PROPERTY business of providing telecommunication or telephone
service are personal properties capable of
I. CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
A. Preliminary Provisions
Things – it is broader in scope for it includes both
appropriable and non – appropriable objects.
Property – it is considered as an object, is that which
is, or may be, appropriated.
REQUISITES or CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPERTY:
a. Utility for the satisfaction of moral or
economic want.
b. Susceptibility of appropriation.
c. Individuality or substantivity – it can exist by
itself, not merely as a part of a whole.
CLASSIFICATION OF THINGS ACCORDING TO
APPROPRIABILTY:
a. Res Nullius (belonging to no one) – these things
belong to no one, and the reason is that they
have not been appropriated or because they have
been abandoned and the owner has no intention
of owning them.
b. Res Communes (belonging to everyone) – they
are common property and are really owned by
everybody in that their use and enjoyment are
given to all of mankind.
c. Res Alicujus (belonging to someone) – these are
objects, tangible or intangible, which are owned
privately, either in a collective or individual
capacity.
May Rights be considered as Property? Yes. They may
be Real or Personal.
Real rights – the right or interest belonging to a
person over a specific thing without a definite passive
subject against whom such right may be personally
enforced.
Personal rights – the right or power of a person to
demand from another as a definite passive subject,
the fulfillment of the latter’s obligation.
Simply put, real rights are those that one has against
everyone and may be enforced against the whole
world. On the other hand, personal rights are those
that one has against another and may be enforced
only on the same person.
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY:
Art. 414: All things which are or may be the object of
appropriation are considered either:
(1) Immovable or real property; or
(2) Movable or personal property.
IMPORTANCE OF CLASSIFICATION:
The classification of property into immovable or
movables is from the fact that different provisions of
the law governs the acquisition, possession,
disposition, loss, and registration of immovable and
movables.
MIXED PROPERTY or SEMI – MOVABLES: This refers
to movable properties which under certain conditions,
may be considered immovable by virtue of their being
attached to an immovable for certain specified
purposes.
Laurel v. Abrogar [G.R. No. 155076, 13 January
2009]
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
filed a complaint for theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code against Baynet Co., Ltd.
(Baynet). PLDT alleged that Baynet offered phone
cards to people in Japan to call their friends and
relatives in the Philippines using PLDT's facilities and
equipment. PLDT alleges that international calls and
appropriation and can be objects of theft. Petitioner
Laurel questions the validity of the Amended
Information alleging among others that it does not
contain material allegations as to the object taken.
The Court held that the business of providing
telecommunication and telephone service are
personal property under Article 308 of the RPC and
act of engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR)
is an act of subtraction penalized under the said
article. However, the Amended Information describes
the thing taken as, international long distance calls,
and only later mentions stealing the business from
PLDT as the manner by which the gain was derived by
the accused. Case was remanded to the trial court to
further amend the information.
Leung Yee vs Strong Machinery Co. [G.R. No. L-
11658, 15 February 1918]
The Compania Agricola Filipina (CAF) purchased from
Strong Machinery Co. rice–cleaning machines which
CAF installed in one of its buildings. As security for
the purchase price, CAF executed a chattel mortgage
on the machines and the building on which they had
been installed. When CAF failed to pay, the registered
mortgage was foreclosed and Strong Machinery Co.
purchased the building. This sale was annotated in
the Chattel Mortgage Registry. Later, Strong
Machinery Co. also purchased from Agricola the lot on
which the building was constructed. The sale wasn't
registered in the Registry of Property BUT Strong
Machinery Co. took possession of the building and the
lot. However, the same building had been previously
purchased by Leung Yee, a creditor of Agricola, at a
sheriff's sale despite his knowledge of the prior sale in
favor of Strong Machinery Co.. The sale to Leung Yee
was registered in the Registry of Property. The Court
held that while the property was registered under the
Chattel Mortgage Act, it does not change the nature
of the property. Since the building is REAL PROPERTY,
its sale as annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry
cannot be given the legal effect of registration in the
Registry of Real Property. The mere fact that the
parties decided to deal with the building as personal
property does not change its character as real
property.
Prudential Bank vs. Panis [G.R. No. 50008, 31
August 1988]
In the enumeration of properties under Art. 415, the
inclusion of “building” separate and distinct from the
land, in said provision of law, can only mean that a
building is by itself an immovable property. While a
mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence
of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings,
still a building by itself may be mortgaged apart from
the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage
would still be a real estate mortgage for the building
would still be considered immovable property even if
dealt with separately and apart from the land.
Possessory rights, thus, over buildings before title is
vested on the grantee may be validly transferred or
conveyed as in a deed of mortgage.
People’s Bank and Trust Co. vs. Dahican Lumber
Co. [G.R. No. L-17500, 16 May 1967]
Several parcels of land were the objects of a real
estate mortgage. The mortgage deed also stated that
the mortgage included essential after-acquired
properties such as machinery, fixtures, tools and
equipment. The real mortgage was then registered as
such in the Registry of Deeds. The Court held that the
deed need not be registered in the chattel mortgage
registry insofar as it covered the after-acquired
machinery, fixtures, tools and equipment. The after-
acquired properties had been immobilized by
destination.
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 1
Board of Assessment Appeals v. MERALCO [G.R.
No. L-15334. January 31, 1964]
Are steel towers or poles of MERALCO considered real
or personal properties? The Court held that they are
personal because a) they do not come under Par. 1 of
Art. 415 because they are neither building nor
constructions adhered to the soil; b) they do not
come under Par. 3 because they are not attached to
an immovable in a fixed manner, that is, they can be
separated without breaking the material or causing
deterioration of the object to which they are attached;
c) they do not come under Par. 5 because they are
not machineries, receptacles, or instruments, but
even if they are not intended for an industry to be
carried on the premises.
B. Immovable Property
Article 415: The following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all
kinds adhered to the soil;
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are
attached to the land or form an integral part of an
immovable;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed
manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object;
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use
or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by
the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it
reveals the intention to attach them permanently to
the tenements;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land , and which tend directly
to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish
ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in case
their owner has placed them or preserves them with
the intention to have them permanently attached to
the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the
animals in these places are included;
(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter
thereof forms part of the bed, and waters either
running or stagnant;
(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are
intended by their nature and object to remain at a
fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and
other real rights over immovable property.
Immovable property are those enumerated in Article
15.
CLASSIFICATION OF REAL PROPERTIES:
a. Real property by nature – like trees and
plants
b. Real property by incorporation – like a
building
c. Real property by destination or purpose – like
machinery placed by the owner of a tenement
on it for direct use in an industry to be carried
on therein
d. Real property by analogy – like the right of
usufrust, or a contract for public works
KINDS OF REAL PROPERTIES:
Par. 1: Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all
kinds adhered to the soil
- A building is a real property because it is a
permanent structure and adheres to the land and
soil it is situated.
- A real estate mortgage of land includes the
building unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary.
- Once a house is demolished, its character as an
immovable ceases. Thus, in an action for
damages, it does not involve title to real property.
Par 2: Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they
are attached to the land or form an integral part of an
immovable
- Trees and plants are considered real property, by
nature if they are the spontaneous products of the
soil, and by incorporation, if they were planted
thru labor.
- They derive their existence or sustenance from
the soil.
- The grown crops cease to be real property when
harvested because they are to be sold and does
not permanently adhere to the soil.
Par 3: Everything attached to an immovable in a
fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated there from without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object.
Par 4: Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for
use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands
by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that
it reveals the intention to attach them permanently to
the tenements
- It is considered real property by incorporation if
there is a permanent intent to attach the
property, absent which it is considered personal
property.
- If placed by a person who is not the owner, the
object will not attain the character of immovable
unless such person acts as the agent of the
owner.
Par 5: Machinery, receptacles, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly
to meet the needs of the said industry or works
Essential Requisites:
a. The placing must be made by the owner of the
tenement, his agent, or duly authorized legal
representative.
b. The industry or works must be carried on in the
building or on the land.
c. The machines, etc., must tend directly to meet
the needs of said industry or works.
d. The machines must be essential and principal
elements in the industry, and not merely
incidental.
Par 6: Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish
ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in case
their owner has placed them or preserves them with
the intention to have them permanently attached to
the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the
animals in these places are included
- Animals are deemed as real property if the houses
they reside in are also considered real property.
- Animals that are the subject of a contract of sale
are deemed personal property.
- Animals that are temporarily outside with an
intent to return are still real property.
Par 7: Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land
- When the fertilizer is still in the bags, it’s still
considered personal property.
Par 8: Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the
matter thereof forms part of the bed, and waters
either running or stagnant
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 2
- Mines, Quarries, and Slag Dumps including the
minerals that are still attached thereto are
considered as real property.
Par 9: Docks and structures which, though floating,
are intended by their nature and object to remain at a
fixed place on a river, lake, or coast
- A floating house tied to a shore or bank post and
used as a residence is considered real property,
considering that the “waters” on which it floats,
are considered immovable.
- Although ships or vessels are considered personal
property (because they can be moved from place
to place), they partake of the nature and
condition of real property on account of their
value and importance in the world of commerce.
Par 10: Contracts for public works, and servitudes
and other real rights over immovable property
- The piece of paper on which the contract for
public works has been written is necessarily
personal property, but the contract itself, or
rather, the right to the contract , is real property.
Standard Oil Co. vs. Jaranillo [G.R. No. L-20329,
16 March 1923]
De la Rosa, who was renting a parcel of land in
Manila, constructed a building of strong materials
thereon, which she conveyed to plaintiff by way of
chattel mortgage. When the mortgagee was
presenting the deed to the Register of Deeds of
Manila for Register of Deeds of Manila for registration
in the Chattel Mortgage Registry, Joaquin Jaranillo,
the Registrar refused to allow the registration on the
ground that the building was a real property, and
therefore could not be the subject of a valid chattel
mortgage. The Court held that the deed be registered
in the chattel mortgage registry. The Registrar's duty
is MINISTERIAL in character. There is no legal
provision conferring upon him any judicial or quasi-
judicial power to determine or qualify the nature of
the document presented before him. The
determination of the nature of the property lies with
the courts of justice, and not by the Register of
Deeds. Moreover, the act of recording a chattel
mortgage operates as constructive notice of the
existence of the contract, and the legal effects of the
contract must be discovered in the instrument itself in
relation with the fact of notice.
It should also be noted that under given conditions
property may have character different from that
imputed in said articles. Parties to a contract may, by
agreement, treat as personal property that which by
nature would be real property. It is undeniable that
the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as
personal property that which by nature would be a
real property, as long as no interest of third parties
would be prejudiced thereby. However, it should be
reiterated that the determination of the nature of the
property, with reference to the placing of the
document on record, is neither a function nor an
authority granted to the Registrar of the Registry of
Deeds.
Serg’s Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing and
Finance, Inc. [G.R. No. 137705, 22 August 2000]
The machines that were subjects of the Writ of
seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built
on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential
and principal elements of their chocolate-making
industry. Hence, although each of them was movable
or personal property on its own, all of them have
become immobilized by destination because they are
essential and principal elements in the industry. In
that sense petitioners are correct in arguing that the
said machines are real property pursuant to Article
415 (5) of the Civil Code. But the Court disagrees
with the submission of the petitioners that the said
machines are not proper subject of the Writ of
Seizure. The Court has held that contracting parties
may validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal. After agreeing to such
stipulation, they are consequently stopped from
claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppels, a
party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from
denying the truth of any material fact found therein.
Clearly then, petitioners are stopped from denying the
characterization of the subject machines as personal
property. Under circumstances, they are proper
subjects of the Writ of Seizure. It should be stressed,
however, that the Court’s holding-that the machines
should be deemed personal property pursuant to the
Lease Agreement is good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned. Hence, while the
parties are bound by the Agreement, third persons
acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation
characterizing the subject machinery as personal. In
any event, there is no showing that any specific third
party would be adversely affected.
Piansay vs. David [G.R. No. L-19468, 30 October
1964]
David secured a loan from Vda. De Uy Kim, and to
secure the payment, he executed a chattel mortgage
over a house in favor of Kim. Due to failure to pay,
the chattel was foreclosed and Kim was the highest
bidder in the public auction. Kim then sold the house
to Mangubat. The latter then filed charges against
David for the collection of loan and praying that the
deed of sale issued by Kim in favor of Piansay be
declared null and void. The trial court held David
liable to Mangubat but dismissed the complaint with
regard Kim and Piansay. Kim and Piansay then filed
charges against David and Mangubat. Due to the civil
case, David demanded from Piansay the payment of
rentals for the use of the house, which the latter
claims to be his property. Regardless of the validity
of a contract constituting a chattel mortgage on a
house, as between the parties to the said contract,
the same cannot and doesn’t bind third persons who
aren’t parties to the aforementioned contract or their
privies. As a consequence, the sale of the house in
question in the proceedings for the sale of the house
in question in the proceedings for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of said chattel mortgage, is null and void
insofar as Mangubat is concerned and didn’t confer
upon Kim as buyer in said sale, any dominical right in
and to said house.
