Quick V Geddie

Case 4:17-cv-00192-HLM Document 55 Filed 08/09/18 Page 1 of 81
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ROME DIVISION
KIERSTEN QUICK,
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.

4:17-CV-0192-HLM
V.
STATE TROOPER JOSEPH

GEDDIE, individually, and
DENNY REYES, DADE
COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPUTY, individually,
Defendant.
ORDER
This case is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment [33], on the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendant Denny Reyes ("Defendant

Reyes") [37], and on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed
by Defendant Joseph Geddie ("Defendant Geddie") [39].
I. Initial Matters
As required by the Local Rules, Plaintiff filed a Statement
of Material Facts ("PSMF") in support of her Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. (PSMF (Docket Entry No. 33-2).)
Defendant Geddie filed a response to PSMF ("GRPSMF"),
while Defendant Reyes also filed a response to PSMF
("RRPSMF"). (GRPSMF (Docket Entry No. 43-1); RRPSMF
(Docket Entry No. 44-1).)
Defendant Reyes also filed a Statement of Material Facts
("RSMF") in support of his own Motion for Summary
Judgment. (RSMF (Docket Entry No. 37-1).) Plaintiff filed a
response to RSMF ("PRRSMF"). (PRRSMF (Docket Entry
No. 46-1).) As permitted by the Local Rules, Plaintiff filed her
own Statement of Additional Material Facts ("PSAF"), to which

2
Defendant Reyes responded ("RRPSAF"). (PSAF (Docket
Entry No. 46-2); RRPSAF (Docket Entry No. 49).)
Defendant Geddie also filed a Statement of Material
Facts in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment
("GSMF"). (GSMF (Docket Entry No. 39-1).) Plaintiff filed a
response to GSMF ("PRGSMF"). (PRGSMF (Docket Entry
No. 45-1).) As permitted by the Local Rules, Plaintiff filed her
own Statement of Additional Material Facts, which is identical
to the Statement of Additional Material Facts that Plaintiff
provided in response to Defendant Reyes' Motion. (Compare
Docket Entry No. 46-2 with Docket Entry No. 45-2.) The Court
refers to both of Plaintiff's Statements of Additional Material
Facts as "PSAF." Defendant Geddie filed a response to PSAF
("GRPSAF"). (GRPSAF (Docket Entry No. 47-1).)
The Court notes that the majority of the statements in
PSAF are identical to the statements contained in PSMF.

3
(Compare PSAF %If 1-76 with PSMF 1111 1-76.) The Court
excludes PSAF 7 1-76 as duplicative. The Court also notes
that certain statements in PSMF are impermissible legal
conclusions or contain legal arguments. (PSMF 7 30-31, 45,
47, 51-52, 54-55, 57-58, 61, 65-71, 76.) The Court has not
considered those statements. See N.D. Ga. R. 56.1B(1)
("The court will not consider any fact. . . stated as an issue or
legal conclusion.").
The Court addresses the remaining portions of PSMF,
GRPSMF, RRPSMF, RSMF, PRRSMF, GSMF, PRGSMF,
PSAF, RRPSAF, and GRPSAF infra. Where the parties
object to a proposed fact and the Court does not explicitly
discuss the objection, the Parties can conclude that the Court
has overruled the objection. If the Court does not mention a
proposed fact or the substance of a proposed fact, the Parties
4
can conclude that the Court has found the proposed fact
immaterial or unsupported.
II. Background
A. Factual Background
Keeping in mind that, when deciding a motion for
summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence and all
factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion, the Court provides the following
statement of facts. Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d
1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012) This statement does not
represent actual findings of fact. Rich v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of
Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 530 (11th Cir. 2013). Instead, the Court
has provided the statement simply to place the Court's legal
analysis in the context of this particular case or controversy.
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1. The Parties
Plaintiff resides in Lookout Mountain, Georgia. (Dep. of
Kiersten Quick (Docket Entry No. 33-16) at 11.) Defendant
Geddie resides in Dade County, Georgia, and he is a Trooper
First Class 3 with the Georgia State Patrol based out of Post
41 in LaFayette, Georgia. (Decl. of Joseph Geddie (Docket
Entry No. 39-3)112; Dep. of Joseph Geddie (Docket Entry No.
33-17) at 19.) Prior to becoming a state trooper, Defendant
Geddie was a deputy with the Dade County Sheriff's Office.
(Geddie Decl. IT 2.) During the time period relevant to this
action, Defendant Reyes was a deputy with the Dade County
Sheriff's Office. (Aff. of Denny Reyes (Docket Entry No. 44-2)
IT 2; Dep. of Denny Reyes (Docket Entry No. 33-18) at 9;
RSMF IT 1; PRRSMF ii 1 . )
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2. The Car Crash
On November 23, 2016, Defendant Geddie responded to
a one-vehicle crash involving Jessica Gaha, who is Plaintiff's
daughter. (GSMF IT 1; PRGSMF IT 1;1 PSMF 1; GRPSMF IT
1; RRPSMF 1.) The accident occurred at night at New
England Road and Main Avenue in Dade County, Georgia.
(Geddie Decl. Ex. A; PSMF ¶ 1; GRPSMF ¶ 1; RRPSMF IT 1.)
Ms. Gaha's vehicle left the roadway, struck a tree, and
became stuck in a ditch on the side of the road. (PSMF ¶ 2;
GRPSMF IT 2; RRPSMF IT 2.)
After receiving a phone call from Ms. Gaha about the
crash, Plaintiff called 911 to report the accident. (PSMF IT 3;
I Plaintiff objected to this proposed fact to the extent that it

relied on a Declaration from Lieutenant Shawn Prather.
(PRGSMF ¶ 1.) Plaintiff, however, failed to file a notice of
objection to that Declaration. The Court has not considered the
impermissible or irrelevant portions of Lieutenant Prather's
Declaration.
7
GRPSMF IT 3; RRPSMF IT 3.) Defendant Geddie responded
to the crash and arrived at the scene at approximately 9:20
p.m. (Geddie Decl. Ex. A; PSMF IT 5; GRPSMF IT 5; RRPSMF
IT 5; Pl.'s Ex. 4 (Docket Entry No. 33-6) at 1.) Defendant Reyes

also responded to the crash, arriving at approximately the
same time. (Reyes Aff. IT 3; Reyes Dep. at 19-20; RSMF IT 2;
PRRSMF If 2; PSMF ¶ 5; GRPSMF 11 5; RRPSMF IT 5.) By
the time Defendants arrived at the scene, Ms. Gaha's friend,
P.P., had arrived in her truck to assist Ms. Gaha. (PSMF 116;
GRPSMF 116; RRPSMF 116.)
After Defendant Geddie arrived on the scene and spoke
with Ms. Gaha, Defendant Geddie did a routine GCIC check.
(GSMF IT 3; PRGSMF If 3.)2 The GCIC check revealed that
2 The video depicts an individual who appears to be Defendant

Reyes interacting with Ms. Gaha before Defendant Geddie spoke
with Ms. Gaha. (Video at 2:27-3:10.)
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Ms. Gaha was driving with a suspended license and with
expired tags. (GSMF IT 3; PRGSMF ¶ 3; PSMF IT 9; GRPSMF
11 9.) Defendant Geddie also investigated the mechanism of
the accident, including asking questions about Ms. Gaha's
speed and the road conditions, and asking whether the
property owner was concerned about damage to his tree.
(PSMF li 8; GRPSMF ¶ 8; Geddie Dep. at 83-84.) Defendant
Geddie placed Ms. Gaha under arrest based on her
suspended license and expired tags and other violations.
(GSMF If 3; PRGSMF IT 3.) Defendant Geddie concluded that
there was no suspicion that Ms. Gaha was intoxicated or
otherwise impaired by alcohol or other substances. (PSMF IT
11, as modified per RRPSMF IT 11; GRPSMF 1111.)
Plaintiff contends that, while Defendant Geddie checked
Ms. Gaha's license, Ms. Gaha and P.P. were in close
proximity to each other and to the wrecked car. (PSMF IT 10;

9
GRPSMF IT 10.) Plaintiff also contends that, when Defendant
Geddie stated that he was going to arrest Ms. Gaha, PP.
approached the area where Defendant Geddie and Ms. Gaha
stood, coming within touching distance. (PSMF IT 12;
GRPSMF IT 12.)
According to Defendant Reyes, Defendant Geddie was in
charge of investigating the crash. (Reyes Aff. ¶ 4.) Defendant
Reyes contends that he did not give orders or directions to
individuals at the scene concerning which movements were
proper or improper. (Id.)
As Defendant Reyes was getting out of his car in a church
parking lot near the crash scene, a black SUV parked in the
church parking lot. (Reyes Dep. at 21; RSMF IT 3; PRRSMF
113; PSMF 1119; GRPSMF IT 19; RRPSMF IT 19.) Plaintiff and
her fiancé, Oswaldo Lopez, got out of the SUV. (RSMF IT 3;
PRRSMF 11 3; PSMF IT 19; GRPSMF IT 19; RRPSMF 11 19;

