JANUARY 2016 – MARCH 2018

REMEDIAL LAW
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
JURISPRUDENCE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

RULE 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSE 

AMANDO A. INOCENTES VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

G.R. NOS. 205963-64. JULY 7, 2016

The applicable law provides that violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, and state
universities shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandganbayan. We have
clarified the provision of law defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by explaining that
the Sandiganbayan maintains its jurisdiction over those officials specifically enumerated in (a) to
(g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, regardless of their salary grades. Simply put,
those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

KHITRI VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 210192. JULY 4, 2016
 The Court agrees that the RTC of Las Piñas City had territorial jurisdiction over the case.
Although the bank account for the joint venture was set up in San Juan City, in which the
P400,000.00 capital contribution of the private complainants was deposited and eventually
withdrawn, Belen issued four checks from her residence in Las Pifias City. These checks were
picked up by the messenger sent by the petitioners.

The Court has ruled in the case of Tan v. People that "[t]he delivery by the private
complainant of the check and its acceptance by [the accused] signified not merely the transfer to
the accused of the money belonging to private complainant, [but] it also marked the creation of a
fiduciary relation between the parties."

DAVID V. MARQUEZ,
G.R. NO. 209859 JUNE 5, 2017

Indeed, venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. As explained by

this Court in the case of Foz, Jr. v. People:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by
the accused. Thus it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the
court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial
show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want
of jurisdiction.

Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 15.Place where action is to be instituted. — a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

At the risk of being repetitive, Sec. 9 of RA 8042, however, fixed an alternative venue
from that provided in Section 15 (a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e., a criminal action
arising from illegal recruitment may also be filed where the offended party actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense and that the court where the criminal action is first filed
shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.

VALDERAMA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 220054 MARCH 27, 2017

The public prosecutor's conformity to the Motion to Reconsider is necessary. Rule

110, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 5. Who Must Prosecute Criminal Actions. — All criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor.
However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor
assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended party, any peace officer, or public
officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority
shall cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional
Trial Court.
 In Laude v. Ginez-Jabalde, this Court ruled that the required conformity of the public
prosecutor was not a mere superfluity and was necessary to pursue a criminal action. A private
party does not have the legal personality to prosecute the criminal aspect of a case, as it is the
People of the Philippines who are the real party in interest The criminal case must be under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, when the public prosecutor does not give his
or her conformity to the pleading of a party, the party does not have the required legal personality
to pursue the case.

In this case, there is no conformity from the public prosecutor. This circumstance was not
denied by the private respondent. Private respondent merely claimed that the the Office of the
City Prosecutor did not object to the filing of the Motion to Reconsider. The Office of the City
Prosecutor was only furnished with a copy of the Motion to Reconsider and it opens with the
phrase "[p]rivate complaining witness, through counsel and the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City, and to this Honorable Court respectfully states . . ." This is not sufficient. Since the
Motion to Reconsider pertains to the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, it involves the
criminal aspect of the case and, thus, cannot be considered without the public prosecutor's
conforme.

JOSHUA CASANAS Y CABANTAC A.K.A. GERONIMO Y LOPEZ VS. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 223833. DECEMBER 11, 2017

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional in that a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. As such, when it becomes
apparent that the crime was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, the case
must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In Navaja v. De Castro, the Court held:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by
the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss
the action for want of jurisdiction.

In this relation, Sections 10 and 15 (a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, also state that:

Section 10. Place of commission of the offense. -The complaint or information is

sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its
essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or
is necessary for its identification. xx xx

Section 15. Place where action is to be instituted. -

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients
occurred.

The venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases shall be placed either where the offense
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place. Otherwise stated, the venue
of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.

PEOPLE V. FELICIANO, JR.

G.R. NO. 196735 AUGUST 3, 2016

For an information to be sufficient, Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure requires that it state:

the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

The purpose of alleging all the circumstances attending a crime, including any
circumstance that may aggravate the accused's liability, is for the accused to be able to
adequately prepare for his or her defense:

To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the
information the details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability for the crime.
The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the
presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated
in the body of the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he
must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice[.]

RULE 111 PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION 

DOMINGO V. SPS. SINGSON

G.R. NO. 203287&207936 APRIL 5, 2017

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a
situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are
similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before
the criminal action can proceed. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.

For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be
present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try
said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

CATERPILLAR, INC. V. SAMSON,

G.R. NOS. 205972 & 164352, NOVEMBER 9, 2016

We note, to begin with, that Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, the civil case filed by Caterpillar
in the RTC in Quezon City, was for unfair competition, damages and cancellation of trademark,
while Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44 were the criminal prosecution of Samson for unfair
competition. A common element of all such cases for unfair competition — civil and criminal —
was fraud. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. In view of its being an independent civil
action, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 did not operate as a prejudicial question that justified the
suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44.

In fact, this issue has already been raised in relation to the suspension of the arraignment
of Samson in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44 in Samson v. Daway, and the Court resolved
it against Samson and in favor of Caterpillar thusly:

Anent the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a
prejudicial question. In his petition, he prayed for the reversal of the March 26, 2003 order which
sustained the denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case
Nos. Q-02-108043-44. For unknown reasons, however, he made no discussion in support of said
prayer in his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-00-41446 nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a prejudicial
question.

At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under
Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud. Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446,
which as admitted by private respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that
will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.

Secondly, a civil action for damages and cancellation of trademark cannot be considered
a prejudicial question by which to suspend the proceedings in the criminal cases for unfair
competition. A prejudicial question is that which arises in a civil case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issues to be determined in the criminal case. It must appear not only that
the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution
of the issues raised in the civil action will necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. As
stated in Librodo v. Judge Coscolluela, Jr.:

A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related
to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before
the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

The elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7 of Rule 111, Rules of
Court, to wit: (a) a previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar to or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
RULE 112 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

REYES V. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 212593-94 MARCH 15, 2016

Owing to the nature of a preliminary investigation and its purpose, all of the foregoing
elements need not be definitively established for it is enough that their presence becomes
reasonably apparent. This is because probable cause - the determinative matter in a preliminary
investigation implies mere probability of guilt; thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion
but less than evidence that would justify a conviction would suffice.

Also, it should be pointed out that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the
full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence, and that the presence or absence of the
elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon
after a full-blown trial on the merits. Therefore, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or
accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during
trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level."

Furthermore, owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical

rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings, keeping in mind that the
determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party's accusation
or defense or on the admissibilitv or veracity of testimonies presented.Thus, in Estrada v.
Ombudsman (Estrada), the Court declared that since a preliminary investigation does not finally
adjudicate the rights and obligations of parties, probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for cred iting the hearsay.

MAZA V. TURLA
G.R. NO. 187094 FEBRUARY 15, 2017

The admissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary investigation.

In a preliminary investigation, . . . the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is

evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged; they merely determine
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

To emphasize, "a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial[;] [i]t is not a

trial on the merits." Since "it cannot be expected that upon the filing of the information in court
the prosecutor would have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of
the accused," the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a
preliminary investigation.

