Should Probationary Judicial Officers Be Suspended Over Liquor Brawl Justice Rajnish Kumar PDF

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IN
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A.F.R.
Reserved
Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1501 of 2014
Petitioner :- Sandeep Singh
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Appointment
Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mudit Agarwal,Naveen Kumar Sinha
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,U.N.Mishra
CONNECTED WITH:
(1) Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1502 of 2014

Petitioner :- Sudhir Misha
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Thru Prin.Secy.Appointment
Deptt.Lucknow & Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Naveen Kumar Sinha,Mudit Agarwal
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,U.N. Misra
AND
Petitioner :- Ravi Kumar Sagar
Deptt. Lko. &
AND
Petitioner :- Vineet Kumar
Deptt. Lko. &
AND
Petitioner :- Rahul Singh
Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashwani Kumar,Romit Seth
AND
Petitioner :- Bhanu Pratap Singh
Deptt. Lko. &
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Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashwani Kumar,Romit Seth
AND
Petitioner :- Ashwani Panwar
Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Ashwani Kumar
AND
Petitioner :- Kshitish Pandey
Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mudit Agarwal
AND
Petitioner :- Asha Ram Pandey
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru Prin.Secy.Appointment
Deptt.Lko. & Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Amar Singh
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,U.N. Misra
AND
Petitioner :- Akhilesh Kumar Sharma
Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Amar Singh
AND
Petitioner :- Ashtosh Tripathi
Deptt. Lko. &
Counsel for Petitioner :- Surya Mani Royekwar,Dr. Deepti Singh
AND
Petitioner :- Mukesh Kumar & Anr.
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin.Secy.
Appointment,Lucknow & 2 Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Sandeep Dixit
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Gaurav Mehrotra,U.N. Mishra
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AND
Petitioner :- Hirdesh Kumar & Anr.
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin.Secy.
Appointment,Lucknow & 2 Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Akhilesh Kalra,Avinash Chandra Counsel
for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Gaurav Mehrotra
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Hon'ble Satyendra Singh Chauhan,J.
Hon'ble Rajnish Kumar,J.
(Delivered by Hon’ble Rajnish Kumar, J.)
Since common questions of law and fact are involved in all
the aforesaid connected writ petitions, therefore, they are being
clubbed and decided together by a common judgment and order.
Heard Sri Jaideep Narain Mathur, learned Senior Advocate,
assisted by Sri Mudit Agarwal, Sri Ashwani Kumar, Sri Akhilesh
Kalra and Sri Sandip Dixit, learned Advocates appearing for the
petitioners and Sri S.K.Kalia, learned Senior Advocate assisted by
Sri U.N.Mishra and Sri Gaurav Mehrotra, learned counsel for the
High Court as well as the learned Standing Counsel for the State.
These writ petitions have been filed by total fifteen
petitioners, namely, S/Shri Sandeep Singh, Sudhir Mishra, Ravi
Kumar Sagar, Vineet Kumar, Rahul Singh, Bhanu Pratap Singh,
Ashwani Panwar, Kshitish Pandey, Asha Ram Pandey, Akhilesh
Kumar Sharma, Ashtosh Tripathi, Mukesh Kumar, Shobhit Sourav,
Hridesh Kumar and Himanshu Misra challenging the order of
discharge simpliciter from service dated 22.09.2014 and 15.06.2015
from the post of Civil Judge (Jr.Div.)/Judicial Magistrate under Rule
24(4) of the U.P.Judicial Service Rules, 2001 (hereinafter referred as
"the Rules"). In some of the writ petitions order dated 19.09.2014
and inquiry report dated 12.09.2014 as well as proceedings of the
Full Court of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated
15.9.2014 have also been challenged.
The necessary facts, as culled out from the pleadings in the
writ petitions, for adjudication of the present case are that after
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qualifying the PCS (J) Examination in pursuance of the
Advertisement issued by the Public Service Commission, Uttar
Pradesh the petitioners were appointed and joined on the post of
Civil Judge (Jr.Div.) in pursuance of the U.P. Government
Notification/appointment dated 10.05.2013. The petitioners joined
on different dates and were posted in various districts in the State of
Uttar Pradesh. The petitioners were on probation for a period of two
years. During tenure of their service and period of probation an
induction training programme was conducted as a consequence of
appointment on the post of Civil Judge (Jr.Div.), for the batch of the
petitioners i.e. Civil Judge (Jr.Div.), Phase-II at Judicial Training
and Research Institute, Lucknow (hereinafter referred as JTRI,
Lucknow) during the period 09.06.2014 to 08.09.2014. On the eve
of last day of Training Programme i.e. on 07.09.2014 the petitioners,
total 15 in number, went for dinner at Charan Club and Resort,
Faizabad Road, Lucknow. The petitioners consumed liquor and
took dinner there. Admittedly the aforesaid fifteen Judicial Officers
were present in the Charan Club and Resort (Supra) at the said place
and time. It appears that while the petitioners were taking liquor and
dinner some heated arguments took place between some of them,
which resulted in a scuffle between them. It has been alleged that
the heated arguments were exchanged between Shri Akhilesh
Kumar Sharma, Shri Asha Ram Pandey, Shri Ashwani Panwar, Shri
Bhanu Pratap Singh and Shri Rahul Singh, resulting in beating
(marpeet) to the extent that an officer fell unconscious and was
brought to JTRI in the same condition. After coming to the premises
of the JTRI, Lucknow again there was marpeet between some of
them before the officers of the Institute. It has also been admitted by
the petitioners that the incident had started because of lewd remarks
made in respect of a fellow lady trainee judicial officer. However,
next day the said officers apologized to each other and the matter
ended in an amicable manner. It has further been submitted that it
was a friendly argument initially, which resulted in a scuffle and
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marpeet, however, later the issue was settled amicably, so it cannot
be termed and treated as either a law and order problem or
misconduct. This incident does not invite any cognizance by third
parties as the matter was between five friends and was also settled
amicably between them. It has been stated on behalf of some of the
petitioners in their writ petitions that they were not involved in any
misbehaviour or any scuffle and some of them have stated that they
had tried to pacify the scuffle. Some of them have stated that they
have not consumed the liquor at all. From the pleadings it is
apparent that one of the Judicial Officers was mercilessly beaten by
fellow trainee officers to the extent that he became unconscious and
was brought to JTRI in an unconscious condition. But none of the
petitioners appointed on such a responsible post or the officers
posted at JTRI even cared to inform the incident to the senior
officers or the High Court.
The incident was brought to the notice of the Registrar
General of this Court on 8th of September 2014 through a
telephonic call. After receiving the information the Registrar
General put up a note before Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Hon'ble the
Chief Justice directed on 09.09.2014 to the Senior Registrar
(Judicial) to visit the place of incident for the purpose of
ascertaining as to what had actually happened on 7th of September
2014 at Charan Club and Resort and then at the premises of JTRI,
Lucknow and submit a report. The Senior Registrar (Judicial)
visited the place of incident and after collecting the necessary
information submitted a report before Hon'ble the Chief Justice on
12th of September 2014. The report of the Senior Registrar was
placed before the Administrative Committee of the High Court in its
meeting held on 15th of September 2014, in which the
Administrative Committee resolved that the report be accepted and
the matter be referred to the Full Court for discussion. The minutes
of meeting of Administrative Committee are extracted as under:-
Sl. AGENDA RESOLUTION
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No.
1 Consideration of report dated 12 Considered the report dated 12 September 2014
September 2014 submitted by submitted by Smt. Rekha Dixit, Senior Registrar
Smt.Rekha Dixit, Senior Registrar
(Judicial)(Budget) (Recruitment
(Judicial)(Budget)(Recruitment Cell), High
Cell), High Court, Allahabad Court. Allahabad.
Resolved that the report dated 12 September
2014 submitted by Smt.Rekha Dixit, Senior
Registrar (Judicial)(Budget)(Recruitment Cell),
High Court. Allahabad be accepted.
Let the matter be referred to the Full Court for
discussion.
In terms of the resolution of the Administrative Committee