10
Reyes Dep. at 21.) Plaintiff and Mr. Lopez walked toward the
crash scene. (RSMF 11 4, as modified per PRRSMF If 4.)
Defendant Reyes described Plaintiff and Mr. Lopez as walking
"abruptly" toward the scene. (Reyes Dep. at 21.)
3. Ms. Gaha's Arrest and Events Leading to

Plaintiff's Arrest
Ms. Gaha's arrest is depicted on a video from a dash
camera (the "video") mounted in Defendant Geddie's patrol
car. (Geddie Decl. Ex. C.) The video shows Defendant
Geddie placing Ms. Gaha under arrest at time marker 7:30.
(GSMF 116; PRGSMF IR 6; Video at 7:30.)
While Defendant Geddie was in the process of arresting
Ms. Gaha, Ms. Gaha handed P.P. one of her personal items
and asked her to get her purse from the car. (PSMF 11 13;
GRPSMF ¶ 13.) Defendants did not tell PP. not to enter the
car or not to remove Ms. Gaha's personal effects. (PSMF IT
11
14; GRPSMF If 14.) P.P. went to the car, opened the driver's
side door, sat in the driver's seat, found Ms. Gaha's purse, and
removed the purse from the vehicle. (PSMF ¶ 15; GRPSMF
IT 15.) Defendants did not say anything to P.P. about the
purse. (PSMF IT 16; GRPSMF IT 16.)
While Defendant Geddie attempted to handcuff Ms.
Gaha, Ms. Gaha asked P.P. if she could get her phone from
her pocket. (PSMF IT 17; GRPSMF 1117.) Defendant Geddie
responded that it was fine for P.P. to retrieve Ms. Gaha's
phone from her pocket, and P.P. reached into Ms. Gaha's
jacket pocket. (PSMF ¶ 18; GRPSMF IT 18.)
While Defendant Geddie was in the process of
handcuffing Ms. Gaha, Plaintiff came onto the scene and
approached Defendant Geddie and Ms. Gaha. (GSMF IT 4, as
modified per PRGSMF If 4; Video at 9:08-9:10.) Ms. Gaha
called out to Plaintiff, "Mom, I'm going to jail. Can you come
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get me?" (PSMF ¶20; GRPSMF 1120; RRPSMF 1120.) P.P.
stated, "They're taking her to jail." (PSMF IT 21; GRPSMF ¶
20; RRPSMF 1121.) Plaintiff stated, "Are you fucking kidding
me!" (GSMF 11 4, as modified per PRGSMF IT 4; Video at
9:09.) Plaintiff contends that she directed her statement
toward Ms. Gaha. (Quick Dep. at 18-19.) Defendant Geddie
contends that he perceived Plaintiff as being "highly irate."
(Geddie Decl. IT 4.) According to Plaintiff, she was "concerned
upset," not "angry upset." (Quick Dep. at 16.) The dash
camera video shows Plaintiff approaching and stating, "Are
you fucking kidding me!" at time marker 9:09. (GSMF If 7;
PRGSMF 117; Video at 9:09.) Plaintiff was approximately five
or ten feet from Defendant Geddie when she made this
statement. (RSMF IT 6, as modified per PRRSMF IT 6; see
also Quick Dep. at 19 (stating that Plaintiff was close to
Defendant Geddie when she made this statement).) Mr.

13
Lopez was visible on the video at this time. (PSMF IT 24, as
modified per GRPSMF IT 24.)
Defendant Geddie advised Plaintiff to go back where she
came from, stating, "Ma'am, go back over there and stand."
(Geddie Decl. ¶ 4; Video at 9:14.) According to Defendant
Geddie, he gave this direction because of Plaintiff's demeanor
and because he was not finished processing the scene.
(Geddie Decl. IT 4.) According to Defendant Geddie, he was
referring to the location where Plaintiff parked her vehicle,
which was approximately fifty yards away in a church parking
lot. (Id.) Defendants also contend that Defendant Geddie was
pointing in the direction of Plaintiff's vehicle. (Video at 9:14.)
Defendant Geddie said to Plaintiff, "Go right back over
there and stand." (Video at 9:16.) Defendants contend that
Defendant Geddie pointed in the direction of Plaintiff's vehicle.
(Id.)
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Plaintiff and Mr. Lopez walked toward the passenger side
of Ms. Gaha's wrecked vehicle. (RSMF IT 9; PRRSMF IT 9.)
Defendant Geddie stated, "Ma'am, go right back over there, or
you will go to jail for obstruction," while pointing. (Video at
9:22.) Defendant Geddie stated, "Right now." (Id. at 9:27.)
Defendant Geddie also stated, "Go back over there where you
was at," again pointing. (Id. at 9:28-9:29.) According to
Plaintiff, she did not understand Defendant Geddie's
commands as instructing her to go back to any particular
location, and she stepped back as instructed. (Quick Dep. at
18, 20.)
At the time of those commands, Defendant Geddie was
in the process of arresting Ms. Gaha and had not yet placed
her or secured her in his patrol car. (GSMF 1111; PRGSMF IT
11.) Defendant Geddie eventually secured Ms. Gaha with
handcuffs and placed her in his patrol car. (Video at 10:06;

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PSMF IT 35; GRPSMF IT 35; RRPSMF IT 35.) Plaintiff contends
that Ms. Gaha stated that her keys were in her car, and that
Ms. Gaha asked if Plaintiff could come get her from jail and
take care of her car. (Video at 9:30.) Plaintiff opened the
passenger side door of the wrecked car. (Id. at 10:04-10:06)
At that time, P.P. was seated inside the wrecked car in the
front driver's side, while Mr. Lopez was standing by the driver's
side door. (PSMF 39; GRPSMF 11 39; RRPSMF IT 39.)
Plaintiff contends that Defendants did not react to P.P.'s
presence inside the vehicle. (PSMF IT 40; GRPSMF II 40.)

Plaintiff did not hear P.P. or Mr. Lopez refuse instructions or
argue with the officers. (Quick Dep. at 99-100.)
Defendant Geddie approached Plaintiff and said, "Hey,
ma'am, I am going to tell you one more time to go right back
over there, or you are going to jail," pointing in the direction of
Plaintiff's vehicle. (RSMF IT14; PRRSMF IT 14; Video at

16
10:07.) Defendant Geddie then approached Plaintiff and said,
"Nope, you go right over there," pointing again in the direction
of Plaintiff's vehicle. (RSMF IT 15; PRRSMF ¶ 15; Video at
10:13.) Defendant Geddie stated, "Get over there right now,"
again pointing in the direction of Plaintiff's vehicle. (RSMF If
16; PRRSMF ¶ 16; Video at 10:15.) Defendant Geddie then
said, "I don't care what. You go now," pointing in the direction
of Plaintiff's vehicle. (RSMF II 17; PRRSMF IT 17; Video at
10:16.) Defendant Geddie said, "You go now," pointing.
(RSMF il 19; PRRSMF IT 19; Video at 10:19.)
Defendant Geddie stated, "Do you want to go to jail?"
(RSMF IT 18; PRRSMF 1118; Video at 10:21.) Plaintiff stated,
"What are you going to take me to jail for?" (GSMF IT 15, as
modified per PRGSMF IT 15; Video at 10:22-10:28.) Plaintiff
also commented, "I know the law. I was married to an attorney
for 20 years." (GSMF IT 15, as modified per PRGSMF IT 15;

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Video at 10:22-10:28.) Plaintiff further stated, "I'm not
obstructing anything." (GSMF ¶ 15, as modified per PRGSMF
IT 15; Video at 10:22-10:28.) According to Plaintiff, she
decided that Defendant Geddie had given her an "unlawful
order," and she "chose not to obey it." (Quick Dep. at 23, 62-
63, 96-97.) Plaintiff testified that she felt that Defendant
Geddie was "bullying" her and she was "fed up with it." (Id. at
23.)
Defendant Geddie responded, "Yes, you are," and
pointed his index finger at Plaintiff. (PSMF IT 48; GRPSMF IT
48; RRPSMF IT 8; Video at 10:29.) Plaintiff responded, "You're
harassing me." (Video at 10:30.) Plaintiff gestured with her
hands during this exchange. (PSMF IT 49, as modified per
GRPSMF IT 49.) The video depicts Plaintiff raising her right
hand while talking with Defendant Geddie. (Video at 10:30.)
According to Defendant Geddie, he did not know Plaintiff's

