The prosecution on even date complied with the said order and
filed an Amended Information, which was admitted by the
[G.R. No. 133289. December 23, 1999]
LICERIO A. ANTIPORDA, JR., ELITERIO RUBIACO,
VICTOR GASCON and CAESAR TALIA petitioners,
vs. HON. FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, HON.
EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON. CATALINO
CASTAEDA, JR. in their capacity as Presiding Justice
and Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order to restrain the
respondent Justices of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan from
further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 24339 and from enforcing the
warrants for the arrest of the accused named therein (herein petitioners)
or to maintain the status quo until further orders from this Court.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Accused Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco, Victor
Gascon, and Caesar Talla were charged with the crime of kidnapping
one Elmer Ramos in an Information dated September 18, 1997. It was
filed with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan comprised of the
Honorable Francis E. Garchitorena, Edilberto E. Sandoval, and
Catalino Castaeda, Jr. The Information reads as follows:
That on or about September 1, 1995, in the Municipality of Sanchez
Mira, Province of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Eliterio Rubiaco, Caesar Talla,
Vicente Gascon and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., armed with guns,
conspiring together and helping one another, by means of force,
violence and intimidation and without legal grounds or any authority
of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap
and carry away one Elmer Ramos from his residence in Marzan,
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his will with the use of a Maroon
Tamaraw FX motor vehicle.
CONTRARY TO LAW[1]
On November 10, 1997, the Court issued an order giving the
prosecution represented by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero Agcaoili
thirty (30) days within which to submit the amendment to the
Information. The said order is quoted in full as follows:
ORDER
This morning, the prosecution represented by Prosecutor Evelyn T.
Lucero Agcaoili appeared in response to this Courts Order of
clarification on the propriety of proceeding with the Information as it
stands.
On her own, Prosecutor Agcaoili informed the Court that there were
inadequacies in the allegations in the Information for which reason she
would beg leave to amend the same. The Court for its part expressed
anxiety as to the Courts jurisdiction over the case considering that it
was not clear whether or not the subject matter of the accusation was
office related.
For this purpose, Prosecutor Agcaoili is given thirty (30) days within
which to submit the amendment embodying whatever changes she
believes are appropriate or necessary in order for the Information to
effectively describe the offense herein charged. Within the same
period, Prosecutor Agcaoili shall submit an expansion of the
recommendation to file the instant Information against the accused
before this Court indicating thereon the office related character of the
accusation herein so that the Court might effectively exercise its
jurisdiction over the same.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Sandiganbayan in a resolution dated November 24, 1997.[3] The
Amended Information thus reads:
That on or about September 10, 1997, at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Licerio
Antiporda, Jr., being the Municipal Mayor of Buguey, Cagayan in the
exercise of his official duties as such and taking advantage of his
position, ordered, confederated and conspired with Juan
Gallardo, Barangay Captain of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan (now
deceased) and accused Eliterio Rubiaco, barangay councilman of San
Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan, Vicente Gascon and Caesar Talla with the
use of firearms, force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and abduct the victim
Elmer Ramos without any authority of law from his residence at
Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his will, with the use of a
Maroon Tamaraw FX motor vehicle and subsequently bring and detain
him illegally at the residence of accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda, Jr.
for more than five (5) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Accused then filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion dated November
16, 1997 praying that a reinvestigation of the case be conducted and
the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred.[5]
An order dated November 26, 1997 was penned by Prosecutor
Evelyn T. Lucero-Agcaoili recommending the denial of the accuseds
Urgent Omnibus Motion[6] was approved by Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto on January 9, 1998.[7]
The accused thereafter filed on March 5, 1998 a Motion for New
Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance and/or Recall
Warrant of Arrest Issued.[8] The same was denied in an order given in
open court dated March 12, 1998 "on the ground that there was nothing
in the Amended Information that was added to the original Information
so that the accused could not claim a right to be heard separately in an
investigation in the Amended Information. Additionally, the Court
ruled that 'since none of the accused have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Court, the accused are not in a position to be heard
on this matter at this time' (p. 245, Record)."[9]
Subsequently, the accused filed on March 24, 1998 a Motion to
Quash the Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged.[10]
On March 27, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order, to wit:
"The Motion to Quash filed in behalf of the accused by Atty. Orlando
B. Consigna is ignored, it appearing that the accused have continually
refused or otherwise failed to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of
this Court. At all events there is an Amended Information here which
makes an adequate description of the position of the accused thus
vesting this Court with the office related character of the offense of the
accused.
"SO ORDERED."[11]
A motion for reconsideration was filed on April 3, 1998 by the
accused wherein it was alleged that the filing of the Motion to Quash
and the appearance of their counsel during the scheduled hearing
thereof amounted to their voluntary appearance and invested the court
with jurisdiction over their persons.[12]
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration filed
by the accused in its resolution dated April 24, 1998.[13]
Hence, this petition filed by Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio
Rubiaco, Victor Gascon, and Caesar Talla.
The petitioners pose the following questions for the resolution of
this Court.
a) CAN THE SANDIGANBAYAN, WHICH HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED
IN THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION,
SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRE SUCH
JURISDICTION BY THE SIMPLE EXPEDIENT OF
AMENDING THE INFORMATION TO SUPPLY,
FOR THE FIRST TIME, JURISDICTIONAL FACTS
NOT PREVIOUSLY AVERRED IN THE
ORIGINAL INFORMATION? and
 b) COROLLARILY, CAN THE AMENDED
INFORMATION BE ALLOWED WITHOUT
CONDUCTING ANEW A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION FOR THE GRAVER OFFENSE
CHARGED THEREIN?
The petition is devoid of merit.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for
administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order
for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it
must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.[14]
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D.
No. 1861 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or
a fine of P6,000.00. Provided, however, That offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does
not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a
fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court.
The Sandiganbayan exercises not only civil but also criminal
jurisdiction. Criminal jurisdiction, as defined in the case of People vs.
Mariano[15], is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular
offense and impose the punishment for it.
The case of Arula vs. Espino[16]enumerates the requirements
wherein a court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case, to wit:
To paraphrase: beyond the pale of disagreement is the legal tenet that
a court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case only when the
following requisites concur: (1) the offense is one which the court is
by law authorized to take cognizance of, (2) the offense must have been
committed within its territorial jurisdiction, and (3) the person charged
with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for trial,
forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the
court.
The petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the case because the original information did not
allege that one of the petitioners, Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., took
advantage of his position as mayor of Buguey, Cagayan to order the
kidnapping of Elmer Ramos. They likewise assert that lacking
jurisdiction a court can not order the amendment of the information. In
the same breath, they contend however that the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over the persons of the accused.
They question the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Sandiganbayan over their case yet they insist that said court acquired
jurisdiction over their motion to quash. The petitioner can not have
their cake and eat it too.
In the aforementioned case of Arula vs. Espino[17]it was quite
clear that all three requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the offense,
territory and person, must concur before a court can acquire
jurisdiction to try a case.
It is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial
jurisdiction over the case.
And we are in accord with the petitioners when they contended
that when they filed a motion to quash it was tantamount to a voluntary
submission to the Courts authority. They cite the case of Layosa vs.
Rodriguez[18] in support of their contention. For therein, it was ruled
that the voluntary appearance of the accused at the pre-suspension
hearing amounted to his submission to the courts jurisdiction even if
no warrant of arrest has yet been issued.
To counter this contention of the petitioners the prosecution
adverted to case of de los Santos-Reyes vs. Montesa, Jr.[19] which was
decided some 28 years after the Layosa case. In this more recent case,
it was held that:
xxx the accused xxx have no right to invoke the processes of the court
since they have not been placed in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of their liberty by reason or as a consequence of the filling of
the information. For the same reason, the court had no authority to act
on the petition.
We find that the case of Layosa and de los Santos-Reyes are not
inconsistent with each other since both these cases discussed the rules
on when a court acquires jurisdiction over the persons of the
accused, i.e., either through the enforcement of warrants of arrest or
their voluntary submission to the court.
The only difference, we find, is that the de los Santos-Reyes case
harped mainly on the warrant of arrest angle while the Layosa case
dealt more on the issue of voluntary submission ruling, that the
appearance at the hearing through a lawyer was a submission to the
courts jurisdiction.
Having discussed the third requirement we now come to the
question of whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the
offense charged.
We answer in the negative. The original Information filed with
the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the
accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the
prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was
omitted therein.
However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental
arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation dated
June 10, 1997[20] filed with the same court, it was they who challenged
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly
stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work
connected, which is hereunder quoted, as follows:
Respondents (petitioners herein) have thoroughly scanned the entire
records of the instant case and no where is there any evidence to show
that the Honorable Prosecution Office of the Province of Cagayan have
been authorized by the Office of the Honorable Ombudsman to
conduct the Preliminary Investigation much less had the former office
been authorized to file the corresponding Information as the said case,
if evidence warrants, fall exclusively with the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Sandiganbayan notwithstanding the presence of other
public officers whose salary range is below 27 and notwithstanding the
presence of persons who are not public officers.
It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction.[21]
We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the case because of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority
to order the amendment of the Information.
Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides thus:
Section 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the
same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner prayed that a reinvestigation be made in view of the
Amended Information.
We hold that the reinvestigation is not necessary anymore. A
reinvestigation is proper only if the accuseds substantial rights would
be impaired.In the case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be
unduly prejudiced if the Amended Information is filed without a
reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to the Information
merely describe the public positions held by the accused/petitioners
and stated where the victim was brought when he was kidnapped.
It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is
essentially inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of
the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place
the persons accused in jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.[22]
The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved
already and we see no cogent nor compelling reason why a
reinvestigation should still be conducted.
As an aside, an offense is considered committed in relation to
office when it is intimately connected with their respective offices and
was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper
or irregular, of their official functions.[23]
In the case of Cunanan vs. Arceo, it was held that:
... the absence in the information filed on 5 April 1991 before Branch
46 of the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, of an allegation that
petitioner had committed the offense charged in relation to his office
is immaterial and easily remedied. Respondent RTC judges had
forwarded petitioners case to the Sandiganbayan, and the complete
records transmitted thereto in accordance with the directions of this
Court set out in the Asuncion case:x x x As if it was originally filed
with [the Sandiganbayan]. That Information may be amended at any
time before arraignment before the Sandiganbayan, and indeed, by
leave of court at any time before judgment is rendered by
the Sandiganbayan, considering that such an amendment would not
affect the juridical nature of the offense charged (i.e., murder), the
qualifying circumstances alleged in the information, or the defenses
that petitioner may assert before the Sandiganbayan. In other words,
the amendment may be made before the Sandiganbayan without
surprising the petitioner or prejudicing his substantive
rights.[24] (Underscoring Supplied)
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
Antiporda vs Garchitorena (1999) G.R. 133289
Facts:
However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental
arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation filed
with the same court, it was they who “challenged the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their
Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected.
It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction.
We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
case because of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to
order the amendment of the Information.
Issue (2): WON reinvestigation must be made anew.
Held: No. A reinvestigation is proper only if the accused’s substantial
rights would be impaired. In the case at bar, we do not find that their
rights would be unduly prejudiced if the Amended Information is filed
without a reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to the
Information merely describe the public positions held by the
accused/petitioners and stated where the victim was brought when
he was kidnapped.
It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially
inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of
the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not
place the persons accused in jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the
full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already
and we see no cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation
should still be conducted.

Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the
crime of kidnapping, the case was filed in the first division of
Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, the Court ordered the prosecution to
submit amended information, which was complied evenly and the
[G.R. No. L-27124. May 29, 1970.]
new information contained the place where the victim was brought.
FRANCISCO COLMENARES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JUDGE ARTURO
The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a
P. VILLAR, Municipal Judge of La Castellana, Negros Occidental, and
reinvestigation be conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest
ATTY. OTHELO CABALES, Chief of Police of La Castellana, Negros
be deferred but it was denied by the Ombudsman. The accused
Occidental, Respondents-Appellees.
thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary investigation and to
hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued but the same
Ibrado & Ibrado for Petitioner-Appellant.
was also denied. Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to Quash
Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense
Manuel Dizon, Jr. for Respondents-Appellees.
charged, which was ignored for their continuous refusal to submit
their selves to the Court and after their voluntary appearance which
invested the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over their persons, their
motion for reconsideration was again denied.
SYLLABUS
Issue (1): WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense
charged.

