Lopez v.

Heesen

365 P.2d 448 (1961)

69 N.M. 206

Jesse G. LOPEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert HEESEN and Sears, Roebuck and Company, a corporation, Defendants-
Appellees.

No. 6760.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

August 22, 1961.

Rehearing Denied October 31, 1961.

*449 Smith, Kiker & Kitts, and Ramon Lopez, Albuquerque, for appellant.

Sutin & Jones, Albuquerque, David R. Hardy, Kansas City, Mo., for appellees.

CHAVEZ, Justice.

Appellant, Jesse G. Lopez, originally filed suit against appellee, Robert Heesen, alleging that on October 15, 1958,
Heesen unlawfully, violently, maliciously and feloniously assaulted and shot appellant with a shotgun, thereby inflicting
dangerous and painful wounds and injuries to appellant, causing him great bodily and mental pain and anguish, all to his
damage in the total sum of $80,000, which included $25,000 punitive damages.

Appellee, Heesen, answered denying the allegations of the complaint and thereafter appellant filed a demand for jury trial.
By stipulation of appellant and appellee, Heesen, appellee, Sears, Roebuck and Company was joined as a party-
defendant. Appellee, Sears, Roebuck and Company, will hereinafter be referred to as appellee "Sears." Thereafter two
amended complaints followed before the third amended complaint was filed, alleging that appellee, Sears, was engaged
in the design and manufacture of hunting firearms, including the Higgins Model 51, Cal. 30.06 rifle, and was also engaged
in the selling of firearms in Albuquerque.

It was also alleged that on October 14, 1958, appellee, Sears, sold to appellee, Heesen, one of said Higgins Model 51
hunting rifles; that said rifle was negligently designed or manufactured by appellee, Sears, in that the safety mechanism
moved readily and in a dangerous manner from a "safe" to a "fire" position. In addition, it was alleged that the rifle in this
dangerous condition known to appellee, Sears, was sold to appellee, Heesen, with the knowledge that it would be used
for hunting purposes and that appellee, Sears, negligently failed to warn appellee, Heesen, of the dangerous and
defective condition of the rifle.

The complaint further alleged that on the afternoon of October 15, 1958, in Colfax County, New Mexico, appellee,
Heesen, negligently permitted the rifle to discharge while hunting and that as a proximate result of the joint and concurrent
negligence of both appellees, appellant sustained a severe and disabling wound and injury to his chest, requiring hospital
and surgical care. Appellant demanded damages in the amount of $55,000 against both appellees, jointly and severally.

Appellee, Heesen, answered denying the allegations of the third amended complaint. Appellee, Sears, also answered
denying the allegations and raising additional affirmative defenses, to-wit: That appellant's injuries were caused by an
unavoidable accident; that the negligence of appellee, Heesen, was the sole cause thereof; that the rifle involved was of a
recognized quality and of proper design and functioned properly by all commercial sporting arms standards when used
with reasonable care; that rifles of this type had been manufactured by the millions and used by hunters generally and by
the government of the United States and foreign countries; that the safety mechanism and its qualities were patent and
obvious, and had been seen and inspected by Heesen prior to the accident; that Heesen knew of the tendency of the
safety mechanism to come off safety to "fire" position while hunting in heavy brush and climbing up and down mountain
*450 terrain when pressure was applied to the safety mechanism; that appellee, Sears, had no duty to warn appellee,
Heesen, of the method of operation and use of the safety mechanism; and that it could not have been foreseen that
appellee, Heesen, would continue to hunt in heavy brush and mountainous terrain knowing that the safety mechanism
would come off safety without taking proper precautions to handle the rifle in a reasonable manner.

The jury returned its verdict finding the issues for both appellees and against appellant. Judgment was entered for
appellees and this appeal followed. Appellant abandoned any contention that the verdict in favor of Heesen was
erroneous and this appeal concerns only appellee, Sears.

The facts are substantially as follows. In the early afternoon of October 14, 1958, appellee, Heesen, an Air Force officer,
purchased a J.C. Higgins Model 51, 30.06 rifle from the store of appellee, Sears. Said rifle has a bolt action known more
particularly as a "Mauser type action" with which Heesen was familar. Heesen, although experienced in hunting, was not
familiar with the Higgins Model 51 and had never used such a rifle. The safety mechanism on the rifle is what is known as
a "Class 1" safety, meaning that it interrupts the firing pin directly. The safety lever is mounted on the left side of the gun
to the rear of the bolt assembly. It is a two-position safety with the action locked when the safety lever is in a raised
position. To release the safety, you push the safety lever to the left and down to a horizontal position and the gun is then
ready to fire.

Heesen first telephoned appellee's store about obtaining a Higgins rifle which they advertised. Later he went to appellee's
store and purchased the rifle. At the time of the purchase Heesen was given an instruction pamphlet which he read. Said
pamphlet explained the composition of the rifle and gave operating instructions, including the method to be pursued to
make the gun "safe," i.e., how the gun is put in a safety position and how it may be released and have the gun ready to
fire. It appears that Heesen first talked to a salesman, John C. Villella, over the telephone and requested that the rifle be
put aside for him. However, another salesman, Roger Perkins made the actual transfer of the rifle to Heesen. Perkins'
whereabouts is unknown and nothing is known as to Perkins' conversation with Heesen. Villella did not give Heesen any
instructions as to the use of the safety mechanism. There was a telescopic sight advertised for sale for use with this rifle
but Heesen did not care for the sight and did not purchase it.

Immediately after the purchase of the rifle, Heesen left for a deer hunting trip in an area known as Ute Park near the town
of Eagle Nest in Colfax County. He arrived at Ute Park that night and began hunting the next morning on October 15,
1958. Heesen hunted without success and had seen no game up until the time his gun discharged and appellant was
wounded shortly after 3:00 P.M.

When Heesen commenced hunting that morning he placed a live cartridge in the chamber and placed the gun on safety
position. He traveled a good deal during the hours before the shooting and on one or two occasions he discovered the
gun off safety position. This was when he had come down a long hill covered with rocks and boulders and he assumed
that he had hit it against a rock or something. Thereafter Heesen checked the safety position on frequent occasions.
Heesen carried the gun on his right shoulder with the sling at port arms or ready position, with his left hand on the forearm
of the gun and his right hand on the stock, and by the forearm of the gun with his right hand at the "balance" of the rifle. In
each of these positions the safety lever was toward Heesen's body or right leg. Heesen changed the position in which he
carried the rifle during the course of his walking up and down mountain slopes. He also carried it in a different position in
going through brush and in climbing or stepping upon rocks. Although the gun moved from "safe" to "fire" position at least
twice during the hours before *451 the shooting, Heesen was not aware of this occurrence. Shortly before the shooting,
Heesen had been sitting on a knoll for about twenty minutes checking the wind and watching for deer. While sitting on the
knoll he checked or observed the safety lever on the rifle several times and it was on safety position. At a time not more
than ten minutes before the shooting he left the knoll and started down a draw which ran in a southerly or southwesterly
direction. Heesen was not sure whether he checked the safety lever after he left the knoll and he was carrying the gun on
his shoulder by the sling as he proceeded down the draw toward the point where the gun discharged.

At about this time, appellant, Jesse G. Lopez, was sitting next to a tree about fifty yards away from the point where
Heesen's gun subsequently discharged. Appellant in the company of two hunting companions, Bennie Aragon and
Ramon Barela, had gone from Albuquerque to Ute Park on the afternoon of October 14, 1958, and after spending the
night in the area, commenced hunting on the morning of October 15th, the first day of deer season. After hunting all
morning and again in the early afternoon, the party stopped to rest at the location where appellant was shot. It was then
about 3:00 P.M. and appellant, dressed in bright hunting clothes, was sitting about twenty feet away from his two
companions and scanning the area for game. After sitting there about four or five minutes, appellant observed an object to
his right which was moving but which he could not identify. This was shortly before the shooting.

As appellee, Heesen, proceeded down the draw after leaving the knoll, he heard a "rustle" and saw a deer go between
some trees to the left of his line of travel about 50 to 100 yards away. The deer, when observed, was in a direction about
80 or 90 degrees to the left of where appellant was sitting and Heesen did not observe appellant or his companions before
the shooting. At about this time Heesen removed the rifle from the sling on his shoulder and held it by his right hand at or
near the balance position of the weapon. He then came to a dead log in his path which was about eight or ten inches in
diameter and was lying horizontally a foot or less off the ground with several dead limbs sticking upward from it. One of
these limbs was a dead sapling sticking up about eighteen inches above the log and had a "fork" shaped like a thumb and
forefinger extended. Heesen wanted to cross the log to see the deer better, and as he stepped across the log his left foot
caught on a little limb sticking out and caused him to stumble. His left foot went down hard on the ground on one side of
the log and his right foot slipped on the grass. This brought the gun down and the gun discharged, the bullet striking
appellant. Heesen testified that he had his hand at least six inches away from the trigger when the gun discharged.
Immediately after the gun discharged he observed that the gun was on "fire" position.

Appellant was sitting on ground higher than Heesen at the time the gun discharged and subsequent investigation showed
that the bullet had gone uphill, hit a dead tree and ricocheted several degrees to the left, and had thereafter struck some
seedlings before hitting appellant in the chest. The bullet traveled approximately fifty yards altogether. Heesen went
quickly to the spot where appellant was sitting, observed the seriousness of his condition, and Heesen and Lopez'
companions made immediate arrangements to care for appellant. Heesen obtained medical aid.

There was testimony at the trial that when Heesen was going to the place of the accident with Dr. E.L. Lindsley, he told
Dr. Lindsley that the gun discharged as he was moving it from "fire" position to the "safe" position.

Under point I, appellant contends that the trial court committed error in permitting testimony as to the general reputation of
other firearms companies who use the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51. A witness for appellee,
Sears, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., qualified as an expert in gun designing and testified *452 that the following companies had
an excellent reputation in the small arms field: Fabrique Nationale of Belgium, Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby
Corporation, Colt Firearms Company, and Jefferson Corporation. Objection was made to this testimony on the ground that
it was wholly immaterial and irrelevant to any issue in the case.

Appellant, in the third amended complaint, alleged that the Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous and defective
condition due to its negligent manufacture, design, assembly or maintenance, in that the safety mechanism thereof moved
readily and in a dangerous manner from "safe" to "fire" position. This is an allegation of an ultimate issue of fact which the
jury had to decide. Here is an issue, the proper understanding of which by a jury composed of six men and six ladies,
requires specialized knowledge or experience and cannot be determined independently merely from deductions made
and inferences drawn on the basis of ordinary knowledge. The jury was instructed that expert testimony is intended only
to assist them in coming to a correct conclusion upon facts which are of a technical nature, but that the opinion of experts
was not binding upon them and the jury must determine the weight to be given to such testimony.

Appellant introduced evidence tending to prove that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 rifle is easy to knock off
safety, making the rifle dangerous. Appellant's witness, Frank Doyle, over appellee's, Sears', objection, expressed the
opinion that the safety device, without the telescopic sight, is not a safe piece, in that the projection is too long and it is too
prone to be knocked from "safe" to "fire" position. There is also testimony of certain tests made with the Higgins Model 51
and the witness, Ira Kessler, expressed the opinion that the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe without the telescopic sight.
Another witness, Robert Allen, testified as to the manner in which the safety lever of the Higgins Model 51 moved from
"safe" to "fire" position without his knowledge.

Appellee, Sears, introduced testimony of witnesses who were either experts in the small arms field or experts in gun
designing. The witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified that he is a gun designer employed by High Standard
Manufacturing Company who manufacture the Higgins Model 51 for Sears. He qualified as an expert gun designer with
many years' experience with other rifle manufacturers and in factories designing and building weapons of the small arms
design. La Violette has two gun patents pending. La Violette testified that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 is
supplied to High Standard Manufacturing Company by Fabrique Nationale of Belgium. He also testified extensively as to
the advantages of the safety device of the Higgins Model 51 and stated that six different makes of guns have the same
modified leaf safety device as does the Higgins Model 51. The manufacturers of these guns are F.N. Mauser, Colt, Marlin,
Nato and Weatherby. The evidence also shows that since 1951, 75,572 Higgins Model 51 rifles with the modified leaf
safety device have been sold by High Standard Manufacturing Company to appellee, Sears. High Standard Manufacturing
Company has never been sued by reason of the design of the Higgins Model 51 rifle. There is also opinion evidence that
the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe by all commercial sporting goods standards.

Appellant appears to concede that the number of rifles manufactured with the modified leaf safety device, and the fact that
other companies manufacture guns with the same design, is relevant as tending to show that the design is proper.
Appellant also seems to concede that the reputation of Fabrique Nationale of Belgium may be relevant to the issue.

Subsequent to the testimony as to the reputation of the various firearms companies who use a similar safety device as the
Higgins Model 51, the witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified without objection that the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe by
all commercial sporting goods standards, and that the design of the safety device of the Higgins *453 Model 51 was not
negligent or defective. He also testified, without objection, that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 rifle is excellent
for hunting and fulfills the requirements of a good designer. The witness, Thomas Raymond Robinson, Jr., testified that in
his opinion the Higgins Model 51 is good and practical in the field for a prudent hunter, and is suitable for hunting. Ira L.
Kessler, an expert witness called by defendant, Heesen, testified that the Marlin Firearms Company has a fair reputation,
and that the Colt Firearms Company has an excellent reputation.

On an issue such as we have here we believe the applicable rule to be as stated in Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. II,
§ 461, p. 489, as follows:

"(1) The conduct of others evidences the tendency of the thing in question; and such conduct e.g. in using chains on a hill,
felt shoes in a powder-factory, railings around a machine, or in not using them is receivable with other evidence showing
the tendency of the thing as dangerous, defective, or the reverse. But this is only evidence. The jury may find from other
evidence that the thing was in fact dangerous, defective, or the reverse, and the maintenance was or was not negligence,
in spite of the above evidence. * * *"

The conduct of others is proper evidence for a jury to consider in determining whether the tendency of the thing is
dangerous, defective, or the reverse. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. McDonough, 8 Cir., 161 F. 657; Wigmore on
Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. II, § 461, p. 495.

Under our Rule, § 21-1-1(43) (a), which is the same as the Federal Rule, the rule which favors the reception of the
evidence governs, the basis being that any evidence which throws light on the question in issue should be admitted,
leaving it to the trial court to hold the hearing within reasonable bounds. Mourikas v. Vardianos, 4 Cir., 169 F.2d 53;
Lawrence v. Nutter, 4 Cir., 203 F.2d 540.

Circuit Judge Bratton, in a specially concurring opinion in United States v. Bowman, 10 Cir., 73 F.2d 716, 720, in stating
the rule, quoted from United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 8 Cir., 166 F. 407, as follows:

"It is true that in trials by jury it is their province to determine the ultimate facts, and that the general rule is that witnesses
are permitted to testify to the primary facts within their knowledge, but not to their opinions. And it is also true that this has
at times led to the statement that witnesses may not give their opinions upon the ultimate facts which the jury are to
decide, because that would supplant their judgment and usurp their province. But such a statement is not to be taken
literally. It but reflects the general rule, which is subject to important qualifications, and never was intended to close any
reasonable avenue to the truth in the investigation of questions of fact. Besides, the tendency of modern decisions is not
only to give as wide a scope as is reasonably possible to the investigation of such questions, but also to accord to the trial
judge a certain discretion in determining what testimony has a tendency to establish the ultimate facts, and to disturb his
decision admitting testimony of that character only when it plainly appears that the testimony had no legitimate bearing
upon the questions at issue and was calculated to prejudice the minds of the jurors. * * *"

Applying the above principles we hold that the testimony as to the reputation of Fabrique Nationale, who manufacture the
safety device on the Higgins Model 51, and the reputation of Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt
Firearms Company and Jefferson Corporation, who manufacture rifles which have the same modified leaf safety device
as the Higgins Model 51, was relevant to the issue of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or
safe, and *454 that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.

Under point II appellant also contends that the trial court committed error in permitting evidence to be introduced as to the
poundage pressure required to move the safety levers of various rifles from "safe" to "fire" position. There is no merit in
this contention. Appellant's witness, Frank Doyle, testified fully as to his experience with guns and particularly with the
Higgins Model 51 safety device, which he termed the dangerous feature of the safety mechanism in that it was "so easy to
knock off." Doyle's testimony was introduced under appellant's contention that the Higgins Model 51 rifle was unsafe and
thus the issue arose as to the pressure required to move the safety lever from "safe" to "fire" position. Under the
circumstances it was proper for appellee, Sears, to show that the poundage pressure required to move the safety lever on
a Higgins Model 51 from "safe" to "fire" measured two-and-one-half pounds, and also to show the poundage pressure
required in rifles with identical safety devices. The evidence discloses that the pound pressure required to move the safety
lever on other similar devices was sometimes a little less and sometimes more than the Higgins Model 51.

Under point III appellant claims that the trial court erred in permitting the witnesses, La Violette, Thomas Robinson and
Edwards Brown, to give opinion evidence that the safety mechanism on the Higgins Model 51 rifle was negligently or
defectively designed. Objection was made to this testimony on the ground that this was an opinion upon a subject which is
within the province of the jury to determine and that the question asked calls for an opinion as to a question of law and
fact.

This contention, we think, must be rejected. The testimony of these witnesses, all experts in their field, was upon the
ultimate issue of fact of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was dangerous and defective or unsafe, and
was properly the subject of expert testimony. Opinion evidence on an ultimate issue of fact does not attempt or have the
power to usurp the functions of the jury, and this evidence could not usurp the jury's function because the jury may still
reject these opinions and accept some other view. Opinion evidence offered by both parties in this case was not binding
upon the jury and they were so instructed. See Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. VII, § 1920, p. 17; Hooper v. General
Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d 549.

In Millers' National Ins. Co., Chicago, Ill. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 10 Cir., 257 F.2d 93, 100, the court said:

"The insurance companies assert that McDonald was improperly permitted to invade and usurp the province of the jury in
that the sole issue was whether there was an explosion and McDonald was allowed to testify that there was an explosion.
The controlling rule as stated by the United States Supreme Court is that where the matter under inquiry is properly the
subject of expert testimony, it is no objection that the opinion sought to be elicited is upon the issue to be decided. That
rule has been followed in this circuit and applied in two recent decisions."

See also Eickmann v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 651, 253 S.W.2d 122; United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 8
Cir., 166 F. 407; Nelson v. Brames, 10 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 256; and Cropper v. Titanium Pigment Co., 8 Cir., 47 F.2d
1038.

In 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, § 775, p. 647, the rule is stated as follows:

"* * * In such cases, witnesses possessing requisite training, skill, or knowledge, denominated `experts,' may testify, not
only to the facts, but to their opinions respecting the facts, so far as necessary to enlighten the jury and to enable it to
come to a right verdict. * * * Issues of this kind are said to create a necessity for the admission in evidence of the opinions
or conclusions of witnesses who are *455 shown to be specially skilled or experienced in the particular field in question."

Appellant's final objection to the opinion testimony is that the question asked of the witnesses calls for an opinion as to a
question of law and fact.

Many of the cases cited by appellant on this point are automobile accident cases which hold that an expert or a non-
expert witness cannot express an opinion that the defendant was negligent. The reasoning behind these cases is that this
is within the field of knowledge and understanding of the jury and is not a matter requiring technical assistance of persons
having unusual knowledge of the subject by reason of skill, experience, or knowledge.

The parties agree that the ultimate issue of liability is for the jury to determine and that a witness cannot express an
opinion on a matter of law, as distinguished from an ultimate fact. The ultimate issue in this case was whether the safety
mechanism on the Higgins Model 51 rifle was in a dangerous and defective condition due to its negligent design, in that it
moved readily and in a dangerous manner from "safe" to "fire" position.

Appellant's witnesses testified at great length in what respect they considered the safety mechanism "dangerous,"
"unsafe," and "defective," and expressed the opinion that the safety mechanism was not a safe piece and was unsafe
without the telescopic sight. Appellees' expert witnesses likewise testified in great detail as to the safety mechanism and
they were of the opinion that the safety mechanism on the Higgins Model 51 rifle was safe by all commercial sporting
goods standards, was suitable for hunting, and was not negligently or defectively designed. Thus the jury was free to
adopt either view and then fix the liability.

The word "negligence" is sometimes used in a broad sense and sometimes in a narrow sense. In the broad sense it
includes the elements of liability. In the narrow sense the element of liability is excluded. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co.
v. Nichols, 78 Ind. App. 361, 130 N.E. 546, 553.

"* * * An allegation of negligence as applied to the conduct of a party is not a mere conclusion of law, unless made so by
the law, but the statement of an ultimate pleadable and provable fact. * * *"

Peavy v. Hardin, Tex.Civ.App. 1926, 288 S.W. 588, 589. See also Gower v. Lamb, Mo. App. 1955, 282 S.W.2d 867; Ege
v. Born, 212 Iowa 1138, 236 N.W. 75; Cohen v. Swiller, 1959, 17 Misc.2d 921, 186 N.Y.S.2d 844; Louis v. Smith-
McCormick Const. Co., 1917, 80 W. Va. 159, 92 S.E. 249; and Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d
549.

Beal v. Southern Union Gas Co., 66 N.M. 424, 349 P.2d 337, follows the rule that an expert witness can express an
opinion on an ultimate issue of fact, but cannot testify as to the ultimate issue of liability.

There is much confusion among the decisions due to the language used by the courts in explaining why opinion testimony
should be excluded. Some courts say that the opinion would "usurp the functions of the jury." Other courts say that the
opinion should not be received because "that is the question which the jury must decide." If we are to add to this, the
additional confusion which exists in the decisions as to whether negligence is a question of law or fact, or is a mixed
question of law and fact, we would tend to create more confusion and add to the fine distinctions and limitations.

Opinion evidence is admissible on the basis that it will aid the jury to understand the problem and lead them to the truth on
the ultimate facts, and opinions may be disregarded by the jury in whole or in part. It is left to the jury to decide the issue.
See Seal v. Blackburn Tank Truck Service, 64 N.M. 282, 327 P.2d 797; and Hooper v. General Motors Corp., supra.

From a careful consideration of the record, we have come to the conclusion that when we consider all of the testimony
*456 bearing upon the question of whether the rifle was dangerous and defective due to its negligent design, that when
appellee used the term "negligent or defective," he was using the word "negligent" in a narrow sense and as to an ultimate
and provable fact. This excluded the element of liability. It was for the jury to fix the ultimate liability of either party. All of
the facts went to the jury and it is our view that under all of the facts and circumstances of this case, the expert opinions
expressed were not improperly admitted.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the experts to express their opinion. Bunton v. Hull, 51 N.M. 5, 177
P.2d 168; State v. Padilla, 1959, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312; and Wells Truckways v. Cebrian, 1954, 122 Cal. App. 2d
666, 265 P.2d 557.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. It is so ordered.

COMPTON, C.J., and CARMODY, J., concur.

MOISE and NOBLE, JJ., not participating.

 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122480. April 12, 2000]

BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF

TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so
must it apply the same standard against itself in refunding excess payments. When it is
undisputed that a taxpayer is entitled to a refund, the State should not invoke technicalities
to keep money not belonging to it. No one, not even the State, should enrich oneself at the
expense of another.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the March 31, 1995 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 34240, which affirmed the December 24, 1993
[1]

Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CA disposed as follows:

[2]

"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit."[3]

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the CTA Decision affirmed by the CA reads
as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in [view of] all the foregoing, Petitioners claim for refund is
hereby DENIED and this Petition for Review is DISMISSED for lack of merit." [4]

Also assailed is the November 8, 1995 CA Resolution denying reconsideration.

[5]

The Facts

The facts of this case were summarized by the CA in this wise:

"This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00
representing petitioners tax withheld for the year 1989.

In its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for the year 1989, the following
items are reflected:
 Income.............................P1,017,931,831.00
Deductions........................P1,026,218,791.00
Net Income (Loss).................(P8,286,960.00)
Taxable Income (Loss).............P8,286,960.00

Less:

1988 Tax Credit...............P185,001.00

1989 Tax Credit...............P112,491.00

TOTAL AMOUNT......................P297,492.00
REFUNDABLE

"It appears from the foregoing 1989 Income Tax Return that petitioner had a
total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00 being
claimed as tax refund in the present case. However, petitioner declared in the
same 1989 Income Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of
P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year.

"On October 11, 1990, petitioner filed a written claim for refund in the amount
of P112,491.00 with the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of P297,492.00
(including P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax
liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year.

"Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on

the claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition for review with respondent Court
of Tax Appeals, seeking the refund of the amount of P112,491.00.

"The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioners petition on the

ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its Corporate Annual
Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet
credited the amount of P297,492.00 (inclusive of the amount P112,491.00
which is the subject of the present controversy) to its 1990 income tax liability.

"Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied
by respondent court in its Resolution dated May 6, 1994." [6]

As earlier noted, the CA affirmed the CTA. Hence, this Petition. [7]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the CTA, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

 "It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show proof that it has not credited to its
1990 Annual income Tax Return, the amount of P297,492.00 (including
P112,491.00), so as to refute its previous declaration in the 1989 Income Tax
Return that the said amount will be applied as a tax credit in the succeeding
year of 1990. Having failed to submit such requirement, there is no basis to
grant the claim for refund. x x x

"Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, they are regarded
as in derogation of sovereign authority and to be construed strictissimi
juris against the person or entity claiming the exemption. In other words, the
burden of proof rests upon the taxpayer to establish by sufficient and
competent evidence its entitlement to the claim for refund." [8]

Issue

In their Memorandum, respondents identify the issue in this wise:

"The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the

refund of P112,491.00, representing excess creditable withholding tax paid for
the taxable year 1989." [9]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue: Petitioner Entitled to Refund

It is undisputed that petitioner had excess withholding taxes for the year 1989 and was
thus entitled to a refund amounting to P112,491. Pursuant to Section 69 of the 1986 Tax
[10]

Code which states that a corporation entitled to a refund may opt either (1) to obtain such
refund or (2) to credit said amount for the succeeding taxable year, petitioner indicated in
its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the said amount as a tax credit for the
succeeding taxable year, 1990. Subsequently, petitioner informed the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) that it would claim the amount as a tax refund, instead of applying it as a
tax credit. When no action from the BIR was forthcoming, petitioner filed its claim with the
Court of Tax Appeals.

The CTA and the CA, however, denied the claim for tax refund. Since petitioner declared
in its 1989 Income Tax Return that it would apply the excess withholding tax as a tax
credit for the following year, the Tax Court held that petitioner was presumed to have done
so. The CTA and the CA ruled that petitioner failed to overcome this presumption because
it did not present its 1990 Return, which would have shown that the amount in dispute was
not applied as a tax credit. Hence, the CA concluded that petitioner was not entitled to a
tax refund.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals. As a rule, the factual findings of the appellate
court are binding on this Court. This rule, however, does not apply where, inter alia, the
judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court failed to
notice certain relevant facts which if considered would justify a different conclusion. This
[11]

case is one such exception.

In the first place, petitioner presented evidence to prove its claim that it did not apply the
amount as a tax credit. During the trial before the CTA, Ms. Yolanda Esmundo, the
manager of petitioners accounting department, testified to this fact. It likewise presented
its claim for refund and a certification issued by Mr. Gil Lopez, petitioners vice-president,
stating that the amount of P112,491 "has not been and/or will not be automatically
credited/offset against any succeeding quarters income tax liabilities for the rest of the
calendar year ending December 31, 1990." Also presented were the quarterly returns for
the first two quarters of 1990.

