1. G.R. No. 108338. April 17, 2001.

*
CALIXTO SAÑADO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SIMEON G.
NEPOMUCENO, respondents.

Administrative Law; Judicial Notice; The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in
suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative
or quasi-judicial; A decision of the Office of the President is explicitly an official act of and an exercise of quasi-judicial
power by the Executive Department headed by the highest officer of the land, and it thus squarely falls under matters
relative to the executive department which courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice.—What is the
nature of the July 31, 1989 Malacañang decision and what is its effect on the resolution of Civil Case
No. 2085? The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a
license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-
judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasijudicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon
the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights
and liabilities determined (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., pp. 143-144). As
such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is explicitly an official act of and an
exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department headed by the highest officer of the land. It
thus squarely falls under matters relative to the executive department which courts are mandatorily
tasked to take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Judicial notice must be
taken of the organization of the Executive Department, its principal officers, elected or appointed, such
as the President, his powers and duties (Francisco, Evidence [Rules 128-134], 1996 ed., p. 24, citing
Canal Zone vs. Mena, 2 Canal Zone 170).

Same; Separation of Powers; The policy of the courts as regards the factual findings of administrative bodies is not to
interfere with actions of the executive branch on administrative matters addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies, a policy especially applicable in the grant of licenses, permits, and leases, or the approval,
rejection, or revocation of applications therefor.—The issue of whether or not petitioner is still entitled to
possession of the subject fishpond area is underpinned by an ascertainment of facts. And such task
belongs to the administrative body which has jurisdiction over the matter—the Ministry of Agriculture
and Food. The policy of the courts as regards such factual findings is not to interfere with actions of the
executive branch on administrative matters addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies.
This policy is specially applicable in the grant of licenses, permits, and leases, or the approval, rejection,
or revocation of applications therefor (Manuel vs. Villena, 37 SCRA 745 [1971]). Such respect is based
on the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers and on the fact that these bodies are considered co-
equal and coordinate rank as courts. The only exception is when there is a clear showing of capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, which we find absent in the case at bar.

Same; Same; Judicial Review; If a party disagrees with the decision of the Office of the President, he should elevate
the matter by petition for review before the Court of Appeals for the latter‘s exercise of the power of judicial review.—
The reasons given by the Office of the President in dismissing petitioner‘s appeal are quite clear.
Transferring or subletting the fishpond granted to a licensee without the consent or approval of the
administrative body concerned, as well as the failure to develop the area required by the fisheries rules,
are definitely solid and logical grounds for the cancellation of one‘s license. Withal, if petitioner
disagrees with the decision of the Office of the President, he should have elevated the matter by petition
for review before the Court of Appeals for the latter‘s exercise of judicial review. Nowhere in the record
do we find such action on petitioner‘s part.

Same; Same; Same; Fishponds; The courts can not award possession to the very same party whose license has been
cancelled by the executive or administrative officer tasked to exercise licensing power as regards the development of
fishpond areas, and which cancellation has been sustained by the Office of the President; The essence of the grant of a
license is that it is not a vested right given by the government but a privilege with corresponding obligations and is
subject to governmental regulation.—Understandably, to restore petitioner to the possession of the fishpond
area is to totally disregard the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President which can hardly be
described as an unrelated matter, considering its patent implications in the result of both Civil Case No.
2085 and CA-G.R. CV No. 23165. For how could the appellate court award possession to the very same
party whose license has been cancelled by the executive or administrative officer tasked to exercise
licensing power as regards the development of fishpond areas, and which cancellation has been sustained
by the Office of the President? Petitioner must remember the essence of the grant of a license. It is not a
vested right given by the government but a privilege with corresponding obligations and is subject to
governmental regulation. Hence, to allow petitioner to possess the subject area is to run counter to the
execution and enforcement of the July 31, 1989 decision which would easily lose its ―teeth‖ or force if
petitioner were restored in possession. In addition, as pointed out in the July 31, 1989 decision,
petitioner is not assailing the May 14, 1985 order of Minister Escudero which gave private respondent
priority in applying for the subject area and which considered respondent‘s improvements thereon as not
forfeited in favor of the government.

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Due Process; Rules of fair play, justice, and due process dictate that parties cannot
raise for the first time on appeal issues which they could have raised but never did during the trial.—Rules of fair
play, justice, and due process dictate that parties cannot raise for the first time on appeal issues which
they could have raised but never did during the trial (Reburiano vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 342
[1999]). Significantly, private respondent could have not been expected to present the July 31, 1989
decision during the trial because it was obviously not yet extant during that time. But one thing is for
sure, petitioner knew that there was a pending administrative case (O.P. Case No. 2958) on the subject
fishpond area. He knew about the appeal since he was precisely the one who filed it, challenging the
January 28, 1985 order of then Minister Escudero which cancelled Fishpond Lease Agreement No.
3090. Hence, the presentation of the July 31, 1989 decision before the appellate court had caused no
undue surprise upon petitioner who, we repeat, was the one who filed the appeal.

Judgments; If the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever
circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, what more if the judgment has not yet attained
finality?—The trial court‘s decision of July 19, 1989 did not attain finality. It was appealed within the
reglementary period. If the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become
executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where
certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the
judgment has become final and executory (David vs. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 710 [1999]) and when
it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it (People vs.
Gallo, 315 SCRA 461 [1999]), what more if the judgment has not yet attained finality?

Same; A judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also covers those necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.—It is thus plain in the case at bar that the July 31, 1989 decision of the
Office of the President is a substantial supervening event which drastically changed the circumstances of
the parties to the subject fishpond lease agreement. For to award possession to petitioner is futile since he
has lost the fishpond license. In point is our ruling in Baluyot vs. Guiao (315 SCRA 396 [1997]) where
we held that judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also covers those
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. For example, where the ownership of a parcel of land
is decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in
the decision, it appearing that the defeated party‘s claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of
ownership. By analogy, the July 31, 1989 decision, is not confined to the validity of the cancellation by
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food of petitioner‘s Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 3090 for violation
of the terms thereof and/or the fisheries rules. The right to possess the subject fishpond area is
necessarily included in the decision. The cancellation or revocation of petitioner‘s license necessarily
eliminated his right to possess the same since the new licensee would then be the one to enjoy this right.
Sañado vs. Court of Appeals, 356 SCRA 546, G.R. No. 108338 April 17, 2001

2. G.R. No. 116801. April 6, 1995.*

GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ, HONORABLE ARTURO C. MOJICA,
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, and HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAMON J. LIWAG,
respondents.

Administrative Law; Ombudsman; The power to investigate and prosecute include the investigation and prosecution
of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or
connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty.—The Office of the Ombudsman has the
power to ―investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient.‖ This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any
crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are
related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty. It is enough that the act
or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public
official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.

Same; Same; The Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance.—In the exercise of his power,
the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. §31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989
(R.A. No. 6770) provides: Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors.—The Ombudsman may utilize
the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and
prosecution of certain cases. Thosedesignated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be
under his supervision and control. (Emphasis added)

Same; Same; When a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the ―supervision and control‖ of the Ombudsman
which means he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his
(prosecutor‘s) decision.—It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already
conducted the preliminary investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation had
been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to
be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under
§31 of the Ombudsman‘s Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the ―supervision and
control‖ of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct,
review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor‘s) decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own
and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.

Same; Same; Contempt; Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to ―punish for contempt, in
accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.‖—
§15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to ―punish for contempt, in
accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided
therein.‖ There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be
held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial,
proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in another context, the
preliminary investigation of a case, of which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in
character.

Same; Same; Suspension; Prior notice and hearing not required since suspension not being a penalty but only a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation.—Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid
because the order was issued without giving her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to
refute the charges against them and because, at any rate, the evidence against them is not strong as
required by §24. The contention is without merit. Prior notice and hearing is not required, such
suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.

Same; Same; Same; Whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking
into account the evidence before him.—As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, however, whether the evidence of
guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before
him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital offenses is not required. In
rejecting a similar argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in that case: The
import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the
evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left
such determination of guilt to the ―judgment‖ of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative
complaint.

Same; Same; Same; Preventive suspension of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor is justified to the end that the
proper prosecution of the case may not be hampered.—Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the
Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their preventive
suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that case may not be hampered. In
addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve grave misconduct, insubordination and
neglect of duty and these charges, if proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman
was justified in ordering their preventive suspension.

Same; Same; Same; The preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus according to law.—On the
other hand, petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were placed under preventive suspension pursuant
to §24 of the Ombudsman Act which expressly provides that ―the preventive suspension shall continue
until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without
pay.‖ Their preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus according to law. Lastimosa vs.
Vasquez, 243 SCRA 497, G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995

3. G.R. No. 97381.November 5, 1992.*

BENIGNO V. MAGPALE, JR., petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and ROGELIO
A. DAYAN, in his capacity as the General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority, respondents.

Administrative Law; Civil Service Commission; Jurisdiction; Rule is settled that a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions acts without jurisdiction if no authority has been conferred by law to hear and decide the case.—
Settled is the rule that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions acts without jurisdiction if
no authority has been conferred by law to hear and decide the case. (Acena v. Civil Service Commission,
193 SCRA 623 [1991]). Magpale, Jr. vs. Civil Service Commission, 215 SCRA 398, G.R. No. 97381
November 5, 1992

4. G.R. No. 137174. July 10, 2000.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD
(DENR), petitioner, vs. MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, respondent.

