TOK – Mathematics

Platonism

Mathematical Platonism is the form of realism that suggests that mathematical entities are
abstract, have no spatiotemporal or causal properties, and are eternal and unchanging. This is
often claimed to be the view most people have of numbers. The term Platonism is used
because such a view is seen to parallel Plato's Theory of Forms and a "World of Ideas"
(Greek: eidos (εἶδος)) described in Plato's allegory of the cave: the everyday world can only
imperfectly approximate an unchanging, ultimate reality. Both Plato's cave and Platonism have
meaningful, not just superficial connections, because Plato's ideas were preceded and probably
influenced by the hugely popular Pythagoreans of ancient Greece, who believed that the world
was, quite literally, generated by numbers.
A major question considered in mathematical Platonism is: Precisely where and how do the
mathematical entities exist, and how do we know about them? Is there a world, completely
separate from our physical one, that is occupied by the mathematical entities? How can we
gain access to this separate world and discover truths about the entities? One proposed answer
is the Ultimate Ensemble, a theory that postulates that all structures that exist mathematically
also exist physically in their own universe.
Plato spoke of mathematics by:
How do you mean?
I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the
soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling against the introduction of visible or
tangible objects into the argument. You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and
ridicule any one who attempts to divide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if you divide,
they multiply, taking care that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions.
That is very true.
Now, suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are these wonderful numbers
about which you are reasoning, in which, as you say, there is a unity such as you demand, and
each unit is equal, invariable, indivisible, --what would they answer?
— Plato, Chapter 7. "The Republic" (Jowett translation)

Nominalism

In metaphysics, nominalism is a philosophical view which denies the existence

of universals and abstract objects, but affirms the existence of general or abstract terms
and predicates. There are at least two main versions of nominalism. One version denies the
existence of universals – things that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular
things (e.g., strength, humanity). The other version specifically denies the existence of abstract
objects – objects that do not exist in space and time.
Most nominalists have held that only physical particulars in space and time are real, and that
universals exist only post res, that is, subsequent to particular things. However, some versions
of nominalism hold that some particulars are abstract entities (e.g., numbers), while others are
concrete entities – entities that do exist in space and time (e.g., pillars, snakes, bananas).

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 Nominalism is primarily a position on the problem of universals, which dates back at least
to Plato, and is opposed to realist philosophies, such as Platonic realism, which assert that
universals do exist over and above particulars. However, the name "nominalism" emerged from
debates in medieval philosophy with Roscellinus.
The term 'nominalism' stems from the Latin nomen, "name". For example, John Stuart Mill once
wrote, that "there is nothing general except names". In philosophy of law, nominalism finds its
application in what is called constitutional nominalism.
In the Middle Ages, when Platonic and Aristotelian realisms were associated with orthodox
religious belief, nominalism could be interpreted as heresy. But religious implications aside,
nominalism does indeed reject Platonic realism as a requirement for thinking and speaking in
general terms; and though it seems to deny also Aristotelian realism, such moderate
nominalists as the 17th-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes affirm that some similarity exists
between particulars and the general word applied to them—otherwise thought and speech
would be impossible. By explaining thought and speech through the use of symbols, such as
mental images or linguistic terms, nominalism seems to imply some form of conceptualism that
involves more than the mere correct use of symbols and thus is not clearly distinguishable from
conceptualism.
In modern logic a nominalistic concern is reflected in the form that is given to
the universalquantifier. Instead of saying “man is mortal,” or even “all men are mortal,” the
modern logician circumvents the universal by saying “for any x, if x is a man it is
mortal.” Neopositivism, in repudiatingmetaphysics, has often been explicitly nominalistic,
insisting that there exist only “the facts” of observation and experiment. In the mid-20th
century, Nelson Goodman, a philosopher of science and of language, and Willard Van Orman
Quine, a logician, have championed a modern nominalism that specifically rejects classes—
Goodman for their being “nonindividuals” and Quine for their being “abstract entities.”

Fictionalism

Fictionalism is the view in philosophy according to which statements that appear to be

descriptions of the world should not be construed as such, but should instead be understood as
cases of "make believe", of pretending to treat something as literally true (a "useful fiction").
Two important strands of fictionalism are modal fictionalism developed by Gideon Rosen,
which states that possible worlds, regardless of whether they exist or not, may be a part of a
useful discourse, and mathematical fictionalism advocated by Hartry Field, which states that
talk of numbers and other mathematical objects is nothing more than a convenience for doing
science. Also in meta-ethics, there is an equivalent position called moral fictionalism
(championed by Richard Joyce). Many modern versions of fictionalism are influenced by the
work of Kendall Walton in aesthetics.
Fictionalism consists in at least the following three theses:
1. Claims made within the domain of discourse are taken to be truth-apt; that is, true or false
2. The domain of discourse is to be interpreted at face value—not reduced to meaning something
else
3. The aim of discourse in any given domain is not truth, but some other virtue(s) (e.g., simplicity,
explanatory scope).