The Bureau of Internal Revenue, for its part, failed to controvert petitioners claim. In fact, it
presented no evidence at all. Because it ought to know the tax records of all taxpayers,
the CIR could have easily disproved petitioners claim. To repeat, it did not do so.

More important, a copy of the Final Adjustment Return for 1990 was attached to
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration filed before the CTA. A final adjustment return
[12]

shows whether a corporation incurred a loss or gained a profit during the taxable year. In
this case, that Return clearly showed that petitioner incurred P52,480,173 as net loss in
1990. Clearly, it could not have applied the amount in dispute as a tax credit.

Again, the BIR did not controvert the veracity of the said return. It did not even file an
opposition to petitioners Motion and the 1990 Final Adjustment Return attached thereto. In
denying the Motion for Reconsideration, however, the CTA ignored the said Return. In the
same vein, the CA did not pass upon that significant document.

True, strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission of the Return after the
trial. The law creating the Court of Tax Appeals, however, specifically provides that
proceedings before it "shall not be governed strictly by the technical rules of
evidence." The paramount consideration remains the ascertainment of truth. Verily, the
[13]

quest for orderly presentation of issues is not an absolute. It should not bar courts from
considering undisputed facts to arrive at a just determination of a controversy.

In the present case, the Return attached to the Motion for Reconsideration clearly showed
that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990. Contrary to the holding of the CA and the CTA,
petitioner could not have applied the amount as a tax credit. In failing to consider the said
Return, as well as the other documentary evidence presented during the trial, the
appellate court committed a reversible error.
It should be stressed that the rationale of the rules of procedure is to secure a just
determination of every action. They are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. But there can be no just determination of the present action if we ignore, on
[14]

grounds of strict technicality, the Return submitted before the CTA and even before this
Court. To repeat, the undisputed fact is that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990;
[15]

accordingly, it incurred no tax liability to which the tax credit could be applied.
Consequently, there is no reason for the BIR and this Court to withhold the tax refund
which rightfully belongs to the petitioner.

Public respondents maintain that what was attached to petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was not the final adjustment Return, but petitioners first two quarterly
returns for 1990. This allegation is wrong. An examination of the records shows that the
[16]

1990 Final Adjustment Return was attached to the Motion for Reconsideration. On the
other hand, the two quarterly returns for 1990 mentioned by respondent were in fact
attached to the Petition for Review filed before the CTA. Indeed, to rebut respondents
specific contention, petitioner submitted before us its Surrejoinder, to which was attached
the Motion for Reconsideration and Exhibit "A" thereof, the Final Adjustment Return for
1990.[17]

CTA Case No. 4897

Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a
Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for refund
for the year 1990. In that case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for
the taxable year 1990 x x x." Respondent, however, urges this Court not to take judicial
[18]

notice of the said case.[19]

As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending
before the same judge." [20]

Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of
matters ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the
Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the
Petition for Review filed before this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at all
that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the
contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take judicial notice
thereof.

To our mind, respondents reasoning underscores the weakness of their case. For if they
had really believed that petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily
proved that it did not suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that respondents
opted not to assail the fact appearing therein -- that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990
in the same way that it refused to controvert the same fact established by petitioners other
documentary exhibits.
In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioners case.
It is merely one more bit of information showing the stark truth: petitioner did not use its
1989 refund to pay its taxes for 1990.

Finally, respondents argue that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and are to
be construed strictissimi juris against the claimant. Under the facts of this case, we hold
that petitioner has established its claim. Petitioner may have failed to strictly comply with
the rules of procedure; it may have even been negligent. These circumstances, however,
should not compel the Court to disregard this cold, undisputed fact: that petitioner suffered
a net loss in 1990, and that it could not have applied the amount claimed as tax credits.

Substantial justice, equity and fair play are on the side of petitioner. Technicalities and
legalisms, however exalted, should not be misused by the government to keep money not
belonging to it and thereby enrich itself at the expense of its law-abiding citizens. If the
State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must
it apply the same standard against itself in refunding excess payments of such taxes.
Indeed, the State must lead by its own example of honor, dignity and uprightness.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue is ordered to refund to petitioner the amount of P112,491 as excess
creditable taxes paid in 1989. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 83377 February 9, 1993

BASILIO DE VERA, LUIS DE VERA, FELIPE DE VERA, HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA represented
by GLICERIA PAPA-FRANCISCO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA V. AGUILAR, respondents.

Pablo M. Gancayaco for petitioners.

De Mesa, Villarica & Associates for respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 1987 in CA-
GR CV No. 07448 entitled, "Basilio de Vera, Luis de Vera, Felipe de Vera, Heirs of Eustaquia de Vera-Papa,
represented by Gliceria Papa-Francisco, and Heirs of Maria de Vera-Torres, represented by Luis V. Torres,
plaintiffs-appellees versus Spouses Mariano Aguilar and Leona V. Aguilar, defendants-appellants", which reversed
the decision ** of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Third Judicial Region, Branch 14, for failure of petitioners to
prove the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale and of all its duplicate original copies.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona, married to
respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe who died on May 10, 1960. In
her lifetime, Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of land situated in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with
an area of 4,195 square meters, designated as Cadastral Lot No. 3621, Cad. 337, Case No. 4, Meycauayan
Cadastre.

The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty. Leonardo
Bordador. When the mortgage had matured, the respondents redeemed the property from Atty. Leonardo Bordador
and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11,
1956.

On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the deed with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan resulting in the
cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Marcosa Bernabe and the issuance of another in the name of the
Aguilars. Since then and up to the present, the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land.

On July 20, 1977, respondent Mariano Aguilar was issued a free patent to the land on the basis of which Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M) was issued in his name.

On September 1, 1980, the petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children of Marcosa Bernabe, they
were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof on threats that the respondents would be charged
with perjury and/or falsification. The petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the property to
Marcosa Bernabe on April 28, 1959.

On September 27, 1980, the respondents wrote in reply to the petitioners that they were the sole owners of the
disputed parcel of land and denied that the land was resold to Marcosa Bernabe.
True to petitioners' threat, they filed a falsification case against the respondents. However, on March 31, 1981,
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Arsenio N. Mercado of Bulacan recommended dismissal of the charge of falsification of
public document against the respondents for lack of a prima facie case.

On March 26, 1981, petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
1356(M).

On July 31, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision *** the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants:

1. To reconvey the property in question to the plaintiffs;

2. To pay plaintiffs P10,000.00 as litigation expenses;

3. To pay plaintiffs P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. To pay P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.1

In ruling in favor of the petitioners, the trial court admitted, over the objection of the respondents, Exhibit A
purporting to be a xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of sale executed on April 28, 1959 by the respondents selling,
transferring and conveying unto Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land for and in consideration of P1,500.00.

Not contented with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that they never sold back
to Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land. Furthermore, respondents contended that since the petitioners
have failed to produce the original of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959, the same was not the best
evidence of the alleged sale hence it should have been excluded and should not have been accorded any
evidentiary value. On the other hand, the petitioners claimed that the existence of the document of sale dated April
28, 1959 had been duly established by the testimony of the notary public before whom it was acknowledged and by
Luis de Vera who was present during its execution and that the loss of the original document had been proven by
the testimony of the representatives of the offices of the National Archives and the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan.

On November 29, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the trial court's decision. It found that
the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not been duly proven by the petitioners. Hence, secondary
evidence, i.e., presentation of the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of sale is inadmissible.

Hence this petition.

The crux of this case is whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale
so as to allow the presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same.

We rule in the negative.

Section 4 of Rule 130 (now Section 5, Rule 130) of the Rules of Court on Secondary Evidence states:

Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. — When the original writing has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction,
or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses.

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the
introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument. The
correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents although this order may be changed if
necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an
alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular
case.2

A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on the existence and due execution of the
alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or
destruction of the original copies of the alleged deed of sale.

In the case at bar, the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of land was proved by the presentation of a xeroxed
copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale.

In establishing the execution of a document the same may be established by the person or persons who executed it,
by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who was present and saw it
executed or who, after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the
instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof.3

We agree with the trial court's findings that petitioners have sufficiently established the due execution of the alleged
deed of sale through the testimony of the notary public to wit:

Preponderance of evidence clearly disclosed the facts that Atty. Ismael Estela prepared Exhibit A.
Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr. positively identified the signatures appearing therein to be that (sic) of the
spouses and witnesses Luis de Vera and Ismael Estela, in his capacity as Notary Public who ratified
the document.4

After the due execution of the document has been established, it must next be proved that said document has been
lost or destroyed. The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be
shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by any one who had made, in the judgment of the court, a
sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by
the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.5

However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies. For, since all the duplicates or
multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be
regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a
third person or the like).6

In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the document testified that the alleged
deed of sale has about four or five original copies.7 Hence, all originals must be accounted for before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. This petitioners failed to do. Records show that petitioners merely accounted for
three out of four or five original copies.

In reversing the trial court, the respondent Court of Appeals considered the following points:

Asked on the witness stand where the original of the document (Exhibit A) was, plaintiff-appellee
Luis de Vera answered that it was with the Provincial Assessor in Malolos, Bulacan, whereupon the
appellees reserved its (sic) right to present it in evidence (p. 11, tsn., August 11, 1981, Steno,
Tecson). The same question propounded to the same witness at the next hearing, he replied that in
the early part of 1976 his sister Maria borrowed from him the original document and a certified true
copy thereof and brought them to the Office of the Register of Deeds in Malolos "for the purpose of
having it registered;" and that when she returned she told him that the original copy of the document
was submitted to that office "and it (the property) was transferred in the name of Marcosa Bernabe
instead of Mariano Aguilar" (p. 8, tsn., December 10, 1981, Steno, Crisostomo; p. 9, tsn., Mar. 16,
1982, Steno, Vallarta).

Indeed, upon the appellees' own evidence the original of the deed of sale in question, a purported
xerox copy and certified true copy of which are marked as Exhibits A and B, has not been lost or
destroyed. It was submitted to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos for registration. The
appellees, therefore, should have asked the office to produce it in court and if it could not be
 produced for one reason or another should have called the Register of Deeds or his representative
to explain why. That they failed to do. The loss or destruction of the original of the document in
question has not, therefore, been established. Hence, secondary evidence of it is inadmissible . . . .

Neither did the testimony of notary public Ibasco, Jr. to the effect that he did not have a copy of the
deed of sale in question because his files were burned when his office at Ronquillo Street, Manila
was gutted by fire in 1971 and 1972 (p. 4, tsn., November 10, 1981, Steno, Crisostomo) establish
the loss or destruction of the original document in question. What was lost or destroyed in the
custody of Atty. Ibasco, Jr. was but one of the duplicate original copies on file with him. Nor did the
testimony of Hipolito Timoteo, representative of the Assessor's Office of Bulacan, to the effect that
he failed to see the deed of absolute sale annotated on the simple copy of tax declaration No. 15412
(p. 7, tsn., Aug. 12, 1982, Steno, Vallarta) and of David Montenegro, Jr. of the National Archives to
the effect that his office had no copy of the document in question because the notary public might
not have submitted a copy thereof; or that it was lost or destroyed during the transmittal; and that
most of the record before 1960 were destroyed by termites (pp. 8-12, tsn., Oct. 5, 1982, Steno,
Tecson), prove loss or destruction of the original and of all the duplicate original copies of the
document in question.8

We find no cogent reason to rule otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-7991 January 29, 1914

LEON J. LAMBERT, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
T. J. FOX, defendant-appellee.

O'Brien and DeWitt and C. W. Ney, for appellant.

J. C. Hixon, for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

This is an action brought to recover a penalty prescribed on a contract as punishment for the breach thereof.

Early in 1911 the firm known as John R. Edgar & Co., engaged in the retail book and stationery business, found
itself in such condition financially that its creditors, including the plaintiff and the defendant, together with many
others, agreed to take over the business, incorporate it and accept stock therein in payment of their respective
credits. This was done, the plaintiff and the defendant becoming the two largest stockholders in the new corporation
called John R. Edgar & Co., Incorporated. A few days after the incorporation was completed plaintiff and defendant
entered into the following agreement:

Whereas the undersigned are, respectively, owners of large amounts of stock in John R. Edgar and Co, Inc;
and,

Whereas it is recognized that the success of said corporation depends, now and for at least one year next
following, in the larger stockholders retaining their respective interests in the business of said corporation:

Therefore, the undersigned mutually and reciprocally agree not to sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any
part of their present holdings of stock in said John R. Edgar & Co. Inc., till after one year from the date
hereof.

Either party violating this agreement shall pay to the other the sum of one thousand (P1,000) pesos as
liquidated damages, unless previous consent in writing to such sale, transfer, or other disposition be
obtained.

Notwithstanding this contract the defendant Fox on October 19, 1911, sold his stock in the said corporation to E. C.
McCullough of the firm of E. C. McCullough & Co. of Manila, a strong competitor of the said John R. Edgar & Co.,
Inc.

This sale was made by the defendant against the protest of the plaintiff and with the warning that he would be held
liable under the contract hereinabove set forth and in accordance with its terms. In fact, the defendant Foz offered to
sell his shares of stock to the plaintiff for the same sum that McCullough was paying them less P1,000, the penalty
specified in the contract.

The learned trial court decided the case in favor of the defendant upon the ground that the intention of the parties as
it appeared from the contract in question was to the effect that the agreement should be good and continue only
until the corporation reached a sound financial basis, and that that event having occurred some time before the
expiration of the year mentioned in the contract, the purpose for which the contract was made and had been fulfilled
and the defendant accordingly discharged of his obligation thereunder. The complaint was dismissed upon the
merits.
It is argued here that the court erred in its construction of the contract. We are of the opinion that the contention is
sound. The intention of parties to a contract must be determined, in the first instance, from the words of the contract
itself. It is to be presumed that persons mean what they say when they speak plain English. Interpretation and
construction should by the instruments last resorted to by a court in determining what the parties agreed to. Where
the language used by the parties is plain, then construction and interpretation are unnecessary and, if used, result in
making a contract for the parties. (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. Rep., 504.)

In the case cited the court said with reference to the construction and interpretation of statutes: "As for us, we do not
construe or interpret this law. It does not need it. We apply it. By applying the law, we conserve both provisions for
the benefit of litigants. The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction
and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them. They are the very last functions which a court should exercise. The majority of the law need no interpretation
or construction. They require only application, and if there were more application and less construction, there would
be more stability in the law, and more people would know what the law is."

What we said in that case is equally applicable to contracts between persons. In the case at bar the parties
expressly stipulated that the contract should last one year. No reason is shown for saying that it shall last only nine
months. Whatever the object was in specifying the year, it was their agreement that the contract should last a year
and it was their judgment and conviction that their purposes would not be subversed in any less time. What reason
can give for refusing to follow the plain words of the men who made the contract? We see none.

The appellee urges that the plaintiff cannot recover for the reason that he did not prove damages, and cites
numerous American authorities to the effect that because stipulations for liquidated damages are generally in
excess of actual damages and so work a hardship upon the party in default, courts are strongly inclined to treat all
such agreements as imposing a penalty and to allow a recovery for actual damages only. He also cites authorities
holding that a penalty, as such, will not be enforced and that the party suing, in spite of the penalty assigned, will be
put to his proof to demonstrate the damages actually suffered by reason of defendants wrongful act or omission.

In this jurisdiction penalties provided in contracts of this character are enforced . It is the rule that parties who are
competent to contract may make such agreements within the limitations of the law and public policy as they desire,
and that the courts will enforce them according to their terms. (Civil Code, articles 1152, 1153, 1154, and 1155;
Fornow vs. Hoffmeister, 6 Phil. Rep., 33; Palacios vs. Municipality of Cavite, 12 Phil. Rep., 140; Gsell vs. Koch, 16
Phil. Rep., 1.) The only case recognized by the Civil Code in which the court is authorized to intervene for the
purpose of reducing a penalty stipulated in the contract is when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly
fulfilled and the court can see that the person demanding the penalty has received the benefit of such or irregular
performance. In such case the court is authorized to reduce the penalty to the extent of the benefits received by the
party enforcing the penalty.

In this jurisdiction, there is no difference between a penalty and liquidated damages, so far as legal results are
concerned. Whatever differences exists between them as a matter of language, they are treated the same legally. In
either case the party to whom payment is to be made is entitled to recover the sum stipulated without the necessity
of proving damages. Indeed one of the primary purposes in fixing a penalty or in liquidating damages, is to avoid
such necessity.

It is also urged by the appelle in this case that the stipulation in the contract suspending the power to sell the stock
referred to therein is an illegal stipulation, is in restraint of trade and, therefore, offends public policy. We do not so
regard it. The suspension of the power to sell has a beneficial purpose, results in the protection of the corporation as
well as of the individual parties to the contract, and is reasonable as to the length of time of the suspension. We do
not here undertake to discuss the limitations to the power to suspend the right of alienation of stock, limiting
ourselves to the statement that the suspension in this particular case is legal and valid.

The judgment is reversed, the case remanded with instructions to enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant for P1,000, with interest; without costs in this instance.

Arellano, C.J., Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., dissenting:

I concur.

I think it proper to observe, however that the doctrine touching the construction and interpretation of penalties
prescribed in ordinary civil contracts as set forth in the opinion is carried to is extreme limits and that its statement in
this form is not necessary to sustain the decision upon the facts in this case.

Without entering upon an extended discussion of the authorities, it is sufficient for my purposes to cite the opinion of
the supreme court of Spain, dated June 13, 1906, construing the provisions of article 6 of Book 4, Title 1 of the Civil
Code which treats of "contracts with a penal clause." In that case the court held:

The rules and prescriptions governing penal matters are fundamentally applicable to the penal sanctions of
civil character.

This as well as other cases which might be cited from American as well as Spanish authorities indicate that special
rules of interpretations are and should be made use of by the courts in construing penal clauses in civil contracts,
and that case may well arise wherein the broad doctrine laid down in the opinion of the court may not be applicable.
209 Phil. 459