Ecology and Environment; Mines and Mining; Philippine Mining Act of 1995; Mine Wastes and Tailings; Words
and Phrases; The Philippine Mining Act of 1995 defines ―Mine wastes and tailings‖ as soil and rock materials from
surface or underground mining and milling operations with no economic value to the generator of the same.—The
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 defines ―Mine wastes and tailings‖ as soil and rock materials from
surface or underground mining and milling operations with no economic value to the generator of the
same.

Same; Same; Same; Pollution Control Law; Statutes; Statutory Construction; The provisions of RA 7942
(Philippine Mining Act of 1995) do not necessarily repeal RA 3931 (Pollution Control Law), as amended by P.D.
984 and E.O. 192—repeals of laws by implication are not favored and that courts must generally assume their
congruent application.—From a careful reading of the foregoing provisions of law, we hold that the
provisions of RA 7942 do not necessarily repeal RA 3931, as amended by PD 984 and EO 192. RA 7942
does not contain any provision which categorically and expressly repeals the provisions of the Pollution
Control Law. Neither could there be an implied repeal. It is well-settled that repeals of laws by
implication are not favored and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. Thus, it
has been held: ―The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface,
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into
accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the
legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should
be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.‖

Same; Same; Same; Same; Pollution; Words and Phrases; Pollution refers to any alteration of the physical, chemical
and biological properties of any water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines, or any discharge thereto of any
liquid, gaseous or solid wastes as will or is likely to create or to render such water, air and land resources harmful,
detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare or which will adversely affect their utilization for domestic,
commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational or other legitimate purposes.—There is no irreconcilable
conflict between the two laws. Section 19 of EO 192 vested the PAB with the specific power to
adjudicate pollution cases in general. Sec. 2, par. (a) of PD 984 defines the term ―pollution‖ as referring
to any alteration of the physical, chemical and biological properties of any water, air and/or land
resources of the Philippines, or any discharge thereto of any liquid, gaseous or solid wastes as will or is
likely to create or to render such water, air and land resources harmful, detrimental or injurious to public
health, safety or welfare or which will adversely affect their utilization for domestic, commercial,
industrial, agricultural, recreational or other legitimate purposes.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; The authority of the mines director is complementary to that of the
Pollution Adjudication Board.—On the other hand, the authority of the mines regional director is
complementary to that of the PAB. Section 66 of RA 7942 gives the mines regional director exclusive
jurisdiction over the safety inspection of all installations, surface or underground in mining operations.
Section 67 thereof vests upon the regional director power to issue orders requiring a contractor to remedy
any practice connected with mining or quarrying operations which is not in accordance with safety and
anti-pollution laws and regulations; and to summarily suspend mining or quarrying operations in case of
imminent danger to life or property. The law likewise requires every contractor to undertake an
environmental protection and enhancement program which shall be incorporated in the work program
which the contractor shall submit as an accompanying document to the application for a mineral
agreement or permit. In addition, an environmental clearance certificate is required based on an
environment impact assessment. The law also requires contractors and permittees to rehabilitate the
mined-out areas, and set up a mine rehabilitation fund. Significantly, the law allows and encourages
people‘s organizations and non-governmental organizations to participate in ensuring that
contractors/permittees shall observe all the requirements of environmental protection.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The power of the mines regional director does not foreclose PAB‘s authority to
determine and act on complaints filed before it—while the mines regional director has express administrative and
regulatory powers over mining operations and installations, it has no adjudicative powers over complaints for
violation of pollution control statutes and regulations.—From the foregoing, it readily appears that the power
of the mines regional director does not foreclose PAB‘s authority to determine and act on complaints
filed before it. The power granted to the mines regional director to issue orders requiring the contractor
to remedy any practice connected with mining or quarrying operations or to summarily suspend the
same in cases of violation of pollution laws is for purposes of effectively regulating and monitoring
activities within mining operations and installations pursuant to the environmental protection and
enhancement program undertaken by contractors and permittees in procuring their mining permit.
While the mines regional director has express administrative and regulatory powers over mining
operations and installations, it has no adjudicative powers over complaints for violation of pollution
control statutes and regulations.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Arbitration; Panel of Arbitrators; Mines Adjudication Board; The provisions
creating the Panel of Arbitrators for the settlement of conflicts refers to disputes involving rights to mining areas,
mineral agreements or permits and those involving surface owners, occupants and claim-holders/concessionaires—the
scope of authority of the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board conferred by R.A. 7942 clearly
exclude adjudicative responsibility over pollution cases.—Neither was such authority conferred upon the Panel
of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board which were created by the said law. The provisions
creating the Panel of Arbitrators for the settlement of conflicts refer to disputes involving rights to mining
areas, mineral agreements or permits and those involving surface owners, occupants and claim-
holders/concessionaires. The scope of authority of the Panel of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication
Board conferred by RA 7942 clearly exclude adjudicative responsibility over pollution cases. Nowhere is
there vested any authority to adjudicate cases involving violations of pollution laws and regulations in
general.

Same; Same; The order of the Office of the President directing a mining company to rehabilitate a particular bay at a
specified cost per day ―during the efficacy of the restraining order‖ became functus officio when said company
voluntarily stopped dumping mine tailings into the bay.—We must sustain the appellate court on this point on
account of the testimony of Mr. Edel Genato. Further, we note that the Office of the President never
objected nor ruled on the manifestation dated July 9, 1991 filed by MMC that it would stop paying since
it already ceased dumping mine tailings into the bay. Still further, the order of the OP directing MMC to
rehabilitate at a cost of P30,000.00 a day ―during the efficacy of the restraining order‖ had become
functus officio since MMC voluntarily stopped dumping mine tailings into the bay. Republic vs.
Marcopper Mining Corporation, 335 SCRA 386, G.R. No. 137174 July 10, 2000

5. G.R. No. 93540. December 13, 1999.*

FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
VICENTE A. ROBLES and NESTOR GAPUZAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Third
Division), Hon. BENIGNO T. DAYAW, as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
80, JESUS SY and LILY FRANCISCO UY, respondents.

Remedial Law; Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Assumption by the trial court of the
replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency‘s
prerogative.—The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law,
comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have
first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and
correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. As to the application of this
doctrine in cases involving violations of P.D. No. 705, our ruling in Paat v. Court of Appeals, is apropos:
―Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and
the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special
responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its
function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the
replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agency‘s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special competence.

Same; Replevin; A writ of replevin does not just issue as a matter of course; Mere filing of an affidavit, sans
allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Section 2, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the
issuance thereof.—A writ of replevin does not just issue as a matter of course upon the applicant‘s filing of
a bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans
allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Sec. 2, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot
justify the issuance of a writ of replevin.

Same; Same; Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin must be
satisfactorily established; The taking of the subject properties is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a
writ of replevin prayed for by private respondents.—Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties
sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof
is offered, the writ should not be issued. x x x As the petitioner Secretary‘s administrative authority to
confiscate is clearly provided by law, the taking of the subject properties is not wrongful and does not
warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for by private respondents.

Same; Same; Issuance of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary was a valid exercise of his power under Section
68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705; When a thing is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance
of his execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover it.—Issuance of the confiscation order by
petitioner Secretary was a valid exercise of his power under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705. By virtue of said
order, the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck of private respondents were held in custodia legis and
hence, beyond the reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to be in
custodia legis. When a thing is in official custody of a judicial or executive officer in pursuance of his
execution of a legal writ, replevin will not lie to recover it. Otherwise, there would be interference with
the possession before the function of law had been performed as to the process under which the property
was taken.

Same; Same; Secretary‘s authority to confiscate forest products under Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 is
distinct from and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action under Section 68.—
Petitioner Secretary‘s authority to confiscate forest products under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct
from and independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section
68 of P.D. No. 705.
Same; Same; Delivery of the seized forest products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the appropriate
official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to criminal prosecutions.—Sec. 80 of
P.D. No. 705 which requires delivery of the seized forest products within six (6) hours from the time of
the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies
only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Sec. 68, and not to administrative confiscation provided for
in Section 68-A.

Same; Contempt; The writ of seizure and the writ of replevin were issued by the trial court in grave abuse of its
discretion; Without a lawful order having been issued, no contempt of court could be committed.—The writ of
seizure and the writ of replevin were issued by the trial court in grave abuse of its discretion. Thus,
disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect contempt of court which presupposes that the court order
thereby violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful order having been issued, no contempt of court
could be committed.

Constitutional Law; Due Process; It is settled that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.—Nothing in the records supports private respondents‘ allegation that their
right to due process was violated as no investigation was conducted prior to the confiscation of their
properties. On the contrary, by private respondents‘ own admission, private respondent Sy who drove
the six-wheeler truck was properly investigated by petitioner Atty. Robles at the PIC/SAID Office of the
DENR. Thereafter, private respondent Sy and his witnesses were given full opportunity to explain the
deficiencies in the documents. Private respondents categorically stated that they made a ―continuous and
almost daily follow-up and plea x x x with the PIC for the return of the truck and lumber x x x.‖ Finally
in a letter dated December 30, 1989, private respondent Lily Francisco Uy requested petitioner Secretary
for ―immediate resolution and release of the impounded narra sawn lumber.‖ Undoubtedly, private
respondents were afforded an opportunity to be heard before the order of confiscation was issued. There
was no formal or trial type hearing but the same is not, in all instances, essential in administrative
proceedings. It is settled that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. Factoran, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 530, G.R. No.
93540 December 13, 1999

6. G.R. No. 142261. June 29, 2000.*

GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FACT-
FINDING INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, respondents.