Held: No. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did
not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-
related. It was only after the same was filed that the prosecution
belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COURTS; JURISDICTION,
DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION. —
It must be remembered that jurisdiction of the court over a case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Here the complaint filed with the
municipal court of La Castellana recited that on 22 Dec. 1966 the
accused, Francisco Colmenares, was found in possession of two
unlicensed firearms in the municipality of La Castellana. That
allegation makes the filing of the case in the La Castellana municipal
court proper.
3. ID.; ID.; VENUE; RULE 110, SEC. 14, REVISED RULES COURT. —
Under Sec. 14, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Court, criminal actions shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province
wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AS MALUM
PROHIBITUM, EXPLAINED. — That the firearms were confiscated from
him in another town than the municipality where the case was
instituted does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. For, being
malum prohibitum, the crime of illegal possession of firearms is
consummated by the very fact of its performance; by the firearms
being possessed or held by the accused without proper authorization
therefor. The place where said firearms were finally confiscated and
taken away from the accused is immaterial; it could not have added
anything to the nature of the unlawful act completed and
consummated earlier.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLEGATIONS OF SITUS OF OFFENSE CHARGED
SATISFIED IN INSTANT CASE. — For purposes of the proceeding
instituted in the La Castellana municipal court, it is sufficient that,
according to the prosecution, the accused was in possession of the
unlicensed firearms while he was in that municipality, for in the
determination of the correct venue, the vital point is the allegation of
the situs of the offense charged in the complaint or information and
that is satisfied in this case.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (in Civil Case No. 7929) dismissing for lack of merit the
petition for certiorari filed therein.
The case arose from the filing in the Municipal Court of La Castellana,
Negros Occidental, by the Chief of Police of the same municipality of
a complaint against one Francisco Colmenares for illegal possession
of firearms (Criminal Case No. 1257), allegedly committed as follows:
"That on the 22nd day of December, 1965, at about 1:30 in the
afternoon more or less, in the municipality of La Castellana, Province
of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused, Francisco Colmenares, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession
and under his custody and control two (2) firearms to wit: one (1) Colt
super .38 bearing SN 45975 with magazine loaded with 9 rounds of
live ammunition and WTC Austen MK.I No. 70 with magazine loaded
with 23 rounds of live ammunitions, without first having obtained
proper license therefor.
An Act Contrary to law.
Named in the complaint as witnesses were Eduardo Colmenares, also
of La Castellana, Negros Occidental, and others.
The accused thereafter filed a motion to quash the complaint 1 on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. It was claimed that venue was
improperly laid, because the firearms mentioned in the complaint
were taken from the possession of the accused in the municipality of
La Carlota, Negros Occidental, by the La Carlota policemen, and not
in La Castellana where the complaint was filed. The municipal court
having denied this motion, the accused went to the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental in a petition for certiorari (Civil Case
No. 7929), raising the same issue of improper venue. And as prayed
for in the petition, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by said
court, restraining the Municipal Judge of La Castellana from
proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 1257.
Therein respondents Municipal Judge and Chief of Police of La
Castellana, traversing the averments of the petition, contended that
although the alleged unlicensed firearms were taken from the
custody of the accused by La Carlota policemen such unlawful act of
carrying unlicensed firearms started from La Castellana; that the La
Carlota policemen intercepted the accused and took the firearms
from him only because they were earlier requested, by telephone, by
the policemen of La Castellana, then a pursuit of the accused, who
was fleeing in a taxicab (Koken No. 25), to assist them in the
apprehension of the latter.
On 7 September 1966, the court ordered the dismissal of the petition
for lack of merit. The accused moved for reconsideration thereof and,
when it was denied, he came to this Court on Appeal, reiterating the
argument that since the firearms specified in the complaint were
found in and removed from his custody in the municipality of La
Carlota, the municipal court of La Castellana has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case for illegal possession of such arms. There
is no merit in the appeal.
It must be remembered that the jurisdiction of the court over a case
is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information.
Here, the complaint filed with the municipal court of La Castellana
recited that on 22 December 1966 the accused, Francisco
Colmenares, was found in possession of two unlicensed firearms in
the municipality of La Castellana. That allegation makes the filing of
the case in the La Castellana municipal court proper. Under the Rules,
criminal actions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any
one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.’ 2 That the
firearms were confiscated from him by the La Carlota policemen
within the territorial boundaries of that municipality would not
sustain the motion for quashal of the complaint in this case nor affect
the merits thereof. It is not altogether improbable that the offense of
unlawful possession of firearms could have been committed in La
Castellana, as stated in the complaint, and also in La Carlota, as
manifested by the appellant. For, being malum prohibitum the crime
is consummated by the very fact of its performance; by the firearms
being possessed or held by the accused without proper authorization
therefor. The place where the said firearms were finally confiscated
and taken away from the accused is immaterial; it could not have
added anything to the nature of the unlawful act completed and
consummated earlier. 3 Thus, for purposes of the proceeding
instituted in the La Castellana municipal court, it is sufficient that,
according to the prosecution, the accused was in possession of the
unlicensed firearms while he was in La Castellana. To determine the
correct venue, the vital point is the allegation of the situs of the
offense charged in the complaint or information, 4 and that is
satisfied in this case.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the order appealed from, the same
is hereby affirmed, with costs against the Appellant.
CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
Petitioner Colmenares was charged for illegal possession of firearms.
He thereafter filed a motion to quash the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. It was claimed that venue was improperly laid,
because the firearms mentioned in the complaint were taken from
the possession of the accused in the municipality of La Carlota, Negros
Occidental, by the La Carlota policemen, and not in La Castellana
where the complaint was filed. The motion was denied. Hence, the
accused went to the CFI of Negros Occidental in a petition
for certiorari, raising the same issue of improper venue. And as
prayed for in the petition, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued
by said court, restraining the Municipal Judge of La Castellana from
proceeding with the trial.
Therein respondents Municipal Judge and Chief of Police of La
Castellana contended that although the alleged unlicensed firearms
were taken from the custody of the accused by La Carlota policemen
such unlawful act of carrying unlicensed firearms started from La
Castellana; that the La Carlota policemen intercepted the accused and
took the firearms from him only because they were earlier requested,
by telephone, by the policemen of La Castellana.
The court ordered the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipal court of La Castellana has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case for illegal possession of
such arms.
RULING.
There is no merit in the appeal.
It must be remembered that the jurisdiction of the court over a case
is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information.
Here, the complaint filed with the municipal court of La Castellana
recited that the accused, Francisco Colmenares, was found in
possession of two unlicensed firearms in the municipality of La
Castellana. That allegation makes the filing of the case in the La
Castellana municipal court proper.
Under the Rules, criminal actions shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was
committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.’
That the firearms were confiscated from him by the La Carlota
policemen within the territorial boundaries of that municipality
would not sustain the motion for quashal of the complaint in this case
nor affect the merits thereof. It is not altogether improbable that the
offense of unlawful possession of firearms could have been
committed in La Castellana, as stated in the complaint, and also in La
Carlota, as manifested by the appellant.
For, being malum prohibitum the crime is consummated by the very
fact of its performance; by the firearms being possessed or held by
the accused without proper authorization therefor. The place where
the said firearms were finally confiscated and taken away from the
accused is immaterial; it could not have added anything to the nature
of the unlawful act completed and consummated earlier.
Thus, for purposes of the proceeding instituted in the La Castellana
municipal court, it is sufficient that, according to the prosecution, the
accused was in possession of the unlicensed firearms while he was in
La Castellana. To determine the correct venue, the vital point is the
allegation of the situs of the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that is satisfied in this case.
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS,
NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C.
MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T.
DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L.
DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A.
REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M.
MENDOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO
ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO
VERSOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ, SABINO
BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y
UBALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO REFUNCION, respondents.
Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the
City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of Provincial Fiscal of Samar for
petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-
16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the
Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal
of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by
the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they
involve one basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance,
namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by
Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8
Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon.
Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective
accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused,
the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed
before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an
Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground,
viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the
offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to
state one essential element of the crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?
This is the central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other
corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.
A — The Information filed by the People —
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided
by Judge Purisima follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO
CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a
violation of paragraph 3, Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation
1081, committed as follows:
That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6-
½ inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of
11-¾ inches, which the said accused carried outside of his residence,
the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessary to
earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of
the accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and
the kind of weapon involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court
presided by Judge Maceren follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y
AQUINO, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 29677
VIOL. OF PAR. 3,
PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI
No. 266 of the Chief
Executive dated April 1, 1975
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a
VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in relation
to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated April 1,
1975, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed
weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8½ inches,
the same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his
livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the
name of the accused, the date and place of the commission of the
crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of
Samar is quoted hereunder:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO
REFUNCION, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 933
For:
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
DEADLY WEAPON
(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)
INFORMATION
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses
PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President
of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081
dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at
Barangay Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao, Province of Samar
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the
abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
carried with him outside of his residence a deadly weapon called
socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no such as could
be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood, which
act committed by the accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree No.
9.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
B. — The Orders of dismissal —
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred
with the submittal of the defense that one essential element of the
offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying
outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt
weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or
related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness
or public disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed
weapon or the like outside residence may be prosecuted and tried
under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege that the
possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of
abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality,
organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and
recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of
this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the
information is not complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to
constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in
these cases under consideration suffer from this defect.
xxx xxx xxx
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to
believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon a
charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more
than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless —
now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for
extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to
imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair
of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas
before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a
stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the
coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the
semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash
cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times
more incriminating than the infamous paltik.
For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and
wisely applied, its necessity can never be assailed. But it seems it is
back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who are
inclined to backsliding.
The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the
heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of the Court, and hence this
resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the desire of
this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by
Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and order
throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion.
It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises
that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons outside of one's
residence which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D.
No. 9 is one that abetssubversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is intended to bring
about these conditions. This conclusion is further strengthened by the
fact that all previously existing laws that also made the carrying of
similar weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9
does not contain any repealing clause or provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons
if not concealed in one's person and if not carried in any of the
aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful and
punishable by law.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the
prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his
opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made unlawful
and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the
intention of the person carrying such weapon because the law makes
it "mala prohibita". If the contention of the prosecution is correct, then
if a person happens to be caught while on his way home by law
enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just
bought from a store in order that the same may be used by one's cook
for preparing the meals in one's home, such person will be liable for
punishment with such a severe penalty as imprisonment from five to
ten years under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife
is going to be used by him to earn a livelihood because he intended it
merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were
to be interpreted and applied in the manner that that the prosecution
wants it to be done. The good intentions of the President in
promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by some
unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of
oppression and tyranny or of extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the
act which the President intended to make unlawful and punishable by
Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is one
that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30,
rollo of L-46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his
order dismissing the Information filed before him, thus:
... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited
Presidential decree, the same should be or there should be an
allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in
furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and
public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of
martial law throughout the country was issued because of wanton
destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and
anarchy. And in order to restore the tranquility and stability of the
country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the
quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and
deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall under
the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling
when we consider the penalty imposable, which is from five years to
ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law would
mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during
martial law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying deadly weapons is
very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their farm
implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would
arise specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-
46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before
arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case before the Court of
(First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same
time moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where the
accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate
release unless held on other charges.
C. — The law under which the Informations in question were filed by
the People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged
with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7
DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972,
RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21,
1972, the Philippines has been placed under a state of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No.
6 dated September 22, 1972 and General Order No. 7 dated
September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid
Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of
firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of
all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in older to attain the desired
result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is
unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution
as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, it the firearm
involved in the violation is unlicensed and is attended by assault upon,
or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the
performance of their official functions resulting in death to said
persons in authority or their agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is
used in the commission of crimes against persons, property or chastity
causing the death of the victim used in violation of any other General
Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated under said
Proclamation No. 1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life
imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/commission may direct,
when the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated under the preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be
imposed upon the owner, president, manager, members of the board
of directors or other responsible officers of any public or private firms,
companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly
allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation
or entity concerned to be used in violation of said General Orders Nos.
6 and 7.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades,
rifle grenades and other explosives, including, but not limited to, "pill
box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other
incendiary device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or
detonating agents containing combustible units or other ingredients
in such proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire,
by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all or part
of the compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden
generation of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous
pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on continguous
objects or of causing injury or death of a person; and any person
convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten
to fifteen years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or
blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo,"
"balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are
being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and
while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty
thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to
ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3
is committed during the commission of or for the purpose of
committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the
offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided
for the particular offenses committed or intended to be committed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
D. — The arguments of the People —
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as
stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal
of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of
dismissal, the main argument advanced on the issue now under
consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that
the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities; that
the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for
reasons of public policy.1
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory
offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is
immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily
perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the carrying
of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of
subversion or the like, but also that of criminality in general, that is, to
eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days.
It is also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor
from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information.2
E. — Our Ruling on the matter —
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a
criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.3
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient
it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute,
and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution
and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the specific
statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact,
another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute
violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order of
respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly
weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city
ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed
about his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly
weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this section shall,
upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a
fine not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period
not exceeding six months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance
No. 3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes
with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more
than one months, or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who
shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise
its deadly character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly
weapon ... in any public place. Consequently, it is necessary that the
particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial
difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand
and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the
commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute
and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3)
does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by
implication is not favored. 6This principle holds true with greater force
with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed
strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact,
Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be
made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal,
under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree.
That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an
accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential
elements of the offense charged against him, if he is not to become an
easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or
misguided official action — a fear understandably shared by
respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial functions are
daily exposed to such dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged
in the caption as well as in the body of the Information with a violation
of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense
treated in the presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying
outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc.
not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second,
that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly
weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city
ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying
any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a
criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable
under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation,
the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute
when the circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only
reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to P.D. 9(3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all
situations where a person carries outside his residence any of the
weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of
motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of
"statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential
decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its
implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to
construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure,
guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed
and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the
state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a
presidential decree in these cases — the primary rule is to search for
and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the
controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo,
per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a
statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence
to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason
for P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the
enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out in the
"Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of
martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated
September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as
well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned
in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder
mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the
use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a
statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential
part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent
defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that
the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed
limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text
itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains the
reason which prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo
of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this
can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses
which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation
of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the
makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and objects
which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute." (West
Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and
Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied)
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may,
when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult of interpretation,
be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which
otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285,
294, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this
Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of
an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule
of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase
might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually
intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with
those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general
provision may have a limited application if read together with other
provisions. 9
Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within
its reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause,
the presidential decree states:
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief
of an the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired
result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
xxx xxx xxx
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those
related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and
therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or
bladed weapons. With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the
underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our
duly constituted government and against our people, and having
committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection and
rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton
acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of
public and private buildings, and attacks against innocent and
defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities have
seriously endangered and continue to endanger public order and
safety and the security of the nation, ...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of
anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and disorder, turmoil and destruction
of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the forces of our
duly constituted government and the New People's Army and their
satellite organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids,
ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders, assassinations, acts of
terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery,
machinations, arsons, plunders and depredations committed and
being committed by the aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged
to the whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and
scheme until and unless they have fully attained their primary and
ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in this
country by overthrowing our present duly constituted government, ...
(See Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the
Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon
with a motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted
desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D.
9(3), and nothing else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. (U.S. v. American
Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v. Philippine
Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; emphasis supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be
kept in mind, and the statute should be construed with reference to its
intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford,
pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas
Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into
the consequences of the measure if a strict adherence to the letter of
the paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a
valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never
intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which
the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious
consequences.9-a
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the
President of the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or an
oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression,
arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and
so on.10
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the
following:
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to
believe the murmurings of detained persons brought to Court upon a
charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more
than ever before, policemen - of course not all can be so heartless —
now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for
extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to
imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair
of scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas
before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a
stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the
coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the
semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash
cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet five to ten times
more incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-
42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's
interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times. To his example
We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by
profession, after gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo
used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and
while crossing the street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing
the bolo being carried by that citizen places him under arrest and
books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree
have been conceived to produce such absurd, unreasonable, and
insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of an accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the
tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to
establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe,
and the discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable
a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to
provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.12
Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner,
viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be
brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should
any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so by the
statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the
only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws, instead, the
rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as
an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. (People v.
Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged
in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently
valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely
by the facts alleged therein.13 Where the facts are incomplete and do
not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation
is in order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the
defendant may move to quash the complaint or information when the
facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged
with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the
judgment was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14
In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar
Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the Court affirmed an order
of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts
recited did not constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1,
Republic Act 145. 15
G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People
could have availed itself of other available remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If the
motion to quash is sustained the court may order that another
information be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in custody,
shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not
made or if having been made another information is not filed
withuntime to be specified in the order, or within such further time as
the court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if in
custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on
some other charge.
Constitution are not violated in the process of its implementation. We
have to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a
law, necessary and justified under prevailing circumstances, which
renders the measure an instrument of oppression and evil and leads
the citizenry to lose their faith in their government.

Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. — The information or complaint
may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any
time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial
as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court,
when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of
the Informations in these cases, viz:
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM
the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the
Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in
the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of
the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information
under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under
other existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed
an amended Information to include the second element of the offense
as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled CASE DIGEST
that if the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a
FACTS:
punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed but the
prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the
Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective
Information.16
Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. An order quashed the information because
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint
it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D.
either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City
No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the crime, viz.: that
Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially
the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a
since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to
bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion
arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.
of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion,
Section 8. Rule 117 states that: organized lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a
perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another related to subversive activities and that they are essentially
prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on the malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this rule.

Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is

barred only when the criminal action or liability had been ISSUE:
extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted
W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related
for reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
to subversive activities.
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully
invoked by the accused in all these cases should new complaints be
filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.
HELD:
H. — We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and
The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative
the prosecuting arm of the government true to the oath of office they
measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the
have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in
law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the
evaluating the particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair
problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes
and just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3)
necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this
and the prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified. This
can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses
obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of the severe penalty
which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation
imposed for the offense.
of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A.

Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on October 15, 1975,
written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the
following:
[G.R. No. 128096. January 20, 1999]
In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so
that persons accused of carrying bladed weapons, specially those PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted authorities, may SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE
not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP,
9.17 IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into
the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial task and prerogative to ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioners-
determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and intervenors.
if basic fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an
act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
being challenged in this petition for prohibition
and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to
prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of Criminal
Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties pleadings
and documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to
be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized
crime syndicate which had been involve in a spate of bank robberies
in Metro Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson of the
Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police
officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by
petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.;
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH)
headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central
Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo
de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by
petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of
the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a
summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between
the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the
Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to
investigate the incident.This panel later absolve from any criminal
liability all the PNP officers and personnel allegedly involved in the
May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a
legitimate police operation.[1]
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panels finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
(26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. This
recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman, except for the
withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among
those charged as principal in eleven (11) informations for
murder[2] before the Sandiganbayans Second Division, while
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those
charged in the same informations as accessories after-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11
informations,[3] the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans action.[4]
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1,
1996 eleven (11) amended informations[5] before
the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an
accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and
others. One of the accused[6] was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c)
of Republic Act No. 7975.[7] They contend that the said law limited the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the
"principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27
or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent
(Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused
in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector,
and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution[8] dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May
9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de
Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena
dissenting,[9] the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information
and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as
none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with
the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the
accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution,
and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of
the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No.
2299[10] and No. 1094[11] (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C.
Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate
Bill No. 844[12] (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were
introduced in Congress, defining/expanding the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others,
to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 (paragraphs
a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No.
8249[13]. The law is entitled, AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It took
effect on February 25, 1997.13 by the President of the Philippines on
February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Resolution[14] denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special
Prosecutor, ruling that it stands pat in its resolution dated May 8,
1996.
On the same day,[15] the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM to its
March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou
concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon, Jr. rendered his concurring
and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and
the President of the Philippines approved it on February 5,
1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices
Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now
granting, the Special Prosecutors motion for
reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his
concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxxxxxxxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP
Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and
Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these
cases in fact, no order of arrest has been issued this court has
competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote
of 3 to 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations in these
cases and by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring nor
dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was
cases.[16] [Emphasis supplied] not convincingly discharged in the present case.

