Duero vs CA (Remedial Law)

GABRIEL L. DUERO
vs.
CA, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL

G.R. No. 131282; January 4, 2002; QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:
Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private Eradelentered and occupied petitioner's land
covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in
the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. Petitioner informed respondent that the
land was his, and requested the latter to vacate the land. However, despite repeated demands, private
respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership
with Damages and Attorney's Fees against private respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and
Inocencio Ruena.

Petitioner and the Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial court's basis for a
partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In this agreement, the Ruenas recognized and bound
themselves to respect the ownership and possession of Duero. Herein private respondent Eradel was
not a party to the agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the
complaint.

Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996, judgment was
rendered in his favor, and private respondent was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over the lot.

On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying
the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the
complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to
the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the
motion for new trial.

Private respondent then filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same
allegation in his Motion for New Trial. The RTC again denied the Petition.

Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he alleged that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the case since the value of the land is only P5,240, which is within the jurisdiction of the
MTC. However, the RTC denied the MR.
Private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari which the latter granted.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case
2) WON the private respondent Eradel is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC after he has
successfully sought affirmative relief therefrom

HELD:
1) None. The case falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC based on Republic Act 7691 amending BP 129.
2) No. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because,
if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.

Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of
the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the
surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the
complaint, private respondent was declared in default.

He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court, but such was denied. He filed before the RTC a
Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for
reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's
lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied.

Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on
appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new
trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for reconsideration

The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the
parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party
may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on
appeal. The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren of
jurisdiction over the action

Citing Javier v CA, the Court reiterated: Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action
'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of
Court)

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

Thus, the ruling of the CA is affirmed. The decision of the RTC and its Order that private respondent turn
over the disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, are annulled and set aside.

DUNCANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. NO. 191894 JULY 15, 2015)

Duncano vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015

Facts: Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.
On March 24, 2009, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a
criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILO DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking
public officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Quezon City, and as such is under an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his
assets, liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth
(SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business interests/connection in Documail Provides
Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the
1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which
are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Held: No. The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution. By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486. The
decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, and
P.D. No. 1861.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4,
Article XI thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-a, and R.A. 7080, which expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249,
and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC. 4.
Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
“A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
“(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:
“(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
“(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
“(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
“(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
“(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
“(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
“(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
“(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989;
“(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
“(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
“(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
“B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
“C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The specific
inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to “officials of the executive
branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.”38 As ruled in Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is occupying a
position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as
applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not
among those specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise,
except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary
grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be
under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts “where none of the principal accused are occupying
positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher.” By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The
cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should
not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And
courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut
magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the
statute – its every word.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director
and higher with Salary Grade “27” or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II
with Salary Grade “26” under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to
the reliefs prayed for.

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UP-Cebu. She was appointed by then President Joseph
Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on
December 31, 2000. On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3 One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex.4 President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of
the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the
KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6 The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa and filed the case to the Sandiganbayan.7 Petitioner moved to quash the
information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her
capacity as UP student regent. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied with finality.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an estafa case? (2) Whether or not petitioner is a public officer
with Salary Grade 27?

DOCTRINE: (1) Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan reads: “Other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection
(a) of this section in relation to their office.” (2) While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and
higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but
who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.

RATIONALE:
(1) The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an
absurd conclusion.33 Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to
arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 Evidently, from the provisions of Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. Plainly, estafa is one of
those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials
and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their
office.

(2) Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even if she does not have a salary grade 27, as she is placed there
by express provision of law.44 Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions
similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer
as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

PAT-OG VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. NO. 198755, JUN. 5, 2013 (CONCURRENT JURISDICITON)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the Apr. 6, 2011 Decision of the CA,
affirming the Apr. 11, 2007 Decision of the CSC, which ordered the dismissal of petitioner Pat-og from the service for grave misconduct.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On Sept. 13, 2003, Bang-on, then a 14 year old second year school student of Antadao National High School in Sagada, Mountain Province,
filed an affidavit of complaint against Pat-og, a third year high school teacher of the same school, before the CSC Cordillera Adm. Region.
Bang-on alleged that on the morning of Aug. 26, 2003, he attended his class at the basketball court of the school, where Pat-og and his
third year students were holding a separate class, that he and some of his classmates joined Pat-og’s third year students who were practicing
basketball shots. Bang-on was not able to follow an instruction on falling in line and was punched by Pat-og. As a result, he suffered stomach
pain for several days and was confined in a hospital from Sept. 10-12, 2003, as evidenced by a medico-legal certificate, which stated that he
sustained a contusion hematoma in the hypogastric area.
Bang-on filed a criminal case against Pat-og for the crime of Less Physical Injury with the RTC of Bontoc, Mountain Province.
Taking cognizance of the administrative case, the CSC-CAR directed Pat-og to file a counter-affidavit. He denied the charges hurled against
him.
On June 1, 2004, the CSC-CAR found the existence of a prima facie case for misconduct and formally charged Pat-og.
While the proceedings of the administrative case were ongoing, the RTC rendered its judgment in the criminal case and found Pat-og guilty
of the offense charged against him.
Meanwhile, in the administrative case, a pre-hearing conference was conducted after repeated postponement by Pat-og. With the approval
of CSC-CAR, the prosecution submitted its position paper in lieu of a formal presentation of evidence and formally offered its evidence, which
included the decision in the criminal case. The decision of CSC-CAR found Pat-og guilty.
The CSC-CAR believed that the act committed by Pat-og was sufficient to find him guilty of Grave Misconduct. It, however, found the
corresponding penalty of dismissal from the service too harsh under the circumstances. Thus he was adjudged for Simply misconduct
(suspension for 6 months). An MR was filed by Pat-og but was denied . Pat-og appealed but was denied and the judgment was modified to
grave misconduct (dismissal).
After evaluating the records, the CSC sustained the CSC-CAR’s conclusion.
Pat-og filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning for the first time the jurisdiction of CSC over the case. He contended that the
administrative charges against a public school teacher should have been initially heard by a committee pursuant to the Magna carta for Pulblic
School Teachers. The MR was denied.
The CA affirmed the resolution of the CSC.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE/S

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that petitioner is estopped form questioning the jurisdiction of the
CSC to hear and decide the administrative case against him?
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

The court cannot sustain his position.

