Verification/Certification Against Forum Shopping

Vicar International Construction, Inc., et al vs. FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation
G.R. No. 157195 April 22, 2005
(Case No. 9)

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and
set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals against herein petitioners.
These complaints stemmed from loans obtained from FEB Leasing by Vicar, a corporation engaged in
construction business, for the purchase of certain heavy equipment. For the total loan of around P30 Million, Vicar
claims to have paid FEB an aggregate amount of P19 Million in monthly installments.
Nonetheless, FEB maintains that Vicar still had an outstanding balance of P22 Million, despite the
extrajudicial foreclosure of petitioners subdivision lots in Laguna, which in the auction sale produced P17 Million, in
which Vicar claims should have been applied to its outstanding loan balance.
In the course of the replevin case, the trial court issued several orders pertaining to the possession and
custody of eight (8) units of subject heavy equipment in favor of FEB. Vicar’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the trial court. Hence, Vicar filed a petition for certiorari (Rule 65) before the Court of Appeals to stop the
implementation of the writ of replevin issued against the eight units of equipment.
The petition was however, dismissed by the Court of Appeals because the Verification and Certification
Against Forum Shopping, executed by petitioner Carmelita V. Lim, without attaching thereto the Board Resolution
as well as the Corporate Secretary’s certification authorizing her to sign for and in behalf of petitioner-corporation.
The day after receiving the Court of Appeals resolution dismissing the said petition, Vicar filed an Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and for Admission of the Secretary’s Certificate. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals
still denied the Omnibus Motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in summarily dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure of the
petitioner Carmelita V. Lim, in behalf of Vicar Corporation, to attach the board resolution and Secretary’s certificate
in their petition before the Court of Appeals, authorizing her to file said petition.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in summarily dismissing the petition.

Citing several cases excusing non-compliance with the requirement of certificate of non-forum shopping,
the court held that with more reason should the instant petition be allowed since petitioner did submit a certification
on non-forum shopping failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. The Supreme Court
further states that the subsequent submission of the Secretary’s certificate authorizing petitioner Carmelita V. Lim
to file the action on behalf of the corporation, mitigated the oversight.
Moreover, while the requirement as to certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless, it must
not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-
shopping.
Finally, the court stresses once more that technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not to
frustrate justice. Rules of Procedures are but tools designed to facilitate, not to obstruct the attainment of justice.
Hence, the petition was granted.
 Docket Fees

Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., et al vs. Hon. Maximiano C. Asuncion, Presiding Judge, Br. 104, RTC, Q.C.
G.R. No. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
(Case No. 43)

Facts:

On March 28, 1984, private respondent Manuel Tiong filed a complaint in the RTC of Quezon City fro
refund of premiums and the issuance of writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd., et al. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and
liquidated damages, Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and cost of the suit.
In the body of the complaint, the total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. However,
in the prayer, the amount of damages asked was not stated. The amount of only P210 was paid for the docket fee.
On June 23, 1986, the private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer, it asked to be
awarded to no less than P10 million, as actual and exemplary damages, but in the body of the complaint, the
amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44 million. Said amended complaint was nevertheless admitted
and private respondent was reassessed additional docket fee of P39 thousand based on his prayer of not less than
P10 Million.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint altering an additional claim of P20
Million in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64 Million. Private respondent paid an additional
docket fee of P80 thousand. Again, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid and additional docket fee of P62
thousand. Hence, private respondent appears to have paid a total of P182 thousand of docket fees based on his
claim of P64 Million.
Petitioner (Sun Insurance) insist that the payments of docket fees made by private respondent was
insufficient , prompting it to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order of the RTC admitting the amended and
supplementary complaints without payments of the proper docket fees, hence, it should likewise be dismissed for
failure to acquire jurisdiction over the complaint.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss the complaint and grant the writ
of preliminary attachment. Hence, the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether a court acquires jurisdiction over a case, where the correct or proper docket fees has not been
paid.

Ruling:

The court ruled that, citing the ruling in Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals:

“The court acquires jurisdiction over any case upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the
payment of the docket fees based on the amounts sought for in the amended pleading.”