18
intentions and he did not know whether she would try to reach
for his weapon. (Geddie Decl. IT 4; Geddie Dep. at 41-43.)
Plaintiff did not touch Defendant Geddie. (Geddie Dep. at 38.)
Defendant Geddie claims that he grabbed Plaintiff's raised
hand and spun around with her, taking her to the ground.
(Geddie Decl. IT 4; Geddie Dep. at 38.) Plaintiff claims that
Defendant Geddie grabbed her arm, twisted it behind her
back, tackled her in a single fluid motion, and slammed her
body into the ditch, without any forewarning. (Quick Dep. at
28-29, 32, 78-79, 92-93.) In any event, the video depicts
Plaintiff stating, "Get your hands off me," before Plaintiff and
Defendant Geddie fall to the ground. (Video at 10:30-10:32.)
The video does not depict Defendant Geddie announcing that
he was placing Plaintiff under arrest. (See generally Video;
see also Quick Dep. at 61-62, 81, 98-99 (stating that
Defendant Geddie never announced that Plaintiff was under

19
arrest); Geddie Dep. at 41 (testifying that Defendant Geddie
did not tell Plaintiff that she was under arrest or tell her to put
her hands behind her back before taking her to the ground).)
While Plaintiff and Defendant Geddie were on the ground
with Defendant Geddie attempting to place Plaintiff in
handcuffs, Plaintiff got her left hand and arm away from
Defendant Geddie and kept them under her body to protect
them. (Quick Dep. at 31, 82.) Plaintiff contends that
Defendant Geddie pulled her arm back very hard to place it in
handcuffs, and that, during the attempt to handcuff her,
Defendant Geddie slammed her body into the ground, causing
her head to hit the ground a few times. (Id. at 28, 32, 80, 95,
102.) According to Plaintiff, while Defendant Geddie was
attempting to handcuff her, Defendant Geddie straddled her
with his knees on the ground and placed his weight on her
lower back or bottom. (Id. at 93-94, 101-02.) Defendant

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Geddie handcuffed Plaintiff and brought her to her feet.
(Geddie Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff testified that her head did not hit
the ground after Defendant Geddie placed her in handcuffs.
(GSMF ¶ 22; PRGSMF ¶ 22; RSMF 1]. 41; PRRSMF If 41.)
Defendant Geddie denies using any other force against
Plaintiff. (Geddie Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff admits that Defendant
Geddie did not kick or strike her, and that he did not use a
weapon or instrument to effect her arrest. (GSMF ¶ 20;
PRGSMF 11. 20.) Defendant Geddie is larger than Plaintiff.
(Geddie Dep. at 36-37.)
The video depicts Mr. Lopez walking toward Plaintiff and
Defendant Geddie while they were on the ground. (RSMF 11
23; PRRSMF 1123 (admitting RSMF IT 23, but contending the
statement is immaterial); Video at 10:33.) Defendant Geddie
yelled for Mr. Lopez to get back. (RSMF 1124; PRRSMF ¶ 24
(admitting RSMF IT 24, but arguing the statement is

21
immaterial); Video at 10:36.) Defendant Reyes walked around
the passenger side of the wrecked car and stood between
Defendant Geddie and Mr. Lopez. (RSMF 11. 25; PRRSMF IT
25 (admitting RSMF II 25, but contending it is immaterial);
Video at 10:38.) Mr. Lopez, who was very animated,
complained about Plaintiff being arrested. (RSMF IT 26;
PRRSMF If 26 (admitting RSMF II 26, but arguing it is
immaterial); Video at 10:38-11:01.) Defendant Reyes told Mr.
Lopez, "He is not going to let her go. So you might as well just
shut up and go." (RSMF 1127; PRRSMF IT 27 (admitting RSMF
IT 27, but contending it is immaterial); Video at 10:56.) Mr.
Lopez continued to complain about Plaintiff's being arrested.
(RSMF 11 28; PRRSMF IT 28 (admitting RSMF 11 28, but
arguing it is immaterial); Video at 11:00-11:30.)
Once Defendant Geddie handcuffed Plaintiff, Defendant
Reyes and Defendant Geddie picked Plaintiff up and escorted

22
her to Defendant Reyes' patrol car. (RSMF if 29; PRRSMF IT
29; Video at 11:30.)
According to Defendant Reyes, Defendant Geddie made
the decision to arrest Plaintiff. (Reyes Aff. IT 5.) Plaintiff
testified that Defendant Reyes did not appear to play a role in
the initial decision to arrest Plaintiff. (Quick Dep. at 71.)
Plaintiff testified that Defendant Reyes "did not have anything
to do with [her] arrest other than escorting [her] and allowing
it to happen." (Id. at 76.) Defendant Reyes did not appear on
the video again until the 10:11 mark, and the video depicted
Defendant Reyes talking with P.P. on the driver's side of Ms.
Gaha's car during most of the time that Defendant Geddie was
giving commands to Plaintiff. (Reyes Dep. at 22, 31, 34, 46,
53, 64; Video at 10:11-10:20.) According to Defendant Reyes,
he was not entirely attentive to what Plaintiff was doing during
these events, and he was engaging with P.P. and Mr. Lopez
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while Defendant Geddie was effectuating Plaintiff's arrest. (Id.
at 31, 48, 64.) Defendant Reyes did not see Defendant Geddie
slam Plaintiff's head into the ground. (RSMF ¶ 34; PRRSMF
IT 34.) According to Defendant Reyes, he did not see
Defendant Geddie tackle Plaintiff, and he did not know how
Plaintiff and Defendant Geddie went to the ground. (Reyes
Dep. at 45, 63.)
4. Plaintiff's Transport to Jail and Treatment
Defendant Reyes transported Plaintiff to the jail after her
arrest. (Reyes Aff. II 6; Reyes Dep. at 53.) According to
Defendant Reyes, he transported Plaintiff to the jail because
Defendant Geddie already had an arrestee secured in the
back of his patrol car, and Plaintiff's arrest had been
completed by the time that Defendant Reyes transported
Plaintiff to the jail. (Reyes Aff. IT 6.)
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After Plaintiff's arrest, Defendant Reyes informed the
Dade County Sheriff's Office that Plaintiff was complaining of
arm pain, and Plaintiff was transported to a hospital for
evaluation. (Quick Dep. at 35-36.) X-rays taken of Plaintiff's
arm at the hospital revealed that Plaintiff's arm was not
broken, and Plaintiff was diagnosed only with contusions,
swelling, and bruising. (Id. at 37-39; Quick Dep. Ex. D-9
(Docket Entry No. 39-5) at 1-3.) Plaintiff did not request that
the hospital staff check her for injuries other than to her arm.
(Quick Dep. at 39.) The hospital released Plaintiff to the jail.
(Pl.'s Ex. B (Docket Entry No. 33-3).)
The hospital gave Plaintiff one tramadol pill at the
hospital, which Plaintiff took. (GSMF IT 26; PRGSMF if 26.)

Plaintiff received a prescription for tramadol, which she did not
fill because she went on vacation. (GSMF If 26; PRGSMF If
26.) Plaintiff took over-the-counter medications such as

25
Tylenol or Advil for pain, and, by the time she returned from
vacation four days later, she did not need medication. (GSMF
IT 26; PRGSMF IT 26.) Plaintiff never lost consciousness
during the incident. (GSMF 1126; PRGSMF 1126.)
5. Defendant Geddie Remains on the Scene
The video depicts that Defendant Geddie remained on
the scene until the tow truck driver arrived to tow Ms. Gaha's
car. (Video at 25:15-31:14; see also Geddie Dep. at 79-80
(stating that Defendant Geddie remained on the scene until
the wrecker got Ms. Gaha's car).) After Plaintiff's arrest,
Defendant Geddie permitted P.P. to go into the wrecked car
to remove additional items. (PSMF 11-159-60; GRPSMF ITIT 59-
60.)
6. Criminal Charges Against Plaintiff
Defendant Geddie wrote an Officer's Statement in
Support of Warrantless Arrest and two Georgia Uniform Traffic

26
Citation, Summons, and Accusations for Plaintiff. (GSMF IT
28; PRGSMF ¶ 28.) The citations listed the offenses of
obstruction of a law enforcement officer under 0.C.G.A. § 16-
10-24(b) and disorderly conduct. (GSMF ¶ 28; PRGSMF IT
28.) The State filed a Motion to Enter NoIle Prosequi, which
the Superior Court of Dade County, Georgia, granted on
January 13, 2017. (Pl.'s Ex. 14 (Docket Entry No. 33-12).)
7. Previous Actions Involving Defendant

Geddie
Defendant Geddie was involved in another action while
he was a deputy with the Dade County Sheriff's Office. Reese
v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1273 (11th Cir. 2008); Geddie Dep.
at 11. Defendant Geddie personally paid no money as a result
of the settlement in that action, and he testified that he did not
change the way he practiced policing as a result of that action.
(Geddie Dep. at 13.) Defendant Geddie also was involved in
27
another case arising from his arrest of an individual for
disorderly conduct at a crash scene. (Id. at 13-17.) Defendant
Geddie personally paid no money for the settlement in that
action, and he testified that this incident and the settlement did
not influence the way that he practices law enforcement. (Id.
at 17-18.)
B. Procedural Background
On August 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. (Compl.
(Docket Entry No. 1).) Plaintiff asserted the following claims:
(1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 false arrest claim against both
Defendants (id. 7 44-50); (2) a § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim against Defendant Geddie (id. IrR 51-56); (3) a § 1983
excessive force claim against both Defendants (id. TT 57-62);
and (4) a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against
both Defendants (id. rIT 63-71).
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On June 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed her Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. (Pl.'s Mot. Partial Summ. J. (Docket
Entry No. 33).) On July 2, 2018, Defendants Reyes and
Geddie filed their Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.
(Def. Reyes' Mot. Summ. J. (Docket Entry No. 37); Def.
Geddie's Mot. Summ. J. (Docket Entry No. 39).) The briefing
processes for the Motions are complete, and the Court finds
that the matters are ripe for resolution.
III. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) allows a court to
grant summary judgment when "there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking
summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the
Court that summary judgment is appropriate and may satisfy
this burden by pointing to materials in the record. Jones v.