the matter was placed before the Full Court on 15th of September
2014 and after deliberations the Full Court resolved that the 11
probationers be discharged from service for having failed to give
satisfaction as stipulated under Rule 24(4) of the U.P. Judicial
Service Rules, 2001 and that a recommendation to that effect be
submitted to the appointing authority. The minutes of meeting of
Full Court dated 15.09.2014 are extracted as under:-
AGENDA RESOLUTION
1 Suitability of the Considered the report dated 12.9.2014 submitted by Smt.Rekha
probationary Judicial Dixit, Senior Registrar (Judicial)(Budget)(Recruitment Cell),
Officers, namely, Sri
Ashwani Panwar,
High Court. Allahabad.
Additional Civil Judge
(Junior Division), The meeting of the Full Court commenced at 4.30 p.m. A live
Lakhimpur Kheri, Sri video link between the Hon'ble Judges at Allahabad and
Bhanu Pratap Singh, Lucknow was established.
Additional Civil Judge
(Junior Division),
Bahraich, Sri Asha Ram The Chief Justice opened the discussion by elaborating upon
Pandey, Judicial the nature of the power conferred by Rule 24(4) of the Uttar
Magistrate, Maharajganj, Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001, which provides as
Sri Rahul Singh, Judicial follows:
Magistrate, Auraiya and
Sri Ashutosh Tripathi,
Civil Judge (Junior "24.Probation-(1)
Division), Azamgarh.
...........................
2. Any other matter with 4. If, it appears, to the Court at any time during or at the end of
the permission of the
period of probation or extended period of probation, as the case
Chair.
may be, that a probationer has not made sufficient use of his
Consideration of report opportunities or has otherwise failed to give satisfaction, it
dated 12 September 2014 may, make recommendation to the appointing authority
submitted by Smt. Rekha whereupon the probationers shall be discharged from the
Dixit, Senior Registrar
service by the appointing authority."
(Judicial)(Budget)
(Recruitment Cell), High
Court, Allahabad The letters of appointment issued to the probationers stipulate
that their appointments are temporary in nature and that until
they are permanently appointed, their conditions of service
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would be governed by the Uttar Pradesh Temporary
Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975,
notified on 11 June 1975. The Chief Justice while elaborating
on the power conferred upon the HIgh court to asses the
suitability of a probationer for continuance in service drew
attenton to sub-rule (4) of Rle 24, under which the High Court
may make a recommendaton to the appointing autority for the
discharge of a probationer from service, where the probationer
has "otherwise failed to give satisfacton" during the term of the
probationary appointment. The position of a probationer has
been laid down by the judgment of a Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Gopi Kishore Prasad (AIR
1960 SC 689) and in a judgment of Seven Hon'ble Judges of
the Supreme Court in Shamsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab
(AIR 1974 SC 2192) which have been followed since. The
present meeting, the Chief Justice noted, was only confined to
determining the suitability of the probationers.
The report submitted by the Senior Registrar (Judicial), dated

12 September 2014 had been circulated to all the judges for the
purposes of determining the suitability of the probationary
judicial officers for their continuance in service.
The Chief Justice invited participation by the Hon'ble Judges,

both at Allahabad and Lucknow. The Hon'ble Judges who
wished to place their views before the Full Court both at
Allahabad and Lucknow placed their views before the Full
Court. The discussions which commenced at 4.30 pm
continued until 6.00 pm. during the course of the discussion,
the suitability for continuance in service of the following
probationary judicial officers was considered;
1. Sri Akhilesh Kumar Sharma

2. Sri Asharam Pandey,
3. Shri Ashutosh Tripathi
4. Sri Ashwani Panwar
5. Sri Bhanu Pratap Singh
6. Sri Kshitish Pandey
7. Sri Rahul Singh
8. Sri Ravi Kumar Sagar
9. Sri Sandeep Singh
10.Sri Sudheer Mishra
11.Shri Vineet Kumar
The Full Court resolved that the aforesaid 11 probationers be

discharged from service for having failed to give satisfaction,
as stipulated in Rle 24(4) and that a recommendation to that
effect be submitted to the appointing authority. All the
probationers, who are to be discharged from service, should be
paid one month's pay plus allowances in lieu of notice.
Accordingly, orders for the discharge simpliciter of the

aforesaid probationary judicial officers be recommended to be
issued by the appointing authority under Rule 24(4) of the
Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001.
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In pursuance of Full Court recommendation, 11
petitioners/Judicial Officers, namely, S/Shri Akhikesh Kumar
Sharma, Asha Ram Pandey, Ashutosh Triapthi, Ashwani Panwar,
Bhanu Pratap Singh, Kshitish Pandey, Rahul Singh, Ravi Kumar
Sagar, Sandip Singh, Sudhir Mishra and Vineet Kumar were
discharged under Rule 24(4) of the U.P.Judicial Service Rules, 2001
giving one month's salary plus allowance in lieu of notice with
immediate effect by an order of simpliciter discharge passed by the
Government.
Subsequently one Hon'ble Judge of this Court wrote a letter
and in pursuance thereof Senior Registrar of the High Court put up a
proposal dated 28.10.2014 before Hon'ble the Chief Justice
indicating therein that report of Senior Registrar (Judicial) is silent
about the role of Senior Officers of the JTRI, Lucknow. He further
stated that though the three Senior Officers had been transferred
from the Institute on 19.9.2014, but their role in the incident is yet to
be inquired into for preventing happening of such incident in future.
He further submitted that it would be in the fitness of the things that
the points indicated by his Lordship may be inquired into by a
Senior Judicial officer so that corrective measures may be taken.
Hon'ble the Chief Justice ordered for Vigilance Inquiry to be
conducted by the OSD (Enquiries) in respect of the role of senior
officers of JTRI on 29.10.2014. In pursuance thereof the inquiry
report was submitted on 27.01.2015 by the OSD (Enquiries) after
conducting the Vigilance Inquiry in the matter.
In paragraph 136 of this inquiry report it has been mentioned
that after seeing the CCTV footage of Charan Club & Resort,
Faizabad Road, Lucknow, fifteen induction trainee officers were
identified, namely, S/Shri Vineet Kumar, Kshitiz Pandey, Sandeep
Singh, Ravi Kumar Sagar, Ashutosh Tripathi, Sudhir Mishra,
Ashwani Panwar, Bhanu Pratap Singh, Asha Ram Pandey, Akhilesh
Kumar Sharma, Rahul Singh, Mukesh Kumar, Hridesh Kumar,
Shobit Sourav and Himanshu Mishra who were present at Charan
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Club& Resort on 07.09.2014. It has also been mentioned that there
were three incidents of fighting between the officers on the same
night, two at Charan Club and Resort and one at JTRI, Lucknow
In view of the aforesaid report the names of four additional
judicial officers namely S/Shri Mukesh Kumar, Hridesh Kumar,
Shobhit Sourav and Himanshu Mishra emerged. The report of the
OSD (Enquiries) was placed before the Administrative Committee,
which after considering the same directed to place it before the Full
Court vide resolution dated 05.02.2015. Accordingly the matter was
placed before the Full Court on 23.05.2015 in terms of resolution
dated 05.02.2015, which after considering the matter resolved that
the four probationers/petitioners, namely, S/Shri Mukesh Kumar,
Hridesh Kumar, Shobhit Sourav and Himanshu Mishra be
discharged from service for having failed to give satisfaction as
stipulated under Rule 24(4) of the Judicial Service Rules 2001, and
a recommendation was made that let orders for discharge
simpliciter of the aforesaid probationary judicial officers be issued
by the appointing authority. The minutes of Full Court meeting
dated 23.05.2015 are extracted as under:-
AGENDA RESOLUTION
2. Sri Mukesh Kumar, Additional Resolved that the following four probationers:
Civil Judge (Junior Division), 1. Sri Mukesh Kumar
Pratapgarh, Sri Hirdesh Kumar,
Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai,
2. Sri Hridesh Kumar
Sri Shobhit Sourav, Civil Judge 3. Sri Shobhit Sourav and
(Junior Division), Shravasti at 4. Sri Himanshu Mishra
Bhinga and Sri Himanshu Mishra, be discharged from service for having failed to
Additional Civil Judge (Junior give satisfaction, as stipulated in Rule 24(4) of
Division), Basti.
the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001
Consideration of the vigilance and that a recommendation to that effect be
report dated 27.1.2015 submitted submitted to the appointing authority. The
by Sri Sanjay Kumar Pachori, probationers, who are to be discharged from
O.S.D.(Enquiry), High Court, service, should be paid one month's pay plus
Allahabad pursuant to the
Administrative Committee's
allowances in lieu of notice.
Resolution dated 5.2.2015. Let orders for discharge simpliciter of the
aforesaid probationary judicial officers be
recommended to be issued by the appointing
authority.
In furtherance thereof the aforesaid four judicial officers were