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 R.A. No. The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated in Section 5,
8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as of the approval hereof. Petitioner argues that: SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be
known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal
a) The questioned provision of the statute were introduced by the and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other
authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the offenses committed by public officers and employees including those
situation in which petitioners cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their
restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to office as may be determined by law."
procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot- The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under
dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident the following provision in Article XI, Section 4:
involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as
passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution
the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
petitioners vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No.
b) Retroactive application of the law is plain from the fact that it was
1486[21] created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws
again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioners
on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No.
cases were under, namely, that trial had not yet commenced, as
1606,[22] Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,[23] P.D. No.
provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer
1860,[24] P.D. No. 1861,[25] R.A. No. 7975,[26] and R.A. No.
be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as
8249.[27] Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of
the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post
R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayanhas jurisdiction over the following
facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused
cases:
in Criminal Case Nos. 23047 23057 to procedural due process
SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid
hereby further amended to read as follows:
innocuous provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands
rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
violating the one-title-one-subject requirement for the passage of
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
statutes under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. [17]
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
that while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
Sections 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending
offense:
before the Sandiganbayan.[18] They further argued that if their case is
tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
before recourse to the Supreme Court. (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General filed (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the engineers, and other provincial department heads;
petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
This Court then issued a Resolution[19] requiring the parties to file panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from department heads;
notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the
subject amended informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047- (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
23057 sufficiently alleged the commission by the accused therein of and higher;
the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No.
8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original (d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. officers of higher rank;

The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the
People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period. superintendent or higher;

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and prosecutor;
argumentative one.[20] The burden of proving the invalidity of the law
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over final judgment, resolution or orders of the regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary
writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that
may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:Provided, That the jurisdiction
over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and
may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to
the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review
filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to
the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme
Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices
or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the
proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
SEC. 7. Transitory provision. This act shall apply to all cases pending
in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof.(Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of
R.A. 7975 provides:
SEC. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606,
as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of high rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and Provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade 27
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 or higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to
their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit
trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on
appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular
courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than
grade 27, or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxxxxxxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices
or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the
proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
SEC. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases which trial
has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper
courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the
word principal before the word accused appearing in the above-
quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is
due to this deletion of the word principal that the parties herein are
at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial
Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the Subject
criminal cases since none of the principal accused under
the amended information has the rank of Superintendent[28]or
higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the
Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the
Supreme Court except in certain cases,[29] contends that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a
violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on
bribery),[30] (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986
(sequestration cases),[31] or (e) other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing
the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or
employee[32] holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a
of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged
with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the
Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional
offense is not paragraph but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This
paragraph b pertains to other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in
relation to their office. The phrase other offenses or felonies is too
broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed
in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said
paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayansjurisdiction is
the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one
of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of
Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the
same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal
participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged
as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the
Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which
does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a
requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249
violate their right to equal protection of the law[33] because its
enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to
deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were
presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress
and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must
present proof of arbitrariness.[34]
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of
the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based
on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class,[35]
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the
presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness of the
questioned provisions. The classification between those pending
cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet
commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval
of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real
differences.[36] In the first instance, evidence against them were not
yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already
submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented
documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the
jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations,[37] it can
be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would
necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a
remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and
intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them
under a different category from those similarly situated as
them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply
to all cases involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory
provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors arguments, the law is not particularly
directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision
does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also
in any court. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are
one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial
had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under
Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is
premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator
and two Justices of the Sandiganbayan[38] for their participation in the
passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the
Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials
involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings
conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the
Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased
against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67
million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word
principal in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of
the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.[39] R.A. 8249, while still a bill,
was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about
250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and
House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the
Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had
against petitioner during the committee hearings, the same would
not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid
law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was
deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the
committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of
the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress,
in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the
Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.[40]
Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive
application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes
an ex post facto law[41] for they are deprived of their right to
procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two tiered
appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in
R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,[42] an ex post facto law is one
(a)which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law
and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action;
or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was
committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed,
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.[43]
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences,
alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage.[44]
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but
in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done
was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.[45]
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal
laws.[46] R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on
jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts
of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
for their violations;[47]or those that define crimes, treat of their
nature, and provide for their punishment. [48] R.A. 7975, which
amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its
mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by
the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one
which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of
all kinds can properly administer justice.[49] Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
Petitioners and intervenors contention that their right to a two-tiered
appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the
enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already
been rejected by the court several times[50] considering that the right
to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be
regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the
statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex
post facto laws.[51] R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure,
and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the
nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and,
therefore, does not come within the prohibition.[52] Moreover, the
law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.[53] It has
been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[54]
In any case, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accuseds right to appeal to
the Supreme Court to review questions of law.[55] On the removal of
the intermediate review facts, the Supreme Court still has the power
of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been
convincingly overcome.[56]
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-
subject provisions of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on
the wording in the title of the law that it defines
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to
expand its jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to
be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the
necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that
every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title[57] is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to
include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute
seeks to achieve.[58] Such rule is severally interpreted and should be
given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here
sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A.
8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended)
and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general
subject.[59] The Congress, in employing the word define in the title of
the law, acted within its powers since Section 2, Article VIII of the
Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.[60]
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject
amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural
application of the law as provided in Section 7 R.A. No. 8249, we shall
now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it
is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction
over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and
intervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or
statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint
or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a
case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information,[61] and
not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.[62]
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and
intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section
4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the
offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to
have jurisdiction over it.[63] This jurisdictional requirement is in
accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which
mandated that the Sandiganbayanshall have jurisdiction over
criminal cases committed by public officers and employees, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to
their office as may be determined by law. This constitutional
mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it
declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue
to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of
multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the
accused PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,[64] we held that an offense is said to have been
committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he
was in the performance of his official functions.[65] This intimate
relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official
duties must be alleged in the Information.[66]
As to how the offense charged be stated in the information, Section
9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
SEC. 9. Cause of Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise
languagewithout repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute
defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended
to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that characterizes
the charge is the actual recital of the facts.[67] The real nature of the
criminal charges is determined not from the caption or preamble of
the information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.[68]
The noble object of written accusations cannot be
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen:[69]
The object of this written accusations was First, To furnish the
accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense, and second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for
the same cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction if one should be had. In order that this requirement may
be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law Every crime
is made up of certain actsand intent these must be set forth in the
complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts
that are imputed to him as he is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[70]
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we
find the amended informations for murder against herein petitioner
and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show
the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and
the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended
informations[71] for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP MICHAEL RAY AQUINO,
CHIEF INSP ERWIN T. VILLACORTE SENIOR INSP JOSELITO T.
ESQUIVEL. INSP RICARDO G. DANDAN SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO,
SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1
ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT.
JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., SUPT.
ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP.
GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INISP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP.
ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS,
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO
GLORIA and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code committed as follows:
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused CHIEF INISP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN
T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO
G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO SPO4 ROBERTO F.
LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R.
JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO all taking advantage of
their public and official positions as officers and members of the
Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in
relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using
firearms with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage
of their superior strengths did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M.
ACOP CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G.
ZUBIA, JR. SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O.
MANCAO II CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN
DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR
TANNAGAN SPO3 WILLY NUAS SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as
officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged
herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein
above alleged by among others falsely representing that there
were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused
herein at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila on or
about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY TO LAW
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named
principal accused committed the crime of murder in relation to their
public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that
the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused
was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as
police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate
that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then
killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein
petitioner and intervenors as among the accessories after-the-fact,
the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that
the said accessories concealed the crime herein-above alleged by,
among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made
during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville
Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of
May 18, 1995. The sudden mention of the arrests made during
the raid conducted by the accused surprises the reader. There is no
indication in the amended information that the victim was one of
those arrested by the accused during the raid.Worse, the raid and
arrests were allegedly conducted at Superville Subdivision, Paraaque,
Metro Manila but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph
of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the
principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon
City. How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in two places far
away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation
in the amended information that the said accessories committed the
offense in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP), we,
however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense
charged and the accuseds official functions, which, as earlier
discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such
particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad
to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the
amended information that the offense was committed by the accused
public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is
merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show
the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of
the accuseds official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,[72] where the jurisdiction between the
Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in
the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,[73] not
the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is
hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby
directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple
murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive
original jurisdiction over said cases.
SO ORDERED.
CASEDIGEST
301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 12809620 JAN 1999]

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of
evidence after trial.
Facts:
In (People vs. ) Montejo (108 Phil 613 [1960] ), where the amended
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng
information alleged
gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were
slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task
Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized
Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were
groups of police patrol and civilian commandos consisting of regular
petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.
policemen and x x x special policemen, appointed and provided by
him with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp x
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of
x x at Tipo-tipo which is under his command x x x supervision and
the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired
control where his co-defendants were stationed, entertained criminal
was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong
complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well
Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman
as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due
Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said
process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and
incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police
that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City
operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and
as such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
maltreated Awalin Tebag who died in consequence thereof.
respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and
herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the
reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before
office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in
the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an
the performance, though improper or irregular of their official
accessory.
functions and would not have been committed had they not held
their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
committing the crime, thus, there was an intimate connection
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the
between the offense and the office of the accused.
cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant
to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the
Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the
15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested
“principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or
and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of
higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused,
Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending
for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00
resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the
abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal”
common purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the
from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.
purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall
control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249,
trial.
including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all
cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the
approval hereof.
phrase committed in relation to public office does not appear in the
information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what
Issues:
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What
is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information (1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the
that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection clause of
accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged, the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced
in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the
public office. Kuratong Baleleng case.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that (2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto
the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of
the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the
accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether
the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s
jurisdiction.
The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an
Information for Obstruction of Justice (Violation of P.D. 1829), and
two (2) Informations[2] were filed with the Sandiganbayan which were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522. The two (2)
informations respectively read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 25521

The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Deputy

Ombudsman for Luzon, hereby accuses PRUDENTE SOLLER, PRECIOSA
SOLLER, MARIO MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO SALCEDO,
and JOSIE MORADA, of committing the offense of Obstruction of
[G.R. No. 144261-62. May 9, 2001]
Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and
penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829, committed as
PRUDENTE D. SOLLER, M.D., PRECIOSA M. SOLLER, M.D., RODOLFO
follows:
I. SALCEDO, JOSEFINA B. MORADA, MARIO M. MATINING, and
ROMMEL M. LUARCA, petitioners vs. THE HONORABLE
That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, all public officers,
DECISION
then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health Officer, SPO II, PO
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: 1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of said
municipality, conspiring and confederating with one another, did
This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally alter and suppress
raises the issue of the propriety of the assumption of jurisdiction by the gunshot wound and conceal the brain of JERRY MACABAEL with
the Sandiganbayan[1] in Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 both intent to impair its veracity, authenticity, and availability as evidence
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Prudente D. Soller, Preciosa M. in the investigation of criminal case for murder against the accused
Soller, Rodolfo Salcedo, Josefina Morada, Mario Matining and Vincent Soller, the son of herein respondents.
Rommel Luarca wherein petitioners are charged with Obstruction of
Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and CONTRARY TO LAW.
penalized under P.D. No. 1829. The grounds for petitioners Motion to
Criminal Case No. 25522
Quash the Informations against them are that only petitioner
Prudente D. Soller occupied a position classified as Grade 27 and
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer, I, Office of the Deputy
higher and because the offenses charged were not committed by him
Ombudsman for Luzon, hereby accuses PRUDENTE SOLLER, PRECIOSA
in violation of his office as Municipal Mayor of Bansud, Oriental
SOLLER, MARIO MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO SALCEDO,
Mindoro.
and JOSIE MORADA, of committing the offense of Obstruction of
Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and
It appears that in the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a
penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829, committed as
municipal guard, was shot and killed along the national highway at
follows:
Bansud, Oriental Mindoro while driving a motorcycle together with
petitioner Sollers son, Vincent M. Soller. His body was brought to a
That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the
medical clinic located in the house of petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller,
Municipality of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro and within the jurisdiction
the Municipal Mayor, and his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the
of this Honorable Court, the above name accused, all public officers,
Municipal Health Officer.The incident was reported to and
then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal health Officer, SPO II, PO
investigated by petitioner SPO4 Mario Matining. An autopsy was
1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of said
conducted on the same night on the cadaver of Jerry by petitioner Dr.
municipality, conspiring and confederating with one another, did
Preciosa Soller with the assistance of petitioner Rodolfo Salcedo,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and criminal give false and
Sanitary Inspector, and petitioner Josefina Morada, Rural Health
fabricated information in the autopsy report and police report to
Midwife.
mislead or prevent the law enforcement agency, from apprehending
the offender by reporting that there are several gunshot wounds in
On the basis of the foregoing incident, a complaint was later filed
the body of the victim, JERRY MACABAEL and that there is no
against the petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with the Office
tattooing (blackening) around the wound of the said victim when in
of the Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to mislead the
truth and in fact, there is only one gunshot wound and there is
investigation of the fatal shootout of Jerry Macabael by (a) altering
tattooing (blackening) around the wound which would indicate that
his wound (b) concealing his brain; (c) falsely stating in police report
the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of the herein
that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he had only one;
respondents spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller.
and d) falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no
blackening around his wound when in truth there was.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioners spouses Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the
of Jerry Macabael, and claimed, among others that Jerry Macabael
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged; this
was brought to their private medical clinic because it was there where
motion was opposed by respondent People. In its assailed Order
he was rushed by his companions after the shooting, that petitioner
dated April 14, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion
Prudente Soller, who is also a doctor, was merely requested by his
to Quash on the ground that the accusation involves the performance
wife Preciosa Soller, who was the Municipal Health Officer, to assist
of the duties of at least one (1) of the accused public officials, and if
in the autopsy considering that the procedure involved sawing which
the Mayor is indeed properly charged together with that official, then
required male strength, and that Mrs. Macabaels consent was
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the entire case and over all
obtained before the autopsy.The two (2) police officers denied having
the co-accused. The Order stated that the accused is the Mayor of the
planted three (3) shells at the place where the shooting took place.
municipality where the alleged incident took place and, therefore,
any attempt to deviate or to present false evidence in connection
with a criminal offense committed in his municipality for which he is
charged would be an offense also in which the accused Mayor would
be probably held accountable before this Court.
Motion for Reconsideration of the above order was filed on the
premise that it is not among the functions of the mayor to conduct
autopsies so that any misdeed, if indeed there was any, could not be
an offense which would put him under the jurisdiction of the
court. Motion for Reconsideration was denied, the Sandiganbyan
ruling that:
The enumeration of the functions of the mayor indicate very clearly
that he is the primary executive and, therefore, necessarily the
primary peace officer of the municipality, for which reason, any action
on his part which deviates from that function is an office-related
offense. In this particular instance, the accused is charged for having
cooperated or co-participated with another public official of lower
rank in the same municipality in the supposed falsification of the
results of an autopsy. Additionally, even if the functions of an autopsy
were totally unrelated to any of the administrative or executive
functions over which the mayor may have supervision and, more
specially, control, the fact of the matter is that the jurisdiction of the
Court covers not only the offenses committed by the officials of Grade
Level 27 or higher as the principal accused but even where such
officials are also accused together with some other public officials
who may be at a level below Grade Level 27 in connection with the
performance of their duties.
In this instance, accused Mayor Prudente D. Soller, Sr. who occupies
a position at Grade Level 27, is co-accused with his wife, the Municipal
Health Officer who occupies a position at Grade Level 24, so that,
necessarily, the offense attributed to the lower ranking officer
elevates the entire case to this Court primarily because somebody
over whom this Court has jurisdiction, the Mayor, is accused together
with the lower ranking officer.[3]
Hence, this petition alleging that-
RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES NOS.
25521 and 25522.[4]
Citing Section 4 of P.D. 1606 as amended, which defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners claim that for an
offense to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
offense must have been committed by the officials enunciated in
paragraph (a) in relation to their office, i.e. it should be intimately
connected with the office of the offender, and should have been
perpetrated while the offender was in the performance of his official
functions. Moreover, these requisites must all be alleged in the
information. Petitioners assert that in the subject criminal cases, the
Informations do not contain factual averments showing that they
committed the acts charged in relation to their office, i.e., the acts
charged are intimately connected with their respective offices and
were perpetrated by them while they were in the performance of
their duties and functions.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, represented
by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, posits that even if the offense charged was not
committed by the accused while in the performance of his official
functions, the same could still be considered done in relation to his
office if the acts were committed in line of duty. Respondents position
is that an offense may be considered committed in relation to office
if it arose from misuse or abuse of public office or from non-
performance of an official duty or function; thus the offense of
falsifying autopsy and police reports is office-related considering that
among the duties and functions of the municipal mayor in the
exercise of general supervision and control over all programs,
projects, services and activities of the municipal government, is that
he shall ensure that all executive officials and employees of the
municipality faithfully discharge their duties and functions. The fact
that the informations do not allege that the acts charged were
committed by petitioner Prudente Soller while he was in the
performance of his official functions or duties is not a fatal defect, as
the conclusion of law that his acts are in violation of his duties as
municipal mayor could necessarily be deduced from the informations.
Petitioners, in their Reply, reiterate that the factual averments in the
Information were fatally defective in view of the absence of any
specific allegation that would indicate that the crimes charged were
committed by the defendants in line of duty or in the performance of
their official functions.
The petition is meritorious.
The rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction
or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired
into.[5] Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly
from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be
presumed or implied. For this purpose in criminal cases, the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law at the time of the
commencement of the action.[6]
The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations on
May 25, 1999 charging the petitioners with the offense of Obstruction
of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined
and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829. The
applicable statutory provisions are those of P.D. No. 1606 as last
amended by the Republic Act No. 8249. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended provides insofar as pertinent:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crime committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
xxx xxx xxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
jurisdictions as provided by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, amended.
xxx xxx xxx
In Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,[7] this Court held that the Municipal
Mayor, who occupies Salary Grade 27 in the hierarchy of positions in
the government under Republic Act No. 6758 and the Index of
Occupational Services. Position Titles and Salary Grades, falls within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The bone of contention here is whether the offenses charged may be
considered as committed in relation to their office as this phrase is
employed in the above-quoted Section 4.
As early as Montilla vs. Hilario,[8] this Court has interpreted the
requirement that an offense be committed in relation to the office to
mean that the offense cannot exist without the office or that the
office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined and
punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven of the Revised Penal Code
(referring to the crimes committed by the public officers). People vs.
Montejo[9] enunciated the principle that the offense must be
intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated
while he was in the performance, though improper or irregular of his
official functions. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Concepcion said that although public office is not an element of the
crime of murder in (the) abstract, the facts in a particular case may
show that -
xxx the offense therein charged is intimately connected with (the
accuseds) respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in
the performance though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed (the accused) had no personal motive to commit
the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held
their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S.
Brown obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer,
as Mayor of Basilan City.[10]
The cited rulings in Montilla vs. Hilario and in People vs.
Montejo were reiterated in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,[11] Republic vs.
Asuncion,[12] and Cunanan vs. Arceo.[13] The case of Republic vs.
Asuncion categorically pronounced that the fact that offense was
committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the information:
That the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation
to their office, must, however, be alleged in the information for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over a case under Section 4 (a)
(2). This allegation is necessary because of the unbending rule that
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the information.[14]
For this purpose what is controlling is not whether the phrase
committed in violation to public office appears in the information;
what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the specific
factual allegation in the information that would indicate close
intimacy between the discharge of the accuseds official duties and the
commission of the offense charged in order to qualify the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office.[15]
In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 25521
and 25522 quoted earlier, fail to allege that petitioners had
committed the offenses charged in relation to their offices. Neither
are there specific allegations of facts to show the intimate
relation/connection between the commission of the offense charged
and the discharge of official functions of the offenders, i.e. that the
obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution of criminal
offenders was committed in relation to the office of petitioner
Prudente Soller, whose office as Mayor is included in the enumeration
in Section 4 (a) of P.D. 1606 as amended. Although the petitioners
were described as being all public officers, then being the Municipal
Mayor, Municipal Health Officer, SPO II, PO I, Sanitary Inspector and
Midwife, there was no allegation that the offense of altering and
suppressing the gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair the
veracity, authenticity and availability as evidence in the investigation
of the criminal case for murder (Criminal Case No. 25521) or of giving
false and fabricated information in the autopsy report and police
report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the
apprehension of the offender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in
the performance of official function.Indeed the offenses defined in
P.D. 1829 may be committed by any person whether a public officer
or a private citizen, and accordingly public office is not an element of
the offense. Moreover, the Information in Criminal Case No. 25522
states that the fabrication of information in the police and autopsy
report would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the
son of herein petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller.Thus
there is a categorical indication that the petitioners spouses Soller
had a personal motive to commit the offenses and they would have
committed the offenses charged even if they did not respectively hold
the position of Municipal Mayor or Municipal Health Officer.
A cursory reading of the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor
as enumerated in Section 444 of the Local Government Code will
readily show that the preparation of police and autopsy reports and
the presentation and gathering of evidence in the investigation of
criminal cases are not among such duties and functions, and the
broad responsibility to maintain peace and order cannot be a basis
for construing that the criminal acts imputed to petitioner Mayor fall
under his functions as Municipal Mayor.[16] What is obvious is that
petitioners spouses probably acted as the parents of the alleged
assailant and if at all, were motivated by personal reasons rather than
official duty.
Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges
were intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions
of accused Mayor Soller, the offenses charged in the subject criminal
cases fall within the exclusive original function of the Regional Trial
Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged orders are
SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
Title : DELOSO VS SANDIGANBAYANCitation : G.R. No. 86899-
903May 15, 1989Ponente : GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:Facts :The petitioner
was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections
ofNovember 1971. While he occupied the position of mayor, a certain
Juan Villanueva filed a lettercomplaint with the Tanodbayan accusing
him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft
Law(Republic Act 3019) in relation to the award of licenses to operate
fish corrals in the municipal waters ofBotolan, Zambales during the
period 1976 to 1978 and the issuance of five (5) tractors of
themunicipality to certain individuals allegedly without any
agreement as to the payment of rentals. Thecomplaint with respect
to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed. As
regards theother complaint, the Tanodbayan filed five (5) separate
informations, all dated May 30, 1984 accusingthe petitioner of
violation of Section 3(e), of the Anti-Graft Law with
the Sandiganbayan.The complaint alleged that Amor Deloso taking
advantage of his public and official position, didthen and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously give unwarranted benefits to
Daniel Ferrer thrumanifest partiality and evident bad faith in the
discharge of his official functions by issuing to him atractor purchased
by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank
of thePhilippines for lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without
any agreement as to the payment ofrentals for the use of tractor by
Daniel Ferrer thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality
ofBotolan. Deloso was suspended indefinitely pending the hearing of
the complaint. Thus, the instantpetition.Issue :Whether or not there
was violation of the right to due process when Deloso was TINGA,
suspendedindefinitely.Held :The order of suspension does not have a
definite period so that the petitioner may besuspended for the rest CHICO-NAZA
of his term of office unless his case is terminated sooner. An
VELASCO, JR
extendedsuspension is a distinct possibility considering that the
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's plea for
NACHURA,