Ombudsman; Statutory Construction; ―Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius‖—the express mention of the things
included excludes those that are not included; All other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose
penalties that are not enumerated in Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. 6770) are not final,
unappealable and immediately executory.—It is clear from the above provisions that the punishment
imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one month, is not among those listed as final
and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. Section 27 states that all provisionary orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory; and that any order, directive or
decision of the said Office imposing the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than
one month‘s salary is final and unappealable. As such the legal maxim ―inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius‖ finds application.The express mention of the things included excludes those that are not
included. The clear import of these statements taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final,
unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant
case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision. This finds support in the Rules of
Procedure issued by the Ombudsman itself which states that ―(I)n all other cases, the decision shall
become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion
for reconsideration or petition for certiorari (should now be petition for review under Rule 43) shall have
been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770.‖
Same; The ruling in Fabian v. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470 (1998), invalidated Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 and
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 and any other provision of law implementing the aforesaid Act
insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the
Supreme Court—the only provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the
proper forum and of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as the proper mode of appeal.—The contention of the Solicitor
General is not well-taken. Our ruling in the case of Fabian vs. Desierto invalidated Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 and any other provision
of law implementing the aforesaid Act only insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The only provision affected
by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters included in said section 27, including the
finality or non-finality of decisions, are not affected and still stand.

Same; Judgments; Appeals; A judgment becomes ―final and executory‖ by operation of law; The fact that the
Ombudsman Act gives the parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these
decisions pending appeal, otherwise the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered
nugatory.—A judgment becomes ―final and executory‖ by operation of law. Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month‘s salary
shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the respondent therein has the right to appeal to the
Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision. In all these other cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will become final after the
lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been
taken, the judgment in the appellate tribunal becomes final. It is this final judgment which is then
correctly categorized as a ―final and executory judgment‖ in respect to which execution shall issue as a
matter of right. In other words, the fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from
its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the
essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.

Judgments; Appeals; Administrative Law; The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become
executory only after they have become final and executory, execution pending appeal being an exception to this
general rule; There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are
immediately executory.—The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory
only after it has become final and executory, execution pending appeal being an exception to this general
rule. It is the contention of respondents however that with respect to decisions of quasi-judicial agencies
and administrative bodies, the opposite is true. It is argued that the general rule with respect to quasi-
judicial and administrative agencies is that the decisions of such bodies are immediately executory even
pending appeal. The contention of respondents is misplaced. There is no general legal principle that
mandates that all decisions of quasijudicial agencies are immediately executory. Decisions rendered by
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board, for example, are not
immediately executory and are stayed when an appeal is filed before the Court of Appeals. On the other
hand, the decisions of the Civil Service Commission, under the Administrative Code, and the Office of
the President under the Local Government Code, which respondents cite, are immediately executory
even pending appeal because the pertinent laws under which the decisions were rendered mandate them
to be so. The provisions of the last two cited laws expressly provide for the execution pending appeal of
their final orders or decisions.

Same; Same; Same; Where the legislature has seen fit to declare a decision of the quasi-judicial agency final and
executory pending appeal, the law so expressly provides.—Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the
decision of the quasi-judicial agency is immediately final and executory pending appeal, the law
expressly so provides. Section 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal
will not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.

Same; Same; Ombudsman; Local Government Code; Municipal Corporations; Where a local elective official was
charged administratively before the Ombudsman, the provisions of the Ombudsman Act should apply; Section 68 of
the Local Government Code only applies to administrative decisions rendered by the Office of the President or the
appropriate Sanggunian against elective local government officials.—Petitioner was charged administratively
before the Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the Ombudsman Act should apply in his case.
Section 68 of the Local Government Code only applies to administrative decisions rendered by the
Office of the President or the appropriate Sanggunian against elective local government officials.
Similarly, the provision in the Administrative Code of 1987 mandating execution pending review applies
specifically to administrative decisions of the Civil Service Commission involving members of the Civil
Service.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and
the Local Government Code on execution pending review should not be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the
Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman Act which provides for such suppletory application; Courts
may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or
intended by the lawmakers.—There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code on execution pending review should be
applied suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman Act
which provides for such suppletory application. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge
the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers. An
omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however
later wisdom may recommend the inclusion.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While in one respect, the Ombudsman Law, the Administrative Code of
1987 and the Local Government Code are in pari materia insofar as the three laws relate or deal with public officers,
the similarity ends there; It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a
particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other.—The Ombudsman
Law, the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code are in pari materia insofar as
the three laws relate or deal with public officers, the similarity ends there. It is a principle in statutory
construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially
designed for the said case must prevail over the other. In the instant case, the acts attributed to petitioner
could have been the subject of administrative disciplinary proceedings before the Office of the President
under the Local Government Code or before the Office of the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act.
Considering however, that petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which
should govern his case.

Same; Same; Ombudsman; Graft and Corruption; Separation of Powers; If it is perceived that the fight against graft
and corruption is hampered by the inadequacy of the provisions of the Ombudsman Act, the remedy lies not with this
Court but by legislative enactment.—Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that
the ruling against execution pending review of the Ombudsman‘s decision grants a one-sided protection
to the offender found guilty of misconduct in office and nothing at all to the government as the aggrieved
party. The offender, according to respondents, can just let the case drag on until the expiration of his
office or his reelection as by then, the case against him shall become academic and his offense,
obliterated. As such, respondents conclude, the government is left without further remedy and is left
helpless in its own fight against graft and corruption. We find this argument much too speculative to
warrant serious consideration. If it perceived that the fight against graft and corruption is hampered by
the inadequacy of the provisions of the Ombudsman Act, the remedy lies not with this Court but by
legislative amendment. Lapid vs. Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 738, G.R. No. 142261 June 29, 2000

7. G.R. No. 96681. December 2,1991.*

HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture 6,
Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila,
petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA
BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO,
ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Commission on Human Rights; Court declares the Commission on Human Rights
to have no jurisdiction on adjudicatory powers over certain specific type of cases like alleged human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.—The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human
Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or
hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations in volving civil or
political rights. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it
was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights.—The most that may be conceded to the Commission. in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusion in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations invoking civil and political rights.—As should at once be
observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication
or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that
power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such
rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession
of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the
conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice or
even quasi-judicial bodies do.—But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts
of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the
popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Commission on Human Rights having merely the power to investigate
cannot and should not try and resolve on the merits the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90–
775.—Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power ―to investigate,‖
cannot and should not ―try and resolve on the merits‖ (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90–775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be
a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The matters are undoubtedly and clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education and also within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.—These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary
of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service
Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Cariño vs.
Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483, G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

8. G.R. No. 114683. January 18, 2000.*

JESUS C. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and MAXIMO ECLIPSE,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed
and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not
necessarily be binding on the other.—The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative
action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court,
in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the
guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence
of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is
another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is
adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the ―substantial evidence‖
rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of
evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative
proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.

Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Due Process; In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; Administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial
sense.—The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict
judicial sense.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity to answer the charges cannot
complain of a denial of due process.—Petitioner‘s failure to present evidence is solely of his own making and
cannot escape his own remissness by passing the blame on the graft investigator. While the respondent
OMBUDSMAN has shown forebearance, petitioner has not displayed corresponding vigilance. He
therefore cannot validly claim that his right to due process was violated. We need only to reiterate that a
party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity to answer the charges cannot complain of a denial of
due process. Ocampo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 322 SCRA 17, G.R. No. 114683 January 18,
2000

9. Cadalin vs. POEA's Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, G.R. No. 104776, G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5, 1994

Conflict of Laws; As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.—As a general rule, a
foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process,
joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum.
This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131 [1979]).

Same; Prescription; A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws.—A law on prescription of
actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or
substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime
Company, supra, the American court applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the
Panamanian law, after finding that there was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was
intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way
to the law of the forum on prescription of actions.

Same; Same; Actions; Words and Phrases; ―Borrowing Statute,‖ Explained; One form of ―borrowing statutes‖
provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced inthe forum even though
the local statute has not run against it.—However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or
substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a ―borrowing statute.‖ Said
statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A ―borrowing statute‖ directs the state of the forum to apply the
foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts 183 [1975]).
While there are several kinds of ―borrowing statutes,‖ one form provides that an action barred by the
laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has
not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of
Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides: ―If by the laws of the state or country where the
cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.‖

Same; Same; Same; Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code.—
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2270 of said
Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as to which were inconsistent with
it. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory
to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws, 104 [7th ed.]).

Same; Same; Labor Law; The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum‘s public
policy.—In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigore
insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976. The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum‘s public policy
(Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To
enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in
question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

Labor Law; Overseas Contract Workers; Prescription; Article 291 of the Labor Code applies to money claims arising
from employer-employee relations, including those arising from application of foreign laws providing for greater
employee benefits.—Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive period for filing
―actions to enforce any cause of action under said law.‖ On the other hand, Article 291 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines provides the prescriptive period for filing ―money claims arising from employer-
employee relations.‖ The claims in the cases at bench all arose from the employer-employee relations,
which is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law or from the collective bargaining
agreement. The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year prescriptive period under
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines applies only to money claims specifically recoverable
under said Code, does not find support in the plain language of the provision. Neither is the contention
of the claimants in G.R. No. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims ―arising from the
employer‘s violation of the employee‘s right,‖ as provided by the Labor Code supported by the facial
reading of the provision.