In the said Manchester case, the court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
because the petitioner did not pay the additional docket fees until the case was decided by the Supreme Court.
Hence, there was intent to defraud the government of the payment of docket fees.
In the present case, the court applied a more liberal interpretation of the rules considering that, unlike
Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket
fees as required by the order of the trial court. Hence, the petition was dismissed.
 Amendment to the Complaint

Pedro Paeste, et al vs. Rustico Jaurigue

G.R. No. L-5711 December 29, 1953
(Case No. 77)

Facts:

Pedro Paeste and Felix Carpio brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province against
Jaurigue for the annulment of two documents, alleging that Felix Carpio and his son Maximo Carpio had been
compelled to sign through force, intimidation, and against their will.
On motion of the defendant, the court dismissed the case on the grounds that plaintiff’s action had already
prescribed, citing Article 1391 of the New Civil Code which provides: “An action for nullity in cases of intimidation or
duress must be brought within 4 years from the date the cause of action accrued.”
Plaintiffs asked for reconsideration and filed an amended complaint alleging that since the execution of the
two deeds, the defendant, with aid of armed men, has continuously committed and employed threat, intimidation,
and duress against plaintiffs and with warning to the latter not to bring this incident and matter to the proper
authorities under pain of death. But the court denied reconsideration and disallowed the amended complaint
whereupon plaintiffs brought the case to the Supreme Court by way of appeal.

Issues:

Whether the lower court erred in: 1) not admitting their amended complaint; and 2) in holding that their
action had already prescribed.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court erred on both issues.
The Rules of Court provides: “a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course, that is, without
leave of court, at any time before a responsive pleading.” As plaintiff amended their complaint before it was
answered, the motion to admit the amendment should not have been denied. It is true that the amendment was
presented after the original complaint had been ordered dismissed. But that order was not yet final for it was still
under reconsideration. Amendments to pleadings are favored and should be liberally construed in the furtherance
of justice.
As to the question of prescription, it is evident that the plaintiffs executed the documents in question
through force and intimidation, that defendant had been threatening plaintiffs with death if they took the matter to
the authorities and that these threats lasted until the filing of the action, plaintiff’s action does not appear to have
prescribed, for in these cases, prescription does not begin to run until the party affected is perfectly free to go to
court as he wishes.
 Venue of Action

Polytrade Corporation vs. Victoriano Blanco

G.R. No. L-27033 October 31, 1969
(Case No. 111)

Facts:

Plaintiff Polytrade Corporation has its principal office and place of business in Makati City. Defendant
Victoriano Blanco has its place of business and a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
The suit is an action for recovery of the purchase price of rawhide delivered by the plaintiff corporation to
defendant. The suit was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. In their contract for the delivery and
payment of the rawhides, the parties agreed that in the event of any breach of the terms of the contract by either of
the parties, any suit may be filed in the City of Manila.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground of improper venue. He claimed that by
contract, suit may only be lodged in the Courts of Manila. The Bulacan Court overruled him. Defendant did not file
his answer to the complaint. As a consequence, default judgment was rendered against him. The defendant
appealed.

Issue:

Whether venue of action was properly laid in the Province of Bulacan, the where defendant resides.

Ruling:

Section, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions, provides that such actions may be
commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff
or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Further, section 3 (now section 4) of the same rule, states that venue may be stipulated by written
agreement-“By written agreement of the parties, the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one
province to another.” Such agreement must be made before filing the action.
In the case at bar, the defendant contends that, because of their agreement, he can only be sued in the
courts of Manila. The court did not agree with the defendant.
Based on their agreement, the parties merely stipulated that they agree to sue and be sued in Manila. Such
agreement did not stipulate that Manila Courts is the exclusive venue for the action. They merely consented to be
sued in Manila, hence, it does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of the plaintiff or defendant.
Hence, the court held that venue was properly laid in the court of Bulacan.
 Cause of Action

Paranaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al

G.R. No. 111538 February 26, 1997
(Case No. 145)

Facts:

Plaintiff is a private corporation with principal place of business at Paranaque City, while defendant Catalina
L. Santos, is a resident of USA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact. Defendant David Raymundo is a resident of
Makati City. Defendant Catalina L. Santos is the owner of eight (8) parcels of land located in Paranaque City.
Plaintiff corporation is the lessee of said parcels of land owned by the defendant. Terms of their lease contract
provides that in case the properties subject of lease agreement are sold or encumbered, Lessee shall have the first
option or priority to buy the properties from the Lessor.
Defendant Santos sold the eight parcels of land subject of the lease to defendant David Raymundo for a
consideration of P5 Million. The said sale was in contravention of the contract of lease, for the first option or priority
to buy was not offered by the defendant Santos to the plaintiff. Upon learning of this fact, plaintiff wrote a letter to
defendant Santos, requesting her to rectify the error and consequently realizing the error, she had it reconveyed to
her for the same consideration of P5 Million.
Subsequently, the property was offered for sale to the plaintiff for P15 Million, and given ten (10) days to
make good of the offer. Before the period given to buy the property expired, plaintiff, through a letter, make a
counter offer to buy the same for P5 Million. Before defendant replied to the counter offer, another deed of sale
was executed by defendant Santos in favor of defendant Raymundo for a consideration of P9 Million. Defendant
Santos violated again the term of the contract of lease, for the first option to buy the property by the lessee. Two
days after she sold the properties, defendant Santos replied to the letter of the plaintiff’s offer to buy. In her reply,
she stated among others that the period has elapsed and the plaintiff is not privy to the contract, and informed the
plaintiff that the new owner now of the property is defendant David Raymundo.
Plaintiff demanded from the defendants to rectify their unlawful acts that they committed, but defendants
refused and failed to comply with the demand, prompting the plaintiff to institute an action against the defendants.

Instead of filing their respective answers, respondents filed motions to dismiss anchored on the grounds of
lack of cause of action, estoppel and laches. The trial court, in conformity with the defendants, dismissed the
complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
ruling of the trial court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

Whether the complaint alleging breach of contractual right of first option or priority to buy states a valid
cause of action.

Ruling:

The court ruled in the affirmative.

A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: 1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; 2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect or
not violate such right; and 3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant violative of the right of plaintiff, for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. Under the Lease Agreement between the parties,
plaintiff was granted the right of first option to purchase the leased properties in case defendant Santos decided to
sell them. Santos sold said properties to Raymundo without first offering the same to petitioner. Based on that act
of defendant Santos, it clearly revealed that she violated the right of petitioner of first option to buy the property,
which right the defendant had the obligation respect.
Hence, the petition was granted and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.
 Pre-Trial

Bartolome Macaraeg, et al vs. Court of Appeals, et al

G.R. No. L-48008 January 20, 1989
(Case No. 179)

Facts:

A case for the fixing rentals was filed by private respondents against the petitioners alleging, among others,
that spouses Rapada (private respondents) have been the duly constituted tenants of the petitioners for more than
twenty (20) years over a land situated in Ramos, Tarlac with an area of 1.5 hectares; that despite the insistent
demands of spouses Rapada for a system of tenancy to govern their relationship with the petitioners, the latter
refused to do so inspite of the fact that the subject property has been declared a land reform area.
The petitioners, in their answer, stated that the spouses Rapada are not their tenants; that the spouses,
relying on the provisions of General Order No. 34 entered said landholding without the knowledge and consent of
the petitioners.
At the pre-trial of the CAR Case conducted by the Clerk of Court a quo, an order was issued delimiting the
facts and issues of the present case as agreed upon by the contending parties, with the assistance of their
respective counsels. Issues to be resolve, among others, during the pre-trial to wit:

1) Fixing of rentals;
2) Damages on both parties.

Parties agreed that at present the plaintiffs (now private defendants) are in possession and cultivation of
the aid landholding in question; that the plaintiffs (tenants) shouldered all the expenses for production.

