ALU-TCP v NLRC ISSUE: WON petitioners are considered as “regular

Provisos employees” as opposed to being “regular project employees”

Petitioners, as employees of private respondent National
Steel Corp (NSC), filed separate complaints for unfair labor
practice, regularization, and monetary benefits with the
NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch of Iligan City
The complaints were consolidated and after hearing, the
Labor Arbiter declared petitioners as “regular project
employees who shall continue their employment as such for
as long as the project exists,” but entitled to the salary of a
regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the collective
bargaining agreement. It also ordered payment of salary
differentials
NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor
Arbiter’s decision. It affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s holding that
petitioners were project employees since they were hired to
perform work in a specific undertaking—the Five Year
Expansion Program the completion of which had been
determined at the time of their engagement and which
operation was not directly related to the business of steel
manufacturing. The NLRC however set aside the award to
petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by regular
employees for lack of legal and factual basis.
of NSC
HELD: NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit.
NLRC Resolutions affirmed.
RATIO: Function of the proviso. Petitioners are not
considered “permanent employees”. However, contrary to
petitioners’ apprehensions, the designation of named
employees as “project employees” and their assignment to a
specific project are effected and implemented in good faith,
and not merely as a means of evading otherwise applicable
requirements of labor laws.
On the claim that petitioners’ service to NSC of more than
six (6) years should qualify them as “regular employees”, the
Supreme Court believed this claim is without legal basis. The
simple fact that the employment of petitioners as project
employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract
from, or legally dissolve, their status as “project employees”.
The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code,
quoted above, providing that an employee who has served
for at least one (1) year, shall be considered a regular
employee, relates to casual employees, not to project
employees.

The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code where
petitioners argue that they are regular employees of NSC
because:

- 1. Their jobs are necessary, desirable, and

work-related to private respondent’s main
business, steel making
- 2. They have rendered service for 6yrs or
more to NSC

• Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment — The

provisions of the written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, and employment shall
be deemed to be regular where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, except where
the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the
time of the engagement of the employee or where
the work or services to be performed is seasonal
in nature and the employment is for the duration of
the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it

