,atpp.4445. Venturina had several contusions located at the back of the
[57]TSN,October30,1995,p.74. upper left arm and hematoma on the back of both
[58]Id.,atpp.3031. hands,[69]two(2)laceratedwoundsatthebackofthehead,[70]
_______________
[59]Id.,atpp.7778.
[61]TSN,June5,1995,p.14.
[60]TSN,June21,1995,pp.56.
162 [62]Id.
162 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED [63]Id.,atpp.1415.
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr. [64]Id.,atp.17.
tionthatmembersofScintillaJuriswereseeninthewestwingof [65]Id.,atp.15.
theMainLibraryandwereregroupinginSMNorth.[61]Lachica [66]Id.,atp.20.
and his group then set off for SM North to confrontScintilla [67]TSN,September16,1996,pp.1014.
Jurisandidentifytheirattackers.[62] [68]TSN,July24,1995,pp.67.
When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones were [69]Id.,atpp.1416.
thrown at them.[63]Lachica saw Robert Michael Beltran Alvir [70]Id.,atpp.1617.
andWarrenZingapanandacertainCarloTaparan.[64]Theyhad 163
nochoicebuttogetawayfromthemallandproceedinsteadto VOL.724,MAY5,2014 163
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
generalizedhematomaontheskull,[71]severalfracturesonthe
head,[72]and intercranial hemmorrhage.[73]The injuries,
accordingtoDr.Victoria,couldhavebeencausedbyahardblunt
object.[74]Dr. Victoria concluded that Venturina died of
traumaticheadinjuries.[75]
On December 12, 1994, Lachica, Natalicio, Mangrobang,
Fortes,andGastonexecutedtheirrespectiveaffidavits[76]before
theNationalBureauofInvestigationandunderwentmedicolegal
examinations[77]with their medicolegal officer, Dr. Aurelio
Villena.AccordingtoDr.Villena,hefoundthatMervinNatalicio
hadlaceratedwoundsonthetopofthehead,abovetheleftear,
andonthefingers;contusedabrasionsonbothknees;contusion
ontheleftlegandthigh,[78]allofwhichcouldhavebeencaused
by any hard, blunt object. These injuries required medical
attendanceforaperiodoften(10)daystothirty(30)daysfrom
thedateofinfliction.[79]
Dr.VillenafoundonArnelForteslaceratedwoundsonthe
head and on the right leg which could have been caused by a
bluntinstrument.[80]Theseinjuriesrequiredhospitalizationfor
aperiodoften(10)daystothirty(30)daysfromdateofinfliction.
[81]HealsofoundonCesarMangrobang,Jr.ahealedabrasion
ontheleftforearmwhichcouldpossiblybecausedbycontactwith
[a]roughhardsurfaceandwouldrequireone
_______________
[71]Id.,atp.18.
[72]Id.,atpp.1920.
[73]Id.,atp.22.
[74]Id.,atp.41.
[75]Id.,atp.23.
[76]TSN,June5,1995,p.17;TSN,July3,1995,p.20;TSN,
September28,1995,pp.116117;TSN,October20,1995,p.34;
TSN,October11,1995,p.48.
[77]TSN,June5,1995,p.17.
[78]TSN,July31,1995,p.14.
[79]Id.,atp.46.
[80]Id.,atpp.2628.
[81]Id.,atp.46.
164
164 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
(1)tonine(9)daysofmedicalattention.[82]HefoundonLeandro
Lachica contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm
andlaceratedwoundontheinfrascapulararea,leftside.[83]On
Christopher Gaston, Jr. he found lacerated wounds on the
anterior chest, left side, left forearm; swollen knuckles of both
hands;contusionsonthemidauxiliaryleftside,leftforearmand
laceratedwoundontheinfrascapulararea,leftside.[84]
On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution presented its
evidenceinchief,thecourtgrantedthedemurrertoevidencefiled
byRodolfoPealosa,Jr.onthegroundthathewasnotidentified
bytheprosecutionswitnessesandthathewasnotmentionedin
anyofthedocumentaryevidenceoftheprosecution.[85]
Upon the presentation of their evidence, the defense
introducedtheirownstatementofthefacts,asfollows:
AccordingtoRomeoCabrera,[86]amemberoftheU.P.Police,
he was on foot patrol with another member of the U.P. Police,
OscarSalvador,atthetimeoftheincident.Theywerenearthe
CollegeofArtsandSciences(PalmaHall)whenhevaguelyheard
somebodyshouting,Rumble!Theywenttotheplacewherethe
allegedrumblewashappeningandsawinjuredmenbeinghelped
bybystanders.Theyhelpedaninjuredpersonboardtheservice
vehicleoftheBeachHouseCanteen.Theyaskedwhathisname
was,andherepliedthathewasMervinNatalicio.Whenheasked
Nataliciowhohithim,thelatterwasnotabletoreplybutinstead
told him that his attackers were wearing masks. Oscar
Salvador[87]corroboratedhistestimony.
_______________
[82]Id.,atp.401.
[83]Id.,atpp.3133.
[84]Id.
[85]RTCDecision,p.15.
[86]TSN,November11,1995.
[87]TSN,November20,1995.
165
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 165
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
Benjamin Lato,[88]a utility worker of the Beach House
Canteen, likewise testified that the identities of the attackers
were unrecognizable because of their masks. He, however,
admitted that he did not see the attack; he just saw a man
sprawledonthegroundatthetimeoftheincident.
FriscoCapilo,[89]autilityworkerofU.P.assignedtotheMain
Library,wasbuyingacigaretteatavendorlocatednearby.From
there,heallegedlysawthewholeincident.Hetestifiedthatten
(10)men,wearingeithermasksofredandblackbonnetsorwith
shirtscoveringtheirfaces,camefromaredcarparkednearby.He
alsosawthree(3)menbeinghitwithleadpipesbythemasked
men.Two(2)ofthemenfellafterbeinghit.Oneofthevictims
wasliftingtheothertohelphim,buttheattackersovertookhim.
Afterwards, the attackers ran away. He then saw students
helpingthosewhowereinjured.Helikewisehelpedincarrying
oneoftheinjuredvictims,whichhelaterfoundouttobeArnel
Fortes.
AU.P.studentandmemberoftheSigmaAlphaNuSorority,
Eda Panganiban,[90]testified that she and her friends were in
line to order lunch at the Beach House Canteen when a
commotionhappened.Shesawaroundfifteen(15)toeighteen(18)
maskedmenattackagroupofSigmaRhoans.Shedidnotseeany
maskfalloff.HersororitysisterandanotherU.P.student,Luz
Perez,[91]corroborated her story that the masked men were
unrecognizablebecauseoftheirmasks.Perez,however,admitted
that a member ofScintilla Jurisapproached her to make a
statement.
Another sorority sister, Bathalani Tiamzon,[92]testified on
substantially the same matters as Panganiban and Perez. She
alsostatedthatshesawapersonlyingonthegroundwho
_______________
[88]TSN,November27,1995.
[89]TSN,December4,1995.
[90]TSN,December11,1995.
[91]Id.
[92]TSN,December18,1995.
166
166 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
wasbeingbeatenupbyaboutthree(3)tofive(5)maskedmen.
Shealsostatedthatsomeofthemenwerewearingblackmasks
whilesomewerewearingwhitetshirtsasmasks.Shedidnotsee
anymaskfalloffthefacesoftheattackers.
AccordingtoFelicianaFeliciano,[93]accusedappellantDanilo
Feliciano,Jr.smother,hersonwasinPampangatovisithissick
grandfatheratthetimeoftheincident.Sheallegedthatherson
wenttoPampangabeforelunchthatdayandvisitedtheschool
wheresheteachestogettheirhousekeyfromher.
According to Robert Michael Beltran Alvir,[94]he had not
beenfeelingwellsinceDecember5,1994.Hesaidthathecould
nothavepossiblybeeninU.P.onDecember8,1994sincehewas
absentevenfromwork.Healsotestifiedthatheworeglassesand,
thus, could not have possibly been the person identified by
LeandroLachica.HealsostatedthathewasnotenrolledinU.P.
atthetimesincehewasworkingtosupporthimself.
According to Julius Victor Medalla,[95]he and another
classmate, Michael Vibas, were working on a school project on
December 8, 1994. He also claimed that he could not have
participated in the rumble as he had an injury affecting his
balance. The injury was caused by an incident inAugust 1994
whenhewasstruckintheheadbyanunknownassailant.His
testimonywascorroboratedbyJoseVictorSantos[96]whostated
that after lunch that day, Medalla played darts with him and,
afterwards,theywenttoJollibee.
Christopher Soliva,[97]on the other hand, testified that he
was eating lunch with his girlfriend and another friend in
Jollibee,Philcoa,onDecember8,1994.Theywentbackto
_______________
[93]TSN,November27,1995.
[94]TSN,February2,2000.
[95]TSN,September22,1999.
[96]TSN,August11,1999.
[97]TSN,June16,1999.
167
VOL.724,MAY5,2014
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
U.P.before1:00p.m.andwentstraighttotheirfraternityhang
outwherehewastoldthattherehadbeenarumbleattheMain
Library.HealsometseveralSigmaRhoansactingsuspiciouslyas
theypassedbythehangout.Theywerealsotoldbytheirhead,
Carlo Taparan, not to react to theSigma Rhoansand just go
home.AnnaCabahug,[98]hisgirlfriend,corroboratedhisstory.
WarrenZingapan[99]alsotestifiedthathewasnotinU.P.at
thetimeoftheincident.HeclaimedtohavegonetoSMNorthto
buyagiftforafriendsweddingbutranintoafraternitybrother.
He also alleged that someSigma Rhoansattacked them in SM
Norththatday.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its
decision[100]withthefindingthatRobertMichaelAlvir,Danilo
Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and
WarrenZingapanwereguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofmurder
and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other
penalties,thepenaltyofreclusionperpetua.[101]Thetrialcourt,
however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo,
Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and Raymund Narag.
[102]Thecase against BenedictGuerrerowasorderedarchived
bythecourtuntilhisapprehension.[103]
The trial court, in evaluating the voluminous evidence at
hand,concludedthat:
Afterajudiciousevaluationofthematter,theCourtisofthe
consideredview thatoftheten accused, some weresufficiently
identifiedandsomewerenot.TheCourtbelievesthatoutofthe
amorphousimagesduring
_______________
[98]TSN,November23,1998.
[99]TSN,May12,1999.
167 [100]Penned by the Hon. Jose Catral Mendoza, now an
AssociateJusticeofthisCourt(CARollo,pp.576644).
[101]RTCDecision,pp.8183.
[102]Id.,atpp.8283.
[103]Id.,atp.83.
168
168 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
thepandemonium,thebeleagueredvictimswereabletoespyand
identifysomeoftheattackersetchinganindelibleimpressionin
theirmemory.Inthisregard,theprosecutioneyewitnesseswere
emphaticthattheysawtheattackersrushtowardsthemwielding
deadlyweaponslikebaseballbats,leadpipes,piecesofwoodand
bladedones,andpounceontheirhaplessvictims,runafterthem,
and being present with one another at the scene of the crime
during the assault. Although each victim had a very strong
motivetoplacehisfraternityrivalspermanentlybehindbars,not
one of them testified against all of them.Ifthe prosecution
eyewitnesses,whowereallSigmaRhoans,weresimplybenton
convictingScintilla Jurismembers for that matter, they could
haveeasilytaggedeachandeverysingleaccusedasaparticipant
intheatrociousandbarbaricassaulttomakesurethatnoone
else would escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness named
onlyoneortwoandsomewerecandidenoughtosaythattheydid
notseewhodeliveredtheblowsagainstthem.[104]
Because one of the penalties meted outwas reclusion
perpetua,thecasewasbroughttothiscourtonautomaticappeal.
However,duetotheamendmentoftheRulesonAppeal,[105]the
casewasremandedtotheCourtofAppeals.[106]IntheCourtof
Appeals,thecasehadtobereraffledseveraltimes[107]beforeit
waseventuallyassignedtoPresidingJusticeAndresB.Reyes,Jr.
forthewritingofthedecision.
_______________
[104]Id.,atpp.4849.
[105]PerPeoplev.Mateo,G.R.Nos.14767887,July7,2004,
433SCRA640,whichmodifiedtherulesondirectappealtothe
SupremeCourt.
[106]Per resolution of this Court dated April 13, 2005,
CARollo,p.297.
[107]Justice Romeo F. Barza voluntarily inhibited due to
membership inSigma RhoFraternity. Justices Celia C. Librea
LeagogoandIsaiasP.Dicdicanalsovoluntarilyinhibited,butthe
reasonwasnotshownintherecords.
169
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 169
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
OnDecember26,2010,theCourtofAppeals,inaSpecialFirst
DivisionofFive,affirmed[108]thedecisionoftheRegionalTrial
Court, with three (3) members concurring[109]and one
(1)dissenting.[110]
ThedecisionoftheCourtofAppealswasthenbroughttothis
courtforreview.
The issue before this court is whether the prosecution was
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellants
attacked private complainants and caused the death of Dennis
Venturina.
On the basis, however, of the arguments presented to this
courtbybothparties,theissuemaybefurtherrefined,thus:
1.Whether accusedappellants constitutional
rights were violated when the information against
them contained the aggravating circumstance of the
use of masks despite the prosecution presenting
witnessestoprovethatthemasksfelloff;and
2.Whether the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals correctly ruled, on the basis of the
evidence, that accusedappellants were sufficiently
identified.
I
An information is sufficient when
the accused is fully apprised of
the charge against him to enable
himtopreparehisdefense
 Itis the argument of appellants that the information filed
againstthemviolatestheirconstitutionalrighttobeinformed
_______________
[108]Rollo,pp.472;CARollo,pp.14801551.
[109]Justices Amelita G. Tolentino, Jose C. Reyes, Jr., and
MariflorP.PunzalanCastillo.
[110]JusticeStephenC.Cruz.
170
170 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. They
arguethattheprosecutionshouldnothaveincludedthephrase
wearingmasksand/orotherformsofdisguiseintheinformation
sincetheywerepresentingtestimonialevidencethatnotallthe
accusedwerewearingmasksorthattheirmasksfelloff.
ItisenshrinedinourBillofRightsthat[n]opersonshallbe
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.[111]Thisincludestherightoftheaccusedtobepresumed
innocentuntilprovenguiltyandtobeinformedofthenatureand
accusationagainsthim.[112]
Uponafindingofprobablecause,aninformationisfiledby
theprosecutoragainsttheaccused,incompliancewiththedue
processofthelaw.Rule110,Section1,paragraph1oftheRules
ofCriminalProcedureprovidesthat:
Acomplaintorinformationissufficientifitstatesthenameof
theaccused;thedesignationoftheoffensegivenbythestatute;
theactsoromissionscomplainedofasconstitutingtheoffense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commissionoftheoffense;andtheplacewheretheoffensewas
committed.
InPeoplev.WilsonLabeo,[113]thiscourthasstatedthat:
ThetestofsufficiencyofInformationiswhetheritenablesa
personofcommonunderstandingtoknowthechargeagainsthim,
andthecourttorenderjudgmentproperly.xxxThepurposeisto
allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding
surprisesduringthetrial.[114]
_______________
[111]Const.,Art.III,Sec.14(1).
[112]Const.,Art.III,Sec.14(2).
[113]424Phil.482;373SCRA461(2002)[PerJ.Carpio,Third
Division].
[114]Peoplev.WilsonLabeo,424Phil.482,497;373SCRA461,
473 (2002) [PerJ. Carpio, Third Division],citingJumawan v.
Eviota,
171
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 171
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
Contrarytotheargumentsoftheappellants,theinclusionof
thephrasewearingmasksand/orotherformsofdisguiseinthe
informationdoesnotviolatetheirconstitutionalrights.
Itshouldberememberedthateveryaggravatingcircumstance
beingallegedmustbestatedintheinformation.Failuretostate
anaggravatingcircumstance,evenifdulyprovenattrial,willnot
beappreciatedassuch.[115]Itwas,therefore,incumbentonthe
prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of wearing
masksand/orotherformsofdisguiseintheinformationinorder
foralltheevidence,introducedtothateffect,tobeadmissibleby
thetrialcourt.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance
because, like nighttime, it allows the accused to remain
anonymousandunidentifiableashecarriesouthiscrimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence
thattendstoprovethattheaccusedweremaskedbutthemasks
fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an
aggravating circumstance.[116]What is important in alleging
disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was
aconcealmentofidentitybytheaccused.Theinclusionofdisguise
intheinformationwas,therefore,enoughtosufficientlyapprise
theaccusedthatinthecommissionoftheoffensetheywerebeing
chargedwith,theytriedtoconcealtheiridentity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the
accusedwerenotwearingmasksisalsonotviolativeoftheirright
tobeinformedoftheiroffenses.
_______________
G.R. Nos. 8551213, July 28, 1994, 234 SCRA 524 [PerJ.
Mendoza,EnBanc].
[115]RulesofCriminalProcedure,Rule110,Sec.8.
[116]SeePeoplev.SabanganCabato,243Phil.262;160SCRA
98(1988)[PerJ.Cortes,ThirdDivision]andPeoplev.Veloso,197
Phil.846;112SCRA173(1982)[PerCuriam,EnBanc].
172
172 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused.
Conspiracy presupposes that the act of one is the act of
all.[117]Thiswouldmeanalltheaccusedhadbeenoneintheir
plantoconcealtheiridentityeveniftherewasevidencelateron
toprovethatsomeofthemmightnothavedoneso.
Inanycase,theaccusedwerebeingchargedwiththecrimeof
murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder. All that is
neededfortheinformationtobesufficientisthattheelementsof
thecrimehavebeenallegedandthattherearesufficientdetails
astothetime,place,andpersonsinvolvedintheoffense.
II
Findings of the trial court, when
affirmedbythe appellate court,
are entitled to great weight and
credence
Asageneralrule,thefindingsoffactbythetrialcourt,when
affirmed by the appellate court, are given great weight and
credenceonreview.TherationaleforthiswasexplainedinPeople
v.DanielQuijada,[118]asfollows:
Settledistherulethatthefactualfindingsofthetrialcourt,
especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great
weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of
observing the witnesses through the different indicators of
truthfulnessorfalsehood,suchastheangryflushofaninsisted
assertionorthesuddenpallorofadiscoveredlieorthetremulous
mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready
reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the
hesitation,thesincereortheflippantorsneeringtone,
_______________
[117]People v. Halil Gambao,G.R. No.172707, October 1,
2013,706SCRA508[PerJ.Perez,EnBanc].
[118]328Phil.505;259SCRA191(1996)[PerJ.Davide,En
Banc].
173
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 173
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
theheat,thecalmness,theyawn,thesigh,thecandororlackof
it, the scant orfull realization of the solemnity ofanoath, the
carriageandmien.[119]
There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule.
InPeoplev.LeticiaLabarias,[120]thiscourtstatedthat:
 ItisthepolicyofthisCourttosustainthefactualfindingsof
thetrialcourtonthereasonableassumptionthatitisinabetter
position to assess the evidence before it, particularly the
testimoniesofthewitnesses,whorevealmuchofthemselvesby
theirdeportmentonthestand.Theexceptionthatmakesthe
rule is where such findings areclearly arbitrary or
erroneousaswhentheyaretaintedwithbiasorhostilityor
areso lacking in basisas to suggest that they were
reachedwithoutthecarefulstudyandperceptivenessthat
should characterize a judicial decision.[121](Emphasis
supplied)
Incriminalcases,theexceptiongainsevenmoreimportance
sincethepresumptionisalwaysinfavorofinnocence.Itisonly
uponproofofguiltbeyondreasonabledoubtthataconvictionis
sustained.
Inthiscase,atotalofeleven(11)witnessesfortheprosecution
andfortytwo(42)witnessesforthedefensewereputonthestand
from1995to2001.Inaneightythree(83)page
_______________
[119]People v. Daniel Quijada,328 Phil. 505, 530531; 259
SCRA191,212213(1996)[PerJ.Davide,EnBanc],citingPeople
v.DeGuzman,G.R.No.76742,August7,1990,188SCRA407
[PerJ.Cruz,FirstDivision];Peoplev.DeLeon,315Phil.584;248
SCRA 609 (1995) [PerJ. Davide, Jr., First Division];People v.
Delovino,317Phil.741;247SCRA637(1995)[PerJ.Davide,Jr.,
First Division];Creamer v. Bivert,214 MO 473, 474 (1908); M.
FrancesMcnamara,200FamousLegalQuotations,p.548(1967).
[120]G.R.No.87165,January25,1993,217SCRA483[PerJ.
Cruz,FirstDivision].
[121]Id.,atp.484.
174
174 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
decision,thetrialcourtacquittedsix(6)andconvictedfive(5)of
theaccused.Onthebasisofthesenumbersalone,itcannotbe
saidthatthetrialcourtactedarbitrarilyorthatitsdecisionwas
solackinginbasisthatitwasarrivedatwithoutajudiciousand
exhaustivestudyofalltheevidencepresented.
Inasmuch, however, as the trial courts findings hold great
persuasivevalue,thereisalsonothingthatprecludesthiscourt
from coming to its own conclusions based on an independent
reviewofthefactsandtheevidenceonrecord.
The accused were sufficiently
identified by the witnesses for the
prosecution
Thetrialcourt,inweighingalltheevidenceonhand,found
thetestimoniesofthewitnessesfortheprosecutiontobecredible.
Initsdecision,thetrialcourtstatedthat:
xxx.Althougheachvictimhadaverystrongmotivetoplace
his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars, notone testified
against all of them.If the prosecution eyewitnesses, who
were allSigma Rhoans, were simply bent on
convictingScintilla Jurismembers for that matter, they
could have easily tagged each and every accused as a
participantintheatrociousandbarbaricassaulttomake
sure no one would escape conviction. Instead, each
eyewitnessnamedonlyoneortwoandsomewerecandid
enough to say that they did not see who delivered the
blowsagainstthem.
Thus, the prosecution witnesses, Ernest Paulo Tan, Dennis
GaioandDarwinAsuncion,testifiedtohaveseenitallbutthey
couldnot,anddidnot,discloseanyname.Lachica,ontheother
hand, said that he did not have the opportunity to see and
identifythepersonwhohithiminthebackandinflictedatwo
inchcut.Hisforearmwasalsohitbyaleadpipebuthedidnot
see who did it. Natalicio, one of the other three who were
hospitalized,was
175
VOL.724,MAY5,2014
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
severelybeatenbythreewavesofattackerstotallingmorethan
15buthecouldonlyname3ofthem.Headded,however,thathe
would be able to recognize those he saw if he would see them
again.Ofthem,Mangrobangpointedtoatleast5buthestressed
that he did not see Zingapan, Soliva, Guerrero, Del Rosario,
Daraoay, Denoista, and Pealosa during the onslaught. Gaston
couldhavenamedanyoftheaccusedastheonewhorepeatedly
hithimwithaheavypipeandstabbedhimbuthefranklysaid
their faces were covered. Like Natalicio, Fortes was repeatedly
beatenbyseveralgroupsbutdidnotnameanyoftheaccusedas
one ofthosewhoattacked him.The personsheidentifiedwere
those leading the pack with one of them as the assailant of
Venturina,andthetwootherswhohesawstandingwhilehewas
runningaway.Headdedthathesawsomeoftheaccusedduring
the attack but did not know then their names.[122](Emphasis
supplied)
Weagree.
Thetrialcourtcorrectlyheldthatconsideringtheswiftnessof
theincident,[123]therewouldbeslightinconsistenciesintheir
statements.InPeoplev.AdrianoCabrillas,[124]itwaspreviously
observedthat:
Itisperfectlynaturalfordifferentwitnessestestifying
on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as
theremaybesomedetailswhichonewitnessmaynotice
while the other may not observe or remember. In fact,
jurisprudence even warns against a perfectdovetailing of
narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their
testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed.
[125](Emphasissupplied)
175 _______________
[122]RTCDecision,p.49.
[123]Id.,atp.57.
[124]G.R. No. 175980, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA
174[PerJ.DelCastillo,FirstDivision].
[125]Id., at p. 191,citingPeople v. Lacbayan,393 Phil. 800,
807; 339 SCRA 396, 401 (2000) [PerJ. YnaresSantiago, First
Division].
176
176 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
According to their testimonies, Lachica was able to identify
Alvir,Zingapan,andMedalla;[126]Nataliciowasabletoidentify
Medalla, Zingapan, and Soliva;[127]and Fortes was able to
identify Feliciano, Medalla, and Zingapan.[128]Their positive
identificationwasduetothefactthattheyeitherworenomasks
orthattheirmasksfelloff.
Itwouldbeinlinewithhumanexperiencethatavictimoran
eyewitnessofacrimewouldendeavortofindwaystoidentifythe
assailantsothatintheeventthatheorshesurvives,thecriminal
couldbeapprehended.Ithasalsobeenpreviouslyheldthat:
Itisthemostnaturalreactionforvictimsofcriminalviolence
tostrivetoseethelooksandfacesoftheirassailantsandobserve
the mannerinwhichthe crimewascommitted.Mostoftenthe
face of the assailant and body movements thereof, creates a
lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their
memory.[129]
 Inthe commotion, itwasmorethanlikelythat themasked
assailants could have lost their masks.Ithad been testified by
thevictimsthat some of the assailantswerewearing masks of
either a piece of cloth or a handkerchief and that Alvir,
[130]Zingapan,[131]Soliva,[132]and Feliciano[133]had masks
onatfirstbuttheirmasksfelloffandhungaroundtheirnecks.
EquallytellingwasthetestimonyofdefensewitnessFrisco
_______________
[126]TSN,June5,1995,pp.1113.
[127]TSN,July3,1995,pp.2122.
[128]TSN,October30,1995,pp.91,112.
[129]People v. Opiniado Dolar,G.R. No. 100805, March 24,
1994, 231 SCRA 414, 423 [PerJ. Puno, Second
Division],citingPeople v. Sartagoda,G.R. No. 97525, April 7,
1993,221SCRA251,257[PerJ.Campos,Jr.,SecondDivision].
[130]TSN,June21,1995,p.33.
[131]TSN,July5,1995,p.24.
[132]Id.,atpp.4852.
[133]TSN,September28,1995,p.24.
177
VOL.724,MAY5,2014
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
Capiloduringcrossexaminationwhoobservedthatsomeofthe
attackerswerewearingmasksandsomewerenot,thus:
QMr.Capilo,doyouknowthisScintillaJurisFraternity?
ANo,sir.
QDuringtheincidentofDecember8,1994,therewerealot
of people eating in the Beach House Canteen, and then
runningtowardsdifferentdirections,isitnot?
AYes,sir.
QAnd some people were wearing masks and some were
not?
AYes,sir.[134]
While the attack was swift and sudden, the victims would
havehadthepresenceofmindtotakealookattheirassailantsif
they were identifiable. Their positive identification, in the
absenceofevidencetothecontrary,mustbeupheldtobecredible.
Ithas been argued that the trial court did not give
MangrobangstestimonycredencewhileGastonstestimonywas
foundtobehazy.Thisargumentisunmeritorious.
Itshouldbenotedthatitwasthetrialcourtitselfthatstated
that the acquittal of theScintilla Jurismembers identified by
Mangrobang should not be. misinterpreted to mean that the
testimonyofMangrobangwasanabsolutefabrication.[135]The
courtwentontostatethattheywereexoneratedmerelybecause
theywereaccordedthebenefitofthedoubtastheiridentification
by Mangrobang, under tumultuous and chaotic circumstances
were [sic] not corroborated and theiralibis, not
refuted.[136]Therewas,therefore,nobasistosay
_______________
[134]TSN,December4,1995,p.47;SeealsoRTCDecision,p.
51.
177
[135]RTCDecision,p.64.
[136]Id.
178
178 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
thatMangrobangwasnotcredible;itwasonlythattheevidence
presentedwasnotstrongenoughtoovercomethepresumptionof
innocence.
Gastons testimony, on the other hand, was considered
hazy[137]by the trial court only with regard to his
identificationofZingapanscompanion.Gastontestifiedthathe
sawZingapanwithMorano,withZingapanmovingandMorano
staying in place. Fortes, however, testified that both Zingapan
andMoranowererunningafterhim.Lachicaalsotestifiedthatit
was Medalla, not Morano, who was with Zingapan. Because of
thisconfusion,thetrialcourtfoundthattherewasdoubtasto
whowasreallybesideZingapan.Theuncertaintyresultedintoan
acquittalforMorano.Despitethis,thecourtstilldidnotimpute
doubt in their testimonies that Zingapan was present at the
scene.
Be that as it may, the acquittals made by the trial court
further prove that its decision was brought about only upon a
thoroughexaminationoftheevidencepresented.Itacceptedthat
therewereinconsistenciesinthetestimoniesofthevictimsbut
thatthesewereminoranddidnotaffecttheircredibility.Itruled
that [s]uch inconsistencies, and even probabilities, are not
unusual for there is no person with perfect faculties or
senses.[138]
Evidence as part of theres gestae
may be admissible but have little
persuasivevalueinthiscase
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador,
[139]whenhearrivedatthescene,heinterviewedthebystanders
whoalltoldhimthattheycouldnotrecognizethe
_______________
[137]Id.,atp.65.
[138]Id.,atp.58.
[139]TSN,November20,1995,p.20.
179
VOL.724,MAY5,2014
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
attackerssincetheywereallmasked.This,itisargued,couldbe
evidencethatcouldbegivenaspartoftheresgestae.
Asageneralrule,[a]witnesscantestifyonlytothefactshe
knowsofhispersonalknowledge;thatis,whicharederivedfrom
hisownperception,xxx.[140]Allotherkindsoftestimonyare
hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court,
however,provideseveralexceptionstothegeneralrule,andone
ofwhichiswhentheevidenceispartofresgestae,thus:
Section42.Part of res gestae.Statements made by a
personwhileastartingoccurrenceistakingplaceorimmediately
prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof,maybegiveninevidenceaspartofresgestae.So,also,
statementsaccompanyinganequivocalactmaterialtotheissue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
theresgestae.[141]
InPeoplev.RodrigoSalafranca,[142]thiscourthaspreviously
discussed the admissibility of testimony taken as part ofres
gestae,statingthat:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of theres
gestaeand thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsayrulewhenthefollowingrequisitesconcur,towit:(a)the
principal act, theres gestae,is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statementsaremadebeforethedeclaranthadtimetocontriveor
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
questionanditsimmediatelyattendingcircumstances.
xxxx
_______________
[140]RulesofCivilProcedure,Rule130,Sec.36.
[141]RulesofCivilProcedure,Rule130(C)(6),Sec.42.
179
[142]G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 501
[PerJ.Bersamin,FirstDivision].
180
180 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
 Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
Thetermresgestaehasbeendefinedasthosecircumstances
whicharetheundesignedincidentsofaparticularlitigatedact
and which are admissible when illustrative of suchact.In a
general way,res gestaerefers to the circumstances, facts, and
declarationsthatgrowoutofthemainfactandservetoillustrate
itscharacterandaresospontaneousandcontemporaneouswith
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication.Theruleonresgestaeencompassestheexclamations
and statements made by either the participants,victims,or
spectatorstoacrimeimmediatelybefore,during,orimmediately
after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are
suchthatthestatementsweremadeasaspontaneousreactionor
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there
wasnoopportunityforthedeclaranttodeliberateandtofabricate
afalsestatement.Thetestofadmissibilityofevidenceasapartof
theres gestaeis, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the
principalfactoreventthatitcharacterizesastoberegardedasa theirrespectivepointsofreference.Therefore,almostalways,
partofthetransactionitself,andalsowhetheritclearlynegatives
anypremeditationorpurposetomanufacturetestimony.[143]
Thereisnodoubtthatasuddenattackonagrouppeacefully
eatinglunchonaschoolcampusisastartlingoccur
_______________
[143]Peoplev.RodrigoSalafranca,G.R.No.173476,February
22, 2012, 666 SCRA 501, 512514 [PerJ. Bersamin, First
Division],citingPeoplev.Peralta,G.R.No.94570,September28,
1994,237SCRA218,224[PerJ.Cruz,FirstDivision];Peoplev.
Maguikay,G.R.Nos.10322628,October14,1994,237SCRA587,
600[PerJ.Puno,SecondDivision];AlhambraBldg.&LoanAssn
v.DeCelle,118P.2d19,47C.A.2d409;ReillyTar&Chemical
Corp. v. Lewis,61 N.E. 2d 297, 326 Ill. App. 117;Kaiko v.
Dolinger,440A.2d198,184Conn.509;SouthernSuretyCo.v.
Weaver, Com. App.,273 S.W. 838;People v. Sanchez,G.R. No.
74740, August 28, 1992, 213 SCRA 70, 79 [PerJ. Davide, Jr.,
Third Division];Molloy v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co.,166 N.E.
530, 335 Ill. 164;Campbell v. Gladden,118 A. 2d 133, 383 Pa.
144,53A.L.R.2d1222.
181
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 181
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
rence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were
madeimmediatelyafterthestartlingoccurrence,theyare,infact,
admissibleasevidencegiveninresgestae.
InPeoplev.Albarido,[144]however,thiscourthasstatedthat
inaccordtoordinaryhumanexperience:
xxx persons who witness an event perceive the same from
theyhavedifferentaccountsofhowithappened.Certainly,
we cannot expect the testimony of witnesses to a crime to be
consistentinallaspectsbecausedifferentpersonshavedifferent
impressions and recollections of the same incident.
xxx[145](Emphasissupplied)
Thestatementsmadebythebystanders,althoughadmissible,
havelittlepersuasivevaluesincethebystanderscouldhaveseen
theeventstranspiringatdifferentvantagepointsandatdifferent
pointsintime.EvenFriscoCapilo,oneofthebystandersatthe
timeoftheattack,testifiedthattheattackershadtheirmaskson
at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were
unmasked.
Whenthebystanderstestimoniesareweighedagainstthose
of the victims who witnessed the entirety of the incident from
beginning to end at close range, the former become merely
corroborativeofthefactthatanattackoccurred.Theiraccountof
the incident, therefore, must be given considerably less weight
thanthatofthevictims.
_______________
[144]420 Phil. 235; 368 SCRA 194 (2001) [PerJ. Sandoval
Gutierrez,ThirdDivision].
[145]Id.,atp.245;pp.202203,citingPeoplev.Real,367Phil.
524; 308 SCRA 244 (1999) [PerJ. Pardo, First Division]. This
statementwasusedinordertojustifythatminorinconsistencies
donotaffectthewitnessescredibilitysolongastheyconcuron
thematerialaspectsoftheincident.
182
182 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
The belated identification by
victims do not detract from their
positive identification of the
pellants
Itisarguedthatthefactthatthevictimsstayedsilentabout
the incident to the U.P. Police or the Quezon City Police but
instead executed affidavits with the National Bureau of
Investigationfour(4)daysaftertheincidentgivesdoubtastothe
credibilityoftheirtestimonies.
U.P.PoliceOfficerRomeoCabrera[146]testifiedthatontheir
waytotheU.P.Infirmary,heinterviewedthevictimswhoalltold
himtheycouldnotrecognizetheattackersbecausetheywereall
wearing masks. Meanwhile, Dr. Mislang[147]testified to the
effect that when she asked Natalicio who attacked them,
Natalicio answered that he did not know because they were
masked.
Itmustberememberedthatthepartiesinvolvedinthiscase
belong to rival fraternities. While this court does not condone
their archaic and oftentimes barbaric traditions, it is conceded
that there are certain practices that are unique to fraternal
organizations.
Itisquitepossiblethatatthispointintime,theyknewthe
identitiesoftheirattackersbutchosenottodiscloseitwithout
first conferring with their other fraternity brothers. This
probability is bolstered by the actions ofSigma Rhoafterthe
incident, which showed that they confronted the members
ofScintilla Jurisin SM North. Because of the tenuous
relationshipofrivalfraternities,itwouldnothavebeenprudent
forSigmaRhotoretaliateagainstthewrongfraternity.
TheiractofnotdisclosingthecorrectinformationtotheU.P.
PoliceortoDr.Mislangdoesnotmakethepoliceofficerorthe
doctorstestimoniesmorecrediblethanthatofthe
the _______________
[146]TSN,November13,1995,pp.3738.
[147]TSN,September16,1998,p.20.
ap
183
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 183
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
victims.Itshould not be forgotten thatthevictims actually
witnessed the entire incident, while Officer Salvador, Officer
Cabrera, and Dr. Mislang were merely relaying secondhand
information.
The fact that they went to the National Bureau of
Investigationfour(4)daysaftertheincidentalsodoesnotaffect
their credibilitysincemostofthemhad been hospitalizedfrom
theirinjuriesandneededtorecoverfirst.Sinceafraternitymoves
asoneunit,itwouldbeunderstandablethattheydecidedtowait
untilallofthemwerewellenoughtogototheNationalBureauof
Investigationheadquartersinordertogivetheirstatements.
Seniorityisalsooftenthenorminfraternities.Itwasuponthe
advice of their seniorbrodsand their legal counsel that they
executedtheirswornstatements beforethe National Bureauof
Investigationfour(4)daysaftertheincident.
ThedecisiontoreporttheincidenttotheNationalBureauof
InvestigationinsteadoftotheU.P.Policewasthecalloftheir
legal counsel who might have deemed the National Bureau of
Investigation moreequippedto handle the investigation. This
does not, however, affect the credibility of the witnesses since
theyweremerelyfollowingthelegaladviceoftheircounsel.
Indeed,thereisreasontobelievethattheNationalBureauof
Investigation isbetterequipped than the U.P. Police to handle
the investigation of the case. As stated in the U.P. College of
Economicswebsite:
TheUPDilimanPolice(UPDP)istaskedwithmaintaining
campussecurity.TheirstationislocatedinfrontoftheCollege
ofArchitecture.
The primary missions of the UPDP are to maintain peace and
order,secureandprotectlivesandproperty,enforcebasiclaws,
applicable Quezon City Ordinances, and University Rules and
Regulationsincludingpoliciesandstandards;andtoperformsuch
otherfunctionsrelative
184
184 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
tothegeneralsafetyandsecurityofthestudents,employees,and
residents in the U.P. Diliman Campus. xxx.[148](Emphasis
supplied)
It can be seen that the U.P. Police is employed by U.P.
primarilyforcampussecurity.Theyarebynomeansanactual
police force that is equipped to handle a fullblown murder
investigation. Fraternityrelated violence in U.P. has also
increasingly become more frequent, which might possibly have
desensitized the U.P. Police in such a way that would prevent
their objectivity in the conduct of their investigations. The
victims reliance on the National Bureau of Investigation,
therefore,isunderstandable.
III
Alibicannot prevail over the posi
tiveidentificationofthevictim
Itis settledthat the defense ofalibicannot prevail over the
positive identification of the victim.[149]InPeople v. Benjamin
Peteluna,[150]thiscourtisstatedthat:
Itisatimehonoredprinciplethatthepositiveidentificationof
the appellant by a witness destroys the defense ofalibiand
denial.Thus:
xxx.Itis wellentrenched thatalibiand
denialareinherentlyweakandhavealways
beenviewedwithdisfavorbythecourtsdue
to the facility with which they can be
concocted.Theywarranttheleastcredibility
_______________
[148]UP Diliman Police,<http://www.econ.upd.edu.ph/up
diliman
police/>(visitedMarch4,2014).
[149]Peoplev.BenjaminPeteluna,G.R.No.187048,January
23,2013,689SCRA190,197[PerJ.Perez,SecondDivision].
 [150]G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013, 689 SCRA 190 Accusedappellants were correctly
[PerJ.Perez,SecondDivision]. charged with murder, and there
185 was treachery in the commission
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 185 ofthecrime
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr. _______________
[151]Id., at p. 197,citingPeople v. Barde,G.R. No. 183094,
ornoneatallandcannotprevailoverthe September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 187, 211 [PerJ. Perez, First
positiveidentificationoftheappellantbythe Division];Peoplev.Estepano,367Phil.209,217218;307SCRA
prosecutionwitnesses.Foralibitoprosper,it 701,708709(1999)[PerJ.Bellosillo,SecondDivision];Peoplev.
is not enough to prove that appellant was Berdin,462 Phil. 290, 304; 416 SCRA 582, 593 (2003) [PerJ.
somewhere else when the crime was
SandovalGutierrez,EnBanc];Peoplev.Francisco,397Phil.973,
committed;hemustalsodemonstratethatit
was physically impossible for him to have 985; 344 SCRA 110, 120121 (2000) [PerCJ. Davide, Jr.,En
beenatthesceneofthecrimeatthetimeof Banc].
its commission. Unless substantiated by 186
clear and convincing proof, such defense is 186 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
negative, selfserving, and undeserving of Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
any weight in law. Denial, likealibi, as an AccordingtotheprovisionsofArticle248oftheRevisedPenal
exonerating justification[,] is inherently Code,theaccusedappellantswerecorrectlychargedwithmurder.
weak and if uncorroborated regresses to Article248states:
blatant impotence. Likealibi, it also ART.248.Murder.Anypersonwho,notfallingwithinthe
constitutes selfserving negative evidence provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of
whichcannotbeaccordedgreaterevidentiary murderandshallbepunishedbyreclusionperpetua,todeathif
weight than the declaration of credible committedwithanyofthefollowingattendantcircumstances:
witnesseswhotestifyonaffirmativematters. 1.Withtreachery,takingadvantageofsuperiorstrength,
[151] with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
Inthiscase,thevictimswereabletopositivelyidentifytheir weakenthedefense,orofmeansorpersonstoinsureor
attackerswhiletheaccusedappellantsmerelyofferedalibisand affordimpunity;
denialsastheirdefense.Thecredibilityofthevictimswasupheld xxxx
byboththetrialcourtandtheappellatecourtwhilegivinglittle
credence to the accusedappellantsalibis. There is, thus, no Itis undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men
reasontodisturbtheirfindings. armed with lead pipes and baseball bats attacked Dennis
Venturina and his companions, which resulted in Venturinas
death.
Ascorrectlyfoundbythetrialcourtandtheappellatecourt,
theoffensecommittedagainstDennisVenturinawascommitted
byagroupthattookadvantageofitssuperiorstrengthandwith
theaidofarmedmen.Theappellatecourt,however,incorrectly
ruled out the presence of treachery in the commission of the
offense.
Ithasbeenstatedpreviouslybythiscourtthat:
[T]reacheryispresentwhentheoffendercommitsanyofthe
crimesagainstpersons,employingmeans,methods,orformsin
the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution,withoutrisktotheoffenderarisingfromthedefense
whichtheoffendedpartymightmake.[152]
_______________
[152]Peoplev.GaryVergara,G.R. No. 177763, July 3, 2013,
700 SCRA 412, 423 [PerJ. De Castro, First
Division],citingPeoplev.
187
VOL.724,MAY5,2014
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
Similarly,inPeoplev.LeozarDelaCruz,[153]thiscourtstated
that:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimesagainstpersons,employingmeans,methods,orformsin
the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution,withoutrisktotheoffenderarisingfromthedefense
which the offended party might make.The essence of
treacheryisthattheattackcomeswithoutawarningand
in aswift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording
thehapless,unarmed,andunsuspectingvictimnochance
to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two
elementsmustconcur:(1)theemploymentofmeansofexecution
that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend
themselves or retaliate; and (2) themeans of execution were
deliberatelyorconsciouslyadopted.[154](Emphasissupplied)
Theappellatecourt,inaffirmingtheconvictionoftheaccused
appellants,ruledthatcontrarytothefindingsofthetrialcourt,
there was no treachery involved. Inparticular, they ruled that
althoughtheattackwassuddenandunexpected,[i]twasdonein
broaddaylightwithalotofpeoplewhocouldseethem[155]and
thattherewasapossibilityfor
_______________
Laurio,G.R.No.182523,September13,2012,680SCRA560,
571572[PerJ.LeonardoDeCastro,FirstDivision].
[153]G.R. No. 188353, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 738
[PerJ.Velasco,ThirdDivision].
[154]Peoplev.LeozarDelaCruz,G.R.No.188353,February
16, 2010, 612 SCRA 738, 747 [PerJ.Velasco, Third
187
Division],citingPeoplev.Amazan,402Phil.247,270;349SCRA
218, 233 (2001) [PerJ. Mendoza, Second Division];People v.
Bato,401Phil.415,431;348SCRA253,260(2000)[PerJ.Pardo,
FirstDivision];Peoplev.Albarido,420Phil.235,252;368SCRA
194, 208 (2001) [PerJ. SandovalGutierrez, Third
Division],citingPeoplev.Francisco,389Phil.243,266;333SCRA
725,746(2000)[PerJ.Kapunan,FirstDivision].
[155]CADecision,p.59.
188
188 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
thevictimstohavefoughtbackorthatthepeopleinthecanteen
couldhavehelpedthevictims.[156]
Thisreasoningisclearlyerroneous.Thevictimsinthiscase
were eating lunchon campus. They were notat a placewhere
theywouldbereasonablyexpectedtobeonguardforanysudden
attackbyrivalfraternitymen.
Thevictims,whowereunarmed,werealsoattackedwithlead
pipesandbaseballbats.Theonlywaytheycouldparrytheblows
waswiththeirarms.Inasituationwheretheywereunarmedand
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back
againstthe attackers.Theattackalsohappened inlessthana
minute,whichwouldprecludeanypossibilityofthebystanders
beingabletohelpthemuntilaftertheincident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no
opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to defend
themselves.Treachery,therefore,waspresentinthiscase.
The presence of conspiracy makes
all of the accusedappellants liable
formurderandattemptedmurder
Inthedecisionofthetrialcourt,alloftheaccusedappellants
were found guilty of the murder of Dennis Venturina and the
attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.,
Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The
appellatecourt,however,modifiedtheirliabilitiesandfoundthat
the accusedappellants were guilty of attempted murder only
against Natalicio and Fortes, and not against Mangrobang,
Lachica,andGaston.
ItistheappellatecourtsreasoningthatbecauseLachicaand
Mangrobang were no longer chased by the attackers,[157]it
concludedthataccusedappellantsvoluntarydesistedfrom
_______________
[156]Id.
[157]CADecision,p.61.
189
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 189
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
pursuing them and from inflicting harm to them, which shows
thattheydidnothavetheintenttodomorethantomakethem
suffer pain by slightly injuring them.[158]Italso pointed out
thatthewoundinflictedonGastonwastooshallowtohavebeen
done with an intent to kill.[159]Thus, it concluded that the
accusedappellantswouldhavebeenguiltyonlyofslightphysical
injuries.
Thisiserroneous.