Caltex vs. Central Board of Assessment Appeals
& City Assessor of Pasay [G.R. No. L-50466, 31
May 1982]
Caltex loaned machines and equipment to gas station
operators under an appropriate lease agreement or
receipt. The lease contract stipulated that upon
demand, the operators shall return to Caltex the
machines and equipment in good condition as when
received, ordinary wear and tear. The lessor of the
land, where the gas station is located, does not
become the owner of the machines and equipment
installed therein. Caltex retains the ownership thereof
during the term of the lease. The City Assessor of
Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station
equipment and machinery as taxable realty. However,
the City Board of Tax Appeals ruled that they are
personalty. The Assessor appealed to the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals. The Board held on June
3, 1977 that the said machines are real property
within the meaning of Ses. 3(k) & (m) and 38 of the
Real Property Tax Code, PD 464, and that the Civil
Code definitions of real and personal property in
Articles 415 and 416 are not applicable in this case.
The subject machines and equipment are taxable
improvement and machinery within the meaning of
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 3
the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code,
because the same are necessary to the operation of
the gas station and have been
attached/affixed/embedded permanently to the gas
station site. Improvements on land are commonly
taxed as realty even though they might be considered
personalty.
Note: This case is also easily distinguishable from
Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Manila Electric Co.,
(119 Phil. 328) where Meralco's steel towers were
exempted from taxation. The steel towers were
considered personalty because they were attached to
square metal frames by means of bolts and could be
moved from place to place when unscrewed and
dismantled.
Philippine Refining Co., Inc. vs. Aboitiz & Co.
[G.R. No. L-41506, 25 March 1935]
Plaintiff Philippine Refining Co. and defendant Jarque
executed three mortgages on the motor vessels
Pandan and Zargazo. The documents were recorded
as transfer and encumbrances of the vessels for the
port of Cebu and each was denominated a chattel
mortgage. Are the mortgages of the vessels governed
by the Chattel Mortgage Law? Yes. “Personal
property” includes vessels. They are subject to the
provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. The Chattel
Mortgage Law says that a good chattel mortgage
includes an affidavit of good faith. The absence of
such affidavit makes mortgage unenforceable against
creditors and subsequent encumbrances.
Note: A mortgage on a vessel is generally like other
chattel mortgages. The only difference between a
chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage
of other personalty is that the first must be noted in
the registry of the register of deeds.
C. Movable Property
CLASSES OF MOVABLE or PERSONAL PROPERTY:
Art. 416: The following things are deemed to be
personal property:
(1) Those movables susceptible of appropriation
which are not included in the preceding article;
(2) Real property which by any special provision of
law is considered as personal;
(3) Forces of nature which are brought under control
by science; and
(4) In general, all things which can be transported
from place to place without impairment of the real
property to which they are fixed.
Art. 417: The following are also considered as
personal property:
(1) Obligations and actions which have for their object
movables or demandable sums; and
(2) Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and
industrial entities, although they may have real
estate.
Three tests to determine whether a particular object
is movable property or not:
1. Whether they can be transported or carried
from place to place;
2. Whether such change of location can be made
without injuring the immovable to which the
object may be attached;
3. Whether the object does not fall within any of
the ten cases enumerated in Article 415.
Incorporeal Property – rights
Corporeal Property – Material things
Sibal vs. Valdez [G.R. No. L-26278, 4 August
1927]
In a case brought by plaintiff against defendant, the
latter won. For the purpose of satisfying the judgment
won by the defendant, the sheriff attached the
sugarcane that was then growing on the lots of the
plaintiff. Said lots incidentally had already been
previously attached by another judgment creditor of
the plaintiff. Within the one-year period given by law
for redemption, the plaintiff wanted to redeem the
lots from one creditor, and the sugarcane from the
other creditor. The lots were redeemed, the
redemption of the sugar cane was however refused by
the defendant, who contended that the sugarcane
was personal property and therefore could not be the
subject of the legal redemption sought to be
enforced. The plaintiff claimed that the sugarcane was
real property. The Court held that the sugarcane must
be regarded as personal property for the purposes of
the Chattel Mortgage Law and also for purposes of
attachment.
CONSUMABLES or NON-CONSUMABLES; FUNGIBLES
or NON-FUNGIBLES
Art. 418: Movable property is either consumable or
non-consumable. To the first class belong those
movables which cannot be used in a manner
appropriate to their nature without their being
consumed; to the second class belong all the others.
Consumable – this cannot be used according to its
nature without it being consumed.
Non – Consumable – any other kind of movable
property.
Fungible – replaceable by an equal quality and
quantity.
Non – fungible – irreplaceable and identical objects
must be returned.
D. Property in Relation to Whom it Belongs
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY ACCORDING TO
OWNERSHIP
Art. 419: Property is either of public dominion or of
private ownership.
In the absence of any showing to the contrary,
property is presumed to be State property.
PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION
Art. 420: The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others
of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth.
Public dominion means ownership by the State in that
the State has control and administration.
i. Kinds
a. For public use – like roads and canals.
b. For public service – like national government
buildings, army rifles, and army vessels.
c. For the development of national wealth – like
our natural resources.
ii. Characteristics
- They are outside the commerce of man, and
cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object
of any contract.
- They cannot be acquired by prescription.
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 4
- They cannot be registered under the Land
Registration Law and be the subject of a Torrens
Title.
- They cannot be levied upon by execution, nor can
they be attached.
- They can be used by everybody
- They may be either real or personal property, for
it will be noted that the law here makes no
distinction.
iii. Those of Similar Character
- Public Streams
- Natural beds of river
- River channels
- Waters of rivers
- Creeks – is no other than an arm extending
from a river.
Harty v. Municipality of Victoria, [G.R. No. 5013,
11 March, 1909] 11, 1909)
The representative of Archbishop Harty filed a
complaint against the municipality of Victoria for
unlawfully and forcibly seizing the plaza of the church
of Victoria. He alleged that the parish acquired the
said parcel of land more than 60 years ago and had
continued to possess the same ever since up to 1901.
The municipality denied all the facts stated. It alleged
that the plaza was founded when the sitio
denominated Canarum, a barrio of the town of Tarlac,
was converted into a civil town in 1855; that the
parish of Tarlac was established many years after the
civil town, and that therefore, it neither had then, nor
has now any title to the plaza claimed. It had not
been satisfactorily shown that the municipality of
Victoria had donated the whole of said land to the
curate of Victoria or to the Catholic Church. Neither
could it have been donated since it is a public plaza
destined to public use and not private
ownership/patrimony of the municipality. The plaza
had been used without hindrance by the public and
the residents of the town of Victoria ever since its
creation. That both the curates and the
gobernadorcillos of the said town procured fruit trees
and plants to be set out in the plaza, did not
constitute an act of private ownership, but evidences
the public use. Therefore, the plaza is of public use
and the municipality is absolved of the complaint.
Manila International Airport Authority vs. CA
[G.R. No. 155650, 20 July 2006]
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax
Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the
taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax
delinquency was estimated at P624 million. The City
of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued
notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport
Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the
Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay
the real estate tax delinquency because Section 193
of the LGC expressly withdrew the tax exemption
privileges of MIAA.
The Court held that MIAA is not a government-owned
or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the
National Government and thus exempt from local
taxation. MIAA is a government instrumentality
vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its
governmental functions. MIAA is like any other
government instrumentality, the only difference is
that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.
Airport Lands and Buildings are also of Public
Dominion. No one can dispute that properties of
public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil
Code, like “roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State,” are owned by the
State. The term “ports” includes seaports and
airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings
constitute a “port” constructed by the State. Under
Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands
and Buildings are properties of public dominion and
thus owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are
devoted to public use because they are used by the
public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects
terminal fees and other charges from the public does
not remove the character of the Airport Lands and
Buildings as properties for public use.
The Court has also ruled that property of public
dominion, being outside the commerce of man,
cannot be the subject of an auction sale. Properties of
public dominion, being for public use, are not subject
to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or
private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or
auction sale of any property of public dominion is void
for being contrary to public policy. Essential public
services will stop if properties of public dominion are
subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction
sale. This will happen if the City of Parañaque can
foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-
hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real
estate tax. Further, Sec 234 of the LGC provides that
real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines
or any of its political subdivisions except when the
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person
following are exempted from payment of the real
property tax.
However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings
that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt
from real estate tax. For example, the land area
occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to private
corporations is subject to real estate tax.
Bishop of Calbayog v. Director of Lands [G.R.
No. L-23481, 29 June 1972]
The Bishop of Calbayog, as a sole corporation, filed a
petition for registration alleging open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession, since the Spanish
regime, of three parcels of land. The Municipality of
Catarman opposed the petition contending that
Nalazon St., traversing Lot I and Lot 2, is a public
thoroughfare and Lot 2, a public plaza, should
therefore be excluded from the application for
registration filed by the Church. Neither the Church
nor the municipality was able to present positive
proof of ownership or exclusive possession for an
appreciable period of time. The only undisputed fact
was the free and continuous use of Lot 2 by the
residents of Catarman, coupled with the fact that the
town had no public plaza other than the disputed
parcel of land. Thus, there was a strong presumption
that the land was segregated as a public plaza upon
the founding of the municipality of Catarman. Nalazon
St., traversing Lots 1 and 2, was originally merely a
trail used by the parishioners in going to and from the
church. But since 1910, when it was opened and
improved as a public thoroughfare by the
municipality, it had been continuously used as such
by the townspeople of Catarman without objection
from the Church authorities. The street does not stop
on Lot I but extends north toward the sea, passing
along the lot occupied by the Central Elementary
School and the Northern Samar General Hospital.
Thus it is clear that Nalazon St. inside Lot 1 is used by
the residents not only in going to the church but to
the public school and the general hospital north of Lot
1. Therefore, Lot 2 and the Nalazon St., being public
dominions cannot be subject to registration.
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 5
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Director of Lands
[G.R. No. 150824, 4 February 2008]
On September 26, 1969, an original certificate of title
was issue in favor of Bugayong, which emanated from
a sales patent issued in Bugayong's name on
September 22, 1969. The original certificate of title
was cancelled and was replaced by 4 transfer
certificate of titles, all in the name of Bugayong.
Bugayong then sold all 4 lots to different people. One
of the lots was sold to the spouses Du. Afterwards,
Du divided the land into 2 lots. One of the lots was
sold to Lourdes Farms, Inc., who then mortgaged the
property to Land Bank of the Philippines. The validity
of the original certificate of title was then question by
some residents of the land who filed a formal petition
before the Bureau of Lands. The Bureau of Lands
found out that at the time the sales patent was issued
to Bugayong, the land was still classified as a forest
zone; it was declared as alienable and disposable land
only on March 25, 1981. Forest lands cannot be
owned by private persons and is not registrable under
the land registration law. Thus, the original certificate
of title is invalid as it was issued when the land was
still classified as a forest zone.
The subject land, being a public domain, cannot be
encumbered, attached, or be the subject to levy and
sold at public auction to satisfy a judgment. Hence,
the mortgage agreement is invalid.
iv. Alienation of Public Agricultural Lands
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified
and alienated by the State to a private person, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit [G.R.
No. 144057, 17 January 2005]
On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for
registration of title of a parcel of land. The
application sought a judicial confirmation of imperfect
title over the land. The public prosecutor, appearing
for the government, and Angeles opposed the
petition. The court issued an order of general default
against the whole world except as to Angeles and the
government. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest
had occupied the land openly and in the concept of
owner without any objection from any private person
or even the government until she filed her application
for registration. The OSG argued that the property
which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession
must first be alienable. Since the subject land was
declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit
could not have maintained a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since
prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or
disposable. The OSG suggested an interpretation that
all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would
not be susceptible to original registration, no matter
the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant.
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title under Section 14(1)
– that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; that the
applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1)
of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes
the government from giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of
the situation would even be aggravated considering
that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet
even considered an independent state. The more
reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered
as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its
v. Patrimonial Property
Art. 421: All other property of the State, which is not
of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.
Art. 422: Property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State.