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Mathematical fictionalism (or as I'll call it, fictionalism) is best thought of as a reaction to
mathematical platonism. Platonism is the view that (a) there exist abstract mathematical
objects (i.e., nonspatiotemporal mathematical objects), and (b) our mathematical sentences
and theories provide true descriptions of such objects. So, for instance, on the platonist view,
the sentence ‘3 is prime’ provides a straightforward description of a certain object—namely,
the number 3—in much the same way that the sentence ‘Mars is red’ provides a description of
Mars. But whereas Mars is a physical object, the number 3 is (according to platonism)
an abstract object. And abstract objects, platonists tell us, are wholly nonphysical, nonmental,
nonspatial, nontemporal, and noncausal. Thus, on this view, the number 3 exists independently
of us and our thinking, but it does not exist in space or time, it is not a physical or mental
object, and it does not enter into causal relations with other objects. This view has been
endorsed by Plato, Frege (1884, 1893–1903, 1919), Gödel (1964), and in some of their writings,
Russell (1912) and Quine (1948, 1951), not to mention numerous more recent philosophers of
mathematics, e.g., Putnam (1971), Parsons (1971), Steiner (1975), Resnik (1997), Shapiro
(1997), Hale (1987), Wright (1983), Katz (1998), Zalta (1988), and Colyvan (2001).
Fictionalism, on the other hand, is the view that (a) our mathematical sentences and theories
do purport to be about abstract mathematical objects, as platonism suggests, but (b) there are
no such things as abstract objects, and so (c) our mathematical theories are not true. Thus, the
idea is that sentences like ‘3 is prime’ are false, or untrue, for the same reason that, say, ‘The
tooth fairy is generous’ is false or untrue—because just as there is no such person as the tooth
fairy, so too there is no such thing as the number 3. It is important to note, however, that
despite the name, fictionalist views do not have to involve any very strong claims about the
analogy between mathematics and fiction. For instance, there is no claim here that
mathematical discourse is a kind of fictional discourse. Thus, fictionalists are not committed to
the thesis that there are no important disanalogies between mathematics and fiction. (We will
return to this issue below, in section 2.4.) Finally, it should also be noted at the start that
fictionalism is a version of mathematical nominalism, the view that there are no such things as
mathematical objects.
Fictionalism was first introduced by Field (1980, 1989, 1998). Since then, the view has been
developed—in a few different ways—by Balaguer (1996a, 1998a, 2001, 2009), Rosen (2001),
Yablo (2002a, 2002b, 2005), Leng (2005a, 2005b, 2010), and Bueno (2009), though as will
become clear below, one might question whether Bueno and Yablo are best interpreted as
fictionalists. Finally, one might also interpret Melia (2000) as defending a fictionalist view,
though he doesn't really commit to this.
(It's worth noting that Hoffman (2004) also endorses a view that is a kind of fictionalism. Her
view is very different from the fictionalist view defined above, however, because it doesn't
involve a commitment to thesis (a). She reinterprets mathematics along the lines of Kitcher
(1984) and then endorses a fictionalist view of this reinterpretation; i.e., she maintains that
once mathematics is reinterpreted in this way, it's singular terms fail to refer and its sentences
are not true. (It's not clear how much this view differs from Kitcher's view; one might interpret
Kitcher as endorsing a very similar view.) In any event, it is important to note that Hoffman's
rejection of thesis (a) makes her view radically different from more standard fictionalist views.
As will become clear below, thesis (a) is very plausible, and its plausibility is one of the main
reasons for the popularity of platonism. Thus, one of the main selling points of fictionalism—
i.e., the standard sort of fictionalism defined above—is that it combines an acceptance of thesis
(a) with an anti-platonistic ontology.)

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When one first hears the fictionalist hypothesis, it can seem a bit crazy. Are we really supposed
to believe that sentences like ‘3 is prime’ and ‘2 + 2 = 4’ are false? But the appeal of fictionalism
starts to emerge when we realize what the alternatives are. By thinking carefully about the
issues surrounding the interpretation of mathematical discourse, it can start to seem that
fictionalism is actually very plausible, and indeed, that it might just be the least crazy view out
there.
Section 1 provides a formulation of what might be thought of as the central argument for
fictionalism. Section 2 provides a discussion of a number of different objections to fictionalism,
as well as a number of different versions of fictionalism. These two things go together very
naturally, because the different versions of fictionalism have emerged in connection with the
responses that different philosophers have given to the various objections to fictionalism.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1EGDCh75SpQ
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vA2cdHLKYB8&t=498s
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UWhPnbZv-o