Itshouldberememberedthatthetrialcourtfoundthatthere
was conspiracy among the accusedappellants[160]and the
appellate court sustained this finding.[161]Conspiracy, once
proven,hastheeffectofattachingliabilitytoalloftheaccused,
regardlessoftheirdegreeofparticipation,thus:
Onceanexpressorimpliedconspiracyisproved,allof
theconspirators are liable as coprincipals regardless of
the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplationoflawtheactofoneistheactofall.The
foregoingruleisanchoredonthesoundprinciplethatwhentwo
ormorepersonsunitetoaccomplishacriminalobject,whether
throughthephysicalvolitionofone,orall,proceedingseverallyor
collectively,eachindividualwhoseevilwillactivelycontributesto
thewrongdoingisinlawresponsibleforthewhole,thesameas
thoughperformedbyhimselfalone.Althoughitisaxiomaticthat
nooneisliableforactsotherthanhisown,whentwoormore
personsagreeorconspiretocommitacrime,eachisresponsible
foralltheactsoftheothers,doneinfurtheranceoftheagreement
orconspiracy.The
_______________
[158]Id.
[159]Id.
[160]SeeRTCDecision,pp.7879.
[161]SeeCADecision,pp.2223.
190
190 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is
clearlyexplainedinonecasewherethisCourtheldthat
... it is impossible to graduate the
separate liability of each (conspirator)
without taking into consideration the close
andinseparablerelationofeachofthemwith
thecriminalact,forthecommissionofwhich
theyallactedbycommonagreement...The
crimemustthereforeinviewofthesolidarity
oftheactandintentwhichexistedbetween
the...accused,beregardedastheactofthe
bandorpartycreatedbythem,andtheyare
allequallyresponsible.
Verily, the moment it is established that the
malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commissionofthefelonyproved,collectiveliabilityofthe
accusedconspiratorsattachesbyreasonoftheconspiracy,
andthecourtshallnotspeculatenoreveninvestigateas
to the actual degree of participation of each of the
perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. xxx.
[162](Emphasissupplied)
Theliabilitiesoftheaccusedappellantsinthiscasearosefrom
asingleincidentwhereintheaccusedappellantswerearmedwith
baseballbatsandleadpipes,allinagreementtodothehighest
amountofdamagepossibletothevictims.Somewereabletorun
awayandtakecover,buttheotherswouldfallpreyatthehands
oftheirattackers.Theintenttokillwasalreadypresentatthe
moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the
accusedappellantsalikewhen
_______________
[162]People v. Peralta, et al.,134 Phil. 703; 25 SCRA 759
(1968) [Per Curiam,EnBanc],citingU.S. v. Ramos,2 Phil. 434
(1903)[PerJ.Willard,EnBanc];U.S.v.Maza,5Phil.346(1905)
[PerJ. Johnson,En Banc];U.S.v. Grant and Kennedy,18 Phil.
122 (1910) [PerJ. Trent,En Banc];U.S.v. Ipil,27 Phil. 530
(1914) [PerJ. Johnson,En Banc];U.S.v. Synder,3 McCrary,
377;People v. Bannaisan,49 Phil. 423 (1926) [PerJ. Villa
Real,En Banc];U.S.v. Bundal,et al., 3 Phil. 89 (1903) [PerJ.
Torres,EnBanc].
191
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 191
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
thepresenceofconspiracywasproven.Itis,therefore,immaterial
todistinguishbetweentheseriousnessoftheinjuriessufferedby
the victims to determine the respective liabilities of their
attackers.Whatisrelevantisonlyastowhetherthedeathoccurs
asaresultofthatintenttokillandwhethertherearequalifying,
aggravatingormitigatingcircumstancesthatcanbeappreciated.
Theappellate court, therefore, erred infindingthe accused
appellants guilty only of slight physical injuries.Itwould be
illogicaltopresumethatdespitetheswiftnessandsuddennessof
the attack, the attackers intended to kill only Venturina,
Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica,
Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident
fromthemomenttheaccusedappellantstooktheirfirstswing,all
ofthemwereliableforthatintenttokill.
Forthisreason,theaccusedappellantsshouldbeliableforthe
murderofDennisVenturinaandtheattemptedmurderofMervin
Natalicio,CesarMangrobang,Jr.,LeandroLachica,ArnelFortes,
andCristobalGaston,Jr.
AFinalNote
Itisnotonlythelossofonepromisingyounglife;rather,itis
alsotheeffectonthefiveotherliveswhoseoncebrightfutures
arenowputinjeopardybecauseofonesenselessactofbravado.
Thereisnowmorehonorforthemtoaccepttheirresponsibility
and servethe consequencesoftheiractions.Thereis,however,
nothingthattheycandotobringbackDennisVenturinaorfully
compensateforhissenselessandpainfulloss.
This is not the first fraternityrelated case to come to this
court; neither will it be the last. Perhaps this case and many
cases like it can empower those who have a better view of
masculinity:onewhichvalorizescourage,sacrificeandhonorin
morelifesavingpursuits.192
192 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
GitingatdangalarewordsoftheanthemoftheUniversity
of the Philippines.Itcolors the stories of many who choose to
expend their energy in order that our people will have better
lives. Fraternity rumbles are an anathema, an immature and
useless expenditure of testosterone.Itfosters aculture that
retardsmanhood.Itisdevoidofgitingatdangal.
Thiskindofshamefulviolencemuststop.
WHEREFORE,thedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinC.A.
G.R. CR No. 01158 dated November 26, 2010
isAFFIRMEDinsofar as the accusedappellants Danilo
Feliciano,Jr.,JuliusVictorMedalla,ChristopherSoliva,Warren
L. Zingapan, and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir are
foundGUILTYbeyondreasonable doubt of Murderin Criminal
Case No. Q9561133 with theMODIFICATIONthat they be
foundGUILTYbeyondreasonabledoubtofAttemptedMurderin
Criminal Case Nos. Q9561136, Q9561135, Q9561134, Q95
61138,andQ9561137.
SOORDERED.
Sereno**(CJ.)andDelCastillo,***JJ.,concur.
Peralta,J.,****IjointhedissentofJ.Abad.
Abad,J.,SeeDissentingOpinion.
_______________
**ChiefJusticeMariaLourdesP.A.Serenowasdesignatedas
acting member of the Third Division, vice Associate Justice
PresbiteroJ.Velasco,Jr.,perRaffledatedFebruary1,2012.
***AssociateJusticeMarianoC.DelCastillowasdesignated
as acting member of the Third Division, vice Associate Justice
Jose Catral Mendoza who penned the lower court decision, per
RaffledatedApril29,2014.
****AssociateJusticeDiosdadoM.Peraltawasdesignatedas
ActingChairpersonoftheThirdDivision,viceAssociateJustice
PresbiteroJ.Velasco,Jr.recusedhimselfduetocloserelationto
oneoftheparties.
193
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 193
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
DISSENTINGOPINION
ABAD,J.:
IstronglydissentfromthemajorityDecision.
The incident in this case was an offshoot of a campus war
between members of two fraternities at the University of the
Philippines (UP) where one group, allegedly masked, surprised
andbeatuptheother,resultingininjuriestosomeanddeathto Alvir,withwhomhewasfamiliar,felloff.SRLachicagotaway
one.
Allegingconspiracy,theCityProsecutorofQuezonCityfiled
an information for murder, two informations for frustrated
murder,andthreeinformationsforattemptedmurderagainst12
accused, belonging to theScintilla JurisFraternity, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal Cases
Q9561133 to 38 with no bail recommended. Only 11 of the
accused were tried, however, since accused Benedict Guerrero
remainedatlarge.
TheFactsandCase
The evidence for the prosecution shows that sevenSigma
RhoFraternitymembersweretakinglunchattheBeachHouse
CanteeninsidetheUPcampusinDiliman,QuezonCity,between
12:30 and1:00p.m.onDecember8,1994 whenabout 15men,
carryingbaseballbatsorleadpipes,withsomewearingmasks,
swooped down upon them. SR Dennis Venturina shouted an
alarm, Brods!Brods! Hisbrodsscampered away but the
attackersgottosomeofthem.(Toavoidconfusion,SRorSJis
affixedbeforethenamesofthoseinvolvedtodistinguishmembers
of theSigma RhoFraternity from members of theScintilla
JurisFraternity.)
SRLeandroLachica,hisfraternitysGrandArchon,testified
thattheattackersallworeimprovisedmasksofclothortshirts.
FiveofthemwentafterSRLachica,hittinghimonthebackand masks,approachwithleadpipesandclubs.Ashereceivedablow
forearmsasheparriedtheblows.Inthecourseof
194
194 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
thatattack,themaskofoneofthem,SJRobertMichaelBeltran
from those who were beating him but he looked back while
runningandsawSJWarrenZingapanandJuliusVictorMedalla,
twooftheattackers,nolongerwearingmasks.Theattacklasted
forabout30to45seconds.[1]
SRMervinNatalicio,a4thyearlawstudentandViceGrand
Archonofhisfraternity,testifiedthatwhilemostoftheattackers
running towards their group wore masks, one of them, SJ
Medalla, wore none. Natalicio tried to scamper away but he
trippedonatreerootandfell.About10attackers,includingSJ
Zingapan and Christopher Soliva who also wore no masks,
bludgeonedhimontheback,arms,leftshoulder,hips,toes,and
righthand.[2]
AfterhisinitialattackersleftSRNatalicio,agroupoffouror
fiveothersledbySJBenedictGuerrero,tookoverandbeathim
up,too.Athirdgroupcameandalsomauledhimontheleftside
ofhisbody.WhenNataliciowassohurthecouldnolongermove,
somepeoplebroughthimtotheUPInfirmarywheretheytreated
hisinjuries.[3]
SR Natalicio later went to the National Bureau of
Investigation(NBI),gavehisstatement,andsubmittedhimselfto
medicolegal examination. He said thatScintilla Jurismembers
attackedthemasanoffshootofanAugust1994rumbledespitea
signedtruce.[4]
SR Cesar Mangrobang testified that after SR Venturina
sounded the alarm, he saw a group of men, some with cloth
onhisback,hetriedtorunbuttwomaskedmenblockedhisway
andrepeatedlybeathimup.Whentheirmasksfell
_______________
[1]TSN,June5,1995,pp.1114.
[2]TSN,July3,1995,pp.616.
 [3]Id.,atpp.1719.
[4]Id.,atpp.2023.
195
VOL.724,MAY5,2014
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
off, the two turned out to be SJ Gilbert Magpantay and Carlo
Fajardo.[]
SRMangrobangsucceededinrunningawayuntilhereached
thecorneroftheMainLibrary.Onglancingback,hesawnoone
after him. He then decided to return to the scene of the
commotion where he saw from three to four meters away SJ
DaniloFeliciano,Jr.andRaymundNaraghittingSRVenturina
with lead pipes. SJ Felicianos cloth mask had fallen off. SR
MangrobangalsosawSJReynaldoAblanidawieldingaleadpipe
whilerunning.[6]
SJNaragandFelicianowereabouttoturnonSRMangrobang
when somebody shouted,Pulis! Takbo! Takbo!prompting the
twotoruninthedirectionoftheMainLibrary.SRMangrobang
andothershelpedcarrySRVenturinaintoapassengerjeepneyto
bringhimtotheInfirmary.[7]
SRCristobalGaston,Jr.testifiedthat,ofthemenwhocame,
twoattackedhim:thefirstwithaleadpipe,hittinghimonthe
armsandhandsashetriedtocoverhishead,whilethesecond
stabbedhimontheleftchestandforearm.Thetwoworemasks.
SR Gaston got away and ran towards Palma Hall but, as he
lookedback,hesawSJZingapan,FelicianoandGeorgeMorano
at the scene.[8]SR Gaston went to confer with his fraternity
brothersattheCollegeofLawbuilding.Laterthatevening,they
metwiththeiralumnibrothers.[9]
SRArnelFortestestifiedthatsomeofthemenwhoattacked
themworemasksbutsomedidnot.HesawSJFeliciano,whom
he recognized despite a cloth mask, and SJ Medalla who wore
none.SRFortesmanagedtorunawaybut,ashelookedback,he
sawSJZingapanandMorano,whoalsoworenomasks,running
afterhim.Theyhithimontheback,
_______________
195
[5]TSN,September28,1995,pp.1419.
[6]Id.,atpp.2030.
[7]Id.,atpp.2834.
[8]TSN,October11,1995,pp.1738.
[9]Id.,atpp.4446.
196
196 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
causing him to fall. He stood up and tried to run again but a
groupof10menattackedhimforfivetoeightseconds,hittinghis
headfivetoseventimes.Theyalsohithimonthelegs.Hedidnot
recognizeanyofhisattackers.But,standingupagainafterthe
second attack, SR Fortes saw SJ Feliciano beating up SR
Venturina.SJFelicianosmaskfelloffintheprocess.[10]
Dr.RolandoVictoriadescribedtheinjuriesthatSRVenturina
suffered.[11]Dr.AureaVillena,ontheotherhand,testifiedonthe
results of her medical examinations of SR Natalicio, Fortes,
Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston four days after the mauling
incident.[12]
EmmanuelBatungbakaltestifiedthathesawagroupofmen
boardthreecarsthathadnoplatenumbers.Thecarsspedpast
the back of the law library. SJ Feliciano was one of those on
board. Batungbakal did not, however, witness the reported
incidentthatfollowed.[13]
ErnestoPaoloTantestifiedthathewasattheBeachHouse
Canteen during the incident. He saw three separate groups of
men,someofwhomworemasks,attackSRNatalicio.Afterthe
attackersleft,hehelpedNatalicioboardaservicevehicle.[14]
 Dennis Gaio testified that he was having lunch outside the
canteen when three of the attackers came from the Arts and
ScienceBuildingfollowedby 10morefromtheCollegeofLaw.
Someworemasksbuttheothersdidnot.Theyattackedthegroup
thatwashavinglunch,includingSRVenturina.Hetriedtohelp
the latter after he had fallen but one of the attackers stopped
him.Gaiohadtwowomencompanionsbuthe
_______________
[10]TSN,October16,1995,pp.4263.
[11]TSN,July24,1995,pp.1124.
[12]TSN,July31,1995,pp.910.
[13]TSN,November6,1995,pp.3339,6162.
[14]TSN,September3,1996,pp.1617,2454.
197
VOL.724,MAY5,2014
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
toldthemtoruntowardsthesunkengardenwhenhesensedthe
arrivalofthemaskedmen.[15]
Thedefensepresented42witnesses.Toproveitsclaimthat
the identities of the attackers were unrecognizable because of
their masks, the defense presented, among others, Benito Lato
andFriscoCapilo,bothutilityworkersatUPandsomestudent
customers at the canteen. Lato recalled that he was collecting
plates at the canteen when the attackers came. But he was
unabletorecognizethembecausetheyworemasksandhecould
seeonlytheireyes.[16]Capilo,ontheotherhand,testifiedthathe
wasonhiswaytotheMainLibrarytoworkwhenseveralmen,all
wearing masks and carrying lead pipes, rushed towards the
canteenandattackedsomewhowereeatingthere.[17]
DanielMabazzatestifiedthathewasonhiswayoutofthe
canteenwhen15menarrivedfromtheSouthwingoftheMain
Library and attacked some customers who were eating at the
tables.Hetestifiedfurtherthathewasabout3to5metersfrom
whereSRVenturinawasattackedbuthecouldnotidentifyanyof
theattackersbecausetheywereallwearingmasksandnoneof
thesefelloffduringtheattack.[18]
Alpha Sigma NuSorority members, Eda Pangilinan, Luz
Perez,andBathalaniTiamsontestifiedthattheywereunableto
identify theattackers because they allwore masks. Pangilinan
andTiamsoninsistedthattheydidnotseeanyoftheattackers
masksfalloff.[19]
UPpoliceofficerRomeoCabreratestifiedthatheandfellow
officer, Oscar Salvador, were at the Arts and Science Building
whentheyrespondedtoreportsthatarumblewastakingplaceat
thebackoftheMainLibrary.Onarrivalat
_______________
[15]TSN,April3,1997,pp.1022.
197 [16]TSN,November27,1995,pp.1012.
[17]TSN,December4,1995,p.13.
[18]TSN,September17,1997,pp.716.
[19]RTCDecision,p.37.
198
198 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
the BeachHouseCanteen,theysawthe woundedSRNatalicio
with some companions. They put him on board a jeepney and
broughthimtothe UPInfirmarywithhiscompanions. Onthe
way, Cabrera asked SR Natalicio who attacked his group. He
repliedthathedidnotrecognizeanyofthembecausetheywore
masks. CabreraaskedSR Nataliciothe samequestion afterhe
had received treatment. SR Natalicio gave the same answer.
Cabrera could not interrogate SR Venturina because the latter
sufferedseriousinjuries.[20]
UPpoliceofficerSalvadortestifiedthatwhenheandCabrera
respondedtoreportsofcommotion,theynoticedamaulingvictim,
SRNatalicio,surroundedbysomepeople.Salvadoraskedsomeof
the bystanders who the culprits were. They said they did not
recognizethemsincetheywerewearingmass.[21]
The police officers brought SR Natalicio and his three
companionstotheInfirmaryusingthecanteensjeepney.Onthe
way,CabreraaskedSRNatalicioandtheotherswithhimwho
attackedthem.Theyrepliedthattheycouldnottellsincethemen
wore masks. Salvador saw SR Venturina and Gaston being
treatedattheInfirmary.AfterSRNataliciowastreated,Cabrera
askedhimagainifherecognizedthemenwhohithim.Natalicio
replied that he did not because they wore masks. When asked
howmanyhithim,Nataliciosaidthathecouldnottellbecausehe
hadhisbackonthem.[22]
SJFelicianotestifiedthathewasinPampangaonDecember
8,1994,visitinghisgrandfatherwhomhethoughthadundergone
surgeryoftheprostategland.[23]Hismother,Feliciana,andan
elementary school teacher, Rogelio Yumul, corroborated his
testimony.Yumultestifiedthathewasonhis
_______________
[20]TSN,November13,1995,pp.2253.
[21]TSN,November20,1995,pp.1522.
[22]Id.,atpp.2240.
[23]TSN,February17,1999,pp.89.
199
VOL.724,MAY5,2014
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
waytotheprincipalsofficeataroundnoonofDecember8when
hesawFelicianoseatedatawaitingshed.[24]
SJ Alvir testified that he had been ill since December 5.
Consequently,heneitherreported forwork norwent toUPon
December8.[25]
SJMedallatestifiedthatonthedayinquestionhewaswith
his classmate Michael Vibas working on a school project. He
claimedthathecouldnothavetakenpartintherumblesincehe
suffered from an August 1994 head injury that affected his
balance.[26]Jose Victor Santos testified that he and Medalla
playeddartsafterlunchonDecember8andtheylaterwentto
Jollibee since Medalla had to treat him after losing the game.
[27]Dr. Gerardo Legaspi corroborated Medallas testimony
regardinghispreviousheadinjuries.[28]
SJ Soliva testified that he was having lunch with his
girlfriend and her lady friend at Jollibee Philcoa when the
incident took place. They returned to UP at around 1:00 p.m.
Solivawentstraighttohistambayanwherehelearnedofthe
rumble at the main library.[29]Anna Cabahug, Solivas
girlfriend,corroboratedhistestimony.[30]
SJZingapantestifiedthathecouldnothavetakenpartinthe
incident at UP since he was at that time having lunch with
TeodoroCanayinKamuning,QuezonCity.Fromthere,hewent
to the SM City mall at around 1:00 p.m. to buy an electric
thermosasaweddinggiftforatownmate.Hewasonhiswayout
ofthemallwhenhechancedupontwoofhisbrods.[31]
_______________
[24]TSN,November12,1997,pp.710.
[25]TSN,February2,2000,pp.916.
[26]TSN,September22,1999,pp.421.
[27]TSN,August11,1999,pp.712.
199 [28]TSN,September15,1999,pp.1025.
[29]TSN,June16,1999,pp.1221.
[30]TSN,November23,1998,pp.527.
[31]TSN,May12,1999,pp.718.
200
200 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
 The RTC absolved SJ Rodolfo Pealosa on a demurrer to
evidencesincenoneoftheprosecutionwitnessestestifiedthathe
hadtakenpartintheattack.
OnFebruary28,2002theRTCrenderedjudgment[32]finding
SJAlvir,Feliciano,Soliva,Medalla,andZingapanguiltybeyond
reasonable doubt of one count of murder and four counts of
attemptedmurder.Thecomigavecredencetothetestimoniesof
thevictimswhoidentifiedtheirattackers.Itthoughtlittleofthe
failureofsomeofthevictimstonamethemwhenaskedbythe
UPpoliceofficersandthephysiciansattheInfirmary.Itdidnot
agree that the victims delayed identification of their attackers
tainted their testimonies. The RTC held that the accused
conspired in the commission of the crimes charged. But it
acquittedSJAblanida,Fajardo,Magpantay,Morano,andNarag
for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond
reasonabledoubt.
Onappeal,theCourtofAppeals(CA),SpecialFirstDivisionof
Five,[33]withoneJusticedissenting,affirmedtheRTCDecision
and found SJ Alvir, Feliciano, Soliva, Medalla, and Zingapan
guiltyofthreecountsofslightphysicalinjuriesinCriminalCases
Q9561136,Q9561135,andQ9561134;twocountsofattempted
murder in Criminal Cases Q9561138 and Q9561137; and one
countofmurderinCriminalCaseQ9561133.TheCAimposedon
theaccusedthepenaltiesthatcorrespondedtotheoffensesand
orderedthemtopayvariouscivilindemnitiestothevictimsor,in
thecaseofSRVenturina,tohisheirs.
TheCAruledthatthewitnessespositiveidentificationofSJ
Alvir,Feliciano,Soliva,Medalla,andZingapanprevailed
_______________
[32]PennedbyHon.JoseCatralMendoza,nowamemberof
theCourt.
[33]ThecaseswerereraffledmanytimesafterseveralCourt
ofAppealsjusticesinhibitedthemselves,claimingcloserelation
withaparty,acounsel,orafraternityinvolvedinthecase.See:
CourtofAppealsDecision,pp.2627.
201
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 201
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
over the latters defenses andalibis.Itregarded the
inconsistenciesinthetestimoniesofthewitnessesastrivialand
didnottarnishtheircredibility.TheCAheldthatthedelayinthe
identificationoftheaccusedhadbeenexplained:SRNatalicioand
Fortesneededmedicalattention;theotherswiththemwantedto
cometogetherwhentheyfiledtheircomplaints.
TheCAexplainedthatitcharacterizedthecrimeschargedin
CriminalCasesQ9561136,Q9561135,andQ9561134asmere
slightphysicalinjuriessincetheintenttokillwasnotevident,
giventhatnoneoftheaccusedchasedthem.SRGaston,saidthe
CA,sufferedonlyalaceratedwoundnearhisbreast,precluding
anattemptonhislife.
TheIssuePresented
ThecentralissueinthiscaseiswhetherornottheCAerred,
liketheRTC,innotrejectingthevictimsidentificationoftheir
assailants as mere fabrications to go around the fact that the
latterworemasksandinthusnotabsolvingtheaccusedofthe
charges.
Ineverycriminalaction,theprosecutionhastoestablishthe
identity of the offender, like the crime itself, by proof beyond
reasonabledoubt.Indeed,itsfirstdutyistoprovetheidentityof
the offender for, even if the commission of the offense can be
established, no conviction can take place without proof of his
identitybeyondreasonabledoubt.[34]
True,alibiisaweakdefenseinthefaceofpositivetestimonies
ofprosecutionwitnessesthattheaccusedcommitted
_______________
 [34]Peoplev.Pineda,473Phil.517,548;429SCRA478,504
(2004);Peoplev.Esmale,313Phil.471,492;243SCRA578,592
(1995),citingTuasonv.CourtofAppeals,311Phil.813,817;241
SCRA695,697(1995).
202
202 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
thecrime.Butsuchtestimoniesmustbecredibleandmustcome
fromcrediblewitnesses.[35]
Several circumstances militate against the mauling victims
testimoniesthattheywereabletoidentifytheirattackers:
1.SRLachica,oneofthevictims,himselftestifiedthatthe
menhesawcomingtoattackhisgroup,atleast10innumber,all
woremasks.Hesaid:
Q:WhenoneofyourbrodyouheardshoutedBrods,whatdid
youdo?
A:IstoodupandIwasalarmed.Istoodupandlookedbackand
frommyside,Isawatleastten(10)armedmenandmasked
men.
Q: Yousaidarmedmen,yousawarmedmenwhenyoulooked
back.Withwhatweretheyarmedwith?
A:Theywerearmedwithleadpipesandbaseballbats.
Q:You also mentioned that these men were wearing masks.
Whatkindofmasks?
A:Theywerewearinghandkerchiefs,pieceofclothes,andsome
tshirts.[36]
SRLachicaalsosaidthat,asfiveoftheattackersbeathimup
on the back, he covered his head with his forearms.
[37]Consequently,itwasnotlikelythat,ashewouldclaim,he
sawSJAlvirsmaskfalloffhisface.
SR Lachica also testified that as he ran away from his
assailants, he looked back running and was able to place the
accusedSJZingapanandMedallaatthescene.[38]But,consid
_______________
[35]People v. Mansueto,391 Phil. 611, 633; 336 SCRA 715,
724(2000);Peoplev.Crispin,383Phil.919,932;327SCRA167,
179(2000).
[36]TSN,June5,1995,p.11.
[37]Id.,atp.29.
[38]Id.,atp.13.
203
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 203
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
eringthatSRLachicawastryingtogetawayfromthemenwho
were beating him up, it was not likely, having succeeded in
sprintingaway,thathewouldlookbackandriskslowingdown
hisescape.HedidnotevenclaimthatSJZingapanandMedalla
were among those who attacked him. He appears to have just
made up the statement to get on record evidence that the two
werepartoftheattackers.
2.SR Natalicio testified that the men who attacked them
mostlyworemasksbutSJMedallawholedthosemenworeno
mask.[201]ThisisnoteasytobelievesinceSRLachica,theother
prosecutionwitness,testifiedthattheattackersallworemasks
butwhenhelookedbackwhilegettingaway,hesawSJMedalla
already without a mask, implying that the latter lost it, thus
belyingSRNataliciostestimonythatSJMedallaworenomask
fromthestart.
SRNataliciotestifiedthatwhileparryinghisattackersblows,
he saw SJ Zingapan and Soliva.[202]These two must be near
each other since he saw them at glance. But, contradicting SR
Natalicio,SRGastonalsosawSJZingapan,notwithSolivabut
withMorano.[203]
3.The RTC itself gave no credence to SR Mangrobangs
testimony and for this reason acquitted SJ Magpantay and
Fajardo,twoofhisattackerswhosemaskssupposedlyfelloff.The
trialcourtalsoacquittedSJNarag,whomSRMangrobangsaid
hesaw,whenhereturnedtothesceneofthecommotion,hitting
SRVenturinawiththeaidofSJFeliciano.Itisquiteunbelievable
that having narrowly escaped his attackers, SR Mangrobang
wouldgobackwhilethemaulingwasstillinprogress.Finally,
thetrialcourtacquittedSJAblanidawhomSRMangrobangsaid
hesawwieldingaleadpipewhilerunningbecauseitsimplycould
notbelievethiswitness.
_______________
[39]TSN,July3,1995,p.9.
[40]Id.,atpp.1416.
[41]TSN,October11,1995,p.143.
204
204 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
4.AfterSRLachicaandNatalicio,thethirdwitnesstouse
thelookbackpropositionwasSRGaston.Hetestifiedthatoneof
twomaskedmentriedtobludgeonhimontheheadastheother
lungedathimwithaknife,woundinghischestandforearm.As
SRGastonranandescapedfromthosetwomen,hemanagedto
lookbackjusttoplaceSJZingapanandMoranoatthesceneof the separate identifications, taking place in split seconds, defy
themauling.
ThetrialcourtitselffoundsomethingterriblywrongwithSR
Gastonstestimonies.Itsaid:
Inthisregard,Gastonrelatedahazystory.Atonepoint,he
saidthathesawZingapanandMoranoatthesameplacebutnot
atthesametimeexplainingthattheformerwastherefirstand
whenhemoved,thelatterstoodinthesameplace.Later,hesaid
thatbothwerethereatthesametime.Grantingarguendothat
Moranowasmoving,hisstorydoesnotentirelyjibewiththatof
Fortes.[42]
5.SRForteswasthefourthwitnesstofoistthesamelook
backproposition.Heranawayafterseeingabout15men,armed
with lead pipes and clubs, coming to attack his group. But he
looked back whileon the run to see SJ Zingapan and Morano,
whosupposedlyhadnomasks,rightbehindhim.Theyhithimon
the back, causing him to fall. As he stood up and tried to run
again,agroupof10menattackedhimforfivetoeightseconds.
He recognized none of them. But, standing up again after the
secondattack,hesupposedlysawSJFelicianowhosemaskfelloff
whilebeatingupSRVenturina.
Justwhatarethechancesthatfouroutoffivewitnesseswho
werefleeingand,indeed,runningfortheirliveswouldjustlook
back,riskstumblingandcrashingdown,toputinevidencethe
identitiesofsomeofthosewhomtheRTCandtheCAconvicted?
Verylittle.Itappearsaconvenientexcuse
_______________
[42]RTCDecision,p.65.
205
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 205
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
forprovidingevidencewherenoneexisted.Thecircumstancesof
belief.Whatbafflesmeisthefactthatthetrialcourtacquitted
SJMoranowhomSRFortesandGastonidentifiedwhilelooking
backontherunbutconvictedSJZingapan,Soliva,andMedalla
whowerealsotargetsoflookbacktestimonies.
 The trial court had reason to further doubt SR Fortes
testimonies.Itsaid:
Bytheway,theCourthasnotignoredthetestimonyofArnel
Fortes that Morano repeatedly struck him with a lead pipe. It
was,however,givenduringtherebuttalstage.Whenhesatatthe
witnessstandforthefirsttime,hesaidnothingofthatsort.He
couldhavebeensayingthetruthandthatwhatherelatedwas
notanafterthoughtbutstillthecloudofdoubtremains.Asthere
stillthathaziness,thebarrierremainsuncleared.[43]
6.Emmanuel Batungbakal of course testified that he saw
threeplatelesscarsrushouttowardstheMainLibrary[44]with
SJFelicianoonboardonecar.Butthistestimonyisinconclusive
since Batungbakal admitted on crossexamination that he was
not sure it was SJ Feliciano he saw. Besides, as pointed out
above,nocredibletestimonysupportstheviewthatSJFeliciano
infacttookpartinthemauling.
Thetrialcourtacquittedsomeoftheaccusedafterrejecting
thetestimoniesofSRMangrobangwhofingeredSJFelicianoas
well.Ontheotherhand,althoughSRGastondidnotmentionSJ
Feliciano on direct testimony, he brought up his name only on
cross,acatchupkindoftestimonythatthetrialcourtrejectedin
SJ Moranos case. SR Fortes,thefinal witness against SJ
Feliciano,saidanuncannything:twogroupsofattackershadjust
bludgeonedhimoneaftertheother,yetSR
_______________
[43]Id.
[44]TSN,November6,1995,pp.31,33.
206
206 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
Fortes claimed that he still managed to stand up in time to
observeSJFelicianoattackingSRVenturina.
7.Notably, the two sides gave conflicting testimonies
regardingthevictimsopportunitytoidentifytheirattackers.The
prosecutionwitnessesclaimthatsomeoftheattackerscouldbe
identifiedbecausetheyworenomasksortheirmasksfelloff.The
defensewitnessestestifiedthatalltheattackersworemasksand
noneofthesefelloff.Sinceidentificationoftheattackersisthe
keyissue,theCourthastoconsiderwhichwitnessesandstories
appeartobemorecredible.
I amimpressed with the testimony of UP police officer
Salvador,whohadservedtheUPspoliceforcefor18yearsand
hadnomotivetofabricateorlie.Hetestifiedthatwhenheand
fellow officer Cabrera arrived at the scene of the mauling, he
asked the bystanders the identities of the assailants. The
bystandersrepliedthattheywereunabletoidentifytheattackers
becausetheyworemasks.Salvadortestified:
Q:Uponbeinginformedbytheblueguardthattherewasa
rumbleneartheBeachHousecanteen,telltheCourtwhat
didyouandCabrerado?
A:Werushedtotheplacewheretheincidenttookplace,sir.
Q:And upon reaching the area of the Beach House Canteen,
whatdidyounotice?
A:Inoticedonevictimtogetherwithsomepeople,sir,andI
asked some of the bystanders if they saw what happened
andtheysaidtheydidnotrecognizetheattackersbecause
theywerewearingmask.[45]
The statement of the bystanders, made while some of the
woundedwerebleedingthereandtheexcitementlingered,may
begiveninevidenceaspartoftheresgestae.Section42,Rule130
oftheRulesofEvidenceprovides:
_______________
[45]TSN,November20,1995,pp.1920.
 207 [47]TSN,December11,1995,pp.80,85.
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 207 208
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr. 208 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sec.42.Part of the res gestae.Statements made by a Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
personwhileastartlingoccurrenceistakingplaceorimmediately his three companions admitted to the two UP police officers
prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances investigating the mauling incident that they could not identify
thereof,maybegiveninevidenceaspartoftheresgestae.xxx theirattackersbecausethelatterworemasks.UPpoliceofficer
Thesestatementsarespontaneous reactions inspiredbythe Cabreratestified:
excitementofthemoment.Itmaybeassumedthat,unliketardy QOn you way to the Infirmary, please tell the court if
witnesses, the bystanders who made the statements had no anythinghadtranspired.
opportunitytodeliberateorfabricate.Thewordstheyutteredare AIaskedMarvinNatalicioofhisnames,sir.
QWhatelsedidyouaskhim,ifany?
part of the commotion they described.[46]Theres
AIaskedhimwhohithim,sir.
gestaecontradicts theattemptof prosecution witnesses to show QWhatdidhesay?
thatanumberoftheattackersworemasksorthatidentification AHetoldmehedidnotrecognizeanyofthembecausethey
waspossiblebecausethemasksofsomefelloff. werewearingmasks,sir.
In fact, Luz Perez, a3rdyear Interior Design student, then QWhat about his companions who were with you in this
lininguptogetfoodattheBeachHouseCanteen,testifiedlike vehicle,didyounotaskthem?
many others that she was unable to identify the attackers ATheyansweredthesamething,theydidnotrecognizeany
becausetheyallworemasks.Shesaid: ofthem,sir.
Q.HowmanymaskedmendidyouseeMissPerez? xxxx
A.Therewereabouttentofifteenmaskedmen. QNow,uponarrivingattheInfirmary,pleasetelltheCourt
xxxx whattranspired?
ATTY.W.CHUA AAt the Infirmary, there were two (2) other persons who
Q.Andcanyouidentifyanyoftheattackersthatyousaw? werealsoinjured,Sir.
WITNESS QPleasetellthecourtwhatyoudidattheU.P.Infirmary?
A.No,Icannot. AI asked Marvin again if he recognized the two (2) other
Q.Whycanyounotidentifythem? persons who hit him and he answered the same thing as
A.Becausetheywerewearingmasks.[47] whatIhaveaskedhimwhenwewereatthevehicle,Sir.[48]
8.In the same way, while the startling incident and the
painsitcausedstilloccupiedtheirminds,SRNatalicioand Notably,asSRFortestestified,itwasSOPforallfratmento
_______________ familiarizethemselveswiththefacesandnamesofthemembers
[46]2Jones,Sec.10:1,6thEdition.
ofotherfraternities.[49]Thisbeingthecase,therewasnoreason
forSRNatalicioandhiscompanions,allfrat
_______________
[48]TSN,November13,1995,pp.3740.
[49]TSN,October30,1995,p.12.
209
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 209
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
men,nottopromptlynametheattackersfromtherivalfraternity
whenfirstqueriedbythepoliceofficers.
9.Besides,Dr.CarmenMislang,aphysicianwhohadbeen
servingattheUPInfirmaryfor20years,alsotestifiedthatwhen
asked,SRNatalicioandhiscompanionstoldherthattheycould
not identify their attackers because the latter were masked.
[212]Dr.Mislanginfactincludedthisinformationinhermedical
report.Shethustestified:
QYousaiddoctor,inthishistoryofpresentillness,markedas
Exhibit 9a2=zingapan, that I quote:
xxxhewasallegedlyhitbyaleadpipeduringtherumble
by unknown assailants. What was the basis of your
statementhere?
AHetoldus,thegroupbecausetheycamewithfriends,they
allegedthathewashitbyagroupofpeoplemaskedbya
leadpipe.Iaskediftheyknowtheassailantsandtheysaid
nobecausetheyaremasked.
QYousaidhe,towhomareyoureferringto?
AThepatientandtheirfriendsaroundbecausetherearealso
commotionintheemergencyroom,sir.
QAre you referring to the patient by the name of Mervin
Natalicio?
AYes,sir.[51]
SRNatalicioofcoursedeniedhavingsaidthathecouldnot
identifytheirassailantswhenthepoliceofficersandthedoctor
askedhimandhiscompanionsaboutit.Butbetweenthelatter,
ontheonehand,andthoseofficersandthedoctor,ontheother,
theCourtshouldhavebeenmoreinclinedtobelievethelatter.
Indeed, there is no evidence that SR Natalicio, Lachica,
Fortes,Gaston,Mangrobang,andTumaneng,whosurvived
_______________
[50]TSN,September16,1998,pp.2021.
[51]Id.
210
210 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
themauling,gavestatementsshortlyaftertheincidenteitherto
the UP police officers or the Quezon City police which had
primaryjurisdictionoverthecrimes.Theytookfourdaysmulling
overitbeforegoingtotheNBItonametheirassailants.
10.SR Natalicio of course gave a different version of his
interviewwiththeUPpoliceofficers.Whentheyaskedhimwho
their assailants were, he said that he requested them to come
backashewasnotfeelingwell.[52]Thereistestimonythattwoof
hisSigma Rhobrothers conferred with him to discuss what
happenedandtheirstrategyforgettingbackatthosewhomthey
believed were responsible. Further to this, SR Lachica[53]and
Gaston[54]testifiedthattheymetwiththeiralumnibrothersthat
evening.SRNataliciosaidthatwhenthepoliceofficerscameback
to ask him the identities of the attackers, a senior fraternity
brotherlawyerwaspresentandhetoldthepoliceofficersthatthe
statements would be given to the NBI and they would just be
furnishedcopies.[55]
Thisisludicrous.Therighttosilenceisgiventopersonsunder
suspicionforcommittingsomecrimes,nottothevictimswhose
dutyistopromptlyassistthepoliceinvestigatorsinpinpointing
criminalresponsibilities.Noevidencehasbeenpresentedtoshow
that the UP police force was partial to the opposing
fraternity.Iamthus unable to blame the accused for believing
that the only possible reason in this case for withholding
informationfromthepolicefromdayonewasthatthevictimsand
theircounselhadyettoputtheiractstogether.
11.The supposed identification of the accused came four
days lateratthe NBIofficeinManila.Admittedly,the victims
andtheirbrodswaitedforeveryonetobereadybeforethey
_______________
[52]TSN,July12,1995,p.3.
[53]TSN,June5,1995,p.15.
[54]TSN,October11,1995,pp.46,148149.
[55]TSN,February7,2001,p.31.
211
VOL.724,MAY5,2014
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
cameasagrouptogivetheirstatementsattheNBIoffice.The
excusethatSRNatalicioandFortesneededmedicalattentionand
that theothers with themwanted to come together when they
filedtheircomplaintsattheNBIisnotavalidexcuse.Sincethey
claimthattheywereterriblyaggrievedandthatoneofthemlost
his life, the natural thing was for them to demand immediate
justiceandactionfromthepoliceortheNBIontheafternoonof
December8,1994.
12.Theprosecutionwitnessestestifiedthatthemasksoffive
oftheaccusedjustfellofftorevealwhotheywere.Thesewere(a)
SJAlvirperSRLachicastestimony;[56](b)SJZingapan;and(c)
SJMedallaalsoperSRLachicastestimonythatthetwowerenot
wearingmaskswhenhelookedbackandsawthem,[57]implying
that they had masks at the beginning of the attack; (d) SJ
Magpantay;and(e)SJFajardoperSRMangrobangstestimony
thatthemasksofthesetwofelloff.[58]SRFortesalsotestified
that he saw SJ Felicianos mask fell off as he was hitting SR
Venturina.[59]
Just what are the chances that themasks of five out of 12
accusedjustfelloffduringthemauling?Quitelittleornilsinceit
wasnotactuallyafraternityrumblewheretheprotagonistshit
each other creating the possibility that any mask they were
wearingcouldfalloff.Here,thevictimstestifiedthattheybore
the punishment and were unable to fight back since their
attackers were numerous and carried lead pipes and clubs.
Indeed,noneofthevictimstestifiedthathisactioninprotecting
his head resulted in the unmasking of one or some of his
attackers. Evidently, the attackers deliberately wore masks to
hide their identities.Itmade no sense for them to wear masks
thatwouldjustfalloffwhenonesneezes.
211 _______________
[56]TSN,June5,1995,p.12.
[57]Id.,atp.13.
[58]TSN,September28,1995,pp.1718.
[59]TSN,October16,1995,pp.6263.
212
212 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr.
Thosewhoswingbatstostrikeatobjectsbeforethemrarely
hittheirownfaces.OnlyinfunnymovieslikeTheThreeStooges
canthathappen.Whatarethechancesthatamaskwouldjust
fallofffromthefaceofthepersonwearingit?Constructionand
industriallaborersdoingstrenuousworkwearmaskalldaylong
to protect themselves from dusts, chemicals, or fumes. Food
processing workers wear them at work to prevent food
contamination. They are not likely to be heard experiencing
unpredictablefallingoffofmaskstakingplaceingreatnumber. Inacaselikethis,wheretheidentitiesandparticipationsof
Here,iftheprosecutionweretobebelieved,fiveoutofjust12 the several accused involved are difficult to prove, the ideal
accusedlosttheirmasksinonly30to45seconds.Theoddsofthis solution is to convince the least guilty of them, the one who
happeningareunbelievable. showedthemostreluctanceanddeliveredthelightestblows,to
Indeed,prosecutionwitnessGaiohimselfwhowasatthescene turnstatewitness.Iamunabletosayifeffortsinthisdirection
ofthecommotiontestifiedthathedidnotseeanyoftheattackers weretakenbytheNBIortheprosecutorstoensurethattheyhad
losingtheirmasksatanypointintime.Hesaid: agoodcase.
ATTY.CHUA: Icondemn the senseless death of SR Venturina and
Q:Atanypointintime,didyouseeanymaskpulling[sic]off? commiserateswiththesufferingsofhisfamily.Fraternitywars,
WITNESS: many of them cruel and barbaric, are the scourge of many
A:Ididnotseeanything,sir.[60] campuses.Newrecruitsareromanticizedwiththemystery,pride,
GaioalsobeliedSRFortestestimonythatSJFelicianosmaskfell and drama of brotherhood or kinship with senior members of
offwhilehewashittingSRVenturina.Gaiosaid: greatreputation.Thisofcourseinvitesenvyandannoyancefrom
Q:Mr. Dennis Venturina was hit and fell down, was the otherbrotherhoodsfornoneisgreaterormorecourageousthan
personwhohitDenniswearingmask? ones own. They thus test each others unity, capability, and
A:Theirfaceswerecovered,sir. resolve, destroying each other, and subordinating the real
Q:Allofthem? purpose of their being in school. They forget that true
A:Yes,sir. brotherhoodcomesfrommutualkindnessandrespect.
Q:Thereisnowaytorecognizethem? ACCORDINGLY,I vote toGRANTthe petition,REVERSE
A:None,sir.[61] AND SET ASIDEthe judgment of conviction of the Regional
_______________ TrialCourtinCriminalCasesQ9561133to38datedFebruary
[60]TSN,April3,1997,pp.4849. 28, 2002, andACQUITthe accusedappellants Robert Michael
[61]Id.,atp.49. Beltran Alvir, Danilo A. Feliciano, Jr., Christopher L. Saliva,
213 Julius VictorL.Medalla, and WarrenL.Zingapan on ground of
VOL.724,MAY5,2014 213 reasonabledoubt.
Peoplevs.Feliciano,Jr. Judgmentaffirmedwithmodification.
Whiletheattackbymaskedmenisdoublycondemnable,not G.R.No.158362.April4,2011.*
only for the treachery involved but also for the cowardice and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff
deception that came with it, the Court cannot hastily send to appellee,vs.GILBERTO VILLARICO, SR. @ BERTING,
prison those charged with these crimes without proof beyond GILBERTOVILLARICO,JR.,JERRYRAMENTOS,andRICKY
reasonable doubt that they committed them. The Constitution VILLARICO,accusedappellants.
ordainsthis.
 Criminal Procedure; Evidence; The first duty of the
prosecutionisnottoprovethecrimebuttoprovetheidentityofthe
criminal, for, even if the commission of the crime can be
established, there can be no conviction without proof of the
identityofthecriminalbeyondreasonabledoubt.Thefirstduty
of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the
identityofthecriminal,for,evenifthecommissionofthecrime
canbeestablished,therecanbenoconvictionwithoutproofofthe
identityofthecriminalbeyondreasonabledoubt.Inthatregard,
anidentificationthatdoesnotprecludeareasonablepossibilityof
mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force. The
interventionofanymistakeortheappearanceofanyweaknessin
theidentificationsimplymeansthattheaccusedsconstitutional
rightofpresumptionofinnocenceuntilthecontraryisprovedis
notovercome,therebywarrantinganacquittal,evenifdoubtmay
cloud his innocence. Indeed, the presumption of innocence
constitutionally guaranteed to every individual is forever of
primaryimportance,andeveryconvictionforcrimemustreston
thestrengthoftheevidenceoftheState,notontheweaknessof
thedefense.
Evidence;Witnesses;Thefamiliarityofthewitnesswiththe
assailanterasedanydoubtthatthewitnesscouldhaveerred.
ThecloserelationshipofRemediosandFranciscowiththevictim
as well as their familiarity with the accused who were their
neighborsassuredthecertaintyoftheiridentificationasHaides
assailants.InMarturillasv.People,theCourtobservedthatthe
familiarity of the witness with the assailant erased any doubt
that the witness could have erred; and noted that a witness
related to the victim had a natural tendency to remember the
facesofthepersoninvolvedintheattackonthevictim,because
relatives, more than anybody else, would be concerned with
seekingjusticeforthevictimandbringingthemalefactorbefore
thelaw.
_______________
*THIRDDIVISION.
44
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
4
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
Same;ResGestae;Inageneralway,resgestaeincludesthe
circumstances,facts,anddeclarationsthatgrowoutofthemain
fact and serve to illustrate its character and which are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to
exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.The termres
gestaerefers to those circumstances which are the undesigned
incidentsofaparticularlitigatedactandwhichareadmissible
when illustrative of such act. In a general way,res
gestaeincludes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that
growoutofthemainfactandservetoillustrateitscharacterand
which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main
fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The
ruleonresgestaeencompassestheexclamationsandstatements
madebyeithertheparticipants,victims,orspectatorstoacrime
immediatelybefore,during, orimmediatelyafter the commission
ofthecrimewhenthecircumstancesaresuchthatthestatements
weremadeasaspontaneousreactionorutteranceinspiredbythe
excitementoftheoccasionandtherewasnoopportunityforthe
declaranttodeliberateandtofabricateafalsestatement.