The petitioner’s argument that the administrative case against him can only proceed under R.A. no. 4670 is misplaced.

Under Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CSC is the body charged with the establishment and administration of a career civil service
which embraces all branches and agencies of the government.

Thus, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the inherent power to supervise and discipline all members of the civil
service, including public school teachers.

Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals.
When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that
such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies
have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of others. In this case, it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was filed before it. Thus, it
had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepED and the Board of Professional Teachers.

Boston equity v CA

(jurisdiction over the person)

Facts:
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Herein respondent filed an Answer
dated 19 March 1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which
she alleged, among others, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already
dead. As a result, petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require respondent to disclose the heirs
of Manuel. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution, praying that Manuel be substituted by his children
as party-defendants. This motion was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October 2000.13

On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon agreement of the
parties. On 24 September 2004, counsel for herein respondent was given a period of fifteen days within
which to file a demurrer to evidence. However, on 7 October 2004, respondent instead filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds: (1) **********; (2) that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(3) ******

The trial court, denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of
the 1997 Rules of Court which Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition to the Court of Appeals alleging that
the trial court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in denying her motion. CA granted the
petition.

Issue

W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the dead (Manuel Toledo) person?

Ruling: No. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of
summons; trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo.

Citing the case of Sarsaba:

“The court’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over one’s person is a defense which is personal to the
person claiming it.Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his
death.Neither can petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of
having the case dismissed against all of the defendants. “

Boston equity v CA

Facts: ----- supra-----

Issue: W/N the Estate of Manuel Toledo is an indispensable party?

Held:
Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:cralavvonline lawlib rary

SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties-in-interest without whom no final

determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.

Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an
indispensable party to the collection case, for the simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife,
respondent herein, is solidary.

The contract between petitioner, on the one hand and respondent and respondent’s husband, on the other,
states: cralavvonl inelawli bra ry

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We jointly and severally46 (in solemn) promise to pay BOSTON EQUITY
RESOURCES, INC. x x x the sum of PESOS: [ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED (P1,400,000.00)] x x x
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter.

Heirs of Santiago Nisperos V Nisperos

When the spouses Santiago died, all the 9 siblings tilted the land of their parents. Maria and Cipriana
paid the taxes of the land since 1988 on behalf of their siblings. All 9 siblings agreed that the taxes and
papers of the land will be under their sister Maria. Maria has an adopted daughter, Marissa, which was a
minor when the land was awarded to Marian in 1992. But because of turn of event, Maria named
Marissa as the beneficiary of the land even she still a minor. When the land was finally transferred to
Maria’s name, Marissa claimed that the 58t square meter property belongs to her adoptive mother. The
other siblings filed a case before the Regional adjudicator board since the land contested is an
agriculture land. The board dismissed the contention of Marissa that she’s the owner of the land since
the land was awarded to Maria while she’s a minor. Marissa filed a petition to DARAB and granted the
petition under the contention that since the land is already transferred to Maria without any problem,
the heirs of Santiago is already barred to question the title. Hence this petition reached the Supreme
Court

Issue:

W/N DARAB has a jurisdiction over the contested land

Held:
The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR Secretary and not with the DARAB.

Thus, in Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, 24 this Court held that there must be a tenancy relationship between
the parties for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case. It is essential to establish all of the following
indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is 23 Sutton v. Lim, G.R. No. 191660, December 3,
2012, 686 SCRA 745, 753. 24 367 Phil. 438 (1999). Decision 8 G.R. No. 189570 an agricultural land; (3)
that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is
to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee. It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasijudicial officer or
government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the
material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the
petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject
matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the
parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the
action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover,
estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The
failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from
addressing the issue, especially where the DARAB’s lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the
complaint or petition.

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.

Ponente: Peralta, J.
Nature: Petition for review on Certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan (SB) which quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged violation
of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

Doctrines:
 The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors.—Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for
conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant
to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly
responsible therefor. This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators
in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or
written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead,
sane or insane at the time of trial. The death of one of two or more conspirators does not
prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors. Thus, this Court held that: x x x [a] conspiracy
is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the
joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be
 convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove
the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.
 The avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress “acts of public officers and
private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices,” would be frustrated if the
death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such
public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.—The Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed
policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress “acts of public officers and private persons
alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices,” would be frustrated if the death of a public
officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public officer in
violating the Anti-Graft Law.

Facts:
1. Background:
a. The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the
Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air
Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
b. Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office
of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged
was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly
conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

2. On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
a. There was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted
because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.

3. Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:
a. On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary
of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to
his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and
President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded
to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft
Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as
amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as
the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under
Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms
are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the
Republic of the Philippines.
b. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.

4. SB order:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this case
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the
accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already
deceased, and not an accused in this case.

5. Prosecution:
a. SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary
appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail.
b. SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was
alleged to have conspired with a public officer.

7. Respondent:
a. filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the ground that the operative facts
adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
b. citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary
Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public
officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

8. The prosecution filed its Opposition.

9. SB resolution:
a. grants respondent’s Motion to Quash.
b. appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-
conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information
filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.