is not covered by the preceding paragraph:
Provided, That, any employee who has rendered
at least one year service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, shall be considered a
regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall
continue while such actually exists.
 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
Exception
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are
various suits questioning and challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate
exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a mere
consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did
not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate
thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the
Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art.
VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
RULING
In relation to art VI sec 26 (2) which states two conditions
before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three
readings on separate days (ii) it has been printed in its final
form and distributed three days before it is finally approved
S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as
required by the Constitution 8 because the second and third
readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But
this was because on February 24, 1994 9 and again on
March 22, 1994, 10 the President had certified S. No. 1630
as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the
bill on separate days
In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation
to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate
clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except"
clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in
the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days
before final approval) would not only violate the rules of
grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the
"except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate
enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public
calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is
dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved
would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring
immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing
away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of
the bill three days before the third reading would insure
speedy enactment of a law in the face of an emergency
requiring the calling of a special election for President and
Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is required
to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress
in emergency session.
15. Tolentino v. Sec. Finance (evat law)
Doctrine: Exceptions
Provision in question:
Article VI, Setion 26 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
“No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.”
ISSUE: WON the presidential certification qualifies both the
printing and “reading in 3 separate days”? YES.
RULING: As to what Presidential certification can
accomplish, we have already explained in the main decision
that the phrase “except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc.” in Art. VI, §26(2)
qualifies not only the requirement that “printed copies [of a
bill] in its final form [must be] distributed to the members
three days before its passage” but also the requirement that
before a bill can become a law it must have passed “three
readings on separate days.” There is not only textual support
for such construction but historical basis as well.
The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if
in all cases three readings on separate days are required
and a bill has to be printed in final form before it can be
passed, the need for a law may be rendered academic by
the occurrence of the very emergency or public calamity
which it is meant to address.
 BAUTISTA V. FULE
Doctrine: Saving clause
Suarez was the owner of a parcel of an unreg coconut land
in Laguna. Sold it to Atienza subject to repurchase in 10
years. Atienza sold it to Dimaano subject to redemption in 5
years. 4 years after, land was levied upon to satisfy a
judgment rendered against Atienza. Sold to Bautista during
the public auction. Atienza has the right to redeem the land
within a year from the date of the auction sale, which he did.
Then, he sold it to Fule by the original owner Suarez (who
acted as vendor a retro). Bautista now wants to recover the
land so he filed a case, contending that it was from him, not
from Atienza, that Suarez should have made the repurchase.
Dismissed.
ISSUE: WON Fule has, by virtue of the transactions covering
the repurchase of the property by Atienza and its sale to
Fule, acquired a right superior to that acquired by Bautista
as a purchaser in a prior sale that was duly registered.
RULING: In justifying the repurchase of the land from
Atienza instead of from Bautista, the lower court cites article
1510 of the Civil Code which provides:
"The vendor may bring his action against any possessor who
holds under the vendee, even though in the second contract
no mention should have been made of the conventional
redemption, saving always the provisions of the Mortgage
Law with respect to third persons."
In authorizing the vendor a retro to enforce his right of
repurchase against any possessor who holds under the
vendee, article 1510 of the Civil Code has provided a saving
clause in favor of the rights of third persons under the
provisions of the Mortgage Law whose function may, in the
case of land not registered either under that law or the Land
Registration Act, be deemed to be performed by those of Act
No. 3344, and registration under this Act produces its effects
against third persons.
It follows from the foregoing that the repurchase of the land
from Atienza instead of from Bautista did not divest the latter
of his right to said land as purchaser at the auction sale, a
right which. Must now be deemed to be absolute in view of
the non-redemption of the property by the judgment debtor
or any other person entitled thereto within the period
prescribed by the Rules. Obviously, Fule's remedy is against
Atienza for the recovery of the sum paid to him in the
repurchase.
A saving clause is enacted to save something which would
otherwise be lost. When existing procedure is altered or
substituted by another, it is usual to save those proceedings
pending under the old law at the time the new law takes
effect.
BAUTISTA V. FULE
FACTS: Felipe Suarez was the owner of a parcel of
unregistered coconut land situated in Alaminos, Laguna. On
June 30, 1930, Suarez sold this land to Gregorio Atienza for
P1,300 subject to repurchase within ten years. Atienza, in
turn, sold it to Valentin Dimaano for P100 subject to
redemption within five years. (This last transaction was,
however, found by the Court of Appeals to be a mere
equitable mortgage and nota pacto de retro sale.) Some four
years thereafter the land was levied upon to satisfy a
judgment rendered against Gregorio Atienza in a case
brought against him by Enrique Bautista and it was, on April
10, 1935, sold at public auction to Bautista for P258.59, the
sale being registered seven days later, that is, on April 17,
under Act No. 3344. Under the law Atienza had the right to
redeem the land within one year from the date of the auction
sale. But before the expiration of that period, that is, on
January 13, 1936, the land was repurchased from Atienza,
redeemed from Dimaano, and then sold outright to
Eustaquio Fule by its original owner and vendor a retro,
Felipe Suarez. To recover the land form Fule, Bautista
instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, contending that the repurchase of the property from
Atienza and its sale to Fule were fraudulent and fictitious and
that it was from him (Bautista) and not from Atienza that