discharged by a simpliciter discharge order vide office
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memorandum dated 15th of June 2015, passed by State
Government.
Being aggrieved with the order of discharge simpliciter the
petitioners have preferred the instant writ petitions before this court.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the order of
simpliciter discharge has been passed in purported exercise of Rule
24(4) of the Rules without affording any opportunity of hearing to
the petitioners at any stage. Submission is that the impugned order
dated 19.09.2014 corrected/amended vide order dated 22.09.2014 is
a camouflage as discharge simpliciter, but in fact the same is
stigmatic order founded on the alleged misconduct based on a
solitary incident which occurred at Charan Club and Resort on
07.09.2014, in which it has been alleged that certain scuffle took
place between the petitioners while they had gone there for liquor
and dinner. In respect of the said incident an inquiry was conducted
by Senior Registrar (Judicial) and a report dated 12.09.2014 was
submitted. On the basis of the aforesaid report the incident was
termed as misconduct and the services of the petitioners have been
terminated. It has further been submitted that the petitioners after
appointment as Civil Judge (Jr.Div.) completed their three months
training successfully at JTRI on 8th of September 2014 and nothing
adverse was reported by the Director of the Institute as such there
was nothing against the petitioners with regard to their conduct or
performance during training. Otherwise the Director should have
sent a report to the Court about the conduct and performance of the
petitioners during the training under Rule 22(3) of the Rules, rather
the training completion certificate has been issued by the Director
with a note that ‘However it is learnt that due to an incident which
took place in the night of 7th of September 2014, services of the
trainee officer has been dispensed with’. Further submission of the
learned counsel for the petitioners is that there was nothing against
the petitioners either in regard to their conduct or performance or
during their training, as such the petitioners could not have been
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discharged in purported exercise of power under Rule 24(4) of the
Rules on the ground that the petitioners have not made sufficient use
of their opportunity or have failed to give satisfaction. Accordingly,
the submission is that the petitioners had been performing their
duties successfully and without any complaint and their working
was always appreciated but for the incident, which had taken place,
in respect of which the inquiry was got conducted and a report was
submitted on 12.09.2014. Further submission is that the aforesaid
report goes to indicate that the allegation of misconduct has been
made against the petitioners and the petitioners have been alleged to
have taken liquor and entered into brawl in public place which is a
Club and Resort and on the basis of the said incident, order of
simpliciter discharge has been passed without holding any inquiry in
pursuance of the said fact finding inquiry. However, since nobody
else was there in the Club and Resort at the time of incident, it can
not be said that it had happened in public place and seen by
anybody. Further submission is that no inquiry was made by the
opposite parties in respect of suitability of the petitioners in the
office of Civil Judge (Jr.Div.), rather the inquiry was conducted into
the incident and once the incident was inquired into and the
complaint was to the effect that liquor has been taken in public place
and the petitioners have entered into a brawl then a full fledged
inquiry should have been held and the petitioners should have been
afforded opportunity of hearing and the principles of natural justice
should not have been violated. Thus, the petitioners' orders of
simpliciter discharge are not sustainable in the eyes of law. It has
also been submitted that it is not a motive on the basis of which the
petitioners have been terminated, but it is a foundation on the basis
of alleged incident and the misconduct which is followed by the
termination order. Further it has been submitted that the Full Court
Agenda was circulated in respect of five officers on the same date
for consideration of the report submitted by the Senior Registrar
(Judicial), but the Full Court has taken a decision to discharge the
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services of 11 Judicial Officers/petitioners without ascertaining their
involvement in the incident and therefore on this count, the
resolution of the Full court is defective, illegal and without
application of mind. The order of simpliciter discharge in pursuance
thereof is therefore said to be not sustainable in law.
On behalf of the petitioners of writ petition No.1356 (SB) of
2015 and Writ petition No.1357 (SB) of 2015, namely, S/Shri
Mukesh Kumar, Shobit Sourav, Hridesh Kumar and Himanshu
Misra, it has been submitted that their names did not appear initially
in the inquiry report, which was conducted by the Senior Registrar
(Judicial), but upon a letter written by an Hon'ble Judge of this
Court an enquiry was held with a pre-determined mind to cover up
the lacuna in the earlier report of the Senior Registrar (Judicial). It
has further been submitted that in the said report names of these four
officers came to light on the basis of CCTV footage, but there is no
incriminating remarks against them. Even then on the basis of the
said report these four petitioners have been discharged vide order
dated 15.06.2015 by an order of simpliciter discharge without there
being any evidence against them. It has further been submitted that
the order dated 15.06.2015 has been passed referring the inquiry
report of the OSD (Enquiries), in which no opportunity was afforded
to the petitioners so the same is not sustainable on the face of it as it
has been passed in gross violation of the principles of natural
justice.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the
reliance placed by the learned counsel for the opposite parties in
respect of conduct of the judicial officers and also that the stand on a
different footing is of no substance and liable to be repelled as the
law applies equally to all. It has further been submitted that if an
officer can be dismissed after holding an inquiry, then it cannot be
said that a judicial officer can be dismissed without holding any
inquiry as the protection of law in respect of discharge/termination
based on misconduct will be available to the petitioners also and
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they cannot be thrown out without following the due procedure of
law.
In view of the aforesaid submissions, it has been submitted
that once the inquiry has been made and the incident has been
alleged, then the order becomes punitive and stigmatic and the same
cannot survive without any opportunity of hearing in the eyes of law
as it has been passed without affording opportunity of hearing in
violation of principles of natural justice.
As regards the petitioner Sri Asha Ram Pandey, it has been
submitted that not only his lien has been terminated from the post of
Assistant Prosecution Officer but the Govt. has also recommended
for cancellation of his selection on the said post in view of the
termination of his services by the High Court.
It has also been pointed out that the petitioners stand debarred
from appointment in judicial service of other States as is evident
from an advertisement of the State of Karnataka which
deprives/disqualifies the persons for appointment for Higher
Judicial Service who have even been discharged simpliciter.
Accordingly it has been submitted that the order of simpliciter
discharge is in fact a punitive and stigmatic order and it is not
sustainable. However during course of arguments it was informed
that some of the petitioners have been selected and appointed again
at other places even in judicial service in other States.
On the basis of the aforesaid submissions learned counsel for
the petitioners submitted that the services of the petitioners have
been discharged in wholly arbitrary, illegal and biased manner
without application of mind and without affording opportunity of
hearing to the petitioners in gross violation of principles of natural
justice as such the same are not sustainable in the eyes of law and
liable to be quashed by this Court and the writ petitions are liable to
be allowed with costs.
Learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of their
submissions, have placed reliance on Shamsher Singh Vs. State of
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Punjab; 1974 (2) SCC 831, Anoop Jaiswal Vs. Government of India, 1984 (2)
SCC 369, Chandra Prakash Shahi Vs. State of U.P.; 2000 (5) SCC 152,
Register General High Court of Gujarat Vs. Jayshree Chaman Lal
Buddhibhatti; 2013 SCC Online 952, State Bank of India Vs. Palak Modi; 2013
(3) SCC 607, Dr.Mrs. Sumati P. Shere Vs. Union of India and others; (1989) 3
SCC 311, Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary Vs. Indira Gandhi Institute of Medical
Sciences, Patna, Bihar and others; (2015) 15 SCC 151, Parshotam Lal
Dhingra Vs. Union of India; AIR 1958 SC 36, K. H. Phadnis Vs. State of
Maharashtra; 1971 (1) SCC 790, Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U. P. State Agro
Industries Corporation Ltd. and another; (1999) 2 SCC 21, Dipti Prakash
Banerjee Vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences,
Calcutta and others; (1999) 3 SCC 60, Mathew P.Thomas Vs. Kerala State
Civil Supply Corpn. Ltd. and others; (2003) 3 SCC 263.
Per contra, learned counsel for the High Court submitted that
the petitioners, after appointment on the post of Civil Judge (Jr.
Div.), were on probation, as such their services were on trial as per
law. But during period of probation they failed to maintain the high
standards of conduct and behaviour expected from a judicial officer.
It has further been submitted that the general principles of service
jurisprudence applicable to any other service may not be strictly
applicable in the case of judicial officers as the judicial service is a
different category of employment. The standards expected from the
judicial officers both in performance of judicial duties as well as
behaviour in private life have to be of a higher probity and propriety
vis-a-vis any other Government service. Further highest standards
of probity, morality and propriety, both in discharge of judicial
functions as well as in public life are expected from persons who are
to be appointed as judicial officers or working as judicial officers
after appointment.
Learned counsel for the High Court further submitted that the
petitioners, who are 15 in number, went for a dinner and liquor at
Charan Club and Resorts, which is a public place and after taking
liquor involved in scuffle and marpeet to the extent that one of the
judicial officer was beaten so mercilessly that he fell unconscious
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and in that stage he was brought to the JTRI where also the marpeet
took place. Even thereafter the petitioners, who were appointed on
the most responsible post of Civil Judge (Jr.Div.) to discharge the
pious work of dispensation of justice, did not inform the higher
officers or High Court about the incident. The worst part is that the
incident was informed telephonically by somebody else on the next
day and on coming to know with the facts, they were got verified by
the Senior Registrar (Judicial) of this Court by the order of Hon'ble
the Chief Justice. It was found that the petitioners have failed to
give satisfaction during probation as stipulated under Rule 24(4) of
the Rules. Accordingly they have been discharged from service by a
simpliciter order of discharge after due consideration by the
Administrative Committee and the Full Court in accordance with
law.
Learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that the
power has been exercised as contemplated in the Rules and there is
no illegality in the order passed by the High Court. He further
submitted that the decision has been taken in accordance with law as
the petitioners had tried to diminish the image of the Institution in
public. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioners have
been discharged by an order of simpliciter discharge in which Rules
of principles of natural justice are not applicable. Accordingly the
order cannot be termed to be stigmatic and the services of the
petitioners have not been discharged on account of any misconduct,
but because they have failed to give satisfaction that they are fit for
the service.
It has further been submitted that the challenge to the
impugned orders on the ground that in some of the orders a mention
has been made of the Inquiry report so it is stigmatic and not
sustainable, is totally misconceived and not sustainable because
once a decision was taken by the Full Court to discharge the
services of the judicial officers by an order of simpliciter discharge,
then, mention, if any, made by the Government, does not make the
16
order punitive, stigmatic or against law. Even otherwise the report
mentioned in the said order was not in respect of any misconduct of
the petitioners, rather it was in respect of the conduct of the judicial
officers posted at JTRI. During inquiry, on the basis of the CCTV
footage, it transpired that in fact 15 officers had gone to Charan
Club and Resort on 07.09.2014, when the incident had taken place.
In fact in the earlier report of the Senior Registrar (Judicial) also
presence of 13-14 judicial officers is mentioned. Accordingly the
services of the remaining 4 judicial officers were dispensed with by
order of simpliciter discharge.
the opposite parties submitted that the petitioners were not liable to
be retained in service.
In regard to the report it has been submitted that no fact
finding inquiry was held and in fact only a report was called by
Hon'ble the Chief Justice from Senior Registrar (Judicial) to know
the facts as to actually what had happened. Once the incident was
verified and it was found that these judicial officers/petitioners have
gone at a public place to have dinner and liquor where they made
lewd remarks in respect of a fellow lady trainee Judicial Officer and
entered into a brawl and marpeet to the extent that a judicial officer
fell unconscious, the court concluded that their conduct and
behaviour is unbecoming of a Judicial Officer and they have failed
to give satisfaction to retain them in service. Further it has been
submitted that the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners
that services of one of the petitioners have been dispensed with from
the post of Assistant Prosecution Officer in view of the order of
discharge passed by this Court and they are not liable for selection
in judicial service of other States, is also misconceived and not
sustainable because it is the view of the department concerned.
Further if the rules of any service permit not to appoint such
officers, it cannot be said that the order is punitive or stigmatic
particularly in view of the fact that some of the judicial officers have
17
been appointed again at other places including in the judicial
service.
the opposite parties submitted that the writ petitions are highly
misconceived and devoid of any merit and are liable to be dismissed
with costs.
Learned counsel for the respondents, in support of their
submissions, have placed reliance on Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs.
Union of India; AIR 1958 SC 36, Rajesh Kohli Vs. High Court of
Jammu and Kashmir; (2010) 12 SCC 783, Pavanendra Narayan
Verma Vs. S.G.P.G.I. & Another; (2002) 1 SCC 520,
Krishnadevaraya Education Trust & Another Vs. L.A.Balakrishna;
(2001) 9 SCC 319, The Manager Govt. Branch Press & Another Vs.
D. B. Belliappa; (1979) 1 SCC 477, Daya Shanker Vs. H.C. of
Allahabad and others; (1987) 3 SCC 1, Ram Gopal Ghaturvedi Vs.
State of M.P.; (1969) 2 SCC 240, C. Ravichandra Iyer Vs. Justice A.
M. Bhattacharjee & Others; (1995) 5 SCC 457, Nawal Singh Vs.
State of U.P. and another; (2003) 8 SCC 117, Ashok Kumar Yadav
Vs. State of Haryana; (1985) 4 SCC 417, Pawan Kumar Nigam
(5571 (SS) 1981); Special Appeal No. 633 of 2014, Dr. T. C. Pillai
Vs. I.I.T. Guindy, Madras; (1971) 2 SCC 251, State of U.P. Vs.
Kaushal Kishore Shukla; (1991) 1 SCC 691, Ashok Kumar Sonkar
Vs. Union of India and others; (2007) 4 SCC 54, Punjab National
Bank & others Vs. Manjeet Singh and Another; (2006) 8 SCC 647,
P. D. Agarwal Vs. State Bank of India and others; (2006) 8 SCC
776, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation & Others Vs. S.
G. Kotturappa & Another; (2005) 3 SCC 409, R. C. Chandel Vs.
High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Another; (2012) 8 SCC 58, High
Court of Judicature, Patna Vs. Shiveshwar Narayn & Another;
(2011) 15 SCC 317, Rajendra Singh Verma Vs. Lt. Governor and
others; (2011) 10 SCC 1, High Court of Judicature of Bombay Vs.
Udai Singh and others; (1977) 5 SCC 129, Municipal Committee,
Sirsa Vs. Munshi Ram; (2005) 2 SCC 382, H. F. Sangati Vs.
18
Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka; (2001) 3 SCC 117,
Paras Nath Pandey Vs. Director, North Central Zone, Cultural
Centre, Allahabad; (2008) 10 ADJ 283 (DB), Judgment and order
dated 23.09.2016 passed in Writ Petition No.2733 of
2013:Gurunath Dinkar Mane Vs. State of Maharahtra (Challenged
through Special Leave to Appeal No.18148 of 2017 – Dismissed on
18.09,2017).
Considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the