LEONARDO-

earlier dates of trial of his cases on the ground that there are other
BRION,
cases set earlier which have a rightto expect priority.It would be most
unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the PERALTA, an
highestprovincial office in their command if they are deprived of his
services for an indefinite period with thetermination of his case BERSAMIN,
possibly extending beyond his entire term simply because the big
number ofsequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder, malversation of ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,
public finds and other more serious offensesplus incidents and
Respondent. Promulgated
resolutions that may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents the
expediteddetermination of his innocence or guilt.The court ruled that
a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13
ofRepublic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under April 24, 200
Section 42 of Presidential Decree No.807, the Civil Service Decree,
which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
thecircumstances of this case.The petition is GRANTED. x

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESand PHOTOKINA DECISION

G.R. No. 154473
MARKETING CORPORATION,

Petitioners,
NACHURA, J.:

- versus -

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review

ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, on certiorari filed under Rules 45 and 122 of the Rules of Court: (1)
G.R. No. 154473 assailing the June 18, 2002[1] and the June 23,
Respondent. 2002[2] Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
102 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407; and (2) G.R. No. 155573
challenging the June 25, 2002[3] and the September 18, 2002[4] Orders
of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
109406.

PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION,

The petitions, while involving the same issues, rest on different
Petitioner, factual settings, thus:
G.R. No. 155573

G.R. No. 154473

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman
of *the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), delivered a speech in the
QUISUMBING,
Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
held at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman
Campus, Quezon City.[5] The speech was subsequently published in
CARPIO,
the February 4 and 5, 2002 issues of the Manila Bulletin.[6]
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the
- versus -
respondent when he stated in his speech that
CARPIO MORALES,
Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing a
6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that could have been
bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isnt even a I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED THE
requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no contract was MOTION TO INHIBIT BEFORE RESOLVING THE MOTION TO DISMISS;
signed. Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract
that is so grossly disadvantageous to the government that it offends
common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF
price tag.[7]
LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED IN RELATION TO
HIS OFFICE; AND

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO

filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-
JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.[16]
Complaint[8] for libel.

Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned

the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
G.R. No. 155573
(OCP-QC).[9] Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an
Information[10] for libel against the respondent, docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-02-109407, with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 102.
On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC
Commissioner Luzviminda Tangcangco were guests of the talk show
Point Blank, hosted by Ces Drilon and televised nationwide on the
ANC-23 channel. The television shows episode that day was entitled
COMELEC Wars.[17] In that episode, the following conversation
transpired:
Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and
Consolidation,[11] contending that Judge Jaime N. Salazar of Branch
102 could not impartially preside over the case because his
appointment to the judiciary was made possible through the Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are being used
recommendation of respondents father-in-law. Petitioner further for a PR campaign against you? Is that what you are saying?
moved that the case be ordered consolidated with the other libel case
[Criminal Case No. Q-02-103406, which is the subject of G.R. No.
155573] pending with Branch 101 of the RTC.
Benipayo: No, I think [its] not COMELEC funds, [its] Photokina funds.
You know, admittedly, according to [c]harg d[a]ffaires of the U.S.
Embassy[,] in a letter sent to me in July of 2001, it is whats been [so]
While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his part, happening to the Photokina deal, they have already spent in excess
moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial of 2.4 [m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that time[,] thats about 120 [m]illion
court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable pesos and I said, what for[?] [T]hey wouldnt tell me, you see. Now you
officer and thus, could not be criminally prosecuted before any court asked me, [who is] funding this? I think its pretty obvious.[18]
during his incumbency; and that, assuming he can be criminally
prosecuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman that should
investigate him and the case should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.[12]

Petitioner considered respondents statement as defamatory, and,

On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged
Order[13] dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407 and considering
as moot and academic petitioners motion to inhibit. While the RTC
found that respondent was no longer an impeachable officer because
his appointment was not confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case
had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the
alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his officehe
delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair.
Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the
case to the exclusion of all other courts.
through its authorized representative, filed a Complaint-
Affidavit[19] for libel. Respondent similarly questioned the jurisdiction
of the OCP-QC.[20] The City Prosecutor, however, consequently
instituted Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406 by filing the corresponding
Information[21] with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101.
Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising
similar arguments that the court had no jurisdiction over his person,
he being an impeachable officer; and that, even if criminal
prosecution were possible, jurisdiction rested with the
Sandiganbayan.[22]

On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling

that it was not vested with jurisdiction to hear the libel case.[14]
Aggrieved, petitioners timely filed before the Court, on pure
questions of law, the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari[15] under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising the following grounds:
On June 25, 2002, the trial court issued the assailed
Order[23] dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406 for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The RTC, in the further
assailed September 18, 2002 Order,[24] denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[25]

Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners seasonably
filed before this Court, on pure questions of law, another Petition for
Review on Certiorari[26] under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court raising the following grounds:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF
LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION
TO HIS OFFICE; AND
II. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE
INFORMATION THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL WAS COMMITTED BY
RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW.
III. EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN
HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
ENDORSED THE CASE TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN INSTEAD OF
DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT.[27]
Considering that the two petitions, as aforesaid, involve the same
issues and the same parties, the Court, upon the recommendation of
the Clerk of Court,[28] consolidated the cases.[29]
The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin cases is
whether the RTC has jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of
all other courts.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their
pleadings on the issue of whether the alleged criminal acts of
respondent are committed in relation to his office. They are of the
conviction that the resolution of the said question will ultimately
determine which courtthe RTC or the Sandiganbayanhas jurisdiction
over the criminal cases filed. The Court, however, notes that both
parties are working on a wrong premise. The foremost concern, which
the parties, and even the trial court, failed to identify, is whether,
under our current laws, jurisdiction over libel cases, or written
defamations to be more specific, is shared by the RTC with the
Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts do not have concurrent
jurisdiction to try the offense, it would be pointless to still determine
whether the crime is committed in relation to office.
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court
to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time
of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof.[30]Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC),[31] as amended by Republic Act No. 4363,[32] is explicit on
which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the
Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous article
is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense
xxx.[33] [Underscoring and italics ours.]
More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v.
Endaya,[34] acknowledged the unmistakable import of the said
provision:
There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first
instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] that is specifically designated
to try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its meaning is free from
doubt. This is one of those statutory provisions that leave no room for
interpretation. All that is required is application. What the law ordains
must then be followed.[35]
This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written
defamations is echoed in Bocobo v. Estanislao,[36] where the Court
further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if
the libelous act is committed by similar means,[37]and despite the fact
that the phrase by similar means is not repeated in the latter portion
of Article 360.[38] In these cases, and in those that followed, the Court
had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the expanded
jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel
cases. Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera,[39] we explained at length
that:
The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which
categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with
the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G.R.
No. 123263, People vs. MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32 and Isah v.
Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over libel was raised. In
that case, the MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts which
had jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691. Upon elevation of
the matter to us, respondent judges orders were nullified for lack of
jurisdiction, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent Courts Orders
dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are
declared null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction; and
said Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded
to remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for proper disposition.
Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving the
matter:
Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error
committed by public respondent Court of Appeals in denying
petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The contention
** that R.A. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to
try libel cases cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by
imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and two
months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is
lodged within the Municipal Trial Courts jurisdiction under R.A. No.
7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law however, excludes therefrom ** cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520
and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the Court of
Appeals, has laid down the rule that Regional Trial courts have the
exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the expanded
jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be
applied to libel cases.
Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public
respondent committed an error in ordering that the criminal case for
libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued.
For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets
of the Regional Trail Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level
courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a later
enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a
law of a special nature. Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a
particular court, are special in character, and should prevail over the
Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the
Court of First Instance) which is a general law. A later enactment like
RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing law, because it is
a well-settled principle of construction that, in case of conflict
between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail
regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by
a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by
a general law on the MTC.
Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no
manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. If there
was such intent, then the amending law should have clearly so
indicated because implied repeals are not favored. As much as
possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A
special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent
general law by mere implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal,
a pre-condition must be found, that is, a substantial conflict should
exist between the new and prior laws. Absent an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless
an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of
the new and old laws. The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely
incompatible. In the law which broadened the jurisdiction of the first
level courts, there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional Trial
Courts from taking cognizance of certain cases over which they have
been priorly granted special and exclusive jurisdiction. Such grant of
the RTC (previously CFI) was categorically contained in the first
sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The inconsistency
referred to in Section 6 of RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to cases
of criminal libel.
Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996,
this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction over libel cases, hence
settled the matter with finality:
RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY,
CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS
CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES.
xxxx
LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION
OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN
CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS.(Underscoring supplied)[40]
As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v.
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 32,[41] Manzano, and
analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare herein that the
law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and civil actions
for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all
other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the
jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of
an express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the RPC
vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in
writing or by similar means.[42] The grant to the Sandiganbayan[43] of
jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office,
similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest
the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written
defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in
relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4,
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No.
8249,[44] cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even
simply modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.[45]
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the
RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties
to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Thus,
the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent
committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former
COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is,
following the above disquisition, gross error. This Court, therefore,
orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-
02-109407 and their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts
for further proceedings. Having said that, the Court finds unnecessary
any further discussion of the other issues raised in the petitions.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari are GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406
and Q-02-109407 are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
PEOPLE v. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, GR No. 154473, 2009-04-24
Facts:
Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC),... delivered a speech in... at
University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus,... Quezon City.
was subsequently published in
Manila Bulletin.
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the
respondent... filed,... an Affidavit-Complaint... for libel.
an impeachable office
Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an Information... for
libel against... the respondent,... respondent... moved for the
dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer and
thus, could not be criminally prosecuted before any court... during his
incumbency... assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the
Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case
should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.
trial court... dismissing Criminal Case... considering that the alleged
libel was committed by respondent in relation to his office--he
delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair.
Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the
case to the exclusion of all other courts.
Issues:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS
CASE WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE;"
AND
Ruling:
rticle 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),... as amended by Republic
Act No. 4363... is explicit on... which court has jurisdiction to try cases
of written defamations, thus:... criminal and civil action for damages
in cases of written defamation... shall be filed simultaneously... or
separately with the court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial
Court]... f the province or city where... the libelous article is printed
and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense... criminal and
civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all other
courts.
A subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other
courts cannot simply... override, in the absence of an express repeal
or modification, the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC,
as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by similar
means.
The grant to the Sandiganbayan... of jurisdiction over offenses
committed in relation to (public) office,... did not divest the RTC of its
exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases
regardless of whether the... offense is committed in relation to office.
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the
RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties
to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to office.
Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent...
committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former
COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is,
following the above disquisition, gross error.
[G.R. Nos. 105965-70. March 20, 2001]
GEORGE UY, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON.
OMBUDSMAN AND THE HON. ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., SPECIAL
PROSECUTION OFFICER III, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
Before the Court is the Motion for Further Clarification filed by
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's ruling in its decision
dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000 that the
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no
authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular
courts.
The Court stated in its decision dated August 9, 1999:
In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has
the authority to file the corresponding information/s against
petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
It explained in the resolution of February 22, 2000 that:
(t)he clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the
authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutors
under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The
investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to
cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional
and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for
other purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman
"primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan"
And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which
emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the
power to "conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated
references to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction clearly serve to limit
the Ombudsman's and Special Prosecutor's authority to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Seeking clarification of the foregoing ruling, respondent Ombudsman
raises the following points:
(1) The jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan is not parallel to
or equated with the broader jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman;
(2) The phrase "primary jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan" is not a delimitation of
its jurisdiction solely to Sandiganbayan cases; and
(3) The authority of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to prosecute
cases before the Sandiganbayan cannot be confused with the broader
investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Thus, the matter that needs to be discussed herein is the scope of the
power of the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation and
the subsequent prosecution of criminal offenses in the light of the
provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act [RA] 6770).
We held that the Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct
preliminary investigation and to prosecute all criminal cases involving
public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts as well.
The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute
offenses committed by public officers and employees is founded in
Section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770. Section 15 vests the
Ombudsman with the power to investigate and prosecute any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient, thus:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.--The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
xxx
Section 11 grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic
component of the Office of the Ombudsman under the latters
supervision and control, the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. It states:
Sec. 11. Structural Organization. x x x
xxx
(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the
Special Prosecutor and his prosecution staff. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor shall be an organic component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and shall be under the supervision and control of the
Ombudsman.
(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision
and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman, have the
following powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and
(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or
omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The
law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been
held that the clause any illegal act or omission of any public official is
broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or
employee.[1]
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15 (1) giving the Ombudsman
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and
Section 11 (4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as
confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary
jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not
necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving
public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The
exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the
discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses
committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be
stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the
Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and
employees during their tenure of office.[2]
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should
not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor
under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is
merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only
act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the
Ombudsman.[3] Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine
the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these
types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all
complaints against officers and employees of the government and to
enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case
where the evidence warrants.[4] To carry out this duty, the law allows
him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal,
state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special
investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist
him work under his supervision and control.[5] The law likewise allows
him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA
6770.
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and
employees is one of the most important functions of the
Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed
the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and
effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public
office.[6] A review of the development of our Ombudsman laws
reveals this intent.
The concept of Ombudsman originated in Sweden in the early
19th century, referring to an officer appointed by the legislature to
handle the peoples grievances against administrative and judicial
actions. He was primarily tasked with receiving complaints from
persons aggrieved by administrative action or inaction, conducting
investigation thereon, and making recommendations to the
appropriate administrative agency based on his findings. He relied
mainly on the power of persuasion and the high prestige of the office
to effect his recommendations.[7]
In this jurisdiction, several Ombudsman-like agencies were
established by past Presidents to serve as the peoples medium for
airing grievances and seeking redress against abuses and misconduct
in the government. These offices were conceived with the view of
raising the standard in public service and ensuring integrity and
efficiency in the government. In May 1950, President Elpidio Quirino
created the Integrity Board charged with receiving complaints against
public officials for acts of corruption, dereliction of duty and
irregularity in office, and conducting a thorough investigation of these
complaints. The Integrity Board was succeeded by several other
agencies which performed basically the same functions of
complaints-handling and investigation. These were the Presidential
Complaints and Action Commission under President Ramon
Magsaysay, the Presidential Committee on Administration
Performance Efficiency under President Carlos Garcia, the
Presidential Anti-Graft Committee under President Diosdado
Macapagal, and the Presidential Agency on Reform and Government
Operations and the Office of the Citizens Counselor, both under
President Ferdinand Marcos. It was observed, however, that these
agencies failed to realize their objective for they did not enjoy the
political independence necessary for the effective performance of
their function as government critic. Furthermore, their powers
extended to no more than fact-finding and recommending.[8]
Thus, in the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the members of the
Constitutional Convention saw the need to constitutionalize the office
of an Ombudsman, to give it political independence and adequate
powers to enforce its recommendations.[9] The 1973 Constitution
mandated the legislature to create an office of the Ombudsman to be
known as Tanodbayan. Its powers shall not be limited to receiving
complaints and making recommendations, but shall also include the
filing and prosecution of criminal, civil or administrative case before
the appropriate body in case of failure of justice. Section 6, Article XIII
of the 1973 Constitution read:
Sec. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the
Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan, which shall receive and
investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate
recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law,
file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil or administrative
case before the proper court or body.
Implementing this constitutional provision, President Marcos, on
June 11, 1978, exercising his power under Proclamation 1081,
enacted Presidential Decree (PD) 1487 creating the Office of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. Its principal task was to
investigate, on complaint, any administrative act[10] of any
administrative agency[11] including any government-owned or
controlled corporation.[12] The Tanodbayan also had the duty to file
and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative
case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or body if he has
reason to believe that any public official, employee, or other person
has acted in a manner resulting in a failure of justice.[13]It should be
noted, however, that the prosecution of cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was to be done by the Tanodbayan
through the Special Prosecutor who, according to PD 1486,[14] had the
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation, file
information for and prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of said
court. The Special Prosecutor was then under the control and
supervision of the Secretary of Justice.[15]
Shortly after its enactment, PD 1487 was amended by PD 1607 which
took effect on December 10, 1978. The amendatory law broadened
the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate administrative acts of
administrative agencies by authorizing it to conduct an investigation
on its own motion or initiative, even without a complaint from any
person.[16] The new law also expanded the prosecutory function of
the Tanodbayan by creating the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor
in the Office of the Tanodbayan and placing under his direction and
control the Special Prosecutor who had the exclusive authority to
conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan; to file informations therefor and to direct and control
the prosecution of said cases therein.[17] Thus, the law provided that
if the Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official,
employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal
or disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall cause him to be
investigated by the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor who shall
file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case
before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper
administrative agency.[18]
On July 18, 1979, PD 1630 was enacted further amending PD 1487
and PD 1607. PD 1630 reorganized the Office of the Tanodbayan and
transferred the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor to
the Tanodbayan himself. Thus, the Tanodbayan was empowered to
directly conduct preliminary investigation, file information and
prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
other courts. The amendment gave the Tanodbayan the exclusive
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan; to file information therefor and to direct and
control the prosecution of said cases.[19] Section 10 of PD 1630
provided:
Sec. 10. Powers.--The Tanodbayan shall have the following powers:
(a) He may investigate, on complaint by any person or on his own
motion or initiative, any administrative act whether amounting to any
criminal offense or not of any administrative agency including any
government-owned or controlled corporation;
xxx
(e) If after preliminary investigation he finds a prima facie case, he
may file the necessary information or complaint with the
Sandiganbayan or any proper court or administrative agency and
prosecute the same.
Section 18 further stated:
Sec. 18. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.--If the
Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public official, employee
or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or
disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall conduct the necessary
investigation and shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal
or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court
or before the proper administrative agency.
With the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the
Ombudsman was created. The present Ombudsman, as protector of
the people, is mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, and to
notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof.[20] He possesses the following powers, functions and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or
employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or
controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite
any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct any
abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a
public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies
of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his
office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties,
and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for
appropriate action.
5. Request any government agency for assistance and information
necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if
necessary, pertinent records and documents.
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances
so warrant and with due prudence.
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement,
fraud, and corruption in the Government and make
recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency.
8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers
or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.[21]
As a new Office of the Ombudsman was established, the then existing
Tanodbayan became the Office of the Special Prosecutor which
continued to function and exercise its powers as provided by law,
except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created
under the 1987 Constitution.[22]
The frameworks for the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of
the Special Prosecutor were laid down by President Corazon Aquino
in Executive Order (EO) 243 and EO 244, both passed on July 24, 1987.
In September 1989, Congress passed RA 6770 providing for the