Same; Same; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; ―Speedy disposition of cases‖ is a relative term, a flexible concept
consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances of each case.—It is true that the constitutional right to
―a speedy disposition of cases‖ is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all
parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and
quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. However, as held in Caballero v.
Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), ―speedy disposition of cases‖ is a relative term. Just like the
constitutional guarantee of ―speedy trial‖ accorded to the accused in all criminal proceedings, ―speedy
disposition of cases‖ is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
delays which render rights nugatory.

Same; Same; Same; Even if the cases took seven years to be disposed of in the administrative level there is no violation
of the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases where the cases are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, involve a
total of 1,767 claimants hired on various dates, with claims totalling more than US$65 million.—The cases at
bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that their final disposition in the administrative level
after seven years from their inception, cannot be said to be attended by unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays as to violate the constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the cases of
complainants. The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of 1,767 claimants. Said
complaint had undergone several amendments, the first being on April 3, 1985. The claimants were
hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were deployed in different areas, one group in and the
other groups outside of, Bahrain. The monetary claims totalled more than US$65 million.

Same; Same; Actions; Class Suits; Where the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain law, only the
claimants who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to file their claims in a class suit, excluding those who worked
elsewhere.—A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 12). While all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain
law, many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia
and Malaysia under different terms and conditions of employment. NLRC and the POEA Administrator
are correct in their stance that inasmuch as the first requirement of a class suit is not present (common or
general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who
worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to file their claims in a class suit.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A principle basic to the concept of ―class suit‖ is that plaintiffs brought on the record must
fairly represent and protect the interests of the others, such that if it appears that each claimant is only interested in
collecting his own claims and has no concern in protecting the interests of the others, the most that can be accorded to
them is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one complaint.—It appears that each claimant is only interested in
collecting his own claims. A claimant has no concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants as
shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into
separate compro-mise settlements of their respective claims. A principle basic to the concept of ―class
suit‖ is that plaintiffs brought on the record must fairly represent and protect the interests of the others
(Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this matter, the claimants who
worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding. The most that can be
accorded to them under the Rules of Court is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one complaint (Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 6).

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they are the
exceptions to the condition sine qua non, requiring the joinder of all indispensable parties.—The Court is extra-
cautious in allowing class suits because they are the exceptions to the condition sine qua non, requiring
the joinder of all indispensable parties. In an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem
if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs. The problem arises when the decision is adverse to
them, in which case the others who were impleaded by their self-appointed representatives, would surely
claim denial of due process.

Actions; Forum Shopping; Before Administrative Circular No. 04-94, the Anti-Forum Shopping Rule (Revised
Circular No. 28-91) applied only to petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.—The Anti-
Forum Shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) is intended to put a stop to the practice of some
parties of filing multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues, with the result that the
courts or agencies have to resolve the same issues. Said Rule, however, applies only to petitions filed
with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. It is entitled ―Additional Requirements For Petitions
Filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals To Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing
of Petitioners and Complainants.‖ The first sentence of the circular expressly states that said circular
applies to and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. While
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 extended the application of the anti-forum shopping rule to the lower
courts and administrative agencies, said circular took effect only on April 1, 1994.

Jurisdiction; Legal Ethics; Attorneys; The NLRC and the POEA have no jurisdiction to investigate charges of
unethical conduct of lawyers.—POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for unethical
conduct against Atty. De Castro because NLRC and POEA have no jurisdiction to investigate charges of
unethical conduct of lawyers.

Same; Same; Same; Complaints for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be filed in a separate
and appropriate proceeding.—The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty. Florante De
Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be filed in a
separate and appropriate proceeding.

Same; Attorney‘s Liens; A statement of a claim for a charging lien should be filed with the court or administrative
agency which renders and executes the money judgment.—A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be
filed with the court or administrative agency which renders and executes the money judgment secured by
the lawyer for his clients. The lawyer shall cause written notice thereof to be delivered to his clients and
to the adverse party (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 37). The statement of the claim for the
charging lien of Atty. Del Mundo should have been filed with the administrative agency that rendered
and executed the judgment.

Evidence; Conflict of Laws; Administrative Law; An official document from a foreign government can be admitted in
evidence in proceedings before an administrative body even without observing the rule provided in Section 24, Rule
132 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence.—Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor
of Bahrain dated April 16, 1983. While said document was presented to the POEA without observing
the rule on presenting official documents of a foreign government as provided in Section 24, Rule 132 of
the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, it can be admitted in evidence in proceedings before an
administrative body. The opposing parties have a copy of the said memorandum, and they could easily
verify its authenticity and accuracy.

Same; Offer to Compromise; In civil cases, an offer to settle a claim is not an admission that anything is due and is
not admissible in evidence against the offeror.—The admissibility of the offer of compromise made by BRII as
contained in the memorandum is another matter. Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on
Evidence, an offer to settle a claim is not an admission that anything is due. Said Rule provides: ―Offer of
compromise not admissible.—In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and
is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.‖ This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the
cluttering of the record with unwanted evidence but a statement of public policy. There is great public
interest in having the protagonists settle their differences amicably before these ripen into litigation.
Every effort must be taken to encourage them to arrive at a settlement. The submission of offers and
counter-offers in the negotiation table is a step in the right direction. But to bind a party to his offers, as
what claimants would make this Court do, would defeat the salutary purpose of the Rule.

Contracts; Overseas Contract Workers; Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted
against the parties who drafted them.—The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted more
felicitously. While a part thereof provides that the compensation to the employee may be ―adjusted
downward so that the total computation (thereunder) plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent
to the compensation‖ therein agreed, another part of the same provision categorically states ―that total
remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation and custom.‖ Any
ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the
parties that drafted it (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, 93 SCRA 257 [1979]).

Same; Conflict of Laws; Parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed, and instead of adopting
the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be
deemed incorporated into their contract ―as a set of terms.‖—The parties to a contract may select the law by
which it is to be governed (Cheshire, Private International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In such a case, the
foreign law is adopted as a ―system‖ to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their
capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and
so forth (16 Am Jur 2d, 150-161). Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may
just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract ―as
a set of terms.‖ By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a
foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set
of contractual terms deemed written in the contract (Anton, Private International Law, 197 [1967];
Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 702-703, [8th ed.]).

Same; Same; The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the parties or their transaction.—A basic
policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties (Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and
Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party expectation is protected
by giving effect to the parties‘ own choice of the applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co. Inc., 151 F.
Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the parties or their
transaction (Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law, 644-647 [1982]). There is no question that the contracts
sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the services
were rendered in that country.

Administrative Law; Due Process; There is no denial of due process even if the respondents had no opportunity to
refute the evidence of the claimants before the POEA where they had all the opportunity to rebut said evidence and to
present their counter-evidence before the NLRC.—NLRC noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters
were submitted to the POEA Administrator by the claimants after the cases were deemed submitted for
resolution and which were taken cognizance of by the POEA Administrator in resolving the cases.
While AIBC and BRII had no opportunity to refute said evidence of the claimants before the POEA
Administrator, they had all the opportunity to rebut said evidence and to present their counter-evidence
before NLRC. As a matter of fact, AIBC and BRII themselves were able to present before NLRC
additional evidence which they failed to present before the POEA Administrator. Under Article 221 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is enjoined to ―use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process.‖

Same; Same; While technical rules of procedure and evidence do not apply to the proceedings conducted by
administrative agencies, there are cardinal rules which must be observed by the hearing officers in order to comply
with the due process requirements of the Constitution.—A principle well embedded in Administrative Law is
that the technical rules of procedure and evidence do not apply to the proceedings conducted by
administrative agencies (First Asian Transport & Shipping Agency Inc. v. Ople, 142 SCRA 542 [1986];
Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]). This principle is enshrined in Article
221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is now the bedrock of proceedings before NLRC.
Notwithstanding the non-applicability of technical rules of procedure and evidence in administrative
proceedings, there are cardinal rules which must be observed by the hearing officers in order to comply
with the due process requirements of the Constitution. These cardinal rules are collated in Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940). Cadalin vs. POEA's Administrator, 238 SCRA 721,
G.R. No. 104776, G.R. Nos. 104911-14, G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5, 1994

10. G.R. No. 113079. April 20, 2001.*

ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PETROLEUM
DISTRIBUTORS AND SERVICES CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 114923. April 20, 2001.*

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTORS AND SERVICES CORPORATION, respondents.

Administrative Law; Oil Industry Deregulation; The policy of the government in regard to the oil industry has been
to allow a free interplay of market forces with minimal government supervision.—The issues raised by the parties
in these consolidated cases bring to the fore the necessity of rationalizing or reconciling two apparently
conflicting decisions of the appellate court on the propriety of building gasoline service stations along
Benigno Aquino, Jr. Avenue in Parañaque, Metro Manila. Considering that the questions raised concern
within the oil industry, whose impact on the nation‘s economy is pervasive and far-reaching, the Court is
constrained to look into the policy and purposes of its governing statutes to resolve this dilemma. The
policy of the government in this regard has been to allow a free interplay of market forces with minimal
government supervision. The purpose of governing legislation is to liberalize the downstream oil
industry in order to ensure a truly competitive market under a regime of fair prices, adequate and
continuous supply, environmentally clean and high-quality petroleum products. Indeed, exclusivity of
any franchise has not been favored by the court, which is keen on promoting free competition and the
development of a free market consistent with the legislative policy of deregulation as an answer to the
problems of the oil industry.