Patrimonial property – is the property of the State
owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity, i.e.,
the property is NOT intended for public use, or for
some public service, or for the development of the
national wealth.
- These properties may be acquired by private
individuals or juridical persons through
prescription and can be the object of an
ordinary contract.
- There must be a formal declaration of the
government that the property of the State is
no longer needed for public use or for public
service before the same can be classified as
patrimonial or private property of the State.
Examples: incomes or rents of the State, vacant lands
with unknown owners, donated to the government,
slaughter houses, public markets
Faustino Ignacio vs Director of Lands [G.R. No.
L-12958, 30 May 1960]
Ignacio applied for the registration of a parcel of a
mangrove land in Rizal. It was stated in the
application that he owned the parcel by right of
accretion. The director of land opposed the
registration for the reason that the land to be
registered is an area of public domain and that the
applicant nor his predecessor-in-interest possessed
sufficient title for the land. The parcel of land applied
was acquired from the government by the virtue of a
free patent title. However, the land in question was
formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by
the action of the Manila bay. The petition was denied
by the lower court and decided that the land to be
registered are part of the public domain. The Court
held that accretions are still part of public domain.
Until there is a formal declaration of reclassification of
land should come from the government, specifically
from the executive department or the legislature.
These bodies should declare that a land in question is
no longer needed for public use, some public use or
for the improvement of national wealth.
Manila Lodge 761 v. CA [G.R. No. L-41001, 30
September 1976]
On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted
Act No. 1360 which authorized the City of Manila to
reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The reclaimed area
was to form part of the Luneta extension. The Act
provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property
of the City of Manila" and that the City of Manila is
authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land
formed by the Luneta extension at the north end for a
hotel site, and to lease the same, with the approval of
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 6
the Governor General, to a responsible person or
corporation for a term not to exceed 99 years.
Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on
May 18, 1907 Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360,
so as to authorize the City of Manila either to lease or
to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site. The
registration was subject, however, to the
encumbrances mentioned in Article 39 of the Land
Registration Act as may be subsisting and "Subject to
the dispositions and conditions provided by Act No.
1360; and subject also to contracts of sale celebrated
and entered into by the City of Manila in favor of the
Army and Navy Club and Manila Lodge No. 761
Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks (BPOE for
short), dated 29th of December 1908 and16th of
January 1909.” On July 13, 1911, the City of Manila
conveyed 5,543.07 square meters of the reclaimed
area to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE on the basis
of which a transfer certificate of title was issued to the
latter over the " Parcel of land which is part of the
Luneta Extension, situated in the District of Ermita.”
The back of the title showed that the City of Manila
has the legal option to repurchase the said property
solely for public purpose. In January 1963 the BPOE
petitioned the CFI of Manila, Branch IV, for the
cancellation of the right of the City Manila to
repurchase the property. This petition was granted on
February 15, 1963. On November 19, 1963 the BPOE
sold for the sum of P4,700,000 the land together with
all the improvements thereon to the Tarlac
Development Corporation (TDC, for short) which paid
P1,700,000 as down payment and mortgaged to the
vendor the same realty to secure the payment of the
balance to be paid in quarterly installments. At the
time of the sale, there was no annotation of any
subsisting lien on the title to the property.
In June 1964 the City of Manila filed with the CFI of
Manila a petition for the reannotation of its right to
repurchase. The court, after hearing, issued an order,
dated November 19, 1964, directing the Register of
Deeds of the City of Manila to reannotate in toto the
entry regarding the right of the City of Manila to
repurchase the property after fifty years. From this
order TDC and BPOE appealed to this Court which on
July 31, 1968 affirmed the trial court's order of
reannotation, but reserved to TDC the right to bring
another action for the clarification of its rights. After
trial the court a quo rendered on July 14, 1972 its
decision finding the subject land to be part of the
"public park or plaza" and, therefore, part of the
public domain. The court consequently declared that
the sale of the subject land by the City of Manila to
Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was null and void; that
plaintiff TDC was a purchaser thereof in good faith
and for value from BPOE and can enforce its rights
against the latter; and that BPOE is entitled to
recover from the City of Manila whatever
consideration it had paid the latter.
Was the property subject of the action patrimonial
property of the City of Manila and not a park or plaza?
The Court ruled in the negative. We hold that it is of
public dominion, intended for public use. The
reclaimed area is an "extension to the Luneta in the
City of Manila." If the reclaimed area is an extension
of the Luneta, then it is of the same nature or
character as the old Luneta. Anent this matter, it has
been said that a power to extend or continue an act
or business cannot authorize a transaction that is
totally distinct. It is not disputed that the old Luneta
is a public park or plaza and it is so considered by
Section 859 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of
Manila. Hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be
also a public park or plaza and for public use.
Calapan Lumber Co. v. Community Sawmill [G.R.
No. L-166351, 30 June 1964]
Calapan Lumber Co. (Calapan) constructed a road and
bridge at its own expense with the knowledge and
consent of the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro.
Before the construction, the personnel of the Office
of the District Engineer surveyed the layout of the
road to be constructed, also at the expense of
Calapan. Calapan also secured and used road-right-
of-way agreements executed in his favor by the
owners of the several parcels of land traversed by the
said road. The road was used by the public without
any restriction except logging and lumber concerns,
which was questioned by Sawmill. The Court held that
the road was not private. Everything that Calapan did
for the construction of the road does not convert it
into a private property for the part of land where the
road was laid out and constructed are not owned by
Calapan. The owners also ceded their parts of the
land owned by them without consideration.
Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles
[G.R. No. L-40474, 28 August 1975]
The City Council of Cebu declared a parcel of land as
abandoned and authorized its sale through public
bidding. Cebu Oxygen was able to purchase the land
and petitioned for its registration. The Prosecutor
opposed and argued that the land is still part of the
public domain and cannot be registered. The City
Council of Cebu has the legislative power to close a
property or withdraw if for public use to form part of
the patrimonial property of the State.
vi. Properties of Political Subdivisions
Art. 423: The property of provinces, cities, and
municipalities is divided into property for public use
and patrimonial property.
Art. 424: Property for public use, in the provinces,
cities, and municipalities streets, consist of the
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the
squares, fountains, public works, promenades, and
public works for the public service paid for by said
provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is
patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Articles 423 and 424 speak of property for public use,
indicating that property for public service are
patrimonial. If such is intended for public service,
without being for public use, then it is of public
dominion.
- If the property has been intended for such
use or service and the city has not devoted it
to other uses or adopted any measure which
amounted to a withdrawal thereof from public
use or service, the same remains property for
public use or service.
vii. Properties of Private Ownership
Art. 425: Property of private ownership, besides the
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities,
and municipalities, consists of all property belonging
to private persons, either individually or collectively.
II. OWNERSHIP
A. Ownership in general
Art. 427: Ownership may be exercised over things or
rights.
Ownership – is that independent right of a person to
the exclusive enjoyment and control of a thing
including its disposition and recovery subject only to
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 7
the restrictions or limitations established by law and
the rights of others.
Kinds of Ownership:
1. Beneficial ownership – is the ownership
recognized b law and capable of being enforced in
court. Right to its enjoyment in one person where
the legal title is in another.
2 senses used:
a. To indicate the interest of a beneficiary in
trust property (also called equitable
ownership)
b. To refer to power of a shareholder of a
corporation to buy or sell, the shares though
the shareholder is not registered in the
corporation’s books as the owner.
2. Naked ownership – is the enjoyment of all the
benefits and privileges of ownership, as against
the bare title to property.
Rights of an Owner
i. Use, Possession, Fruits and Disposition
Art. 428: The owner has the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the
holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover
it.
a. Jus possidendi or right to possess – is the right to
hold a thing or enjoy a right. It may be exercised
in one’s own name or in that of another. It does
not always include the right to use.
- A person may be declared owner but he may
not be entitled to possession which may be in
the hands of another such as a tenant or a
lessee. A judgment of ownership does not
necessarily include possession as a necessary
incident.
b. Jus utendi or right to use and enjoy – necessarily
includes the right to transform and the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof.
c. Jus fruedi or right to the fruits and Jus accessionis
or right to accessories – the ownership of
property gives the right by the accession to
everything which is produces thereby, or which is
incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally
or artificially.
d. Jus abutendi or right to consume – thie right of
the owner to consume a thing by its use, the use
that extinguishes, that consumes things which are
consumable.
e. Jus dispodendi or right to dispose or alienate – an
owner may dispose of or alienate his property
either totally, as in sale and donation, or partially,
without transferring ownership, encumber as in
lease, pledge and mortgage.
f. Jus vindicandi or right to vindicate or recover –
the owner has a right of action against the holder
and possessor of the thing (or right) in order to
recover it.
Perez vs. Evite [G.R. No. L-16003, 29 March
1961]
Action to quiet brought by the spouses Cesareo Perez
and Mamerta Alcantara against Vicente Evite and
Susana Manigbas. The Court of First Instance of
Batangas rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint of the plaintiffs and declaring the
defendants the owners of the land in question. CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. The decision
having become final, the court of origin, upon
application by the defendants, ordered its execution.
Provincial Sheriff of Batangas "to deliver the
ownership of the portion of the land in litigation to the
defendant Vicente Evite, of Rosario, Batangas,
pursuant to the terms and conditions contained in the
above-quoted decision." Plaintiffs contend that the
decision sought to be executed merely declared the
defendants owners of the property and did not order
its delivery to said parties. A judgment is not confined
to what appears upon the face of the decision, but
also those necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto. Thus, in a land registration case 1 wherein
ownership was adjudged, we allowed the issuance of
a writ of demolition (to remove the improvements
existing on the land), for being necessarily included in
the judgment. Considering that herein plaintiffs-
appellants have no other claim to possession of the
property apart from their claim of ownership which
was rejected by the lower court consequently has no
right to remain thereon after such ownership was
adjudged to defendants-appellees, the delivery of
possession of the land should be considered included
in the decision. Indeed it would be defeating the ends
of justice should we require that for herein appellees
to obtain possession of the property duly adjudged to
be theirs, from those who have no right to wit to
court litigations anew.
E. Rommel Realty & Development Corporation
vs. Sta. Lucia Realty [G.R. No. 127636 24
November 2006)
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
titles alleging that the said documents were not
genuine and authentic. The trial court dismissed the
complaint. By virtue of the writ of possession, the
respondent received a notice to vacate the parcel of
land. Was E. Rommel Realty was entitled to a writ of
possession? No, Guido et al. had the title to the land
but through their waiver, were considered to have
abandoned their right in favor of 2 sets of occupants.
The respondent in this case fell within the 2nd set of
qualified occupants since they and their predecessors
had been in possession of the land in the concept of
owner since 1940, which had ripened into ownership.
Flancia v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 146997, 26
April 2005]
Oakland executed a contract to sell over a lot in favor
of the spouses Flancia. Oakland authorized the
spouses Flancia to transport their personal belongings
to the lot. The spouses Flancia then received a copy
of the execution foreclosing the mortgage, Oakland
appeared to have mortgaged the lot to Ong. The
spouses Flancia contended that the foreclosure was
invalid because a mortgagor must be the absolute
owner of the property for it to be valid. In this case,
Oakland was no longer the owner of the lot so the
mortgage must not be valid. The mortgage was valid.
The contract between Oakland and the spouses
Flancia was just a contract to sell. The title was not
yet passed to them until the price has been fully paid,
just the ownership. Hence, Oakland still remains to be
the owner of the lot and has the right to mortgage the
property.
Vda. De Baustista v. Marcos [G.R. No. L-17072,
31 October 1961]
Marcos obtained a loan from Bautista secured by a
mortgage of an unregistered parcel of land. It was to
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 8
last for 3 years and the possession of the land
mortgaged was to be turned over to Bautista by way
of usufruct. Marcos filed an application for the
issuance of a free patent over the land. The free
patent was issued to her and the land was registered
in her name. Marcos was unable to pay her debt to
Bautista so the latter filed for the foreclosure of her
mortgage on the land given as a security. The
mortgage was void and ineffective because Marcos
was not yet the owner of the land when the mortgage
was executed. Hence, Marcos could not encumber
the same to Bautista. Neither could the subsequent
acquisition by Marcos of title over the land through
the issuance of a free patent validate and legalize the
mortgage since upon the issuance of the said patent,
the land was brought under the operations of the
Public Land Law that prohibits the taking of said land
for the satisfaction of debts contracted prior to the
expiration of 5 years from the issuance of the patent.