VASQUEZ, J.:
In their petition for review by certiorari, petitioners are seeking a reversal of the
decision of the former Court of Appeals (now the Intermediate Appellate Court) dated
April 30, 1981 in CA-G.R. No. 57597-R, and its resolution dated September 3, 1981
which denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof. Our resolution of
May 25, 1983 gave due course to the petition.
The action initiated by the petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Rizal prayed for
a judgment:
"1. Declaring the inexistence of the 'Deed of Sale of Lands', Annex 'A' hereof, and
'Deeds of Absolute Sale', Annexes 'B' and 'C', as well as the Original Certificate of Title
No. 4591 and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 339629 and 340842 of the Registry of
Deeds, null and void;
2. Declaring the plaintiffs (now petitioners) the owners in fee simple of
the aforedescribed property, pro-indiviso;
3. Ordering the private defendants (now private respondents) to reconvey to the
plaintiffs the afore-described lot;
4. Declaring the 'Joint Venture Agreement' executed by the defendant partnership
and the defendant corporation null and void and ineffective insofar as the plaintiffs are
concerned;
5. Ordering the defendant Register of Deeds of Rizal to issue a new transfer
certificate of title in favor of the plaintiffs over the said lot;
6. Condemning the defendants, except the defendant Register of Deeds, to pay the
plaintiffs, actual and exemplary damages, the amounts of which they will prove during
the hearing of the instant case on the merit;
7. Condemning the defendants, except the defendant Register of Deeds, to pay to the
plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00; plus costs of suit." (Printed
Record on Appeal, pp. 116-118.)
Petitioners' original and amended complaints alleged that during their lifetime the
spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos were the absolute owners of the disputed
property, which is a parcel of land located at San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, with an
area of 42,299 square meters, more or less. The spouses had six children, named
Andres, Juliana, Aurelio, Leona, Jose and Cristina, and all surnamed
Guerrero. Panay Ramos predeceased Isidoro Guerrero. Before his
demise, Isidoro Guerrero verbally willed and ordained that the questioned lot be
assigned and adjudicated to Andres Guerrero as his share in the inheritance, the other
children having been assigned other lots. Accordingly, upon the death
of Isidoro Guerrero, Andres Guerrero physically possessed the lot and cultivated it
through his tenant Dominador Ramirez, who earned a 50% share in the net produce,
the other 50% being retained by Andres Guerrero who defrayed the cultivation
expenses and real estate taxes on the property. Shortly after the beginning of the
Japanese occupation, Andres Guerrero entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina
Guerrero, and allowed her to have the property cultivated and to retain the owner's
share in the harvests. The arrangement between brother and sister was that Cristina
Guerrero could continue in the cultivation of the land and enjoyment of the owner's
share in the produce for as long as she needed the property. Dominador Ramirez
continued his tenancy until shortly before the death of Andres Guerrero. Sometime in
July 1943, Andres Guerrero died survived by his widow, Segunda Laquindanum, and
their children, who are the petitioners in this case. Cristina Guerrero continued as
trustee of the deceased Andres Guerrero.
The complaints further alleged that as early as December 10, 1957, the land was
surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of Andres Guerrero as Lot No.
4752, Case No. 4, Cadastre No. 229 of the Parañaque Cadastre. Sometime during the
latter part of 1971 certain people who introduced themselves as agents or buyers of the
land approached some of the plaintiffs in order to secure their consent to the sale of the
property. Said plaintiffs were informed that the land was titled in the name of their
cousin, Manuel Guerrero. Plaintiffs made inquiries and discovered the following: that
Manuel Guerrero was able to have the lot titled in his name on the basis of a 'Deed of
Sale of Land' dated April 24, 1948 purportedly executed by Cristina Guerrero; that he
caused the lot to be surveyed in his name as Lot No. 4752 and he was issued advance
Plan No. AP-10008 on February 28, 1962; that in the advance plan issued to him, it
was duly noted that Lot No. 4752 had been previously surveyed for Andres Guerrero;
that in 1963, Manuel Guerrero, assisted by FelicisimoGuerrero, father of the
defendants Guerreros, filed an application for registration of land with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal; that notwithstanding the opposition of the heirs of Cristina
Guerrero, the court ruled that Manuel Guerrero owned the lot; that despite oppositors'
appeal to a higher court, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No.
4591 to the applicant; that on September 14, 1971, there was filed with the Register of
Deeds of Rizal a "Deed of Absolute Sale" purportedly executed by Manuel Guerrero in
favor of the defendants Guerreros; that the Register of Deeds gave due course to the
registration of that deed, cancelled OCT No. 4591 and was issued Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 339629 in its stead; that on the same day that the deed of sale was registered,
the defendants Guerreros caused to be notarized an "Articles of Partnership" of St.
Clare's Realty Company, Ltd., constituting themselves as partners; that on September
28, 1971, the defendants Guerreros sold the disputed lot in a "Deed of Absolute Sale" to
the St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd.; that by virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds
issued TCT No. 340842 in the name of said realty company.
According to the original and amended complaints, the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel
Guerrero was fraudulent, simulated and falsified for the reason, among others, that
Cristina Guerrero was not the owner of the land at the time she purportedly sold it; that
Manuel Guerrero obtained OCT No. 4591 in fraud of the plaintiffs; that the Deeds of
Sale to the defendants Guerreros and St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd. and the transfer
certificates of title in their favor are fraudulent and simulated, and ineffective against
the plaintiffs for the reason, among others, that at the time of execution of the Deeds of
Sale, the defendants Guerreros knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero;
that long after the complaint in the present case has been filed, the plaintiffs came to
know that the St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd. executed a "Joint Venture Agreement"
with the United Housing Corporation under which the latter bound itself to develop the
property into a residential subdivision; and that the said agreement was entered into in
gross and evident bad faith.
Separate answers were filed by the defendants Guerreros, St. Clare's Realty Company,
Ltd. and United Housing Corporation. The defendants Guerreros alleged that Cristina
Guerrero was the absolute owner of the property; that the action of the plaintiffs had
prescribed and they are guilty of laches. St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd. averred that
its contract with United Housing Corporation was made in good faith. United Housing
Corporation averred that there is no privity of interest between plaintiffs and this
defendant considering that the plaintiffs are not parties to the Joint Venture
Agreement.
Issues having been joined; the case proceeded to trial.
Frisco Cervantes, grandson of Cristina Guerrero, testified as a witness of the plaintiffs
that having had previous information that the disputed lot was borrowed from Andres
Guerrero and that Cristina Guerrero merely mortgaged it to Manuel Guerrero, he went
to the house of Manuel Guerrero in Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, in 1968 at
the behest of the plaintiffs, to inquire about the mortgage; that in reply, Manuel
Guerrero stated that the land had been sold but it would be changed with another lot of
the same area; that in 1970, Sotero Cervantes and Laura Cervantes, children of Cristina
Guerrero, and he went to see Manuel Guerrero at the Sta. Rita Church in Parañaque;
that Sotero and Laura asked if they could get the land back; that Manuel Guerrero
answered that it were better to change the disputed lot with another parcel of the same
area and value; that as he was not satisfied with the answer, Frisco Cervantes went to
the Office of the Register of Deeds in Pasig, Rizal, where he obtained a copy of a Deed
of Sale in favor of Manuel Guerrero which he delivered to the children of Andres
Guerrero.
Roman Mataverde, Chief Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands designated as
Officer-In-Charge of the Surveys Division, testified for the plaintiffs that in the
Bureau's Lot Data Computation Book showing the list of claimants for Lot 4752, Case
4, Cadastre 299, Parañaque, Rizal, (Exhibit A), which was surveyed on December 10,
1957, Andres Guerrero is listed as claimant. The records of the Bureau of Lands from
1957 (when Lot 4752 was cadastrally surveyed for Andres Guerrero) until 1962 show no
claimant to the property except Andres Guerrero. In 1962, the Bureau of Lands
received a letter with an affidavit attached to it from Manuel Guerrero requesting that
an advance plan be made. Advance Plan No. 10008 was made without Andres
Guerrero being notified. But in the advance plan, the Bureau of Lands listed Andres
Guerrero as original claimant so that he would, not be prejudiced when a case comes to
trial.
Dominador Ramirez testified that during the rainy season of 1936, Andres Guerrero
asked him to work on his land located at Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, with an
area of four (4) hectares, more or less. As tenant, his agreement with Andres Guerrero
was that he would till the land in consideration of 50% of the harvests with Andres
Guerrero shouldering the cultivation expenses. From 1936, to about 1941 or 1942, he
worked on the land and gave 50% of the produce to Andres Guerrero who went
personally to the field to get the same. In 1941 or 1942, he stopped working on the land
because war had broken out.
On October 19, 1973, Laura Cervantes testified that her mother, Cristina Guerrero, had
been sick for a long time before she died at the age of 80 years in 1948; and that her
mother could walk only inside their house in Parañaque; that the money spent for the
illness of her mother came from Manuel Guerrero; and that, through her children,
Cristina Guerrero could ask money from Manuel Guerrero because of the land that
Andres Guerrero had lent to her.
After Laura Cervantes had thus testified, counsel for the defendants Guerreros objected
to the line of questioning on the ground that the said witness was testifying "on matters
which are prohibited under Sec. 20(a), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court." The trial court
having ruled that the witness "may answer", defendants' counsel registered a
continuing objection. The court allowed the witness to continue her testimony subject
to such objection. (TSN, pp. 9-20, October 19, 1973.)
Resuming her testimony, Laura Cervantes stated that the land was lent by Andres
Guerrero to Cristina Guerrero; that Manuel Guerrero loaned money to Cristina
Guerrero for quite some time; that shortly after the death of Cristina Guerrero, Manuel
Guerrero went to their house, accompanied by Felicisimo Guerrero, and summed up
the loans he had extended to Cristina Guerrero in the total amount of P1,900.00; and
that Felicisimo Guerrero asked Laura Cervantes to sign a piece of paper to attest to the
fact that a certain amount of money had been borrowed from Manuel Guerrero.
On October 24, 1973, the defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to disqualify
Laura Cervantes as a witness on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130, of the New Rules
of Court. The motion was opposed by the plaintiffs. On November 16, 1973, the trial
court granted the motion and declared that Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes as well as
other witnesses similarly situated, are disqualified to testify in the case.
On February 12, 1974, plaintiffs filed a "Motion For The Honorable Presiding Judge Of
This Honorable Court To Inhibit Himself And/Or To Transfer Case To
Another Branch." Oppositions to the said motion were filed. On April 26, 1974, the
trial court denied the motion.
At the continuation of the trial on June 14, 1974, plaintiffs and their counsel failed to
appear despite due notice and repeated previous warnings to their lawyer. Instead of
appearing in court, plaintiffs, thru counsel, filed an urgent motion to reset the hearing,
which was opposed by the defendants. On even date, the, court issued an order as
follows:
"In view of the non-appearance of the plaintiffs as well as their counsel for today's
hearing, they are deemed to have waived their right to further present or formally offer
their evidence in court, and on motion of defendants' counsels, the Clerk of Court, Atty.
Juan A. Carambas, is hereby authorized and commissioned to receive the evidence for
the defendants. After the defendants have closed their case, they are given 10 days
within which to file their respective memoranda and the case is deemed submitted for
decision after receipt of the complete transcript of stenographic notes." (Record on
Appeal, p. 212.)
On June 22, 1974, plaintiffs filed a "Manifestation" to the effect that they did not waive
their rights to present further evidence, to cross-examine defendants witnesses, and to
present rebuttal evidence; and that they were reserving the exercise of those rights
upon the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against the Presiding Judge of the trial court, which they
were then preparing to file.
Indeed, on June 25, 1974, plaintiffs instituted the said special civil action, which was
docketed in the Court of Appeals as its CA-G.R. No. SF-03120. The action sought the
disqualification of the trial judge from continuing with the hearing of the case. On
June 27, 1974, the Court of Appeals denied the petition outright. Copy of the resolution
was received by the plaintiffs on July 2, 1974. They filed a motion for reconsideration
on July 17, 1974.
On the same date, July 17, 1974, the trial court rendered its decision with the
following dispositive part:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants (and) against
the plaintiffs:
1. Dismissing the complaint and Amended Complaint;
2. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the private defendant Guerreros the amount of
P20,000.00 for actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages and P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees;
3. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant St. Clare's Realty Co. Ltd., the amount
of P1,923,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;
4. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant United Housing Corporation the
amount of P90,500.00 as actual damages; P100,000.00 for loss of goodwill and
business reputation, P80,000.00 as exemplary damages, P15,000.00 as lawyer's fees;
and
5. To pay the cost of suit.
The Register of Deeds of Rizal is hereby directed to cancel the Lis Pendens in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 340842 in the name of the St. Clare's Realty Co., Ltd., Book T-
1971. Meanwhile, the defendant United Housing Corporation is ordered to proceed
and continue with its commitments under the Memorandum Agreement dated October
12, 1971." (Record on Appeal, pp. 259-261.)
On July 20, 1974, or three (3) days before plaintiffs received the decision, they filed
with the trial court a "Motion Ex-Abundantia Cautela" praying that should the Court of
Appeals render an adverse resolution in CA-G.R. No. SF-03120, the lower court should
set aside its order of June 14, 1974 and allow plaintiffs to present other evidence, cross-
examine witnesses of the defendants, and present rebuttal evidence.
On August 21, 1974, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision which
they received on July 23, 1974.
Early in 1975, Judge Arsenio Alcantara who rendered the decision was replaced by
Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome. In her order of February 13, 1975, Judge Castro-
Bartolome resolved that:
"1) The plaintiffs' 'Motion Ex-Abundantia Cautela' dated July 18, 1974, having been
passed upon by Judge Arsenio B. Alcantara by the rendition of the Decision dated July
17, 1974, is deemed to have been clearly denied by the Honorable Judge who penned
the said decision;
2) The plaintiffs 'Motion for Reconsideration' dated August 21, 1974 and 'Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration' dated August 22, 1974, have to be as they are hereby,
denied;
xxx xxx xxx
5) The plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration' and 'Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration' are not pro-forma and have suspended the running of the period of
appeal."
On February 21, 1975, plaintiffs perfected their appeal to the Court of Appeals where
the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 57597-R. On April 20, 1981, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision as follows:
"WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with modification in regard to damages as follows: (a) for the
defendants Guerreros, P50,000.00 moral damages, and P10,000.00 exemplary
damages; (b) for the defendant St. Clare's Realty Co., Ltd., P10,000.00 exemplary
damages; (c) for the defendant United Housing Corporation, P40,000.00 for loss of
goodwill and business reputation and P10,000.00 exemplary damages. The actual
damages and attorney's fees 'are hereby maintained."
On May 27, 1981, the Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition for review by certiorari.
In their instant petition for review, petitioners have raised substantive and procedural
points on which the lower tribunals have allegedly erred. The substantive issues refer
to the lack of basis for the grant of actual, moral and exemplary damages in the huge
amount of over two million pesos; and the error of ruling that the action was barred by
prescription and laches. Petitioners underscore the procedural errors they attribute to
the lower courts which resulted in the deprivation of their full opportunity to ventilate
their case and prove the validity of their claim. They assail the ruling that their
witnesses Laura Cervantes, Jose Cervantes" and others similarly situated" are
disqualified to testify; and that they waived the right to present their evidence when
they failed to appear at a hearing set by the trial judge during the pendency of
proceedings taken by the petitioners to disqualify him due to alleged hostility
manifested by the latter towards the petitioners.
At this instance, We consider it unnecessary to discuss the substantive merits of the
petitioners' cause of action. The record reveals that they have not yet completed the
presentation of their evidence. Whatever evidence they had previously presented were
apparently not considered in the rendition of the questioned decisions for not having
been "formally offered." It does not strike Us as fair and just that the petitioners would
be made answerable for damages in such a huge amount for having filed an allegedly
baseless and unfounded action without affording them the full opportunity of
establishing the merit of their claim. On the face of the record, We are convinced that
they had been denied that chance due to some mistaken and capricious application of
pertinent procedural rules.
The first question of importance that engages the attention of this Court is whether or
not the witnesses Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from
testifying in the case and their testimonies excluded on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule
130, of the Rules of Court, which provides as follows:
"Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. The following
persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly
as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the
estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify
as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before
such became of unsound mind."
Upon the facts and under the law, this Court is fully persuaded that the affirmative
rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were made in error. The plain
truth is that Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case,
and neither are they assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted." They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to
establish that it was not Cristina Guerrero, but Andres Guerrero, who owned the
disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel Guerrero; that Cristina Guerrero
did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel Guerrero.
"Following this rule of construction, it may be said that incompetency to testify
established in the provision above quoted, affects only the persons therein mentioned,
and no others, that is, only parties plaintiff or their assignors, persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted. Mere witnesses who are neither parties plaintiff, nor their
assignors, nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, are not included in the
prohibition." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., Vol. 5, p. 166.)
By excluding the testimonies of the two witnesses and by barring them from further
testifying, upon reasoning that unduly strained the meaning of the provisions of the
Rules of Court relied upon, the trial court deprived itself of the opportunity of knowing
the truth in this case.
Moreover, the present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased
Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators
or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in
their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of
Manuel Guerrero. Hence, the inapplicability of the dead man's rule.
"It has been held that statutes providing that a party in interest is incompetent to
testify where the adverse party is dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance
with their express wording, irrespective of their spirit. The law uses the word 'against
an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person.' It should be
noted 'that after the mention of an executor or administrator the words or other
representative follows, which means that the word 'representative' includes only those
who, like the executor or administrator, are sued n their representative, not personal,
capacity. And that is emphasized by the law by using the words 'against the estate of
such deceased persons', which convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the
deceased at the time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that
are to be asserted and defendant in the litigation by the person representing him, not
the personal rights of such representative." (Moran, ibid., pp. 169-171.)
The next question that requires attention is whether or not the exclusion of plaintiffs'
evidence and their preclusion from presenting further proof was correctly sustained by
the respondent Court of Appeals. Prior to the issuance of the court's order of June 14,
1974, by which the plaintiffs were "deemed to have waived their right to further present
or formally offer their evidence", the following had testified as witnesses of the
plaintiffs, namely: Alfredo Zamora,
Roman Mataverde, Moises Javillonar, Dominador Ramirez, Bonifacio Sumulong,
Frisco Cervantes, Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes. It was error to hold that the
testimonial evidence should have been formally offered, or that without such offer,
such evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is effected by calling the
witness to the stand and letting him testify before the court upon appropriate
questions. (Moran, Comments on the Revised Rules of Court, Vol. 6, 1970 ed., p. 122.)
Notwithstanding rigid cross-examination conducted by the lawyers of the defendants,
the witnesses discovered the following facts: In the 1930's Andres Guerrero physically
possessed the disputed lot, paid the real estate taxes for it, had the same cultivated
through a tenant, defrayed the cultivation expenses, and exclusively enjoyed the
owner's share in the harvests. Andres Guerrero loaned the lot to his sister, Cristina
Guerrero, before he died. Cristina Guerrero became ill prior to the year 1948. She
could walk only inside her house in Parañaque, Rizal. The money spent for her illness
was borrowed from Manuel Guerrero. After the death of Cristina Guerrero, Manuel
Guerrero andFelicisimo Guerrero came to her house and the money loaned to her
was totalled in the amount of P1,900.00. On December 10, 1957, the questioned lot
was cadastrally surveyed and denominated as Lot 4752 of
the Parañaque Cadastre. Andres Guerrero was the lone claimant. Until 1962, no other
person claimed the lot.
The foregoing proofs bear materially on the questions raised by the plaintiffs as to
whether or not: (1) Cristina Guerrero or Andres Guerrero owned the lot when the
former purportedly sold it to Manuel Guerrero in 1948; (2) Cristina Guerrero really
sold or merely mortgaged the land to Manuel Guerrero; (3) Manuel Guerrero and, after
him, the defendants Guerreros were buyers in good faith. Instead of insulating itself
from evidence that could lead it to the truth, the trial court should have addressed itself
to the questions why: (1) if it is true that Cristina Guerrero was the owner of the
disputed lot in 1948, the cadastral surveyors who actually repaired to the field listed
Andres Guerrero as the sole claimant of the property; (2) until 1962, no other person
except Andres Guerrero claimed the lot as his own; (3) notwithstanding the purported
deed of sale by Cristina Guerrero to Manuel Guerrero was executed on April 24, 1948,
it was presented for registration with the Register of Deeds almost ten (10) years later
only on February 27, 1958 (TSN, p. 15, January 9, 1974); (4) in the deed of sale to
Manuel Guerrero, it is stated that he appeared in Parañaque, Rizal, before Atty. Jose
D. Villena who was a notary public in Makati, Rizal; (5) the area of the land bought by
Manuel Guerrero was 33,090 square meters whereas the area of the land sold by him to
the defendants Guerreros was 42,299 square meters. The court also ought rather to
have noticed the fact that, in the deed of sale in favor of Manuel Guerrero, it is stated
that the subject parcel of land "is surrounded by mud-dikes besides the stone
monuments that visibly marked all its boundaries", which clearly indicate a previous
survey and which may in turn lead to the question if the deed of sale to Manuel
Guerrero "might have been made after the cadastral survey in 1957 and not in 1948.
The trial court rendered its decision solely on the basis of the defendants' evidence and
without regard to the proofs that the plaintiffs had presented on July 17, 1974 before
the Court of Appeals could finally resolve plaintiffs' petition to disqualify the trial
judge. As modified by the Court of Appeals, the decision sentences the plaintiffs to pay
damages and attorney's fees, apart from the costs of suit, in the staggering amount of
Two Million One Hundred Eighty Three Thousand and Five Hundred (P2,183,500.00)
Pesos, without plaintiffs having been given the chance to complete their evidence, to
cross-examine the witnesses of the defense, and to present rebuttal evidence. The way
the trial court and the Court of Appeals proceeded in this case, litigation became more
a game of technicalities than a proceeding to search the truth and mete justice. No
other fairer course of action is demanded but for this Court to remand the case for
further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby set
aside. Let the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin with instruction to
the trial court to allow the plaintiffs to complete their evidence, to cross-examine the
defendants' witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence if they so desire, and thereafter
to decide the case anew.
SO ORDERED.
United States v. Nobles
United States Supreme Court
422 U.S. 225 (1975)

Facts
Nobles (defendant) was tried in federal court and convicted for robbing a bank. The only evidence
linking Nobles to the crime was the identification testimony of a bank teller and salesman who were
present at the time of the robbery. The defense tried to impeach these eyewitnesses and hired an
investigator. This investigator interviewed both eyewitnesses and preserved some written notes.
When testifying at trial, defense counsel used these notes to attempt to impeach the witnesses during
cross-examination. With the bank teller, the defense asked if he remembered telling the investigator
that he had seen only the back of the head of the person identified as the perpetrator. When he replied
that he did not remember making that statement, he was allowed, despite the defense’s objections, to
refresh his recollection by looking at a part of the investigator’s notes. The prosecution too was
allowed to examine the relevant part of the notes. The witness then testified that although the report
says that he saw only the back of the head, he still had seen more than that and insisted that Nobles
was the robber. With the salesman, defense asked whether he remembered making the statement that
“all blacks look alike to me.” After denying making this statement, the prosecution asked to see the
document, defense objected, and the court refused the prosecution’s request. The court added that it
would order disclosure of the document if the investigator testified concerning the witnesses’ alleged
statements. Nobles called the investigator to the stand. The court said that a copy of the report
(inspected and edited) would have to be submitted to the prosecution at the end of the investigator’s
impeachment testimony. The defense refused to produce the report, and the court did not allow the
impeachment testimony. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said that the lower
court decision was reversible error, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

United States Supreme Court

UNITED STATES v. NOBLES, (1975)
No. 74-634
Argued: April 23, 1975 Decided: June 23, 1975
During respondent's federal criminal trial, which resulted in a conviction, defense counsel sought to impeach the
credibility of key prosecution witnesses by testimony of a defense investigator regarding statements previously obtained
from the witnesses by the investigator. When the investigator was called as a witness, the District Court stated that a copy
of the investigator's report, inspected and edited by the court in camera so as to excise references to matters not relevant
to such statements, would have to be submitted to the prosecution for inspection at the completion of the investigator's
testimony. When defense counsel said he did not intend to produce the report, the court ruled that the investigator could
not testify about his interviews with the witnesses. The Court of Appeals, considering such ruling to be reversible error,
held that both the Fifth Amendment and Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16 prohibited the disclosure condition imposed.

Held:

1. In a proper case, the prosecution, as well as the defense, can invoke the federal judiciary's inherent power to require
production of previously recorded witness statements that facilitate full disclosure of all the relevant facts. Here the
investigator's report might provide critical insight into the issues of credibility that the investigator's testimony would
raise and hence was highly relevant to such issues. Pp. 230-232.

2. The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, being personal to the defendant, does not extend
to the testimony or statements of third parties called as witnesses at trial. In this instance the fact that the statements of
third parties were elicited by a defense investigator on respondent's behalf does not convert them into respondent's
personal communications, and requiring their production would in no sense compel respondent to be a witness against
himself or extort communications from him. Pp. 233-234.

3. Rule 16, whose language and history both indicate that it addresses only pretrial discovery, imposes no constraint on
the [422 U.S. 225, 226] District Court's power to condition the impeachment testimony of respondent's witness on the
production of the relevant portions of his report. The fact that the Rule incorporates the Jencks Act limitation shows no
contrary intent and does not convert the Rule into a general limitation on the trial court's broad discretion as to
evidentiary questions at trial. Pp. 234-236.

4. The qualified privilege derived from the attorney work-product doctrine is not available to prevent disclosure of the
investigative report, since respondent, by electing to present the investigator as a witness, waived the privilege with
respect to matters covered in his testimony. Pp. 236-240.

5. It was within the District Court's discretion to assure that the jury would hear the investigator's full testimony rather
than a truncated portion favorable to respondent, and the court's ruling, contrary to respondent's contention, did not
deprive him of the Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory process and cross-examination. That Amendment does not
confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system and cannot be invoked as
a justification for presenting what might have been a half-truth. Pp. 240-241.

501 F.2d 146, reversed.

POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, and
BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, and in parts II, III, and V of which WHITE and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 242. DOUGLAS, J., took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.

Paul L. Friedman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Acting
Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, Sidney M. Glazer, and Ivan Michael Schaeffer.

Nicholas R. Allis argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John K. Van de Kamp. *

[ Footnote * ] Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by John J. Cleary for the California Public Defenders
Assn. et al., and by the Federal Public Defender of New Jersey. [422 U.S. 225, 227]

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

In a criminal trial, defense counsel sought to impeach the credibility of key prosecution witnesses by testimony of a
defense investigator regarding statements previously obtained from the witnesses by the investigator. The question
presented here is whether in these circumstances a federal trial court may compel the defense to reveal the relevant
portions of the investigator's report for the prosecution's use in cross-examining him. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit concluded that it cannot. 501 F.2d 146. We granted certiorari, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975), and now reverse.

I
Respondent was tried and convicted on charges arising from an armed robbery of a federally insured bank. The only
significant evidence linking him to the crime was the identification testimony of two witnesses, a bank teller and a
salesman who was in the bank during the robbery. 1 Respondent offered an alibi but, as the Court of Appeals recognized,
501 F.2d, at 150, his strongest defense centered around attempts to discredit these eyewitnesses. Defense efforts to
impeach them gave rise to the events that led to this decision.

In the course of preparing respondent's defense, an investigator for the defense interviewed both witnesses and preserved
the essence of those conversations in a written report. When the witnesses testified for the prosecution, respondent's
counsel relied on the report in conducting their cross-examination. Counsel asked the bank [422 U.S. 225, 228] teller
whether he recalled having told the investigator that he had seen only the back of the man he identified as respondent. The
witness replied that he did not remember making such a statement. He was allowed, despite defense counsel's initial
objection, to refresh his recollection by referring to a portion of the investigator's report. The prosecutor also was allowed
to see briefly the relevant portion of the report. 2 The witness thereafter testified that although the report indicated that he
told the investigator he had seen only respondent's back, he in fact had seen more than that and continued to insist that
respondent was the bank robber.

The other witness acknowledged on cross-examination that he too had spoken to the defense investigator. Respondent's
counsel twice inquired whether he told the investigator that "all blacks looked alike" to him, and in each instance the
witness denied having made such a statement. The prosecution again sought inspection of the relevant portion of the
investigator's report, and respondent's counsel again objected. The court declined to order disclosure at that time, but
ruled that it would be required if the investigator testified as to the witnesses' alleged statements from the witness
stand. 3 The [422 U.S. 225, 229] court further advised that it would examine the investigator's report in camera and
would excise all reference to matters not relevant to the precise statements at issue.

After the prosecution completed its case, respondent called the investigator as a defense witness. The court reiterated that
a copy of the report, inspected and edited in camera, would have to be submitted to Government counsel at the completion
of the investigator's impeachment testimony. When respondent's counsel stated that he did not intend to produce the
report, the court ruled that the investigator would not be allowed to testify about his interviews with the witnesses. 4

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, while acknowledging that the trial court's ruling constituted a "very limited and
seemingly judicious restriction," 501 F.2d, at 151, nevertheless considered it reversible [422 U.S. 225, 230] error. Citing
United States v. Wright, 160 U.S. App. D.C. 57, 68, 489 F.2d 1181, 1192 (1973), the court found that the Fifth Amendment
prohibited the disclosure condition imposed in this case. The court further held that Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16, while
framed exclusively in terms of pretrial discovery, precluded prosecutorial discovery at trial as well. 501 F.2d, at 157;
accord, United States v. Wright, supra, at 66-67, 489 F.2d, at 1190-1191. In each respect, we think the court erred.

II
The dual aim of our criminal justice system is "that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer," Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935). To this end, we have placed our confidence in the adversary system, entrusting to it the primary
responsibility for developing relevant facts on which a determination of guilt or innocence can be made. See United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

While the adversary system depends primarily on the parties for the presentation and exploration of relevant facts, the
judiciary is not limited to the role of a referee or supervisor. Its compulsory processes stand available to require the
presentation of evidence in court or before a grand jury. United States v. Nixon, supra; Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 443 -444 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93 -94 (1964) (WHITE, J., concurring). As we recently
observed in United States v. Nixon, supra, at 709:

"We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues before a court of
law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both [422 U.S. 225, 231] fundamental and
comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative
presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full
disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to
the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the
prosecution or by the defense."

Decisions of this Court repeatedly have recognized the federal judiciary's inherent power to require the prosecution to
produce the previously recorded statements of its witnesses so that the defense may get the full benefit of cross-
examination and the truth-finding process may be enhanced. See, e. g., Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S.
657 (1957); 5 Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Palermo v.
United States, 360 U.S. 343, 361 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result). At issue here is whether, in a proper case,
the prosecution can call upon that same power for production of witness statements that facilitate "full disclosure of all the
[relevant] facts." United States v. Nixon, supra, at 709.

In this case, the defense proposed to call its investigator to impeach the identification testimony of the prosecution's
eyewitnesses. It was evident from cross-examination that the investigator would testify that each witness' recollection of
the appearance of the individual identified as respondent was considerably less clear at[422 U.S. 225, 232] an earlier
time than it was at trial. It also appeared that the investigator and one witness differed even as to what the witness told
him during the interview. The investigator's contemporaneous report might provide critical insight into the issues of
credibility that the investigator's testimony would raise. It could assist the jury in determining the extent to which the
investigator's testimony actually discredited the prosecution's witnesses. If, for example, the report failed to mention the
purported statement of one witness that "all blacks looked alike," the jury might disregard the investigator's version
altogether. On the other hand, if this statement appeared in the contemporaneously recorded report, it would tend
strongly to corroborate the investigator's version of the interview and to diminish substantially the reliability of that
witness' identification. 6

It was therefore apparent to the trial judge that the investigator's report was highly relevant to the critical issue of
credibility. In this context, production of the report might substantially enhance "the search for truth," Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S., at 82 . We must determine whether compelling its production was precluded by some privilege available
to the defense in the circumstances of this case. [422 U.S. 225, 233]

III
A
The Court of Appeals concluded that the Fifth Amendment renders criminal discovery "basically a oneway street." 501
F.2d, at 154. Like many generalizations in constitutional law, this one is too broad. The relationship between the accused's
Fifth Amendment rights and the prosecution's ability to discover materials at trial must be identified in a more
discriminating manner.

The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is an "intimate and personal one," which protects "a
private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation."
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973); see also Bellis v. United States,417 U.S. 85, 90 -91 (1974); United States
v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944). As we noted in Couch, supra, at 328, the "privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres
basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him." 7

In this instance disclosure of the relevant portions of the defense investigator's report would not impinge on the
fundamental values protected by the Fifth Amendment. The court's order was limited to statements [422 U.S. 225,
234] allegedly made by third parties who were available as witnesses to both the prosecution and the defense.
Respondent did not prepare the report, and there is no suggestion that the portions subject to the disclosure order
reflected any information that he conveyed to the investigator. The fact that these statements of third parties were elicited
by a defense investigator on respondent's behalf does not convert them into respondent's personal communications.
Requiring their production from the investigator therefore would not in any sense compel respondent to be a witness
against himself or extort communications from him.

We thus conclude that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, being personal to the
defendant, does not extend to the testimony or statements of third parties called as witnesses at trial. The Court of
Appeals' reliance on this constitutional guarantee as a bar to the disclosure here ordered was misplaced.

B
The Court of Appeals also held that Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16 deprived the trial court of the power to order disclosure of the
relevant portions of the investigator's report. 8 Acknowledging that the Rule appears to control pretrial discovery only, the
court nonetheless determined [422 U.S. 225, 235] that its reference to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500, signaled an
intention that Rule 16 should control trial practice as well. We do not agree.

Both the language and history of Rule 16 indicate that it addresses only pretrial discovery. Rule 16 (f) requires that a
motion for discovery be filed "within 10 days after arraignment or . . . such reasonable later time as the court may permit,"
and further commands that it include all relief sought by the movant. When this provision is viewed in light of the
Advisory Committee's admonition that it is designed to encourage promptness in filing and to enable the district court to
avoid unnecessary delay or multiplication of motions, see Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 16, 18 U.S.C. App., p. 4494,
the pretrial focus of the Rule becomes apparent. The Government's right of discovery arises only after the defendant has
successfully sought discovery under subsections (a) (2) or (b) and is confined to matters "which the defendant intends to
produce at the trial." Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16 (c). This hardly suggests any intention that the Rule would limit the court's
power to order production once trial has begun. 9 Finally, the Advisory Committee's Notes emphasize its pretrial
character. Those notes repeatedly characterize the Rule as a provision governing pretrial disclosure, never once suggesting
that it was intended to constrict a district court's [422 U.S. 225, 236] control over evidentiary questions arising at trial. 18
U.S.C. App., pp. 4493-4495.

The incorporation of the Jencks Act limitation on the pretrial right of discovery provided by Rule 16 does not express a
contrary intent. It only restricts the defendant's right of pretrial discovery in a manner that reconciles that provision with
the Jencks Act limitation on the trial court's discretion over evidentiary matters. It certainly does not convert Rule 16 into
a general limitation on the trial court's broad discretion as to evidentiary questions at trial. Cf. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S.
66, 101 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring in judgment). 10 We conclude, therefore, that Rule 16 imposes no constraint on the
District Court's power to condition the impeachment testimony of respondent's witness on the production of the relevant
portions of his investigative report. In extending the Rule into the trial context, the Court of Appeals erred.

IV
Respondent contends further that the work-product doctrine exempts the investigator's report from disclosure at trial.
While we agree that this doctrine applies to criminal litigation as well as civil, we find its protection unavailable in this
case.

The work-product doctrine, recognized by this Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), reflects the strong "public
policy underlying the orderly prosecution [422 U.S. 225, 237] and defense of legal claims." Id., at 510; see also id., at 514-
515 (Jackson, J., concurring). As the Court there observed:

"Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully
protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work
with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper
preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the
irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the
historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote
justice and to protect their clients' interests. This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda,
correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways - aptly
though roughly termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case as the `work product of the lawyer.' Were such
materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten.
An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would
inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession
would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served." Id., at 510-511.

The Court therefore recognized a qualified privilege for [422 U.S. 225, 238] certain materials prepared by an attorney
"acting for his client in anticipation of litigation." Id., at 508. 11 See generally 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 26.63 (2d ed.
1974); E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 204-209 (2d ed. 1972); Note, Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 Harv. L.
Rev. 940, 1027-1046 (1961).