 Same;Same;Testofadmissibilityofevidenceasapartofthe
resgestae;RequisitesofResGestae.Thetestofadmissibilityof
evidenceasapartoftheresgestaeiswhethertheact,declaration,
orexclamationissointimatelyinterwovenorconnectedwiththe
principalfactoreventthatitcharacterizesastoberegardeda
part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it
clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.Adeclarationoranutteranceisthusdeemedaspartof
theresgestaethatisadmissibleinevidenceasanexceptiontothe
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the
principal act, theres gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statementsweremadebeforethedeclaranthadtimetocontrive
ordevise;and(c)thestatementsmustconcerntheoccurrencein
questionanditsimmediatelyattendingcircumstances.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Conspiracy; A conspiracy exists
whentwoormorepersonscometoanagreementconcerningthe
commissionofafelonyanddecidetocommitit;Itisaxiomatic
thatonceconspiracyisestablished,theactofoneistheactofall.
Inthefaceofthepositiveidentificationofallthefouraccused,
it did not matter whether only one or two of them
hadactuallyfiredthefatalshots.Theiractionsindicatedthata
conspiracyexistedamongthem.In
45
VOL.647,APRIL4,2011
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
deed,aconspiracyexistswhentwoormorepersonscometo
anagreementconcerningthecommissionofafelonyanddecideto
commit it. Direct proof of a previous agreement among the
accusedtocommitthecrimeisnotnecessary,forconspiracymay
beinferredfromtheconductoftheaccusedatthetimeoftheir
commission of the crime that evincesa common understanding
amongthemonperpetratingthecrime.Thus,theconcertedacts
ofthefourmanifestedtheiragreementtokillHaide,resultingin
eachofthembeingguiltyofthecrimeregardlessofwhetherhe
actually fired at the victim or not. It is axiomatic that once
conspiracyisestablished,theactofoneistheactofall;andthat
alltheconspiratorsarethenliableascoprincipals.
Same; Same;PositiveIdentification; Two Types ofPositive
Identification Distinguished.Relevantly, the Court has
distinguished two types of positive identification inPeople v.
Gallarde, 325 SCRA 835 (2000), namely: (a) that by direct
evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the
act;and(b)thatbycircumstantialevidence,suchaswherethe
accusedislastseenwiththevictimimmediatelybeforeorafter
thecrime.
Same; Same; Alibis; A positive identification that is
categorical, consistent, and devoid of any showing of ill or vile
motiveon the part of the Prosecution witnessesalways prevails
overalibianddenialthatareinthenatureofnegativeandself
serving evidence.Long judicial experience instructs that their
denial and alibis, being too easy to invent, could not overcome
their positive identification by credible Prosecution witnesses
whosemotivesfortheidentificationwerenotshowntobeillor
vile.Truly,apositiveidentificationthatiscategorical,consistent,
anddevoidofanyshowingofillorvilemotiveonthepartofthe
45
Prosecutionwitnessesalwaysprevailsoveralibianddenialthat
are in the nature of negative and selfserving evidence. To be
accepted,thedenialandalibimustbesubstantiatedbyclearand
convincingevidenceestablishingnotonlythattheaccuseddidnot
takepartinthecommissionoftheimputedcriminalactbutalso
thatitwasphysicallyimpossiblefortheaccusedtobeatornear
theplaceofthecommissionoftheactatoraboutthetimeofits
commission. In addition, their proffered alibis were really
unworthyofcreditbecauseonlytheaccusedthemselvesandtheir
relativesandotherintimatessubstantiatedthem.46
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
6 _______________
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; It is the
suddennessoftheattackcoupledwiththeinabilityofthevictimto
defend himself or to retaliate that brings about treachery;
Treacherymaystillbeappreciatedevenifthevictimwasfacing
the assailant.There is treachery when: (a) at the time of the
attack,thevictimwasnotinapositiontodefendhimself;and(b)
theaccusedconsciouslyanddeliberately adopted the particular
means,methods,orformsofattackemployedbyhim.Theessence
oftreacheryliesinthesuddennessoftheattackthatleavesthe
victimunabletodefendhimself,therebyensuringthecommission
oftheoffense.Itisthesuddennessoftheattackcoupledwiththe
inabilityofthevictimtodefendhimselfortoretaliatethatbrings
abouttreachery;consequently,treacherymaystillbeappreciated
evenifthevictimwasfacingtheassailant.
APPEALfromadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
PublicAttorneysOfficeforaccusedappellants.
BERSAMIN,J.:
Theidentificationoftheaccusedasthepersonresponsiblefor
the imputed crime is the primary duty of the State in every
criminalprosecution.Suchidentification,tobepositive,neednot
always be by direct evidence from an eyewitness, for reliable
circumstantialevidencecanequallyconfirmitastoovercomethe
constitutionallypresumedinnocenceoftheaccused.
On appeal by the accused is the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) promulgated on June 6, 2003,1finding Gilberto
Villarico,Sr.,GilbertoVillarico,Jr.,JerryRamentos, 2and
1CARollo,pp.173184;pennedbyAssociateJusticeHakimS.
Abdulwahid,andconcurredbyAssociateJusticeBennieAdefuin
DelaCruz(retired)andJoseI.Sabio,Jr.(retired).
2AttimesspelledasRamientosintherecordsandintheRTC
decision.
47
VOL.647,APRIL4,2011 47
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
RickyVillaricoguiltyofmurderforthekillingofHaideCagatan,
andimposingthepenaltyofreclusionperpetuaoneachofthem,
therebymodifyingthedecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC),
Branch16,inTangubCitythathadpronouncedthemguiltyof
homicideaggravatedbydwelling.3
Withtreacheryhavingattendedthekilling,weaffirmtheCA
but correct the civil liability to accord with pertinent law and
jurisprudence.
Antecedents
OnOctober7,1999,aninformationformurderwasfiledinthe
RegionalTrialCourtinMisamisOccidental(RTC)againstallthe
accused,4theaccusatoryportionofwhichreads:
ThatonoraboutAugust8,1999,atabout7:50oclockinthe
morning at Barangay Bolinsong, Municipality of Bonifacio,
Province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
conspiring,confederatingandmutuallyhelpingoneanother,with
intent to kill, armed with a short firearms (sic), did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously suddenly and
treacherouslyshootHAIDECAGATANatthebackpenetrating
throughtheneckwhichcause(d)theinstantdeathofsaidvictim
andthathehadnochancetoavoidordefendhimselffromthe
attack.
CONTRARYTOLAW.
AlltheaccusedpleadednotguiltyattheirDecember15,1999
arraignment.
VersionoftheProsecution
At around 7:50 p.m. on August 8, 1999, Haide was busy
preparing dinner in the kitchen of his familys residence in
Bolinsong,Bonifacio,MisamisOccidental.Thekitchen,lo
_______________
3Rollo,pp.4569;pennedbyJudgeResurrectionT.Inting.
4Records,pp.12.
48
48 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
catedattherearoftheresidence,hadawallwhoseupperportion
wasmadeofthreefeethighbambooslats(sasa)andwhoselower
portionwasalsomadeofbambooslatsarrangedlikeachessboard
withfourinchgapsinbetween.Atthattime,Haidessisterin
law Remedios Cagatan was attending to her child who was
answeringthecallofnaturenearthetoilet.Fromwhereshewas,
Remedios saw all the accused as they stood at the rear of the
kitchenaimingtheirfirearmsatthedoorRickyVillaricowasat
theleftside,andGilberto,Jr.stoodbehindhim,whileGilberto,
Sr. was at the right side, with Ramentos behind him. When
Gilberto, Jr. noticed Remedios, he pointed his gun at her,
promptingRemediostodroptothegroundandtoshouttoLolita
Cagatan,hermotherinlawandHaidesmother:Nay,Naytawo
Nay(Mother,mother,therearepeopleoutside,mother).Atthat
instant,Remediosheardthreegunshots.5
Francisco Cagatan, the father of Haide, also heard the
gunshots just as he was coming out of the toilet, making him
instinctivelyjumpintoahole,fromwherehewasabletoseeand
recognize Gilberto, Sr., Gilberto, Jr. and Ricky who were then
standing by the kitchen door. They were aiming their guns
upward,andsoonafterlefttogetherwithRamentos.6
Lolitaalsoheardthegunshotswhileshewasinthesala.She
recalled that Haide then came towards her from the kitchen,
askingforhelp andsaying:Tabang kaygipusilkoni Berting(I
was shot by Berting).7At that, she and Remedios brought the
wounded Haide to Clinica Ozarraga, where he was treated for
gunshotwoundsonhisleftscapularregion(backofleftshoulder)
and right elbow. He succumbed shortly thereafter due to
hypovolemicshockormassivelossofblood.8
_______________
5TSN,March29,2000,pp.56.
6TSN,March10,2000,pp.67.
7TSN,February24,2000,pp.19and24.
8SeeExhibits A and Bfor the Prosecution (Records, pp.
5354).
49
VOL.647,APRIL4,2011 49
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
VersionoftheDefense
 The accused denied the accusations and each proffered an
alibi.
Gilberto,Sr.claimedthathewassleepinginhishomewitha
feverwhenheheardagunshot.Heinsistedthathelearnedthat
Haidehadbeenshotonlyinthenextmorning. 9Hisdenialand
alibiwerecorroboratedbyhiswifeCarmelita 10andhisdaughter
Jersel.11
Gilberto,Jr.testifiedthatonthedayoftheincident,hewent
toLiloan,Bonifacio,MisamisOccidentalataround5:00p.m.to
visit his girlfriend together with Charlie Bacus and Randy
Hernan. They stayed there until 9:00 p.m. Thereafter, they
proceededtoTiamantoattendthewakeforoneHelenOligario
Cuizon, and were there for an hour. They then returned to
BolinsongandspentthenightinthehouseofRandy.Itwasonly
inthemorningthatRandysfatherinformedthemthatHaidehad
beenshot.12
Rickydeclaredthathestayedthroughoutthewholeeveningof
August 8, 1999 in the house of his aunt Flordeliza. 13Myrna
Hernan,aneighborofFlordeliza,corroboratedhistestimony.14
Ramentos alleged that he was drinkingtubawith others at
thestoreownedbyCinderellaBacusatthetimeoftheshooting;
andthathewenthomeataround9:00p.m.afterhisgroupwas
done drinking. He did not recall hearing any gunshots while
drinkingandcametoknowoftheshootingonlyfromacertain
AnecitoDuyagonthefollowingmorning.
_______________
9TSN,May31,2000,pp.45.
10TSN,July21,2000,pp.317.
11TSN,April11,2000,pp.4358.
12TSN,May31,2000,p.1415.
13TSN,June29,2000,pp.45.
14TSN,April4,2000,pp.4557.
50
50 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
TodiscreditthetestimonyaboutHaidebeingabletoidentify
his assailants, the Defense presented Peter Ponggos, who
narratedthathehadbeenonboardamotorcycle(habalhabal)
whenLolitaandRemediosaskedforhishelp;andthathethen
aided Lolita and Remedios in bringing Haide to the hospital.
AccordingtoPeter,heaskedHaidewhohadshothim,butHaide
repliedthattherehadbeenonlyoneassailantwhomhedidnot
recognize.15
RulingoftheRTC
After trial, the RTC convicted the four accused of homicide
aggravatedbydwelling,disposing:16
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theCourtfindsallthe
accusedguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthecrimeofHomicide,
withoneaggravatingcircumstanceofdwelling,andapplyingthe
IndeterminateSentenceLaw,herebysentenceseachoneofthem
toapenaltyofimprisonmentrangingfrom6yearsand1day,as
itsminimumto17years,4monthsand1day,asitsmaximum,to
suffertheaccessorypenaltiesprovidedforbylaw,topayjointly
andsolidarily,theheirsofthevictimP50,000.00,ascivilliability
andtopaythecosts.
Let all the accused be credited of the time that they were
placed in jail under preventive imprisonment, applying the
provisionsofArt.29oftheRevisedPenalCode,asamended.
SOORDERED.
The RTC accorded faith to the positive identification of the
accused by the Prosecutions witnesses, and disbelieved their
denial and alibis due to their failure to show the physical
improbabilityforthemtobeatthecrimescene,forthedistances
between the crime scene and the places where the accused
allegedlywereatthetimeofthecommissionofthe
_______________
15TSN,April4,2000,pp.317.
16Records,p.138.
51
VOL.647,APRIL4,2011
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
crime were shown to range from only 100 to 700 meters. 17The
RTCfound,however,thattheProsecutionwasnotabletoprove
treacherybecause:
xxx The medical report of gunshot wound left scapular
regionwhichthedoctorinterpretedtobeatthebackoftheleft
shoulderisnotsufficienttoprovetreachery,itbeingsusceptible
to 2 different interpretations: one: that victim had his back
towardshisassailants,andtwo:thathewasactuallyfacingthem
butheturnedaroundforcoveruponseeingthearmedgroupof
Berting. The Court is inclined to believe the second
interpretationbecausethevictimwasabletoseeandidentifyhis
assailants. Two prosecution witnesses testified that the victim
identifiedtothemwhoshothim.18
RulingoftheCA
Onintermediatereview,theCAmodifiedtheRTCsdecision,
holdinginsteadthatmurderwasestablishedbeyondreasonable
doubtbecausethekillingwasattendedbytreachery,viz.:19
WHEREFORE,theappealedDecisionisherebyMODIFIED.
PursuanttoSection13,paragraph2ofRule124oftheRulesof
CriminalProcedure,WerenderJUDGMENTwithoutenteringit,
asfollows:
1.We find all accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
MURDER. Each accused is hereby SENTENCED TO
SUFFERthepenaltyofreclusionperpetua.
2.TheDivisionClerkofCourtisherebydirectedtoCERTIFY
and ELEVATE the entire records of this case to the
SupremeCourtforreview.
51 _______________
17ThedistancebetweenthehouseofGilberto,Sr.andHaides
housewasonly100meters(TSN,May31,2000,p.21).Gilbert,
Jr.testifiedthathisgirlfriendshousewasonly500metersaway
from Bolinsong (TSN, May 31, 2000, pp. 1921). Ricky claimed
that the house of his aunt was only 700 meters from Haides
house(TSN,June29,2000,p.9).
18Records,p.137.
19CARollo,p.173184.
52
52 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
SOORDERED.20
CitingPeople v. Valdez,21the CA explained that the
attendance of treachery did not depend on the position of the
victimatthetimeoftheattack,fortheessenceoftreacherywas
in the element of surprise the assailants purposely adopted to
ensure that the victim would not be able to defend himself.
Considering that the accused had purposely positioned
themselvesatnightoutsidethedoortothekitchenfromwhere
they could see Haide, who was then busy preparing dinner,
through the holes of the kitchen wall, the CA concluded that
Haide was thus left unaware of the impending assault against
him.
Issues
Inthisrecourse,theaccusedraisethefollowingerrors:
I CONSIDERING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS OF MURDER
DESPITEFAILUREOF
_______________
20Id.,atp.183.
21G.R.No.127663,March11,1999,304SCRA611,wherethe
Courtpointedout:
Underparagraph16,Article14oftheRevisedPenalCode,the
qualifyingcircumstanceoftreacheryispresentwhentheoffender
employsmeans,methods,orformsintheexecutionofthecrime
whichtenddirectlyandespeciallytoensureitsexecutionwithout
risktohimselfarisingfromanydefensiveorretaliatoryactwhich
the victim might make (People vs. Santos,270 SCRA 650
[1997]).Thesettledruleisthattreacherycanexistevenif
theattackisfrontalifitissuddenandunexpected,giving
the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend himself
againstsuchattack.Whatisdecisiveisthattheexecution
of the attack, without slightest provocation from the
victimwhoisunarmed,madeitimpossibleforthevictim
todefendhimselfortoretaliate(Peoplevs.Javier,269SCRA
181[1997]).
53
VOL.647,APRIL4,2011
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE IDENTITY OF THE
ASSAILANT AS WELL AS ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS GUILT
BEYONDREASONABLEDOUBT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
TREACHERY, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED
ACCUSEDAPPELLANTSAREGUILTY.
TheaccusedcontendthattheProsecutionwitnessesfailedto
positively identify them as the persons who had actually shot
Haide; that treachery was not attendant because there was no
proofshowingthattheyhadconsciouslyanddeliberatelyadopted
the modeofattackingthe victim; andthatassuming that they
committedthekilling,theycouldonlybeconvictedofhomicide.
Thedecisivequeriesare,therefore,thefollowing:
(a)Shouldanidentification,tobepositive,havetobemade
byawitnesswhoactuallysawtheassailants?
(b)Was treachery attendant in the killing of Haide as to
qualifythecrimeasmurder?
Ruling
We affirm the finding of guilt for the crime of murder, but
modifythecivilliability.
1.
Positiveidentificationrefersto
proofofidentityoftheassailant
Thefirstdutyoftheprosecutionisnottoprovethecrimebut
53 toprovetheidentityofthecriminal,for,evenifthecommissionof
thecrimecanbeestablished,therecanbenoconvictionwithout
proofoftheidentityofthecriminalbeyond
54
54 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
reasonabledoubt. Inthatregard,anidentificationthatdoesnot
22
precludeareasonablepossibilityofmistakecannotbeaccorded
any evidentiary force.23The intervention of any mistake or the
appearanceofanyweaknessintheidentificationsimplymeans
that the accuseds constitutional right of presumption of
innocenceuntilthecontraryisprovedisnotovercome,thereby
warranting an acquittal,24even if doubt may cloud his
innocence.25Indeed,thepresumptionofinnocenceconstitutionally
guaranteedtoeveryindividualisforeverofprimaryimportance,
andeveryconvictionforcrimemustrestonthestrengthofthe
evidenceoftheState,notontheweaknessofthedefense.26
TheaccusedcontendthattheProsecutionwitnesses didnot
actuallyseewhohadshotHaide;hence,theiridentificationasthe
malefactorswasnotpositivelyandcrediblymade.
Wecannotupholdthecontentionoftheaccused.
Theestablishedcircumstancesunerringlyshowthatthefour
accusedweretheperpetratorsofthefatalshootingof
_______________
22People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 141644, May 27, 2004, 429
SCRA478;Peoplev.Esmale,G.R.Nos.10298182,April21,1995,
243SCRA578.
23People v. Fronda, G.R. No. 130602. March 15, 2000, 328
SCRA185;Natividadv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.L40233,June
25, 1980, 98 SCRA 335, 346;People v. Beltran, L31860,
November29,1974,61SCRA246,250;Peoplev.Manambit,G.R.
Nos. 7274445, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 344, 377;People v.
Maongco, G.R. Nos. 10896365, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 562,
575.
24Peoplev.Raquel,G.R.No.119005,December2,1996,265
SCRA 248, 259;People v. Salguero, G.R. No. 89117, June 19,
1991, 198 SCRA 357;Natividadv. Court of Appeals, G.R. L
40233,June25,1980,98SCRA335,346.
25Pechov.People,G.R.No.111399,September27,1996,262
SCRA 518, 533;Perez v.Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 7620304,
December 6, 1989, 180 SCRA 9;People v. Sadie, No. L66907,
April 14, 1987, 149 SCRA 240;U.S. v.Gutierrez, 4 Phil. 493
(1905).
26Peoplev.Pidia,G.R.No.112264,November10,1995,249
SCRA687,702.
55
VOL.647,APRIL4,2011 55
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
Haide. Their identification as his assailants by Remedios and
Francisco was definitely positive and beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically,Remediossawallthefouraccusednearthedoorto
the kitchen immediatelybeforethe shots were fired and
recognized who they were. She even supplied the detail that
Gilberto, Jr. had trained his firearm towards her once he had
noticedherpresenceatthecrimescene.Onhispart,Francisco
attested to seeing the accused near the door to the kitchen
holdingtheirfirearmsrightafterheheardthegunshots,andalso
recognizedthem.
The collective recollections of both Remedios and Francisco
about seeing the four accused standing near the door to the
kitchenimmediatelybeforeandaftertheshootingofHaideinside
the kitchen were categorical enough, and warranted no other
logicalinferencethanthatthefouraccusedwerethepersonswho
had just shot Haide. Indeed, neither Remedios nor Francisco
needed to have actually seen who of the accused had fired at
Haide,foritwasenoughthattheytestifiedthatthefourarmed
accused: (a) had strategically positioned themselves by the
kitchendoorpriortotheshootingofHaide;(b)hadstillbeenin
the same positionsafterthe gunshots were fired; and (c) had
continuously aimed their firearms at the kitchen door even as
theywereleavingthecrimescene.
The close relationship of Remedios and Francisco with the
victim as well as their familiarity with the accused who were
their neighbors assured the certainty of their identification as
Haidesassailants.InMarturillasv.People,27theCourtobserved
thatthefamiliarityofthewitnesswiththeassailanterasedany
doubtthatthewitnesscouldhaveerred;andnotedthatawitness
related to the victim had a natural tendency to remember the
facesofthepersoninvolvedintheattackonthevictim,because
relatives,morethananybody
_______________
27G.R.No.163217,April18,2006,487SCRA273.
56
56 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
else,wouldbeconcernedwithseekingjusticeforthevictimand
bringingthemalefactorbeforethelaw.28
Moreover, the following portions of Lolitas testimony show
that Haide himself recognized and identified his assailants, to
wit:
Atty.Fernandez:
Q.Andwherewereyouatthattimewhenhewasshot?
A.Inthesala.
Q.CouldyoupossiblytelltheHonorableCourtwhatactually
tookplacewhenyoursonwasshot?
A.HecamefromthekitchenatthattimewhenIheard
gunreports, he said Nay help me because I was
shotbyBerting.29
xxx
Atty.Anonat:
Q.And that affidavit was executed by you at the Bonifacio
PoliceStation?
A.Yes.
_______________
28Id.,atp.301;seealsoPeoplev.Evangelista,G.R.No.84332
33, May 8, 1996, 256 SCRA 611 (holding that where the
identificationmadebythewifeofthevictimwasheldtobe
reliablebecauseshehadknowntheaccusedforalongtime
and was familiarwith him, considering herbeing positive
thatitwastheaccusedwhohadshotherhusbandalthough
she saw only the back part and the body contour of the
assailant.Atthetimeshe saw him, theaccusedwas only
fourmetersaway,andtherewassufficientilluminationfrom
alamppostsixmetersawayfromthehouseofthevictim
andhiswife);Peoplev.Jacolo,G.R.No.94470,December16,
1992,216SCRA631(holdingthatwheretheconditionsof
visibilitywerefavorableandthewitnessdidnotappearto
bebiasedagainstthemanonthedock,hisorherassertions
as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be
accepted,moresowherethewitnesseswerethevictims,or
nearrelatives of the victims, because thesepeople usually
strovetorememberthefacesoftheassailants).
29TSN,February24,2000,p.19;boldemphasissupplied.
57
VOL.647,APRIL4,2011
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
xxx
Q.Andyouaffirmtothetruthofwhatyouhavestatedinthis
affidavit?
A.Yes.
Q.OnquestionNo.7youwereaskedinthismannerGiunsa
mannimopagkasayodngasilamaoyresponsiblesa
kamatayon sa imong anak? How do youknow that
they were responsible (for) the death of your son?
And your answer is this Tungod kay ang biktima
nakasulti pa man sa wala pa siya namatay ug ang
iyangpulongmaongaTABANGNAYKAYGIPUSIL
KO NILA NI BERTING ug nasayod ako nga sila
gumikan sa akong mga testigos. which translated
into EnglishBecause the victim was able to talk
beforehediedandthewordswhichhetoldmehelp
meNayIamshotbythegroupofBertingandIknow
thisbecauseofmywitnesses.30
xxx
ThestatementofHaidetohismotherthathehadjustbeen
shotbythegroupofBertingutteredintheimmediateaftermath
of the shooting where he was the victimwas a true part of
theresgestae.Thestatementwasadmissibleagainsttheaccused
asanexceptiontothehearsayruleunderSection42,Rule130of
theRulesofCourt,whichprovides:
Section42.Partoftheresgestae.Statementsmadebya
personwhileastartlingoccurrenceistakingplaceorimmediately
prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of theresgestae. So,
also,statementsaccompanyinganequivocalactmaterialtothe
57 issue,andgivingitalegalsignificance,maybereceivedaspartof
theresgestae.(36a)
_______________
30Id.,atp.24;boldemphasissupplied.
58
58 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
Thetermresgestaereferstothosecircumstanceswhichare
theundesignedincidentsofaparticularlitigatedactandwhich
are admissible when illustrative of such act. 31In a general
way,resgestaeincludesthecircumstances,facts,anddeclarations
thatgrowoutofthemainfactandservetoillustrateitscharacter
and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the
main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication.32Theruleonresgestaeencompassestheexclamations
and statements made by either the participants,victims, or
spectators to a crime immediatelybefore,during,
orimmediatelyafter the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as
aspontaneousreactionorutteranceinspiredbytheexcitementof
theoccasionandtherewasnoopportunity for the declarantto
deliberateandtofabricateafalsestatement.33
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of theres
gestaeis whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the
principalfactoreventitself,andalsowhetheritclearlynegatives
any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. 34A
declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of theres
gestaethat is admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the
principalact,theresgestae,isastartlingoccurrence;(b)
_______________
31AlhambraBldg.&LoanAssnv.DeCelle,118P.2d19,47
C.A. 2d 409;Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp.v. Lewis, 61 N.E. 2d
297,326Ill.App.117.
32Kaikov.Dolinger,440A.2d198,184Conn.509;Southern
SuretyCo.v.Weaver,Com.App.273S.W.838.
33Peoplev. Sanchez, G.R.No. 74740, August28, 1992, 213
SCRA70.
34Molloyv.ChicagoRapidTransitCo.,166N.E.530,335Ill.
164;Campbellv.Gladden,118A.2d133,383Pa.144,53A.L.R.
2d1222.
59
VOL.647,APRIL4,2011
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.35
We find that the requisites concurred herein.Firstly, the
principal actthe shooting of Haidewas a startling
occurrence.Secondly, his statement to his mother about being
shotbythegroupofBertingwasmadebeforeHaidehadtimeto
contriveortodeviseconsideringthatitwasutteredimmediately
aftertheshooting.And,thirdly,thestatementdirectlyconcerned
the startling occurrence itself and its attending circumstance
(that is, the identities of the assailants). Verily, the statement
was reliable as part of theres gestaefor being utteredin
spontaneityandonlyinreactiontothestartlingoccurrence.
Inthefaceofthepositiveidentificationofallthefouraccused,
it did not matter whether only one or two of them
hadactuallyfiredthefatalshots.Theiractionsindicatedthata
conspiracyexistedamongthem.Indeed,aconspiracyexistswhen
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commissionofafelonyanddecidetocommitit. 36Directproofofa
previousagreementamongtheaccusedtocommitthecrimeisnot
necessary,37for conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of
the accused at the time of their commission of the crime that
evincesacommonunderstanding
_______________
35People v. Guillermo, G.R. No. 147786, January 20, 2004,
420SCRA326;Peoplev.DelaCruz,G.R.No.152176,October1,
59 2003, 412 SCRA 503;People v. Ignas, G.R. Nos. 14051415,
September30,2003,412SCRA311;Peoplev.Lobrigas,G.R.No.
147649, December 17, 2002, 394 SCRA 170;People v. Peralta,
G.R. No. 94570, September 28, 1994, 237 SCRA 218;People v.
Maguikay,G.R.Nos.10322628,October14,1994,237SCRA587,
600.
36Article8,RevisedPenalCode.
37People v. Ronquillo, G.R. No. 126136, April 5, 2002, 380
SCRA266;Peoplev.Geguira,G.R.No.130769,March13,2000,
328SCRA11,3233.
60
60 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
amongthemonperpetratingthecrime.38Thus,theconcertedacts
ofthefourmanifestedtheiragreementtokillHaide,resultingin
eachofthembeingguiltyofthecrimeregardlessofwhetherhe
actually fired at the victim or not. It is axiomatic that once
conspiracyisestablished,theactofoneistheactofall; 39andthat
alltheconspiratorsarethenliableascoprincipals. 40
But did not the fact that the name Bertingwithout any
surnamebeingtoogenericopentheidentificationoftheaccused
astheassailantstodisquietingdoubtabouttheircomplicity?
Weholdthattherewasnoneedforasurnametobeattached
tothenicknameBertinginordertoinsulatetheidentificationby
Haidefromchallenge.Thevictimsresgestaestatementwasonly
oneofthecompetentandreliablepiecesofidentificationevidence.
As already shown, the accused were competently incriminated
alsobyRemediosandFranciscoinamannerthatwarrantedthe
logical inference that they,and no others, were the assailants.
Also,thatBertingwasthenaturalnicknameforapersonwhose
givennamewasGilberto, like herein accused Gilberto, Sr. and
Gilberto, Jr., was a matter of common knowledge in the
Philippines. In fine, the pieces of identification evidence,
including Haidesres gestaestatement, collaborated to render
theiridentificationunassailable.
Relevantly,theCourthasdistinguishedtwotypesofpositive
identification inPeople v. Gallarde,41namely: (a) that by direct
evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the
act;and(b)thatbycircumstantialevidence,such
_______________
38Peoplev.Geguira,supra.
39Peoplev.Sotes,G.R.No.101337,August7,1996,260SCRA
353,365;Peoplev.Pablo,G.R.Nos.12039497,January16,2001,
349SCRA79.
40Peoplev.Peralta,G.R.No.L19069,October29,1968,25
SCRA759,776777;Peoplev.Pablo,supra.
41G.R.No.133025,February17,2000,325SCRA835.
61
VOL.647,APRIL4,2011 61
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
as where the accused is last seen with the victim immediately
beforeorafterthecrime.TheCourtsaid:
xxxPositive identification pertains essentially to
proof of identity and notper seto that of being an
eyewitness to thevery act of commission of the
crime.Therearetwotypesofpositiveidentification.Awitness
may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the
perpetratorofthecrimeasaneyewitnesstotheveryactofthe
commissionofthecrime.Thisconstitutesdirectevidence.There
may,however,beinstanceswhere,althoughawitnessmaynot
haveactuallyseentheveryactofcommissionofacrime,
he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or
accusedastheperpetratorofacrimeasforinstancewhen
thelatteristhepersonoroneofthepersonslastseenwith
the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of thecrime.Thisis thesecondtypeofpositive
identification,whichformspartofcircumstantialevidence,which,
whentakentogetherwithotherpiecesofevidenceconstitutingan
unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion,
which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the
exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only
onesallowedtopossiblypositivelyidentifyasuspectoraccusedto
theexclusionofothers,thennobodycaneverbeconvictedunless categorical, consistent, and devoid of any showing of ill or vile
thereisaneyewitness,becauseitisbasicandelementarythat motiveonthepartoftheProsecutionwitnessesalwaysprevails
there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is overalibianddenialthatareinthenatureofnegativeandself
positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, servingevidence.43Tobeaccepted,thedenialandalibimustbe
becauseitissettledthatdirectevidenceofthecommissionofa substantiatedbyclearandconvincingevidenceestablishingnot
crimeisnottheonlymatrixwherefromatrialcourtmaydrawits onlythattheaccuseddidnottakepartinthecommissionofthe
conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial imputedcriminalactbutalsothatitwasphysicallyimpossiblefor
evidencewouldnotbeallowedtoproveidentityoftheaccusedon theaccusedtobeatorneartheplaceofthecommissionoftheact
theabsenceofdirectevidence,thenfelonswouldgofreeandthe atoraboutthetimeofitscommission.Inaddition,theirproffered
communitywouldbedeniedproperprotection.42 alibis were really unworthy of credit because only the accused
Toconclude,theidentificationofamalefactor,tobepositive themselvesandtheirrelativesandotherintimatessubstantiated
and sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct them.44
evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be
possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, 2.
trustworthycircumstantialevidencecanequallycon Theessenceoftreacheryisinthemodeofattack,
notintherelativepositionofthevictim
_______________ andtheassailant

42Id.,atpp.849850;boldemphasissupplied. _______________
62
62 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
firm the identification and overcome the constitutionally
presumedinnocenceoftheaccused.
Facedwiththeirpositiveidentification,thefouraccusedhad
toestablishconvincingdefenses.Theyoptedtorelyondenialand
their respective alibis, however, but both the RTC and the CA
rightlyrejectedsuchdefenses.
The rejection was warranted. Long judicial experience
instructs thattheir denial and alibis, being too easy to invent,
could not overcome their positive identification by credible
Prosecutionwitnesseswhosemotivesfortheidentificationwere
notshowntobeillorvile.Truly,apositiveidentificationthatis
43People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 140676, July 31, 2002, 385
SCRA573,580;Peoplev.Ocampo,G.R.No.80262,September1,
1993, 226 SCRA 1;People v. Herico, G.R. Nos. 8968283,
December21,1990,192SCRA655;Peoplev.Fulinara,G.R.No.
88326, August3, 1995, 247 SCRA28;Peoplev.Cardesan, G.R.
No.L29090,April29,1974,56SCRA631.
44Peoplev.Abendan,G.R.Nos.13202627,June28,2001,360
SCRA106,121122.
63
VOL.647,APRIL4,2011 63
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
 The RTC ruled out the attendance of treachery due to its 47People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 188610, June 29, 2010, 622
persuasionthatthevictimmusthavebeenfacinghisassailants SCRA 548;Peoplev. Dela Cruz, G.R.No. 188353, February 16,
atthetimeoftheassaultandwasthusnottakenbysurprise.The
2010, 612 SCRA 738, 747;People v. Escote, Jr.,supra, pp. 632
CAdifferedfromtheRTC,however,andstressedthatregardless
633.
of the position of the victim, the essence of treachery was the
48Peoplev.Aguilar,88Phil693(1951).
element of surprise that the assailants purposely adopted to
ensurethatthevictimwasnotabletodefendhimself.45 64
WeupholdtherulingoftheCA. 64 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
There is treachery when: (a) at the time of the attack, the Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
victimwasnotinapositiontodefendhimself;and(b)theaccused The argument of the accused that the Prosecution did not
show that they had consciously and deliberately adopted the
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
mannerofkillingHaidehadnosubstance,forthetestimoniesof
methods, or forms of attack employed by him. 46The essence of
RemediosandFranciscodisclosethecontrary.
treachery lies in the suddenness of the attack that leaves the
Remedios testimony about seeing the four accused taking
victimunabletodefendhimself,therebyensuringthecommission
positionsnearthedoortothekitchenimmediatelyprecedingthe
oftheoffense.47Itisthesuddennessoftheattackcoupledwith
shootingofHaidewasasfollows:
theinabilityofthevictimtodefendhimselfortoretaliatethat
Atty.Fernandez:
brings about treachery; consequently, treachery may still be
xxx
appreciatedevenifthevictimwasfacingtheassailant. 48
Q.WereyoupresentwhenthelateHaideCagatanwasshot?
Here,theelementsoftreacherywerepresent.Hisassailants
A.Yes,Iwaspresent.
gunnedHaidedownwhilehewaspreoccupiedinthekitchenof
Q.CouldyoupossiblytelltheCourtinwhatparticularplace
hisownabodewithgettingdinnerreadyforthehousehold.He
youwerewhentheallegedincidenttookplace?
was absolutely unaware of the imminent deadly assault from
A.Iwasinthegroundfloor.
outside the kitchen, and was for that reason in no position to
Q.Whatwereyoudoingthere?
defendhimselfortorepelhisassailants.
A.I attended my child (to) answer(ing) the call of his ( sic)
_______________ nature.
Q.Now, could you possibly describe before this Honorable
45CARollo,p.182. Court,Mrs.Cagatan,theexacteventthattookplacewhen
theallegedshootingincidenttookplaceinyourpresence?
46Peoplev.Escote,Jr.,G.R.No.140756,April4,2003,400
A.Atthattime,Iattendedmychild(to)answer(ing)the
SCRA603,632;Peoplev.Ave,G.R.Nos.13727475,October18,
callof(his)natureandafterdoingthatwhenIwas
2002,391SCRA225,246.
abouttostanduptogoupIsawtheVillaricoswas
(sic)atthebackofthekitchen.
Q.Atthetimeyousawthemwas(sic)anyoneofthem
sawyoulikewise?
A.Therewas.
Q.Whowashe?
A.GilbertoVillarico,Jr.
Q.Atthatprecisetimewhenyousawthemandoneof
themsawyou,whatdidVillarico,Jr.do?
A.Heaimedhisguntome.65
VOL.647,APRIL4,2011
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
Q.CouldyoupossiblydemonstratethattotheCourt?
A.(Witnessdemonstratedbysquattingposition)
Q.NowatthatprecisemomentwhenyousawVillarico,
Jr.onasquattingpositionpointinghisgunatyou,
whatwastheexactactionthatyoudid?
A.WhenheaimedhisguntomeIimmediatelydropped
totheground.
xxx
Q.Since you were personally present could you still
remember Mrs.Cagatan how many gun burst you
headatthatprecisemomentwhenyoudroppedto
thegroundbecauseVillaricoJr.wasaiminghisgun
atyou.Howmanygunburstdidyouhear?
A.Threegunbursts.
Q.LetusgobacktothetimewhenVillarico,Jr.pointed
hisguntoyou.Doyoustillrememberwhatwerethe
other accused doing or where were they at that
time?
A.Icanremember.
Q.PleasetelltheHonorableCourt.
A.Gilberto Villarico, Sr. was on the right side; Ricky
Villarico was on the left side and behind Gilberto
Villarico,Sr.wasJerryRamientosandbehindRicky
Villaricois(sic)GilbertoVillaricoJr.
Q.WhatwereRickyandGilbertoVillarico,Jr.doingat
thetime?
A.They were also dropping themselves on the ground
andaimedtheirguns.
65 Q.Towhatparticularobjectthattheywereaimingtheir
guns?
A.Tothedoorofourkitchen.
Q.How about Ramientos, where was he at that time
when you saw the accused pointing their guns
towardsthedoorofyourkitchen?66
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
A.Ramientos was standing behind Gilberto Villarico
Sr.49
Likewise, Francisco saw the four accused in the same
positions that Remedios had seen them moments prior to the
shooting.Heclaimedthattheywereaimingtheirfirearmsatthe
kitchenandcontinuedaimingtheirfirearmsevenastheywere
leavingthecrimescene,viz.:
Atty.Fernandez:
xxx
Q.Nowyousaidthatyousawalloftheaccusedatthetime
whenyourlatesonHaideCagatanwasmurderedin the
evening of August 8. Could you possibly explain to this
HonorableCourtattheveryfirsttimewhatdidyousee?
A.AfterIcamefromthetoiletIwasproceedingtothekitchen
becauseHaidewaspreparingfoodandhewascallingfor
 dinner.WhenHaideCagatanwascallingfordinnerandat
thetimeIwasproceedingtothedoorofthekitchen,whenI
wasnearthedoorIheardthegunshots.
Q.Atthetimewhenyouheardgunshots,whatdidyoudo?
A.Ilaiddownflatonthegroundwhilemyheadis(sic)
lookingupandthereIsawthe3Villaricosbringing
a revolver. They came from aiming their guns
towards upstairs and they are about to withdraw
fromthatplacetogetherwithJerryRamientos.
xxx
Q.Now, since you said that you saw the accused
Villaricos, could you possibly tell the Court, what
weretheirresponsibleposition(s)inrelationtothe
doorofthekitchen?
A.Theywereinshootingpositionastheyaimedupward
andtheywerebringingrevolveraimingupstairs.
_______________
49TSN,March29,2000,pp.56.
67
VOL.647,APRIL4,2011
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
Q.In relation to the door of the kitchen, could you
possibly tell theCourt what were their responsible
positionatthattimewhenyousawthem?
A.Thefourofthemweresituatedinfrontofthekitchen
door.VillaricoJr.andVillaricoSr.werefacingeach
other while Ricky Villarico and Jerry Ramientos
werealsofacingeachother.50
ThetestimoniesofRemediosandFranciscoonhowandwhere
the four accused had deliberately and strategically positioned
themselvescouldnotbutrevealtheirdeliberatedesigntothereby
ensuretheaccomplishmentoftheirdesigntokillHaidewithout
anypossibilityofhisescapeorofanyretaliationfromhim.Aptly
didtheCAobserve:
A perusal of the information shows that treachery was
properlyallegedtoqualifythekillingofHeide[sic]Cagatanto
murder. The prosecution was likewise able to prove treachery
throughtheelementofsurpriserenderingthevictimunableto
defendhimself.Inthiscase,theevidenceshowsthatthevictim,
whowasinthekitchenpreparingdinner,couldbeseenfromthe
outsidethroughtheholesofthewall.Thewitnessesconsistently
describedthekitchenswallasthreefeethighbamboosplits(sa
sa),accentedwithbamboosplitswoventolooklikeachessboard
with4inch holes inbetween. The accusedappellants, likewise,
positionedthemselvesoutsidethekitchendooratnightwherethe
victimcouldnotseethem.Whentheaccusedappellantsshothim,
hewascaughtunaware.51
3.
PenaltyandDamages
ThereisnoquestionthattheCAjustlypronouncedallthefour
67
accusedguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofmurder,andpunished
them withreclusion perpetuapursuant to Article 24852of
theRevisedPenalCode,inrelationtoArticle63,
_______________
50TSN,March10,2000,pp.57.
51CARollo,pp.182183.
52Article248.Murder.Anypersonwho,notfallingwithin
theprovisionsofArticle246shallkillanother,shallbeguiltyof
68
68 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
paragraph2,oftheRevisedPenalCode,consideringtheabsence
ofanygenericaggravatingcircumstance.
However,theCAdidnotexplainwhyitdidnotreviewand
revise the grant by the RTC of civil liability in the amount
ofonlyP50,000.00. Thereby, the CA committed a plainly
reversible error for ignoring existing laws, like Article 2206 of
theCivilCode,53whichprescribesadeathindemnitysepa
_______________
murderandshallbepunishedbyreclusionperpetuatodeath,if
committedwithanyofthefollowingattendantcircumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
withtheaidofarmedmen,oremployingmeanstoweakenthe
defenseorofmeansorpersonstoinsureoraffordimpunity.
2.Inconsiderationofaprice,reward,orpromise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a
railroad,fallofanairship,orbymeansofmotorvehicles,orwith
theuseofanyothermeansinvolvinggreatwasteandruin.
4.On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the
precedingparagraph,orofanearthquake,eruptionofavolcano,
destructivecyclone,epidemicorotherpubliccalamity.
5.Withevidentpremeditation.
6. Withcruelty,bydeliberatelyandinhumanlyaugmenting
thesufferingofthevictim,oroutragingorscoffingathisperson
or corpse. (As amended by Section 6, Republic Act No. 7659,
approvedonDecember13,1993).
53Article2206.Theamountofdamagesfordeathcausedby
a crime or quasidelict shall be at least three thousand pesos,
eventhough there may havebeenmitigating circumstances.In
addition:
(1) Thedefendantshallbeliableforthelossoftheearning
capacityofthedeceased,andtheindemnityshallbepaidtothe
heirsofthelatter;suchindemnityshallineverycasebeassessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanentphysicaldisabilitynotcausedbythedefendant,had
noearningcapacityatthetimeofhisdeath;
(2)Ifthedeceasedwasobligedtogivesupportaccordingto
the provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir
called to the decedents inheritance by the law of testate or
intestatesuccession,
69
VOL.647,APRIL4,2011 69
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
rately from moral damages, and Article 2230 of
theCivilCode,54which requires exemplary damages in case of
death due to crime when there is at least one aggravating
circumstance;andapplicablejurisprudence,specifically,Peoplev.
Gutierrez,55where we held that moral damages should be
awardedtotheheirswithoutneedofprooforpleadinginviewof
theviolentdeathofthevictim,andPeoplev.Catubig,56
_______________
may demand support from the person causing the death, for a
periodnotexceedingfiveyears,theexactdurationtobefixedby
thecourt;
 (3)Thespouse,legitimateandillegitimatedescendantsand
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mentalanguishbyreasonofthedeathofthedeceased.
54Art.2230.Incriminaloffenses,exemplarydamagesasa
part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damagesareseparateanddistinctfromfinesandshallbepaidto
theoffendedparty.
55G.R.No.188602,February4,2010,611SCRA633.
56G.R.No.137842,August23,2001,363SCRA621,where
theCourtexplained:
The term aggravating circumstances used by
the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise,istobeunderstoodinitsbroadorgeneric
sense. The commission of an offense has a two
prongedeffect,oneonthepublicasitbreachesthe
socialorderandtheotherupontheprivatevictimas
it causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of
heavier punishment for the accused and by an
award of additional damages to the victim. The
increaseofthepenaltyorashifttoagraverfelony
underscores the exacerbation of theoffense by the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether
ordinaryorqualifying,initscommission.Unlikethe
criminalliabilitywhichisbasicallyaStateconcern,
the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who
suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an
awardofexemplarydamagestobeduetheprivate
offended party when the aggravating circumstance
isordinarybuttobewith
70
70 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.Villarico,Sr.
where we ruled that exemplary damages were warranted
whenever the crime was attended by an aggravating
circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary. Here, the
aggravating circumstance of treachery, albeit attendant or
qualifyinginitseffect,justifiedthegrantofexemplarydamages.
PlainoversightmighthavecausedboththeRTCandtheCA
to lapse into the serious omissions. Nonetheless, a rectification
shouldnowbemade,for,indeed,grossomissions,intendedornot,
should be eschewed. It is timely, therefore, to remind and to
exhortallthetrialandappellatecourtstobealwaysmindfulof
andtoapplythepertinentlawsandjurisprudenceonthekinds
andamountsofindemnitiesanddamagesappropriateincriminal
cases lest oversight and omission will unduly add to the
sufferingsofthevictimsortheirheirs.Norshouldtheabsenceof
specific assignment of error thereon inhibit thesua
sponterectificationoftheomissions,forthegrantofalltheproper
kindsandamountsofcivilliabilitytothevictimorhisheirsisa
matteroflawandjudicialpolicynotdependentuponorcontrolled
by an assignment of error. An appellate tribunal has a broad
discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of
errors and to consider errors not assigned,57for technicality
should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.
Indeed, the trend in modern day procedure is to accord broad
discretionary powersuchthattheappellatecourtmayconsider
mattersbearingontheissuessubmittedforresolutionthatthe
partiesfailedtoraiseorthatthelowercourtignored.58
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we grant to the
heirs of Haide P75,000.00 as death indemnity; 59P75,000.00 as
moral damages;60and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. 61As
clarifiedinPeoplev.Arbalate,62damagesinsuchamountsareto
begrantedwhenevertheaccusedareadjudgedguiltyofacrime
coveredbyRepublicActNo.7659,likethemurderchargedand
proved herein. Indeed, the Court, observing inPeople v.