Suarez should have made the repurchase. Overruling both
contentions, the Court of First Instance dismissed the action,
and the dismissal having been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, the case has been brought to us for review.
HELD: Authorizing the vendor a retro to enforce his right of
repurchase against "any possessor who holds under the
vendee," the article has provided a saving clause in favor of
the right of third persons under the provisions of the
Mortgage Law, whose function may, in the case of land not
registered either under that law or the Land Registration Act,
be deemed to be performed by those of Act No. 3344. If this
Act is to have any utility at all, registration thereunder should
produce its effects against third persons. It follows from the
foregoing that the repurchase of the land from Atienza
instead of from Bautista did not divest the latter of his right to
said land as purchaser at the auction sale, a right which
must now be deemed to be absolute in view of the non-
redemption of the property by the judgment debtor or any
other person entitled thereto within the period prescribed by
the Rules. Obviously, Fule's remedy is against Atienza for
the recovery of the sum paid to him in the repurchase.
 LAUREL v ABROGAR
>Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) is
the holder of a legislative franchise to render local and
international telecommunication services under Republic Act
No. 7082. Under said law, PLDT is authorized to establish,
operate, manage, lease, maintain and purchase
telecommunication systems, including transmitting, receiving
and switching stations, for both domestic and international
calls.
>PLDT alleges that one of the alternative calling patterns
that constitute network fraud and violate its network integrity
is that which is known as International Simple Resale (ISR).
ISR is a method of routing and completing international long
distance calls using International Private Leased Lines (IPL),
cables, antenna or air wave or frequency, which connect
directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the
terminating country (the country where the call is destined).
The IPL is linked to switching equipment which is connected
to a PLDT telephone line/number. In the process, the calls
bypass the IGF found at the terminating country, or in some
instances, even those from the originating country
>One such alternative calling service is that offered by
Baynet Co., Ltd. (Baynet) which sells "Bay Super Orient
Card" phone cards to people who call their friends and
relatives in the Philippines.PLDT asserts that Baynet
conducts its ISR activities by utilizing an IPL to course its
incoming international long distance calls from Japan. The
IPL is linked to switching equipment, which is then
connected to PLDT telephone lines/numbers and equipment,
with Baynet as subscriber. Through the use of the telephone
lines and other auxiliary equipment, Baynet is able to
connect an international long distance call from Japan to any
part of the Philippines, and make it appear as a call
originating from Metro Manila. Consequently, the operator of
an ISR is able to evade payment of access, termination or
bypass charges and accounting rates, as well as compliance
with the regulatory requirements of the NTC. Thus, the ISR
operator offers international telecommunication services at a
lower rate, to the damage and prejudice of legitimate
operators like PLDT.
>After conducting the requisite preliminary investigation, the
State Prosecutor filed an Amended Information impleading
Laurel (a partner in the law firm of Ingles, Laurel, Salinas,
and, until November 19, 1999, a member of the board of
directors and corporate secretary of Baynet), and the other
members of the board of directors of said corporation,
namely, Yuji Hijioka, Yasushi Ueshima, Mukaida, Lacson
and Villegas, as accused for theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code.
>Laurel moved to quash said complaint as the property
(service/business)contemplated by herein private
respondent is not the one embraced in ART 308 of RPC nor
any special law for that matter. Laurel further cited the
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice in Piltel v. Mendoza,
where it was ruled that the Revised Penal Code, legislated
as it was before present technological advances were even
conceived, is not adequate to address the novel means of
"stealing" airwaves or airtime. In said resolution, it was noted
that the inadequacy prompted the filing of Senate Bill 2379
(sic) entitled "The Anti-Telecommunications Fraud of 1997"
to deter cloning of cellular phones and other forms of
communications fraud. The said bill "aims to protect in
number (ESN) (sic) or Capcode, mobile identification
number (MIN), electronic-international mobile equipment
identity (EMEI/IMEI), or subscriber identity module" and "any
attempt to duplicate the data on another cellular phone
without the consent of a public telecommunications entity
would be punishable by law." Thus, Laurel concluded, "there
is no crime if there is no law punishing the crime."
>The RTC as well as the CA however dismissed his motion.
Thus he filed a motion for certiorari before the SC alleging
the following: the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the Amended
Information. As gleaned from the material averments of the
amended information, he was charged with stealing the
international long distance calls belonging to PLDT, not its
business. Moreover, the RTC failed to distinguish between
the business of PLDT (providing services for international
long distance calls) and the revenues derived therefrom. He
opined that a "business" or its revenues cannot be
considered as personal property under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, since a "business" is "(1) a commercial
or mercantile activity customarily engaged in as a means of
livelihood and typically involving some independence of
judgment and power of decision; (2) a commercial or
industrial enterprise; and (3) refers to transactions, dealings
or intercourse of any nature." On the other hand, the term
"revenue" is defined as "the income that comes back from an
investment (as in real or personal property); the annual or
periodical rents, profits, interests, or issues of any species of
real or personal property."
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPERTY
CONTEMPLATED BY HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENT
FALLS WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ART. 308 OF RPC, thus no
network fraud exist.
HELD: NO, THE KIND OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
CONTEMPLATED BY SAID ARTICLE DOES NOT COVER
THE 'BUSINESS OR SERVICE' RENDERED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
The court finds that the international telephone calls placed
by Bay Super Orient Card holders, the telecommunication
services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said
services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code. The rule is that, penal laws are to be
construed strictly. It is Congress, not the Court, which is to
define a crime, and ordain its punishment. Due respect for
the prerogative of Congress in defining crimes/felonies
constrains the Court to refrain from a broad interpretation of
penal laws where a "narrow interpretation" is appropriate.
And only when the congressional purpose is unclear that
court my rule on its lenity.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as
follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.– Theft is committed by
any person who, with intent to gain but without violence,
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall
take personal property of another without the latter’s
consent.
For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must have an intent