10. Hence, the instant petition

Issue:
Whether herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the
filing of the Information.

Held:

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with
public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3
of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto. This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a
case involving herein private respondent.

Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was
charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of
conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His
death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between
him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there
was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e)
and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in
court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be
indicted alone.

Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. If
two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is,
in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This means
that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the
common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no
difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. The death of one
of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors. Thus, this
Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends
upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be
convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases
of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.
(you can stop reading here on the topic of conspiracy; below is just an extended discussion on the
intricacies of conspiracy; followed by a discussion on jurisdiction)

The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent)
conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other
co-conspirators.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the
legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or
corrupt practices," would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a
private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.

In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta as to the nature of
and the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically
provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the
common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime is a
reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt
acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the
tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.

However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or

more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the
liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S.
vs. Infante and Barreto opined that

While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a
crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a
conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together with
the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated crime and its
commission by the conspirators.

Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the
commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound
principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the
physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will
actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though
performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own,
"when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of
the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability
upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to
graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and
inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by
common agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which
existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and
they are all equally responsible x x x

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of
the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any
conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping
ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.

In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the
crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that
conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal
liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of
collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of
the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership,
and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable.

This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with
Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and
involves evidentiary matters. Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left
ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or
disprove its presence.

(the following part is about jurisdiction naman; read until end)

Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion as well as in his Urgent Motion to
Resolve that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late
Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another
agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present
case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted
respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the
person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution
dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB.
This Resolution became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this
Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.

The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in
G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for
Consolidation in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private
respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over
his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking
affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, it has been held that: When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent
court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the
jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very
earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the
merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald,
51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly.
When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to
that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If
the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for
respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s
jurisdiction over him. x x x.28

In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction
of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his
Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order
requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
over his person.

As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract
entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special
criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This
includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said
public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019,
in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile
should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the
death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not
follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving
herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would
no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of
the alleged offenders.

Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the
main case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the
case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by no
means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005,
granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is
forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014

THE CITY OF MANILA ETC., ET AL. v. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO ETC., ET AL
PERALTA, J.:

NATURE:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable
period from January to December 2002 against the private respondents.In addition to the taxes
purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue
Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes. private respondents were
constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City the complaint denominated
as one for “Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously–Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition
with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
The RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied. Petitioners then filed a special civil
action for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari holding that it
has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows
that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should,
likewise, be filed with the CTA.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence, this petition

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory
order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
HELD:
The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by
the RTC in a local tax case. In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring
exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as
partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that “if a case may be appealed to a particular court or
judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” This principle was affirmed in De
Jesus v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992) where the Court stated that “a court may
issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by
appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

FALLO: petition is denied

LOMONDOT VS. BALINDONG

762 SCRA 494
FACTS: In 1991, Omaira and Lomondot filed with SDC Marawi City a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages with prayer for mandatory injunction and TRO against respondents
Pangandamun and Diaca, claiming they are the owners by succession of parcel of land on which
Pangandamun and Diaca illegally entered and encroached 100 sqm and 200 sqm respectively. The SDC
in 2005 rendered a decision declaring plaintiffs owner of the subject land and ordering defendants to
vacate portions illegally encroached. Respondents appealed with SC but the latter dismissed the
petition. The SDC Decision became final and executory on October 31, 2007 and an entry of judgment
was subsequently made. Petitioners filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution with prayer for a
writ of demolition which the SDC granted. However, after hearing, the SDC issued a resolution that the
motion for issuance of a Writ of Demolition should be held in abeyance and provided that while the
decision has become final and executory and a Writ of Execution has been issued, there are instances
when a Writ of Execution cannot be enforced as when there is a supervening event that prevents the
Sheriff to execute a Writ of Execution. The fact that the defendants claimed they have not encroached
as they have already complied with the Writ of Execution and their buildings are not within the area
claimed by the plaintiffs is, according to SDC, a supervening event. After attempts for settlement failed,
plaintiffs asked anew for a writ of demolition. At this point in time, the court cannot issue a special order
to destroy, demolish or remove defendants' houses, considering their claim that they no longer
encroach any portion of plaintiffs’ land. Motion for issuance of a writ of demolition was denied.
Petitioners filed with the CA-CDO petition for certiorari assailing the Orders issued by the SDC. The CA
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction saying that, under RA 9054, it is the Shari’a Appellate Court
(SAC) which shall exercise jurisdiction over petition for certiorari; that, however, since SAC has not yet
been organized, it cannot take cognizance of the case as it emanates from the Shari’a Courts, which is
not among those courts, bodies or tribunals enumerated under Chapter 1, Section 9 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129, as amended, over which it can exercise appellate jurisdiction. Under Republic Act No. 9054,
the Shari'a Appellate Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions
of the Shari'a District Courts.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not CA has jurisdiction over decisions of SDC.
2. Whether or not the fact that the defendants claimed they have not encroached as they have
already complied with the Writ of Execution and their buildings are not within the area claimed
by the plaintiffs is a supervening event that can hold the writ of execution in abeyance.

HELD:
1. YES. In Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong, we stated that: x x x [t]he Shari’a Appellate Court has yet to
be organized with the appointment of a Presiding Justice and two Associate Justices. Until such
time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been organized, however, appeals or petitions
from final orders or decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be referred to a Special Division
to be organized in any of the CA stations preferably composed of Muslim CA Justices. Notably,
Tomawis case was decided on March 5, 2010, while the CA decision was rendered on April 27,
2010. The CA's reason for dismissing the petition, i.e., the decision came from SDC which the CA
has no appellate jurisdiction is erroneous for failure to follow the Tomawis ruling.