Marcos had possessory rights over the land before the
title was vested in her name, and these possessory
rights could validly be transferred to Bautista, as
Marcos did in the deed of mortgage.
ii. Doctrine of Self-Help
Art. 429: The owner or lawful possessor of a thing
has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he
may use such force as may be reasonably necessary
to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property. (n)
“Doctrine of Self-Help”
The right to repel or prevent an actual or threatened
physical invasion or usurpation of property is essential
to the maintenance of property rights.
The owner may only use such force as may be
reasonably necessary. Available only when possession
has not been lost, if already lost --- resort to judicial
process.
Elements:
a. Person exercising rights is owner or lawful
possessor
b. Can only be exercised at the time of an actual
or threatened unlawful physical invasion of his
property.
c. Use force as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent it.
German Management & Services v. Court of
Appeals [G.R. No. 76216, 14 September 1989)
The Spouses Jose were the owners of a parcel of land.
They executed a special power of attorney authorizing
German Management & Services (German
Management) to develop their property into a
residential subdivision. German Management found
that part of the property was occupied by the private
respondents and 20 other persons. They advised the
occupants to vacate the premises but the latter
refused. Nevertheless, German Management
proceeded with the development of the property. The
private respondents filed an action for forcible entry
against German Management. They alleged that
German Management forcibly removed and destroyed
the barbed wire fence enclosing the private
respondents farm holdings without notice; bulldozed
the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of
private respondents by means of force, violence and
intimidation; trespassed, coerced and threatened to
harass, remove and eject private respondents from
their respective farm holdings. German Management's
drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops
of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of
self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil
Code was unavailing because the doctrine of self-help
can only be exercised at the time of actual or
threatened dispossession which is absent in the case
at bar. When possession has already been lost, the
owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery
of property.
iii. Right to Enclose and Fence
Art. 430: Every owner may enclose or fence his land
or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon.
Limitation: The right which flows from the right of
ownership of others to existing servitudes imposed on
the land or tenement of another.
iv. Surface Rights of a Landowner
Art. 437: The owner of a parcel of land is the owner
of its surface and of everything under it, and he can
construct thereon any works or make any plantations
and excavations which he may deem proper, without
detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws
and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable
requirements of aerial navigation.
a. Extent: Right to surface and everything under
it only as far as necessary for his practical
interest, benefit or enjoyment.
b. Limitations: existing servitudes or easements,
special laws, local ordinances, the reasonable
requirements of aerial navigation, the rights
of third persons
Republic v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-43938,
15 April 1988]
Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a
parcel of land on his own behalf and on behalf of his
children. This application was separately opposed by
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. (Benguet) and Atok Big
WedgeCorporation (Atok). The petitioners claimed
that they have acquired the land from their parents
and that they have been in possession of the land
ever since. Benguet and Atok opposed on the ground
that they have mineral claims covering the property
and had been in actual, continuous and exclusive
possession of the land in concept of owner. The trial
court denied the application while the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
recognized the claims of the applicant but subject to
the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining
claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land
while at the same time reserving the sub-surface
rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining
claims. The Supreme Court disagreed with the CA.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface
owner will be planting on the land while the mining
locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer
cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the
operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel
lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the
farmer, and how high can the miner, go without
encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the
dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface
rights? It is a well-known principle that the owner of
piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also
to everything underneath and the airspace above it
up to a reasonable height. The rights over the land
are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must
be categorical; the land must be either completely
mineral or completely agricultural.
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 9
Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership
i. Actions available to the owner
Recovery of Personal Property
Replevin - action or provisional remedy where the
complainant prays for the recovery of possession of
the personal property.
NOT Applicable to:
a. Movables distrained or taken for a tax assessment
or a fine pursuant to the law
b. Those under a writ of execution or preliminary
attachment
c. Those under custodia legis
Where to file: MTC OR RTC depending on the
amount of money involved
Issue involved: Recovery of possession of
personal property
Arabesque Industrial Phils. vs. Court of Appeals
[G.R. No. 101431, 14 December 1992]
Arabesque Industrial Philippines, Inc. (AIPI) bought at
public auction the tugboat, MT Rover of PNOC
Dockyard and Engineering Corp. (PDEC). Despite
notice by PDEC that it was imposing lay day charges if
the boat was not removed from its premises, AIPI did
not remove the boat; instead, it engaged PDEC to
repair it. The bill for repair rose and AIPI paid partial
and was not willing to pay the whole amount. AIPI
received a notice for a sale of the tugboat at a public
auction so it filed for a writ of replevin against PDEC.
The trial court granted the writ and ordered the
return of the boat to AIPI. The Court of Appeals set
aside the order and directed the return of the tugboat
to PDEC on the ground that the chattel was not
wrongfully detained but possessed in the exercise of
PDEC of a mechanic's lien for its unpaid repair bills.
The Court of Appeals correctly set aside the writ of
replevin. Such writ cannot be properly directed
against a lawful possessor of a chattel. In this case,
PDEC has the right to retain possession of the tugboat
until the repair fees are fully settled by AIPI.
Chua v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 79021, 17
May 1993]
The RTC of Cebu issued a search warrant directing the
immediate search of the premises of R.R.
Construction and the seizure of an Isuzu dump
truck. Canoy seized the vehicle and took custody.
Chua filed a civil action for replevin for the recovery of
possession of the vehicle against Canoy. He alleged
that he had a lawful ownership and possession of the
vehicle, that he had not sold the vehicle to anyone;
that he had not stolen nor carnapped it, and that he
never been charged of the crime of carnapping or any
other crime for that matter. The writ of replevin was
issued and the vehicle was seized. Meanwhile, a case
for carnapping against Chua pending preliminary
investigation before the Office of the City Fiscal of
Cebu City was provisionally dismissed with the
following reservation: "without prejudice to its
reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved".
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and ordered
the dismissal of the Replevin action, and directed that
possession of the subject vehicle be restored to
Canoy. Where a personal property is seized under a
search warrant and there is reason to believe that the
seizure will not anymore be followed by the filing of a
criminal and there are conflicting claims over the
seized property, the proper remedy is the filing of an
action for replevin; however, where there is still a
probability that the seizure will be followed by the
filing of a criminal action, as in the case at bar where
the case for carnapping was "dismissed provisionally,
without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of
ownership is resolved in favor of complainant", or the
criminal information has actually been commenced, or
filed, and actually prosecuted, and there are
conflicting claims over the property seized, the proper
remedy is to question the validity of the search
warrant in the same court which issued it and not in
any other branch of the said court.
Recovery of Real Property
Forcible Entry - Summary action to recover material
or physical possession of real property when a person
originally in possession was deprived thereof by FISTS
(Force, Intimidation, Strategy, Threat, Stealth)
Where to File: MTC
Prescription: When through FIT (Force,
Intimidation, Threat) - 1 year from
dispossession; When through SS (Stealth and
strategy) - 1 year from discovery
Issues involved: Material or physical
possession of real property (possession de
facto)
Unlawful Detainer - Action brought when
possession by a landlord; vendor or vendee or other
person of any land or building is being unlawfully
withheld after termination or expiration of the right to
hold possession, by virtue of a contract, express or
implied.
Where to file: MTC
Prescription: 1 year from the time possession
became unlawful or last date of demand or
letter of demand.
Issue Involved: Material or physical
possession of real property(possession de
facto)
These two are collectively known as action interdictal.
Peralta-Labrador v. Bugarin [G.R. No. 165177,
25 August 2005]
Peralta-Labrador purchased a parcel of land from the
spouses Pronto in 1976. In 1990, the Department of
Public Works and Highways constructed a road
traversing the parcel of land, separating 108 sq. m.
Sometime in 1994, Bugarin forcibly took possession
of the 108 sq. m. lot and refused to vacate despite
the pleas of Peralta-Labrador. In 1996, Peralta-
Labrador instituted a complaint for recovery of
possession and ownership with the Metropolitan Trial
Court against Bugarin. Bugarin pleaded the defense
of lack of cause of action and prescription. The
Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of Bugarin. The
Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision. The Court
of Appeals, however, reversed the declaration of the
Metropolitan Trial Court that Bulgarin was the owner
of the land. It was clear that Peralta-Labrador's
averment was a case for forcible entry because she
alleged prior physical possession of the subject lot
way back in 1976, and the forcible entry thereon by
Bulgarin. Considering her allegation that the unlawful
possession of respondent occurred 2 years prior to
the filing of the complaint in 1996, the cause of action
for forcible entry had prescribed and the Metropolitan
Trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
The complaint therefore should have been filed with
the Regional Trial Court via an accion publiciana, a
suit for recovery of the right to possess, or an accion
reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover
ownership as well as possession.
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 10
Nuñez v. SLTEAS [G.R. No. 180542, 12 April
2010]
The spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng
executed a deed of assignment over their parcel of
land in favor of SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc.
(SLTEAS) in 1999. SLTEAS left the parcel of land idle
and unguarded for some time due to important
business concerns. In 2003, an ocular inspection
conducted by SLTEAS revealed that Nuñez and 21
other individuals were already occupying the parcel of
land and were refusing to vacate despite of verbal
demands made by SLTEAS. SLTEAS filed a complaint
for forcible entry against Nuñez, who alleged to have
a subsisting lease agreement over the parcel of land
with Maria Sylianteng. He argued that SLTEAS did
not meet the first requirement of a forcible entry case
because it left the parcel of land idle and unguarded.
He also had been occupying the parcel of land since
1999. Possession can be acquired not only by material
occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject
to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and
legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
The parcel of land was acquired by SLTEAS by virtue
of the 1999 Deed of Assignment. Although it did not
immediately put the same to active use, SLTEAS
appeared to have registered the property in its name
in 2002, paid the real taxes alongside the sundry
expenses incidental thereto. The first element of
forcible entry was satisfied in this case.
Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 139442,
6 December 2006]
Reyes owned the lot rented by Dela Cruz for well over
40 years. In 1989, a fire struck the premises and
destroyed Dela Cruz's house. After the fire, Dela Cruz
returned to the lot and rebuilt her house. Reyes,
however, made several demands to vacate the lot but
Dela Cruz did not comply. Despite the setback, Reyes
did not initiate court proceedings against Dela Cruz.
In 1996, Reyes sold the lot to Tan Te. Despite the
sale, Dela Cruz did not give up the lot. In 1997, Tan
Te sent Dela Cruz a written demand to vacate the lot,
which the latter ignored. Tan Te tried to settle the
dispute but failed. As a result, Tan Te filed an
ejectment complaint with the MeTC against Dela Cruz.
Dela Cruz filed her answer and alleged that the MeTC
had no jurisdiction over the case because it fell within
the jurisdiction of the RTC as more than 1 year had
already elapsed from her forcible entry. The
ejectment complaint based on possession by
tolerance of the owner, like the Tan Te complaint, is
an unlawful detainer case. A person who occupies the
land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between then, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them. After
the fire, Reyes merely tolerated the continued
occupancy of the lot by Dela Cruz. When the lot was
sold to Tan Te, the rights of Reyes were transferred to
the former, who for a time tolerated the stay of Dela
Cruz until she decided to eject the latter by sending
several demands, the last being in 1997. In such
case, the unlawful possession is to be counted from
the date of the demand to vacate. Since the last
demand was sent on January 14, 1997 and the action
was filed in September, 8, 1997, the action was
instituted well within the 1 year period reckoned from
the date when the last demand was sent.
De La Paz v. Panis [G.R. No. L-57023, 22 June
1995]
The petitioners alleged in their complaint that
sometime in 1970 or 1971 the private respondents
illegally entered portions of the property, established
possession thereof, and introduced illegal
improvements. In their answer, the private
respondents admitted that they indeed entered into
the said property, but averred that they did so in the
honest belief that it was part of the public domain;
that they introduced the improvements without
objection from any party; and that they have been in
peaceful, open, and uninterrupted material possession
thereof for more than ten years. Judge Panis of the
Court of First Instance dismissed the case observing
that while the complaint was one for recovery of
possession, it was "in reality one for ejectment or
illegal detainer." The Court held that the action was
not for forcible entry; there was no allegation in the
complaint that the petitioners were denied possession
of the land in question through any of the methods
stated in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
although private respondents prior possession was
clearly alleged. Neither was the action one for
unlawful detainer; it was noted earlier that there is no
lease contract between the parties, and the demand
to vacate made upon the private respondents did not
make them tenants of the petitioners. In order to gain
possession of the land occupied by the private
respondents, the proper remedy adopted by the
petitioners was the plenary action of recovery of
possession before the then Court of First Instance.
Respondent judge, therefore, had jurisdiction over the
case and should not have dismissed it on the ground
of lack thereof.
Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 116192,
16 November 1995]
Sarmiento purchased a parcel of land. The adjacent
lot was owned by the family of Atty. Naguid and was
occupied by Cruz. Sarmiento found out that Cruz is
occupying about 71 meters of her lot. She informed
Cruz that she would like to remove the old fence so
that she could construct a new one that will cover the
true area of her property but Cruz refused. Sarmiento
filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, which ruled in favor of Sarmiento.
Cruz appealed to the Regional Trial Court and
assailed the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, which ruled in favor of Cruz. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court and reinstated that of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court. A careful reading of the facts averred in said
complaint filed by herein private respondent reveals
that the action is neither one of forcible entry nor of
unlawful detainer but essentially involves a boundary
dispute which must be resolved in an accion
reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the
disputed 71 square meters involved. What determines
the cause of action is the nature of defendant's entry
into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action
which may be filed against the intruder within one
year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand,
the entry is legal but the possession thereafter
became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer
which must be filed within one year from the date of
the last demand. In the case at bar, the complaint
does not characterize herein petitioner's alleged entry
into the land, that is, whether the same was legal or
illegal. It does not state how petitioner entered upon
the land and constructed the house and the fence
thereon. It is also silent on whether petitioner's
possession became legal before private respondent
made a demand on her to remove the fence. The
complaint merely avers that the lot being occupied by
petitioner is owned by a third person, not a party to
the case, and that said lot is enclosed by a fence
which private respondent claims is an encroachment
on the adjacent lot belonging to her.
Ocampo v. Dionisio [G.R. No. 191101, 1 October
2014]
Dionisio filed a complaint for forcible entry with the
MTC against Ocampo. The MTC dismissed the
complaint on the ground that Dioniso failed to
establish prior possession of the parcel of land. A
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 11
judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar
an action between the same parties respecting title or
ownership because between a case for forcible entry
and an accion reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of
causes of action. A forcible entry case only involves
the issue of possession over the subject property
while the recovery of possession case puts in issue
the ownership of the subject property and the right to
possess the same. The decision in the forcible entry
case is conclusive only as to the MTC’s determination
that the petitioners are not liable for forcible entry
since the respondents failed to prove their prior
physical possession; it is not conclusive as to the
ownership of the parcel of land.
Suarez v. Emboy [G.R. No. 187944, 12 March
2014]
A parcel of land was partitioned into 5 among the
heirs of the Carlos and Asuncion. Lot No. 1907-A-2
was occupied by Felix and Marilou Emboy, who were
claiming that they inherited it from their mother
Claudia Emboy, who inherited it from her parents
Carlos and Asuncion. Felix and Marilou were asked by
their cousins to vacate Lot No. 1907-A-2 and transfer
to Lot No. 1907-A-5. They refused to comply and
insisted that Claudia's inheritance pertained to Lot No.
1907-A-2. In 2004, Felix and Marilou received a
demand letter from Carmencita requiring them to
vacate the lot and informed them that she had
already purchased the lot from the former's relatives.
Felix and Marilou did not heed the demand so
Carmencita filed before the MTCC a complaint against
unlawful detainer against them. Felix and Marilou
argued that the complaint for unlawful detainer was
fundamentally inadequate. There was practically no
specific allegation as to when and how possession by
tolerance of them began. In ejectment cases, it is
necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show a
statement of facts to determine the class of case and
remedies available to the parties. When the
complaint fails to state the facts constituting a forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state
how entry was effected or how the dispossession
started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or accion reinvidicatoria. In this case, the
first requisite was absent. Carmencita failed to
clearly allege and prove how Emboy entered the lot
and constructed a house upon it. She was also silent
about the details on who specifically permitted Emboy
to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance
came about.
Accion Publiciana - is intended for the recovery of
the better right to possess, and is plenary in action in
an ordinary civil proceeding before RTC. Is also used
to refer ejectment suit filed after the expiration of 1
year from the accrual of the cause of action or from
the unlawful withholding of possession. It is also an
action to rescind contracts in fraud of creditors.
Where to file: When the value of the assesses
property is less than Php 20,000 – MTC; more
than Php 20,000 - RTC
Prescription: Within a period of 10 years.
Issue Involved: Material or physical
possession of real property (possession de
facto)
Accion Reivindicatoria - an action to recover
ownership over real property
Where to file: RTC where the real property is
situated
Prescription: Within a period of 10 years.
Issue Involved: Issue involved is ownership,
and for this purpose, evidence of title or mode
may be introduced.
Bokingo v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 161739, 4
May 2006]
Bokingo filed an application for titling of the subject
land before the DENR, which was opposed by Busa on
the ground that it was inherited by them from their
late father. The PENRO resolved the protest in favor
of Busa and issued a certification stating that the
order had become final and executory. Busa
requested for a land survey but this was prevented by
Bokingo. Busa filed a relief of injunction with the RTC
against Bokingo. Bokingo filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim. Bokingo contended that
it could be gleaned from the complaint that the issue
between the parties involved the possession of the
land. As such, the assessed value of the land was
crucial to determine the court’s jurisdiction over the
subject matter. He contended that since the assessed
value of the land based on his tax declaration was
P14,000, then the MTC should have jurisdiction over
the case and not the RTC.
The Court held that Busa's complaint had not sought
to recover the possession or ownership of the subject
land. Rather, it was principally an action to enjoin
Bokingo from committing acts that would tend to
prevent the survey of the subject land. It cannot be
said therefore that it is one of a possessory action.
The nature of the action and which court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is
determined by the material allegations of the
complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the
plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
some or all of the claims asserted therein. The
caption of the complaint is not determinative of the
nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the
court depend upon the answer of the defendant or
agreement of the parties, or to the waiver or
acquiescence of the parties. As such, the subject
matter of litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and should be within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.
Hilario v. Salvador [G.R. No. 160384, 29 April
2005]
Hilario filed a complaint with the RTC against Salvador
alleging that they were the co-owners of the parcel of
land where Salvador constructed his house without
their knowledge and refused to vacate despite their
demands. Salvador filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He
contended that the complaint did not state the
assessed value of the property, which determines the
jurisdiction of the court. Hilario maintained that the
RTC had jurisdiction since their action was an accion
reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of
the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction fell within
the said court. Also, in their opposition to Salvador's
motion to dismiss, they mentioned the increase in the
assessed value of the land in the amount of P3.5
million. Moreover, they maintained that their action
was also one for damages exceeding P20,000.00,
over which the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction. The
action filed by Hilario did not involve a claim of
ownership over the property. They prayed that
Salvador vacate the property and restore possession
to them. Hence, it was an accion publiciana, or one
for the recovery of possession of the real property. It
was not an aaccion reinvindicatoria or a suit for the
recovery of possession over the real property as
owner. The complaint did not contain an allegation
stating the assessed value of the property. Absent
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 12
any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value
of the property, it could not thus be determined
whether the RTC or the MTC had original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the action.
Urieta v. Aguilar [G.R. No. 164402, 5 July 2010]
Aguilar filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession
and Damages alleging that in 1997 her husband
Ignacio was issued a Torrens Title over a parcel of
land. Prior thereto, or in 1968, Ignacio allowed
Anastacia to construct a house on the southern
portion of the land and to stay therein temporarily. In
1994, Ignacio died and his heirs decided to partition
the parcel of land. They asked Elderlina, who took
possession of the premises after the death of
Anastacia, to vacate the land but the former did not
heed her demand. Aguilar filed a case for accion
publiciana against Elderlina. In her answer, Elderlina
did not dispute that Ignacio had the title to the land.
However, she asserted that in 1973, Ignacio sold to
her mother Anastacia the southern portion of the land
shown by the Kasulatan sa Bilihan. The CA upheld the
validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan. The objective of
accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue
of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to
possess the property. This decision, however, is not a
final and binding determination of the issue of
ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the
issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
decision of the issue of ownership, being provisional,
is not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. The decision in short, is
not conclusive on the issue of ownership. The ruling in
this case was limited only to the issue of determining
who between the parties had a better right to
possession. The decision was not a final and binding
determination of the issue of ownership. As such, the
ruling was not a bar for the parties to file an action for
the determination of the issue of ownership where the
validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan and of OCT No. P-
9354 could be properly threshed out.
Bongato v. Malvar [G.R. No. 141614, 14 August
2002]
Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry against
Bongato alleging that Bongato unlawfully entered
their parcel of land and constructed a house of light
materials. The MTCC rendered a decision in favor of
Malvar. Bongato contended that the MTCC had no
jurisdiction because the complaint was filed beyond
the 1 year period. She declared that Malvar already
knew about the house as early as 1987 when he filed
a criminal case against her for anti-squatting. An
action for forcible entry is a quieting process, and that
the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement
the summary nature of such process. The one-year
period within which to bring an action for forcible
entry is generally counted from the date of actual
entry to the land. However, when entry is made
through stealth, then the one-year period is counted
from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the
lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed
of a parcel of land may file either an accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the
right of possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which
is an action to recover ownership as well as
possession. Malvar already had knowledge of
Bongato's house since 1987. The cause of action for
forcible entry filed by Malvar had already prescribed
when they filed the Complaint for ejectment in 1992.
Hence, even if Malvar may be the owner of the land,
possession could not be wrested through a summary
action for ejectment of Bongato, who had been
occupying it for more than 1 year. Malvar should have
presented their suit before the RTC in an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not before the
MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible entry.
Their cause of action for forcible entry had prescribed
already, and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to
hear and decide it.
Encarnacion v. Amigo [G.R. No. 169793, 15
September 2006]
Magpantay owned a parcel of land, which Amigo
allegedly entered and took possession in 1985 without
the permission of the owner. When Magpantay died,
his widow executed an affidavit in 1995 waiving her
right over the land in favor of her son-in-law
Encarnacion. In 2001, Encarnacion sent a letter to
Amigo demanding the latter to vacate the land.
Amigo refused to heed to Encarnacion's demand so
the latter filed a case for ejectment. The MTCC
rendered judgment in favor of Encarnacion. On
appeal, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground
that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case. The
CA confirmed the decision of the RTC saying the
accion publiciana and not unlawfult detainer. The
action was accion publiciana and not unlawful
detainer. Encarnacion became the owner of the
property in 1995 by virtue of the waiver of rights
executed by his mother-in-law. He filed the complaint
for ejectment in 2001 after his letter to the Amigo
demanding that the latter vacate the premises
remained unheeded. From the date of Encarnacion's
dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his complaint
for ejectment in 2001, almost 6 years had already
elapsed. The length of time that he was dispossessed
of his property made it one for accion publiciana.
De Leon v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 96107, 19
June 1995]
Balbuena, owner of a parcel of land, entered into a
lease agreement with Inayan in 1970, who bound
himself to deliver 252 cavans of palay each year as
rental. The ownership of the land was then
transferred to Balbuena's daughter, De Leon. In 1983,
Inayan stopped paying the agreed rental. In 1984,
Balbuena filed a complaint for "Termination of Civil
Law Lease; Recovery of Posession; Recovery of
Unpaid Rentals and Damages" with the RTC against
Inayan. The RTC ruled in favor of De Leon. On appeal
to the CA, Inayan questioned the jurisdiction of the
RTC. The CA, in Inayan's motion for reconsideration,
dismissed the civil case filed by De Leon for want of
jurisdiction. It ruled that De Leon's complaint was
based on accion interdictal, a summary action for
recovery of possession that should have been brought
before the MTC. It found that the 1-year period had
not yet elapsed from the time when the civil case for
the recovery of possession was filed. A detainer suit
exclusively involves the issue of physical possession.
The case filed by De Leon was not an unlawful
detainer since it involved more than the issue of
possession. De Leon prayed that Inayan be ordered
to vacate the premises, pay back rentals, unpaid
irrigation fees, moral and exemplary damages and
litigation fees. Where the issues of the case extend
beyond those commonly involved in unlawful detainer
suits, such as for instance, the respective rights of
parties under various contractual arrangements and
the validity thereof, the case is converted from a
mere detainer suit to one "incapable of pecuniary
estimation," thereby placing it under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC.
Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 39430, 3
December 1990]
The respondents in this case filed filed an ejectment
case with the MTC against the petitioners. They
alleged that the petitioners, thru force, intimidation
and threats and with the use of guns, forcibly ousted
the respondents from the subject lots, which they had
been occupying and cultivating peacefully, notoriously
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 13
and continually for more than 10 years. The
petitioners resisted the ejectment case filed by the
respondents due to the pendency of a civil case
regarding the ownership of the lots. It is a firmly
settled rule that a municipal court has jurisdiction
over forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases even if
the ownership of the property is in disputed. In an
action for forcible entry and detainer, the main issue
is one of priority of possession. The legal right thereto
is not essential to the possessor's cause of action, for
no one may take law into his own hands and forcibly
eject another or deprive him of his possession by
stealth, even if his title thereto were questionable or
actually disputed in another case. If the plaintiff can
prove prior physical possession in himself, he may
recover such possession even from the owner, but on
the other hand, if he cannot prove such prior physical
possession, he has no right of action for forcible entry
and detainer even if he should be the owner of the
property. An action for recovery of possession is
totally distinct and different from an action for
recovery of title or ownership. A judgment rendered
in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only
on the question of possession and not that of
ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or
affect the ownership of the land or building. It was
clear that the municipal court correctly assumed
jurisdiction over the case as the complaint filed before
it sought to recover possession of the lots. The
pendency of the civil case, wherein the question of
ownership was raised, was of no moment. Pending
final adjudication of ownership, the municipal court
had jurisdiction to determine in the meantime the
right of possession over the land.
Action to Recover is based on Ownership
Action for Reconveyance – what is sought is the
transfer of the property, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person’s name, to
a) its rightful owner or b) one with a better right than
the one whose name the property is registered.
The complaint for reconveyance must allege 2 facts:
a) That the plaintiff was the owner of the land or
possessed the land in the concept of an owner
b) That the defendant had illegally disposed him
of the land
Note: For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the
property should not have passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value. In other words, the title
should still remain with the one who erroneously
registered the property in his name. If this is so, then
only an action for damages is the remedy if the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.
Prescriptive periods:
4 years – from the date of issuance of the
certificate of title over the property when the
property is registered
10 years – if based on implied or constructive
trust
Imprescriptible – when the plaintiff or the person
enforcing the trust is in possession of the
property.
Spouses Valdez vs Spouses Fabella [GR No.
132424, 2 May 2006]
Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against respondent spouses before the MTC.
The complaint alleges that sometime in November
1992, by virtue of a sales contract, petitioner spouses
acquired a residential lot and respondent spouses,
without any color of title whatsoever occupied the
said lot by building their house in the same thereby
depriving the former rightful possession thereof. A
formal demand to vacate the premises was sent on
July 12, 1994 but it was ignored. Respondent spouses
contend that the complaint failed to state that
petitioner had prior physical possession of the
property in dispute and in the alternative, claimed
ownership over the land on the ground that they
possess the same for more than thirty years.
Jurisdictional facts establishing a case for ejectment
must appear on the face of the complaint. To justify
an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the
plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been
present right from the start of the possession which is
later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. In
the case at bar, the allegations in petitioner spouses
complaint did not contain any averment of fact that
would substantiate their claim that they permitted or
tolerated the occupation of the property by
respondents. The complaint contains only bare
allegations that “respondents without any color of title
whatsoever occupies the land in question by building
their house in the said land thereby depriving
petitioners the possession thereof.” Nothing has been
said on how respondents’ entry was effected or how
and when dispossession started. The failure of
petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts
constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer,
the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
Caro v. Sucaldito [G.R. No. 157536, 16 May
2005]
Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land known as
Assessor's Lot No. 160 from Ruperto Gepilano as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated October 21, 1953.
Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold a portion of the said lot
to his son Melchor Caro, consisting of 70,124 square
meters, and now identified as Lot No. 4512 of the
Cadastral survey of Nueva Valencia, Pls-775. Father
and son executed a Deed of Definite Sale dated
January 31, 1973 covering Lot No. 4512. Melchor
Caro applied for a free patent before the Bureau of
Lands, covering the said area of the property which
he bought from his father. The application was,
however, opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. On
November 6, 1980, the Regional Director rendered a
Decision canceling the said application. Caro filed a
notice of appeal before the Regional Land Office in
Iloilo City, docketed as MNR Case No. 5207. However,
the appeal was dismissed in an Order dated June 29,
1982, on the ground of failure to file an appeal
memorandum within the reglementary period
therefor.
On August 29, 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the
buyer of Lot No. 4512, filed an Application for a Free
Patent covering the said lot, and was issued Free
Patent. Thereafter, on February 20, 1984, Caro filed a
Complaint against Sucaldito for "Annulment of Title,
Decision, Free Patent and/or Recovery of Ownership
and/or Possession with Damages". He later filed an
amended complaint, alleging that he was the owner of
the subject lot, and had been in possession of the
same "since 1953 and/or even prior thereto in the
concept of owner, adversely, openly, continuously and
notoriously."
Caro has no legal personality to file for the
reconveyance of the subject land. The Supreme Court
ruled that under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one "who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit." Corollarily, legal standing has been defined
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 14
as a personal and substantial interest in the case,
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest
means a material interest in issue that is affected by
the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished
from a mere incidental interest in the question
involved. The petitioner is not the proper party to file
an action for reconveyance that would result in the
reversion of the land to the government. The
petitioner has no personality to "recover" the property
as he has not shown that he is the rightful owner
thereof.
PEZA v. Fernandez [G.R. No. 138971, 6 June
2001]
Lot 4673 was registered in the names of Florentina
Rapaya, Victorino Cuizon among others covered by an
OCT. Sometime thereafter, Jorgea Igot-Soro ño et al
executed an Extra-judicial Partition claiming to be the
only surviving heirs of the registered owners, through
which they were issued a TCT. Said lot was among
the object of an expropriation proceeding before the
RTC. Said RTC approved the compromise Agreement
b/w the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and
Igot-Soroño et al wherein EPZA would pay a certain
amount in exchange for the subject property. EPZA
acquired title to said land by virtue of the RTC
decision and was issued a corresponding TCT. The
Heirs of the Florentina Rapaya and Juan Cuizon filed a
complaint to nullify several documents including the
TCT issued to EPZA for they were excluded from the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate.
As provided in the Rules of Court, persons unduly
deprived of their lawful participation in a settlement
may assert their claim only w/in the 2-year period
after the settlement and distribution of the estate.
However, this prescriptive period will not apply to
those who had not been notified of the settlement.
The Private respondents are deemed to have been
notified of the extrajudicial settlement since it was
registered and annotated on the certificate of title
over the lot. The only exception to this rule is when
the title still remains in the hands of the heirs who
have fraudulently caused the partition of the said
property. In the case at bar, the title has already
passed to an innocent purchaser for value, the gov’t
through EPZA. Their remedies of action for
reconveyance resulting from fraud, and action for
reconveyance based on an implied constructive trust
has already prescribed as well the former having
prescribed 4 years from the discovery and the latter
prescribing 10 years from the alleged fraudulent
registration.
Reconveyance is a remedy for those whose property
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another’s name. However, this cannot be availed once
the property has passed to an innocent purchaser for
value. Since the property has already passed to the
gov’t in an expropriation proceeding, EPZA is entitled
to enjoy the security afforded innocent 3rd persons
and their title to the property must be preserved.
However, the private respondents are not w/o
remedy. They can sue for damages their co-heirs.
Gasataya vs. Mabasa [G.R. No. 148147, 16
February 2007]
Buenaventura Mabasa was granted a homestead
patent which he mortgaged to DBP to secure a loan.
However, he was unable to pay the indebtedness so
the lot was forcelosed in favor of DBP. His daughter,
Editha, was able to repurchase the land in a deed of
conditional sale. Editha then entered into an
agreement with Gasataya to assume payment for her
obligation to DBP. However, 8 years after the
agreement, Gasataya stopped paying DBP which
resulted to the revocation of Mabasa’s right to
repurchase of the land. The land was then sold in a
public auction where Gasataya was the highest
bidder. Mabasa filed a complaint for reconveyance
against Gasataya. The trial court and CA ruled in
Mabasa’s favor. The Court affirmed the rulings.
Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner
of a property but also to the person with a better right
than the person under whose name said property was
erroneously registered. While respondent is not the
legal owner of the disputed lots, she has better right
than petitioner to the contested lots because of the
Deed of Conditional Sale executed by DBP which gave
her the right to repurchase and that it would have
subsisted had Gasataya not defrauded her.
Other actions for recovery of possession:
1. Injunction - is a writ framed according to the
circumstances of the case commanding a the
court regards as essential to justice, or restraining
an act deems contrary to equity and good
conscience.
In order that preliminary injunction may be granted at
any time after the commencement of the action and
before judgment:
1. There must exist a clear and positive right
over the property in question which should be
judicially protected through the writ.
2. The acts against which the injunction is to be
directed at are violative of said right and the
violation is material and substantial
3. There is urgent and paramount necessity to
protect that right.
Equitable Remedy of injunction may be availed of:
 Actions for forcible entry
 Ejectment cases
 Possessor admittedly owner or in possession in
concept of owner
 Possessor clearly not entitled to property
 Extraordinary cases
Idolor vs. CA [G.R. No. 141853, 7 February
2001]
Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private
respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial
foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage.
Upon the failure of the petitioner to settle her
mortgage, respondents went to the Barangay which
resulted into a ―Kasunduang Pag-aayos which noted
that the petitioner shall pay within 90 days and her
failure would warrant the foreclosure of the property
with the right to repurchase within one year without
interest. Petitioner failed to comply with her
undertaking; thus respondent Gumersindo De
Guzman filed an extra judicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage. The property was sold in a public
auction to respondent Gumersindo and the Certificate
of Sale was registered. After more than a year,
petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint for
annulment of Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. Trial court
subsequently issued the TRO and the writ. CA anulled
the writ.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at
protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an
injunction can be issued, it is essential that the
requisites be present. Petitioner had one year
redemption period from the registration of the
sheriff’s sale to redeem the property but she failed to
exercise this right. Hence, the right no longer exists.
Savellano vs. CA [G.R. No. 134343, 30 January
2001]
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 15
Maximo A. Savellano Jr. filed a complaint for
recovery of possession of real property with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction against herein private respondents.
Petitioner claimed that he was the registered
owner of three parcels of land, portions of which were
being occupied by private respondents for at least a
year prior to the institution of his complaint. Private
respondents in their answer denied the allegations
stating that they were in peaceful possession of the
property for more than 17 years prior to the
institution of the complaint. To resolve the issue, the
trial court ordered the survey of the property with
manifestation that private respondent would vacate
the property if it be shown that they were occupying
petitioner's property. Result of the survey showed
that private respondents encroached upon
portions of petitioner's land. After both parties
presented evidence, the trial court issued an order
stating that Savellano had clearly established his right
to a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction. Private respondents moved for
reconsideration, but it was denied by the trial court.
Meanwhile, the trial court granted an ex-parte motion
filed by the petitioner for release and
enforcement of the writ of injunction. On petition for
review filed by private respondents,
the Court of Appeals nullified the order of the
trial court holding that the resolution to vacate
granted in the writ of preliminary injunction was
patently erroneous since it would preempt the
decision that would be rendered after trial on the
merits of the case. Failing to obtain
reconsideration, Savellano filed this petition raising
issues that centered on whether compelling reasons
existed to justify the trial court's grant of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction.
According to the Supreme Court, the effect of the
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
issued by the lower court was to dispose of the main
case without trial. Private respondents would lose
their opportunity to prove their right of possession
in court.
Federated Realty Corporation vs. CA [G.R. No.
127967, 14 December 2005]
FRC owned a lot in Brgy. Apas, Cebu. In the lot
adjacent was the military camp ran by AFP-VISCOM.
When FRC wanted to fence the said property, several
generals and soldiers harassed the workers who were
working on the fence. FRC filed for injunction against
them. The RTC granted the complaint and issued a
writ of injunction. This was reversed by the Court of
Appeals. The Court held that the issuance of a writ
was proper. The invasion of the right is material and
substantial because FRC, as the owner of the land,
could validly fence his property. The right is also clear
and unmistakable because FRC has title to the
property. And lastly, there is urgent and paramount
necessity to protect the right of FRC.
Limitless Potentials, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No.
164459, 24 April 2007]
A preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order may be granted only when, among other things,
the applicant, not explicitly exempted, files with the
court, where the action or proceeding is pending,
a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in
an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that
the applicant will pay such party or person all
damages which he may sustain by reason of the
injunction or temporary restraining order if the court
should finally decide that the applicant was not
entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond,
a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued. Thus,
the posting of a bond is a condition sine qua non for a
writ of preliminary injunction to be issued.
The injunction bond is intended as a security for
damages in case it is finally decided that the
injunction ought not to have been granted. Its
principal purpose is to protect the enjoined party
against loss or damage by reason of the injunction,
and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly. The
damages sustained as a result of a wrongfully
obtained injunction may be recovered upon the
injunction bond which is required to be deposited with
court. Malice or lack of good faith is not an element of
recovery of the bond.