to steal (animus furandi) personal property, meaning the
intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession
of personal property which intent is apart from and
concurrently with the general criminal intent which is an
essential element of a felony of dolo (dolus malus).
An information or complaint for simple theft must allege the
following elements: (a) the taking of personal property; (b)
the said property belongs to another; (c) the taking be done
with intent to gain; and (d) the taking be accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation of person/s or
force upon things.
One is apt to conclude that "personal property" standing
alone, covers both tangible and intangible properties and are
subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code. But the
words "Personal property" under the Revised Penal Code
must be considered in tandem with the word "take" in the
law. The statutory definition of "taking" and movable property
indicates that, clearly, not all personal properties may be the
proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that, only
movable properties which have physical or material
existence and susceptible of occupation by another are
proper objects of theft.
According to Cuello Callon, in the context of the Penal Code,
only those movable properties which can be taken and
carried from the place they are found are proper subjects of
theft. Intangible properties such as rights and ideas are not
subject of theft because the same cannot be "taken" from
the place it is found and is occupied or appropriated.
A naked right existing merely in contemplation of law,
although it may be very valuable to the person who is
entitled to exercise it, is not the subject of theft or larceny.
Such rights or interests are intangible and cannot be "taken"
by another. Thus, right to produce oil, good will or an interest
in business, or the right to engage in business, credit or
franchise are properties. So is the credit line represented by
a credit card. However, they are not proper subjects of theft
or larceny because they are without form or substance, the
mere "breath" of the Congress.
There is "taking" of personal property, and theft is
consummated when the offender unlawfully acquires
possession of personal property even if for a short time; or if
such property is under the dominion and control of the thief.
The taker, at some particular amount, must have obtained
complete and absolute possession and control of the
property adverse to the rights of the owner or the lawful
possessor thereof.It is not necessary that the property be
actually carried away out of the physical possession of the
lawful possessor or that he should have made his escape
with it.Neither asportation nor actual manual possession of
property is required. Constructive possession of the thief of
the property is enough.
Taking may be by the offender’s own hands, by his use of
innocent persons without any felonious intent, as well as any
mechanical device, such as an access device or card, or any
agency, animate or inanimate, with intent to gain. Intent to
gain includes the unlawful taking of personal property for the
purpose of deriving utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and
pleasure.
Gas and electrical energy should not be equated with
business or services provided by business
entrepreneurs to the public. Business does not have an
exact definition. Business is referred as that which
occupies the time, attention and labor of men for the
purpose of livelihood or profit. It embraces everything
that which a person can be employed. Business may
also mean employment, occupation or profession.
Business is also defined as a commercial activity for
gain benefit or advantage. Business, like services in
business, although are properties, are not proper
subjects of theft under the Revised Penal Code because
the same cannot be "taken" or "occupied." If it were
otherwise, as claimed by the respondents, there would
be no juridical difference between the taking of the
business of a person or the services provided by him for
gain, vis-à-vis, the taking of goods, wares or
merchandise, or equipment comprising his business. If
it was its intention to include "business" as personal
property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
the Philippine Legislature should have spoken in
language that is clear and definite: that business is
personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Respondent PLDT does not acquire possession, much less,
ownership of the voices of the telephone callers or of the
electronic voice signals or current emanating from said calls.
The human voice and the electronic voice signals or current
caused thereby are intangible and not susceptible of
possession, occupation or appropriation by the respondent
PLDT or even the petitioner, for that matter. PLDT merely
transmits the electronic voice signals through its
facilities and equipment. Baynet Card Ltd., through its
operator, merely intercepts, reroutes the calls and
passes them to its toll center.
OBITERDICTUM? In Examining foreign statutes, the courts
found that other states specifically included
“business/services” to be one of a “personal property” as
implemented therein. In the Philippines, Congress has not
amended the Revised Penal Code to include theft of
services or theft of business as felonies. Instead, it approved
a law, Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the
Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998, on February 11,
1998. Under the law, an access device means any card,
plate, code, account number, electronic serial number,
personal identification number and other telecommunication
services, equipment or instrumentalities-identifier or other
means of account access that can be used to obtain money,
goods, services or any other thing of value or to initiate a
transfer of funds other than a transfer originated solely by
paper instrument. Among the prohibited acts enumerated in
Section 9 of the law are the acts of obtaining money or
anything of value through the use of an access device, with
intent to defraud or intent to gain and fleeing thereafter; and
of effecting transactions with one or more access devices
issued to another person or persons to receive payment or
any other thing of value. Under Section 11 of the law,
conspiracy to commit access devices fraud is a crime.
However, the petitioner is not charged of violation of R.A.
8484.
Petition is granted. The assailed decision of RTC and CA is
hereby reversed and ser aside. The Regional Trial Court is
directed to issue an order granting the motion of the
petitioner to quash the Amended Information.
 THE CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF
MANILA, ET AL
The important question presented by this appeal is: In
expropriation proceedings by the city of Manila, may the courts
inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the
expropriation?
The City of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First
Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein
particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a public improvement. The petitioner alleged that for
the purpose of constructing an extension of Rizal Avenue,
Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership of
certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo. The
defendants – the Chinese Community of Manila, Ildefonso
Tambunting, and Feliza Concepcion de Delgado – alleged in
their Answer (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation
and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had
been used as such for many years, and was covered with
sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be
converted into a street for public purposes. One of the
defendants, Ildefonso Tampbunting, offered to grant a right of