QUISAY V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 216920, JANUARY 13, 2016

FACTS:

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued a Pasiya or Resolution
finding probable cause against Girlie M. Quisay for violation of Section 10 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act." Consequently, a Pabatid Sakdal or
Information was filed before the RTC on January 11, 2013 charging petitioner of such
crime.

Quisay moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack
of authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. In support of her motion,
Quisay pointed out that the Pasiya issued by the OCP-Makati was penned by Assistant
City Prosecutor Estefan H. De La Cruz (ACP De La Cruz) and approved by Senior
Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang (SACP Hirang), while the Pabatid Sakdal
or Information was penned by ACP De La Cruz, without any approval from any higher
authority, albeit with a Certification claiming that ACP De La Cruz has prior written
authority or approval from the City Prosecutor in filing the said Information. In this
regard, Quisay claimed that nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would
show that ACP De La Cruz and/or SACP Hirang had prior written authority or approval
from the City Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the Information against her. As
such, the Information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that
cannot be cured.

The RTC denied Quisay's Motion to Quash for lack of merit as it found that the
Certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal have sufficiently complied with Section 4,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires the prior written authority or approval by,
among others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of Informations.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to quash on the
grounds that: (a) the City Prosecutor of Makati may delegate its authority to approve the
filing of the Pabatid Sakdal pursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071, as well as OCP-Makati
Office Order No. 32; and (b) the Pabatid Sakdal contained a Certification stating that its
filing before the RTC was with the prior written authority or approval from the City
Prosecutor.

The Supreme Court reversed the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

RULING:

Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that
the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of
the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the
courts, viz.:

SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. — If the

investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall
prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the
information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the
complaint.
 Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to
the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or
his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from
their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating

prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or
city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, as a general rule, complaints or Informations filed before the courts without
the prior written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the
same defective and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of
the same Rules, to wit:

SECTION 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or

information on any of the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no
authority to do so;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While the Supreme Court found that the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable
cause to indict Quisay of the crime charged was validly made as it bore the approval of
one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as evidenced
by his signature therein, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information
filed before the RTC.

The Supreme Court held that the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before the
RTC suffers from an incurable infirmity as it did not show that it was approved by either
the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCP-Makati's division chiefs or review
prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La Cruz which stated,
among others, that "the filing of the Information is with the prior authority and approval
of the City Prosecutor." The filing of an Information by an officer without the
requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which
cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent. Hence,
such ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

Similarly-worded certifications were already rejected by the Supreme Court in the

cases of People v. Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin [549 Phil. 903 (2007)], and Tolentino v.
Paqueo [551 Phil. 355 (2007)]. In those cases, the SC held that despite such
certifications, the Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers filing the
same in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they obtained
prior written authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in Section 4,
Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
 Presumption of regularity can not also be accorded because neither does it show
that ACP De La Cruz have authority to file the Information on his own nor did he seek
the prior written approval from those authorized to do so before filing the Information
before the RTC.

MAXIMO V. VILLAPANDO, JR., G.R. NOS. 214925, APRIL 26, 2017

FACTS: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City thru ACP Canobas issued a
Resolution (Canobas Resolution) finding probable cause against Villapando for the crime
of perjury. The Resolution was approved by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor (SACP)
Christopher Garvida. Accordingly, on August 15, 2011, an Information 21 dated July 26,
2011 for Perjury was filed against Villapando before Branch 67 of the METC, Makati
City. The Information was signed by ACP Canobas and sworn to before ACP Benjamin S.
Vermug, Jr.

A motion to partially reconsider the said resolution was filed by Villapando

alleging that the person who filed the Information had no authority to do so. The OCP-
Makati denied the Motion stating that there was prior written authority for the City
Prosecutor in filing the Information by virtue of Office Order No. 32 dated July 29, 2011.
The finding of probable cause was also affirmed. The Order was approved by City
Prosecutor Feliciano Aspi. Villapando filed petition for review of the Canobas Resolution
before the DOJ, however, the petition was denied.

Villapando also filed a and a Motion to Quash Information before the METC and
asserted that the Information, as well as the Resolution finding probable cause against
him, did not bear the approval of the City Prosecutor of Makati, Feliciano Aspi, which is
contrary to Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

The METC denied the Motion to Quash and ruled that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions should be appreciated in favor of the
public prosecutors. It found that the certification by ACP Canobas in the Information
stating that the filing of the Information was with the prior authority of the City
Prosecutor constitutes substantial compliance with the rules. Unsuccessful at
reconsideration, Villapando elevated the case to the RTC through a petition for certiorari.
The RTC denied the petition ratiocinating that from the denial of the motion to quash,
Villapando should have gone to trial without prejudice to reiterating his special defenses
invoked in his motion. In the event that an adverse decision is rendered, an appeal
therefrom should be the next legal step. Nonetheless, it found that the presumption of
regularity exists in the filing of the information on the basis of the certification of ACP
Canobas and ACP Vermug, Jr., coupled with the approval of the resolution by Garvida,
stating that the filing of the Information was with the prior authority of the City
Prosecutor. The RTC posited that the presumption has not been disputed by the City
Prosecutor.

Undaunted, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by Villapando

before the Court of Appeals. He raised before the CA the same issues: a) that the
Information was filed without the prior written authority of the City Prosecutor; b) that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC.

In the petition filed by Maximo and Villapando, before the Supreme Court, the
core issue relates to the validity of the Amended Information at bar. Maximo and
Panganiban argued in their petition that the CA erred in holding that the Information did
not comply with the rule requiring prior written authority or approval of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor. They pointed out that the Information bears the certification that
the filing of the same had the prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor who is the
officer authorized to file information in court. According to them, there is a presumption
that prior written authority or approval of the City Prosecutor was obtained in the filing
of the Information, such that, the non-presentation of Office Order No. 32, which was the
alleged basis of the authority in filing the Information, is immaterial.

RULING:

The Supreme Court reiterated the recent ruling in Quisay v. People. It held that
there must be a demonstration that prior written delegation or authority was given by the
city prosecutor to the assistant city prosecutor to approve the filing of the information.

In the cases of People v. Garfin, Turingan v. Garfin, and Tolentino v. Paqueo, thE
Court had already rejected similarly-worded certifications uniformly holding that, despite
such certifications, the Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers
filing the same in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they
obtained prior written authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

An Information, when required by law to be filed by a public prosecuting officer,

cannot be filed by another. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over the case because
there is a defect in the Information. There is no point in proceeding under a defective
Information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction.

FORTALEZA V. GONZALES
G.R. NOS. 179287 & 182090, FEBRUARY 1, 2016

Moreover, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court recognizes the Secretary of Justice's
power to review the actions of the investigating prosecutor, even motu proprio. Xxxx

Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his
recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or
the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by
himself, file the information against the respondent, or direct another assistant prosecutor or state
prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary investigation.

If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may
prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned
either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to
the parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of
the Office of the Ombudsman.

Verily, the Secretary of Justice was empowered to review the actions of the Provincial Fiscal
during the preliminary investigation or the reinvestigation. We note by analogy, however, that in
Department of Justice v. Alaon, the Court declared that respondents should be given due notice
of the review proceedings before the Secretary of Justice and be afforded adequate opportunity to
be heard therein.