Sarcia,63citingPeople v. Salome64andPeople v. Quiachon,65that
theprincipalconsiderationfortheawardofdamagesxxxisthe
penaltyprovidedbylaworimposablefortheoffensebecauseofits
heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the
offender,announcedthat:
Thelitmustest[,]therefore,inthedeterminationofthecivil
indemnityistheheinouscharacterofthecrimecommitted,which
would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced
toreclusionperpetua.
WHEREFORE,weaffirmthedecisionpromulgatedonJune6,
2003inCAG.R.CRNo.24711,findingGILBERTOVILLARICO,
SR., GILBERTO VILLARICO, JR., JERRY RAMENTOS, and
RICKY VILLARICO guilty of murder and sentencing each of
themtosufferreclusionperpetua,subjecttothemodificationthat
theyareheldjointlyandsolidarilyliabletopaytotheheirsofthe
late Haide Cagatan death indemnity of P75,000.00, moral
damagesofP75,000.00,andexemplarydamagesofP30,000.00.
Theaccusedshallpaythecostsofsuit.
SOORDERED.
CarpioMorales (Chairperson), Brion, Villarama,
Jr.andSereno,JJ.,concur.
Judgmentaffirmed.
Note.Section42ofRule130oftheRulesofCourtmentions
twoactswhichformpartoftheresgestae,namely:spontaneous
statementsandverbalacts.(Talidanovs.FalconMaritimeand
AlliedServices,Inc.,558SCRA279[2008])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
VOL.207,MARCH23,1992 461
PhilippineAirlines,Inc.vs.Ramos
G.R.No.92740.March23,1992.*
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,vs.JAIME M.
RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO, MILAGROS
ILANO, DANIEL ILANO AND FELIPA JAVALERA,
respondents.
Evidence;Documentaryevidence;Writingordocumentmade
contemporaneously with transaction regarded as more reliable
proofthanoraltestimony.Intheabsenceofanycontroverting
evidence,thedocumentaryevidencepresentedtocorroboratethe
testimonies of PALs witnesses areprima facieevidence of the
truth of their allegations. The plane tickets of the private
respondents,exhs.1,2,3,4,(withemphasisontheprinted
conditionofthecontractofcarriageregardingcheckintimeas
wellasonthenotationlate4:02stampedontheflightcouponby
the checkin clerk immediately upon the checkin of private
respondents)andthepassengerManifestofFlightPR264,exh.
5,(whichshowedthenonaccommodationofCapatiandGoand
theprivaterespondents)areentriesmadeintheregularcourseof
businesswhichtheprivaterespondentsfailedtoovercomewith
substantialandconvincingevidenceotherthantheirtestimonies.
Consequently,theycarrymoreweightandcredence.Awritingor
_______________
*
FIRSTDIVISION.
462
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
62
PhilippineAirlines,Inc.vs.Ramos
document made contemporaneously with a transaction in
whichareevidencedfactspertinenttoanissue,whenadmittedas
proofofthosefacts,isordinarilyregardedasmorereliableproof
andofgreaterprobativeforcethantheoraltestimonyofawitness
astosuchfactsbaseduponmemoryandrecollection(20AmJurS
1179, 1029 cited in Francisco,Revised Rules of Court in the
PhilippinesAnnotated,1973Edition,VolumeVII,PartII,p.654).
Same;Same;Exception to hearsay rule; Res gestae.The
hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or
conduct accompanying or so nearly connected with the main
transactionastoformapartofit,andwhichillustrate,elucidate,
qualifyorcharacterizetheact,areadmissibleaspartoftheres
gestae(32C.J.S.,S.411,3031).
Commoncarriers;Contractofcarriage;Passengersboundby
conditionsofcontract.Whentheprivaterespondentspurchased
theirtickets,theywereinstantaneouslyboundbytheconditions
of the contract of carriage particularly the checkin time
requirement.Thetermsofthecontractareclear.Theirfailureto
comeontimeforcheckinshouldnotmilitateagainstPAL.Their
nonaccommodation on that flight was the result of their own
actionorinactionandtheensuingcancellationoftheirticketsby
PALisonlyproper.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Ricardo V. Puno, Jr., Caesar R. Dulay & Marceliano C.
Calicaforpetitioner.
MarcosL.Estrada,Jr.forprivaterespondents.
MEDIALDEA,J.:
Thispetitionforreviewoncertiorariseekstoreversethedecision
oftheCourtofAppealsdatedMarch15,1990affirmingintotothe
decisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtofImus,Cavite,Branch21,
directingthePhilippineAirlines,Inc.(PAL,forshort)topaythe
private respondents the amounts specified therein as actual,
moral and temperate damages as well as attorneys fees and
expensesoflitigation.
The antecedent facts are briefly recounted by the appellate
court,asfollows:
463
VOL.207,MARCH23,1992 463
PhilippineAirlines,Inc.vs.Ramos
Plaintiffs Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros
Ilano,DanielIlanoandFelipaJavalera,areofficersoftheNegros
TelephoneCompany who heldconfirmed ticketsforPALFlight
No. 264 from Naga City to Manila on September 24, 1985,
scheduled to depart for Manila at 4:25 p.m. The tickets were
boughtsometimeinAugust1985.Amongtheconditionsincluded
inplaintiffsticketsisthefollowing:
1.CHECKINTIMEPleasecheckinattheAirportPassenger
checkincounteratleastonehourbeforePUBLISHEDdeparture
timeofyourflight.Wewillconsideryouraccommodationforfeited
infavorofwaitlistedpassengersifyoufailtocheckinatleast30
minutesbeforePUBLISHEDdeparturetime.(Exhs.(1AA,2A
1,SA,OA1,tsn,Nov.23,1987,p.8).
Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that they went to the
checkincounterofthedefendantsNagabranchatleastone(1)
hourbeforethepublisheddeparturetimebutnoonewasatthe
counteruntil30minutesbeforedeparture,butuponcheckingin
and presentation of their tickets to the employee/clerk who
showedup,theirticketswerecancelledandtheseatsawardedto
chancepassengers;plaintiffshadtogotoManilabybus,andseek
actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees for
breachofcontractofcarriage.
Defendant disclaims any liability, claiming that the non
accommodationofplaintiffsonsaidflightwasduetotheirhaving
checkin (sic) late for their flight. It is averred that even if
defendantisfoundliabletotheplaintiffssuchliabilityisconfined
to, and limited by, the CAB Economic Regulations No. 7 in
conjunctionwithP.D.589.
Thetrialcourtrenderedjudgmentfindingdefendantguiltyof
breachofcontractofcarriageinbumpingofftheplaintiffsfrom
itsF264flightofSeptember25,1985,andordereddefendantto
pay:
1. 1)P1,250.20thetotalvalueofthetickets;
2. 2)P22.50the total value of airport security fees and
terminalfees;
3. 3)P20,000.00for each of the plaintiffs for moral and
temperatedamages;and
4. 4)P5,000.00for attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation.
(Rollo,pp.3536)
PALappealedtotheCourtofAppeals.OnMarch15,1990,the
appellate court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which,reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMEDin
toto,withcostsagainstappellant.
SOORDERED.(Rollo,p.42)
Hence,thispresentpetitionwiththefollowinglegalquestions:
1. 1.Can the Honorable Court of Appeals validly
promulgate the questioned decision by the simple
expedientofadoptingintotothetrialcourtsfindingthat
defendantappellant is liable for damages on the sole
issueofcredibilityofwitnesseswithoutconsideringthe
material admissions made by the plaintiffs and other
evidence on record that substantiate the defense of
defendantappellant.
2. 2.Can the Honorable Court award legally moral and
temperate damages plus attorneys fees of P5,000.00
contrarytotheevidenceandestablishedjurisprudence.
(Rollo,p.9)
UnderSection1,Rule131oftheRulesofCourt,eachpartyina
caseisrequiredtoprovehisaffirmativeallegations.Incivilcases,
thedegreeofevidencerequiredofapartyinordertosupporthis
claimispreponderanceofevidenceorthatevidenceadducedby
onepartywhichismoreconclusiveandcrediblethanthatofthe
other party (Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.,G.R. No. 83376, May 29, 1989,173 SCRA 619,
625).
Thecaseatbarpresentsasimplequestionoffact:Whetheror
not the private respondents were late in checkingin for their
flight from Naga City to Manila on September 24, 1985. It is
immediately apparent from the records of this case that the
claimsofthepartiesonthisquestionaredramaticallyopposed.
Asarule,thedeterminationofaquestionoffactdependslargely
onthecredibilityofwitnessesunlesssomedocumentaryevidence
is available which clearly substantiates the issue and whose
genuineness and probative value is not disputed (Legarda v.
Miaile,88Phil.637,642).Theexceptiontotherulenowrunstrue
inthiscase.
We reverse. This case once more illustrates Our power to
reweigh the findings of lower courts when the same are not
supported by the record or not based on substantial evidence
(seeCruz v. Villarin,G.R. No. 75679, January 12, 1990,181
SCRA53,61).
Itisanadmittedfactthattheprivaterespondentsknewofthe
required checkin time for passengers. The time requirement
isprominentlyprintedasoneoftheconditionsofcarriageontheir
tickets, i.e., that the airport passenger should checkinat least
onehourbeforepublisheddeparturetimeofhisflightandPAL
shallconsiderhisaccommodationforfeitedinfavorofwaitlisted
passengersifhefailstocheckinatleast30minutes.
Wenotethatwhiletheaforequotedconditionhasalwaysbeen
appliedstrictlyandwithoutexception(TSN,December16,1987,
p.11),thestationmanager,however,mayexercisehisdiscretion
to allow passengers who checkedin late to board provided the
flightisnotfullybookedandseatsareavailable(ibid,pp.1718).
OnSeptember24,1985,flight264fromNagatoManilawasfully
booked owing to the Peafrancia Festival (TSN, January 25,
1988,p.5).Inaddition,PALmorningflights261and262were
cancelled resulting in a big number of waitlisted passengers.
(TSN,November23,1987,p.6).
The private respondents claim that they were on time in
checkingin for their flight; that no PAL personnel attended to
them until much later which accounted for their late checkin;
thatPALadvancedthecheckintimeandthedepartureoftheir
flight resulting in their nonaccommodation; and that they
sufferedphysicaldifficulties,anxietiesandbusinesslosses.
The evidence on record does not support the above
contentions. We note that there were two other confirmed
passengerswhocameaheadoftheprivaterespondentsbutwere
refused accommodation because they were late. Edmundo
Araquel, then the checkinclerk, testified on this point, as
follows:
Atty.MarcelinoC.Calica,counselforPAL
Q Beforetheplaintiffsarrive(sic)atthecheckincounter,doyourecallifthere
wereotherpassengerswhoarrivedatthecounterandtheywereadvisedthat
theywerelate?
A Yes,sir.
Q Whowerethosepersons?
A MyformerclassmatesatAteneo,sir,RoseCapatiandGo,Merly.
Q Werethesetwopassengersalsoconfirmedpassengersonthisflight?
A Yes,sir.
Q IshowtoyouadocumentwhichisentitledPassengerManifestofflight
264,September24,1985,whichwerequesttobemarkedasExh.5you
saidearlierthataside
fromtheplaintiffsherethereweretwootherpassengerswho
alsocheckedinbuttheywerealsolateandyoumentionedthe
namesofthesepassengersasCapatiandGo,pleasepointto
usthatentrywhichwillshowthenamesofGoandCapati??
AHere,sir,numbers13and14oftheManifest.
ATTY. CALICA:We request that passengers 13 and 14 be
markedinevidence,Gofor13andCapatifor14asExh.5A.
QYousaidthatthesetwopassengersyoumentionedwerealso
similarly denied accommodations because they checked in
late,didtheycheckinbeforeoraftertheplaintiffs?
ABefore,sir.
QWhattimedidtheyappearatthecounter?
A4:01p.m.,sir.
QWhathappenedwhentheycheckedinat4:01?
AI told them also that they were late so they cannot be
accommodatedandtheytriedtoprotest,buttheydecidedlater
onjusttorefundtheticket.(TSNofNovember23,1987,pp.
1112)
Shortlyafter,theprivaterespondentsfollowedtheaforesaidtwo
passengers at the counter. At this juncture, Araquel declared,
thus:
Q Now,yousaidthatyoumettheplaintiffsinthiscasebecausetheywere
passengersofFlight264onSeptember24,1985andtheywerenot
accommodatedbecausetheycheckedinlate,whattimedidtheseplaintiffs
checkin?
A Around4:02p.m.,sir.
Q Whowastheclerkatthecheckincounterwhoattendedtothem?
A Iwastheone,sir.
xxx
Q Yousaidwhenyouwerepresentedtheticketsoftheplaintiffsinthiscase clearly manifested above, the intervening time between Capati
andnotingthattheywerelateforcheckingin,immediatelyafteradvising
themthattheywerelate,yousaidyoumadeannotationonthetickets?
A Yes,sir.
Q IamshowingtoyouExhs.A,B,C,andD,whicharetheticketsof
Mr.&Mrs.JaimeRamosforExh.A,Exh.BticketofMr.&Mrs.
DanielIlano,CticketofFelipaJavaleraandDticketofErlindaIlano,
willyoupleasegooverthesameandpointtousthenotationsyousaidyou
467
VOL.207, 467
MARCH23,
1992
PhilippineAirlines,Inc.vs.Ramos
madeonthesetickets?
A Thisparticulartime,sir.(Witnesspointingtothenotation
Lateandthetime4:02appearingattheupperrighthandof
theticketsExhs.A,B,C,andD.)
Q Howlongdidittakeaftertheticketsweretenderedtoyoufor
checkinginandbeforeyoumadethisnotation?
A Itwasjustseconds,sir.
Q Ontheticketsbeingtenderedforcheckinandnotingthatthey
werelate,youmeantosayyouimmediatelymade
annotations?
A Yes,sir.ThatisanS.O.P.oftheoffice.
Q Soonwhattimedidyoubasethat4:02?
A Atthecheckincounterclock,sir.
Q Atthetimeyouplacedthetime,whatwasthetimereflectedat
thecounterclock?
A 4:02,sir.(ibid,pp.811)
Theprivaterespondentssubmittednocontrovertingevidence.As
andGoandtheprivaterespondentstookonlyameresecond.If
indeed,theprivaterespondentswereatthecheckincounterat
3:30p.m.,theycouldhavebeenthefirstonestobeattendedtoby
AraquelthanCapatiandGo.Theycouldhavealsoprotestedif
theyweretheearliestpassengersatthecounterbutwereignored
byAraquelinfavorofGoandCapati.Theydidnot.
ItislikewiseimprobablethatnotasinglePALpersonnelwas
in attendance at the counter when the checkin counter was
supposedtobeopenedat3:25p.m.Itmustberememberedthat
themorningflighttoManilawascancelledandhence,itisnot
farfetched for Us to believe that the PAL personnel then have
theirhandsfull indealing with the passengers of the morning
flightwhobecamewaitlistedpassengers.Moreover,theemphatic
assertionsofprivaterespondentDanielJavaloraIlanoregarding
theabsenceofaPALpersonnellostitsimpactduringthecross
examination:
ATTY.CALICA
Q So,youmaintainthereforethatforallthetimethatyouwaitedthereforthe
wholetwenty(20)minutesthecheckincounterandotherPALOfficesthere
thewholecounterwascompletelyunmanned?Iamreferringtothewhole
468
468 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
PhilippineAirlines,Inc.vs.Ramos
areatherewhereitisenclosedbyacounter.
Iwilldescribetoyou,forthebenefitofthecourt.
WhenyouapproachthecounteratNagaAirport,thecounterisenclosed,I
mean,youcannotjustgoinsidethePALoffice,right?thereissomesortof
counterwhereyoudealwiththePALpersonnelandyouapproximatethis
countertobefive(5)tosix(6)meters.Now,thisspaceafterthecounter,
didyouobservewhatfixturesorenclosuresarecontainedthereinsidethe
enclosedspace?
A Iamnotsurewhetherthereareofficesorenclosuresthere.
Q Youhavebeentravellingandhadopportunitytocheckinyourticketsso
manytimes.Everytimethatyoucheckin,howmanypersonnelare
manningthecheckincounter?
A Thereareaboutthree(3)orfour(4),sir.
Q Everytime,therearethree(3)orfour(4)?
A Everytimebutnotthattime.
Q Iamreferringtoyourprevioustrips,Iamnotreferringtothisincident.
OnpreviousoccasionswhenyoutooktheflightwithPiliAirportandyou
seethree(3)orfour(4)personneleverytime,areallthesethree(3)orfour
(4)personnelatthecounterorsomearestandingatthecounterorothers
areseatedonthetabledoingsomethingorwhat?Willyoudescribetous?
Q Somearehandlingthebaggagesandsomearecheckinginthetickets.
Q So,onmostoccasionswhenyoucheckinandsay,therewereatleastthree
(3)offour(4)peopleatthecheckincounter,onewouldattendtothe
tickets,anothertothecheckinbaggage,ifany.Now,doyounoticeif
somebodyevadewhenyoucheckinyourticket.Thisotherpersonwould
receivetheflightcouponwhichisdetachedfromyourticketandrecordit
onwhatwecallpassengermanifest?
A Thatstrue.
Q Now,itisclearonewouldattendtothebaggage,anotherpersonwould
receivetheticket,detachthecouponandonewouldrecorditonthe
passengermanifest.Whataboutthefourth,whatwashedoing,ifyou
recall?
A Ithink,puttingtheidentificationtagsonthebaggages(sic).(TSN,
November17,1986,p.38)
Ilanosdeclarationbecomesevenmorepatentlyunreliableinthe
faceoftheDailyStationReportofPALdatedSeptember24,1985
whichcontainedtheworkinghoursofitspersonnelfrom
469
VOL.207,MARCH23,1992 469
PhilippineAirlines,Inc.vs.Ramos
0600to1700andtheirrespectiveassignments,asfollows:
ATTY.CALICA
Q Normallyuponopeningofthecheckincounter,howmanyPALpersonnel
areassignedtomanthecounter?
EDMUNDOARAQUEL
A Atotaloffourpersonnelwiththeassistanceofothers.
Q Whoarethesepersonnelassignedtothecounterandwhatspecificduties
theyperformed?
A Mr.Oropesahandledthecargo,Mr.Espirituhandledtheticketing,Mr.
Valenciaandmehandledthecheckinginofpassengers.
Q Areyoureferringtothisparticularflight264onSeptember24,1985?
A Yes,sir.
Q Whowasassignedascheckinclerkthatparticulartime?
A IwastheonewithMr.Valencia,sir.
Q WhatwasMr.Valenciadoing?
A Heassistedme,sir.
Q How?
A Ifagroupofpassengerssimultaneouslycheckin,wedividedthework
betweenus.(TSN,November23,1987,p.7)
xxx
Q WhentheplaintiffstestifiedinthiscaseparticularlyplaintiffDanielIlano
andFelipaJavaleraattheprevioushearingssaidplaintiffsstatedthatthey
arrivedatthecheckincounteratabout3:25or3:30andtherewasnobodyin
thecounter,whatcanyousaytothat?
A Wecannotleavethecounter,sir.Thatwasalwaysmannedfrom3:25upto
thelastminute.Wewerethereassignedtohandlethecheckinginof
passengers.
Q Youmentionedearlierthatasidefromyoutherewereotherpersonnel
assignedtothecheckincounterandyouevenmentionedaboutacertain
Valenciaassistingyou,doyouhaveanyevidencetoshowsaidassignmentof
personnelattheairport?
A Yes,sir.
Q Ishowtoyouadailystationreportfor24September1985coveringworking
hours0600to1700,willyoupleasegooverthesameandthereaftertellus
fromthepersonnellistedinthisDailyStationReportwhatwerethename
(sic)ofthepersonnelassignedtomanthecheckincounteratthattime?
AThere(sic)personsassignedwereMr.Oropesa,Mr. Espiritu,
Mr.Medevilla,myselfandMr.Valencia.
QYoumentionedaboutMr.Espiritu,whatwashisspecifictask
atthattime?
AHewashandlingtheticketing,sir.
QWhataboutMr.Medevilla?
AHewastakingcareoftheramphandling.
QAndMr.Oropesa?
AHewashandlingtheincomingcargo.
ATTY. CALICA:We request that this Daily Station Report be
markedExh.6andtheportionoftheReportwhichshowsthe
deploymentofpersonnelofPALNagaStationonSeptember
24,1985as6A.
QPlaintiffsinthiscasetestifiedthatwhentheycheckedinthere
was nobody manning the counter and they had to wait for
twentyminutesbeforesomeonecameintothecounter,what
canyousaytothat?
AItisnottruebecauseallthetimeweweretherefromthestart,
an hour before the flight we were there because we were
assignedthere.
QPlaintiff Daniel Ilano testified that he went to the counter
twice,firstat3:25anditwasonlyat4:00p.m.thatsomebody
went to the counter and attended to him and while he
expectedhisboardingpasshewastoldinsteadthatplaintiffs
couldnotbeaccommodatedbecausetheywerelate,whatcan
yousaytothat?
AThe truth is we were always there and we never left the
counterfromthestartofthecheckintimeof3:25wewereall
there,weneverleftthecounter.
QUntilwhattimedidyouremainatthecheckincounter?
AAtaround4:15p.m.,sir.
QYousaidthatthecheckincounterwasclosedat3:55,forwhat
purposewereyoustillmanningthecheckincounter?
AToattendtothepassengerswhoarelateincheckinginbecause
theyalsoneedassistanceinexplainingtothemthesituation.
QSoitwasforthatpurposeyouwerethere?
AYes,sir.(ibid.,pp.1618)
Itissignificanttonotethattherewerenootherpassengerswho
checkedinlateaftertheprivaterespondents(TSN,November23,
1987, p. 13). In the absence of any controverting evidence, the
documentaryevidencepresentedtocorroboratethetestimoniesof
PALs witnesses areprima facieevidence of the truth of their
allegations. The plane tickets of the private respondents, exhs.
1,2,3,4,(withemphasisontheprintedconditionofthe
contract of carriage regarding checkin time as well as on the
notationlate4:02stampedontheflightcouponbythecheckin
clerkimmediatelyuponthecheckinofprivaterespondents)and
thepassengerManifestofFlightPR264,exh.5,(whichshowed
the nonaccommodation of Capati and Go and the private
respondents)areentriesmadeintheregularcourseofbusiness
whichtheprivaterespondentsfailedtoovercomewithsubstantial
and convincing evidence other than their testimonies.
Consequently,theycarrymoreweightandcredence.Awritingor
documentmadecontemporaneouslywithatransactioninwhich
areevidencedfactspertinenttoanissue,whenadmittedasproof
ofthosefacts,isordinarilyregardedasmorereliableproofandof
greaterprobativeforcethantheoraltestimonyofawitnessasto
such facts based upon memory and recollection (20 Am Jur S
1179, 1029 cited in Francisco,Revised Rules of Court in the
PhilippinesAnnotated,1973Edition,VolumeVII,PartII,p.654).
Spokenwordscouldbenotoriouslyunreliableasagainstawritten
documentthatspeaksauniformlanguage(SpousesVicenteand
SalomedeLeonv.CA,etal.,G.R.No.95511,January30,1992).
Thisdictumisamplydemonstratedbythediverseallegationsof
theprivaterespondentsintheircomplaint(wheretheyclaimed
thatnoonewasatthecounteruntilthirty(30)minutesbeforethe
published departure time and thatthe employeewho finally
attendedtothemmarkedthemlate,Records,p.2)andintheir
testimonies(wheretheycontendedthatthereweretwodifferent
PAL personnelwho attended to them at the checkin counter,
TSNsofNovember17,1986,pp.4145andofMay18,1987,pp.5
6).Privaterespondentsonlyobjectiontothesedocumentsisthat
theyareselfservingcannotbesustained.Thehearsayrulewill
not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct
accompanyingorsonearlyconnectedwiththemaintransaction
astoformapartofit,andwhichillustrate,elucidate,qualifyor
characterizetheact,areadmissibleaspartoftheresgestae(32
C.J.S., S. 411, 3031). Based on these circumstances, We are
inclined to believe the version of PAL. When the private
respondents purchased their tickets, they were instantaneously
boundbytheconditionsofthecontractofcarriageparticularly
the checkin time requirement. The terms of the contract are
clear. Their failure to come on time for checkin should not
militate against PAL. Their nonaccommodation on that flight
wasthe result of their ownaction or inactionand the ensuing
cancellationoftheirticketsbyPALisonlyproper.
Furthermore,Wedonotfindanythingsuspiciousinthefact
that PAL flight 264 departed at 4:13 p.m. instead of 4:25 p.m.
Apartfromtheirverbalassertions,theprivaterespondents did
notshowanyevidenceofirregularity.Itbeingclearthatallthe
passengershavealreadyboarded,therewasnosenseinkeeping
themwaitingforthescheduledtimeofdeparturebeforetheplane
couldtakeflight.
ACCORDINGLY, thepetitionisGRANTED. The questioned
decisionoftheCourtofAppealsdatedMarch15,1990ishereby
ANNULLEDandSETASIDE.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa(C.J.),CruzandGrioAquino,JJ.,concur.
Bellosillo,J.,Onleave.
Petitiongranted;decisionannulledandsetaside.
VOL.409,AUGUST14,2003
Laovs.StandardInsuranceCo.,Inc.
G.R.No.140023.August14,2003.*
RUDYLAO,petitioner,vs.STANDARDINSURANCECO.,INC.,
respondent.
Evidence:Documentary Evidence;Police Blotter;A police
blotter is admissible if the following requisites are met.The
police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the
Rules of Court. Under the said rule, the following are the
requisitesforitsadmissibility:(a)thattheentrywasmadebya
publicofficer,orbyanotherperson,speciallyenjoinedbylawto
doso;(b)thatitwasmadebythepublicofficerintheperformance
ofhisduties,orbysuchotherpersonintheperformanceofaduty
specially enjoined by law; (c) that the public officer or other
personhadsufficientknowledgeofthefactsbyhimstated,which
must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
Damages:Exemplary Damages;Although exemplary
damagescannotberecoveredasamatterofright,theyalsoneed
notbeproved.Althoughexemplarydamagescannotberecovered
asamatterofright,theyalso
_______________
*
SECONDDIVISION.
44
4 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
4
Laovs.StandardInsuranceCo.,Inc.
neednotbeproved.Butacomplainantmuststillshowthat
he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether or not
43 exemplarydamagesshouldbeawarded.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofadecisionoftheCourtof
Appeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
WilliamP.Demaisipforpetitioner.
The Law Office of Mirano,Mirano & Miranofor private
respondent.
QUISUMBING,J.:
TheinstantpetitionseeksthereversaloftheCourtofAppeals
Decision1datedFebruary4,1999,aswellasitsResolution, 2dated
September 7, 1999, inCAG.R. CV No. 47227. The assailed
decisiondismissedpetitionersappealandtheresolutiondenied
petitionersmotionforreconsideration.
TheoriginalactionwaslodgedbeforetheRegionalTrialCourt
of IloiloCity, Branch 25, asCivil Case No. 17045for breach of
contract and damages, as a result of the insurance companys
refusalofpetitionersclaimontheinsurancepolicyofhistruck
whichfiguredinanaccidentduringtheeffectivityofthepolicy.
 Thefollowingaretheantecedentfacts:
PetitionerRudyLaoistheownerofaFusotruckwithPlate
No.FCG538.ThetruckwasinsuredwithrespondentStandard
InsuranceCo.,Inc.underPolicyNo.CV21074 3forthemaximum
amountofP200,000andanadditionalsumofP50,000tocover
anydamagesthatmightbecausedtohisgoods.
Whilethepolicywasineffect,anaccidentoccurred.Ataround
8:00p.m.ofApril24,1985,inBarangayBuhang,Jaro,IloiloCity,
theinsuredtruckbumpedanothertruck,withPlateNo.FBS917,
alsoownedbypetitionerLao.Thelattertruckwasrunningahead
oftheinsuredtruckandwasbumpedfromtherear.Theinsured
_______________
1
Rollo,pp.5664.
2
Id.,atpp.7879.
3
Records,pp.67.
45
VOL.409,AUGUST14,2003
Laovs.StandardInsuranceCo.,Inc.
trucksustaineddamagesestimatedtobearoundP110,692,while
thedamagetotheothertruckandtopropertiesinthevicinityof
theaccident,wereplacedatP35,000moreorless.
Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for the
proceedsfromhispolicy.However,theclaimwasdeniedbythe
insurancecompanyonthegroundthatwhenitsadjusterwentto
investigatethematter,itwasfoundthatthedriveroftheinsured
truck,LeonardoAnit,didnotpossessaproperdriverslicenseat
the time of the accident. The restriction 4in Leonardo Anits
drivers license provided that he can only drive fourwheeled
vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Since the insured
truckhewasdrivingweighedmorethan4,500kgs.,hetherefore
violatedtheauthorizeddriverclause5oftheinsurancepolicy.In
addition,respondentcitedthefollowingexcerptsfromthepolice
blotteroftheIloiloINP,towit:
CUN85 DAMAGE TO PROPERTY W/ PHY INJURIES
R/IMPRUDENCE
11:30PMSgt.A.Bernasinformedthisofficethatacollision
tookplaceatBrgy.Buhang,Jaro,IC.Investigationconductedby
Pat. Villahermosa, assisted by Lt. P. Baclaron (OD), disclosed
thatatabout8:00PMthisdateattheaforementionedplace,a
collisiontookplacebetweenatruck(Hino)withPlateNrFB[S]
917ownedbyRudyLaoanddrivenbyBOYGIDDIEYCOYEL,
38yrs.,ares.ofBalasan,Iloilo,withLicenseNrDLR1108142
andanothertruckwithPlateNr.FCG538ownedbyRudy Lao
anddriver(sic)byLEONARDOANITYPANES,33yrs,ares,of
Brgy Lava, Balasan, Iloilo with License Nr 1836482. . . .
(Emphasissupplied.)6
_______________
45 Id.,atp.195;RestrictionCode2.
4
Id.,atp.121;AUTHORIZEDDRIVER:
5
Anyofthefollowing:
1. (a)Theinsured
2. (b)AnypersondrivingontheInsuredsorderorwithhis
permission.
Provided thatthepersondriving is permitted, inaccordance
withthelicensinglaworotherregulations,todrivetheScheduled
vehicle,orhasbeenpermittedandisnotdisqualifiedbyorderofa
CourtofLaworbyreasonofanyenactmentorregulationthat
behalf,providedthatforSectionsIandIIonlyofthisPolicyan
authorized driver shall include a duly licensed driver whose On appeal with the Court of Appeals, the RTC decision was
license at the time of the accident had expired. (Emphasis affirmed. The petition was dismissed and the motion for
supplied.) reconsiderationwasdenied.TheCAstated:
6
Records,p.193. INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOING,thedecisionappealedfromis
46 herebyAFFIRMED.Consequently,thecomplaintisDISMISSED
46 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED forlackofmerit.
Laovs.StandardInsuranceCo.,Inc. SOORDERED.9
Petitionerclaimsthatatthetimeoftheaccident,itwasinfact In his petition for review now before us, petitioner cites the
anotherdrivernamedGiddieBoyYCoyelwhowasdrivingthe followingasgroundstherefor:
insuredtruck.GiddieBoypossessedadriverslicenseauthorizing
himtodrivevehiclessuchasthetruckwhichweighedmorethan 1. A.THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSANDTHE
4,500 kgs. As evidence, petitioner presented the Motor Vehicle LOWER COURT RELIED MAINLYON SECTION 44,
AccidentReport7whereintheInvestigatingOfficer,Pat.FelipeD. RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT IN
Villahermosa,statedthatitwasGiddieBoydrivingtheinsured UPHOLDINGTHEENTRYINTHEPOLICEBLOTTER
truck and not Leonardo Anit. The said report was made three WHICH STATED THAT THE DRIVER OF THE
daysaftertheaccidentoronApril27,1985.However,respondent INSUREDVEHICLE
insurancecompanywasfirminitsdenialoftheclaim.
Hence, petitioner filed the civil case before the RTC. After _______________
trial,thecourtdisposedofthecaseasfollows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that 7
Id.,atp.11.
plaintifflackssufficientcauseofactionagainstthedefendantand 8
Rollo,p.30.
henceorderedhiscasedismissedandfurtherorderes(sic)himto 9
Id.,atp.63.
paythedefendantthefollowing: 47
VOL.409,AUGUST14,2003 47
1. 1)P20,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P500.00 for Laovs.StandardInsuranceCo.,Inc.
appearancefee;and
1. WASLEONARDOANITYPANES,WHOWASNOTAN
2. 2)P50,000.00asexemplarydamages. AUTHORIZEDDRIVER.UNDERTHESAIDSECTION
44, RULE 130 ITSELF HOWEVER, THE POLICE
SOORDERED.8 BLOTTER IS MERELY A PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE
OFTHEFACTSSTATEDTHEREINWHICHMAYBE
NULLIFIEDBYOTHEREVIDENCE;10
2. B.PERCEPTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF JURISPRUDENCE ESTABLISHED BY THIS
APPEALSONTHEDIMINISHEDCREDIBILITYOF HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AS WELL AS
PAT. FELIPE VILLAHERMOSA, THE TRAFFIC CLEAR MISAPPREHENSION OF THE FACTS IN
POLICE INVESTIGATOR, IS MISPLACED AND THISCASE.15
UNFOUNDED;11
Three issues must be resolved: (1) The admissibility and
3. C.THE DRIVER OF THE INSURED TRUCK WITH probative value of the police blotter as evidence; (2) The
PLATENR.FCG538WASGIDDIEBOYYCOYEL,AN assessmentofthecredibilityofwitnesses;and(3)Thepropriety
AUTHORIZED DRIVER OF THE SAID TRUCK. THE andbasisofthe
DRIVEROFTHEOTHERTRUCKINVOLVEDINTHE
ACCIDENT WITH PLATE NR. FBS917 WAS _______________
LEONARDOANITYPANES;12
10
Id.,atp.10.
4. D.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
11
Id.,atp.12.
MISAPPLIED ARTICLES 2232 AND 2208 OF THE
12
Id.,atp.13.
NEW CIVIL CODE IN GRANTING EXEMPLARY 13
Id.,atp.15.
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES TO 14
Id.,atp.17.
RESPONDENT. UNDER ARTICLES 2229 AND 2234 15
Id.,atp.19.
OFTHENEWCIVILCODE,EXEMPLARYDAMAGES 48
CANNOT BE AWARDED IN THE ABSENCE OF AN
48 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
AWARD FOR MORAL, TEMPERATE, LIQUIDATED
ORCOMPENSATORYDAMAGES;13 Laovs.StandardInsuranceCo.,Inc.
awardsforexemplarydamagesandattorneysfees.Alsopertinent
here is the factual issue of whether or not Leonardo Anit, an
5. E.TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES OF unauthorizeddriver,wasdrivingtheinsuredtruckatthetimeof
RESPONDENTNAMELY,SGT.BERNAS,THEDESK
theaccident.
OFFICER AND ROMEO GUIERGEN, INSURANCE
Petitioner assails the admissibility and evidentiary weight
ADJUSTER, WERE INCONSISTENT AND
giventothepoliceblotter,asabasisforthefactualfindingofthe
UNRELIABLE;14and
RTCandtheCA.Hecontendsthatthesameentrywasbeliedby
the Motor Vehicle Accident Report and testimony of the
6. F.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS UPHELD investigatingpolicemanhimself,attestingthatitwasGiddieBoy
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DESPITE Coyel,notLeonardoAnit,whowasdrivingtheinsuredvehicle. 16
GLARING MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW AND
 Respondentaversthatthesamepolicereportandtestimony
wereofdubiousnature.Bothtrialandappellatecourtsnotedthat
the reportwasmadethreedays aftertheaccidentand didnot
formpartoftheofficialpolicerecords.17
ThepoliceblotterwasadmittedunderRule130,Section44of
theRulesofCourt.18Underthesaidrule,thefollowingarethe
requisitesforitsadmissibility:
1. (a)that the entry was made by a public officer, or by
anotherperson,speciallyenjoinedbylawtodoso;
2. (b)that it was made by the public officer in the
performanceofhisduties,orbysuchotherpersoninthe
performanceofadutyspeciallyenjoinedbylaw;
3. (c)that the public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledgeofthefactsbyhimstated,whichmusthave
been acquired by him personally or through official
information.19
Weagreewiththetrialandappellatecourtsinfindingthatthe
policeblotterwasproperlyadmittedastheyformpartofofficial
records.20Entriesinpolicerecordsmadebyapoliceofficerinthe
performance of the duty especially enjoined by law areprima
facie
_______________
16
Rollo,pp.1011.
17
Id.,atp.171.
18
Rule130,Section44.Entriesinofficialrecords.Entriesin
officialrecordsmadeintheperformanceofhisdutybyapublic
officerofthePhilippines,orbyapersonintheperformanceofa
duty specially enjoined by law, areprima facieevidence of the
factsthereinstated.
19
Africa v. Caltex (Phil.) Inc.,123 Phil. 272, 277;16 SCRA
448(1966).
20
People v. Dy,G.R. No. L74517, 23 February 1988,158
SCRA111,125.
49
VOL.409,AUGUST14,2003 49
Laovs.StandardInsuranceCo.,Inc.
evidenceofthefactthereinstated,andtheirprobativevaluemay
be either substantiated or nullified by other competent
evidence.21Althoughpoliceblottersareoflittleprobativevalue,
theyareneverthelessadmittedandconsideredintheabsenceof
competentevidencetorefutethefactsstatedtherein.
In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the
information subject of the controversy. Stated therein was the
factthatLeonardoAnitwasdrivingtheinsuredtruckwithplate
numberFCG538.ThisisunlikePeoplev.Mejia,22wherewesaid
that entries in the police blotters should not be given undue
significanceorprobativevalue,sincetheCourttherefoundthat
the entries in question are sadly wanting in material
particulars.
Furthermore,inthiscasethepoliceblotterwasidentifiedand
formally offeredas evidence. The person who made theentries
was likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as
correcttheentrieshemadeontheblotter.Theinformationwas
suppliedtotheentrantbytheinvestigatingofficerwhodidnot
protestaboutanyinaccuracywhentheblotterwaspresentedto
him. No explanation was likewise given by the investigating
officerfortheallegedinterchangeofnames.
 Petitioneralsoassailsthecredencegivenbythetrialcourtto
the version of the respondentsvisvisthe testimonies of the
witnesses.Timeandagainwehavereiteratedthesettleddoctrine
that great weight, and even finality, is given to the factual
conclusionsoftheCourtofAppealswhichaffirmthoseofthetrial
courts.23We find on this score no reason to overturn such
conclusions.
On the issueof damages, we agree with petitioner that the
awardofexemplarydamageswasimproper.InTiongcov.Atty.
Deguma24we held that the entitlement to the recovery of
exemplary damages must be shown. In the case at bar,
respondent have not shown sufficient evidence that petitioner
indeed schemed to procure the dubious documents and lied
throughhisteethtoestablishhisversionofthefacts.Whatwas
foundwasthatthedocumenthepresentedwasinadmissible,and
its contents were dubious. However, no proof was adduced to
sufficiently establish that it came to his hands through his
employment of underhanded means. InTiongco,we further
stated:
Althoughexemplarydamagescannotberecoveredasamatterof
right,theyalsoneednotbeproved.Butacomplainantmuststill
show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damagesbeforethecourtmayconsiderthequestionofwhetheror
notexemplarydamagesshouldbeawarded.25
Thus, it was error for the courts below to award exemplary
damages in the absence of any award for moral, temperate or
compensatorydamages.
Theawardofattorneysfeesmustalsobedeleted.Suchaward
wasgiveninitsextraordinaryconceptasindemnityfordamages
tobepaidbythelosingpartytotheprevailingparty. 26Butitwas
not sufficiently shown that petitioner acted maliciously in
instituting the claim for damages. Perforce, the award of
attorneysfeeswasimproper.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
CourtofAppealsareAFFIRMED,withtheMODIFICATIONthat
the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees is hereby
DELETED.Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Bellosillo(Chairman),AustriaMartinezandTinga,
JJ.,concur.
Callejo,Sr.,J.,Onleave.
Judgmentandresolutionaffirmedwithmodification.
Note.Thetestimoniesofthethreepoliceofficerscarrywith
it the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions.(Peoplevs.Barita,325SCRA22[2000])
o0o
G.R.No.193261.April24,2012.*
MEYNARDO SABILI, petitioner,vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONSandFLORENCIOLIBREA,respondents.
Election Law; Election Protests; The additional rule
requiringnoticetothepartiespriortopromulgationofadecision
is not part of the process of promulgation.InLindo v.
CommissiononElections,194SCRA25(1991),petitionerclaimed
thattherewasnovalidpromulgationofaDecisioninanelection
protest case when a copy thereof was merely furnished the
parties,insteadoffirstnotifyingthepartiesofasetdateforthe
promulgationthereof,inaccordancewithSection20ofRule35of
the COMELECs own Rules of Procedure, as follows: Sec.
20.Promulgationand Finality ofDecision.Thedecisionof the
courtshallbepromulgatedonadatesetbyitofwhichduenotice
mustbegiventheparties.Itshallbecomefinalfive(5)daysafter
promulgation.Nomotionforreconsiderationshallbeentertained.
Rejecting petitioners argument, we held therein that the
additional rule requiring notice to the parties prior to
promulgation of a decision is not part of the process of
promulgation. Since lack of such notice does not prejudice the
rightsoftheparties,noncompliancewiththisruleisaprocedural
lapsethatdoesnotvitiatethevalidityofthedecision.
Same; Domicile; To establish a new domicile of choice,
personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct
indicativeoftheintentiontomakeitonesfixedandpermanent
placeofabode.Inthepresentcase,thepartiesareinagreement
that the domicile of origin of Sabili was Brgy. Sico, San Juan,
Batangas.Heclaimsthatheabandonedhisdomicileoforiginand
establishedhisdomicileofchoiceinBrgy.Pinagtongulan,Lipa
City,therebymakinghimqualifiedtorunforLipaCitymayor.
On the other hand, respondent COMELEC held that no such
changeindomicileorresidencetookplaceand,hence,theentry
inhisCertificateofCandidacyshowingthathewasaresidentof
Brgy.Pinagtongulan,LipaCityconstitutedamisrepresentation
that disqualified him from running for Lipa City mayor. To
establishanewdomicileofchoice,personalpresenceintheplace
mustbecoupledwithconductindicativeofthe
_______________
*ENBANC.
665
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
intention to make it ones fixed and permanent place of
abode. As in all administrative cases, the quantum of proof
necessary in election cases is substantial evidence, or such
relevantevidenceasareasonablemindwillacceptasadequateto
supportaconclusion.
Same;Same;Residence;Itisnotrequiredthatacandidate
shouldhavehisownhouseinordertoestablishhisresidenceor
domicileinaplace.Itisenoughthatheshouldliveinthelocality,
eveninarentedhouseorthatofafriendorrelative.TheDissent
claimsthattheregistrationofthepropertyinPalomaressname
does not prove petitioners residence as it merely showed
donativeintentwithoutthenecessaryformalitiesorpaymentof
taxes.However,whateverthenatureofthetransactionmightbe,
this point is immaterial for the purpose of ascertaining
petitionersresidence.Wehavelongheldthatitisnotrequired
thatacandidateshouldhavehisownhouseinordertoestablish
hisresidenceordomicileinaplace.Itisenoughthatheshould
liveinthelocality,eveninarentedhouseorthatofafriendor
relative. What is of central concern then is that petitioner
identifiedandestablishedaplaceinLipaCitywhereheintended
toliveinandreturntoforanindefiniteperiodoftime.
Same; Same; Same; Section 117 of the Omnibus Election
Code provides that transfer of residence to any other place by
reasonofonesoccupation;profession;employmentinprivateand
public service; educational activities; work in military or naval
reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the
constabularyornationalpoliceforce;orconfinementordetention
ingovernmentinstitutionsinaccordancewithlawisnotdeemed
665 aslossofresidence.Wehaveheldthatabsencefromresidence
to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not
constitutelossofresidence.Infact,Section117oftheOmnibus
Election Code provides that transfer of residence to any other
place byreasonof ones occupation;profession; employment in
privateandpublicservice;educationalactivities;workinmilitary
ornavalreservations;serviceinthearmy,navyorairforce,the
constabularyornationalpoliceforce;orconfinementordetention
ingovernmentinstitutionsinaccordancewithlawisnotdeemed
aslossofresidence.666
6 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
66
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
Same; Same; Same; There is nothing wrong in an
individual changing residences so he could run for an elective
post,foraslongasheisabletoprovewithreasonablecertainty
thathehaseffectedachangeofresidenceforelectionlawpurposes
fortheperiodrequiredbylaw.Moreimportantly,wehavegone
so far asto rule that there is nothing wrong in an individual
changingresidencessohecouldrunforanelectivepost,foras
longasheisabletoprovewithreasonablecertaintythathehas
effectedachangeof residenceforelectionlawpurposes for the
periodrequiredbylaw.
RemedialLaw;Evidence;EntriesinOfficialRecords;Three
(3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be
admissible in evidence.InCountry Bankers Insurance
Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multipurpose
Cooperative, Inc., 374 SCRA 653 (2002), we explained that the
following three (3)requisitesmust concur for entriesin official
recordstobeadmissibleinevidence:(a)Theentrywasmadebya
publicofficer,orbyanotherpersonspeciallyenjoinedbylawtodo
so;(b)Itwasmadebythepublicofficerintheperformanceofhis
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and (c) The public officer or other
personhadsufficientknowledgeofthefactsstatedbyhim,which
facts must have been acquired by him personally or through
officialinformation.
ElectionLaw;Domicile;Residence;Tosuccessfullychallenge
awinningcandidatesqualifications,thepetitionermustclearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibilityandtherebygivingeffecttotheapparentwillofthe
people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.We
reiterateourrulinginFrivaldov.CommissiononElections,337
SCRA 574 (2000), that (t)o successfully challenge a winning
candidates qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibilityandtherebygivingeffecttotheapparentwillofthe
people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.
Similarly,inJapzonv.CommissiononElections,576SCRA331
(2009),weconcludedthatwhentheevi
667
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 667
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
dence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a
candidateforanelectivepositionisweakorinconclusiveandit
clearlyappearsthatthepurposeofthelawwouldnotbethwarted
by upholding the victors right to the office, the will of the
electorateshouldberespected.Forthepurposeofelectionlawsis
togiveeffectto,ratherthanfrustrate,thewillofthevoters.
VELASCO,JR.,J.,Dissenting:
 ElectionLaw;Domicile;Residence;Viewthattoestablisha
new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be
coupledwithconductindicativeofthatintention.Bodilypresence
inthenewlocalityisnottheonlyrequirement;theremustbea
declaredandprobableintenttomakeitonesfixedandpermanent
placeofabode.Forthepetitionertoovercomethepresumption
ofthecontinuityofhisdomicileoforigin,hemustshowbyclear
and convincing evidence of (1) an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; (2) a bona fideintention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3)
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. Thus,
toestablishanewdomicileofchoice,personalpresencein
theplacemustbecoupledwithconductindicativeofthat
intention.Bodily presence in the new locality is not the
onlyrequirement;theremustbeadeclaredandprobable
intent to make it ones fixed and permanent place of
abode.Indeed, the most important requirements for the
establishment of a new domicile is (1) an actual and physical
presenceinthenewlocality;and(2)aclearanddeclaredintentto
abandontheolddomicile(animusnonrevertendi)andremainin
thenewplaceofresidence(animusmanendi).
