CASE DIGEST : Restituto Ynot Vs IAC

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo
for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality
of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case,
the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling
of RTC.

Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the
Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will
not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried
out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after
he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying due process.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform
175 SCRA 343 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection –
Valid Classification
Eminent Domain – Just Compensation
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or
R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights
includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall,
by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was
enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their
payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program
(CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s)
implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the
earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are
not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners
of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that
since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute
their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till
their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because
they claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and
229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform
program and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which
provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated
due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their
land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has
always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms
of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt
from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not
shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The
argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to
share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who
will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is
allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to
the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in
classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from
determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon
by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both
parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the
landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law
however is that, the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely
preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an
administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the
final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court
of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional
exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have
to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient
money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just
compensation.
DECS vs San Diego G.R. No. 89572
DECS and Dir. of Educational Measurement vs. Roberto Rey San Diego and Judge Dizon-
Capulong
G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989

FACTS: Roberto Rey San Diego, a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of B.S.
Zoology, had taken and flunked 4 National Medical Admission Tests and was applying to take
another test. NMAT Rule provides that a student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take
the test. After three successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the
fourth time. The Regional Trial Court held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to
pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has been deprived of his right to quality education.

RULING: NMAT is a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools to those who
have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education. The regulation of
practice of medicine is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.
This regulation includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to
practice medicine. NMAT is a means of achieving the country’s objective of “upgrading the
selection of applicants into medical schools” and of “improving the quality of medical education
in the country” It is the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every citizen has
the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirement.
The equal protection requires equality among equals. There would be unequal protection if some
applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied
entrance.
The petition has been granted and the decision of the respondent court has been reversed.
 CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL GR No. 166494,
June 29, 2007
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL
GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007

FACTS:
 Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the
Philippines, are praying for preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.”
On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257, amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004. Section 4(a) of
the Act states:

SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:

(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization
of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and
purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior
citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;

 The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction
based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the
discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of
value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and
shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended.
 The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
RA No. 9275, Rule VI, Article 8 which contains the proviso that the implementation of the tax
deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by the BIR and approved by
the DOF. With the new law, the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines wanted a
clarification of the meaning of tax deduction. The DOF clarified that under a tax deduction
scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together with other
deductions which are considered as operating expenses before the Tax Due was computed
based on the Net Taxable Income. On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of
discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due amount.
 The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percent discount shall include both
prescription and non-prescription medicines, whether branded or generic. It stated that such
discount would be provided in the purchase of medicines from all establishments supplying
medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens.
 Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting the discount would result to
loss of profit and capital especially that such law failed to provide a scheme to justly
compensate the discount.

ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is unconstitutional or not
violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the Constitution which provides that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation and the equal protection clause of Article 3
Section 1.
 HELD:
 The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of
private property for public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which
petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the
meaning of the word compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered
for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
 The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for medical and dental services, and
diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses,
carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement; fares for domestic land,
air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the exclusive use or
enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business
establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount
as a tax deduction.
 The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain,
has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has
been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as “the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great
public needs.” It is “[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.”
Case Brief: White Light Corporation v City of Manila
NOVEMBER 26, 2013JEFF REY

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA.
MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S.
LIM,Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission,
Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns,
Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila”
(the Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow
the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of
rooms more than twice a day.

The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta.
Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several
hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business
interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.

RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty
of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.” Reference
was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the
incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises.
Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to
dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise
of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which
confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance
of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses
and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they
contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to
enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix
penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the
right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power;
and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments
that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of
police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful
method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb
immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed
to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-
being of its constituents in general.

Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and
as such, it is unconstitutional.

The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio
Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations
Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs
through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the
localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted
with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient
lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is
no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these
establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the
extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including
City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within
the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices,
namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban
is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government
units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare
clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding
right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for
numerous and varied actions by the State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the
covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power
of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for
their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.

SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be
analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that
the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the
injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity
of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those
persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the
lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same
fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined
by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to
enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to
such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare,

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the
invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence
accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers
should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private
rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal
rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and
could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures
such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police
work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement
of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures
would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit
activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from
their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and
even apartments.

SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that
may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives
of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their
patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the
petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more
than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.
People vs. Siton, et al.,GR 169364, 18 Sept. 2009

Facts:

Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to
Art. 202 (2) of the RPC in two separate Informations. Accused were found wandering and
loitering around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets of Davao City, without any visible means to
support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose. Respondents filed separate Motions to
Quash on the ground that Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overboard. The
municipal trial court denied the motions, directed respondents to file their respective
counter-affidavits, and declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the
State’s police power (or the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property) and justified by the Latin maxim “salus populiest suprema
lex” (which calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater
number). Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC challenging the
constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law and claiming that Art 202 (2) violated the equal
protection clause. The RTC granted the petition of the herein respondents and declared Art.
202 (2) unconstitutional

Issue:
Does Article 202 (2), RPC on vagrancy violate the equal protection clause?

Ruling:

No. Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it
discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are
punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves
under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in
the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently
or to engage in immoral conduct.
G.R. No. 175356 MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC v.
SECRETARY OF DSWD 711 SCRA 302
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC v. SECRETARY OF DSWD
711 SCRA 302
G.R. No. 175356
December 3, 2013

TOPIC: Bill of Rights; Eminent Domain v. Police Power

FACTS: RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257), granting senior citizens
20% discount on certain establishments.

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the DSWD
issued its own Rules and Regulations.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but are only
assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257
and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.

Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the
Constitution, which provides that: "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation."

Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the
State’s police power.

ISSUE: Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of
police power or eminent domain.

RULING: The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.

It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental act is an

exercise of police power or eminent domain. The judicious approach, therefore, is to
look at the nature and effects of the challenged governmental act and decide on the basis
thereof.

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age,
are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities,
and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It serves to honor senior
citizens who presumably spent their lives on contributing to the development and
progress of the nation.

In turn, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a
private establishment.
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions
from, price control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally
regarded as police power measures.

The subject regulation differs there from in that (1) the discount does not prevent the
establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the
discount does not apply to all customers of a given establishment but only to the class of
senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree material to the resolution of this case, the
20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the category of price regulatory
measures which affect the profitability of establishments subjected thereto. On its face,
therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure.
 CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY AKLAN,

G.R. No. 211356; September 29, 2014

DOCTRINE: Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial
powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments. This power granted by the
LGC, as earlier explained, We believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of the
LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted, which is subject to review by the DENR.
The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the
administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly
speaking, is not an issue on environmental protection, conservation of natural
resources, and the maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or illegality of the
structure. Rather than treating this as an environmental issue then, focus should not be
diverted from the root cause of this debacle compliance.

FACTS

Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove
Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company
applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan.2 While
the company was already operating a resort in the area, and the application sought the
issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a
parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay
Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism
Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.

Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning
Administrator denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed
construction site was within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance
2000-131 (Ordinance).

Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no
action was ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by
the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011,
the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure
and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion.

PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a

nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.
And the Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before
proceeding with the demolition.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The demolition needed no court order because the

municipal mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to
order the removal of illegally constructed buildings.

ISSUE

Whether or not a judicial proceedings be conducted first before the LGU can order the
closure and demolition of the property in question.

RULING

Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a
thing is a nuisance per se.

Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, we still find
in this case that the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is
because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights
of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to
promote the general welfare.

Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after
satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and
demolition.

One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders.
Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its
function as the executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to
hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective
order or resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the LGC, which
empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed
establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.