In the case at bar, we find that there is nothing on record to show that respondents were
given notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Secretary of Justice. For this reason, we
remand the case to the Secretary of Justice with respect to respondents Dongail, Lorilla, Hulleza,
and Cimatu for further proceedings, with the caveat that any resolution of the Secretary of Justice
on the matter shall be subject to the approval of the trial court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ERNESTO L. DELOS SANTOS

G.R. NO. 220685. NOVEMBER 29, 2017

A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause -that is, one made for the purpose
of filing an [I]nformation in court -is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally
lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.

However, Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of C riminal Procedure explicitly
states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause, viz.:

Section 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -(a) By the Regional Trial Court. -Within ten
(10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue
a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had al ready been arrested, pursuant to a
warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5)
days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing
of the complaint or information. x xx x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In De Los Santos-Dia v. CA, the Court explained that "the judge's dismissal of a case
[under the authority of the aforesaid provision] must be done only in clear-cut cases when the
evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause -that is when the records readily
show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the
elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record [show] that, more
likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of
the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial.
In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of
additional evidence.

SALES V. ADAPON
G.R. NO. 171420 OCTOBER 5, 2016

In view of the foregoing, the investigating prosecutor gravel y erred in dismissing the
petitioner's criminal complaint for falsification simply because of her non-appearance at the
clarificatory hearing. To start with, her personal presence was excusable because of her advanced
age and the distance of her place of residence at the time (New York, United States of America)
from the Province of Batangas, the venue of the proceedings. Secondly, the records already
contained sufficient evidence upon which the investigating prosecutor could make a finding of
probable cause. Thirdly, she was represented in the proceedings by her son-in-law Jerico B.
Sales, whom she had constituted as her agent for purposes of pursuing the criminal case against
the respondents. Being her agent expressly authorized for that special purpose, Jerico could
competently respond to the investigating prosecutor's clarificatory questions in a manner legally
binding on her. Thirdly, had the investigating prosecutor sincerely considered her personal
presence as absolutely necessary in the determination of probable cause, he should have granted
her request to have her deposition taken instead. Such power was within his discretion as the
investigating prosecutor. And, lastly, the investigating prosecutor's requiring her personal
presence at the clarificatory hearing was probably unnecessary and superfluous in view of his
failure to specify the matters still needing to be clarified. As earlier mentioned, the documents
submitted by both parties in the proceedings were already sufficient for the determination of
whether or not probable cause existed against the respondents. If the clarificatory hearing was
geared towards the determination of the existence of probable cause, 12 the non-specification of
the matters to be inquired into during the clarificatory hearing indicated that no more matters
needed to be clarified from the petitioner herself.

Although it was concededly discretionary on the part of the investigating prosecutor to

call for the clarificatory hearing considering that Section 4 (e) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
has used the word may in assigning such prerogative to him, the discretion was not unbounded
because the rule precisely stated that the clarificatory hearing was to be set only "if there are such
facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness." XXXX

In fine, the personal presence of the petitioner at the clarificatory hearing was
unnecessary to establish probable cause against the respondents, and requiring it was legally
untenable.

IENT V. TULLETT PREBON (PHILIPPINES), INC.

G.R. NOS. 189158& 189530 JANUARY 11, 2017

Anent respondent's contentions that the present petitions (assailing the issuances of the
Secretary of Justice on the question of probable cause) had become moot and academic with the
filing of the Informations in the trial court and that under our ruling in Advincula v. Court of
Appeals the filing of a petition for certiorari with the appellate court was the improper remedy as
findings of the Secretary of Justice on probable cause must be respected, we hold that these cited
rules are not inflexible.

In Yambot v. Tuquero, we observed that under exceptional circumstances, a petition for

certiorari assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice (involving an appeal of the
prosecutor's ruling on probable cause) may be allowed, notwithstanding the filing of an
information with the trial court. We reiterated the doctrine in Ching v. Secretary of Justice that
the acts of a quasi-judicial officer may be assailed by the aggrieved party through a petition for
certiorari and enjoined (a) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused; (b) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice; (c) when the
acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (d) where the charges are manifestly false
and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (e) when there is clearly no prima facie case against
the accused.
PEMBERTON V. DE LIMA
G.R. NO. 217508, APRIL 18, 2016

In Ching v. Secretary of Justice, this Court expounded on the evidence required for a
determination of probable cause:

Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the
investigating officer acts upon probable cause of reasonable belief. Probable cause implies
probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would
justify a conviction. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspect.

This was reiterated in Chan v. Secretary of Justice:

Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the
person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation. Being based merely on opinion
and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty. Probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief.
Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than
evidence which would justify a conviction.

xxx

Absence of direct evidence does not preclude a finding of probable cause. It has been the
consistent pronouncement of the Supreme Court that, in such cases, the prosecution may resort to
circumstantial evidence. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where
concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted upon under all circumstances, the
guilt of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or in secluded places will be
hard, if not impossible, to prove.

YOUNG V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 213910, FEBRUARY 3, 2016

Pertinently, the Court declared in Santos-Dia v. CA (Santos-Dio) (sic) that while a judge's
determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing arrest
warrants, he is nonetheless authorized under Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure to immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. Thus:

In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor's authority, it must be stressed
that the judge's dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on
record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the records readily show
uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements
of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not, the
crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge
should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases,
however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence.

Accordingly, a judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut
cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the
records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the
existence of the elements of the crime charged.

WILSON FENIX, ET AL. VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 189878. JULY 11, 2016

Further supporting the proposition that judges only have to concern themselves with the
accused and the evidence against the latter in the issuance of warrants of arrest is Section 6(a),
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 6. When Warrant of Arrest May Issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within
ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case
if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the complaint or information.

Indeed, under the above-cited provision, judges may very well (1) dismiss the case if the
evidence on record has clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest
upon a finding of probable cause; or (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. When judges
dismiss a case or require the prosecutor to present additional evidence, they do so not in
derogation of the prosecutor's authority to determine the existence of probable cause.

First, judges have no capacity to review the prosecutor's determination of probable cause.
That falls under the office of the DOJ Secretary. Second, once a complaint or an Information has
been filed, the disposition of the case is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, subject
only to the qualification that its action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the
right of the People to due process of law. Third, and most important, the judge's determination of
probable cause has a different objective than that of the prosecutor. The judge's finding is based
on a determination of the existence of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested. The prosecutor, on the other hand, determines probable cause by ascertaining the
existence of facts sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed,
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.

To be sure, in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
the judge is not compelled to follow the prosecutor's certification of the existence of probable
cause. As we stated in People v. Inting, "[i]t is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of
stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the [p]rosecutor's
certification which are material in assisting the [j]udge to make his determination.
xxxx
Section 3(e), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Procedure. - The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a
party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or
cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be
asked to the party or witness concerned. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the provision, the conduct of a clarificatory hearing is not indispensable; rather, it
is optional on the part of the investigating prosecutor as evidenced by the use of the term “may.”
That hearing fulfills only the purpose of aiding the investigating prosecutor in determining the
existence of probable cause for the filing of a criminal complaint before the courts. The
clarificatory hearing does not accord validity to the preliminary investigation by the prosecutor,
nor does its absence render the proceedings void. Necessarily, the failure of Ong and Santiago to
appear at the scheduled clarificatory hearing might have caused some slight inconvenience to the
investigating prosecutor, but it did not result in the exclusion of the affidavits or counter-
affidavits already submitted by the parties. In fact, under the rules, an investigating prosecutor
may resolve a complaint based only on the evidence presented by the complainant if the
respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit a counter-affidavit within
the prescribed period.