Same; Same; Same; View that petitioners temerity in
asserting that he had been living with Palomares for 20 years,
while he was legally married to another, and so should be
consideredtohavefollowedhisparamoursresidencesimplygoes
againstthenormsofdecency,ifnotthelawagainstconcubinage
underArticle334oftheRevisedPenalCode;Toconsideramanto
follow the residence of the woman who he cannot marry is
dangerous precedent.Indeed, petitioner heavily anchors his
claimedresidencyinPinagtongulan,LipaCitysinceApril2007
primarily on his allegation that he purchased a house and lot
thereatinthesamemonth,registeredthepropertyinthenameof
his commonlaw spouse, Bernadette Palomares (Palomares),
andactuallyresidedthereinsinceApril2007togetherwith
668
6 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
68
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
Palomaresandtheirchildren.Tosaytheleast,thisclaimis
not only questionable but appalling. Petitioners temerity in
asserting that he had been living with Palomares for 20
years,while he was legally married to another, and so
shouldbeconsideredtohavefollowedhisparamoursresidence
simplygoesagainstthenormsofdecency,ifnotthelawagainst
concubinageunderArticle334oftheRevisedPenalCode.Thus,
WecannotnowrecognizehisresidencyinLipaCityonthepretext
that his commonlaw spouse lives therein.Commodum ex
injuria sua non habere debet.No person ought to derive
anyadvantageofhisownwrong.EveninRomualdezMarcos
v.COMELEC,248SCRA300(1995),thisCourtdidnotconsider
Mrs.MarcostohavefollowedtheresidenceofformerPresident
Marcos, her legal spouse. Why should this Court now consider
SabilitohaveadoptedadomicileofchoiceinLipajustbecause
his commonlaw spouse has a house registered in her name
located in the same city? To consider a man to follow the
residence of the woman who he cannot marry is dangerous
precedent.
Same;Same;Same;Viewthatalltherequisitesforavalid
change of domicile or residence is necessary for election law
purposes.Intheabsenceofevenjustoneelement,thepresumption
isinfavorofthemaintenanceandcontinuityofthedomicileof
origin.Intheclearabsenceofthemostimportantelementinthe
establishmentofadomicileanimusmanendiitisofnouseto
discusstheconsequenceoftestimoniesastohisbodilypresencein
the locality.As stated,alltherequisitesfora valid changeof
domicile or residence is necessary for election law purposes. In
theabsenceofevenjustoneelement,thepresumptionisinfavor
of the maintenance and continuity of the domicile of origin.
Hence,inthiscase,petitionerispresumedtostillbearesidentof
SanJuan,Batangasanddisqualifiedfromtakingthemayoralty
positioninLipaCity,Batangas.
SPECIALCIVILACTIONintheSupremeCourt.Certiorari.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
RomuloB. MacanlintalandEdgardo Carlo L. Vistan IIfor
petitioner.
Manalo, Jocson & Enriquez Law Officefor private
respondent.
669
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
SERENO,J.:
BeforeusisaPetitionforCertiorariunderRule64inrelation
toRule65oftheRulesofCourt,seekingtoannultheResolutions
inSPANo.09047(DC)dated26January2010and17August
2010oftheCommissiononElections(COMELEC),whichdenied
duecoursetoandcanceledtheCertificateofCandidacy(COC)of
petitionerMeynardoSabili(petitioner)forthepositionofMayor
of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections. At the heart of the
controversy is whether petitioner Sabili had complied with the
oneyearresidencyrequirementforlocalelectiveofficials.
WhenpetitionerfiledhisCOC1formayorofLipaCityforthe
2010elections,hestatedthereinthathehadbeenaresidentof
thecityfortwo(2)yearsandeight(8)months.Priortothe2010
elections, he had been twice elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as
Provincial Board Member representing the 4th District of
Batangas. During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the
position of Representative of the 4th District of Batangas, but
lost.The4thDistrictofBatangasincludesLipaCity. 2However,it
isundisputedthatwhenpetitionerfiledhisCOCduringthe2007
elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral
homeinBarangay(Brgy.)Sico,SanJuan,Batangas.
PrivaterespondentFlorencioLibrea(privaterespondent)filed
a Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some
GroundsforDisqualification3againsthimbeforetheCOMELEC,
docketedasSPANo.09047(DC).CitingSection
_______________
1Rollo,p.79.
2The 4th district of Batangas is composed of the
municipalities of Ibaan, Padre Garcia, Rosario, San Jose, San
Juan and Taysan, and the City of
669
Lipa.http://www.batangas.gov.ph/index.php?p=15(last accessed
on30January2012).
3Rollo,pp.7076.
670
670 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
78inrelationtoSection74oftheOmnibusElectionCode, 4private
respondent alleged that petitioner made material
misrepresentationsoffactinthelattersCOCandlikewisefailed
tocomplywiththeoneyearresidencyrequirementunderSection
39oftheLocalGovernmentCode.5Allegedly,
_______________
4Section78.Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificateofcandidacy.Averifiedpetitionseekingtodeny
duecourseortocancelacertificateofcandidacymaybe
filedby any personexclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required
underSection74hereofisfalse.Thepetitionmaybefiledat
any time not later than twentyfive days from the time of the
filingofthecertificateofcandidacyandshallbedecided,afterdue
noticeandhearing,notlaterthanfifteendaysbeforetheelection.
.........
Section74.Contents of certificate of candidacy.The
certificateofcandidacyshallstatethatthepersonfilingit
isannouncinghiscandidacyfortheofficestatedtherein
andthatheiseligibleforsaidoffice;ifforMemberofthe
BatasangPambansa,theprovince,includingitscomponent
cities,highlyurbanizedcityofdistrictorsectorwhichhe
seekstorepresent;thepoliticalpartytowhichhebelongs;
civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or
occupation;thathewillsupportanddefendtheConstitutionof
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgatedbythedulyconstitutedauthorities;thatheisnota
permanentresidentorimmigranttoaforeigncountry;thatthe
obligationimposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion;and that the facts
statedinthecertificateofcandidacyaretruetothebestof
hisknowledge.(Emphasissupplied.)
5Section39.Qualifications.
(a)Anelectivelocalofficialmustbeacitizenofthe
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality,city,orprovinceor,inthecaseofamember
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, orsangguniangbayan, thedistrict wherehe
intendstobeelected;aresident
671
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 671
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had
already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight
monthspriortothescheduled10May2010localelections.
Insupportofhisallegation,privaterespondentpresentedthe
following:
1.Petitioners COC for the 2010 elections filed on 1
December20096
2.2009 Tax Declarations for a house and lot (TCT Nos.
173355,173356andbuildingsthereon)inPinagtongulan,
Lipa City registered under the name of Bernadette
Palomares,petitionerscommonlawwife7
3.Lipa City Assessor Certification of Property Holdings of
propertiesunderthenameofBernadettePalomares8
4.AffidavitexecutedbyprivaterespondentFlorencioLibrea 9
5.SinumpaangSalaysayexecutedbyEladiodeTorres10
6.Voter Certification on petitioner issued by COMELEC
ElectionOfficerJuanD.Aguila,Jr.11
7.1997VoterRegistrationRecordofpetitioner12
8.National Statistics Office (NSO) Advisory on Marriages
regardingpetitioner13
_______________
thereinforatleastone(1)yearimmediatelypreceding
thedayoftheelection;andabletoreadandwriteFilipino
or any otherlocallanguage or dialect. (Underscoring
supplied.)
6Id.,atp.137.
7Id.,atpp.138,152155.
 8Id.,atp.139. _______________
9Id.,atpp.140141. 14Id.,atp.148.
10Id.,atpp.142143. 15Id.,atp.149.
11Id.,atp.144. 16Id.,atp.150.
12Id.,atpp.145146. 17Id.,atp.156.
13Id.,atp.147. 18Id.,atpp.157158.
672 19Id.,atp.159.
672 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED 20Id.,atp.160.
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections 21Id.,atp.161.
9.Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement on 22Id.,atp.162.
Block2,Lot3,Brgy.Lood,LipaCityregisteredinthename 23Id.,atp.163.
ofpetitioner14 673
10.NSO Certificate of No Marriage of Bernadette
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 673
Palomares15
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
11.Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement on
Block2,Lot5,Brgy.Lood,LipaCityregisteredinthename 19.Petitioners 2007 COC for Member of House of
ofpetitioner16 Representative24
12.LipaCityPermitsandLicensingOfficeCertificationthat For ease of later discussion, private respondents evidence
petitionerhasnobusinesstherein17 shallbegroupedasfollows:(1)Certificatesregardingownership
13.ApparentprintoutofaFacebookwebpageofpetitioners of real property; (2) petitioners Voter Registration and
daughter,MeyBernadetteSabili18 Certification (common exhibits of the parties); (3) petitioners
14.Department of Education (DepEd) Lipa City Division COCs in previous elections; (3) Certifications regarding
Certification that the names Bernadette Palomares, Mey petitioners family members; and (4) Affidavits of Lipa City
BernadetteSabiliandFrancisMeynardSabili(petitioners residents.
son)donotappearonitslistofgraduates19 Ontheotherhand,petitionerpresentedthefollowingevidence
15.Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of toestablishthefactofhisresidenceinLipaCity:
Lipa City that Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette 1.AffidavitexecutedbyBernadettePalomares25
SabiliandFrancisMeynardSabilidonotappearinitslist 2.BirthCertificateofFrancisMeynardSabili26
ofvoters20 3.AffidavitofLeonilaSuarez(Suarez)27
16.AffidavitexecutedbyVioletaFernandez21 4.Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtongulan
17.AffidavitexecutedbyRodrigoMacasaet22 BarangayCaptain,DominadorHonrade28
18.AffidavitExecutedbyPabloLorzano23 5.AffidavitexecutedbyRosalindaMacasaet29
 6.Certificate of Appreciation issued to petitioner by the 16.Joint Affidavit of twentyone (21) Pinagtongulan
parishofSto.NinoofPinagtongulan30 residents, including past and incumbent Pinagtongulan
7.Designation of petitioner in the Advisory Body (AB) of officials.40
Pinagtongulan,SanJose/LipaCityChapterofGuardians For ease of later discussion, petitioners evidence shall be
Brotherhood,Inc.31 groupedasfollows:(1)hisIncomeTaxReturnsandcorresponding
8.COMELEC Voter Certification on petitioner issued by Official Receipts for the years 2007 and 2008; (2) Certification
ElectionOfficerJuanAguila,Jr.32 fromthebarangaycaptainofPinagtongulan;(3)Affidavitofhis
_______________ commonlawwife,BernadettePalomares;and(4)Affidavitsfrom
24Id.,atp.164. apreviouspropertyowner,neighbors,CertificateofAppreciation
25Id.,atp.102. from thebarangayparish and Memorandum from the local
26Id.,atp.103. chapterofGuardiansBrotherhood,Inc.
27Id.,atp.104. _______________
28Id.,atp.105. 33Id.,atp.110.
29Id.,atp.106. 34Id.,atp.111.
30Id.,atp.107. 35Id.,atp.112.
31Id.,atp.108. 36Id.,atp.113.
32Id.,atp.109. 37Id.,atp.114.
674 38Id.,atp.187.
674 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED 39Id.,atp.190.
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections 40Id.,atpp.211212.
9.COMELEC Application for Transfer/Transfer with 675
Reactivationdated6June2009signedbyElectionOfficer VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 675
JuanAguila,Jr.33 Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
10.PetitionersIncomeTaxReturnfor200734 TheCOMELECRuling
11.Official Receipt for petitioners income tax payment for In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010, 41the COMELEC
200735 Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent,
12.PetitionersIncomeTaxReturnfor200836 declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty
13.Official Receipt for petitioners income tax payment for postinLipaCity,andcanceledhisCertificateofCandidacyfor
200837 hisnotbeingaresidentofLipaCityandforhisfailuretomeet
14.BirthCertificateofMeyBernadetteSabili38 thestatutoryoneyearresidencyrequirementunderthelaw.
15.AffidavitexecutedbyJacintoCornejo,Sr.39
 Petitionermovedforreconsiderationofthe26January2010
ResolutionoftheCOMELEC,duringthependencyofwhichthe
10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was
proclaimedthedulyelectedmayorofLipaCityaftergarnering
the highest number of votes cast for the said position. He
accordinglyfiledaManifestation42withtheCOMELECenbancto
reflectthisfact.
InitsResolutiondated17 August2010, 43theCOMELECen
bancdenied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.
Although he was able toreceive his copy of the Resolution, no
prior notice setting the date of promulgation of the said
Resolution was received by him. Meanwhile, Section 6 of
COMELECResolutionNo.8696(RulesonDisqualificationCases
FiledinConnectionwiththeMay10,2012AutomatedNational
andLocalElections)requiresthepartiestobenotifiedinadvance
ofthedateofthepromulgationoftheResolution.
SEC.6.Promulgation.ThepromulgationofaDecisionor
ResolutionoftheCommissionoraDivisionshallbemadeona
datepreviouslyfixed,noticeofwhichshallbeservedinadvance
uponthe partiesor theirattorneyspersonally,or byregistered
mail,telegram,fax,orthruthefastestmeansofcommunication.
_______________
41Id.,atpp.4862.
42Id.,atpp.296299.
43Id.,atpp.6369.
676
676 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition
forCertiorariwithExtremelyUrgentApplicationfortheIssuance
ofaStatusQuoOrderandfortheConductofaSpecialRaffleof
thisCase)underRule64inrelationtoRule65oftheRulesof
Court, seeking the annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17
August2010ResolutionsoftheCOMELEC.Petitionerattachedto
hisPetitionaCertificateofCanvassofVotesandproclamationof
WinningCandidatesforLipaCityMayorandViceMayorissued
bytheCity/MunicipalBoardofCanvassers, 44aswellasacopyof
his Oath of Office.45He also attached to his Petition another
Certification of Residency46issued by Pinagtong
ulanBarangayCaptainDominadorHonradeandsworntobefore
anotarypublic.
On 7 September 2010, this Court issued a StatusQuo
AnteOrder47requiring the parties to observe the
statusquoprevailing before the issuance of the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions. Thereafter, the parties filed their
responsivepleadings.
Issues
Thefollowingaretheissuesforresolution:
1.WhethertheCOMELECactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretion
whenitfailedtopromulgateitsResolutiondated17August
2010inaccordancewithitsownRulesofProcedure;and
2.WhethertheCOMELECcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretion
inholdingthatSabilifailedtoprovecompliancewiththeone
yearresidencyrequirementforlocalelectiveofficials.
_______________
44Id.,atp.294.
45Id.,atp.295.
46Id.,atp.300.
47Id.,atpp.314315.
677
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 677
 Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
TheCourtsRuling
1.On whether the COMELEC acted
with grave abuse of discretion when
it failed to promulgate its Resolution
dated 17 August 2010 in accordance
withitsownRulesofProcedure
Petitioner argues that the assailed 17 August 2010
COMELEC Resolution, which denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration,isnullandvoid.TheResolutionwasallegedly
notpromulgatedinaccordancewiththeCOMELECsownRules
ofProcedureand,hence,violatedpetitionersrighttodueprocess
oflaw.
TherulesgoverningthePetitionforCancellationofCOCin
this case is COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on
Disqualificationof CasesFiled in ConnectionwiththeMay10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections), which was
promulgated on 11 November 2009. Sections 6 and 7 thereof
provideasfollows:
SEC.6.Promulgation.ThepromulgationofaDecisionor
ResolutionoftheCommissionoraDivisionshallbemadeona
datepreviouslyfixed,noticeofwhichshallbeservedinadvance
uponthe partiesor theirattorneyspersonally,or byregistered
mail,telegram,faxorthruthefastestmeansofcommunication.
SEC.7.MotionforReconsideration.Amotiontoreconsider
aDecision,Resolution,OrderorRulingofaDivisionshallbefiled
withinthree(3)daysfromthepromulgationthereof.Suchmotion,
if not proforma, suspends the execution for implementation of
theDecision,Resolution,OrderorRuling.
Within twentyfour (24) hours from the filing thereof, the
ClerkoftheCommissionshallnotifythePresidingCommissioner.
Thelattershallwithintwo(2)daysthereaftercertifythecaseto
theCommissionenbanc.
The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the Motion for
Reconsideration for the resolution of the Commissionen
bancwithinthree(3)daysfromthecertificationthereof.
678
678 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
However,theCOMELECOrderdated4May201048suspended
Section6ofCOMELECResolutionNo.8696byorderingthatall
resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for
immediate promulgation in view of the proximity of the
Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material
time.TheOrderstates:
ORDER
Considering the proximity of the Automated National and
LocalElectionsandlackofmaterialtime,theCommissionhereby
suspendsSec.6ofResolutionNo.8696promulgatedonNovember
11,2009,whichreads:
Sec.6.Promulgation.The promulgation of a
Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a Division
shallbemadeonadatepreviouslyfixed,noticeofwhich
shall be served upon the parties or their attorneys
personally,orbyregisteredmail,telegram,faxorthruthe
fastestmeansofcommunication.
LetallresolutionsbedeliveredtotheClerkoftheCommission
forimmediatepromulgation.
SOORDERED.
Petitioner claims that he did not receive notice of the said
suspensionofSection6ofCOMELECResolutionNo.8696.Thus,
hisrighttodueprocesswasstillviolated.Ontheotherhand,the
COMELECclaimsthatithasthepowertosuspenditsownrules
of procedure and invokes Section 6, Article IXA of the
Constitution, which gives it the power to promulgate its own
rulesconcerningpleadingsandpracticebeforeitorbeforeanyof
itsoffices.
WeagreewiththeCOMELEConthisissue.
InLindov.CommissiononElections,49petitionerclaimedthat
there was no valid promulgation of a Decision in an election
protestcasewhenacopythereofwasmerelyfurnished
_______________
48Id.,atp.739.
49271Phil.844;194SCRA25(1991).
679
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
theparties,insteadoffirstnotifyingthepartiesofasetdatefor
thepromulgationthereof,inaccordancewithSection20ofRule
35oftheCOMELECsownRulesofProcedure,asfollows:
Sec.20.Promulgation and Finality of Decision.The
decisionofthecourtshallbepromulgatedonadatesetbyitof
whichduenoticemustbegiventheparties.Itshallbecomefinal
five (5) days after promulgation. No motion for reconsideration
shallbeentertained.
Rejecting petitioners argument, we held therein that the
additional rule requiring notice to the parties prior to
promulgation of a decision is not part of the process of
promulgation. Since lack of such notice does not prejudice the
rightsoftheparties,noncompliancewiththisruleisaprocedural
lapsethatdoesnotvitiatethevalidityofthedecision.Thus:
Thiscontentionisuntenable.Promulgationistheprocessby
whichadecisionispublished,officiallyannounced,madeknown
tothepublicordeliveredtotheclerkofcourtforfiling,coupled
withnoticetothepartiesortheircounsel(Neriav.Commissioner
ofImmigration,L24800,May27,1968,23SCRA812).Itisthe
delivery of a court decision to the clerk of court for filing and
publication(Aranetav.Dinglasan,84Phil.433).Itisthefilingof
thesigneddecisionwiththeclerkofcourt(Sumbingv.Davide,
G.R.Nos.8685051,July20,1989,EnBancMinuteResolution).
TheadditionalrequirementimposedbytheCOMELECrulesof
notice inadvance of promulgation is not part of the process of
promulgation. Hence, We do not agree with petitioners
contention that there was no promulgation of the trial courts
decision.Thetrialcourtdidnotdenythatithadofficiallymade
thedecisionpublic.Fromtherecitaloffactsofbothparties,copies
of the decision were sent to petitioners counsel of record and
679 petitioners (sic) himself. Another copy was sent to private
respondent.
What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently
objected to was not the promulgation of the decision but the
failure of the trial court to serve notice in advance of the
promulgationofitsdecisionasrequiredbytheCOMELECrules.
Thefailuretoservesuchnoticeinadvanceofthepromulgation
maybeconsideredaproce
680
680 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
durallapseonthepartofthetrialcourtwhichdidnotprejudice
the rights of the partiesand didnot vitiate the validity of the
decision of the trial court nor (sic) of the promulgation of said
decision.
Moreover, quotingPimping v.
COMELEC, citingMacabingkilv.Yatco, wefurtherheldinthe
50 51
same case that failure to receive advance notice of the
promulgation of a decision is not sufficient to set aside the
COMELECsjudgment,aslongasthepartieshavebeenafforded
anopportunitytobeheardbeforejudgmentisrendered,viz.:
Thefactthatpetitionerswerenotservednoticeinadvanceof
thepromulgationofthedecisionintheelectionprotestcases,in
Our view, does not constitute reversible error or a reason
sufficientenoughtocompelandwarrantthesettingasideofthe
judgment rendered by the Comelec. Petitioners anchor their
argumentonanallegeddenialtothem(sic)dueprocesstothe
deviationbytheComelecfromitsownmaderules.However,the
essence of due process is that, the parties in the case were
affordedanopportunitytobeheard.
Inthepresentcase,wereadfromtheCOMELECOrderthat
the exigencies attendant to the holding of the countrys first
automated national elections had necessitated that the
COMELECsuspendtheruleonnoticepriortopromulgation,and
thatitinsteaddirectthedeliveryofallresolutionstotheClerkof
theCommissionforimmediatepromulgation.Notably,weseeno
prejudicetothepartiescausedthereby.TheCOMELECsOrder
didnotaffecttherightofthepartiestodueprocess.Theywere
stillfurnishedacopyoftheCOMELECDecisionandwereableto
reckontheperiodforperfectinganappeal.Infact,petitionerwas
abletotimelylodgeaPetitionwiththisCourt.
Clearly,the COMELEC validly exercised itsconstitutionally
grantedpowertomakeitsownrulesofprocedurewhenit
_______________
50224Phil.326,359;140SCRA192,223(1985).
51128Phil165;21SCRA150(1967).
681
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
issuedthe4May2010OrdersuspendingSection6ofCOMELEC
Resolution No. 8696. Consequently, the second assailed
ResolutionoftheCOMELECcannotbesetasideonthegroundof
COMELECsfailuretoissuetopetitioneranoticesettingthedate
ofthepromulgationthereof.
2.On whether the COMELEC com
mitted grave abuse of discretion in
holding that Sabili failed to prove
compliance with the oneyear resi
dency requirement for local elective
officials
As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the
COMELECsappreciationandevaluation ofevidence. However,
exceptions thereto have been established, including when the
COMELECsappreciationandevaluationofevidencebecomeso
grosslyunreasonableastoturnintoanerrorofjurisdiction.In
these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden
constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELECs
error.52
InMitrav.CommissiononElections,(G.R.No.191938,2July
2010), we explained that the COMELECs use of wrong or
irrelevantconsiderationsindecidinganissueissufficienttotaint
itsactionwithgraveabuseofdiscretion
As a concept, grave abuse of discretion defies exact
definition;generally,itreferstocapriciousorwhimsicalexercise
ofjudgmentasisequivalenttolackofjurisdiction;theabuseof
discretionmustbepatentandgrossastoamounttoanevasionof
apositivedutyoravirtualrefusaltoperformadutyenjoinedby
law,ortoactatallincontemplationoflaw,aswherethepoweris
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
681 passionandhostility.Mereabuseofdiscretionisnotenough;it
must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or
irrelevantconsiderationsindecid
_______________
 52Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191938, 19
October2010,633SCRA580.
682
682 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
inganissueissufficienttotaintadecisionmakersactionwith
graveabuseofdiscretion.
Closelyrelatedwiththelimitedfocusofthepresentpetitionis
thecondition,underSection5,Rule64oftheRulesofCourt,that
findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial
evidence,shallbefinalandnonreviewable.Substantialevidence
isthatdegreeofevidencethatareasonablemindmightacceptto
supportaconclusion.
Inlightofourlimitedauthoritytoreviewfindingsoffact,we
do not ordinarily review in acertioraricase the COMELECs
appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the
COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of
judgment,notofjurisdiction.
Inexceptionalcases,however,whentheCOMELECsaction
on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the
limitsofitsdiscretiontothepointofbeinggrosslyunreasonable,
theCourtisnotonlyobliged,buthastheconstitutionaldutyto
intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting
errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of
judgmenttooneofjurisdiction.
Beforeus,petitionerhasallegedandshowntheCOMELECs
useofwrongorirrelevantconsiderationsindecidingtheissueof
whether petitioner made a material misrepresentation of his
residency qualification in his COC as to order its cancellation.
Amongothers,petitionerpointedtotheCOMELECsinordinate
emphasis on the issue of property ownership of petitioners
declaredresidenceinLipaCity,itsinconsistentstanceregarding
PalomaressrelationshiptothePinagtongulanproperty,andits
failure to consider in the first instance the certification of
residence issued by the barangay captain of Pinagtongulan.
PetitionerbewailsthattheCOMELECrequiredmoreevidence
toshowthechangeinhisresidence,notwithstandingthevarious
piecesofevidencehepresentedandthefactthatunderthelaw,
the quantum of evidence required in these cases is merely
substantial evidence and not clear and convincing evidence.
Petitioner further ascribes grave abuse of discretion in the
COMELECsbrushingasideofthefactthathehasbeenfilinghis
ITRinLipaCity(where
683
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 683
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
heindicatesthatheisaresidentofPinagtongulan)onthemere
expedientthatthelawallowsthefilingoftheITRnotonlyinthe
placeoflegalresidencebut,alternately,inhisplaceofbusiness.
Petitioner notes that private respondents own evidence shows
that petitioner has no business in Lipa City, leaving only his
residencethereinasbasisforfilinghisITRtherein.
Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner had not
sufficientlyshownthathehadresidedinLipaCityforatleast
oneyearpriortotheMay2010elections,weexaminetheevidence
adducedbythepartiesandtheCOMELECsappreciationthereof.
In the present case, the parties are in agreement that the
domicileoforiginofSabiliwasBrgy.Sico,SanJuan,Batangas.
He claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin and
establishedhisdomicileofchoiceinBrgy.Pinagtongulan,Lipa
City,therebymakinghimqualifiedtorunforLipaCitymayor.
On the other hand, respondent COMELEC held that no such
changeindomicileorresidencetookplaceand,hence,theentry
inhisCertificateofCandidacyshowingthathewasaresidentof
Brgy.Pinagtongulan,LipaCityconstitutedamisrepresentation
thatdisqualifiedhimfromrunningforLipaCitymayor.
Toestablishanewdomicileofchoice,personalpresenceinthe
placemustbecoupledwithconductindicativeoftheintentionto
make it ones fixed and permanent place of abode. 53As in all
administrativecases,thequantumofproofnecessaryinelection
cases is substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a
reasonablemindwillacceptasadequatetosupportaconclusion.54
_______________
53Domino v. Commission on Elections, 369 Phil. 798; 310
SCRA546(1999).
54Enojas,Jr.v.CommissiononElections,347Phil.510;283
SCRA229(1997).
684
684 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
The ruling on private respondents
evidence
WebeginwithanevaluationoftheCOMELECsappreciation
ofprivaterespondentsevidence.
a)PetitionersVoterCertification,Registrationand
COCs in previous
elections
Petitioners Voter Certification is a common exhibit of the
parties.Itstates,amongothers,thatpetitionerisaresidentof
Pinagtongulan,LipaCity,Batangas;thathehadbeenaresident
ofLipaCityfortwo(2)yearsandthree(3)months;andthathe
wasso registered on31 October2009. The information therein
was certified correct by COMELEC Election Officer Juan B.
Aguila,Jr.
Private respondent presented this document as proof that
petitionermisrepresentedthatheisaresidentofLipaCity.On
theotherhand,thelatterpresentedthisdocumentasproofofhis
residency.
The COMELEC correctly ruled that the Voter Certification
issuedbytheCOMELECElectionOfficer,Atty.JuanB.Aguila,
Jr.,wasnotconclusiveproofthatpetitionerhadbeenaresidentof
Lipa City since April 2007. It noted that Aguila is not the
competent public officer to certify the veracity of this claim,
particularly because petitioners COMELEC registration was
approvedonlyinOctober2009.
TheVoterRegistrationRecordofpetitioneraccomplishedon
21June1997showingthathewasaresidentofSico,SanJuan,
Batangas,aswellashisvariousCOCsdated21June1997and
March2007indicatingthesamething,werenolongerdiscussed
by the COMELECand rightly so. These pieces of evidence
showingthathewasaresidentofSico,SanJuan,Batangason
the said datesare irrelevant as, prior to April 2007, petitioner
wasadmittedlyaresidentofSico,San
685
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 685
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
JuanBatangas.Rather,therelevanttimeperiodforconsideration
isthatfromApril2007onwards,afterpetitionersallegedchange
ofdomicile.
b)Certificates regarding owner
shipofrealproperty
The various certificates and tax declarations adduced by
private respondent showed that the Lipa property was solely
registered in the name of petitioners commonlaw wife,
BernadettePalomares.Indiscussingtheimportofthisdocument,
the COMELEC reasoned that,being aseasonedpolitician,he
should have registered the Lipa property (which he claimed to
havepurchasedwithhispersonalfunds)inhisownname.Such
action would have offered positive proof of intent to change
actual residence from San Juan, Batangas to Lipa City,
consideringthathehadpreviouslydeclaredhisancestralhomein
San Juan, Batangas as his domicile. Since Palomares and
petitionerarecommonlawspousesnotcapacitatedtomarryeach
other,thepropertyrelationbetweenthemisgovernedbyArticle
148 of the Family Code,55where only the parties actual
contributions are recognized. Hence, petitioner cannot prove
ownershipofapropertyandresidence
_______________
55Art. 148.Incasesofcohabitationnotfallingunderthe
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
partiesthroughtheiractualjointcontributionofmoney,property
orindustryshallbeownedbythemincommoninproportionto
their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumedtobeequal.Thesameruleandpresumptionshallapply
tojointdepositsofmoneyandevidencesofcredit.
Ifoneofthepartiesisvalidlymarriedtoanother,hisorher
shareinthecoownershipshallaccruetotheabsolutecommunity
or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
partywhoactedinbadfaithisnotvalidlymarriedtoanother,his
orhershareshallbeforfeitedinthemannerprovidedinthelast
paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on
forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.
686
686 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
inLipaCitythroughtheregisteredownershipofthecommonlaw
wifeofthepropertyinLipaCity.
Ontheotherhand,petitionerbewailstheinordinateemphasis
thattheCOMELECbestoweduponthequestionofwhetherthe
Lipapropertycouldbeconsideredashisresidence,forthereason
thatitwasnotregisteredinhisname.Hestressesthattheissue
shouldberesidence,notpropertyownership.
It is true that property ownership is not among the
qualificationsrequiredofcandidatesforlocalelection. 56Rather,it
isacandidatesresidenceinalocalitythroughactualresidencein
whatevercapacity.Indeed,wesustainedtheCOMELECwhenit
consideredasevidencetendingtoestablishacandidatesdomicile
ofchoicethemerelease(ratherthanownership)ofanapartment
byacandidateinthesameprovincewhereheranfortheposition
ofgovernor.57InthemorerecentcaseofMitrav.Commissionon
Elections,58wereversedtheCOMELECrulingthatacandidates
sparselyfurnished,leasedroomonthemezzanineofafeedmill
could not be considered as his residence for the purpose of
complying with the residency requirement of Section 78 of the
OmnibusElectionCode.59
_______________
56Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal,G.R.No.187478,21December2009,608SCRA733.
57Perez v. Commission on Elections, 375 Phil. 1106; 317
SCRA641(1999).Theotherpiecesofevidenceconsideredbythe
COMELEC in thePerezcase were the candidates marriage
certificate, the birth certificate of his daughter, and various
lettersbearingtheaddress,allshowingthathewasaresidentof
theprovinceforatleastone(1)yearbeforetheelections.
58G.R.No.191938,2July2010,622SCRA744.
59As further proof of his change in residence, Mitra had
adduced affidavits from the seller of the lot he purchased, the
owner of Maligaya Feedmill, the barangay captain and
sangguniangbarangaymembersofIsaub,Aborlan,aswellasan
Aborlan councilor. He also presented photographs of the
residentialportionofMaligayaFeedmillwhereheresides,andof
hisexperimentalpineappleplantation
 687
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
The Dissent claims that the registration of the property in
Palomaress name does not prove petitioners residence as it
merely showed donative intent without the necessary
formalitiesorpaymentoftaxes.
However, whatever the nature of the transaction might be,
this point is immaterial for the purpose of ascertaining
petitionersresidence.Wehavelongheldthatitisnotrequired
thatacandidateshouldhavehisownhouseinordertoestablish
hisresidenceordomicileinaplace.Itisenoughthatheshould
liveinthelocality,eveninarentedhouseorthatofafriendor
relative.60What is of central concern then is that petitioner
identifiedandestablishedaplaceinLipaCitywhereheintended
toliveinandreturntoforanindefiniteperiodoftime.
Hence, while the COMELEC correctly ruled that, of itself,
Palomares ownership of the Lipa property does not provethat
sheorandinviewoftheircommonlawrelations,petitioner
residesinLipaCity,nevertheless,theexistenceofahouseandlot
apparentlyownedbypetitionerscommonlawwife,withwhomhe
hasbeenlivingforovertwodecades,makesplausiblepetitioners
allegationofbodilypresenceandintenttoresideinthearea.
c)Certifications regarding the
familymembersofpetitioner
PrivaterespondentpresentedaCertificationfromtheDepEd,
Lipa City Division, indicating that the names Bernadette
Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili (petitioners daughter) and
FrancisMeynardSabili(petitionersson)donotappearonthelist
of graduates of Lipa City. Private respondent also presented a
CertificationfromtheOfficeoftheElection
_______________
and cock farm. He further submitted the community tax
687 certificate he himself secured, and a House of Representatives
IdentificationCard,bothindicatingthatheresidesinAborlan.
60DelosReyesv.Solidum,61Phil.893(1935).
688
688 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
OfficerofLipaCitythatthenamesofthesefamilymembersof
petitionerdonotappearinitslistofvoters.
As the issue at hand is petitioners residence, and not the
educational or voting record of his family, the COMELEC
properlydidnotconsiderthesepiecesofevidenceinarrivingat
itsResolution.
TheDissentneverthelessassertsthatbecausehischildrendo
notattendeducationalinstitutionsinLipaandarenotregistered
voters therein, and because petitioner does not maintain a
business therein nor has property in his name, petitioner is
unabletoshowtheexistenceofrealandsubstantialreasonforhis
stayinLipaCity.
AstotheDissentsfirstassertion,itmustbestressedthatthe
children,likethewife,donotdictatethefamilydomicile.Evenin
thecontextofmarriage,thefamilydomicileisjointlydecidedby
bothhusbandandwife.61Inaddition,wenotethatthetransferto
Lipa City occurred in 2007, when petitioners children were
alreadywellintocollegeandcouldverywellhavechosentostudy
elsewherethaninLipaCity.
Also,itispetitionersdomicilewhichisatissue,andnotthat
ofhischildren.Butevenassumingthatitwaspetitionerhimself
(ratherthanhischildren)whoattendededucationalinstitutions
orwhoregisteredasavoterinaplaceotherthanLipaCity,we
have held that absence from residence to pursue studies or
practiceaprofessionorregistrationasavoterotherthaninthe
place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence.62In fact, Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
providesthattransferofresidencetoanyotherplacebyreasonof
onesoccupation;profession; employmentinprivateandpublic
service; educational activities; work in military or naval
reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the
constabularyornationalpoliceforce;orcon
_______________
61FamilyCode,Article69.
62Fayponv.Quirino,96Phil.294(1954).
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VOL.670,APRIL24,2012
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
finementor detentioningovernmentinstitutions in accordance
withlawisnotdeemedaslossofresidence.
As to the Dissents second assertion, petitioner apparently
doesnotmaintainabusinessinLipaCity.However,apartfrom
the Pinagtongulan property which both Suarez (the previous
property owner) and Palomares swear was purchased with
petitioners own funds, the records also indicate that there are
twootherlotsinLipaCity,particularlyinBarangayLodlod,Lipa
City63whichareregisteredjointlyinthenameofpetitionerand
Palomares.Infact,itwasprivaterespondentwhopresentedthe
LipaCityAssessorsCertificatetothiseffect.Evenassumingthat
this Court were to disregard the two Lodlod lots, it is well
established that property ownership (and similarly, business
interest)inthelocalitywhereoneintendstorunforlocalelective
postisnotrequirementoftheConstitution.64
Moreimportantly,wehavegonesofarastorulethatthereis
nothingwronginanindividualchangingresidencessohecould
runforanelectivepost,foraslongasheisabletoprovewith
reasonablecertaintythathehaseffectedachangeofresidencefor
electionlawpurposesfortheperiodrequiredbylaw.65
d)AffidavitsofLipaCityresidents
Private respondent also presented the affidavits of Violeta
Fernandez66and RodrigoMacasaet,67who werealsoresidentsof
Pinagtongulan.Bothstatedthatpetitionerdidnotreside
_______________
63Rollo,pp.148and150,OfficeoftheCityAssessorofLipa
Certificationdated14December2009.
64Maquerav.Borra,122Phil.412;15SCRA7(1965).
65Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088, 19
January 2009, 576 SCRA 331, citingAquino v. Commission on
689
Elections,318Phil.467;248SCRA400(1995).
66Supranote21.
67Supranote22.
690
690 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
in Pinagtongulan, as they had rarely seen him in the area.
Meanwhile, Pablo Lorzano,68in his Affidavit, attested that
althoughtheLipapropertywassometimesusedforgatherings,
hedidnotrecallhavingseenpetitionerintheirbarangay.On
theotherhand,privaterespondent69andEladiodeTorres,70both
residentsofBrgy.Calamias,reasonedthatpetitionerwasnota
residentofLipaCitybecausehehasnoworkorfamilythere.
TheCOMELECdidnotdiscusstheseAffidavitsinitsassailed
Resolution. It was correct in doing so, particularly considering
thattheseAffidavitsweredulycontrovertedbythosepresented
bypetitioner.
Moreover, evenassuming the truthof theallegation in the
Affidavitsthatpetitionerwasrarelyseeninthearea,thisdoes
notprecludethepossibilityofhisresidencetherein.InFernandez
v.HouseofRepresentativesElectoralTribunal,71weheldthatthe
avermentsofcertainbarangayhealthworkersthattheyfailedto
see a particular candidate whenever they made rounds of the
locality of which he was supposed to be a residentis of no
moment.Itispossiblethatthecandidatewasoutofthehouseto
attendtohisownbusinessatthetime.Thelawdoesnotrequirea
persontobeinhishometwentyfour(24)hoursaday,seven(7)
daysaweek,tofulfilltheresidencyrequirement.
Therulingonpetitionersevidence
WenowevaluatehowtheCOMELECappreciatedpetitioners
evidence:
_______________
68Supranote23.
69Rollo,pp.8283.
70Id.,atpp.8485.
71G.R.No.187478,21December2009,608SCRA733.
691
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012
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a)Petitioners Income Tax Re
turnsfor2007and2008
TheIncomeTaxReturnsofpetitionerpresentedbelowshowed
thatpetitionerhadbeenpayinghisIncomeTax(2007and2008)
totheRevenueDistrictOfficeofLipaCity.Inwavingasidehis
Income Tax Returns, the COMELEC held that these were not
indications of residence since Section 51(B) of the National
InternalRevenueCodedoesnotonlystatethatitshallbefiledin
apersonslegalresidence,butthatitmayalternativelybefiledin
apersonsprincipalplaceofbusiness.
Inparticular,Section51(B)oftheNationalInternalRevenue
Code72providesthattheIncomeTaxReturnshallbefiledeither
intheplacewhereapersonresidesorwherehisprincipalplaceof
businessislocated.However,privaterespondentsownevidence
aCertificationfromtheCity PermitsandLicensingOffice of
LipaCityshowedthattherewasnobusinessregisteredinthe
Cityunderpetitionersname.
Thus,COMELECfailedtoappreciatethatpreciselybecause
anindividualincometaxreturnmayonlybefiledeitherinthe
legalresidenceORtheprincipalplaceofbusiness,asprescribed
under the law, the fact that Sabili was filing his Income Tax
Returns in Lipa City notwithstanding that he had no business
therein showed that he had actively elected to establish his
residenceinthatcity.
The Dissent claims that since the jurisdiction of RDO Lipa
CityincludesbothSanJuanandLipaCity,petitionersfiling
_______________
72SEC.51.IndividualReturn.
(A)Requirements.......
(B)Where to File.Except in cases where the
Commissionerotherwisepermits,thereturnshallbefiledwithan
691
authorizedagentbank,RevenueDistrictOfficer,CollectionAgent
ordulyauthorizedTreasurerofthecityormunicipalityinwhich
suchpersonhashislegalresidenceorprincipalplaceofbusiness
in the Philippines, orif therebe no legal residence or place of
businessinthePhilippines,withtheOfficeoftheCommissioner.
xxx
692
692 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
ofhisITRthereincanalsosupportanintenttoremaininSan
Juan,Batangaspetitionersdomicileoforigin.
However, a simple perusal of the Income Tax Returns and
RevenueOfficialReceiptsfor2007and2008showsthatpetitioner
invariablydeclareshisresidencetobePinagtongulan,LipaCity,
ratherthanSanJuan,Batangas. 73Hence,whilepetitionermaybe
submitting his income tax return in the same RDO, the
declaration therein is unmistakable. Petitioner considers Lipa
Citytobehisdomicile.
b)Certification from the Barangay
CaptainofPinagtongulan
The COMELEC did not consider in the first instance the
Certification issued by PinagtongulanBarangayCaptain
DominadorHonrade74(Honrade)thatpetitionerhadbeenresiding
in Brgy Pinagtongulan since 2007. When this oversight was
raisedasanissueinpetitionersMotionforReconsideration,the
COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that the said
Certificationwasnotsworntobeforeanotarypublicand,hence,
cannotbereliedon.Subsequently,petitionerpresentedanother,
substantially identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong
ulanBarangayCaptain, save for the fact that it had now been
sworntobeforeanotarypublic.
We disagree with the COMELECs treatment of
theBarangayCaptains Certification and find the same tainted
withgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Evenwithoutbeingsworntobeforeanotarypublic,Honrades
Certificationwouldnotonlybeadmissibleinevidence,butwould
alsobeentitledtodueconsideration.
Rule130,Section44oftheRulesofCourtprovides:
_______________
73Rollo,pp.112114.
74Rollo,p.105.
693
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
SEC.44.Entries in official records.Entries in official
recordsmadeintheperformanceofhisdutybyapublicofficerof
the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, areprima facieevidence of the facts
thereinstated.
InCountryBankersInsuranceCorporationv.LiangaBayand
Community Multipurpose Cooperative, Inc.,75we explained that
the following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in
officialrecordstobeadmissibleinevidence:
(a)The entry was made by a public officer, or by another
personspeciallyenjoinedbylawtodoso;
(b)Itwasmadebythepublicofficerintheperformanceofhis
duties,orbysuchotherpersonintheperformanceofaduty
speciallyenjoinedbylaw;and
(c)The public officer or other person had sufficient
knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must
havebeenacquired by himpersonally or throughofficial
information.
Astothefirstrequisite,theBarangaySecretaryisrequiredby
the Local Government Code to keep an updated record of all
inhabitantsofthebarangay.76Regardingthesecondreq
_______________
75425Phil.511;374SCRA653(2002).
76SEC.394.Barangay Secretary: Appointment,
Qualifications, Powers and Duties.(a)Thebarangay secretary
shallbeappointedbythepunongbarangaywiththeconcurrence
of the majority of all the sangguniang barangay members. The
appointment of the barangay secretary shall not be subject to
attestationbytheCivilServiceCommission.
(b)Thebarangaysecretaryshallbeoflegalage,aqualified
693 voterandanactualresidentofthebarangayconcerned.
(c)Nopersonshallbeappointedbarangaysecretaryifheis
asangguniangbarangaymember,agovernmentemployee,ora
relativeofthepunongbarangaywithinthefourthcivildegreeof
consanguinityoraffinity.
 (d)Thebarangaysecretaryshall:
694
694 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
uisite, wehaveexplicitly recognizedinMitrav. Commissionon
Elections,77thatitisthebusinessofapunongbarangaytoknow
who the residents are in his own barangay. Anent the third
requisite, theBarangayCaptains exercise of powers and
duties78concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to
theserecordskeptbytheBarangaySecretary.
_______________
(1)Keepcustodyofallrecordsofthesangguniangbarangay
andthebarangayassemblymeetings;
(2)Prepare and keep the minutes of all meetings of the
sangguniangbarangayandthebarangayassembly;
(3)Preparealistofmembersofthebarangayassembly,and
havethesamepostedinconspicuousplaceswithinthebarangay;
(4) Assistinthepreparationofallnecessaryformsforthe
conductofbarangayelections,initiatives,referendaorplebiscites,
incoordinationwiththeComelec;
(5)Assistthemunicipalcivilregistrarintheregistrationof
births,deaths,andmarriages;
(6) Keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the
barangay containing the following items of information: name,
address, place and date of birth, sex, civil status, citizenship,
occupation, and such other items of information as may be
prescribedbylaworordinances;
(7)Submit a report on the actual number of barangay
residents as often as may be required by the sangguniang
barangay;and
(8)Exercise such other powers and perform such other
dutiesandfunctionsasmaybeprescribedbylaworordinance.
77Supranote56.
78SEC.389.Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and
Functions.(a) Thepunongbarangay,asthechiefexecutiveof
the barangay government, shall exercise such powers and
performsuchdutiesandfunctions,asprovidedbythisCodeand
otherlaws.
(b) Forefficient, effectiveandeconomicalgovernance,the
purposeofwhichisthegeneralwelfareofthebarangayandits
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the punong
barangayshall:
(1)Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable
withinthebarangay;
(2)Negotiate,enterinto,andsigncontractsforandinbehalf
of the barangay, upon authorization of the sangguniang
barangay;
695
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 695
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
Accordingly,thereisbasisinfaultingtheCOMELECforits
failuretoconsiderHonradesCertificationonthesolegroundthat
itwasinitiallynotnotarized.