29
UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012).
Once the moving party has supported its motion adequately,
the burden shifts to the non-movant to rebut that showing by
coming forward with specific evidence that demonstrates the
existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id.
When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the
Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable factual
inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir.
2013); Strickland, 692 F.3d at 1154. The Court also must
"resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the
non-movant." Morton, 707 F.3d at 1280 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Further, the Court may not make
credibility determinations, weigh conflicting evidence to
resolve disputed factual issues, or assess the quality of the
evidence presented. Strickland, 692 F.3d at 1154. Finally,

30
the Court does not make factual determinations. Rich, 716
F.3d at 530.
The Court further observes that the standard for a motion
for summary judgment differs depending on whether the party
moving for summary judgment also bears the burden of proof
on the relevant issue. As the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit has noted:
When the moving party does not have the burden of

proof on the issue, he need show only that the
opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial. But
where the moving party has the burden—the plaintiff
on a claim for relief or the defendant on an
affirmative defense—his showing must be sufficient
for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact
could find other than for the moving party.
Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986)
(quoting William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under
the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact,
99 F.R.D. 465, 487-88 (1984)). "Where the movant also bears
31
the burden of proof on the claims at trial, it 'must do more than
put the issue into genuine doubt; indeed, [it] must remove
genuine doubt from the issue altogether." Franklin v.
Montgomery Cty., Md., Civil Action No. DKC 2005-0489, 2006
WL 2632298, at *5 (D. Md. Sept. 13, 2006) (quoting Hoover
Color Corp. v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 1999))
(alteration in original).
IV. Defendant Reyes' Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff asserted three claims against Defendant Reyes:
(1) § 1983 false arrest; (2) § 1983 First Amendment retaliation;
and (3) § 1983 excessive force. Plaintiff agreed to dismiss her
§ 1983 excessive force claim against Defendant Reyes in her
response to Defendant Reyes' Motion for Summary
Judgment, and the Court grants Defendant Reyes' Motion for
Summary Judgment as to that claim. (See PL's Resp. Def.
Geddie's Mot. Summ. J. (Docket Entry No. 46) at 1 n.1

32
("[Defendant] Reyes also argues that he is not liable for
Defendant Geddie's excessive force. [Plaintiff] agrees to
dismiss the excessive force claim against Defendant Reyes
only.").
Defendant Reyes asserts the defense of qualified
immunity with respect to Plaintiff's remaining claims. The
Court first sets forth the general standard governing qualified
immunity, and then applies that standard to Plaintiff's claims
against Defendant Reyes.
A. Qualified Immunity: In General
Defendant Reyes asserts the defense of qualified
immunity with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 false arrest claims
asserted against him in his individual capacity. Qualified
immunity protects government officials performing
discretionary functions from suits for damages brought against
them in their individual capacities. Morris v. Town of

33
Lexington, Ala., 748 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2014). The
Eleventh Circuit applies a two-part analysis to determine
whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at
1322.
Under the qualified immunity analysis used in this Circuit,
the defendant first must prove that the allegedly
unconstitutional conduct occurred while the defendant official
was acting within the scope of the official's discretionary
authority. Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 849 (11th Cir.
2010). To determine whether the defendant acted within her
discretionary authority, the Court asks "whether the
[defendant] was (a) performing a legitimate job-related
function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through
means that were within [the defendant's] power to utilize."
34
Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265
(11th Cir. 2004).3
Once a defendant shows that he or she acted within his
or her discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to demonstrate that (1) the defendant's conduct violated the
plaintiff's constitutional rights and (2) that the constitutional
rights violated were "clearly established when the defendant
committed the act complained of." Morris, 748 F.3d at 1322
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
Penley, 605 F.3d at 849 ("Once the defendant establishes that
3 In making this determination, the Court does not inquire

"whether it was within the defendant's authority to commit the
allegedly illegal act." Holloman ex rel Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1266
(internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the Court must "look
to the general nature of the defendant's action, temporarily putting
aside the fact that it may have been committed for an
unconstitutional purpose, in an unconstitutional manner, to an
unconstitutional extent, or under constitutionally inappropriate
circumstances." Id.
35
he was acting within his discretionary authority, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not
appropriate." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The qualified immunity inquiry can begin with either prong.
Morris, 748 F.3d at 1322. If the plaintiff fails to make either of
those showings, however, then the defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity. Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753,
762 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Smith ex rel. Smith v.
Siegelman, 322 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity based on
plaintiff's failure to allege constitutional violation).
"The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether
a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a
reasonable [individual in the defendant's position] that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Morris,
748 F.3d at 1322 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation

36
marks and citation omitted). Although a plaintiff "need not
demonstrate that there is case-law specifically addressing his
factual scenario, existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff may
demonstrate that a right is clearly established by proceeding
in one of three ways:
First, [the plaintiff] may show that "a materially

similar case has already been decided." Second,
[the plaintiff] can point to a "broader, clearly
established principle [that] should control the novel
facts [of the] situation." Finally, the conduct involved
in the case may "so obviously violate[] th[e]
constitution that prior case law is unnecessary."
Under controlling law, [the plaintiff] must carry [his]
burden by looking to the law as interpreted at the
time by the United States Supreme Court, the
Eleventh Circuit, or the [Georgia] Supreme Court.
Id. (some alterations in original) (quoting Terrell v. Smith, 668
F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012)).
37
Here, it is clear that Defendant Reyes acted in his
discretionary authority during the events that gave rise to this
lawsuit. The Court next determines whether Defendant Reyes
violated clearly established law.
B. Application to this Case
1. False Arrest
It is undisputed that Defendant Reyes did not personally
arrest Plaintiff. Plaintiff, however, seeks to hold Defendant
Reyes liable for failing to intervene to prevent Defendant
Geddie from arresting Plaintiff. "[A] participant in an arrest,
even if not the arresting officer, may be liable if he knew the
arrest lacked any constitutional basis and yet participated in
some way." Wilkerson v. Seymour, 736 F.3d 974, 980 (11th
Cir. 2013); see also Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1284
(11th Cir. 1999) (noting that a jury issue existed whether a
non-arresting officer could be liable for participating in the

38
plaintiffs arrest). If, however, an officer lacks "the requisite
information to put him on notice that an unlawful arrest was
occurring or had occurred," the officer cannot be liable for
failing to intervene to prevent the unlawful arrest. Wilkerson,
736 F.3d at 980.
Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant
Reyes had sufficient involvement in, or control over, Plaintiff's
arrest. Although Plaintiff speculates that Defendant Reyes
was aware of the events that were transpiring between
Plaintiff and Defendant Geddie, Defendant Reyes is not visible
on the video for a portion of Plaintiff's interaction with
Defendant Geddie. Just prior to Plaintiff's arrest, the video
depicts Defendant Reyes speaking with PP. on the driver's
side of Ms. Gaha's car while Defendant Geddie interacted with
Plaintiff on the other side of Ms. Gaha's car. The arrest itself
transpired quickly, and the evidence failed to demonstrate that

39
Defendant Reyes had sufficient knowledge of all that
transpired between Defendant Geddie and Plaintiff to be
deemed to have participated in Plaintiff's arrest. Moreover,
there is no evidence that Defendant Reyes played any role in
the decision to arrest Plaintiff. Instead, the evidence indicates
that Defendant Geddie alone made the decision to arrest
Plaintiff, without input from Defendant Reyes. (Reyes Aff. lilT
4-5.) Moreover, as discussed infra Part V.A., at least arguable
probable cause existed to support Plaintiff's arrest. Under
those circumstances, Plaintiff failed to show that Defendant
Reyes is liable to Plaintiff for failing to intervene to prevent
Defendant Geddie from arresting Plaintiff.4
4 Plaintiff cannot hold Defendant Reyes liable for her arrest

simply because Defendant Reyes transported Plaintiff from the
arrest scene to the Jail. The evidence in the record demonstrates
that Plaintiff's arrest had been completed by the time that
Defendant Reyes transported Plaintiff to the Jail. (Reyes Aff. ¶ 6.)
40
Alternatively, Plaintiff failed to show that Defendant
Reyes' failure to intervene to prevent her arrest violated
clearly established law. Plaintiff pointed to no pre-existing
case law from the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Circuit, or the Georgia Supreme Court that would have put
Defendant Reyes on notice that, under the circumstances, his
failure to intervene to prevent Defendant Geddie from
arresting Plaintiff was unlawful. Defendant Reyes therefore is
entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983
false arrest claim.
2. First Amendment Retaliation
Plaintiff also contends that her arrest was in retaliation for
exercising her First Amendment rights. Defendant Reyes
correctly points out that, with respect to this claim, "the right in
question is not the general right to be free from retaliation for
one's speech, but the more specific right to be free from a