Same; Same: Statutory Construction; The interpretation of an administrative government agency like the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB), which is tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the
construction of the courts.—The interpretation of an administrative government agency like the ERB, which
is tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the
courts. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

Same; Same; Same; When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.—When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement
of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory
for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Thus, an action by an administrative
agency may be set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.

Same; Same; A distinct worldwide trend towards economic, deregulation has been evident in the past decade.—A
distinct worldwide trend towards economic deregulation has been evident in the past decade. Both
developed and developing countries have seriously considered and extensively adopted various measures
for this purpose. The country has been no exception. Indeed, the buzzwords of the third millenium are
―deregulation,‖ ―globalization‖ and ―liberalization.‖ It need not be overemphasized that this trend is
reflected in our policy considerations, statutes and jurisprudence.

Same; Same; Judicial Review; In reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein must be
respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant; The power
to determine whether the building of a gasoline retail outlet in a trading area would benefit public interest and the oil
industry lies with the ERB not the appellate courts.—Time and again this Court has ruled that in reviewing
administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein must be respected as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant; that it is not for the
reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence; that the
administrative decision in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of
grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. Petitioner ERB is in a better position to resolve petitioner
Shell‘s application, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The
power to determine whether the building of a gasoline retail outlet in a trading area would benefit public
interest and the oil industry lies with the ERB not the appellate courts.

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest
level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence and substantial evidence, in that order.—
In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by
clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence and substantial evidence, in that order. A
litany of cases has consistently held that substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an
administrative finding of fact. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion. Suffice it to state in this regard that the factual landscape, measured within the
context of such an evidentiary matrix, is strewn with well-nigh overwhelming proof of the necessity to
build such a gasoline retail outlet in the vicinity subject of the application.

Same; Same; Public Utilities; While in the rigid standards governing public utility regulation exclusivity, upon the
satisfaction of certain requirements, is allowed, exclusivity is more the exception rather than the rule in the gasoline
service station business.—It must be pointed out that in determining the allowance or disallowance of an
application for the construction of a service station, the appellate court confined the factors thereof
within the rigid standards governing public utility regulation, where exclusivity, upon the satisfaction of
certain requirements, is allowed. However, exclusivity is more the exception rather than the rule in the
gasoline service station business. Thus, Rule V, Section 1, of the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Establishment, Construction, Operation, Remodelling and/or Refurbishing of Petroleum Products
Retail Outlets issued by the Oil Industry Commission, and adopted by the ERB, enumerates the
following factors determining the allowance or disallowance of an application for outlet construction, to
wit: (a) The operation of the proposed petroleum products retail outlet will promote public interest in a
proper and suitable manner considering the need and convenience of the end-users, (b) Reasonable
expectation of a commercially viable operation. (c) The establishment and operation thereof will not
result in a monopoly, combination in restraint of trade and ruinous competition, (d) The requirements of
public safety and sanitation are properly observed, (e) Generally, the establishment and operation thereof
will help promote and achieve the purposes of Republic Act No. 6173.

Same; Same; Same; The mere possibility of reduction in the earnings of a business is not sufficient to prove ruinous
competition—it must be shown that the business would not have sufficient gains to pay a fair rate of interest on its
capital investment.—While it is probable that the operation of the proposed Shell outlet may, to a certain
extent, affect PDSC‘s business, private respondent nevertheless failed to show that its business would not
have sufficient profit to have a fair return of its investment. The mere possibility of reduction in the
earnings of a business is not sufficient to prove ruinous competition. Indeed—―In order that the
opposition based on ruinous competition may prosper, it must be shown that the opponent would be
deprived of fair profits on the capital invested in its business. The mere possibility of reduction in the
earnings of a business is not sufficient to prove ruinous competition. It must be shown that the business
would not have sufficient gains to pay a fair rate of interest on its capital investment. Mere allegations by
the oppositor that its business would be ruined by the establishment of the ice plants proposed by the
applicants are not sufficient to warrant this Court to revoke the order of the Public Service
Commission.‖

Same; Same; Same; A climate of fear and pessimism generated by unsubstantiated claims of ruinous competition
already rejected in the past should not be made to retard free competition, consistently with legislative policy of
deregulating and liberalizing the oil industry to ensure a truly competitive market under a regime of fair prices,
adequate and continuous supply, environmentally clean and high-quality petroleum products.—It would not be
remiss to point out that Caltex, PDSC‘s principal, whose products are being retailed by private
respondent in the service outlet it operates along the MIA/Domestic Road in Pasay City, never filed any
opposition to Shell‘s application. All told, a climate of fear and pessimism generated by unsubstantiated
claims of ruinous competition already rejected in the past should not be made to retard free competition,
consistently with legislative policy of deregulating and liberalizing the oil industry to ensure a truly
competitive market under a regime of fair prices, adequate and continuous supply, environmentally
clean and high-quality petroleum products. Energy Regulatory Board vs. Court of Appeals, 357 SCRA
30, G.R. No. 113079, G.R. No. 114923 April 20, 2001

11. G.R. No. 137473. August 2, 2001.*

ESTELITO V. REMOLONA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

Administrative Law; Public Officers; Right to Counsel; The right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is
meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under custodial investigation—the exclusionary rule under paragraph
(2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made
in an administrative investigation.—The submission of Remolona that his alleged extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible because he was not assisted by counsel during the investigation as required under Section
12 paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution deserves scant consideration. The right to
counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who had been
taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit
incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right
to counsel attaches only upon the start of such investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under
paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.

Same; Same; Same; While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be
assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent‘s capacity to represent himself, and
no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel; The right to counsel is not always
imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there
are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining
the dignity of government service.—While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times
be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the
respondent‘s capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the
services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act
No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on
discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987). Thus, the right to counsel is not always imperative in
administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there
are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating
authority is not part of a criminal prosecution.

Same; Same; Same; Admissions made by a respondent during an administrative investigation may be used as
evidence to justify his dismissal.—In the case at bar, Remolona was not accused of any crime in the
investigation conducted by the CSC field office. The investigation was conducted for the purpose of
ascertaining the facts and whether there is a prima facie evidence sufficient to form a belief that an
offense cognizable by the CSC has been committed and that Remolona is probably guilty thereof and
should be administratively charged. Perforce, the admissions made by Remolona during such
investigation may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal.

Same; Same; Dishonesty; The rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the
course of the performance of duty by the person charged—if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty
of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his
right to continue in office; The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the
punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public‘s
faith and confidence in the government.—It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense
punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book
V of Executive Order No. 292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be
committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is
that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even
if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office.
The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties
correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample
opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the
government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and
possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression
and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The
private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the
fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service. The
principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of
such officer, or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public‘s
faith and confidence in the government.

Same; Judicial Review; The rule is that courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the
latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical
manner such that their action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction.—The general rule is that where the
findings of the administrative body are amply supported by substantial evidence, such findings are
accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding on this Court. It is not for the reviewing court
to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence. Thus, when confronted
with conflicting versions of factual matters, it is for the administrative agency concerned in the exercise
of discretion to determine which party deserves credence on the basis of the evidence received. The rule,
therefore, is that courts of justice will not generally interfere with purely administrative matters which
are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear showing that the
latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and
whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess of jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 of the Supreme Court clearly states that in resolving appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies, it is within the discretion of the Court of Appeals to have the original records of the
proceedings under review transmitted to it.—The transmittal of the transcript of stenographic notes taken
during the formal hearing before the CSC is entirely a matter of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals. Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 of this Court clearly states that in resolving appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies, it is within the discretion of the Court of Appeals to have the original
records of the proceedings under review transmitted to it. Verily, the Court of Appeals decided the merits
of the case on the bases of the uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the pleadings filed by
the parties. Remolona vs. Civil Service Commission, 362 SCRA 304, G.R. No. 137473 August 2,
2001

12. [No. 46496. February 27, 1940]

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL
WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

1.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER.—The nature of the Court of Industrial

Relations and of its power is extensively discussed in the decision.

2.ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF LAW.—The Court of

Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth
Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just
and equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that
the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard
the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.—There are cardinal primary rights which must
be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not
only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial
Relations should, in all controvercial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; NEW TRIAL GRANTED.—In the light of the foregoing
fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between
the Ang Tibay and the National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not
satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of law. This
result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for by the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given
opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as
may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial
Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not
entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be, and the same is hereby, granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the
Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it re-open the case, receive all such evidence as may
be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth in the decision.
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc., 69 Phil. 635, No. 46496 February 27, 1940
 13. G.R. No. 127838. January 21, 1999.*
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. JOSE J. LUCAS, respondent.

Administrative Law; Public Officers; Simple Misconduct; Grave Misconduct; In grave misconduct as distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established
rule, must be manifest.—As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an existing guideline of the CSC
distinguishing simple and grave misconduct. In the case of Landrito vs. Civil Service Commission, we
held that ―in grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest,‖ which is
obviously lacking in respondent‘s case.

Same; Same; Same; Due Process; A person can not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged.—
Respondent maintains that as he was charged with simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his
right to due process by convicting him of grave misconduct. We sustain the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed of the
charges against him and that (b) a person can not be convicted of a crime with which he was not
charged.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural
principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.—Administrative proceedings are not
exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in
administrative proceedings.