NO. The SDC Decision dated January31, 2005 ordered respondents to vacate the portions or areas they
had illegally encroached had become final and executory after we affirmed the same and an entry of
judgment was made. Such decision can no longer be modified or amended. In Dacanay v. Yrastorza, Sr.,
Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. This is the doctrine of finality of
judgment. In Abrigo v. Flores,33 we said: x x x a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a
matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already
litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render
the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the
execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all
too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment. In this case, the matter of
whether respondents' houses intruded petitioners' land is the issue in the recovery of possession
complaint filed by petitioners in the SDC which was already ruled upon, thus cannot be considered a
supervening event that would stay the execution of a final and immutable judgment.

1. THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE

vs. HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG ET. AL.
G.R. No. 193340, January 11, 2017
Jardeleza, J:
FACTS
The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo led a Complaint against the petitioner
Municipality of Tangkal (Municipality) before the with the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City for the
recovery of possession and ownership of a 25-hectare parcel of land located at Barangay Banisilon,
Tangkal, Lanao del Norte.
They alleged that in 1962, Macalabo Alompo entered into an agreement with the Municipality allowing
the latter to “borrow” the land to pave the way for the construction of the municipal hall and a health
center building, on the condition that the Municipality will pay the value of the land within 35 years, or
until 1997; otherwise, ownership of the land would revert to Macalabo. Private respondents claimed
that the Municipality neither paid the value nor returned the land to its owner.
The Municipality led an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue and lack of
jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it
cannot be considered as a Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover, since the
complaint for recovery of land is a real action, it should have been led in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte.
In its Order dated March 9, 2010, the Shari'a District Court denied the Municipality’s motion to dismiss
and held that since the mayor of Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M. Batingolo, is a Muslim, the case “is an action
involving Muslims, hence, the court has original jurisdiction concurrently with that of regular/civil
courts.” It added that venue was properly laid because the Shari'a District Court has territorial
jurisdiction over the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte. In response to an Order by Shari'a
District Court to file an answer within 10 days, the Municipality, in its answer, raised as an affirmative
defense the court's lack of jurisdiction.
Within the 60-day reglementary period, the Municipality elevated the case to the Supreme Court via
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and reiterated the Shari'a District Court’s lack of jurisdiction. In their Comment, the heirs of Alompo
echo the reasoning of the Shari'a District Court that since both the plaintiffs below and the mayor of
defendant municipality are Muslims, the Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Code of Muslim Personal Laws vests the Shari'a District Court jurisdiction over the
Municipality of Tangkal.
RULING
No, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws does not vests the Shari'a District Court jurisdiction over the
Municipality of Tangkal.
Article 143 (2) (b) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws qualifies the conferment of jurisdiction to
actions “wherein the parties involved are Muslims,” the word “parties” necessarily refers to the real
parties in interest. “Muslim” is “a person who testifies to the oneness of God and the Prophethood of
Muhammad and professes Islam." The ability to testify to the “oneness of God and the Prophethood of
Muhammad” and to profess Islam is restricted to natural persons. In contrast, juridical persons are
artificial beings considered as persons only by virtue of legal action. The Municipality of Tangkal falls
under this category. Under the Local Government Code, a municipality is a body politic and corporate
that exercises powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory.
Another manifested error on the part of Shari’a District Court is the attribution of the religious affliation
of the mayor to the Municipality. It is an elementary principle that a municipality has a personality that
is separate and distinct from its mayor, vice-mayor, sanggunian, and other offers composing it. And
under no circumstances can this corporate veil be pierced on purely religious considerations — as the
Shari'a District Court has done — without running afoul the inviolability of the separation of Church and
State enshrined in the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, the Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law to decide private
respondents’ complaint because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims.

2. Municipality of Tangkal v Hon Balindong, GR No. 193340 (Jan 11 2017)

Concept: Municipal Corporation, defined

FACTS:
Private respondents as heirs of Macalabo Ampo filed a complaint for recovery of possession against
Municipality of Tangkal with the Shari'a District Court. The private respondents contend that since the
parties to the case are muslim, then Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction over the case. The premise is
that since the Mayor of Tangkal is a Muslim then as the representative of Tangkal it is now considered
under Article 143(2)(b) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws actions "wherein the parties involved are
Muslims”

Municipality of Tangkal filed a motion to dismiss (MTD) on the ground of improper venue and lack of
jurisdiction. It argued that the municipality has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural or
ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. The Mayor
was only a representative of the Municipality but the real party in interest is the municipality and not
the mayor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an action for recovery
of possession filed by Muslim individuals against a municipality whose mayor is a Muslim.

RULING:
NO. Although the definition does not explicitly distinguish between natural and juridical persons, it
nonetheless connotes the exercise of religion, a personal right which by nature is restricted to natural
persons. Juridical persons are considered persons only by virtue of legal fiction. The Municipality of
Tangkal falls under this category.

Under the Local Government Code, a municipality is a body politic and corporate that exercises
powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity representing
the inhabitants of its territory. Furthermore, as a government instrumentality, the Municipality of
Tangkal can only act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects-consistent with
the non-establishment clause.

The Shari'a District Court appears to have understood the foregoing principles, as it conceded that the
Municipality of Tangkal "is neither a Muslim nor a Christian." Yet it still proceeded to attribute the
religious affiliation of the mayor to the municipality. This is manifest error on the part of the Shari'a
District Court. The municipality has a separate and distinct personality form the officers composing it.

In view of the foregoing, the Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law to decide private
respondents' complaint because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims.

REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC. VS. DELA CRUZ

781 SCRA 607
January 25, 2016

FACTS:

Petitioner Corporation is the owner of an apartment in Pasay and respondent Dela Cruz leased two
units. The contract of lease for each of the two units similarly provides a lease period of one month,
subject to automatic renewals, unless terminated by the petitioner upon written notice. Petitioner sent
the respondent a letter to terminate the lease of the two subject units. Due to the respondent’s refusal
to vacate the units, the petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment before the MTC of Pasay City. MTC
ordered the respondent to vacate the premises, and pay the rentals due until the respondent actually
complies. Respondent then appealed to the RTC. Pending appeal, the respondent consigned the
monthly rentals to the RTC due to the petitioner’s refusal to receive the rentals. RTC affirmed the
decision of the MTC and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent.

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA to assail the RTC Orders which
granted the petitioner’s motion to withdraw funds. CA dismissed the petition and held that the assailed
RTC Orders were issued pursuant to its equity jurisdiction, in accordance with Section 5, Rule 39, and
Rules 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. The respondent’s motion for reconsideration was
similarly denied.

ISSUE:

Whether RTC had jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property

HELD:

YES. Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court. The court of origin with respect to the assailed RTC orders is the court which issued these
orders. The RTC is the court with jurisdiction to order the execution of the issued RTC orders.

It is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by
the parties. “Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the
reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case.”
Even assuming that the case has been rendered moot due to the respondent’s redemption of the
property, the CA may still entertain the jurisdictional issue since it poses a situation capable of repetition
yet evading judicial review.

The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties when an appeal is perfected. On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to
provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special
circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given
situation. The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust
enrichment and to ensure restitution. The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited
funds for the use and occupation of the subject units were issued pursuant to the RTC’s equity
jurisdiction, as the CA held in the petition docketed as C.A.--G.R. S.P. No. 81277. The RTC’s equity
jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case. The RTC could
not have issued its orders in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing more to
execute on the dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the dismissal of the ejectment
case effectively and completely blotted out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were
clearly issued in the exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction.

Hence, the petitioner correctly moved for the issuance of the writ of execution and levy of the
respondent’s real property before the RTC as the court of origin. Petition is GRANTED.

SPS. CARBONELL v. METROBANK

Sps. Cristino and Edna Carbonell Vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
G.R. No. 178467
April 26, 2017

FACTS:

The petitioners alleged that they had experienced emotional shock, mental anguish, public ridicule,
humiliation, insults and embarrassment during their trip to Bangkok, Thailand because of the
respondent's release to them of five US$ 100 bills that turned out to be counterfeit.

They withdrew US$ l, 000.00 in US$ 100 notes from their dollar account at the respondent's Pateros
branch. While in Bangkok, they had exchanged five US$ 100 bills into Baht, but only four of the US$ 100
bills had been accepted by the foreign exchange dealer because the fifth one was "no good." Because of
currency’s rejection, they had asked a companion to exchange the same bill at Norkthon Bank in
Bangkok, thereat the dollar bill was declared “fake, and was confiscated by the bank teller. On the next
day, they had been confronted by the shop owner at the hotel lobby because their four US$ 100 bills
had turned out to be counterfeit after they had bought jewelry.

Upon the petitioners’ return to the Philippines, they had confronted the manager of the respondent's
Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had insisted that the dollar bills she had released to
them were genuine, for the bills were certified by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) after examination.
They had demanded moral damages of ₱10 Million and exemplary damages.

Prior to the filing of the suit in the RTC, the petitioners had two meetings with the respondent's
representatives. In the course of the two meetings, the latter's representatives reiterated their
sympathy and regret over the troublesome experience that the petitioners had encountered, and
offered to reinstate US$500 in their dollar account, and, in addition, to underwrite a round-trip all-
expense-paid trip to Hong Kong, but they were adamant and staged a walk-out.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. The petitioners appealed, but the CA ultimately promulgated
its assailed decision affirming the judgment of the RTC with the modification of deleting the award of
attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA gravely erred in affirming the judgment of the RTC.

HELD:

No. The court affirmed with the judgment of the RTC. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right,
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called dmimum absque injuria.

In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore, the injured person alone bears the
consequences because the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act that does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. For instance, in BP I Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
Court turned down the claim for damages of a cardholder whose credit card had been cancelled after
several defaults in payment, holding therein that there could be damage without injury where the loss
or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty towards the plaintiff. In such situation, the
injured person alone should bear the consequences because the law afforded no remedy for damages
resulting from an act that did not amount to a legal injury or wrong. Indeed, the lack of malice in the
conduct complained of precluded the recovery of damages.