41
retaliatory arrest that is otherwise supported by probable
cause." Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665 (2012). In
2012, the Supreme Court stated, "Mills Court has never held
that there is such a right." Id. (footnote omitted). The
Supreme Court noted that a reasonable officer reasonably
could have relied on its decision in Hartman v. Moore, 547
U.S. 250 (2006), "which held that a plaintiff cannot state a
claim of retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First
Amendment if the charges were supported by probable
cause," to conclude that Hartman's rule also applied to
retaliatory arrests. Id. The Eleventh Circuit consistently held
that "the existence of probable cause to arrest" defeated a
plaintiff's First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. Dahl v.
Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002). The Supreme
Court, however, recently abrogated this line of authority,
finding that a plaintiff "need not prove the absence of probable

42
cause to maintain a claim of retaliatory arrest." Lozman v. City
of Riviera Bch., Fla., 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1955 (2018). As of
November 23, 2016, the date of Plaintiff's arrest, however, the
rule in this Circuit was that the existence of probable cause
defeated a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. See
Nunnelee v. Morgan, 550 F. App'x 716, 717 (2013) (per
curiam) ("[U]nder our binding case law, the existence of
probable cause continues to bar a retaliatory arrest claim."
(footnote omitted)); see also Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d
1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting that, in connection with an
arrest that occurred on November 26, 2014, "when an officer
has arguable probable cause to arrest, he is entitled to
qualified immunity both from Fourth Amendment claims for
false arrest and from First Amendment claims stemming from
the arrest."). As discussed infra, arguable probable cause
existed to arrest Plaintiff for obstruction, and a reasonable

43
officer could have concluded that a retaliatory arrest based on
probable cause did not violate the Constitution. Under those
circumstances, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that her
arrest violated clearly established law. Defendant Reyes
therefore is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to
Plaintiffs First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.
C. Summary
In sum, Defendant Reyes is entitled to summary
judgment as to Plaintiff's claims asserted against him. First,
Plaintiff abandoned her § 1983 excessive force claim against
Defendant Geddie. Second, Defendant Reyes is entitled to
qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 false arrest
and § 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims asserted
against him. The Court therefore grants Defendant Reyes'
Motion for Summary Judgment.
44
V. Defendant Geddie's Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff asserts four claims against Defendant Geddie:
(1) § 1983 false arrest; (2) § 1983 malicious prosecution; (3)
§ 1983 First Amendment retaliatory arrest; and (4) § 1983
excessive force. Defendant Geddie asserts the defense of
qualified immunity with respect to all of those claims. The
Court applies the qualified immunity standard set forth supra
Part IV.A., finds that the evidence demonstrates that
Defendant Geddie was acting within his discretionary authority
at the time relevant to this action, and addresses Plaintiff's
claims in turn.
A. § 1983 False Arrest
As an initial matter, "[t]here is no question that an arrest
without probable cause to believe a crime has been committed
violates the Fourth Amendment." Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117
F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Qualified

45
immunity, however, will protect Defendant Geddie if arguable
probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff. Storck v. City of
Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2003).
"'Arguable probable cause exists when an officer reasonably
could have believed that probable cause existed, in light of the
information the officer possessed." Id. (quoting Durruthy v.
Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1089 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). "'Even law enforcement officials
who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause
is present are entitled to immunity." Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d
872, 878 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
224, 227 (1991)). Moreover, qualified immunity applies so
long as an officer "has 'arguable probable cause to arrest for
any offense." Merenda v. Tabor, 506 F. App'x 862, 865 (11th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d
1240, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010)).

46
When determining whether probable cause exists to
support a prosecution, the Court considers whether the
prosecuting officer's actions were "objectively reasonable
based on the totality of the circumstances." Kingsland v. City
of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). "This standard is met
when the facts and circumstances within the officer's
knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy
information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under
the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense." Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). "'Although probable
cause requires more than suspicion, it does not require
convincing proof, and need not reach the [same] standard of
conclusiveness and probability as the facts necessary to
support a conviction." Wood, 323 F.3d at 878 (quoting Lee

47
v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2002) (alteration in
original)). The officer's subjective intent is immaterial, and the
Court instead must consider the facts objectively. Williams v.
City of Homestead, Fla., 206 F. App'x 886, 888 (11th Cir.
2006) (per curiam); see also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S.
146, 153 (2004) ("Our cases make clear that an arresting
officer's state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is
irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.").
"To determine whether an officer had probable cause for
an arrest, [courts] examine the events leading up to the arrest,
and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from
the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,
amount to probable cause." District of Columbia v. Wesby,
138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). "Because probable cause deals with
probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances,

48
it is a fluid concept that is not readily, or even usefully, reduced
to a neat set of legal rules." Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). "It requires only a probability or substantial
chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such
activity." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
"Probable cause is not a high bar." Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Here, the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, demonstrates that Defendant Geddie had at least
arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for misdemeanor
obstruction under Georgia law. 0.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a)
provides, in relevant part: "a person who knowingly and
willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer. . . in
the lawful discharge of his or her official duties shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor." 0.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a). Refusing to
obey orders may be sufficient to support a misdemeanor

49
obstruction conviction under Georgia law. See Meadows v.
State, 303 Ga. App. 40, 43, 692 S.E.2d 708, 711(2010) ("The
evidence shows that Meadows refused to obey officers when
they ordered him to enter the detention cell and resisted to the
extent that he had to be physically placed inside. This was
sufficient to support Meadows's conviction for misdemeanor
obstruction." (footnote omitted)). Further, under Georgia law,
"violence or forcible resistance is not required to prove that an
officer was hindered or obstructed in a misdemeanor
obstruction case." Pinchon v. State, 237 Ga. App. 675, 675,
516 S.E.2d 537, 538 (1999). Instead, "[a]rgument, flight,
stubborn obstinance, and lying are all examples of conduct
that may satisfy the obstruction element." Id., id.
To prove misdemeanor obstruction under Georgia law,
the obstruction must be knowing and willful, and must occur
"while the officer was in the lawful discharge of his official

50
duties." Stryker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 493, 494, 677 S.E.2d
680, 681 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). "An officer may be engaged in the lawful discharge
of his official duties even if he does not have probable cause
to arrest an individual. Thus, for example, an individual who
obstructs an officer during the investigation of a crime may be
guilty of obstruction notwithstanding the lack of probable
cause to arrest that individual." West v. State, 296 Ga. App.
58, 60-61, 673 S.E.2d 558, 561 (2009) (internal quotation
marks and footnote omitted). Moreover, "all law enforcement
officers have the general duty to enforce the law and maintain
the peace." Id. at 61, 673 S.E.2d at 561 (internal quotation
marks and footnote omitted).
Plaintiff appears to argue that Defendant Geddie was not
engaged in the lawful discharge of his duties. This argument
fails, as Defendant Geddie was in the process of placing M

51
Gaha under arrest for a traffic offense and investigating a
crash scene when Plaintiff engaged in the conduct for which
Defendant Geddie placed her under arrest.5 See Pinchon,
237 Ga. App. at 675, 516 S.E.2d at 538 (finding that an officer
was lawfully discharging his duties where he was in the
process of arresting one of the defendants without a warrant
for traffic offenses).
Plaintiff's contention that Defendant Geddie gave her an
unlawful order is also misplaced. "Police can create a
5 This case is distinguishable from Woodward v. Gray, 241 Ga.