Same; Same; Same; Sexual Harassment; An employee‘s act of touching a co-employee‘s leg is not constitutive of
grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that respondent was maliciously motivated.—Of course, we do not in
any way condone respondent‘s act. Even in jest, he had no right to touch complainant‘s leg. However,
under the circumstances, such act is not constitutive of grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that
respondent was maliciously motivated. We note that respondent has been in the service for twenty (20)
years and this is his first offense. Civil Service Commission vs. Lucas, 301 SCRA 560, G.R. No.
127838 January 21, 1999

14. G.R. No. 87977. March 19, 1990.*

ILUMINADO URBANO and MARCIAL ACAPULCO, petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,
RAMON BARCELONA and AMY LAZARO-JAVIER, respondents.
G.R. No. 88578. March 19, 1990.*

NEMESIO G. CO, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG (BRANCH 165), THE
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL and FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, respondents.

Political Law; Public Official; Criminal Case; Stare Decisis; The Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to
represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case. The doctrine in Anti-Graft League of the Phil. Inc. vs. Hon.
Ortega and Solicitor General vs. Garrido, and all decided cases affirming the same, not inconsistent with this
pronouncement should be deemed abandoned.—The Court rules that the Office of the Solicitor General is not
authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case. For this reason, the doctrine
announced in Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Ortega and Solicitor General v.
Garrido, and all decided cases affirming the same; in so far as they are inconsistent with this
pronouncement, should be deemed abandoned. The principle of stare decisis notwithstanding, it is well-
settled that a doctrine which should be abandoned or modified should be abandoned or modified
accordingly. After all, more important than anything else is that this Court should be right.

Same; Same; Civil Suit For Damages arising from a felony committed by a public official; This pronouncement
should apply to a public official who is haled to court on a civil suit for damages arising from a felony allegedly
committed by him.—This observation should apply as well to a public official who is haled to court on a
civil suit for damages arising from a felony allegedly committed by him. Any pecuniary liability he may
be held to account for on the occasion of such civil suit is for his own account. The State is not liable for
the same. A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General likewise has no authority to represent him in
such a civil suit for damages.

Same; Same; The argument of the Office of the Solicitor General that it has the authority to represent or otherwise
defend any public official without any qualification or distinction in any litigation pursuant to P.D. No. 478 and
other cited laws is untenable.—For all these reasons, the argument of the Office of the Solicitor General to
the effect that it has the authority to represent or otherwise defend any public official without any
qualification or distinction in any litigation pursuant to the unconditional provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 478 and the other cited laws is untenable. Applying these principles to the case at bar, the
Office of the Solicitor General has no authority to represent Solicitor General Chavez in the civil suit for
damages filed against him in the Regional Trial Court arising from allegedly defamatory remarks uttered
by him.

Same; Same; Citizens Legal Aid Office of the Department of Justice; The Citizens Legal Aid Office of the Department
of Justice may be made to assist in the defense of such public official.—Of course, there is the Citizens Legal Aid
Office of the Department of Justice that may be made to assist in the defense of any such public official.
As to respondent Francisco I. Chavez, he may appear in his own defense in his private capacity in the
action for damages against him. The services of private counsel may also be availed of. And if it is the
intention of the State to protect public officials from alleged harassment suits, then the creation of a
separate office of government lawyers for this purpose may be in order. But certainly the Office of the
Solicitor General can not assume a responsibility in defense of such public officials beyond its statutory
authority.

Same; Same; Office of the Solicitor General not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case
or in civil suit for damages arising from a felony. This applies to all public officials and employees in the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of the Government.—Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds
that the Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a
criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony. This pronouncement applies to all
public officials and employees in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Government.
Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA 347, G.R. No. 87977, G.R. No. 88578 March 19, 1990

15. G.R. No. 96283. February 25, 1992.*

CHUNG FU INDUSTRIES (PHILIPPINES), INC., its Directors and Officers namely: HUANG
KUO-CHANG, HUANG AN-CHUNG, JAMES J.R. CHEN, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG,
VICENTE B. AMADOR, ROCK A.C. HUANG, JEM S.C. HUANG, MARIA TERESA SOLIVEN
and VIRGILIO M. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO
X. VELEZ (Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Makati [Branch 57]) and ROBLECOR
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.

Civil Law; Arbitration; The finality of the arbitrator‘s award is not absolute and without exceptions.—It is stated
explicitly under Art. 2044 of the Civil Code that the finality of the arbitrators‘ award is not absolute and
without exceptions. Where the conditions described in Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040 applicable to both
compromises and arbitrations are obtaining, the arbitrators‘ award may be annulled or rescinded.
Additionally, under Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration Law, there are grounds for vacating,
modifying or rescinding an arbitrator‘ award. Thus, if and when the factual circumstances referred to in
the above-cited provisions are present, judicial review of the award is properly warranted.

Same; Same; Even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared ―final‖ by law are not exempt from
judicial review when so warranted.—Even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared ―final‖
by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. Thus, in the case of Oceanic Bic
Division (FFW), et al. v. Flerida Ruth P. Romero, et al., this Court had occasion to rule that: ―x x x x
Inspite of statutory provisions making ‗final‘ the decisions of certain administrative agencies, we have
taken cognizance of petitions questioning these decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of
discretion, violation of due process, denial of substantial justice or erroneous interpretation of the law
were brought to our attention.
Same; Same; Voluntary arbitrators by the nature of their functions act in a quasi-judicial capacity.—It
should be stressed too, that voluntary arbitrators, by the nature of their functions, act in a quasijudicial
capacity. It stands to reason, therefore, that their decisions should not be beyond the scope of the power
of judicial review of this Court. Chung Fu Industries (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA
545, G.R. No. 96283 February 25, 1992

16. G.R. No. 114711. February 13, 1997.*

GARMENTS and TEXTILE EXPORT BOARD (GTEB), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 115889. February 13, 1997.*

AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. GLORIOUS SUN FASHION

GARMENTS MANUFACTURING (PHILS.), INC. and GARMENTS and TEXTILE EXPORT
BOARD (GTEB), respondents.

Administrative Law; Jurisdiction; Action; The ―re-registered‖ AIFC does not possess the legal personality necessary
for it to prosecute the petitions.—It is obvious that the ―re-registered‖ AIFC does not possess the legal
personality necessary for it to prosecute these petitions. In view of the May 20, 1990 Order of the SEC,
―the certificate of registration issued to American Inter-Fashion Corporation on October 14, 1993 under
SEC Reg. No. AS093-008101-A‖ was revoked. For all legal intents and purposes, AIFC no longer exists,
and it may no longer claim to be entitled to the export allocations subject of these petitions. After all, it
stands to reason that where there is no claimant, there can be no claim. The AIFC International is a
personality separate and distinct from AIFC. For this reason, we cannot grant to AIFC International
Fashion Corporation the personality to pursue the petition in G.R. No. 114711. It has not applied for
and is thus equally devoid of any personality to lay claim on the export allocations subject of said
petition.

Same; Same; Court holds that the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate on the question of AIFC‘s entitlement to the
export allocations belongs solely to the GTEB and not to the regular courts.—After examining the arguments
raised by all parties concerned, we find the arguments of the GTEB and Glorious Sun to be impressed
with merit, and accordingly hold that the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate on the question of AIFC‘s
entitlement to the export allocations subject of the above-entitled petitions (be they export quotas or
export authorizations), which includes the discretion to grant and disapprove said export allocations,
belongs solely to the GTEB, and not to the regular courts.

Same; Same; The power to adjudicate on the question of an entity‘s entitlement to export allocations was expressly
granted to the GTEB or at the very least, was necessarily implied from the power to cancel or suspend quota
allocations is beyond cavil.—In light of the above, AIFC‘s reliance on our ruling in Globe Wireless, Ltd. v.
PSC, is clearly misplaced. On the basis of the provisions of law cited by both the GTEB and Glorious
Sun, that the power to adjudicate on the question of an entity‘s entitlement to export allocations was
expressly granted to the GTEB, or at the very least, was necessarily implied from the power to cancel or
suspend quota allocations, is beyond cavil.

Same; Same; It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.—Having
already invoked the jurisdiction of the GTEB in earlier actions involving the same controversy as that
before us, AIFC cannot now be heard to question that same jurisdiction simply because it was unable to
obtain the reliefs prayed for by it from the GTEB. We have warned against such a practice on more than
one occasion in the past. Most recently, in St. Luke‘s Medical Center, Inc. v. Torres, we reiterated such
warning: ―It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
relief against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. A party cannot invoke jurisdiction at one time and reject it at another in the same
controversy to suit its interests and convenience. The Court frowns upon and does not tolerate the
undesirable practice of some litigants who submit voluntarily a cause and then accepting the judgment
when favorable to them and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse (Tajonera v. Lamaroza,
110 SCRA 447, citing Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 35).‖
Same; Same; Due Process; The GTEB, as an administrative agency, has in its favor the presumption that it has
regularly performed its official duties, including those which are quasi-judicial in nature.—Anent AIFC‘s claim
that it was not afforded the opportunity to present evidence in GTEB Case No. 92-50, we find such
claim unworthy of belief. The GTEB, as an administrative agency, has in its favor the presumption that
it has regularly performed its official duties, including those which are quasi-judicial in nature. In the
absence of clear facts to rebut the same, said presumption of regularity must be upheld. This is also but
in keeping with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; What is repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.—More
importantly, it is apparent that not only was AIFC afforded the opportunity to present evidence, it
actually took advantage of this opportunity by presenting documentary evidence, as asserted by Glorious
Sun, an assertion which AIFC most notably failed to refute. As we have declared time and again, what is
repugnant to due process is the denial of the opportunity to be heard. That AIFC was afforded this
opportunity is beyond question. Garments and Textile Export Board vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA
258, G.R. No. 114711, G.R. No. 115889 February 13, 1997

17. G.R. No. 87146. December 11, 1991.*

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. HON. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION AND MARIA ASUNCION SALAZAR, respondents.