Here, although the petitioners suffered humiliation resulting from their unwitting use of the counterfeit
US dollar bills, the respondent, by virtue of its having observed the proper protocols and procedure in
handling the US dollar bills involved, did not violate any legal duty towards them. Being neither guilty of
negligence nor remiss in its exercise of the degree of diligence required by law or the nature of its
obligation as a banking institution, the latter was not liable for damages. Given the situation being one
of damnum absque injuria, they could not be compensated for the damage sustained.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 176717 March 17, 2010
EVANGELINE C. COBARRUBIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In 1982, Evangeline C. Cobarrubias (petitioner) was hired as a faculty member at St. Louis University, Inc.
(respondent) in Baguio City.1
By letter of May 23, 2003,2 respondent’s President Rev. Fr. Paul Van Parijs informed petitioner that she
had failed to meet the required minimum evaluation rating for faculty members during the 5-year
period beginning school year 1998 until 2003 to thus place her on forced leave during the first semester
of school year 2003-2004; and that while on forced leave, all benefits due her would be suspended
following Section 7.7 of the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between respondent and the
Union of Faculty and Employees of Saint Louis University.
In the same letter of May 23, 2003, petitioner was advised that "before the lapse of thirty (30) days prior
to the end of the First Semester . . . or on or before 12 September 2003," she should "inform in writing .
. . [her] readiness and availability to teach during the Second Semester . . ."
The above-cited CBA provision reads:
Section 7.7. For teaching employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation, the following provisions
shall apply:
(a) Teaching employees who are retained for three (3) cumulative years in five (5) years, shall be on
forced leave for one (1) regular semester during which period all benefits due them shall be suspended;
(b) Teaching employees who obtain evaluation ratings below 80 for three (3) cumulative years in five (5)
years shall be terminated.3 (italics and underscoring supplied)
Under the guidelines for Faculty Promotion of respondent’s Handbook,4 a faculty member is "retained in
rank if he does not obtain the required rating for that particular rank." And under respondent’s
Evaluation Manual,5 a faculty member is evaluated on the basis of his rank.
Petitioner had the following performance record for the 5-year period preceding the notice for her to go
on forced leave:
School Over-all Required Remarks Faculty Rank
Year Rating Minimum
Evaluation
1998- 85.50 86 Retained Asst. Professor III+
99
1999- 85 86 Retained Asst. Professor III+
2000
2000- 87 86 Passed Asst. Professor III+
2001 but
maximum
rank
obtained
2001- 90.50 86 Passed Asst. Professor III+ and was later
2002 but adjusted to Associate Professor I-1*
maximum owing to the passing of the BAR
rank exam
obtained
2002- 85 87 Retained Associate Professor I-2**
2003
* Faculty rank effective 1 April 2002 until 31 May 2002
** Faculty rank for SY 2002-2003 due [for] having passed the evaluation of SY 2002-2002.6 (underscoring
supplied)
Before the first semester of the 2003-2004 school year began or in June 2003, petitioner attempted to
report for work, but as she was placed on forced leave, she was not given any teaching load.7
Petitioner thereupon filed on June 5, 2003 a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement, backwages, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and payment of service
incentive leave before the Regional Arbitration Branch, Cordillera Administrative Region of the National
Labor Relations Commission.8 The Executive Labor Arbiter, for lack of jurisdiction, was later to refer the
case to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board by Order of January 19, 2005.
By letter of October 13, 2003,9 respondent’s Personnel Officer advised petitioner that a 24-unit load had
been prepared for her for the second semester of the school year 2003-2004 "which starts on
November 3, 2003," but that despite its letter of May 23, 2003, it had not received any communication
from her. She was thus required to signify in writing her intention to resume teaching duties "on or
before the end of October 2003" failing which her teaching load would be assigned to "other qualified
and available faculty."10
As no word was received from petitioner, respondent sent her another letter of November 8, 200311 the
pertinent portions of which read:
xxxx
Despite all these efforts, you failed to report for work. We urge you to come. We shall give you up till
Nov. 10, 2003. Otherwise we will be constrained to assign your load to other teachers.
Since your forced leave is finished, we ask you to come and continue your teaching function this Second
Semester.
x x x x12 (underscoring supplied)
Still later, respondent sent petitioner another letter of November 12, 200313 asking her to explain in
writing within 48 hours why she should not be deemed to have abandoned her work, and a final letter
dated November 28, 200314giving her an opportunity to report for work within five days from receipt
and to explain in writing within the same period why she should not be terminated due to
abandonment.
Petitioner never ever responded to respondent’s letters, hence, she was, by letter of December 6,
2003,15dismissed for abandonment.
Before the Voluntary Arbitrator designated to handle the case, the following issues were raised:
1. The legality of dismissal of complainant due to abandonment;
2. The validity of forced leave imposed upon complainant for one semester; and
3. . . . [Whether] due process [was] observed by Respondent.16
The Arbiter, by Decision of July 11, 2005,17 declared the earlier-quoted Article 7, Section 7 of the CBA to
be void, viz:
It is elementary that a contract that contravenes a policy, which confers a juridical relation to which it
refers shall be void. The CBA may not interpret or expand the provisions of the Evaluation Manual that
will make it prejudicial to the interests of the persons referred to in the evaluation
manual…18 (underscoring supplied)
xxxx
The Evaluation Manual manifests the will of the University in its educational policy in the ranking and
promoting members of its faculty. The CBA as a labor contract may not contravene the policy of the
University where it does not impose a penalty other than what the University manifests in that the
failure of a faculty member in his performance within a five year period of which he has failed to meet
the minimum rating for three (3) cumulative years will not be promoted but retained in rank only. The
CBA states otherwise as it adds a penal provision that said faculty member shall be on forced leave, for
one regular semester and all his benefits suspended. Such penalty constitutes undue and unreasonable
restraint in the occupation of the faculty member and works hardship in his economic life as he will be
deprived of his only livelihood for one regular semester including any benefit owing to him during that
period.19 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And he noted that petitioner was not afforded due process, there being no showing that the twin
requirements of notice and hearing were complied with.20
Respecting the issue of abandonment, the Arbiter ruled that petitioner’s failure to report for work,
despite repeated notices from respondent, did not constitute abandonment, citing Samarca v. Arc-men
Industries, Inc.21 which held that to constitute abandonment, there must be clear proof of deliberate
and unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee relationship22 which, to the Arbiter, was wanting
in the case at bar. Hence, the Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of petitioner.