way for the said extension over other land, without cost to the
plaintiff, in order that the sepulchers, chapels and graves of his
ancestors may not be disturbed.
The Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, decided that there was no
necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in
question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all
liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. On
appeal, the plaintiff contended that the city of Manila has
authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes. Section
2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that
"the city (Manila) . . . may condemn private property for public
use."
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Manila can condemn private
property for public use
HELD: No. It is true that Section 2429 of Act No. 2711, or the
Charter of the City of Manila states that "the city (Manila) . . .
may condemn private property for public use." But when the
statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how it
may be taken, the necessity of taking particular property is a
question for the courts. When the application to condemn or
appropriate property is made directly to the court, the question of
necessity should be raised The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature.
But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is
exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts
have the right to inquire into.
The impossibility of measuring the damage and inadequacy of a
remedy at law is too apparent to admit of argument. To disturb
the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes
becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of
necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the
last resting place of our friends, should be maintained, and the
preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for that object.
Whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its
appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the
lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a
cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its
appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is
fully established that the greatest necessity exists therefor. In the
present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the
opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of
the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The
record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been
offered by Tambunting to the city free of charge, which will
answer every purpose of the plaintiff.
The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.
RATIO/DOCTRINE
[1] The taking of private property for any use, which is not
required by the necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of
the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent
domain, and beyond the power of the legislature to delegate. To
justify the exercise of this extreme power (eminent domain)
where the legislature has left it to depend upon the necessity that
may be found to exist, in order to accomplish the purpose of the
incorporation, … the party claiming the right to the exercise of
the power should be required to show at least a reasonable
degree of necessity for its exercise
[2] The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain
must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular
case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal
corporations and other entities within the State, general authority
to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by
the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities
must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular
instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity
attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with
the conditions accompanying the authority.
[3] The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a
municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some
law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts
come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a
law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised
in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two
conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of
Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose
must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these
conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it
cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in
accordance with law.
[4] The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly
by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in
derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the
authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is
held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by
the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the
freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that
right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of
an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law
should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation.
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his
consent is one of the most delicate exercise of governmental
authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as
the power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity
which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the
citizens, constrains the strict observance of the substantial
provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the
exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. Not only
must the authority of municipal corporations to take property be
expressly conferred and the use for which it is taken specified,
but the power, with all constitutional limitation and directions for
its exercise, must be strictly pursued.
 OCHATE VS DELING
Petition for prohibition led by Jose U. Ochate, Mayor of the
Municipality of Clarin, province of Misamis Occidental
against the Provincial Governor therein, Diego H. Ty Deling
or his successor, and the town Vice-Mayor, Tomas Torres of
the same municipality, praying that the said respondents be
prohibited from proceeding in the administrative charges
against petitioner and to declare unlawful and without
authority of law, the order of respondent Governor
suspending him from office pending investigation by the
Provincial Board.
Jose U. Ochate is the incumbent municipal mayor of Clarin,
Misamis Occidental, while respondents Diego H. Ty Deling
and Tomas Torres are the incumbent provincial governor
and vice-mayor of the said municipality, respectively.
In an administrative complaint dated December 18, 1957,
petitioner was charged before the Provincial Board of:
I. Organizing, tolerating, and participating in illegal cockfight
and other forms of gambling;
II. Committing grave public scandals and acts unbecoming of
public official;
III. Corruption of subordinate employees." which complaint
was later amended on December 23, 1957, it include the
following specifications:
1. Misconduct in Office —
(a) while the municipal council of Clarin was in session
presided by the petitioner as mayor, he abruptly left the
said session and slapped his daughter and boxed his
wife before the councilors and in the presence of
numerous persons inside the municipal building,
thereby disturbing and interrupting the council's
meeting with the ensuing commotion and disorder
(b) petitioner, being a municipal mayor, organized or
participated directly in illegal cockfights in unlicensed
cockpits, and allowed or tolerated gambling therein.
(c) the petitioner and his policemen resisted with
firearms and violence and prevented the policemen of
the neighboring municipality from arresting those