Civil Service; Appeals from decisions of appointing officers involving personnel action; Jurisdiction.—When the law
bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is
to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested
with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
Presidential Decree No. 1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board shall take cognizance of
appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving personnel action. The
Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of the cases specified under Section 5 of P.D.
1409, except in the case specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it
such power, to wit: SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall
administer the Civil Service Commission and shall have the following powers and functions: ―x x x j)
Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section
37 or brought to it on appeal.‖

Same; Same; Same.—The Commission, however, is not without power. As the final arbiter on any matter
concerning personnel action in the government, the Commission is empowered by P.D. 1409, to review the decisions
of the Board, as follows: ―Section 8. Relationship with the Civil Service Commission.—Decisions of the Board
involving the removal of officers and employees from the service shall be subject to automatic review by
the Commission. The Commission shall likewise hear and decide appeals from other decisions of the
Board, provided that the decisions of the Commission shall be subject to review only by the Courts.‖ In
the case at bar, We note that the appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the Review Committee created
under Executive Order No. 17 to both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission. In
the absence of a decision from the Merit Systems Board, the Commission cannot legally assume
jurisdiction over the appeal.

Same; Career service; Primarily confidential positions; Nature of position depends upon nature of functions.—
Whether the position of Technical Assistant III belongs to the career service where the incumbent enjoys
a security of tenure or primarily confidential where her tenure is co-terminous with that of the appointing
authority or endures only as long as confidence in her exists (See Pacete vs. Acting Chairman of COA, et
al., G.R. No. 39456, 7 May 1990) depends upon the nature of the functions of the office (Borres vs.
Court of Appeals, L36845, August 21, 1987). Not even the fact that the position had already classified as
one under the career service and certified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission, can conceal or
alter a positions‘ being confidential in nature (See Hon. Simplicio Grino, et al. vs. CSC, et al., G.R. No.
91602, February 26,1991). GSIS vs. Civil Service Commission, 204 SCRA 826, G.R. No. 87146
December 11, 1991
 18. G.R. No. 100579. June 6, 2001.*
LEANDRO P. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY GOVERNING BOARD, and JOSEFEL P. GRAJEDA,
respondents.

Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies recourse through court action cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies would have first
been exhausted.—The records would show that petitioner filed the petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with the trial court even while the administrative investigation was yet ongoing. Petitioner‘s
immediate recourse to the trial court was premature and precipitate. From the decision of the PCA
Board, once rendered, an administrative remedy of appeal to the Civil Service Commission would still
be available to him. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court
action, cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies would have first been exhausted. The
doctrine does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve, or interfere in, a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is lodged initially with an administrative body, like the PCA
Board and its Investigation Committee, of special competence. The rule is an element of petitioner‘s
right of action, and it is too significant a mandate to be just waylaid by the courts.

Same; Same; If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can
be made to the courts.—‗When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the
government, but nevertheless, a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall
decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on convenience but likewise
on respect: convenience of the party litigants and respect for a coequal office in the government. If a
remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be
made to (the) courts.‖

Same; Same; The rule is that where a law has delineated the procedure by which administrative appeal or remedy
could be effected, the same should be followed before recourse to judicial action can be initiated.—There is no
question that the petitioner Committee and PCA Board acted in the exercise of their jurisdiction in
conducting the administrative investigation of private respondent Garcia. Under Civil Service Law and
Rules exclusive original jurisdiction is lodged in the administrative agency, and appeal is available to the
Commission on Civil Service. The rule is that where a law has delineated the procedure by which
administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the same should be followed before recourse to
judicial action can be initiated (Pascual vs. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 and several other cases).
While there are recognized exceptions to this rule (Cortes, Philippine Administrative Law, pp. 394-395),
We find none of the reasons for excepting this case from the rule.
Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 358 SCRA 416, G.R. No. 100579 June 6, 2001

19. G.R. No. 121863. May 5, 1997.*

UNIVERSI TY OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHAN CELLO R ROGER POSADAS, VICE
CHANCELLOR ROLANDO P. DAYCO, VICE CHANCELLOR MARTIN GREGORIO, PROF.
ARTURO BALBASTRO, PROF. CECILIA FLORENCIO, and PROF. LETICIA PENAÑ O-HO,
petitioners, vs. HON. ELPIDIO M. CATUNGAL, JR. (deceased); HON. OSCAR C. HERRERA,
JR., in his capacity as former acting Presiding Judge of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City; HON. PEDRO M. AREOLA, in his capacity as Present Presiding Judge of Branch 85
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and SALVADOR CARLOS, respondents.

Remedial Law; Injunctions; A litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has
been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.—Since injunction is
the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come with equity or with clean hands. This is so
because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed
in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.
Same; Same; Court is convinced that Carlos did not com e to court for equitable relief with equity or with clean
hands.—We are convinced that Carlos did not come to court for equitable relief with equity or with clean
hands. It is patently clear from the above summary of the facts and from that made by the trial court in
its order of 1 February 1995 that the conduct of Carlos and his counsel before the Tribunal can by no
means be characterized as nobly fair, just, and reasonable. The various strategies adopted by them could
lead rational minds to only one conclusion: they were intended to unduly delay the investigation, if not
to gain time to prevent the witnesses from testifying.

Same; Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The underlying principle of the rule on
exhaustion of administrative rem edies rests on the presumption that the administrative agency if afforded a com plete
chance to pass upon the m atter will decide the same correctly.—Indisputably then, Carlos‘ immediate recourse
to the court was effectively barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The underlying
principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that the adminis
trative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly.
There are both legal and practical reasons for the principle. The administrative process is intended to
provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a
procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or recons ideration,
the courts—for reasons of law, comity, and convenience—will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. University of the
Philippines vs. Catungal, Jr., 272 SCRA 221, G.R. No. 121863 May 5, 1997

20. G.R. No. 106028. May 9, 2001.*

LILIA Y. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO S. MARAYA, as
Regional Director, DAR, Region VI, Iloilo City, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Iloilo
City, RAMON PERUEL, MARCELINO BOLIVAR, ALFONSO CARMELO, ESPERIDION
PELEGRINO and WILFREDO CARMELO,1 respondents.

Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence; Reasons of law, comity and convenience
prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies.—The thrust of the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to
carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass
upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum.
Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper
for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes
fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner.

Same; Same; Exceptions to the doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.—The petitioner raises the
following exceptions to the doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as applicable to the case
at bar: (1) where the questioned order is a patent nullity; (2) where there is a deprivation of the
petitioner‘s fundamental right to due process; and (3) where the question involved is a purely legal one.
We are not convinced that any of the exceptions obtains here. As above stated, the Orders issued by the
Regional Director pursuant to law are not patent nullities, and the alleged denial of the petitioner‘s right
to due process is intertwined with the question of notice upon the petitioner which raises basically a
factual matter, i.e., whether three notices were properly served upon petitioner.

Agrarian Law; Procedure for the determination of the compensation for the landowners under the land reform
program was outlined by the Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals.—The procedure for the
determination of the compensation for the landowners under the land reform program was outlined by
this Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, viz.: x x x under the law, the Land Bank of the
Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under
agrarian reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. (Sec. 1, E.O. 405) Through notice sent
to the landowner pursuant to §16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case the landowner
rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterward, the provincial (PARAD),
the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case maybe, depending on the value
of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he
may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for
the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 357
SCRA 599, G.R. No. 106028 May 9, 2001

21. G.R. No. 132174. August 20, 2001.*

GUALBERTO CASTRO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY RICARDO GLORIA IN
HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS, respondent.

Administrative Law; Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; It is settled that non-observance of the
doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal
of the complaint.—The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the
appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction
before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. It is settled that non-observance of the
doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court
for the dismissal of the complaint.

Same; Same; Doctrine not Absolute; Instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly
resorted to immediately.—The doctrine is not absolute. There are instances when it may be dispensed with
and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are: 1) When the
question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act
complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim
involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 9) in quo warranto proceedings.

Same; Same; Where the case involves only legal questions, the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies
before such judicial relief can be sought.—Truly, a petition for mandamus is premature if there are
administrative remedies available to petitioner. But where the case involves only legal questions, the
litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial relief can be sought. In Cortes
v. Bartolome, a case involving a petition for mandamus, we ruled that ―while it may be that non-judicial
remedies could have been available to respondent in that he could have appealed to the then Secretary of
Local Government and Community Development and thereafter to the Civil Service Commission, the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be adhered to when the question is purely
legal.‖ This is because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal
to the administrative officer would only be an exercise in futility.

Same; Same; Distinction between a question of law and a question of fact.—It is settled that for a question to be
one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well known. There is a question of law when the
doubt or differences arise as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when
the doubt or differences arise as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.