NAPOLES V. DE LIMA
G.R. NO. 213529, JULY 13, 2016

During preliminary investigation, the prosecutor determines the existence of probable

cause for filing an information in court or dismissing the criminal complaint. As worded in the
Rules of Court, the prosecutor determines during preliminary investigation whether "there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." At this stage, the
determination of probable cause is an executive function. Absent grave abuse of discretion, this
determination cannot be interfered with by the courts. This is consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers.

On the other hand, if done to issue an arrest warrant, the determination of probable cause
is a judicial function. No less than the Constitution commands that "no . . . warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce[.]" This
requirement of personal evaluation by the judge is reaffirmed in Rule 112, Section 5(a) of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure:

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. —

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order
when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the complaint or information. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the determination of probable cause for filing an information in court and that
for issuance of an arrest warrant are different. Once the information is filed in court, the trial
court acquires jurisdiction and any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.

RULE 113 ARREST 

PEOPLE V. RIVERA
G.R. NO. 208837, JULY 20, 2016

Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides instances when
warrantless arrest may be affected, to wit:
 Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful.

A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another

Under Section 5(a) of the above-quoted provision, a person may be arrested without a
warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
Appellant was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in
flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-
bound to arrest him even without a warrant.

In People v. Agulay, the Court reiterated the rule that an arrest made after an entrapment
operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid "warrantless arrest," in
line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court
proceeded to state that:

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid
and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a
crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the
offense. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation
deserves judicial sanction.

PEOPLE V. MAGNO
G.R. NO. 212340, AUGUST 17, 2016

Under the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may
be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto, (b) an arrest of a
suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that
said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during
the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential that the element of
personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may
be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be
rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution. In
Pestilos v. Generoso, the Court explained the requirement of immediacy as follows:

Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the
offense has just been committed" and "personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case.

However, we note that the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstance" under
Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
 Dictionary, "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions."
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or
observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has
not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal
evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of
probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the
determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made
immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or

circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances
should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers
have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This
guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts
or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this — as the time gap from the commission of the
crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and
subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of
immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or
uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.
The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard
for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless
arrest.
XXXX
A variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the setup of military
or police checkpoints — as in this case — which, based on jurisprudence, are not illegal per se
for as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way
least intrusive to motorists. Case law further states that routine inspections in checkpoints are not
regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable searches, and thus,
permissible, if limi ted to the following: (a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (b) simply looks into a vehicle; (c)
flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected
to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search
or visual inspection; and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

SINDAC V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 220732 SEPTEMBER 6, 2016

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must
concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b),
Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused
had committed it.

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an
offense is essential. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, he knows for a fact
that a crime has just been committed.
xxxx
Advancing to a warrantless arrest based only on such information, absent circumstances
that would lead to the arresting officer's "personal knowledge" as described in case law,
unfortunately, skews from the exacting requirements of Section 5, Rule 113. It is settled that
"reliable information" alone — even if it was a product of well-executed surveillance operations
— is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. It is further required that the accused performs
some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense, which, as already discussed, is missing in the instant case.

In People v. Villareal, the Court highlighted the importance of the "personal knowledge"
requirement by elucidating that:

To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a person's reputation or past criminal citations

would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police
officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person's previous criminal
infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5[, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure].

Verily, warrantless arrests conducted without this indispensable requisite should be struck
down as unlawful, as in this case.

This is not the first instance where the Court, despite the existence of reliable information
on the part of the arresting officer, invalidated a warrantless arrest of an accused on account of
such officer's lack of personal knowledge that the accused has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. In People v. Racho, the Court invalidated the
warrantless arrest made on the person of the accused despite a confidential agent explicitly
identifying him as a drug-dealer. In that case, the Court noted that at the time of the arrest, the
accused was neither committing a crime in the presence of the police officers nor acting in a
suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and
conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Further, the Court held that the
arresting officers were not impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the
requisite warrant, especially considering that they received the "tipped information" a day before
conducting a warrantless arrest on the accused. To the Court, the arresting officers had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant. As such, their failure to do so renders the warrantless arrest,
as well as the search made incidental thereto, invalid, thus, resulting in the acquittal of therein
accused.

RULE 114 BAIL 

PEOPLE V. ESCOBAR
G.R. NO. 214300 JULY 26, 2017

Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested and
detained but "whose guilt has not yet been proven" in court beyond reasonable doubt. The right
to bail is cognate to the fundamental right to be presumed innocent. In People v. Fitzgerald:

The right to bail emanates from the [accused's constitutional] right to be presumed
innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the
presumption of innocence he [or she] enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a
security to guarantee his [or her] appearance before any court, as required under specified
conditions.

Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the
offense charged is "not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court. However, if the accused is charged with an offense the
penalty of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment — "regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution" — and when evidence of one's guilt is not strong, then the accused's
prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court.
 In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death, reduced to
reclusion perpetua. Escobar's bail is, thus, a matter of judicial discretion, provided that the
evidence of his guilt is not strong.

Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall be

admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Tr ial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b)
before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment. HEITAD
xxx xxx xxx
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The Regional Trial Court denied Escobar's Second Bail Petition on the ground of res
judicata. The Court of Appeals overturned this and correctly ruled that his Second Bail Petition
was not barred by res judicata.
XXXX
Escobar's Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not
recognized in criminal proceedings.

Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the dispute between
the parties or their successors-in-interest. Trinidad v. Marcelo declares that res judicata, as found
in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and "has no bearing on
criminal proceedings." XXXX Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on
criminal proceedings. XXXX

An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in
nature, does not give rise to res judicata. As in Trinidad, even if we are to expand the argument of
the prosecution in this case to contemplate "res judicata in prison grey" or double jeopardy, the
same will still not apply. Double jeopardy requires that the accused has been convicted or
acquitted or that the case against him or her has been dismissed or terminated without his express
consent. Here, while there was an initial ruling on Escobar's First Bail Petition, Escobar has not
been convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated.

Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases, Escobar's
Second Bail Petition cannot be barred as there is no final judgment on the merits.
XXX
A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral matter — whether accused
is entitled to provisional liberty — and is not a final judgment on accused's guilt or innocence.
Unlike in a full-blown trial, a hearing for bail is summary in nature: it deliberately "avoid[s]
unnecessary thoroughness" and does not try the merits of the case.

CRUZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 224974 JUNE 3, 2017

Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 22. Cancellation of bail. — Upon application of the bondsmen, with due
 notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his
death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the
case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.

The provisions of the Rules of Court are clear. Bail shall be deemed automatically
cancelled in three (3) instances: (1) the acquittal of the accused, (2) the dismissal of the case, or
(3) the execution of the judgment of conviction. The Rules of Court do not limit the cancellation
of bail only upon the acquittal of the accused.