parties and perused the record.
A judicial officer is required to maintain high standards of

probity, morality and propriety in their judicial duties as well as in
personal life. Once a person has been appointed as a Judge, he must
accept restrictions on his/ her conduct and behaviour which would
be viewed as burdensome and onerous by an ordinary citizen. He is
required to maintain high standards of conduct. A judge has to act at
all times in a manner which upholds and promotes the good name,
dignity and esteem of the office of a judicial officer and
administration of justice. It is an established fact that the conduct of
a judicial officer does not end at the door of the court room, it goes
beyond it. Increased media attention, public awareness and public
scrutiny allows very little privacy and the behaviour of judges even
in their private capacity can have serious effects on the public
perception of their impartiality and on the judicial system. A judge
should respect and comply with the law and act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the institution. Public
confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper
bahaviour of Judges in public places, which leads to a situation
where public and Government officers do not care to have deference
to the judgements and court proceedings. That is why a Judge
carries a great responsibility to maintain high standards of probity
and behaviour, both personally and in public life, adherence to
which brings public confidence in the impartiality of judiciary,
19
while conversely, violation of laws and loose behaviour that too in
public places diminishes public confidence in the judiciary and
injures the judicial system. There is one more aspect. Punishment
has been provided for contempt or scandalizing Judges. Therefore,
the Judges have more responsibility to maintain high standards and
not to give chance to public to abuse or even raise a finger against a
judicial officer or the system. Consequently a judicial officer stands
on a different pedestal than any other Government servant.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Daya Shankar versus

High Court of Allahabad and others; (1987) 3 SCC 1 has held that
the judicial officers cannot have two standards, one in the court and
another outside the court. They must have only one standard of
rectitude, honesty and integrity. They cannot act even remotely
unworthy of the office, they occupy.
In the case of C. Ravichandran Iyer versus Justice A.M.

Bhattacharjee and others; (1995) 5 SCC 457, the Hon'ble Apex
Court held that judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society is
therefore entitled to expect that a judge must be a man of high
integrity, honesty and required to have moral vigour, ethical
firmness and impervious to corrupt or venial influences and after
dealing the issue has held that it is expected of him to maintain high
standard of conduct. The relevant paragraph 21 of the judgment is
reproduced as under:-
"21. Judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society is,

therefore, entitled to expect that a Judge must be a man
of high integrity, honesty and required to have moral
vigour, ethical firmness and impervious to corrupt or
venial influences. He is required to keep most exacting
standards of propriety in judicial conduct. Any conduct
which tends to undermine public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the court would be
deleterious to the efficacy of judicial process. Society,
therefore, expects higher standards of conduct and
rectitude from a Judge. Unwritten code of conduct is writ
large for judicial officers to emulate and imbibe high
moral or ethical standards expected of a higher judicial
functionary, as wholesome standard of conduct which
would generate public confidence, accord dignity to the
20
judicial office and enhance public image, not only of the
Judge but the court itself. It is, therefore, a basic
requirement that a Judge's official and personal conduct
be free from impropriety; the same must be in tune with
the highest standard of propriety and probity. The
standard of conduct is higher than that expected of a
layman and also higher than that expected of an
advocate. In fact, even his private life must adhere to
high standards of probity and propriety, higher than
those deemed acceptable for others. Therefore, the
Judge can ill-afford to seek shelter from the fallen
standard in the society."
In the case of R.C.Chandel versus High Court of Madhya
Pradesh and another; (2012) 8 SCC 58, the Hon'ble Apex Court
has held that judicial service is not an ordinary government service
and the Judges are not employees as such. They hold the public
office. Their function is one of the essential functions of the State. In
discharge of their functions and duties, the Judges represent the
State. The office that a Judge holds is an office of public trust. A
judge must be a person of impeccable integrity and unimpeachable
independence.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Kohli versus

High Court of Jammu & Kashmir; (2010) 12 SCC 783 while
considering the case of a judicial officer has held as under:
31. The High Court has a solemn duty to consider and appreciate the
service of a judicial officer before confirming him in service. The
district judiciary is the bedrock of our judicial system and is positioned
at the primary level of entry to the doors of justice. In providing the
opportunity of access to justice to the people of the country, the judicial
officers who are entrusted with the task of adjudication must officiate in
a manner that is becoming of their position and responsibility towards
the society.
32. Upright and honest judicial officers are needed not only to bolster
the image of the judiciary in the eye of the litigants, but alst to sustain
the culture of integrity, virtue and ethics among Judges. The public's
perception of the judiciary matters just as much as its role in dispute
resolution. The credibility of the entire judiciary is often undermined by
isolated acts of transgression by a few members of the Bench, and
therefore it is imperative to maintain a high benchmark of honesty,
accountability and good conduct.
In the said judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court has also held
that services rendered by a judicial officer during probation are
21
assessed not solely on the basis of judicial performance, but also on
the probity as to how one has conducted himself.
Similar view has been expressed by the Apex Court in the

case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay Vs. Udai Singh;
(1997) 5 SCC 129.
The Apex Court in the case of Rajendra Singh Verma versus
Lieutenant Governor and others; (2011) 10 SCC 1, held that
judicial service is not a service in the sense of an employment as is
commonly understood. Judges discharge their functions while
exercising the sovereign judicial power of State.
Similar principle has been laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Patna versus
Shiveshwar Narayan and another; (2011) 15 SCC 317.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nawal Singh versus
State of U.P. and another; (2003) 8 SCC 117, has held that judicial
service is not a service in sense of an employment as is commonly
understood. Judges discharge their functions while exercising the
sovereign judicial power of State. It should be reflected in their
overall reputation. Further the nature of judicial service is such that
it cannot afford to suffer continuance in service of persons of
doubtful integrity or persons who have lost their utility. Though the
said case is of compulsory retirement but regarding the probity and
propriety in behaviour of a judicial officer, the observation of the
Hon'ble Apex Court is in consonance with the principles laid down
by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
In view of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the
aforesaid judgments it is well settled that the judicial service is not a
service in the sense of an employment and it is on different footing
in which the judicial officer is required to maintain high standards of
probity, morality and propriety in their judicial duties as well as in
personal life and public appearances. But it does not mean that they
are not amenable to law or protection of law is not available to
them. The only thing is that it has to be applied in the facts,
circumstances and the law.
22
Now coming to the question of right of a probationer to
continue in service, it is a settled principle of law that the service of
an employee placed on probation are taken on trial during the period
of probation and if he fails during the period of trial to give
satisfaction to continue in service, his services are liable to be
dispensed with in terms of the conditions of appointment and the
service Rules.
The Apex Court has dealt with this issue in the case of
Parshotam Lal Dhingra versus Union of India; AIR 1958 SC 36.
The relevant portion of paragraph 26 and paragraph 28 of the said
judgment are extracted as under:
26.) ………………………………………….Thus where a person is