Meanwhile,theDissentopinesthattheswornaffidavitofthe
barangaychairofPinagtongulanthatpetitionerisaresidentof
LipaCitydoesnothelppetitionerscasebecauseitwasnotshown
thatthetermresidentasusedthereincar
_______________
(3)Maintainpublicorderinthebarangayand,inpursuance
thereof,assistthecityormunicipalmayorandthesanggunian
membersintheperformanceoftheirdutiesandfunctions;
(4)Call and preside over the sessions of the sangguniang
barangayandthebarangayassembly,andvoteonlytobreaka
tie;
 (5) Uponapprovalbyamajorityofallthemembersofthe InMitra v. Commission on Elections,79the declaration of
sangguniang barangay, appoint or replace the barangay Aborlanspunong barangaythat petitioner resides in
treasurer,thebarangaysecretary,andotherappointivebarangay
hisbarangaywastakentohavethesamemeaningasdomicile,
officials;
inasmuch as the said declaration was made in the face of the
(6) Organize and lead an emergency group whenever the
CourtsrecognitionthatMitramightnothavestayedinAborlan
samemaybenecessaryforthemaintenanceofpeaceandorderor
norinPalawanformostof2008and2009becausehisofficeand
onoccasionsofemergencyorcalamitywithinthebarangay;
activitiesasaRepresentativewereinManila.
(7)Incoordinationwiththebarangaydevelopmentcouncil,
Assuming that the barangay captains certification only
prepare the annual executive and supplemental budgets of the
pertains to petitioners bodily presence in Pinagtongulan, still,
barangay;
the COMELEC cannot deny the strength of this evidence in
(8)Approve vouchers relating to the disbursement of
establishingpetitionersbodilypresenceinPinagtongulansince
barangayfunds;
2007.
(9)Enforcelawsandregulationsrelatingtopollutioncontrol
c)Affidavit of petitioners
andprotectionoftheenvironment;
commonlawwife
(10)Administer the operation of the Katarungang
Tosubstantiatehisclaimofchangeofdomicile,petitioneralso
PambarangayinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthisCode;
presented the affidavit of Palomares, wherein the latter swore
(11)Exercise general supervision over the activities of the
thatsheandpetitionerbeganresidinginLipaCityin2007,and
sangguniangkabataan;
that the funds used to purchase the Lipa property were
(12)Ensurethedeliveryofbasicservicesasmandatedunder
petitioners personal funds. The COMELEC ruled that the
Section17ofthisCode;
Affidavitwasselfservingforhavingbeenexecutedbypetitioners
(13) Conduct an annual palarong barangay which shall
commonlawwife.Also,despitethepresentationbypetitionerof
featuretraditionalsportsanddisciplinesincludedinnationaland
otherAffidavitsstatingthatheandPalomareshadlivedinBrgy.
international games, in coordination with the Department of
Pinagtongulansince2007,thelattersAffidavitwasrejectedby
Education,CultureandSports;
theCOMELECforhavingnoindependentcollaboration.
(14)Promotethegeneralwelfareofthebarangay;and
PetitionerfaultstheCOMELECsstand,whichitclaimstobe
(15)Exercise such other powers and perform such other
inconsistent.Hearguesthatsincethepropertyregimebetween
dutiesandfunctionsasmaybeprescribedbylaworordinance.
himandPalomaresisgovernedbyArticle148oftheFamilyCode
696
(basedonthepartiesactualcontribution)asthe
696 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
_______________
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections 79G.R.No.191938,2July2010,622SCRA744.
ries the same meaning as domicile, that is, not merely bodily 697
presence but also,animus manendior intent to return.This VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 697
Courthasruledotherwise.
 Sabilivs.CommissiononElections 81Unchuanv.Lozada,G.R.No.172671,16April2009,585
COMELECstressed,thenPalomaressAffidavitexpresslystating SCRA421.
thatpetitionersmoneyalonehadbeenusedtopurchasetheLipa 82Peoplev.Catalino,131Phil.194;22SCRA1091(1968).
property (notwithstanding that it was registered in her name) 698
was not selfserving, but was in fact, a declaration against 698 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
interest. Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
Petitioners argument that Palomaress affidavit was a her marriage to petitioner. However, this was not the reason
declarationagainstinterestis,strictlyspeaking,inaccurateand propounded by the COMELEC when it rejected Palomares
irrelevant.Adeclarationagainstinterest,undertheRulesofCivil affidavit.
Procedure,referstoadeclarationmadebyapersondeceased,or Moreover, it is notable that Palomares assertion in her
unableto testify against the interest of a declarant, ifthe fact affidavit that she and petitioner have been living in the
assertedinthedeclarationwasatthetimeitwasmadesofar PinagtongulanpropertysinceApril2007iscorroboratedbyother
contrarytodeclarantsowninterest,thatareasonablemaninhis evidence, including the affidavits of Pinagtongulan barangay
positionwouldnothavemadethedeclarationunlesshebelieved officialsandneighbors.
ittobetrue.80Adeclarationagainstinterestisanexceptionto d)Affidavits froma previous
thehearsayrule.81Assuch,itpertainsonlytotheadmissibility
property owner, neighbors, cer
of,nottheweightaccordedto,testimonialevidence.82
tificate from parish and desig
Nevertheless, wesee thelogic in petitioners claim that the
nation from sociocivic organi
COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion in being
inconsistent in its stand regarding Palomares, particularly zation
regarding her assertion that the Lipa property had been TheAffidavitissuedby LeonilaSuarez 83(erstwhile ownerof
purchased solely with petitioners money. If the COMELEC the Lipa house and lot) states that in April 2007, after she
acceptstheregistrationoftheLipapropertyinhernametobe receivedthedownpaymentfortheLipapropertyandsignedan
accurate,heraffidavitdisavowingownershipthereofinfavorof agreement that petitioner would settle her bank obligations in
petitionerwasfarfromselfservingasitrancountertoher(and connectionwiththesaidtransaction,heandPalomaresactually
herchildrens)propertyinterest. startedresidingatPinagtongulan.TheCOMELECbrushedthis
The Dissent states that it was not unreasonable for the Affidavit aside as one that merely narrates the circumstances
COMELEC to believe that Palomares may have committed surroundingthesaleofthepropertyandmentionsinpassingthat
misrepresentations in her affidavit considering that she had SabiliandPalomareslivedinPinagtongulansinceApril2007up
perjuredherselfasaninformantonthebirthcertificatesofher tothepresent.84
childrenwithrespecttothesupposeddateandplaceof WedisagreewiththeCOMELECsappreciationoftheSuarez
_______________ Affidavit.Sinceshewasitsowner,transactionsforthepurchase
80RulesofCourt,Rule130C(6),Sec.38. of the Lipa property was within her personal knowledge.
Ordinarily, this includes the arrangement regarding who shall
payforthepropertyandwhen,ifever,itshallbeoccupiedbythe
buyers.Wethusconsiderthatherstatementsimpactpositively
onpetitionersclaimofresidence.
_______________
83Rollo,p.104.
84Id.,atp.66.
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The Dissent on the other hand argues that the claim that
petitionerstartedlivingintheLipahouseandlotinApril2007is
madedubiousbythefactthat(1)theremightnotbeenoughtime
to effect an actual and physical change in residence a month
before the May 2007 elections when petitioner ran for
representativeofthe4thDistrictofBatangas;and(2)theDeedof
Absolute Sale was notarized, and the subsequent transfer of
ownershipinthetaxdeclarationwasmade,onlyinAugust2008.
Beforefurtherdiscussingthis,itispertinenttopointoutthat
these were not the reasons adduced by the COMELEC in the
assailedResolutions.Assumingthattheabovereasonswerethe
unutteredconsiderationsoftheCOMELECincomingupwithits
conclusions, such reasoning still exhibits grave abuse of
discretion.
As to the Dissents first argument, it must be remembered
thatatransferofdomicile/residenceneednotbecompletedinone
single instance. Thus, inMitra v. Commission on
Elections,85where the evidence showed that in 2008, petitioner
MitrahadleasedasmallroomatMaligayaFeedmillslocatedin
Aborlanand,in2009purchasedinthesamelocalityalotwhere
he began constructing his house, we recognized that petitioner
transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008
andconcludedhistransferinearly2009andthus,hetransferred
his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the
period required by law. We cannot treat the transfer to the
PinagtongulanhouseanylessthanwedidMitrastransfertothe
MaligayaFeedmillsroom.
Moreover, the Joint Affidavit of twentyone (21) Pinagtong
ulan residents, including former and incumbent barangay
officials, attests that petitioner had begun living in the
PinagtongulanhouseandlotbeforetheMay2007electionssuch
699
thatitwaswherehiscoordinatorsfortheMay2007elections
_______________
85G.R.No.191938,19October2010,633SCRA580.
700
700 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
went to meet him.86Jacinto Cornejo Sr., the contractor who
renovated the Pinagtongulan house when it was bought by
petitioner,alsosworethatpetitionerandhisfamilybeganliving
therein even while it was being renovated.87Another Affidavit
petitioneradducedwasthatofRosalindaMacasaet,aresidentof
Brgy. Pinagtongulan,88who stated that she also sold a lot she
ownedinfavorofpetitionerandPalomares.Thelatterboughther
lotsinceitwasadjacenttotheLipahouseandlottheyhadearlier
acquired. Macasaet also swore that the couple had actually
residedinthehouselocatedinPinagtongulansinceApril2007,
andthatsheknewthisbecauseherownhousewasverynearthe
couples own. Macasaets Affidavit is a positive assertion of
petitioners actual physical presence in Brgy. Pinagtongulan,
LipaCity.
While private respondent had adduced affidavits of two
Pinagtongulan residents (that of Violeta Fernandez 89and
Rodrigo Macasaet)90attesting that petitioner could not be a
residentofPinagtongulanashewasrarelyseeninthearea,
these affidavits were controverted by the Joint affidavit of
twentyone(21)Pinagtongulanresidentswhoplainlyaccusedthe
twooflying.Meanwhile,theaffidavitsofprivaterespon
_______________
86Rollo, pp. 211212,PinagsamaSamang Salaysayexecuted
by 21 Barangay Pingtongulan residents, namely Esmeraldo P.
Macasaet(formerbarangaycaptainofPinagtongUlan),Eduardo
R.Lorzano(formerbarangaycaptainofPinagtongulan),Patricia
L. Alvarez (incumbent councilor of Pinagtongulan), Pedro Y.
Montalba (former councilor of Pinagtongulan), Loida M.
Macasaet, Mario P. Lingao, Sancho M. Garcia, Jr., Atilano H.
Macasaet,BabyJeanA.Mercado,LigayaC.Mercado,Rosalinda
M. Macasaet, Olga M. Reyes, Jennifer D. Garcia, Sancho C.
Garcia,Sr.,MarissaG.Mercado,WilmaC.Mercado,AireenM.
Macasaet, Eden R. Suarez, Noemi R. Ubalde, Arthur A. del
Rosario,andNorbertoM.Layog.
87Rollo,p.190.
88Id.,atp.106.
89Rollo,p.161.
90Rollo,p.162.
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dent91and Eladio de Torres92stating that petitioner is not a
residentofLipaCitybecausehehasnoworkorfamilythereis
hardlyworthyofcredencesincebothareresidentsofBarangay
Calamias,whichis,andprivaterespondentdoesnotcontestthis,
about15kilometersfromPinagtongulan.
As to the Dissents second argument, the fact that the
notarizationofthedeedofabsolutesaleofthepropertywasmade
monthsafterApril2007doesnotnegatepetitionersclaimthathe
started residing therein in April 2007. It is clear from the
Affidavitofthepropertysseller,LeonilaSuarez,thatitwasnot
yetfullypaidinApril2007,soitwasunderstandablethatadeed
ofabsolutesalewasnotexecutedatthetime.Thus:
That initially, the contract to sell was entered into by and
between Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa Sabili and Bernadette
Palomaresandmyself,buteventuallythespouseschangedtheir
mind,andafterthecouplesettledallmyloanobligationstothe
bank,theyrequestedmetoputthenameofMs.BernadetteP.
Palomares instead of Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa Sabili and
BernadettePalomaresintheabsolutedeedofsale;
ThatitwasMr.MeynardoAsaSabiliwhocametomyformer
residenceatBarangayPinagtongulansometimeinthemonthof
April 2007. At that time, Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili was still
runningforRepresentative(Congressman)inthe4thDistrictof
Batangas;
Thatafterpaymentofthedownpaymentandsigningofan
agreementthatMr.MeynardoAsaSabiliwillbetheonetosettle
my bank obligations, Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo A. Sabili and
BernadettePalomareshadanactualtransferoftheirresidenceat
BarangayPinagtongulan,LipaCity;
ThattheystartedlivingandresidinginPinagtongulaninthe
monthofApril,2007uptothispointintime;xxx93
701 _______________
91Rollo,pp.8283.
92Rollo,pp.8485.
93Rollo,p.188.
702
702 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
Astotherestofthedocumentspresentedbypetitioner,the
COMELECheldthattheMemorandumissuedbytheGuardians
BrotherhoodInc.SanJose/LipaCityChaptermerelydeclaresthe
designationofpetitionerintheorganization,withoutanyshowing
that residence in the locality was a requirement for that
designation. Meanwhile, the Certificate of Appreciation was
nothing more than an acknowledgment of petitioners material
andfinancialsupport,andnotanindicationofresidence.
We agree that considered separately, the Guardians
Brotherhood Memorandum and the Pinagtongulan Parish
CertificateofAppreciationdonotestablishpetitionersresidence
inPinagtongulan,LipaCity.Nevertheless,coupledwiththefact
that petitioner had twice been elected as Provincial Board
Member representing the Fourth District of Batangas, which
encompassesLipaCity,petitionersinvolvementinthereligious
life of the community, as attested to by the certificate of
appreciationissuedtohimbythePinagtongulanparishforhis
material and financial support as President of the Barangay
Fiesta Committee in 2009, as well as his assumption of a
leadership role in the sociocivic sphere of the locality as a
member of the advisory body of the Pinagtongulan, San
Jose/Lipa City Chapter of the Guardians Brotherhood Inc.,
manifestsasignificantlevelofknowledgeofandsensitivitytothe
needsofthesaidcommunity.Such,afterall,istherationalefor
theresidencyrequirementinourelectionslaws,towit:
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a
qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in
ordertogivecandidatestheopportunitytobefamiliarwiththe
needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all
matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it
enablestheelectoratetoevaluatetheofficeseekersqualifications
andfitnessforthejobtheyaspireforxxx.94
_______________
94Torayno v. Commission on Elections, 392 Phil. 343; 337
SCRA574(2000).
703
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 703
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
Considering all of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
whileseparately,eachevidencepresentedbypetitionermightfail
toconvincinglyshowthefactofhisresidenceatPinagtongulan
since 2007, collectively, these pieces of evidence tend to
sufficientlyestablishthesaidfact.
Petitioners actual physical presence in Lipa City is
establishednotonlybythepresenceofaplace(Pinagtongulan
houseandlot)hecanactuallylivein,butalsotheaffidavitsof
various persons in Pinagtongulan, and the Certification of its
barangay captain. Petitioners substantial and real interest in
establishinghisdomicileofchoiceinLipaCityisalsosufficiently
shownnotonlybytheacquisitionofadditionalpropertyinthe
area and the transfer of his voter registration, but also his
participationinthecommunityssociocivicandreligiouslife,as
wellashisdeclarationinhisITRthatheisaresidentthereof.
We therefore rule that petitioner has been able to adduce
substantialevidencetodemonstratecompliancewiththeoneyear
residencyrequirementforlocalelectiveofficialsunderthelaw.
In view of this Courts finding that petitioner has not
misrepresentedhisresidenceatPinagtongulanandtheduration
thereof, there is no need to further discuss whether there was
material and deliberate misrepresentation of the residency
qualificationinhisCOC.
Asafinalnote,wedonotlosesightofthefactthatLipaCity
voters manifested their own judgment regarding the
qualifications of petitioner when they voted for him,
notwithstandingthattheissueofhisresidencyqualificationhad
been raised prior to the elections. Petitioner has garnered the
highestnumberofvotes(55,268votesasopposedtothe48,825
votesinfavorofhisopponent,OscarGozos) 95legallycastforthe
positionofMayorofLipaCityandhasconse
 _______________
95http://www.comelec.gov.ph/results/2010_natl_local/res_reg
1014000.html(lastaccessedon3April2012).
704
704 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
quently been proclaimed duly elected municipal Mayor of Lipa
CityduringthelastMay2010elections96
In this regard, we reiterate our ruling inFrivaldo v.
Commission on Elections97that (t)o successfully challenge a
winning candidates qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibilityandtherebygivingeffecttotheapparentwillofthe
people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitutionandlawssozealouslyprotectandpromote.
Similarly, inJapzon v. Commission on Elections,98we
concludedthatwhentheevidenceoftheallegedlackofresidence
qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or
inconclusiveand itclearly appearsthat thepurposeof thelaw
wouldnotbethwartedbyupholdingthevictorsrighttotheoffice,
thewilloftheelectorateshouldberespected.Forthepurposeof
electionlawsistogiveeffectto,ratherthanfrustrate,thewillof
thevoters.
In sum, we grant the Petition not only because petitioner
sufficiently established his compliance with the oneyear
residency requirement for local elective officials under the law.
Wealsorecognizethat(a)boveandbeyondall,thedetermination
ofthetruewilloftheelectorateshouldbeparamount.Itistheir
voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in
essence,isthedemocracywecontinuetoholdsacred.99
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
GRANTED. The assailed COMELEC Resolutions dated 26
January 2010 and 17 August 2010 inFlorencio Librea v.
MeynardoA.Sabili[SPANo.09047(DC)]areANNULLED.
_______________
96Rollo,p.294.
97G.R.No.137329,9August2000,337SCRA574.
98G.R.No.180088,19January2009,576SCRA331.
99Sinacav.Mula,373Phil.896;315SCRA266(1999).
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VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 705
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
Private respondents Petition to cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Meynardo A. Sabili is DENIED. The StatusQuo
AnteOrderissuedbythisCourton7September2010isMADE
PERMANENT.
SOORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
ReyesandPerlasBernabe,JJ.,concur.
Corona,J.,IjointhedissentofHon.JusticeVelasco,Jr.
Velasco,Jr.,J.,PleaseseeDissentingOpinion.
LeonardoDeCastro,J.,IjointhedissentofJusticeVelasco.
DelCastillo,J.,Nopart.
Abad,J.,IjointhedissentofJ.P.J.Velasco,Jr.
Mendoza,J.,Nopart.
DISSENTINGOPINION
VELASCO,JR.,J.:
BeforeUsisaPetitionforCertiorari1assailingandseekingto
setasidetheResolutions2datedJanuary26,2010andAugust17,
2010oftheCommissiononElections(COMELEC)inSPANo.09
047 (DC), which denied due course to, and canceled, the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili
(Sabili)forthepositionofMayorofLipaCityintheMay2010
elections on the ground of his misrepresentation that he is a
residentofBarangay(Brgy.)Pinagtongulan,LipaCity.
During the 1995 and 1998 elections, petitioner Sabili was
electedasamemberoftheProvincialBoardrepresentingthe
_______________
1UnderRule64inrelationtoRule65oftheRulesofCourt.
2BothpennedbyJudgeJoseEmmanuelM.Castillo.
706
706 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
4thDistrictofBatangas.Duringthe2007elections,heranfor
theofficeofCongressmanofthe4thDistrictofBatangasbutlost.
Duringthesetimes,headmittedthathewasaresidentofBrgy.
Sico, San Juan, Batangas. On December 1, 2009, however,
petitionerMeynardoSabilifiledaCOCforMayorofLipaCity,
BatangasfortheMay2010elections.InhisCOC,hewrotethat
hehadbeenaresidentofBrgy.Pinagtongulan,LipaCityfortwo
(2)yearsandeight(8)months.
On December 5, 2009, private respondent Florencio Librea
(Librea)filedaverifiedPetitiontoDenyDueCourseandtoCancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify aCandidate for
Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualificationswith respondent
COMELEC,whichwasdocketedasSPANo.09047(DC).Inhis
petition, private respondent Librea maintained that petitioner
madeseveralmaterialmisrepresentationsinhisCOCwherehe
indicatedthathewasaresidentofBrgy.Pinagtongulanforthe
lasttwoyearswheninfacthewas,andis,aresidentofBrgy.
Sico, San Juan, Batangas, and so failed to meet the oneyear
residencerequirementunderSection39oftheLocalGovernment
Code.3
In resolving the controversy, the COMELEC held in its
January 26, 2010 Resolution that the evidence presented by
petitioner, as respondent in SPA No. 09047 (DC), failed to
establish an abandonment of his domicile of origin and the
adoption of Lipa City as his domicileof choice or residence for
electionlawpurposes.Hence,petitionerwasdisqualifiedto
_______________
3Sec.39.Qualifications.
(a)An elective local official must bea citizen of the
Philippines;aregisteredvoterinthebarangay,municipality,city,
or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan,
thedistrictwhereheintendstobeelected;aresidentthereinfor
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;andableto readand writeFilipinoor any otherlocal
languageordialect.(Underscoringsupplied.)
707
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 707
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
runintheMay2010electionsforthemayoraltypositioninthat
city.TheCOMELECstated:
In the case before us, it is not denied that Respondents
domicile of origin is in San Juan, Batangas. What Respondent
repeatedlyassertsisthatsince2007,hetransferredhisdomicile
to Lipa City after allegedly acquiring theBgy. Pinagtong Ulan
propertyandclaimingthathecontinuouslylivedthere.
Inthefirstplace,domicileororiginisnoteasilylost.Ifone
wishestosuccessfullyeffectachangeofdomicile,hemust
demonstratebyevidenceanactualremovaloranactual
change of domicile, abona fideintention of abandoning
theformerplaceofresidenceandestablishinganewone,
and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.These elements must concur, and absent clear and
positiveproofoftheconcurrenceofthesethreerequirements,the
domicileoforigincontinuesxxx.
xxxx
The above pieces of documentary evidence, all taken
together however, fail to convince us that Respondent
Sabilisuccessfullyeffectedachangeofdomicile.Inall,the
evidenceadducedbyRespondentSabiliplainlylacksthe
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this
Commissionthatanabandonmentofdomicileororiginin
favorofadomicileofchoiceindeedoccurred.Theclaimof
anincidentalchangeofresidence,lackingevidencedeterminative
ofabandonmentofdomicileoforigin,withoutmore,wouldnotbe
sufficienttobreaktheprinciple,longfollowedincasesinvolving
questionsofdomicilethattherewasclearintenttoabandonand
repudiate his domicile in San Juan, Batangas.To effect
abandonmentrequiresthevoluntaryactofrelinquishing
Petitioners former domicilewithintent to supplant the
formerdomicilewithoneofhisownchoosing.Sinceheisa
new voter of Lipa City, the records clearly indicating that
officially, his registration came into effect only on October 31,
2009;thesaidvotersdocumenthardlyfurnishessufficientproof
ofabandonmentofdomicileoforiginandachangeofdomicileof
choice.Indeed,whilewehaveruledinthepastthatvotinggives
rise to a strong presumption of residence, it is not conclusive
evidencethereof.Sabili,infact,hasneverevenvotedinLipa
Cityxxx.708
708 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
Toestablishanewdomicileofchoice,personalpresenceinthe
placemustbecoupledwithconductindicativeofthatintention.It
requiresnotonlysuchbodily presencein thatplace butalsoa
declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and
permanentplaceofabode.
Inthiscase,Sabilisclaimofacommonlawrelationship
with Bernadette Palomaresdoes not establish hisactual
physical presence in Bgy. Pinagtongulan, Lipa City.In
fact, the documents pertaining to Palomares actual place of
residence are conflicting, sinceshe is listed as a resident of
ParaaqueCity.TheDeedofSaleandregistrationofthehouse
in Bgy. Pinagtongulan, Lipa City, merely proves Palomares
ownership or that she own property in the city. And it is not
impossiblethat,asindicatedindocumentspresentedherein,she
isaresidentofParaaqueCityowningpropertyinLipaCity.4
On January 28, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for
ReconsiderationoftheCOMELECsJanuary26,2010Resolution,
andaSupplementalMotionthefollowingday.
On February 2, 2010, the case was elevated to the
COMELECEn Banc.In the meantime, the May 10, 2010
electionswereconductedandpetitioneremergedasthewinning
candidate for Mayor of Lipa City. 5He eventually took his oath
andassumedoffice.6
InaManifestationdatedJune15,2010,petitionerinformed
theCOMELECEnBancofthesedevelopmentsandagainprayed
forthesettingasideoftheJanuary26,2010Resolution.
In its August 17, 2010 Resolution, however, the
COMELECEn Bancdenied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.Discussingeachpointpetitionerraisedinthat
motion,theCOMELECEnBancheld:
_______________
4Rollo,pp.5961.Emphasissupplied.
 5AnnexPtothePetition.
6Rollo,p.293,AnnexQtothePetition.
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We find that the Second Division fully appreciated the
evidence presented by both parties and correctly found Sabili
disqualifiedforfailingtocomplywiththeone(1)yearresidency
requirement.
AnentSabilisfirstgroundinhismotionforreconsideration,
WefinditimportanttostatethatSabiliadmittedinParagraph
14ofhisAnswerthathisdomicileoforiginisinBrgy.Sico,San
Juan, Batangas. This admission on the part of Sabili was
construedinconjunctionwithrelatedjurisprudencethatdomicile
of origin is not easily lost. In order [t]o successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual change of
domicile;2)abonafideintentionofabandoningtheformerplace
of residence and establishing a new one; and 3) acts which
correspond with the purpose. Undoubtedly, Librea must prove
hisallegationsinsupportofhispetitionfordisqualification,but
since Sabili did not deny that his domicile of origin is
differentfromtheplacewhereheintendstorun,henow
hastoprovethathehasabandonedhisdomicileoforigin
infavorofLipaCity.Unfortunately,hefailedtoprovethe
sametothesatisfactionoftheSecondDivision.
Sabilis second and third grounds refer to the Second
Divisionssupposedfailuretoappreciatetheevidenceadducedin
thiscase.Wedonotfindbasisforthesearguments.Theevidence
presented, together with the arguments of the parties, were
inextricably interrelated and were thoroughly discussed and
resolved by the Second Division in the assailed 15page
Resolution.TheSecondDivisionwascorrectingivinglittle
ornoweighttothefollowingpiecesofevidencepresented
bySabili:a)AffidavitofBernadetteP.Palomareswhichis
selfserving for being executed by the commonlaw wife,
709 and has no independent corroboration that they are
residinginLipaCitysince2007orthatthepropertywas
purchased with Sabilis personal funds; b) Affidavit of
LenilaG.Suarez,thepreviousownersofthepropertyin
Lipa City supposedly occupied by Sabili and his family,
whichmerelynarratesthecircumstancessurroundingthe
sale ofthepropertyand mentionsin passing that Sabili
andPalomareslivedinPinagtongulansinceApril2007up
tothepresent;c)CertificationissuedbyHon.Dominador
B. Honrade, Barangay Captain of Brgy. Pinagtongulan,
LipaCity,whichisunswornandthuscannotbereliedon;
d) Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Parish of
SantoNio,
710
710 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
Brgy. Pinagtongulan, Lipa City which is nothing more
thananacknowledgmentofSabilismaterialandfinancial
supportandnotanindicationofresidence;e)Designation
as member of the Advisory Body of Guardians
Brotherhood,Inc.,SanJose/LipaCityChaptereffective02
January 2009 which merely declares the designation of
Sabiliwithoutanyshowingthatresidenceinthelocalityis
arequirementforsuchdesignation;f)VoterCertification
issued by Atty. Juan B. Aguila, Jr. Election Officer of
COMELECLipaCityandtheApplicationforTransferof
Registration Record Due to Change of Residence filed
with the COMELEC on 06 June 2009 which are not
conclusive proof of change of domicile; g) Income Tax
Returnsofrespondentfortheyears2007and2008andthe
correspondingOfficialReceiptswhicharenotindications
of residence since Sec. 51(B) of the National Internal
RevenueCodedoesnotonlystatethatitshallbefiledina
personslegalresidencebutthatitmayalsobefiledina
persons princip[al] place of business, and in most cases
thereturnisfiledwheretheindividualearnshisincome.
The only other evidence for Sabili on record are the
affidavitshesubmittedwhich,standingalone,cannotbe
considered, no matter how many, as sufficient proof of
oneschangeofdomicile.Therehastobemore.
WithregardtoSabilisfourthground,WefindthattheSecond
Divisionmadenopronouncementaddingapropertyrequirement
asaqualificationofanelectiveofficial.
As to the fifth ground, We will sustain the position of the
SecondDivisionwhenitruled:
Inthiscase,Sabilisclaimofacommonlawrelationship
with Bernadette Palomares does not establish his actual
physicalpresenceinBgy.Pinagtongulan,LipaCityxxx
as indicated in documents presented herein, she is a
residentofParaaqueCityowningpropertyinLipaCity.
Sabilis sixth and seventh grounds deserve little merit.
Nothing in the Assailed Resolution reveals that Sabilis
relationship with Palomares or the property regime governing
such relationship had direct bearing on the Second Divisions
determination of Sabilis qualification. Sabilis relationship was
merelydiscussedinrelationtotheallegationsthatSabilibought
ahouseusinghispersonal
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Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
funds but decided to register theproperty only in the name of
Palomareswhichisquitepeculiar.
Finally,ontheeightground,WeherebydeclarethatSabilis
residenceisamatterthatwillaffecthisqualificationtorunfor
publicofficeinLipaCity.Inviewoftheevidencepresentedinthis
case,hisdeclarationinhiscertificateofcandidacythatheisa
residentofLipaCity,wheninfacthehadnotyetabandonedhis
domicileoforigininSanJuan,Batangas,mayconvincethevoters
thathehasallthequalificationstorunforthepositionofmayor,
which tends to mislead the public from a fact that would
otherwise render him ineligible, is precisely what is being
referredtointhecaseofUgdoracion.7
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court aPetition for
CertiorariwithExtremelyUrgentApplicationfortheIssuanceofa
Status Quo Orderunder Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of the COMELECs
Resolutions for supposedly having been issued without or in
excess of respondent COMELECs jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Among the documents attached to his petition is a new
Certification of Residency issued by the Pinagtong
ulanbarangaychairman Dominador Honrade that had been
swornbeforeanotarypublic.8
On September 7, 2010, this Court issued a StatusQuo
AnteOrderrequiringthepartiestoobservethestatusquobefore
theissuanceoftheassailedCOMELECResolutions.
AspointedoutbyJusticeSerenoinheropinion,thefollowing
aretheissuesforOurResolution:
(1)Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to promulgate its Resolution dated 17
711 August2010inaccordancewithitsownRulesofProcedure;and
_______________
 7Emphasissupplied.
8Rollo,p.300,AnnexStothePetition.
712
712 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
(2)Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretioninholdingthatSabilifailedtoprovecompliancewith
theoneyearresidencyrequirementforlocalelectiveofficials.
Failuretoserveadvancenoticeofthepromulgationofthe
resolutiondoesnotaffectthevalidityoftheresolution
Onthefirstissue,petitionerpositsthattheCOMELECacted
with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to serve advance
notice of the promulgation of the August 17, 2010 Resolution
under Sec. 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on
Disqualificationof CasesFiled in ConnectionwiththeMay10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections). 9Hence, so
petitioner claims, his right to due process was violated.
Respondents,ontheotherhand,arguethatSec.9ofCOMELEC
Resolution8696hadbeensuspendedbyCOMELECOrderdated
May4,2010inviewoftheexigenciesattendanttotheholdingof
thecountrysfirstautomatednationalelections.
Justice Sereno is of the opinion that petitioner erred in his
claim of having been deprived of due process, adding that the
August 17, 2010 Resolution was validly promulgated. On this
issue,Ifullyagreewithmyesteemedcolleague.
ThesuspensionofSec.6,COMELECResolutionNo.8696and
the consequential lack of advance notice regarding the date of
promulgation of the COMELECEn Bancs August 17, 2010
ResolutionisinaccordancewiththeCOMELECsconstitutionally
grantedpowertomakeitsownrulesofprocedure.Thesuspension
action,withoutmore,didnotviolatethepetitionersrighttodue
processorvitiatethevalidityofthe
_______________
9SEC.6.Promulgation.ThepromulgationofaDecisionor
ResolutionoftheCommissionoraDivisionshallbemadeona
datepreviouslyfixed,noticeofwhichshallbeservedinadvance
uponthe partiesor theirattorneyspersonally,or byregistered
mail,telegram,faxorthruthefastestmeansofcommunication.
713
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 713
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
COMELECs resolution. After all, as pointed out by Justice
Sereno,theadvancenoticeofthedateofpromulgationisnotpart
of the process of promulgation. More than that, the
COMELECEnBancsResolutionwassufficientlymadeknownto
petitioner who was able to timely file the present petition to
assailandquestionthesameResolution.Clearly,thesuspension
ofSec.6,COMELECResolutionNo.8696andthenonserviceof
an advance notice to petitioner are of no consequence to the
validityoftheResolutionandthefindingsoftheCOMELEC,orto
theopportunitygrantedtopetitionertoassailtheResolution.
Acertiorari writ isnot availabletocorrect errorsin the
appreciationofevidencebythelowertribunal
On the second issue, however, I respectfully disagree with
Justice Sereno who maintains that the COMELEC committed
errorsintheappreciationandevaluationofevidencesothatthe
Court is compelled by it[s] bounden constitutional duty to
interveneandcorrecttheCOMELECserrors.10
Lestitbeforgotten,thepresentrecoursewasfiledunderthe
aegisofRule64inrelationtoRule65oftheRulesofCourt.Time
and again, this Court has emphasized that a Rule 65 petition
forcertiorariis a limited remedy to correct only errors of
jurisdiction,notofjudgment.11Itsonlyfunctionistokeepalower
tribunal within its jurisdiction12and not to authorize the court
exercisingcertioraripowerstoreview,reconsider,reevaluate,and
recalibrate the evidence previously presented before and
consideredbythelowertribunal.
_______________
10Ponencia,p.12.
11LydiaR.Pagaduanv.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.
172278,March29,2007,519SCRA512.
12Angarav.FedmanDevelopmentCorporation,483Phil.495;
440SCRA467(2004);quotedinPCGGv.SilanganInvestorsand
Managers,Inc.,G.R.Nos.16705556&170673,March25,2010,
616SCRA382.
714
714 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
InFirstCorporationv.FormerSixthDivisionoftheCourtof
Appeals,13Wereiteratedthiselementaryprecept:
Itisafundamentalaphorisminlawthatareviewoffactsand
evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy
ofcertiorari, which isextra ordinembeyond the ambit of
appeal.Incertiorariproceedings, judicial review does not
go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the
partiesandtoweightheprobativevaluethereof.Itdoes
not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the
evaluation of the evidence. Any error committed in the
evaluationoftheevidenceismerelyanerrorofjudgment
that cannot be remedied bycertiorari.Anerror
ofjudgmentisonewhichthecourtmaycommitintheexerciseof
its jurisdiction. Anerror of jurisdictionis one where the act
complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is
tantamounttolackorinexcessofjurisdictionandwhicherroris
correctible only by the extraordinary writ
ofcertiorari.Certiorariwillnotbeissuedtocureerrorsof
thetrial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the
parties,oritsconclusionsanchoredon thesaidfindings
anditsconclusions oflaw.Itisnot forthisCourttore
examineconflictingevidence,reevaluatethecredibilityof
the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the
courtaquo.
This rule holds greater force in an application
forcertiorariagainst the COMELEC as it is the institution
createdbytheConstitutionpreciselytohandleelectionmatters
andsopresumedtobemostcompetentinmattersfallingwithin
its domain.14Hence, the factual findings of the COMELECEn
BancarebindingonthisCourt15absentanyshowingofagrave
abuseofitsdiscretion.
_______________
13G.R. No. 171989, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 564, 578
(emphasis supplied); quoted inSoriano v. Marcelo, G.R. No.
160772,July13,2009,592SCRA394.
14Matalamv.CommissiononElections,338Phil.447,470;
271SCRA733,750(1997).
15Japzon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180088,
January19,2009,576SCRA331;citingDaglocv.Commisionon
Elect
715
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 715
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
Expectedly, petitioner Sabili attributes grave abuse of
discretion torespondentCOMELECto justify a review andre
evaluationoftheevidencepresentedbytheparties.However,not
everyclaimofanexistenceofagraveabuseofdiscretiondeserves
consideration;otherwise,everyerroneousjudgmentwillbevoid,
appellatecourtswillbeoverburdenedandtheadministrationof
justicewillnotsurvive.16Mereabuseofdiscretionisnotenough.
Grave abuse of discretion exists only when there is a
capriciousandwhimsicalexerciseofjudgmentasisequivalentto
lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is
exercisedinanarbitrarymannerbyreasonofpassion,prejudice,
or personal hostility, and itmust be so patent and grossas to
amounttoanevasionofapositivedutyortoavirtualrefusalto
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.17An unfavorable evaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidencepresentedbyapartywillnotbeinquiredintounlessitis
shownthattheevaluationwasdoneinanarbitrarymannerby
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility.18This, the
petitionerhasfailedtoproveinhispetitionforcertiorari.
In fact, petitioner has not disputed or even mottled the
presumptionthattheCOMELEChasregularlyperformed19its
_______________
ions,463Phil.263,288;417SCRA574,594(2003);Mastura
v.CommissiononElections,349Phil.423,429;285SCRA493,
499(1998).
16San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. v. Pampanga Omnibus
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 168088, April 4, 2007, 520
SCRA564.
17Id.;citingLeev.People,G.R.No.159288,October19,2004,
440SCRA662,678679.
18Rimbunan Hijau Group of Companies v. Oriental Wood
Processing Corporation, G.R. No. 152228, September 23, 2005,
470SCRA650,661.
19RulesofCourt,Rule131,Sec.2(m).
716
716 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
duties in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. 20Thus, this
Court must not, as it cannot, stray beyond the confines of
acertiorarireviewandgosofarastoreexamineandreassess
theevidenceofthepartiesandweighanewitsprobativevalue. 21
Nonetheless, Justice Sereno subscribes to the view that the
COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence are so
grossly unreasonable as to turn into errors of jurisdiction. 22I
beg to disagree. Even if We consider the present case as an
exceptiontotheruleonthelimitationsofacertiorarireview,the
evidence presented by petitioner does not persuade an actual
changeofhisdomicile.
Petitioner failed to establish compliance with
alltherequisitesforachangeofdomicile
PetitioneradmitsthatbeforeApril2007hewasaresidentof,
andhisdomicileoforiginwas,SanJuan,Batangas.ThisCourt
has previously ruled that domicile and residence are
synonymous in election law. A domicile is the place where a
partyactuallyorconstructivelyhashispermanenthome,where
he, no matter where he may be found, at any given time,
eventuallyintendstoreturnandremain. 23Thus,thequestionof
domicileismainlyoneofintention24andcircumstances.25
_______________
20Id.,id.,Sec.2(n).
21Macawaig v. Balindong, G.R. No. 159210, September 20,
2006,502SCRA454;citingGarciav.NationalLaborRelations
Commission,G.R.No.147427,February7,2005,450SCRA535,
547.
22Ponencia,p.12.
23Japzonv.COMELEC,supranote15;emphasissupplied.
 24Limbona v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 186006,
October16,2009,604SCRA240.
25Pundaodayav.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.179313,
September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 178, 184185; citingDomino v.
CommissiononElections,369Phil.798,818;310SCRA546,568
(1999).
717
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be
borne in mind: (1) a man must have residence or domicile
somewhere;(2)aresidenceonceestablishedremainsuntilanew
one is acquired; and(3) a man can only have one residenceor
domicileatatime.26Clearly,therefore,thereisapresumption
in favor of a continuance of an existing domicile.27When
theevidencepresentedbythecontendingpartiesareinequipoise
thatitisimpossibleforthecourttodeterminewithcertaintythe
real intent of the person whose domicile is in question,the
presumption requires the Court to decide against a
change of domicile and the retention of a domicile in
question.28Hence, the burden of proving a change of
domicileliesonthepersonwhoclaimsthatachangehas
occurred.29Inthiscase,theburdenliesonthepetitioner.
For the petitioner to overcome the presumption of the
continuity ofhis domicileoforigin,he mustshow byclear and
convincingevidenceof(1)anactualremovaloranactualchange
of domicile; (2) abona fideintention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) definite
acts which correspond with the purpose.30Thus, toestablish a
new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place
must be coupled with conduct indicative of that
intention.Bodily presence in the new locality is not the
onlyrequirement;theremustbeadeclaredandprobable
intenttomakeitonesfixedandpermanent
_______________
26Id.
27In the Matter of the Petition for Disqualification of Tess
DumpitMichelena,G.R.Nos.16361920,November17,2005,475
717 SCRA290,303;Chesire,PrivateInternationalLaw218219.
28PrivateInternationalLawbyChesire,pp.218219.
29Bevilaquav.Bernstein,642F.Supp.1072,1073(S.D.N.Y.
1986);citedinIsraelv.Carpenter,NotReportedinF.Supp.,1995
WL 640534 (S.D.N.Y.);Rich Products Corp. v. Diamond, 51
Misc.2d675,273N.Y.S.2d687,N.Y.Sup.1966,October11,1966.
30Id.
718
718 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
placeofabode. Indeed,themostimportantrequirementsfor
31
theestablishmentofanewdomicileis(1)anactualandphysical
presenceinthenewlocality;and(2)aclearanddeclaredintentto
abandontheolddomicile(animusnonrevertendi)andremainin
thenewplaceofresidence(animusmanendi).
Intending to establish that petitioner failed to meet the
foregoing requisites, respondent Librea presented the following
documentaryexhibits:
1.PetitionerSabilisCOCfiledonDecember1,2009;32
2.Tax Declaration issued in 2009 covering the property in
Brgy. Pinagtongulan, Lipa City and in the name of
BernadettePalomares(Palomares);33
 3.CertificationofPropertyHoldingsissuedonNovember24, 9.CertificationofNoImprovementdatedDecember14,2009
2009coveringthepropertiesinPinagtongulan,LipaCity over Block 2, Lot 3, Brgy. Lodlod, Lipa City (TCT No.
inthenameofPalomares;34 164454)inthenameofSabiliandPalomares;40
4.Palomares Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 10.CertificationofNoImprovementdatedDecember14,2009
over the lot bought from spouses Manolito and Leonila overBlock2, Lot5 Brgy. Lodlod, Lipa City (TCT No. T
SuarezandcoveredbyTCTNo.T173356;35 164455)inthenameofSabiliandPalomares;41
5.Palomares Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 11.AffidavitofpetitionerFlorencioLibreadatedDecember4,
over the lot bought from spouses Rodolfo and Rosalinda 2009;42
MacasaetandcoveredbyTCTNo.T173355;36 12.SinumpaangSalysayEladiodeTorresdatedDecember4,
6.Palomares Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 2009;43
overthebuildingonthelotcoveredbyTCTNo.TCTNo.T 13.Affidavit executed by Violeta Fernandez dated December
173356 bought from the spouses Suarez and covered by 28,2009;44
TCTNo.T173355;37 14.Affidavit executed by Rodrigo Macasaet dated December
7.Palomares Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 28,2009;45
overthebuildingonthelotcoveredbyTCTNo.TCTNo. 15.AffidavitexecutedbyPabloLorzano;46
_______________ 16.Voter Certification on petitioner Sabili issued by
31Dominov.CommissiononElections,supranote25,atp.820 COMELECElectionOfficerJuanD.Aguila,Jr.;47
(1999);emphasissupplied. 17.Voters Registration Record No. 07361248 of petitioner
32Rollo,p.431. SabiliapprovedonJune21,1997;48
33Id. 18.1997VoterRegistrationRecordofpetitioner;
_______________
34Id.,atp.433.
38Id.,atp.447.
35Id.,atp.444.
39Id.,atp.448.
36Id.,atp.445.
40Id.,atp.442.
37Id.,atp.446.
719 41Id.,atp.443.
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 719 42Id.,atp.434.
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections 43Id.,atp.436.
T173355boughtfromthespousesSuarezandcoveredbyTCT 44Id.,atp.454.
No.T173355;38 45Id.,atp.455.
8.Palomares Tax Declaration issued on December 14, 2009 46Id.,atp.456.
over the building on the lot no. 5553 bought from the 47Id.,atp.438.
spousesSuarez;39
48Id.,atp.440. 49Id.,atp.457.
720 50Id.,atp.441.
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED 51Id.,atp.439.
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections 52Id.,atp.449.
19.Sabilis2007COCforMemberofHouseofRepresentative;49 53Id.,atp.450.
20.Certification of No Marriage for Bernadette Palomares
54Id.,atp.452.
issuedbytheNationalStatisticsOffice(NSO)onDecember
22,2009; 55Id.,atp.453.
21.National Statistics Office (NSO) Advisory on Marriages 721
statingthatasofNovember28,2009,Sabiliismarriedto VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 721
DaisyCervas;50 Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
22.NSO Certification issued on December 22, 2009 stating 1.AffidavitofBernadattePalomares;56
thatPalomaresdoesnotappearintheNationalIndicesof 2.BirthCertificateofFrancisMeynardSabili;57
Marriages;51 3.BirthCertificateofMeyBernadetteSabili;58
23.LipaCityPermitsandLicensingOfficeCertificationthat 4.AffidavitofLeonilaG.Suarez;59
SabilihasnobusinessthereindatedDecember11,2009;52 5.Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtongulan
24.Printout of a Facebook webpage of petitioners daughter, Barangay Chairman Dominador Honrade dated October
Mey Bernadette Sabili stating that her hometown is 30,2009;60
Portofino,LasPias,Philippines;53 6.Notarized Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtong
25.Department of Education (DepEd) Lipa City Division ulan Barangay Chairman Dominador Honrade dated
Certification that the names Bernadette Palomares, Mey August25,2010;61
BernadetteSabiliandFrancisMeynardSabili(petitioners 7.AffidavitexecutedbyJacintoHonradeCornejo,Sr.;62
son)donotappearonitslistofgraduates;54 8.AffidavitexecutedbyRosalindaMacasaet;63
26.CertificationfromtheOfficeoftheElectionOfficerofLipa 9.CertificateofAppreciationissuedbytheparishofSto.Nio
CitydatedDecember28,2009thatBernadettePalomares, ofPinagtongulan;64
MeyBernadetteSabiliandFrancisMeynardSabilidonot 10.Designation of petitioner in the Advisory Body (AB) of
appearinitslistofvoters.55 Pinagtongulan,SanJose/LipaCityChapterofGuardians
On the other hand, to support his position that he has Brotherhood,Inc.;65
abandonedhisdomicileoforiginandadoptedLipaCity,Batangas 11.COMELEC Voter Certification on petitioner issued by
ashisdomicileofchoice,makinghimqualifiedtobeelectedasthe ElectionOfficerJuanAguila,Jr.;66
Citys Mayor, petitioner Sabili presented the following 12.COMELEC Application for Transfer/Transfer with
documentaryevidence: ReactivationdatedJune6,2009;67
_______________ 13.PetitionersIncomeTaxReturnfor2007;68
_______________
56Annex1topetitionersAnswer;Id.,atp.102,394.
57Annex2toSabilisAnswer;Id.,atpp.103,395.
58Annex3toSabilisAnswer;Id.,atp.394.
59Annex4toSabilisAnswer;Id.,atpp.104,397.