2. Writ of Possession - is an order whereby a sheriff
is commanded to place a person in possession of
real/personal property, such as when a property
is extrajudicially foreclose or to enforce a
judgment and give possession of the property to
the person entitled under the judgment.
Canlas v. CA [G.R. No. 77691, 8 August 1988]
This case involves an attorney and his client and
certain properties subject to a foreclosure. Because
private respondent was unable to pay a loan, his
properties were sold at a public auction with his
creditor being the highest bidder. However, he was
allowed the right to repurchase within a year. Despite
the execution of a Compromise Agreement, he was
unable to pay the loan and redeem the property. His
lawyer, herein petitioner, met with him to discuss the
redemption of the said properties by mortgaging the
properties to him until he is able to secure a loan.
However, private respondent later on learned that his
lawyer had already registered the properties in his
name. It was found out that instead of a mortgage
agreement, petitioner changed the tenor of the
document and made it appear to be a deed of sale
where private respondent would transfer all his rights
upon payment of purchase price. He filed an adverse
claim that was annotated in the title. Petitioner, the
lawyer, filed a petition to cancel the annotation and a
prayer for a writ of possession.
The Court stated that a writ of possession is improper
to eject another from possession unless sought in
connection with: 1) a land registration proceeding; 2)
an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real
property, 3) in a judicial foreclosure of property
provided that the mortgagor has possession and no
third party has intervened and 4) in execution sales.
The petitioner moved for the issuance of the writ of
possession pursuant to the deed of sale between him
and the private respondent and not on the judgement
on compromise. The writ does not lie in this case.
Vencilao vs. Vano [G.R. No. L-25660, 23
February 1960]
In a registration case, the judgment confirming the
title of the applicant and ordering its registration in
his name necessarily carried with it the delivery of
possession which is an inherent element of the right
of ownership. The issuance of the writ of possession
is, therefore, sanctioned by existing laws in this
jurisdiction and by the generally accepted principle
upon which the administration of justice rests. A writ
of possession may be issued not only against the
person who has been defeated in a registration case
but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely
occupying the land or any portion thereof during the
land registration proceedings up to the issuance of
the final decree. It was incumbent upon the sheriff to
exercise the writ. Thus, the petitioner should not be
cited in contempt.
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 16
Jetri Construction Corp vs. BPI [G.R. No. 77691,
8 August 1988]
Jetri loaned from Far East Bank and Trust Company,
the predecessor-in-interest of BPI, secured by a
mortgage over a land and the building thereon.
Despite a Loan Restructuring Agreement, Jetri was
still unable to pay the loan. Thus, BPI foreclosed the
mortgage. An auction sale was held and the bank was
the highest bidder. When Jetri failed to redeem, the
sale was consolidated. Despite demands, Jetri refused
to vacate the property. BPI filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession which was granted
by the trial court and upheld by the CA. The Court
held that regardless of whether or not there is a
pending suit for the annulment of the mortgage or the
foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of
possession, without prejudice to the eventual
outcome of the case. The issuance of a writ of
possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a
ministerial act. After the consolidation of title in the
buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem
the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter
of right and its issuance to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial
function.
A.G. Development Corporation v. CA [G.R. No.
111662, 23 October 1997]
Petitioner A.G. Development Corporation (AGDC) and
public respondent National Housing Authority (NHA)
entered into a memorandum of agreement, wherein
the former agreed to construct on its lot a dormitory-
apartment-commercial building for the latter. AGDC
executed in favor of NHA a promissory note and a real
estate mortgage over the land as security for the
obligation. NHA, however, rescinded the agreement
on the ground that AGDC was not able to complete
the project on time and demanded the return of the
initial amount paid. The demand was refused as a
result of which, the real estate mortgage was
foreclosed and the property sold to NHA as the
highest bidder. The one-year period to redeem having
expired, a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was
issued in favor of NHA, thereafter, a writ of
possession was applied for and granted by the RTC of
Quezon City. AGDC filed a complaint against NHA
before the RTC of Makati for breach of contract,
declaration of nullity of promissory note and real
estate mortgage, and annulment of foreclosure sale
and reversion of possession and title. NHA filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia,
which was denied by the trial court. While the case
was pending, private respondent A. Francisco Realty
and Development Corp. (AFRDC) filed a motion to
intervene claiming that it is an innocent purchaser for
value of the subject property since it has already
purchased the foreclosed property from NHA. The
principal issue to be resolved is whether the issuance
of a writ of possession by the Quezon City RTC
constitutes res judicata as to bar the complaint filed
by AGDC.
The Supreme Court ruled that the issuance of a writ
of possession is not a judgment on the merits. It is
merely a ministerial function, as such; the court
neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment.
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of
administrative powers or to legislative, executive or
ministerial determination. Cases disposed of on
technical grounds do not fall within the doctrine. The
issuance of the writ of possession was simply an
incident in the transfer of title.
Maglente v. Baltazar [G.R. No. 148182, 7 March
2007]
PRC leased a land with Maglente where the conditions
include a) the right of first refusal in case PRC wanted
to sell the property and b) that Maglente would not
sublease the property. However, Maglente subleased
the property without PRC’s consent and her lessees
are the respondents. When PRC wanted to sell the
property, it offered it first to Maglente. The former
affirmed that she wanted to buy the property.
However, the respondents wanted to buy the property
themselves. PRC filed an Interpleader to determine
who has the better right to purchase the property.
The trial court ruled in favor of Maglente. She then
asked the court to issue a Writ of Possession in her
favor. The Court held that the issuance of the writ is
improper. The directive of the Interpleader case was
only for PRC to execute the necessary contract in
favor of petitioner as the winning parties, nothing
else.
Real Action vs. Personal Action
Real Action – any actions where the subject are real
property
Personal Action – actions where the subject are
personal property
Action In Personam vs. Action In Rem
Action In Personam – an action against a person on
the basis of his personal liability
Action In Rem - an action against the thing itself; an
action against the whole world
Obligations of An Owner
Art. 431: The owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such manner as to injure the rights of third
persons.
Art. 432: The owner of a thing has no right to
prohibit the interference of another with the same, if
the interference is necessary to avert an imminent
danger and the threatened damage, compared to the
damage arising to the owner from the interference, is
much greater. The owner may demand from the
person benefited indemnity for the damage.
Presumption of Ownership
Art. 433: Actual possession under claim of ownership
raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The
true owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of the property.
Action to Recover
Art. 434: In an action to recover, the property must
be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant's claim. (n)
Requisites in an Action to Recover:
(1) Identity of the property
(2) Strength of plaintiff’s title
Heirs of Vencilao vs. CA [G.R. No. 123713, 1
April 1988]
A parcel of registered land located at Canduyao,
Calapo, San Isidro, Bohol mortgaged by Pedro Luspo
to the PNB was foreclosed and a portion of which was
later sold to the Gepalago Spouses. It was donated by
the spouses to their son in 1988. On February 12,
1990, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery
thereof claiming ownership by virtue of acquisitive
prescription in favor of their deceased father who had
declared the property for taxation purposes. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners
holding that they had been in possession thereof for
more than thirty (30) years and that the Gepalagos
knew that the land had long been possessed and
enjoyed in the concept of owners by petitioners. The
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 17
Court of Appeals, on appeal, reversed the trial court
and held that the vendee for value has the right to
rely on what appears on the certificate of title and
that a certificate of title is the best evidence of
ownership of registered land.
The Supreme Court held that a title, once registered,
cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and
notorious possession. Tax declarations and receipts
do not by themselves conclusively prove title to the
land.
In order that an action to recover ownership of real
property may prosper, the person who claims that he
has a better right to it must prove not only his
ownership of the same but also satisfactorily prove
the identity thereof. As a general rule, where the
certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when
the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to
rely on what appears on the face of the title. He is
under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the
face of the certificate. By way of exception, the
vendee is required to make the necessary inquiries if
there is anything in the certificate of title which
indicates any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
real property. In the instant case, there is nothing
from the records showing that the title of PNB, the
vendor, was flawed.
Pang-oden v. Leonen [G.R. No. 138939, 6
December 2006]
There was a need for the NIA to protect the irrigation
canal that would be destroyed when the creek
dividing the parties’ properties would overflow. Thus,
instead of the creek running from south to north, it
now ran from south to northwest and cut across
respondents’ property. The portion segregated by the
new creek, consisting of 1,336.50 square meters, is
the strip of land subject of this controversy.
Respondents later found out that petitioner had been
occupying the said strip and refused to vacate despite
repeated demands. Respondents filed a complaint for
recovery of possession based on ownership which was
granted by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. Petitioner
raised the argument that no new creek was created
which would show that they are the owners of the
said property. The court held that the respondents
were able to prove their lawful ownership of the land
in question because they were able to show proof that
indeed, a new creek was made. Further, the
testimonies of the witnesses presented were given
credence by the lower courts. The respondents were
able to dispose of their burden under Article 434
which provides that the property must be identified
and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title
and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.
Heirs of Fabela v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No.
142546 9 August 2001]
Carmelino Neri, as vendee-a-retro, was entrusted
with the possession of a parcel of land for a period of
fourteen (14) years from the date of the instrument.
Upon the expiration of said period, possession of the
property was to be restored to Simeona Balhon and
her children (heirs of Anastacio Fabela) without need
of "redemption." In 1977 or 1978, Barrio Abacan road
was constructed across the subject land, which
divided it into two separate lots known as Lot 868 and
870. Roque Neri, Sr. declared these two parcels of
land in his name with the Bureau of Lands and the
Assessor's office. Sometime in 1980, the Philippine
Veterans Industrial Development Corporation
(PHIVIDEC), negotiated with Roque Neri, Sr. for the
purchase of Lot 870, however, the heirs of Anastacio
Fabela, protested. As a consequence, Roque Neri, Sr.
executed a waiver of rights stating that the 8,000 sq.
meter portion of Lot 870 was erroneously included in
his name, thus plaintiff heirs of Anastacio Fabela
eventually received the proceeds of the sale.
Thereafter, the late Roque Neri, Sr. continued to
ignore plaintiffs' demand for the return of Lot 868.
The heirs of Anastacio Fabela filed a complaint for
reconveyance and damages against the heirs of
Roque Neri, Sr., involving said lot. The case was
submitted for decision on the basis of plaintiffs'
evidence since all the defendants were declared in
default. After trial and hearing ex-parte, the trial
court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. In
finding that the property belonged to the heirs of
Anastacio Fabela, the trial court concluded that in the
"Escritura de Transaccion," Carmelino Neri was
obliged to restore the subject property in or about
1938 to the heirs of Anastacio Fabela. Defendant
heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. filed a motion to set aside
orders of default and judgment which the trial court
denied. The Heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals which rendered its
assailed decision reversing the trial court's judgment
by default and dismissed the complaint. It sustained
the trial court's declaration of default against
appellants Heirs of Roque Neri, Sr. but found that the
judgment of default was contrary to the evidence or
the law. It concluded that petitioners had not
successfully adduced the required preponderance of
evidence on their claim of absolute ownership over
Lot 868. Appellees' motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, this petition filed by the heirs of
Anastacio Fabela.
According to the Supreme Court, the judgment of
default against defendants who have not appeared or
filed their answers does not imply a waiver of all their
rights, except their right to be heard and to present
evidence to support their allegations. Since the trial
court rendered a judgment of default against private
respondents, the latter took the appropriate remedy,
which is an ordinary appeal. Thus, notwithstanding
the respondent court's complete agreement with the
trial court's findings that all the respondents were
properly declared in default, it found that the
judgment by default was contrary to the evidence or
the law and thus reversed the trial court's decision. In
civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish his case by preponderance of evidence. If he
claims a right granted or created by law, he must
prove his claim by competent evidence and need not
rely upon the weakness of the evidence of his
opponent. When the record did not show that the
land, which was the subject matter of the action for
recovery of ownership, had been exactly determined,
such action could not prosper. Hence, petitioners'
ownership rights in the land claimed were not
satisfactorily and conclusively proven during the trial.
The petition was denied and the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals was affirmed.