appointed to a permanent post in a government service on probation,
the termination of his service during or at the end of the period of
probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment, for the
government servant, so appointed, has no right to continue to hold such
a post any more than the servant employed on probation by a private
employer is entitled to do. Such a termination does not operate as a
forfeiture of any right of the servant to hold the post, for he has no such
right and obviously cannot be a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank
by way of punishment.…………………………………………
28.) The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and

every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in
rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a con'.
tractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by
this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. The Union of India (supra).
Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of
a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to
the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Art.; 311(2), as has
also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh
(I). In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the
service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or
allowances under r. 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the
misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be
the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to
take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the
specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or
the rules, to terminate the service the motive, operating on the mind of
the Government is, as Chagla C.J. has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v.
Union of India (supra), wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of
service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service
rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries
with it no evil consequences and so Art. 3 1 1 is not attracted. But even
if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to
terminate the employment without going through the procedure
prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or
reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish
23
the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on
misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is
a punishment and the requirements of Art. 311 must be complied with.
As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post,
then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the
contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for
misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause.
A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be
a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Art. 311, for
it operates as a forfeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil
consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma
on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise
may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing.' If the
Government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very
reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose
the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right
to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to
his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the
mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the
Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the
right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of
reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any
circumstances be a Punishment. The real test for determining whether
the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find
out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal
consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of
his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank
or, the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion,
then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the
Government bad purported to exercise its right to terminate the
employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of
the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the
Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty.
The use of the expression " terminate " or " discharge " is not
conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court
has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the
servant had a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether he has been
visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to ? If
the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the
servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be
taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his
substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the
requirements of the rules and Art.311, which give protection to
Government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the
service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in
violation of the constitutional right of the servant.
In the aforesaid it has been specifically held that if

termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract
or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a
punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article
311 of the Constitution is not attracted. Further it has been held that
the use of the expression "terminate" or "discharge" is not
24
conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the
court has to apply the two tests, namely, (1) whether the servant had
a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether he has been visited with
evil consequences of the kind referred in the judgment and if the
case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the
servant has been punished. Meaning thereby if either of the two tests
are not satisfied the order of simplicter would not amount to
stigmatic or punitive. In the present case the petitioners were on
probation and it is well settled law that the probationer has no right
to post.
The case of K.H.Phadnis Vs. State of Maharashtra; 1971
(1) SCC 790 is regarding reversion, so it is not applicable on the
present case. However, in the said case the Apex Court has held that
the order of reversion simpliciter will not amount to reduction in
rank or the punishment but if there is evidence that the order of
reversion is not 'a pure accident of service' but an order in the nature
of punishment, Article 311 of the Constitution would be attracted.
The case of Anoop Jaiswal Vs. Government of India and
Another; (1984) 2 SCC 369 was a case of an officer of Indian
Police Service, in which on a particular day, all the trainees reached
about 22 minutes late at the place where P. T./ Unarmed Combat
Practice was to be conducted after change of venue on account of
rains, So it is not applicable on the facts of the present case.
In the case of Radhey Shyam Gupta Vs. U.P.State Agro
Industries Corporation Ltd.and another; (1999) 2 SCC 21, the
Apex Court held in paragraphs 33 and 34 as under:-
"33. It will be noticed from the above decisions that the termination of
the services of a temporary servant or one on probation, on the basis of
adverse entries or on the basis of an assessment that his work is not
satisfactory will not be punitive inasmuch as the above facts are merely
the motive and not the foundation. The reason why they are the motive
is that the assessment is not done with the object of finding out any
misconduct on the part of the officer, as stated by Shah, J. (as he then
was) in Ram Narayan Das case [AIR 1961 SC 177 : (1961) 1 SCR 606 :
(1961) 1 LLJ 552] . It is done only with a view to decide whether he is
to be retained or continued in service. The position is not different even
if a preliminary enquiry is held because the purpose of a preliminary
enquiry is to find out if there is prima facie evidence or material to
25
initiate a regular departmental enquiry. It has been so decided in
Champaklal case [AIR 1964 SC 1854 : (1964) 1 LLJ 752] . The purpose
of the preliminary enquiry is not to find out misconduct on the part of
the officer and if a termination follows without giving an opportunity, it
will not be bad. Even in a case where a regular departmental enquiry is
started, a charge-memo issued, reply obtained, and an enquiry officer is
appointed — if at that point of time, the enquiry is dropped and a simple
notice of termination is passed, the same will not be punitive because
the enquiry officer has not recorded evidence nor given any findings on
the charges. That is what is held in Sukh Raj Bahadur case [AIR 1968
SC 1089 : (1968) 3 SCR 234 : (1970) 1 LLJ 373] and in Benjamin
case[(1967) 1 LLJ 718 (SC)] . In the latter case, the departmental
enquiry was stopped because the employer was not sure of establishing
the guilt of the employee. In all these cases, the allegations against the
employee merely raised a cloud on his conduct and as pointed by
Krishna Iyer, J. in Gujarat Steel Tubes case [(1980) 2 SCC 593 : 1980
SCC (L&S) 197] the employer was entitled to say that he would not
continue an employee against whom allegations were made the truth of
which the employer was not interested to ascertain. In fact, the
employer by opting to pass a simple order of termination as permitted
by the terms of appointment or as permitted by the rules was conferring
a benefit on the employee by passing a simple order of termination so
that the employee would not suffer from any stigma which would attach
to the rest of his career if a dismissal or other punitive order was
passed. The above are all examples where the allegations whose truth
has not been found, and were merely the motive.
34. But in cases where the termination is preceded by an enquiry and

evidence is received and findings as to misconduct of a definitive nature
are arrived at behind the back of the officer and where on the basis of
such a report, the termination order is issued, such an order will be
violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the purpose of
the enquiry is to find out the truth of the allegations with a view to
punish him and not merely to gather evidence for a future regular
departmental enquiry. In such cases, the termination is to be treated as
based or founded upon misconduct and will be punitive. These are
obviously not cases where the employer feels that there is a mere cloud
against the employee's conduct but are cases where the employer has
virtually accepted the definitive and clear findings of the enquiry officer,
which are all arrived at behind the back of the employee — even though
such acceptance of findings is not recorded in the order of termination.
That is why the misconduct is the foundation and not merely the motive
in such cases."
The case of Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary Vs. Indira Gandhi

Institute of Medical Sciences, Patna, Bihar and others; (2015) 15
SCC 151 is a case of dismissal as after issuance of the show cause
notice and obtaining reply from the delinquent employee, the
documents were not supplied and no regular inquiry was held and
the punishment of dismissal was passed, so the same is not
applicable on the facts of the present case.
26
In the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satyendra Nath
Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and others;
(1999) 3 SCC 60, the Apex Court has held, in paragraph 21, as
under:-
21. If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct, behind
the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the
simple order of termination is to be treated as “founded” on the
allegations and will be bad. But if the enquiry was not held, no findings
were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an
enquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee
against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive
and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer
did not want to enquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay
in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing
adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a
motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination
would be valid.
Further the Apex Court has held in the said case that the order
of termination passed therein was not a simple order of termination
but a lengthy order.
In the case of Mathew P. Thomas Vs. Kerala State Civil