Civil Service Law; Suspension; Payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to
work may he decreed if he is found innocent of the charges.—The issue regarding payment of back salaries
during the period that a member of the civil service is out of work but subsequently ordered reinstated is
settled in our jurisdiction. Such payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not
allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges. However, if the employee is not
completely exonerated of the charges such as when the penalty of dismissal is reduced to mere
suspension, he would not be entitled to the payment of his back salaries. Castro vs. Gloria, 363 SCRA
417, G.R. No. 132174 August 20, 2001
 22. G.R. No. 139382. December 6, 2000.*
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, and ATTY. CARINA J. DEMAISIP, petitioners, vs. ATTY.
JOSEFINA G. BACAL, respondent.

Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; If no appeal need be taken to the Office of the President
from the decision of a department head because the latter is in theory the alter ego of the former, there is greater reason
for not requiring prior resort to the Office of the President in this case since the administrative decision sought to be
reviewed is that of the President himself.—If, as has been held, no appeal need be taken to the Office of the
President from the decision of a department head because the latter is in theory the alter ego of the
former, there is greater reason for not requiring prior resort to the Office of the President in this case
since the administrative decision sought to be reviewed is that of the President himself. Indeed, we have
granted review in other cases involving the removal of the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration and the Executive Director of the Land Transportation Office without
requiring the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies considering that the administrative actions
in question were those of the President.

Same; Same; The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the question raised is purely
legal.—In any event, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the
question raised is purely legal. In this case, the question is whether respondent‘s transfer to the position
of Regional Director of the Public Attorney‘s Office, which was made without her consent, amounts to a
removal without cause.

Constitutional Law; Civil Service Commission; Respondent not having the rank appropriate for the position of Chief
Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent and she can claim no security of
tenure in respect of that position.—As respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the position of
Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent, and she can
claim no security of tenure in respect of that position. As held in Achacoso v. Macaraig: It is settled that
a permanent appointment can be issued only ―to a person who meets all the requirements for the
position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.‖ Achacoso did
not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be
withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and ―at a moment‘s notice,‖ conformably to established
jurisprudence . . . The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically
confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or
lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to
it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting
capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as
permanent even if it may be so designated. . . .

Same; Same; The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the Career Executive Service (CES) does not extend to
the particular positions to which they may be appointed but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President;
Respondent did not acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that she was appointed to the higher position of Chief
Public Attorney.—Security of tenure in the career executive service is thus acquired with respect to rank
and not to position. The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the
particular positions to which they may be appointed—a concept which is applicable only to first and
second-level employees in the civil service—but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President.
Accordingly, respondent did not acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that she was appointed to the
higher position of Chief Public Attorney since she was not subsequently appointed to the rank of CESO I
based on her performance in that position as required by the rules of the CES Board.

Same; Same; Respondent as a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) can be assigned or made to occupy a Career
Executive Service (CES) position with a lower salary grade.—Petitioners are, therefore, right in arguing that
respondent, ―as a CESO, can be reassigned from one CES position to another and from one department,
bureau or office to another. Further, respondent, as a CESO, can even be assigned or made to occupy a
CES position with a lower salary grade. In the instant case, respondent, who holds a CES Rank III, was
correctly and properly appointed by the appointing authority to the position of Regional Director, a
position which has a corresponding CES Rank Level III.‖

Same; Same; The rule is that unless an employee is appointed to a particular office or station he can claim no security
of tenure in respect of any office.—Even in the other branches of the civil service, the rule is that, unless an
employee is appointed to a particular office or station, he can claim no security of tenure in respect of
any office. This rule has been applied to such appointments as Director III or Director IV or Attorney IV
or V in the Civil Service Commission since the appointments are not to specified offices but to particular
ranks; Election Registrars; Election Officers, also in the Commission on Elections; and Revenue District
Officers in the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Special Civil Actions; Quo Warranto; In a quo warranto proceeding the person suing must show that he has a clear
right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another.—On the other hand, as respondent herself does not
have the requisite qualification for the position of Chief Public Attorney, she cannot raise the lack of
qualification of petitioner. As held in Carillo v. Court of Appeals, ―in a quo warranto proceeding the
person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another.
Absent that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.‖ Cuevas
vs. Bacal, 347 SCRA 338, G.R. No. 139382 December 6, 2000

23. G.R. No. 132767. January 18, 2000.*

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, DAVAO CITY and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Administrative Law; Courts; Jurisdiction; Nothing contradictory between the provision of §50 granting the
Department of Agrarian Reform primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate ―agrarian reform matters‖ and
exclusive original jurisdiction over ―all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform‖ which includes the
determination of questions of just compensation, and the provision of §57 granting Regional Trial Courts ―original
and exclusive jurisdiction‖ over (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowner, and (2)
prosecutions of criminal offenses under Republic Act No. 6657.—There is nothing contradictory between the
provision of §50 granting the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate ―agrarian reform
matters‖ and exclusive original jurisdiction over ―all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform,‖ which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the provision of §57
granting Regional Trial Courts ―original and exclusive jurisdiction‖ over (1) all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses under R.A.
No. 6657. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.
Under R.A. No. 6657, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the preliminary determination
of the value of lands placed under land reform program and the compensation to be paid for their taking.
It initiates the acquisition of agricultural lands by notifying the landowner of the government‘s intention
to acquire his land and the valuation of the same as determined by the Land Bank. Within 30 days from
receipt of notice, the landowner shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. In the
event the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held by the provincial
(PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator, as the case may be, depending
on the value of the land, for the purpose of determining the compensation for the land. The landowner,
the Land Bank, and other interested parties are then required to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land. The DAR adjudicator decides the case within 30 days after it is submitted for
decision. If the landowner finds the price unsatisfactory, he may bring the matter directly to the
appropriate Regional Trial Court.

Same; Same; Same; It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, §11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to
the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate
jurisdiction.—As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, this rule is an acknowledgment by the
DARAB that the power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is
vested in the courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, §11, the original and exclusive
jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby
been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles
of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to
determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.

Same; Same; Same; Resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the
legality of administrative action.—The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less ―original and
exclusive‖ because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a
continuation of the administrative determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision
of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the
theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action. Philippine Veterans Bank
vs. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 139, G.R. No. 132767 January 18, 2000

24. G.R. Nos. 142801-802. July 10, 2001.*

BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB, CESAR POSADA, REMEDIOS G. PRINCESA, BENJAMIN
KHO, BENIGNO MANGA, LULU MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RONALDO B. ZAMORA, HON. SECRETARY JOSE PARDO, DEPARTMENT
OF FINANCE, HON. SECRETARY BENJAMIN DIOKNO, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, HON. SECRETARY ARTEMIO TUQUERO, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
respondents.

Constitutional Law; Political Law; Public Offices; Abolition; General rule has always been that the power to abolish
a public office is lodged with the legislature; Except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be
abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence; As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the President‘s power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular
office, or certain law may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.—The general rule
has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds
from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either
created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created
by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The
exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the President‘s power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular
office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Authority of the President to effect organizational changes in the department or agency
under the executive structure recognized in the Larin case.—We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that
this provision recognizes the authority of the President to effect organizational changes in the
department or agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of
Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads Of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and
other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a comprehensive review of their
respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and
procedures; (b) identify activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and
which may be scaled down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the
streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their respective agencies. Section 78 ends
up with the mandate that the actual streamlining and productivity improvement in agency organization
and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the
President.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) is subject to the President‘s
continuing authority to reorganize.—The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls
under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the President‘s continuing authority to
reorganize.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Reorganization is carried out in ‗good faith‘ if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient; Circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil
service employees made as a result of reorganization.—Reorganization is carried out in ‗good faith‘ if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656
provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil
service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in
the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an
office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where
incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices, and (e) where the
removal violates the order of separation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity.—We hold that petitioners‘ right to
security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office
within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Valid
abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.—Indeed, there is no such thing as an
absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, 360 SCRA 718, G.R. Nos. 142801-802 July 10, 2001

25. G.R. No. 96409. February 14, 1992.*

CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

Administrative Law; The presidential power of control was held to mean the power of the President to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter.—This presidential power of control over the executive branch
of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has
been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, to mean ―the power of [the President] to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.‖ It is said to be at the very
―heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.‖

Same; Same; The ―Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency‖ equally accepted as a corollary rule to the control powers
of the President.—Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the
―Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.‖ As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control
powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet
members.

Same; Same; Same; The President‘s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet
who in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdiction in the
executive department.—Thus, and in short, ―the President‘s power of control is directly exercised by him
over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices
under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.‖

Same; National Police Commission; There is no usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM under
Section 51.—We agree, and so hold, with the view of the Solicitor General that ―there is no usurpation of
the power of control of the NAPOLCOM under Section 51 because under this very same provision, it is
clear that the local executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. XXX As such
deputies, they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their functions
under that section. Thus, unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and binding as
acts of the NAPOLCOM.‖

Same; Same; Same; The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP Members to the People‘s Law Enforcement Boards
and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the Commission‘s power of control over the PNP.—The
grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the ―People‘s Law Enforcement Boards‖ (or the
PLEB) and city and municipal mayors is also not in derogation of the Commission‘s power of control
over the PNP.

Same; Same; The police force not being integrated with the military is not a part of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.—It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives
muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the Commander-
in-Chief powers of the President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated with
the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a civilian agency of the government,
it properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive
control.

Same; Same; Same; The President, as Commander-in-Chief is not a member of the Armed Forces.—Consequently,
Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the
transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian
function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat,
abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view,
that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian
whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision ―represent only a part of the organic duties
imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.‖ His position as a civilian
Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that ―civilian
authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.‖ Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290,
G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992