engaged in illegal cockfights, instead of assisting the
latter in performing their duty.
2. Neglect of Duty — That the petitioner, knowing that illegal
cockfights and gambling were held in his presence,
maliciously refrained from instituting or causing the
prosecution of the violators of the law thereby committing
dereliction of duty as mayor
3. Oppression — That he ordered anyone of his policemen
to accompany him to illegal cockpits and gambling, or
assigned them as bodyguards of his mistress, or prevented
them enforcing the gambling laws, thereby depriving them of
their liberty of action in the performance of their duties, thus
inducing them to commit dereliction of duty, as in fact, two of
them are now indicted with for assault.
On the same date that the original administrative charge was
led, the respondent Governor issued Executive Order No. 7
suspending the petitioner from office and directing the latter
to turn over the same to the respondent Vice-Mayor. The
petitioner questions the legality of the administrative charges
and of the order of suspension. Upon his motion and ling a
bond of five Hundred pesos, this Court by resolution dated
January 20, 1958, issued a preliminary prohibitory injunction.
Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code provides,
and we quote: "Supervisory authority of provincial governor
over municipal officers. — The provincial governor shall
receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption
or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction
by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. For
minor delinquency, he may reprimand the offender; and if a
more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he shall
submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial
board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused
either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such
suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer)
pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be
one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question.
Where suspension is thus effected, the written charges
against the officer shall be filed with the board within five
days."
ISSUE: Are the administrative charges above-stated
grounds for the valid suspension of Ochate?
HELD: No. Acts charged affect only his character as a
private individual.
Ochate's acts “cannot be safely said or considered to be
related to the performance of his official duties” and he does
not have to be a Mayor to commit the offenses charged.
“Misconduct in Office” is misconduct such as affects
the performance of his duties as an officer and not such
as only affects his character as a private individual.
"Misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood
legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is misconduct
such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer
and not such only as affects his character as a private
individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times, it is
necessary to separate the character of the man from the
character of the officer. 'It is settled that misconduct,
misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office
of an officer, must have direct relation to and be connected
with the performance of official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to
discharge the duties of the office . . .'
In the instant case, the records fail to indicate that Ochate
was motivated by any official considerations when he
committed the acts complained of. It appears that the acts
complained of were done for more personal reason.
Moreover, the alleged violation of the gambling law occurred
within another municipality. The charges of “oppression”
seems too superficial to meet the standard fixed in the legal
definition of “oppression”. Ochate was accused and
convicted of slight physical injuries which did not involve
moral turpitude; he does not appear to have been convicted
of the charges of “illegal cockfighting” and “assaults upon
agents in authority”. The charges do not constitute
misconduct or maladministration of office. As such, the order
of suspension was not founded on legal grounds.
 CU v REPUBLIC
Justino O. Cu alias Justo Dee filed a petition for
naturalization with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte. The court, with the Honorable Fidel Villanueva
presiding, approved the petition.
During the hearing, petitioner sought to establish that:
he was born in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, on July 28, 1934,
of Chinese parents; that he has mingled socially with
Filipinos; that he finished his high school education at
the Northwestern College, and took preparatory collegiate
courses at the St. William's College, both schools being
located at Laoag; that he studied Medicine at the
University of Santo Tomas without, however, finishing it
as he stopped to help his parents attend to their
business; that he knows how to read and write English
and Ilocano, aside from Chinese; that he has embraced
the customs and traditions of the Filipinos; that he is
managing the business of his father from whom be
receives P200.00 salary every month and 30% bonus of
the net income thereof; that before 1957, he was
employed as manager of the Red Log Co. in Cagayan;
that he is not a polygamist nor a believer in the practice
of polygamy; that he does not believe in communism or
profess communistic ideals; that he does not believe in
the use of violence to attain his objectives; that he is
not suffering from any contagious disease; and that he
is willing to renounce his Chinese citizenship.
In support of his petition, the petitioner presented a
joint affidavit executed by Cresencio Castro and Jose P.
Castro, his character witnesses, who vouched for his
qualifications to be admitted to Philippine citizenship.
They were also presented as witnesses during the
hearing. The assistant provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte,
representing the Solicitor General, appeared and cross-
examined the petitioner and the witnesses presented on
his behalf. After trial, as stated above, a decision was
rendered approving the application of petitioner to
become a Filipino citizen.
Not satisfied, the Solicitor General has appealed. After a
careful perusal of the record and the transcript of
stenographic notes taken at the hearing, We are
convinced that petitioner has not proven that he has all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in the Naturalization Law.
Among the requirements for Philippine citizenship are
that the petitioner must own real estate in the
Philippines worth not less than P5,000.00, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation. (Sec. 2, par. 4,
Revised Naturalization Law.)
While the petitioner in this case had stated in his
petition that he is the owner of a building for residential
and commercial purposes with an assessed value of
P5,000.00, he did not say so in his oral testimony. Only
Atty. Jose B. Castro, one of the character witnesses,
during the cross-examination by the fiscal, made a
statement to this effect. And it is not explained why no
certificate of assessment or a declaration of real estate
property, or any other piece of evidence from the
treasurer's or assessor's office was submitted. In the
absence of credible proof to support the allegation as
to property ownership of the petitioner in this case, We
are constrained to conclude that petitioner has not met
the requirement. As to the question of whether or not
petitioner has a lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation, the petitioner testified to the effect that he
is employed by his father at a monthly salary of
P200.00, with bonus equivalent to 30% of the profit
from his father's business, and that he receives the