Thus the Arbiter disposed:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the clause in the CBA, Article 7, Section 7, Par. (a), imposing
forced leave for one regular semester during which period all benefits due the, will be suspended
is declared void, and Respondent is ordered to reinstate Complainant to her former position without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges; to pay her backwages from the time it was withheld from
her to the time of her actual reinstatement; to pay moral damages of ₱50,000.00; exemplary damages
ay ₱25,000.00 and attorney’s fees pf 10% of the total sum awarded to Complainant.23 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
On respondent’s Petition for Review,24 the Court of Appeals, by Decision of May 23, 2006,25 reversed the
Arbiter’s decision, holding that the Arbiter breached the bounds of his authority by nullifying Sec. 7.7 of
the CBA.26 To the appellate court, the Arbiter’s authority to settle labor disputes is confined only to the
proper interpretation and implementation of the CBA provisions,27 citing Art. 261 of the Labor Code
which provides:
ART. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. – The Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies…
The appellate court went on to hold that, assuming arguendo that the Arbiter has authority to nullify the
provisions of the CBA, the questioned provision is not contrary to law.
Citing Peña v. National Labor Relations Commission,28 the Court of Appeals upheld the prerogative of a
school to maintain high standards of efficiency for its teachers, quality education being a mandate of the
Constitution, and to dismiss teachers who fail to attain reasonable work goals set by it.29
Respecting the issue of abandonment, the appellate court found that petitioner had indeed abandoned
her job, she having failed to report back for work despite several notices for her to do so, the pendency
of her complaint for illegal dismissal not being a valid excuse therefor.
Contrary to the Arbiter’s finding, the Court of Appeals declared that petitioner was afforded ample
opportunity to contest the ratings she had been given, citing Peña which held that a university’s act of
informing faculty members of their ratings after every evaluation period and inviting them to examine
their grades and discuss them with their evaluators amounts to sufficient compliance with the due
process requirement.30
Nonetheless, the appellate court, passing on the above-quoted provision of Section 7 of Article 7 of the
CBA, held that there was doubt on its proper interpretation, particularly when the five-year period in the
phrase "three (3) cumulative years in five (5) years" should be reckoned.
Resolving the doubt in petitioner’s favor, the appellate court held:
. . . We are of the impression that the matter of forced leave for teachers who failed thrice in the
evaluation within a five year span should be co-terminous with, and anchored on the particular
CBA from which it draws its breathing force. Emphasis should be placed on the fact that the provision
for the six month forced leave is exclusively of contractual origin as the same is found nowhere else but
in the parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement, having been introduced for the first time in the 1996-
2001 CBA and reiterated in the 2001-2006 CBA. Indeed, although some provisions may have been
reproduced from the old bargaining agreement, still, every bargaining agreement remains a separate
pact between the employer and its employees. Hence, one should be construed independently of the
other.
Again, it is because there are doubts engendered by the CBA as regards the reckoning period of five
years mentioned under Sec. 7.7 thereof that we are inclined to declare the suspension of the
respondent as illegal.
. . . [J]udicial partiality to workers on occasions of doubt in labor agreements is not a dictate of whim,
but of a need to safeguard the interest of an underprivileged sector. The legal tie that binds labor and
capital are not merely contractual in character. It is because the morally disadvantaged employee very
seldom has the upper hand in the bargaining table that gray areas in labor contracts are customarily
interpreted to his benefit.31 (citation omitted; italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the matter of damages, the appellate court set aside the Arbiter’s award to petitioner of moral
damages, her dismissal by respondent on account of an "erroneous interpretation" of the CBA provision
having been attended with good faith.32 The appellate court accordingly deleted the award of exemplary
damages.
Noting that that was the first offense of petitioner who had devoted 20 years of service during which
she was cited for her contributions to respondent,33 the appellate court awarded petitioner separation
pay following Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC34 which held:
There should be no question that where it comes to such valid but not iniquitous causes as failure to
comply with work standards, the grant of separation pay to the dismissed employee maybe both just
and compassionate, particularly if he has worked for some time with the company.35
Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision
rendered by the Voluntary Arbitrator dated July 11, 205 is hereby declared null and void, and a new one
is entered declaring the respondent to have been illegally suspended, but nonetheless validly dismissed.
Accordingly, the petitioner is ordered to pay the respondent all salaries and benefits that are due her for
the duration of her six month forced leave. Solely to satisfy the demands of equity, the petitioner is
likewise ordered to pay the respondent an amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of
service as separation pay.
SO ORDERED.36 (emphasis and italics in the original)
Her Motion for Reconsideration37 having been denied by Resolution of January 26, 2007,38 petitioner
filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, faulting the appellate court
A. . . . IN HOLDING PETITIONER TO HAVE ABANDONED HER WORK EVEN AND DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF
THE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL CASE PETITIONER FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENT.
B. . . . [IN HOLDING] THAT [PETITIONER] IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR[.]39
The petition fails.
Petitioner was, for five times, notified in writing by respondent to resume teaching for the second
semester of school year 2003-2004 following the service of her suspension during the first semester. She
was advised that a teaching load had already been prepared for her. Respondent never ever replied to
those notices.
Petitioner’s justification for her failure to respond to the notices – that her acceptance of the offer could
be constituted as a waiver of her claims – is not indeed a valid excuse.1avvphi1
At all events, petitioner contends that her filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal was a manifestation
of her desire to return to her job and negated any intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, citing Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission40 which held:
. . . Thus we cannot conceive how private respondent could abandon her job and give up the benefits
she has earned from years of hard work. Finally, her filing of an illegal dismissal case contradicts
petitioner’s allegations that she abandoned her job.41
Petitioner forgets that her complaint for "illegal dismissal" which she filed on June 5, 2003 sprang, not
from her dismissal on December 6, 2003 due to abandonment but, from her suspension during the first
semester of school year 2003-2004. While the filing of a complaint with a prayer for reinstatement
negates an intention to sever the employer-employee relationship,42 the same contemplates an action
made subsequent to dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