Although the work-product doctrine most frequently is asserted as a bar to discovery in civil litigation, its role in assuring
the proper functioning of the criminal justice system is even more vital. The interests of society and the accused in
obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand that adequate safeguards assure the
thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the case. 12

At its core, the work-product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within
which he can analyze and prepare his client's case. But the doctrine is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities
of litigation in our adversary system. One of those realities is that attorneys often must rely on the assistance of
investigators and other agents in the compilation of materials in preparation for trial. It is therefore necessary that the
doctrine protect material prepared by agents for the attorney as [422 U.S. 225, 239] well as those prepared by the
attorney himself. 13 Moreover, the concerns reflected in the work-product doctrine do not disappear once trial has begun.
Disclosure of an attorney's efforts at trial, as surely as disclosure during pretrial discovery, could disrupt the orderly
development and presentation of his case. We need not, however, undertake here to delineate the scope of the doctrine at
trial, for in this instance it is clear that the defense waived such right as may have existed to invoke its protections.

The privilege derived from the work-product doctrine is not absolute. Like other qualified privileges, it may be waived.
Here respondent sought to adduce the testimony of the investigator and contrast his recollection of the contested
statements with that of the prosecution's witnesses. Respondent, by electing to present the investigator as a witness,
waived the privilege with respect to matters covered in his testimony. 14 Respondent[422 U.S. 225, 240] can no more
advance the work-product doctrine to sustain a unilateral testimonial use of work-product materials than he could elect to
testify in his own behalf and thereafter assert his Fifth Amendment privilege to resist cross-examination on matters
reasonably related to those brought out in direct examination. See, e. g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,
215 (1971). 15

V
Finally, our examination of the record persuades us that the District Court properly exercised its discretion in this
instance. The court authorized no general "fishing expedition" into the defense files or indeed even into the defense
investigator's report. Cf. United States v. Wright, 160 U.S. App. D.C. 57, 489 F.2d 1181 (1973). Rather, its considered ruling
was quite limited in scope, opening to prosecution scrutiny only the portion of the report that related to the testimony the
investigator would offer to discredit the witnesses' identification testimony. The court further afforded respondent the
maximum [422 U.S. 225, 241] opportunity to assist in avoiding unwarranted disclosure or to exercise an informed choice
to call for the investigator's testimony and thereby open his report to examination.

The court's preclusion sanction was an entirely proper method of assuring compliance with its order. Respondent's
argument that this ruling deprived him of the Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory process and cross-examination
misconceives the issue. The District Court did not bar the investigator's testimony. Cf. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,
19 (1967). It merely prevented respondent from presenting to the jury a partial view of the credibility issue by adducing the
investigator's testimony and thereafter refusing to disclose the contemporaneous report that might offer further critical
insights. The Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the
adversarial system; one cannot invoke the Sixth Amendment as a justification for presenting what might have been a half-
truth. Deciding, as we do, that it was within the court's discretion to assure that the jury would hear the full testimony of
the investigator rather than a truncated portion favorable to respondent, we think it would be artificial indeed to deprive
the court of the power to effectuate that judgment. Nor do we find constitutional significance in the fact that the court in
this instance was able to exclude the testimony in advance rather than receive it in evidence and thereafter charge the jury
to disregard it when respondent's counsel refused, as he said he would, to produce the report. 16 [422 U.S. 225, 242]

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is therefore

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Footnotes
[ Footnote 1 ] The only other evidence introduced against respondent was a statement made at the time of arrest in which
he denied that he was Robert Nobles and subsequently stated that he knew that the FBI had been looking for him.

[ Footnote 2 ] Counsel for the Government complained that the portion of the report produced at this time was illegible.
The witness' testimony indicates, however, that he had no difficulty reading it.

[ Footnote 3 ] The essence of the District Court's order was as follows:

"[If the investigator] is allowed to testify it would be necessary that those portions of [the] investigative report which
contain the statements of the impeached witness will have to be turned over to the prosecution; nothing else in that report.

.....

"If he testifies in any way about impeaching statements made by either of the two witnesses, then it is the Court's view that
the government is entitled to look at his report and only those portions of that report which contain the alleged
impeaching statements . . . of the witnesses." App. 31.

[ Footnote 4 ] Although the portion of the report containing the bank teller's alleged statement previously was revealed
and marked for identification, it was not introduced into evidence. When the discussion of the investigator's testimony
subsequently arose, counsel for the Government noted that he had only a limited opportunity to glance at the statement,
and he then requested disclosure of that portion of the report as well as the statement purportedly made by the salesman.

As indicated above, the bank teller did not deny having made the statement recorded in the investigator's report. It is thus
possible that the investigator's testimony on that point would not have constituted an impeachment of the statements of
that witness within the contemplation of the court's order and would not have given rise to a duty of disclosure. Counsel
did not pursue this point, however, and did not seek further clarification of the issue. Respondent does not, and in view of
the failure to develop the issue at trial could not, urge this as a ground for reversal. Nor does respondent maintain that the
initial disclosure of the bank teller's statement sufficed to satisfy the court's order. We therefore consider each of the two
alleged statements in the report to be impeaching statements that would have been subject to disclosure if the investigator
had testified about them.

[ Footnote 5 ] The discretion recognized by the Court in Jencks subsequently was circumscribed by Congress in the so-
called Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500. See generally Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).

[ Footnote 6 ] Rule 612 of the new Federal Rules of Evidence entitles an adverse party to inspect a writing relied on to
refresh the recollection of a witness while testifying. The Rule also authorizes disclosure of writings relied on to refresh
recollection before testifying if the court deems it necessary in the interests of justice. The party obtaining the writing
thereafter can use it in cross-examining the witness and can introduce into evidence those portions that relate to the
witness' testimony. As the Federal Rules of Evidence were not in effect at the time of respondent's trial, we have no
occasion to consider them or their applicability to the situation here presented.

[ Footnote 7 ] "The purpose of the relevant part of the Fifth Amendment is to prevent compelled self-incrimination, not to
protect private information. Testimony demanded of a witness may be very private indeed, but unless it is incriminating
and protected by the Amendment or unless protected by one of the evidentiary privileges, it must be disclosed." Maness v.
Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 473 -474 (1975) (WHITE, J., concurring in result). Moreover, the constitutional guarantee protects
only against forced individual disclosure of a "testimonial or communicative nature," Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 761 (1966); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).

[ Footnote 8 ] Rule 16 (c), which establishes the Government's reciprocal right of pretrial discovery, excepts "reports,
memoranda, or other internal defense documents made by the defendant, or his attorneys or agents in connection with
the investigation or defense of the case, or of statements made by the defendant, or by government or defense witnesses,
or by prospective government or defense witnesses, to the defendant, his agents or attorneys." That Rule therefore would
not authorize pretrial discovery of the investigator's report. The proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure leave this subsection substantially unchanged. See Proposed Rule 16 of Criminal Procedure, 62 F. R. D. 271,
305-306 (1974).

[ Footnote 9 ] Rule 16 (g) imposes a duty to notify opposing counsel or the court of the additional materials previously
requested or inspected that are subject to discovery or inspection under the Rule, and it contemplates that this obligation
will continue during trial. The obligation under Rule 16 (g) depends, however, on a previous request for or order of
discovery. The fact that this provision may have some effect on the parties' conduct during trial does not convert the Rule
into a general limitation on the court's inherent power to control evidentiary matters.

[ Footnote 10 ] We note also that the commentators who have considered Rule 16 have not suggested that it is directed to
the court's control of evidentiary questions arising at trial. See, e. g., Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the
Prosecution - the Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C. L. Rev. 437, 494-514 (1972); Rezneck, The New
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 Geo. L. J. 1276, 1279, 1282 n. 19 (1966); Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Under
Proposed Rule 16, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 994 (1972).

[ Footnote 11 ] As the Court recognized in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S., at 508 , the work-product doctrine is distinct from
and broader than the attorney-client privilege.

[ Footnote 12 ] A number of state and federal decisions have recognized the role of the work-product doctrine in the
criminal law, and have applied its protections to the files of the prosecution and the accused alike. See, e. g., State v.
Bowen, 104 Ariz. 138, 449 P.2d 603, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969); State ex rel. Polley v. Superior Ct. of Santa Cruz
County, 81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d 263 (1956); Peel v. State, 154 So.2d 910 (Fla. App. 1963); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Duffy v. United States), 473 F.2d 840 (CA8 1973); In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683 (SDNY 1966).

[ Footnote 13 ] The sole issue in Hickman related to materials prepared by an attorney, and courts thereafter disagreed
over whether the doctrine applied as well to materials prepared on his behalf. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F. R. D. 487, 501 (1970); 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 26.63 8. (2d ed.
1974). Necessarily, it must. This view is reflected in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Rule 26 (b) (3), and in Rule
16 of the Criminal Rules as well, see Rules 16 (b) and (c); cf. E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 208 (2d ed. 1972).

[ Footnote 14 ] What constitutes a waiver with respect to work-product materials depends, of course, upon the
circumstances. Counsel necessarily makes use throughout trial of the notes, documents, and other internal materials
prepared to present adequately his client's case, and often relies on them in examining witnesses. When so used, there
normally is no waiver. But where, as here, counsel attempts to make a testimonial use of these materials the normal rules
of evidence come into play with respect to cross-examination and production of documents.

[ Footnote 15 ] We cannot accept respondent's contention that the disclosure order violated his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel. This claim is predicated on the assumption that disclosure of a defense investigator's notes
in this and similar cases will compromise counsel's ability to investigate and prepare the defense case thoroughly.
Respondent maintains that even the limited disclosure required in this case will impair the relationship of trust and
confidence between client and attorney and will inhibit other members of the "defense team" from gathering information
essential to the effective preparation of the case. See American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,
The Defense Function 3.1 (a) (App. Draft 1971). The short answer is that the disclosure order resulted from respondent's
voluntary election to make testimonial use of his investigator's report. Moreover, apart from this waiver, we think that the
concern voiced by respondent fails to recognize the limited and conditional nature of the court's order.

[ Footnote 16 ] Respondent additionally argues that certain statements by the prosecution and the District Court's
exclusion of purported expert testimony justify reversal of the verdict, and that the Court of Appeals' decision should be
affirmed on those grounds. The Court of [422 U.S. 225, 242] Appeals rejected respondent's challenge to the exclusion of
the testimony of the proffered expert, 501 F.2d, at 150-151. Respondent did not present this issue or the question involving
the challenged prosecutorial statements to this Court in a cross-petition for certiorari. Without questioning our
jurisdiction to consider these alternative grounds for affirmance of the decision below, cf. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531,
538 (1931); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 -476, n. 6 (1970); see generally Stern, When to Cross-Appeal or
Cross-Petition - Certainty or Confusion?, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 763 (1974), we do not consider these contentions worthy of
consideration. Each involves an issue that is committed to the trial court's discretion. In the absence of a strong suggestion
of an abuse of that discretion or an indication that the issues are of sufficient general importance to justify the grant of
certiorari we decline to entertain them.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, concurring.

I concur in the judgment and in Parts II, III, and V of the opinion of the Court. I write only because of misgivings about the
meaning of Part IV of the opinion. The Court appears to have held in Part IV of its opinion only that whatever protection
the defense investigator's notes of his interviews with witnesses might otherwise have had, that protection would have
been lost when the investigator testified about those interviews. With this I agree also. It seems to me more sensible,
however, to decide what protection these notes had in the first place before reaching the "waiver" issue. Accordingly, and
because I do not believe that the work-product [422 U.S. 225, 243] doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947),
can be extended wholesale from its historic role as a limitation on the nonevidentiary material which may be the subject of
pretrial discovery to an unprecedented role as a limitation on the trial judge's power to compel production of evidentiary
matter at trial, I add the following.

I
Up until now the work-product doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor, supra, has been viewed almost exclusively as a limitation
on the ability of a party to obtain pretrial discovery. It has not been viewed as a "limitation on the trial court's broad
discretion as to evidentiary questions at trial." Ante, at 236. The problem discussed in Hickman v. Taylor arose precisely
because, in addition to accelerating the time when a party could obtain evidentiary matter from his adversary, 1 the new
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure greatly expanded the nature of the material subject to pretrial disclosure. 2 [422 U.S.
225, 244] Under the Rules, a party was, for the first time, entitled to know in advance his opponent's evidence and was
entitled to obtain from his opponent nonprivileged "information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts" relevant to a
case even though the "information" was not itself evidentiary. Hickman v. Taylor, supra, at 501. Utilizing these Rules, the
plaintiff in Hickman v. Taylor sought discovery of statements obtained by defense counsel from witnesses to the events
relevant to the lawsuit, not for evidentiary use but only "to help prepare himself to examine witnesses and to make sure
that he ha[d] overlooked nothing." 329 U.S., at 513 (emphasis added). In concluding that these statements should not be
produced, the Court treated the matter entirely as one involving the plaintiff's entitlement to pretrial discovery under the
new Federal Rules, 3 and carefully limited its opinion accordingly. The relevant Rule in the Court's view, Rule 26, on its
face required production of the witness statements unless they were privileged. Nonetheless, the Court expressly stated
that the request for witness statements was to be denied "not because the subject matter is privileged" (although noting
that a work-product "privilege" applies in England, 329 U.S., at 510 n. 9) as that concept was used in the Rules, but
because the request "falls outside the arena of discovery." Id., at 510 (emphasis added). The Court stated that it is essential
that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, and concluded that the effect of giving one lawyer's work (particularly
his strategy, legal theories, and mental impressions) to another would have a "demoralizing" effect on the legal profession.
The Court then noted that witness [422 U.S. 225, 245] statements might be admissible in evidence under some
circumstances and might be usable to impeach or corroborate a witness. However, it concluded that in the case before it
the plaintiff wanted the statements for preparation only and had shown no reason why he could not obtain everything he
sought by doing his own work rather than utilizing that of his adversary.

The conclusion that the work product of a lawyer is not "privileged" made it much more difficult for the Court to support
its result. Nothing expressed in the Rule supported its result, and the Court was forced to explain its decision by stating:
"When Rule 26 and the other discovery rules were adopted, this Court and the members of the bar in general certainly did
not believe or contemplate that all the files and mental processes of lawyers were thereby opened to the free scrutiny of
their adversaries." Id., at 514. (Emphasis added.)

I am left with the firm conviction that the Court avoided the easier route to its decision for a reason. To have held an
attorney's work product to be "privileged" would have been to limit its use at trial as evidence in those cases in which the
work product qualified as evidence, see Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States, 5 F. R. D. 433, 460 (1946), and, as Mr. Justice Jackson stated in his concurring opinion, a
party is entitled to anything which is "evidence in his case." 329 U.S., at 515. 4 [422 U.S. 225, 246]

Since Hickman v. Taylor, supra, Congress, the cases, and the commentators have uniformly continued to view the "work
product" doctrine solely as a limitation on pretrial discovery and not as a qualified evidentiary privilege. In 1970, Congress
became involved with the problem for the first time in the civil area. It did so solely by accepting a proposed amendment
to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26, which incorporated much of what the Court held in Hickman v. Taylor, supra, with respect to
pretrial discovery. See Advisory Committee's explanatory statement, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 7778. In the criminal area,
Congress has enacted 18 U.S.C. 3500 and accepted Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16 (c). The former prevents pretrial discovery of
witness statements from the Government; the latter prevents pretrial discovery of witness statements from the defense.
Neither limits the power of the trial court to order production as evidence of prior statements of witnesses who have
testified at trial. 5

With the exception of materials of the type discussed in Part II, infra, research has uncovered no application of the work-
product rule in the lower courts since Hickman to prevent production of evidence - impeaching or[422 U.S. 225,
247] otherwise - at trial; 6 and there are several examples of cases rejecting such an approach.7

Similarly, the commentators have all treated the attorney work-product rule solely as a limitation on pretrial discovery, e.
g., 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice §§ 26.63-26.64 (2d ed. 1974); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
2026 (1970); 2A W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 652 (Wright ed. 1961), and some have expressly
stated that it does not apply to evidentiary matter. F. James, Civil Procedure 211 n. 13 (1965); 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice
§ 16.23 [8.-4] (1963).

The reasons for largely confining the work-product rule to its role as a limitation on pretrial discovery are compelling.
First of all, the injury to the factfinding [422 U.S. 225, 248] process is far greater where a rule keeps evidence from the
fact finder than when it simply keeps advance disclosure of evidence from a party or keeps from him leads to evidence
developed by his adversary and which he is just as well able to find by himself. In the main, where a party seeks to discover
a statement made to an opposing party in order to prepare for trial, he can obtain the "substantial equivalent . . . by other
means," Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (b) (3), i. e., by interviewing the witness himself. A prior inconsistent statement in the
possession of his adversary, however, when sought for evidentiary purposes - i. e., to impeach the witness after he testifies
- is for that purpose unique. By the same token, the danger perceived in Hickman that each party to a case will decline to
prepare in the hopes of eventually using his adversary's preparation is absent when disclosure will take place only at trial.
Indeed, it is very difficult to articulate a reason why statements on the same subject matter as a witness' testimony should
not be turned over to an adversary after the witness has testified. The statement will either be consistent with the witness'
testimony, in which case it will be useless and disclosure will be harmless; or it will be inconsistent and of unquestioned
value to the jury. Any claim that disclosure of such a statement would lead the trial into collateral and confusing issues was
rejected by this Court in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), and by Congress in the legislation which followed.

The strong negative implication in Hickman v. Taylor, supra, that the work-product rule does not apply to evidentiary
requests at trial became a holding in Jencks v. United States, supra. There a defendant in a criminal case sought
production by the Government at trial of prior statements made by its witnesses on the same subject matter as their
testimony. The Government [422 U.S. 225, 249] argued, inter alia, that production would violate the "`legitimate interest
that each party - including the Government - has in safeguarding the privacy of its files.'" 353 U.S., at 670 . The Court held
against the Government. The Court said that to deny disclosure of prior statements which might be used to impeach the
witnesses was to "deny the accused evidence relevant and material to his defense," id., at 667 (emphasis added). Also
rejected as unrealistic was any rule which would require the defendant to demonstrate the impeachment value of the prior
statements before disclosure, 8 and the Court held that entitlement to disclosure for use in cross-examination is
"established when the reports are shown to relate to the testimony of the witness." Id., at 669. Thus, not only did the Court
reject the notion that there was a "work product" limitation on the trial judge's discretion to order production of
evidentiary matter at trial, but it was affirmatively held that prior statements of a witness on the subject of his testimony
are the kind of evidentiary matter to which an adversary is entitled.

Indeed, even in the pretrial discovery area in which the work-product rule does apply, work-product notions have been
thought insufficient to prevent discovery of evidentiary and impeachment material. In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S., at
511 , the Court stated:
"We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or prepared by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward
litigation are necessarily free from discovery in all cases. Where relevant and nonprivileged [422 U.S. 225, 250] facts
remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one's case,
discovery may properly be had. Such written statements and documents might, under certain circumstances, be
admissible in evidence or give clues as to the existence or location of relevant facts. Or they might be useful for purposes of
impeachment or corroboration." (Emphasis added.)

Mr. Justice Jackson, in concurring, was even more explicit on this point. See supra, at 245. Pursuant to this language, the
lower courts have ordered evidence to be turned over pretrial even when it came into being as a result of the adversary's
efforts in preparation for trial. 9 A member of a defense team who witnesses an out-of-court statement of someone who
later testifies at trial in a contradictory fashion becomes at that moment a witness to a relevant and admissible event, and
the cases cited above would dictate disclosure of any reports he[422 U.S. 225, 251] may have written about the
event. 10 Since prior statements are inadmissible hearsay until the witness testifies, there is no occasion for ordering
reports of such statements produced as evidence pretrial. However, some courts have ordered witness statements
produced pretrial in the likelihood that they will become impeachment evidence. 11 Moreover, where access to witnesses
or to their information is unequal, discovery of their statements is often granted solely to help a party prepare for trial
regardless of any eventual evidentiary value of the out-of-court statements. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F. R. D., at 501.

Accordingly, it would appear that with one exception to be discussed below, the work-product notions of Hickman v.
Taylor, supra, impose no restrictions on the trial judge's ordering production of evidentiary matter at trial; that these
notions apply in only a very limited way, if at all, to a party's efforts to obtain evidence pretrial pursuant to available
discovery devices; and that these notions supply only a qualified discovery immunity with respect to witness statements in
any event. 12 [422 U.S. 225, 252]

II
In one of its aspects, the rule of Hickman v. Taylor, supra, has application to evidentiary requests at trial. Both the
majority and the concurring opinions in Hickman v. Taylor were at pains to distinguish between production of statements
written by the witness and in the possession of the lawyer, and those statements which were made orally by the witness
and written down by the lawyer. Production and use of oral statements written down by the lawyer would create a
substantial risk that the lawyer would have to testify. 13 The majority said that this would "make the attorney much less an
officer [422 U.S. 225, 253] of the court and much more an ordinary witness." 329 U.S., at 513 . Mr. Justice Jackson, in
concurring, stated:

"Every lawyer dislikes to take the witness stand and will do so only for grave reasons. This is partly because it is not his
role; he is almost invariably a poor witness. But he steps out of professional character to do it. He regrets it; the profession
discourages it. But the practice advocated here is one which would force him to be a witness, not as to what he has seen or
done but as to other witnesses' stories, and not because he wants to do so but in self-defense." Id., at 517.

The lower courts, too, have frowned on any practice under which an attorney who tries a case also testifies as a witness,
and trial attorneys have been permitted to testify only in certain circumstances. 14

The remarks of the Court in Hickman v. Taylor, supra, while made in the context of a request for pretrial discovery have
application to the evidentiary use of lawyers' memoranda of witness interviews at trial. It is unnecessary, however, to
decide in this case whether the policies against putting in issue the credibility of the lawyer who will sum up to the jury
outweigh the jury's interest in obtaining all relevant information; and whether Jencks v. United States, supra, and 18
U.S.C. 3500 [422 U.S. 225, 254] are to be viewed as expressing a preference for disclosure of all facts. 15 In this case, the
creator of the memorandum was not the trial lawyer but an investigator 16 and he was, in any event, to be called as a
witness by the defense. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment below because, quite apart from waiver, the work-
product rule of Hickman v. Taylor, supra, has no application to the request at trial for evidentiary and impeachment
material made in this case.

[ Footnote 1 ] Under criminal discovery rules the time factor is not as great as might otherwise appear. Federal Rule Crim.
Proc. 16 permits discovery through the time of trial; and under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17 (c), evidentiary matter may be
obtained pursuant to subpoena in advance of trial in the discretion of the trial judge.

[ Footnote 2 ] Prior to the Federal Rules, requests for witness statements were granted or denied on the basis of whether
they were evidence and nonprivileged. In the main, production was denied, either because witness statements were not
evidence (they are inadmissible hearsay until and unless the witness testifies); because a party is not entitled to advance
knowledge of his adversary's case; or because the statements were made by the client or his agent to his attorney and thus
covered by the attorney-client privilege. 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 26.63 3. (2d ed. 1974), and cases cited therein. The
cases did not hold that witness statements were generally privileged, if they were evidentiary, and had no cause to decide
whether a work-product notion should protect them from discovery, since they were nondiscoverable anyway under
applicable discovery rules. But see Walker v. Struthers, 273 Ill. 387, 112 N. E. 961 (1916).

[ Footnote 3 ] Mr. Justice Jackson's concurrence is even more express on this point. It states: "[T]he question is simply
whether such a demand is authorized by the rules relating to various aspects of `discovery.'" 329 U.S., at 514 .

[ Footnote 4 ] Mr. Justice Jackson also emphasized that the witness statements involved in Hickman v. Taylor were
neither evidence nor privileged. Id., at 516. Indeed, most of the material described by the Court as falling under the work-
product umbrella does not qualify as evidence. A lawyer's mental impressions are almost never evidence and [422 U.S.
225, 246] out-of-court statements of witness are generally inadmissible hearsay. Such statements become evidence only
when the witness testifies at trial, and are then usually impeachment evidence only. This case, of course, involves a
situation in which the relevant witness was to testify and thus presents the question - not involved in Hickman v. Taylor -
whether prior statements should be disclosed under the trial judge's power over evidentiary matters at trial.

[ Footnote 5 ] In n. 13 of its opinion, the Court cites Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 16 (c), as containing the work-product rule. In n.
10, the Court correctly notes that Rule 16 (c) is not "directed to the court's control of evidentiary questions arising at trial."
It seems to me that this supplies a better ground for the Court's decision than "waiver."

[ Footnote 6 ] The majority does cite one case, In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683 (SDNY 1966), in which the court
referred to the work-product doctrine in preventing the Government from inquiring of a lawyer before the grand jury
whether he had participated in suborning perjury of a prospective witness while preparing a criminal case for trial. In any
event, a grand jury investigation is in some respects similar to pretrial discovery. Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Duffy v. United States), 473 F.2d 840 (CA8 1973), with Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (CA8), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). The proper scope of inquiry is as broad, and it can be used as a way of preparing for the later
criminal trial. There is for example a split of authority on whether the work-product rule applies to IRS tax investigations.
Compare United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (CA5 1967), with United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038 (CA7 1973).

[ Footnote 7 ] Shaw v. Wuttke, 28 Wis. 2d 448, 454-456, 137 N. W. 2d 649, 652-653 (1965); State ex rel. State Highway
Comm'n v. Steinkraus, 76 N. M. 617, 620-621, 417 P.2d 431, 432-433 (1966); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 24 F. R. D. 416 (Del. 1959); United States v. Matles, 154 F. Supp. 574 (EDNY 1957); United States v. Sun
Oil Co., 16 F. R. D. 533 (ED Pa. 1954); United States v. Gates, 35 F. R. D. 524 (Colo. 1964).

[ Footnote 8 ] The Court in Jencks quoted the language of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
187, 191 (Va. 1807):

"`Now, if a paper be in possession of the opposite party, what statement of its contents or applicability can be expected
from the person who claims its production, he not precisely knowing its contents?'" 353 U.S., at 668n. 12.

[ Footnote 9 ] Cummings v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 47 F. R. D. 373 (ED Pa. 1968); Marks v. Gas Service Co.,
168 F. Supp. 487 (WD Mo. 1958); Maginnis v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 207 F. Supp. 739 (ED La. 1962); Julius
Hyman & Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 17 F. R. D. 386 (Colo. 1955); Parrett v. Ford Motor Co., 47 F. R. D. 22 (WD
Mo. 1968); Scuderi v. Boston Ins. Co., 34 F. R. D. 463, 468 (Del. 1964) (each involving a situation in which a member of a
litigation team witnessed an event or scene in the course of preparing a case for trial and the court ordered disclosure of
his report of the event); Bourget v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 48 F. R. D. 29 (Conn. 1969); McCullough Tool Co. v.
Pan Geo Atlas Corp., 40 F. R. D. 490 (SD Tex. 1966); O'Boyle v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 299 F. Supp. 704 (WD Mo.
1969). Cf. LaRocca v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 47 F. R. D. 278 (WD Pa. 1969), and Kennedy v. Senyo, 52 F.
R. D. 34 (WD Pa. 1971) (in each of which the preparation for trial was the subject of the suit); see also Natta v. Hogan, 392
F.2d 686, 693 (CA10 1968); F. James, Civil Procedure 211 (1965).

[ Footnote 10 ] The holding in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), would put to rest any claim that such prior
statement would be disclosable only if the adversary established its evidentiary value ahead of time by specific proof that it
was inconsistent.

[ Footnote 11 ] Vetter v. Lovett, 44 F. R. D. 465 (WD Tex. 1968); McDonald v. Prowdley, 38 F. R. D. 1 (WD Mich. 1965);
Tannenbaum v. Walker, 16 F. R. D. 570 (ED Pa. 1954); Fulton v. Swift, 43 F. R. D. 166 (Mont. 1967); Republic Gear Co. v.
Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 557-558 (CA2 1967) (in camera inspection). Cf. Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d
45 (CA4 1963). For cases contra see 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 26.64 3. n. 14 (2d ed. 1974).