App. 847, 527 S.E.2d 595 (2000). In Woodward, the Georgia
Court of Appeals noted that "[a] police officer. . . is not discharging
his or her lawful duty when she makes an arrest of an individual
without reasonable and probable cause or stops an individual
without specific articulable suspicion; in this case, neither of
plaintiff's brothers' arrests was based upon probable cause." 241
Ga. App. at 849, 527 S.E.2d at 598 (citation omitted). Here,
Defendant Geddie had probable cause to arrest Ms. Gaha for
driving on a suspended license, as well as the duty to investigate
the crash scene.
52
reasonable crime scene perimeter, put up a crime scene tape
to avoid destruction or tampering with evidence, or exclude
the public from a reasonable physical zone of an arrest within
which there is a risk of physical contact between the officer,
suspect, and public or a passing of weapons or evidence."
Woodward, 241 Ga. App. at 850, 527 S.E.2d at 599,
disapproved on other grounds by Stryker, 297 Ga. App. at 495
n.1, 677 S.E.2d at 682 n.1. Admittedly, the Georgia Court of
Appeals has stated that "a command to clear the general are
entirely beyond the zone of police operations constitutes an
overly broad and unreasonable demand that exceeds
reasonable law enforcement procedure and needs." Id., j4.
Here, however, the Court cannot say, as a matter of law, that
directing Plaintiff to return to her car, which was parked a short
distance away, was an unreasonable demand such that
Plaintiff was entitled to choose to disobey it.

53
Plaintiff also contends that Defendant Geddie's
investigation of the crash scene was complete after Defendant
Geddie placed Ms. Gaha in handcuffs and in his patrol car.
Plaintiff cites no authority to support this argument, and the
videotape contradicts her claims. Rather, the videotape
demonstrates that Defendant Geddie remained on the scene
until the wrecker appeared to remove Ms. Gaha's crashed car
from the roadway. This argument thus does not defeat a
conclusion that arguable probable cause existed to arrest
Plaintiff for obstruction.
Plaintiff also relies on cases stating that words alone
cannot constitute obstruction. Those cases, however, are no
longer persuasive "because force is no longer an element of
misdemeanor obstruction." Stryker, 297 Ga. App. at 494, 677
S.E.2d at 682; see also Weidmann v. State, 222 Ga. App. 796,
797, 476 S.E.2d 18, 20 (1996). ("To consummate an offense

54
of misdemeanor obstruction, some form of knowing and wilful
opposition to the officer sufficient to constitute obstruction or
hinderance is required, but actual violence or threat thereof is
not."). In any event, as discussed below, the evidence
demonstrates that Defendant Geddie did not simply arrest
Plaintiff based on words alone.
Here, Defendant Geddie, while pointing in the direction of
Plaintiff's vehicle, repeatedly directed Plaintiff to move away
from the scene and to go back to where she was. Plaintiff
refused to go back to her vehicle, although she moved to the
other side of Ms. Gaha's car. At one point, the video shows
Plaintiff attempting to enter Ms. Gaha's car from the
passenger side. Defendant Geddie again instructed Plaintiff
to go back to where she came from, pointing toward Plaintiff's
car, and cautioned Plaintiff that he would arrest her if she did
not do so. Plaintiff did not return to her car. Instead, Plaintiff
55
began disputing the legality of Defendant Geddie's
commands, using her hands and gesturing. Under those
circumstances, Defendant Geddie had at least arguable
probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for misdemeanor obstruction.
See West, 296 Ga. App. at 61-62, 673 S.E.2d at 561-62
(finding that the evidence was sufficient to convict the
defendant of obstruction where the officer repeatedly directed
the defendant to leave the scene and specifically advised the
defendant that failure to comply would result in arrest, and the
defendant refused to listen, continuing to speak and ignoring
the officer's statements); see also Harris v. State, 276 Ga.
App. 234, 236, 622 S.E.2d 905, 907 (2005) ("When Harris
disobeyed Officer Wheeler's lawful commands to wait and to
back off, he committed the crime of misdemeanor
obstruction.").
56
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Geddie allowed Mr.
Lopez and P.P. to remain in fairly close proximity to the scene,
including permitting P.P. to enter Ms. Gaha's car. This
contention is misplaced, as no evidence indicates that Mr.
Lopez or P.P. refused to obey orders or engaged in argument
with Defendant Geddie. Moreover, neither PP. nor Mr. Lopez
walked up to Defendant Geddie and angrily remarked, "Are
you fucking kidding me?" Under those circumstances, the fact
that Defendant Geddie did not direct Mr. Lopez or PP. to
leave the scene is immaterial.
Even if Defendant Geddie lacked arguable probable
cause to arrest Plaintiff, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that
Defendant Geddie's decision to arrest her violated clearly
established law. The Supreme Court recently explained:
We have stressed that the specificity of the [clearly

established law] rule is especially important in the
Fourth Amendment context. Probable cause turn[s]
57
on the assessment of probabilities in particular

factual contexts and cannot be reduced to a neat set
of legal rules. It is incapable of precise definition or
quantification into percentages. Given its imprecise
nature, officers will often find it difficult to know how
the general standard of probable cause applies in
the precise situation encountered. Thus, we have
stressed the need to identify a case where an officer
acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to
have violated the Fourth Amendment. While there
does not have to be a case directly on point, existing
precedent must place the lawfulness of the particular
arrest beyond debate. Of course, there can be the
rare obvious case, where the unlawfulness of the
officer's conduct is sufficiently clear even though
existing precedent does not address similar
circumstances. But a body of relevant case law is
usually necessary to clearly establish the answer
with respect to probable cause.
Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (second and third alterations in
original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The
Eleventh Circuit has given similar instructions, noting:
In deciding that clearly established law existed

sufficient to put Defendants on notice that their
arrest of Plaintiff was unconstitutional, the district
court made the following statement: The Eleventh
Circuit has concluded that it is clearly established
58
that an arrest without probable cause to believe a

crime had been committed violates the Fourth
Amendment. Of course, no one would disagree that
the Fourth Amendment requires an arrest to be
based on probable cause. But we reiterate that an
officer who has arrested someone without probable
cause might still be entitled to immunity. This is so
because the clearly-established inquiry does not ask
whether there was probable cause in actuality.
Instead, it asks whether the preexisting law was so
clear that, given the specific facts facing a particular
officer, one must say that every reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing
violates the Constitutional right at issue.
In framing its inquiry more broadly than the above

standard permits, the district court erred, running
afoul of the Supreme Court's oft-repeated directive
not to define clearly established law at a high level
of generality. Rather, the clearly established law
inquiry must be particularized to the facts of the
case.
Reframing the analysis to conform with the direction

of the Supreme Court, the dispositive question is
whether it was already clearly established, as a
matter of law, that at the time of Plaintiff's arrest, an
objective officer could not have concluded
reasonably that probable cause existed to arrest
Plaintiff under the particular circumstances
Defendants confronted. Again, resolution of the
59
clearly-established test does not depend on whether

a judge might decide later that probable cause was
lacking in fact. Instead, the test asks whether
already existing law was so clear that, given the
specific facts facing this particular officer, one must
conclude that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates the
Constitutional right at issue.
Gates, 884 F.3d at 1302-03 (emphasis in original) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has pointed to no clearly established law
demonstrating that, under the facts of this case, every
reasonable official would have understood that arresting
Plaintiff violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff
relies on Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2008).
Reese, however, is distinguishable from this action The
defendants in Reese arrested the plaintiff for misdemeanor
obstruction under Georgia law. 527 F.3d at 1272. The
60
Eleventh Circuit found that no probable cause existed to arrest
the plaintiff for misdemeanor obstruction, noting:
Ten minutes had elapsed since the alleged

aggressor in the domestic violence dispute had been
handcuffed and placed in Deputy Geddie's6 patrol
car. Herbert was standing outside the building to
prevent others from entering the apartment where
Deputy Geddie was interviewing the alleged victim.
After approaching Herbert, Reese patiently waited
for a few minutes before making his request that the
law enforcement vehicles be moved. He then
requested to speak with the officer in charge.
6 Defendant Geddie was a sheriff's deputy with the Dade

County Sheriff's Office at the time of the plaintiff's arrest in Reese,
and he is the same individual as the "Deputy Geddie" involved in
Reese. (Geddie Dep. at 11.) Importantly, "[w]hen considering
whether an official would have known that his actions were
prohibited by the law at the time he engaged in the conduct in
question, [t]he standard is one of objective reasonableness."
Baas v. Fewless, 886 F.3d 1088, 1093 (11th Cir. 2018) (second
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Thus, "evidence of improper motive is irrelevant to. . .
[the] analysis." Abercrombie v. Beam, 728 F. App'x 918, 928 (11th
Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d
1156, 1165 (11th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he standard for determining if an
officer violated clearly established law is an objective one and
does not include inquiry into the officer's subjective intent or
beliefs.").
61
Throughout this exchange, Reese maintained a

calm voice and demeanor. Reese did not impede or
hinder Herbert in the performance of his police
duties. Though Reese may have refused to obey
Herbert's order to leave the scene by attempting to
approach Trooper Geddie, arrest for obstruction
cannot be predicated upon such a refusal to obey a
command to clear the general area entirely beyond
the zone of police operation, which, in the
circumstances described, was clearly an overly
broad and unreasonable demand that exceed[ed]
reasonable law enforcement procedure and needs.
Id. at 1272-73 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). Here, unlike the plaintiff in Reese,
Plaintiff walked up to Defendant Geddie and Ms. Gaha and
immediately said, "Are you fucking kidding me?" Plaintiff also
refused to obey repeated orders from Defendant Geddie to
return to her car, and, at one point, Plaintiff even opened the
passenger door of Ms. Gaha's vehicle. When Defendant
Geddie ordered Plaintiff to return to her own car, Plaintiff
refused to comply with that order and began to debate the
62
issue with Defendant Geddie. This case is therefore
distinguishable from Reese, and Reese cannot clearly
establish that Plaintiff's arrest was unlawful.
Similarly, Skop v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 485 F.3d 1130
(11th Cir. 2007), does not clearly establish that Defendant
Geddie lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. In Skop, the
plaintiff was arrested after she politely asked the defendant
officer to pull his car one foot forward, without raising her voice
or threatening the defendant officer, and after she attempted
to clarify her question. 485 F.3d at 1138. The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that there was no indication that the plaintiff in Skop
had impeded or instructed the defendant officer in the pursuit
of his lawful duties. Id. at 1138-39. The defendant officer also
contended that the plaintiff had refused to comply with his
order, but the plaintiff introduced evidence showing that either
the defendant officer never gave such an order or knew that