The Office of the Solicitor General made the same observation in its Comment before the
Court of Appeals:

The trial court denied the motion to release cash bond on the ground that the dismissal was only
due to the desistance of the complainant and not because the accused was acquitted or that the
crime was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Such ruling, however, has no legal basis. In fact, the provision of Section 22, Rule 114 is clear: the
dismissal of the criminal case results to the automatic cancellation of the bail bond.

Non-compliance with the Rules of Court is not, as the Office of the Solicitor General asserts, a
mere error of judgment. It constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In Crisologo v. JEWM Agro-
Industrial Corporation:

This manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion.

In State Prosecutors II Comilang and Lagman v. Judge Medel Belen, the Court held as
inexcusable abuse of authority the trial judge's "obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of
law or procedure." Such level of ignorance is not a mere error of judgment. It amounts to "evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law," or in essence, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith
as judicial competence requires no less.

When a court or tribunal renders a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the
proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Rule 65,
Section 1 states:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto,
and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3,
Rule 46.
 Considering that the trial court blatantly disregarded Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of
Court, petitioners' remedy was the filing of a petition for certiorari with the proper court.

The Court of Appeals, however, focused on the Office of the Solicitor General's argument
that petitioners availed the wrong remedy. It cited Belfast Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v.
People and Babasa v. Linebarger as bases to rule that appeal was the proper remedy for a denial
of a motion to release cash bond.

In Belfast Surety, the trial court declared a forfeiture of cash bond under Rule 114,
Section 15 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure for failure of the accused to appear on trial.
This Court stated that while appeal would be the proper remedy from a judgment of forfeiture of
bond, certiorari is still available if the judgment complained of was issued in lack or excess of
jurisdiction:

While appeal is the proper remedy from a judgment of forfeiture, nevertheless, certiorari
is available despite the existence of the remedy of appeal where the judgment or order complained
of was either issued in excess of or without jurisdiction. Besides, appeal under the circumstances
of the present case is not an adequate remedy since the trial court had already issued a writ of
execution. Hence, the rule that certiorari does not lie when there is an appeal is relaxed where, as
in the present case, the trial court had already ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.

Babasa, meanwhile, states that an appeal should be available in denials of petitions for
the cancellation of a bond. Nothing in Babasa, however, limits the remedy to an appeal only:

Inasmuch as the said petition to procure the cancellation of the bond was denied without further
process of law, it is unquestionable that the order of court denying it could be appealed from, for
the reason that if this last decision were not appealable, it would become final, without ulterior
remedy, and would work irreparable injury to the petitioner.

Thus, a party may still file a petition for certiorari in instances where the lower court
commits grave abuse of discretion in excess of jurisdiction.

The automatic cancellation of bail, however, does not always result in the immediate
release of the bail bond to the accused. A cash bond, unlike a corporate surety or a property bond,
may be applied to fines and other costs determined by the court. The excess shall be returned to
the accused or to the person who deposited the money on the accused's behalf.

PEOPLE V. SOBREPEÑA, SR.,

G.R. NO. 204063, DECEMBER 5, 2016

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court also states that no person charged with a capital
offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.

Thus from the above-cited provisions and in cases involving non-bailable offenses, what
is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong which is a matter of
judicial discretion that remains with the judge. The judge is under legal obligation to conduct a
hearing whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court to determine the existence
of strong evidence or lack of it against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. "The court's grant or refusal of bail must
contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution on the basis of which should be
formulated the judge's own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the
guilt of the accused." In People v. Plaza, the Court defined a summary hearing and expounded
the court's discretionary power to grant bail to an accused. "A summary hearing is defined as
'such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable
and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence
for the purposes of bail.' On such hearing, the Court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into
any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary examination and cross-examination."

JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 213847. JULY 12, 2016

Section 2, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court expressly states that one of the conditions of
bail is for the accused to appear before the proper court whenever required by the court or these
Rules. The practice of bail fixing supports this purpose. Thus, in Villasenor v. Abano, the Court
has pronounced that the principal factor considered (in bail fixing), to the determination of which
most factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his fight to
avoid punishment. The Court has given due regard to the primary but limited purpose of granting
bail, which was to ensure that the petitioner would appear during his trial and would continue to
submit to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to answer the charges levelled against him.

Bail exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer to a criminal
prosecution without unduly restricting his or her liberty and without ignoring the accused's right
to be presumed innocent. It does not perform the function of preventing or licensing the
commission of a crime. The notion that bail is required to punish a person accused of crime is,
therefore, fundamentally misplaced. Indeed, the practice of admission to bail is not a device for
keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found convenient to give them a trial. The
spirit of the procedure is rather to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial with all the
safeguards has found and adjudged them guilty. Unless permitted this conditional privilege, the
individuals wrongly accused could be punished by the period or imprisonment they undergo
while awaiting trial, and even handicap them in consulting counsel, searching for evidence and
witnesses, and preparing a defense. Hence, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate
both the accused's interest in pretrial liberty and society's interest in assuring his presence at trial.

Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused will take flight. This is the
reason precisely why the probability or the improbability of flight is an important factor to be
taken into consideration in granting or denying bail, even in capital cases. The exception to the
fundamental right to bail should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of
evasion of prosecution. Apparently, an accused's official and social standing and his other
personal circumstances arc considered and appreciated as tending to render his flight improbable.

RULE 115 RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 

REMULLA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 218040 APRIL 17, 2017

Procedural law mandates that all criminal actions, commenced by a complaint or an

information, shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In appeals
of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals (CA) and before this Court, the OSG is the
appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code. In certain instances, the OSP represented the People when it involved
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The present case challenges the dismissal of a criminal case due to the violation of the
right to speedy disposition of cases. The petition filed before this Court was initiated by Remulla
in his capacity as a private complainant without the intervention of either the OSG or the OSP.
Although he claims that he has legal standing as a taxpayer, the present case is criminal in nature
and the People is the real party in interest. Remulla captioned his petition. as "People of the
Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and Erineo S. Maliksi" but it is clear that he
does not represent the People.

Only on rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal
action on his own behalf such as when there is a denial of due process, or where the dismissal of
the case is capricious shall certiorari lie. As will be discussed later, Remulla failed to qualify in
any of these exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, he has no legal personality to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case against Maliksi on the ground of violation of the right to a speedy
disposition of his case.

TORRES V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 221562-69 OCTOBER 5, 2016

In Isabelo A. Braza v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), this Court has laid
down the guiding principle in determining whether the right of an accused to the speedy
disposition of cases had been violated:

Section 16. Article III of the Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "[A]ll
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies." The right to a speedy disposition of a case is deemed violated only when
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive,
a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. The
constitutional guarantee to a speedy disposition of cases is a relative or flexible concept. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.

In Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, the Court laid down certain guidelines to determine
whether the right to a speedy disposition has been violated, as follows:

The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning

of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of
whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as
follows: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. (emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the lapse of time in the conduct of the proceedings is tantamount to a
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay, which We find to be in violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 199151-56. JULY 25, 2016

The right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of
spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen
by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to
speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the
anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever
legitimate defense he may interpose. This looming unrest, as well as the tactical disadvantages
carried by the passage of time, should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual.
In the context of the right to a speedy trial, the Court in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan stated:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily
compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial
was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety
and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of
these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to
recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial,
he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion
and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is
subjected to public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the
government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or
extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate ihat such
right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in
Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay,
it must show two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which
ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is
reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such
delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the
State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense
should be weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally
delay to gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other
hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily
against the State. x x x

RULE 116 ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA 

FORTALEZA V. GONZALES
G.R. NOS. 179287 & 182090, FEBRUARY 1, 2016

In People v. Espinosa, we stressed that the court does not lose control of the proceedings
by reason of a reinvestigation or review conducted by either the DOJ or the Office of the
President. On the contrary, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, may grant or deny a motion
to dismiss based on such reinvestigation or review:

Under Section 11 (c) of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the arraignment shall be suspended for a
period not exceeding 60 days when a reinvestigation or review is being conducted at either the
 Department of Justice or the Office of the President. However, we should stress that the court does
not lose control of the proceedings by reason of such review. Once it had assumed jurisdiction, it is
not handcuffed by any resolution of the reviewing prosecuting authority. Neither is it deprived of its
jurisdiction by such resolution. The principles established in Crespo v. Mogul still stands, as
follows:

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a
motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits
proceed for the proper determination of the case.

RULE 117 MOTION TO QUASH

PEOPLE V. CASTILLO, SR.,

G.R. NO. 204419, NOVEMBER 7, 2016

The special civil action for certiorari is the proper recourse availed of by petitioner in
questioning the quashal of the search warrant as the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the judge that ordered the said quashal. In his allegation that the judge misapplied the
rules on jurisdiction or on the proper courts authorized to issue a search warrant, petitioner has
shown that the quashal of the search warrant was patently and grossly done. In any case, the
Court had allowed even direct recourse to this Court or to the Court of Appeals via a special civil
action for certiorari from a trial court's quashal of a search warrant. The general rule is that a
party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of
petitions filed directly before it. In this case, since the pivotal issue raised by petitioner involves
an application of a rule promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under
the Constitution regarding the jurisdiction of courts in the proper issuance of a search warrant,
this Court deems it proper to resolve the present petition.

As such, even if the petitioner in this case, representing the People, is only the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor and not the Office of the Solicitor General, such technicality can be
relaxed in the interest of justice. The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed
despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid
application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for
the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends
of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties,
giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if
not a miscarriage of justice. In certain cases, this Court even allowed private complainants to file
petitions for certiorari and considered the said petitions as if filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General. In United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, this Court ruled that an exception exists to the
general rule that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court assailing any
adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines,
through the OSG, thus:

The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to assail any
adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines,
through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the
Court allowed a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari,
and considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case even held that the
petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu of the OSG:
 From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings which
led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while the
general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the
Court of Appeals, if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process,
the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor
General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will allow petitioners to
argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General.

The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in
exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. In this case, the Court has opted to
take cognizance of the petition, considering the nature of the issues raised by the parties.

Therefore, if this Court had previously considered the petitions filed by private
complainants and deemed them as if filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, there is no
reason to disallow the petition herein filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LINO ALEJANDRO Y PIMENTEL

G.R. NO. 223099. JANUARY 11, 2018

The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where
there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where
there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. We find that these
exceptions do not exist in this case.

A mere manifestation also will not suffice in assailing a judgment of acquittal. A petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed. A judgment of acquittal may
only be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless
of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the
constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated.

RULE 119 TRIAL 

MACAPAGAL-ARROYO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 220598&220953 APRIL 18, 2017

To start with, the State argues that the consolidated petitions for certiorari were improper
remedies in light of Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibiting the review
of the denial of their demurrer prior to the judgment in the case either by appeal or by certiorari;
that the Court has thereby limited its own power, which should necessarily prevent the giving of
due course to the petitions for certiorari, as well as the undoing of the order denying the
petitioners' demurrer to evidence; that t he proper remedy under the Rules of Court was for
the petitioners to proceed to trial and to present their evidence-in-chief thereat; and that even if
there had been grave abuse of discretion attending the denial, the Court's certiorari powers
should be exercised only upon the petitioners' compliance with the stringent requirements of
Rule 65, particularly with the requirement that there be no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, which they did not establish.

Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, pertinently provides:

Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. — x x x
xxx xxx xxx
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself
shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (n)
 The argument of the State, which is really a repetition of its earlier submission, was
squarely resolved in the decision, as follows:

XXXXX
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by
rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because
the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever
and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the
denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the
remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As we shall soon
show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it
capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient
evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to
expect a guilty verdict.

We reiterate the foregoing resolution, and stress that the prohibition contained in Section
23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is not an insuperable obstacle to the review by the Court of
the denial of the demurrer to evidence through certiorari. We have had many rulings to that effect
in the past. For instance, in Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan, the Court expressly ruled that the petition
for certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the denial of the demurrer to evidence that was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.

Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:

Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. — When two or more persons are
jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting
its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that
they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and
the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the
court is satisfied that:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

(b) The is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused;

(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

Evidence adduced in sup port of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial.
If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement
shall be inadmissible in evidence. '

The rule is explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge proceeding will
only be inadmissible if the court denies the motion to discharge the accused as a state witness.
However, the motion hearing in this case had already concluded and the motion for discharge,
approved. Thus, whatever transpired during the hearing is already automatically deemed part of
the records of Criminal Case No. Q-11-168431 and admissible in evidence pursuant to the rule.

Mendiola's testimony was not incomplete, contrary to how Miranda paints it to be. The
contents of his lengthy narration were more than sufficient to establish his possession of all the
necessary qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, under Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court to be eligible as a state witness. The argument of incompleteness even contradicts
respondent Miranda's own position since he does not contest here the RTC's Order granting
Mendiola's motion to be a state witness, only the admissibility of his testimony following his
demise.

Respondent raised that Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court makes it mandatory
that the state witness be presented during trial proper and that, otherwise, his
failure to do so would render his testimony inadmissible. On this point, Miranda, the RTC and
the CA are mistaken in their interpretation of the rule, which pertinently provides:

Section 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. — The order indicated in the preceding
section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to future
prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-
accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge.