benefits of free board and lodging from his parents.
Again, this bare testimony has not been supported by
documentary evidence.
We had occasion to state in a previous naturalization
case that "the fact that petitioner's father is his
employer and that he is still living with him makes
doubtful the truth of petitioner's employment and gives
rise to the suspicion that he was employed by his
father, if it were true that he was, only for the purpose
of this petition."
While it is most usual and common for applicants for
naturalization to present in evidence their income tax
returns to prove their statement as to their occupation,
and at the same time to show that they are law-
abiding, the record of this case reveals not a single
income tax return that petitioner had filed. To our mind,
this failure would indicate that either petitioner has been
delinquent in his payment of taxes or that his income
is not such that would call for income tax — less than
P150.00 — in which case, not lucrative, judging by
present standards the cost of living and the low
purchasing power of the peso.
In naturalization cases, the burden is on the applicant
to prove by competent and satisfactory evidence that he
has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications specified by law. The naturalization law
should be strictly construed, and doubts resolved,
against the applicant
The petitioner in the case at bar having failed to satisfy
Us that he has met all the qualifications to become a
Filipino citizen, does not deserve the grant of his
petition.
 MACTAN CEBU INT’L AIRPORT (MCIAA) VS JUDGE
MARCOS
Facts: Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958,
mandated to "principally undertake the economical, efficient
and effective control, management and supervision of the
Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the
Lahug Airport in Cebu City, . . . and such other airports as
may be established in the Province of Cebu . . ." (Sec. 3, RA
6958).
Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the
privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in
accordance with Section 14 of its Charter:
Sec. 14. Tax Exemptions. — The Authority shall be exempt
from realty taxes imposed by the National Government or
any of its political subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities . . ..
On October 11, 1994, however, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa,
Ocer-in-Charge, Oce of the Treasurer of the City of
Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several
parcels of land belonging to the petitioner in the total
amount of P2,229,078.79. Petitioner objected to such
demand for payment as baseless and unjustified,
claiming in its favor the aforecited Section 14 of RA
6958 which exempts it from payment of realty taxes. It
was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the
government performing governmental functions, citing
Section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991
which puts limitations on the taxing powers of local
government units:
Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers
of Local Government Units. — Unless otherwise
provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not
extend to the levy of the following: Taxes, fees or
charges of any kind on the National Government, its
agencies and instrumentalities, and local government
units.
Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside
petitioner's realty tax account, insisting that the MCIAA
is a government-controlled corporation whose tax
exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of
Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code
that took effect on January 1, 1992:
As the City of Cebu was about to issue a warrant of
levy against the properties of petitioner, the latter was
compelled to pay its tax account "under protest" and
thereafter led a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, on December 29,
1994. MCIAA basically contended that the taxing powers of
local government units do not extend to the levy of taxes or
fees of any kind on an instrumentality of the national
government. Petitioner insisted that while it is indeed a
government-owned corporation, it nonetheless stands on the
same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national
government by the very nature of its powers and functions.
Respondent City, however, asserted that MCIAA is not an
instrumentality of the government but merely a government-
owned corporation performing proprietary functions. As
such, all exemptions previously granted to it were deemed
withdrawn by operation of law, as provided under Sections
193 and 234 of the Local Government Code when it took
effect on January 1, 1992.
Issue: WON MCIAA, a GOCC, is exempted from the
payment of realty taxes pursuant to Section 133 of the
LGCC
Held: No.
As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of
sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in
its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is
to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which
imposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay it.
Nevertheless, effective limitations thereon may be imposed
by the people through their Constitutions. Our Constitution,
for instance, provides that the rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable and Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation. So potent indeed is the
power that it was once opined that "the power to tax involves
the power to destroy." Verily, taxation is a destructive power
which interferes with the personal and property rights of the
people and takes from them a portion of their property for the
support of the government.
Accordingly, tax statutes must be construed strictly against
the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. But
since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the
lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions
from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally
in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of exemption from tax
payments must be clearly shown and based on language in
the law too plain to be mistaken.
Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefrom is
the exception. However, if the grantee of the exemption is a
political subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid rule of
construction does not apply because the practical effect of
the exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that
has to be handled by the government in the course of its
operations. The power to tax is primarily vested in the
Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised
by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a
valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority
conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. Under
the latter, the exercise of the power may be subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide
which, however, must be consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy.
There can be no question that under Section 14 of R.A. No.
6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty
taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its
political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities.
Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and exemption
therefrom the exception, the exemption may thus be
withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The only
exception to this rule is where the exemption was granted to
private parties based on material consideration of a mutual
nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered
by the non- impairment clause of the Constitution
 PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition
INC. VS. PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, ET AL. of local franchise taxes.