63
the plaintiff could not and did not hear him. ki at 1141. Unlike
the plaintiff in Skop, Plaintiff refused to comply with several
orders from Defendant Geddie and argued with Defendant
Geddie. This case therefore is distinguishable from Skop.
Finally, this case is distinguishable from Davis v.
Williams, 451 F.3d 759 (2006). Davis involved Florida's
obstruction and disorderly conduct statutes, and the Eleventh
Circuit observed that Florida courts generally have held "that
physical conduct must accompany offensive words to support
a conviction under" the obstruction statute and that "probable
cause for purposes of [the disorderly conduct statute] cannot
be based on mere words." 451 F.3d at 765-66 (internal
quotation marks omitted). As previously noted, Georgia's
obstruction statute is different. 0.C.G.A. § 16-10-24(a). In
any event, the plaintiff in Davis did not physically interfere with
or obstruct the deputies, never got close to the scene, never

64
made threats, yelled, or argued, but simply asked questions
and asked to speak to a supervisor. Id. at 766. The plaintiff
in Davis did not disobey orders or argue with a police officer.
Under those circumstances, Davis does not clearly establish
that Plaintiffs arrest was unlawful.
In sum, Plaintiff failed to show that clearly established law
demonstrated that, under the facts of this case, every
reasonable official would have understood that arresting
Plaintiff violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.
Defendant Geddie therefore is entitled to qualified immunity
with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 false arrest claim. See Gates,
884 F.3d at 1303-04 (finding that the defendant officers were
entitled to qualified immunity for arresting the plaintiff for
violating Georgia's mask statute where no already existing law
clearly established, beyond debate, the unlawfulness of an
arrest under the circumstances).

65
B. § 1983 Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff also asserts a § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim against Defendant Geddie. "To establish a federal
malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious
prosecution, and (2) a violation of her Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable seizures." Kingsland, 382 F.3d
at 1234. The common law elements of a malicious
prosecution claim include "(1) a criminal prosecution instituted
or continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice and
without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff
accused's favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff
accused." Wood, 323 F.3d at 882. As with a § 1983 false
arrest claim, a defendant will be entitled to qualified immunity
for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim if arguable probable
66
cause existed for the plaintiff's arrest. Grider v. City of Auburn,
Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010).
For the reasons discussed supra Part V.A., arguable
probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has not
shown that her arrest violated clearly established law.
Defendant Geddie therefore is entitled to qualified immunity
with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.
C. First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest
Plaintiff also asserts a § 1983 First Amendment
retaliatory arrest claim against Defendant Geddie. For the
reasons stated supra Part IV.B.2., Defendant Geddie is
entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this claim.
D. Excessive Force
For Fourth Amendment excessive force claims, "a
court must carefully balance the nature and quality of the
67
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against the countervailing governmental interests." Mann
v. laser Intl, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1305 (11th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "To
balance the necessity of the use of force used against the
arrestee's constitutional rights, a court must evaluate
several factors, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id.
at 1305-06 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). "Whether the use of force was reasonable must
be determined from the perspective of a reasonable officer
on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
68
hindsight." Id. at 1306 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
"[W]here an arrest is supported by probable cause the
application of de minimis force as needed to effect the arrest,
without more, will not support a claim for excessive force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment" Williams v. Sirmons, 307
F. App'x 354, 360 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). "This is the
case because the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop
necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of
physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it, and [courts]
recognize that the typical arrest involves some force and
injury." Id. at 361 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Defendant Geddie argues that the force he used against
Plaintiff was de minimis. (Br. Supp. Def. Geddie's Mot. Summ.
J. (Docket Entry No. 39-2) at 16-20.) Defendant Geddie notes

69
that, although Plaintiff complained of arm pain, her arm was
not actually broken, and Plaintiff instead suffered only
contusions and abrasions. (Id. at 6-8.) Defendant Geddie also
argues that Plaintiff only required one prescription pain pill,
that Plaintiff otherwise treated her injuries with over the
counter pain medications, and that Plaintiff's pain resolved in
three or four days. (Id.)
It Is undisputed that "some use of force by a police officer
when making a custodial arrest is necessary and altogether
lawful, regardless of the severity of the alleged offense."
Durruthy, 351 F.3d at 1094.7 Application of de minimis force,
without more, will not support an excessive force claim. See
7 Plaintiff relies on a line of cases concluding that, when an

arrest is unlawful, a plaintiff has a right to resist and any use of
force is impermissible. As previously discussed, Defendant
Geddie had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiff,
which distinguishes this case from the ones on which Plaintiff
relies.
70
Noun v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000)
("[T]his Circuit has established the principle that the
application of de minimis force, without more, will not
support a claim for excessive force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment."). Even viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, the force used here was de
minimis. Plaintiff testified that Defendant Geddie tackled
her, throwing her into a ditch, and that he slammed her
body into the ground, which caused her head to hit the
ground a few times, while trying to get Plaintiff into
handcuffs. Plaintiff also testified that Defendant Geddie
pulled her arm back hard to get it into handcuffs, and that,
while Defendant Geddie was attempting to handcuff her,
he straddled her and placed his weight on her body and
lower back. Plaintiff, however, testified that she placed her

71
left hand and arm underneath her body to protect it as
Defendant Geddie was attempting to place her in
handcuffs. Plaintiff acknowledged that Defendant Geddie
did not kick or strike her, and that he did not use a weapon
or instrument to effect the arrest. Plaintiff also testified that
her head did not hit the ground after Defendant Geddie
placed her in handcuffs. Plaintiff's arm was not broken, as
she feared, and she suffered some scrapes and bruises.
Plaintiff took one prescription pain pill given to her at the
hospital, and she treated the rest of her injuries with over-
the-counter pain medications. Plaintiff testified that, after
three or four days, she did not need over-the-counter pain
medications to treat her injuries.
The Eleventh Circuit has found that similar uses of
force were de minimis. See Williams, 307 F. App'x at 361-

72
62 (concluding that the use of force was de minimis where
a defendant grabbed the plaintiff from behind and pulled
her to the ground, and another defendant "placed his knee
on her back and put his weight upon her in order to
handcuff her," and noting that "we have no choice but to
conclude that the force was reasonable where an officer
causes no injuries in the course of effecting a lawful arrest,
despite the fact that the arrestee is particularly susceptible
to injury." Further, the Court stated that "[o]nce Williams
was restrained, no further force was used against her.
Williams presents no evidence that she was injured as a
result of the force; accordingly, we must characterize the
use of force. . . as de minimis."); Bryan v. Spillman, 217 F.
App'x 882, 886 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (finding that
the force used was de minimis where the officer

73
"conducted a 'rough search' of [the plaintiff's] genitals,
pushed him against a patrol car and held his head down
against the car"); Durruthy, 351 F.3d at 1094 ("[E]ven if the
force applied by Pastor in effecting the arrest—forcing
Durruthy down to the ground and placing him in
handcuffs—was unnecessary, plainly it was not unlawful.
The amount of force used was de minimus."); Nolin, 207
F.3d at 1254-58 (concluding that the force used was de
minimis where the officer "grabbed [the plaintiff] from
behind by the shoulder and wrist, threw him against a van
three or four feet away, kneed him in the back and pushed
his head into the side of the van, searched his groin area
in an uncomfortable manner, and handcuffed him," and the
plaintiff "suffered bruising to his forehead chest and wrists,"
74
but "the bruises disappeared quickly and [the plaintiff] did
not seek medical treatment").
Even if Defendant Geddie used more than de minimis
force against Plaintiff, he is still entitled to qualified
immunity because a reasonable officer would not
necessarily have concluded that the force used was
excessive. Defendant Geddie took Plaintiff to the ground
and used some force against Plaintiff while trying to place
Plaintiff in handcuffs. While Plaintiff was on the ground,
she admittedly was attempting to keep her left arm and
hand underneath her. Defendant Geddie did not use force
against Plaintiff after she was restrained in handcuffs, and
he did not use a weapon or device or strike or kick Plaintiff.
Under those circumstances, the Court cannot say that the
force used by Defendant Geddie was clearly unlawful. See