Supply Corpn. Ltd. and others; (2003) 3 SCC 263, the Apex
Court dealing with the case of a probationer has held that whether
the order of termination is simpliciter or punitive has ultimately to
be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each
case
The case of Dr. Mrs. Sumati P. Shere Vs. Union of India
and others; (1989) 3 SCC 311, is a case where the order of
appointment was on ad hoc basis for a period of six months or till
availability of a regular candidate. The case is not applicable to the
facts of the case in hand.
The case of Chandra Prakash Shahi Vs. State of U.P.; 2000
(5) SCC 152 is a case of a Constable, who had successfully
completed his training and also completed two years of probation
period without any blemish. Thereafter on account of an incident
some inquiry was held, in which his involvement was found
27
established on the basis of which the termination order was passed.
In this case the Apex Court held in paragraph 30 that the termination
was founded on the report of the preliminary inquiry as the
employer had not held the preliminary inquiry to find out whether
the appellant was suitable for further retention in service or for
confirmation as he had already completed the period of probation
quite a few years ago but was held to find out his involvement. In
this situation particularly when it is admitted by the respondent that
the performance of the appellant throughout was unblemished, the
order was definitely punitive in character as it was founded on the
allegations of misconduct. Accordingly the said case is not
applicable on the facts of the present case. However, the Apex
Court while dealing with the question pertaining to motive and
foundation in paragraphs 28 and 29 has categorically held that a
probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be
terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of
probation on account of general unsuitability for the post in
question, which are reproduced as under:-
28. The important principles which are deducible on the concept of
“motive” and “foundation”, concerning a probationer, are that a
probationer has no right to hold the post and his services can be
terminated at any time during or at the end of the period of probation
on account of general unsuitability for the post in question. If for the
determination of suitability of the probationer for the post in question or
for his further retention in service or for confirmation, an inquiry is
held and it is on the basis of that inquiry that a decision is taken to
terminate his service, the order will not be punitive in nature. But, if
there are allegations of misconduct and an inquiry is held to find out the
truth of that misconduct and an order terminating the service is passed
on the basis of that inquiry, the order would be punitive in nature as the
inquiry was held not for assessing the general suitability of the
employee for the post in question, but to find out the truth of allegations
of misconduct against that employee. In this situation, the order would
be founded on misconduct and it will not be a mere matter of “motive”.
29. “Motive” is the moving power which impels action for a definite
result, or to put it differently, “motive” is that which incites or
stimulates a person to do an act. An order terminating the services of an
employee is an act done by the employer. What is that factor which
impelled the employer to take this action? If it was the factor of general
unsuitability of the employee for the post held by him, the action would
be upheld in law. If, however, there were allegations of serious
misconduct against the employee and a preliminary inquiry is held
behind his back to ascertain the truth of those allegations and a
termination order is passed thereafter, the order, having regard to other
28
circumstances, would be founded on the allegations of misconduct
which were found to be true in the preliminary inquiry."
In the case of Krishnadevaraya Education Trust v. L.A.

Balakrishna; (2001) 9 SCC 319 the Apex Court while considering
the issue of discharge of an officer on probation and on being
challenged before the court, the consequence of the reply of the
employer, were dealt with, in paragraphs 5 and 6, as under:-
“5. There can be no manner of doubt that the employer is entitled to
engage the services of a person on probation. During the period of
probation, the suitability of the recruit/appointee has to be seen. If his
services are not satisfactory which means that he is not suitable for the
job, then the employer has a right to terminate the services as a reason
thereof. If the termination during probationary period is without any
reason, perhaps such an order would be sought to be challenged on the
ground of being arbitrary. Therefore, naturally services of an employee
on probation would be terminated, when he is found not to be suitable
for the job for which he was engaged, without assigning any reason. If
the order on the face of it states that his services are being terminated
because his performance is not satisfactory, the employer runs the risk
of the allegation being made that the order itself casts a stigma. We do
not say that such a contention will succeed. Normally, therefore, it is
preferred that the order itself does not mention the reason why the
services are being terminated.
6. If such an order is challenged, the employer will have to indicate the
grounds on which the services of a probationer were terminated. Mere
fact that in response to the challenge the employer states that the
services were not satisfactory would not ipso facto mean that the
services of the probationer were being terminated by way of
punishment. The probationer is on test and if the services are found not
to be satisfactory, the employer has, in terms of the letter of
appointment, the right to terminate the services.”
Similar view has been expressed by the Apex Court in the

case of Municipal Committee, Sirsa Vs. Munshi Ram; 2005 2
SCC 382 and The Manager, Govt. Branch Press Vs. D. B.
Belliappa; (1979) 1 SCC 477.
The Apex Court while dealing with a case of discharge of a
Munsif on probation, discharged on the ground that he was
unsuitable to hold the post of Munsif as stated in the impugned
order, after considering the case of Constitution Bench decision in
the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India and Seven
29
Judges decision of Samsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab and other
cases, Hon'ble Apex Court in H.F. Sangati Vs. Registrar General,
High Court of Karnataka; (2001) 3 SCC 117 held that the High
Court was justified in discharging the petitioner from service during
the period of probation and it was not necessary that there should
have been a charge and an inquiry on his conduct since the
petitioner was only on probation.
In the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma Vs. Sanjay
Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences and another; (2002) 1 SCC
520, the Apex Court had held that tests to determine whether an
order of termination is punitive it is to see whether prior to the
termination there was a full scale formal enquiry into the allegations
involving moral turpitude or misconduct which culminated in a
finding of guilt and if all three factors are present the termination
has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the
termination order, but if any one of three is missing the termination
would be upheld. However, the observations made in paragraph 29
of the judgment have been considered by the Apex Court in the
case of State Bank of India and others Vs. Palak Modi and
another; 2013 (3) SCC 607 and held in paragraph 45 that the said
proposition must be read as confined to the facts of that case and
cannot be relied upon for taking the view that a simple order of
termination of service can never be declared as punitive even though
it may be founded on serious allegation of misconduct or
misdemeanour on the part of the employees. However, after
considering the right of the probationer the Apex Court held, in
paragraph 25 of the judgment after considering several judgments,
as under:-
25. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that a probationer has no
right to hold the post and his service can be terminated at any time
during or at the end of the period of probation on account of general
unsuitability for the post held by him. If the competent authority holds
an inquiry for judging the suitability of the probationer or for his
further continuance in service or for confirmation and such inquiry is
the basis for taking decision to terminate his service, then the action of
the competent authority cannot be castigated as punitive. However, if
30
the allegation of misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action
taken, the ultimate decision taken by the competent authority can be
nullified on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice."
In the case of Dr. T. C. Pillai Vs. The Indian Institute of

Technology; 1971 (2) SCC 251, the Apex Court, while considering
the termination of a probationer, held in paragraph 7, as under:
7. It is well settled that a probationer or a temporary servant can be
discharged if it is found that he is not suitable for the post which he is
holding. This can be done without complying with the provisions of
Article 311(2) unless the services are terminated by way of punishment.
Suitability does not depend merely on the excellence or proficiency in
work. There are many factors which enter into consideration for
confirming a person who is on probation. A particular attitude or
tendency displayed by an employee can well influence the decision of
the confirming authority while judging his suitability or fitness for
confirmation.
It has been followed by a Division Bench of this court in the

case of Pawan Kumar Nigam Vs. The Central Ware Housing
Corporation; Special Appeal No. 633 of 2014 and held that the
probationer has no right to post and upheld the order of discharge.
A Division Bench of this court in the case of Paras Nath
Pandey Vs. Director, North Central Zone, Cultural Centre,
Allahabad; (2008) 10 ADJ 283 (DB), after considering several
judgments, laid down the principals, broadly, in paragraph 57 and
also held in paragraph 58 that each case has to be tested on the facts
and circumstances of the each case. Paras 57 and 58 are reproduced
as under:
57. From the above discussions, the principles discernible to
find out whether a simple order of termination/discharge of a
temporary employee or probationer is punitive or not, broadly, may
be stated as under :
(a) The termination of services of a temporary servant or
probationer under the rules of his employment or in exercise of
contractual right is neither per se dismissal nor removal and does
not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution.
(b) An order of termination simplicitor prima facie is not a
punishment and carries no evil consequences.
(c) Where termination simplicitor is challenged on the ground of
casting stigma or penal in nature, the Court initially would glance
the order itself to find out whether it cast any stigma and can be
said to be penal or not. If it does not, no further enquiry shall be
held unless there is some material to show certain circumstances,
31
preceding or attending, shadowing the simplicitorness of the said
order.
(d) The Court is not precluded from going beyond the order to
find out as to whether circumstances, preceding or attending,
makes it punitive or not. If the circumstances, preceding or
attending, show only the motive of the employer to terminate, it
being immaterial would not vitiate the order unless it is found
that order is founded on such act or omission constituting
misconduct.
(e) If the order visits the public servant with evil consequences
or casts aspersions against his character or integrity, it would be
an order by way of punishment irrespective of whether the
employee was a mere probationer or temporary.
(f) "Motive" and "foundation" are distinct, though the distinction
is either very thin or overlapping. "Motive" is the moving power,
which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently.
"Motive" is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an
act. "Foundation", however, is the basis, i.e., the conduct of the
employee, when his acts and omissions treated to be misconduct,
proved or founded, it becomes a case of foundation.
(g) If an order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it
is dismissal, but if it falls short of it, it would not.
(h) Where the employer is satisfied of the misconduct and the
consequent desirability of termination, it is dismissal even
though the order is worded innocuously. However, where there
is mere suspicion of misconduct and the employer does not wish
to bother about it, and, instead of going into the correctness of
guilt, feel like not to keep the employee and thus terminate him,
it is simpliciter termination and not punitive.
(i) Where the termination simplicitor is preceded by an enquiry,
preliminary or regular, the Court would see the purpose, object
of such enquiry as also the stage at which, the order of
termination has been passed.
(j) Every enquiry preceding the order of termination/discharge,
would not make it punitive. Where an enquiry contemplated in
the rules before terminating a probationer or temporary
employee is held, it would not make the order punitive.
(k) If the enquiry is to find out whether the employee is fit to be
confirmed or retained in service or to continue, such an enquiry
would not render termination punitive.
(l) Where the employer hold a formal enquiry to find out the
correctness of the alleged misconduct of the employee and
proceed on the finding thereof, such an order would be punitive,
and, cannot be passed without giving an opportunity to the
concerned employee.
(m) If some formal departmental enquiry commenced but not
pursued to the end. Instead a simple order of termination is
passed, the motive operating in the mind of the authority would
be immaterial and such an order would be non punitive.
(n) When an order of termination is assailed on the ground of
mala fide or arbitrariness, while defending the plea of mala fide,
if the authority has referred certain facts justifying the order of
discharge relating to misconduct, negligence or inefficiency of
the employee in the appeal or in the affidavit filed before the
Court, that would not make the order founded on any
misconduct.
32
(o) Sometimes when some reason is mentioned in the order, that
by itself would not make the order punitive or stigmatic. The
following words mentioned in the order have not been held to be
punitive.
(i) "want of application",
(ii) "lack of potential",
(iii) "found not dependable",
(iv) "under suspension",
(v) "work is unsatisfactory",
(vi) "unlikely to prove an efficient officer".
(p) Description of background facts also have not been held to
be stigmatic.
(q) However, the words "undesirable to be retained in
Government service", have been held stigmatic.
(r) If there is (i) a full scale formal enquiry, (ii) in the allegations
involving moral turpitude or misconduct, (iii) which culminated
in a finding of guilt; where all these three factors are present, the
order of termination would be punitive irrespective of the form.
However, if any one of three factors is missing, then it would not
be punitive.
58. The aforesaid are not exhaustive, but lay down some of the
principles to find out whether termination of an employee is
simplicitor or punitive. Each and every case has to be considered
in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, but broadly
the aforesaid are the factors to find out whether termination of an
employee is punitive or not.
Coming to the question of adherence to the principle of