Doctrine: -The tax exemption must be expressed in the statute in clear

-The tax exemption must be expressed in the statute in clear
language that leaves no doubt of the intention of the
legislature to grant such exemption.
Facts:
-PLDT is a holder of a legislative franchise under Act No.
3436, as amended, to render local and international
telecommunications services. The terms and conditions of its
franchise were later consolidated under Republic Act No.
7082, Section 12 of which embodies the so-called “in-lieu-of-
all taxes” clause, where under PLDT shall pay a franchise
tax equivalent to 3% of all its gross receipts, which franchise
tax shall be “in lieu of all taxes”.
language that leaves no doubt of the intention of the
legislature to grant such exemption. And, even if it is
granted, the exemption must be interpreted in strictissimi
juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority.
-Mutatis mutandis also applies to this case: When exemption
is claimed, it must be shown indubitably to exist. At the
outset, every presumption is against it. A well-founded doubt
is fatal to the claim. It is only when the terms of the
concession are too explicit to admit fairly of any other
construction that the proposition can be supported.’

-Thereafter, the Local Government Code took effect. Section

137 of the Code, in relation to Section 151 thereof, grants
provinces and other local government units the power to
impose local franchise tax on businesses enjoying a
franchise. Invoking its authority, the Province of Laguna,
through its local legislative assembly, enacted a provincial
ordinance imposing a franchise tax upon all businesses
enjoying a franchise, which includes PLDT. In compliance
with the ordinance, PLDT paid the Province of Laguna its
local franchise tax liability for the year 1998 in the amount of
P1,081,212.10.

-Prior thereto, Congress enacted the Public

Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines. Then, the
Department of Finance, thru its Bureau of Local Government
Finance (BLGF), issued a ruling to the effect that PLDT,
among other telecommunication companies, became
exempt from local franchise tax. Accordingly, PLDT shall be
exempt from the payment of franchise and business taxes
imposable by LGUs under Sections 137 and 143,
respectively of the Local Government Code, upon the
effectivity of RA 7925. However, PLDT shall be liable to pay
the franchise and business taxes on its gross receipts during
the period that PLDT was not enjoying the ‘most favored
clause’ provision of RA 7025.

-PLDT then refused to pay the Province of Laguna its local

franchise tax liability for the following year and it even filed
with the Office of the Provincial Treasurer a written claim for
refund of the amount it paid as local franchise tax for the
previous year.

Issue:

-Does Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7925 operate to exempt

PLDT from payment of franchise tax?

Held:

-No. In approving Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress

intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all
telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict
construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule
that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal
corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal
taxing powers, we hold that section 23 of R.A. No. 7925
cannot be considered as having amended petitioner’s