60Annex5toSabilisAnswer;Id.,atpp.105,398.
61AnnexStoSabilisPetitionforCertiorari;Id.,atp.300.
62Annex6toSabilisAnswer;Id.,atp.399.
63Annex7toSabilisAnswer;Id.,atpp.106,400.
64Annex8toSabilisAnswer;Id.,atpp.107,401.
65Annex9toSabilisAnswer;Id.,atpp.108,402.
66Annex10toSabilisAnswer;Id.,atpp.109,403.
67Annex11toSabilisAnswer;Id.,atpp.110,404.
68Annex12toSabilisAnswer;Id.,atpp.111,405.
722
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
14.Official Receipt for petitioners income tax payment for
2007;69
15.PetitionersIncomeTaxReturnfor2008;70
16.Official Receipt for petitioners income tax payment for
2008;71
17.Pinagsamasamang Sinumpaang Salaysaydated January
16,2010;72
18.SinumpaangSalaysaydatedJanuary16,2010executedby
DominadorMacuha;73
19.Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of
WinningCandidatesforLipaCityMayorandViceMayor;74
20.SabilisPanunumpasaKatungkulandatedJuly30,2010.75
Petitionerclaimsthattheforegoingdocumentsaresufficient
to constitute substantial evidence of his change of domicile
pursuant to this Courts pronouncements inMitra v.
COMELEC.76A closer inquiry, however, will reveal a whale of
differencebetweenthepresentcaseandMitra.Consider:While
there were circumstances inMitrathat led the majority of this
Court to conclude that petitioner Mitra made incremental
transfermovestochangehisdomicile(by,amongothers,leasing
adwelling,purchasingalotforhispermanenthome,buildinga
house thereon, and maintaining substantial investments in the
newlocalityintheformofanexperimentalpineappleplantation,
farm, farmhouse, and a cock farm), the petitioner in this case,
Sabili, failed to adduce any evidence that would substantially
proveachangeofhisdomicile
_______________
69Annex12AtoSabilisAnswer;Id.,atpp.112,407.
70Annex13toSabilisAnswer;Id.,atpp.113,406.
71Annex13AtoSabilisAnswer;Id.,atpp.114,408.
72Rollo,p.212.
73Id.,atp.213.
74AnnexPtoPetitionforCertiorari.
75AnnexQtoPetitionforCertiorari.
76G.R.No.191938,October19,2010,633SCRA580.
723
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 723
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
fromSanJuan, BatangastoLipa Citywhetherby incremental
actsoranimmediatedeed.Thereliesthedifference.
AsshownbytheCertificationofNoImprovementissuedby
theLipaCityassessor,petitionermadenoeffortstobuildahouse
onthelotslocatedinBrgy.Lodlodthatareactuallyregisteredin
hisownname.77Neitherhashemaintainedanybusinessinthe
locality despite his avowed profession as a businessman. 78As
implied byMitra, having substantial investments and
constructing improvements on properties bought in the new
locality are indicative ofanimus manendi. Hence, the non
existence of such evidence in the present case supports
respondentsclaimofcontinuanceofhisdomicileoforigininSan
Juan,Batangas.
Indeed, petitioner heavily anchors his claimed residency in
Pinagtongulan, Lipa City since April 2007 primarily on his
allegationthathepurchasedahouseandlotthereatinthesame
month,registeredthepropertyinthenameofhiscommonlaw
spouse,BernadettePalomares(Palomares),andactuallyresided
therein since April 2007 together with Palomares and their
children.
To say the least, this claim is not only questionable but
appalling. Petitioners temerity in asserting that he had been
living with Palomares for 20 years,while he was legally
married to another, and so should be considered to have
followedhisparamoursresidencesimplygoesagainstthenorms
ofdecency,ifnotthelawagainstconcubinageunderArticle334of
theRevisedPenalCode.
Thus,WecannotnowrecognizehisresidencyinLipaCityon
the pretext that his commonlaw spouse lives
therein.Commodum ex injuria sua non habere debet.No
personoughttoderiveanyadvantageofhisownwrong.79
_______________
77Rollo,pp.442443.
78Id.,atp.449.
79RimbunanHijauGroupofCompaniesandNiuginiLumber
Merchants Pty., Ltd. v. Oriental Wood Processing Corporation,
G.R.
724
724 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
EveninRomualdezMarcosv.COMELEC,80thisCourtdidnot
consider Mrs. Marcos to have followed the residence of former
PresidentMarcos,herlegalspouse.WhyshouldthisCourtnow
considerSabilitohaveadoptedadomicileofchoiceinLipajust
becausehiscommonlawspousehasahouseregisteredinher
namelocatedinthesamecity?Toconsideramantofollowthe
residence of the woman who he cannot marry is dangerous
precedent.
IfthisCourtisdisposedtoestablisharulethatamancan
followtheresidenceofawoman,thatwomanmustbethemans
lawfulwife,nothisconcubine.Thisiscorollarytotheprovisions
of the Family Code explicitly imposing on the husband the
obligation to establish his domicile with his wife and live with
her:
Art.68.Thehusbandandwifeareobligedtolivetogether,
observemutuallove,respectandfidelity,andrendermutualhelp
andsupport.
Art.69.Thehusbandandwifeshallfixthefamilydomicile.
Incaseofdisagreement,thecourtshalldecide.
Thecourtmayexemptonespousefromlivingwiththeotherif
the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compellingreasonsfortheexemption.However,suchexemption
shallnotapplyifthesameisnotcompatiblewiththesolidarityof
thefamily.
Further,evenassumingthatitwaspetitionerwhonegotiated
the purchase and paid for the property in Pinagtongulan (no
deedofsalewaspresented),hisactofhavingitregisteredinthe
nameofhiscommonlawspouseonlyindicatesadonativeintent
withoutthenecessaryformalitiesorthepay
_______________
No. 152228, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 650;European
Resources and Technologies, Inc. v. Ingenieuburo Birkhahn +
Nolte,Ingeniurgesellschaftmbh,G.R.No.159586,July26,2004,
435SCRA246;CommunicationMaterialsDesign,Inc.v.Courtof
Appeals,G.R.No.102223,August22,1996,260SCRA673.
80G.R.No.119976,September18,1995,248SCRA300.
725
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 725
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
ment of taxes,notthe intent to abandon his domicile of origin
andmaintainanewdomicileofchoice.
Infact,SabilisresoundingomissiontoprovidetheCOMELEC
andthisCourtthedeedsofsaleoverthepropertiesinPinagtong
ulan, Lipa City executed by the spouses Manolito and Leonila
SuarezandthespousesRodolfoandRosalindaMacasaetinfavor
of Palomares, as well as the certificates of title, puts doubton
Sabilisallegationthattherewasatransferofownershipoverthe
propertiestoPalomaresinApril2007thatwouldhaveallowed
her and/or the petitioner to claim the right to reside in the
properties. This doubt is aggravated by the fact that the tax
declarationsoverthepropertiesshowthatthedeedsofsalewere
drawnupandnotarizedonlyinAugust2008.81
Indeed, the claim of an actual and physical transfer on the
same month of the negotiation, April 2007, strains credulity
consideringthatitisadmittedbySabilithatheranforaposition
in the lower house of Congress in the May 2007 elections (for
which he filed a COC indicating his domicile as San Juan,
Batangas). Was there enough time to effect an actual and
physicalchangeamonthbeforetheelections?Iftherewastimeto
relocate,whywerethedeedsofsaledrawnupandnotarizedonly
inAugust200882andthetaxdeclarationstransferredinthename
of Palomares only in the same month if they had already
relocatedinApril2007?
AlltheseinconsistencieseasilyshowthatwhenSabilistated
inhisCOCthathehadlivedinBrgy.PinagtongulansinceApril
2007, he had deliberately committed a material
misrepresentationobviouslytodeceivethevotingpublic.
It is also curious to note that even Sabilis commonlaw
spouse,namedastheownerofthepropertyinBrgy.Pinagtong
ulan,isregisteredasaresidentof215ElizaldeStreet,BFHomes,
ParaaqueCityinthetaxdeclarationscovering
_______________
81Rollo,pp.444448;PrivaterespondentsAnnexB.
82Id.
726
726 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
thePinagtongulanproperty.83Clearly,theCOMELECcouldnot
beheldgrosslyunreasonableforholdingthatwhilePalomares
mightbeaLipaCitypropertyowner,shewasaresidentof
ParaaqueCity.OfficialdocumentsissuedbytheOfficeofthe
CityAssessorofLipaCityclearlyestablishsuchfact.Thisofficial
recordscannotbedefeatedbyaselfservingaffidavitdrawnupby
petitioners commonlaw wife that she resides in Lipa City in
ordertosupportpetitionersclaimthathetooisaresidentofthe
city.
Parenthetically,PalomaresAffidavitcannotbeconsideredas
a declaration against her interest under the rules on evidence
becausetheprimaryrequisiteofSec.38,Rule130 84isthatthe
declarantisdeadorunabletotestify,anditisnotallegedthat
Palomareshasdiedorisnowunabletotestify.
Instead, Palomares Affidavit should be taken with the
metaphoricalgrainofsalt.Thenumerousfalsitiescommittedby
Palomaresinvariousofficialandgovernmentaldocumentsnegate
anyfaithonherwordandbetrayherpropensitytolietofavorher
family so that it is not grossly unreasonable to hold that
Palomareshavecommittedamisrepresentationinheraffidavitin
order to support Sabili. This is readily apparent in the very
documentspresentedbySabiliashisownevidence.Forinstance,
Palomares had previously perjured herself as the informant in
the birth certificates of her children sired by
petitioner.85Palomaresassertedinthebirthcertificateofherson
that she married petitioner on December 2, 1980 in Bulacan,
Bulacan.Ontheotherhand,sheclaimed
_______________
83Id.
84Section38.Declarationagainstinterest.Thedeclaration
made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
interestofthedeclarant,ifthefactisassertedinthedeclaration
wasatthetimeitwasmadesofarcontrarytodeclarant'sown
interest, thata reasonable manin hispositionwould nothave
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be
receivedinevidenceagainsthimselforhissuccessorsininterest
andagainstthirdpersons.
85Rollo,pp.5859.
727
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
thatsheandpetitionerweremarriedonMarch2,1983inManila
inthebirthcertificateofherdaughterwhenthefactcertifiedby
the NSO is that she and petitioner had never been
married.86Thesemisrepresentationsareundeniablyimportantas
they determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the children.
Hence, the doctrine offalsus in uno, falsus in omnibusclearly
appliesand the COMELEC had reason not to find Palomares
statementsworthyofcredit.
SoareSabilisstatements.ItshouldnotescapethisCourtthat
SabilihasadoptedtheuntruthfulstatementsofPalomaresinthe
birth certificates of their children as his own evidence in the
proceedings before the COMELEC and this Court. He has,
therefore, clearly sanctioned the falsities boldly stated thereon.
Worse,thesamepredilectionfortheuntruthcanbeobservedin
Sabilis Voters Certification that he presented as his own
evidence. While it is not denied that he is married to Daisy
CervasSabili,hedidnotdisputetheentrymadeonhisstatusas
single.Infact,inhisIncomeTaxReturns(ITRs)for2007and
2008heclaimedthathisspousesnamewasSabiliBernadette
Palomares,whentheNSOcertifiedthatasofNovember2009,
Sabili was still legally married to Daisy Cervas. Clearly,
petitioner shows a pattern of false machinations intended to
assumeacovetedelectoralposition.Unfortunatelyforhim,deceit
cannot take the place of compliance with the statutory
qualificationsforoffice.
ItisalsonotablethatpetitionerschildrenbyPalomareshave
not attended any of the educational institutions in Lipa
City,87nor have Palomares or the children been registered as
votersofLipaCity88despitethefactthatSabilifiledaCOCfor
theMayoraltyposition.Instead,Sabilisowndaughtermadean
727 extrajudicialdeclarationthatsheconsidersPortofino,LasPias
asherhometown,notBatangas.
_______________
86Id.,atp.439;RespondentsAnnexF.
87Id.,atp.452.
 88Id.,atp.453.
728
728 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
InthecaseofFernandezv.HouseofRepresentativesElectoral
Tribunal,89this Court considered the existence of real and
substantialreasontoindicateanimusmanendiinthepurported
newdomicileofchoice:
Inthecaseatbar,therearerealandsubstantialreasons
for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of
choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any
otherpreviousdomicile.Tobeginwith,petitionerandhis
wife have owned and operated businesses in Sta. Rosa
since 2003. Their children have attended schools in Sta.
Rosa at least since 2005.Although ownership of property
should never be considered a requirement for any candidacy,
petitionerhadsufficientlyconfirmedhisintentiontopermanently
resideinSta.Rosabypurchasingresidentialpropertiesinthat
city even prior to the May 2007 election, as evidenced
bycertificatesoftitleissuedinthenameofpetitionerand
hiswife.OneofthesepropertiesisaresidenceinBelAir,Sta.
Rosa which petitioner acquired even before 2006 but which
petitionerhadbeenleasingout.Heclaimsthatherentedoutthis
propertybecausepriorto2006hehadnotdecidedtopermanently
reside in Sta. Rosa. This could explain why in early 2006
petitionerhadtorentatownhouseinVilladeToledohisBelAir
residencewasoccupiedbyatenant.Therelativelyshortperiodof
the lease was also adequately explained by petitionerthey
rented a townhouse while they were in the process of building
theirownhouseinSta.Rosa.Trueenough,petitionerandhis
spouse subsequently purchased a lot also in Villa de
ToledoinApril2007, aboutamonthbeforeelectionday,
wheretheyhaveconstructedahomefortheirfamilysuse
asaresidence.Inall,petitionerhadadequatelyshownthathis
transfer of residence to Sta. Rosa was bona fide and was not
merely for complying with the residency requirement under
electionlaws.90
Unlike inFernandezwhereWe sustained petitioners change
ofdomicileandqualificationforhisoffice,Sabilihasnorealand
substantial reason to establish his domicile in Lipa City and
abandonhisdomicileoforigininSanJuan,Batangas.
_______________
89G.R.No.187478,December21,2009,608SCRA733.
90Emphasissupplied.
729
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 729
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
With no children or wife actually residing in Lipa City, or
businessintereststherein,itisnotgrosslyunreasonableforthe
COMELEC to conclude that petitioner had no declared and
probativeintenttoadoptLipaCityashisdomicileofchoicein
theabsenceofarealandsubstantialreasontodoso.
ContrarytoJusticeSerenosOpinion,Sabilisactoffilinghis
ITRinRevenueDistrictOfficeNo.(RDO)59inLipaCityforthe
years2007and2008doesnotindicateachangeofdomicilefrom
SanJuantoLipaCity,Batangas.RDO59sjurisdictionincludes
bothSanJuanandLipaCity 91sothattheintenttoremaincannot
immediatelybeascribedtoLipaCity.Onthecontrary,hisfiling
oftheITRinRDO59canalsobeusedtosupporthisintentto
remain in San Juan, Batangashis domicile of origin. In fact,
petitionerleftthespaceforhisresidenceinhis2007ITRblank
withoutindicatingwherehewasactuallyresiding.Toreiterate,
anydoubtonresidencyordomicileshallberesolvedinfavorof
thedomicileoforigin.
In the clear absence of the most important element in the
establishmentofadomicileanimusmanendiitisofnouseto
discusstheconsequenceoftestimoniesastohisbodilypresencein
the locality.As stated,alltherequisitesforavalidchangeof
domicile or residence is necessary for election law purposes. In
theabsenceofevenjustoneelement,thepresumptionisinfavor
of the maintenance and continuity of the domicile of origin.
Hence,inthiscase,petitionerispresumedtostillbearesidentof
SanJuan,Batangasanddisqualifiedfromtakingthemayoralty
positioninLipaCity,Batangas.
The notarized certification of theBaranggay Chairmanof
Brgy.Pinagtongulan,LipaCitydoesnotbarUsfromholdingthis
position contrary to Justice Serenos opinion. My esteemed
colleaguebasesherappreciationofthenotarized
_______________
91<http://www.bir.gov.ph/directory/rdoinner.htm#66> visited
March15,2012.
730
730 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
certificationonSection44,Rule130oftheRulesofCourt,which
states:
Section44.Entries in official records.Entries in official
recordsmadeintheperformanceofhisdutybyapublicofficerof
the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, areprima facieevidence of the facts
thereinstated.
As is readily apparent, Section 44, Rule 130 pertains to
entriesinofficialrecords.Needlesstostate,nosuchentriesor
recordswerereferredtointhecertification,muchlesspresented
before the COMELEC or this Court. Instead, the certification
plainly states in a proforma way: This is to certify that
Meynardo A. Sabili, 53 years old is a resident of Zone 5 of
Barangay Pinagtongulan Lipa City since April 2007. Neither
doesthecertificationmentionanyrecordkeptbytheBaranggay
Secretary,orevenciteanyofitsentries.Clearly,Section44,Rule
130 cannot clothe the certification executed by the Baranggay
Chairman of Pinagtongulan with finality and conclusiveness.
Instead,asitisnotthedutyoftheBaranggayChairman,butthe
dutyoftheBaranggaySecretary,tokeepanupdatedrecordofall
inhabitants of the baranggay,92the certification must be
dismissedasnothingbutcontaininghearsaystatements.
In fact, even if we considerarguendothe Baranggay
Chairmanscertification stating that Sabili is a resident of his
baranggay,thereisnoindicationthatthetermresidentused
thereincarriesthesamemeaningastheresidentusedinthe
provision requiring residence as a qualification for candidacy,
which is equivalent to domicile that requires not just physical
presencebut,again,animusmanendi.Atmost,thecertification
may only attest to the bodily presence of petitioner in
hisbaranggay, but not the element of Sabilis intent to remain
thereinwhich,asindicatedbycircumstances,ispatentlyabsent.
_______________
92Section394(d)(6),LocalGovernmentCode.
731
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 731
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
The certification is also negated given
theconflictingtestimonies of residents of the Brgy. Pinagtong
ulanwherepetitionerclaimstoberesiding.93Again,theruleisin
thepresenceofconflictingevidenceontheissueofdomicile,the
Courtisbehoovedtoupholdthepresumptionofthecontinuity
ofthedomicileoforigin.94
Both the Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Parishof
SantoNioandSabilisDesignationasaMemberoftheAdvisory
Body of Guardians Brotherhood Incorporated cannot be
consideredtoestablishSabilisdomicileinBrgy.Pinagtongulan
since, as noted by the COMELEC, the first merely mentions
materialandfinancialsupporttothefiestacelebration.Andthere
is nothing in the second document making residency in Brgy.
PinagtongulanasarequisiteforthedesignationintheAdvisory
Board.
Furthermore,itnotablethatSabiliappliedfortransferofhis
registration record only on June 9, 2009 and the same was
approved in October 31, 2009 as proven by Sabilis voter
certification.Technically,therefore,Sabiliisaregisteredvoterof
LipaCityonlyinOctober2009,sevenmonthspriortotheMay
2010elections.
_______________
93RespondentLibreapresentedhisAffidavitaswellas the
Affidavits of Eladio de Torres, Violeta Fernandez, Rodrigo
MacasaetandPabloLorzano.Sabiliontheotherhand,presented
the Affidavits of Leonila Suarez, Jacinto Cornejo Sr and
RosalindaMacasaet.Notably,thewitnessesofSabiliallbenefited
fromabusinesstransactionwithPalomares,Sabiliscommonlaw
wife. Suarez and Macasaet sold properties to Palomares while
Cornejowashiredbyhertorenovateahouse.Hence,itisnotfar indeedprimary,theelectoratelikewisedeservesapersonwhois
fetchedtoconcludethattheywouldbebiasedinfavourofSabili.
Furthermore, thePinagsamasamang Sinumpaang
SalaysaydatedJanuary 16, 2010 and theSinumpaang
Salaysayexecuted by Dominador Macuha attributed familial
relations to the witnesses of Librea and the wife of Sabilis
opponentforthemayoraltyposition.
94Bevilaqua,supranote29.
732
732 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
Indeed, it is not only that each evidence presented by
petitionerfail(s)toconvincinglyshowthatfactofhisresidence
at Pinagtongulan since 2007,95even collectively considered,
thesepiecesofevidencetendtosufficientlyestablishsuchfailure.
AsSabilisactsbeliehisintenttochangehisdomicileandbea
resident of Lipa City, he had deliberately and falsely
misrepresented in his COC that he is resident of Lipa City,
knowing fully well that he is not, in order to qualify as a
candidate for the office of the Mayor. Sabilis statement in the
COC cannot be dismissed as a simple mistake that does not
warrantitscancellationsinceresidencebeingprimarilyamatter
of intent, any falsehood with regards thereto, as in this case,
reveals an intentional and deliberate misrepresentation that
cannotbesanctionedbythisCourt.Hence,themisrepresentation
committedbySabiliregardinghisresidenceisacleargroundfor
the cancellation of his COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus
ElectionCode(OEC)andhisdisqualificationfromtheofficeheis
presentlyoccupying.
Sabilissubsequentelectionisofnoconsequenceconsidering
thataninvalidCOCcannotgiverisetoavalidcandidacy,much
lessvalidvotes.Moreimportantly,whiletheelectorateswillis
unwillingtoresorttoaMachiavelliancircumventionofthelaws
andblatantfalsehoodjusttosuithisownpurposes.Heisnotonly
disqualifiedfroma public office but more importantly does not
deservethepublicstrust.
I, therefore, submit that the COMELECs Resolutions be
upheldandtheinstantpetitionforcertioraribedenied.
 Petitiongranted,COMELECResolutionsannulled.
Notes.The powers of the Commission on Elections are
essentiallyexecutiveandadministrativeinnature,andthisis
_______________
95Ponencia,pp.2324.
733
VOL.670,APRIL24,2012 733
Sabilivs.CommissiononElections
the reason why the question of whether or not there were
terrorism, votebuying and other irregularities in the elections
should be ventilated in regular election protests. (Suhuri vs. G.R.No.185374.March11,2015.*
CommissiononElections,602SCRA633[2009])
Thepurposetoremaininoratthedomicileofchoicemustbe SIMPLICIACERCADOSIGAandLIGAYACERCADO
foranindefiniteperiodoftime;thechangeofresidencemustbe
BELISON,petitioners,vs.VICENTECERCADO,JR.,MANUELA
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
C.ARABIT,LOLITAC.BASCO,MARIAC.ARALARandVIOLE
domicile must be actual. (Asistio vs. Aguirre,619 SCRA 518
[2010]) TAC.BINADAS,respondents.
o0o Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Private
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights Documents;AsearlyasinthecaseofU.S.v.Evangelista,29Phil.
reserved. 215 (1915),it has been settled that church registries of births,
marriages, and deathsmadesubsequenttothepromulgationof
GeneralOrderNo.68andthepassageofActNo.190arenolonger
public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public
officials.Insupportoftheexistenceoftheallegedfirstmarriage
,petitionerspresentedacopyoftheContrato
Matrimonial.Thereisnodisputethatsaidmarriagecontractwas
issuedbyIglesiaFilipinaIndependientechurch.TheCourtofApp
ealscorrectlyruledthatitisaprivatedocument.Asearlyasinth
ecaseofU.S. v. Evangelista, 29 Phil. 215 (1915),
ithasbeensettledthatchurchregistriesofbirths,marriages,and
deathsmadesubsequenttothepromulgationofGeneralOrderNo.
68andthepassageofActNo.190arenolongerpublicwritings,no
raretheykeptbydulyauthorizedpublicofficials.Theyareprivat
ewritingsandtheirauthenticitymustthereforebeprovedasare
allotherprivatewritingsinaccordancewiththerulesofevidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 20, Rule 132,
RulesofCourt,beforeaprivatedocumentisadmittedinevidence,
itmustbeauthenticatedeitherbythepersonwhoexecutedit,the
personbeforewhomitsexecutionwasacknowledged,anyperson
whowaspresentandsawitexecuted,orwhoafteritsexecution,
sawitandrecognizedthesignatures,orthepersontowhomthe
parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution
thereof.UnderSection20,Rule132,RulesofCourt,beforeapriv
atedocumentisadmittedinevidence,itmustbeauthenticatedeit
herbythepersonwhoexecutedit,thepersonbeforewhomitsexec
utionwasacknowledged,anypersonwhowaspresentandsawite
xecuted,orwhoafter
_______________
*FIRSTDIVISION.
515
VOL.752,MARCH11,2015
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
itsexecution,sawitandrecognizedthesignatures,ortheper
sontowhomthepartiestotheinstrumentshadpreviouslyconfess
edexecutionthereof.AsobservedbytheCourtofAppeals,petition
ersfailedtopresentanyoneofsuchwitnesses.Infact,onlySimpli
ciatestifiedthathermothergaveherthemarriagecontract.Unfo
rtunatelyhowever,shewasnotpresentduringitsexecutionnorco
uldsheidentifyBenitashandwritingbecauseSimpliciaadmitted
thatsheisilliterate.
Same; Same; Same; Carbon Copies; An unsigned and
uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not
competent evidence.WehadpreviouslyruledinVallarta v.
Court of Appeals,163 SCRA 587
(1988),thatasignedcarboncopyorduplicateofadocumentexec
utedatthesametimeastheoriginalisknownasaduplicateorigi
nalandmaybeintroducedinevidencewithoutaccountingforthe
nonproductionoftheoriginal.But,anunsignedanduncertifiedd
ocumentpurportingtobeacarboncopyisnotcompetentevidence.
Itisbecausethereisnopublicofficeracknowledgingtheaccuracy
ofthecopy.
Same;Same;Same;AncientDocuments;WordsandPhrases;
Section21,Rule132definesanancientdocumentasonethat:1)
ismorethanthirty(30)yearsold;2)isproducedfromcustodyin
which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is
unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of
suspicion.Whilepetitionersconcedethatthemarriagecontracti
saprivatedocument,theynowarguethatitisanancientdocume
ntwhichneednotbeauthenticated.Petitionersargumentstillha
515
snomerit.Section21,Rule132definesanancientdocumentason
ethat:1)ismorethan30
yearsold;2)isproducedfromcustodyinwhichitwouldnaturally
befoundifgenuine;and3)isunblemishedbyanyalterationorby
anycircumstanceofsuspicion.Themarriagecontractwasexecute
don 9October1929,henceitisclearlymorethan30
yearsold.Onitsface,thereappearstobenoevidenceofalteration
.
Themarriagecontracthoweverdoesnotmeetthesecondrequirem
ent.Ancientdocumentsareconsideredfrompropercustodyifthe
ycomefromaplacefromwhichtheymightreasonablybeexpected
tobefound.Custodyisproperifitisprovedtohavehadalegitima
teoriginorifthecircumstancesoftheparticularcasearesuchast
orendersuchanoriginprobable.Ifadocumentisfoundwhereit
wouldnotprop
516
516 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
erlyandnaturallybe,itsabsencefromtheproperplacemus
tbesatisfactorilyaccountedfor.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Bartolome v. Intermediate
AppellateCourt,183SCRA102(1990),theSupremeCourt(SC)
ruledthattherequirementofpropercustodywasmetwhenthe
ancientdocumentinquestionwaspresentedincourtbytheproper
custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would
naturally keep it. InBartolomev. Intermediate Appellate
Court,183 SCRA 102
theCourtruledthattherequirementofpropercustodywasmetw
hentheancientdocumentinquestionwaspresentedincourtbyth
epropercustodianthereofwhoisanheirofthepersonwhowould
naturallykeepit.Inthiscasehowever,wefindthatSimpliciaalso
failedtoproveherfiliationtoVicenteandBenita.Shemerelypres
entedabaptismalcertificatewhichhaslongbeenheldasevidenc
eonlytoprovetheadministrationofthesacramentonthedatest
hereinspecified,butnottheveracityofthedeclarationsthereinst
atedwithrespecttoherkinsfolk.Thesameisconclusiveonlyoft
hebaptismadministered,accordingtotheritesoftheCatholicCh
urch,bythepriestwhobaptizedsubjectchild,butitdoesnotprov
etheveracityofthedeclarationsandstatementscontainedinthe
certificateconcerningtherelationshipofthepersonbaptized.As
such,Simpliciacannotbeconsideredasanheir,inwhosecustody
themarriagecontractisexpectedtobefound.Itbearsreiteration
thatSimpliciatestifiedthatthemarriagecontractwasgiventohe
rbyBenitabutthatSimpliciacannotmakeoutthecontentsofsai
ddocumentbecauseshecannotreadandwrite.
Same; Same; Same; While the Supreme Court (SC)
acknowledges the difficulty of obtaining old records, it simply
cannot ignore the rules on evidence, specifically the rule on
authentication with respect to private documents which is
preciselyinplacetopreventtheinclusionofspuriousdocuments
inthebodyofevidencethatwilldeterminetheresolutionsofan
issue.Whileweacknowledgethedifficultyofobtainingoldrecord
s,wesimplycannotignoretherulesonevidence,specificallyther
uleonauthenticationwithrespecttoprivatedocumentswhichisp
reciselyinplacetopreventtheinclusionofspuriousdocumentsin
(1990), thebodyofevidencethatwilldeterminetheresolutionsofanissu
e.
517
VOL.752,MARCH11,2015 517
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
PETITIONforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolution
oftheCourtofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
NapoleonUyGalitandAssociatesLawOfficesforpetitioners.
WillieG.Purisimaforrespondents.
PEREZ,J.:
Nottoolongago,wewerecalledtopassupontheissueofthep
robativevalueofamarriagecontractissuedbythechurchtoprov
ethefactofmarriage.1Onceagain,itbehoovesuponustodetermi
newhetherthemarriagecontractorContrato
Matrimonial,asitisdenominatedinthiscase,issufficienttoprov
ethefactofmarriage.
ThisPetitionforReviewonCertiorariassailsthe5August200
8Decision2oftheCourtofAppealsandits14November2008Reso
lution3inC.A.G.R.CVNo.89585reversingthe30January2007
Decision4oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofBinangonan,Rizal,
Branch69,whichnullifiedtheExtrajudicialSettlementofEstate
oftheDeceasedVicenteCercado,Sr.(Vicente)andLeonoraDitabla
n(Leonora).
IntheirComplaintagainstrespondentsVicenteCercado,Jr.,
ManuelaC.Arabit,LolitaBasco,MariaC.Aralar,VioletaC.Bina
dasandtheRegistrarofDeedsofBinangonan,Rizal,petitionersS
impliciaCercadoSiga(Simplicia)andLigaya
_______________
1Macua Vda. de Avenido v. Avenido,G.R. No. 173540, 22
January2014,714SCRA447,457458.
2Rollo, pp. 76108; Penned by Associate Justice Celia C.
LibreaLeagogo,withAssociateJusticesMarioL.GuariaIIIand
MariflorP.PunzalanCastillo,concurring.
3Id.,atpp.142143.
4Id.,atpp.144171;PennedbyPresiding
JudgeNarmoP.Noblejas.
518
518 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
CercadoBelison(Ligaya)claimedthattheyarethelegitimatec
hildrenofthelateVicenteandBenitaCastillo(Benita),whowere
marriedlast9October1929inPililla,Rizal.Petitionersallegedth
atduringthelifetimeoftheirparents,theirfatheracquiredbygra
tuitoustitleaparceloflandidentifiedasLotNo.7627Cad609Dl
ocatedatBarangayKinagatan,Binangonan,Rizalwithanareaof
6,032squaremetersandcoveredbyTaxDeclarationNo.BIP021
0253.PetitionersclaimedthatuponthedeathoftheirfatherVicen
teandbyvirtueofintestatesuccession,ownershipoverthesubject
landpertainedtothemasheirs;thatuponthedeathofBenita,he
rsharewasacquiredbypetitionersbyoperationoflaw.Sometime
inSeptember1998,petitionersreadfromanewspaperanoticetha
ttheestateofVicenteandacertainLeonoraDitablanhasbeenext
rajudiciallysettledbytheirheirs,respondentsherein.Uponverific
ation,petitionerswerefurnishedacopyoftheExtrajudicialSettle
mentoftheEstate(Deed)executedandsignedbyrespondents.Pe
titionersinsistthatVicenteandLeonorawerenotmarriedorifth
eyweresomarried,thensaidmarriagewasnullandvoidbyreaso
nofthesubsistingmarriageoftheirparents,VicenteandBenita.
PetitionersprayedforthedeclarationoftheDeedasnullandvoid;
fortheOfficeoftheRegisterofDeedsofRizaltocorrecttheentryo
nthemaritalstatusofVicente;andforthepaymentofdamagesa
ndattorneysfees.5
ToprovethemarriagebetweenVicenteandBenita,petitioners
presentedthefollowingdocuments:1)Contrato
Matrimonialorthemarriagecontract;62)Certificationdated19N
ovember2000issuedbyIglesiaFilipinaIndependienteofitsaccep owingthatVicentewasmarriedtoBenitaisnotacertifiedtrueco
tanceoforiginalmarriagecontract;73)Certificationofnon py;andthattheyarenowestoppedbylaches.12
productionofrecordofbirthofSimpliciaissuedbytheOfficeofth On30January2007,theRTCrenderedjudgmentinfavorofpe
eMunicipalCivilRegistrarofPililla,Rizal;8 titioners.Thedispositiveportionreads:
_______________ WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,judgmentisherebyrend
eredasfollows:
5Records,pp.15.
1. Extra
6Id.,atp.7.
JudicialSettlementofEstateofthedeceasedVicenteCercado,Sr.
7Id.,atp.20.
andBenitaDitablanisherebydeclarednullandvoidandtherefor
8Id.,atp.34.
enoforceandeffect;

2.
519
The[petitioners]andthe[respondents]areentitledtosharepro
VOL.752,MARCH11,2015 519
indivisointhesubjectpropertyasfollows:
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
a. 2,639squaremetersFor[petitioner]SimpliciaCercado
Siga;
4)CertificateofBaptismofSimplicia;95)Certificationofnon
_______________
productionofrecordofbirthofLigayaissuedbytheOfficeofthe
MunicipalCivilRegistrarofPililla,Rizal;10and6)JointAffidavito 9Id.,atp.35.
ftwodisinterestedpersonsattestingthatLigayaisthechildofVic 10Id.,atp.37.
enteandBenita.11 11Id.,atp.36.
IntheirAnswer,respondentsallegedthattheyarethelegitima 12Id.,atpp.7477.
teheirsofVicenteandLeonora,whoweremarriedon27June197 520
7asevidencedbyamarriagecertificateregisteredwiththeLocal 520 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
CivilRegistrarofBinangonan,Rizal.Theyaverredthatpetitioner CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
sarenotthereal partiesin b. 2,639squaremetersFor[petitioner] LigayaCercado
interesttoinstitutethecasebecausetheyfailedtopresenttheirbi Belison;
rthcertificatestoprovetheirfiliationtoVicente;thatthemarriag c. 150.8 square meters For [respondent]
ebetweenVicenteandBenitawasnotvalid;thatthedocumentsh VicenteCercado,Jr.;
d.150.8squaremetersFor[respondent]ManuelaC.Arabit;
e.150.8squaremetersFor[respondent]LolitaC.Basco;
 f. 150.8squaremetersFor[respondent]
MariaC.Aralar;and
g.150.8squaremetersFor[respondent]VioletaC.Binadas.
3.
Intheeventthatthepropertyhasalreadybeensoldbythe[respo
ndents],theyareherebyorderedtopaythe[petitioners]theamou
ntequivalenttotheirshare,atthetimethesubjectpropertywass
old;
4.
[respondents]topay[petitioners]theamountofP30,000.00attorn
eysfees;and
5.Topaythecostofsuit.13
Thetrialcourtreducedtheissuesintothree:1)whethertheEx
traJudicialSettlementoftheEstateoftheDeceasedVicenteCerc
ado,Sr.andLeonoraDitablanCercadoisvalid;2)whetherpetitio
nersareentitledtorecoverfromrespondentstheirshareinthepr
operty;and3)whetherpetitionersareentitledtodamagesandatt
orneysfees.
Inresolvingtheissues,thetrialcourtreliedonthefollowingm
aterialfindings:
The[petitioners]arethelegitimatechildrenofthelateVicente
Cercado,Sr.andBenitaCastillote/CastillowhoweremarriedonO
ctober9,1929,asevidencedbyaContratoMatrimonialxxx.14
_______________
13Rollo,pp.170171.
14Id.,atp.167.
521
VOL.752,MARCH11,2015 521
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
Thetrialcourtfirstupheldthevalidityofthemarriagebetwee
nVicenteandBenitaandconsideredthesubsequentmarriagebet
weenVicenteandLeonoraasvoidandbigamousbeforeitconclude
dthatthesubjectpropertywaspartoftheconjugalpropertyofVic
enteandBenita.Consequently,thetrialcourtheldthattheDeedi
snullandvoidbecauseitdeprivedBenitaofhershareoftheprop
ertyassurvivingspouseandimpairedthesharesandlegitimesof
petitioners.15Thus,thetrialcourtruledthatpetitionersareentitle
dtorecoverfromrespondentstheirshareinthepropertysubjecto
fthisaction.
Respondentsappealedfromsaidjudgmentandassignedthefol
lowingerrors:1)thetrialcourterredinpassinguponthevalidity
ofthemarriagebetweenVicenteandLeonora;2)thetrialcourtfai
ledtoconsidertheprobativevalueofthecertificateofmarriagebe
tweenVicenteandBenita;3)thetrialcourtfailedtoconsiderthe
probativevalueofthecertificateoflivebirthtoprovefiliation;and
4)thetrialcourterredwhenitreliedonthebaptismalcertificatet
oprovefiliation.16
Theappellatecourtruledthatthetrialcourtcanpassuponth
eissueofthevalidityofmarriageofVicenteandLeonora[because
]nojudicialactionisnecessarytodeclareamarriageanabsolute
nullityandthecourtmaypassuponthevalidityofamarriageeve
ninasuitnotdirectlyinstitutedtoquestionthesame,aslongasi
tisessentialtothedeterminationofthecasebeforeit.17However,
theappellatecourtfoundthattheContrato
MatrimonialofVicenteandBenita,beingaprivatedocument,was
notproperlyauthenticated,hence,notadmissibleinevidence.Mor
eover,theappellatecourtdidnotconsiderthebaptismalcertificat
esubmittedbypetitionersasconclusiveproofoffiliation.TheJoin
tAffidavitexecutedbyacertainMarioCasaleandBalasChimlan
gco
_______________
15Id.,atp.168.
16Id.,atpp.4546.
17Id.,atp.100.
522
522 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
attestingtothebirthofLigayatoVicenteandBenitawasnotg
ivencredencebytheappellatecourtforbeingahearsayevidence.
Forfailureofpetitionerstoprovetheircauseofactionbypreponde
ranceofevidence,theappellatecourtreversedandsetasidetheD
ecisionandResolutionoftheRTC.
PetitionersfiledaMotionforReconsideration,buttheCourtof
AppealsdenieditinitsResolution18dated14November2008.
Hence,theinstantpetitionbasedonthefollowinggrounds:
I THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
THERESPONDENTCOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDA
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE
MARRIAGE CONTRACT AS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT AND
SO WITH ITS DUPLICATE ORIGINAL. THECONTRATO
MATRIMONIALBUTTRESSED A CERTIFICATION ISSUED
BYTHEIGLESIAFILIPINAINDEPENDIENTEISAPUBLIC
DOCUMENT, [IT]BEING REQUIRED BY LAW TO BEKEPT
NOT ONLY BY THE CHURCH CONCERNED BUT BY THE
OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR AND THE
NATIONAL STATISTIC OFFICE. AND THE DUPLICATE
ORIGINAL COPY OF THE SAME IS ALSO CONSIDERED
ORIGINAL (SECTION 4, RULE 130) (AND HENCE ALSO A
PUBLICDOCUMENTUNDERTHERULE)ONEVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT,
COMMITTED ANOTHER REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHEN IT
DIDNOTCONSIDERTHESAIDDUPLICATEORIGINALOF
THE SUBJECT MARRIAGE CONTRACT AS AN ANCIENT
DOCUMENT,BESIDES,THESAIDDOCUMENT,MORETHAN
30YEARSINEXISTENCEISCONSIDEREDASANANCIENT
_______________
18Id.,atpp.142143.
523
VOL.752,MARCH11,2015 523
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
DOCUMENT,OUTSIDETHENEEDEDREQUIREMENTOF
AUTHENTICATIONAPPLICABLETOPRIVATEDOCUMENT.
III
ERRORWHENITIGNOREDTHEPROBATIVEVALUEOFA
BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE AND PETITIONERS PARENTS
YEARS [OF] COHABITATION. THE BAPTISMAL
CERTIFICATE WHILE NOT ADMISSIBLE AS DIRECT
EVIDENCEFORAMARITALCONTRACT,THESAMEISOF
STRONGEVIDEN[T]IARYSUPPORTTOTHEEXISTENCEOF
MARRIAGEOF [PETITIONERS]PARENTS, EVIDENCED BY
EXHIBITAANDEXHIBITA1ANDBYTHECERTIFICATE
OFITSDESTRUCTIONDURINGWORLDWARII,ALSO,BY
THE OPEN AND PUBLIC COHABITATION OF
[PETITIONERS]PARENTS,ADDEDTHEPRESUMPTIONIN
FAVOR OF SUCH MARRIAGE, BOLSTERED BY THE OPEN
ANDPUBLICCOHABITATION.
IV
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED ANOTHER
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE WEIGHT
AND PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF
TWO (2) DISINTERESTED PERSONS. THE AFFIDAVIT OF
TWO (2) DISINTERESTED PERSONS BEING A
REQUIREMENTBYTHELOCALCIVILREGISTRARAND/OR
THE NSO TO SUPPORT THE EXISTENCE OF
[PETITIONERS]PARENTSMARRIAGE,ANDINTHATSINCE
BECOMESALSOAPUBLICDOCUMENTORATTHEVERY
LEAST, A CIRCUMSTANTIAL DOCUMENTARY PROOF,
WHICH IF ADDED TO THE BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE
EXHIBIT H1, THECONTRATO MATRIMONIALAND THE
CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE IGLESIA FILIPINA
INDEPENDIENTE TAKEN TOGETHER, PLUS THE OPEN
ANDPUBLICCOHABITATIONOF
524
524 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
THE [PETITIONERS] PARENTS MARRIAGE, AND THE
PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW,
BANDEDTOGETHER,ARESTRONGEVIDENCETOPROVE
THEEXISTENCEOF[PETITIONERS]PARENTSMARRIAGE.
V 525
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ANOTHER YET
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR, WHEN IT DID NOT
CONSIDER THE RESPONDENTS PARENTS MARRIAGE AS
BIGAMOUS. THE NULLITY OF THE [RESPONDENTS]
PARENTSMARRIAGE,FORBEINGBIGAMOUS,ANDBEING
THE INCIDENT NECESSARILY INTERTWINED IN THE
ISSUES PRESENTED, AND IT BEING A BIGAMOUS
MARRIAGE, CAN BE COLLATERALLY ATTACK[ED] OR
SLAINATSIGHTWHEREVERANDWHENEVERITSHEAD
(THE [RESPONDENTS] PARENTS MARRIAGE) IS
EXHIBITED.19
PetitionersinsistthattheContrato
Matrimonialisapublicdocumentbecauseitisrequiredbylawto
berecordedinthelocalcivilregistrarandtheNationalStatisticsO
ffice(NSO).Petitionersclaimtohaveintheirpossessionaduplica
teoriginaloftheContrato
Matrimonialwhichshouldberegardedasoriginal.Petitionersemp
hasizethatthecertificationissuedbytheIglesiaFilipinaIndepen
dienteChurch,thejointaffidavitoftwodisinterestedpersons,the
baptismalcertificatepresentedbypetitioners,andtheopenandp
ubliccohabitationofpetitionersparentsaresufficientproofofthei
rmarriage.
GrantingthattheContrato
Matrimonialisaprivatedocument,petitionersmaintainthatsaid
documentshouldbeconsideredanancientdocumentwhichshould
beexcludedfromtherequirementofauthentication.
_______________
19Id.,atpp.6166.
VOL.752,MARCH11,2015 525
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
 PetitionersaverthattheCourtofAppealsshouldhaveconside
redthemarriagebetweenVicenteandLeonoraasbigamous.
IntheirComment,20respondentssubmitthattheContrato
Matrimonialisaprivatedocumentandthefactthatmarriagesar
erequiredtoberegisteredinthelocalcivilregistrardoesnotipso
factomakeitapublicdocument.Respondentsassertthatthecerti
ficateofbaptismislikewiseaprivatedocumentwhichtendstopro
veonlytheadministrationofthesacramentofbaptismandnotth
everacityofthedeclarationstherein.Respondentsmoreoverrefut
ethecertificationissuedbythelocalcivilregistryarguingthatit
doesnotprovefiliationbutonlythefactthatthereisnorecordof
Ligayaonfilewithsaidoffice.
Withrespecttothejointaffidavitattestingtothemarriageof
VicenteandBenita,respondentsassertthatitisinadmissiblefor
beingahearsayevidencebecausethetwoaffiantswereneverpres
entedonthewitnessstand.
ThevalidityoftheExtrajudicialSettlementoftheEstateofVic
enteandLeonorahingesontheexistenceofthefirstmarriageofV
icenteandBenita.
Insupportoftheexistenceoftheallegedfirstmarriage,petitio
nerspresentedacopyoftheContrato
Matrimonial.21Thereisnodisputethatsaidmarriagecontractwa
sissuedbyIglesiaFilipinaIndependientechurch.
TheCourtofAppealscorrectlyruledthatitisaprivatedocume
nt.AsearlyasinthecaseofU.S.
Evangelista,22ithasbeensettledthatchurchregistriesofbirths,
marriages,anddeathsmadesubsequenttothepromulgationofGe
neralOrderNo.6823andthepassageofActNo.190arenolonger
_______________
20Id.,atpp.190196.
21Id.,atp.178.
2229Phil.215(1915).
23OnDecember18,1899,atthebeginningoftheAmerican
occupationofthePhilippines,MajorGeneralOtis,exercisingthe
legis
526
526 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
publicwritings,noraretheykeptbydulyauthorizedpublicoffi
cials.Theyareprivatewritingsandtheirauthenticitymusttheref
orebeprovedasareallotherprivatewritingsinaccordancewitht
herulesofevidence.24
UnderSection20,Rule132,RulesofCourt,25beforeaprivated
ocumentisadmittedinevidence,itmustbeauthenticatedeitherb
ythepersonwhoexecutedit,thepersonbeforewhomitsexecutio
nwasacknowledged,anypersonwhowaspresentandsawitexec
uted,orwhoafteritsexecution,sawitandrecognizedthesignatu
res,orthepersontowhomthepartiestotheinstrumentshadprevi
ouslyconfessedexecutionthereof.26AsobservedbytheCourtofAp
peals,petitionersfailedtopresentanyoneofsuchwitnesses.Infa
ct,onlySimpliciatestifiedthathermothergaveherthemarriage
contract.Unfortunatelyhowever,shewasnotpresentduringitse
xecutionnorcouldsheidentifyBenitashandwritingbecauseSimp
liciaadmittedthatsheisilliterate.
v. Petitionersinsistontheadmissibilityofthemarriagecontract
onthegroundthatitisaduplicateoriginal,hence,the
_______________
 lative power vested in him as CommanderinChief of an
Americanarmyinoccupiedterritory,promulgatedGeneralOrder
No.68thepurposeofwhichwastoestablishrulesoflawrelating
tomarriage.Itprovidesthatmarriagesmaybesolemnizedbya
judgeofacourtinferiortotheSupremeCourt,byajusticeofthe
peace, or by a priest or minister of the gospel of any
denomination.xxx.<http://kahimyang.
info/kauswagan/articles/830/todayinphilippinehistory
december181899majorgeneralotispromulgatedgeneralorder
no68knownasthemarriagelaw.>(visited10November2014)
24U.S.v.Evangelista,supranote22.