functional and structural organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman. As in the previous laws on the Ombudsman, RA 6770
gave the present Ombudsman not only the duty to receive and relay
the people's grievances, but also the duty to investigate and
prosecute for and in their behalf, civil, criminal and administrative
offenses committed by government officers and employees as
embodied in Sections 15 and 11 of the law.
Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical
Ombudsman model whose function is merely to receive and process
the people's complaints against corrupt and abusive government
personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is
armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers and
employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on
anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be
committed by such officers and employees. The legislature has vested
him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own
actions. Recognizing the importance of this power, the Court cannot
derogate the same by limiting it only to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. It is apparent from the history and the language of
the present law that the legislature intended such power to apply not
only to cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also
those within the jurisdiction of regular courts. The Court observed in
the case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:[23]
A perusal of the law originally creating the Office of the Ombudsman
then (to be known as the Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws
issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office
of the Ombudsman was already vested with the power to investigate
and prosecute civil and criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and
even the regular courts.
xxx
Presidential Decree No. 1630 was the existing law governing the then
Tanodbayan when Republic Act No. 6770 was enacted providing for
the functional and structural organization of the present Office of the
Ombudsman. This later law retained in the Ombudsman the power of
the former Tanodbayan to investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. x x x.
Finally, it must be clarified that the authority of the Ombudsman to
prosecute cases involving public officers and employees before the
regular courts does not conflict with the power of the regular
prosecutors under the Department of Justice to control and direct the
prosecution of all criminal actions under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The Rules of Court must be read in conjunction
with RA 6770 which charged the Ombudsman with the duty to
investigate and prosecute all illegal acts and omissions of public
officers and employees. The Court held in the case of Sanchez vs.
Demetriou[24] that the power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1)
of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. Thus,
Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman
provides:
The prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be
under the direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the
Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by regular Courts, the control and
supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman
cases in the sense defined (therein).[25] The law recognizes a
concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman
and other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of
cases cognizable by regular courts.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9,
1999 and its resolution dated February 20, 2000 that the Ombudsman
exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
Issue: Wether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman has
no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of
regular courts?
Held: No. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law
to the Ombudsman us plenary and unqualified. It has been held that
the clause “any illegal act or omission of any public officials” is broad
enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-
feasance committed by public officers and employees during their
tenure of office.
malfeasance – bad and illegal acts, especially by a public official.
Misfeasance – An act that is legal but performed improperly.
Nonfeasance – omission to do a duty.
The court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou that the power
of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive
authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense charged. Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the
Office of Ombudman provides: The prosecution of case cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and
supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman. The law recognizes a
concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman
and other investigate agencies of government in the prosecution of
cases cognizable by regular courts.
G.R. No. L-62075 April 15, 1987
NATIVIDAD CORPUS, AURORA FONBUENA, JOSIE PERALTA,
CRESENCIA PADUA, DOMINADOR BAUTISTA, LEOLA NEOG,
EPIFANIO CASTILLEJOS AND EDGAR CASTILLEJOS, petitioners,
vs.
TANODBAYAN OF THE PHILIPPINES, FISCAL JUAN L. VILLANUEVA,
JR., AND ESTEBAN MANGASER, respondents.
Simplicio M. Sevilleja for respondent E. Mangaser.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
Petitioners Natividad Corpuz, Aurora Fonbuena, Josie Peralta,
Cresencia Padua, Dominador Bautista and Leola Neog were members
of the Citizens Election Committee of Caba, La Union in the January
30, 1980 elections; petitioner Epifanio Castillejos was Director of the
Bureau of Domestic Trade and petitioner Edgar Castillejos was then a
candidate and later elected mayor in the same election. Private
respondent Esteban Mangaser, an independent candidate for vice.
mayor of the same municipality sent a letter to President Ferdinand
E. Marcos charging the petitioners with violation of the 1978 Election
Code, specifically for electioneering and/or campaigning inside the
voting centers during the election. On instruction from the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) the Regional Election Director of
San Fernando, La Union, conducted a formal investigation and on
September 29, 1981 submitted its report recommending to the
COMELEC the dismissal of the complaint. On October 29, 1981,
private respondent Mangaser formally withdrew his charges filed
with the COMELEC stating his intention to refile it with the
Tanodbayan. On November 26, 1981 the COMELEC dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Subsequently the assistant provincial fiscal started a preliminary
investigation of a complaint filed by Mangaser with the Tanodbayan
against the same parties and on the same charges previously
dismissed by the COMELEC. The COMELEC Legal Assistance Office
entered its appearance for the respondents (except Director Epifanio
Castillejos and Edgar Castillejos) and moved for dismissal of the
complaint. The motion was denied. The TANODBAYAN asserting
exclusive authority to prosecute the case, stated in a letter to the
COMELEC Chairman that a lawyer of the COMELEC if not properly
deputized as a Tanodbayan prosecutor has no authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and prosecute offenses committed by
COMELEC officials in relation to their office. (Rollo, p. 102) A motion
for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari and preliminary injunction. This Court after considering the
pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised considered the
comment of the Solicitor General an Answer to the petition and
considered the case submitted for decision.
In the landmark case of the De Jesus v. People (No. L-61998, February
28, 1983, 120 SCRA 760) this Court dealt with the following question
of first impression relative to the rival claim of jurisdiction over
election offenses committed by public officials:
Which of these entities have the power to investigate, prosecute and
try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his
office — the Commission on Elections and the Court of First Instance
(now the regional trial court) or the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan?
This Court rejected the assertion that no tribunal other than the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office, thus:
The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the
concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election
offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional
intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the
free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would
result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere
Idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen
to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their
office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this
clear constitutional mandate.
From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by
the Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither explicit nor implicit grant
to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to
investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by
public officers in relation to their office as contradistinguished from
the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction
upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182
and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election
Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses
committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer
or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the
offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other
words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the
offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense
jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view
of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections.
WHEREFORE, inasmuch as the charge of electioneering filed against
the petitioners had already been dismissed by the COMELEC for
insufficiency of evidence, the petition is hereby granted and the
complaint filed by private respondent being investigated anew by the
Tanodbayan charging the petitioners with the same election offense,
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
233 Phil. 279
CORTES, J.:
Petitioners Natividad Corpuz, Aurora Fonbuena, Josie Peralta,
Cresencia Padua, Dominador Bautista and Leola Neog were members
of the Citizens Election Committee of Caba, La Union in the January
30, 1980 elections; petitioner Epifanio Castillejos was Director of the
Bureau of Domestic Trade and petitioner Edgar Castillejos was then a
candidate and later elected mayor in the same election. Private
respondent Esteban Mangaser, an independent candidate for vice-
mayor of the same municipality sent a letter to President Ferdinand
E. Marcos charging the petitioners with violation of the 1978 Election
Code, specifically for electioneering and/or campaigning inside the
voting centers during the election. On instruction from the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) the Regional Election Director of
San Fernando, La Union, conducted a formal investigation and on
September 29, 1981 submitted its report recommending to the
COMELEC the dismissal of the complaint. On October 29, 1981,
private respondent Mangaser formally withdrew his charges filed
with the COMELEC stating his intention to refile it with the
Tanodbayan. On November 26, 1981 the COMELEC dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Subsequently the assistant provincial fiscal started a preliminary
investigation of a complaint filed by Mangaser with the Tanodbayan
against the same parties and on the same charges previously
dismissed by the COMELEC. The COMELEC Legal Assistance Office
entered its appearance for the respondents (except Director Epifanio
Castillejos and Edgar Castillejos) and moved for dismissal of the
complaint. The motion was denied. The TANODBAYAN asserting
exclusive authority to prosecute the case, stated in a letter to the
COMELEC Chairman that a lawyer of the COMELEC if not properly
deputized as a Tanodbayan prosecutor has no authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and prosecute offenses committed by
COMELEC officials in relation to their office. (Rollo p. 102) A motion
for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition
for certiorari and preliminary injunction. This Court after considering
the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised considered
the comment of the Solicitor General an Answer to the petition and
considered the case submitted for decision.
In the landmark case of the De Jesus v. People (No. L-61998, February
28, 1983, 120 SCRA 760) this Court dealt with the following question
of first impression relative to the rival claim of jurisdiction over
election offenses committed by public officials:
Which of these entities have the power to investigate, prosecute and
try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his
office the Commission on Elections and the Court of First Instance
(now the regional trial court) or the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan?
This Court rejected the assertion that no tribunal other than the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office, thus:
The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the
concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election
offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional
intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the
free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would
result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere
idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen
to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their
office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this
clear constitutional mandate.
From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by
the Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither explicit nor implicit grant
to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to
investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by
public officers in relation to their office as contradistinguished from
the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction
upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182
and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election
Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses
committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer
or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the
offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other
words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the
offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense
jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view
of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections.
WHEREFORE, inasmuch as the charge of electioneering filed against
the petitioners had already been dismissed by the COMELEC for
insufficiency of evidence, the petition is hereby granted and the
complaint filed by private respondent being investigated anew by the
Tanodbayan charging the petitioners with the same election offense,
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 177857-58 September 4, 2012
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED),
MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, DOMINGO P. ESPINA, SALVADOR P.
BALLARES, JOSELITO A. MORALEDA, PAZ M. YASON, VICENTE A.
CADIZ, CESARIA DE LUNA TITULAR, and RAYMUNDO C. DE
VILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, OSCAR F. SANTOS, SURIGAO DEL SUR
FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES (SUFAC) and MORO
FARMERS ASSOCIATION OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR (MOFAZS),
represented by ROMEO C. ROYANDOYAN, Intervenors.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 178193
DANILO B. URSUA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
For consideration is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of
the Court dated January 24, 2012 interposed by petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 177857-58, namely: Philippine Coconut Producers Federation,
Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel V. del Rosario, Domingo P. Espina, Salvador
P. Ballares, Joselito A. Moraleda, Paz M. Yason, Vicente A. Cadiz,
Cesaria De Luna Titular, and Raymundo C. De Villa.
On March 14, 2012, petitioner-movants filed a Manifestation and
Motion stating that they failed to include the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in the list of persons to be furnished with a copy of the
Motion for Reconsideration. They accordingly moved that their
belated service of a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration on the
OSG be considered compliance with the rules on service of motions
for reconsideration. This Court noted and accepted the Manifestation
and Motion. On March 15, 2012, petitioner-movants filed a
Memorandum in support of the instant motion for reconsideration.
To the said motion, intervenors Wigberto E. Tañada, et al. filed on
June 10, 2012 their Comment and Opposition. The OSG, on the other
hand, after filing two motions for extension on May 22, 2012 and June
21, 2012, respectively, filed its Motion to Admit Comment, with
Comment attached, on July 13, 2012. This Court noted and admitted
the Comment.
As will be recalled, the Court, in its January 24, 2012 Decision,
affirmed, with modification, the Partial Summary Judgments (PSJs)
rendered by the Sandiganbayan (1) on July 11, 2003 in Civil Case No.
0033-A (PSJ-A), as amended by a Resolution issued on June 5, 2007;
and (2) on
May 7, 2004 in Civil Case No. 0033-F (PSJ-F), as amended by a
Resolution issued on May 11, 2007.
In this recourse, petitioner-movants urge the Court to reconsider its
Decision of January 24, 2012 on the ground that it:
1. Made erroneous findings of fact;
2. Erred in affirming the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the subdivided amended complaints;
3. Erred in ruling that due process was not violated;
4. Erred in ruling on the constitutionality of the coconut levy laws;
5. Erred in ruling that the Operative Fact Doctrine does not apply; and
6. Erred in ruling that the right to speedy disposition of cases was not
violated.
The instant motion is but a mere reiteration or rehash of the
arguments that have already been previously pleaded, discussed and
resolved by this Court in its January 24, 2012 Decision. And
considering that the motion’s arguments are unsubstantial to warrant
a reconsideration or at least a modification, this Court finds no reason
to modify or let alone reverse the challenged Decision.
As of 1983,1 the Class A and B San Miguel Corporation (SMC) common
shares in the names of the 14 CIIF Holding Companies are 33,133,266
shares. From 1983 to November 19, 2009 when the Republic of the
Philippines representing the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) filed the "Motion To Approve Sale of CIIF SMC
Series I Preferred Shares," the common shares of the CIIF Holding
companies increased to 753,848,312 Class A and B SMC common
shares.2
Owing, however, to a certain development that altered the factual
situation then obtaining in G.R. Nos. 177857-58, there is, therefore, a
compelling need to clarify the fallo of the January 24, 2012 Decision
to reconcile it, vis-a-vis the shares of stocks in SMC which were
declared owned by the Government, with this development. We refer
to the Resolution3 issued by the Court on September 17, 2009 in the
then consolidated cases docketed as G.R. Nos. 177857-58, G.R. No.
178193 and G.R. No. 180705. In that Resolution which has long
become final and executory, the Court, upon motion of COCOFED and
with the approval of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, granted the conversion of 753,848,312 Class "A" and
Class "B" SMC common shares registered in the name of the CIIF
companies to SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares of 753,848,312, subject
to certain terms and conditions. The dispositive portion of the
aforementioned Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the conversion of the 753,848,312
SMC Common Shares registered in the name of CIIF companies to
SMC SERIES 1 PREFERRED SHARES of 753,848,312, the converted
shares to be registered in the names of CIIF companies in accordance
with the terms and conditions specified in the conversion offer set
forth in SMC’s Information Statement and appended as Annex "A" of
COCOFED’s Urgent Motion to Approve the Conversion of the CIIF SMC
Common Shares into SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares. The preferred
shares shall remain in custodia legis and their ownership shall be
subject to the final ownership determination of the Court. Until the
ownership issue has been resolved, the preferred shares in the name
of the CIIF companies shall be placed under sequestration and PCGG
management. (Emphasis added.)
The net dividend earnings and/or redemption proceeds from the
Series 1 Preferred Shares shall be deposited in an escrow account
with the Land Bank of the Philippines or the Development Bank of the
Philippines.
Respondent Republic, thru the PCGG, is hereby directed to cause the
CIIF companies, including their respective directors, officers,
employees, agents, and all other persons acting in their behalf, to
perform such acts and execute such documents as required to
effectuate the conversion of the common shares into SMC Series 1
Preferred Shares, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution.
Once the conversion is accomplished, the SMC Common Shares
previously registered in the names of the CIIF companies shall be
released from sequestration.
SO ORDERED.4
The CIIF block of SMC shares, as converted, is the same shares of
stocks that are subject matter of, and declared as owned by the
Government in, the January 24, 2012 Decision. Hence, the need to
clarify.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY with FINALITY the instant
Motion for Reconsideration dated February 14, 2012 for lack of merit.
The Court further resolves to CLARIFY that the 753,848,312 SMC
Series 1 preferred shares of the CIIF companies converted from the
CIIF block of SMC shares, with all the dividend earnings as well as all
increments arising from, but not limited to, the exercise of
preemptive rights subject of the September 17, 2009 Resolution, shall
now be the subject matter of the January 24, 2012 Decision and shall
be declared owned by the Government and be used only for the
benefit of all coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut
industry.
As modified, the fallo of the January 24, 2012 Decision shall read, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and 178793 are
hereby DENIED. The Partial Summary Judgment dated July 11, 2003
in Civil Case No. 0033-A as reiterated with modification in Resolution
dated June 5, 2007, as well as the Partial Summary Judgment dated
May 7, 2004 in Civil Case No. 0033-F, which was effectively amended
in Resolution dated May 11, 2007, are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, only with respect to those issues subject of the
petitions in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and 178193. However, the issues
raised in G.R. No. 180705 in relation to Partial Summary Judgment
dated July 11, 2003 and Resolution dated June 5, 2007 in Civil Case
No. 0033-A, shall be decided by this Court in a separate decision.
The Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-A dated July 11,
2003, is hereby MODIFIED, and shall read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We rule as follows:
SUMMARY OF THE COURT’S RULING.
A. Re: CLASS ACTION MOTION FOR A SEPARATE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT dated April 11, 2001 filed by Defendant Maria Clara L.
Lobregat, COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al.
The Class Action Motion for Separate Summary Judgment dated April
11, 2001 filed by defendant Maria Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al.
and Ballares, et al., is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
B. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: COCOFED,
ET AL. AND BALLARES, ET AL.) dated April 22, 2002 filed by Plaintiff.
1. a. The portion of Section 1 of P.D. No. 755, which reads:
…and that the Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby authorized to
distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the
coconut farmers under such rules and regulations it may promulgate.
taken in relation to Section 2 of the same P.D., is unconstitutional: (i)
for having allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private
interest by the outright and unconditional grant of absolute
ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the
CCSF to the undefined "coconut farmers", which negated or
circumvented the national policy or public purpose declared by P.D.
No. 755 to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut
industry and achieve its vertical integration; and (ii) for having unduly
delegated legislative power to the PCA.
b. The implementing regulations issued by PCA, namely,
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975 and Resolution No. 074-78
are likewise invalid for their failure to see to it that the distribution of
shares serve exclusively or at least primarily or directly the
aforementioned public purpose or national policy declared by P.D.
No. 755.
2. Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 which mandated that the coconut levy
funds shall not be considered special and/or fiduciary funds nor part
of the general funds of the national government and similar
provisions of Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 961 and Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No.
1468 contravene the provisions of the Constitution, particularly, Art.
IX (D), Sec. 2; and Article VI, Sec. 29 (3).
3. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. have not legally and
validly obtained title of ownership over the subject UCPB shares by
virtue of P.D. No. 755, the Agreement dated May 25, 1975 between
the PCA and defendant Cojuangco, and PCA implementing rules,
namely, Adm. Order No. 1, s. 1975 and Resolution No. 074-78.
4. The so-called "Farmers’ UCPB shares" covered by 64.98% of the
UCPB shares of stock, which formed part of the 72.2% of the shares
of stock of the former FUB and now of the UCPB, the entire
consideration of which was charged by PCA to the CCSF, are hereby
declared conclusively owned by, the Plaintiff Republic of the
Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.
The Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-F dated May 7,
2004, is hereby MODIFIED, and shall read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the MOTION FOR EXECUTION OF PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (RE: CIIF BLOCK OF SMC SHARES OF STOCK) dated August
8, 2005 of the plaintiff is hereby denied for lack of merit. However,
this Court orders the severance of this particular claim of Plaintiff. The
Partial Summary Judgment dated May 7, 2004 is now considered a
separate final and appealable judgment with respect to the said CIIF
Block of SMC shares of stock.1âwphi1
The Partial Summary Judgment rendered on May 7, 2004 is modified
by deleting the last paragraph of the dispositive portion, which will
now read, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hold that:
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Re: Defendants CIIF
Companies, 14 Holding Companies and Cocofed, et al) filed by Plaintiff
is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, THE CIIF COMPANIES, NAMELY:
12. Rock Steel Resources, Inc.;
13. Valhalla Properties Ltd., Inc.; and
14. First Meridian Development, Inc.
AND THE CONVERTED SMC SERIES 1 PREFERRED SHARES TOTALING
753,848,312 SHARES SUBJECT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE COURT
DATED SEPTEMBER 17, 2009 TOGETHER "WITH ALL DIVIDENDS
DECLARED, PAID OR ISSUEDTHEREON AFTER THAT DATE, AS WELL AS
ANY INCREMENTS THERETO ARISING FROM, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
EXERCISE OF PRE-EMPTIVE RIGHTS ARE DECLARED OWNED BY THE
GOVERNMENT TO RE USED ONLY FOH THE BENEFIT OF ALL COCONUT
FARMERS AND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COCONUT INDUSTRY.
AND ORDERED HECONVEYED TO THE GOVERNMENT.
THE COURT AFFIRMIS THE RESOLUTIONS ISSUED BY THE
SANDIGANBAYAN ON JUNE 5, 2007 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 0033-A AND ON
MAY 11, 2007 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 0033-F, THAT THERE IS NO MORE
NECESSITY OF FURTHER TRIAL WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP OF (1) THE SEQUESTERED UCPB SHARES, (2) THE CHF
BLOCK OF SMC SHARES AND (3) THE CIIF COMPANIES, AS THEY HAVE
FINALLY BEEN ADJUDICATED IN THE AFOREMIENTIONED PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS DATED JULY 11, 2003 AND MAY 7, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
Costs against petitioners COCOFED, et al., in G.R. Nos. 177857-58 and
Danilo S. Ursua in G.R. No. 178193.
No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let Entry of Judgment be
made in due course.
SO ORDERED.