natural justice, the Apex Court has held in several cases that if there
is any alleged violation, it is for the employee to show the prejudice
caused to him.
In the case of Ashok Kumar Sonkar Vs. Union of India
and others; (2007) 4 SCC 54, the Apex Court has held in paragraph
26 and 27 that it is also well settled that it cannot put any straitjacket
formula and it may not be applied in a given case unless a prejudice
is shown.
Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of
Punjab National Bank and others versus Manjeet Singh and
another; (2006) 8 SCC 647.
Similarly in the case of P.D.Agarwal Vs. State Bank of
India and others (2006) 8 SCC 776 the Apex court has held that
the principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straitjacket
formula. It must be seen in circumstantial flexibility. It has separate
facets. It has in recent time also undergone a sea change.
33
Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of
Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and others Vs.
S.G.Kotturappa and another; (2005) 3 SCC 409.
Adverting to the facts of the present case, considered in the
light of the aforesaid law.
The petitioners were appointed on the post of Civil Judge (Jr.

Div.) in pursuance of selection made by the Public Service
Commission and their services were placed on probation as per
Rules, as such in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court the
services of the petitioners were taken on trial. During course of their
probationary period the petitioners participated in an induction
training programme at JTRI, Lucknow along with their batch mates
during the period from 09.06.2014 to 08.09.2014. On the eve of last
day of training the petitioners, total fifteen in number, went for
dinner at Charan Club and Resort, Faizabad Road, Lucknow and
there liquor was also taken.
Admittedly all the fifteen petitioners were present in the
Charan Club and Resorts and none of the petitioners has denied his
presence at the said time and place. On account of some lewd
remarks made in respect of a fellow lady trainee judicial officer,
some heated arguments had taken place, resulting into a scuffle and
marpeet to the extent that one of the judicial officers fell
unconscious and was brought to the Institute in the same condition.
The petitioners did not inform to the higher officers or the High
Court about the incident. The incident was brought to the notice of
Registrar General through a telephonic call on 08.09.2014. The
Registrar General put up a note before the Hon'ble Chief Justice.
Hon'ble the Chief Justice, for the purpose of ascertaining the facts in
respect of the incident at Charan Club and Resort and within the
premises of JTRI, Lucknow, directed the Senior Registrar (Judicial)
to visit the place of incident for the purpose of ascertaining as to
34
what had actually happened. The Senior Registrar (Judicial) after
collecting information submitted a report on 12th of September
2014, which was considered by the Administrative Committee and
on being directed to place the same before the Full Court, the matter
was placed before the Full Court for consideration of suitability of
the five probationary judicial officers mentioned in the Agenda and
any other matter with the permission of the Chair. While
considering the matter, the Full Court considered the report of the
Senior Registrar (Judicial) and after deliberations recommended for
discharge of the 11 officers named by the Senior Registrar (Judicial)
in report. According to report of Senior Registrar (Judicial) there
were about 13-14 officers although names of only 11 officers were
given. It seems that names of others could not be ascertained by
Senior Registrar (Judicial) at that time. In the Agenda besides the
names of five judicial officers any other matter with the permission
of the Chair could have also been considered. Accordingly the
report of the Senior Registrar (Judicial) mentioning the names of 11
officers was considered and decision taken.
In view of the above, it is totally misconceived to say that the
names of only five persons/judicial officers could have been
considered by the Full Court and the consideration and
recommendation of other persons is illegal. Once there was an
Agenda that any other matter could be considered with the
permission of Chair and the report of the Senior Registrar (Judicial),
in which 11 persons were named including the 5 persons mentioned
in the agenda was considered, therefore, there is no illegality or
infirmity in the decision taken by the Full Court and it is in
accordance with the agenda and the law.
The Full Court has made recommendation under Rule 24(4)
of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules 2001 as the petitioners
have otherwise failed to give satisfaction. The Rule 24(4) of the
Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules 2001, on reproduction, reads as
under:-
35
24. Probation -(1) …………………
(2) ...........................
(3) ………………..
(4) If, it appears, to the Court at any time during or at
the end of period of probation or extended period of
probation, as the case may be, that a probationer has not
made sufficient use of his opportunities or has otherwise
failed to give satisfaction, it may, make recommendation
to the appointing authority whereupon the probationers
shall be discharged from the service by the appointing
authority."
Submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that since

the petitioners have completed their training successfully and a
certificate to that effect has been issued on 30th of September 2014,
so the order of discharge of the petitioners is arbitrary and illegal. It
was also submitted that the petitioners continued to discharge their
duties to the full satisfaction of the Superior Officers in the district
also. He also argued that the Director, JTRI did not send report to
the Court about the conduct and performance of the petitioners
during the training for consideration of Hon'ble Court under Rule 22
(3) and (4) of the Rules 2001. Rather the Director, JTRI issued a
certificate on 30th of September 2014 towards successful
completion of the Training, with a note ‘It is learnt that due to an
incident which took place in the night of 7th of September 2014
services of the Trainee officers have been dispensed with’.
Certificate dated 30th of September 2014 issued by the
Director of the Institute states that ‘This is to certify that Mr.......,
Designation…………., District………., participated in the
induction training programme organized by the Institute
from ............. to ................’. It is not mentioned on the said
certificate that the trainees have completed the training successfully,
rather a note as aforesaid has been put up at the foot of the
certificate, therefore, the contention of the petitioners that they have
completed their training successfully, on the basis of the said
certificate is misconceived. There is no such certificate by the
Director. He issued certificate regarding participation in training.
36
The behavior and conduct of the petitioners in the Club,
which was a public place, was unbecoming of Judicial Officers as
lewd remarks were made in respect of a fellow lady judicial officer,
consequently they indulged into scuffle and marpeet to the extent
that a judicial officer fell unconscious and liquor was consumed,
which is against the U.P. Government Servant Conduct Rules 1956
and Circular No.CL No.71 dated 12th of May 1971 issued by the
High Court in pursuance thereof.
The Circular No.CL No.71 dated 12th of May 1971 issued by
the High Court, on reproduction, reads as under:
“(i) As required by rule 3 of the U. P. Government Servants Conduct
Rules, Judicial Officers are expected to maintain absolute integrity and
devotion to duty. They should avoid mixing freely with the members of
the public and the Bar, dining or drinking with them or going with them
on picnics and outings, nor should they attend too many social
functions. They should also avoid sitting in clubs till late in the night
and playing bridge, etc. with high stakes. Rule 4-A of the aforesaid rules
prohibits habitual use of intoxicating drinks and drugs and appearance
in public places in a state of intoxication. Conveyance belonging to
private persons or subordinate officers or legal practitioners must also
not be used too often.”
It is totally misconceived to allege that since nobody was

present at the time when the petitioners assembled at Charan Club
and Resorts for dinner and liquor and nobody had seen the incident,
so it cannot be said that it was in a public place. Club and Resort,
by any stretch of imagination, cannot be said that it is not a public
place. It may be the coincidence that nobody from public was
present in the Club and Resort at that time, but the employees of
club and staff must have been present. Even otherwise a public
place will remain a public place.
Submission of learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ
Petition No. 1356 (S/B) of 2015 and 1357 (S/B) of 2015 to the
effect that petitioners' names had not come in the earlier enquiry
report submitted by the Senior Registrar(Judicial) and no other
enquiry was conducted in respect of the petitioners and the enquiry
in which the names of the petitioners have appeared was in respect
of the conduct of the judicial officers of the J.T.R.I. and no
37
opportunity was afforded to the petitioners, so the names of the
petitioners have wrongly been mentioned in the report of OSD
(Enquiries) and the discharge of the petitioners on the basis of the
said report mentioned in the order of simpliciter discharge makes
the order punitive and stigmatic, which is not sustainable and is also
mis-conceived. The enquiry was conducted, on a letter written by
one Hon'ble Judge of the High Court about role of the senior
judicial officers at J.T.R.I. and also their role in the incident,which
was got conducted by the O.S.D. (Enquiries). While conducting the
enquiry, the O.S.D. (Enquiries) found, on the basis of CCTV
footage, that 15 persons/petitioners were present at the time of
incident and their names have been mentioned in paragraph 138 of
the report. It is to be noted that the said enquiry was not conducted
in regard to the conduct of the petitioners rather it was in respect of
the conduct of the officers of the J.T.R.I. but during course of the
enquiry on the basis of the CCTV footage the petitioners were
recognized by the employees of the J.T.R.I. among the persons
assembled for dinner and liquor at Charan Club and Resort, so the
order of discharge simpliciter of the petitioners has rightly been
passed and it cannot be said that it is punitive and stagmatic.
The relevant paragraph 136 of the said report dated 27th of