Evidence that may be presented:
(a) Torrens certificate
(b) Titles granted by the Spanish Gov’t, like those
effected by royal cedula
(c) Long and actual possession
(d) Occupation of a building for a long time without
paying rentals
(e) Testimony of adverse and exclusive possession of
ownership corroborated by tax declaration of
properties, payment of taxes, and deeds of
mortgage
(f) Patent duly registered in the Registry Property by
the grantee
(g) Deed of sale
(h) A letter in which defendant recognized the
ownership of the property by the plaintiff
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 18
Quantum of Proof
(1) Preponderance of evidence
(2) Indicia of claim of ownership
(3) Conclusiveness of certificates of title
Republic v. Carrasco [G.R. No. 143491, 6
December 2006]
Carrasco sought to register a parcel of land he
allegedly received from a certain Mingao. He
presented a Waiver and Mingao’s Affidavit of
Ownership. This was granted by the trial court and
affirmed in toto by the CA. However, on appeal by the
Republic, the Supreme Court denied his application
for land registration because he was not able to
discharge his burden. While it is true that the subject
land was alienable and disposable, he was unable to
establish the ownership of Mingao. The Affidavit
merely claims ownership. There is also no proof that
Mingao declared the land in his name for taxation
purposes or paid taxes due thereon. True, a tax
declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove
ownership. Nonetheless, it may serve as sufficient
basis for inferring possession. Thus, Mingao himself
cannot validly transmit his rights over the land in
respondent’s favor. Yet assuming arguendo that
Mingao can transmit rights, he admits Mingao has
only been in possession since 1950, 5 years short of
the requirement under PD 1459.
Ramos-Balalio vs. Ramos [G.R. No.168464, 23
January 2006]
This is a case about siblings who fought over
possession of a parcel of land. When she mortgaged
her share, her mortgagees were unable to gain
possession of the land because it was found out that
her brother was in possession thereof. Petitioner
Zenaida asserts her right to a parcel of agricultural
land that her parents Susana and Abundio had
possessed since 1938. She claims that, for some
time, the cultivation of this land was left to her and
her grandfather and that, following the death of her
father Abundio, the land was allegedly sold to her by
her mother Susana. Zenaida’s argument is flawed
because it assumes that her parents had perfected
their title over the land and that they could validly
convey the same to third persons, whether by sale or
by inheritance. However, a careful examination of the
records show that petitioner has not satisfactorily
established that a valid application for homestead
patent was filed by her parents. The decision of the
Bureau of Lands in 1958 only addressed Zenaida’s
family’s right of preference over the land, in view of
their possession and cultivation of the land.
Nonetheless, the Bureau of Lands ordered the filing of
an appropriate application for its registration which
indicated that as of that time, there was yet no valid
application filed. The purported sale, therefore,
cannot be given effect, nor can it be a source of right
for Zenaida because Susana did not have the
authority to sell what did not belong to her. The
invalidation of the sale also nullified that partition of
the property among Zenaida, Alexander and Rolando
and his siblings because Zenaida could not have
disposed of the land which she could not own. Tax
declarations are also not sufficient proofs of
ownership but merely a good indicia of passion in the
concept of owner. But while this is the case, she was
awarded preferential possession of the said parcel of
land.
Republic v. Enriquez [G.R. No. 160990, 11
September 2006]
This concerns registration of 2 parcels of land which
was granted by the RTC and affirmed in toto by the
CA. Despite not being a trier of facts, the Court
delved into the pertinent circumstances of the case. It
was found out that there was a technical discrepancy
between the metes and bounds of Parcel 2. The deed
of sale shows a sale of a land that was 250 sq. m,
while the application sought to register 297 sq.m.
Respondents also did not submit the original tracing
cloth plan to identify a piece of land for registration
purposes, nor did they submit a report of the geodetic
engineer. It should be stressed that a person who
seeks registration of title to a piece of land must
prove the claim by clear and convincing evidence, and
is duty bound to identify sufficiently and satisfactorily
the property. With regard to Parcel 1, the Court
allowed the registration of such to respondents’ name
because they were able to prove possession of such.
Sps. Azana vs. Lumbo [G.R. No. 157593, 22
March 2007]
This is a petition for quieting of title filed by
respondents over a parcel of land in Boracay. They
alleged that they were the owners of a parcel of land
bought by their parents at a public auction. Lot 64
was only segregated in the national survery because
the Spouses Gregorio had claims over it. Petitioners
on the other hand claim that they purchased the said
lot from the Spouses Gregorios. The RTC ruled that
respondents were unable to establish the identity of
the lot sold under the final bill of sale. The CA
reversed the trial court and held for respondents. It
nullified the sale between the Spouses Gregorio and
Petitioners. Upon appeal, the Court found out that the
documents presented by petition cast doubt on the
description of the land. It was seen that if the land
which Bandiola, their predecessor-in-interest before
Gregorio, claims is to be hers, then it should have
been bounded with the Visayan Sea in the Eastern
portion. However, all the tax declarations show that is
was bounded by land mass. Meanwhile, the
respondents were able to prove the existence of
Deeds of Sale on the subject property executed by
Maming and their parents and Lumbo, the original
owner of the property.
Sps. Rumarate v. Hernandez [G.R. No. 168222,
18 April 2006]
The Sps. Rumarate filed an action to for reconveyance
of real property and quieting of title against
respondent heirs of Fernandez. Teodulo, the
husband,that he had been in open, continuous,
notorious and exclusive possession of the same lot
since 1929. His claim traces back to his godfather
who was granted the land in a CFI decision. His
godfather, Santigao, allegedly bequeathed his rights
over the property in favor of Teodulo. As a result,
Teodulo and his 11 children have been cultivating the
land. Respondent heirs allege that the said parcel of
land was acquired by them through a sale by
Santiago to their parents in 1964. The trial court held
for petitioners and adjudged them owners of the said
land. However, the CA reversed the petition. The
Supreme Court held that Teodulo’s open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of the
lot for more than 30 years vested him and his heirs
title over the lot. When the conditions specified in
Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act are complied with,
the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a government grant,
without necessity of a certificate of title being issued
and the land ceased to be part of public domain.
Thus, confirmation proceedings would be merely a
formality. On the part of respondents, Santiago could
not have validly conveyed the land to them because
he had only been in temporary possession of the said
land. They are also guilty of laches for not asserting
their rights over the parcel of land. While they may
have paid taxes over the said property, this cannot be
construed as ownership without possession thereof.
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Fule v. Legare [G.R. No. L-17951, 28 February
1963]
Legare commenced this action to recover from
petitioners a subject house and lot. It was alleged
that her adopted son, John, let her sign a paper for
compensation when in fact it was a deed of
conveyance of the said property to his name.
Thereafter, John was able to register the property in
his name and sought the help of a broker to sell the
said land. When Legare returned to her home,
someone else had been occupying the said house. It
was found out that Fule had bought the land from
John. The trial court and CA adjudged respondent the
owner of the land and directed petitioners to pay
monthly rentals and delivery the said property.
Hence, this petition. The Supreme Court granted the
petition by saying that they were purchasers in good
faith. There was sufficient basis for them to believe
that John was the absolute owner of the property
because he was able to register the land in his name.
In fact, the evidence shows the petitioners were
diligent enough to ascertain the ownership of the
land.
Deprivation of Property by Competent Authority
Art. 435: No person shall be deprived of his property
except by competent authority and for public use and
always upon payment of just compensation. Should
this requirement be not first complied with, the courts
shall protect and, in a proper case, restore the owner
in his possession. (349a)
As an exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain, the
requisites are:
(1) The taking must be done by competent authority;
(2) It must be for public use;
(3) The owner must be paid just compensation; and
(4) The requirement of due process of law must be
observed.
Phil. Columbian Association vs. Panis [G.R. No.
106528, 21 December 1993]
Phil. Colombian Association questions the authority of
the City of Manila to expropriate their property to
benefit those settlers residing there. Petitioner forgot
that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, R.A.
No. 409, expressly authorizes the City of Manila to
"condemn private property for public use" (Sec. 3)
and "to acquire private land . . . and subdivide the
same into home lots for sale on easy terms to city
residents" (Sec. 100). The Revised Charter of the City
of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila general
powers over its territorial jurisdiction, including the
power of eminent domain. That only a few could
actually benefit from the expropriation of the property
does not diminish its public use character. It is simply
not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for
all who need them.
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-47553,
31 January 1981]
In 1969, the National Power Corporation filed a
complaint for eminent domain for acquisition of right
of way easement over defendants' two parcels of land
known as Blocks 10 and 19 which it needed for the
construction of a power line. Block 19 had already
been occupied by plaintiff since 1957 with the
permission of defendants' predecessor although no
agreement as to compensation had ever been
completed, while Block 10 was placed in its
possession in 1970 upon deposit of a provisional
amount. The trial court rendered judgment
expropriating Blocks 10 and 19 and ordering plaintiff
to pay defendants P15.00 per square meter for the
area expropriated, shown to be the prevailing market
value of the property at the time plaintiff took
possession. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that
the market value at the time of the taking determined
the just compensation, and inasmuch as plaintiff had
been occupying Block 19 since 1957 and defendants
did not present evidence as to the market value of
said property as of 1957, the just compensation
should be that appearing in the 1957 tax declaration
which in this case is P.07 per square meter.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that since the
plaintiff did not take possession of Block 19 for the
purpose of eminent domain in 1957, nor did it
subsequently file an action for expropriation in court
over the said property but only sought a right of way
easement over the same, the market value should not
be fixed as of the time of the taking but as of the time
the trial court made its order of expropriation.
|||
Manila Railroad Company vs. Velasquez [G.R.
No. 10278, 23 November 1915]
"Compensation" means an equivalent for the value of
the land taken. Anything beyond that is more and
anything short of that is less than compensation. The
word "just" is used merely to intensify the meaning of
the word "compensation." The market value of the
condemned land is all that the owner is entitled to.
Evidence that the locality may become a business or
choice residential district, when its history over a
period of years shows that there are large tracts of
agricultural land in the vicinity, including the
condemned land, which have never been appropriated
for any of those purposes, does not justify appraising
such land at figures which it would be worth if such
development were an actual fact. Such evidence
amounts to a mere expectancy, the market value of
which is comparatively insignificant.
For the purpose of fixing just compensation,
commissioners are appointed by the Court. The view
of the premises made by the commissioners is for the
purpose of better enabling them to determine upon
the weight of conflicting evidence. Being disinterested
land owners, selected for their ability to arrive at a
judicious decision in the assessment of damages, and
being allowed to view the property, their report is
entitled to greater weight than that of an ordinary
trier of facts. Notwithstanding the respect due the
report of the commissioners, their valuation of the
property must be supported by competent evidence of
record, and in those cases where the evidence as to
value and damages is conflicting, they should always
set forth in full their reasons for accepting certain
evidence, especially in those cases where a view of
the premises has been made.
Yet, the fixing of just compensation is ultimately a
judicial function. The Court may accept or deny, in
part or in whole, the report of the commissioners. It
may also, with or without fraud and mistake, appoint
new commissioners to determine the market value of
the land and receive evidence pursuant to such.
Art. 436: When any property is condemned or seized
by competent authority in the interest of health,
safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be
entitled to compensation, unless he can show that
such condemnation or seizure is unjustified. (n)
As an exercise of Police Power,
(a) Relates to use and enjoyment, not ownership of
property
(b) Taking of property not involved
(c) Person affected not entitled to financial
compensation
EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 20
Hidden Treasure
Art. 438: Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of
the land, building, or other property on which it is
found. Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on
the property of another, or of the State or any of its
subdivisions, and by chance, onehalf thereof shall be
allowed to the finder. If the finder is a trespasser, he
shall not be entitled to any share of the treasure. If
the things found be of interest to science or the arts,
the State may acquire them at their just price, which
shall be divided in conformity with the rule stated.
(351a)

Art. 439: By treasure is understood, for legal

purposes, any hidden and unknown deposit of money,
jewelry, or other precious objects, the lawful
ownership of which does not appear.

Right to hidden treasure

(1) Place where treasure may be found (land,
building, or other property)
(2) Belongs to the owner of the land, building, or
property, if he is the finder
(3) Finder is entitled to one-half if he is not the owner
of the land, etc.
(4) Meaning of “by chance”
- term not defined by law
- there must be no purpose or intent to look for the
treasure(Spanish commentators)
- “by good luck” (Dean Capistrano & Dean
Francisco
(5) Finder not entitled to share if a trespasser
(6) Right of finder employed to look for treasure –
deemed as a stranger, he is not a trespasser but
he is not entitled to any part of the treasure
unless there is agreement to the contrary
(7) Right of lessee or usufructuary – considered as
stranger, he gets one half as finder

Requisites:
(1) It consist of money, jewelry or other precious
objects
(2) Its existence is hidden and unknown
(3) Its lawful ownership does not appear

EH407 | PRE-MIDTERMS | 21