[ Footnote 12 ] The majority states:

"Moreover, the concerns reflected in the work-product doctrine do not disappear once trial has begun. Disclosure of an
attorney's [422 U.S. 225, 252] efforts at trial, as surely as disclosure during pretrial discovery, could disrupt the orderly
development and presentation of his case. We need not, however, undertake here to delineate the scope of the doctrine at
trial, for in this instance it is clear that the defense waived such right as may have existed to invoke its protections." Ante,
at 239.

As noted above, the important question is not when the document in issue is created or even when it is to be produced.
The important question is whether the document is sought for evidentiary or impeachment purposes or whether it is
sought for preparation purposes only. Of course, a party should not be able to discover his opponent's legal memoranda or
statements of witnesses not called whether his request is at trial or before trial. Insofar as such a request is made under the
applicable discovery rules, it is within the rule of Hickman v. Taylor even though made at trial. Insofar as the request seeks
to invoke the trial judge's discretion over evidentiary matters at trial, the rule of Hickman v. Taylor is unnecessary, since
no one could ever suggest that legal memoranda or hearsay statements are evidence. If this is all the majority means by
the above-quoted language, I agree.

[ Footnote 13 ] If the witness does not acknowledge making an inconsistent statement to the lawyer - even though the
lawyer recorded it - the cross-examiner may not offer the document in evidence without at least calling the lawyer as a
witness to authenticate the document and otherwise testify to the prior statement.

[ Footnote 14 ] United States v. Porter, 139 U.S. App. D.C. 19, 429 F.2d 203 (1970); United States v. Fiorillo, 376 F.2d 180
(CA2 1967); Gajewski v. United States, 321 F.2d 261 (CA8 1963), cert. den., 375 U.S. 968 (1964); United States v. Newman,
476 F.2d 733 (CA3 1973); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Dykes, 395 F.2d 747 (CA5 1968); United States v. Alu, 246 F.2d 29 (CA2
1957); United States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903, modified on rehearing, 187 F.2d 12 (CA2 1950), vacated as to one
petitioner, 341 U.S. 946 , cert. denied as to other petitioner sub nom. Stancin v. United States, 341 U.S. 956 (1951); United
States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617 (CA7 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 312 (1961).

[ Footnote 15 ] The cases have held records of witness statements made by prosecutors to be disclosable under 18 U.S.C.
3500, United States v. Hilbrich, 341 F.2d 555 (CA7), cert, den., 381 U.S. 941 , reh. den., 382 U.S. 874(1965), and 384 U.S.
1028 (1966); United States v. Aviles, 315 F.2d 186 (CA2 1963); Saunders v. United States, 114 U.S. App. D.C. 345, 316 F.2d
346 (1963); United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311 (CA10 1973), cert. den.,415 U.S. 915 (1974). Cf. Canaday v. United
States, 354 F.2d 849 (CA8 1966). In State v. Bowen, 104 Ariz. 138, 449 P.2d 603 (1969), the court reached a contrary
result under state law.

[ Footnote 16 ] A conflict arose among lower federal courts over the question whether the work product of members of a
litigation team other than the lawyer was protected from discovery by the rule of Hickman v. Taylor, supra. Ghent,
Development, Since Hickman v. Taylor, of Attorney's "Work Product" Doctrine, 35 A. L. R. 3d 438-440 ( 7 [a] and [b]) and
453-455 ( 15 [a] and [b]) (1971); Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48
F. R. D. 487, 501-502 (1970). With respect to discovery in civil cases under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26, the conflict was
resolved in the 1970 amendments by affording protection to documents by a party's "representative," whether a lawyer or
not. Where the purpose of the rule protecting the work product is to remove the incentive a party might otherwise have to
rely solely on his opponent's preparation, it is sensible to treat preparation by an attorney and an investigator alike.
However, the policy against lawyers testifying applies only to the lawyer who tries the case. [422 U.S. 225, 255]
 EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175603

Appellee,

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- v e r s u s - AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION and
PERALTA, JJ.

RENATO ESPAOL,
Appellant. Promulgated:
February 13, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x

D E CI S I O N

CORONA, J.:

This is an appeal of the November 30, 2005 decision[1] and June 29, 2006 resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 1375 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42 convicting appellant of the crime of
parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Appellant Renato Espaol was charged with killing his wife, Gloria Pascua Espaol, in an
Information that read:
 That on or about the 2nd day of February, 2000, in the City of Dagupan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, RENATO ESPAOL@ Atong, being then legally married to one GLORIA
ESPAOL, with intent to kill the latter, did then and there, [willfully], unlawfully and
criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter by shooting her,
hitting her on vital part of her body, thereby causing her death shortly thereafter due
to Hypovolemic shock, hemorrhage, massive, due to multiple gunshot wound as per
Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Benjamin Marcial Bautista, Rural Health Physician, to
the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased, GLORIA ESPAOL, in
the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine
Currency, and other consequential damages.

Contrary to Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.[3]

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. During the pre-trial, the
prosecution and defense agreed on the following stipulations and admissions:

1. That the appellant under detention and named in the information was the
accused who had been arraigned;

2. That the victim, Gloria Pascua Espaol, was the legal wife of appellant;

3. That Gloria and appellant were living together as husband and wife prior to
February 2, 2000 and that she was shot to death at the early dawn of February 2, 2000
at Pantal, Dagupan City;

4. That before the victim was shot, appellant borrowed the tricycle of Federico
Ferrer and drove said tricycle with his wife inside the cab thereof from their house
towards the house of Felicidad Ferrer, sister of the victim;

5. That appellant and the victim lived in their own house with their four
children.[4]

Thereafter, trial ensued.

The factual antecedents follow.

At about 2:00 a.m. of February 2, 2000, Domingo Petilla was waiting for his companions
at Pantal Road, Dagupan City. They were on their way to Manila. All of a sudden, he heard two
successive gunshots. A few moments later, a yellow tricycle sped past him along Pantal Road
headed towards Sitio Guibang, Dagupan City. The tricycle was driven by a man wearing a dark-
colored long-sleeved shirt.[5]

Petillas companions arrived shortly thereafter on board a van. As they started loading their
things, they saw, through the lights of their vehicle, a person lying on the pavement along
Pantal Road. Upon closer scrutiny, they discovered the lifeless body of Gloria Espaol. They
immediately reported the matter to the police.[6]

The gunshots were also heard by Harold Villanueva,[7] a boatman working at the Pantal
River, while he was waiting for passengers at the dock about 100 meters away from the crime
scene. The shots were followed by the sound of a motorcycles revving engine. He then saw a
speeding yellow tricycle. The tricycle bore the name Rina in front of its cab. Its driver was
wearing a dark jacket and blue pants. The boatman was later told by a tricycle driver that there
was a dead body nearby. Out of curiosity, he (the boatman) went there and recognized the
victim as one of his regular passengers.[8]

Felicidad Pascua Ferrer, sister of the victim, was told by the police and neighbors that her
sister was dead. She immediately proceeded to the place. Upon confirming that it was indeed
her sister, she asked bystanders to inform appellant about the death of his wife.[9]

A few minutes later, appellant arrived. Even before he saw his dead wife, he shouted She is my
wife, she is my wife. Who killed her? Vulva of your mother! She was held up.Appellant
stepped across the body and saluted the police investigator. He told the police that he brought
the victim to the place where she was found and that she could have been robbed of the P2,000
he had earlier given her.[10]
Meanwhile, Villanueva noticed that the appellant seemed to be wearing the same clothes as
those worn by the driver of the speeding tricycle he saw along Pantal Road right after he heard
the gunshots.[11]
At around 3:00 a.m., appellant went to the house of Mateo Pascua, brother of Gloria, to
inform him that Gloria was held up and killed. They then proceeded to the scene of the crime
using the yellow tricycle of their brother-in-law, Federico Ferrer. The tricycle had the name
Rina emblazoned in front. On the way, Mateo noticed that the seats and floor of the tricycle
were wet. When asked about it, appellant did not answer.[12]
Thereafter, at the morgue, appellant refused to look at the body and preferred to stay
outside.[13] The autopsy yielded the following results:

EXTERNAL FINDINGS

CADAVER WAS IN RIGOR MORTIS AND REGULAR BUILT.

GUNSHOT WOUND, POE, 0.7 CM, MID FRONTAL AREA, LEVEL 5 CM

ABOVE THE EYEBROW, COLLAR ABRASION, NO GUNPOWDER BURN,
PENETRATING, SKULL FRACTURE, BRAIN TISSUE.

POEx: NONE

GUNSHOT WOUND, POE, 1.5 CM, RIGHT MID AXILLIARY LINE, LEVEL 2
CM BELOW THE RIGHT NIPPLE, LESS DENSE, GUNPOWDER BURN
PERIPHERY, COLLAR ABRASION, SKIN ABRASION POSTERIOR,
PENETRATING.

POEx: NONE

CONTUSION HEMATOMA AT THE RIGHT EYE AREA.

INTERNAL FINDINGS

INTRACRANIAL HEMORRHAGE, MODERATE

PENETRATING PERFORATING BRAIN TISSUE
INTRATHORACIC RIGHT, HEMORRHAGE MASSIVE
PENETRATING AND PERFORATING THRU AND THRU RIGHT [LUNG] AND
HEART.
6TH [RIB] FRACTURE, 2.5 CM, LEFT MID CLAVICULAR LINE, MEDIAL
SLUG FOUND ABOVE THE 6TH [RIB], WITHIN THE MUSCLES, LEFT
THORACIC AREA.[14]

Disturbed by appellants actuations, Felicidad asked the police to interrogate her brother-in-law.
At the police station, while appellant was being investigated, he requested Senior Police Officer
(SPO)1 Isagani Ico if he could talk privately with Felicidad. During their talk, appellant begged
Felicidads forgiveness and asked that he be spared from imprisonment.[15]
 During the victims wake in their house, appellant hardly looked at his wifes remains. He
chose to remain secluded at the second floor. He repeatedly asked for Felicidads forgiveness
during the first night of the wake. At one point, Delfin Hernandez, a nephew of the victim,
approached appellant and asked why the latter killed his aunt. Appellant just kept silent.[16]

It was also disclosed by Norma Pascua Hernandez, Glorias other sister, that Gloria confided to
her appellants illicit relationship with a woman named Eva Seragas. Gloria went to Evas house
and confronted her about the adulterous relationship but appellant came to Evas defense and
forcibly dragged Gloria away. Later, Gloria had another heated argument with Eva. Norma
pacified her sister and brought her home.[17]

After the presentation of the prosecutions evidence in-chief, the defense filed a demurrer to
evidence. The RTC denied the demurrer in an order dated August 21, 2000.[18]
For his defense, appellant testified that he had been an employee of the Dagupan City
Water District since 1990. In the early morning of February 2, 2000, he and his wife were on
their way to downtown Dagupan City on board a tricycle driven by him to
buy binuburan (fermented cooked rice), a local medication for his ulcer. However, upon
reaching Quimosing Alley along Pantal Road, Gloria decided to alight and wake up her sister
Felicidad who lived nearby. Gloria and Felicidad were engaged in the trading of fish in
Dagupan City.[19]

After saying their goodbyes, appellant proceeded to the city proper alone. He
bought binuburan and other ulcer medications and went home. Around 2:30 a.m., a passing
tricycle driver informed him that the water engine of the Dagupan Water District was creating
too much noise. He decided to verify the information.[20]

On his way there, appellant noticed a commotion along Pantal Road. An unidentified man later
told him, Espaol, come here. Your wife is dead. He immediately proceeded to the scene of the
crime. As he was about to embrace the dead body of his wife, someone tapped him on the
shoulder and said No, dont touch her, she is still to be investigated. At the morgue, he noticed
that his wife had a bruise above her right elbow and that her zipper was partially opened. After a
few minutes, he asked to be excused for he could not bear the pain and sorrow. [21]

He denied that he asked forgiveness from his sister-in-law Felicidad for killing his wife; that he
was barely around during his wifes wake and that he did not respond to his nephews accusation.
He likewise denied having an adulterous relationship with Eva Seragas.[22]
Rachel and Richwell Espaol, appellants children, corroborated their fathers story and
maintained that he was at their house resting at the time of the commission of the crime. They
insisted that he was always beside the coffin of their mother during the wake and that he had no
other woman. Rachel testified that she and her mother were close. If it were true that her father
had illicit relations with another woman, her mother would have confided in her.

On February 19, 2001, the RTC convicted appellant:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused RENATO ESPAOL alias Atong is

hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE as defined
by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by R.A. 7659 otherwise
known as the Heinous Crime Law. Under the latter law, the offense is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death and there being no aggravating circumstance alleged
in the information, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua. In addition, the death his wife has to be indemnified by him in
the amount of P50,000.00 and is further ordered to pay to Felicidad Ferrer the amount
of P20,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages. No moral damages is awarded
for the reason stated above.

SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, appellant filed an appeal in this Court which we referred to the CA in
accordance with People v. Mateo.[23] The CA affirmed the RTC in a decision promulgated on
November 30, 2005. It denied reconsideration in a resolution dated June 29, 2006.

Hence this appeal.

The issue for our resolution is whether appellant is guilty of the crime of parricide.
 Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, parricide is the killing of ones legitimate or
illegitimate father, mother, child, any ascendant, descendant or spouse and is punishable by the
single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

Article 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his
spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.

In convicting the appellant, the RTC and CA found that the following circumstances
proved beyond reasonable doubt that he was guilty of parricide:

1. appellant admitted that he was the one who brought his wife to the scene of
the crime minutes before the latters body was discovered. In other words,
appellant was with the victim around the time she was shot and killed.

2. the tricycle which he used in transporting his wife was seen by Harold
Villanueva and Domingo Petilla traveling at a high speed coming from the
direction where the gunshots were heard.

3. appellant, immediately after the incident, was wearing the same dark jacket
and blue jeans worn by the driver of the speeding tricycle.

4. appellant asserted that his wife was robbed, even before the investigation had
started. However, the victims purse and other belongings were all found intact.

5. appellant did not respond to his brother-in-laws query as to why the tricycles
sidecar which appellant had used in transporting his wife was wet.

6. appellant isolated himself during the nine-day wake of his wife.

7. appellant repeatedly asked to be forgiven by Felicidad and spared from

imprisonment during the investigation of the case, which was corroborated by
SPO1 Ico, and during the first night of the wake.

8. appellant had a paramour, a certain Eva Seragas. A month prior to the killing,
the victim confided to her sister, Norma Fernandez, that she had a
confrontation with her husbands paramour at the latters home, but appellant
dragged and pulled her away. A few days after, the two crossed paths again
and quarreled.[24]
 We agree with the CA.

These circumstances are proven facts. We are convinced that at around 2:00 a.m. of
February 2, 2000, appellant shot his wife twice on the head and breast, causing her
death. Though there is no direct evidence, we have previously ruled that direct evidence of the
actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when circumstantial evidence can
adequately establish his or her guilt.[25]

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.[26]

Circumstantial as it is, conviction based thereon can be upheld, provided the

circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person. Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only
matrix from which the trial court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.
Circumstantial evidence is of a nature identical to direct evidence. It is equally direct
evidence of minor facts of such a nature that the mind is led, intuitively or by a
conscious process of reasoning, to a conclusion from which some other fact may be
inferred. No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is
circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there be
proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that accused-appellant
committed it.[27]

None of the prosecution witnesses saw the actual killing of the victim by
appellant. However, their separate and detailed accounts of the surrounding circumstances
reveal only one conclusion: that it was appellant who killed his wife.[28]

Appellant argues that the lower courts should not have given weight to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses because they were incredible and illogical.[29] We disagree.

Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial courts evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses
is accorded great respect in the absence of proof that it was arrived at arbitrarily or that the trial
court overlooked material facts. The rationale behind this rule is that the credibility of a witness
can best be determined by the trial court since it has the direct opportunity to observe the candor
and demeanor of the witnesses at the witness stand and detect if they are telling the truth or
not.[30] We will not interfere with the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses.

Appellants bare denial that he did not kill his wife is a negative and self-serving assertion
which merits no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony
of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. [31] The prosecution witnesses were
not shown to have any ill-motive to fabricate the charge of parricide against appellant nor to
falsely testify against him.

Appellants defense of alibi is likewise weak. He alleged that he went home after he went
downtown to buy his medications. His children attested that he was with them in their house at
the time of the commission of the crime. However,

[alibi] is easy to fabricate but difficult to prove. xxx We have held that for the
defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place (or distance) must be
strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the
crime was committed. He must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime during
its commission.[32]

Appellants house was merely minutes away from the place where the crime took
place. Assuming that the children actually knew that appellant was home when their mother
was killed, this did not prove that he was not guilty. It was easy for him to hurry home right
after the crime. In fact, this is a reasonable conclusion from the circumstantial evidence
gathered.
Another piece of evidence against appellant was his silence when his wifes nephew asked him
why he killed his wife. His silence on this accusation is deemed an admission under Section 32,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Section 32. Admission by silence. An act or declaration made in the presence

and within the hearing observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act
 or declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when
proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him.

In addition, appellants act of pleading for his sister-in-laws forgiveness may be considered as
analogous to an attempt to compromise, which in turn can be received as an implied admission
of guilt under Section 27, Rule 130:[33]
Section 27. Offer of compromise not admissible.

xxx xxx xxx

In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those

allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

xxx xxx xxx

In sum, the guilt of appellant was sufficiently established by circumstantial

evidence. Reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed considering that there was neither any
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance present.[34] The heirs of the victim are entitled to a civil
indemnity ex delicto of P50,000, which is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the
victim and the culpability of the accused for the death.[35]

Likewise, moral damages in the amount of P50,000 should be awarded even in the
absence of allegation and proof of the emotional suffering by the victims heirs. Although
appellants two children sided with him in his defense, this did not negate the fact that the family
suffered emotional pain brought about by the death of their mother. [36] We also award them
exemplary damages in the sum of P25,000 considering that the qualifying circumstance of
relationship is present, this being a case of parricide.[37]

WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 1375 finding the appellant, Renato Espaol, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Gloria Espaol, in the
amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P20,000 as actual damages, P50,000 as moral damages
and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-37398 June 28, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROSARIO CABRERA and CONRADO VILLANUEVA, defendants, CONRADO VILLANUEVA, defendant-
appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor
Pio C. Guerrero for plaintiff-appellee.

Jesus E. Mendoza & Raul M. Aviso for defendant-appellant.

BARREDO, J.:p

Appeal from the judgment of conviction of Robbery-Hold-up with Homicide of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, in its Criminal Case No. O423-V,
the dispositive portion of which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Rosario Cabrera y Martin alias Charing and Conrado
Villanueva y Santos alias Cadoc guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime as charged in the
information and hereby sentence each of them to life imprisonment; to indemnify jointly and severally
the heirs of the offended party the amount of P12,000.00; and also jointly and severally to pay the
amount of P8,000.00, the cost of the jeep stolen; and the further amount of P30,000.00 representing
actual, moral and exemplary damages; to suffer all the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to
pay the costs.

Accused shall be entitled to full credit for the preventive imprisonment they have already undergone
in accordance with Rep. Act 6127.

SO ORDERED.

Accused Rosario Cabrera did not appeal. Only defendant Conrado Villanueva's appeal is before Us.

Accused Rosario Cabrera and appellant Conrado Villanueva were charged in an information reading:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Rosario Cabrera y Martin alias Charing and Conrado
Villanueva y Santos alias Cadoc of the crime of robbery holdup with homicide, penalized under the
provisions of Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of January, 1972, in the municipality of Valenzuela, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Rosario
Cabrera y Martin alias Charing and Conrado Villanueva y Santos alias Cadoc, with John Doe alias
Ben and Peter Doe alias Abay, who are still at large, armed with knives or ice picks, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, holdup, take, rob
and carry away with them a jeep with plate number 84-26 S'71, Bulacan, being driven by Luis dela
Cruz y de Jesus and owned by one Reynaldo Santos, Jr., with a value of P8,000.00, to the damage
and prejudice of the said owner in the said amount of P8,000.00; that during the commission of this
 crime, and on the occasion thereof, the said accused in furtherance of their conspiracy, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie and stab several times with the said knives or ice picks
the said Luis dela Cruz y de Jesus and thereafter was abandoned, thereby inflicting upon the said
Luis dela Cruz y de Jesus stabbed wounds which caused his death after a few days of confinement
in the hospital.

Contrary to law.

The facts pertinent to this appeal are briefly stated in the brief of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza assisted by
Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero as follows:

At about 11:00 in the evening of January 17, 1972 Police Sgt. Mario Tanfelix of Valenzuela, Bulacan,
while on a patrol duty received an instruction from his superior Lt. Carlos Palomares to proceed
immediately to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital at Manila to investigate an abandoned person who
was found at the North Diversion Road suffering from stab wounds (pp. 12-13, tsn., May 11, 1972).

This abandoned and wounded person was identified as Luis de la Cruz (pp. 6-7, tsn., May 11, 1972).
He gave an ante mortem statement (Exhibit A; p. 11, tsn., May 11, 1972). In the ante-mortem
statement the deceased named defendant Rosario Cabrera as the person who hired his jeep
(Exhibit A) but did not know the names of the three men who stabbed him and took his money and
jeep (pp. 11-72, tsn., May 11, 1972; Exhibit A).

In the morning of January 18, 1972, defendant Rosario Cabrera was arrested by the police (p. 18,
tsn., May 18, 1972). On January 20, 1972 she executed an extra-judicial confession (Exhibit B, to B-
3, inclusive). In the said extra-judicial confession she pointed to appellant Conrado Villanueva as the
mastermind of the robbery. She merely hired the jeep upon instruction of appellant but the robbery
and the killing of the deceased were done by appellant and his two unidentified companions (Ibid).

Lt. Carlos Palomares of the Valenzuela Police Department who took the extra-judicial confession of
defendant Rosario Cabrera testified to identify and to read the contents of the said extra-judicial
confession (pp. 3-37, tsn., May 18, 1972). Dr. Ernesto G, Brion of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) testified regarding the post-mortem examination conducted on the body of the
deceased (pp. 310, tsn., September 7, 1972). Reynaldo Santos Jr. testified on the ownership and
value of the jeep stolen (pp. 4-14, tsn., June 9, 1972). Alejandro de la Cruz testified on the expenses
and damages suffered by the family of the deceased (pp. 15-27, tsn., June 9, 1972) on account of
the deceased's untimely death. Dante Marcelo testified that in the early evening before the robbery
took place he saw defendant Rosario Cabrera riding on the jeep of the deceased (pp. 29-41, tsn.,
June 9, 1972) but did not notice whether there were other passengers (p. 33, tsn., June 9, 1972).

Defendant Rosario Cabrera and appellant Conrado Villanueva did not take the witness stand.
Neither did they present any evidence. On the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution
together with their respective cross-examination and objections to some of the exhibits, particularly
appellants objection to the admission of Exhibits B to B-3 (defendant Cabrera's extra-judicial
confession) insofar as he was concerned, the case was considered submitted for decision." (Pp. 2-4,
Brief for the Appellee)

xxx xxx xxx

The only evidence that would support the judgment of conviction of appellant Villanueva was the
extra-judicial confession of his co-accused Rosario Cabrera which was read into the record over the
continuing objection of appellant's counsel (p. 10, tsn., May 18, 1972). Appellant reiterated his
objection when the said extra-judicial confession was being offered in evidence (p. 12, tsn.,
September 7, 1972)." (Id.)

In their prayer, counsel for the People, joining appellant's counsel, ask for the reversal of appellant's conviction and
his acquittal.
After carefully going over the record and minutely reviewing the evidence, We are fully convinced that the prayer for
acquittal is in order.

The extrajudicial statement of accused Cabrera does point to appellant as the mastermind and perpetrator, together
with two persons whose identities are still unknown, of the killing of the deceased Luis dela Cruz and the taking of
the jeep he was driving. But said statement is obviously inadmissible against appellant, who made timely objection
thereto.

There is no question that Cabrera's inculpatory statements were made by her during the investigation conducted by
the Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972, two days after the date of the incident in question. For this reason alone,
that is, that said statement was not made during the existence of the alleged conspiracy between her and appellant,
but after said supposed conspiracy had already ceased and when she was already in the hands of the authorities,
Section 27 of Rule 130 cannot be availed of. Said provision reads:

Admission by conspirator.— The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

There being no other evidence against appellant, We have no alternative but to reverse the judgment appealed from
and to acquit him, as prayed for by his counsel as well as counsel for the People.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, appellant Conrado Villanueva is acquitted,
and his immediate release from confinement is ordered, unless he is lawfully held for another case, with costs de
oficio.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Parker v. Randolph
442 U.S. 62 (1979)
U.S. Supreme Court
Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979)

Parker v. Randolph

No. 78-99

Argued March 20, 1979

Decided May 29, 1979

442 U.S. 62

Syllabus

Respondents were convicted, after a joint trial in a Tennessee court, of murder committed during the
commission of a robbery. None of the respondents took the witness stand, and their oral confessions,
found by the trial court to have been freely and voluntarily given, were admitted into evidence through
police officers' testimony. Respondent Pickens' written confession was also admitted into evidence
over his objection that it had been obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436. The trial court instructed the jury that each confession could be used only against the
defendant who gave it and could not be considered as evidence of a codefendant's guilt. Ultimately,
the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the convictions, holding that admission of respondents'
confessions did not violate the rule of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, which held that a
defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated by the
admission, at a joint trial, of the confession of a codefendant who did not take the stand. Respondents
subsequently obtained writs of habeas corpus in a Federal District Court, which held that
respondents' rights under Bruton had been violated, and that introduction of respondent Pickens'
written confession had violated his rights under Miranda. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: The judgment is affirmed as to respondent Pickens and reversed as to the other respondents.
Pp. 442 U. S. 69-77;442 U. S. 77-81.

575 F.2d 1178, affirmed in part and reversed in part.

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III,
concluding that, since the grant of certiorari was limited to the Bruton issue, the Court had no
occasion to pass on the merits of the ruling that respondent Pickens' rights under Miranda had been
violated. Pp. 442 U. S. 76-77.

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR.
JUSTICE WHITE, concluded, in Part II, that admission of respondents' confessions with proper
limiting jury instructions did

Page 442 U. S. 63
not infringe respondents' right of confrontation secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Pp. 442 U. S. 69-76.

(a) In Bruton, introduction at a joint trial of a nontestifying codefendant's confession had a

"devastating" effect on the nonconfessing defendant's case. Introduction of such incriminating
extrajudicial statements of a codefendant will seldom, if ever, have the same "devastating"
consequences to a defendant who has himself confessed. The constitutional right of cross-
examination protected by Bruton has far less practical value to a defendant who has confessed to the
crime than to one who has consistently maintained his innocence. Pp. 442 U. S. 72-73.

(b) Nor does the natural "motivation to shift blame onto others," recognized in Bruton to render the
incriminating statements of codefendants "inevitably suspect," require application of the Bruton rule
when the incriminated defendant has corroborated his codefendant's statements by heaping blame
onto himself. P. 442 U. S. 73.

(c) The Confrontation Clause does not bar admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial
statement by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way incriminates the defendant. And
an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial statement only against its
source is generally sufficient to avoid offending the implicated defendant's confrontation right. Pp. 442
U. S. 73-74.