The Agrarian court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents declaring them as tenants; fixing
the lease rental; ordering the defendants to reimburse the plaintiffs (tenants) of the excess of rental paid by the
latter for the crop year 1972-1973; and Dismissing all other claims for damages for lack of sufficient evidence to
support same.
On appeal, the respondent Court affirmed in toto the agrarian court’s judgment. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the parties are bound by the stipulations at the pre-trial stage.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners are bound by the stipulations and the delimitations of the
issues during the pre-trial because they themselves agreed to the same.
Petitioners agreed that private respondents shall shoulder the expenses of cultivation of the subject
landholding, and now comes to this court to dispute the existence of the tenancy relationship between them and
the private respondents. At the pre-trial of the case, the issue of the existence of tenancy relationship was never
raised by the petitioners as among the specific issues to be resolved. Hence, the petition was dismissed.
 Attorney’s Fees

Pedro Mirasol vs. Hon. Rafael Dela Cruz (Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, et al
G.R. No. L-32552 July 31, 1978
(Case No. 213)

Facts:

Petitioner Pedro Mirasol instituted an action for Forcible Entry against private respondent Dominador
Mendoza. In his answer, private respondent interposed a Counterclaim alleging 1) the prior existence of a tenancy
contract between him and petitioner, and 2) that the complaint was filed purely for harassment. Private respondent
that the complaint be dismissed; that plaintiff be ordered to pay moral damages; to declare the existence of lease-
hold relations; and for such other relief and remedy as the court may deemed just and equitable in the premises.
The trial court dismissed the complaint with cost against the plaintiff, likewise it dismissed the counterclaim
for insufficient proof. On appeal to the Court of First Instance by the petitioner, the respondent judge, on the
ground that the issue involved is purely an agrarian matter, dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction and
awarded an Attorney’s fees in favor of the defendant in the amount of not less than P500.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review seeking to
modify that part of the judgment rendered by the respondent court, awarding the defendant attorney’s fees in the
amount of P500, for being unreasonable and lack of factual basis. Defendant insist that the award of attorney’s
fees is in order, pointing out that it may be given as moral damages, it is specifically claimed in his Counterclaim
and his answer incorporated a general prayer for relief.

Issue:

Whether the award of attorney’s fees of P500 is reasonable, has factual basis and can be awarded as
moral damages.

Ruling:

No. The court is not persuaded by the private respondent’s contention.

The rule on award of attorney’s fees is found in Art. 2208 of the new Civil Code which provides:

Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
cannot be recovered, except:
1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;
3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s valid and
demandable claim;
6) In action for legal support;
7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers, and skilled workers;
8) In actions fro indemnity under women’s compensation and employer’s liability laws;
9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered;

In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
Art. 2208 clearly intended to retain the award of attorney’s fees as the exception in our law, as the general
rule remains that attorney’s fees are not recoverable in the absence of a stipulation thereto, the reason being that it
is not sound policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. Private respondent fails to note that attorney’s fees are
recoverable only in the concept of actual damages and not as moral damages as he contends. The allegation of
private respondent that the complaint filed by the petitioner was clearly unfounded and filed purely for purposes of
harassment, was not properly substantiated by concrete proof at the trial, entitling him to the award of attorney’s
fees. Likewise, private respondent insist that he had incorporated in his Answer a general prayer for “such other
relief and remedy as this court may deem just and equitable.” The court found this conclusion erroneous. What is
just and equitable in a given case is not a mere matter of feeling but of demonstration of facts and law.
 Petition for Certiorari/Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal/Non-Forum Shopping

Noel Y. Repol vs. Commission on Elections, et al

G.R. No. 161418 April 28, 2004
(Case # 247)

Facts:

Repol and private respondent Violeto Ceracas were candidates for Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar
in the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 16, 2001, Cerecas was proclaimed as the elected Mayor with 66 votes
more than Repol.
Repol filed an election protest before the RTC of Taranguan, Samar, claiming fraud and irregularities
marred the elections. The court dismissed the protest. On certiorari, the COMELEC Fisrt Division reversed the
dismissal order of the trial court, being issued with abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The COMELEC First Division directed the trial court to reinstate the subject election protest, conduct the revisions
of ballots from the protested precincts, and render its decision with immediate dispatch. The COMELEC en banc
denied Ceracas’ motion to reconsider the COMELEC First Division’s resolution and affirmed in toto the
reinstatement of Repol’s election protest. After trial and revision of the ballots, the trial court declared Ceracas’
proclamation void and proclaimed Repol as the duly elected Mayor.
Repol filed before the trial court a motion for execution of judgment pending appeal. The trial court granted
Repol’s motion and issued a writ of execution. Meanwhile, Ceracas appealed the trial court’s judgment to the
COMELEC.
Repol took his oath as the duly elected Mayor. Ceracas filed before the trial court an omnibus Motion to
reconsider, set aside and quash the writ of execution.
During the pendency of his appeal with the COMELEC, and without waiting for the trial court to resolve his
omnibus motion, Ceracas filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari (with prayer for temporary restraining
order, writ of preliminary injunction and/or status quo ante) assailing the writ of execution.
The COMELEC First Division issued the assailed order directing the parties to maintain the status quo
ante, and ordered Repol to cease and desist from assuming the duties and functions of Municipal Mayor of
Pagsanghan, Samar until further orders from the Commission. In the meantime, Ceracas shall assume the post of
Municipal Mayor.
Repol then file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the order of the COMELEC First
Divison.

Issues:

1. Whether the COMELEC First Division acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the status quo ante
order, which indefinitely suspended and effectively nullified the trial courts writ of execution.

2. Whether an interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC First Division may be challenged by way of
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, without filing first a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC
en banc.

3. Whether private respondent Ceracas is guilty of forum shopping.

Rulings:

1. On the first issue, the COMELEC First Division has the discretionary authority to grant preliminary
injunction, and while such injunction is pending, said division may grant a temporary restraining order to be
effective only for a period of 20 days, while the injunction is being resolve. After 20 days had lapsed without the
injunction having been resolve, such temporary restraining order is deemed automatically vacated, or when such
preliminary injunction is denied, Hence, the issuance of status quo ante is proper since the court treated the same
as temporary restraining order.
 However, the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the trial court’s
order granting execution pending appeal. In the case of Edgar Y. Santos vs. COMELEC First Division, et al, the
ruled:
“Between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates won the elections and the finding of the Board
of Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the courts decision that should prevail. This was sufficiently explained in the case
of Ramas vs. COMELEC in this wise:
All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the immediate
execution should be based upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. The rationale is to give as much recognition to
the worth of a trial judge’s decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers.
To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would, in the words, of Tobon Oy vs. COMELEC,
bring back the ghost of the grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in
the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This would, as a consequence, lay to waste the will of the
electorate.”

2. As to the second issue, the Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or
even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC. Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides: “Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved
by the Commission en banc, except motions on interlocutory orders of the division, which shall be resolved
by the division itself who issued the order.” As gleaned from the foregoing Rules of Procedures of the
COMELEC, not even the COMELEC en banc may resolve interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division which is
exclusively confined to the latter.

3. As to the third issue, the court ruled that Ceracas is clearly guilty of forum-shopping when he filed a
petition for Certiorari before the COMELEC First Division, assailing the order of execution pending appeal by the
trial court, during the pendency of his appeal with COMELEC and while his Omnibus Motion was not yet resolved
by the trial court. Due this clear showing of forum shopping, the COMELEC First Division should have dismiss
outright instead of giving due course to Ceracas’ Petition for Certiorari with prayer for writ preliminary injunction
and status quo ante.
 Execution of Judgment/Foreclosure of Mortgaged Property

St. Dominic Corporation vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court, et al

G.R. No. 70623 June 30, 1987
(Case No. 281)

Facts:

This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the respondent appellate court in a civil case entitled
‘Francisco B. Bustamante, et al vs. Hon. Ricardo P. Tensuan, et al,” which set aside the order of the then CFi of
Rizal.
On February 1968, a civil case was filed seeking the cancellation of TCT in the name of the spouses Carlos
Robes and Adalia Francisco, covering a lot in Malaya Subdivision, People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC). It appears that sometime in 1961, the PHHC awarded the property in question to one Cristobal Santiago,
Jr., in whose favour a final deed of sale was executed and a TCT was issued.
Subsequently, the Robes spouses mortgaged the realty to the Manufacturer’s Bank and Trust Company.
Claiming legal interest in the property, spouses Flaviano and Francisca Bustamante were allowed to intervene in
the said civil case.
For failure of the Robes spouses to pay the mortgage obligation, the Manufacturer’s bank foreclosed the lot
and caused the same to be sold at public auction. The property was purchased by one Aurora Francisco in whose
favour a certificate of sale was issued. No redemption of said property was effected. Thus, the TCT of spouses
Robes were cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the name of aurora Francisco. The notice of lis pendens on
the title of the Robes spouses, however, was not carried over to the new TCT issued in favor of the buyer Aurora
Francisco.
On September 1976, Aurora Francisco sold the property to petitioner, St. Dominic Corporation. As a
consequence, a new TCT was issued to petitioner corporation. Before the said sale, Aurora Francisco applied for a
writ of possession before the CFi of Rizal, the latter issued the same.
Meanwhile, a decision was promulgated in the civil case declaring: 1) null and void the sale of PHHC to
defendant Cristobal Santiago, Jr., 2) declaring null and void the sale of said lot bu Cristobal Santiago, Jr. to
spouses Adalia Francisco, and 3) directing PHHC to process the application to purchase said subject lot filed by
intervenor Francisco Bustamante and caused to execute the requisite documents for the award of said lot to him.
When the judgment became final, spouses Bustamante applied for a writ of execution to the CFI of Rizal.
Judge Tensuan issued an order granting the application for a writ of execution with the qualification, however, that
said writ may not be enforced and/or implemented as against St. Dominic Corporation.
The spouses Bustamante moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court effectively amended a final and
executory judgment in qualifying the writ of execution, which excluding St. Dominic Corporation. Judge Tensuan
denied the motion. Bustamante spouses then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Intermediate
Appellate Court, questioning the order of the CFi exempting petitioner corporation from the enforcement of the trial
court’s judgment and denying reconsideration reconsideration.
The Intermediate Appellate Court rendered judgment, granting the certiorari and mandamus and ordered
respondent Judge Tensuan to cause the issuance of a writ of execution in strict conformity with the dispositive
portion of the final and executory judgment. Petitioner corporation and Aurora Francisco filed their respective
motion for reconsideration but denied by the Intermediate Appellate Court.
Hence, this petition to review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the court, in exempting from execution one not a party to the case nor privy to the interest of the
parties therein, from the effects of its pronouncement, may considered as amending the dispositive portion of its
final and executor judgment.

Ruling:

No. In its ruling, the court states that indeed, a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action. It is
elementary that strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court an such judgment Is not
available as an adjudication either against or in favour of such other person. A decision of a court will not operate
to divest the rights of a person who has not and has never been a party to a litigation, either as a plaintiff or
defendant. Verily, execution of judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action , and not
against one who, not being a party in the case, has not yet had his day in court.
 Collateral Attack to a Judgment

Ceferina Ramos, et al vs. Anatolio C. Manalac, et al

G.R. No. L-2610 June 16, 1951
(Case No. 315)

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan placing one Felipe Lopez in possession of two (2) parcels of land claimed to belong to petiotioners,
and of the decision ordering the foreclosure of the mortgage executed on said property to satisfy the payment of an
obligation.
On August 1933 Ceferina, Victoriano, Leonardo, Vicenta, Isabina, Gregoria, Jose and Geronimo, all
surnamed Ramos, executed a power of attorney in favour of their brother Eladio Ramos, giving the latter authority
to encumber, mortgage and transfer in favour of any person a parcel of land situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan.
By virtue of the said power of attorney, Eladio Ramos executed in favour of one Romualdo Rivera a mortgage on
the aforesaid property, together with another parcel of land, to guarantee the payment of a loan of 300 with
interest. Eladio failed to pay the obligation on its date of maturity. Romulado Rivera, the mortgagee, filed an action
to foreclose the mortgage, making as parties-defendants the herein petitioners, brothers and sisters of Eladio
Ramos.
The court rendered its decision ordering Eladio Ramos to pay to the plaintiff his obligation of 300, with
interest thereon at the rate of 12 percent per annum, plus the sum of 100 as attorneys fees, and ordering the
foreclosure of the mortgage upon failure of Eladio Ramos to pay the judgment within the ninety (90) days from the
date decision becomes final. Eladio Ramos failed to pay the judgment within the period therein specified. On
motion of the plaintiff Romualdo Rivera, the court ordered the sale at public auction of the mortgaged properties,
which were sold to plaintiff as the highest bidder. The Provincial Sheriff issued the corresponding deed of sale in
his favor.
Romualdo Rivera then sold the subject properties to Felipa Lopez, who later filed a motion praying that she
be placed in possession thereof. The motion was granted. However, petitioners did not heed the order. They were
then summoned by the court to explain why they should not be punished for contempt for their refusal to comply
with the writ of possession. Petitioners fiied their answer contending that said writ partakes of the nature of an
action an as it was issued after more than five years, the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, and that the sale
conducted by the sheriff was illegal because they were not properly served with summons as defendants in the
foreclosure suit. The explanation, having been found to be unsatisfactory, the court insisted in its order and
threatened to punish petitioners for contempt of court if they failed to obey the order. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether the decision of the lower court ordering the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties executed by
Eladio Ramos, valid.
2. Whether the order of the court directing the issuance of a writ of possession to place respondent Felipa
Lopez in possession of the properties purchased by her from the mortgage.