1. Southern Luzon Coconut Oil Mills (SOLCOM);

2. Cagayan de Oro Oil Co., Inc. (CAGOIL);

HECTOR TREAS, G. R. No. 1950
3. Iligan Coconut Industries, Inc. (ILICOCO);
Petitioner,
4. San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. (SPMC);
Present:
5. Granexport Manufacturing Corp. (GRANEX); and

6. Legaspi Oil Co., Inc. (LEGOIL),

CARPIO, J.,
AS WELL AS THE 14 HOLDING COMPANIES, NAMELY:
Chairperson,
1. Soriano Shares, Inc.;
- versus - PEREZ,
2. ACS Investors, Inc.;
SERENO,
3. Roxas Shares, Inc.;
REYES, and
4. Arc Investors; Inc.;
PERLAS-BERNA
5. Toda Holdings, Inc.;

6. AP Holdings, Inc.;
Promulgated:
7. Fernandez Holdings, Inc.;
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
8. SMC Officers Corps, Inc.;
Respondent. January 25, 20
9. Te Deum Resources, Inc.;
x--------------------------------------------------x
10. Anglo Ventures, Inc.;

11. Randy Allied Ventures, Inc.;

DECISION

SERENO, J.:
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep
strictly within the limits of the law authorizing them to take
jurisdiction and to try the case and render judgment thereon.[1]
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated 9 July 2010 [2] and Resolution
dated 4 January 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted
to buy a house-and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was
then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager Joselito Palma
recommended the appellant Hector Treas (Hector) to private
complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita,
for advice regarding the transfer of the title in the latters name.
Hector informed Elizabeth that for the titling of the property in the
name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses would be
incurred:
P20,000.00- Attorneys fees,
P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,
P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,
P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.
Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a
corresponding receipt dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a]
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Subsequently, Hector
gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for
P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she
consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake.
When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake
and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. Elizabeth
demanded the return of the money.
To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a
Bank of Commerce check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in
the amount of P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the
P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. When the check was deposited with the
PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that
the account was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal
demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was
filed against him.[3]
On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City.
The Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from
ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 which money was
given to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express
obligation on the part of the accused to use the said amount for
expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused, once in
possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and abuse of
confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and
benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorneys fees and the said
accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita
Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of P130,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own
counsel, entered a plea of Not Guilty. Allegedly due to old age and
poor health, and the fact that he lives in Iloilo City, petitioner was
unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case.
On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] finding petitioner
guilty of the crime of Estafa under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), with the dispositive portion as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding
accused Hector Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of
confidence as penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
and which offense was committed in the manner described in the
aforementioned information. As a consequence of this judgment,
accused Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and
Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he is ordered to
indemnify private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of
P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum,
reckoned from the date this case was filed until the amount is fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.[6]
We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treas
and Trenas in the pleadings and court issuances, but for consistency,
we use the name Treas, under which he was accused in the
Information.
On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[7] which was denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated
2 July 2008.[8]
On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the
RTC.[9] The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July
2010, the CA rendered a Decision[10] affirming that of the RTC. On 4
August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.[11]
On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Review on Certiorari[12] before this Court. He asked
for a period of 15 days within which to file a petition for review, and
the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February 2011.
On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on
Certiorari before this Court, with the following assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN
ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE
OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION
APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY
SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE
OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;[13]
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence
presented by the prosecution does it show that ₱150,000 was given
to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Instead, the evidence
shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was dated
22 December 1999, without any indication of the place where it was
issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage
prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on
22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion
is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially
since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any
direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the
disputable presumption that things happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only time
Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the
check provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank
in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the
prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to
the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present
evidence to prove lack of jurisdiction, when such lack is already
indicated in the prosecution evidence.
As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000
actually belongs to Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation,
it was actually she not Elizabeth who was the offended party. Thus,
the latters demand does not satisfy the requirement of prior demand
by the offended party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the
demand could have been properly made by Elizabeth, the demand
referred to the amount of P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally,
there is no showing that the demand was actually received by
petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return Receipt was not
proven to be that of petitioners.
On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) to file the latters Comment on the
Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension,
praying for an additional period of 60 days within which to submit its
Comment. This motion was granted in a Resolution dated 12
September 2011. On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for
Special Extension, requesting an additional period of five days. On 29
September 2011, it filed its Comment on the Petition.
In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting
petitioner as charged. The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute
the factual findings of the trial court with respect to the delivery
of P150,000 to him, and that there was a relationship of trust and
confidence between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that
the Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not
supported by any piece of evidence, as he did not present any.
Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to weigh the
credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial
courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great
weight, unless tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance, which is not the case here.
With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense
of no valid demand was not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless,
the demand letter sent to Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the
complainants alleged in the Information, as an agent of Margarita.
Moreover, no proof was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioners
signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the demand letter.
The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend
petitioner for executive clemency, in view of his advanced age and
failing health.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is impressed with merit.
Review of Factual Findings
While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the
Petition requires a review of the factual findings of the lower courts
and the evidence upon which they are based.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In many instances, however, this
Court has laid down exceptions to this general rule, as follows:
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial
court are contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures;
(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings
of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on
misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the
specific evidence on which they are based; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the
evidence on record.[14]
In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the
issue of the place of commission of the offense are conclusions
without any citation of the specific evidence on which they are based;
they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures.
The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense
without any finding as to where it was committed:
Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private
complainant Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused
Trenas had committed the offense of Estafa by taking advantage of
her trust so that he could misappropriate for his own personal benefit
the amount entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax.
As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused
Trenas had obtained the amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave
her two receipts purportedly issued by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her
believe that he had complied with his duty to pay the aforementioned
taxes. Eventually, private complainant Luciaja discovered that said
receipts were fabricated documents.[15]
In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised
the argument that it had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The
trial court denied the motion, without citing any specific evidence
upon which its findings were based, and by relying on conjecture,
thus:
That the said amount was given to [Treas] in Makati City was
incontrovertibly established by the prosecution. Accused Treas, on
the other hand, never appeared in Court to present countervailing
evidence. It is only now that he is suggesting another possible
scenario, not based on the evidence, but on mere what ifs. x x x
Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same
would still not warrant a reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed on 22
December 999 in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that the
P150,000.00 was delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in
Makati City the following day. His reasoning the money must have
been delivered to him in Iloilo City because it was to be used for
paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does not inspire
concurrence. The records show that he did not even pay the taxes
because the BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake
documents. Thus, his argumentation in this regard is too specious to
consider favorably.[16]
For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction in
this wise:
It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence
unless it is offered in evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not
comment on the formal offer of prosecutions evidence nor present
any evidence on his behalf. He failed to substantiate his allegations
that he had received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence,
Hectors allegations cannot be given evidentiary weight.
Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered,
could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and
assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court
remain binding on appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great
weight and respect and will not be disturbed on review.[17]
The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual
findings of the lower courts.
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in
criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside
its limited territory. In Isip v. People,[18] this Court explained:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one
of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with
an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that
the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the
offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused
and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of
the court.
In Fukuzume v. People,[19] this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa,
wherein the prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements
of the offense took place within the trial courts jurisdiction. The Court
ruled:
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination
of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted
business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires
inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati,
or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an
essential element of jurisdiction. x x x
In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was
filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa
as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, the elements of which are as follows: x x x
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed
in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu
on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn statement
or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the
offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution
failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu
in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22,
1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October
18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show that
the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its
custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is
authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to
Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all
the elements of the offense charged had been committed in
Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of
Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject
aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a
representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap
wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to
buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the
initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage.
Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was
consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latter's house in
Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires,
Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.
xxx
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove
that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any
of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said
city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of
the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of jurisdiction,
without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with
the court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense
of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was
committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.
That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the
information as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from
ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)[20]
Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the RTC of Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint
executed by Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the
offense was committed. It provides in part:
4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to
ATTY. HECTOR TREAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as
agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy
of which is hereto attached as Annex B,
5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREAS, the
latter failed to transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS.
MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax,
documentary stamps and BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR
TREAS accomplished was only the preparation of the Deed of Sale
covering aforesaid property. A copy of said Deed of Sale is hereto
attached as Annex C,
6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR
TREAS issued to me a check for refund of the sum given to him less
the attorneys fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly
paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x
7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela
Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the
drawee bank for the reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x[21]
Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence
was presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense or any of
its elements was committed in Makati City.
Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as
follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received
by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or
to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion
of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of
such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is
to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended
party to the offender.[22]
There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the
prosecution[23] that points to where the offense, or any of its
elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of Elizabeth also
shows that there was no mention of the place where the offense was
allegedly committed:
Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treas to you, what
happened next?
A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will
have to and she will work for the Deed of Sale.
Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?
A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q What was the amount quoted to you?
A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND?
A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorneys fee, NINETY THOUSAND is
for the capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for
documentary sum (sic) and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other
expenses for BIR.
Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he issue a receipt?
A Yes, sir.
Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treas for this ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already
identified during the pre-trial as exhibit B. This appears to be a receipt
dated December 22, 1999. Will you please go over this document and
inform this court what relation has this to the receipt which you said
Atty. Treas issued to you?
A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treas.
Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was
given to Atty. Treas by you, what happened next?
A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.[24]
Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner
was dishonored in a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element
of the offense of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.
Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is
nothing in the prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of
the elements of the offense were committed in Makati. The rule is
settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the
court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be
considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings
or on appeal.[25] Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by
express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred
by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only
by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.[26]
It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a
defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it
is not the court of proper venue.[27]Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that [s]ubject
to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. This
fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not
compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of
the province where the crime was committed as it would cause him
great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence
in another place.[28] This principle echoes more strongly in this case,
where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age
and failing health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the
charges against him.
There being no showing that the offense was committed within
Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.[29]
As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by
petitioner.
At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of
Professional Responsibility strongly militates against the petitioners
conduct in handling the funds of his client. Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of
the Code provides:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected
or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and
apart from his own and those others kept by him.
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a
particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees,
transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to
the client how the money was spent.[30] If he does not use the money
for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.
His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if
the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes
a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[31]
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or
properties as they fall due or upon demand.[32] His failure to return
the client's money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that
he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. [33] It is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.[34]
In Cuizon v. Macalino,[35] this Court ruled that the issuance of checks
which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed
account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and
constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.
This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any
case, should there be a finding that petitioner has failed to account
for the funds received by him in trust, the recommendation should
include an order to immediately return the amount of ₱130,000 to his
client, with the appropriate rate of interest from the time of demand
until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July
2010 and the Resolution dated 4 January 2011 issued by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 137,
Makati City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without
prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for
investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
Petitioner: HECTOR TREÑASRespondent
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012
DOCTRINE: In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over a personcharged with an offense
committed outside its limited territory.Facts:
1. Elizabeth Luciaja gave P150,000.00 to Atty. Hector Treñas to assist
in the titling of a house and lot locatedin Iloilo City. Treñas prepared
and issued a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. He also
gaveElizabeth three Revenue Official Receipts amounting to
P120,000. However, when Elizabeth consultedwith the BIR, she was
informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector
admitted to her thatthe receipts were fake and that he used the
money for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded thereturn of
the money. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against
Hector.2. An Information was filed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor before the RTC Makati City which rendereda Decision
finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa. Petitioner appealed
with the CA which alsorendered a Decision
affirming that of the RTC.3.
Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that ₱ 150,000
was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Also, the
evidence shows that the Receipt issuedby petitioner was without any
indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of
Salewith Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed
and notarized in Iloilo City. Petitionerclaims that the only logical
conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo
City,especially since his residence and office were situated there as
well. Absent any direct proof as to theplace of delivery, one must rely
on the disputable presumption that things happened according to
theordinary course of nature.
Issue:
1. Whether RTC Makati has jurisdiction over the controversy.
Ruling + Ratio:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essentialelement of jurisdiction. For
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense
should have beencommitted or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of thecourt.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the
court has jurisdiction to take cognizance orto try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a personcharged with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory.Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in thecomplaint or
information. In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the
offense of estafa was committedwithin the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Makati City. Also, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth
does notcontain any allegation as to where the offense was
committed. Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no
other evidence was presented by the prosecution toprove that the
offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City. There is
nothing in the documentaryevidence offered by the prosecution that
points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was
committed.There being no showing that the offense was committed
within Makati, The RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the
case.The case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of Governors for
investigation and recommendation pursuantto Section 1 of Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court.
DISPOSITION
: There being no showing that the offense was committed within
Makati, The RTC of that city hasno jurisdiction over the case.
G.R. No. 217874
OPHELIA HERNAN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolution1 dated February 2, 2015 and Decision2 dated November
13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division which affirmed, with
modification, the Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC),Branch 7, Baguio City convicting petitioner of the crime of
malversation of public funds in Criminal Case No. 15722-R.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In October 1982, petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC),Cordillera Administrative
Region (CAR) in Baguio City wherein she served as an accounting
clerk. In September 1984, she was promoted to the position of
Supervising Fiscal Clerk by virtue of which she was designated as
cashier, disbursement and collection officer.3 As such, petitioner
received cash and other collections from customers and clients for
the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll foes, and special message
fees. The collections she received were deposited at the bank account
of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City
Branch.4
On December 17, 1996, Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor of the
Commission on Audit (COA), conducted a cash examination of the
accounts handled by petitioner as instructed by her superior,
Sherelyn Narag. As a result, Lopez came across deposit slips dated
September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of
₱11,300.00 and ₱81,348.20, rcspectively.5 Upon close scrutiny, she
noticed that said deposit slips did not bear a stamp of receipt by the
LBP nor was it machine validated. Suspicious about what she found,
she and Narag verified all the reports and other documents turned-
over to them by petitioner.6 On the basis of said findings, Narag sent
a letter to the LBP to confirm the remittances made by petitioner.
After adding all the deposits made and upon checking with the teller's
blotter, Nadelline Orallo, the resident auditor of LBP, found that no
deposits were made by petitioner for the account of DOTC on
September 19, 1996 for the amount of ₱11,300.00 and November 29,
1996 for the amount of ₱81,340.20.7
Thereafter, the LBP's officer-in-charge, Rebecca R. Sanchez,
instructed the bank's teller, Catalina Ngaosi, to conduct their own
independent inquiry. It was discovered that on September 19, 1996,
the only deposit in favor of the DOTC was that made by its Ifugao
office in the Lagawe branch of the LBP.8 This prompted Lopez to write
to petitioner informing her that the two (2) aforesaid remittances
were not acknowledged by the bank. The auditors then found that
petitioner duly accounted for the ₱81,348.20 remittance but not for
the ₱11,300.00. Dissatisfied with petitioner's explanation as to the
whereabouts of the said remittance, Narag reported the matter to the
COA Regional Director who, in turn wrote to the LBP for confirmation.
The LBP then denied receiving any ₱11,300.00 deposit on September
19, 1996 from petitioner for the account of the DOTC.9 Thus, the COA
demanded that she pay the said amount. Petitioner, however,
refused. Consequently, the COA filed a complaint for malversation of
public funds against petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Luzon which, after due investigation, recommended her indictment
for the loss of ₱11,300.00.10 Accordingly, petitioner was charged
before the RTC of Baguio City in an Information, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about September 16, 1996, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the above-named accused, a
public officer, being then the Disbursing Officer of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, Baguio City, and as such an
accountable officer, entrusted with and responsible for the amount
of ₱1 1,300.00 which accused received and collected for the DOTC,
and intended for deposit under the account of DOTC with the Land
Bank of the Philippines-Baguio City, by reason of her position, while
in the performance of her official functions, taking advantage of her
position, did then and there, wilfully, feloniously, and unlawfully
misappropriate or consent, or through abandonment or negligence,
permit other persons to take such amount of ₱11,300.00 to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
Upon arraignment on July 31, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged. Hence, trial on the merits ensued.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
two (2) COA auditors, namely, Maria Lopez and Sherelyn Narag as well
as three (3) LBP employees, namely, Rebecca Sanchez, Catalina
Ngaosi, and Nadelline Orallo.12 In response, the defense presented
the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized as follows:
On September 19, 1996, petitioner and her supervisor, Cecilia
Paraiso, went to the LBP Baguio branch and personally deposited the
exact amount of ₱11,300.00 with accomplished deposit slips in six (6)
copies.13 Since there were many clients who came ahead of her, she
decided to go with her usual arrangement of leaving the money with
the teller and telling her that she would just come back to retrieve the
deposit slip. Thus, she handed the money to Teller No. 2, whom she
identified as Catalina Ngaosi. Upon her return at around 3 o'clock in
the afternoon, she retrieved four (4) copies of the deposit slip from
Ngaosi. She noticed that the same had no acknowledgment mark on
it. Being contented with the initials of the teller on the deposit slips,
she returned to her office and kept them in her vault. It was only
during the cash count conducted by auditor Lopez when she found
out that the said amount was not remitted to the account of the LBP.
When demand was made on her to return the amount, she requested
that she be allowed to pay only after investigation of a complaint of
Estafa that she would file with the National Bureau of Investigation
against some personnel of the bank, particularly Catalina
Ngaosi.14 The complaint, however, was eventually dismissed.15
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered convicting accused Ophelia Hernan of Malversation and
hereby sentences her, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, to suffer imprisonment from 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day
of prision mayor medium period, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months
and 21 days of prision mayor as maximum period to reclusion
temporalmaximum period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
₱11,300.00.
Accused Ophelia Hernan is further sentenced to suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification.
Likewise, accused Ophelia Hernan is hereby ordered to pay back to
the government the amount of ₱11,300.00 plus legal interest thereon
at the rate of 12% per annum to be computed from the date of the
filing of the Information up to the time the same is actually paid.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.16
Erroneously, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed her conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon
motion, however, the CA set aside its decision on the finding that it
has no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it is the
Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
petitioner occupying a position lower than Salary Grade
27.17 Petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Leticia Gutierrez Hayes-Allen,
then appealed the case to the Sandiganbayan. In a Decision dated
November 13, 2009, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the RTC's judgment
of conviction but modified the penalty imposed, the dispositive
opinion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modifications that the indeterminate
penalty to be imposed on the accused should be from 6 years and 1
day of prision mayor as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months, and 21 days
of prision mayor as maximum, together with the accessory penalties
under Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and that interest of only
6% shall be imposed on the amount of ₱11,300.00 to be restored by
the accused.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 21,