25Rule132,Section20.Proofofprivatedocument.Before
anyprivatedocumentofferedasauthenticisreceivedinevidence,
itsdueexecutionandauthenticitymustbeprovedeither:
(a)Byanyonewhosawthedocumentexecutedorwritten;or
(b)By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwritingofthemaker.
26MalayanInsurance,Co.,Inc.v.PhilippineNailsandWires
Corp.,430Phil.163,168;380SCRA374,379(2002).
527
VOL.752,MARCH11,2015
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
originalneednotbeproduced.Wedonotagree.Wehadprevio
uslyruledinVallarta v. Court of
Appeals27thatasignedcarboncopyor
duplicateofadocumentexecutedatthesametimeasthe
originalisknownasaduplicateoriginalandmaybeintroducedin
evidencewithoutaccountingforthenonproductionoftheoriginal.
But,anunsignedanduncertifieddocumentpurportingtobeacarb
oncopyisnotcompetentevidence.Itisbecausethereisnopublic
officeracknowledgingtheaccuracyofthecopy.28
Next,whilepetitionersconcedethatthemarriagecontractisa
privatedocument,theynowarguethatitisanancientdocument
whichneednotbeauthenticated.Petitionersargumentstillhasn
omerit.Section21,Rule132definesanancientdocumentasonet
hat:1)ismorethan30yearsold;2)isproducedfromcustodyinw
hichitwouldnaturallybefoundifgenuine;and3)isunblemished
byanyalterationorbyanycircumstanceofsuspicion.Themarria
gecontractwasexecutedon9October1929,henceitisclearlymor
ethan30
yearsold.Onitsface,thereappearstobenoevidenceofalteration
.
Themarriagecontracthoweverdoesnotmeetthesecondrequi
rement.
Ancientdocumentsareconsideredfrompropercustodyifthey
comefromaplacefromwhichtheymightreasonablybeexpectedt
obefound.Custodyisproperifitisprovedtohavehadalegitimat
eoriginorifthecircumstancesoftheparticularcasearesuchast
orendersuchanoriginprobable.Ifadocumentisfoundwhereitw
527 ouldnotproperlyandnaturally
_______________
27246 Phil. 596, 603; 163 SCRA 587, 592593 (1988),
citingMahilumv.CourtofAppeals,123Phil.1335;17SCRA482,
486 (1966); andU.S. v. Zapanta, 33 Phil. 567
(1916).SeeHerrera,Remedial Law, Vol. V, pp. 182183, 1999
edition.
28Id.
528
528 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
 CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
be,itsabsencefromtheproperplacemustbesatisfactorilyacc
ountedfor.29
Gibson
Poor citedthereasonwhyitisrequiredthatanancientdocumen
30
tshallbeproducedfromtheproperdepository:
xxxthattherebycreditisgiventoitsgenuineness.Wereitno
tforitsantiquity,andthepresumptionthatconsequentlyarisest
hatevidenceofitsexecutioncannotbeobtained,itwouldhavetob
eproved.Itisnotthatanyoneparticularplaceofdepositcanhave
morevirtueinitthananother,ormakethattruewhichisfalse;b
utthefactofitscomingfromthenaturalandproperplace,tendst
oremovepresumptionsoffraud,andstrengthensthebeliefinitsg
enuineness.Itmaybefalse,andsoshown,notwithstandingthepr
esumptionsinitsfavor.Iffoundwhereitwouldnotproperlyandn
aturallybe,itsabsencefromtheproperplacemustbesatisfactoril
yaccountedfor;butthatbeingdoneandallsuspicionsagainstits
genuinenessremoved,wecandiscovernoreasonwhyitmaynotb
ereadinevidence.Therealquestionwhichistoaffectitsconsider
ationis,whethertheinstrumentofferedisgenuine,andcontainsa
truestatementofwhatitpurportsto.IntheBishop of Meath v.
Marquis
Winchester,2Bing.183,Tindal,CJ.,speakingofancientdocumen
ts,holdsthislanguage.Itisnotnecessarythattheyshouldbefou
ndinthebestandmostproperplaceofdeposit.Ifdocumentsconti
nuedinsuchcustody,thereneverwouldbeanyquestionastothei
rauthenticity;butitiswhendocumentsarefoundinotherthant
heirproperplaceofdeposit,thattheinvestigationcommenceswhe
theritwasreasonableandnaturalunderthecircumstancesinthe
particularcase,toexpectthat
_______________
v.
2929A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 1204, citingMcGuire v.
Blount,199U.S.142,26S.Ct.1,50L.Ed.125(1905);Nicholson
v.EurekaLumberCo.,156N.C.59,72S.E.86(1911);Gibsonv.
Poor,21N.H.440,1850WL2344(1850).SeeHerrera,Remedial
Law,Vol.V,pp.186187,1999edition.
30Gibsonv.Poor,id.
529
VOL.752,MARCH11,2015 529
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
theyshouldhavebeenintheplacewheretheyareactuallyfou
nd;foritisobvious,thatwhiletherecanbeonlyoneplaceofdepos
itstrictlyandabsolutelyproper,theremaybemanyandvarioust
hatarereasonableandprobable,thoughdifferingindegree;some
beingmoreso,someless;andinthosecasesthepropositiontobed
eterminedis,whethertheactualcustodyissoreasonablyandprob
ablyaccountedfor,thatitimpressesthemindwiththeconviction,
thattheinstrumentfoundinsuchcustodymustbegenuine.Som
of eauthoritieshold,thattheantiquityofthedocumentisalonesuffi
cienttoentitleittoberead,andthattheothercircumstancesonly
gotoitseffectinevidence.
InBartolome v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, theCourtruledthattherequirementofpropercustodywa
31
smetwhentheancientdocumentinquestionwaspresentedincou
rtbythepropercustodianthereofwhoisanheirofthepersonwho
wouldnaturallykeepit.Inthiscasehowever,wefindthatSimplic
iaalsofailedtoproveherfiliationtoVicenteandBenita.Shemere
lypresentedabaptismalcertificatewhichhaslongbeenheldase
videnceonlytoprovetheadministrationofthesacramentonthed
atesthereinspecified,butnottheveracityofthedeclarationsther
einstatedwithrespecttoherkinsfolk.Thesameisconclusiveonl
yofthebaptismadministered,accordingtotheritesoftheCatholi
cChurch,bythepriestwhobaptizedsubjectchild,butitdoesnot
provetheveracityofthedeclarationsandstatementscontainedin
thecertificateconcerningtherelationshipofthepersonbaptized.3
2
Assuch,Simpliciacannotbeconsideredasanheir,inwhosecust
odythemarriagecontractisexpectedtobefound.Itbearsreiterat
ionthatSimpliciatestifiedthatthemarriagecontractwasgivent
oherbyBenitabutthatSimpliciacannot
_______________
31262Phil.113,122123;183SCRA102,109110(1990).
32HeirsofPedroCabaisv.CourtofAppeals,374Phil.681,
689;316SCRA338,344(1999),citingMacadangdangv.Courtof
Appeals,188Phil.192,201;100SCRA73,8485(1980);Paav.
Chan,128Phil.815,822;21SCRA753,759(1967).
530
530 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
makeoutthecontentsofsaiddocumentbecauseshecannotrea
dandwrite.
Ontheotherhand,thedocumentpresentedtoproveLigayask
inshipisaJointAffidavitexecutedbytwopersonstotheeffecttha
tshewasborntoVicenteandBenita.Thesetwoaffiantswerenev
erpresentedincourt.Thus,theirstatementistantamounttohear
sayevidence.
Petitionersalsopresentedcertificationsfromthelocalcivilregi
strarcertifyingthattherecordsofbirthfrom1930to1946werede
stroyedbyfireand/orwar.Insaiddocuments,therecontainsana
dvicethatpetitionersmaymakeafurtherverificationwiththeNS
Obecausethelocalcivilregistrarsubmitsacopyofthebirthcertif
icateofeveryregisteredbirthwiththeNSO.Theadvicewasnothe
eded.PetitionersfailedtopresentacertificationfromNSOwhethe
rsuchrecordsdoexistornot.
Whileweacknowledgethedifficultyofobtainingoldrecords,w
esimplycannotignoretherulesonevidence,specificallytheruleo
nauthenticationwithrespecttoprivatedocumentswhichisprecis
elyinplacetopreventtheinclusionofspuriousdocumentsinthe
bodyofevidencethatwilldeterminetheresolutionsofanissue.
Consideringthatpetitionersfailedtoprovethevalidityofthe
marriagebetweenVicenteandBenita,itfollowsthattheydonoth
aveacauseofactioninthecaseforthedeclarationofnullityofth
eExtrajudicialSettlementoftheEstateofVicenteandLeonora.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIED.The5August2008
DecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinC.A.G.R.CVNo.89585reversi
ngandsettingasidethe30January2007Decisionand16April20
07ResolutionoftheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch69ofBinangona
n,RizalinCivilCaseNo.R98047isAFFIRMED.
531
VOL.752,MARCH11,2015 531
CercadoSigavs.Cercado,Jr.
SOORDERED.
 Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), LeonardoDe Castro,
BersaminandPerlasBernabe,JJ.,concur.
Petitiondenied,judgmentaffirmed.
Notes.Before private documents can be received in
evidence,proofoftheirdueexecutionandauthenticitymustbe
presented. (Ledesco Development Corporation vs. Worldwide
StandardInternationalRealty,Inc.,636SCRA53[2010])
Proof of due execution and authenticity required beforeany
private document offered as authentic is received in evidence.
(Menesesvs.Venturozo,659SCRA577[2011])
o0o
Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
172 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
ManilaElectricCompanyvs.Quisumbing
G.R.No.127598.February22,2000.*
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,vs.Hon.
SECRETARY of LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING and
MERALCO EMPLOYEES and WORKERS ASSOCIATION
(MEWA),respondents.
Labor Law;Collective Bargaining Agreements;Public
Utilities;An increase in the prices of electric current needs the
approval of the appropriate regulatory government agency and
doesnotautomaticallyresultfromamereincreaseinthewagesof
thepublicutilityfirmsemployees.Petitionerwarnsthatifthe
wageincreaseofP2,200.00permonthasorderedbytheSecretary
isallowed,itwouldsimplypassthecostcoveringsuchincreaseto
theconsumersthroughanincreaseintherateofelectricity.This
is anon sequitur.The Court cannot be threatened with such a
misleadingargument.Anincreaseinthepricesofelectriccurrent
needs the approval of the appropriate regulatory government
agencyanddoesnotautomaticallyresultfromamereincreasein
the wages of petitioners employees. Besides, this argument
presupposesthatpetitioneriscapableofmeetingawageincrease.
Same;Same;Evidence;CommercialLists;Amerenewspaper
account is not considered a commercial listit is at most an
analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight in
determiningtherateofwageincrease.Undertheaforequoted
rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be
admittedonlyifthatcompilationispublishedforusebypersons
engagedinthatoccupationandisgenerallyusedandreliedupon
bythemtherein.AscorrectlyheldinourDecisiondatedJanuary
27,1999,thecitedreportisamerenewspaperaccountandnot
evenacommerciallist.Atmost,itisbutananalysisoropinion
whichcarriesnopersuasiveweightforpurposesofthiscaseasno
sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did
anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that
businessmengenerallyrelyonnewsitemssuchasthisintheir
occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the
publicationwasregularlypreparedbyapersonintouchwiththe
market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and
reliable.Absentextrinsicproofoftheiraccuracy,thesereportsare
notadmissible.In
__________________
 SPECIALFIRSTDIVISION.
*
173
VOL.326,FEBRUARY22,2000
ManilaElectricCompanyvs.Quisumbing
the same manner, newspapers containingstockquotations
arenotadmissibleinevidencewhenthesourceofthereportsis
available.Withmorereason,mereanalysesorprojectionsofsuch
reportscannotbeadmitted.Inparticular,thesourceofthereport
in this case can be easily made available considering that the
same is necessary for compliance with certain governmental
requirements.
Same;Same;Arbitral Awards;Retroactive Effect; Collective
BargainingAgreementarbitralawardsgrantedaftersixmonths
from theexpiration ofthelast CollectiveBargaining Agreement
shallretroacttosuchtimeagreeduponbybothemployerandthe
employeesortheirunion,andintheabsenceofsuchanagreement
astoretroactivity,theawardshallretroacttothefirstdayafter
thesixmonthperiodfollowingtheexpirationofthelastdayofthe
CollectiveBargainingAgreementshouldtherebeone,or,inthe
absence of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Secretarys
determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his
discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control.The
CourtintheJanuary27,1999Decision,statedthattheCBAshall
beeffectiveforaperiodof2yearscountedfromDecember28,
1996 up to December 27, 1999. Parenthetically, this actually
coversathreeyearperiod.Laborlawsaresilentastowhenan
arbitral award in a labor dispute where the Secretary had
assumedjurisdictionbyvirtueofArticle263(g)oftheLaborCode
shall retroact. In general, a CBA negotiated withinsix months
after the expiration of the existing CBA retroacts to the day
immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter, the
effectivitydependsontheagreementoftheparties.Ontheother
hand,thelawissilentastotheretroactivityofaCBAarbitral
173 awardorthatgrantednotbyvirtueofthemutualagreementof
the parties but by intervention of the government. Despite the
silence of the law, the Court rules herein that CBA arbitral
awardsgrantedaftersixmonthsfromtheexpirationofthelast
CBAshallretroacttosuchtimeagreeduponbybothemployer
andtheemployeesortheirunion.Absentsuchanagreementasto
retroactivity,theawardshallretroacttothefirstdayafterthe
sixmonthperiodfollowingtheexpirationofthelastdayofthe
CBAshouldtherebeone.IntheabsenceofaCBA,theSecretarys
determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his
discretionarypowersoverarbitralawardsshallcontrol.
Same;Same;Same;Anarbitralawardcanbeconsideredas
an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which
wouldotherwisehavebeenenteredintobytheparties.Itistrue
thatan
174
1 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
74
ManilaElectricCompanyvs.Quisumbing
arbitralawardcannotpersebecategorizedasanagreement
voluntarily entered into by the parties because it requires the
interferenceandimposingpoweroftheStatethrutheSecretary
of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction. However, the arbitral
award can be considered as an approximation of a collective
bargainingagreementwhichwouldotherwisehavebeenentered
intobytheparties.ThetermsorperiodssetforthinArticle253A
pertains explicitly to a CBA. But there is nothing that would
prevent its application by analogy to an arbitral award by the
Secretaryconsideringtheabsenceofanapplicablelaw.
 Same;Same;Same;Cooperatives;The award of loans for
housingisjustifiedbecauseitpertainstoabasicnecessityoflife,
butprovidingseedmoneyfortheestablishmentofanemployees
cooperative is a matter in which the employer has no business
interest or legal obligation.On the allegation concerning the
grant of loanto a cooperative, thereis no merit in theunions
claim thatitisno differentfromhousingloansgrantedbythe
employer.Theawardofloansforhousingisjustifiedbecauseit
pertains to a basic necessity of life. It is part of a privilege
recognized by the employer and allowed by law. In contrast,
providing seed money for the establishment of the employees
cooperativeis amatter inwhichthe employerhasnobusiness
interestorlegalobligation.Courtsshouldnotbeutilizedasatool
tocompelanypersontograntloanstoanothernortoforceparties
toundertakeanobligationwithoutjustification.Onthecontrary,
itisthegovernmentthathastheobligationtorenderfinancial
assistance to cooperatives and the Cooperative Code does not
makeitanobligationoftheemployeroranyprivateindividual.
Same;Same;Management Prerogatives;Contracting Out of
Services;Theemployerisallowedtocontractoutservicesforsix
months or more.The added requirement of consultation
imposedbytheSecretaryincasesofcontractingoutforsix(6)
monthsormorehasbeenrejectedbytheCourt.Sufficeittosay
that the employer is allowed to contract out services for six
months or more. However, a line must be drawn between
management prerogatives regarding business operations per se
andthosewhichaffecttherightsofemployees,andintreating
thelatter,theemployershouldseetoitthatitsemployeesareat
leastproperlyinformedofitsdecisionormodesofactioninorder
to attain a harmonious labormanagement relationship and
enlightentheworkersconcerningtheirrights.
175
VOL.326,FEBRUARY22,2000 175
ManilaElectricCompanyvs.Quisumbing
Same;Same;Same;Same;The management cannot be
deniedthefacultyofpromotingefficiencyandattainingeconomy
byastudyofwhatunitsareessentialforitsoperationithasthe
ultimatedeterminationofwhetherservicesshouldbeperformedby
itspersonnelorcontractedtooutsideagencies;Contractingoutof
services is an exercise of business judgment or management
prerogative.Hiring of workers is within the employers
inherent freedom to regulate and is a valid exercise of its
management prerogative subject only to special laws and
agreementsonthematterandthefairstandardsofjustice.The
managementcannotbedeniedthefacultyofpromotingefficiency
andattainingeconomybyastudyofwhatunitsareessentialfor
its operation. It has the ultimate determination of whether
services should be performed by its personnel or contracted to
outside agencies. While there should be mutual consultation,
eventuallydeferenceistobepaidtowhatmanagementdecides.
Contractingoutofservicesisanexerciseofbusinessjudgmentor
managementprerogative.Absentproofthatmanagementactedin
amaliciousorarbitrarymanner,theCourtwillnotinterferewith
the exercise of judgment by an employer. As mentioned in the
January27,1999Decision,thelawalreadysufficientlyregulates
this matter. Jurisprudence also provides adequate limitations,
suchthattheemployermustbemotivatedbygoodfaithandthe
contractingoutshouldnotberesortedtocircumventthelawor
mustnothavebeentheresultofmaliciousorarbitraryactions.
These are matters that may be categorically determined only
whenanactualsuitonthematterarises.
MOTIONFORRECONSIDERATIONofadecisionofthe
SupremeCourt.
ThefactsarestatedintheresolutionoftheCourt. resolution
RolandoR.Arbues,AtilanoS.Guevarra,Jr.andMarianito Wages P1,900.00for199596 P2,200.00
D. Miranda and Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiakofor Xmasbonus modifiedtoonemonth 2months
petitioner. Retirees remandedtotheSecretary granted
PerfectoV.Fernandez,JoseP.FernandezandCristobalP. Loantocoops denied granted
FernandezforMeralcoEmployeesandWorkersAssociation. GHSIP,HMPandHousingloans granteduptoP60,000.00 granted
M.B.TomacruzLawOfficeandJesusS.SiloforFirstLine Signingbonus denied granted
Asso.ofMeralcoSupervisoryEmployees. Unionleave 40days(typoerror) 30days
176 Highvoltage/ notapplytothosewhoarenot members
176 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED pole exposedtotherisk ofateam
ManilaElectricCompanyvs.Quisumbing Collectors noneedforcashbond,noneed
RESOLUTION toreducequotaandMAPL

YNARESSANTIAGO,J.: _________________

In the Decision promulgated on January 27, 1999, the Court Decision promulgated January 27, 1999, G.R. No. 127598
1

disposedofthecaseasfollows: penned by Justice Antonio Martinez (now retired) with Chief

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisgrantedandtheordersofpublic Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and Justices Jose Melo, Santiago
respondent Secretary of Labor dated August 19, 1996 and KapunanandBernardoPardo,concurring.
December28,1996aresetasidetotheextentsetforthabove.The 177
partiesaredirectedtoexecuteaCollectiveBargainingAgreement VOL.326,FEBRUARY22,2000 177
incorporating the terms and conditions contained in the ManilaElectricCompanyvs.Quisumbing
unaffectedportionsoftheSecretaryofLaborsordersofAugust
CBU excludeconfidentialemployees include
19,1996andDecember28,1996,andthemodificationssetforth
Unionsecurity maintenanceofmembership closedshop
above.TheretirementfundissueisremandedtotheSecretaryof
Labor for reception of evidence and determination of the legal Contractingout noneedtoconsultunion consult
personalityoftheMeralcoretirementfund.1 first
Themodificationsofthepublicrespondentsresolutionsinclude Allbenefits existingtermsandconditions allterms
thefollowing: Retroactivity Dec.28,1996Dec.27,199(9) from
January27,1999decision Secretary Dec.1,1995
s DissatisfiedwiththeDecision,someallegedmembersofprivate
respondent union (Union for brevity) filed a motion for
interventionandamotionforreconsiderationofthesaidDecision.
A separate intervention was likewise made by the supervisors
union (FLAMES2) of petitioner corporation alleging that it
hasbonafidelegalinterestintheoutcomeofthecase. 3TheCourt
required the proper parties to file a comment to the three
motionsforreconsiderationbuttheSolicitorGeneralaskedthat
hebeexcusedfromfilingthecommentbecausethepetitionfiled
in the instant case was granted by the Court. 4Consequently,
petitioner filed its own consolidated comment. An Appeal
SeekingImmediateReconsiderationwasalsofiledbythealleged
newly elected president of the Union. 5Other subsequent
pleadingswerefiledbythepartiesandintervenors.
The issues raised in the motions for reconsideration had
alreadybeenpasseduponbytheCourtintheJanuary27,1999
decision.Nonewargumentswerepresentedforconsiderationof
theCourt.Nonetheless,certainmatterswillbeconsideredherein,
particularly those involving the amount of wages and the
retroactivity of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
arbitralawards.
Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of P2,200.00 per
monthasorderedbytheSecretaryisallowed,itwouldsimply
__________________
2
FirstLineAssociationofMeralcoSupervisoryEmployees.
3
MotionforLeavetoInterveneandtotreatthisasMovants
InterventionfiledbyFLAMES,p.4;Rollo,p.2476.
4
SolicitorGenerals Manifestation and Motion dated August
10,1999,p.2;Rollo,p.2506.
5
Rollo,p.2495.
178
178 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
ManilaElectricCompanyvs.Quisumbing
passthecostcoveringsuchincreasetotheconsumersthroughan
increase in the rate of electricity. This is anon sequitur.The
Courtcannotbethreatenedwithsuchamisleadingargument.An
increaseinthepricesofelectriccurrentneedstheapprovalofthe
appropriate regulatory government agency and does not
automatically result from a mere increase in the wages of
petitionersemployees.Besides,thisargumentpresupposesthat
petitioner is capable of meeting a wage increase. The All Asia
CapitalreportuponwhichtheUnionreliestosupportitsposition
regarding the wage issue can not be an accurate basis and
conclusivedeterminantoftherateofwageincrease.Section45of
Rule130RulesofEvidenceprovides:
Commercial lists and the like.Evidence of statements of
mattersofinteresttopersonsengagedinanoccupationcontained
in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is
admissibleastendingtoprovethetruthofanyrelevantmatterso
statedifthatcompilationispublishedforusebypersonsengaged
inthatoccupationandisgenerallyusedandrelieduponbythem
therein. Under the aforequoted rule, statement of matters
contained in a periodical may be admitted only if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that
occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them
therein.
As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the
cited report is a mere newspaper account and not even a
commerciallist.Atmost,itisbutananalysisoropinionwhich
carries no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no
sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did
anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that
businessmengenerallyrelyonnewsitemssuchasthisintheir
occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the
publicationwasregularlypreparedbyapersonintouchwiththe
market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and
reliable.Absentextrinsicproofoftheiraccuracy,thesereportsare
notadmissible.6Inthesamemanner,newspaperscon
________________
6
20Am.Jur.819.
179
VOL.326,FEBRUARY22,2000
ManilaElectricCompanyvs.Quisumbing
tainingstockquotationsarenotadmissibleinevidencewhenthe
source of the reports is available.7With more reason, mere
analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In
particular,thesourceofthereportinthiscasecanbeeasilymade
availableconsideringthatthesameisnecessaryforcompliance
withcertaingovernmentalrequirements.
Nonetheless, by petitioners own allegations, its actual total
netincomefor1996wasP5.1billion. 8AnestimatebytheAllAsia
financialanalyststatedthatpetitionersnetoperatingincomefor
thesameyearwasaboutP5.7billion,afigurewhichtheUnion
relieson to support its claim. Assuming without admitting the
truth thereof, the figure is higher than the P4.171 billion
allegedly suggested by petitioner as its projected net operating
income. The P5.7 billion which was the Secretarys basis for
granting theP2,200.00ishigherthanthe actualnetincome of
P5.1 billion admitted by petitioner. It would be proper then to
increasethisCourtsawardofP1,900.00toP2,000.00forthetwo
yearsoftheCBAaward.For1992,theagreedCBAwageincrease
forrankandfilewasP1,400.00andwasreducedtoP1,350.00,for
1993; further reduced to P1,150.00 for 1994. For supervisory
employees,theagreedwageincreasefortheyears19921994are
P1,742.50, P1,682.50 and P1,442.50, respectively. Based on the
foregoingfigures,theP2,000.00increaseforthetwoyearperiod
awarded to the rankandfile is much higher than the highest
increasegrantedtosupervisoryemployees.9Asmentionedinthe
January27,1999Decision,theCourtdoesnotseektoenumerate
inthisdecisionthefactorsthatshouldaffectwagedetermination
becausecollectivebargainingdisputesparticularlythoseaffecting
the national interest and public service requires due
considerationandproperbalancingoftheinterestsoftheparties
tothedisputeandofthosewhomight
179
_________________
7
20Am.Jur.819820.
8
Petitioners Comment to Motions for Reconsideration and
MotionforIntervention,p.6;Rollo,p.2514.
9
SeetheJanuary27,1999Decision.
180
180 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
ManilaElectricCompanyvs.Quisumbing
beaffectedbythedispute.10TheCourttakesjudicialnoticethat
thenewamountsgrantedhereinaresignificantlyhigherthanthe
weightedaveragesalarycurrentlyenjoyedbyotherrankandfile
employees within the community. It should be noted that the
relations between labor and capital is impressed with public
interest which must yield to the common good. 11Neither party
shouldactoppressivelyagainsttheotherorimpairtheinterestor
convenienceof thepublic.12Besides,matters ofsalary increases
arepartofmanagementprerogative.13
OntheretroactivityoftheCBAarbitralaward,itiswellto
recallthatthispetitionhaditsoriginintherenegotiationofthe
parties19921997CBAinsofarasthelasttwoyearperiodthereof
isconcerned.WhentheSecretaryofLaborassumedjurisdiction
andgrantedthearbitralawards,therewasnoquestionthatthese
arbitralawardsweretobegivenretroactiveeffect.However,the
parties dispute the reckoning period when retroaction shall
commence.Petitionerclaimsthattheawardshouldretroactonly
fromsuchtimethattheSecretaryofLaborrenderedtheaward,
invoking the 1995 decision inPier 8case14where the Court,
citingUnionofFiliproEmployeesv.NLRC,15said:
TheassailedresolutionwhichincorporatedtheCBAtobesigned
by the parties was promulgated on June 5, 1989, (and hence,
outsidethe6monthperiodfromJune30,1987,)theexpirydateof
thepastCBA.BasedontheprovisionofSection253A,itsretro
__________________
10
Manila Electric Company v. Quisumbing,302 SCRA 173,
196(1999).
11
Article1700,NewCivilCode(NCC).
12
Article1701,NCC.
13
SeeNational Federation of Labor Unions v. NLRC,202
SCRA346(1991).
14
Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. v.
RoldanConfesor,(2ndDiv.),311Phil.311;241SCRA294(1995)
penned by Justice Puno with Chief Justice Narvasa (ret.) and
JusticesBidin(ret.),Regalado(ret.)andMendoza,concurring,p.
329.
15
192SCRA414(1990).
181
VOL.326,FEBRUARY22,2000
ManilaElectricCompanyvs.Quisumbing
activity should be agreed upon by the parties. But since no
agreement to that effect was made, public respondent did not
abuseitsdiscretioningivingthesaidCBAaprospectiveeffect.
The action of the public respondent is within the ambit of its
authorityvestedbyexistinglaws.
On the other hand, the Union argues that the award should
retroacttosuchtimegrantedbytheSecretary,citingthe1993
decisionofSt.Lukes.16
Finally,theeffectivityoftheOrderofJanuary28,1991,must
retroact to the date of the expiration of the previous CBA,
contrarytothepositionofpetitioner.Underthecircumstancesof
thecase,Article253Acannotbeproperlyappliedtohereincase.
AscorrectlystatedbypublicrespondentinhisassailedOrderof
April12,1991dismissingpetitionersMotionforReconsideration
Anent the alleged lack of basis for the retroactivity provisions
awarded,wewouldstressthattheprovisionoflawinvokedbythe
Hospital,Article253AoftheLaborCode,speaksofagreements
byandbetweentheparties,andnotarbitralawards...
Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law
prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards
issuedbytheSecretaryofLaborpursuanttoArticle263(g)ofthe
LaborCode,suchashereininvolved,publicrespondentisdeemed
vested with plenary and discretionary powers to determine the
effectivitythereof.
In the 1997 case ofMindanao Terminal,17the Court applied
theSt.Lukesdoctrineandruledthat:
_________________
16
St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. v. Torres,(3rd Div.),223
181
SCRA779(1993),pennedbyJusticeMelowithJusticesFeliciano
(ret.), Bidin (ret.), Davide, Jr. (now Chief Justice) and Romero
(ret.),concurring,pp.792793.
17
InMindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v.
Confesor,(2ndDiv.),338Phil.671;272SCRA161(1997)penned
byJusticeMendozawithJusticesRegalado(ret.),Romero,(ret.),
PunoandTorres(ret.),concurring,p.679.
182
182 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
ManilaElectricCompanyvs.Quisumbing
InSt.LukesMedicalCenterv.Torres,adeadlockalsodeveloped
during the CBA negotiations between management and the
union.TheSecretaryofLaborassumedjurisdictionandordered
the retroaction of the CBA to the date of expiration of the
previousCBA.Asinthiscase,itwasallegedthattheSecretaryof
Labor gravely abused its discretion in making his award
retroactive.IndismissingthiscontentionthisCourtheld:
Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law
prohibitingretroactiveoftheeffectivityofarbitralawardsissued
bytheSecretaryofLaborpursuanttoArticle263(g)oftheLabor
Code, such as herein involved, public respondent is deemed
vested with plenary and discretionary powers to determine the
effectivitythereof.
TheCourtintheJanuary27,1999Decision,statedthattheCBA
shallbeeffectiveforaperiodof2yearscountedfromDecember
28,1996uptoDecember27,1999.Parenthetically,thisactually
coversathreeyearperiod.Laborlawsaresilentastowhenan
arbitral award in a labor dispute where the Secretary had
assumedjurisdictionbyvirtueofArticle263(g)oftheLaborCode
shall retroact. In general, a CBA negotiated withinsix months
after the expiration of the existing CBA retroacts to the day
immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter, the
effectivitydependsontheagreementoftheparties. 18Ontheother
hand,thelawissilentastotheretroactivityofaCBAarbitral
awardorthatgrantednotbyvirtueofthemutualagreementof
the parties but by intervention of the government. Despite the
silence of the law, the Court rules herein that CBA arbitral
awardsgrantedaftersixmonthsfromtheexpirationofthelast
CBAshallretroacttosuchtimeagreeduponbybothemployer
andtheemployeesortheirunion.Absentsuchanagreementasto
retroactivity,theawardshallretroacttothefirstdayafterthe
sixmonthperiodfollowingtheexpirationofthelastdayofthe
CBAshouldtherebeone.IntheabsenceofaCBA,theSecretarys
determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his
discretionarypowersoverarbitralawardsshallcontrol.
________________
Article253A,LaborCode,asamended.
18
183
VOL.326,FEBRUARY22,2000 183
ManilaElectricCompanyvs.Quisumbing
Itistruethatanarbitralawardcannotpersebecategorizedas
anagreementvoluntarilyenteredintobythepartiesbecauseit
requirestheinterferenceandimposingpoweroftheStatethru
theSecretaryofLaborwhenheassumesjurisdiction.However,
thearbitralawardcanbeconsideredas anapproximationofa
collectivebargainingagreementwhichwouldotherwisehavebeen
entered into by the parties. 19The terms or periods set forth in
Article253ApertainsexplicitlytoaCBA.Butthereisnothing
thatwouldpreventitsapplicationbyanalogytoanarbitralaward
by the Secretary considering the absence of an applicable law.
Under Article 253A: (I)f anysuch agreementis entered into
beyond six months, the parties shall agree on the duration of
retroactivity thereof. In other words, the law contemplates
retroactivity whether the agreement be entered into before or
after the said sixmonth period. The agreement of the parties
neednotbecategoricallystatedfortheiractsmaybeconsidered
indeterminingthedurationofretroactivity.Inthisconnection,
the Court considers the letter of petitioners Chairman of the
Board and its President addressed to their stockholders, which
statesthattheCBAfortherankandfileemployeescoveringthe
periodDecember1,1995toNovember30,1997isstillwiththe
SupremeCourt,20asindicativeofpetitionersrecognitionthatthe
CBA award covers the said period. Earlier, petitioners
negotiatingpaneltransmittedtotheUnionacopyofitsproposed
CBAcoveringthesameperiodinclusive. 21Inaddition,petitioner
does not dispute the allegation that in the past CBA arbitral
awards,theSecretarygrantedretroactivitycommencingfromthe
period immediately following the last day of the expired CBA.
Thus, by petitioners own actions, the Court sees no reason to
retroactthesubjectCBAawardstoadifferentdate.Theperiodis
hereinsetattwo(2)yearsfromDecember1,1995toNovember
30,1997.
_________________
nor to force parties to undertake an obligation without
justification.Onthecontrary,itisthegovernmentthathasthe
obligationtorenderfinancialassistancetocooperativesandthe
CooperativeCodedoesnotmakeitanobligationoftheemployer
oranyprivateindividual.22
Anentthe40dayunionleave,theCourtfindsthatthesameis
atypographicalerror.Inordertoavoidanyconfusion,itisherein
declaredthattheunionleaveisonlythirty(30)daysasgranted
by the Secretary of Labor and affirmed in the Decision of this
Court.
The added requirement of consultation imposed by the
Secretaryincasesofcontractingoutforsix(6)monthsormore
hasbeenrejectedbytheCourt.Sufficeittosaythattheem
___________________
See Section 2, R.A. No. 6838 (Cooperative Code of the
22

19
Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v.
Confesor,338Phil.671;272SCRA161(1997).
20
Rollo,p.2347.
21
AnnexCofthePetition.
184
184 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
ManilaElectricCompanyvs.Quisumbing
Ontheallegationconcerningthegrantofloantoacooperative,
thereisnomeritintheunionsclaimthatitisnodifferentfrom
housingloansgrantedbytheemployer.Theawardofloansfor
housingisjustifiedbecauseitpertainstoabasicnecessityoflife.
Itispartofaprivilegerecognizedbytheemployerandallowedby
law.Incontrast,providingseedmoneyfortheestablishmentof
theemployeescooperativeisamatterinwhichtheemployerhas
no business interest or legal obligation. Courts should not be
utilizedasatooltocompelanypersontograntloanstoanother
Philippines) which provides: It is the declared policy of
theStateto foster the creation and growth of cooperative as a
practical vehicle for promoting selfreliance and harnessing
people power towards the attainment of economic development
andsocialjustice.TheStateshallencouragetheprivatesectorto
undertaketheactualformationofcooperativesandshallcreate
anatmospherethatisconducivetotheorganizationalgrowthand
development of the cooperatives. Towards this end,
theGovernmentand all its branches, subsidiaries,
instrumentalities, and agencies shall ensure the provision of
technical guidelines,financial assistance,and other services to
enablesaidcooperativetodevelopmentintoviableandresponsive
economic enterprises and thereby bring about a strong
cooperativemovementthatisfreefromanyconditionsthatmight
infringe upon the autonomy or organizational integrity of
cooperatives.
185
VOL.326,FEBRUARY22,2000 185
ManilaElectricCompanyvs.Quisumbing
ployerisallowedtocontractoutservicesforsixmonthsormore.
However, a line must be drawn between management
prerogatives regarding business operationsper seand those
whichaffecttherightsofemployees,andintreatingthelatter,
the employer should see to it that its employees are at least
properlyinformedofitsdecisionormodesofactioninorderto
attain a harmonious labormanagement relationship and
enlightentheworkersconcerningtheirrights. 23Hiringofworkers
is within the employers inherent freedom to regulate and is a
valid exercise of its management prerogative subject only to
speciallawsandagreementsonthematterandthefairstandards
of justice.24The management cannot be denied the faculty of
promotingefficiencyandattainingeconomybyastudy ofwhat
units are essential for its operation. It has the ultimate
determination of whether services should be performed by its
personnelorcontractedtooutsideagencies.Whilethereshouldbe
mutualconsultation,eventuallydeferenceistobepaidtowhat
managementdecides.25Contractingoutofservicesisanexercise
ofbusinessjudgmentormanagementprerogative. 26Absentproof
thatmanagementactedinamaliciousorarbitrarymanner,the
Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an
employer.27AsmentionedintheJanuary27,1999Decision,the
law already sufficiently regulates this matter. 28Jurisprudence
alsoprovidesadequatelimitations,suchthattheemployermust
bemotivatedbygoodfaithandthecontractingoutshouldnotbe
resortedtocircumventthelawormustnothavebeentheresultof
maliciousorarbitrary actions.29Theseare mattersthat maybe
categoricallydeterminedonlywhenanactualsuitonthematter
arises.
WHEREFORE,themotionforreconsiderationisPARTIALLY
GRANTEDandtheassailedDecisionisMODIFIEDasfollows:(1)
the arbitral award shall retroact from December 1, 1995 to
November30,1997;and(2)theawardofwageisincreasedfrom
the original amount of One Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos
(P1,900.00)toTwoThousandPesos(P2,000.00)fortheyears1995
and 1996. This Resolution is subject to the monetary advances
granted by petitioner to its rankandfile employees during the
pendencyofthiscaseassumingsuchadvanceshadactuallybeen
distributedtothem.TheassailedDecisionisAFFIRMEDinall
otherrespects.
SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.(C.J.),Melo,KapunanandPardo,JJ.,concur.
Petitionpartiallygranted,judgmentmodified.
Notes.A public utility under the Constitution and the
PublicServiceLawisoneorganizedforhireorcompensationto
servethepublic,whichisgiventherighttodemanditsservice.
(Bagatsingvs.CommitteeonPrivatization,246SCRA334[1995])
ThesigningoftheCBAisnotdeterminativeofthequestion
whethertheagreementwasenteredintowithinsixmonthsfrom
thedateofexpiryofthetermofsuchotherprovisionsasfixedin
such collective bargaining agreement withinthecontemplation
ofArt.253AoftheLaborCodewherethepartiesalreadyhada
meetingofthemindsbeforetheendofthesaidsixmonthperiod.
(Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. vs. Roldan
Confesor,272SCRA161[1997])
A CBA which is part of an arbitral award may be made
retroactive to the date of expiration of the previous agreement
sinceArt.253AoftheLaborCodereferstoCBAsenteredintoby
thepartiesasaresultoftheirmutualagreement,nottoarbitral
awards. (Manila Central Line Corporation vs. Manila Central
Line Free Workers UnionNational Federation of Labor,290
SCRA690[1998])
180 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Peoplevs.OrtizMiyake
G.R.Nos.11533839.September16,1997.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,vs.LANIE
ORTIZMIYAKE,accusedappellant.
Labor Law;Criminal Law;Illegal Recruitment;Words and
Phrases;RecruitmentandPlacement,Defined.TheLaborCode
defines recruitment and placement as x x x any act of
canvassing,enlisting,contracting,transporting,utilizing,hiring
or procuring workers and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whetherforprofitornotxxx.
Same;Same;Same;RepublicActNo.8042(MigrantWorkers
andOverseasFilipinosActof1995);ExPostFactoLaws;R.A.No.
8042doesnotapplytoanoffensecommittedbeforeitseffectivity.
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 8042,
otherwiseknownastheMigrantWorkersandOverseasFilipinos
Act of 1995, was passed increasing the penalty for illegal
recruitment.Thisnewlaw,however,doesnotapplytotheinstant
casebecausetheoffensechargedhereinwascommittedin1992,
beforetheeffectivityofsaidRepublicActNo.8042.Hence,what
areapplicablearetheaforecitedLaborCodeprovisions.
Same;Same;Same;Inillegalrecruitmentcases,thenumber
of persons victimized is determinative.It is evident that in
illegal recruitment cases, the number of persons victimized is
determinative.Whereillegalrecruitmentiscommittedagainsta
lone victim, the accused may be convicted of simple illegal
recruitment which is punishable with a lower penalty under
Article39(c)oftheLaborCode.Corollarily,wheretheoffenseis
committedagainstthreeormorepersons,itisqualifiedtoillegal
recruitmentinlargescalewhichprovidesahigherpenaltyunder
Article39(a)ofthesameCode.
Same;Same;Same;Right of Confrontation;The right of
confrontationhastwopurposes:first,tosecuretheopportunityof
crossexamination;and,second,toallowthejudgetoobservethe
deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying.
Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is
guaranteedthe
_______________
SECONDDIVISION.
*
181
VOL.279,SEPTEMBER16,1997 181
Peoplevs.OrtizMiyake
rightofconfrontation.Suchrighthastwopurposes:first,to
securetheopportunityofcrossexamination;and,second,toallow
the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the
witnesswhiletestifying.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Hearsay Rule;The right of
confrontation is not absolute as it is recognized that it is
sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who has
already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his
previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of
evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule.This right,
however,isnotabsoluteasitisrecognizedthatitissometimes
impossibletorecallorproduceawitnesswhohasalreadytestified
inapreviousproceeding,inwhicheventhisprevioustestimonyis
made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of
exception to the hearsay rule. The previous testimony is made
admissiblebecauseitmakestheadministrationofjusticeorderly
andexpeditious.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Same;Judgments;The exception
totherightofconfrontationcontemplatedbylawcoversonlythe
utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous
proceedings,anddoesnotincludeutilizationofpreviousdecisions
or judgments.Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati
trial court of the facts stated in thedecisionof the Paraaque
trial court does not fall under the exception to the right of
confrontationasthe exceptioncontemplatedbylawcoversonly
theutilizationoftestimoniesofabsentwitnessesmadeinprevious
proceedings,anddoesnotincludeutilizationofpreviousdecisions
orjudgments.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Same;Same;A previous decision
orjudgment,whileadmissibleinevidence,mayonlyprovethatan
accusedwaspreviouslyconvictedofacrimeitmaynotbeusedto
provethattheaccusedisguiltyofacrimechargedinasubsequent
case.A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in
evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously
convictedofacrime.Itmaynotbeusedtoprovethattheaccused
isguiltyofacrimechargedinasubsequentcase,inlieuofthe
requisiteevidenceprovingthecommissionofthecrime,assaid
previousdecisionishearsay.Tosanctionitsbeingusedasabasis
forconvictioninasubsequentcasewouldconstituteaviolationof
therightoftheaccusedtoconfrontthewitnessesagainsthim.
182
1 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
82
Peoplevs.OrtizMiyake
Same;Same;Same;Same;Same;Every conviction must be
basedonthefindingsoffactmadebyatrialcourtaccordingtoits
appreciation of the evidence before ita conviction may not be
basedmerelyonthefindingsoffactofanothercourt.Asearlier
stated, the Makati courts utilization of and reliance on the
previousdecisionoftheParaaquecourtmustberejected.Every
convictionmustbebasedonthefindingsoffactmadebyatrial
court according to its appreciation of the evidence before it. A
conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of
another court, especially where what is presented is only its
decisionsansthetranscriptofthetestimonyofthewitnesseswho
testifiedthereinanduponwhichthedecisionisbased.
Same;Same;Same;Words and Phrases;Simple Illegal
Recruitment and Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale,
Distinguished.The distinction between simple illegal
recruitmentandillegalrecruitmentinlargescaleareemphasized
byjurisprudence.Simpleillegalrecruitmentiscommittedwhere
aperson:(a)undertakesanyrecruitmentactivitydefinedunder
Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under
Articles 34 and 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a
license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placementofworkers.Ontheotherhand,illegalrecruitmentin
largescalefurtherrequiresathirdelement,thatis,theoffenseis
committed against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.
Same;Same;Same;Evidence;Inillegalrecruitmentinlarge
scale,whilethelawdoesnotrequirethatatleastthreevictims
testifyatthetrial,itisnecessarythatthereissufficientevidence
proving that the offense was committed against three or more
persons.Inillegalrecruitmentinlargescale,whilethelawdoes
not require that at least three victims testify atthe trial, it is
necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the
offensewascommittedagainstthreeormorepersons.ThisCourt
agrees with the trial court that the evidence presented
sufficiently proves that illegal recruitment was committed by
appellantagainstMarasigan,butthesameconclusioncannotbe
madeasregardsGenerilloandDelRosarioaswell.
Same;Same;Same;Estafa;Double Jeopardy;Conviction
under the Labor Code for illegal recruitment does not preclude
punishmentundertheRevisedPenalCodeforthefelonyofestafa.
TheCourtlikewiseaffirmstheconvictionofappellantforestafa
whichwas
183
VOL.279,SEPTEMBER16,1997
Peoplevs.OrtizMiyake
committedagainstMarasigan.ConvictionundertheLabor
Codeforillegalrecruitmentdoesnotprecludepunishmentunder
onacomplaintinitiatedbyElenitaMarasigan,ImeldaGenerillo
andRosamardelRosario.Inaddition,shewasindictedforestafa
bymeansoffalsepretensesinthesamecourt,theoffendedparty
beingElenitaMarasiganalone.
Theinformationinthechargeofillegalrecruitmentinlarge
scaleinCriminalCaseNo.926153readsasfollows:
ThatinorabouttheperiodcomprisedfromJune1992toAugust
1992, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
PhilippinesandwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,
theabovenamedaccused,falselyrepresentingherselftohavethe
capacity and power to contract, enlist and recruit workers for
employmentabroaddidthenandtherewillfully,unlawfully,and
feloniouslycollectforafee,recruitandpromiseemployment/job
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placementabroadtothefollowingpersons,towit:1)Rosamardel
Rosario;2)ElenitaMarasigan;3)ImeldaGenerillo,withoutfirst
securingtherequiredlicenseorauthorityfromtheDepartmentof
LaborandEmployment,thusamountingto