Ruling:

1. As regards the first issue, the court ruled that the claim of the petitioners can not be sustained for the
reason that it is in the nature of a collateral attack of a judgment which on its face is valid and regular and has
become final long ago. It is a welk-known rule that a judgment, which on its face is valid and regular, can only be
attacked in a separate action brought principally for that purpose. Granting for the sake if argument that petitioners
were not properly served with summons, the defect in the service was cured when they voluntarily appeard and
answered the complaint thru their attorney of record, who appeared in their behalf in all stages of the proceedings.
Hence, the foreclosure proceedings was valid.
 2. As to the second issue, the same was not also taken for the simple reason that the issuance of a writ of
possession in a foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of judgment within the purview of Sec. 6, Rule 39, of
the Rules of Court, but is merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the court can undertake even after the
lapse of five (5) years, provided the statute of limitations and the rights of third persons have not intervened in the
meantime. The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a decree in a foreclosure suit, the court has
the power to give possession to the purchaser, and the latter will not be driven to an action at law to obtain
possession.
 Quasi in Rem/Quasi in Personam

Roman Mabanag v. Joseph M. Gallemore

G.R. No. L-825 July 20, 1948
(Case No. 21 ProvRem)

Facts:

The purpose of the action is to recover P735.18, an amount said to have been paid by the plaintiff to the
defendant for two parcels of land whose sale was afterward annnuled. The defendant is said to be residing in Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A.. He has no Property in the Philippines except an alleged debt owing him by a resident
of the municipality of Occidental Misamis. This debt, upon petition of the plaintiff, after the filing of the complaint
and before suit was dismissed, was attached to the extent of plaintiff’s claim for the payment of which the action
was brought. But the attachment was dissolved in the same order dismissing the case. The trial court’s dismissal
was based on its finding that the action was one in personam hence, has no authority nor jurisdiction to render
judgment against herein defendant, Joseph M. Gallemore for being a non-resident.

Issue:

Whether the action was one in personam or in rem.

Ruling:

The court ruled that the action was one in rem.

As a general rule, when the defendant is not residing and is not found in the Philippines, the Philippine
courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person, unless
he voluntarily appears in court. But, when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff residing in the
Philippines, or is intended to seize or dispose of any property, real or personal, of the defendant, located in the
Philippines, it may be validly tried by the Philippine courts, for then, they have jurisdiction over the res, i.e., the
personal status of the plaintiff or the property of the defendant, and their jurisdiction over the person of the non-
resident defendant is not essential (Section 2, Rule 5, of the Rules of Court). Venue in such cases my be laid in the
province where plaintiff whose personal status is in question resides, or where the property of the defendant or a
part thereof involved in the litigation is located.
In the case at bar, the court has acquired jurisdiction of the case by virtue of the attachment of the
defendants credit. Though no jurisdiction is obtained over the debtor’s person, the case may proceed to judgment
if there is property in the custody of the court that can be applied to its satisfaction.