While respondent Miranda is correct that the motion hearing is different from the
presentation of evidence in chief, it is precisely because of this distinction and separability that
the validity of the discharge proceeding should remain untouched despite the non-presentation of
Mendiola during trial on the merits. True, the provision requires the accused to testify again
during trial proper after he qualifies as a state witness. However, non-compliance therewith
would only prevent the order of discharge from operating as an acquittal; it does not speak of any
penalty to the effect of rendering all the testimonies of the state witness during the discharge
proceeding inadmissible. On the contrary, the testimonies and admissions of a state witness
during the discharge proceedings may be admitted as evidence to impute criminal liability
against him should he fail or refuse to testify in accordance with his sworn statement constituting
the basis for the discharge, militating against the claim of inadmissibility.
XXXX
That the testimony of Mendiola was offered for the limited purpose of qualifying him as a state
witness does not automatically render his statements as to the specifics on the commission of the
offense inadmissible. To recall, one of the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 is to
establish that the erstwhile respondent does not appear to be the most guilty among him and his
cohorts. Thus, it is quite understandable that, during the discharge proceeding, Mendiola narrated
in graphic detail his entire knowledge of the crime and the extent of the participation of each of
the accused,

IBANEZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. 190798, JANUARY 27, 2016

⁃ failure of counsel de officio to appear during trial is not deprivation of constitutional right
to counsel

There was no denial of right to counsel as evinced by the fact that the petitioners were not
only assisted by a counsel de oficio during arraignment and pre-trial but more so, their counsel
de oficio actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court including the direct and
cross-examination of the witnesses. As aptly found by the CA, the petitioners were duly
represented by a counsel de oficio all throughout the proceedings except for one hearing when
their court appointed lawyer was absent and Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit presented their testimonies.
As previously stated, it was during said hearing when the trial court declared that the cross-
examination of the said two prosecution witnesses was deemed waived.

Mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-
examine. The case of Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas nag Manggagawang Pilipino, et al.
thoroughly explained the meaning and substance of right to cross-examine as an integral
component of due process with a colatilla that the same right may be expressly or impliedly
waived, to quote:

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it
criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial
powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one
which may be waived expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right
of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but
failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony
given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.

RULE 121 NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION 

SENIT V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO, 192914, JANUARY 11, 2016

A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching;
and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the
judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate
the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. The Court agrees with the
CA in its decision which held that a new trial may not be had on the basis of evidence which was
available during trial but was not presented due to its negligence. Likewise, the purported errors
and irregularities committed in the course of the trial against [the petitioner’s] substantive rights
do not exist.

RULE 122 APPEAL 

PERSONAL COLLECTION DIRECT SELLING, INC. VS. TERESITA L. CARANDANG

G.R. NO. 206958. NOVEMBER 8, 2017

Appeal was and was the proper remedy. Rule 122, Section l of the Rules of Court states:

Section 1. Who may appeal. -Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order,
unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.

An order granting a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case is

final, and the remedy to question this final order is an appeal. In Santos v. Orda:

On the first issue, the petition for certiorari filed by respondent under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is inappropriate. It bears stressing that the Order of the RTC, granting the motion of
the prosecution to withdraw the Informations and ordering the case dismissed, is final because it
disposed of the case and terminated the proceedings therein, leaving nothing to be done by the
court. Thus, the proper remedy is appeal.

Respondent filed with the CA the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal, not because it was the only plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy available to him under the law, but, obviously, to make up for the loss of his right
to an ordinary appeal. It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be
a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available, as it was in this case. A special civil
action under Rule 65 cannot cure a party's failure to timely appeal the assailed decision or
 resolution. Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost
remedy of an ordinary appeal.

Appealing the withdrawal of an information does not violate the right of the accused
against being placed in double jeopardy. In First Womens Credit Corp. v. Baybay:

As to what mode of review petitioners may avail of after a court grants an accused's motion to
withdraw information and/or to dismiss the case, Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure instructs: "Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the
accused will be placed in double jeopardy." In availiμg of the remedy of certiorari before the RTC,
petitioners claim that they had no plain, adequate and speedy remedy to question the MeTC's grant
of the motion. The records of the cases show, however, that the motion was granted by the MeTC
before respondents were arraigned. Thus, the prohibition against appeal in case a, criminal case is
dismissed as the accused would be placed in double jeopardy does not apply.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE VS. ALEXANDER ALVARO Y DE LEON AND

ROSALIE GERONIMO Y MADERA
G.R. No. 225596, JANUARY 10, 2018

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for
review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the
appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate
court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.

PEOPLE V. FELICIANO, JR.

G.R. NO. 196735 AUGUST 3 2016

They were meted the death penalty, and the case was brought to this Court on automatic
review. In view, however, of People v. Mateo and the Amended Rules to Govern Review of
Death Penalty Cases, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for review. A notice of
appeal in this instance was unnecessary. Rule 122, Sections 3 (d) and 10 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, state:
RULE 122
APPEAL
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. —
xxx xxx xxx
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the death
penalty. The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the judgment as provided in Section 10 of
this Rule. (3a)
xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 10.Transmission of records in case of death penalty. — In all cases where the death penalty is
imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic
review and judgment within twenty days but not earlier than fifteen days from the promulgation of
the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall
also be forwarded within ten days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.

The Court of Appeals was mandated to review the case with regard to all five (5) of the
accused, now referred to as accused-appellants, regardless of whether they filed a notice of
appeal. The review is considered automatic. XXX

XXX while we can review the case in its entirety and examine its merits, we cannot
disturb the penalties imposed by the Court of Appeals on those who did not appeal XXX. This is
consistent with Rule 122, Section 11 (a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure:

RULE 122
APPEAL
SEC. 11.Effect of appeal by any of several accused. —
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the
latter[.]

BURGOS V. SPOUSES NAVAL

G.R. NO. 219468, JUNE 6, 2016

Jurisprudence dictates that it is the OSG which possesses the requisite authority to
represent the People in an appeal on the criminal aspect of a case. The OSG is the law office of
the Government whose specific powers and functions include that of representing the Republic
and/or the [P]eople before any court in any action which affects the welfare of the people as the
ends of justice may require. Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code provides that:

Section 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyer, x x x. It shall have
the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.

In People v. Piccio (Piccio), G.R. NO. 203370, April 11, 2016, this Court held that “if
there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it
is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. The
rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal
action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses. For this reason,
the People are therefore deemed as the real parties in interest in the criminal case and, therefore,
only the OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. In
view of the corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by
the party entitled to the avails of the suit, an appeal of the criminal case not filed by the People as
represented by the OSG is perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the offended party
may, however, file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG but only insofar as the civil
liability of the accused is concerned. He may also file a special civil action for certiorari even
without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his interest in the civil
aspect of the case.”

RULE 124 PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE VS. HILARIO

G.R. NO. 210610. JANUARY 11, 2018

The Court establishes that an appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision

reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court authority. The right to appeal is neither a natural
right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. When the Court of Appeals
imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) file a notice
of appeal under Rule 124, Se ction 13(c) of the Rules of Court to avail of an appeal as a matter of
right before the Court and open the entire case for review on any question; or (2) file a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of discretion and raise
only questions of law.

PEOPLE V. PARCON
G.R. NO. 219592, AUGUST 17, 2016

We find that the Court of Appeals acted in accord with paragraph 1, Section 8 of Rule
124 of the Rules of Court when it dismissed the motion for reconsideration by reason of delay in
the filing of the appellant's brief. The rule states that:

Section 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. — The Court of

Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either
case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this
Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during
the pendency of the appeal.
Clearly, it is within the appellate court's mandate to dismiss the appeal motu proprio if the
appellant fails to file his brief within the prescribed time. The primordial policy is faithful
observance of the Rules of Court, and their relaxation or suspension should only be for
persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases. A bare invocation of "the interest of substantial
justice" will not suffice to override a stringent implementation of the rules.