(d) When the defendant's own confession is properly before the jury, as here, the possible prejudice
resulting from the jury's failure to follow the trial court's instructions is not so "devastating" or "vital" to
the confessing defendant as to require departure from the general rule allowing admission of
evidence with limiting instructions. Pp. 442 U. S. 74-75.

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN would not find the rule of Bruton to be inapplicable simply because
interlocking confessions are involved. Rather, even where the confessions of nontestifying
codefendants overlap to some degree, he would follow the analysis indicated by Bruton and then
determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On the facts of this case, he
concludes that any error was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Pp. 442 U. S. 77-81.

REHNQUIST, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered an opinion of the Court with respect
to Parts I and III, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, and
an opinion with respect to Part II, in which BURGER, C.J., and STEWART and WHITE, JJ., joined.
BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 442 U. S.
77. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,

Page 442 U. S. 64

in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 442 U. S. 81. POWELL, J., took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-45470 February 28, 1985

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO LAQUINON, alias "JOLLY", defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

Accused Gregorio Laquinon was charged with the crime of murder in the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur for
the killing of Pablo Remonde, coated as follows:

That on or about November 13, 1972, in the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Davao del Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with
treachery and evident premeditation, armed with a gun and with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one Pablo Remonde with said weapon, inflicting upon the
latter wounds which caused his death.

After the trial, the lower court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of the crime charged and sentenced
him as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder, and imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua (Art. 248, Revised
Penal Code); to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P 12,000.00 and to pay the costs.

From the foregoing judgment, accused Gregorio Laquinon interposed the present appeal.

The People's version of the case is as follows:

On November 13, 1972, at about 11:30 o'clock in the evening, Samama Buat, barrio captain of Clib,
Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, was at his residence in barrio Clib. In a short while he heard gunshots
coming from the bank of a river some three hundred meters to the south of his house (pp. 4-6, tsn,
Dec. 8, 1975). Then, his brother, Leocario Buat, arrived and told him that a man was shouting for
help at the bank of the river. Samama Buat told his brother to call the barrio councilman. Thereafter,
he proceeded to the place where the unidentified man was. His brother, Leocario and the barrio
councilman also arrived there. Samama Buat found the man lying on the sand and asked who he
was. The man answered, "I am Pablo Remonde" (pp 7-10, Id.). Remonde's two hands were tied on
his back. He was lying face down (p. 10, Id).

Samama Buat then took the "ante mortem" statement of Pablo Remonde. He asked him who he was
to which he answered that he was Pablo Remonde. Samama Buat asked "who shot you" and
Remonde said that it was Gregorio Laquinon. He asked Pablo Remonde whether from the gunshot
wounds he suffered he would survive to which the victim answered "I do not know" (pp. 11, 19,
21, Id.; see also Exh. A, Folder of Exhibits). After that, barrio captain Buat went to the municipality of
Hagonoy and reported to Vice Mayor Antonio Biran the shooting of Pablo Remonde. Vice Mayor
Biran went to the scene of the incident and asked the victim who shot him to which the latter
answered that he was shot by Gregorio Laquinon (pp. 21 A to 23, tsn, Dec. 8, 1975). Pablo
Remonde was placed on a jeep of the Vice Mayor and brought to the hospital (p. 23, Id,). Pablo
Remonde was admitted to the Canos Hospital in Digos, Davao del Sur where he was attended to by
Dr. Alfonso Llanos. Dr. Llanos performed an operation on the victim from whose body a slug was
 recovered (pp. 15-16, tsn, Jan. 26, 1976; Exh. B). Pablo Remonde died in the hospital on November
16, 1972 because of bullet wounds (pp. 17-20, tsn, Jan. 26, 1976; see also clinical chart. Exh. C,
Folder of Exhibits).

The accused Gregorio Laquinon denied having killed the deceased. The trial court summarized his defense, as
follows:

In his defense, the accused declared that he was a KM member; that he was ordered by one Noli
Cabardo, then their CO, to fetch Pablo Remonde; he requested one Cristino Nerosa to go with him,
and matter of factly, they brought Remonde to the place where said CO Cabardo with ten
companions, was waiting at the riverbank; that before reaching the place, Nerosa separated from
him and he alone brought Remonde to Cabardo. There Cabardo confronted Remonde why, having
been commanded to buy some provisions in Matanao, he (Remonde) never returned; to which
Remonde answered that he spent the money 'in drinking and gambling; when upon Cabardo got
mad and as Remonde attempted to escape, he (witness) heard a shot which must have been fired
by Cabardo as he was holding a .38 Cal. revolver; that he (witness) also had that evening a Cal.
22 paltik; that after the shot he saw Remonde sprawled on the ground, and then Cabardo ordered
them to go to the mountain as in fact they did; that two days later during the day, their mountain
camp was raided by the PC and Cabardo and two others were killed while he (witness) was able to
escape and went to Magpet, North Cotabato, and engaged in farming therein with his relatives; but
believing that as a KM member he 'c•mmitted something,' he surrendered to the Davao PC
Barracks in May, 1975 (Exhibit '2'), where up to now he is being confined.

The accused-appellant prays for the reversal of the appealed judgment on the ground that the lower court erred in
finding him guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the statement attributed to the deceased Pablo Remonde
which reads:

Q State your name and other personal circumstances.

A Pablo Remonde y Saballa, 24 years old, laborer and resident of Pob. this mun.

Q Who shot you?

A Mr. Laquinon, a person who ran for councilor before the ticket of Liberal last local
election and son of Suelo Maravllias whose name I don't know.

Q Why you were shot by said persons above?

A They are suspecting me that I'm an informer of Vice Mayor Viran regarding KM .

Q Do you think you'll die with your wound?

A I don't know sir.

The accused-appellant argues that the foregoing statement is inadmissible in evidence as an ante-mortem
declaration because it was not executed under a consciousness of an impending death; and that the deceased was
not a competent witness.

The fact that the deceased had named the son of Suelo Maravillas who turned out as Cristino Nerosa as one of
those who shot him in his dying declaration does not make the deceased an incompetent witness. Nor does it
render said dying declaration incredible of belief. The testimony of the accused that he and Nerosa separated and
that he alone brought the deceased to Noli Cabardo is not corroborated. It may be that Nerosa was with the
accused when the latter shot the deceased, as stated in the dying declaration, but that the accused testified that
Nerosa was not with him when he brought the deceased to Noli Cabardo in order to free Nerosa from criminal
liability.
Nor does the testimony of Barrio Captain Samama Buat that the place was dark and that the victim had told him that
he was shot by members of the KM make the deceased an incompetent witness. On the contrary, it strengthens the
statement of the deceased since the accused is a member of the KM.

But the dying declaration of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since
the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased
believed himself in extremist, "at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis
for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule." 1

It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident
and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.

On the whole, We are satisfied with the findings of the trial court that the accused was responsible for the killing of
Pablo Remonde. We cite with approval the following observations of the trial court:

Indeed, the Court cannot believe that CO Cabardo did the killing as related by the accused for the
following reasons:

First, when the deceased was allegedly delivered to CO Cabardo, he was already hand-tied at his
back, that the place of the shooting was "covered by thick bushes and beside the river", and that CO
Cabardo was with ten men excluding the accused; under these circumstances, it is hard to believe
that the deceased, with all those overwhelming handicap, would attempt to flee.

Second, if the deceased truly tried to flee, the logical thing he would do would be to flee away from
and not towards Cabardo; in doing the former he would turn to his right or to his left or towards his
back; if he fled to his left or right, or towards his back, he would be exposing one side of his body, or
his back, and when fired upon in that position he would have been hit on one side of the body or at
his back. The evidence — as testified to by Dr. Llanos — however, shows that the deceased had
only one wound a gunshot wound, in the abdomen; this shows he was fired upon frontally, the bullet
going through and through the intestines and lodged, presumably in the bony portions of his back,
that is why the slug (Exhibit "B") was recovered. The accused's version, therefore, that the deceased
tried to flee is hard to believe for being against the physical facts.

Now, if the accused is innocent, why should he relate such an incredible version?

Oh what a tangled web they weave when first day practice to deceive.

— Sir
Walter
Scott

With these observations, the Court cannot believe that the accused really delivered the deceased to
CO Cabardo and that it was Cabardo who shot him. As testified to by him, their mountain camp was
raided by the PC two days after the incident, as a result of which raid Cabardo and two of their
companions were killed. The accused himself was able to escape, went to hide in a relative's farm in
faraway Magpet, North Cotabato, did farming there until one day in May, 1975, repentant that, as a
KM member, he had "committed something", he finally surrendered to the PC Barracks in Davao
City. Cabardo, may he rest in peace, having gone to the other world, and can no longer speak in his
behalf, it is not unlikely that the accused conceived of this outlandish defense by pointing to CO
Cabardo, to free himself from responsibility.

Most important to remember on this point is that at the time the deceased grade his "dying"
statement, Cabardo was still alive; that per the accused himself, he had no previous differences with
the deceased or with the barrio captain; and that from the prosecution witness Bo. Capt. Buat when
he took the statement of the deceased, the deceased was feeling strong, surely, under such
circumstances it is hard to believe that the deceased would name the accused with whom he had no
quarrel and Nerosa as his killers if that was really not the truth.
Accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. The victim was apparently
shot while his two hands were tied at his back. Accused, in shooting the victim, obviously employed means or force
in the execution of the offense which tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased is increased to
P30,000.00, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED. With costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010

BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO, Petitioner,

vs.
ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI LOPEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a
Complaint1 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition and support against Ben-Hur
Nepomuceno (petitioner).

Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an extramarital affair of petitioner with
Araceli; that petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a handwritten note dated
August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give her financial support in the amount of ₱1,500 on
the 15th and 30th days of each month beginning August 15, 1999.

Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be
ordered to: (1) recognize her as his child, (2) give her support pendente lite in the increased amount of ₱8,000 a
month, and (3) give her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age of majority.

Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father of Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to
execute the handwritten note on account of threats coming from the National People’s Army.2

By Order of July 4, 2001,3 Branch 130 of the Caloocan RTC, on the basis of petitioner’s handwritten note which it
treated as "contractual support" since the issue of Arhbencel’s filiation had yet to be determined during the hearing
on the merits, granted Arhbencel’s prayer for support pendente lite in the amount of ₱3,000 a month.

After Arhbencel rested her case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court granted by Order dated
June 7, 2006,4 whereupon the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The trial court held that, among other things, Arhbencel’s Certificate of Birth was not prima facie evidence of her
filiation to petitioner as it did not bear petitioner’s signature; that petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide
support did not contain a categorical acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that there was no showing
that petitioner performed any overt act of acknowledgment of Arhbencel as his illegitimate child after the execution
of the note.

On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 20, 2007,5 reversed the trial court’s decision,
declared Arhbencel to be petitioner’s illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered petitioner to give Arhbencel
financial support in the increased amount of ₱4,000 every 15th and 30th days of the month, or a total of ₱8,000 a
month.

The appellate court found that from petitioner’s payment of Araceli’s hospital bills when she gave birth to Arhbencel
and his subsequent commitment to provide monthly financial support, the only logical conclusion to be drawn was
that he was Arhbencel’s father; that petitioner merely acted in bad faith in omitting a statement of paternity in his
handwritten undertaking to provide financial support; and that the amount of ₱8,000 a month was reasonable for
Arhbencel’s subsistence and not burdensome for petitioner in view of his income.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 3, 2008,6 petitioner comes before
this Court through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.7

Petitioner contends that nowhere in the documentary evidence presented by Araceli is an explicit statement made
by him that he is the father of Arhbencel; that absent recognition or acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not
entitled to support from the putative parent; that the supposed payment made by him of Araceli’s hospital bills was
neither alleged in the complaint nor proven during the trial; and that Arhbencel’s claim of paternity and filiation was
not established by clear and convincing evidence.

Arhbencel avers in her Comment that petitioner raises questions of fact which the appellate court had already
addressed, along with the issues raised in the present petition.8

The petition is impressed with merit.

The relevant provisions of the Family Code9 that treat of the right to support are Articles 194 to 196, thus:

Article 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. 1awph!1

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his
schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall
include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.

Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to
the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:

1. The spouses;

2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;

3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;

4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and

5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.

Article 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to
support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or
sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Arhbencel’s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls
under Article 195(4). As such, her entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her
filiation.

Herrera v. Alba10 summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part
as follows:

Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence

Establishing Filiation

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
 xxxx

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:

SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of
family history intimately connected with pedigree.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous
to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other
family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.

This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe
Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by
such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article
278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the
putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a
child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother
vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions,
together with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to
a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic
writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note executed by petitioner which reads:

Manila, Aug. 7, 1999

I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide financial support in the amount of ₱1,500.00
every fifteen and thirtieth day of each month for a total of ₱3,000.00 a month starting Aug. 15, 1999, to Ahrbencel
Ann Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the necessity of demand, subject to
adjustment later depending on the needs of the child and my income.

The abovequoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is,
therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent
evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child referred to in
Herrera. For it is not even notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the
putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has
petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.

The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth,11 has no probative
value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.

At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her
which, without more, fails to establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in
cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the disturbance that
unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of July 20, 2007 is SET ASIDE. The Order
dated June 7, 2006 of Branch 130 of the Caloocan City RTC dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 184971

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD, and

PEREZ, JJ.

MONETS EXPORT AND

MANUFACTURING CORP.,

VICENTE V. TAGLE, SR. and Promulgated:

MA. CONSUELO G. TAGLE,

Respondents. April 19, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the evidence required to prove how much a borrower still owes the
bank when he has multiple loan accounts with it that had all fallen due.
 The Facts and the Case

On June 25, 1981 petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and respondent
Monets Export and Manufacturing Corporation (Monet) executed an Export Packing Credit
Line Agreement (Agreement) under which the bank gave Monet a credit line of P250,000.00,
secured by the proceeds of its export letters of credit, promissory notes, a continuing guaranty
executed by respondent spouses Vicente V. Tagle, Sr. and Ma. Consuelo G. Tagle (the Tagles),
and a third-party mortgage executed by one Pepita C. Mendigoria. Land Bank renewed and
amended this credit line agreement several times until it reached a ceiling of P5 million.

Land Bank claims that by August 31, 1992 Monets obligation under the Agreement had
swelled to P11,464,246.19. Since Monet failed to pay despite demands, the bank filed a
collection suit against Monet and the Tagles before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila.[1] In their answer, Monet and the Tagles claimed that Land Bank had refused to
collect the US$33,434.00 receivables on Monets export letter of credit against Wishbone
Trading Company of Hong Kong while making an unauthorized payment of US$38,768.40 on
its import letter of credit to Beautilike (H.K.) Ltd. This damaged Monets business interests
since it ran short of funds to carry on with its usual business. In other words, Land Bank
mismanaged its clients affairs under the Agreement.

After trial or on July 15, 1997 the RTC rendered a decision[2] that, among other things,
recognized Monet and the Tagles obligations to Land Bank in the amount reflected in Exhibit
39, the banks Schedule of Amortization from its Loans and Discount Department, but sans any
penalty. The RTC ordered petitioners to pay Land Bank the same.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),[3] the latter rendered judgment on October 9,
2003, affirming the RTC decision.[4] Land Bank filed a petition for review with this Court[5] and
on March 10, 2005 the Court rendered a Decision[6] that, among other things, remanded the
case to the RTC for the reception of additional evidence. The pertinent portion reads:

Insofar as the amount of indebtedness of the respondents [Monet and the

Tagles] to the petitioner [Land Bank] is concerned, the October 9, 2003 decision
 and the January 20, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
57436, are SET ASIDE. The case is hereby remanded to its court of origin, the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, for the reception of additional evidence
as may be needed to determine the actual amount of indebtedness of the
respondents to the petitioner. x x x

In remanding the case, the Court noted that Exhibit 39, the Summary of Availment and
Schedule of Amortization, on which both the RTC and the CA relied, covered only Monets debt
of P2.5 million under Promissory Note P-981, a small amount compared to the P11,464,246.19
that Land Bank sought to collect from it. The records showed, however, that Monet executed
not only one but several promissory notes in varying amounts in favor of the bank. Indeed, the
bank submitted a Consolidated Statement of Account dated August 31, 1992 in support of its
claim of P11,464,246.19 but both the RTC and the CA merely glossed over it. Land Bank also
submitted a Summary of Availments and Payments from 1981 to 1989 that detailed the series
of availments and payments Monet made.

The Court explained its reason for remanding the case for reception of additional
evidence, thus:
Unfortunately, despite the pieces of evidence submitted by the parties, our
review of the same is inconclusive in determining the total amount due to the
petitioner. The petitioner had failed to establish the effect of Monets Exhibit 39 to
its own Consolidated Statement of Account as of August 31, 1992, nor did the
respondents categorically refute the said statement of account vis--vis its Exhibit
39. The interest of justice will best be served if this case be remanded to the court
of origin for the purpose of determining the amount due to petitioner. The dearth
in the records of sufficient evidence with which we can utilize in making a
categorical ruling on the amount of indebtedness due to the petitionerconstrains
us to remand this case to the trial court with instructions to receive additional
evidence as needed in order to fully thresh out the issue and establish the rights
and obligations of the parties. From the amount ultimately determined by the trial
court as the outstanding obligation of the respondents to the petitioner, will be
deducted the award of opportunity losses granted to the respondents in the
amount of US$15,000.00 payable in Philippine pesos at the official exchange rate
when payment is to be made.[7]
 On remand, the RTC held one hearing on October 30, 2006, at which the lawyer of Land
Bank told the court that, apart from what the bank already adduced in evidence, it had no
additional documents to present. Based on this, the RTC issued an order on the same
day,[8] affirming its original decision of July 15, 1997. The pertinent portion of the order reads:

At todays hearing of this case, the lawyer for Land Bank stated on record
that he has no more documents to present. Therefore, the obligation of the
defendants would be those stated in the schedule of amortization from the Loans
& Discount Department of the Land Bank (Exhibit 39) as well as the interest
mentioned therein, as provided in the Decision of this Court. From the said
obligation shall be deducted in favor of the defendants the REDUCED amount of
US$15,000.00 representing the award of opportunity losses, as determined by the
Supreme Court, payable in Philippine Pesos at the official exchange rate when
payment is to be made.[9]

In effect, the RTC stood by Exhibit 39 as the basis of its finding that Monet and the
Tagles owed Land Bank only P2.5 million as opposed to the latters claim
of P11,464,246.19. Effectively, the RTC reinstated the portion of its July 15, 1997 decision that
the Court struck down with finality in G.R. 161865 as baseless for determining the amount due
the bank.

Land Bank filed a motion for reconsideration, actually a motion to reopen the hearing,
to enable it to adduce in evidence a Consolidated Billing Statement as of October 31, 2006 to
show how much Monet and the Tagles still owed the bank. But the trial court denied the
motion. Land Bank appealed the order to the CA[10] but the latter rendered a decision on May
30, 2008,[11] affirming the RTC orders.[12] Land Bank moved for reconsideration, but the CA
denied it in its October 10, 2008 resolution,[13] hence, the present petition by Land Bank.

Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC and the CA acted
correctly in denying petitioner Land Banks motion to reopen the hearing to allow it to present
the banks updated Consolidated Billing Statement as of October 31, 2006 that reflects
respondents Monet and the Tagles remaining indebtedness to it.

The Courts Ruling

The CA conceded that the RTC needed to receive evidence that would enable it to
establish Monets actual indebtedness to Land Bank in compliance with the Courts decision in
G.R. 161865. But since Land Bank, which had the burden of proving the amount of that
indebtedness, told the RTC, when it set the matter for hearing, that it had no further
documentary evidence to present, it was but right for that court to issue its assailed order of
October 30, 2006, which reiterated its original decision of July 15, 1997.

The CA also held that the RTC did right in denying Land Banks motion to reopen the
hearing to allow it to present its Consolidated Billing Statement as of October 31,
2006 involving Monets loans. Such billing statement, said the CA, did not constitute sufficient
evidence to prove Monets total indebtedness for the simple reason that this Court in G.R.
161865 regarded a prior Consolidated Statement of Account for 1992 insufficient for that
purpose.

But what the RTC and the CA did not realize is that the original RTC decision of July 15,
1997 was an incomplete decision since it failed to resolve the main issue that the collection
suit presented: how much Monet and the Tagles exactly owed Land Bank. As the Court noted
in its decision in G.R. 161865, the evidence then on record showed that the credit line Land
Bank extended to Monet began at P250,000.00 but, after several amendments, eventually
rose up to P5 million. Monet availed itself of these credit lines by taking out various loans
evidenced by individual promissory notes that had diverse terms of payment.

As it happened, however, in its original decision, the RTC held that Monet still owed
Land Bank only P2.5 million as reported in the banks Schedule of Amortization (Exhibit 39). But
that schedule covered only one promissory note, Promissory Note P-981. Noting this, the
Court rejected Exhibit 39 as basis for determining Monets total obligation, given that it
undeniably took out more loans as evidenced by the other promissory notes it executed in
favor of Land Bank.
 And, although the bank presented at the trial its Consolidated Statement of Account for
1992 covering Monets loans, the Court needed to know how the balance of P2.5 million in
Exhibit 39, dated April 29, 1991, which the RTC regarded as true and correct, impacted on that
consolidated statement that the bank prepared a year later. The Court thus remanded the
case so the RTC can receive evidence that would show, after reconciliation of all of Monets
loan accounts, exactly how much more it owed Land Bank.

The CA of course places no value on the Consolidated Billing Statement that Land Bank
would have adduced in evidence had the RTC granted its motion for reconsideration and
reopened the hearing. Apparently, both courts believe that Land Bank needed to present in
evidence all original documents evidencing every transaction between Land Bank and Monet
to prove the current status of the latters loan accounts. But a bank statement, properly
authenticated by a competent bank officer, can serve as evidence of the status of those
accounts and what Monet and the Tagles still owe the bank. Under Section 43, Rule 130[14] of
the Rules of Court, entries prepared in the regular course of business are prima facie evidence
of the truth of what they state. The billing statement reconciles the transaction entries
entered in the bank records in the regular course of business and shows the net result of such
transactions.

Entries in the course of business are accorded unusual reliability because their
regularity and continuity are calculated to discipline record keepers in the habit of
precision.If the entries are financial, the records are routinely balanced and audited. In
actual experience, the whole of the business world function in reliance of such kind of
records.[15]

Parenthetically, consider a borrower who takes out a loan of P10,000.00 from a bank
and executes a promissory note providing for interests, charges, and penalties and an
undertaking to pay the loan in 10 monthly installments of P1,000.00. If he pays the first five
months installments but defaults in the rest, how will the bank prove in court that the debtor
still owes it P5,000.00 plus interest?

The bank will of course present the promissory note to establish the scope of the
debtors primary obligations and a computation of interests, charges, and penalties based on
its terms. It must then show by the entries in its record how much it had actually been
paid. This will in turn establish how much the borrower still owes it. The bank does not have to
present all the receipts of payment it issued to all its clients during the entire year, thousands
of them, merely to establish the fact that only five of them, rather than ten, pertains to the
borrower. The original documents need not be presented in evidence when it is numerous,
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result.[16]

Monet and the Tagles can of course dispute the banks billing statements by proof that
the bank had exaggerated what was owed it and that Monet had made more payments than
were reflected in those statements. They can do this by presenting evidence of those greater
payments. Notably, Monet and the Tagles have consistently avoided stating in their letters to
the bank how much they still owed it. But, ultimately, it is as much their obligation to prove
this disputed point if they deny the banks statements of their loan accounts.

In reverting back to Exhibit 39, which covers just one of many promissory notes that
Monet and the Tagles executed in favor of Land Bank, the RTC and the CA have shown an
unjustified obstinacy and a lack of understanding of what the Court wanted done to clear up
the issue of how much Monet and the Tagles still owed the bank. The bank lawyer who
claimed that Land Bank had no further evidence to present during the hearing was of course in
error and it probably warranted a dismissal of the banks claim for failure to prosecute. But the
banks motion for reconsideration, asking for an opportunity to present evidence of the status
of the loans, opened up a chance for the RTC to abide by what the Court required of it. It
committed error, together with the CA, in ruling that a reopening of the hearing would serve
no useful purpose.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals decision
in CA-G.R. CV 88782 dated May 30, 2008 and resolution dated October 10, 2008 and the
Regional Trial Court order in Civil Case 93-64350 dated October 30, 2006, REMANDS the case
to the same Regional Trial Court of Manila for the reception of such evidence as may be
needed to determine the actual amount of indebtedness of respondents Monets Export and
Manufacturing Corp. and the spouses Vicente V. Tagle, Sr. and Ma. Consuelo G. Tagle and
adjudicate petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines claims as such evidence may warrant.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

LOLITA REYES doing business G.R. No. 165377

under the name and style, SOLID
BROTHERS WEST MARKETING,
Petitioner, Present:

CORONA, J., Chairperson

- versus -
VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

PERALTA, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION,

Respondent.
Promulgated:

February 16, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated
September 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67975, which reversed and
set aside the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 267, Pasig City, in Civil Case
No. 66863.

The antecedent facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

Plaintiff corporation, Century Canning Corporation, is engaged in the business of

manufacturing, processing, and distribution of canned goods, particularly, Century
Tuna. Defendant Lolita Reyes is a businesswoman doing business under the name
and style Solid Brothers West Marketing.

The facts as gathered by the Court a quo are as follows:

In the subject case, Plaintiff Century Canning Corporation tried to establish the fact
that defendant Lolita Reyes had applied for and was granted credit line from the
former thereby allowing the latter to allegedly obtain and secure Century tuna
canned goods. And when the defendant's obligation to pay became due and
demandable, the same failed to pay as she refused to pay her unsettled accounts in
the total amount of P787,191.27. However, due to the constant and diligent efforts
exerted by the representatives of the plaintiff to collect the alleged unpaid
obligations of the defendant, the later returned some unsold Century tuna canned
goods, the value of which at P323,697.64 was deducted from the principal obligation
thereby leaving the amount of P463,493.63 as the unsettled account of defendant
Reyes. That because of the refusal of the defendant to satisfactorily and completely
settle her unpaid account, the plaintiff was constrained to refer the matter to its
legal counsel, who consequently sent a demand letter, and accordingly filed the
instant case in Court after the defendant failed to comply and satisfy the demand
letter to pay.
 In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, defendant averred that she has no
transaction with the plaintiff for the purchase of the alleged canned goods in
question, inasmuch as she is not engaged in the canned goods business but in auto
airconditioning, parts and car accessories in Banaue, Quezon City.[3]

Trial thereafter ensued.

On April 28, 2000, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby ordered

DISMISSED. The prayer for counterclaim of defendant in the form of moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees is hereby granted.

Accordingly, let judgment be rendered in favor of defendant's counterclaim, and

plaintiff Century Canning Corporation is directed to pay defendant Lolita Reyes moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,
000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 as well as to pay the costs of
the suit.[4]

SO ORDERED.

In so ruling, the RTC found that respondent failed to substantiate its allegations that petitioner
is liable to pay a certain sum of money. It based its conclusion on the fact that petitioner's
signature in the Credit Application Form submitted by respondent was significantly different
from the signature appearing in petitioner's COMELEC voter's identification card (ID) and her
Community Tax Certificate (CTC) which she proffered to be her usual, true, and genuine
signature. It also found that petitioner's signature did not appear in the five sales invoices
presented by respondent where the former acknowledged receipt of the delivered canned
good; that there was no explicit authority such as a written document showing the
appointment of a certain Oscar Delumen as petitioner's authorized representative to transact
business and/or receive canned goods for and on petitioner's behalf; that there was also no
showing that respondent requested or asked for Delumen's authority to transact or receive
the goods on petitioner's behalf inasmuch as the amount involved was of considerable
value. The RTC did not give credence to the testimonial as well as the documentary
evidence presented by respondent for being self-serving. It awarded damages to petitioner
taking into consideration the mental anguish she suffered by reason of the case and for being
forced to litigate to protect her right.