75
Horn v. Barron, 720 F. App'x 557, 564 (11th Cir. 2018) (per
curiam) (finding that, even if a plaintiff was totally compliant
with an officer effecting her arrest, the officer "was allowed
to use some force in effecting her arrest," and that "[e]ven
if the force applied by [the officer] in effecting [the plaintiff's]
arrest—a soft hands, straight arm bar takedown technique,
by which he gained control of her by taking hold of her left
arm, putting his right arm over her left arm, and using
gravity and his own weight to bring her to the ground was
unnecessary, it was not unlawful"); Rodriguez v. Farrell,
280 F.3d 1341, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2002) (concluding that
an officer was entitled to qualified immunity where the
evidence showed that the officer "grabbed plaintiff's arm,
twisted it around plaintiff's back, jerking it up high to the
shoulder and then handcuffed plaintiff as plaintiff fell to his

76
knees screaming that [the officer] was hurting him"); Jones
v. City of Dothan, 121 F.3d 1456, 1460-61 (11th Cir. 1997)
(finding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity for
a plaintiff's § 1983 excessive force claim where the
evidence showed that the officers "slammed [the plaintiff]
against the wall, kicked his legs apart, required him to raise
his arms above his head, and pulled his wallet from his
pants," the plaintiff "experienced pain from having to lift his
arms since he had previously suffered a stroke, and . . he
experienced pain in his arthritic knee from having his legs
kicked apart," and "he received minor medical treatment").8
8 Admittedly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that an officer's

actions in effectuating an arrest constituted excessive force where
an officer grabbed the plaintiff from behind as the plaintiff was
following another officer's order to return to his house, "pushed
him to the ground, dragged him, intentionally inflicted more pain
when told that [the plaintiff] had an injured shoulder and threw him
forcibly into the dog cage in a canine unit, all while a compliant
77
[plaintiff] was already in handcuffs." Davis, 451 F.3d at 767. Here,

however, Defendant Geddie did not use force against Plaintiff
after placing Plaintiff in handcuffs, and Plaintiff admittedly
attempted to keep her left arm from being handcuffed by placing
it underneath her body. Under those circumstances, Davis does
not compel a finding that the force used here was excessive.
Reese also does not require a different conclusion. In
Reese: (1) four officers used force against the plaintiff, who was
lying face down on the ground; (2) the officers piled on top of the
plaintiff and began kicking and beating him; (3) one or more of the
officers continued to twist the plaintiff's arm behind his back, in
spite of the plaintiff's repeated screams that the officers were
breaking his arms; (4) another officer applied a pressure point
technique on the plaintiff's neck; and (5) after the officers
handcuffed the plaintiff's left arm, another officer pepper-sprayed
the plaintiff in the face. 527 F.3d at 1273. The plaintiff in Reese
was not fighting back or attempting to escape. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit found that the Graham factors weighed in the plaintiff's
favor, noting that, "[i]n view of the fact that [the plaintiff] was lying
face down on the ground, was not suspected of having committed
a serious crime, did not pose an immediate threat of harm to
anyone, and was not actively resisting or evading arrest, the
defendants' use of force was a wholly disproportionate response
to the situation." Id. at 1274. The force used in this case did not
approach the magnitude of the force used in Reese, and, unlike
the plaintiff in Reese, Plaintiff admittedly placed her left arm under
her body in an attempt to keep Defendant Geddie from
handcuffing it. Reese therefore is not controlling here.
78
Although Plaintiff may be correct that Defendant Geddie
should have announced that he was arresting Plaintiff
before he took Plaintiff to the ground, the Court cannot find
that this failure, standing alone, makes the force used
unlawful. The Court therefore concludes that Defendant
Geddie is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's
excessive force claim.
E. Summary
The Court recognizes that most of the events in this
case could have been prevented if Defendant Geddie had
chosen a different course of action or approached the
matter from a different perspective. The Court, however,
cannot judge Defendant Geddie's actions with the 20/20
vision of hindsight, and, under the authority in this Circuit,
the Court cannot find that Defendant Geddie violated

79
clearly established law. Qualified immunity therefore
applies as to all of Plaintiff's claims asserted against
Defendant Geddie, and the Court grants Defendant
Geddie's Motion for Summary Judgment.
VI. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment in her favor
on her § 1983 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.
Plaintiff bears the burden of proof on those claims, and, as
such, she must show that any reasonable juror must find in
favor on those claims. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Defendants as the non-movants, at least a
genuine issue of fact remains as to whether probable cause
or arguable probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for
obstruction. Plaintiff therefore is not entitled to summary
judgment in her favor on her § 1983 false arrest and malicious
80
prosecution claims, and the Court denies Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.
VII. Conclusion
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment [33], GRANTS Defendant Reyes'
Motion for Summary Judgment [37], and GRANTS Defendant
Geddie's Motion for Summary Judgment [39]. The Court
DISMISSES Plaintiffs claims, and DIRECTS the Clerk to
CLOSE this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this the L day of August, 2018.
UNIT Slq-rd4 IS ICT JUDGE
81

Quick V Geddie

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Case 4:17-cv-00192-HLM Document 55 Filed 08/09/18 Page 1 of 81

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.

STATE TROOPER JOSEPH

This case is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment [33], on the Motion for Summary

Judgment filed by Defendant Denny Reyes ("Defendant

Reyes") [37], and on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed

by Defendant Joseph Geddie ("Defendant Geddie") [39].

As required by the Local Rules, Plaintiff filed a Statement

of Material Facts ("PSMF") in support of her Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment. (PSMF (Docket Entry No. 33-2).)

Defendant Geddie filed a response to PSMF ("GRPSMF"),

while Defendant Reyes also filed a response to PSMF

("RRPSMF"). (GRPSMF (Docket Entry No. 43-1); RRPSMF

(Docket Entry No. 44-1).)

Defendant Reyes also filed a Statement of Material Facts

("RSMF") in support of his own Motion for Summary

Judgment. (RSMF (Docket Entry No. 37-1).) Plaintiff filed a

response to RSMF ("PRRSMF"). (PRRSMF (Docket Entry

No. 46-1).) As permitted by the Local Rules, Plaintiff filed her

own Statement of Additional Material Facts ("PSAF"), to which

Defendant Reyes responded ("RRPSAF"). (PSAF (Docket

Entry No. 46-2); RRPSAF (Docket Entry No. 49).)

Defendant Geddie also filed a Statement of Material

Facts in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment

("GSMF"). (GSMF (Docket Entry No. 39-1).) Plaintiff filed a

response to GSMF ("PRGSMF"). (PRGSMF (Docket Entry

No. 45-1).) As permitted by the Local Rules, Plaintiff filed her

own Statement of Additional Material Facts, which is identical

to the Statement of Additional Material Facts that Plaintiff

provided in response to Defendant Reyes' Motion. (Compare

refers to both of Plaintiff's Statements of Additional Material

Facts as "PSAF." Defendant Geddie filed a response to PSAF

("GRPSAF"). (GRPSAF (Docket Entry No. 47-1).)

The Court notes that the majority of the statements in

PSAF are identical to the statements contained in PSMF.

excludes PSAF 7 1-76 as duplicative. The Court also notes

that certain statements in PSMF are impermissible legal

conclusions or contain legal arguments. (PSMF 7 30-31, 45,

considered those statements. See N.D. Ga. R. 56.1B(1)

("The court will not consider any fact. . . stated as an issue or

The Court addresses the remaining portions of PSMF,

GRPSMF, RRPSMF, RSMF, PRRSMF, GSMF, PRGSMF,

PSAF, RRPSAF, and GRPSAF infra. Where the parties

object to a proposed fact and the Court does not explicitly

has overruled the objection. If the Court does not mention a

proposed fact or the substance of a proposed fact, the Parties

Keeping in mind that, when deciding a motion for

factual inferences in the light most favorable to the party

opposing the motion, the Court provides the following

statement of facts. Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d

1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012) This statement does not

represent actual findings of fact. Rich v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of

has provided the statement simply to place the Court's legal

analysis in the context of this particular case or controversy.

Plaintiff resides in Lookout Mountain, Georgia. (Dep. of

Kiersten Quick (Docket Entry No. 33-16) at 11.) Defendant

Geddie resides in Dade County, Georgia, and he is a Trooper

41 in LaFayette, Georgia. (Decl. of Joseph Geddie (Docket

Entry No. 39-3)112; Dep. of Joseph Geddie (Docket Entry No.

33-17) at 19.) Prior to becoming a state trooper, Defendant

Geddie was a deputy with the Dade County Sheriff's Office.