St. Louis University, Inc. v. Cobarrubias [G.R. No. 187104. August 03, 2010]
03
OCT
ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
EVANGELINE C. COBARRUBIAS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 187104. August 03, 2010]

FACTS:

Respondent is an associate professor of the petitioner and an active member of the union of faculty and
employees. The Collective Bargaining Agreements contained the following provision that for teaching
employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation, who are retained for three (3) cumulative years in
five (5) years, shall be on forced leave for one (1) regular semester during which period all benefits due
them shall be suspended. Petitioner placed respondent on forced leave for failing to achieve the
required rating points. Respondent sought recourse from the CBA’s grievance machinery, but to no
avail. Respondent filed a case with DOLE but circulation and mediation again failed. The parties
submitted the issues between them for voluntary arbitration before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA).
Respondent argued that the CA already resolved the forced leave issue in a prior case between the
parties, ruling that the forced leave for teachers who fail their evaluation for three (3) times within a
five-year period should be coterminous with the CBA in force during the same five-year period.
Petitioner argued that said CA decision is not yet final. The VA dismissed the complaint. Respondent
filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court but failed to pay the filing fees
and to attach the material portion of the records. Motion for reconsideration was filed, complying with
the procedural lapses, and CA reinstated the petition.

ISSUES:

Remedial Law

(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating respondent’s petition despite her failure to
appeal (docket) fee within the reglementary period.

RULINGS:

Remedial Law

(1) Yes. The CA erred in its ruling. Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus,
appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by law. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for
review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing
of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-
compliance with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the petition’s dismissal.
Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also
jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without which, the decision appealed from would become
final and executory as if no appeal has been filed. Here, the docket fees were paid late, and without
payment of the full docket fees, Cobarrubias’ appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period.

There are, however, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately
paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence
of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar, legal and
equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
(12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all
the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality,
to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.

NOTE: There is no justiciable issue here in Labor Law.

GIPA VS SLI (G.R. NO.177425 JUNE 18, 2014)

Gipa vs Southern Luzon Institute
G.R. No.177425 June 18, 2014

Facts: On February 26, 1996, respondent Southern Luzon Institute (SLI), an educational institution in
Bulan, Sorsogon, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Damages against
petitioners Alonzo Gipa, Imelda Marollano, Juanito Ludovice, Demar Bitangcor, Virgilio Gojit, Felipe
Montalban and four others namely, Arturo Rogacion, Virgilio Gracela, Rosemarie Alvarez and Rosita
Montalban (Rosita). During trial, defendant Rosita executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of her
sister Daisy M. Placer (Placer) authorizing the latter to represent her in the case and to sign any and all
papers in relation thereto.
Finding SLI to have proven its ownership of the property by preponderance of evidence, the RTC
rendered a Decision in its favor on January 5, 2005.
Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a Notice of Appeal which was granted by the RTC in its Order of
January 27, 2005. The CA, however, dismissed the appeal in its Resolution of August 26, 2005 since it
was not shown that the appellate court docket fees and other lawful fees were paid. Petitioners and
their co-defendants promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which they attached a Certification
from the RTC that they paid the appeal fee in the amount of₱3,000.00 under Official Receipt No.
18091130 dated January 25, 2005. In view of this, the CA granted the said motion and consequently
reinstated the appeal through a Resolution dated November 2, 2005. Subsequently, however, the CA
further required petitioners and their codefendants, through a Minute Resolution dated March 1, 2006,
to remit within ten days from notice the amount of ₱30.00 for legal research fund, which apparently
was not included in the ₱3,000.00 appeal fee previously paid by them. Copy of the said resolution was
received on March 13,2006 by petitioners‘ counsel, Atty. Jose G. Gojar of the Public Attorney‘s Office.
Despite the lapse of nine months from their counsel‘s receipt of the said resolution, petitioners and their
co-defendants, however, failed to comply with the CA‘s directive. Hence, the said court dismissed the
appeal through its Resolution of December 20, 2006. Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a Motion
for Reconsideration invoking the principle of liberality in the application of technical rules considering
that they have paid the substantial amount of ₱3,000.00 for docket and other legal fees and fell short
only by the meager amount of ₱30.00. As compliance, they attached to the said motion a postal money
order in the sum of ₱30.00 payable to the Clerk of Court of the CA. The CA, however, was not swayed,
hence, the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution of March 30, 2007.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the appeal for the nonpayment of the ₱30.00.
Held: No. Payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and lawful fees is mandatory and
jurisdictional; Relaxation of the rule on payment of appeal fee is unwarranted in this case.
Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the
full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal.
In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, as with other subsequent cases of the same ruling, the Court explained
that the procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of
the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It
bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from a
decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this
period, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. The requirement of paying the full
amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of
an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes
final and executory. Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its
own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the
full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original
and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees.
Suffice it to say that “[c]oncomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.”
Those who seek exemption from the application of the rule have the burden of proving the existence of
exceptionally meritorious reason warranting such departure. Petitioners‘ failure to advance any
explanation as to why they failed to pay the correct docket fees or to complete payment of the same
within the period allowed by the CA is thus fatal to their cause. Hence, a departure from the rule on the
payment of the appeal fee is unwarranted. Neither do the cases cited by petitioners help because they
are not in point. Unlike in this case, the CA in Camposagrado no longer required the petitioners therein
to complete the payment of the appeal fee by remitting the ₱5.00 deficiency but just dismissed the
appeal outright. Moreover, a justifiable reason for the insufficient payment was tendered by petitioners
in the said case, i.e., that they relied on the assessment made by the collection officer of the court and
honestly believed that the amount collected from them was that which is mandated by the Rules.