Respondent filed its appeal with the CA. Petitioner filed her appellee's brief, and respondent
filed a Reply thereto.

On September 16, 2004, the CA granted the appeal, the dispositve portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed

decision of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the defendant-
appellee held liable for the amount claimed by the plaintiff-appellant.[5]

In reversing the RTC, the CA found that the RTC's conclusion that petitioner's signature in the
Credit application form was different from her signature in the CTC and voter's IDwas contrary
to the RTC's observation during the September 9, 1999 hearing, where it made a remark that
as far as the strokes, there seemed to be a similarity, because signatures sometimes differed in
size; but as far as the strokes were concerned, they seemed to be the same. The CA found that
in the credit application form, where petitioner's certificate of registration of business name
was attached, a certain Oscar Delumen represented himself as petitioner's former sales
operations manager; that the existence and authenticity of both documents were never
refuted by petitioner; that the fact that Delumen was acting for and on petitioner's behalf was
not controverted, except by mere denial. The CA noted that in Delumen's Comments on
Motion to Cite him in Contempt of Court, he stated that when he saw on his desk the RTC
Order of December 27, 1999, directing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00 as form of wastage fee,
he immediately brought the said Order to petitioner and was assured by the latter that she
would have her lawyer attend to and take care for him; that this statement proved that
petitioner and Delumen knew each other; and that the RTC should have required Delumen's
testimony, as he was a vital witness to the case, but the RTC opted to forego with the same.
The CA gave credence to the respondent's witnesses, who testified that they had previously
met with petitioner when they attempted to collect her unpaid accounts; that petitioner even
tried to settle her indebtedness through monthly installments until such time that the debt
was fully paid; that petitioner even returned some of the goods previously delivered to her to
reduce her accountabilities; that the testimonies of these witnesses belied petitioner's
defense that she never transacted business with respondent, because, if she did not transact
with the latter, she would not have entertained respondent's officers and would not have
offered settlement and returned the goods. The CA concluded that the positive declarations of
respondent's witnesses could not be overturned by petitioner's general denial that she never
transacted business with respondent.

Hence, this petition where petitioner raises the issue that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING

RESPONDENT'S APPEAL AND HOLDING PETITIONER LIABLE TO PAY RESPONDENT'S
CLAIM.

Petitioner contends that the CA misquoted or misapplied the remarks made by the RTC during
the trial of the case, since the observation as far as the strokes, there seems to be a similarity
refers to that between petitioner's signature appearing in her community tax certificate and
the verification in her answer, and not between petitioner's alleged signatures in the credit
application form and her community tax certificate and voter's ID. She argues that contrary to
the CA finding that she never refuted the existence and authenticity of the credit application
form, she categorically denied having executed the same by claiming that the signature
appearing therein was not hers; that she not only denied her signature in the credit
application form, but she also presented documents showing her genuine signature. She also
claimed that the CA's finding that Delumen was acting on her behalf was not established by
competent evidence during the trial of the case, as the only evidence submitted by respondent
to prove the authority of Delumen was the credit application form; that said credit application
form has no probative value for being self-serving, and its genuineness and authenticity were
not established.
Petitioner contended that the Comment on Motion to Cite in Contempt of Court submitted by
Delumen, which the CA claimed to have proven the fact that petitioner and Delumen knew
each other, was not formally offered as part of respondent's evidence, and Delumen was not
even presented during the trial; that the CA erred in concluding that petitioner returned some
of the canned goods to respondent, relying on the statement of account which was self-
serving, and no copy of the same was sent to the petitioner; and that the statement of
account where the amount of P323,697.64 was deducted was merely based on the credit
memo, which respondent's witness did not prepare himself. There was no evidence that the
goods were received by petitioner, as even the sales invoices did not bear her signatures; and
the fact that the goods were received by Delumen because he was petitioner's general
manager was not established.
The issue presented before Us is whether the CA correctly found that petitioner was liable to
pay respondent's claim. This is a factual issue.

The Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law
that may have been committed by the lower courts.[6] As a general rule, petitions for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure filed before this Court may only raise questions
of law.[7] However, jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to this rule.[8]
In this case, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the RTC; thus,
we find it proper to review the evidence.

It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative
allegations by the degree of evidence required by law.[9] In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence,[10] or that evidence
that is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not
mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more believable than
that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on one side than on the other.

We find no merit in the petition.

The RTC dismissed respondent's complaint, as it found that the signature appearing in the
credit application form, alleged to be that of petitioner, was significantly different from the
signature in the CTC and voter's ID that petitioner claimed to show her usual and genuine
signature. However, the CA found that such conclusion was contrary to the RTC's observation
made during the trial, when the latter said that there seems to be a similarity in strokes
because a signature sometimes differs on the size. While the CA's finding on this matter was
erroneous, since a reading of the transcript of stenographic notes of the September 9, 1999
hearing, when the alleged observation regarding the similarity in strokes was made by the
RTC, shows that the RTC was comparing petitioner's signatures in her voter's ID and her CTC
with her signature in the Verification in her Answer. We still affirm the CA's reversal of the RTC
decision.

While petitioner denies having any transaction with respondent regarding the sale and
delivery to her of respondent's canned goods, a review of the evidence shows
otherwise. Records show that respondent submitted a certificate of registration of business
name under petitioner's name and with her photo, which was marked as respondent's Exhibit
L.[11] Notably, respondent's formal offer of evidence[12] stated that the purpose of Exhibit L was
to show that petitioner had submitted such certificate as one of her supporting documents in
applying as a distributor of respondent's products, and also for the purpose of contradicting
petitioner's allegation that she had no transaction with respondent.[13] In petitioner's
Objections/Comment to respondent's offer of evidence,[14] she offered no objection to this
exhibit.[15] In fact, in the same Comment, petitioner prayed that the other exhibits be denied
admission for the purpose for which they were offered, except Exhibit L.[16] In effect, petitioner
admitted the purpose for which Exhibit L was offered, i.e., one of the documents she
submitted to respondent to be a distributor of the latters products. Thus, such admission
belies her allegation in her Answer with compulsory counterclaim that she had no transaction
with respondent for the purchase of the canned goods,[17] as well as her testimony on direct
examination that she did not know respondent.[18]

Although petitioner denies her signature in the credit application form, the entries[19] therein
show informations whose veracity even admitted by petitioner. Such entries include the
residential address at 132 Zamora Street, Caloocan, which was petitioner's previous residence
prior to her transfer to Banaue, Quezon City;[20] and shows Eliseo Dy as authorized signatory of
two bank accounts, whom petitioner admitted on cross-examination to be her live-in partner
for 23 years.[21] Notable also is the fact that the tax account number appearing in the credit
application form was the same tax account number stated in petitioner's CTC, which she
presented to reflect her true and usual signature.[22] It was also in the credit application form
where the name of Oscar Delumen, with his signature affixed thereto, appears as petitioner's
operations manager.

Petitioner claims that there was no evidence showing that she received the canned goods
delivered by respondent, as the sales invoices evidencing such delivery were not signed by
her. The sales invoices were signed by Delumen, her operations manager. While petitioner
denies having received the canned goods and knowing Delumen, respondent presented two
witnesses who categorically declared and positively identified petitioner as the person whom
they met several times in her store and residence for the purpose of collecting her unpaid
obligations with respondent.

George Navarez, respondent's former Credit and Collection Supervisor, testified that
petitioner was their former customer who failed to pay the purchases and deliveries covered
by five sales invoices;[23] that he knew petitioner since he had met her several times when he
was collecting her unpaid obligations;[24] that in one of his visits to petitioner, the latter offered
to pay P50,000.00 a month as partial settlement of her total indebtedness with respondent;
and that to reduce her debt, petitioner even returned some of the canned goods delivered to
her.[25] Navarez, on cross examination, testified that he was the one who personally received
the canned goods that petitioner returned, as he was there in the store when the goods were
pulled out;[26] that the transaction regarding the returned goods was contained in three credit
memos, which served as the bases for the amount deducted from petitioner's debt.[27] On re-
direct, he clarified that the amount of P323,697.64 was the amount of the returned canned
goods which was reflected as deductions in the statement of account,[28] and that the
statement of account was prepared by a clerk and approved by him.[29]

Manuel Conti Uy, respondent's Regional Sales Manager, testified that he met petitioner
several times when he presented to her the five unpaid sales invoices[30] that, in one instance,
petitioner, who was with Eliseo Dy who could not speak because of a throat infection, asked
him to just pull out the remaining unsold goods for application to her total
indebtedness;[31] that he told her that he would still have to ask the approval of their credit
and collection department. Uy then came back with Navarez and, in the presence of
petitioner, initiated the pull-out of the goods;[32] that after deducting the amount of the
returned canned goods, the remaining balance was P463,493.63;[33] and when he made
another visit, i.e., a few days after Eliseo's death, he presented to petitioner the statement of
account where the amount of the returned goods was deducted, but petitioner still refused to
pay.[34]

Notably, petitioner did not even rebut, either in her direct testimony or in rebuttal, the
testimonies of Navarez and Uy that they met with her several times, and talked with her
regarding the collection of her indebtedness and the pull-out of the canned goods. In fact, in
Uy's testimony, he also mentioned Eliseo's death, and that Uy even allowed few days to pass
before going to petitioner's place to collect so as to give petitioner time to comfort
herself. Eliseo's death sometime in October 1997 was confirmed by petitioner.

We agree with the CA when it said that if indeed petitioner did not transact with respondent,
she should not have entertained respondent's collecting officers and should not have offered
settlement or returned some of the canned goods.

The testimonies of respondent's witnesses were further bolstered by the absence of any
motive on their part to falsely testify against petitioner; thus, their testimonies are hereby
accorded full faith and credit.

Petitioner's defense consists of denial. We have held that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence that has no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who
testified on affirmative matters.[35]

We find that respondent has sufficiently established petitioner's liability in the amount
of P463,493.63. Such amount must be paid with legal interest from the filing of the complaint
on June 25, 1998, until fully paid. As held in the landmark case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,[36] to wit:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of

money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which
may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn
legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation,
the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of
the Civil Code.

xxxx

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
 paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction,
this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated September 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 67975 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
U.S. Supreme Court
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)

Sandstrom v. Montana

No. 78-5384

Argued April 18, 1979

Decided June 18, 1979

442 U.S. 510

Syllabus

Based upon a confession and other evidence, petitioner was charged under a Montana statute with
"deliberate homicide," in that he "purposely or knowingly" caused the victim's death. At trial, petitioner
argued that, although he killed the victim, he did not do so "purposely or knowingly," and therefore
was not guilty of deliberate homicide. The trial court instructed the jury that "[t]he law presumes that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts," over petitioner's objection that such
instruction had the effect of shifting the burden of proof on the issue of purpose or knowledge. The
jury found petitioner guilty, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although shifting
the burden of proof to the defendant by means of a presumption is prohibited, allocation of "some
burden of proof" to a defendant is permissible. Finding that under the instruction in question
petitioner's sole burden was to produce "some" evidence that he did not intend the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts, and not to disprove that he acted "purposely or knowingly," the
Montana court held that the instruction did not violate due process standards.

Held: Because the jury may have interpreted the challenged presumption as conclusive, like the
presumptions in Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, and United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422, or as shifting the burden of persuasion, like that in Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, and because either interpretation would have violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, the instruction is unconstitutional. Pp. 442 U. S. 514-527.

(a) The effect of a presumption in a jury instruction is determined by the way in which a reasonable
juror could have interpreted it, not by a state court's interpretation of its legal import. Pp. 442 U. S.
514, 442 U. S. 517.

(b) Conclusive presumptions

"conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which t,he law endows the accused and
which extends to every element of the crime,"

Morissette, supra at 342 U. S. 275, and they "invad[e the] factfinding function," United States Gypsum
Co. supra at 438 U. S. 446, which, in a criminal case, the law assigns to the jury. The presumption
announced to petitioner's jury may well have had exactly

Page 442 U. S. 511

these consequences, since upon finding proof of one element of the crime (causing death), and of
facts insufficient to establish the second (the voluntariness and "ordinary consequences" of
petitioner's action), the jury could have reasonably concluded that it was directed to find against
petitioner on the element of intent. The State was thus not forced to prove "beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . every fact necessary to constitute the crime . . . charged," In re Winship,397 U. S. 358, 397
U. S. 364, and petitioner was deprived of his constitutional rights. Pp. 442 U. S. 521-523.

(c) A presumption which, although not conclusive, had the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion
to petitioner, would have suffered from similar infirmities. If the jury interpreted the presumption in this
manner, it could have concluded that, upon proof by the State of the slaying, and of additional facts
not themselves establishing the element of intent, the burden was then shifted to petitioner to prove
that he lacked the requisite mental state. Such a presumption was found constitutionally deficient
in Mullaney, supra. P. 442 U. S. 524.

(d) Without merit is the State's argument that, since the jury could have interpreted the word "intends"
in the instruction as referring only to petitioner's "purpose," and could have convicted petitioner solely
for his "knowledge" without considering "purpose," it might not have relied upon the tainted
presumption at all. First, it is not clear that a jury would have so interpreted "intends." More
significantly, even if a jury could have ignored the presumption, it cannot be certain that this is what it
did do, as its verdict was a general one. Pp. 442 U. S. 525-526.

(e) Since whether the jury's reliance upon the instruction constituted, or could have ever constituted,
harmless error are issues that were not considered by the Montana Supreme Court, this Court will not
reach them as an initial matter. Pp.442 U. S. 526-527.

176 Mont. 492, 580 P.2d 106, reversed and remanded.

BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. REHNQUIST, J., filed a concurring
opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, p. 442 U. S. 527.

Page 442 U. S. 512

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8332 November 13, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PIO MERCADO, TOMAS MERCADO, and
CATALINO MERCADO, defendants-appellants.

Eugenio Paguia, for appellants

Officee of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

These defendants were charged with the crime of coaccion in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan.
On the 13th of March, 1912, one Claro Mercado presented a complaint against the defendants in the court of the
justice of the peace of Baliuag. The justice of the peace conducted a preliminary examination and found that there
was probable cause for believing that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged and held them for trial in the
Court of First Instance. On the 21st of March, 1912, the prosecuting attorney of said province presented the
complaint, which alleged:

That the said accused on December 22, 1911, in the municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, P. I., did
willfully and criminally, without legitimate authority therefore, and by means of violence or force employed
upon the person of Claro Mercado, prevent the latter from rendering aid to Maria R. Mateo in order that
Santiago Mercado might at his pleasure maltreat the said Maria R. Mateo, in a violation of law.

After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the Honorable Alberto Barretto, judge, found the
defendants guilty of the crime in the complaint, without any aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and
sentenced each of them to be imprisoned for a period of two months and one day of arresto mayor, with the
accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of 325 pesetas and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment, allowing to the defendants one-half of the time they had already suffered in prison, and each to pay
one-third part of the costs. From that sentence each of the defendants appealed to this court and made the following
assignments of error:

I. The trial court erred in overruling the objection of the accused to the private prosecutor's question referring
to the character of the witness.

II. The trial court erred in reaching the conclusion that the crime prosecuted was committed and that the
accused are responsible therefor.

III. The trial court erred in sentencing the accused.

IV. The trial court erred in not having the accused testify in their own behalf, as they offered to do, allowing
them to testify in the same way as he did the sole witness for the defense.

With reference to the first assignment of error, we find by referring to page 75 of the record, that Mr. Ricardo
Gonzalez Lloret, attorney for the private prosecutor, asked the witness for the defense, the said Santiago Mercado,
who is mentioned in the complaint presented in said cause, the following question:

How many times have you been convicted of assault upon other persons?
To this question, the defendant Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. Mr.
Lloret explained the purpose of his question by saying:

I wish to demonstrate that he has a pugnacious disposition. I have had occasion to defend him in various
causes for assault.

Upon the question and the objection Judge Barretto ruled that "the character of the witness has an intimate relation
or may have a strong relation with the facts being investigated in the present cause. The objection is overruled."

To that ruling of the court the defendant duly accepted. Said exception is assigned here as the first assignment of
error. The only argument which the appellant presents in support of his assignment of error is that the question had
no relation to the question which was being discussed by the court and id not tend to show that the defendants were
either guilty or not guilty of the crime charged; that questions tending to disclose the character of a witness are
immaterial. In reply to the argument of the appellant, the Attorney-General contends that the question was a proper
question, because it tended to impugn the credibility of the witness and that such questions were for that purpose
material and pertinent. It will be remembered that the complaint charged that on the occasion when the alleged
crime was committed Santiago Mercado was attempting to and did assault and illtreat one Maria R. Mateo. In
answer to said question, the witness admitted that complaint had been presented against him for the offense of
assault and battery.

The prosecution, in order to show the circumstances under which the crime charged here was actually committed,
showed that this witness, Santiago Mercado, had assaulted and illtreated Maria R. Mateo, under the circumstances
described in the complaint. That was an important fact. If the said assault did not actually take place, then the theory
of the prosecution must fail. If there was no assault or attempted assault, there was no occasion for the alleged
interference on the part of the said Claro Mercado to prevent it, and the probability of the guilt of the defendants is
greatly lessened. If the witness who had committed the alleged assault, had assaulted other persons and had been
prosecuted therefor, may that fact be considered by the court in weighing the proof and in testing the credibility of
the witness? It was an important fact to prove that Santiago Mercado, at the time and place mentioned in the
complaint, had assaulted or attempted to assault or illtreat Maria R. Mateo, in order to show that there was occasion
for the inference of Claro Mercado. lawph!1.net

Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by
showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements: or (b) by showing that his general reputation for the truth,
honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted
to show that the witness had made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness, except by showing that he has made
contradictory statements or that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, you
may show by an examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted
of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) In the present case, the other offense to which the question above related
was not a high crime, as that term is generally used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in
section 342, is used in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful
acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies. We believe that the objection to the above question was
properly interposed and should have been sustained. The question now arises, did the admission of the question
prejudice the rights of the defendants? If there was proof enough adduced during the trial of the cause, excluding
the particular proof brought out by this question to show that the defendants are guilty of the crime. then the
question and answer and the ruling of the court upon the same did not affect prejudicially the interests of the
defendants. Errors committed by the trial court, which are not prejudicial to the rights of the parties, should be
disregarded by the court. In our opinion the evidence clearly shows that the witness committed the assault to which
reference is made in the complaint in the present cause. Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a
matter of no importance in the present action. The admission or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such
question related could in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants.

The second and third assignments of error relate to the sufficiency of the proof adduced during the trial of the cause
to show that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged. A question of fact only is raised by these assignments
of error. After a careful examination of the proof, we are convinced that the same shows, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendants are each guilty in the manner and form charged in the complaint. We find no reason for
modifying the conclusions of fact reached by the lower court.
With reference to the fourth assignment of error, an examination of the record shows that but one witness was
examined for the defense: that was the said Santiago Mercado. At the close of the examination of said witness, we
find the following statement by the accused:

The accused state that should they testify they would testify in the same way as the witness Santiago R.
Mercado, with whose testimony they close their evidence.

Both parties close their evidence.

Even admitting that the accused, had they testified, would have made the same declarations as those by the only
witness, Santiago Mercado, we are of the opinion that such declarations would not have been sufficient, inasmuch
as they would have added nothing to the record, except an accumulation of proof, to have shown that the
defendants were not guilty of the crime charged. We find no reason in the fourth assignments of error for modifying
the conclusions of the lower court.

After a careful examination of the record, we are persuaded that the same shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendants were guilty of the crime charged and that the sentence of the lower court should be affirmed, with
costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Carson, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., dissents.
State v. Oswalt
62 Wn.2d 118 (1963)

381 P.2d 617

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. ROY EARL OSWALT, Appellant, DONALD

MICHAEL GILMAN, Defendant.[*]

No. 36462.

The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two.

May 9, 1963.

Irving C. Paul, Jr., for appellant.

Charles O. Carroll and Victor V. Hoff, for respondent.

HAMILTON, J.

Defendant appeals, upon a short record, from a conviction of robbery and first degree burglary.
During trial, a defense of alibi was introduced. Error is assigned to the admission of certain rebuttal
testimony, defendant contending such evidence constituted impeachment on a collateral matter.

The short record before us (testimony of two witnesses) indicates that on July 14, 1961, two armed
men entered the King County residence of Frank L. Goodell. One man stood guard over a number of
people at the home. The other man took Mr. Goodell to a Tradewell store and forced him to open the
safe and turn over the money therein. Defendant was identified as one of the two men.

In presenting his defense of alibi, defendant called a Mr. August Ardiss of Portland, Oregon. On direct
examination Mr. Ardiss testified in substance that: his wife and he operated a restaurant in Portland;
he was acquainted with the defendant, as a fairly regular patron of the restaurant; defendant was in
the restaurant at such times on July 14, 1961, as to render it impossible, as a practical matter, for
defendant to be in Seattle at the time of the offense charged; and he remembered this occasion
because defendant had accompanied a restaurant employee to work, assisted in a part of her work,
and escorted her home.

On cross-examination by the state, the following exchange took place:

*120 "Q. To the best of your knowledge would you say Oswalt had been in every day for the last
couple of months or did he miss occasional periods of three or four days, or what was it? A. No. I
think he was in there every day. I really think he was in there every day. Q. For the last couple
months? A. Yes."

In rebuttal, a police detective was permitted to testify, over defense objections, as follows:

"Q. Did you see and talk to the defendant Mr. Oswalt on June 12, 1961? A. I did. Q. And in what city
did you talk to him? A. In the City of Seattle. Q. And did you during that conversation ask him how
long he had been in this city of Seattle at that time? ... A. I did. Q. And how long did he state he had
been in the City of Seattle? A. He stated he had arrived in Seattle a couple days before I talked to
him. Q. Did he state where he had come from? A. Portland, Oregon."

During colloquy between the trial court and counsel relative to the admissibility of the detective's
testimony, the trial court commented: "There is no claim by Oswalt he wasn't in Seattle, Gilman [a
codefendant] claims that, but Oswalt doesn't."

It is to the rebuttal testimony of the police detective that defendant assigns error. The state, in
response, contends such testimony to be admissible not only because it challenges the credibility of
witness Ardiss, but also establishes defendant's presence in Seattle preparatory to the offense.

[1] It is a well recognized and firmly established rule in this jurisdiction, and elsewhere, that a witness
cannot be impeached upon matters collateral to the principal issues being tried. State v. Myers, 47
Wn. (2d) 840, 290 P. (2d) 253; State v. Fairfax, 42 Wn. (2d) 777, 258 P. (2d) 1212; State v. Gilmore,
42 Wn. (2d) 624, 257 P. (2d) 215; State v. Putzell, 40 Wn. (2d) 174, 242 P. (2d) 180; State v. Kritzer,
21 Wn. (2d) 710, 152 P. (2d) 967; O'Neil v. Crampton, 18 Wn. (2d) 579, 140 P. (2d) 308; Warren v.
Hynes, 4 Wn. (2d) 128, 102 P. (2d) 691; State v. Johnson, 192 Wash. 467, 73 P. (2d) 1342; State v.
Sandros, 186 Wash. 438, 58 P. (2d) 362; State v. Nolon, 129 Wash. 284, 224 Pac. 932; State v.
Carroll, 119 Wash. 623, 206 Pac. 563; State v. Schuman, *121 89 Wash. 9, 153 Pac. 1084; State v.
Stone, 66 Wash. 625, 120 Pac. 76; State v. Carpenter, 32 Wash. 254, 73 Pac. 357.

The purpose of the rule is basically two-fold: (1) avoidance of undue confusion of issues, and (2)
prevention of unfair advantage over a witness unprepared to answer concerning matters unrelated or
remote to the issues at hand. State v. Fairfax, supra; 3 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed.) § 1002, p. 656.

[2] We, in common with other jurisdictions, have stated the test of collateralness to be: Could the fact,
as to which error is predicated, have been shown in evidence for any purpose independently of the
contradiction? State v. Winters, 54 Wn. (2d) 707, 344 P. (2d) 526; State v. Gilmore, supra; State v.
Kritzer, supra; State v. Johnson, supra; State v. Sandros, supra.

We are handicapped by the limited record before us in evaluating the relationship of the contradictory
evidence in question to the general issues presented in the trial.

[3] So far as appears by this record, the sole issue raised by defendant's defense of alibi, through the
direct testimony of witness Ardiss, was whether or not the defendant was or could have been in
Seattle at the time of the offense on July 14, 1961. The defendant did not contend or seek to prove by
this witness that he had not been in Seattle prior to such date. Thus, for purposes of impeaching this
witness, whether the defendant was in Seattle on a given occasion one month prior to July 14th, was
irrelevant and collateral. While a cross-examiner is, within the sound discretion of the trial court,
permitted to inquire into collateral matters testing the credibility of a witness, he does so at the risk of
being concluded by the answers given. State v. Anderson, 46 Wn. (2d) 864, 285 P. (2d) 879.

The state, however, contends that the quoted testimony of Ardiss, as elicited by its cross-
examination, carries with it an inference that defendant could not have been in Seattle sufficiently in
advance of July 14, 1961, to have participated in necessary planning of and preparation for the
offense. Upon the inference so erected, the state asserts the questioned testimony becomes material
and admissible *122 independently of its contradictory nature. The state further supports this
argument by testimony elicited from the police detective to the effect that defendant admitted, in the
interview of June 12, 1961, that he had purchased some adhesive tape.

[4] Admittedly, relevant and probative evidence of preparations by an accused for the commission of
a crime is admissible. State v. Stevenson, 169 Wash. 10, 13 P. (2d) 47. Based upon the limited
record before us, however, the state's argument requires us to speculate that the defendant could not
readily commute between Portland and Seattle, and that his presence in Seattle and acquisition of
adhesive tape, upon an isolated occasion approximately a month before the offense in question,
constituted significant evidence of planning and preparation for the offense in question, the particular
mechanics of which are unrevealed by the record. This we decline to do, absent effort upon the part
of the state to obtain a more complete record. Rules on Appeal 36, 46(3), RCW Vol 0; Palin v.
General Constr. Co., 45 Wn. (2d) 721, 277 P. (2d) 703.

Upon the record before us, we must conclude it was error to admit the questioned testimony.

[5] Having so concluded, we must next determine whether the error was prejudicial. State v. Moore,
35 Wn. (2d) 106, 211 P. (2d) 172.

In State v. Britton, 27 Wn. (2d) 336, 341, 178 P. (2d) 341, we said:

"A harmless error is an error which is trivial, or formal, or merely academic, and was not prejudicial to
the substantial rights of the party assigning it, and in no way affected the final outcome of the case....

"...

"A prejudicial error is an error which affected the final result of the case and was prejudicial to a
substantial right of the party assigning it...."

[6] In the instant case, the state's charge apparently rested upon an identification of the defendant by
witnesses at the scene of the crime. The defense apparently rested upon alibi. The state seemingly
considered the testimony *123 of witness Ardiss sufficiently credible to require this attack. The
defendant was convicted. It is difficult, therefore, to classify admission of the testimony in question
trivial, formal, academic, or harmless, and to conclude that such did not affect the outcome of the
case. The alternative is that it was prejudicial. We so hold.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for new trial.