The reason for the dismissal lies in the nature of the right to appeal. The right to appeal is
statutory and one who seeks to avail of it must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements
for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly
followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays. Moreover,
the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory
but jurisdictional as well; hence, failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and
executory.

Furthermore, in a long line of cases ruled by the Court, negligence and mistakes of
counsel bind the client. A disregard of this rule would bring about never-ending suits, so long as
lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client's case and obtain
remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law. The only exception would be where the
lawyer's gross negligence would result in the grave injustice of depriving his client of the due
process of law.

RULE 126 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 

PEOPLE V. PASTRANA,
G.R. NO. 196045, FEBRUARY 21, 2018

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees every individual the right to personal
liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz.:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
 personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the
sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to
give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.

Additionally, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provide for the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to
the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

Hence, in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno (Stonehill), the Court stressed two
points which must be considered in the issuance of a search warrant, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined personally by the judge; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. Moreover, in Stonehill, on account of
the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the search warrants involved in
that case, the Court deemed it fit to amend the former Rules of Court by providing that "a search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense."

One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it must
be issued based on probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in connection with one
specific offense to prevent the issuance of a scatter — shot warrant. In search warrant
proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

In Stonehill, the Court, in declaring as null and void the search warrants which were
issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code," stated:

In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments
thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract.As a consequence, it was impossible
for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to
any determinate provision of said laws; or ATICcS

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of
the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution,for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice
 or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional
provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine
what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the
minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Alvarez, the Court further ruled:

In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily determine whether an
offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant because the personal
properties that may be subject of the search warrant are very much intertwined with the "one
specific offense" requirement of probable cause. The only way to determine whether a warrant
should issue in connection with one specific offense is to juxtapose the facts and circumstances
presented by the applicant with the elements of the offense that are alleged to support the search
warrant.
xxx xxx xxx
The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a
search warrant should issue only on the basis of probable cause. Since the primary objective of
applying for a search warrant is to obtain evidence to be used in a subsequent prosecution for an
offense for which the search warrant was applied, a judge issuing a particular warrant must satisfy
himself that the evidence presented by the applicant establishes the facts and circumstances
relating to this specific offense for which the warrant is sought and issued. x x x

PEOPLE V. CASTILLO, SR.,

G.R. NO. 204419, NOVEMBER 7, 2016

Anent the main issue as to whether a municipal trial court has the authority to issue a
search warrant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction, this Court answers in the
affirmative.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in
writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Necessarily, a
motion to quash a search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such
as (1) the place searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search
warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search warrant and eventually
dismissed the case based merely on the fact that the search warrant was issued by the MTC of
Gattaran, Cagayan proceeding from a suspected violation of R.A. 9165 or The Dangerous Drugs
Act, an offense which is beyond the jurisdiction of the latter court. It is therefore safe to presume
that the other grounds raised by the private respondent in his motion to quash are devoid of any
merit. By that alone, the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search
warrant on a basis other than the accepted grounds. It must be remembered that a search warrant
is valid for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only be
quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.
 This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search warrant. Rule
126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the
crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the
judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the
court where the criminal action is pending.

Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within the same
judicial region where the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the Municipal
Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue a search warrant to search and seize
the dangerous drugs stated in the application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the
same judicial region. The fact that the search warrant was issued means that the MTC judge
found probable cause to grant the said application after the latter was found by the same judge to
have been filed for compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was
duly complied with.

It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a
search warrant must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by
any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the resultant case may be
filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the offense committed. What controls here is that
a search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. 24 Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may
issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed,
provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present.

BALAUITAN V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 218891 SEPTEMBER 19, 2016

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of the said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches
and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained
from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.

It must, however, be clarified that a search warrant issued in accordance with the
provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not give the authorities limitless
discretion in implementing the same as the same Rules provide parameters in the proper conduct
of a search. Section 8, Rule 126 of the aforesaid Rules, states that:

SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. — No

 search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

Under this provision, a search under the strength of a warrant is required to be witnessed
by the lawful occupant of the premises sought to be searched. It must be stressed that it is only
upon their absence that their presence may be replaced by two (2) persons of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. In People v. Go, the Court held that a departure from the
said mandatory rule — by preventing the lawful occupant or a member of his family from
actually witnessing the search and choosing two (2) other witnesses observe the search —
violates the spirit and letter of the law, and thus, taints the search with the vice of
unreasonableness, rendering the seized articles inadmissible due to the application of the
exclusionary rule, viz.:

As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team categorically admitted that the search of
the upper floor, which allegedly resulted in the recovery of the plastic bag containing the shabu,
did not take place in the presence of either the lawful occupant of the premises, i.e., appellant
(who was out), or his son Jack Go (who was handcuffed to a chair on the ground floor). Such a
procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by law are prevented from actually observing and
monitoring the search of the premises, violates both the spirit and letter of the law:
xxx xxx xxx
That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to witness the search at the second floor
is of no moment. The Rules of Court clearly and explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the
witnesses in whose presence the search of the premises must be conducted. Thus, Section 8, Rule
126 provides that the search should be witnessed by "two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality" only in the absence of either the lawful occupant of the
premises or any member of his family. Thus, the search of appellant's residence clearly should
have been witnessed by his son Jack Go who was present at the time. The police officers were
without discretion to substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the law.
xxx xxx xxx
The raiding team's departure from the procedure mandated by Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, taken together with the numerous other irregularities attending the search of appellant's
residence, tainted the search with the vice of unreasonableness, thus compelling this Court to
apply the exclusionary rule and declare the seized articles inadmissible in evidence. This must
necessarily be so since it is this Court's solemn duty to be ever watchful for the constitutional
rights of the people, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. In the oft-quoted language of
Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection
enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed.

In People v. Del Castillo, the Court similarly held that the search of the premises must be
witnessed by the lawful occupant or the family members; otherwise, the search becomes
unreasonable, thus rendering the seized items inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.

PETRON GASUL LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION AND TOTALGAZ LPG DEALERS

ASSOCIATION VS. ELENA LAO, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 205010. JULY 18, 2016

A search warrant (SW) is defined as a written order issued in the name of the People of
the Philippines, signed by a judge, and directed to a peace officer commanding him to search for
the personal property described therein and bring it to the court.

In Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the requisites, procedure and
purpose for SW issuance are totally different from those of a criminal action. It stressed that the
application for and issuance of a SW is not a criminal action but a judicial process more
particularly, a special criminal process designed to respond to an incident in the main case, if one
has been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. The power to issue SW is inherent in all courts,
such that the power of courts to issue SWs where the place to be searched is within their
jurisdiction is not intended to other courts from exercising the same power.

In addition, SW shall be issued only upon probable cause personally determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. In turn, probable cause for SW refers to such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.
Xxxx
Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides for the proper court where an SW
application shall be filed, to wit:

Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. --An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following: a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime
was committed b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or
any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. xx xx

The foregoing provision is clear. Generally, the SW application must be filed with the
court which has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the offense was alleged to be
committed. This, however, is not an iron-clad rule compelling reasons, which must be expressly
stated in the application, an SW application may be filed in a court other than the one having
jurisdiction over the place where the purported offense was committed and where the SW shall
be enforced.