January 2015 is reproduced as under:-
136. That after seeing the CCTV footage of Charan Club &
Resort, Faizabad Road, Lucknow, the witnesses EW-24, 37 and 39
indentified 15 induction trainee namely Shri Vineet Kumr, Shri
Kshitiz Pandey, Shri Sandeep Singh, Shri Ravi Kumar Sagar, Shri
Ashutosh Tripathi, Shri Sudhir Mishra, Shri Ashwani Panwar, Shri
Bhanu Pratap Singh, Shri Asha Ram Pandey, Shri Akhilesh Kumar
Sharma, Shri Rahul Singh, Shri Mukesh Kumar, Shri Hirdesh
Kumar, Shri Shobhit Sourav and Shri Himuanshu Mishra. In the
first incident of fighting occurred at 11.33.06 pm. in Restaurant,
II incident of fighting occurred at 11.35.28 pm. at lobby of said
Restaurant and III incident of fighting occurred in fromt of
officer's hostel and in this incident Shri Ashwani Panwar, Shri
Bhanu Pratap Singh and Shri Rahul Singh had done marpeet with
Shri Akhilesh Kumar Sharma, and Shri Asha Ram Pandey."
Moreover these five petitioners have not denied their presence
alongwith others in the Club where incident took place.
38
The alleged conduct and behavior of the petitioners was not a
misconduct in discharge of official work and duties and it is also not
the case of the opposite parties. So no regular departmental enquiry
was required. However, in view of the law as discussed above, the
petitioners have failed to maintain the high standards of probity,
morality and propriety as expected from a judicial officer.
Accordingly, their cases have rightly been considered by the Full
Court and recommended for discharge simpliciter, in pursuance of
which the State Government, being the appointing authority, has
passed the order of simpliciter discharge.
In case there is some discrepancy in the order passed by the

appointing authority in pursuance of the recommendation of the Full
Court, that does not make the order stigmatic, punitive or illegal
because once the matter has been considered by the Full Court and
recommended for discharge by a simpliciter order of discharge then
any mentioning by the government does not vitiate the order. In this
regard against an order of challenge to the order of compulsory
retirement on the ground that the government being the appointing
authority has passed the order with non-application of mind the
Apex Court in the case of R.C.Chandel versus High Court of
Madhya Pradesh and another(2012) SCC 58 has held that on the
recommendation of the High Court after full consideration the
consequent action by the Government on such recommendation are
beyond any doubt. Similar view had been expressed by the Apex
Court in the case of Ram Gopal Chaturvedi Vs. State of M. P.;
(1969) 2 SCC 240. Accordingly, if any mention has inadvertently
been made by the government, that does not vitiate the order.
Applying the case of Rajesh Kohli versus High Court of

Jammu Kashmir(2010) 12 SCC 783 in which the Apex Court held
that services rendered by the judicial officers during probation are
assessed not solely on the basis of judicial performance but also on
the probity and propriety as to how one has conducted himself. It
39
has been found that the petitioners have failed to conduct with
probity and propriety, therefore, the discharge of their services by
the order of simpliciter discharge has rightly been passed in
accordance with law.
Admittedly the petitioners were on probation and the

petitioners have no right to post and in view of the law as discussed
above It is well settled that a probationer or a temporary servant can
be discharged if it is found that he is not suitable for the post which
he is holding. It is also settled that regular departmental enquiry is
not required in each and every case. Further if any discreet enquiry
is held to verify the facts, it will not vitiate the order on the ground
that no opportunity was afforded or regular enquiry was not held.
As held by the Apex Court in various decisions discussed

above that merely by conducting an enquiry for verifying the facts
does not vitiate the order. No regular enquiry was held in regard to
the any misconduct of the petitioners so the question of affording
any opportunity does not arise.
The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that

the order is stigmatic and punitive in nature as they have been
debarred from services in future is a mis-conceived argument
because the rule has already been amended and the provision of
debarring from future employment has been abolished. Further it
has been informed that some of the petitioners have joined at other
places, even in judicial service, also indicates that the order is not
punitive or stigmatic. In fact the High Court has taken a lenient
view of discharging the services of the petitioners by an order of
simpliciter discharge. Thus, there is no stigma also as dealt with by
Hon'ble the Apex Court in paragraph 25 of the case of Dipti
Prakash Banerjee (Supra). Paragraph 25 of the judgment, on
reproduction, reads as under:-
40
25. In the matter of “stigma”, this Court has held that the effect which
an order of termination may have on a person's future prospects of
employment is a matter of relevant consideration. In the seven-Judge
Bench decision in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab [(1974) 2 SCC
831 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 550] Ray, C.J. observed that if a simple order of
termination was passed, that would enable the officer to “make good in
other walks of life without a stigma”. It was also stated in Bishan Lal
Gupta v. State of Haryana [(1978) 1 SCC 202 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 55]
that if the order contained a stigma, the termination would be bad for
“the individual concerned must suffer a substantial loss of reputation
which may affect his future prospects.
The relevant unamended sub-rule (5) of Rule 24 of the Uttar
Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001 is reproduced as under:-
"(5) A person, whose services are dispensed with under sub-rule (4)
shall not be entitled to compensation and shall also not be eligible for
re-appointment to the service."
The relevant amended sub-rule (5) of Rule 24 of the Uttar
Pradesh Judicial Service (Third Amendment) Rules, 2015 is
reproduced as under:-
"(5) A person, whose services are dispensed with under sub-rule (4)
shall not be entitled to any compensation."
The case of the petitioners is squarely covered by a Division
Bench Judgment of Bombay High Court rendered in the case of
Gurunath Dinkar Mave Vs. State of Maharashtra and another;
Writ Petition No. 2733 of 2013 dated 23.09.2016. On being
challenged before the Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal, the S.
L. P. No. 18148 of 2017 has been dismissed vide order dated
18.09.2017. In the said case the petitioner was appointed on the post
of Civil Judge, Junior Division and Judicial Magistrate First Class
and was placed on probation. During period of probation he
underwent a training programme at the Judicial Academy and
Training Institute and completed successfully and joined back at the
place of posting. After some time he received an order of discharge.
In fact in a discreet enquiry, the petitioner was found under the
influence of the alchohal twice while he was residing as a trainee
Judge at the Academy. So a complaint or report was submitted by
the Joint Director of Academy to the Registrar General of The
Bombay High Court. Considering the same the High Court decided
to discharge the petitioner from service. On being challenged, the
41
Division Bench, after considering the nature of judicial service and
expected conduct and behavior of a Judicial Officer, held that
merely because some preliminary or discreet enquiry is held while
judging for assessing the performance and take note of it or called
for a report about the same from the superior of the persons like the
petitioner, does not mean that they desired to hold a full fledged
enquiry or there is a decision to terminate the services on account of
some misconduct.
Considering the cases of the petitioners in view of the law as

discussed above, the writ petitions are mis-conceived and devoid of
merit so the petitioners are not entitled for any relief and the writ
petitions are liable to be dismissed.
The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Order Dated:03.07.2018
Banswar
(Rajnish Kumar,J.)

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(1) Case :- SERVICE BENCH No. - 1502 of 2014

In terms of the resolution of the Administrative Committee

The report submitted by the Senior Registrar (Judicial), dated

The Chief Justice invited participation by the Hon'ble Judges,

1. Sri Akhilesh Kumar Sharma

The Full Court resolved that the aforesaid 11 probationers be

Accordingly, orders for the discharge simpliciter of the

In furtherance thereof the aforesaid four judicial officers were

Considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the

A judicial officer is required to maintain high standards of

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Daya Shankar versus

In the case of C. Ravichandran Iyer versus Justice A.M.

"21. Judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society is,

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Kohli versus

Similar view has been expressed by the Apex Court in the

26.) ………………………………………….Thus where a person is

28.) The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and

In the aforesaid it has been specifically held that if

34. But in cases where the termination is preceded by an enquiry and

The case of Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary Vs. Indira Gandhi

In the case of Mathew P. Thomas Vs. Kerala State Civil

In the case of Krishnadevaraya Education Trust v. L.A.

Similar view has been expressed by the Apex Court in the

In the case of Dr. T. C. Pillai Vs. The Indian Institute of

It has been followed by a Division Bench of this court in the

Coming to the question of adherence to the principle of

Adverting to the facts of the present case, considered in the

light of the aforesaid law.

The petitioners were appointed on the post of Civil Judge (Jr.

Submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that since

It is totally misconceived to allege that since nobody was

The relevant paragraph 136 of the said report dated 27th of

In case there is some discrepancy in the order passed by the

Applying the case of Rajesh Kohli versus High Court of

Admittedly the petitioners were on probation and the

As held by the Apex Court in various decisions discussed

The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners that

Considering the cases of the petitioners in view of the law as

The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed.

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