OTT, C.J., DONWORTH, FINLEY, and HUNTER, JJ., concur.

June 28, 1963. Petition for rehearing denied.

NOTES

[*] Reported in 381 P. (2d) 617.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 92739 August 2, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE BURGOS, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, SIEGFRED
DEDURO y DELFIN alias "Raul Delfin y Zerrudo, Tomas Magtanggol, Vic, Mar". EDWIN LOPEZ DE
OCAMPO alias "Gerardo Santos", ABUNDIO AMANTE alias "Ilyong, Milyo", CYNTHIA AGUIRRE y
DEDURO alias"Myra, Mara, Myla, Mareth, Budec, Lina", FEDERICO GUANZON alias "Alvin, Al, Ben",
THELMA DIANALA GUANZON alias "Alma Arro, Maya", CATALINA PERAS alias "Liling", FR. LEONARDO
SISON y DARUNDAY alias "Rey Martin" and AUXILIUM TOLING OLAYER alias "Ma. Consuelo Valente y
Itchon, Maring",respondents.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

On 2 September 1989, an information for violation of Republic Act No. 1700, as amended,1 was filed against the
nine (9) private respondents by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu. The information recommended no bail on
the ground that the offense charged in said information was non-bailable, the respondents allegedly being leaders of
the Communist Party of the Philippines.

After arraignment, private respondents filed petitions for their temporary liberty on bail pending trial of the criminal
case. There being no opposition from the prosecution to the petition for bail of private respondent Catalina Peras,
who was then in her eighth month of pregnancy, respondent Judge fixed bail for her at P10,000.00. In respect of the
other private respondents, their petitions for bail were opposed by the prosecution.

While the prosecution was still presenting its evidence in support of its opposition to the petitions for bail, respondent
Judge issued an Order dated 5 April 1990 fixing bail at P30,000.00 each for the temporary liberty of five (5) of the
remaining eight (8) private respondents, namely: Cynthia Aguirre, Thelma Guanzon, Edwin Lopez, Abundio Amante
and Fr. Leonardo Sison. The applications for bail of the three (3) other private respondents (Siegfred Deduro,
Auxilium Toling Olayer and Federico Guanzon) were denied on the ground that insofar as these particular
respondents were concerned, the evidence of guilt was strong.

The prosecution opposed the 5 April 1990 Order upon the ground that issuance thereof was premature, considering
that the prosecution was then still in the process of presenting its evidence in support of its opposition to the
applications for bail. Respondent Judge, rather than ruling outright on petitioner's opposition, ordered it to file a
motion for reconsideration in writing. In the same proceeding, respondent Judge disallowed petitioner's request for
its witness, Eulogio Llego, a computer programmer, to print out in open court the material encoded in certain
diskettes seized from private respondents by virtue of a search warrant.

Instead of filing a written motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari questioning: (1)
the Order dated 5 April 1990 granting bail; and (2) the oral order of respondent Judge given in open court during the
hearing on the same date preventing the prosecution from holding an actual demonstration in court by printing out
data from the seized diskettes.

Deliberating on the instant Petition for Certiorari, the Court considers that respondent Judge has committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing his Order dated 5 April 1990.
It was grave abuse on the part of respondent Judge to issue the 5 April 1990 Order. That order, which was issued
while the prosecution was still in the process of presenting other evidence, was clearly premature and deprived the
People of its right to present its evidence relating to the applications for bail. In People v. Dacudao,2 this Court,
citing People v. San Diego,3 held:

The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The
answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant
who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular
trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that
it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If as in the criminal case
involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would
be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void
on that ground. ... (Emphasis supplied).

Moreover, the Order of 5 April 1990 failed to comply with the following requirement set forth in the above-cited case:

The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical.
Hence, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The orders of October
7, 9 and 12, 1968, granting bail to the five defendants are defective in form and substance because they do
not contain a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution. They only contain the court's
conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not strong. Being thus defective in form and substance, the orders
complained of cannot, also on this ground, be allowed to stand. (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the Order dated 5 April 1990 only sets out a conclusion that the evidence of guilt is strong but
does not contain a summary of the evidence presented and considered. The Order states:

After due consideration of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution thru its
witnesses ... , this Court finds reasonable ground to believe that so far, strong evidence exists as against the
three accused Siegfred Deduro alias 'Vic,' alias 'Tomas Magtanggol', alias 'Raul Delfin,' Auxilium Toling
Olayer, alias 'Maria' Consuelo Valente alias 'Choy,' alias 'Choline' and Federico Guanzon.

IN VIEW THEREOF, the petitions for bail are DENIED with respect to the above-named accused. The rest
of the accused are granted bail which is hereby fixed at P30,000.00 each for their provisional release ... .

Being prematurely issued and having failed to include a summary of the evidence presented at the hearing on the
motion for bail, the 5 April 1990 Order must be set aside.

Petitioners also question the order also dated 5 April 1990 given in open court by respondent Judge. Said order
disallowed a prosecution witness from holding an actual demonstration in court by printing out the contents of the
seized diskettes using the very same computer seized from the accused on the ground that they could be
"manipulated." The Order stated:

COURT:

It has been a common knowledge of both prosecution and defense that these diskettes have been in
possession of the prosecution since the start and anything may happen while they are in their
possession, so much so that the witness admitted that the diskettes can be manipulated or altered.

FISCAL MARCOS:

Since they are the exhibits for the prosecution, naturally they are in our possession, just like the
exhibits for the defense. They are in their possession.

COURT:
 To let this witness operate the computer is very dangerous, because the witness said that these
diskettes can be manipulated. So the motion of the prosecution to let this witness have an actual
demonstration before the court on the computer is denied.

In his Comment, respondent Judge reiterated that he did not allow the printing out of the contents of the seized
diskettes because they could be "manipulated" which would be prejudicial to the rights of the accused.

Respondent Judge's insinuation or speculation that the prosecution, considering the fact that it had the diskettes in
its possession prior to the hearing, may have tampered with them appears absolutely baseless and quite unfair to
the prosecution. Such statement had in fact no basis in the evidence before the respondent Judge. There was
neither testimonial evidence nor any physical evidence on the diskettes themselves which might indicate they had
actually been tampered or their contents altered in order to secure the conviction of the accused. Respondent Judge
was in effect charging the prosecution with fabricating evidence against the private respondents, which constitutes
serious misconduct and quite possibly a criminal offense.

The mere fact that the diskettes had been in the possession of the prosecution does not necessarily imply that it had
altered or tampered with the evidence to suit its prosecutorial objectives. Indeed, the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed prevails, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.

We, therefore hold that the printing out of data (if any) encoded in the diskettes should be allowed. Respondent
Judge's asserted apprehension that the witness brought in by the prosecution to undertake the printing out of the
diskettes' contents could himself "manipulate" said diskettes during the actual printing out in court may very easily
relieved by designating a competent person agreeable to both parties, and especially to respondent Judge, who can
perform the task of printing out the contents of the diskettes. Respondent Judge's ostensible lack of confidence in
the prosecution witness should not in any way affect the integrity of the diskettes themselves or the right of the
prosecution to show the contents of the diskettes subject, of course, to applicable rights of the accused.

Moreover, contrary to private respondents' contention that the diskettes themselves should be deemed inadmissible
in evidence because they were not included in the things mentioned in the search warrant, we find that these
diskettes had been sufficiently described in the search warrant. The search warrant states:

You are, therefore, hereby commanded to make immediate search at any time of the day or night of Rm. 31
of the third floor of said building where the persons or suspects above-named are presently occupying and
to seize and to take possession of the following properties used or intended to be used as the means of
committing violation of RA 1700 and/or Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code:

Incendiary or subversive documents, pamphlets; books, computer print-outs and subversive materials, and
computer machine used imprinting seditious or subversive literature. (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "computer machine used in printing seditious or subversive literature" is appropriately regarded as
necessarily including diskettes into which data is encoded and stored, such as those seized in the present case on
the same occasion the computer itself was seized, for indeed a computer system cannot store and print out any
data without diskettes. Technically and realistically speaking, diskettes are deemed integral parts of a computer
system, the diskettes constituting one of the "input-output devices" or "peripherals," in the same manner that the
keyboard is an "input-output device" and the monitor, keyboard and printer are "peripherals" in relation to the
memory or central processing unit (CPU) of a computer system.4

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT the Petition for certiorari and to SET ASIDE and ANNUL the Order
dated 5 April 1990. Respondent Judge is hereby ORDERED forthwith to continue hearing the motions for bail and to
allow the prosecution to finish presenting its evidence. Respondent Judge is also ORDERED to cause the re-arrest
of the five (5) private respondents previously ordered released in the 5 April 1990 Order.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION

FELIPA DELFIN, GINA G.R. No. 146550

MAALAT, SHIRLEY TAMAYO,
RECIO DAOS, and ROBERTO
DELFIN,
Petitioners, Present:
- versus
QUISUMBING, J.,
PRESENTACION D. BILLONES, Chairman,
ROSARIO D. DEMONARCA CARPIO,
(accompanied by husband Pedro CARPIO MORALES,
and Demonarca), WENEFREDO TINGA, JJ.
DEGALA (representing Pedro Degala),
RAMON DELA CRUZ (representing
his deceased wife Maria Daradar dela Cruz),
TERESITA DALIVA DEVIENTE
(daughter of Esperanza Daradar Daliva),
and JOLLY DATAR (representing his Promulgated:
deceased mother Trinidad D. Datar) and
the COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents. March 17, 2006

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This treats of the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision [1] and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54035 entitled Presentacion D. Billones, et al. v. Felipa
Delfin, et al., promulgated on 13 October 2000 and 26 December 2000, respectively, which
reversed the 27 May 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15 of Roxas City.

The antecedents are as follows:

On 29 July 1960, a Deed of Absolute Sale[2] over Lot No. 213, covered by RO-5563
(14516) of the Cadastral Survey of Panitan, Capiz, was executed by Teresa Daos, Esperanza
Daradar, Estrella Daradar and Maria Daradar, with the marital consent of Cipriano Degala,
husband of Teresa Daos, in favor of the spouses Rodolfo Delfin and Felipa Belo (spouses
Delfin). The document, so it appears, bore the signatures of Esperanza and Estrella, as well as
the thumb marks of Teresa, Maria, and Cipriano, and was acknowledged before a notary
public. On 18 November 1980, the spouses Delfin registered the Deed of Absolute Sale with the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Capiz. Thereupon, a new title, Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-17071, was issued in the name of the spouses Delfin.[3]

Meanwhile, on 26 March 1965, an Extra-Judicial Partition and Absolute Deed of

Sale[4] involving Lot No. 3414 then covered by TCT No. T-16804 was made between Teresa
Daos, Trinidad Degala, Leopoldo Degala, Presentacion Degala, Rosario Degala and Pedro

Degala, on one part, and the spouses Delfin, on the other. The deed, bearing either the thumb
marks or the signatures of the sellers, was likewise notarized. Said document was registered by
the spouses Delfin on 24 June 1980. Thus, TCT No. T-16804 covering Lot No. 3414 was
cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-16805, was issued in the names of the spouses Delfin
on 24 June 1980.[5]

The spouses Delfin then consolidated Lots No. 213 and No. 3414 and subdivided the resulting
lot into six (6) smaller lots.[6] Lot No. 1, covered by TCT No. T-19618, was sold to Roberto
Delfin on 21 October 1989; Lot No. 2 covered by TCT No. T-19619 to Recio Daos on 25 April
1985; Lot No. 3 covered by TCT No. T-19620 to Gina Maalat on 14 June 1989, and; Lot No. 4
covered by TCT No. T-19621 to Shirley Tamayo on 11 August 1989. Lot No. 5 remained with
the spouses Delfin, while Lot No. 6 was used as an access road.[7]
On 12 April 1994, herein respondents, claiming to be the heirs of the former owners of Lots No.
213 and No. 3414, filed an action for annulment, reconveyance, recovery of ownership and
possession and damages.[8] According to them, it was only in 1989[9] when they

discovered that Teresa Daos, sick and in dire need of money, was constrained to mortgage the
one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 3414 to the spouses Delfin for P300.00 sometime in
1965.[10] Taking advantage of her condition, the spouses Delfin made her sign a document
purporting to be a mortgage, but which turned out to be an extrajudicial partition with deed of
absolute sale. As to Lot No. 213, respondents averred that the Deed of Sale covering the
property was fictitious and the signatures and thumb marks contained therein were all forged
because three (3) of the signatories therein died before the alleged sale in 1960, namely: Estrella
Daradar, who died in 1934, and Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala, who both died in
1946.[11] As proof thereof, respondents presented certifications [12] on the deaths of Esperanza
Daradar and Cipriano Degala by the Local Civil Registrar of Panitan, Capiz.

To counter respondents arguments, petitioners alleged that respondents action was already
barred by prescription and laches. Further, they argued that the spouses Delfin, as well as the
subsequent owners of the subject properties, are innocent purchasers for value and in good faith,
whose titles to the lots at the time of the purchase were
[13]
all clean and free from liens and encumbrances. The documents

evidencing the conveyance of the properties were personally and unilaterally executed by the
vendors-signatories therein without any intervention from the spouses Delfin, and duly
acknowledged before a notary public, petitioners averred.[14]

Giving credence to the claims of petitioners, the trial court ruled that respondents claim of
ownership over the subject properties was not established by a preponderance of
evidence. Compared to respondents verbal claims of ownership, the spouses Delfin were able to
prove that they bought the properties from the original owners, the trial court added. The trial
court held that the deeds of sale being duly executed notarial and public documents, they enjoy
the presumption of regularity which can only be contradicted by clear and convincing
evidence. In addition, respondents claims based on fraud were barred by prescription, having
been filed more than four (4) years from the time the instruments were registered with the
Register of Deeds, and they are estopped from annulling the documents by reason of laches, the
action having been filed 15 years after the deeds were registered. The trial court also denied
respondents claims for damages.[15]

Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the ruling of the trial
court. In its Decision,[16] the Court of Appeals ruled that while an action for reconveyance based
on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title over the property, such prescriptive period does not apply if the person
claiming to be the owner of the property is in possession thereof, such as respondents in this
case.[17] Moreover, considering that a similar action for reconveyance was filed by respondents
as early as 1989 which was eventually dismissed without prejudice, respondents action to annul
the two (2) deeds on the ground of fraud has not yet prescribed, according to the Court of
Appeals.[18]
The appellate court annulled the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Sale covering Lot No.
3414. The appellate court noted that: (i) Teresa Daos was a very old and sickly woman; (ii) she
and her children lacked formal education to fully comprehend the document to which they
affixed their signatures and/or thumb marks; (iii) P300.00 was inadequate consideration for a lot
consisting of 1,565 square meters even in 1965; (iv) respondents were allowed to remain in the
subject properties; and (v) the questioned document was registered in the name of the spouses
Delfin 15 years after the alleged date of its execution, when most of the alleged vendors have
already died. These circumstances surrounding the execution of the said document show that
the real intention was merely to secure the loan of P300.00. Thus, what took place was in fact,
an equitable mortgage and not a sale.[19]

As for Lot No. 213, the Court of Appeals held that the Deed of Absolute Sale could not have
been executed on 9 July 1960. Relying on the certifications of death presented by respondents,
the Court of Appeals ruled that the defense of due execution cannot prevail over the fact that
two (2) of the signatories therein have already died prior to said date. [20] Roberto Delfin, Recio
Daos, Gina Maalat, and Shirley Tamayo, buyers of the subdivided lot, could not be considered
as purchasers in good faith nor entitled to be protected in their rights because they were
informed by respondents prior to the purchase that they, and not the spouses Delfin, are the real
owners of the lots, the appellate court added.[21]
The Court of Appeals thus ruled:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The

Decision dated May 27, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Capiz,
Branch 15 presided over by Judge Roger B. Patricio is hereby REVERSED and SET
SIDE and a new one entered:

(1) Annulling the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale

dated March 26, 1965 and Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 9, 1960;
(2) Reinstating OCT No. RO-5563 (14516) referring to Lot 213 registered
in the names of Teresa Daos (1/2 portion), and the children of Lucia Daos, namely:
Esperanza Daradar, Estrella Daradar and Maria Daradar (1/2 pro-indiviso) and OCT
No. (4650) RO-5529 referring to Lot 3414 registered in the names of the late spouses
Cipriano Degala and Teresa Daos, and canceling the TCTs issued thereafter;

(3) Ordering plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, to pay defendant

Felipa Belo Delfin the amount of P300.00 within thirty (30) days from the date of
finality of this decision;
(4) Ordering defendants-appellees to free Lots 3414 and 213 from any and
all obligations and encumbrances that may have been attached to both lots and
thereafter to deliver possession of the same to plaintiffs-appellants; and
 (5) Ordering defendants-appellees, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs-
appellants P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and [sic] for attorneys fees
and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses.

Costs against defendants-appellees.

SO ORDERED.[22]

In the present petition for review under Rule 45, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals
erred in finding that respondents retained possession of the subject properties. Moreover,
petitioners posit that respondents allegations of fraud and forgery confine their action to a four
(4)-year prescriptive period which has long expired. Additionally, they argue that respondents
failed to: (i) prove the inadequacy of the selling price of Lot No. 3414; (ii) prove the frail
condition of Teresa Daos; (iii) show that fraud attended the sale of Lot No. 213; (iv) show that
Roberto Delfin, Recio Daos, Gina Maalat and Shirley Tamayo are not purchasers in good faith;
and (v) overcome the presumption of regularity enjoyed by the notarized deeds of
sale. Petitioners also question the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees in favor of
respondents.[23] On the other hand, respondents for the most part merely reiterated the ruling of
the Court of Appeals.[24]

The complete resolution of the issues presented before the Court requires a determination
of facts, which this Court, not being a trier of facts, does not normally exercise in an appeal by
certiorari.[25] This rule, however, is subject to exceptions, such as where the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court are conflicting or contradictory,[26] as in the instant case.

When ones property is registered in anothers name without the formers consent, an
implied trust is created by law in favor of the true owner. [27] Implied trusts are those which,
without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction by operation of law as
matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. Meanwhile,
constructive trusts are created in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust
enrichment. They arise against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or
holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to
hold.[28] An action for reconveyance based upon an implied or constructive trust prescribes in
ten (10) years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title, registration
being constructive notice to all persons.[29] However, an action for reconveyance based on fraud
is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the acts.[30]

In essence, petitioners insist that respondents failed to prove that fraud attended the sale of Lots
No. 213 and No. 3414. The Court agrees.
 A contract or conduct apparently honest and lawful must be treated as such until it is
shown to be otherwise by either positive or circumstantial evidence.[31] A duly executed contract
carries with it the presumption of validity. The party who impugns its regularity has the burden
of proving its simulation.[32] A notarized document is executed to lend truth to the statements
contained therein and to the authenticity of the signatures. Notarized documents enjoy the
presumption of regularity which can be overturned only by clear and convincing evidence.[33]

As plaintiffs in the action before the trial court, respondents have the burden to establish
their case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. Hence, parties who have the burden of
proof must produce such quantum of evidence, with plaintiffs having to rely on the strength of
their own evidence, not on the weakness of the defendants.[34]

As regards Lot No. 3414, respondents specifically alleged that the spouses Delfin tricked
the plaintiffs and their late mother into signing a fictitious and simulated document, and that
TCT No. T-16805 was the product of a fictitious and simulated transaction [that] was obtained
through fraud, the same should be declared null and void.[35]They claimed that the original
owners of Lot No. 3414 did not intend to execute a deed of extra-judicial partition and absolute
sale but only a mortgage instrument. However, all that respondents came out with were
bare allegations that the said owners were either old and sickly or illiterate; that the purported
selling price of P300.00 was unconscionable; and that petitioners failed to eject respondents
from the subject land, as respondents were unable to present any evidence to substantiate their
claims, much less the charge of fraud.

Respondents did not present any witness to testify on the execution of the deed, nor on
the condition of the signatories thereto. At best, their witnesses merely testified as to the
identity of the previous owners of the property. Worse, petitioners Presentacion Degala Billones
and Rosario Degala Demonarca, both signatories to the subject deed, were not presented to
testify on the real circumstances surrounding the assailed transaction. As for the selling price
of P300.00, suffice it to say that respondents did not even present a witness to testify as to its
alleged unconscionability vis-a-vis the prevailing market value of the property at the time of the
sale. Meanwhile, the belated registration of the document with the Register of Deeds can be
explained by the fact that the original of OCT No. 4650 covering Lot No. 3414 was either lost
or destroyed and was reconstituted only in 1971, while the original copy of the deed of sale was
lost by Felipa Delfin.[36]

Even respondents claim of possession of the subject properties has not been sufficiently
proved. This Court has uniformly held that the one who is in actual possession of a piece of
land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the
adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by
one who is in possession.[37] Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as those a party would naturally exercise over his own
property.[38]

Contrary to the appellate courts illation, respondents have not established possession of
the subject properties. Save for the lone testimony of Orlando Buday, a neighbor, that Rosario
Degala Daradar was the only one still residing in the properties in dispute, no other evidence
was presented to show that respondents are in actual occupation and possession thereof. Not
even Rosario herself testified. Doubts also arise as to the veracity of respondents claim of
possession since respondents themselves averred in their complaint that the spouses Delfin had
immediately taken possession of the subject properties in the same year that the sale was made,
and appropriated the produce found in the subject lots from then on. [39] Admissions made in the
complaint are judicial admissions which are binding on the party who made them and cannot be
contradicted[40] absent any showing that it was made through palpable mistake. No amount of
rationalization can offset such admission.[41] By their very own admissions, it can be inferred
that respondents or their predecessors-in-interest did not exercise actual occupancy, as they had
ceased to perform acts of dominion over the property upon the sale thereof.

Fraud may be, and often is, proved by or inferred from circumstances, and the
circumstances proved may in some cases raise a presumption of its existence. However, while
fraud may be proved by circumstances or presumed from them, it cannot be demonstrated by
mere construction, but must be proven in all cases.[42] Respondents indeed failed to prove that
fraud attended the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale. Their
bare and unsupported allegations are not enough to overthrow the presumption of the validity of
said agreement or to raise the presumption of fraud.

Considering that respondents failed to establish the existence of fraud in the spouses
Delfins acquisition of Lot No. 3414, it cannot be said that implied or constructive trust was
created between respondents and the spouses Delfin. The action for reconveyance of Lot No.
3414 must fail. Further, in view of respondents failure to show their valid title to Lot No. 3414
or even their occupation thereof, the case cannot prosper even when it is viewed as one for
quieting of title.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals annulled the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 9 July
1960 covering Lot No. 213 because one of the vendors therein was already dead,[43] relying on
the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar. In assailing this declaration, petitioners
once more point out that the Deed of Sale, being a duly notarized document, should be given
full faith and credit. Also, they argue that the appellate courts conclusion is based on the
disputable presumption that identity of names means identity of persons.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a

public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.[44] Public documents are (i)
the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; (ii)
documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and (iii)
public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.[45] Public documents may be proved by the original copy, an official publication
thereof, or a certified true copy thereof;[46] and when a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of evidence, the attestation by the officer having legal custody of the record
must state that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be.[47] A duly-registered death certificate is considered a public document and the entries
found therein are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce
positive evidence establishing otherwise.[48] Nevertheless, this presumption is disputable and is
satisfactory only if uncontradicted, and may be overcome by other evidence to the contrary.

The documents presented by respondents were mere certifications and not the certified
copies or duly authenticated reproductions of the purported death certificates of Esperanza
Daradar

and Cipriano Degala. They are not the public documents referred to by the Rules of Court, nor
even records of public documents; thus, they do not enjoy the presumption granted by the
Rules. Respondents did not even present the local civil registrar who supposedly issued the
certifications to authenticate and identify the same. Likewise, respondent Jolly Datar who
adverted to the certifications did not testify on how the certifications were obtained, much less
his role therein.[49] As a consequence, the trial court did not admit the certifications as
independent pieces of evidence but merely as part of the testimony of respondent Jolly
Datar.[50] A document or writing which is admitted not as an independent evidence but merely
as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts related
therein.[51] Clearly then, the certifications cannot be given probative value, and their contents
cannot be deemed to constitute proof of the facts therein stated.

More importantly, the very exhibits of respondents dispel the presumption of regularity
of the issuance of the certifications of death relied upon by the Court of Appeals. The
certifications state that both Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala died in 1946 at ages 24
and 63, respectively. However, a careful study of the records of the case shows that in OCT No.
RO 5563 (14516),[52] Esperanza Daradar was already 20 years old in 1929, making her date of
birth to be sometime in 1909. This is totally incongruous with her supposed age of 24 years in
1946, which places the year of her birth in 1922. Likewise, the Court takes note of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31739,[53] wherein the appellate court in its
statement of facts found that Esperanza Daradar died on 10 August 1940, while Estrella Daradar
died on 15 June 1943, contrary to the claim of respondents in this case.[54] The Esperanza
Daradar named in the OCT and the one referred to in the aforesaid Decision could not have
been the same Esperanza Daradar in the Local Civil Registrars certification.

As for the Ciprianos thumb mark on the deed, suffice it to say that his consent was not in
fact needed to perfect the sale. Teresa Daos Degalas share in Lot 213 was paraphernal property
and, under the provisions of the Civil Code applicable at the time of the sale, she could alienate
or dispose of the said property without the permission or consent of her husband.[55] Thus, with
or without such thumb mark, whether it was forged or not, the Deed of Absolute Sale remains
valid and effectual.

Under the circumstances, therefore, respondents were unable to overthrow the presumption of
validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Said deed, as well as the titles derived as a result thereof
must be accorded respect and must remain undisturbed.

Anent the charge of bad faith on the part of petitioners, the Court takes note of respondents
statement in their Plaintiff-Appellants Brief,[56] to wit:

From the facts and circumstances of this case, Lot 213 and 3414 both of Panitan
Cadastre which were consolidated, into one single lot, per consolidated plan as
appearing at the back of TCT No. T-17071, and after the two lots were consolidated,
and the same was subdivided, into six smaller lots, Lots 1, 4 and 5 thereof still
remained in the names of appellees spouses Rodolfo Delfin and Felipa Belo, while
Lots 2 and 3 thereof were transferred by the said spouses appellees to Recio Daos and
Gina Maalat, respectively. These two transferees are innocent purchasers for value
which appellants admit, and this appeal is only an appeal by appellants against
defendant-appellees spouses Rodolfo Delfin and Felipa Belo, and not against Recio
Daos and Gina Maalat.[57] (Emphasis supplied.)

In effect, contrary to the testimony of respondents witness Myrna Degala-Distura that her
mother warned petitioners against buying the subject lots,[58] respondents admitted that the only
persons they consider to be not innocent purchasers are the spouses Delfin. However, in view of
respondents failure to prove the fraud attributed to the spouses Delfin, the Court has no choice
but to declare all petitioners to be purchasers for value and in good faith.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13
October 2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
dated 27 May 1996 is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

A document or writing which is admitted not as independent evidence but merely as part of the testimony of a witness does not
constitute proof of the facts related therein.

Identification of documentary evidence, formal offer

Identification- made in the course of the trial

Evidence identified and marked as exhibits may be withdrawn before formal offer.

Formal offer- when proponent rests its case

Where objection may be made