2009 alleging that during the trial before the RTC, her counsel was
unable to elicit many facts which would show her innocence. Said
counsel principally failed to present certain witnesses and documents
that would supposedly acquit her from the crime charged. The
Sandiganbayan, however, denied the motion in a Resolution dated
August 31, 2010 on the ground that evidence not formally offered
before the court below cannot be considered on appeal.19
On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration became final and executory and was recorded in the
Book of Entries of Judgments.20 On July 26, 2013, petitioner's new
counsel, Atty. Meshack Macwes, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen
the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the
Execution.21 In a Resolution22 dated December 4, 2013, however, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion and directed the execution of the
judgment of conviction. It noted the absence of the following
requisites for the reopening of a case: (1) the reopening must be
before finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by
the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued
only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a
miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or
further evidence should be terminated within thirty (30) days from
the issuance of the order.23
Unfazed, petitioner filed on January 9, 2014 a Petition for
Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of
the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment praying for a
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan' s recent Resolution, that the
case be reopened for further reception of evidence, and the recall of
the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013.24 In a Resolution dated
February 2, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the petition for lack of
merit. According to the said court, the motion is clearly a third motion
for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of
Court. Also, the grounds raised therein were merely a rehash of those
raised in the two previous motions. The claims that the accused could
not contact her counsel on whom she merely relied on for
appropriate remedies to be filed on her behalf, and that she has
additional evidence to present, were already thoroughly discussed in
the August 31, 2010 and December 4, 2013 Resolutions. Moreover,
the cases relied upon by petitioner are not on point.25
On May 14, 2015, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the
following arguments:
I.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN WAS
FILED OUT OF TIME CONSIDERING TI-IE EXTRAORDINARY AND
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CASE.
II.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE INTENDED TO BE
PRESENTED BY PETITIONER SHOULD HER MOTTON FOR REOPENING
BE GRANTED, WAS PASSED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT.
III.
THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN PRONOUNCING THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN AND
THE PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY PETITIONER ARE
CONSIDERED AS THE SECOND AND THIRD MOTIONS TO THE DENIAL
OF THE DECISION.
Petitioner posits that her counsel, Atty. Hayes-Allen, never received
the August 31, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying her
Motion for Reconsideration. This is because notice thereof was
erroneously sent to said counsel's previous office at Poblacion, La
Trinidad, Benguet, despite the fact that it was specifically indicated in
the Motion for Reconsideration that the new office is at the Public
Attorney's Office of Tayug, Pangasinan, following her counsel's
appointment as public attorney. Thus, since her counsel was not
properly notified of the subject resolution, the entry of judgment is
premature.26 In support of her assertion, she cites Our ruling
in People v. Chavez,27 wherein We held that an entry of judgment
without receipt of the resolution is premature.
Petitioner also claims that during trial, she could not obtain the
necessary evidence for her defense due to the fact that the odds were
against her. Because of this, she asks the Court to relax the strict
application of the rules and consider remanding the case to the lower
court for further reception of evidence.28 In particular, petitioner
seeks the reception of an affidavit of a certain John L. Ziganay, an
accountant at the Depaiiment of Science and
Technology (DOST), who previously worked at the DOTC and COA, as
well as two (2) deposit slips. According to petitioner, these pieces of
evidence would show that the ₱11,300.00 deposited at the Lagawe
branch of the LBP was actually the deposit made by petitioner and
not by a certain Lanie Cabacungan, as the prosecution suggests. This
is because the ₱11,300.00 deposit made by Cabacungan consists of
two (2) different amounts, which, if proper accounting procedure is
followed, shall be recorded in the bank statement as two (2) separate
amounts and not their total sum of ₱11,300.00.29 Thus, the
Sandiganbayan's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen the case is
capricious, despotic, and whimsical since the admission of her
additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage.
Finally, petitioner denies the Sandiganbayan's ruling that her motion
to reopen and petition for reconsideration are considered as a second
and third motion for reconsideration, and are thus, prohibited
pleadings. This is because the additional evidence she seeks to
introduce were not available during the trial of her case.
The petition is devoid of merit.
At the outset, the Court notes that as pointed out by respondent
Office of the Special Prosecutor, petitioner's resort to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an improper
remedy. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies
available, a party aggrieved by a cou1i order, resolution or decision
must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or
decision he intends to assail.30 It bears stressing that the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.31 If the Order or Resolution sought to be
assailed is in the nature of a final order, the remedy of the aggrieved
party would be to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.32 Petitioner, in the instant
case, seeks to assail the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated
December 4, 2013 and February 2, 2015 wherein said court denied
her motion to reopen the malversation case against her. Said
resolutions are clearly final orders that dispose the proceedings
completely. The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is,
therefore, improper.
Even if We assume the propriety of petitioner's chosen action, the
Court still cannot grant the reliefs she prays for, specifically: (1) the
reversal of the Sandiganbayan's December 4, 2013 and February 2,
2015 Resolutions denying her motion to reopen and petition for
reconsideration; (2) the reopening of the case for further reception of
evidence; and (3) the recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June 26,
2013.33
First of all, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that since her counsel
was not properly notified of the August 31, 2010 Resolution as notice
thereof was erroneously sent to her old office address, the entry of
judgment is premature. As the Court sees it, petitioner has no one but
herself to blame. Time and again, the Court has held that in the
absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of
address, the service of the order or resolution of a court upon the
parties must be made at the last address of their counsel on
record.34 It is the duty of the party and his counsel to device a system
for the receipt of mail intended for them, just as it is the duty of the
counsel to inform the court officially of a change in his address.35 If
counsel moves to another address without informing the court of that
change, such omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the
finality of the decision. The court cannot be expected to take judicial
notice of the new address of a lawyer who has moved or to ascertain
on its own whether or not the counsel of record has been changed
and who the new counsel could possibly be or where he probably
resides or holds office.36
Here, it is undisputed that petitioner's counsel failed to inform the
court of the change in her office address from Poblacion, La Trinidad,
Benguet, to the Public Attorney's Office in Tayug, Pangasinan. The fact
that said new address was indicated in petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration does not suffice as "proper and adequate notice" to
the court. As previously stated, courts cannot be expected to take
notice of every single time the counsel of a party changes address.
Besides, it must be noted that petitioner even expressly admitted
having received the subject resolution "sometime in September or
October 2010."37 Easily, she could have informed her counsel of the
same. As respondent posits, it is not as if petitioner had no knowledge
of the whereabouts of her counsel considering that at the time of the
filing of her Motion for Reconsideration, said counsel was already
with the PA0.38 Moreover, the Court cannot permit petitioner's
reliance on the Chavez case because there, petitioner did not receive
the resolution of the Court of Appeals through no fault or negligence
on his paii.39 Here, however, petitioner's non-receipt of the subject
resolution was mainly attributable not only to her counsel's
negligence but hers, as well. Thus, the Court deems it necessary to
remind litigants, who are represented by counsel, that they should
not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the
outcome of their case. They should give the necessary assistance to
their counsel for what is at stake is their interest in the case. It is,
therefore, their responsibility to check the status of their case from
time to time.40
To recall, petitioner, on December 21, 2009, filed her Motion for
Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the Sandiganbayan's November
13, 2009 Decision which affirmed the RTC's ruling convicting her of
the crime of malversation. In a Resolution dated August 31, 2010, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Said
resolution became final in the absence of any pleading filed
thereafter, and hence, was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgments on June 26, 2013. Subsequently, on July 12, 2013,
petitioner, through her new counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to
Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the
Execution, which was denied through the Sandiganbayan's Resolution
dated December 4, 2013.41 Undeterred, petitioner filed her Petition
for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu
of the Prayer for the Stay of Execution of Judgement on January 9,
2014 which was likewise denied in the Sandiganbayan's February 2,
2015 Resolution.
It seems, therefore, that petitioner waited almost an entire three (3)
year period from the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration to act
upon the malversation case against her through the filing of her
urgent motion to reopen. In fact, her filing of said motion may very
well be prompted only by her realization that the case has finally
concluded by reason of the entry of judgment. Stated otherwise, the
Court is under the impression that had she not heard of the recording
of the August 31, 2010 Resolution in the Book of Entries of Judgments
on June 26, 2013, petitioner would not even have inquired about the
status of her case. As respondent puts it, the urgent motion to reopen
appears to have been filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of an
appeal via a petition for review on certioraribefore the Court.42 On
this inexcusable negligence alone, the Court finds sufficient basis to
deny the instant petition.
Second of all, petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan's denial of her
motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical since
the admission of her additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage
has no legal nor factual leg to stand on. Section 24, Rule 119 and
existing jurisprudence provide for the following requirements for the
reopening a case: (l) the reopening must be before the finality of a
judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own
initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing
is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice;
and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should
be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the order.43
But as the Sandiganbayan ruled, the absence of the first requisite that
the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction
already cripples the motion.1âwphi1 The records of the case clearly
reveal that the August 3l, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration had already become
final and executory and, in fact, was already recorded in the Entry
Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013. Moreover, petitioner's
supposed predicament about her former counsel failing to present
witnesses and documents should have been advanced before the trial
court.44 It is the trial court, and neither the Sandiganbayan nor the
Court, which receives evidence and rules over exhibits formally
offered.45 Thus, it was, indeed, too late in the day to advance
additional allegations for petitioner had all the opportunity to do so
in the lower court. An appellate court will generally not disturb the
trial court's assessment of factual matters except only when it clearly
overlooked certain facts or where the evidence fails to substantiate
the lower court's findings or when the disputed decision is based on
a misapprehension of facts.46
Ultimately, it bears stressing that the Court does not find that the
Sandiganbayan acted in a capricious, despotic, or whimsical manner
when it denied petitioner's motion to reopen especially in view of the
fact that the rulings it seeks to refute are legally sound and
appropriately based on the evidences presented by the parties. On
this score, the elements of malversation of public funds under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a
public officer; (2) that he had the custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or
property were public funds or prope1iy for which he was accountable;
and (4) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or,
through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to
take them. This article establishes a presumption that when a public
officer fails to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he
is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall
be prima facieevidence that he has put such missing funds to personal
uses.47
As duly found by the trial court, and affinned by the Sandiganbayan,
petitioner's defense that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia
Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the subject ₱11,300.00 deposit
to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where the
money went failed to overcome the presumption of law. For one,
Paraiso was never presented to corroborate her version. For another,
when questioned about the subject deposit, not only did petitioner
fail to make the same readily available, she also could not
satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of
malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof
that the accountable officer had received public funds, that she did
not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made,
and that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so.48
Thus, even if it is assumed that it was somebody else who
misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable
for malversation. The Comi quotes, with approval, the trial court's
ruling, viz.:
Even if the claim of Hernan, i.e., that she actually left the amount of
₱11,300.00 and the corresponding deposit slip with the Bank Teller
Ngaosi and she came back to retrieve the deposit slip later, is to be
believed and then it came out that the said ₱11,300.00 was not
credited to the account of DOTC with the Land Bank and was in fact
missing, still accused Hernan should be convicted of malversation
because in this latter situation she permits through her inexcusable
negligence another person to take the money. And this is still
malversation under Article 217.49
Said ruling was, in fact, duly reiterated by the Sandiganbayan in its
Decision, thus:
Shifting our gaze to the possibility that it was the bank teller Catalina
Ngaosi who misappropriated the amount and should therefore be
held liable, as the accused would want to poltray, the Court doubts
the tenability of that position. As consistently ruled by jurisprudence,
a public officer may be held liable for malversation even if he does not
use public property or funds under his custody for his personal
benefit, but consents to the taking thereof by another person, or,
through abandonment or negligence, permitted such taking. The
accused, by her negligence, simply created the opportunity for the
misappropriation. Even her justification that her deposits which
were not machine-validated were nonetheless acknowledged by
the bank cannot fortify her defense. On the contrary, it all the more
emphasizes her propensity for negligence each time that she
accepted deposit slips which were not machinevalidated, her only
proof of receipt of her deposits. 50
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan's
finding that petitioner's motion to reopen and petition for
reconsideration are practically second and third motions for
reconsideration from its Decision dated November 13, 2009. Under
the rules, the motions are already prohibited pleadings under Section
5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court due to the fact that the grounds raised
in the petition for reconsideration are merely a rehash of those raised
in the two (2) previous motions filed before it. These grounds were
already thoroughly discussed by the Sandiganbayan in its subject
resolutions. Hence, as duly noted by the Sandiganbayan, in the law of
pleading, courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the
substance, not to be misled by a false or wrong name given to a
pleading because the title thereof is not controlling and the court
should be guided by its averments.51 Thus, the fact that the pleadings
filed by petitioner are entitled Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with
Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay Execution and Petition for
Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of
the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment does not exempt them
from the application of the rules on prohibited pleadings.
Let it be remembered that the doctrine of finality of judgment is
grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound
practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts
and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some
definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are
the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tune entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render
its execution unjust and inequitable.52 None of the exceptions is
present in this case.
Indeed, every litigation must come to an end once a judgment
becomes final, executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party has
the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning
party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the
judgment, which is the "life of the law." To frustrate it by dilatory
schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts,
time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that
this Court should write finis to this litigation.53
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still necessary
to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated
June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of
evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in order to modify the
penalty imposed by said court. The general rule is that a judgment
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and
may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it
will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of
the land.54 When, however, circumstances transpire after the finality
of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the
Court may sit en bane and give due regard to such exceptional
circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of
immutability. The same is in line with Section 3(c),55 Rule II of the
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides that cases raising
novel questions of law are acted upon by the Court en bane. To the
Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 entitled An
Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage on
which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised
Penal Code Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known
as the "Revised Penal Code" as Amended which accordingly reduced
the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an example of
such exceptional circumstance. Section 40 of said Act provides:
SEC. 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act. No.
1060, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of
malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate
the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise
be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of pnswn correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or
malversation docs not exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000.00).
xxxx
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty
of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of
the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property
embezzled.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, We have here a
novel situation wherein the judgment convicting the accused,
petitioner herein, has already become final and executory and yet the
penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage
of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner's sentence be
modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of
laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused,56 she may even
apply for probation,57 as long as she does not possess any ground for
disqualification,58 in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A.
No. 10707 entitled An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 968,
otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976," As
Amended. allowing an accused to apply for probation in the event
that she is sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of
not more than six (6) years when a judgment of conviction imposing
a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such
judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable
penalty.59
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may
suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the
Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry
of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which
imposed the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-
one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the
amount involved herein is ₱11,300.00, which does not exceed
₱40,000.00, the new penalty that should be imposed is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which has a prison
term of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years.
The Court, however, takes note of the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender appreciated by the
Sandiganbayan in favor of petitioner.60 Hence, taking into
consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the
presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance, the range of the penalty
that must be imposed as the maximum term should be prision
correccional medium to prision correccional maximum in its
minimum period, or from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1)
day, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days, in
accordance with Article 6461 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the range of the minimum term that should be
imposed upon petitioners is anywhere within the period of arresto
mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum with a range of
four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.
Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3)
years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days prision correccional, as
maximum.
On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private
counsels, and such other officers of the law are hereby advised to
similarly apply the provisions of RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by
reason of justice and equity, called for by the facts of each case.
Hence, said recent legislation shall find application in cases where the
imposable penalties of the affected crimes such as theft, qualified
theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious mischief,
malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is
dependent upon the value of the object in consideration thereof,
have been reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into consideration
the presence of existing circumstances attending its commission. For
as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall
find application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the
time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service
of sentence has already begun. The accused, in these applicable
instances, shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting
him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already
begun serving his previous sentence, and said service already
accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the latter case,
moreover, the Court, in the interest of justice and expediency, further
directs the appropriate filing of an action before the Court that seeks
the reopening of the case rather than an original petition filed for a
similar purpose.
Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of
the instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and
favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the
reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which
is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable
penalties to be imposed.
Henceforth: (1) the Directors of the National Penitentiary and
Correctional Institution for Women are hereby ordered to determine
if there are accused serving final sentences similarly situated as the
accused in this particular case and if there are, to coordinate and
communicate with the Public Attorney's Office and the latter, to
represent and file the necessary pleading before this Court in behalf
of these convicted accused in light of this Court's pronouncement; (2)
For those cases where the accused are undergoing preventive
imprisonment, either the cases against them are non-bailable or
cannot put up the bail in view of the penalties imposable under the
old law, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the
necessary pleading before the proper courts, whether undergoing
trial in the RTC or undergoing appeal in the appellate courts and apply
for bail, for their provisional liberty; (3) For those cases where the
accused are undergoing preventive imprisonment pending trial or
appeal, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the
necessary pleading if the accused have already served the minimum
sentence of the crime charged against them based on the penalties
imposable under the new law, R.A. No. 10951, for their immediate
release in accordance with A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC or the Guidelines For
Decongesting Holding Jails By Enforcing The Rights Of Accused
Persons To Bail And To Speedy Trial; 62 and (4) Lastly, all courts,
including appellate courts, are hereby ordered to give priority to
those cases covered by R.A. No. 10951 to avoid any prolonged
imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is DENIED. The Resolution dated February 2, 2015 and Decision dated
November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.Petitioner is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum term, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and
twenty (20) days prision correccional, as maximum term.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for dissemination to the First and Second Level
courts, and also to the Presiding Justices of the appellate courts, the
Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, Public
Attorney's Office, Prosecutor General's Office, the Directors of the
National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for Women, and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information, guidance,
and appropriate action.
Likewise, let the Office of the President, the Senate of the Philippines,
and the House of Representatives, be furnished copies of this
Decision for their information.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST
OPHELIA HERNAN v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 217874 December 5, 2017
TOPIC: Reopening of case, malversation of public funds
PONENTE: Peralta
FACTS:
Petitioner Hernan worked as a Supervising Fiscal Clerk at DOTC-CAR
in Baguio City. By virtue of his position, she was designated as cashier,
disbursement and collection officer.
As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from
customers and clients for the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll
fees, and special message fees. The collections she received were
deposited at the bank account of the DOTC at the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch.
On December 17, 1996, a cash examination of accounts handled by
Hernan was conducted. It was found out that the deposit slips dated
September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of
P11,300.00 and P81,348.20, respectively, did not bear a stamp receipt
by LBP nor was it machine validated. Petitioner was then informed
that the two aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by the
bank. The auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the
P81,348.20 remittance but not for the P11,300.00.
Accused-petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds
with the amount of P11,300.00. RTC found the accused guilty.
Petitioner appealed to CA which affirmed her conviction but modified
the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set aside its
decision on the finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over the
case.
Petitioner appealed the case to Sandiganbayan which affirmed RTC’s
decision but modified the penalty imposed. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution dated August
31, 2010. On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner’s MR
became final and executory.
On July 26, 2013, accused filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case
with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution.
Sandiganbayan denied the same and directed the execution of the
judgment of conviction.
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Petition for Reconsideration with
Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay
of Execution of Judgement on January 9, 2014 which was likewise
denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of malversation of public funds.
2. Whether or not the case may be reopened for further
reception of evidence.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: YES.
The Court affirmed the finding of guilt of accused for the crime
of malversation of public funds.
The elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a public officer;
(2) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason
of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or property were public
funds or property for which he was accountable; and (4) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
This article establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails
to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, it shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal
uses.
As duly found by the trial court, and affirmed by the Sandiganbayan,
petitioner’s defense that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia
Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the subject P11,300.00 deposit
to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where the
money went failed to overcome the presumption of law.
For one, Paraiso was never presented to corroborate her version. For
another, when questioned about the subject deposit, not only did
petitioner fail to make the same readily available, she also could not
satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of
malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof
that the accountable officer had received public funds, that she did
not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made,
and that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so. Thus,
even if it is assumed that it was somebody else who
misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held liable
for malversation.
SECOND ISSUE: NO, but the instant case was nevertheless reopened
ONLY to modify the penalty imposed in view of the enactment of an
amendatory law favorable to the accused.
The Court upheld Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the absence of
the first requisite that the reopening must be before the finality of a
judgment of conviction already cripples the Motion to Reopen the
Case. The records of the case clearly reveal that the August 31, 2010
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration had already become final and executory and, in fact,
was already recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26,
2013.
that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. When, however,
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en banc and give
due regard to such exceptional circumstance warranting the
relaxation of the doctrine of immutability.
To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951
which accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime
charged herein is an example of such exceptional circumstance.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, we have here a
novel situation wherein the judgment convicting the accused,
petitioner herein, has already become final and executory and yet the
penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage
of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner’s sentence be
modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of
laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused, she may even
apply for probation, as long as she does not possess any ground for
disqualification, in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No.
10707.
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may
suffer as well as a possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the
Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall the Entry
of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which
imposed the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the amount
involved herein is P11,300.00, which does not exceed P40,000.00, the
new penalty that should be imposed is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term of two (2)
years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, to six (6) years.
The Court also held that when exceptional circumstances exist, such
as the passage of the instant amendatory law imposing penalties
more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not
hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment,
the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt
but the applicable penalties to be imposed.

Requirements for reopening of the case (Section 24, Rule 119 of

Rules of Court)

1. The reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of

conviction;

2. The order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or

upon motion;

3. The order is issued only after a hearing is conducted;

4. The order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and

5. The presentation of additional and/or further evidence

should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance
of the order

However, the Court held that it is still necessary to reopen the

instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of
the Sandiganbayan, not for further reception of evidence, however,
as petitioner prays for, but in order to modify the penalty imposed
by said court.

The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court